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NEWSLETTER/NUUSBRIEF

1972 No. 2

DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT
VAN
INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE

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S.A.I.I.A. NEWSLETTER/NUUSBRIEF

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"THE PASSING YEARS"

by

Sir Nicholas Cayzer, Bt.

I was born into the Edwardian era; admittedly I just made it by a month or two, but that year - 1910 - which not only saw the beginning of a new reign, that of King George V, but also the advent of a new country, the Union of South Africa, somehow stands out like an historical watershed.

I have used the title "The Passing Years" because, as I look back over my life, it seems that in this precise period of time the world has seen more change than in any corresponding period of history. I wish to have a look back over the tracks we have made, not through any sentimental attachment to the past, but rather to establish where we are now and where we are likely to go in the Seventies. I do not suppose we can really know what we are until we have seen what we have been.

If my vantage point in viewing this changing scene is England, I think it is none the worse for that, as England over that period has been at the centre of things for most of the time; and, as England has been affected by change, so the ripples have fanned out and especially had impact on those countries that once formed her great Empire.

There is in Britain today, and I believe also in other European countries, a tremendous curiosity, especially among the young, about the world that existed before 1914. Someone who was actually alive then becomes an object of rather special scrutiny, almost of envy. I think one can be forgiven for looking back with nostalgia to the years before the 1914 war, to a life so utterly different from that of today.

Life in England was then not unlike what it had been for centuries; the cities and countryside had not yet been spoiled by the mass advent of the motor car and the aeroplane. Skyscrapers had not yet come to spoil the skyline of our cities; and the villages, unmarred by the jerry-builder, still retained the charm and atmosphere of a bygone day. Life moved at a slower and more even tempo. There was not the mass media of communication which so disturbs our life and nerves today; and, although the critic would have found plenty to remark on and condemn, nevertheless life in England for many people was in a considerable measure gay and untroubled. We were at peace with the world and we took pride in our far-flung Empire, and perhaps a special pride in the Royal Navy - quite appropriate I think, as our fortunes were built up on sea power and communications. Even in the early part of the twentieth century the Pax Britannica still meant something, and the White Ensign was known and respected in all quarters of the globe.

No wonder as a small boy I wore a sailor suit, and in those days all the nice girls loved a sailor - or so I believed.

The first world war shattered the peace and the way of life we had known for close on a century. There had of course been confrontations and limited wars, mostly far away, as for instance here in South Africa the Anglo-

Boer conflict, but none of these involved the whole British nation, and life in Britain went on much as usual. 1914 changed all this, and for the first time in its history the world began to understand what total war was all about. The countries that comprised the British Empire rallied to the mother country, and for four bloody years life and treasure were poured out in the defence of country and Empire.

In looking back, one cannot but see that this war was a complete tragedy, and a quite unnecessary tragedy, for this was a war that ought never to have been fought; it not only destroyed millions of lives but it destroyed much of the quality of life itself as European civilisation had developed it. Life henceforth became cheap, and one cannot help reflecting that Europe, with all its advantages of experience and civilisation, must have been smitten with a kind of self-immolating madness in 1914. The first world war changed the map of Europe. Large chunks of land were lopped off one country and given to another. New countries, as has happened before, were created with very little regard to ethnic differences. The seeds of a new war germinated at the Peace Conference, and by the withdrawal of the United States into isolation at the very time when her influence was most needed, much was lost.

America emerged from the war as a new super power, and a red star was rising in the East which would cast its baleful glow far and wide in the years that lay ahead.

The inter-war years were years of great economic stress in the world. In Europe unemployment was rife, and neither statesmen nor politicians had the least idea how to tackle the problem. The Empire which centred around Great Britain showed signs of stress, and Mahatma Gandhi, who spent part of his early years in South Africa, came to the fore as the exponent of civil disobedience and of Indian independence. It was a time of enquiry and heart-searching for Great Britain. No one can say that the inter-war years were happy ones. They could be described as the years of drift. Certainly in England our statesmanship seemed at a low ebb. Perhaps too many of our real leaders had fallen in the war. We experimented for the first time with a Labour Government and found that, in spite of all their boasts and promises of better times if they came to power, when in fact they did, the economic gloom grew even deeper. They had no answer to mass unemployment, and were clearly at sea when it came to economics. It seemed that politicians of any persuasion were paralysed by the problems that confronted them. People were beginning to get desperate, not only in my country but also in Europe, and the climate was ripe for anyone who could hold out hope of work.

Thus, in this stagnant state, the scum floated to the surface, and two men caught the imagination of the people of Germany and Italy. They were evil men, but in the course of achieving their aims they brought, at a price, law and order and a measure of prosperity to their countries; and so the world looked on and opinion varied. In England it was clear to a few where the rearming was going to lead, but those in power, and to be fair the mass of the population, wanted peace and were quite unwilling to face up to the facts. In many cases words were a substitution for action. With resolution and a minimum of force, the second world war could have been prevented if the threat had been taken in time.

3.

The slide into yet another war makes sickening reading, and as usual we were inadequately prepared. This time it took six long years to knock Germany and her allies out. Once more countries changed hands, Russia helping herself to a large part of Europe, and two super powers, America and Russia, dominated the scene, opposing in each other two entirely different political systems, the free societies of the West and the Communist system of the East.

From now on the changes in the world had become obvious, changes that set the scene for the drama that we, our children and grandchildren will have to live through. It must be kept in mind that in the power struggle of the past quarter of a century one side maintains the democratic freedoms, which means that public opinion has always to be taken into account, where there is no bar to the free expression of even the most crazy and sometimes dangerous ideas. On the other side is the dictatorship of rigid controls in economics as in communication, where public opinion is of little or no account, where people may not even pass freely in and out of their own countries.

You may feel that one side in this struggle has a distinct advantage, and so it has. It can direct its economy in the way best suited to its aims. Guns can come before butter if it so wishes. It can direct propaganda towards the democracies, and besides has many willing or misguided hands to help it in its task. No word of criticism of the Communist countries is likely to be published in their own papers.

With the end of the Second World War the dismemberment of the British Empire began. The shattering of the British Empire was the end of a conception of a dream that might have brought peace and progress to millions of people, but the eruption of two world wars and the advent of strong national tendencies put paid to this dream. India was the first to go, and as the pace quickened many countries in Africa were given their independence, together with a Constitution which in all cases was quickly discarded in favour of one vote one party, thus frustrating those who were naive enough to believe that, left to themselves, the African countries would embrace the Westminster example.

Pressure from the new members of the Commonwealth, and a lack of support from at least one of the original members, left South Africa little option but to withdraw from the Club, which her Prime Minister did with great dignity at the Commonwealth Conference in 1961. The new independent countries of Africa did not automatically look to their late mother countries, such as Britain and France, for advice and economic assistance, though they were not unwilling to receive assistance provided there were no strings.

The departure of Britain and France from their world responsibilities left a great gap, and it did not require much imagination to know who would fill it. As we retreated from our Empire, so the French were pushed out of the Far East, and the Dutch out of Indonesia.

Suez was a turning point. It gave Russia one of the greatest opportunities in her history - something that she had dreamed about for centuries - the opportunity to acquire warm water ports. Without firing a shot she was

able to establish her ships, with friendly help, in the Mediterranean and later in the Red Sea. Had we stood up to Nasser when the British Army was still in Egypt, we should have had no trouble from America or anyone else. Nothing succeeds like success. We could have been in Cairo in a few hours from our Canal bases, and the opposition would have been negligible. Despite the political and timing mistakes we made in the actual Suez affair, had we possessed a fit and determined national leader, we could almost certainly have persevered for another twenty-four hours and presented a fait accompli which would have altered history. India has recently done just that.

Our political and economic troubles in that area I believe stem from that time. For Russia it was a great victory. But besides Egypt there seemed plenty of other countries ready to accommodate Russia in return for military or other aid, and some countries even seemed to take a nefarious joy in turning away from old friend and partners.

The leaders that came to the fore in the countries that had gained their independence were a strange assortment, and some of them quite unpredictable in their actions. Some of these leaders were quite ready to co-operate with the Russians and to give them useful strategic footholds in return for economic or military aid of one sort or another.

Russia's avowed aim is world domination, and we would do well never to forget this. Communism makes some odd bed-fellows. It is able to exploit ignorance, appeal to idealism, and finds many adherents in strange places. The disciples have seldom visited Russia and seem quite uncritical of a regime that cannot, at any stretch of the imagination, be called free. Communism thrives on poverty and dissension. She is quite ready to exploit the political and economic frailty of the developing countries, and those particularly who have recently achieved their independence. For them diplomacy is another form of espionage that comes in useful, and the mass departure of Embassy staff from London is a case in point - in my view if we turned them out, they must really have been on the job.

The shape that Russian infiltration may take will be varied, but as a shipowner I am very alive and concerned at the form it is taking in regard to shipping. Using their fast growing mercantile marine as a strategic weapon, they are quite ready to cut freight rates to a level that is quite unacceptable to free enterprise countries. Those who ship their goods by sea are not necessarily politically orientated and therefore not unwilling to use the cheapest form of transport, in spite of the fact that short term advantage may have to be paid for later on, if the Russian incursion is too successful. I should explain that in any authoritarian regime, provided foreign disbursements can be paid for out of earnings, the national cost need not be taken into account and can be debited, if you like, to defence expenditure. This is not true in a free enterprise country where capital has to be found without help from the state, and the service of such, together with all other disbursements, provided out of revenue. Thus this is how Russia is well on the way to establishing her ships on the trade routes of the world to our disadvantage. Nor, as a shipowner, can I overlook the defence of our merchant shipping.

We have seen how Russia tried to interrupt communications between West Berlin and Europe and how we only overcame this challenge by an airlift of remarkable competence and improvisation. With the Suez Canal closed - but even if it were open - with the Russian presence in that area in such strength, the Cape route is the only safe way for us and our NATO allies to reach by sea the countries to the South and East of us. Most of the oil we use comes via the Cape route, besides much of the food we eat, and the sinews of our industry. We therefore have a great interest to see that that part of the ocean is not dominated by Russian warships, and that their movements are carefully watched. This policing of a vital trade link is a long and laborious task, and I feel we cannot expect South Africa to bear the whole burden.

The British Labour Government denied arms to South Africa on ideological grounds, as indeed they did to Spain. I hope that our present Government will realistically sum up the strategic situation and not allow ideological differences to prevent a British vital interest from being looked after, although I appreciate how difficult it is for your Government to commit itself to purchase from Great Britain such arms as air reconnaissance planes and corvettes, and to risk a reversal of policy on this question should the Labour Opposition win the next General Election.

I must stress here that the arms that South Africa wishes to purchase from abroad are for external defence: they can easily produce all the arms they might need for internal security.

I have mentioned Russia and the opportunities of her processing her proclaimed aim of world domination, but another potentially great power is gaining strength and purpose. China is now a member of the United Nations and will, I believe, become a world power to be reckoned with. Meanwhile she is following Russia's example of infiltrating wherever she sees opportunity. Zambia and Tanzania have become bases from which Chinese Communism can operate. They have trained and armed the Africans of these countries in the tactics of terrorism. Further, they are financing and building the rail link from Dar es Salaam to the Copper Belt. The presence of these trained troops is a threat to South Africa and Rhodesia, which I am quite sure they can cope with, but the black African countries are slowly beginning to realise that it could be a threat to them. The hand of China is clearly discernable in Vietnam, and America's difficulties in maintaining a presence there reflect what I have said of the difference between democracy and dictatorship.

It is too early to assess the significance of the moral support that Russia has given to India on the one hand, and China to Bangladesh and what was West Pakistan on the other, but clearly both these countries are taking up positions in those countries in pursuance of their over-all world aspirations.

Japan must not be overlooked, and seems to be turning away from the United States. Will she remain a peaceful nation or turn her growing economic power to implementing other ambitions?

These are some of the imponderables.

As I have said, we have in more than a quarter of a century since World War II, learned to live with the familiar face, though ever-changing mask, of international Communism peering in at the windows of our Western democracies. And, as always, the price of our freedom is eternal vigilance. We do well never to forget the Communist threat. At the same time it would be unintelligent and intellectually slothful not to see beyond that particular problem, not to recognise other pressing dangers to our advanced Western societies, the dangers that come from within and concern their very nature, and their continuing ability to influence international politics.

It is a fact in the international field that one detects their worrying symptoms, most glaringly perhaps in the American involvement in Vietnam where we have seen a kind of failure of nerve on the part of the Americans, brought about by an intense national introspection. I sometimes think that Vietnam has brought the whole American nation to the psychiatrist's couch. Britain has no Vietnam to act as a catalyst, but she, too, and all the Western countries, are in this process of self-questioning in an effort to find something to believe in to restore their faith in themselves.

The British, of course, have a problem peculiar to themselves; this has to do with what I started out from, the fact that the Empire that existed in 1910 is no longer there, and we no longer have the resources we once enjoyed. The adjustments we have to make in our new circumstances are going on all the time and not all are painless. Our efforts to find a new identity in Europe as a member of its economic community may provide a new outlet for British energy and idealism. It remains to be seen. It also remains to be seen if entry into Europe, and all that that entails psychologically for Britain, will do something to dissipate the growing restlessness and discontent, the contempt for established institutions and conventional wisdom, which is so noticeable among our young people who accept, though seemingly resent, being affluent and privileged in comparison with previous generations of young people. In the 1950's I remember how the young people went on demonstration marches to Aldermarston, the nuclear power centre, because they feared the world's populations were going to be wiped out by nuclear war. But twenty years later, with a nuclear world war becomingly increasingly remote, the younger generation express views aghast at the dangers of excessive population, the fear that Britain may have an incredible population of 66 million people by the end of the century.

The existence of so many paradoxes in the problems affecting our Western societies and their ability to play a meaningful role in international affairs makes their solution more baffling. Let me try to state them briefly as I see them.

Because we live in a democracy where we have long believed the freedom of the individual to be more important than the State, we have allowed the fantastic technological and scientific advances of the last half century to proceed without any kind of interference or effort to control their

harmful influence on the shape and form of our society. Now in the 1970's has come the realisation that some form of control, planning, direction, is inevitable if we are to avoid chaos. We shall have to accept a growing interference by the State in our lives in the interests of survival, and yet our heritage and instinct utterly reject such restraint on our individual freedom to choose.

Let me give a practical example of the kind of dilemma now facing Britain, and which typifies the strains of our Western industrial societies. In the closing years of the 1960's profits from British industry fell by some 20 per cent, and, if British industry could not immediately make itself more efficient, the economy was seriously threatened, foreign debt would continue to be unpaid, and we would have had difficulty in maintaining the high standards of our social services. In the past two years or so British industry has become, and continues to become, more efficient, and great progress has been made in strengthening the country economically. But this very process of increasing efficiency has entailed laying off redundant workers, and Britain, at a time of growing prosperity, has a million people out of work.

The point is that the application of advanced technology, in the interest of industrial efficiency, may mean in future not only shorter working hours for most, but perhaps no work at all for some. This poses an enormous social problem, because it means educating people for leisure. In addition, one has to remember this: in 1911 only 6.8 per cent of Britain's population were of retirement age; today 10 million, or 16 per cent, are over retirement age, and this percentage is reckoned to go on rising until 1981 before stabilising. A way has therefore to be found of providing useful activity for so many people who might be otherwise idle. Failure to do so could lead to terrible frustrations in our free societies.

Again, Western countries continue to believe that they must grow economically all the time; otherwise they feel something is wrong. One needs to grow to maintain the civilised social and educational standards of the population; but growth comes from increased industrial efficiency, and this may mean the employment of fewer people. Also involved in this growth concept are the problems of pollution and the excessive use of resources. The uncertainties and doubts which many young people today, particularly in the Universities, have about our Western societies, are in the circumstances understandable, and, if we are to cure their frustrations which have sometimes led to senseless violence, or the taking up of extreme political views, we shall have to solve these internal problems. Herein lie dangers for our free societies, which the controlled Communist world does its best to exploit.

It seems to me, therefore, that we have a major creative task on our hands, one in which our various institutions will have to work together, perhaps in multiple groups, co-ordinated by Government and including commerce and industry, as well as the Church and Universities, the popular

media and the professions. Only in this controlled way can the advanced technological societies of the Western world survive. As I have noted earlier, this task may entail a diminution in the sovereignty of the individual, and for people with our history and our instincts this may involve a high degree of adaptation and discipline. It is a question of finding a balance, and it has happened before, as I am reminded by one of our historians whom I much admire, Sir Arthur Bryant. In his Book "MAKERS OF THE REALM", he wrote of our English forebears: "Loving private liberty, yet finding it could not exist without public order, the English devoted themselves to making the two compatible. Freedom within a framework of discipline became their ideal. They achieved it through the sovereignty of law." I believe this is our aim in 1972 under Elizabeth II, as it was in 1572 under Elizabeth I.

As a means to this end we must also give a lot of thought to how we bring up our young. Each generation one hopes will be an improvement on the one before. It is a fact that the great strides that have been made in the technological field have not been matched with a more mature outlook on life. Most people are emotionally backward and react to situations emotionally rather than intellectually. I believe there is a great deal of further study needed in regard to human behaviour.

I have tried to indicate some of the internal strains which afflict in varying degree our highly developed Western democratic societies and which we must solve if we are to secure their safety, not only from a hostile Communist world, but from the violence we might inflict upon ourselves from within.

I believe that your country usually catches our troubles just when we are about to get over them and to become infected with a new crop. I would like to suggest to you today that here in South Africa you have a wonderful opportunity. South Africa is of course a developed and an under-developed country at one and the same time. You have a highly evolved industrial/technological society which will have to face in due course the same strains as ours in the West, but with your special problems in addition, those which come from having your dependent peoples in your midst, and the problems of finding out what form their independence and decolonisation should take. But you still have time.

South Africa has vast natural resources; it has for its size a small and very varied population. It has not yet reached the stage of other industrialised countries which I have referred to, of creating social problems through unregulated economic growth, the problems also of excessive population, dwindling natural resources, and industrial pollution. I know there is already an awareness in South Africa of these Western ills, and some of their signs are already visible, but you still have time to tackle them.

Since this is basically a problem of humanity as a whole adapting itself to its environment, you have here in South Africa a way of associating in a common human task each of the different communities here -

White, Cape Coloured, African, and Indian. All of these - White, Black or Brown - are involved in this problem of finding a way of living in an advanced technological age. If you can tackle this problem together on an inter-community basis for the common good, you may well find that the things that divide you racially or culturally will assume a lesser importance, and you may find a unity in the common task of tackling, simply as people, the kind of environmental problems that we in Britain or America are already having to cope with. Willy-nilly, worker and employer, of whatever class or race, will have to collaborate in the interest of their joint survival in our industrial/technological world, becoming ever more complicated.

Finally I would like to say this:

I first visited South Africa forty years ago, and during these passing years have witnessed great changes in your country for which, I need hardly say, I have always had a great affection. The qualities of character on which South Africa was built were those of the Victorian era. In that period of history, not only in South Africa, but in my country, our people were hard-working, thrifty and frugal; they believed in self-help; and they had a tremendous moral sense.

If I have now come full circle back to 1910 where I started, it is only to say at the end that, though the externals in 1972 are greatly different, there still seems to be room in tackling today's problems for some of those character-traits which distinguished the world of my youth, both in your country and in mine. We need feel no shame in taking the best from the past to help us cope with the future. In fact, it was one of your great sons, Paul Kruger, who enjoined us so to do.

Sir Nicholas Cayzer is Chairman of the British and Commonwealth Shipping Co. and of other Companies, including Cayzer, Irvine S.A. Ltd. He has been a member of the Council of the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom since 1947, and was President of the Chamber in 1959.

The above address by Sir Nicholas Cayzer was given at a meeting of the Cape Town Branch of the Institute on 7 March, 1972.

POSSIBILITIES OF COOPERATION IN AFRICA

by

Professor J.H. Coetzee

It would be quite superfluous to have a lengthy discussion on the desirability and necessity of intra-African cooperation. On our continent the situation closely approaches the much emphasised twentieth century ecumenical ideas with their political expression in the United Nations Organisation, socially manifested in the concept of the great society and theologically institutionalised in the World Council of Churches. More regionally, and in African idiom, their expression is observed in the Organisation for African Unity, in various political and economic bloc formations (Casablanca, OCAM, East African Economic Community, etc.), a series of all-African or regional African conferences, the All African Church Conference and many more.

These institutions, organisations and conferences serve in the first instance to express an idea, a desire for unity, for belonging and for security. Although some concrete objectives have been attained, it still remains an open question whether the saying that the wish is father to the thought does not apply to most of them. Real intra-African cooperation has not yet scored any impressive successes, not even in those fields where the African nations are most vociferous.

This situation offers a rather strong temptation to confine the discussion of the subject to an analysis of intra-African cooperation as such, viewed as a process of uniting forces in various fields for attaining a common goal. As a compromise I shall allow myself only a few personal views on the general situation, and afterwards focus attention on the possibilities of cooperative action between the Republic of South Africa and the rest of Africa.

Intra-African Cooperation

Without indulging in exaggeration, it is possible to state that since World War II Africa has experienced a passionate craving for unity and combined action. It constituted an integral part of the desire of the African peoples for political independence and self-determination. All the relevant, mostly psychological, ingredients were present to bring the urge to boiling point: the common fate of being colonised and subjected peoples, the common desire towards national independence, the existence of a common opposition in the form of the colonial masters and hence a common need for power, for allies, and for acceptance in the wide world of self-governing nations.

This new venture was articulated as Pan-Africanism. In some extremist quarters it was formulated as the goal of one Africa, one state, one leader. From the most extreme onesidedness down to far more moderate expectations, most of the ideas and schemes within this framework foundered on the hard rocks of African diversity in almost every field of life - religion, culture, ethnic awareness, history, race, etc. -

intensified by the emotions guarding the newly found independence and separate nationhood.

Any reference or appeal to a tradition of intra-African cooperation or unity prior to the advent of the "destructive forces" of the colonial period is founded on a myth. African history reveals this remarkable fact that almost any worthwhile large scale regional cooperative effort on the continent before the era of the European scramble originated, was initiated and carried out by external forces.

African peoples lived in relative isolation. War was a far more potent factor of contact than peaceful projects. History gives the lie, partly at least, to the dogmatic view and evaluation of colonialism as a purely dividing force. Any realistic analysis of colonial policy and practice brings to light a credit as well as a debit side. I do not maintain that the two were in balance. Who is able to evaluate the acts of history? The relevant fact is this: European colonisation was, irrespective of all else, an important factor of regional cooperation at least. It did function as a unifying force. And although one should be careful not to overstress or over-evaluate the colonial merits, the achievements as far as unity and combination of potential are concerned, are observable, vide India, Nigeria and other post-tribal states.

Although some of these colonial creations have been proved by later events to be largely artificial, superficial and of short duration, the presence of a measure of post-colonial unity and combination of efforts cannot be denied.

So far the concepts 'cooperation' and 'unity' have deliberately been used interchangeably. It seems to be one of the cardinal problems in African thought - although not peculiar to Africans - and hence one of the obstacles on their way to progress, that African nations obviously have not reached clarity on the difference between these concepts. They tend to lay remarkable accent on unity, only to discover to their own dismay, that this approach is in potentially dangerous conflict with their national sovereignty. No allowance is made for elasticity of action or for difference of approach between various nations. This attitude is partly reflected in the tendency to one-party political systems. Hence unity acquires an artificial and mechanistic character.

A philosophy of this nature deals only in opposing absolutes, black and white, right and wrong, and leaves no room for acting in accordance with reality and its shades of grey. When the implications of unity are applied to their own situation, a sharp appeal is made to the uniqueness of the national interests, circumstances and problems. But when looking outwards the eye does not meet the existence of over-all diversity. In their political thinking, problems and policies are framed in terms of either/or, not of and/and.

I submit that this represents a generalisation of the African situation. Of course the different nuances and grades of this tendency have to be taken into regard. For instance, the French speaking African states

seem to be less prone to follow this direction and are furthest advanced on the road of cooperative enterprise. The Arabic nations show an obsession for unity and cooperation but in reality on a very narrow ledge and a very negative one at that. Their mutual cooperation reaches as far as they can find or imagine a common danger or foe; for the rest they are usually pitched against one another.

South Africa and Africa

In the wake of these general and admittedly largely subjective ramifications, I hope to come to the real subject, and to discuss some possibilities of cooperative action between South Africa and the Africa which has been outlined above. The preceding image might have the function of providing the decor for better understanding the problems pervading all efforts to cooperate.

Cooperation between the Republic and other parts of Africa does not pose a new question. Forms of institutionalised cooperation existed before and after World War II, for example the C.C.T.A. This situation existed more or less till the sixties. The admittedly rather limited cases of cooperative enterprise, largely of an ad hoc nature, were undertaken and executed on the initiative of the then existing colonial administrations who gradually became aware of the necessity and the possibilities of combined action. It mainly applied to technical and professional fields. Economic aid was expected to come from the colonial power in question.

The year 1960 was a watershed. The sixties formed the decade of pressurised and high tempo liberation of African nations, including the Republic of South Africa. The parental colonial hands were withdrawn. The newly created situation was no less in need than the pre-independence situation, of mutual intra-African sharing of energies and potentials all along the line of national existence. On the contrary, if viewed in the light of both external as well as internal circumstances, both the desirability and necessity substantially increased. For one thing the political aims and the extended arms of the USSR, followed by those of Red China, and the direct absence of the ex-masters, Britain, France and Belgium, stressed the greater urgency for the closing of the ranks of the ex-colonial territories, were they to prevent themselves from falling from the saucepan of western imperialism into the fire of socialist domination.

Simultaneously the internal conditions of the new states, their desire for development, for modernisation, their need of aid in the form of capital investment, better infrastructure, technical experts, professionals in all fields, experienced manpower in the civil service, etc., etc., demanded the greatest amount of cooperation with whomsoever was in a position to provide those means. Without exception all the newly independent countries were in the same predicament - they could anticipate no assistance from their immediate neighbours.

Theoretically a wide field of possibilities was opened to South Africa

as the only exception to the rule. She was the most developed country on the continent and able in part to tender her resources for the benefit of African countries. The defects of this statement should be conspicuous. The needs of the more or less two score independent countries by far exceeded the limited resources of the Republic. Even when limited to the five nearest countries, South Africa was unable to provide for all their needs. In Madagascar last year I had to warn against the overstrained expectations of Malagasy ministers and officials, regarding aid from South Africa, more than once. They had to be brought to realise South Africa's need of capital for its own development projects, its limited manpower, its vast and exacting commitments on its own doorsteps, concerning its backward hinterlands and the Bantu homelands. The peculiarity of the situation, however, was that the possibilities of cooperation, as far as South Africa was able to meet the demands, dwindled, and were eventually lost to her. Why? If co-operation was possible and feasible prior to 1960, why has it not been so since that year?

An analysis of the phenomenon exposes a very complex web of causation. The favourable outlook was wrecked on the rocks of unfriendly attitudes. Like all revolutions, the African revolution was engendered and took place in an atmosphere of reaction and strong emotion. A tense feeling of opposition existed between the liberated colonies and the ex-colonialist masters. South Africa was intimately associated with the colonial powers, except that she was not regarded as an ex-colonialist.

The situation was aggravated, and the attitude of African leaders intensified, by the knowledge that South Africa is part of Africa, and white South Africans are not expatriates. In addition, South Africa's population consists of a majority of African peoples amidst and under the political authority of a white minority akin to the Africans' previous European masters. Briefly, the obstacle then was articulated as South Africa's racial policy or policy of racialism. This started a real ideological war, figuratively as well as literally.

The importance of this situation as an obstacle to otherwise beneficial cooperation necessitates some broader discussion of the rationalised rather than rational policy. As an aftermath of a political upheaval of great historic importance, the presence of a very strong irrational and emotional element, forged into an ideology, is quite understandable. Let us try to reach some clarity on this issue. The black African peoples, in the first place, cherish a strong desire for attaining nationhood and having accorded to them human dignity equal to that of other peoples and individuals. It is a well-known phenomenon that people newly escaped from an inferior position in life are prone to an attitude of over-sensitivity as regards their newly acquired status and dignity. In addition, nationalism, more so an aggressive and militant nationalism, formed a potent element in the dependence and post-dependence era. A vehement anti-colonialism constituted a further conspicuous component of the general atmosphere. While listening to a Ghanaian guide in one of the old coastal fortresses used in the slave trade, and observing the emotion in his voice when recounting the treatment meted out to those

unfortunate members of his people, I caught a glimpse of the deep-seated and all-pervading strain in the mind of a West African at least. During discussion at a Conference which I attended in Ghana, I experienced the same sensation and observed the endlessly recurring symptoms of the syndrome of the colonial past coupled to the history of slavery, even when obviously irrelevant to the subject discussed. The thought struck me that in a rational approach to the problem of overpopulation, the fact of compulsory export of people could hardly be employed as a valid argument or as a causative factor of the existing problem.

Another relevant point is the inconsistency towards the question of national self-determination. On the one hand, an aggressive demand is maintained for self-determination of the black peoples in South Africa. On the other hand the African states cling affectionately to the colonial inheritance of national boundaries which were artificial in so far as they ignored the ethnic composition of the populations concerned. This setup stands in direct contradiction to the stand they take on national independence. In most of these states different peoples are forced into one political entity and kept there against their wishes. At the same time a single people is divided between two and even four states. Africa has already witnessed the dire results of this situation - identical to the colonialist sin of divide and rule - in the Biafra tragedy, the civil wars in the Sudan and Chad, the Eritrean rebellion in Ethiopia, the unrest in Kenya, the eruptions in Uganda and the strains in the politics of Zambia, Ghana, Zaire and Zanzibar. The dramatised outcry against minority rule in the south in more than one case only serves the function of a manoeuvre to draw attention from their own internal setup. Ethiopia, as also several other countries, has never made any effort to introduce a system of democratic majority rule. And as far as minorities are concerned, the question is relevant whether the denial of their ethnic aspirations can be justified. Or should we conclude that the only form of political injustice is presented by political authority of whites over blacks, but not of whites over whites or blacks over other blacks?

To judge this in its right perspective it should be compared with the aims of the South African policy, namely to enable, to lead, and to aid the several African peoples to reach a position of self-determination and national independence. So far this aspect of South Africa's policy has received appreciation neither from the ranks of the African peoples, nor from their friends and allies. According to President Nixon's declaration of his country's foreign policy affecting Africa, as well as Mr. Bush's statement before the United Nations Security Council meeting in Addis Ababa, even the United States has not yet reached clarity on this point. Their point of departure is the situation in their own countries: a multi-ethnic and poli-cultural state. It has not dawned on the Americans yet that the crucial difference between the States and South Africa lies in the fact that the former houses immigrant ethnic portions, as against the existence of peoples in the latter.

We should, however, avoid the pitfall of onesidedness in which so many of the above mentioned nations have fallen. Guilt and error are rarely

confined to one party exclusively. There is one aspect we have to consider from the South African corner. We must find and recognise the factor distorting the image of our policy of national self-determination for the Bantu peoples and confusing the issue for outsiders and even for insiders. I wish to submit this as an explanation. It is very clear that the African peoples are primarily concerned with the recognition of the human dignity and personal human equality of the people of their race and that they should be treated accordingly. Their approach to the so-called policy of apartheid stumbles on the belief that this fundamental right is denied to coloured people. The sooner South Africa becomes conscious of and acknowledges this point of view, the better. I do not plead for or even suggest a revolutionary change of the status quo. We are on this plane primarily concerned with human attitudes, rather than with institutions and law. We should move in that direction, but it will prove to be no easy task. Attitudes and traditions forged through three centuries, and on good and justifiable premises, are not to be discarded and disentangled in one decade. The more revolutionary the means employed, the stronger will be the resistance engendered. But whatever the changes envisaged, this situation of partial understanding of motives and objectives causes the main short circuit in all the bona fide efforts on both sides to communicate and to cooperate properly. These clashing images of the policies on both sides finally reduced the possibilities for cooperation by South Africa with other African countries, during the late fifties and the early sixties, to almost nil. Africa closed its doors to South Africa leaving scarcely a slit, except for some rare personal and church contacts. The late sixties saw the commencement of a detente in the relations and a change to the good.

In general, the heat of anti-colonialism cooled down a few degrees. A rational view of internal political, social, and economic needs, brought a larger amount of moderation. Some African leaders were growing aware of the threat entailed by Soviet and Chinese ambitions and strategic aims centering on this continent. South Africa's treatment of its immediate independent black neighbours might also have contributed towards convincing those further afield that the Republic's intentions were not quite as evil as assumed. Apart from countries such as Lesotho and Malawi and, to a lesser degree, Swaziland and Botswana, the French speaking countries disclosed a more friendly attitude and reached out for dialogue as a means of reaching a solution to the problems of Southern Africa, and of improving intra-African relations. It is no secret that even some of those crying out against South Africa in public, are on the quiet seeking increasing and expanding trading opportunities, or are making use of the technical and professional aid available.

This brings to the fore the question of the possibilities of South African cooperation with Africa under the existing conditions and in the hope of improving relations. Evidence of what can be achieved in the way of cooperative action, where an attitude of good neighbourliness exists unhampered by ideological scruples, is provided by South Africa's dealings with Rhodesia, the Portuguese territories and Malawi. Madagascar is also moving into this sphere of mutual aid. In the case of Rhodesia especially, the cooperation was, although largely unilateral,

at least comprehensive, ranging from trade, throughout the period of international embargoes, to police assistance against terrorist intrusion. Rhodesia represents a case of an independent African state divorced from its ex-colonial bonds and the priorities usually allowed to the mother country. She fully availed herself of the amenities placed at her disposal by her southern neighbour. South Africa maintained normal diplomatic and economic relations with Rhodesia and abstained from interfering in Rhodesia's internal as well as foreign affairs.

As far as mutual trade and economic relations with the neighbouring Portuguese territories are concerned, a particular hampering factor lurks in the built-in limitation suggested in the name 'Portuguese territories'. It is self evident that the metropole keeps to a policy of first priority for Portuguese interests both in the form of investment, exports and imports, and of other economic liabilities and benefits. This, however, does not bar South Africa from all possibilities and avenues of commercial and other transactions with Mozambique and Angola. The most striking evidence is provided by the Cabora Bassa project. The production of hydro-electric power, for which the Angolan and Mozambique rivers are excellently suited, offers a field of still incompletely explored cooperative scope to the mutual benefit of all parties concerned.

Similar principles apply to the provision of that extremely scarce South African commodity, water. The ever growing need for water as an indispensable component of South Africa's expanding industries, coupled to the increasing demand for cheap electric power, provides a favourable field for combined efforts between the Republic and her immediate neighbours. The Oxbow project, in cooperation with Lesotho, provides another relevant example. It seems probable that South Africa, Angola, and Botswana could profitably join forces in a grandiose water scheme tapping the sources of the Kunene, Okavango and adjoining rivers.

In the agricultural field, with special reference to food production, South Africa, due to its growing industrial population, will in addition to escalating its own production of meat, vegetables, etc., including that of the Bantu homelands, be forced to look to external sources of supply in the not very far future. The Portuguese territories with their sparsely populated areas and favourable climatic conditions, Malawi and even Madagascar seem to be natural reservoirs of vegetables out of season, other tropical and semi-tropical agricultural products and meat. This, however, demands a timely output of South African know-how for the modernisation of agricultural undertakings in these countries, too. Development in this sphere creates a market for agricultural machinery, farm implements, fertilisers, materials for pest control, as well as a need for development of new methods, provision of veterinary services, etc. Communications and the extension of the present rudimentary infrastructures provide another field of possible and profitable cooperation. Southern Africa, like Africa in general, is shedding the relative isolation of its past. Means of communication and systems of infrastructure are less and less limited by national boundaries. Rhodesia called on a South African commission for advice on

a new railway line. Lusaka is to be connected with Botswana by means of a new highway. If relations improve, the western parts of South Africa could make good use of this road, too. The South African great northern road essentially forms part of a system combining the Republic, Rhodesia, Mozambique and Malawi. South African construction companies are working on rail and road projects in Malawi. With her engineering know-how, equipment and experience, the Republic could perhaps lend a helping hand to solve Madagascar's serious need of more and better roads, an exacting and truly expensive venture owing to the island's peculiar topography.

In general the same applies to airlines. A dovetailing of regional and countrywide air services of the various Southern African countries, for whom larger enterprises might be too exacting, with South African overseas lines, obviously belongs to the area of economic desirability and possibility. Direct railway connections with Swaziland and the eventual gearing of part of Botswana to the envisaged Sishen-Saldanha project are possibilities, if not for the immediate, then at least for a not too distant future.

It is quite impossible to attempt to draw up a resumé of all the possibilities of cooperative enterprise. The above mentioned cases should serve to exemplify what I have in mind. Attention should also be focused on the possibilities of cooperative exploitation of the tourist field. Efforts are afoot already to develop a system of inter-country package tours.

Two further points have to be made. The goal envisaged when speaking on this subject is not limited to the benefits South Africa could derive, or to the promotion of economic interests concerned. In a politically divided world, where the ultimate goal of a socialist world revolution should not for a moment be left out of consideration, the maximum degree of cooperation amongst African, and particularly southern African, countries is essential. USSR and Red Chinese strategy and goals concerning Africa are clear. Their presence on the continent and in the seas surrounding it, primarily in the Indian Ocean and in the Mediterranean, but not without importance in the Atlantic, comprises far more than normal diplomatic and commercial interests. A policy of good neighbourliness towards other African nations as far to the north as possible, is a question of her very existence for the Republic. The more extensive the sphere of peace, the better and safer. Equally for the sake of Africa and her newly liberated peoples, mutual cooperation which includes the Republic as an African country, along the whole spectrum of national existence, including the strategic and military sectors, is of the utmost importance. As a basis for cooperation in these important and inescapable - though unpleasant - sectors, all peaceful forms of cooperation, and many there are, should be exploited.

In the previous paragraphs the stress might have been placed mainly on measures of inter-state activities. Previously I have made a plea for cooperative activities issuing from the private and at least the semi-public sectors. Under existing circumstances statewise initiative easily engenders suspicion and even opposition to projects of good merit.

Private enterprise in the economic field, on the academic level, from the sector of the Church, very often stands a better chance of success. Missionary work, for instance, although in principle no implement for advancing political or economic interests, has proved itself to be a factor of far reaching consequence in the creation of good relations in other fields of life. Private investment and enterprise could provide a positive initial step. These need not be spectacular ventures. I would say that the less spectacular they are at the outset, the better.

I would like to quote one further example of cooperation in which South Africa is taking the lead, and where she has wide scope for further action. All African, regional African and world-wide international conferences seem to be exceedingly popular in Africa. In addition to the knowledge dispersed and the valuable contacts on personal, professional and official levels, they also carry a distinct prestige value. Without wishing to be sceptical or cynical, one must ask whether the latter motive does not dominate in some cases. Most of these conferences are far too large in attendance. One should pity the Africans for being surrendered to so many dilettantes and occasionally to out and out leftist, male fide propagandists. South Africa is usually barred from these conferences. Nevertheless I am convinced that we are in a position to make a truly substantial contribution. Conferences of limited size, representative of friendly and neutral nations, with discussions on topics of direct actuality for the participant nations, are far more beneficial than larger prestige ones. With a number of recognised authorities on the subject, including South Africans, a truly seminar style of discussion can be maintained. The discussions can be far more to the point and the results of much greater intrinsic value than most conferences, which are far too large and tend to be superficial. The forthcoming conference on African development is an example of what I have in mind, and I wish to congratulate the sponsors of this project, including the South African Institute of International Affairs.

The quoted examples of cooperative enterprises actually in progress, or others still shrouded in the future, primarily concern South Africa and her nearest neighbours. Naturally the approach remains the same for the less and the more remote. The particulars would of course differ in certain instances. South Africa would naturally be less interested in a hydro-electric scheme on the river Congo than in one on the Zambezi. The specific enterprise must be adjusted to the specific situation, taking into account factors of distance, common interests, etc. Academic and professional cooperation can be spread over greater distances than water supplies. What is accentuated is the need for an atmosphere of willingness to reach clarity on problems, without resorting to land mines and submachine guns. Possibilities for cooperation thus also demand the creation of an attitude of understanding, mutual trust and respect, without a demand for the removal of all differences. Although I am not so optimistic as to predict such a situation reaching from the Cape to Cairo, the responsibility to expand the small area of peaceful coexistence to the utmost of our power, rests with all of us.

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FRANCOPHONE WEST AFRICA

by

Professor Barend van Niekerk

Introduction

It should be explained that I am no authority on the subject of Francophone Africa; nor am I attempting here to present crisp analyses fraught with momentous revelations. Rather, I shall deal with a few impressions gained on several trips through Africa, some of them, I hope, critically arrived at, others perhaps of a rather second-hand nature. In a sense I am asking you merely to accept me for what I was while making my odysseys through our continent, namely a vagabond or just a plain tramp.

As a vagabond in Africa -- more particularly French Africa -- I must nevertheless present you with my credentials such as they are. I think, if I may be so immodest, I can safely say that I have seen and experienced a bit of our continent; I have had the opportunity of visiting some 21 countries in our continent and, if I may continue this exercise of immodesty, I may add that I have already had the experience of having been deported and declared a prohibited immigrant about half a dozen times. On my trips I have been graciously accorded hospitality by jailers and presidents alike, and I have likewise been able to penetrate the lives and the hardships of the very rich and the ineffably poor. As a student I did a thesis on pan-Africanism and also made a study of the poetry of the Senegalese President, Léopold Senghor, and published a short treatise thereon. Above all I can claim to have always had a somewhat romantic love for this tortured continent of ours, a love which has undergone great variations but which has nevertheless remained remarkably enduring.

Something now about the topic of the talk. I have selected the subject of Francophone West Africa, rather than the broader topic of Francophone Africa, and my reason for this is three-fold: first, I think Francophone West Africa is very much more important than Francophone Central Africa; secondly, I think that this part of the world is far more important to the shaping of South Africa's foreign policies than French Central Africa; and thirdly, and especially, because my acquaintance with that area has been more profound and more recent. I have in fact returned very recently from a visit to that part of the world.

As regards the first and second points - i.e. the relative importance in general terms, and to South Africa in particular, of that area - I shall briefly adumbrate, without going into details, a slight correction to that point of view. Two Francophone countries, not situated in West Africa, certainly qualify as being (potentially at least) of enormous

importance, not only to South Africa, but also in a more general context, namely Zaire and the Malagasy Republic. Zaire, according to any conceivable criterion, certainly qualifies as a potential giant on our continent; not only is it one of the richest countries in the world as far as strategic minerals are concerned, but it also straddles the invisible frontier between Southern Africa and Central Africa; its political stability or lack of it, or its commitment to revolutionary change in Southern Africa, or the lack of such commitment, will never fail to have a strong bearing on its neighbours. Considering, however, that Zaire is heir to a different kind of Francophonie - that is the Belgian version - the strong ties which exist between most other French African states and the motherland do not exist in this case, a situation which results in Zaire not being really subject to any magnetic pull on the part of a European country which, even in the short run, makes the future evolution of Zaire extremely unpredictable. Without wishing to spend any more time on this country, which is only really of peripheral importance in the ambit of this discussion, I can only say that in view of its geographic and strategic location, in view also of its inherent strength and its interesting trading possibilities, Zaire should figure much more prominently in the plans of South African political strategists. In actual fact it hardly does at all.

Madagascar is another country with which I shall not be dealing but which will, I am sure, continue to become progressively more important, especially as regards South Africa's so-called outward approach. In the last two or three years South African businessmen have obtained a very important foothold on this gigantic island which promises to become a veritable treasure chest; strategically the island may also appear to be of considerable importance to South Africans who are progressively made to believe in the great desire of the Soviets to dominate the Indian Ocean and in their messianic rôle to try and prevent this. Be that all as it may, Madagascar and Zaire remain in my opinion the two Francophone countries in East and Central Africa which, for economic, political and strategic reasons, are of inherent importance to any dynamic foreign policy which the South African Government may pursue; our Government has been notably successful in opening up relations with Madagascar; as far as we know there has been no similar rapprochement with Zaire.

With this long-winded introduction, we arrive finally in West Africa, previously called the White man's grave and now ironically regarded by some as the White man's salvation, in view of the dialogue moves and noise emanating from Abidjan in the Ivory Coast and elsewhere. On my recent trip through West Africa I visited five French-speaking countries - Togo, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast and Senegal. Of these only Senegal and the Ivory Coast are of great interest; though also of political importance is Guinea, which in a real sense has become the African Cuba. Although I could not, and in fact would not, visit that country which today constitutes the best example imaginable of a revolution consuming its own makers, I shall have something to say about it. The only other black French-speaking country in this area is Mali.

French West Africa

French West Africa, as the vast area was administratively called before

the wave of independence struck that part of the world in the early sixties, is a vast area, as a mere glance at the map would indicate; it is therefore practically impossible to generalise more than just approximately about the area as a whole, but I shall nonetheless attempt a few generalisations as background to my discussion of the three most important West African Countries: Senegal, Ivory Coast and Guinea.

The one characteristic of French West Africa - indeed of French Africa as a whole - is the profundity of the French presence; this may perhaps seem like a statement of the very obvious, but it nevertheless still constitutes the one inescapable reality of French Africa. One only has to cross the frontier, a very visible and perceptible one, between so-called British Africa and French Africa, to realise the importance of this reality. Travelling for instance overland from Accra to Ouagadougou in Upper Volta, I had for days hardly seen a white man, although I visited such fairly large centres as Kumasi, Tamale and Bolgatanga. Crossing into Upper Volta - one of the most backward and underdeveloped countries imaginable - the very first people I saw were French road engineers. Entering Ouagadougou, which is a rectangular town in the semi-desert, one was suddenly back in the old Africa; although an incredibly poor country and over-populated to boot (5 million), every conceivable aspect of economic life is in the hands of French expatriates. Travelling through West Africa, and especially in the more sophisticated countries like Senegal and the Ivory Coast, I was time and again struck by the very blatant way in which Frenchmen still continue to run the economic show. In the centre of Abidjan one sees more Whites I think than Blacks, all of whom are enjoying possibly the highest standard of living of any substantial group of persons in the world.

Now all this may sound like cheap tourist-like observations which may perhaps not be borne out by the statistics; however, I think, this is objectively not the case. Whereas in English-speaking Africa there has since independence been a drop in the number of expatriates living there, the opposite is true of the greater part of French Africa. Whereas in English-speaking Africa there has also been an influx of non-British expatriates, there has been no similar influx of non-French expatriates into French Africa, and whereas attempts have been made with varying degrees of success in British Africa to allow locals a greater say in the economic life of their countries, this has also not been the case in French Africa. Even in Marxist off-beat Congo-Brazzaville I was told by none other than the Rector of the University, whom I chanced to meet in Dakar, that this has also substantially been the case there despite vehemently anti-French sentiments being the order of the day. Perhaps a little anecdote will illuminate the situation more clearly. I was having lunch with a German economist in Senegal's most prestigious hotel (I may just add that I was not paying for it myself!) when a small group of five or six French patricians took up their reserved table in a corner. "Look at that group", my friend told me, "because you are in fact looking at the most influential group of persons in this country, because as bankers and insurance men they probably represent about 80 per cent of the economic power in this country."

Now I do not think that I would easily describe myself as a believer in some kind of conspiratorial theory, trying to discover a communist or an

imperialist under every bed, but I never fail to be impressed by the exceedingly competent way in which the French have succeeded in retaining their economic power in their erstwhile colonies. One would have thought that the fact that all these territories have become associated members of the European Economic Community would have opened the flood-gates to those inveterate vagabonds, the Germans, with their colossal economic might to back them up. But this has palpably not been the case. Although, theoretically, French and German firms would compete on a footing of complete equality as regards tenders, the equality invariably ends up lopsidedly.

Related to this first reality of French Africa, to which I have just referred, and in a sense bolstering it, we have the reality of French cultural penetration in their erstwhile colonies. Perhaps this reality is in truth the most basic fact which has to be grasped about French Africa. As I have said somewhat immodestly before, I have seen a little of Africa, and whenever I found myself in French Africa, this is the one fact which imprinted itself on my mind. The best way to understand this imprint of the French mind on French Africa is by comparing it with the imprint - or lack of it - of the British English mind on British Africa. Now it is undoubtedly true, as it must in the nature of things be, that a half-century of British colonization must have had a profound imprint on the ex-British colonies; if I may generalize, however, it would seem that this imprint was very much more formal than real. I am reminded of an incident which will, superficially at least, describe this formal imprint of the British. Walking around the North Ghanaian town of Kumasi I stumbled upon the court buildings; I immediately entered and there, in a simple magistrate's court, was all the paraphernalia of British justice - the gowns, the wigs, the pompous phrases. Within five minutes, however, I was rudely turfed out of the spectator bay because of my safari suit; although the British had taken the short pants to tropical Africa, they were not regarded as decorous enough for the court atmosphere, in a sweltering and reeking Kumasi court. A little incident, no doubt, but I think one that is significant enough to mention because I think it portrays something far more important. Whenever I spoke to Africans from British Africa, I could never escape the awareness of the fact that the people to whom I was speaking very often only had the rudiments of the English language in common with, say, the average Englishman. I recall sitting next to a Nigerian judge of the High Court in a plane and becoming aware of this phenomenon, as well as when speaking to academics of Ghanaian and Nigerian Universities. I remember when as a student in Europe, long before I had had the opportunity to visit West Africa, I was always struck by the great degree of identity between French Africans and Frenchmen, and the lack of such identity between the British and Africans from British Africa.

The reason for this striking difference between British Africans and French Africans is, of course, historical. The colonial policy of the French had as one of its main aims not only the civilization, but also the Frenchification, of their colonial subjects. The best scholars were more often than not attracted to schools which were not only completely racially integrated, but were also of a standard on a par with the education imparted in Metropolitan France. Whereas in fact, if not in theory, the British administrators remained extremely aloof from their

subjects in social matters, the exact opposite was the ideal and the practice in French Africa. Now it also so happens that of all the European nations the French are perhaps more imbued with what one may call a sense of destiny, and the ideal as regards the colonies was always, to put it very simplistically, that if they should behave themselves, the colonial subject could ultimately enjoy all the advantages of French nationality. The way to these good things of life lay in becoming French - in outlook and in spirit. The net result of many years of assimilation policies was that all over French Africa the élite became, to a greater or lesser extent, assimilated into the French culture, and although very often they would differ profoundly with the French colonial administration, they differed as Frenchmen. And when ultimately the French gave their African territories their independence on a silver platter, with one exception only (that of Guinea), the leaders left in control were by and large profoundly imbued and permeated by French culture, the French language and, perhaps to a lesser extent, French political thought. The two best examples in my view are the two leaders of whom I would like to say something in due course. Léopold Senghor and Félix Houphouët-Boigny. The odd man out, perhaps fortuitously so - I don't really know - happens to be Sekou Touré of Guinea who, although fluent in the French language, was not a product of the French educational system and of the French political system, in which people like Senghor and Boigny learned their political ropes. Sekou Touré is in every respect a self-made man who was expelled from school at the age of fifteen, who climbed to the top of the political ladder in his country in the trade union movement, and lacks any attachment or love for France and the French.

These two interrelated realities, the French economic presence and the cultural attachment to France, constitute in my opinion the two most important factors which make of French Africa - perhaps more particularly French West Africa - a distinct unit. Flowing from these two realities, we have another factor which constitutes an additional characteristic of French Africa - economic and political co-operation. There was a time when, under the French wing, all these territories were united in two vast political and administrative units, French West Africa with its capital Dakar, and French Equatorial Africa with its capital Brazzaville. Political parties were organized on an interterritorial basis, and there was generally also considerable movement of people between the different territories which later became independent states. The fact that France gave these two empires their independence in a form of supreme balkanization must, I think, be regarded as one of the supreme historical blunders of that country. However, from the point of view of the continued French dominance of those countries, this carving up of the empires probably constituted an act of brilliance. It may of course be that ultimately this dominance may come to be regarded as the sine qua non for economic development, and economic independence, and then this policy of balkanization on the part of General de Gaulle may yet be regarded as having been worthwhile. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the French African governments have always realized that their common heritage and moreover their common problems called for close co-operation, and already from a very early stage there have been a number of organisations dedicated to the aim of co-operation.

So for instance they have created a common airline, Air Afrique, and they have a common organization in the form of OCAM which has a much more impressive record than the OAU. The Council of the Entente, under the wing of Houphouet-Boigny's Ivory Coast also boasts of quite an impressive record of economic co-operation, with the Ivory Coast finding itself in the unique situation for an African Country of giving aid to its sister members of the Entente, viz. Upper Volta, Dahomey and Niger. A surprising feature of this co-operation is that it is very often not channelled through conventional diplomatic ties, but conducted by way of visits and telephone. Senegal and the Ivory Coast do not, in the strict sense of the word, have any diplomatic relations at all, and there is no consulate of the Ivory Coast in Upper Volta, although the vast majority of imports and exports of the latter country enter and leave through the Ivory Coast. Needless to say perhaps, the French diplomatic representatives constitute, in the majority of cases, the actual link between the various French African countries.

And so, with a wide sweep through French Africa as a whole, we have arrived in the three most important French African countries in West Africa: Senegal, the Ivory Coast and Guinea. Each merits some discussion which must necessarily be brief.

Guinea

The case of Guinea can be discussed in the briefest of terms, because in the first place I have not visited it and have, for reasons of personal safety, no inclination whatsoever of going there in a hurry. And yet, one cannot travel through French West Africa without ever so often being confronted by the reality of Guinea. In a way Guinea constitutes what one may call the "alternative French Africa". All over French Africa tales are told - and no doubt sometimes exaggerated - of this strange country. Whereas a few years ago it was a point of attraction for every journalist and statesman making the customary swing through West Africa, a pall of revolutionary silence has now fallen over this country which, before independence, was French West Africa's most prosperous territory. Time and again I was told most horrific stories by diplomatic and other officials of life in this revolutionary country, and that the esteem - sometimes admittedly a silent and begrudged one - in which the 50 year old Touré was previously held, has now made way for contempt. Now it happens to be my opinion that the greater part of French Africa - and indeed of Africa as a whole - is in dire need of revolutionary changes, but the way in which revolutionary changes have been implemented in Guinea has certainly and quite understandably, in my opinion, made French African leaders extremely hesitant to take dramatic steps in the social field. Sekou Touré, suffering from an extreme degree syphilis, has according to all accounts - including left-wing accounts - become a megalomaniacal dictator hell-bent on sending his country and its people to ruin. Although a potentially rich country, the population has apparently reached a state of deprivation and poverty only equalled by the Ethiopians. Nothing, but nothing, apparently works, and trade, apart from the export of minerals (bauxite, aluminium and iron ore), has come to a complete halt. Ironically perhaps - but probably not quite so ironically - the United States' economic involvement in the mining industry has become virtually the only prop which is still keeping the despot Sekou Touré in power.

Ivory Coast

And now we arrive in Abidjan - glittering capital of South Africa's new found friend, Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Judged purely superficially, one cannot but be impressed by what one sees when arriving in that city from any other West-African city, with the partial exception of Dakar. Standards in the entire country are what one may call, for the lack of a better name, sophisticated and enlightened. Years ago, the story goes, Houphouët-Boigny and Kwame Nkrumah took a bet about which method of government - free enterprise or socialism - would ultimately bring greater advantages to their respective peoples; there is little doubt today that the Ivory Coast as regards its economic situation has got no peer in Africa. Although the development is concentrated in the capital and the two other large cities Bingerville and Grand-Bassam, the sophistication and enlightenment generally permeates the country. The city of Abidjan resembles from the point of view of the race of passers-by much more a European city than any South African city. It has happened to me that in entering consecutively a number of shops, I did not see a single African. The number of Frenchmen living in the Ivory Coast is steadily increasing and, if I remember correctly, there are presently over 100,000. Now essentially the Ivory Coast is a poor country with little mineral resources compared with, say, Guinea; yet in 1964 it exported about 6½ times as much as Guinea. It has been able to attract more French investments than any other African country with the exception of Senegal and it accounts for just under half of all exports from French West Africa.

Houphouët-Boigny and Senghor

The man who rules the Ivory Coast with a firm but nevertheless humanitarian hand has of course become something of a by-word in the South African political vocabulary during the past year. I had the privilege - and I really make no bones about the way in which he impressed me - of having a 45 minute intensive conversation with him. Two weeks later I had an interview, my second one, with his great rival on the French African scene, Léopold Senghor. Together these two statesmen have dominated the French African scene for about fifteen years. I would now like to give my views and impressions about these two men, both highly impressive but very different in their outlook and both demanding possibly the greatest respect of all African leaders on the international political scene. You may call me gullible if you like, but I am firmly of the opinion that these two giants on the African scene do not have their intellectual peers amongst the statesmen of our entire continent. It is true, both of them may perhaps be regarded as conservative and both may have made mistakes in common with all politicians and indeed with all mortal men, but from the point of view of the profundity of their humanity, their sweep of vision, their contributions to the cause of social progress in their countries, and their attachment to the values of civilised standards in government, these two people are certainly great.

Félix Houphouët-Boigny has one dominant strand in his political make-up, namely his unswerving and almost emotional belief in peace and his loathing of violence. His belief in the duty of all men of goodwill to dedicate themselves to peace has become almost a religious credo. After my conversation with him in Abidjan, he gave me a book which he had signed for me. Suddenly he took it back and added the rider which is so significant to anyone familiar with his career: "Peace in Africa through absolute neutrality."

Boigny who is 66 has earned himself the nickname of "Le Vieux" or "The Old Boy". When in the early sixties Africa was riddled with dissension and bloc forming (Who still remembers them : the Brazzaville Bloc, the Casablanca Bloc, the Monrovia Bloc, etc.?) and when in the neighbouring country of Ghana a little Hitler called Nkrumah was vociferously proclaiming a host of fancy doctrines, such as African Political Unity, African High Command, African Personality and African Socialism, Boigny quietly went on with his job of building up his country's economy in close association with France. He was the odd man out then and he has remained so ever since.

Although Houphouet-Boigny has often been accused of being a French stooge, he is certainly, from a purely historical point of view, nothing of the sort. In the early fifties he led the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (R.D.A.) which clashed on many occasions with the French colonial authorities who were never known for their kid glove approach to recalcitrant subjects.

At the same time Boigny was a member of the French Parliament and only his parliamentary immunity prevented his arrest. The R.D.A. was closely allied to the French Communist Party, but seeing where this alliance and violence were leading his country, Boigny made a clean break with the Communist Party in 1950. He has since 1950 been one of the principle enemies of the French Communists, because as leader of the R.D.A. he stymied their attempts to get a firm foothold in West Africa.

I have no doubt that at the root of Boigny's dialogue policy with South Africa is his pragmatic realisation that dialogue is the more promising of the two alternative policies, namely change through confrontation or change through contact.

As a man in whose make-up hard economic and strategic realities play a decisive role, he has simply come to the conclusion that the chances of effecting changes in South Africa by way of violence, boycotts and isolation are too remote at present to merit his serious attention. After all, he told me, this is precisely what has been preached for more than two decades without any sign of success.

Two French-speaking Africans dominate the stage in the French sphere of influence in Africa - Léopold Senghor of Senegal and Boigny of the Ivory Coast. They have been ardent political rivals in the past and it so happens that they hold different views on starting a dialogue with South Africa. Both men are highly civilized, and by this I mean that they are very sophisticated, informed, intellectual and enlightened. I shall avoid the temptation to compare them with some of the leading stars in our own political firmament, both in the Government and the Opposition, except to say that the comparison would not be flattering to some of the locals.

Both are men of the world who look at problems in a clinical fashion, and both are assured of a niche in the turbulent history of Africa's first two decades of independence. Both are products of French culture, but both are ardent nationalists at the same time. Being a product of the French culture does not, I may add, in my view merely mean possessing a working knowledge of French and drinking imported Vichy water and French wine; it means a complete absorption of French culture and French

humanistic thought.

Although they both are firmly in control of one-party states, while insistently proclaiming their allegiance to the ideals of democracy, they have a genuine appreciation for the value and the dignity of the common man. They both served in the French cabinet and both feel a warm and profound sense of attachment to France. (The only picture in Senghor's office is that of General de Gaulle!) In short, both are statesmen of original ideas with which we in South Africa may well, for our own benefit, become acquainted.

They have many differences. Senghor is the great dreamer, the poet and the thinker. Boigny is the doer, the pragmatist and the man of practical politics. Sitting opposite both of them with only an interval of two weeks inbetween, I could not escape the great differences in their personal approach. Senghor the linguist (he incidentally put the finishing grammatical touches to the constitution of the Fourth French Republic - an event not quite without precedent, if one thinks that an Afrikaner, Jannie Smuts, wrote the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations Organisation) had a ready and clever answer for even the thorniest questions. Boigny went to the point immediately and made no attempt to shroud his answers in verbose nomenclature. Senghor had a constant twinkle in his eye, a captivating laugh now and then, and a very informal manner.

Houphouet-Boigny explained to me at great length, with an all-consuming seriousness, his pre-occupations and the reasons for his new approach to South Africa. His language was simple and lacked the poetic flavour of Senghor's, but it was indeed "Le Vieux" speaking with emphasis, with absolute conviction and with obvious sincerity. Not for him the dramatic slogans which are Senghor's forte, but the straight answer and the clinical approach of a surgeon. (He is, in fact, a medical doctor by profession.)

Boigny rules his country from a sumptuous presidential palace. Although I caught a fleeting glimpse of white secretaries at work, the faces that greeted me and showed me to the very French looking ante-chamber, were all black.

The doors to the ante-chamber opened and I was led into the biggest office I have ever seen; a hall would be a more appropriate description. A small, shy man with big eyes and a boyish face which age had endowed with a rare tranquillity and beauty, came forward and invited me to sit down on the enormous sofa dominating the one side of the hall, as a mammoth desk dominated the other.

There was no ice to break, or, if there was, Boigny quickly broke it for us both by asking some direct questions about the reaction his dialogue proposals had had in South Africa and what my own view was on how it should be tackled in future. A great urgency came over his fine features when he recapitulated to me the reasons for the reversal in his policy.

"We simply cannot ignore South Africa and its Whites, and violence and threats of violence have proved to be worthless", he said. "I detest

the indignities meted out under apartheid, but I do not believe in war and violence

It is in order to change the rigidities of apartheid that the idea of dialogue was conceived, not to benefit from South African trade and tourism. "Of course these are factors, but they are subsidiary ones and they do not motivate me in any way."

In sombre tones he decried the duplicity of many other African leaders "People who preach boycott but trade happily with South Africa", and especially those who are opening up the doors to Chinese penetration in Africa - the "worst kind of colonialism". "There is nothing secretive about my policy of dialogue. What I am telling you now I shall say to the whole world. My word is my word and it remains the same."

From topic to topic the conversation switched, but always the urgency, the seriousness and the solemnity of a man knowing full well that he has mounted a tiger from which he will have great difficulty in dismounting. But - and this is the point which South Africans will do well to note - the ever recurring theme was that of bringing about moral pressure on the race conscious people of this country.

"Yes, it will take time, much time", Boigny explained, although the urgency remained written large on his face. "But what is time in the history of a continent? A start had to be made and that is what I have done. I may not myself see the result, but of the result I have no doubt - the elimination of racial barriers and the absolute neutrality of our continent."

I stepped out of the autumn coolness of the palace back into the oppressive heat and humidity of Abidjan. Behind shopwindows in air-conditioned luxury one saw few black faces. But for the climate the centre of Abidjan is more European in outward appearance than any South African city. Although the rumblings beneath the surface are not difficult to detect, few countries present an outward picture of a happier marriage between two peoples and races than does the Ivory Coast.

Is it therefore surprising that Boigny, who started his political career by fighting the French colonial policies, but who later discovered that he had greater chances of success by joining the enemy, should be the first African leader to propound in any depth the theory of dialogue with South Africa? In his lifetime Félix Houphouët-Boigny has crossed many barriers - the racial barrier, the colonial barrier, numerous political barriers, the ministerial barrier in France, the presidential barrier in his own country, as well as the barrier of skillfully outmanoeuvring all opposition. Having crossed them all successfully, it seems almost logical that a man with his dynamism and pragmatic idealism should try to overcome, with personal courage and dedication, the greatest barrier of our continent - the barrier between the black and the white races in Southern Africa.

He may be over-reaching himself; he may perhaps have under-estimated the forces of the opposition in Black Africa as well as in South Africa; he may not have fully realised that the very nature of the barrier makes change extremely difficult.

These thoughts might not have occurred to Boigny, or, if they have, he would not have entertained them for long because a man of his quality and with his vision would never agree that change is impossible.

In spite of Abidjan's heat, humidity and all its outward contradictions, I could not escape the impression that for a few moments I had been in the company of one of Africa's truly great men.

Senegal and Senghor

In conclusion, a few thoughts about Senegal and especially its poet-president, Léopold Senghor. Endowed essentially with a mono-culture, that of groundnuts, the country is a poor one and about half of it is semi-desert; the South again is to a very large extent covered by thick bush. Nevertheless, the one aspect which I have found striking about Senegal is its comparative degree of sophistication and development, compared to other African countries, with the exception perhaps of the Ivory Coast. I had the opportunity, which I did not have in other countries, to be able to contact and meet any person I wished; I think that at the very least I have obtained a very broad picture of the country and its people. I could also travel at state expense and I made abundant use of the right. In a word, although obviously still an underdeveloped country with great chunks of abject poverty and with great gulfs between the rich and the poor, it is a country about whose future I feel very hopeful. We sometimes hear unctuous noises here in South Africa about the situation of African education; in Senegal something like twenty per cent of the budget (I am no longer sure about the figure, but at the time I was highly impressed) is spent on education, and primary education has become almost universal. Any traveller in the bundu of Senegal cannot but become aware of this phenomenon; a comparison with similar areas in South Africa must inevitably be highly critical of the situation here.

Dakar, the capital, has of course also got its bidonvilles but nothing compared to what one can see elsewhere in Africa; the city and its people have retained the image of their former glory as capital of the vast French West African empire. Together with Abidjan, it is a place inveterate South African racists would do well to visit in order to see how relatively competently a city can be run by blacks. Of course, the ever present hand of France is also visible here - more in the financial circles perhaps than elsewhere, but it is certainly not a phenomenon unknown to, say, the capitals of the Transkei, Vendloland or Tswanaland. The city prides itself on one of the true universities in Africa; visiting it as a guest of the dean of the Faculty of Science, I was impressed for instance to see the results of research into the generation of electricity from the sun. However, I must add in the same breath, that it is staffed by Frenchmen to the tune of about 80 per cent and that it is almost entirely financed by France. A third of the students in fact are French.

The heavy French involvement in the country has of course not gone unnoticed by the youth which, as can perhaps be expected in the case of first or second generation literates, is revolutionary and in the opinion of some, including the President, Maoist-inspired. President Senghor who, as one may expect, takes a great personal interest in the

University, has already been compelled to close it on several occasions. It is said that his regime is opposed by something like 60 per cent of students who resent things such as the strong contingent of French troops in the country, and especially the profound French economic involvement. One of the more mundane objections levelled against Senghor is the fact that he is married to a French lady!

Like the Ivory Coast, Senegal is certainly nowhere near a police state; there are, as also in the case of the Ivory Coast, no political prisoners - a rare phenomenon in Africa. The press is, as in the case of the Ivory Coast, not perhaps a paragon of a free press, but it is certainly also not of the kind found elsewhere in Africa. It is, shall we say, about as free as the Transvaler! In fact I am of the opinion that there is only one completely free press in West Africa (it is indeed one which is subject to fewer restrictions than the South African press), and that press is to be found in Ghana.+ Naturally, the country is a one-party state - once more, I think, Ghana today qualifies as the only approximately democratic country in Africa, including Southern Africa+ - but every effort is in fact made to retain a high degree of flexibility and democracy within the party structure. Yet there is no gainsaying that essentially the country is no liberal democracy.

Senghor is in my opinion the greatest statesman at present moving across the African scene; indeed he has few peers in the world. He is great in my opinion because his policies and his actions are founded on humanitarian bases, and because he views the dignity of man as the ultimate premise of statesmanship. He is great in my opinion because his horizons have been very wide; he has worked to satisfy not only the material needs of his people today, but indeed also their spiritual needs of tomorrow. He has, more than any other contemporary statesman in Africa, given the world at large an indication that there is a lot which is beautiful in the African spirit, and he has, more than any other black statesman, shown Africans the contribution which they should make to what he often calls the "Universal civilization" which is presently emerging. Long after the world will have forgotten about the antics of people like Nkrumah, Kaunda, Kenyatta and Ian Smith, they will still value the poetry of a man who, although born in the bundu of Africa, moved around on the world stage as the equal, and indeed the superior, of most of his contemporaries, a man who, although born far from any contact with the Western world, became one of the most accomplished poets in the French language. The message of the philosophy of Léopold Senghor is one which South Africans would do well to ponder - it is the message of reconciliation of antitheses, of racial and religious tolerance, and of individual dignity and personal liberty; indeed he is the poet and the philosopher of dialogue in its broadest and most enduring sense. More's the pity, therefore, that his message is one which is seldom heard and even more seldom pondered in South Africa. Together with Jan Smuts, whose memory, of course, has faded in the last few decades, Senghor is a man of universal dimensions and the closest approximation our continent has known to the Platonic ideal of the philosopher-king.

+ written before the recent coup.

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B R I E F R E P O R T S / K O R T V E R S L A E

- Voorberei deur die Instituut se Personeel -
- Prepared by the Institute's Staff -

Parliament and Foreign Affairs

During the debate in the House of Assembly on the Budget Vote for Foreign Affairs (4 May, 1972), an exchange took place between Mr. J.D. du P. Basson, chief Opposition spokesman on Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, concerning the advisability or otherwise of the establishment of a standing Foreign Affairs Committee of the House. The relevant extracts from the debate (Hansard, No. 13, columns 6454 - 6534) are given below:

Mr. J.D. du P. Basson (during his first speech in the debate):

We are once again faced with the situation that we have to examine the whole field of South Africa's foreign relations, and the Government's administration of foreign affairs, in the limited time of only a few hours. I am not placing any blame on the Hon. the Minister, as we are all victims of the system of time limits. However, this lends weight to a plea I have made before in this House, namely that we should have a Foreign Affairs Committee as a standing committee of this House. I am not asking for a bipartisan policy committee. That is something else, and we see no value in that at this stage. But we believe that it is in the interests of the country, and certainly in the interests of Parliament, that a permanent Foreign Affairs Committee be established to deal constantly with questions relating to foreign relations, either at its own initiative or in response to specific requests coming from the Government. This is established practice in most democratic parliaments in the world. Parliamentarians from other countries who have come on visits to South Africa, are usually amazed to find that foreign affairs is conducted in our country on a basis of no-consultation with Parliament. Apart from the general value of a committee on Foreign Affairs, we know that from time to time matters arise which, we appreciate, cannot fully be discussed in open session of Parliament.

(Mr. Basson then referred to South West Africa and the visit of the U.N. Secretary-General, Dr. Kurt Waldheim.)

The Minister of Foreign Affairs (during his first speech in the debate):

As usual he (Mr. Basson) again advocated a foreign affairs committee, a permanent committee of this Parliament. He pointed out that something of this kind existed in many other countries of the world. The Hon. member is aware that the country on whose Parliament our Parliament is modelled does not have such a committee. I have already stated the Government's standpoint in this regard in the past, so I do not think it is necessary for me to elaborate further on this.

Mr. J.D. du P. Basson (during his second speech in the debate):

I again raised the matter of a foreign affairs committee. But what is the reaction of the Hon. the Minister? He says England does not have one, good enough for us. Well, England has a king. Should we also have a king now?

The Minister of Foreign Affairs: I have replied to that question for nine years running.

Mr. J.D. du P. Basson: But we have never considered it properly. We again had an example here this afternoon of the Minister's not being able to give this House in open session details which we should like to have, and to which this Parliament is entitled, but at the same time he does not want to create a body in which such discussions can take place. And he cannot take Britain as an example, because Britain's Parliament has completely different traditions, and the Minister knows this as well as anybody else. In England you have the closest of relationships between the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition. There is continual consultation between them and, what is more, they have a series of institutions, such as the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and a whole series of special foreign affairs committees on which the Opposition and the Government are continually in consultation with each other. Consequently their traditions are of such a nature that they meet the need which is met by a standing committee on foreign affairs, in virtually all the parliaments of Europe. I think it is the duty of all of us to improve the standard in this House through establishing a foreign affairs committee.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs (during his second speech, in reply to the debate):

In regard to the Hon. member's request that we appoint a permanent committee on foreign affairs, I want to say that I do not hide behind Great Britain. The Hon. member said that all the visitors who come here are astonished that we do not have such a committee. There is one country that does not have it, but there may be many others of which I am not aware. We do not hide behind that. Our attitude is -- and I am repeating it as I have stated it in the past -- that the Government is responsible for our foreign relations. We are responsible to the entire country, and we shall inform Parliament and the country when it is possible to do so. It is not always possible, however, because many of the things done in the diplomatic sphere, not only by South Africa, but by all countries, are of a secret nature. They are highly confidential; we cannot blurt out all these things to members of the Opposition who want to serve on such a Parliamentary foreign affairs committee. We, and not the Opposition, bear the responsibility for the government. By that I am not insinuating that they are irresponsible persons, but we are the people who bear the responsibility and we have to decide when these things must remain confidential or secret. That is the reason, and I have already given it in the past. I am giving it again now.

The United States-China Joint Communiqué

The following joint communiqué was issued in Shanghai on 27 February, 1972:

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-Lai of the People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei held talks in the same spirit.

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial, and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.

The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.

The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. The

United States stressed that the Peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny, without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal put forward by the Republic of VietNam and the United States on January 27, 1972, represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean Peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favours the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry. // The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution - this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries.

The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the elaboration of February this year on the two key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese peoples. It firmly supports the eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the "U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea". It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations Resolutions on Indi-Pakistan question,

immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir, and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination. // There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

- Progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;
- Both wish to reduce the danger in international military conflict;
- Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and
- Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan", "one China, two governments", "two Chinas", and "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined".

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but

one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.

The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

The joint communique was issued in two versions. In the American version (quoted above) the United States' position is set out first; in the other version the Chinese position comes first. This was done by mutual agreement. In both versions, however, the communique concludes with the areas of agreement reached during the talks between President Nixon and the Communist Chinese leaders.

It was agreed, inter alia, between the two sides that they should "stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. Representative to Peking from time to time". In discussing this question subsequently with newsmen, the President's adviser, Dr. Henry Kissinger, indicated the establishment of an arrangement, such as the semi-permanent Warsaw talks, in the reasonably near future and not in the United States. The presence of an American official in Peking as the need arises was, therefore, not considered to preclude other contact points. However, Dr. Kissinger did not foresee a Communist Chinese representative in Washington.

Rhodesië - Suid-Afrikaanse Reaksie op die
Verslag van die Pearce-kommissie

Die verslag van die Pearce-kommissie is op 23 Mei 1972 deur die Britse regering vrygestel. Die volgende slot-paragraaf van die verslag (Cmnd. 4964) bevat die kommissie se bevinding:

"We are satisfied on our evidence that the Proposals are acceptable to the great majority of Europeans. We are equally satisfied, after considering all our evidence including that on intimidation, that the majority of Africans rejected the Proposals. In our opinion the people of Rhodesia as a whole do not regard the Proposals as acceptable as a basis for independence."

Die Suid-Afrikaanse Eerste Minister, Mnr. B.J. Vorster, het op 23 Mei die volgende verklaring uitgereik:

"Met die oog op die feit dat die Britse en die Rhodesiese regering tot 'n ooreenkoms geraak het vir die oplossing van hul sewe jaar lange geskil en die opsegging van sanksies, is die bevinding van die Pearce-kommissie 'n tragiese skok. Die gevolge daarvan is moeilik om te voorsien. 'n Mens weerhou jou met moeite om jou nie uit te laat oor die wyse waarop die kommissie te werk gegaan en tot 'n bevinding geraak het nie, gesien veral die gevolge vir Suider-Afrika wat daaruit kan spruit. Suid-Afrika se betrekkinge met en houding teenoor Rhodesië en sy regering word in geen opsig verander deur die verslag van die Pearce-kommissie nie. Die besluit waartoe die kommissie geraak het en die aanname daarvan deur die Britse regering, het beslis nie sake vir regerings van Suider-Afrika makliker gemaak nie. Maar dit is nou meer as ooit tevore nodig om kalm en bedaard voort te gaan om te doen wat reg is vir blank en nie-blank."

(Die Burger, 24 Mei 1972)

Die Leier van die Opposisie, Sir De Villiers Graaff, het in 'n verklaring op 23 Mei gesê dat alle vriende van Rhodesië in Suid-Afrika diep teleurgesteld is oor die bevinding van die Pearce-kommissie.

"Ons weet almal dat dit 'n situasie is wat Rhodesië in die eerste plek raak, maar ons kan nie onverskillig staan teenoor die probleme van 'n belangrike staat in Suider-Afrika nie - 'n staat wat ons onmiddellike buurman is en met wie ons lang historiese en ekonomiese verbintenisse het. Ons ken Rhodesië as een van die state in Afrika wat op die doeltreffendste wyse geregeer word en wat, ondanks sanksies, verlede jaar 'n groeikoers van 10 persent gehad het."

Sir De Villiers Graaf het ook gesê dit is alle Suid-Afrikaners se bede dat ons Rhodesiese bure, en al die ander wat betrokke is by die toekomstige stabiliteit van Suider-Afrika en die geluk van sy volke, die probleem wat hulle in die gesig staar, met geduld en wysheid sal benader.

"Ons is vol vertroue dat 'n regverdigte oplossing in die belang van al die betrokkenes gevind kan en sal word."

(Die Burger, 24 Mei 1972)

President Nixon se Besoek aan Moskou

Die volgende hoofartikel het in Die Burger (Kaapstad) van 30 Mei 1972 verskyn:

Verdrag van Tordesillas

In die toespraak wat hy in die naweek oor die beeldradio van die Sowjet-Unie gehou het, het Pres. Nixon 'n versekering gegee wat nie in die eerste plaas, of selfs glad nie, vir sy onmiddellike toehoorders bedoel was nie.

"In hierdie samesprekinge" (tussen hom en die leiers van die Sowjet-Unie), het hy gesê, "was dit ons nie te doen om die wêreld in invloedssfeer te verdeel of om 'n kondominium te vestig of om op enige wyse teen die belange van ander volke saam te sweer nie."

Daar kan aangeneem word dat dit nie die uitgangspunt van die onderhandelaars was nie, maar dit kan die logiese gevolg word van hul strewe om te voorkom dat hulle deur die toedoen van andere in 'n oorlog gesleep word.

Daar is verskeie aanduidinge dat dié saak baie swaar by die onderhandelaars geweeg het, as dit nie die vernaamste oorweging was wat hulle bymekaar gebring het nie. So 'n aanduiding is vervat in die Deklarasie van Moskou, wat ná afloop van die samesprekinge uitgereik is. Een van die sleutelsinne daarin lui dat die Verenigde State en die Sowjet-Unie groot betekenis heg aan "die voorkoming van die ontwikkeling van situasies wat 'n gevaarlike verslegting van hul betrekkinge kan veroorsaak".

Dit sluit aan by wat vooraf gesê is deur Alexei Kosygin, eerste minister van die Sowjet-Unie, aan die een kant en pres. Nixon aan die ander kant. Mnr. Kosygin het gesê dat alles gedoen moet word "om die broeineste van oorlog in die Midde-Ooste en Viëtnam op te ruim", terwyl pres. Nixon in sy beeldradio-rede gewaarsku het dat "groot nasies al dikwels teen wil en dank in 'n oorlog gesleep is deur konflikte tussen kleinere nasies".

Hoe ruimer die geleentheid vir die kleinere nasies om self na eie goeëddunke oor hul lotgevalle te besluit en op te tree, des te groter moet die moontlikheid wees, uit Russiese en Amerikaanse hoek besien, dat tussen hulle konflikte kan ontstaan waarin die twee supermoondhede teen wil en dank ingesleep sal word. En omgekeerd.

Dit kan die Russe en die Amerikaners in die toekoms beweeg om al hoe meer die sake van die res van die wêreld tussen hulle te probeer reël en 'n Amerikaans-Russiese wêreldbestel of kondominium, om pres. Nixon se woord te gebruik, te skep - iets soos 'n Pax Americana-Sovietica. Dit is 'n vrees wat al lank by ander lande bestaan.

'n Ander moontlikheid waarmee ook sedert jare rekening gehou word, is dat die Verenigde State en die Sowjet-Unie 'n verstandhouding kan bereik om die wêreld in invloedsfere te verdeel - waarna pres. Nixon ook uitdruklik verwys het.

Dit sou nie die eerste maal in die geskiedenis wees dat so iets gebeur nie. Byna vyfhonderd jaar gelede, in 1494, het Portugal en Spanje die Verdrag van Tordesillas gesluit waarby hulle die wêreld tussen hulle twee verdeel het. Destyds is vooraf 'n belangrike rol gespeel deur die Pous, Alexander VI, wat deur albei lande as opperste wêreldheerser beskou is. Vandag kan die kernbom die rol vervul wat die Pous in daardie dae gespeel het.

Kort na sy terugkoms in Washington het President Nixon 'n gesamentlike sitting van die Amerikaanse kongres toegesprek. Hy het onder andere gesê dat sy Moskou se spitsberaad die grondslag gelê het vir 'n nuwe houding tussen die twee magtigste lande ter wêreld. Volgens waarnemers het President Nixon uit sy pad gegaan om konserwatiewe Amerikaners se vrees dat die ooreenkoms oor die inperking van kernwapens tot Rusland se voordeel sal wees, die nek in te slaan.

"Ek kan die kongres en die Amerikaanse volk vanaand die versekering gee dat die huidige en beplande strategiese mag van die Verenigde State sonder twyfel voldoende is vir die handhawing van ons sekuriteit en vir die beskerming van ons belange.

"Geen mag ter wêreld is vandag sterker as die Verenigde State van Amerika nie. En nie een sal in die toekoms sterker as die Verenigde State van Amerika wees nie."

Hy het egter gesê dat die kernwapen-ooreenkoms daartoe sal bydra dat die vrees onder Amerikaners, Russe en alle ander volke sal verminder, omdat die oorsake van die vrees verminder is. President Nixon het dit reguit gestel dat hy nie enige vergelyk met Rusland kon tref om die Viëtnamoorlog

te beëindig nie. Dit was voor-die-hand-liggend dat albei partye hul eie standpunt en eie benadering tot hierdie vraagstuk het. Hy wil graag 'n "vroee en eerbare" beëindiging in die Viëtnamoorlog bewerkstellig.

"Maar ons sal dit op so 'n wyse beëindig dat ons nie ons vriende verraaï nie, nie die lewens van die dapper Amerikaners in Viëtnam in gevaar stel nie, nie troubreuk pleeg teenoor diegene wat aangehou word nie en nie die eer van die Verenigde State bevlek nie."

(Opsomming gebaseer op 'n verslag in
Die Vaderland van 2 Junie 1972).

Nota: Verdere besonderhede oor die ooreenkomste tussen die Verenigde State en die Sowjet-Unie sal in ons volgende Nuusbrief gegee word.

Trans-Africa Highway

A brief report in Newsletter 1971 No. 3 (August, 1971) referred to the proposed plan to build an East/West highway across Africa. The route has now been approved, following completion of a pre-feasibility study financed by the United Kingdom. The highway will extend from Mombasa to Lagos through the following six countries: Kenya, Uganda, Zaire, Central African Republic, Cameroon and Nigeria. It will connect main centres of population, and the route has been determined with the aim of minimising construction and maintenance costs. The intention is that it should be an all-weather road.

U.N. Conference on the Human Environment

A report in Newsletter No. 8 - December, 1970, gave some of the background to the plans for the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment being held in Stockholm from 5 to 16 June, 1972. The purpose of this Conference was defined in a resolution of the U.N. General Assembly in December, 1969, as follows:

"To serve as a practical means to encourage, and to provide guidelines for, action by Governments and international organizations designed to protect and improve the human environment and to remedy and prevent its impairment, by means of international co-operation, bearing in mind the particular importance of enabling developing countries to forestall the occurrence of such problems."

The provisional agenda for the Conference included several subject areas to be considered, namely:

Planning and management of human settlements for environmental quality.

Environmental aspects of natural resources management.

Identification and control of pollutants of broad international significance.

Educational, informational, social and cultural aspects of environmental issues.

Development and environment.

International organizational implications of action proposals.

In addition, the provisional agenda provided for the adoption of a Declaration on the Human Environment, a draft of which was prepared beforehand, and for the adoption of a "plan of action". Substantial reports on all the subject areas were compiled for member countries and their delegates, during the several years of preparatory work preceding the Conference. However, it appears from reports immediately before the opening of the Conference in Stockholm, that a number of political controversies will intrude to prevent the extensive preparations from producing the constructive results which were hoped for.

NOTE: The Institute hopes to produce a paper on the results of this important Conference, which will be circulated to members later in the year.

Members will recall that the Institute organised a Symposium on "Natural Resources in Southern Africa" in December, 1971. The proceedings of the Symposium (which will be available shortly in a printed report) were very relevant to the subject of the Stockholm Conference.

The Foreign Policy of Swaziland

At a meeting of the Swaziland Students Union at Luyengo on 29 April, 1972, the Permanent Secretary in the Department of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Nkomeni Ntiwane gave an address on the subject: "The Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of Swaziland". He stated that this policy could be said to be a "Policy for Independence". It was formulated to meet the needs of a newly independent country that was launching itself into the international arena.

Mr. Ntiwane said that one factor that was considered, when the Kingdom of Swaziland formulated this policy, was the geographical location of Swaziland. Although the Swazi Kingdom believed in the neighbourliness of states, it could not condone Apartheid on the one hand and "Assimilation" on the other. The second factor was the economy. Mr. Ntiwane said that the Kingdom of Swaziland, in its economic dealings with neighbouring states, was not trying to please anybody, but to underline the reality of the economic factor. He declared that it went without saying that the advantages of the Customs Union with Botswana, Lesotho and South Africa far outweighed whatever disadvantages there might be.

On the question of South West Africa, Mr. Ntiwane said Swaziland regarded the Namibian issue as a U.N. - South African concern, and the Kingdom's policy was that with the United Nations-South African negotiation machinery and good offices at work, that issue would be solved.

On Rhodesia, Mr. Ntiwane said Swaziland, in compliance with a U.N. resolution, placed an embargo on all Rhodesian trade and that embargo would remain for as long as the illegal regime in Rhodesia flouted the NIBMAR conditions.

The Permanent Secretary continued that the attitude of Swaziland towards global areas of conflict was that the local people must be left to resolve their differences. He also recalled that, as Swaziland was concerned about the non-U.N. membership of the People's Republic of China, at the recent session of the U.N. Swaziland was co-sponsor of the "Two-China" resolution. It was the belief of the Kingdom that Nationalist China should have retained its seat. Mr. Ntiwane said that Swaziland chose the path of non-alignment with the full awareness of the existence of the East West Power Struggle.

On the question of dialogue with South Africa, Mr. Ntiwane said Swaziland believed that meaningful dialogue must be based on the Lusaka manifesto, and the Swazi stand on the principle embodied in that manifesto was unwavering.

He added that if the Kingdom's foreign policy of the first decade had assisted in the establishment and consolidation of its independence, then no one in the Kingdom need have any fear for the future. Swaziland had taken no directives from any of its neighbours in formulating its foreign policy. A strong foundation had been laid, and it was for the new generation to build thereon.

(Based on a report in "News from Swaziland"
(Mbabane), 29 April, 1972).

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