DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE

NUUSBRIEF/NEWSLETTER

1971 No. 4

THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

DIE SUID - AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE

THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

N U U S B R I E F / N E W S L E T T E R

1971 No. 4

Huis Jan Smuts/Jan Smuts House
Posbus/P.O. Box 31596
Braamfontein
Johannesburg

October/Oktober 1971

S.A.I.I.A.

Nasionale Voorsitter - Dr. Leif Egeland - National Chairman

- - - - - - -

Voorsitters van Takke Chairmen of Branches

WITWATERSRAND

Mnr./Mr. Gideon Roos

KAAPSTAD/CAPETOWN

Mnr./Mr. W.T. Ferguson

OOSTELIKE PROVINSIE/EASTERN PROVINCE

Mnr./Mr. A.J. Karstaedt

NATAL

Prof. E.N. Keen

PRETORIA

Mnr./Mr. Leon Coetzee

STELLENBOSCH

Prof. W.B. Vosloo

- - - - - -

Direkteur - Mnr./Mr. John Barratt - Director

- - - - - -

S.A.I.I.A. NUUSBRIEF/NEWSLETTER

1971 No. 4

INHOUD/CONTENTS

- - - - - - - - - -

INTRODUCTORY NOTES

Since the inception of the Institute's Newsletter in 1969, it has been the practice to have four issues a year. However, it is now felt that, when sufficient material is available, this number should be increased. This fourth Newsletter of the current year is, therefore, appearing earlier than usual, and we plan to issue a further one before the end of the year.

George Quester is Associate Professor of Government in the Center for International Studies at Cornell University. He is an authority on nuclear arms control and its related topics, and for several years has been engaged in research on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in particular. The first article in this Newsletter, "The Control of Nuclear Weapons", is based on a talk which he gave at a meeting of the Witwatersrand Branch of the Institute on 17th June, 1971, during a visit to South Africa.

"South Africa in a Changing African Scene" is the title of the address given by the South African Minister of Information, of Social Welfare and Pensions and of Immigration, Dr. the Hon. C.P. Mulder, at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, on 5th July, 1971. Dr. Mulder is the third South African Minister to have addressed meetings at Chatham house during the past two years. The others were the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. H. Muller, in October 1969, (see Newsletter No. 4, 1969) and the Minister of Finance, Dr. N. Diederichs, in October 1970.

"The Sudan: the July Coups and the Soviet Union" was written for the Newsletter by David Hirschmann who is on the staff of the Institute at Jan Smuts House.

THE DIRECTOR

THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

George Quester

Let me begin by summarising in very general terms some characteristics of the disarmament process since World War II. Typically the focus until very recently pitted the United States against the Soviet Union, or the United States and its allies against the Soviet Union and its satellites. And very typically there was much disagreement on the preferability of reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles or conventional arms. There was also a general suspicion that one would not really have an agreement that each side could be expected to live up to, unless there were some means of controlling and monitoring compliance to assure that neither side cheated, so that neither side would expose itself to sudden attack as a result of having been honest.

This unhappy pattern of efforts at disarmament is well known, continuing until 1963 when the United States and the Soviet Union indeed took a very memorable first step, a decision not to test weapons in the atmosphere any longer. The United States, Britain and the Soviet Union agreed to this, and most other countries in the world signed the same Test-Ban treaty even though they had no weapons of their own to detonate; these promised never to test nuclear weapons or to allow any other nation to test on their territory. South Africa was among these nations. The significant exceptions were France, which declined to sign and had already made its first atomic bomb in 1960, and Communist China which refused to sign and then detonated a bomb to join the nuclear club in 1964.

There was thus by the middle 1960's a sense that some co-operation between the United States and the Soviet Union, or between the East and the West if you will, would be possible when the benefits to mankind in general seemed to outweigh the particular national interests of the countries involved. The test ban would be good, because it would reduce the amount of radioactivity in the atmosphere; it might also be good in that it would slow down procurement and development of new weapons on each side, so that the United States and the Soviet Union would not have to spend quite so much money on new weapons.

Yet a second major change emerged in the mid 1960's, in that the attention of the two major countries -- actually the attention of a third also, Great Britain -- shifted away from limiting the combative competition between the major powers, toward limiting the spread of weapons to nations outside the great powers. As I said, four countries had already acquired nuclear weapons by 1960, a fifth, Communist China by 1964, and it seemed that many more nations in the future might start to acquire these weapons, and this might not be at all desirable. There was thus a lot of talk in 1965 and 1966 about a Non-Proliferation Treaty, a treaty by which agreement could somehow be reached not to allow any further spread of atomic weapons.

For a time it seemed that there would never be a final treaty draft acceptable to both the Russians and the Americans, because of unsolved questions about western Europe and West Germany. Many nations at this stage voiced vehement approval of an NPT in principle, saying: "Yes, we agree, it will be bad to have nuclear weapons spreading to more and more countries, and we are in favour of non-proliferation." Ireland had already introduced such resolutions in 1958, 1959, and 1960 at the United Nations General

Assembly, resolutions which were overwhelmingly approved. Countries made a great to-do about how much they agreed on the need to stop nuclear proliferation, until suddenly, to the shock of many, it appeared in 1967, that an agreement was going to be reached, that the Russians and the Americans were actually going to present a treaty that everyone else would be asked to sign.

It was interesting to talk to diplomats of various countries involved at the time, which suddenly had to do a double turn to say: "Well, as a matter of fact, it is very nice that the Russians and the Americans sitting in a smoke-filled room in Geneva have agreed; when we thought they would not agree, we always thought it was a good thing that they were talking about an NPT; but now that they have agreed, is it really so good?" The West Germans were quite unhappy because they could not learn anything beyond what they were reading in the newspapers, about what the Americans were agreeing to. Just to make it even, the Roumanians were similarly unhappy, because the Russians were not telling them anything either. Suddenly the Italians, who had been enthusiastically for the treaty, were enthusiastically reluctant to sign it. The Japanese said that this was the kind of thing they wanted to study very carefully, and were not going to say much else about it. Brazil announced that it was quite opposed. India announced that it was quite unhappy. South Africa said very little, Israel said very little; to say little at this moment indicates that one also was not too happy about the news that had come out of Geneva.

Since we all used to be in favour of disarmament in principle, and knew that every disarmament treaty was good, with the Russians and the Americans suddenly arm in arm and perfectly in agreement, was this really so good or was it really bad? Why for example, is it good to limit the nuclear club at five, why not fifteen, why not ten, why not zero, why not two? The basic NPT argument of course is that to have more and more nations possessing their own atomic bombs or hydrogen bombs would make war more horrible, whenever it happened, and also make war more likely.

If you can imagine a war between India and Pakistan, which is not such a hard thing to imagine, just visualise how bad it would be if both sides had atomic bombs: the Pakistanis dropping them on Calcutta or New Delhi, and the Indians on Karachi. It does not require a great stretch of the imagination to say that many more people would suffer and much more damage would be done in any war of that kind, or in any war in the Middle East or Latin America, if nuclear weapons spread. Secondly, there is a risk that as nuclear weapons spread certain kinds of war would be more likely, since there is something about this kind of weapon that encourages taking the offensive, beating the other fellow to the punch. If he has aeroplanes on his aerodrome, why not hit it with one of your bombs and destroy all his aeroplanes. Because he might do it to you in the next hour, you had better do it in this hour. We can imagine kinds of wars that neither side really wanted, when neither side really preferred war to peace, but each preferred it to the war they felt was about to happen.

But if it is so bad for India to get the bomb, for Israel or South Africa to get the bomb, why do we not go from five down to two or to zero? Well, there are limits of persuasibility on what any of us can do in the field of arms control. If any of you have suggestions on how we can persuade the Communist Chinese to give up the bomb, I will certainly be ready to collect them for my reference in future. When one tries to get representatives of the United Kingdom to entertain the idea that they might give up the bomb, one is received very coldly. Britain has frankly announced

that it is not giving up their atomic weapons, as have the United States and the Soviet Union. Certifying that the last bomb had been destroyed, of all those eighty thousand warheads on one side and what-have-you on the other, would be very difficult. So the answer, about what is so good about five, is probably that it is a lot better than six, fifteen or twenty, and that it is very hard to get from five to four to three to two. The Non-Proliferation Treaty is simply a treaty which freezes the number of countries that have nuclear weapons. It says quite boldly that anyone who has the bomb in 1967 can keep it forever legally, while any other country which signs the treaty renounces the right to make bombs, or to accept them as a gift. Is there anything wrong with the treaty? Are there any reasonable arguments against signing it, for you after all live in a country that until now has not seen fit to sign the NPT? Indeed South Africa has merely announced that it will study the question carefully, which tells the outside world something, but not a great deal.. South Africa is not alone: there is a long list of countries that in one way or another have decided *not* to sign the treaty.

Before going through the various kinds of anti-NPT arguments that are presented, let me just remind you what kind of company South Africa is in. Of countries that have the weapon, France has not signed, but has said that she will behave just as if she had signed, which is not the most informative statement either, but it is reassuring compared to some other things that have been said. Communist China has not signed the NPT and has said that it is a terrible treaty, since the Russians and the Americans want to enslave the world. At an earlier point the Communist Chinese said that the best possible world was a world in which everybody had atomic bombs, but lately they have turned off that tune. In fact, ever since they made their own bombs they have stopped endorsing all-out proliferation, they now are instead saying that it is alright for a nation to build such bombs, but it must do so all by itself, the implication being: do not come to Peking asking for help.

Countries that could make the bomb soon, but have not yet done so, and in effect would be signing away something if they agreed to this treaty, constitute an increasingly long list. I should stress that almost all assumptions people used to make about how difficult it was to make nuclear weapons, or what an enormous departure it was from the normal pursuit of civilian goals, are obsolete. There was a time, perhaps ten years ago, where it would have been a substantial and costly venture to make nuclear weapons, something involving great sacrifices to us in the civilian sector. It is becoming more and more true now that one can easily have nuclear weapons simply as a by-product of what one is doing on the civilian side: indeed one would almost have to go out of one's way to avoid having such weapons. If you are going to generate electricity with nuclear power, you are going to produce a by-product called plutonium, which can be used as an explosive, which was used in the bomb that destroyed Nagasaki -- an atomic bomb.

Several countries that matter have signed the treaty, but have not ratified, West Germany and its Euratom partner Italy, and Japan. India has absolutely refused and said that it will never sign this treaty. Brazil has said the same thing. Australia has signed the treaty, but has said that it will think twice about ratifying, as it is not really certain whether it wants to be bound by the NPT.

The kinds of arguments listed in opposition take a number of forms. Firstly, it is politically undignified to have a treaty which says countries in the first class compartment get to have nuclear weapons and countries in tourist

class forever will not; some Italian diplomats I have spoken to have said that this is the first unequal treaty of the twentieth century. There is a general feeling that this forever freezes a distinction between the super powers and other political levels of statehood, and that this would somehow radiate into subservience on other questions. It is an argument that shows up in India, Brazil, Italy and many other countries.

There is also of course a military argument that says: "Well, we might need the bomb someday. What if we have a war with X? Or what if the Russians come storming ashore? Or what if someone threatens us with nuclear weapons? How will we threaten them back?" I am always impressed by the ingenuity of professional soldiers anywhere in finding use for any possible weapon, and I have never yet found a general or admiral who, if asked whether there was any possible use for an atomic bomb in his service, would say no. Japanese Naval Self Defence Force officials have discovered that perhaps they could use it for depth charges to destroy submarines; Turkish generals have visions of using atomic bombs up in the mountain passes, and so do Indians. There is a congenital tendency on the part of military officers to be ready to say: "Oh, yes, we could use that too, if the national interest requires, maybe we should retain the option."

Yet I think by far the most serious objection has been neither political nor military, but economic (an objection to which the South African government has come back most often) since it is actually going to cost money to give up the bomb. As I say, one used to have to pay money to get the bomb, and now one has to pay money to avoid getting it. How is that so? Well, since we have to show the outside world that we are not making nuclear weapons,we have to let people visit and conduct inspection safeguards. But this can be a big nuisance, because they may want to come at four o'clock in the morning -- bad enough four o'clock in the afternoon -- and so we may have to have a trained physicist there to show them around. They may ask us to shut the whole thing down so that they can take it apart to see whether everything is there that is supposed to be and what will you do for electricity in Pretoria that night? If you are Japanese you do not have many physicists that speak English, but the people from the International Atomic Energy Agency who will inspect these reactors do not often speak Japanese, and so you have to provide a bilingual physicist, to waste his time showing inspectors around instead of doing real physics.

There are various kinds of inspection costs. For example, we will have to design a reactor so that it will be more visible, with all the parts accesible for inspection purposes. This may be more expensive than one designed in the most efficient way. There is the further question of who is going to pay the salaries of the various inspectors involved. Related to that is the fear that the inspector will not just come to inspect, but will do some "moonlighting", i.e. make some money on the side by walking off with commercial secrets and selling them to commercial competitors. Typically, West Germans are diplomatic enough to say that they only fear commercial espionage, carried on by Russians; but one quickly sees that it is not the Russians they are worried about, but General Electric and Westinghouse, since the Russians could not make much use of what the Germans are doing -- the Germans are too far ahead -- but General Electric certainly could. When GE is trying to sell a reactor in Argentina by beating out Siemens, no holds are barred, and all tricks are clean. Such fears have been expressed in South Africa, in particular, as new processes are developed -- for example, new ways of enriching uranium. As soon as the South Africans showed such processes to an inspector, to prove that you were not making weapons, all the ideas might simply be lifted and

within a month or a year used all over the world, with not so much as a thank you and certainly no royalty payments to those people who devised it.

Well, that sets up the general form of the argument as it has gone. One group of nations is saying that they want to preserve peace, and that the way to preserve peace is to limit the number of people who can use the most horrible weapons ever devised. Another group of nations saying that we have to maintain political integrity, and that we have to maintain military options in case we ever need them, or that we have to protect our industry because otherwise we will be second-grade industrial societies; otherwise, the Americans will do all the major nuclear energy work and other states will just be making handicrafts or what-have-you.

The treaty at this stage is neither a success nor a failure, and it is important to avoid what I think are some premature conclusions by my colleagues on its progress. The treaty was signed in June of 1968 with elaborate fanfare. The invasion of Czechoslovakia took place in August; I keep reminding any Russians I talk to on the NPT that, but for that invasion, many more countries would have signed by now and many more countries would have ratified. There was a nice little chain going of countries regularly signing and ratifying, but everything came to a screeching halt, because this after all was not such a nice example of how big countries were going to respect the rights of little countries. I happened to be in India at the time and one Indian after another said: "You see, if Czechoslovakia had its own bomb, that would never have happened, and does this not prove that we should have our own bomb?"

Several nations that could have made the weapon a long time ago have been very forthcoming in signing and ratifying. Canada after all could have made atomic bombs in 1952. It had uranium, it had the technology, and it had participated in the American bomb projects of World War II. For various reasons Canadians decided a long time ago that it was much more beautiful not to make bombs than to do so. It was much more dignified never to touch the stuff, and Canada has now in effect promised forever not to make this kind of weapon, and to submit to an international inspection assuring all of its neighbours that it never will make the bomb, that the man from Vienna will be able to wander through Canada looking at reactors, looking at power plants and certifying in regular reports that no weapons are being made.

Sweden is another significant country that has done the same thing--significant because it has a vast nuclear technology, and especially because in 1960 Sweden was on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons. In 1960 Swedish public opinion was really in the mood to say: "Why don't we round out our military arsenal by having the very latest in weapons--we Swedes have the very latest in everything else, in aircraft and tanks, and we shall have the very latest in atomic bombs if we make our own." And so you have the remarkable swing, showing how public opinion can sometimes really change, for by now Sweden has signed and ratified a treaty which says that it will never make atomic bombs.

As I suggested, however, most of the other important countries are remaining less firmly committed and let me close by discussing how much difference it has made that South Africa itself has not signed. For one thing, this does make it easier for other countries not to commit themselves. When anyone is out in the cold, in terms of world public opinion, it is easier if they have someone out in the cold with them.

Around the time the treaty was being put forward all the nations that had their qualms about whether they should sign took a look around and said: "Will we be the only ones who are staying out? Will we run the risk of the Russians and the Americans being very angry and taking various economic and political steps to make life miserable for us?" But they knew they were not alone, for there were others, there was Japan and there was South Africa and there was Israel quietly in the wings. And so a sigh of relief was heard and a massive retaliation did not come down on the non-signers and the United States did not cut off all aid and all trade, as each of these nations made it easier for every other one to stand back and to withhold its commitment, to withhold the pledge not to make weapons.

Much more directly related to South Africa are various fears expressed in various parts of the world that South Africans are making the bomb. For example, Black African leaders ask why South Africa refuses to sign this treaty: "Why do they not open up their labs to inspection? Why do they not show every bit of their uranium to an international agency? They must be making the bomb." Whether or not Black African leaders are really seriously worried about this, or whether they are just padding their list of worries, because longer lists look more impressive, is not entirely clear. I suspect that at the moment it is padding the window dressing, but whether it will be that in 1976 or 1978 is something else again. Now, your reaction may be: "Who cares whether the Central African Republic is worried or not, or whether Tanzania is worried. Maybe it is good that they are worried." I must simply remind you how easy it will be in the future for any nation to make an atomic bomb. If I repeat myself on this point, I apologise, but will reiterate that one cannot understress how easy it has become for anyone to make atomic bombs. It is no longer a major question of physics. It is more a problem of engineering and to some extent a problem of plumbing, simply a question of learning the trick of making the fluids go around in a way that they won't all leak and get mixed up; when it is all done you've got something that, if squeezed properly, will explode and kill off an awful lot of people if dropped in the right place. It is apparently the case that the peace-loving Swedes, who don't miss any tricks, have done research on hundreds of ways of making bombs explode, and have proven to their own satisfaction--all this mind you on a "defensive" basis--that almost any form of plutonium can be made somehow to explode if you know how to do it, and that it really is not that hard to design bombs. In fact, if I asked a physicist whether he could assemble a bomb, his typical answer would be: "Could I do it? Most of my graduate students could do it." It is just not that hard anymore; therefore, it is not beyond the realm of the imagination that some of these nations that now express fear that South Africa is making atomic bombs could be propelled by genuine fears--fears that are sometimes artificial and sometimes genuine--to launch a project which by 1982-1984 would produce the bomb in Black Africa. If India started working today to make the bomb, about two years from now at the latest you could have an explosion. And the Indian economy in terms of wealth per capita is considerably lower than the wealth per capita of most Black African states. One simply has to erase the image that a country has to be advanced all across the board, in order to be a menace in this regard. What was true perhaps ten years to fifteen years ago will certainly not be true ten years from now.

There is still one other possibility that exercises the minds of the outside world, about what these South Africans are doing vis-a-vis this grand

scheme of ours to make the world more safe by limiting the spread of this particularly obnoxious kind of weapon. After all, South Africa not only has an advanced technology, but she also has uranium. There are not many places in the world where large quantities of uranium are available, Canada is one, (the Canadians are good guys, remember they have signed the treaty, so that they cannot give it away to anybody except under supervision), and the United States is another country that has uranium and then you go down the list South Africa is the third. You have all this uranium, and whoever worries about any other country making the atomic bomb, asks the question: "Where would they get the uranium to make it with?" By force of circumstance the answer tends to come galloping back to South Africa. Many Arabs are worried about Israel making the bomb: Where would the Israelis get the uranium? Do they have it in their own country? No. Are they on generally good terms with anybody these days who has uranium? Yes, South Africa.

Brazilians say they must make peaceful explosives--which are virtually indistinguishable from atomic bombs--it is just a question of where you blow it up. If you blow it up over the canal it is peaceful, if you blow it up over here, it is a weapon. Do they refuse to sign the treaty? Yes. Do they say that they plan at some point to make these explosives? Yes. Where are they going to get the uranium? Is there a country that Brazil gets along with pretty well that has uranium, and has not promised never to give it away? Yes, South Africa. This reasoning will emerge simply by the force of facts. Any geographic atlas that shows where uranium is to be found shows a lot of blue marks in South Africa and very few elsewhere. If the thought did not occur to people naturally, there is always someone helpful enough to start it going. Those of you who listen to Radio Moscow regularly will know that every once in a while it has a "news item" about Israeli and West German, Brazilian and South African co-operation on nuclear weapons, and that now and then a Czech magazine or some other East European source makes the same charge, rumours which may be entirely malicious and falsified at the point or origin, but which strike a certain number of readers and listeners on the outside as being not impossible.

Israelis are being very cute about the treaty. They are not showing everything they are doing. Isrealis spread rumours every once in a while that they are making the bomb. If they are doing all that, they must be getting uranium from some place, goes the reasoning. Maybe they have it under their sand and maybe they don't. If they don't, the mere fact that South Africa has not signed this treaty, for good or ill, brings the suspicion back to South Africa.

Now much of what I have spun out for you is simply the working of a malicious imagination which looks at these questions somewhat abstractly and then it says: "Since I cannot prove that what I have just imagined is false, perhaps it is true. If I cannot prove to myself that they are not making the bomb, and that they are not giving uranium away indiscriminately to people who are making the bomb, how do I know that they are not? Now, we can do various things with that kind of imagination. The general viewer can say: "Well, I must be getting paranoid; it is time for me to study a different subject." If I am a responsible leader of a country, however, it is my job not to think of other things, but rather to stay with the question until it is somehow reassuringly answered. It is thus possible that a cycle could establish itself at some point whereby the rumours become selffulfilling. Because I

thought you were about to make bombs, maybe I had better do something on my own. Or because I know that you will not really trust me, maybe I had better protect myself, since you, as a result of your distrust, may do something that hurts me.

It isn't too far fetched to look back on various situations of this kind, on other weapons and other wars. An important explanation of why World War I broke out is simply that the mobilisation schemes were so effective on each side. I knew that if you started the mobilisation today, you would have an army twice as big as mine tomorrow; since I could not prove that you had not started mobilising, maybe I had better start myself. But then rumours go back and forth. How do I as the Kaiser assure you as the Tsar that I have not mobilised, and how do you assure me, and don't we both do things in a precautionary way that will lead us into a situation that is worse for both of us? If Argentina and Chile and Brazil refuse to sign the treaty -- they have indeed refused -- if they persist in their avoidance of international safeguards and international inspection, what is going to stop a rumor-mongering campaign from getting going in 1980, in which Argentina rumours lead to Brazilian action, which lead to Argentine confirmation of rumours, in ways that were never intended in the first place? And what is going to stop some sort of an entanglement in which South Africa suddenly gets involved?

I would like to close by referring to various side comments I have heard since being here in South Africa, comments which one also hears in the United States. "It is all very good to talk as you have, but are you saying the cold war is over? Whatever happened to the fact that the Russians maintain a political system that is very antithetical to ours so that we cannot really trust them? Whatever happened to the way the Russians behaved in the past and indeed not so far in the past? The same Russians let the Egyptians slip missiles forward in the Suez Canal zone, just a year ago. Can they be trusted to keep their word on a treaty of this importance and are you not in effect acting as though there were no problem here at all?"

I would suggest that there are at least two different kinds of situations in which the Russians or the Communist Chinese can be trusted, or anyone else should be trusted, regardless of the basic hostilities in which the political systems are involved. One is in the situation where everything that everyone is doing is quite visible, where we would instantly know whether they cheated. For example, we would know immediately if the Russians broke the Test-Ban Treaty by exploding a bomb in the atmosphere, and they would know if we had. As a result of certain kinds of reconnaissance satellites which have been put into orbit, we would pretty quickly know if they have doubled the number of missiles that they have in Siberia, and they will pretty quickly know if we doubled the number of missiles we put into Montana.

The second kind of situation is the case where the treaty does exactly what the Russians want. This applies to the NPT. There is good evidence that Moscow does believe in and want this treaty to take effect, so that it would gain nothing by double-crossing us, even when we cannot watch them. Ask yourself: would it make sense for the Russians to give nuclear weapons away, to their allies or to their friends? If you were a Russian would you really want to give atomic bombs to the Czech Army or the Hungarian Army, or to the East German Army? The answer is clearly and unchallengably, no. The Russians know very well that to give their satellites another kind of weapon is to create very great

potential trouble for the future, either in terms of some small country asserting its independence, or that country getting even for the way the Red Army treated them in World War II, or what-have-you.

I think the same goes vis-a-vis Egypt or India, or the countries of Black Africa: however the Russians feel about Black African states supporting insurgency in South Africa, or however they feel about the Arab states continuing war with Israel, one thing that they decidedly are convinced about is that to have nuclear weapons around in those areas would make everything unpredictable. Nuclear weapons might all too easily then spread to the opposing states, and the war might then get out of hand. In no time at all bombs would be dropping in the Ukraine and in the Southern Soviet Union, and this is just not the kind of a world that a country with so much of a vested interest as the Soviet Union has would want to allow to develop. Indeed, as I argued earlier, the Chinese views are very similar. They realise that it is just a little dangerous to give atomic bombs to Uganda, where next week the regime might be knocked off by some General and you would not know where the atomic bombs went to. This is just not the way anybody who has something going in the world is going to take chances. Therefore, the normal view that the Russians are putting one over on us, so that as soon as we have signed it--we, of course, will be law-abiding--they will on the sly violate it, leaves the question, why and where? Where are the Russians going to give atomic bombs away on the sly? What would they gain by it? They would lose much more than they gain. Indeed, as soon as it came out that they had given bombs to Egypt, the United States would forget about its Treaty obligations and go ahead and let the Israelis have the bomb. Or if the Russians were so foolish as to give East Germany atomic bombs, wouldn't the United States rush ahead very quickly to give bombs to West Germany?

Indeed, the Russians have done more than propose this treaty, they have given evidence that they really mean it. They have done some of the work of pushing a basically unpopular treaty. If the Russians had really been unscrupulous, they could have been in favour of the treaty and been in the mood to live up to it, but they could still have let the United States do all the work. I hear stories about three Americans who came to this country in 1968, to try and convince the South African government that it should sign the treaty, three American government representatives who tried to do the hard sell and did not succeed very well, indeed were making themselves slightly unpopular; that is exactly what happened in any place where the United States has reasonably good relations. But for any country with which Moscow have reasonably good relations, one gets the same story about the Russians. They have done their bit, from a great power point of view, in making themselves unpopular by trying to sell this treaty. In India one gets just as many nasty stories of how the Russians have been pushing this awful treaty as one gets about Americans pushing it.

I submit to you, this in some way is now an an issue that has nothing to do with the Cold War anymore. There are many Cold War issues left. The Cold War is not over, and day by day there are confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East. There is a confrontation between somebody and the United States in Vietnam. Obviously there are many issues left, but the issue of whether or not nuclear weapons should spread is a much more complicated question than any that used to be batted around in the old days of Arms Control Negotiations during the Cold War. It is an issue on which the South African government and the South African people at some point will have to make a very serious decision, as to whether they want to say yes or no.

- - - - -oOo- - - - -

SOUTH AFRICA IN A CHANGING AFRICAN SCENE

Address by the South African Minister of Information, Dr. the Hon. C.P. Mulder, at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London : 5th July, 1971.

I am very conscious of the honour of being able to address so distinguished a forum. I say this because your Institute, or Chatham House, as it is more popularly known, enjoys a world repute for the specialist level of its members and its non-partisan approach to international affairs.

The subject on which I propose to address you is one which I hope will be of interest to you and will provide some small addition to your knowledge and scholarship. My colleagues, Dr. Nic Diederichs, Minister of Finance, and Dr. Hilgard Muller, South Africa's Minister of Foreign Affairs, of course addressed you on previous occasions on different aspects of the South African spectrum. I hope that my speech will indicate to you how we see our position in Africa in relation to future developments on the African continent.

I observe Sir, that some of the objects of your institute are:

> "to promote,
> encourage and facilitate the study and investigation of international affairs, and provide and maintain information on these matters;
>
> to promote the exchange of information, knowledge and thought in this field and the understanding of the circumstances, conditions and views of nations and peoples ...."

Mainly for this reason I have decided to speak today on the subject:

"SOUTH AFRICA IN A CHANGING AFRICAN SCENE"

In the course of my speech I will refer to the relationship of South Africa with the developing Black nations within our borders.

I will also deal with our relations with our immediate neighbouring Black states as well as with our attitude towards the African continent in general and African countries further afield.

We live in a changing world and Africa is, especially since 1960, a fast-changing continent. Independence was given to many African countries. In some of these countries stability and gradual growth in different spheres, were the fruits of this step. In many other African countries the whole system collapsed, and after a period of chaos, riot and civil war, order is gradually returning. Leaders came and went - but in this whole process, Africa was adapting itself to the new changed situation.

The African continent woke up after its sleep of many centuries - the young giant was looking around in the world of the twentieth century asking himself what part he was to play. During this period of adaptation, many ideas, concepts and systems of the previous period were evaluated in the

11/ .....

light of new circumstances. Some were totally rejected, others maintained or reformed to fit into the African concept according to the customs and demands of Africa. In many African countries this process is still continuing.

The fact of the matter is that the continent of Africa is finding its own feet and rightful place in the Third World. The nations of Africa are preparing themselves to play their part.

South Africa not only sincerely wishes them well, but also claims to be part and parcel of the awakening Africa, doing its share in its own way to assist African countries wherever possible and by guiding the nine African nations within our boundaries to full independence and sovereignty, and full participation in international affairs.

South Africa claims to be one of the first African countries to obtain full independence, after its long history of colonial government.

As a matter of fact, we in South Africa had chosen Africa as our one and only fatherland at a time when many European countries still regarded Africa as a dark and backward continent. Mr. Chairman, more than two centuries ago we accepted the name Afrikaners, and called one of our offical languages, Afrikaans, in this way permanently binding ourselves in love and loyalty to the continent of Africa.

By doing this we became really and truly Africans, white Africans, more than two cenutries ago. And this we still claim to be today. Africa has treated us well, and we will serve not only South Africa, but also Africa to the best of our ability.

Far from being left behind, or shunted aside, South Africa has been in the very forefront of the changing African scene. By virtue of her political stability, economic vitality and general capability, she has been able, and willing, to provide the friendship, support and assistance of which many emerging African countries obviously stand in need. South Africa believes that she can make, and has already made, a valuable contribution to the development of other African states and to the peace and security of Africa. South Africa has repeatedly stated that she is at all times prepared to help, as far as is practically possible, other African states to help themselves. She does not believe in give-aways or hand-outs or assistance with strings attached. The aid given must not impair the self-respect of the country concerned - this is the only way in which lasting, long-term development can take place in Africa.

Co-operation must be on a basis of equality; it must be based on the recognition of the sovereign independence of states. Nigeria, for example, will surely and rightly not be prepared to allow South Africa to tell her how to deal with her domestic affairs. In the same way South Africa has the right to solve her problems in her own way. But still these two countries could co-operate, in solving mutual problems of Africa. Only on this basis can there be constructive co-operation and true friendship between states despite possible differences in domestic policies.

Surely, the United States of America does not agree with the domestic policies of Russia or Red China, but that does not prevent her from co-operating with Russia in the space programme, or playing ping-pong in Peking. It is inter-

esting that both President Pompidou and Mr. Heath emphasised that membership of the Common Market did not mean the disappearance of separate national identities or the sacrifice of the essential properties of sovereignty. This is exactly the basis for South Africa's approach to multinational development in South Africa itself as well as in respect of the economic interdependence of the states of Southern Africa. This should also form the basis for co-operation between all African countries. Israel, as you know, has made it clear that she is willing to co-operate with her neighbours, but only on condition that the Hebrew character and identity of Israel is not endangered. The South African nation, for its part, is prepared to co-operate with its immediate, and more distant, neighbours, but it is not prepared to sacrifice its political-cultural identity. We believe in self-determination of nations and equality of people. That is the reason why we are assisting the nine black nations in South Africa to achieve sovereignty and full independence. And we have gone a long way towards success. All of these nations have progressed considerably since 1959. Many black leaders have come forward to speak of the sincerity and integrity of the South African government's attempts, not only to assist them to obtain a better standard of living, but also to obtain political freedom. And may I remind you that this is all being done without any foreign aid or assistance.

We believe that these nine nations must become sovereign independent states in their own right, exactly as free as Ghana, Nigeria, or the United Kingdom, with full membership of the United Nations if they so desire. We also believe that they are entitled to maintain their own languages, cultures and identities in their own way according to their own wishes in their own geographical territories. To achieve all these ends we are not only offering them a helping hand, but are encouraging them as far as possible.

At the same time we also believe that the South African nation is similarly entitled to self-determination and the maintenance of its own identity in exactly the same way.

My Prime Minister has proved himself to be prepared to meet fair requests for greater realism in racial matters in South Africa as far as possible. We know him as a very practical man, who is prepared to face the realities of life. He has stated quite clearly that separate development is not a denial of human values, but that it flows from the acceptance of human values. For this reason he has quite often spoken out and acted to ensure that the dignity of all people in South Africa remains intact.

He is also a courageous man who is prepared to bring about changes, if and where necessary, and even face criticism and a break away from his party, as happened in 1969, when he believes it to be in the interest of South Africa. But, if we are asked to change certain laws and customs in South Africa, - laws and customs which may be unpopular according to world opinion, but which are devised to prevent friction among the different nations and to maintain and protect the identity of the South African nation - if we are asked to change these, then the world is asking too much. The reply must, and will always,remain: "No, we are not prepared to sacrifice our identity as a nation in our own right, or our future, to satisfy the demands of world opinion."

It is true that for a period of time feeling between South Africa and Black Africa was being whipped up by our enemies to an explosive pitch, and the

impression created that racial tension in Africa was rising towards breaking point. And let us face facts: some of our more unscrupulous critics have quite obviously been relishing the prospect of a racial explosion. That, after all, was what they had consistently prophesied, and they were obviously not prepared to be disappointed in their expectations.

That Black Africa could display a measure of understanding of our particular situation and resultant policies, instead of presenting an allout intractibility and hostility, was not, apparently, regarded as within the bounds of possibility. Time is proving that a racial confrontation in Southern Africa is not necessary. And the South African Government, of which I am am a member, certainly does not believe it to be necessary. In fact, we have never believed that it was inevitable.

We believe that there is diversity in the unity of God's creation on earth. We believe that there are well founded differences between people, which do not make them superior or inferior to one another, but distinctly different from one another. These differences, if not guided carefully, with tact and wisdom, will cause friction and may even flare up in war and bloodshed. These differences may be in religion as in India and Pakistan, or in Northern Ireland. These differences may be in language, as in Belgium, Switzerland or Canada. These differences may be in colour and race as in the United States. These differences may be in culture and custom as it is found amongst the various tribes in a whole number of African countries like Nigeria, Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya and others.

These differences have nothing to do with superiority or inferiority, but they cannot be ignored. It is a plain matter of fact, to be accepted and handled with great care, diplomacy and wisdom in order to prevent friction and revolt.

In South Africa we have a combination of all the differences mentioned above, i.e. religion, language, colour, race, culture and customs. It must therefore follow that South Africa has more potential for strife and friction than most countries of the world. And yet I make bold to say that very few countries can equal South Africa's record of peaceful co-existance, stability, economic growth and high standard of living for all its peoples comparatively speaking. Maybe that is the reason why we have to have check points on our borders, not to prevent people from breaking out, but to prevent people from illegally entering South Africa to find employment and a higher standard of living. And I have never heard of free people voluntarily trying to slip into a police state (as South Africa is often made out to be) to be suppressed and belittled. We firmly believe that in the fullness of time common sense and rational thinking will prevail over misunderstanding, emotion and, in some cases, downright illwill.

What has encouraged us in this belief more than anything, have been the good and improving relations we have long had with the Black nations in South Africa as well as in our immediate proximity; with countries like Malawi, Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana. Dialogue with the Black people of South Africa takes place every day. Perhaps I might mention, for example, that since January of this year, full delegations of at least three Black developing nations in South Africa have been to Cape Town and had official discussions with my colleague responsible for Bantu Administration and Development, as well as with our Prime Minister. Round table conferences took place and matters of mutual interest were discussed at length. Press

interviews were arranged after these meetings and the Black leaders spoke out clearly on this dialogue between the South African Government and the Black developing nations in our midst. Subsequently the leaders of the Vendas and the North Sothos had official discussions with the Prime Minister. Only last week Mr. Wessel Motla, leader of the South Sothos at Witzieshoek, visited Pretoria to negotiate, while Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, the leader of the Zulus, who has just returned from a visit to the United States, had discussions with Mr. Vorster last Tuesday. According to my information, Mr. Kaiser Matanzima, Chief Minister of the Transkei, Chief Lucas Mangope, leader of the Tswanas, and Chief Buthelezi of the Zulus will visit Europe later this year, and will be able to speak for themselves on the future relations between their countries and South Africa.

Political leaders from independent states such as Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho, the Malagasy Republic, Mauritius and Malawi visited South Africa recently and fruitful discussions took place.

Dr. Verwoerd started the dialogue with our neighbouring Black states when he had discussions with Prime Minister Jonathan of Lesotho in September 1966. Mr. Vorster has continued and extended this practice and even paid a visit to Malawi last year. Dr. Banda will reciprocate later this year when he officially visits Pretoria as Head of State of Malawi.

These people after all know us best, and if they can see sincerity in our intentions, it is possibly just a matter of time, or of opportunity, before other states in Africa gain a more realistic insight into what we in South Africa are trying to do. Our friendship with these neighbouring states has not remained purely a matter of exchanging courtesies and civilities; it has assumed in many cases a concrete form. Realising that they are developing states that have had to come to grips with various development problems, we are doing what we can to assist them.

Assistance has been given in the form, for example, of famine relief, supply of electricity, provision of health and welfare services, signing of trade agreements to ensure markets for agricultural produce, the planning, designing and constructing of various projects, and the provision of low-interest loans, while the private sector in South Africa has been responsible for the opening of hotels, factories, plants and works, as well as the construction of railway lines and the building up of a physical infra-structure.

I can mention numerous further examples of definite assistance to these and many other African countries, but do not wish to dwell on this aspect, as it may perhaps cause embarrassment to some of these states.

The degree of economic and other co-operation between South Africa and her immediate neighbouring states is far advanced. These states not only form a customs union with South Africa, but also a monetary union. The Republic provides employment for a large percentage of their labour force, as also a ready market for their produce. Directly and indirectly they benefit from the South African infra-structure, such as transport, harbours, power grid, communications, health services, industry and technology, and research institutions in virtually every field of activity.

From this secure basis of friendly relations with our immediate neighbours, we are now reaching out towards an extension of the friendly areas in Black Africa, and the past year in particular has brought significant developments.

There has been, first of all, a closer relationship with a number of these countries. Trade Missions have been exchanged and official visits were paid by leaders and ministers for the purpose of discussing the co-operation and assistance, technical and otherwise, that South Africa would be able to render.

In March this year, Dr. Muller, speaking on a motion in the South African Assembly approving the Government's policy of friendly relations and co-operation with other states in Africa, said that "hardly a week passed without South Africa having discussions with states in Africa." A week or two later, our Prime Minister, Mr. John Vorster, in the course of his press conference made it clear that he would not only welcome a dialogue with Black African leaders but that such a dialogue could well include a discussion of the policy of separate development. Our Prime Minister said:

> "I will welcome the opportunity to discuss it with everybody concerned for the simple reason that more nonsense has been written and spoken about separate development than about any other subject that I know of. I will make use of the opportunity to explain what separate development is, that it is not what people think it is."

The Prime Minister has made it clear that South Africa is prepared to discuss any matter affecting peace and prosperity in Africa with other leaders in Africa on a basis of equality.

Late in April the President of the Ivory Coast, M. Felix Hophouët-Boigny, made a statement advocating direct talks with South Africa, and calling on other African leaders to follow him. This forthright statement, taken in conjunction with views expressed by other African leaders, such as Prime Minister Busia of Ghana, President Bongo of Gabon, President Banda of Malawi, President Tsiranana of Malagasy and Prime Minister Jonathan of Lesotho, signals a new attitude in Africa.

This is not to say that one should expect radical achievements in the short term. There are bound to be set-backs, disappointments, hindrances. A great deal of hard work and patience from all concerned lie ahead. Nevertheless there is good reason to believe that we are entering a new era.

I believe that the future of Africa has to be decided and determined in the first place by its own peoples; by Black and White African states. The United Kingdom has played its part in Africa in the previous decade, and so have France, Belgium, Italy, Germany, Spain and other countries. In future most of these countries will be mainly interested observers with indirect interests, while we will be direct participants. We have a duty towards Africa, more so than towards any other continent on the globe.

To return to the general topic of South Africa playing its part in a changing Africa, which is the main theme of this address, South Africa is well equipped appreciably to assist its neighbours and other friendly states in their development. Whatever people may say about South Africa, they cannot deny its economic pre-eminence on a continent which has always battled to make its way, a continent where poverty, ignorance and disease have flourished far better than have high living standards. In South Africa, taking into consideration all the challenges and moods of an ever changing Africa, a modern technostructure has been created on, and

out of, the African soil. This benefits not only the black and white nations in South Africa, but also many African nations further afield.

South Africa's Foreign Trade figures for 1969 provide some very interesting reading. South Africa's imports from Africa amounted to R111,000,000 which puts Africa fifth after the United Kingdom, the United States, Western Germany and Japan, while the export figure of R255,000,000 puts Africa second only to the United Kingdom.

My country can and will, if the goodwill and co-operation between ourselves and the rest of Africa are forthcoming, make a contribution to the continent's development and welfare. We have, after all, already achieved for the developing nations in South Africa, excellent educational, medical, housing, transport and employment facilities and conditions.

I believe in the future of the African continent. It has the natural resources, it has gold, coal, diamonds, platinum, antimony, vanadium, chrome, asbestos, manganese, iron, copper, uranium, oil, it has vast open spaces which can be developed, it has the vegetation, the timber, the water, the climate - but above all, it has the human resources, people, Black and White, who really love Africa and are prepared to play their part in developing this vast pioneering continent. Even if it takes many years, Africa may well become the continent of the future.

What I do think is essential now, as between South Africa and Black African countries, is that we talk with one another, that we understand one another, and accept one another. I think that once we get to know more about one another, understanding and acceptance will follow. No doubt there are aspects on which we can criticise one another. We in South Africa do not regard ourselves as being above criticism; as a matter of fact, we have made mistakes in the past and we will make mistakes in the future, because we are human and therefore fallible.

Similarly, other nations, in Africa, and elsewhere, have policies which we feel quite able to criticise, should we feel so inclined. Negative criticism and condemnation will take us nowhere. But if we are prepared to accept one another's bona fides, we in Africa shall be well on our way towards peaceful and beneficial co-existence.

Then I think we in Africa will be able to come face to face with the real problems of our continent. Then the different ways in which different countries run their own domestic affairs, can be regarded as relatively insignificant compared with other challenges facing Africa. Then we shall all realise that we are wasing time and energy criticising one another, and that we should rather provide for the real needs of Africa, which are better education, more health facilities, bigger economic development, improvement in the field of agriculture, further industrial expansion, better housing and improved living conditions for all. Then we shall also realise that the real danger is communist infiltration - whether it be Russian or Red Chinese - and that we should forget our small squabbles and differences and create better understanding amongst all African countries.

In the light of this, South Africa's formal offer of non-agression pacts with African countries, proves our bona fides, and offers the possibility to form a common front to combat communist infiltration.

These are the real problems facing us Black and White Africans, and in this gigantic project, South Africa shall try to play her humble, but very essential, part.

- - - - - - - oOo - - - - - -

THE SUDAN: THE JULY COUPS AND THE SOVIET UNION

David Hirschmann

The Sudan is the largest country in Africa covering an area of 976,275 square miles. It consists principally of a sprawling plateau encompassing disparate environments, from the sandy deserts of the north to the central grassy plains and tropical swamps and rain forests in the south. It has a 400-mile Red Sea coastline and is bordered also by Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, the Congo, Chad, Libya and the Central African Republic.

Its population of about 15 million includes 600 tribes comprising 56 tribal groups, but can be divided into two principal ethnic and religious groups. About two-thirds of the population are Moslem Arabs and Nubians inhabiting the Sudan's six northern provinces. The population of the three southern provinces - Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and the Upper Nile - comprises Nilotic and Negro tribes, generally Christian or animist in faith. Over three-quarters of the population is rural and life expectancy is only 40 years. About 85% of the Sudanese are illiterate.

Long-staple cotton is the principal export; more than half the gross national product is derived from agriculture, fishing and forestry. The economy is dependent on the Nile and its tributaries to provide vital irrigation. There is little industry. United States aid was cut off when diplomatic ties were broken after the Arab-Israel war of June, 1967. The Soviet Union is now the Sudan's biggest customer under a barter agreement.

The northern part of the present Sudan, Nubia, was originally colonized by Egypt in the pre-Christian era. The north was forcibly converted to Islam by Arab conquests in the 15th century that gradually extended downward to the south. In 1822 Mohammed Ali Pasha, Viceroy of Egypt under the Turkish Empire, sent forces to conquer it. He unified the country with its present boundaries for the first time and established a Turco-Egyptian rule which continued for several decades. In 1881 Mohammed Ahmed, The Mahdi, backed by tens of thousands of Sudanese raised the standard of revolt and overthrew the Egyptians in a great religious crusade. In 1898 Anglo-Egyptian forces under Lord Kitchener reconquered it at the battle of Omdurman. The Sudan remained under British-Egyptian rule until 1956 when an independent Republic was proclaimed.

A large factor in the Sudan's political instability has been the continuing separatist rebellion in the south. Hostility between south and north goes back to the 19th century, when Arab slave traders flourished in the south. In August, 1955, southern Sudanese troops mutinied amid rumours that when independence came the country would be dominated by the Moslem northerners. The struggle has been estimated to have cost more than 500,000 lives. In 1970 Major-General Jaafar al-Nimeiry offered the south regional autonomy within a unified Sudan; however southern suspicion was reawakened by his interest in joining the Federation of Arab Republics.

Coup and Counter Coup

On 19th July, 1971 a group of army officers calling themselves the Free Officers' Organization seized power, a seven-man Revolution Command Council

18/ .....

was formed and 36 year old Major Hashim Atta, who led the coup, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Three members of the Command Council, the Chairman, Lt.-Col. Babikir Nur Osman, the Deputy-Chairman, Major Hashim Mohammed Atta, and Major Farouq Osman Hamadallah, had been dismissed in November, 1970, from Nimeiry's Government for passing Council decisions to the Communist party during a purge of communists and their sympathisers. The Sudanese Communist party moved swiftly and overtly to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the coup, but to what extent the party was involved in the planning of the coup is unclear.

The coup appeared to have gone without a hitch, and so confident was Atta that he imposed no restrictive measures. His optimism, however, led him into error: he made no effort to placate non-Communist public opinion, nor to indicate that Arab unity was an aim of his regime, and, most important, he underestimated the possibility of intervention by foreign countries which might feel themselves threatened by his revolt.

The first evidence of outside interference came when Libya seized a BOAC plane and removed from it two of the proposed leaders of the new Command Council. Then early on the morning of 22 July Egypt transferred 2,000 Sudanese paratroops from the Suez to Jebel Aulia, an Egyptian airforce base near Khartum. Jebel Aulia also contains the Egyptian Military Academy which Nasser transferred from Cairo to place it out of the reach of the Israelis. Officers of the Academy and the 2,000 returned troops are reported to have played a decisive role in the counter-coup which turned the tables on Atta, returned Nimeiry to power, and brought down a terrible vengeance on the Communist party. Nimeiry in his first broadcast appealed to his people:

> "I would like every person in the Armed Forces and among the people to embark on a search to-day for every renegade communist who belongs to the communist party, to arrest him and immediately inform the nearest police or Army post. They are traitors. I hereby declare, I hereby warn that anyone who tries to hide any outlaw will be treated just as the plotter is treated."

Nimeiry then set about crushing the party by arresting thousands of its members and by executing those of its top leaders whom he could lay his hands on, including Abdul Khalik Mahgoub, Joseph Garany and Shajie Ahmed Shaikh, all men of great ability. Mahgoub was the most important leader of the largest, best organised and most broadly based communist party in the Arab world, and he had held that position for nearly ten years.

And the Soviet Union

It has become a general rule of Soviet policy to maintain good relations with the governments of third world countries, irrespective of their treatment of local communists. Because of the strength of the Communist party in the Sudan, however, Moscow chose to make an exception and back the coup. Russia's ambassador in Khartum made a precipitate call on the new rebel leaders and, also precipitately, Russia called on President Sadat of Egypt to recognise the new regime. Radio Moscow reported every public comment made against Nimeiry, strongly condemned the execution of leading communists, and the Kremlin gave its blessing to anti-Nimeiry demonstrations in Moscow.

On 29th July Izvestia published an article entitled "Slaughter in the Sudan", which contained the following points:

> "More and more reports are coming in about the ruthless persecution, wholesale arrests and execution of patriots in the Sudan. An atmosphere of savage terror against all progressive forces, and above all against the communists, has been created in the Sudan.
>
> "An attempt has been made to draw the entire population into acts of terrorism. For instance, an address was broadcast over the radio urging the population to search for communists and take them to the nearest police station or military unit. This, in actual fact, looks like inciting the population to make short work of them.
>
> "More than a thousand people have already been arrested. In many areas searches are continuing to find new victims for reprisal. Six military tribunals are permanently at work. Hearings are hastily held in the course of which the basic standards of legality are violated. The defendants are given no opportunity to appeal against the tribunals, decisions, and death sentences are carried out immediately they have received the approval of General Nimeiry.
>
> "All this gives grounds for the conclusion that in the Sudan a policy is being pursued which is aimed at the complete liquidation of the Sudanese Communist Party and at the destruction of its leaders, activists and rank-and-file communists.....
>
> "The Soviet people show profound sympathy for the liberation struggle of the Arab peoples, including the Sudanese people and they treasure Soviet-Arab friendship, but they resolutely condemn the mass terror in the Sudan. The Soviet public raises its voice in defence of the victims of ruthless persecution and expresses the hope that the principles of the national democratic revolution, in accordance with the interests of the anti-imperialist unity of the Sudanese people and their striving for social progress will be restored in the Sudan."

The Soviet decision to back the coup and the local communists and to attack Nimeiry turned out to be a serious blunder, which has already dealt a severe blow to Soviet-Sudanese relations and caused a serious setback to Russian intentions in a country of great potential importance as a link between Black Africa and the Arab world. The economic realities of Sudan's dependence on the Soviet Union - 80% of its trade is with Warsaw pact countries and great reliance has been placed on Soviet advisers - will probably prevent a formal breach of diplomatic relations. Nevertheless the Kremlin must already be counting its losses.

The strength of the communist party in the Sudan held out a promise, unique in the region, of Russia ultimately establishing an ideological relationship with the country's rulers. This chance has been lost, as demonstrated by Nimeiry's decision to send home the second in command of the Russian Embassy and to lay off the Russian advisers. The naval opportunities offered at

20/ .....

Port Sudan are no longer open, and the Soviet drive southward has been temporarily thwarted. Furthermore the Sudanese have strongly denounced Soviet trading practices claiming that the Russians have been charging them prices up to 30% above world market levels and have been undercutting them in world markets by selling cotton at 10% discount.

To make matters worse for the Russians the Chinese have made it clear to the Sudanese that they will be only too happy to increase substantially present levels of trade and economic co-operation. Next year trade with Peking will probably double, and the Chinese have said there will be no problem about arranging interest free loans. The Sudan is also keen to re-establish good economic relations with Britain, and the Ministry of the Treasury has been assigned to visit London to take up the question of a loan.

Finally the reaction of Arab governments must have been a severe disappointment to Moscow. The fact that Iraq was the only Arab country to recognise the three-day Atta regime demonstrates how out of step the Russians were with the Arab world. When the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo called on President Sadat to recognise Atta's government, Sadat is reported to have replied: "You should know that we Arabs will never be Marxists. That is why we cannot allow a Communist regime to exist in the Arab world." Though he must thus have been aware of Moscow's support for Atta, Sadat still went ahead to aid the counter-coup - this in spite of a formal treaty with the Soviet Union. Once again Arab leaders have cause to watch more closely the growing Soviet influence in their countries.

B R I E F R E P O R T S

- Prepared by the Staff of the Institute -

African Development Bank

The seventh annual conference of the African Development Bank was held in Kampala, Uganda from 26 July to 1 August, 1971. (Zambia, Tanzania and Guinea stayed away because they refuse to recognise the Amin government. Congo, Brazzaville, and Rwanda were also absent.)

The original agreement establishing the Bank was signed in Khartum in August 1963. The Bank was set up as an agency of the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) with the object of becoming an important agency in helping to overcome the economic problems caused by state frontiers bequeathed by the colonial powers, particularly by backing projects which affect more than one state, by harmonising development plans of different states and by assisting weaker African states when in difficulty.

The initiative came from ECA which produced a document emphasising the need for economic co-operation in development finance. The document pointed out that, excluding Egypt, South Africa and Nigeria, there were about 40 countries or countries-to-be in Africa, averaging about 4 million people per country. Of these people only half, i.e. 2 million, had any contact with a market economy, and their average cash purchasing power corresponded to approximately one-twentieth of that of an average inhabitant of Europe. Thus they represented a cash market equivalent to a moderate size European town of 100,000 inhabitants. ECA concluded that, in the same way that it did not make sense in Europe to have separate plans and financing institutions for each individual town of 100,000, regardless of what went on in the next town, so a purely national approach to planning and financing economic development in Africa was no more sensible.

Outlining the past year's progress at the recent Kampala conference the Bank's president, Mr. A. Labidi of Tunisia, announced that the Banks commitments rose from £7.5 million in June 1970 to about £14 million in June 1971. The programme of action for the three years 1971-1973 envisaged investments totalling about £28 million, of which 25% would be devoted to agricultural projects and 30% to transport projects.

One of the principal issues debated was a proposed change in the Bank's charter to permit the participation of non-African countries in its capital. The strongest opposition to this idea came from Somalia whose govenor argued that offers by developed countries to participate in the Bank's capital were politically motivated and incompatible with the Bank's status as "an institutionalized form of Pan-Africanism". The Bank, he said, had a definite political as well as financial role. Also opposed were the Algerian, Malian and Sudanese delegations.

The strongest support for the idea came from Malawi, whose governor said non-African participation and the setting up of the development fund were complementary projects, both of which should be implemented. His views were endorsed by Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia and Morocco.

22/ .....

A decision was taken to set up an African Development Fund to be an adjunct to the Bank and channel soft loans from developed countries to the developing countries in Africa. It is planned to draw up a final agreement for approval at the 1972 conference, due to be held in Algiers.

Swaziland, whose accession to the Bank's Agreement, became effective on 27th July, became its 33rd member. The Botswana Assistant Minister of Finance and Development Planning, Mr. B.K. Kgari, attended as an observer at the invitation of the Bank. A resolution was passed recommending acceptance of Botswana's application for membership, thus clearing the way for Botswana to become the 34th member.

- - - - - - - - - - -

Liberia : Tolbert Succeeds Tubman

On 23rd July, 1971, President William V.S. Tubman, aged 75, one of Black Africa's senior statesmen died in a London hospital. Less than five hours later Vice-President William R. Tolbert, aged 58, was sworn in as Liberia's nineteenth President since the establishment of the country in 1847.

Tubman was born in 1895. He studied law and was called to the bar in 1917. From 1919 to 1922 he was collector of internal revenue in Maryland county. He served as a senator from 1923 to 1931, and again from 1934 to 1937. He was an associate Justice of the Supreme Court from 1937 to 1944. In 1944 he succeeded Edwin Barclay as President of the Republic and leader of the True Whig Party. He was re-elected in 1951, 1955, 1959, 1963, 1967 and again in May 1971. In his 28 years of rule he made increasing efforts to include the interior tribes within the national framework and succeeded in structuring a rapidly growing economy. He followed a practical and conciliatory approach in African affairs, and from early in the sixties stood out as one of the leaders of the moderate group.

William Tolbert commenced his political career in the same year that Tubman became President, when he was elected to the House of Representatives. In 1951 he was elected Vice-President and held that post under Tubman for 20 years. Though he has succeeded by virtue of constitutional provisions, it is believed in Liberia that he offers the best chance of continued stability and further economic development. He was Tubman's choice to succeed to the Presidency, he enjoys the support of all leading politicians (including Shad Tubman, his son-in-law, and son of the late President), and, for a prominent Liberian politician, he has relatively close ties with tribes of the hinterland.

In a continent where coups and attempted coups have been reported from almost every country in the past decade, and examples of peaceful, constitutional succession are rare, the smooth manner in which Tolbert has taken over and continued administering the country says a great deal for the political experience built up in the 124 years of independence as well as for the satisfactory growth of the economy.

If Tolbert wishes to maintain peaceful development in his country, however, he will have to make a concerted effort to include the people of the interior in the political mainstream, and to spread the growing wealth of the country beyong the Americo-Liberian establishment to the rest of the country.

- - - - - - - - - - -

Latin America

a) Haiti: The last SAIIA Newsletter (1971, No. 3) described the transition of power from Papa Doc Duvalier to his son Jean-Claude. No sooner had that article been written than Haiti faced its first political crisis since the succession. The dispute which arose was reportedly over the imprisonment of a cousin of the President's elder sister, Marie-Denise; in fact, however, it was symptomatic of a very real division within the group that shares power. Marie-Denise and her husband, Max Dominique, were said to be pressing for a speedier liberalization of the regime. Luckner Cambronne, Minister of Interior and Defence, Adrien Raymond, Foreign Minister,and Claude Raymond, Commander-in-Chief, have spent their lives in the service of Duvalierism and opposed changes in a system they understand and which has brought them power and wealth.

The latter group appears to have emerged victorious, and Marie-Denise and her husband have flown off to Paris. It is unclear to what extent Jean-Claude was an independent agent in his choice of supporting the conservative Ministers against his sister. One view is that he is a mere puppet ruler, completely under the control of Cambronne and his Ministers, and another that he is heavily dependent upon his mother, Mrs. Simone Duvalier, for advice.

b) Cuba: Diplomatic sources at the Organisation of American States in Washington are reported to be expecting shortly moves to withdraw the mandatory character of the sanctions imposed on Cuba seven years ago. A majority of the 23 voting members is believed to be attainable for such a resolution, which would apparently require only a simple majority. A resolution lifting sanctions completely would, however, require a two-thirds majority, and this is almost certainly not attainable. With Argentina and Venezuela said to be considering restoring diplomatic ties with Castro's government, it does appear that an end to Havana's diplomatic ostracism is imminent. The re-entry of Cuba to the OAS, however, is highly unlikely, Castro having indicated that he has no wish to rejoin.

c) Territorial Waters: There is a possibility of a compromise being reached between the nine Latin American states which claim territorial waters of 200 miles, and other maritime nations which maintain that a 12 mile limit is preferable. Peru, the leading spokesman for the nine at a UN Seabed Conference in Geneva, announced that navigation, overflight and other international communications need not be affected, if some agreement could be reached regulating the preservation and utilization of both living and non-living resources. This would satisfy the requirements of both sides and would probably lead to Peru abandoning its claim to full sovreignty over the entire 200 mile area. The Venezuelan Foreign Minister suggested that a distinction be drawn between territorial waters and maritime resources, while a Chilean jurist said that the 200 mile claim should be limited to economic rights only.

- - - - - - - - - - -

24/ .....

Oil Prospecting in Lesotho

On 13th September 1971 the Lesotho National Development Corporation announced that it had in principle accepted a bid from Ponder Oils of Winnipeg, Canada, to prospect for natural oil in a selected area of about 17,000 square kilometres within Lesotho.

The first year of operation will entail geological investigations and gravity and magnetic surveys. Drilling will start in the second year on structural prospects determined during the first year. Ponder Oils is expected to start operations towards the end of the year.

Should the prospecting lead to further developments, the LNDC will share in 30% of the development cost and income.

- - - - - - - - - - -

Appointment of American Ambassador to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland

A new development in the relations of the United States with the countries of Southern Africa is the recent appointment of an Ambassador, Mr. Charles Nelson, to South Africa's three neighbours: Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. The United States was previously represented by a Chargé d' Affaires in each of these countries.

According to a statement issued by the U.S. Information Service, Mr. Nelson is a black foreign service officer and since 1968 he has served as Director of the U.S.Agency for International Development (AID) mission in Tanzania. Previously he held posts with AID as Director of North African Affairs and as Director of the Office of Development Resources. He has also served with the Peace Corps in Africa and in the Office of Program Development and Co-ordination, Washington.

Ambassador Nelson will also serve as co-ordinator of U.S. economic assistance for the three countries. He will reside initially in Gaborone, Botswana.

When he presented his credentials to the President of Botswana on 14 September, Ambassador Nelson spoke of his government's readiness to help Botswana's development effort, and "to assist in Botswana's efforts to strengthen its associations with other African nations. An example is of course our participation in helping to bring into reality the Botswana-Zambia road link." He referred to the "unique role" of the new states of Southern Africa, and in particular to Botswana's non-racial democracy which he said constituted "a model that might might well be studied by other African states".

In his reply the President, Sir Seretse Khama, said: "We recognise that, while we do have a modest but significant role to play in achieving change in Southern Africa, we cannot sustain that role single-handed. For this reason, we welcome American assistance, not only for the tangible benefit it brings us in our attempts to improve the living standards of our people, but also because it serves to demonstrate that the United States of America shares our desire that the values of non-racialism and democracy which are common to our two Republics should eventually triumph throughout Southern Africa."

(continued on page 26)

RECENT ACQUISITIONS BY THE LIBRARY AT JAN SMUTS HOUSE

Ball, Howard and Lauth, Thomas P., eds.
Changing Perspectives in Contemporary Political Analysis, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall Inc. 1971.

Beaufre, André
The Suez Expedition 1956, transl Barry, Richard, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1969.

Contini, Paolo
The Somali Republic : An Experiment in Legal Integration, London, Frank Cass and Company, 1969.

Denton, G.R., ed.
Economic Integration in Europe, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969.

Drachkovitch, Milorad M, ed.
Marxism in The Modern World, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1965.

Eisenhower, Dwight David,
The Papers of, The War Years, 5 Vols., Baltimore, The John Hopkins Press, 1970.

Forsyth, M.G., Keens-Soper, H.M.A., and Savigear, P., eds.
The Theory of International Relations, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1970.

Hanna, Sami A., and Gardner, George H.
Arab Socialism, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1969.

Johnston, G.A.,
The International Labour Organisation, London, Europe Publications, 1970.

Liddell-Hart, B.H.,
Strategy, An Indirect Approach, Fourth ed., London, Faber and Faber, 1967.

Lipson, Leslie
The Great Issues of Politics, Fourth ed., New Jersey, Prentice-Hall Inc., 1970.

Nelson, William R., ed.
The Politics of Science, Readings in Science, Technology and Government, London, Oxford University Press, 1968.

Park, Richard L.
India's Political System, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall Inc., 1967.

Pike, Douglas
War, Peace and the Viet Cong, Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1969.

26/ .....

Pye, Lucian W.
Southeast Asia's Political Systems, Comparative Asian Government Series, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall Inc, 1967.

Pye, Lucian W., ed.
Cases in Comparative Politics - Asia, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1970.

Ward, Robert E
Japan's Political System, Comparative Asian Government Series, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall Inc., 1967.

Triska, Jan F. and Finley, David D.
Soviet Foreign Policy, New York, Macmillan, 1968.

- - - - - - - - - -

(continued from page 24)

The President also mentioned the Botswana-Zambia road project, to which Botswana, he said, attached great significance. Its successful realization would no doubt stand out in the minds of the people of his country "as the most outstanding example of America's determination to help in equipping us for our chosen role".

(Quotations from Botswana Daily News, 15 September, 1971.)

- - - - - - - - - -