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1972 No. 4

DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT

VAN

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THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS  
DIE SUID - AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE

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S.A.I.I.A. NEWSLETTER/NUUSBRIEF

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## THE UNITED NATIONS AND SOUTH AFRICA

by

Dr. W. Pfeiffenberger

I shall try to deal with some political questions concerning South Africa's relations with the world organization, the competence of the latter according to the UN-Charter, the political implications of the present UN policy and the prospects for future UN actions vis-à-vis South Africa. I shall neither try to justify the world organization's actions nor do I intend to defend South Africa's position, although much of what I am going to say will have the appearance of one or the other intention. I shall also not deal with South Africa's home policy, since I did not come to this country to judge its political institutions but to study them. What I propose to do, is to look at the last twenty-five years' events from the angle of an impartial observer who is, however, very much interested in the improvement of the world organization's influence and to ask for the chance of such an improvement.

As you all know, the Republic of South Africa has two unresolved issues before the United Nations, that of its policy of Apartheid and that of the former mandate of South West Africa. All of you know the merits of these two cases better than I do, so I will not go into these merits but shall only investigate the effects of these issues on the activity and the competences of the world organization.

When the Charter of the United Nations was being drafted during the last World War, probably no one could really foresee the actual development of this forthcoming political forum after the war. To give you one characteristic example of what was generally thought to be the future pattern of international relations, let me quote you the American Secretary's of State address to Congress on 18 November, 1943:

"At the end of the war each of the United Nations and each of the nations associated with them will have the same common interest in national security, in world order under law, in peace, in full promotion of the political, economic and social welfare of their respective peoples - in the principles and spirit of the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration by United Nations ...

As the provisions of the four-nations declaration are carried into effect, there will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power, or any other of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests." (1)

This was clearly the concept of Roosevelt's "one world" which ignored the "two worlds" of ideology and did not yet know the aspirations of the forthcoming "third world". It was at the same time a rather abstract concept which could easily be expressed during the war, when the political situation was quite different from what was to ensue from this alliance against the Axis Powers. Germany and Japan had, of course, their own ideas of a

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(1) United States Department of State Publications, "The Moscow Conference", Publication 2027, Washington 1943, pp.4, 5, 6.

new world order after the war which were certainly more to their liking but resembled those of the allies in the lack of realism as to the future harmony among the victors.

When the exact wording of the new UN Charter and the competences of its political organs had to be stipulated however, it was no longer a just peace based on universal harmony which counted most, but power and the individual security of the Great Powers. The very persons who had spoken more or less unrealistically about future peace during the war became quite realistic at the end of the war when they were to handle their actual power within the framework of the United Nations. For this new, much more realistic attitude of the Great Powers on questions of security, world order, and peace, the New Zealand complaint about the four sponsoring Power's opposition to the smaller states' demand for a just and democratic peace stands as one of many instances:

"For their part, the Great Powers explained with a great show of cogency that, after all, it was they who had won the war, it was they who had made the sacrifices, it was they who in the post-war period would dispose of the vast preponderance of the power necessary in the last resort to support the decisions of the Organisation." (2)

By whatever proposal the smaller states attempted to subject the "great peace-loving powers", as they called themselves, to a democratic approach to international relations, they encountered the latter's opposition and accusations that they would destroy the whole alliance for peace if they did not recognize the old power system. Thus, the Soviet Foreign Minister did not hesitate to warn the smaller States as early as 26 April 1945, in the cold war style:

"The opponents of the creation of such an international organization have not laid down their arms. They are carrying on their subversive activities even now, though in most cases they are doing it in a latent and veiled form. For these purposes they frequently use ostensibly the most democratic watchwords and arguments, including the professed protection of the interests of small nations or of the principles of the equity and equality of nations. But in the end it is not important what reasons of protection have been used to disrupt the establishment of an effective organization of the security of nations." (3)

Taking into consideration this stubborn rejection of supranational proposals by the Great Powers, it seems to me to be a historic truism that the United Nations Organization would not have come into existence if, let us say, a majority of small states, had insisted on binding majority decisions of the General Assembly as the general representative organ. In fact, such deadlocks occurred from time to time as, for instance, in the fourth commission of the San Francisco Conference, when the majority of states adopted a proposal against the votes of the Great Powers qualifying the International Court of Justice for compulsory jurisdiction. It was equally no accident that the sanctionary powers of the Organisation were exclusively vested with the Security Council which is bound by the unanimity

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(2) United Nations Conference on International Organization - Report on the Conference, Department of External Affairs, Wellington 1945, Publication No. 11, p. 77.

(3) Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO), San Francisco 1945, Vol I, General, p. 135.

rule of its permanent members. The same applies to the question of domestic jurisdiction. In 1945 no one wanted the world organization to intervene in matters which by tradition are subject to the internal competence of every single state. The renunciation of sovereign rights in favour of the United Nations was not the intended purpose of the fathers of the Charter. It is clearly shown in the documents of the San Francisco Conference and it found its expression in Article 2 (7) of the Charter. The words "solely within the domestic jurisdiction" as stated in the League of Nations Charter have been changed into "essentially", in order to exclude all possible interferences from the organization and even widen the scope of internal matters. With regard to human rights and especially to Article 1 (3) of the Charter which proposes "to achieve international cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion", the delegate of Costa Rica expressed an absolutely undisputed opinion of the conference when he said:

"It is certain that if the word 'promote' is understood as implying the power to constrain the States or to provoke a social movement of whatever orientation within their frontiers, such a principle could never be admitted by anyone of them. One should specify that the activity of the Organization in this sphere will be exclusively of a spiritual nature." (4)

Thus, while the Security Council's competence within the internal sphere of member states was expressly limited to matters which, though essentially within the domestic jurisdiction, constitute at least a threat to international peace and thus are subject to sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter, the General Assembly was to have no power whatsoever within the so-called "domaine réservé". It is, moreover, clearly stated in Article 11 (2) that the Assembly has only been given the power of making noncommittal recommendations to member states or to other UN organs. Any interpretation to the contrary would have destroyed the whole United Nations organization from the very beginning.

Here, the question arises: did the Charter and the UN organs undergo an extra-constitutional evolution to the effect that despite the aforementioned constitutional limitations the competences of the organization were broadened towards supranationality?

On principle, one can observe that since 1945 the Charter has in fact been subject to extra-constitutional modifications by a general practice accepted as law. There is for instance the case of Article 27 (3) of the Charter according to which decisions of the Security Council on all nonprocedural matters do not come about unless at least nine members, including the permanent members vote in favour of a proposal. Since this provision proved to be inconvenient for the practice of the Security Council as well as for the permanent members, because the latter could not abstain from voting without wrecking the resolution, a general practice has been adopted according to which abstention of a permanent member does not prevent the Council from adopting a resolution with the vote of at least nine members.

As to the eventual customary evolution of the constitutional competences of the UN organs, Western theorists often speak of so-called "inherent competences"

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(4) UNICO, Vol 4, p 389

or "implied competences", that is to say, functions which are not expressly stated in the Charter, but can be considered necessary for the effective fulfillment of the constitutional duties of these organs.

This doctrine is, however, not agreed upon by Soviet authors who resolutely deny that there exist such implied competences of the United Nations organs without the previous and explicit consent of all members states. Although the Soviet Union has violated this legal point of view of its own theorists whenever it was in her national interest, she nevertheless resorts to this rather strict interpretation in all general statements, and in practice, as soon as she deems it useful for the protection of her minority position. It is therefore hardly possible generally to confirm the existence of such implied competences against the devout denial by one of the leading power blocs.

The only legal right the General Assembly has, with relation to the question of human rights is thus embodied in Article 10 of the Charter. This article endows the Assembly with the right to "discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter" and "to make recommendations to the members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters". But the Assembly is not entitled to recommend actions, as is clearly stated in Article 11 (2). The well-known actions of the General Assembly in matters of South Africa's domestic policy, therefore, clearly violate the Charter. Every other country would treat such interventions as an infringement of its sovereignty. Even if we accept the argument that South Africa is discriminating against various elements of her population and if one suggests UN intervention for the sake of principles of humanity we would automatically come to the demand for intervention in all those countries where, let us say, only large scale discrimination or other gross violations of human rights occur. This however, would un hinge the whole United Nations Organization which was not founded, and was not intended, to fight against major national violations of human rights, but rather for the restoration and maintenance of international peace. Since frequently used argument states that South African domestic policy is a threat to international peace in which the United Nations has to be concerned, let us consider this question.

There might in fact be justification for Security Council interventions under Article 2 (7) and Chapter VII of the Charter, if this charge proves to be right. Yet, the question is, who endangers international peace, and here the African states are frank enough to state that it is they who endanger international peace with their military aspirations in the southern part of Africa. The delegate of Ghana, for instance, stressed in a general statement in the Security Council on July 24, 1963:

"The very fact that certain African countries - in fact, all African countries - are behind the nationalists fighting for their independence means a threat to international peace and security." (5)

Similar statements have been uttered time and again by several African states. The legal question can thus only be answered after having proved this question of fact. The case would not be very promising for the black African states, however, as long as they admit in advance their threat to international peace.

In regard to the question of South West Africa, the situation is somewhat different. One cannot say, to my mind, that this matter lies essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the Republic of South Africa. The former German colony of South West Africa was not ceded to the Union as a colony, but



as a mandate. Although being a C-Mandate, and thus administered " as integral portion" of the Republic of South Africa there were clearly some international legal duties connected with its administration. According to Article 22 of the Covenant, the mandatory power accepted the obligation to promote the well-being and development of the people inhabiting the mandate. It assumed this obligation in an international treaty. True, South Africa's partner to this treaty, the League of Nations, was dissolved on April 18, 1946, and South Africa's treaty obligations could therefore on principle be considered as disposed of. One must not forget, however, that although the Charter of the United Nations made no provision for the continuation of the Mandate system of the League under the UN, the League of Nations expressly provided for the transfer to the United Nations Organization (6) of its functions and powers under treaties, international conventions, agreements and other instruments having political character.

It was, no doubt, impossible for Mandatory Powers to comply fully with the provisions of their mandate after the disappearance of the League, but the new world organization assumed at least to some degree the League's powers of supervision because of this transfer, even if no trusteeship agreement was concluded. This was implicitly recognized by all Mandatories already in 1946 when they pledged themselves before the United Nations to continue to administer the mandated territories for the well-being and development of the inhabitants thereof. Thus, in my opinion, the International Court of Justice was right, when it stated in 1950 that South Africa cannot be obliged legally to submit its mandate to a trusteeship system, but nevertheless it keeps its international obligations as Mandatory Power. South Africa itself recognized a certain competence of supervision by the United Nations in submitting its 1947 report on the administration of South West Africa, and still earlier in 1945/46, when it asked the UN for the termination of the Mandate.

It almost goes without saying, however, that the competence to supervision does not imply by itself any broader legal rights, such as direct administration by a United Nations organ against the will of the Mandatory Power, and the like. According to the generally recognized legal principle "nemo plus iuris transferre potest quam ipse habet" the United Nations could not even with the League's consent have acquired any more powers vis-à-vis South Africa than the League itself enjoyed until 1946. Nor does the United Nations have the right to enforcement actions against South Africa's obstinacy in not yielding to UN administrative authority.

Let us try to answer the following question: are these illegal transgressions by the UN at least politically wise in the sense that they either strengthen the organization or have some success with relation to South Africa or other countries?

Here again it is advisable to look at the history of the Organization. In 1945 the United Nations was created, not as a world government, but for a mutual exchange of political opinions of sovereign states and as a permanent institution for the facilitation of diplomatic negotiations, lest the outbreak of large-scale war be repeated. As is stated as one of the main purposes in Article 1 of the Charter, it was intended "to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends". This seems to be all the more reasonable since the United Nations as a permanent international conference

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(6) This is also recognized by the Department of Information of South Africa in its publication : "Ethiopia and Liberia versus South Africa", Pretoria 1970.

of sovereign states represents at best a mirror of what is going on in the world politically. At any rate it is not something institutional which is above the Member States. The attempt at collective security may have been well meant historically but rested on entirely different theoretical preconditions than actually always existed. Thus, insofar as one can say that the United Nations succeeds in harmonizing the political actions of nations it is possible to say that the world organization is successful in its work. If there is political criterion for judging whether the world organization has transgressed its competence then one can only derive an answer from its resolutions. As long as these are generally heeded by the states concerned, one can certainly say that they were adopted in the framework of the organization's constitutional or implied competences and that they serve to enhance the prestige and usefulness of the United Nations. As soon as a decision which purports to be binding does not have the requisite hold and authority on which it can rely, it suffers the same fate as a legal tender which does not have ample cover: it becomes worthless. The organ which tries to solve problems in the authoritarian way without actually being able to do so suffers a loss of prestige similar to that of a government which issues too much money in order to solve economic problems. The problems themselves, however, become aggravated by the failing attempt to solve them and their actual solution might very well become impossible. This happened, for instance, to the issue of the Palestine mandate and threatens to become the fate of the problem of South West Africa, if the United Nations persists in its present attitude. Instead of bringing the issue closer to a peaceful diplomatic solution it stiffened its intransigent attitude toward South Africa without actually being able to execute its wishes. In this manner it has already failed and continues to suffer a loss of international prestige with fatal consequences for the solution of other security questions. The reason for this lies in the fact that the Afro-Asian States expect the world organization to enforce their regional ambitions without considering that a universal organization cannot do so without compromising itself and its world wide mission. Although the United Nations' intervention in the Palestine problem had already shown in 1948 the soundness of this argument the organization obviously did not learn from the experience. According to Christian Morgenstern's principle that it cannot be what must not be, the UN engages anew in the attempt to compensate its actual inability for action by an overproduction of resolutions. These decisions have, of course, nothing to do with a de facto evolution of competences extra chartam, since the General Assembly is in fact unable to give shape to its written demands. What is more, by fictitiously assuming all competences of the Security Council it renounces also those competences which it would otherwise possess according to the Charter; partly because it does not find enough time to search for a political adjustment of conflicts as long as it engages in propagandistic campaigns and illusory sanctions, partly, because it renders itself incompetent for the role of mediator by its repeated undiplomatic actions. Its openly declared policy is the search for a military confrontation with South Africa in the course of which it hopes to carry out its self-assumed function of decolonisation.

This behaviour of the Assembly rests mainly on the Afro-Asian members' notion of the political value of their resolutions. Although they are not able to reach their aims simply by their own recommendations, and often complain about "dead letters", they delude themselves with hopes about the propagandistic force of such resolutions and are in fact confirmed in this error by the attitude of the Western powers as well as the Eastern bloc. Thus, most Afro-Asians hope to compel their opponents to renounce their national interests by means of stereotyped maximum demands supported by propagandistic speeches testifying the objectionableness of their adversaries. At the same time these resolutions have to justify their illegal moves towards aggravating the conflict by asserting self-made "legitimate rights" to use force outside the Security Council.

The Western powers are now stressing somewhat more clearly than some years ago that they deem only the Security Council competent for the infliction of sanctions. The danger of their behaviour lies, however in the fact that they pretend to be as equally irritated by South Africa's political conduct and thus encourage the Afro-Asian States to even further escalations; particularly will this be the case so long as the Organization of African Unity hopes to induce the Western powers to intervene forcefully against South Africa and reject a diplomatic settlement of the conflict. As long as South Africa is pressed by propagandistic attacks and threats of the use of force by small countries it will not be readier for compromise.

The present aggravation threatens, however, to lead to a point where the controversy escapes the control of the United Nations. The remaining diplomatic possibilities would then give way to armed conflict. The nature of such a conflict seems to be quite unclear to the Afro-Asians, again because of the Western powers' attitude. The latter deny repeatedly their interests in South Africa admitting at best to some economic ties, but belittling the strategic importance for the maintenance of the balance of power between East and West. An armed conflict with South Africa therefore seems to many African States not as unacceptable as it would be if the Western position were clear to everyone. How unclear the Western position to many in fact is, is shown by several resolutions which call upon the Western powers to renounce their national interests with regard to South Africa and to sever their political relations with that country. The advantage of this fictitious point of departure for a military attack by Black Africa against the Republic of South Africa might very well lead to the embarrassment of the West. In such a situation they would either have to abandon their interests to obtain a certain localization of the conflict and by this to shake the international order, or to maintain their position and thus to move to the brink of a new world war.

The Soviet Union contributes to this misleading of the African expectations by eagerly joining their propaganda rumble without in fact being ready to join an armed conflict. Although she is certainly not interested in the continued existence of the Republic of South Africa she is equally not willing to risk a military confrontation with the West because of some unimportant developing countries of Black Africa. In her propagandistic support of the Afro-Asians, however, she moves as far as to subscribe without hesitation to the imposition of sanctions by the General Assembly, though only as long as there are no real UN actions to be feared. As soon as the African States attempt to involve her in the conflict whether directly or indirectly through United Nations action, she becomes very reluctant.

If, however, the Great Powers persist with their present attitude in the Security Council this organ runs the risk of suffering the same fate as the General Assembly. Already its resolutions, in which an average of two to three permanent members abstain from voting, are hardly apt to impress anyone. Although they satisfy the Afro-Asians, all these victories remain mainly on paper and cause the States concerned to turn away from the Security Council.

The role of the late Secretary-General would not be worth mentioning as to the functions entrusted to him by the General Assembly resolutions. What was remarkable, however, were his diplomatic and public interventions. Here he felt called upon to act as protagonist of the Afro-Asian demands and to pursue their strategic aims.

To be sure, he was not generally concerned about the disdain of human rights by member states. The bloodshed in the Sudan which lasted for many years, to

mention only one example on the African continent, did not induce him at all to call forth the conscience of the world. All non-Western neglects of human dignity were regarded by him as matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the countries concerned. The southern part of Africa was his favourite preoccupation. And he did not care that his exhortations to Charter violations and excess of competences contributed to deceive the Black African States about their actual power position within the world organization, or that he obstructed the few diplomatic ways which were open to the Organization in the course of the conflict and that by this he thwarted the proper task of the United Nations - the peaceful adjustment between political adversaries.

When in 1972 the new Secretary-General assumed his office there was some change in this UN practice of political agitation. Whereas U Thant officially refused to implement his diplomatic duties in the South African conflict, the new Secretary-General quickly returned to the old practice of quiet diplomacy behind the scenes. Moreover, he is no longer convinced, as his predecessor was, that discrimination is only to be condemned if it happens somewhere in the West. Asked on 11th March of this year after his return from the visit to South Africa and South West Africa what he thought about discrimination in South Africa, Waldheim answered that he disapproved of discrimination wherever it occurs, thus thwarting the attempt to induce him to a unilateral condemnation. And since even some Afro-Asian member States have become - little by little - aware that the problem can not be solved by a military conflict there is some reasonable hope that the decades-old hostile confrontation will finally make place for negotiation and mutual understanding. The fact that a new Secretary-General tackles the issue from a different point of view could be a propitious start.

Dr. W. Pfeiffenberger lectures at the Institute of Political Science of the University of Salzburg, Austria. The above article is based on an address which he delivered to the Witwatersrand Branch of the Institute on 13th September 1972.

STATEMENT BY Dr. THE HON. HILGARD MULLER, MINISTER OF FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, IN THE GENERAL DEBATE  
AT THE TWENTY-SEVENTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NEW YORK

29 SEPTEMBER 1972

Mr. President,

I am glad to have the opportunity today of extending to you, on behalf of the South African Delegation, my congratulations on your election to the high office of President of the General Assembly. At the same time I should like to pay tribute to your predecessor, Mr. Malik of Indonesia, who so successfully guided our deliberations during the 26th Session of the Assembly.

May I also pay my respects to our new Secretary-General and wish him every success in the discharge of his heavy responsibilities.

Change is inevitable, and nowhere is this more true than in the field of international relations. We contemplate today a world different from the world that existed at the time of the last General Assembly, for the past year has witnessed changes of more than ordinary significance, including the evolution of what may be termed a new relationship among the major powers. It is true that the legacy of the Second World War, the polarization of the nations of the world into different power blocs, is still with us today more than a quarter of a century later. But recently important developments have begun to ease at least some of the tensions of the past.

These developments have followed a series of initiatives on the part of several of the major powers leading, it would seem, to a degree of reconciliation and a lessening of animosity between some of them. We find ourselves in a new situation, and axiomatically a new situation brings with it the prospect of new opportunities. There is in particular, the promise of better understanding and therefore of a more peaceful world.

We in South Africa hope that this promise will be realized. We welcome any development which tends to lessen international tension and which leans in the direction of defusing rather than accentuating international confrontation - confrontation which in this day and age could lead to catastrophe for the world. We welcome the approach of the major powers which, after all these years, are moving increasingly, albeit cautiously, from a posture of mutual recrimination towards one of negotiation. And we are glad that the negotiations which have already taken place provide support for the concept of the peaceful settlement of disputes between nations, large and small.

What conclusions are to be drawn by an onlooker from these developments? In the first place, it is striking that although the internal political and social system of the major powers are often widely divergent, this has not deterred them from reaching an accommodation with one another on the issues which have hitherto divided them. None has found it necessary to change its own system or to try to impose such an adjustment on others. It has, in fact, been specifically stated in communiqués and conference documentation that essential differences in ideology, social systems and even foreign policies should be no bar to the conduct of relations between States, based on such universal principles as respect for the sovereignty

and territorial integrity of all States, non-aggression against States, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. It was also recognised that international disputes should be settled without resort to the threat or use of force.

In the second place we should note that, despite the significance of the recent developments to which I have referred, the progress so far made is unfortunately only marginal in comparison with the awesome magnitude and complexity of the problems that still remain. These problems, which vitally affect not only the larger nations but every nation in the world, include such issues as economic development, the preservation of our global environment, famine and over-population, disarmament and so on. Any advance in these spheres is encouraging and it is indeed gratifying to acknowledge in passing that a measure of progress has this year been recorded in some of them. It is regrettable, however, that even on such cardinal matters as the environment and economic development, political considerations for reasons frequently not even remotely relevant to the central issue, are allowed to intrude into the proceedings.

How are the smaller nations affected by the new fluidity in international relations? It is clear that the developments in the past year or two involving the major powers have acted as a catalyst for the reassessment of many existing political situations. No country can wisely disregard them altogether. It seems to me, furthermore, that the smaller powers now have an incentive to show that they too can relax tension among themselves. The lesson is that consultation and negotiation are more rewarding for all the parties concerned than confrontation leading to possible conflict, destruction and suffering; the lesson is that differences in internal social systems are no deterrent to accommodation between the parties; the lesson, furthermore, is that an essential prerequisite to a climate of mutual trust and confidence, leading to the settlement of differences, is acceptance and implementation of the principles of non-aggression, non-interference in the internal affairs of other States and peaceful co-existence. It is my hope that the smaller States will heed this lesson, strive for co-operation and thus lay the basis for the progress and advancement of their peoples. In the face of the great problems with which the world as a whole is confronted, and with particular reference to the immense task of development which faces the smaller developing countries, none of us can afford the luxury of international bickering and dispute, which distract our attention from the fundamental problems and detract from our ability to solve them.

Let us in this regard briefly consider the record of the year which has just gone by. We find that progress has in fact been erratic. In some areas improvement has been registered; in others, however, an atmosphere of armed hostility survives in the aftermath of a regional war; elsewhere we have witnessed military coups d'etat, assassination attempts, massive loss of life in communal conflicts, hijacking and terrorism in its different manifestations. Only some of these activities have received the attention of this Organization. This is the darker side of the picture, but I mention it because these are activities which gravely undermine international order and progress, and history will harshly judge the international community and this Organization if they continue unchecked. In the economic and social fields progress has also been uneven and the world has had to live through a further period of financial crisis and instability. It is clear that progress will not come easily.

Against this background of shifting international attitudes and uneven accomplishment, may I sketch some of the principles governing South Africa's approach to international intercourse. As a starting point, let me reiterate that we fully subscribe to the principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States. We shall continue to apply this principle in the conduct of our relations with our neighbours in southern Africa, where the principle has most relevance for us. We have given solemn undertakings in this regard. Our aim is to exist peacefully with each of them to our mutual advantage. We have no aggressive intentions or expansionist ambitions.

We believe also in the peaceful settlement of disputes, which is the fundamental message of the Charter, and we reject the use of violence and force as a means to an end. Instead we favour dialogue and negotiation, contact and communication. We can point in this regard to our contacts with the Secretary-General on the future of South West Africa. We remain ready to enter into dialogue with anyone who reciprocates our genuine interest therein. Let me make it clear once again today that we are prepared to discuss even South Africa's internal policies in the course of such a dialogue. My country practises and lives dialogue and sees in it a positive approach to world problems and an effective way of promoting peaceful co-existence and world harmony.

Accordingly we have on several occasions shown our readiness to seek solutions to current problems within this framework. I am convinced that the development of dialogue between South Africa and African nations can lead only to improved relations to the benefit of all. There is already evidence that this is so. I may mention in this regard, for example, the historic state visit of the Life President of Malawi to South Africa during 1971, which was followed by an equally successful return visit by the South African State President earlier this year. We believe that reciprocal visits of this nature, conducted at all levels, are important from the point of view of breaking down prejudices and increasing understanding.

Then there is the question of internal dialogue. It has been asserted in some quarters that South Africa should conduct a dialogue with her own people before attempting to engage in a dialogue with independent States, particularly those of Africa. This assertion appears to be based, as in the case of so many attitudes towards South Africa, on a fundamental misconception of the situation. There is, in fact, a continuing dialogue with the various peoples in South Africa, which has been and is being conducted at all levels, from the lowest to the highest. The self-governing nations emerging in South Africa are producing leaders and representatives who are empowered by their own people to conduct a dialogue at the highest level with the South African Government and this they have been doing. Ministers and officials of my government are in constant touch with Ministers and their officials in the homelands, all of which enjoy some form of self-government.

Last year the South African Prime Minister himself conferred with leaders of all the different peoples of the Republic, some of which, namely the Xosas and the Zulus, total as many as 4 million each, and these meetings have continued this year. Moreover, these leaders travel overseas extensively and exchange views and ideas with a wide cross-section of world opinion. What is all this, if it is not dialogue in the truest sense of the word?

It is a strange phenomenon that dialogue in any form should be discouraged in this Organization. The Organization, whose raison d'être is the maintenance of peace in the world, is the largest and most universal forum of the community of nations for the exchange of points of view. Implicit in the concept of the United Nations is that disputes are better settled by words than by force. It is therefore inexplicable and unforgivable that the membership should actively or even obliquely support in any way programmes of force, violence and terror, while at the same time disavowing dialogue. We hope that all members will adopt a positive approach to dialogue and that dialogue itself will not become a source of discord among the nations of the world. It would be tragic if it were to be used by some for divisive purposes to split us into opposing groups or blocs.

The repudiation of dialogue leads to reliance upon uglier means of settling differences, none more ugly and abhorrent than terrorism. Recent incidents of terrorism have horrified the world. But, Mr. President, terrorism is not new. It has existed for years.

During the past decade or more, indiscriminate terrorism has spread to virtually every corner of the globe, bringing in its wake suffering, destruction and death. The Munich and other terrorist outrages have been widely condemned, here and elsewhere. This is very proper, but it is not enough. Terrorism is a universal evil which must be stamped out everywhere. There can be no differentiation between types of terrorism. In all its forms it is a disease which respects no frontier. None that ignores it abroad is immune to it at home.

This Organization in particular must be consistent. It cannot shirk its duty and discard its Charter in regard to terrorism. We must speak with one voice on this scourge, without equivocation, because terrorism, no matter where it may erupt or what its current guise, cannot shed its essential characteristics : it is beyond the pale of order, of law, of decency, of society and of humanity. We cannot for selfish or regional reasons move to stamp it out in one form or in one region, while encouraging it in another. It is obvious that this merely guarantees its survival and its spread. And yet, the records of this Assembly abound in expressions serving as encouragement to those committed to violence as a means of achieving their political objectives. Furthermore, at the very time of Munich, plans were openly being laid for stepping up terrorism in Africa. Mr. President, terrorism will survive so long as this and other Organizations continue not only to condone the use of force and violence as a means to an end but, in certain circumstances, to support and even to subsidize it.

We deplore this attitude. South Africa cannot and will not compromise on the issue of terrorism. We have not hesitated to take drastic action against it in the past and we shall fight it with all means at our disposal in the future. I much regret, I might add, that even while the Secretary-General and the South African Government are engaged in discussions on the future of South West Africa, with progress already registered, some individuals and organizations, and even some Governments represented here, should still openly advocate the use of force and violence in this Territory.

So far as contacts between the Secretary-General and my Government are concerned, this is obviously not the opportune moment for me to speak on them at any length. There is no denying that the gap to be bridged is wide and deep and it cannot be expected that a solution will be found overnight. Time, perseverance and patience will clearly be required.



Nevertheless, we sincerely hope that goodwill, mutual trust and understanding will prevail on all sides and that in this atmosphere progress will be possible. I want again to re-affirm that, so far as South West Africa is concerned, the South African Government is firmly committed to the principle of self-determination and independence with all that this implies, and we shall continue to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in the search for a solution.

In the meantime, South Africa is continuing to assist in the development of the Territory and the advancement of its peoples in all spheres, so that they may achieve the declared goal of self-determination and independence as rapidly as possible. During the last two generations we have made a considerable contribution to the Territory's development. I may also mention that, by virtue of South African legislation, all revenue collected in South West Africa, including taxation on foreign investments, is applied there exclusively for the benefit of all the inhabitants. In addition, South Africa itself annually contributes directly and indirectly a substantial amount to the Territory's development. In 1972 this additional contribution by the South African Government, on current account alone, is estimated at \$80 million, an amount which very nearly equals South West Africa's own estimated revenue receipts. We shall be more than prepared to continue to assist the peoples of the Territory after independence, if that is what they desire, and we are in a good position to do so, because of our close association with South West Africa over many years, our geographic proximity and our links in numerous fields; but it will be clear that our assistance then cannot be on the same scale as it is today. Even now the growing needs of the indigenous peoples can hardly be met from local and South African resources combined.

After independence, therefore, as in the case of most newly independent states, they will inevitably continue to look beyond their borders for assistance.

In all the circumstances we simply cannot understand the motives of those who discourage new foreign investment or call for the cessation of existing foreign investment in South West Africa. It cannot be in the interest of the peoples of the Territory to deprive them of the contribution to their welfare which overseas investors make in the context of their business operations there, for it is the inhabitants themselves who gain from such investments. And it must surely be clear that, the closer we move in the direction of self-determination and independence, the more important foreign investment becomes in developing the essential economic launching pad which new States need in order to get off to a sound start. An attempt to retard the economic growth of the Territory simply means a prolongation of its economic dependence upon others. I would ask those discouraging, or advocating a withdrawal of, investments in South West Africa at least to take account of the wishes of the inhabitants of the Territory, and to cease arrogating to themselves exclusively the privilege of deciding what is in their best interests.

Mr. President, from what I have said today, it should be clear that South Africa has adopted an approach to her problems and her relations with other countries which is not out of tune with the current trend of negotiation and détente now influencing international relations. This applies both to the conduct of South Africa's internal affairs and to the wider international sphere.

I have in mind, in this regard, relations with our neighbours as well as with the United Nations. We subscribe to this policy because we are convinced that, provided our efforts are not undermined by external influences, it will promote peace in our part of the world.

It should not be necessary to commend a similar approach to members of this Organization, since that approach is implicit in the Charter. But a return to the Charter in this respect might lead the Organization to higher levels of achievement in the pursuit of its principal objective, international peace and security.

A SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL  
AND ECONOMIC POSITION IN THE WORLD<sup>+</sup>

by

John Barratt

Introduction

The main focus of this paper will be on the political aspects of South Africa's external relations, But, as will become apparent, it is not possible to separate politics and economics in this field or in any other. There is perhaps a tendency to think that economic relations can be constructively developed, if only politics can be avoided. This, of course, is not possible, as the ultimate decisions in all countries are political - even if economic considerations are often the major determinants in reaching the political decisions. Those directly involved in external economic relations need, therefore, to be aware of and to understand, as far as possible, the political factors in their own and other countries, as well as the trends in international politics generally.

Likewise, it is not possible to put domestic and foreign policies neatly into separate compartments; there is continual interaction between the two. While this is true of all countries, it is especially evident in South Africa's case.

The inter-relationship of all these factors indicates that the subject of international affairs, including the foreign policies of one's own country, is not the domain only of the specialists. It concerns all citizens, and businessmen particularly are involved. It is very appropriate, therefore, that this Congress should be giving attention to South Africa's position in the world, not only from an economic, but also a political point of view.

This paper is intended to be an overall survey in fairly general terms, and it must of necessity deal rather briefly with a number of questions. The practical implications for businessmen in particular will be dealt with in a later paper. Their special problems and opportunities in the field of external relations are, therefore, not referred to here.

South Africa's Political Isolation

In international politics South Africa's position is one of isolation; the Republic is not a member of any grouping of states, and it belongs to no defence or other alliances. In a world which has increasingly, during the past two or three decades, seen the formation of blocs or regional groups, South Africa stands alone. This isolated position is manifested especially in the United Nations where all members - with the exception of South Africa and Israel - belong to one or more political groups, and where these groups act and vote together, with the members protecting each other in various ways. Moreover, in this isolated position,

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<sup>+</sup> This paper was presented at a Symposium on South Africa's Position in the World Economy, held in Pretoria on 19 October, 1972, during the 70th Annual Congress of the Association of Chambers of Commerce of South Africa.

South Africa is subject to numerous pressures in the international field, pressures closely related to and affecting internal developments.

In looking for the main causes of this isolation and the accompanying pressures, one can say - at the risk of a little oversimplification - that two factors in particular were relevant in the fast-changing world situation after World War II. One was the growing concern in the Western World about the infringement of individual human rights, as a result of the reaction to nazism and racism. Thus, for example, the United Nations Charter in its Preamble (which was drafted by General Smuts) expressed the determination of the member states "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person ..." In Article 55 of the Charter member states agreed to promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion", in addition to promoting such ideals as higher standards of living and full employment.

The other relevant factor in the post-war world was anti-colonialism - the movement for self-determination and independence throughout Asia and Africa. This movement gathered increasing momentum until, by the early sixties, most African states were independent. In the process the Western and White colonial powers were brought into conflict with the non-White peoples of the world. In this confrontation White South Africa was regarded as an outpost of Western colonialism in a Black continent, and as the Western powers withdrew from their colonies South Africa became increasingly isolated and increasingly regarded by these same Western powers as an embarrassment to them.

Both these tendencies - the concern for human rights and anti-colonialism - came together in the United Nations. It is not surprising, therefore, that it is the United Nations in which South Africa's international problems have been most dramatically highlighted, and that the United Nations has provided the centre for the increasingly strident campaign against the South African Government.

Although this campaign gathered strength during the fifties, South Africa's international position was not as acute then as it became after 1960, the year in which there was the first large influx of new Black states into the United Nations and the year of Sharpsville. This was followed in 1961 by the ending of South Africa's membership of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth was the only group of states to which South Africa belonged, and this association - which meant in effect association with the United Kingdom as a Great Power - had been a basic ingredient in South African foreign policy since Union in 1910. South Africa had gradually been developing a more independent position in the world, as its economic strength increased during and after World War II, but it was still very dependent on Britain for contacts in Africa and throughout the world, especially in the many countries where it had no diplomatic or trade representatives of its own. This dependence was suddenly broken and South Africa was forced, without much time for preparation and in a hostile world, to look after itself without outside help.

#### The Movement Outward - Africa and the World

During the early sixties the initial reaction was to go on to the defensive, which further increased the political isolation. However, it was not possible in the modern world for those conducting South Africa's foreign relations, or those engaged in external trade, to allow this isolation to

grow unchallenged. With the prop of the Commonwealth connection removed, they were therefore forced to be more self-reliant and to seek their own contacts abroad. As the country's economic strength increased during the middle and latter sixties, a sense of greater confidence returned and the so-called "outward movement" began, involving both the Government and many in the private sector.

The development of this "outward movement" cannot be dealt with in any detail here. The Government moved cautiously, always conscious of possible reaction among the White electorate, to develop contacts in Africa and also to expand trade and diplomatic links in Asia, Australasia and Latin America. A more pragmatic attitude became apparent towards the United Nations, and in general there was a less defensive reaction to criticism.

It is mainly in respect of South Africa's relations with Africa that the "outward movement" became known, and it is here that the results were most significant when judged against South Africa's complete isolation in Africa in the early sixties. The independence of the former High Commission territories of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland was accepted by the South African Government, in spite of the earlier policy of seeking their incorporation into South Africa, and co-operative relations were established with them. Then there came the exchange of diplomatic representatives with Malawi, the signing of a trade agreement with that country, and considerable financial and technical assistance from South Africa.

While the development of relations with these four independent Black states was important for South Africa, in showing the outside world that South Africa could co-operate peacefully with African states, the significance of this development was qualified by the fact of their dependence on South Africa, which gave them very little choice in the matter. Then in 1970 and 1971 South Africa's opportunities to expand relations in Africa beyond these dependent countries suddenly seemed to increase. The Government of Madagascar invited the South African Foreign Minister for an official visit, an agreement was signed, and it was officially announced that South Africa would be giving financial assistance to Madagascar. Furthermore, several other French-speaking African states, led by President Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, indicated that they wished to conduct a dialogue with South Africa, and that they were opposed to the policy of confrontation and force which was being pursued by the majority of African states through the Organisation of African Unity. This general approach was supported, too, by Dr. Busia, the Prime Minister of Ghana.

While the dialogue proposals did not win support from the majority in the OAU, when they were discussed at a summit meeting of that Organisation in June, 1971, there was a substantial minority of more than one-quarter which seemed willing to give the dialogue movement a chance. The hopes of a breakthrough for South Africa, resulting from these tentative dialogue proposals, have however not so far been fulfilled. In fact, during the past year there have been notable set-backs in that both Ghana and Madagascar have firmly withdrawn their support - as a result of changes of Government - and in general the enthusiasm among other states has declined. Even in Southern Africa the statements of Black leaders are much less friendly than they were a year ago.

What has gone wrong is not yet clear, and in any case the dialogue proposals were vague and possibly open to misunderstanding. What is clear however is that central to these proposals was concern about South Africa's internal policies, and there was much talk about changing these policies through contacts and discussions. For this reason the

Government's reaction was always cautious and, while the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs have indicated willingness to discuss the separate development policies, they could not indicate any willingness to change them as a result of outside pressures. Another factor from the African side has been the strong pressure on all states not to create disunity in Black Africa over this issue, so that there has been a tendency for individual Black leaders to insist that, whatever their personal feelings might be, they could only take part in a unified African approach to South Africa. The basis for this approach, they say, must be the Lusaka Manifesto which the South African Government would not easily be able to accept, even as a basis for negotiation, because it clearly demands radical change in South Africa.

This then, very briefly, is the present position in South Africa's relations with the rest of Africa. In the overall picture of South Africa's position in the world, relations with Africa may not seem all that important, when one considers that for our external economic relations, for the development of our industry and technology, and for world-wide communications generally, our relations with the Western world are still the most vital. But from the political point of view relations with Africa cannot be separated from relations with the rest of the world. There is no doubt that the improvement or deterioration of South Africa's position in the world generally is directly linked with our position in Africa and our relations with Black Africans both inside and beyond our borders. While there may not seem to be much economic advantage, in the short term, at least, in expanding the contacts with African states beyond our immediate region in the sub-continent, there would in fact be immense political, and indirectly also economic, advantage, because of the effect outside Africa, namely on the Western countries on whom we depend for our political and economic survival, and on countries of Asia and Latin America which are likely to become increasingly important to us. Relations with Japan - from both the political and economic points of view - are already of considerable importance. But Japan, in its own interests, must also be concerned with its expanding economic relations with the rest of Africa, and as a result is susceptible to political pressures from the Black African states.

An improvement in relations with Africa would also have a bearing on South Africa's position in international organisations. Membership of these various political, financial, technical and trade bodies is of considerable importance to South Africa - more than to most countries, in fact, because of our need to counter the threats of isolation. This applies, for instance, to the United Nations itself in the political field, and I should add here that it also applies to GATT in the field of external trade - in spite of special problems which South Africa is at present experiencing in regard to the latter body. (These problems are, of course, not political in nature, as in the case of the U.N. and some of its Specialised Agencies.)

#### The Western World

To consider more specifically, but briefly, our relations with some of the Western countries, one turns first to the United States which during the past decade was pursuing a policy of gradually increasing South

Africa's isolation. This included the arms embargo, adopted as a result of a U.N. Security Council decision in 1963, and the forbidding of naval visits to South African ports since 1967. The official policy since the advent of the Nixon administration is no longer one of isolation, but rather of communication at all levels, official and unofficial. However, this policy is still directed towards change in South Africa, and in fact it has been defined as "communication for change".

While South Africa does not have high priority in American foreign policy, it does appear to be gradually moving up in the list of priorities, mainly because of increasing pressures on the U.S. Government from groups within the United States. Most noticeable is the growing interest of the organised Black group in the United States Congress, and for the first time ever there are, in this year's presidential elections, reference to relations with South Africa in the official platforms of both major parties.

There is also the growing pressure on American firms with interests in South Africa. In its extreme form this pressure is directed at forcing these firms to withdraw entirely. But at the least it is directed towards forcing them to change their policies, particularly with regard to the conditions of employment of non-Whites in South Africa. As a significant article in "Fortune" magazine of July, 1972, put it :

"The issue of American corporate involvement in South Africa has been taken up by civil-rights leaders, labor unions, churches, stockholder groups, the Ford Foundation, the State Department, and Congress, with varying bias and varying answers. Some, including Representative Charles Diggs, a black Congressman from Detroit, have decided that American corporations can stay - if they mend their ways. A number of critics, however, are demanding that they get out. 'American firms in South Africa are partners in apartheid,' asserts George M. Houser, executive director of the American Committee on Africa, a privately funded organization in New York that promotes freedom for Africans. Representatives of six Protestant denominations returned from a three-week tour this winter to report that 'most of us believe that American corporations should totally disengage from South Africa.'"<sup>+</sup>

The clear tendency at present is for American firms to remain in South Africa. But if the pressures within the United States increase dramatically, there could be a change, because these companies in general stand to lose more, for instance, from work stoppages in their plants within the United States or even from restricted boycotts of their products, than they would from closing down in South Africa. Of course they would be reluctant to suffer the loss of profits in South Africa, but it must be remembered that for some of them their annual profits here could be wiped out by the loss of only a few days production in the United States itself.

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<sup>+</sup> Fortune, July 1972, page 1.

The likelihood, therefore, is that American policy towards South Africa<sup>+</sup> will be more affected during the coming years by internal pressures rather than external influences from, for instance, the African states or the United Nations, which played a more prominent role in the past. As internal pressures are usually more important in any country's foreign policy, this means that relations with the United States are probably entering a rather delicate phase. Careful handling of policy will be needed on both sides. The South African Government and other informed South Africans no doubt appreciate the importance of our links with America for political, economic and security reasons; and South Africa is also of some importance to the United States, not least because of its strategic position.

In spite of the Commonwealth break in 1961, the United Kingdom has continued to be South Africa's most important trading partner and, in a general political sense, the most important link in our external relations. The Labour Government under Mr. Wilson was not popular in South Africa, and relations with the Conservative Government are easier. But, of course, the Conservatives may not be in power forever, and the Labour Party, at least in opposition, is adopting an increasingly radical attitude. In any case, it has to be accepted that Britain's relations with the rest of Africa are of growing importance, even if some disillusionment is being experienced as a result of developments such as those at present in Uganda.

The British Ambassador, Sir Arthur Snelling, has pointed out that Britain's economic transactions with Africa as a whole constitute about 10% of her global external economic transactions. Exports to Africa amount to about 8% of her total exports and are divided almost exactly equally between Black and White Africa. Britain imports a lot more from Black than from White Africa, while investments are much larger in South Africa than in Black Africa. The Ambassador has concluded, therefore, that, from the economic point of view, Black and White Africa are each roughly of the same order of importance to Britain. He continued: "The political inference to be drawn from this is that, in so far as the British are a nation of shopkeepers, they must conduct their relations with Africa in such a way that they are not forced to choose between White and Black Africa."<sup>+</sup> (As Sir Arthur makes clear in the address from which this quotation comes, there are other factors, such as security, which must also be taken into account in any country's foreign policy, in addition to the economic factor.)

This balancing act between Black and White Africa is complicated by the Rhodesian dispute, which has also created difficulties for South Africa in maintaining friendly relations with both Rhodesia and Britain.

Reference has been made to the pressures on American business interests in South Africa. Signs are now appearing that similar pressures are developing in the United Kingdom, too. If these pressures become at all effective, they could create serious difficulties both for Britain and South Africa, because of the relatively much greater British financial interest in this country.

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<sup>+</sup> See "A Personal View of Africa" by Sir Arthur Snelling in S.A. Institute of International Affairs, Newsletter, 1971, No. 5, (Dec. 1971), page 1.



South Africa has come to rely on France more in recent years, especially for defence equipment and also in the expansion of trade links. Under both President de Gaulle and President Pompidou, France's policy has been characterised by a high degree of pragmatism, and the French Government has been able to maintain good relations with both Black Africa and the White South. But maintaining these relations nevertheless creates some diplomatic problems for France, and there is no doubt that the French have been keen to see progress in the dialogue movement in Africa. That this progress has not so far been forthcoming is a setback for French policy, too - although it would be wrong to assume that France has brought strong pressure on the African states to pursue a dialogue policy, or that it would be able to exert such pressure effectively in the future.

As with France and the United Kingdom, other European countries, such as Germany and Italy, have continually to take into account their economic links both with South Africa and with the Black African states. Looking to the future, as they must do, it is not surprising that they should be concerned chiefly about expanding their economic relations with Africa as a whole. They are likely, therefore, to be careful not to be associated too closely with South Africa in the political sphere, and it must be noted that in Germany, too, there are growing pressures on these companies with interests in South Africa.

#### Politics and Economics - Southern Africa

It should now be apparent from what has been said above that it is not possible neatly to separate politics from economics; they continually affect each other. The development of political relations depends often on the extent and importance of economic relations, and vice versa. But ultimately it is the political decisions that determine a country's direction, even at the expense sometimes of economic considerations. In Black Africa there are many examples of this, but it is true also of South Africa and other more industrialised countries, because political decision-makers must take into account various factors, when they determine what they believe to be the overall national interest - and economics is only one of the factors, even though it may often be the crucial one in reaching a decision.

This can be illustrated by certain aspects of the relations between South Africa and its immediate neighbours. The situation of economic dependence on South Africa, in which these countries find themselves, is no guarantee of their political friendship. In fact, this very dependence may well be a motivating factor in their increasingly obvious efforts to assert their political independence, even at the risk of causing a South African reaction which might adversely affect them economically. Of course, South Africa has nothing to gain by retaliating with economic threats, when, for instance, a Black leader makes critical statements, because such retaliation would in all likelihood only further aggravate political relations, with unforeseeable consequences for Southern African security and stable development. In view, therefore, of the prominence of political considerations in these new and relatively weak states, and their sensitivity about their independence, it serves no good purpose to argue, as was done in a recent article in Business South Africa, entitled the "Bumble Bee Economy", that : "if Jonathan continues with his present attitude, Pretoria and South Africa's industrialists may re-evaluate their participation in Lesotho. Jonathan should take a lesson from biology."

The bumble bee has no sting."<sup>+</sup>

A notable recent event has been the establishment of a Development Bank for Equatorial and Southern Africa, known as EDESA; In calling for support for this project, Dr. Anton Rupert has spoken of the need for a right approach to the question of development assistance which should not be such as simply to increase the dependence of the poorer countries on the wealthier ones. This is an approach which for South Africans involves helping our neighbours to increase their independence - economic and political - rather than simply reacting with threats as soon as they assert their independence by challenging South Africa economically or politically. In the long run a mutually beneficial relationship between the countries of this region will only be possible on the basis of a genuine interdependence rather than simple dependence of the weaker countries on South Africa.

#### A Positive Approach for the Future

In conclusion it can be suggested that, in attempting to improve South Africa's international relations there is need to take into account the factors mentioned at the beginning of this paper, which led to the isolation and external pressure, namely the increased world concern about human rights and the anti-colonial movement.

Firstly, the concern for human rights does not involve simply a question of political rights, but rather a need to recognise and protect various basic rights of all people within South Africa, including equality of opportunity in the economic sphere. This is, of course, a prime responsibility of the Government, but there is much that can be done by the private sector. Within the general direction of Government policy there is room for improvement in various directions, for instance with regard to wages, training, the creating of more opportunities for advancement and for assuming greater responsibilities, etc. There is also room to improve generally the lines of communication between different sections of the population, and to provide opportunities for genuine consultation. The time of paternalistic attitudes towards the non-White peoples of South Africa is past, and there is a need to get away from the tendency of Whites to think of acting for the Blacks rather than with them. The whole question of human dignity is involved here, and this is important for every aspect of South African life - political, economic and social. There is no doubt that improvements in attitudes and practice along these lines would have a profound effect on South Africa's relations with the rest of Africa and the world in general.

Closely related to these internal questions is the need to improve relations with Black Africa, beginning with our immediate neighbours, so as gradually to remove the stigma of being a remnant of the old colonial era. For healthy relations with our neighbours it is necessary, as discussed above, to appreciate their aspirations for economic and political independence. In assisting their economic development - as we must do for our own sake as much as theirs - a paternalistic attitude must be avoided, opportunities for consultation must be created, great patience must be practised, and there must even be a willingness to make sacrifices in the long-term interests of mutual co-operation and stable development in Southern Africa. This is

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<sup>+</sup>Business South Africa, Vol. 7 No. 8, August 1972, page 76.

of course, a field where businessmen and industrialists have an important role to play, and many are already aware of this.

Africa in general is an important area for the development of South Africa's external relations, not only because we belong to this continent; not only because there are security threats from "liberation movements", with intervention and aid from communist China and other powers; not only because of the opportunities in the future for developing trade and other economic links; but also, as indicated above, because of the effect which the improvement of our relations with Africa will have on the major countries of the Western world and elsewhere, with whom our political and economic links are so vital.

Dialogue is now perhaps an overused word. But it remains a useful concept, because it implies an open-ended exchange between equals, with no pre-conditions. Through dialogue in Africa it may be possible to reach an accommodation, provided there is a willingness to acknowledge the need for change on both sides. But it is clear now that a dialogue simply between the Whites of South Africa and other Black African states is not possible, especially as this would be a dialogue about the Blacks in South Africa. Ways will have to be found both to increase the dialogue within South Africa, at official and unofficial levels, and to include our own Black leaders in dialogue with the rest of Africa. These Black leaders are already becoming involved in the debate, both within South Africa and in their increasingly frequent visits abroad. This trend is being encouraged from various quarters, and it will no doubt continue to develop. It is one of the most hopeful signs for the future.

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## THE CURRENT CRISIS IN IRELAND

by

David W. Harkness

It is always difficult to decide how far back to go in explaining Ireland's troubles. Mr. de Valera, when dealing with British leaders in the 1920's and 30's, would usually preface his remarks with an account of 700 years of British misrule in Ireland. More generally, it has been felt necessary to explain at least the British plantations of Ireland, in particular the Province of Ulster, in the 16th and 17th centuries. Here we have scarcely room for such surveys, for we must concentrate upon the division, first of the United Kingdom, then of Ireland; upon the half century of Unionist rule in Northern Ireland; and especially upon the events in that little area since 1968. But to make sense of these matters it is necessary also to sketch in briefly the events of the first two decades of the twentieth century.

If we examine the United Kingdom in 1900, we will observe a single political entity embracing England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland, all governed from Westminster, of a total population of approximately 40 million. In Ireland, where the population numbered 4½ million there was in 1900 a vocal demand for a local parliament; a demand for Home Rule which had been mounted by the Irish Nationalist Party in Westminster since the 1880's. Between 1900 and 1912 the Home Rule campaign prospered on the back of an Irish Nationalist-British Liberal Alliance. The desire for Home Rule, let it be said, was centred on Dublin, the old capital of Catholic Ireland.

In the North East of Ireland, however, there was strong opposition to Home Rule : opposition centred upon Belfast, the focus of Protestant settlement in Ireland. The intensity of this opposition increased in proportion to the waxing fortunes of Home Rule. In Belfast, undisturbed union with Protestant Britain was preferred. Here, in 1904, an Ulster Unionist Council, formed to speak for the 9 Ulster counties of 32 county Ireland, proclaimed Protestant determination to prevent Home Rule, at any price. After 1904, feelings mounted, so that by 1912, the year in which a Home Rule Bill eventually passed the House of Commons, a triangle of tensions existed within the United Kingdom.

In London, a Liberal Government, beholden to the Irish Nationalist Party, had introduced the 3rd Home Rule Bill, a measure designed to allow the Irish to run Irish affairs, but careful also to retain British control over major matters such as defence and foreign and fiscal policies, and to preserve intact the integrity of His Majesty's domains.

In Dublin, the Nationalist demand for Home Rule seemed about to be granted. To be sure, it was not yet home and dry, for the House of Lords had rejected the Bill, but the Lords could now only delay the legislation for two years. By 1914 Home Rule must follow. It is worth noting also, however, that more extreme views were at this time being voiced in Dublin. A small minority was already claiming full Irish sovereignty; and complete independence from Britain.

In Belfast, Protestant Irishmen organised - and armed - to resist a Roman Catholic Home Rule Parliament in Dublin; organised to wreck Home Rule and so preserve the United Kingdom.

Thus, while Home Rulers awaited the suspension of Home Rule by the House of Lords to expire and anti-Home Rulers demonstrated and drilled, the Liberal Government faced a dilemma. Committed to Home Rule, it could not ignore the Northern Irish Protestants, particularly as the British Tory opposition had rallied to their cause. So, Prime Minister Asquith attempted a compromise resolution of the triangular dispute. He called a conference, which met at Buckingham Palace from 21 - 24 July 1914; but the conference failed, and it failed on a point of great relevance to the current Irish crisis. Delegates raised the possibility of excluding some part of Ireland from the operation of Home Rule: an area in Northern Ireland which would keep the bulk of Protestants outside the jurisdiction of Dublin. But what area? This was the question and failure to agree upon an answer doomed the Conference. Almost immediately the Great War burst upon this domestic quarrel and, in danger of its life, the United Kingdom Parliament passed the Home Rule Bill but suspended it from operation until the end of hostilities.

But the Buckingham Palace talk of exclusion forced the Ulster Unionists to reconsider most seriously their future. For if their 9 county opposition was not going to prevent Home Rule, then a new strategy was required - and a new objective. The aim must now be to exclude the maximum area of Protestant safety. In 9 county Ulster, out of a population of 1,600,000, some 850,000 were deemed to be Protestant Unionists; 750,000 Catholic Nationalists. In political terms this was too fine a balance. Protestant strength lay in the four easterly counties but their total area was small. The 6 North Eastern counties however, with a total population of 1,200,000, gave a breakdown of 800,000 Protestants to 400,000 Catholics: a reasonable territory with a 2 to 1 Protestant majority. To exclude this made political sense, so the Ulster Unionist Council took a hard-headed, if agonising, decision to abandon 3 of its member counties (and along with them the scattered Protestants in the rest of Ireland) and to seek to exclude from Home Rule the 6 North Eastern Irish counties: to exclude this area as a single block, without plebiscite, without county by county or parish by parish voting. This was its new demand upon the Liberal Government: 6 county exclusion, or war.

The demand was not voiced immediately however, and the war years contrived to change much of the Irish scene. In 1916 the minority of extremists in Dublin rose to proclaim an Independent Irish Republic. The British put down their rising but organised in 1917 an Irish Convention, modelled on Southern American precedent, to work out an acceptable solution. While this Convention was foundering, also on the issue of exclusion, majority Irish opinion hardened in favour of the demand for complete independence. In the 1918 General Election, a majority of Irish representatives were returned on an independence ticket. 1919 consequently saw the beginning both of an indigenous National Assembly (Dail Eireann) and a guerilla war against Britain in pursuit of this demand. In 1920 the British Government, weighed down with the problems of world order, turned again to Ireland to seek a compromise. Its 1920 Government of Ireland Act was an ingenious attempt to satisfy all Irishmen while at the same time continuing to protect British interests.

This Act offered two Home Rule Parliaments: one for Dublin operating over 26 counties; the other for Belfast, governing the remaining 6 counties, thus preserving Protestant Northern Ireland from Catholic control - and conceding in full the area chosen by the Ulster Unionist Council. Overall control was preserved to Westminster, defence arrangements and the sovereignty of the Crown being upheld.

This Act was accepted in Belfast and provided the foundation of Northern Ireland as a political entity. But in Dublin the arrangements were rejected with contempt. Nationalists there fought on for a 32 county Republic; fought on until July 1921, when military stalemate produced a truce, followed by negotiations, which in turn led to an agreed settlement that December. This settlement, the Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland, reflected the power position at that time. It also appeared to satisfy the incompatible objectives of both contending parties. That it did so implied some measure of misunderstanding and this misunderstanding too has bearing on the present crisis.

The 1921 Articles of Agreement offered the same status as was enjoyed by Canada to a new Irish Dominion, the Irish Free State. The Agreement was with "Ireland", but Northern Ireland's 6 counties were permitted to opt out of the scheme. If they chose to do so, however, a Boundary Commission would revise the area of Belfast's jurisdiction. This Boundary Commission was crucial to Dublin's acceptance of the package, for it seemed to the Irish negotiators that such a Commission would redraw the boundary around 'Belfast and its backyard'; an unviable territory that would soon join in with the rest of Ireland, completing the long sought unity of the whole island.

Northern Ireland did exercise its right to withdraw. So the Irish Free State was established as a 26 County Dominion.<sup>+</sup> Dominion status was hotly contested, however, and a Civil War was fought between the Free State Government and those who preferred still to pursue their Republican ideals. It was not until 1925, therefore, that the Boundary Commission could complete its work. Its Report, drawn up within the narrow interpretation of its South African Chairman - Mr. Justice Feetham - contemplated little alteration in the existing boundary, but did envisage some Free State territory passing to Belfast, as well as some other transfers in the opposite direction. This was dynamite to the Dublin regime. The Report was withdrawn, remained unpublished at the time and was replaced by a compensatory financial agreement between Dublin and London. The Dublin Government was forced to commit itself to prolonged Partition and to state that there would be no unity until willed by the people of Northern Ireland.

Thus, by 1925, first the United Kingdom had been divided; then Ireland had been divided. And this latter division had been given the stamp of permanence. The Roman Catholic Free State had its hands full putting its own house in order. Protestants now seemed securely in command of the North East. Let us look at the Northern Ireland of their creation.

This six-county area formed part of the United Kingdom but had its own local parliament at Stormont, in Belfast: a parliament controlling such matters as law enforcement, education, housing and health, giving Protestant control of the judiciary, the police, the civil service. The process by which Northern Ireland had been achieved was scarcely democratic: its structure - by deliberate act of creation incorporating a two-to-one Protestant majority over Roman Catholics - was scarcely ideal for the operation of democracy. Remember, too, that Protestants deliberately

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<sup>+</sup> For an account of the impact of Ireland in the imperial arena see D.W. Harkness The Restless Dominion: The Irish Free State and the British Commonwealth of Nations, 1921-31 (Macmillan) 1969.

included in their area a large, reluctant Roman Catholic minority.

Protestant rule over Northern Ireland has since conformed to the pattern of its conception and birth. Protestants were determined to keep control: aggressively determined, because they still felt insecure as a minority in all-Ireland. Their psychology exemplified something recently described as a 'siege mentality'; a mentality exacerbated by the knowledge of that reluctant Roman Catholic minority within, which owed no allegiance to the Northern Irish state.

Protestants dominated two to one. But everyone knew that the Roman Catholic population enjoyed a higher birth rate. Therefore, to Protestants, Roman Catholics must experience a higher departure rate (not death rate; that was not necessary, for emigration would suffice. But relatively more Roman Catholics must emigrate). Emigration was, and is, an all-Ireland phenomenon, for people with insufficient jobs and too few houses will rove in search of them. In Northern Ireland, Protestants as employers and local councillors, were in a position to deny jobs and houses to a sufficiently higher proportion of Roman Catholics to preserve the balance. Between 1920 and 1970 the ratio of Protestants to Catholics remained unaltered,

Protestants and Catholics: the two separate communities had been left intact and apart at the creation of Northern Ireland. They formed two communities, each cohering around its received religious tradition, but living apart despite being physically close and even in places, intermingled; two communities, raised and living in mutual ignorance of one another; two communities, born, educated, entertained, buried, SEPARATELY; two bitter communities, the Protestant aggressively in command, the Catholic angry at Partition, looking to Dublin and a United Ireland, defiantly remaining aloof. It was Roman Catholic policy to keep apart in order to preserve the purity of the faith. Protestants were glad to concur in order to preserve their numbers (for the ne temere decree, dictating that offspring of mixed marriages be reared in the Roman Catholic faith, was rightly feared and resented by Protestant mothers and Protestant politicians), and to preserve their power, both political and economic.

The results of this apartness have been manifold. Most particularly there has been a lack of communication between the communities; and this has led to the holding by each of a stereotyped, caricature image of the other; an image applied to all individuals of the other group; and it has also induced in each an exaggerated fear of the other - points of considerable importance when a crisis situation arose between the communities. Another feature of the two communities is worth repeating: their permanently fixed relationship, one to another, Protestants dominant, Roman Catholics dominated.

Under circumstances of permanent power Protestants developed a peculiar psychology. Members of the Protestant community grew to accept the righteousness of the status quo; learned not to question the origins of the situation but to assume that because life was right for them, society must be right and good. To this dominant group, allegations of oppression, of discrimination, of political gerrymandering or abuse of power were to be rejected as biased fabrications unworthy of serious consideration. The dominant group developed a superiority complex through undisturbed power. The chief expression of this complex has been violent resistance to change, violent reaction to suggested doubts as to the validity of its moral foundation. For such a group new thinking is difficult; by such a group change is repudiated.

But, to resume the narrative, change has a habit of occurring. Between 1920 and 1970 there has been much change, technical and social, throughout the developed world. And in the U.K. this change has been particularly apparent since World War Two. Since 1945, a Welfare State has been built and this has had an increasing impact upon both communities in Northern Ireland. Even allowing for discrimination against Catholics, both communities began to enjoy a higher standard of living than was general in the rest of Ireland. This presented a new situation, demanded new objectives of the Roman Catholic minority and led to the formulation of new desires for equal citizenship within Northern Ireland rather than for a merging of the North into an all-Ireland Republic. These desires, however, led in turn to conflict, a conflict, it is worth stressing, that stemmed directly from the mutual ignorance of the two communities. Mutual ignorance bred suspicion, and suspicion all too readily proved self-fulfilling. Conflict began overtly in 1968 and has escalated since then. So let us review briefly the past four years of crisis, and try to establish how it is that even yet both communities feel entitled to such high levels of righteous anger.

By 1967 new undercurrents were stirring within the Roman Catholic Community. Already there had been organised protest against years of Protestant control, Protestant appointments, Protestant law. Now, in March 1967, a Civil Rights Association was formed rather along the lines organised by the U.K. Council of Civil Liberties to help individuals combat discriminatory acts. In 1968 the C.R.A. widened its scope and began to ally with other organisations, to state more general grievances and to march and demonstrate and protest, as Civil Rights workers in the U.S.A. had done. Thus, in August 1968, the C.R.A. marched to Dungannon to expose discrimination there in the allocation of public housing; next it agreed to support the Derry Housing Action Committee in a protest march in Derry in October. This march, however, was banned by the N. Irish Government. But the ban was defied and the march, when it took place, was dispersed by the Police with a violence that received much publicity.

The C.R.A. now became the focus of Roman Catholic community feeling, and in the wake of the Derry debacle it articulated formally the new demands of the aggrieved minority. Its statement contained seven major requests: one man one vote in local council elections (here the law lagged behind English law, to the detriment, it was felt of the Catholic community); removal of gerrymandered boundaries (Derry was the most notable example here), legislation to prevent discrimination; machinery to deal with complaints; the allocation of public housing according to an agreed points system; repeal of the Special Powers Act (1922), and the disbanding of the 'B' Special Police Reserve (a Protestant force).

The C.R.A. was a non-denominational body. But because of the nature of its membership and its tasks it was identified with Roman Catholicism; and because of its opposition to the Unionist Government it attracted all kinds of opponents of that Government. These included the I.R.A., moribund as a military force since its abortive campaign, 1956-62 and increasingly adopting a political, Marxist stance; and the Peoples Democracy, a left wing student organisation called into being after the banned Derry March. As such, the C.R.A. presented an all too familiar face to the Protestant Community, particularly the more extreme Protestants. They viewed the C.R.A. with disbelief. Civil Rights? - Rubbish! there



There was no need. This could only be Republicanism in disguise. Therefore it must be destroyed! C.R.A. activities, in consequence, met with increasing violence from Protestant activists. Increasingly, community attitudes and hatreds sharpened and hardened.

Early on, however, in the face of mounting but still low level conflict, the Unionist Prime Minister, Terence O'Neill, did make a response to C.R.A. grievances. In November 1968 he announced a reform package directly related to the civil rights demands. Public housing would be allocated on a points system; grievance investigation machinery would be established and an Ombudsman appointed; Derry Borough Council would be replaced by a Development Commission; Local Government would be reformed, in terms both of franchise and boundaries; parts, at least, of the Special Powers Act would be repealed. And all this would be completed by the end of 1971.

O'Neill's announcement, however, received a mixed reaction. Distrust prevailed in discontented Roman Catholic quarters, for Unionists would hardly deliver the goods when it came to action; rage dominated extreme Unionists, notably Ian Paisley and his Ulster Constitution Defence Committee, for it was sheer madness to make such concessions to Papists; dissatisfaction characterised the left wing Peoples Democracy, for more thorough-going reforms were needed in the fields of housing, employment and local government. Distrust and discontent rather than gratitude were the reaction, therefore, and few immediate changes followed to encourage waverers. Even in December, when O'Neill made an unprecedented appeal to moderate Roman Catholics as well as Protestants to support him in opposition to mounting violence, there was little response. And 1969 began with a major increase of the violence level.

From 1 - 4 January 1969 a group of the Peoples Democracy marched from Belfast towards Derry until, at Burntollet, it was brutally dispersed. From 3 - 5 January disorder reigned in Derry itself and continued intermittently until April, with the Royal Ulster Constabulary rampaging at times in Catholic areas.

Under pressure from left and right, O'Neill called a General Election for 24 February. The elections produced little change; too little. On 28 April O'Neill resigned, being replaced by Major James Chichester Clarke. But the new Prime Minister was faced with growing alarm as the July-August marching season approached, with Protestant and Catholic glaring menacingly at one another. In London, Premier Harold Wilson feared increasing British involvement and admitted considerable ignorance of Northern Ireland conditions. In Belfast the I.R.A. grew restless under the organisation's 'pacific' policy; while extreme Protestants resented concessions to 'Nationalists' and 'Republicans'. In Dublin government and public alike viewed with mounting concern the threats posed to their co-religionists in the North. And from 12 - 16 August 1969 the worst fears of all groups seemed realised. A new explosion of communal violence in Derry and Belfast altered the whole scale of the problem and introduced two powerful new factors.

Briefly, communal riots in Derry, from 12 August, resulted in an appeal by Derry Catholics to Catholics in Belfast for diversionary action to relieve pressure. The action of Belfast Catholics was met with such Protestant ferocity there that military action was required. In the

first place this meant that the British Government sent in the British Army, on 14 August, to separate the two communities. The army was to prove a blunt weapon in civil circumstances and its increasingly destructive impact was to be a major factor from then on. Its entry was accompanied, on 19 August, by the Downing Street Declaration, by which the British Labour Government reaffirmed its aim of equal citizenship for all in Northern Ireland. The O'Neill package would go through; law and order would be restored.

The second military action was equally important. The violence in Derry and Belfast hastened a split in the ranks of the I.R.A. and gave birth to the Provisional I.R.A. - a group committed to military activism. The Provisionals swore to protect the defenceless Roman Catholic community (and for this they were welcomed by that community), but they also determined to use the situation to return Catholic thinking to a United Ireland and to achieve that end by any means. By bombing, murder, terror and destruction they would show that the Stormont government was no longer able to govern. Thus it was that Protestant violence recreated the bogey that Protestants had always feared and which they mistakenly ascribed to the C.R.A.: a renewed assault on Partition.

The latter part of 1969 and the early part of 1970 were devoted by all parties, the British Army, the I.R.A., the militant Protestants, to regrouping, so that comparative calm prevailed. But it is worth noting that in September 1969 the Cameron Report on the disturbances in Derry underlined the need for reform in Northern Ireland; and in October the Hunt Report on the re-organisation of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, recommended the disbanding of the 'B' Special Reserve, encouraging Catholic militants and inflaming their Protestant counterparts.

In June, 1970, Edward Heath and the Conservatives replaced Harold Wilson's Labour Government in Britain. In July, instead of a banning of Protestant parades, a massive Army arms search of the Catholic Falls Road area of Belfast took place, adding to the Catholic disenchantment with the British Army, and contributing a burst of new recruits to the Provisional I.R.A. With increasing momentum, the I.R.A. escalated its violence throughout the rest of 1970, despite some progress with Unionist reform legislation.

On 20 March, 1971, James Chichester Clarke went the way of Terence O'Neill. He was replaced by the ambitious Mr. Brian Faulkner. On 22 June, Faulkner made an imaginative attempt to involve the Social Democratic and Labour Party Opposition in the management of Northern Ireland's affairs, offering it participation in three important new government committees. But by ill luck the S.D.L.P., denied satisfaction in its demand for an independent inquiry into alleged army brutality, felt obliged to leave the Stormont Parliament on 15 July. On 9 August, Faulkner tried another approach. He ordered the internment without trial of suspected terrorists.

Internment produced uproar. There was an immediate and widespread outcry from Catholics, for only Catholic suspects were interned; also the British Army, the instrument of the internment policy, was none too gentle in going about its business (a point confirmed by the Crompton Report on 17 November, 1971). Besides, the use of the army implied that it was now simply an arm of the Unionist Government. The Catholic Community, staggered by both partisanship and brutality, was thus, by the end of 1971, totally disillusioned with Unionist rule. Stormont good faith was simply no longer credible.

Their alienation from the Northern Ireland government was complete, despite what many Protestants sincerely felt was a genuine attempt at legislative reform. There had been so much reform, indeed, that Protestants felt able to claim that Catholics could never be satisfied. Unionists too could feel righteous indignation.

Their view was officially enshrined on 18 August, 1971, just after Internment, in a deliberately timed Stormont White Paper entitled A record of constructive change. The Record listed all the reforms carried out since 1968 and also summarised a massive programme of economic and social development. The reforms affected the police, who were disarmed and placed under civilian control, with the 'B' Specials disbanded. They provided a Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, a Commissioner for Complaints, Universal Adult Suffrage for local council elections, codes of employment to end discrimination. Housing was now allocated on a points system: there was a Ministry of Community Relations established and a Community Relations Commission independent of the government. A law had been passed against incitement to religious hatred and there had been a reorganisation of local government administration, including boundaries and functions. This was an impressive list, though the reforms were necessarily slow to bear fruit, slow to impinge on the electorate at large.

The trouble was that by this time some Roman Catholics had returned their sights to a United Ireland and were in consequence disinterested in Northern Irish reform, while many others were too disenchanted with the Unionist Government to take these reforms seriously, or to accept at face value the claims made in the White Paper. Indeed a significant group of Catholics who had begun to play a part in Northern Irish affairs, joining the public services and working to achieve one community, now decided to come out firmly against Faulkner's claims.

Their reply, Commentary on the White Paper, published on 20 September, 1971, demonstrated disbelief in the practical utility of the 'reforms', rejected its comprehensive claims, and showed how far application of some of the new laws departed from their ostensibly constructive spirit. Commentary complained that the police had in fact been little altered, in personnel and practice, that the Special Powers Act remained, that both the 'Ombudsman' and the Commissioner for Complaints were shackled by inadequate back-up machinery, that the local government legislation ignored the peculiar circumstances of Northern Ireland and that there was need for a Religious Relations Act along the lines of the U.K. Race Relations Act. In short, as the Sunday Times Insight team pointed out, the fact remained that this legislative tinkering was not designed to change the basic premises of the state, the whole raison d'etre of which was to preserve Protestant predominance.

In these circumstances, the situation did not improve. On 24 March, 1972, therefore, the British Government, assuming at last its ultimate responsibility for Northern Ireland and recognising the barren results of Unionist rule, suspended the Stormont Parliament, took over Direct rule, and appointed Mr. William Whitelaw as Minister of State responsible for N. Irish affairs.

Since March 1972, Mr. Whitelaw has struggled to establish the credibility of Westminster justice, Westminster good faith; to conciliate the Catholics without rousing the Protestants. He is still trying. But the situation remains tense, with the two communities still acting belligerently towards one another. And their hostility has not left untouched the rest of the island of Ireland.

Events in the North, indeed, have had great impact on the Dublin based Irish Republic (established in 1949). Since its inception, the Dublin Government has sought the unity of all Ireland. At least since 1925 it has been committed to achieving this by peaceful, voluntary agreement. But communal violence since 1968 has presented it with a real dilemma. It could not ignore the threat to its co-religionists in the North; neither could it easily intervene. The Cabinet of Mr. Lynch split, however, on the action that could be taken. A minority, while agreeing with the rest that the Irish Army could not be used, felt that a supply of arms at least could be furnished to protect Northern Catholics.

In the summer of 1970 the involvement of Cabinet members in such an arms supply caused a scandal that rocked the ruling Fianna Fail Party. Thereafter, as public support became manifest for the banned I.R.A., the whole democratic edifice of the Republic threatened to crack. In the face of continued Northern conflict that edifice remains shaky today, so that it is true to say that it is the whole island that is currently undergoing a crisis.

It is in the North, however, that a solution must be found, and it is in terms of the North that we must now draw to a close. There, it is the extremists on both sides who continue to make the running. In the middle, there are many decent, upright men and women who are confused, frightened - and above all righteously indignant. It is in their righteous anger that the tragedy lies. For this conflict could have been avoided had there been more community understanding, more mutual sympathy, at the start; had there been less ignorance, less suspicion and a less selfish attitude on the part of the dominant group. That lesson remains for others to learn. Meanwhile, can any optimistic observation be applied to the Irish?

Here only three points can be made. In the short term the I.R.A. may discredit itself by its indiscriminate destruction: peace and a cooling period under an impartial Westminster administration may allow the sores to heal, may permit a reconciliation of Irishmen within N. Ireland. In the medium term, membership of both parts of Ireland in the European Economic Community may give publicity to the many common Irish interests: Northern Irish farmers, for example, may find their case better expressed in Brussels by the representatives of the agricultural Republic than by their own representatives of largely industrial Britain. In circumstances such as this - and there are many - a genuine reconciliation might take place between Irishmen North and South. And in the long term the spirit of ecumenism abroad in the world may penetrate even to Christian Ireland and complete a process of reconciliation that might lead at last to political union: a union that could turn Irishmen North and South away from petty past conflict towards fruitful argument about the sort of future they might build together.

Perhaps the key to such developments lies in the grasping by both Irish communities of a broader view of history. It is, therefore, appropriate to end with a quotation from Ireland's leading contemporary historian, F.S.L. Lyons, whose book Ireland since the Famine (Weidenfeld & Nicholson 1971) admirably presents the broader views in which hope lies:

To understand the past fully is to cease to live in it and to cease to live in it is to take the earliest steps towards shaping what is to come from the material of the present.

Dr. Harkness is in the Department of History of the University of Kent at Canterbury. The above article is based on a lecture he gave to the Witwatersrand Branch of the Institute on 15th August, 1972.

APARTHEID AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Review of SOUTH AFRICAN DIALOGUE, Ed. N.J. Rhoodie,  
McGraw-Hill, Johannesburg, 1972.

by

David Hirschmann

Apartheid and International Relations is the title of the last of ten sections included in the book edited by Professor Rhoodie on South African race relations and policies. The title is apt, for it points explicitly to the intimate connection between the country's foreign and domestic relations; a connection more significant than is the norm in international affairs, for here the question of South Africa's internal political structure is itself a key issue in the country's relations with the world. This theme underlies the thinking of all three contributors: Mr. John Barratt, Director of the S.A. Institute of International Affairs, Dr. Denis Worrall, acting head of the Department of International Relations of the University of the Witwatersrand, and Professor C.A.W. Manning, who was for thirty-two years Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics. In reading this section one does sense a time gap between the writing of the texts and the publication of the book, for this is a sphere of study in which there are frequent changes of direction and policy.

Mr. Barratt's contribution, 'South Africa's Outward Policy : from Isolation to Dialogue', provides a useful history of, and a relevant background to, the country's foreign relations from the end of World War II through until 1971. This traces the stages from Smuts' success in 1945; the commencement the next year of attacks on South Africa in the UN; the increasing volume of these attacks, notably in the early sixties with the proliferation of new independent states; growing isolation from international organisations; withdrawal from the Commonwealth; the continuing South West Africa case; and then growing confidence in the mid-sixties and the first cautious steps in the outward movement. These in turn reached a peak with the visit of President Banda, the positive approach to dialogue of President Houphouët-Boigny and Prime Minister Busia, and with Mr. Vorster's concession that he was willing to discuss South Africa's domestic policies with leaders of other countries. The author notes the wish to change apartheid as the principal reason for African leaders supporting dialogue. But he also notes three further reasons: possible economic advantages; lessening of friction on the continent which would enable these countries to concentrate on economic development; and a desire to check the spread of communism on the continent.

All this led him to conclude on an optimistic if cautious note. Since the time of writing the outward movement has suffered a number of serious setbacks, notably with the changes in Government in Ghana and Madagascar and with change in attitude of Chief Jonathan of Lesotho.

Mr. Barratt sees the 1966 decision of the International Court of Justice on South West Africa as a turning point in the country's foreign policy. Attitudes became more relaxed and threats from outside were regarded less seriously. This may have been the turning point but there were numerous other factors involved in the new approach, particularly growing economic and military confidence. In this regard, a useful supplement to his analysis would have been some discussion of the impetus to change resulting

from Dr. Muller replacing Mr. Eric Louw as Foreign Minister, and Mr. Vorster succeeding Dr. Verwoerd as Prime Minister.

Dr. Worrall comments in his chapter, South Africa's Reaction to External Criticism, that there can be no doubt that overseas criticism has influenced government policy. Its precise effect or extent, however, is not simple to determine. He commences by listing the more important forms of criticism: for example - activist groups in western countries, championing the application of economic sanctions; pressure on South Africa to withdraw from international organisations; assistance to liberation movements; expulsion from international sporting bodies; criticism through academic and press media. In recent days two further pressure factors have been receiving attention and these could be added to his list: pressure on commercial firms with investments in South Africa to disinvest or at least radically to improve the conditions of Black workers; and the Black caucus in the United States.

Dr. Worrall then goes on to discuss how white South Africans have responded to these criticisms. One method is to ignore them; a second is to point to the questionable bona fides of the critic or double-standards in his approach; a third is to present such attacks as a threat to the country and then use them to rally party followers; a fourth is to argue that the question is not one else's business and remind the world of paragraph 2(7) of the UN Charter; and a fifth is a very detailed defence of the policies of the Government. The changing emphasis from the fourth to the fifth method corresponded with growing confidence in the country, and here again some analysis of the part played by Dr. Muller in bringing about this alteration of defence would have been useful.

At some length the author describes the pressures brought to bear in the field of sport and the alterations in official sports policy for which those pressures were a partial cause - though this is never admitted in Government circles. This is a helpful example, for, as he says, it illustrates both how South Africa's race relations evolve and demonstrates how escalating overseas pressure plays a role in change of policy.

He makes an interesting point: "Ironical, however, is the fact that, all the pressure notwithstanding, the thrust of change in South Africa has been in the opposite direction from that demanded by the country's critics ... While South Africa's external critics have overwhelmingly supported the common society, alternative official policy has steered change in the other direction." (p 585-586). While this is in essence valid the subject appears more complex. The sports model, for example, does not fit this theory too tidily; and many of the questions on which the world is making South Africa focus attention are not of the separate development variety: the position of urban Blacks and of the Asians and Coloureds, easing up of job restrictions and the ending of petty apartheid.

Professor Manning's contribution, 'South Africa's Racial Policies - A Threat to Peace?' deals separately with two questions, namely whether South Africa's policies are 'racial' and whether they constitute a threat to peace. He argues that, because a country includes within its borders more than one race, this fact adds to all its problems and policies a racial dimension - but that they are not as such 'racial'. To call them racial, he says, does not make them simpler to solve. In support of his argument he lists certain questions clearly presupposing negative replies: Does legislation perhaps become racial by virtue of being that of a parliament in which persons of European descent alone can sit? Are South Africa's educational policies racial because they presuppose a differentiation between the races? Are her

military policies racial, when it is the white man who bears the burden of defending the country? Such questions hardly support his argument, for they are not, as he assumes, leading questions to which there is but one answer. In the opinion of the reviewer in fact the answer to all of them is a positive one.

In dealing with the second question, he points out that in deciding upon the matter members of the UN devote little attention to factual evidence.

When in an English court, it is asked, Was there negligence? what is meant is, Was there negligence in the sight of the law? But by contrast when, at the United Nations, the question is, Is there a threat to the peace? what is meant is, Shall there be declared to exist a threat, in the sight of the Security Council? It is proper to consider how very different a question this could be. For now instead of being concerned with what was essentially a question of opinion, we are looking at what may in practice be a matter of something else, namely, the collective official policy of a number of member states. (p594)

Irrespective of whether these policies do or do not constitute an actual or potential threat, one can accept his argument that no objective and comprehensive study is made of the available evidence before a decision is reached. Also one can accept that the hostile environment in which South Africa exists in the world is a contributory factor to the threat. When, however, he goes on to compare Hitler's wish to conquer Czechoslovakia with the OAU (led originally by Nkrumah) wish to conquer South Africa his line of argument loses its credence. The covetousness, he maintains, of Nkrumah was no less than that of Hitler, and just as Hitler would have invaded Czechoslovakia even if there were no Germans living there, so too, he implies, would Nkrumah have desired to take the resources of South Africa even if there were no Blacks in the country.

A substantial portion of his chapter constitutes a defence of South African policies, which is not within the mandate of this review to discuss; save to say, that in a book of the nature of Professor Rhodie's a contribution by a second non-South African with views to balance those of Professor Manning would have been appropriate.

NEWS FROM THE BRANCHES / NUUS VAN DIE TAKKE

EASTERN PROVINCE

The following speakers addressed meetings of the Branch during the past year :

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|------------------------------|--|
| Mr. Anthony le Jeune         | on "Historical Developments in Zaire"                |
| Professor Stanislav Andreski | on "The Generation Gap"                              |
| Mrs. I. Neethling            | on "Life in Transylvania after the Second World War" |
| Dr. T.R.H. Davenport         | on "African Urban Areas - A Comparative Analysis"    |

STELLENBOSCH

Vergaderings is gedurende 1972 deur die volgende persone toegesprek :

- |                        |   |
|------------------------|---|
| Mnr. D. Donnelly       |   |
| Adv. D.P. de Villiers  | oor „Die Stryd oor Suidwes Afrika: Perspektief en Voorstuitsigte" |
| Professor R.W.E. Winks | oor "The Roots of American Foreign Policy"                        |
| Dr. W. Pfeiffenberger  | oor "The United Nations and South Africa"                         |
| Mnr. R.R. Gosende      | oor "The American Election 1972"                                  |

CAPE TOWN

The following speakers addressed meetings during 1972 :

- |                              |   |
|------------------------------|---|
| Mr. Colin Eglin              | on "A recent visit to Central Africa"                 |
| Sir Nicholas Cayzer, Bt.     | on "The Passing Years"                                |
| Professor Stanislav Andreski | on "Internal Crisis in the U.S.A."                    |
| Mr. D.G. Milne               | on "Whither Oil?"                                     |
| Mr. Japie Basson M.P.        | on "South West Africa and its International Position" |
| Professor Robin Winks        | on "Roots of American Foreign Policy"                 |
| Mr. Victor Norton            | on "Collection of Foreign News"                       |
| Mr. W.H. Stoops              | on "International Aspects of the Fishing Industry"    |



Professor J.L. Sadie on "The European Common Market -  
Towards Monetary Integration"

Mr. Gerald Shaw on "A South African's Impressions of  
the United States"

NATAL

The following speakers addressed meetings of the Natal Branch in 1972 :

Professor Stanislav Andreski on "Britain's Predicament"

Professor A.M. Keppel-Jones on "The Problem of Quebec"

Dr. D.W. Harkness on "The Current Irish Crisis"

Mr. W E.G. Beckman on "Brazil"

PRETORIA

Die volgende vergaderings is vanjaar gehou :

Professor Stanislav Andreski oor "Britain Today"

Mnr. W.J. Breytenbach oor „Politieke Toestande in Lesotho"

Mnr. W.A.C. Adie oor "Politics in Communist China"

Mnr. Gideon Roos oor "International Protection of  
Intellectual Property"

Filmvertoning : President Nixon in China - A  
Journey for Peace; President  
Nixon in Russia - A Summit of  
Substance; en Newsom's Speech -  
Mid-America Club

Dr. W. Pfeiffenberger oor "The Role of Permanently Neutral  
Countries in World Politics"

Dr. P.J. Nieuwenhuizen oor „Aspekte van die Huidige  
Internasionale Monetêre Stelsel"

Professor P. Smit oor „Die Ekonomiese Aspekte van  
Kommunistiese Indringing in Afrika"

Kaptein W.N. du Plessis oor „Die Militêre Aspekte van  
Kommunistiese Indringing in Afrika  
en die Indiese Oseaan-Gebied" en

Kolonel F.E. Wagoner oor "The American View on Communist  
Activities in Africa and the  
Indian Ocean Area"

Mnr. C.J.A. Barrett oor "The War in Mozambique"

WITWATERSRAND

The following meetings took place at Jan Smuts House during 1972 :

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|---|--|
| Professor J.H. Coetzee  | on "Possibilities of Co-operation with Africa"   |
| Dr. J.- P. Koszul   | on "The International Monetary Situation and Gold"   |
| Professor Kurt Glaser   | on "The American Election System and How It Works"   |
| Dr. Ivan Shearer  | on "Problems of International Law and Relations Arising from the Granting of Independence to New States in Africa" |
| Professor David Pugsley                                       | on "The Council of Europe"   |
| Mr. R. Fendrick and<br>Dr. R. Speer                           | on "The American Presidential Elections: Phase One: The Primaries"   |
| Professor Robin Winks   | on "Roots of American Foreign Policy"  |
| Film Evening  | : President Nixon in China;<br>President Nixon in Russia;<br>US Foreign Policy in Africa.                          |
| Mr. W.A.C. Adie   | on "Chinese Foreign Policy"  |
| Professor A.M. Keppel-Jones                                   | on "Canadian Politics Today"   |
| Dr. D.W. Harkness   | on "The Current Irish Crisis"  |
| Dr. W. Pfeiffenberger   | on "The United Nations and South Africa"   |
| Mr. J.H.P. Serfontein,<br>Mr. R. Fendrick and<br>Dr. R. Speer | on "The American Presidential Election: Phase Two: Conventions and Candidates"                                     |
| Dr. Charles Malik   | on "Some Reflections on the General World Situation"   |
| Professor M.I. Zand   | on "Dissident Movements in the Soviet Union"   |
| Dr. George Barrie   | on "Developments in the Law of the Sea and the 1974 Law of the Sea Conference"                                     |
| Mr. John Rees   | on "Investment in Southern Africa"   |
| Mr. I. van Kan  | on "Impressions of Brazil"   |
| Sir Roy Welensky  | on "Rhodesia: Quo Vadis"   |

JAN SMUTS HOUSE LIBRARY - 1972

Since January 1972, the library of the South African Institute of International Affairs has been administered by the University and is officially called Jan Smuts House Library. Primarily designed to serve members of the Institute, it has nevertheless been used almost exclusively by University students and staff. This year, as a result of a stable staff situation, simplification in its previously very complex shelf arrangement, and several other administrative alterations, it seems to be a popular working library, and the use made of it is increasing steadily. Bibliographical information and reference queries, which come from a variety of sources outside the University, are handled frequently.

The task of interfiling the three separate monograph sections, namely Books on Africa, International Affairs and Strategic Studies, and then re-arranging the serial and Government publications in alphabetical order necessitated a spring-clean. A major disadvantage continues to be the unsatisfactory classification scheme (Chatham House), which is used for the Institute books. Cataloguing and the entire processing of each monograph is completed in the library, and a corresponding set of cards is sent to the Main Library in each case. There are some 7,000 titles in stock at the present time. An accessions list is compiled at the end of each quarter. Monographs ordered by the Department of International Relations and therefore belonging to the University, are processed in the Main Library and classified by the Library of Congress scheme and these are shelved separately in the library. The serial publications, which are an important part of the collection, are handled entirely by the library. At present there are some 220 subscriptions to current journals and about 160 Government publications are received regularly. The fairly extensive pamphlet collection is used quite frequently as an additional source of information. An effort has been made this year to revise and extend our exchange arrangements with similar Institutes throughout the world; considerable material is now being received regularly, in return for which the Institute Newsletters and Occasional Publications are sent.

Our valuable collection of United Nations material is still a very unsatisfactory section to handle, due to lack of records and general organisation. It urgently requires full-time professional attention to ensure that all relevant publications are received, adequately processed and therefore accessible. It could and should be a vital section of the library collection.

G. NICHOLSON  
(Librarian)

DECEMBER 1972

SOME RECENT ACQUISITIONS IN THE LIBRARY AT JAN SMUTS HOUSE

- ARON, Raymond  
De Gaulle, Israel and the Jews. London: Deutsch, 1968.
- CRABB, Cecil V.  
Nations in a multipolar world. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.
- DEUTSCH, Karl Wolfgang  
Nationalism and its alternatives. New York: Knopf, 1969.
- DJILAS, Milovan  
The unperfect Society : beyond the new class. London: Unwin, 1972.
- DUNN, John  
Modern revolutions: an introduction to the analysis of a political phenomenon. Cambridge: Univ. pr., 1972.
- EKSTEEN, Michael Casparus  
Lesotho in uitwaarts beweging. Johannesburg: Perskor, 1972.
- FOX, William T.R., ed.  
Theoretical aspects of international relations. Notre Dame: Univ. pr., 1959.
- GERTZEL, Cherry J. ed.  
Government and politics in Kenya: a nation building text. Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969.
- GORDENKER, Leon, ed.  
The United Nations in international politics. Princeton: Univ. pr., 1971
- HALL, Richard, ed.  
South-West Africa (Namibia): proposals for action. London: Africa Bureau, 1970.
- HANAK, H  
Soviet foreign policy since the death of Stalin. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972.
- HATCH, John Charles  
Tanzania: a profile. London: Pall Mall, 1972.
- JONES, Roy E.  
Analysing foreign policy: an introduction to some conceptual problems. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970.
- KAHN, Herman  
The emerging Japanese superstate: challenge and response. London: Deutsch, 1971.
- KHAKETLA, B.  
Lesotho, 1970: an African coup under the microscope. London: Hurst, 1971.

- LEISTNER, Gerhard Max Erich  
Economic and social forces affecting the urbanization of the Bantu population of South Africa. Pretoria: Africa Institute, 1972.
- LIPSET, Seymour Martin, ed.  
Elites in Latin America. London: Oxford Univ. pr., 1967.
- LIU, Leo Yueh-Yun  
China as a nuclear power in world politics. London: Macmillan, 1972.
- PLANO, Jack C.  
International approaches to the problems of marine pollution. Brighton: Institute for the Study of International Organisation, 1972.
- RIVKIN, Arnold  
Africa and the European Common Market: a perspective. Denver: the University, 1964
- SWAZILAND. Land statutes, etc. National Industrial Development Corporation Act, 1971. The National industrial development corporation act, 1971. /Mbabane: Govt. printer, 1971/
- UNITED NATIONS. Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. /Miscellaneous papers/ 4 pts.
- UNITED NATIONS. Unit on Apartheid Foreign investment in the Republic of South Africa. New York: United Nations, 1970.
- UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, Stockholm, 1972  
Report. New York: United Nations, 1972.
- UWECHUE, Raph  
Reflections on the Nigerian civil war: a call for realism. London: O.I.T.H. International Publishers, 1969.
- VAMBE, Lawrence  
An ill-fated people: Zimbabwe before and after Rhodes. London: Heinemann, 1972.
- VATIKIOTIS, Panayiotis  
Conflict in the Middle East. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1971.
- VATIKIOTIS, Panayiotis  
Politics and the military in Jordan: a study of the Arab legion, 1921-1957. London: Cass, 1967.
- VITAL, David  
The survival of small states: studies in the small power/great power conflict. London: Oxford Univ. pr., 1971.
- WERTH, Alexander  
Russia, the post-war years. London: Robert Hale, 1971.
- WHITAKER, C S.  
The politics of tradition, continuity and change in Northern Nigeria, 1946 - 1966. Princeton: Univ. pr. 1970.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS AVAILABLE

The Library of Jan Christian Smuts

A catalogue arranged and edited by Ursula Brigish (In two parts)  
- Published by the University of the Witwatersrand and the Smuts Memorial Trust, in co-operation with the South African Institute of International Affairs.

Price: non-members : R10, members: R5.

International Aspects of Overpopulation, Edited by John Barratt and Michael Louw.

Proceedings of a Conference held by the South African Institute of International Affairs at Johannesburg.

Published for the Institute by the Macmillan Press Ltd., London.

Price : R8.75 (if ordered through the Institute).

Questions Affecting South Africa at the United Nations, 1971

The fifth in a series of annual reports issued by the Institute, containing the texts of resolutions, details of voting, etc. The report for the year 1971 also includes extracts from selected statements made during U.N. debates.

This publication can be obtained without charge by members of the Institute on request. (It will not be automatically circulated to all members.) Price for non-members: 50 cents.

The Roots of American Foreign Policy by Robin W. Winks

This paper by Professor Robin Winks of Yale University is based on an address given to an Institute meeting at Jan Smuts House, and it includes the replies to questions during the discussion period.

The paper is available to members on request at no charge.

Price for non-members : 30 cents.

Peking and Moscow : The Permanence of Conflict by Stefan T. Possony.

Professor Stefan Possony is Director of the International Political Studies Program of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, California.

This paper is available to members on request at no charge.

Price to non-members : 30 cents.

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Available shortly: The Use and Protection of Natural Resources in Southern Africa;

Proceedings of a Symposium organised by the Institute at Jan Smuts House in December, 1971. (Price not yet available).