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Huis Jan Smuts

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S. A. I. I. A.

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S.A.I.I.A. NUUSBRIEF

Nr. 4 - November 1969

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L.W.

Alle artikels in hierdie Nuusbrief word vir die inligting van lede van die Instituut bedoel. Verder is alle standpunte ingeneem in die artikels die verantwoordelikheid van die skrywers en nie van die Instituut nie.

INLEIDENDE NOTAS

Gedurende die afgelope maande is nuwe voorsitters deur die Instituut se takke in Kaapstad, Port Elizabeth en Durban gekies. Hulle is mnr. W.T. Ferguson, mnr. A.J. Karstaedt en professor E.N. Keen respektiewelik, en namens die Instituut wil ons hulle gelukwens. Ons wil ook ons dank aan die uittredende voorsitters betuig, naamlik kapt. J.G.Y. Loveband, mnr. J.P. Hamber en professor K.H.C. McIntyre.

Op 16 en 17 Oktober het die simposium oor "Die Buitelandse Beleid van die Verenigde State in Streeksverband" by Huis Jan Smuts plaasgevind. Dit was 'n baie suksesvolle onderneming, en verteenwoordigers van alle Transvaalse Universiteite sowel as die Universiteite van Kaapstad en Natal en die Universiteitskollege in Durban het die verrigtinge bygewoon. Inligting oor die program en die hoofsprekers word op bls. 28 en 29 gegee. Ons hoop dat dit moontlik sal wees om verdere simposia in die toekoms te reël.

In nuusbrieff nr. 3 het ons 'n lys van individuele lede gepubliseer wat bydraes tot die koste van die konferensie oor die bevolkingsontploffing (Junie 1970) gemaak of toegesê het. Die volgende individue het sedert die publikasie van daardie lys bydraes gemaak, en ons wil ons hartelike dank aan hulle betuig:-

Mev. Bruna Millner
Mev. Susan Dickson
Mnr. H.H. McGregor
Dr. T. Bramwell-Jones

Sedert die publikasie in nuusbrieff 2 en 3 van die name van maatskappye wat die Instituut van hulle geldelike steun vir die Konferensie verseker het, het ons 'n bydrae van Imperiale Koelkamers en Voorsieningsmaatskappy ontvang. Ons wil ons dank ook aan dié firma betuig.

Ons volgende nuusbrieff sal inligting oor die bedrywighede van die Instituut se takke gedurende die tweede helfte van 1969 bevat.

Die Direkteur

ADDRESS BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DR. THE HON. H. MULLER,

AT THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, LONDON:

30TH OCTOBER, 1969

"SOME ASPECTS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY"

I am glad that my travels have at last enabled me to take advantage of the invitation with which Chatham House honoured me quite a while ago. And when I say that it is indeed a privilege to speak from so distinguished a rostrum, I am not, as is frequently the way with speakers, trying to ingratiate myself with my audience. The Royal Institute of International Affairs for half a century has been pre-eminent in the field of international studies. Its surveys are written with a magisterial authority, its research is a model of good scholarship. And where in this distracted, immensely exciting and dangerous world, could one hope to find an audience less given to a simplistic dogmatism or more judicious in its approach to highly complex situations?

I felt that today an obvious theme would be the place of South Africa in a world moving, or rather stumbling, into the hazardous and unpredictable decade of the seventies. In speculating about the onward course of events, it is useful to take one's bearings by looking back on the recent record: as recently, indeed, as the conclusions of the Second World War. Who then could have foreseen the astonishing changes in the balance of power, the precipitate dissolution of historic empires and the emergence of super powers competing for influence in regions until recently under the control of European colonial countries?

South Africa had developed towards independent nationhood in a world dominated by the great nations of Europe and America. There seemed no serious challenge to the predominance of the Western political system and Western culture. Soviet Russia, after the Bolshevik revolution, was absorbed in its internal problems, China torn by endemic civil war; and vast regions of Asia were under the rule of European powers. In the African continent there were four independent countries including my own. Within the ambit of Western power, South Africa seemed free to work out the enormously complex process of organising a political system which would provide for the co-existence of peoples of vastly different ethnical and cultural origins, and yet guarantee the survival of Western values at the southern end of the continent - not as an agent of Western power but simply because a nation lives there which treasures these values. This remains our mission; and yet how radically changed are the circumstances in which we have to carry it out!

/The old order...

The old order was shattered by the war. The tide of European political power receded in Africa. A score, and more, of new nations came into existence. Many of them were insufficiently prepared for independence. Most of them were economically underdeveloped, lacking the administrative machine or the technical infrastructure essential for economic development, yet armed, magically, with a vote that guaranteed them a rather unreal equality at the United Nations but, en masse, a voting power not commensurate with responsibility. Many professed to see in South Africa a neo-colonial relic, stranded by the tides of history, a sort of irrelevance in the new African dispensation. They could not be more mistaken.

It is a simple fact of history that white South Africans and their culture had their origin in the nations of Western Europe. Having achieved their own distinctive nationhood, however, they do not think of themselves as a branch of the European family marooned, or exiled, in Africa. While they had their origins in Europe, they see themselves as one of the nations of Africa; and it is especially in the African context that they mean to develop their nation, and to co-operate with other African countries in building up the prosperity, progress and stability of the region in which they live. They believe that this can be their own best contribution to a reasonable world order. In short, they believe themselves just as entitled to a national existence as all those others, in the Americas or Australasia, who also owe their origin to the outward surge from Europe.

When South Africans of European descent claim the right to a distinctive nationhood for themselves, they fully accept that this cannot be guaranteed unless the same right is extended to the Bantu nations whom history has brought, with themselves into the bounds of a single geographical area.

It is quite common to speak of the South African situation as unique; and, in certain important respects, no doubt, it is, if only because of the multi-national character of our population and the great disparities that exist in the cultures and the backgrounds of the various groups. But other countries besides our own have serious problems arising from the composition of their peoples. There are some divided by tribal, or ethnic, or communal, or sectarian, or linguistic antagonisms. Not a few have been forced to take refuge in various forms of territorial separation.

Man may reach into space and find other worlds to conquer; but he has not conquered his own nature. We are still very much the creatures of fierce, and often exclusive, group loyalties. One of the overriding problems of our time is how to ensure the peaceful co-existence, on a basis of political equality, of diverse racial or cultural groups. Contemporary experience, except in some favoured and homogeneous countries, makes the cry of "one man, one vote" sound rather hollow and unreal; and one discerns a declining faith in the application of a Westminster-type democracy as a universal panacea. In South Africa we see no future in the idea of

/a common...

a common political system embracing all our extremely diverse peoples. Peace and stability and the hope of progress, we believe, lie rather in the increasing devolution of authority to cohesive Bantu nations in their historical homelands. No one is more conscious than we ourselves of the difficulties in carrying out such a policy; but we see no other way of avoiding the kind of disruptive struggle for power which threatens the stability of so many countries, in Africa and elsewhere.

Within South Africa we seek, in our own way, to build a system of co-operative relationship and a shared prosperity; but we accept that, in these days of a world-wide economic system and communications, South Africa can no more live unto itself than any other modern country. Standing fourteenth in the order of trading nations, we look outwards to the world; but, inevitably, it is in the African continent that we have our being, and it is in an African - more particularly a Southern African - context that we must seek our own safety and prosperity.

Our policy, therefore, is one of increasing contacts and co-operation with the countries of Southern Africa in particular, beginning with those nearest to our borders, and expanding, as we hope, in a widening circle. There is no old-fashioned imperialism or neo-colonialism in this; we have no wish, nor any interest, in trying to dominate our neighbours. We have no claim, whether of territory or population, on any other country. We see it as our vital interest, and obligation to co-operate on a basis of equality with any country in Southern Africa which is ready to accept our offer of co-operation.

In our approach to international relationships we are sure that nothing fruitful can be achieved unless it is based on tolerance and mutual respect, the recognition of the sovereign independence of all states and non-interference in each other's domestic affairs. Of course, as we all know only too well, there are wide differences of approach to political issues, including the domestic problems of various countries; but differences of this kind should not stand in the way of a constructive co-operation between governments in matters where they have a common interest. In times so dangerous as these, it is surely better to put the emphasis on ways of working together than on causes of division. An expanding economic prosperity is essential for the political peace and stability of the region.

We have no doubt that we can make a great contribution to this. South Africa is by far the most highly industrialised and technologically advanced country in the whole of the continent. It produces, in fact, 57 per cent of all the electrical power generated in Africa. Our present per capita consumption has surpassed that of Italy and Japan and equals that of Great Britain seven years ago. With only 6 per cent of the continent's population we produce no less than 24 per cent of the continent's total income; and at present rates of growth, our gross national product will multiply at least five times by the turn of the

/century.

As a leading producer of many kinds of minerals, we have mining techniques as advanced as any in the world; and we produce oil from coal on a scale greater than anywhere else. Our agricultural and veterinary research is of acknowledged quality, not to mention the high standard of medical science in South Africa.

I would not wish, Mr. Chairman, to inflict any more detailed statistics on an audience so well informed as this. The rather generalised statements I have just made were not meant in any spirit of self-satisfaction. They are intended merely as a reminder that South Africa has the industrial capacity and the technological skills, developed in an African environment, to enable it to play the role for which it casts itself in helping forward the development of our neighbours and of friendly states further afield: indeed, history has assigned this role to the man of Europe who has made his permanent home in Africa.

Experience has shown that we, in some respects more than countries much greater, are in a specially favourable position to stimulate economic growth in the region and to give it momentum. A rather dramatic example of this is the great electric power undertaking on the Zambesi at Cabora Bassa, in Mozambique. The project will be the largest of the kind in Africa - larger even than Aswan or Kariba. A South African group is a member of the international consortium whose tender has recently been accepted, and the Republic has made the scheme economically possible by contracting to take the preponderant share of its output - an interesting, if unorthodox, example, incidentally, of access to the market of another country being furnished in order to advance development and growth. A wider result is that other countries will eventually share in the benefits of cheap electric power and all that this means in the development of their economies. Similar, though smaller, schemes are in preparation. One is on the Kunene, on the Angolan border, and the other is called the Oxbow, from which Lesotho as well as the Republic will gain.

We are able to assist other countries with their problems in the scientific, technological and economic fields because we ourselves, in the course of many decades, have learnt to solve similar problems. We are working with our neighbours in many co-operative undertakings concerned with the use of common rivers, and are in continuous contact with Lesotho and other states in such fields as labour, civil aviation, stock diseases, soil conservation, and a diversity of other matters. In the Southern African region we have regular air links with all our neighbours as well as with Malawi, Madagascar and Mauritius.

There is no doubt that the achievement of independence by our neighbouring states has opened the way to a new and constructive phase in our relationships. As soon as they became independent they accepted our hand of friendship; this led to contacts and co-operation in many fields which in turn promote better understanding and mutual respect. There is much coming and going at the ministerial and official levels. I myself had the honour to

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represent South Africa at the independence celebrations of Lesotho and Botswana and Swaziland; and recently cabinet colleagues were in Swaziland and Lesotho for the anniversaries of those countries' independence. I also paid a very useful and interesting official visit last year to Malawi. We receive many visits, almost of a routine kind, from ministers of other countries in the region. We have lately held in Pretoria a successful conference at ministerial level to amend in important respects the customs union between South Africa and Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland, which has existed since 1910.

Our trading links with Rhodesia are important, and we have maintained them since UDI, in accordance with our policy of continuing normal relations with both the United Kingdom and Rhodesia in the present unhappy dispute between them. As for our relations with the Portuguese provinces of Mozambique and Angola, these continue to develop, and this despite the difference of approach in our respective internal policies.

We look forward to the time when this pattern of working with our immediate neighbours will extend to relations with countries farther a field in Africa. Contact with some of these countries is on the increase, and I am confident that we are on the threshold of an era of growing co-operation in Africa.

In all this activity, which aims at increasing the area of economic progress and stability in Southern Africa, we feel we are making a useful contribution also to the good order of the Western world, in which we have so large a stake. The Cape sea route has for centuries been one of the principal highways of the world, linking West and East in trade. Now, with the Suez Canal again indefinitely closed, it is of literally vital significance in commerce and in strategy. A Soviet fleet is making its presence felt in the Indian Ocean. In recent months it has been visiting ports on the East Coast of Africa. There are plans for a British withdrawal from east of Suez, and it seems that the United States is not taking Britain's place in the protection of the Indian Ocean routes. Soviet Russian naval power, inevitably, moves into the vacuum created. This is indeed a cause for deep concern to the free world and I am glad to note that the Royal Institute has also sounded a warning in this regard.

Ships by the thousand, sailing under every flag, call at South African ports in the course of trade, or for bunkers and repairs. They are grateful for the efficient working of our harbours and the amenities of a civilised and well-ordered life. For Britain this route is a vital artery. Around the Cape there come the giant tankers bringing its supplies of oil from the Middle East, and the hundreds of ships engaged in its trade with the Far East and Australasia. Upwards of a million tons of oil pass our coasts to Western Europe each day. All this must be guarded and protected.

South Africa understands, and accepts, its responsibilities; and it is in this context that the Simonstown Agreement is so

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important. It was freely negotiated between South Africa and the United Kingdom to provide for the effective defence of the route round the Cape; and it includes provisions for the supply of equipment from British sources to enable South Africa to play its part. I do not need to remind you that, conforming to an ill-conceived United Nations embargo, the United Kingdom has cut off the supply of many types of arms and even of those aircraft designed solely for sea-defence and for guarding the jugular vein through which flows so much of Britain's life-blood. All this is a source of great regret to South Africa, which values the centuries-old record of naval co-operation with Britain, and would sincerely wish it to continue in full force, to the mutual benefit of both our countries and of the whole Western world. It would seem relevant, in this connection, to mention that of the 90 visits of naval vessels to our ports in the first six months of this year no less than 76 were British.

I have suggested that South Africa guards a vital link in the sea communications of the Western world; there are other, and more general, considerations that give the West a strong interest in the maintenance of a stable situation in Southern Africa. If the Russians are making their presence felt in the Indian Ocean, their rivals, the Communist Chinese, are penetrating with great assiduity and long-range objective into the African continent south of the Sahara. Perhaps the most striking infiltration is the Tanzam railway. Neither Communist giant is, to say the least, a friend of the West, and I trust that due cognisance has been taken of this chain of events.

The Republic is a leading - and in some cases by far the most important - source of many minerals of strategic significance. Its trading relationship with the United Kingdom in particular, is of special importance to both our countries. Britain is our largest market while we are invariably among the first three countries in order of importance for British exports; and approximately £1,500 million of British capital is invested there. Our countries have, in varying constitutional relationships, been associated for a century and a half and we would wish this association to continue on the basis of a growing understanding and mutual respect.

In the circumstances, would it not be useful to devote more time and energy to devising means of extending the co-operation which is so clearly to our mutual benefit? It is not appropriate that we ponder the eroding effects of acts and decisions that stand in the way of efforts to increase trade and other mutually advantageous activities? We do not live in a static world and there is only retrogression for those who neglect the opportunities which are so eagerly seized by others.

Although, as I have indicated, our primary concern is to work out our future in an African context, South Africa also has strong and treasured links with Europe and the Western world. Moreover, we have always been prepared to fulfil our role and accept our

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responsibilities as a member of the international community. Evidence of this is the fact that South Africa was a founder member of both the League of Nations and of the United Nations. Indeed South Africa had a share of no mean proportion in the establishment of both organisations.

Regrettably our relations with UNO and some of its agencies have not always been satisfactory owing to the efforts of certain member states to use the organisation for launching attacks against my country's policies. The South-West Africa issue is an example of this. In defiance of the clear stipulations of the Mandate, of sound legal principles and of every practical consideration, we were told that we have no right in the territory and are ordered to withdraw. I do not intend to expound the legal and other grounds on which my Government refused to comply with the resolution by the Security Council. This is fully set out in a publication, copies of which could be made available to your Institute. I would, however, like to stress that the enforced withdrawal of the existing administration from South-West Africa would have serious implications for the territory itself, for the whole of Southern Africa and for the world at large. It should be realised that the abdication by South Africa of the charge entrusted to it some half a century ago could be to the advantage only of adversaries of the free world - certainly not of the peoples who live in South-West Africa, and whose welfare surely should be the paramount consideration of all who profess to have their interest at heart. The abandonment of these diverse peoples to internal conflict and external aggression would violate the spirit of the Mandate which the South African Government has repeatedly declared will guide its policies.

Leading powers of the West should therefore resist any efforts which, if successful, would add still further to the already existing unrest and instability in so many other parts of Africa. Those who are concerned with the balance, and the strategic disposition, of power, should recognise that a South-West Africa in hands unfriendly to the West, would be a disaster, spreading its effects far over the Southern and Northern oceans. Indeed, the powers who shield the values of Western civilisation should refuse to contemplate chaos in South-West Africa.

In conclusion I would like to refer once again to South Africa's relations with the United Kingdom. Over the last century and a half we have had close connections with Great Britain, during which time we have fought against each other but eventually also side by side. A large number of our people are of British origin. Our trade ties are of the utmost importance to both our countries. There is thus a large measure of goodwill existing between us, which will not easily be broken down. As friends and foe we have learnt to respect each other but, unfortunately, certain tensions arise from time to time which are doing harm to that spirit of good fellowship which is such an important factor in relations between states.

/This is a ...

This is a matter of concern to those of us who attach importance to friendly relations between Great Britain and South Africa. We can only hope that good sense will ultimately prevail and that any irritations, big and small, which create disharmony in our relations, will be removed. This must surely follow when it is realised at last that what we are achieving in the political, economic, educational and other fields in the Republic as well as the progress in friendly co-operation in Southern Africa will ultimately prove to be in the interests and for the benefit of the entire subcontinent. If we are able to live in peace and good neighbourliness with the non-white peoples in South Africa itself, as well as with the people of Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and Malawi, who differ from us in background, culture and tradition far more than we differ from the people of the United Kingdom, then surely this happy state should apply even more so to the relations between our two countries. This is indeed my fervent hope for we must all fully realise that international co-operation benefits us all.

NATIONS IN THE SEVENTIES:
CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE

by

Anthony Harrigan

It is a pleasure to have an opportunity to address the Institute of International Affairs this evening.

International studies are essential for any nations that seeks to understand what is taking place on this globe or that desires to play a significant role in the modern world. More than that, indeed, international studies are essential to survival, for the world in which we live is full of threats and challenges. If a nation fails to understand its environment, it may perish.

If you will forgive a personal note, I would like to mention that it has been my good fortune in the last decade to have visited more than a score of countries, including lands as varied as South Africa, Israel, Cuba, Turkey, Tunisia and Vietnam. Most of the nations I have visited have been "problem" countries—that is to say, nations with vexing internal difficulties and grave external dangers. My own country, the United States, falls in that category, of course, as we in America are confronted with serious threats within and without.

Most travelers, I suppose, prefer the quiet countries where one can get away from it all, where there are a minimum of political, social and economic problems. But my work as a writer takes me to the nations with headaches, and I have come to enjoy them the most. Challenge produces response, in nations as in individuals. People who have never known adversity and stress in life often are dull, whereas individuals who have struggled in their careers are full of vigour and personality. The same thing holds true of countries. In this conclusion, I hold to the view of John C. Calhoun; the early American statesman, who declared: "The victory of life is in the struggle."

Your country is such a nation, so is mine. Therefore, I propose to talk with you tonight about the nature of the struggles in which we are engaged in the final third of the 20th century. By examining one another's problems, each of us may gain some insight into our own difficulties and into opportunities for national advancement.

National problems, as I see it, fall into two categories: 1) problems affecting security in a world of aggressors and 2) problems that pertain to the inner character of a country and its people's sense of nationhood and appropriate national goals.

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The second set of problems, those touching on a people's sense of identity and unity, is far more difficult. At least that is my judgment, based on the internal strife now confronting the United States.

Let me first address myself to the external problems. In the early years of this century, many people in the West concluded that a peaceful world was possible-- a world of co-operation in which the rule of law prevailed. The optimism of that period was unjustified, however. We have learned from World War II and the conflicts of the years since 1945 that an orderly world environment is unlikely any time soon. The odds are that disorder and strife will increase. The emergence of scores of new nations has created competition for their allegiance.

The United States, for example, has found it necessary to commit more than 500,000 soldiers and billions of dollars to the defense of an Asian nation that didn't exist when World War II ended.

In supporting the formation of many new countries, the United States has compounded its problems and placed enormously heavy economic burdens on its people. One of the root troubles, of course, is that most of the new nations are unworthy of nationhood. They lack the means to support themselves or to create a framework of progress for their people. But that is spilt milk. Eliminating synthetic states is not as easy as creating them. In the United States in the 1950s we had an emotional attitude to the national ambitions of the so-called Third World, and today we are paying for our emotionalism.

In the United States, we didn't think far enough ahead; we didn't look at the world with a sufficiently cold eye. The goal of a world community of peaceful, independent nations was attractive but ignored the unpleasant truths one finds in the history of men and nations.

Some of our neo-isolationists still ignore the real world. The isolationist bloc in our Congress, and the isolationists in the American academic world, want us to abandon the defense commitments we have made. They argue that national resources devoted to defense should be used for providing a better life for poor people at home. The isolationists don't explain how the U.S. would be able to abandon its commitments without disaster resulting. One wonders how they reach the conclusion that the Soviets or the Chinese Communists will let us alone to eliminate slums or to uplift the downtrodden in other ways. As we know, power abhors a vacuum, and the communist states with militant doctrines stand ready to fill every vacuum from Vietnam to South America.

One has to be a Utopian to believe that the Soviets, Chinese Communists, Castroites and North Koreans will let the West have peace

/and quiet

and quiet to rebuild cities and solve domestic problems. One wonders: don't the daydreamers realize that the human animal, like other animals, has the instinct of territoriality, and that the communists, who have tremendous ambitions for space, are bent on pushing back Western civilization from all its outposts and strong-points?

I don't say that the United States, or your country for that matter, should adopt a conflict philosophy, but it certainly needs a recognition that conflict is the rule of life on this planet and is likely to endure for a long time to come. Thus we have to be conflict-oriented. We have to be willing to use force, if necessary, to deter aggression and protect our national interests.

Periodically, of course, a nation has to reassess its national objectives and role in the world. It has to determine what national interests are vital and what are the high-priority and low-priority interests. Then it has to develop a national program to support the protection of those interests.

I think we are witnessing such a reassessment taking place in the United States. The neo-isolationist pressure is one cause of the reassessment. The tremendous cost of defense systems is another reason. Even without these factors, however, I believe Americans would want to take another look at their interests.

Leaving aside the neo-isolationists, who are a minority, the majority of Americans still believe that the U.S. must maintain military superiority in order to deter Soviet nuclear attack. In regional terms, I believe most thoughtful Americans agree that the two vital area interests are Western Europe and Japan. In other words, we believe that the powerful economies of the United States, Western Europe and Japan must be linked together.

Despite this, there is considerable restiveness in the U.S. concerning military aid to nations capable of defending themselves. Even some of the toughest-minded Americans resent the fact that the Europeans, who could well afford to do so, have not provided for their common defense. We would like to bring our troops home from Europe, save for a token force. Many Americans also believe it is time for Japan, with the third strongest economy in the world, to provide for its conventional defense and assume a bigger share of the defense of the Pacific world. I believe it is safe to predict that you will see more American pressure to reduce the military burdens in the areas I mentioned.

Even as the U.S. focuses on Western Europe and Japan, there are signs of declining interest in and commitment to other regions of the world. For generations, the U.S. has played an exclusive role in Latin America. The days of exclusiveness may be numbered. Some Americans believe that Western Europe and Japan should be

/encouraged

encouraged to participate more extensively in the Latin area. I am wondering whether there also isn't a vital role for South Africa, especially with respect to Argentina. The exchange of visits between the military leaders of the two countries certainly is valid in view of the common problems associated with defense of the South Atlantic. Perhaps such military exchanges could lead to studies for closer economic links.

One of the reasons I wanted to return to South Africa this year was to learn something of South African thinking with regard to national objectives and areas of special concern. In my book "The New Republic," published in 1965, I predicted that your country would turn outward in the years ahead. The expansion of your merchant marine is a significant and encouraging development, for it points to a bigger world role for your country - a role in commercial development and peaceful contacts.

Even as the United States depends on and requires stability on its borders, in Canada and Mexico, your country has a similar requirement for stability in Southern Africa. Almost 10 years ago, attention was called to the possibility of a South Atlantic Treaty organization as a stabilizing element. Perhaps the world will yet witness the emergence of such an organization.

It is not far-fetched to envision such an organization involving your country, Portugal, some of the smaller developing countries in Southern Africa, Argentina, the Malagasy Republic, and Australia. If anyone is tempted to smile at such a far-flung alliance system, consider the dimensions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that joins such countries as Canada, Norway and Turkey in a single defensive system that promotes cultural, scientific and economic links.

In considering this possibility, I view South Africa as the central element, possessing the biggest industrial machine, the strongest armed forces, and the greatest financial resources. Such a system could be a stabilizing force for the highly unstable southern hemisphere. Obviously, the emergence of any such system will require a wider international view in South Africa, a willingness to deploy trained manpower and brainpower into areas where it is needed and to participate more heavily in the economic development of lands across the sea.

To be sure, such an international posture for South Africa would require a supporting military program of adequate dimensions. An adequate, in-depth discussion of such a program would take more time than I have this evening. In general, however, I believe it is reasonable to state that South African air and naval power would have to be considerably augmented. As your country develops sound relationships with adjacent African countries, it will have to extend a protective umbrella, chiefly in the form of air power so

/as to

as to assist neighboring lands against foreign attack. Without going into the question too deeply, I nevertheless would like to note that South Africa will need a retaliatory power to deter future aggressors. What form that retaliatory power will take depends, of course, on the professional judgment of your defense forces.

If South Africa is to build bridges to Argentina, the Malagasy Republic and Australia - indeed if it is to enjoy security in the oceanic regions that extend on the eastern and western flanks of the African sub-continent, it will have to be able to deploy naval power sufficient in strength to protect the shipping lanes, help guard against missile-submarine attack, or deter sea-launched invasions of friendly shores. Nowadays, the most important anti-submarine weapon is another submarine. You would need a modern submarine force. In addition, expanded international commitments by South Africa would require aerial reconnaissance of a considerable part of the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Such planes might serve as dual role, not simply as the eyes of your Navy but, if equipped with air to surface missiles, as a stand-off force. The development of some form of naval aviation, capable of operating with surface units of your navy, may be South Africa's most important need. I suspect that a small carrier, capable of launching helicopters and/or short take-off-and-landing aircraft, a vessel similar to the Soviet Union's Moskva, may be the type of ship that would be needed for this purpose.

The concept and supporting military program I have sketched here is ambitious and represents a major extension of South African national goals. It is not a concept that would have seemed in any way practical even a decade ago. But the astonishing vitality of South Africa's economy, plus the easing of domestic tensions, now makes a wider national vision a distinct option for the future.

Why should South Africa consider such an international concept? That question surely will be asked, and deserves an answer. My answer is that it is in the nature of ambitious, progressive peoples to carry the benefits of their civilization into distant areas. It has always been thus, from the time of the Greeks and the Romans. The United States, I remind you, began as a handful of colonies on the Atlantic seaboard. Over the years, the nation moved westward, filling out the continent. In the 1950s, the United States accepted Hawaii and Alaska into the federal union, thereby gaining one state in the Central Pacific and another that almost touches the North Asian mainland. Many Hawaiians today want to absorb islands far to the west. This may happen, and the U.S. in the 1970s could have territory on the western side of the Pacific. Meanwhile, in the last two decades the U.S. has become deeply involved in the economic life of Western Europe.

The Japanese, another progressive people, are extending their interests and ties throughout the world. I remind you that a few

/years ago

years ago the head of the lower house of the West German parliament suggested including Japan in the NATO alliance. Nothing came of the proposal, but the ties between Japan and western countries are increasing yearly. The Japanese are economically committed in the province of British Columbia in Canada, in the Alaskan panhandle and in South America.

I find it hard to believe that a country so energetic and resourceful as South Africa will long refrain from establishing links well beyond its borders. Now the Suez Canal is closed, South Africa is more than ever at the crossroads of the world.

Perhaps you will be tempted not to widen your horizons, but actually to draw within. As I mentioned earlier, there is such an attitude or mood in a part of the American population and leadership. The international life, for a nation, is a strenuous life; it means crises and dangers as well as opportunities. So there is understandable reluctance sometimes to make big commitments. It is not for me, a visitor, to tell you what is the proper course for your nation. But I can say that, as an American, I favor my own country's continuing participation in world affairs on a global basis. A nation grows through the centuries and discovers its destiny. If it is to grow, it must look outward and seek new avenues to explore. The nation that turns inward is a nation that isn't growing. A nation that loses interest in growth is a nation that shows signs of losing interest in life. It may succumb to other nations with more ambition and more adventurousness. I think of South Africa as a growth-oriented nation.

Now after discussing the outward aspects of national life in our era, let us turn to the inner problems that cannot be neglected. As I mentioned earlier, international involvement produces strains. In the United States the commitment to the Vietnam war has resulted in an outpouring of dissent, of objections to national goals and objectives. This outpouring comes from only a small minority of Americans, but it is a very noisy and well-organized minority. This minority receives tremendous attention at home and abroad.

In a big nation, especially one with varied ethnic strains, there is bound to be some dissent, some traces of disunity. This isn't anything new in the United States. In the American Revolution, the colonists included great numbers of Tories who didn't want to break with Britain. Our first half-century of national existence was riddled with strife between regions. In the 1860s the U.S. experienced one of the most terrible civil wars in history, with vast armies engaged on either side. 600,000 men died. Industrial strife has been a frequent feature of the American scene for the last century. We had our anarchist elements in the 19th century, and three of our presidents have been assassinated by fanatics.

I mention these things to set in perspective the urban riots

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and the extremist movements that have taken hold at some of our most famous universities. As we know from history, some of the worst demagogues and most dangerous nihilists have come from socially elite backgrounds. The leading anarchist in 19th century Russia, Kropotkin, was a prince. Lenin certainly wasn't a downtrodden worker or peasant. Revolution almost always begins at the top. In the 1930s, it was Oxford students who said they wouldn't fight for king or country.

We are seeing something of the same phenomenon in the United States. Three of our most famous Ivy League colleges - Harvard, Yale and Princeton - had commencement protests this year. Radical students condemned their country for the war in Vietnam, called the U.S. sick, or otherwise revealed a lack of loyalty to their country and to national goals. Elsewhere in the nation, there have been grave campus disturbances, including forcible occupation of university buildings, mob scenes, and resort to arms by extremist students.

The grievances are unreal - even some of the extremist leaders, such as Mark Rudd at Columbia University - has admitted the grievances are mere pretexts for revolutionary action.

By and large, the students who are rebelling and breaking the law, rejecting all decorum and shouting obscenities at officials and police, are students from comfortable, affluent backgrounds. Many of them attend university on scholarships, both private and government.

The background of affluence cannot be ignored. These are young people who have had too much, who have been treated in too permissive a way over the years. They think they can do what they please, including opting out of national service and they will never be called to account or have their funds cut off.

A key fact that I call to your attention is that the United States has approximately 1,000 senior colleges - yes, I said 1,000 - but only a small fraction of the colleges or the students attending them, have been involved in campus disturbances. The commotion has centered around perhaps 20 colleges and universities, chiefly the Berkeley campus of the University of California, Harvard, Columbia, Cornell and the University of Michigan. Very often, the news media have played into the hands of the disruptionists, giving people at home and abroad the impression that all American college students are protesters.

The military minority has been allowed to get out of hand, and the U.S. Congress now is considering legislation to deal with the campus anarchists. But the student disorders deserve much study in all civilised countries. What has happened at Berkeley and Harvard could happen at universities elsewhere in the West.

As is the case in all revolutions - and the New Left in America is engaged in an attempt at revolution - there is organisation. The chief agency of revolution on the campus in the United States is the misnamed Students for a Democratic Society. This organisation was founded in 1962. It has links with the orthodox Communists and with revolutionary and subversive elements of all types. The SDS determined to launch their revolution from American university

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campuses, and the Berkeley campus in California was selected as the SierraMaestra of the revolution. The SierraMaestra, you will remember, was the mountain range from which Fidel Castro mounted his conquest of Cuba in the 1950s.

Every advanced Western country has to be alert for a similar type of revolutionary operation, using universities as a staging base. We have recognized the menace in the United States, and, at long last, are doing something about it. The American public is outraged and demands action.

But beyond police measures, there is a need for a country, especially one with a dynamic growth and wide international interests, to concern itself about the ideas of nationhood in the minds of its young, college-trained people.

There is a danger in our time to view education in narrow, technical terms, to develop minds and forget values, especially national values. In earlier generations, in the U.S., there was considerable hardship and sacrifice. Young people who received a college education were aware of the costs and were mindful of the family work and saving that went into such a privilege as attendance at college. But hardship has diminished for many and sacrifice often is unknown in an era of scholarships and grants in aid.

I don't know what the answer^{is} to a lack of the hardship that develops character. We know from classical history that a nation's prolonged exposure to comfort and luxury weakens the will and erodes loyalty. While we all enjoy the good life, we should beware of its temptations and enervating influence. In planning national projects and in setting tax policies, a country's leadership should be mindful of the hurtful as well as the beneficial effects of material benefits.

We who live in Western countries should not forget that the Soviets have operated on a virtual war economy since the end of World War II. They have deprived their citizens of many consumer goods. In the process, they have kept alive the spartan outlook, and this doesn't hurt them. One way or another, the spartan spirit has to be maintained in our countries, which enjoy so many material advantages. Insofar as the United States is concerned, I believe that exposure to the dangers and hardships of the Vietnam war may prove, in the long run, to have been a saving development. More than one million young Americans have fought in the jungles and rice paddies of South Vietnam against determined communist attackers. But, of course, we don't want to have to depend on war as a school for citizenship.

What we need in advanced nations such as yours and mine are very carefully thought-out and fully supported citizen-education programs for the young so that they don't lose faith in their

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country's values and goals, so that they can reply to the sophisticated arguments of the nihilists, and so that they have a moral and intellectual framework for their lives in the professions and industry.

In the West, we need to deal with the outpouring of books and plays that contain hatred of our civilization and that are destructive of essential values and traditions. We need a massive reinforcement of our inner convictions and counter-action against those who would erode our will to engage in nation-building.

I submit that this emphasis upon national values and inner leadership is a vital component of interest and activity in international affairs, whether for individuals or nations. As we seek wider horizons for our country in commerce and industry, science and diplomatic involvement, we have to deepen our exploration of our national identity, striving to learn and profit from the lessons of history.

We will not find this an easy task in the 1970s, for there are enemies of national freedom and enemies of the spirit. One American writer has said that the ancient Romans fought their barbarians on the frontiers, but America today faces challenge from the barbarians within. This is true of all advanced countries. The jungle-makers are everywhere in the Western world, engineering urban riots, resorting to obscenity campaigns, storming universities, and destroying unity and loyalty. They are what a Spanish philosopher has referred to as "the vertical barbarians." Thus the challenge facing us is within and without. This means we will be severely tested in the decades ahead. If we are to survive the testing, we will have to develop understanding of all the challenges facing us, all the options open to us. Your country, I believe, is one of the nations of the world that will be in the forefront of the struggle.

Friends of South Africa sometimes shake their heads at your country's problems, citing comparative isolation in the world at large and population stresses within. They are pessimistic in viewing the future. I don't feel that way at all. As I envision South Africa's future, I see the challenges producing a response of greatness. I think you already have demonstrated such greatness in wrestling with your problems. The pressures on your country, in my judgment, are refining pressures. Out of the heat in the crucible is coming a stronger steel - a stronger nation that is, which is developing new solutions to problems of harmonious co-existence among disparate population groups and which at the same time is moving towards a new world role.

In short, you live in an exciting country at an exciting time. If one accepts the view that the victory of life is in the struggle, this is a place where men and women of ability and courage will

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want to live.

In its 193 years of national existence, the United States changed this world and the patterns of human society. I am confident that your country, with its tremendous dynamic, is destined to play a similar, change-making role in the world. You have the material, intellectual and moral resources for greatness. It is a pleasure to visit with you in this country and to gauge anew the pace of development, witnessing your widening involvement with the world.

Note:

Mr. Anthony Harrigan is a journalist and author from the United States who has travelled widely throughout the world during the past two decades. He is at present Assistant Editor of "The News and Courier" (Charleston, South Carolina).

The above talk was given at a private meeting of the Witwatersrand Branch of the Institute on 24th July, 1969.

REALISME IN INTERNASIONALE SAKE

deur Ambassadeur Charles W. Yost

(Verteenwoordiger van die V.S.A. by die V.V.O.)

Ek meen dat daar twee elemente is wat altyd noodsaaklik vir ware realisme in internasionale sake was en wat in ons tyd in 'n groter mate noodsaaklik is. Dit is objektiwiteit en versierendheid.

As ons probeer om realisties te wees, om objektief en versierende in die internasionale sake van vandag te wees, wat sien ons dan? Ek sien vier besonder dramatiese en verontrustende paradokse.

Die eerste paradoks is dat, alhoewel daar nog nooit 'n tyd in die geskiedenis was dat nasies so goed bewapen was as wat nou die geval is nie, hulle nog nooit so onveilig was as nou nie. Nog nooit tevore sou die aktuele gebruik van die volle reeks van beskikbare wapens so volkome dodelik vir so 'n groot deel van die mensdom gewees het nie. Daar kan vir realisme geen groter of dringender taak wees as die oplossing van hierdie paradoks nie.

Die tweede paradoks is dat, alhoewel tegnologie die wêreld elke jaar nouer saamsnoer, die mense van die wêreld nog steeds meer en meer opgebreek word in aparte nasionale soewereiniteite. En elkeen van hierdie nasies dring aan op sy reg om te doen presies wat hy wil, op 'n tydstip in die geskiedenis wanneer die interafhanklikheid van alle nasies meer en meer gebiedend word.

Die derde paradoks is dat, juis op 'n tydstip dat die wetenskap uiteindelik daarin geslaag het om die probleem van produksie op te los, en wanneer die bruto nasionale produk van die ontwikkelde nasies met rasse skrede vermeerder, die gaping tussen ryk en arm nasies steeds groter word in plaas daarvan die teenoorgestelde gebeur.

Die vierde paradoks staan met die derde in verband. Dit is dat ons triomfe self, as hulle nie beheer word nie, ons na 'n ramp kan voer. Die triomf van die mediese wetenskap mag daarvoor verantwoordelik word dat die bevolking van die wêreld in so 'n mate vermeerder dat die wêreld sal versmoor en ineenstort. Die triomfe van die ingenierswese en die chemie mag ons lug, water en grond dodelik besoedel; die triomfe van kommunikasie mag misbruik word om mense wat daardeur ingelig en beskerm behoort te word, in die war te bring of te domineer.

Realisme in internasionale sowel as in nasionale aangeleenthede behoort in die laaste derde van die twintigste eeu met alle moontlike erns op die oplossing van hierdie vier paradokse gerig te word.

In sy intreerede het President Nixon gesê dat dit sy bedoeling is om van konfrontasie weg te beweeg in die rigting van onder-

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handeling. Hy het gesê: "Ons kan nie verwag om elke mens ons vriend te maak nie. Maar ons kan probeer om niemand ons vyand te maak nie. Aan diegene wat ons teenstanders wil wees, rig ons 'n uitnodiging om op 'n vreedsame wyse met ons mee te ding - nie in die oornam van gebiede nie of in die uitbreiding van ons magsfere nie, maar in die verryking van die lewe van die mensdom."

Ek beskou hierdie onderneming as die hoogste realisme in internasionale sake. Maar dit is nie 'n onderneming wat eensydig nagekom kan word nie. Dit neem ten minste twee mense om te onderhandel, net soos wat dit twee mense neem om mekaar te konfronteer. Gelukkig lyk dit asof daar sterk blyke is dat President Nixon se aanbod om oor sake van die grootse belang te onderhandel, ten minste aanvanklik 'n positiewe ontvangs gehad het.

Een van die eerste stappe wat President Nixon op die gebied van buitelandse sake gedoen het, was om die noodsaaklikheid te beklemtoon dat die Verenigde State en ander groot moondhede moet help om 'n skikking - of dan ten minste 'n vermindering in die spanning - in die stryd in die Midde-Ooste te bewerkstellig. Totdat 'n regverdigde en blywende vrede in daardie streek teweeggebring word, sal nie net die mense van die Midde-Ooste in vrees en onveiligheid leef nie, maar sal die vrede van die hele wêreld in gevaar wees.

'n Intelligente en sobere realisme spoor die Verenigde State ook aan om 'n skikking in Viet Nam teweeg te bring. Die doelwit bly nog steeds om so gou as moontlik in Parys 'n vrede te sluit wat eerbaar en blywend sal wees.

Wat die Verenigde Volke betref, moet ons nie nalaat om dieselfde toetse op die gebied van realisme op hierdie groot instelling toe te pas as wat ons op ander faktore in internasionale sake toepas nie.

Daar is natuurlik mense wat redeneer dat die hele konsep van die Verenigde Volke onrealisties is. Hulle redeneer dat in 'n wêreld van nasionalisme slegs nasionale state effektief kan optree en dat die Oktrooi van die Verenigde Volke onrealisties is. Ek wil ten sterkste van hierdie mense verskil. Inteendeel sou ek redeneer dat - in hierdie inter-afhanklike wêreld - die bekwaamheid van selfs die sterkste individuele nasies om alleen doeltreffend op te tree, minder en minder word.

Verder sou ek redeneer dat dit die essensie van realisme is om op elke moontlike manier die internasionale organisasies wat ons het - die Verenigde Volke en sy groot gesin van gespesialiseerde agentskappe - te versterk, teneinde hulle beter in staat te stel om die paradokse van ons tyd te hanteer.

Realisme in internasionale sake vereis vandag hoër doelwitte as die strewe na dinge wat tot voordeel van 'n nasie of 'n ras of 'n ideologie is. In die lig van die wondere wat ons toelaat om op die maan te land, of om ons eie planeet te verwoes, of om die menigtes te voed, verg die hoogste realisme van ons om

/verstandiglik...

verstandiglik tussen hierdie wonderlike nuwe bekwaamhede te kies - om daardie bekwaamhede wat ons kan vernietig, te kontroleer en uit te roei, en daardie bekwaamhede wat ons kan verryk en verenig, tot die uiterste toe te ontwikkel.

DIE LANG PAD NA HELSINKI - EN VERDER

deur Barry Brown

Wanneer 'n mens die feit in ag neem dat die Verenigde State en die Sowjet-Unie op 17 November in Helsinki sal ontmoet vir voorlopige samesprekings in verband met die moontlikheid om strategiese bewapening te beperk, is dit van belang om daaraan te dink hoe lank dit geduur het om hierdie punt te bereik.

Jare gelede het President Johnson reeds begin met sy pogings om die Sowjet-Unie te betrek in besprekings met die oog op die projektielwapenwedloop. Vroeg in 1967 het die Eerste Minister van Rusland, Kosygin, reeds ingestem om samesprekings te voer met die oog op die beperking van offensiewe en defensiewe kernwapens.

Waarom was dit vir die twee belangrikste kern-lande nodig om so lank te wag voordat hulle samesprekings oor hierdie saak kon voer?

Staatsekretaris Rogers het in hierdie verband die volgende gesê: „Daar is min wat ons kan wen deur aan die faktore te dink wat vir die vertraging van die onderhandelings aan altwee kante verantwoordelik was. Die inval deur die Sowjet-Unie in Tjegoslowakye, die feit van die totstandkoming van die Nixon-administrasie in die Verenigde State, en die feit dat Rusland al sy aandag aan die grens-insidente met Rooi China moes gee, was alles faktore in die vertraging.”

Maar die een duidelike afleiding wat 'n mens kan maak van die versigtigheid waarmee hierdie onderhandelings deur altwee lande benader is, is dat dit in Washington sowel as in Moskou - om mnr. Rogers se woorde te gebruik - as waarskynlik die belangrikste onderhandelings beskou word wat nog ooit tussen daardie lande gevoer is.

Die strategie van onderlinge afskrikking - die angs-balans, soos mnr. Winston Churchill dit jare gelede genoem het - lê so dig by die sentrum van internasionale politiek dat 'n poging om direk daarmee te handel, iets van die geaardheid van brein-sjirurgie het. Daar is altyd die hoop en die verwagting dat so 'n operasie 'n basiese verbetering teweeg mag bring - dat die Verenigde State en die Sowjet-Unie inderdaad daarin mag slaag om 'n einde te bring aan hul duur en gevaarlike wapen-wedren en dat die wêreld as gevolg daarvan 'n veiliger plek sal wees. Aan die ander kant kan so 'n operasie ook 'n radikaal destabiliserende uitwerking hê, en daarom moet die risiko's van hierdie samesprekings ook in ag geneem word.

Daar is genoegsame rede vir die erns en realisme - in the woorde van mnr. Rogers - waarmee die Verenigde State hierdie onderhandelings benader, en mnr. Rogers voel daarvan oortuig dat hy dieselfde erns en realisme by die Russiese onderhandelaars sal vind. Dit verklaar ook waarom die Verenigde State hierdie samesprekings as van 'n voorlopige aard beskou.

/Die eerste...

Die eerste en onmisbare voorwaarde is dat daar die politieke wil moet wees om sekuriteit langs 'n meer rasionale weg te vind. Die hoop bestaan dat die feit dat Amerika en Rusland gewillig was om hul afgesante na Helsinki te stuur, 'n aanduiding mag wees dat dit die gees is waarin hulle die saak benader, en dat hulle dus in staat sal wees om 'n formule te vind waardeur die wapenwedloop gekeer en hul altwee se veiligheid en ekonomie gedien sal word.

Mnr. Barry Brown, die skrywer van bogenoemde artikel, is 'n kommentator vir die Verenigde State se Inligtingsdiens (U.S.I.S.), en die volgende verslag oor die "SALT" same-sprekings het in "American News Digest" (deur U.S.I.S. uitgegee) van 20 November 1969 verskyn.

VOORLOPIGE SAMESPREKINGS OOR WAPENBEPERKING OM NUWE AANVOORWERK TE DOEN

Amerika se onderhandelaar, mnr. Gerard C. Smith, Direkteur van die Verenigde State se Wapenbeheer- en Ontwapeningsagentskap, het voorlopige besprekings met sy Russiese eweknie begin. Die bespreking is van 'n voorlopige aard en dit sal gaan oor 'n beperking van strategiese wapens. Dit het op 17 November in Helsinki, Finland, plaasvind.

Dit word nie verwag dat daar enige finale beslissings tydens hierdie samesprekings geneem sal word nie. Volgens die Sekretaris van Staat, William P. Rogers, is die plan dat die samesprekings vanaf 'n paar dae tot 'n paar weke mag duur. Mnr. Rogers het verduidelik dat die doel van die samesprekings is om die tegnieke te bepaal om 'n vergadering te belê waar die besprekings 'n wyer veld sal dek en die besluite van 'n meer blywende aard sal wees.

Dit was op 25 Oktober dat die Wit Huis die aanstaande opening van die voorlopige besprekings oor die beperking op strategiese wapens aangekondig het. Hierdie voorlopige besprekings is populêr bekend as die S.A.L.T. Die aankondiging het gekom ongeveer 15 maande nadat die besprekingsoorspronklik beplan was om te begin, en 25 jaar nadat Bernard M. Baruch, V.S.A.-vertegenwoordiger op die Verenigde Volkere se Atoomkragkommissie (UNAEC) vir die eerste keer 'n skema voorgestel het, die doel waarvan was om die kanse te verminder dat kernwapens vir destruktiewe doeleindes gebruik word.

/Die Baruch Plan,...

Die Baruch Plan, soos die Verenigde State se voorstelle genoem word, is aan UNAEC op 14 Junie 1946 voorgelê. Dit het voorgestel dat daar 'n internasionale Atomiese Kragontwikkelings-gesag gestig moet word, en dat hierdie liggaam verantwoordelik sou wees vir alle fases van die ontwikkeling en gebruik van atoomkrag, beginnende met die grondstof, en insluitende direkte beheer oor alle potensieel gevaarlike atomiese aktiwiteite en die lisensiëring van alle ander atoomkrag in die wêreld. Op daardie stadium het die Verenigde State 'n monopolie van kernwapens gehad, en onder die Baruch-Plan was dit gewillig om van hierdie monopolie af te sien.

Moskou, op sy beurt, het oor die volgende twee jaar 'n reeks van teenvoorstelle gemaak wat, in die opinie van die Verenigde State en van ander lede van die Verenigde Volkere Organisasie, hopeloos onvoldoende was, omdat dit nie ruimte gelaat het vir verifikasie nie. Dit het nie die middels daargestel waardeur regerings kon nagaan en vasstel of ander lande op hierdie gebied die internasionale ooreenkomste nakom nie. Rusland was destyds nog besig om kern-ondersoeke te doen.

Twee jaar nadat die atoom-energie-paneel van die Verenigde Volkere besluit het dat die plan wat Rusland aan die hand gedoen het, nie bevredigend was nie, het President Harry S. Truman aangekondig dat die Russe 'n atoombom ontplof het en dat die ontploffing waargeneem is.

In 1952 het die Algemene Vergadering van die Verenigde Volkere 'n ontwapeningskommissie gestig onder die Veiligheidsraad, bestaande uit die lede van die Veiligheidsraad plus Kanada: 'n totaal dus van 12. Dit het prakties neergekom op 'n samesmelting van UNAEC met 'n kommissie vir konvensionele bewapening wat in 1949 gestig is. Die meeste aktiwiteite op die gebied van wapenbeheer in die na-oorlogse tydperk is onder die toesig van die Verenigde Volkere uitgevoer.

Toe daar gedurende die vroeëre vyftigerjare voortgegaan is met die ophoping van kernmateriaal, is dit besef dat verifikasie al hoe moeiliker geword het. Dit was duidelik dat daar 'n nuwe benadering gesoek moes word. Omvattende voorstelle ten opsigte van ontwapening wat deur 'n aantal partye vanaf 1952 tot 1954 aan die hand gedoen is, is altyd deur een van die twee kante verwerp.

Op 24 Julie 1955 by 'n konferensie in Geneva, waar staatshoofde van die Verenigde State, Rusland, Brittanje en Frankryk bymekaar gekom het, het President Dwight D. Eisenhower voorgestel dat daardie vier lande die bloudrukke van hulle militêre stellings aan mekaar beskikbaar sou stel. Elke land sou dit aan elkeen van die ander drie lande gee, en hulle sou toelaat dat hierdie gegewens bevestig word deur onderlinge waarnemings vanuit die lug. Hierdie voorstel het bekendgestaan as die „Opelug-voorstel.“

Vroeër het die Russe voorgestel dat daar 'n grondkontrole-sisteem by strategiese sentra moet wees wat as waarskuwings kon dien teen onverwagte aanvalle. Generaal Eisenhower het die Russiese Eerste Minister, Nikolai Bulganin, in kennis gestel dat hy

/sou toestem...

sou toestem tot die grondkontrole-sisteem, as die Russe gewillig sou wees om waarneming uit die lug te aanvaar.

Gedurende die laaste paar sittingsdae van die Algemene Vergadering van die Verenigde Volkere Organisasie in 1955 is 'n voorstel aanvaar waarin die groot moondhede gevra is om voort te gaan met hulle ontwapeningsonderhandelings en dat hulle voorkeur moet gee aan sake soos die "Opelugplan" en die grondkontrole-sisteem. Uiteindelik het die belangstelling in daardie twee skemas gestaan.

Op 14 Januarie 1957 het die Verenigde State 'n verskerpte poging aangekondig om op die gebied van wapenbeheer tot 'n ooreenkoms te kom. Ambassadeur Henry Cabot Lodge het 'n reeks voorstelle wat van mekaar afhanklik is, voor die Algemene Vergadering van die Verenigde Volkere Organisasie gelê.

Die plan het duidelik getoon dat die behoefte gevoel is om voorlopig op gedeeltelike ontwapening te konsentreer. Dit het dan ook voorgestel dat kernwapens geban sou word, dat die produksie van sulke wapens verbied sou word en dat daar 'n verbod sou wees op kerntoetse. Die voorstel het verder ingesluit dat daar 'n gestadige vermindering van konvensionele magte sou wees, dat vuurpyltoetse aan inspeksie onderhewig sou wees en dat maatreëls getref sou word om te verseker dat die buitenste ruimte alleen vir vreedsame doeleindes gebruik sou word, en dat daar 'n progressiewe oprigting sou wees van middels waardeur lande teen onverwagte aanvalle beskerm sou word.

Later in daardie jaar het Washington aangekondig dat dit bereid was om weer met samesprekings te begin, onafhanklik van ander ontwapeningsvoorstelle, en dat die onderhandelings sou gaan oor die versekering dat die buitenste ruimte vir vreedsame doeleindes gebruik sal word.

In 1958 was daar intensiewe onderhandelings tussen Washington en Moskou. Op 3 Oktober het die Verenigde State, Brittanje en Rusland, mekaar in Geneve ontmoet om die moontlikheid te bespreek dat daar 'n verbod op kerntoetse geplaas sou word. Daardie byeenkoms was een van verskillende gebeurtenisse wat uiteindelik tot die historiese "Beperkte Kerntoets-verbod-ooreenkoms" van 1963 gelei het.

Op 10 Junie 1963 in 'n uiters belangrike toespraak by die American University in Washington, D.C., het President Kennedy aangekondig dat samesprekings op die hoogste vlak binnekort in Moskou tussen Brittanje, die Verenigde State en Rusland, sou begin. Hy het bygevoeg dat die Verenigde State besluit het om geen verdere kerntoetse in die atmosfeer uit te voer solank as wat ander state dit ook nie doen nie. Hy het gesê dat hy nie die eerste sou wees om sulke toetse te hervat nie.

Die gesprekke het in die hoofstad van Rusland op 15 Julie 1963 begin. Tien dae later het die drie lande 'n ooreenkoms getref waarkragtens kerntoetse in die atmosfeer, in die buitenste

/ruimte, ...

ruimte, en onder-water, verbied sou word. Ondergrondse toetse wat radio-aktiewe afval buitekant die territoriale grense van die betrokke staat sou versprei, is ook verbied.

Vier dae later het Frankryk en Kommunistiese China aangekondig dat hulle hulle nie deur die verdrag gebonde ag nie. Op 5 Augustus egter is die verdrag geteken. Dit is deur die Verenigde State se Senaat op 24 September bekragtig.

In die tydperk tussen 1965 en 1968 het Washington en Moskou in die rigting beweeg van 'n ooreenkoms waarkragtens kernwapens nie versprei sou word nie. In 1966 het altwee kante 'n formule aanvaar wat dit onwettig sou maak om kernwapens te lewer aan 'n land wat nie 'n kernmoontheid is nie. Terwyl die twee lande daaraan gewerk het om 'n finale konsep-ooreenkoms op te trek, is twee oorwinnings behaal in die rigting van 'n verbod op kernwapens:

- Die eerste was die ooreenkoms wat deur die Verenigde Volke aangegaan is ten opsigte van die buitenste ruimte. Dit het 'n verbod geplaas op die opstelling van militêre basisse of ander militêre instellings op die maan of op ander hemelliggame. Dit het ook 'n verbod geplaas op die lansering van wapens vir massadestruksie in die buitenste ruimte of in 'n wentelbaan rondom die aarde.

- Die tweede sukses wat behaal is, was die Verdrag van Tlatelolco (Mexico), waarkragtens 'n kern-vrye sone in Latyns-Amerika geskep is. Dit plaas 'n verbod op die partye om kernwapens aan te skaf, en dit doen 'n beroep op hulle om veiligheidsinspeksies deur die internasionale atoomkragagentskap (IAEA) toe te laat. Dit is die agentskap wie se taak dit is om die vreedsame gebruik van atomiese materiaal te bewerkstellig.

Hierdie verdrae is voorafgegaan deur die Antartika-verdrag, wat enige militêre bedrywighede op daardie sub-kontinent onwettig gemaak het. Dit verbied ook enige kernontploffing en kernafval of radio-aktiewe afvalmateriaal in daardie sub-kontinent.

[Die huidige sitting van die Algemene Vergadering van die Verenigde Volke Organisasie sal eersdaags 'n voorstel bespreek wat deur 'n ontwapeningskomitee ingedien is vir 'n verdrag waarkragtens dit verbied sal word dat kernwapens op die seebodem of in die see geplaas word.]

Op 12 Junie 1968 het die Algemene Vergadering sy goedkeuring gegee aan 'n verdrag waarkragtens kernwapens nie versprei mag word nie (NPT). Daardie verdrag sal van krag word nadat dit bekragtig is deur die drie kern-lande - Brittanje, die Verenigde State en Rusland - plus 40 ander nasies. Die NPT is vir ondertekening op 1 Julie in Washington, Moskou en London beskikbaar gestel. Dit is nou in een of ander stadium van bekragtiging in verskeie lande, insluitende die Verenigde State en Rusland. (Teen 1 Oktober 1969 was die verdrag alreeds bekragtig deur Brittanje en 21 ander nasies.)*

By die ondertekeningseremonie op 1 Julie 1968 in die Wit Huis, het President Johnson aangekondig dat die Verenigde State en Rusland ooreengekom het om in die nabye toekoms samesprekings te

* Die bedrag is op 24 November 1969 deur die V.S.A. en Rusland bekragtig.

hou met die oog op die beperking en die vermindering van sowel offensiewe strategiese kernwapens en van verdediging-sisteme teen vuurpyle wat kernwapens dra.

Maar op 20 Augustus 1968 het magte van Rusland, saam met magte van ander lede van die Warsaw-verdrag, Tsjegoslowakye binnegeval. Daarna het daar 15 maande verloop voordat die moontlikheid van verdere onderhandelings weer onder oë gesien is. Hierdie onderhandelings - die S.A.L.T.-samesprekings - het nou uiteindelik hulle preliminêre stadium binnegaan.

"UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
IN A REGIONAL CONTEXT"

The titles of the papers read at the Symposium held at Jan Smuts House on 16 and 17 October, 1969, are given below, with the main speakers indicated. Each paper was followed by a short prepared comment by one of the participants (except at the evening session addressed by Professor Thomas Molnar) and then by general discussion. At the final session of the Symposium there was a panel discussion, in which the main speakers participated.

It is hoped that in due course the Institute will be able to publish the proceedings of this Symposium.

1. "The Course of U.S. Foreign Policy Since World War II and Its Relation to Regional Problems"

Main Speaker: Professor B. Cockram
(University of the Witwatersrand)

Comment: Mr. R. Goldman
(University of the Witwatersrand)

2. "Foreign Policy and Modern Concepts of Regionalism" - A Theoretical Overview.

Main Speaker: Dr. Denis Worrall
(University of South Africa)

Comment: Professor M.H.H. Louw
(University of South Africa)

3. "United States Policy Towards European Regional Co-operation"

Main Speaker: Professor J.A. Lombard
(University of Pretoria)

Comment: Dr. Sheila van der Horst
(University of Cape Town)

4. "Contemporary Issues in United States Foreign Policy"

Main Speaker: Professor Thomas Molnar
(City University of New York and
University of Long Island)

5. "United States Policy Towards the Americas"

Main Speaker: Professor M.H.H. Louw

Comment: Mr. Gordon Lawrie
(University of the Witwatersrand)

6. "United States Policy Towards Regional Groupings
in Africa"

Main Speaker: Dr. G.M.E. Leistner
(Africa Institute, Pretoria)

Comment: Mr. Alan Syer
(Foreign Editor of the Argus
Printing and Publishing Company)

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