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S.A.I.I.A. NUUSBRIEF/NEWSLETTER 5

Feb. 1970

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INTRODUCTORY NOTES

The major event for the Institute this year will be the Conference in June, for which we have been planning for the past two years. The widespread interest it has aroused, in South Africa and abroad, and the generous support received from South African organisations and individuals augurs well for the Conference's success. But much preparatory work still remains to be done, and, if the Institute is to carry out effectively its plans for this important project, more financial support is still required.

This issue of the Newsletter contains the names of most of the experts from abroad who will be attending the Conference as the Institute's guests, and who will be presenting papers on the various topics to be discussed.

The Conference is intended by the Institute as a contribution towards the celebration of the centenary of the birth of Jan Christiaan Smuts. It is appropriate that this year should see the realisation of the Institute's aim of making Jan Smuts House a centre for conferences on international questions. Preparations are already beginning for the next conference, to take place within two years.

The centenary will also be marked at Jan Smuts House by an exhibition of photographs and other items of interest, illustrating the various aspects of the life of General Smuts. This exhibition will be opened on Friday 22nd May, two days before the actual birthday.

Within the next few months two special centenary publications will be appearing in bookstores. The one is a book by Professor T.J. Haarhoff, sponsored by the Institute, and entitled "Smuts, the Humanist". The other is a book of tributes to General Smuts by many prominent persons who knew him well. This book has been edited by Miss Zelta Friedlander, and is being sponsored by the Smuts Memorial Trust. Members will soon receive further information about both these publications.

During 1969 there were changes in the Chairmanship of three of the Institute's Branches. Professor E.N. Keen succeeded Professor K.H.C. McIntyre as Chairman of the Natal Branch. Mr. A.J. Karstaedt succeeded Mr. J.P. Hamber as Chairman of the Eastern Province Branch; and Mr. W.T. Ferguson became Chairman of the Cape Town Branch in place of Captain J.G.Y. Loveband. The Institute is deeply indebted to the retiring Chairmen for their devoted service over so many years, and the National Council has conveyed its thanks to each of them. It has also expressed its appreciation to the new

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Chairmen for their willingness to take over the task of organising the activities of their respective Branches and encouraging interest in the Institute's work -- often under very difficult circumstances. It is hoped that the members of these Branches will give their enthusiastic support to the efforts of their Chairmen and Committees.

The Institute has been closely associated with the Smuts Chair of International Relations in the University of the Witwatersrand, since the Chair's establishment over seven years ago. Professor Ben Cockram, as the first occupant of this Chair, has become well known to many of our members, especially those who have been privileged to attend his monthly talks to the Witwatersrand Branch. We therefore wish, on the occasion of his retirement, to express our very sincere appreciation to him for the work and time he has so generously devoted to the Institute.

Professor M.H.H. Louw will be taking up the post of Smuts Professor in April, and we look forward to welcoming him to Jan Smuts House.

THE DIRECTOR.

TOWARDS A LATIN AMERICAN NATIONALISM?

by LUCIANO TOMASSINI

The past year has seen one of the most interesting changes in the history of the external relations of Latin American countries. It would not be unfair to say that, for the first time, something like a Latin American foreign policy has evolved. It is the result of a long process of regionalisation in this part of the world. The trend may be described, paraphrasing a comment made by President Nixon about South East Asia but which seems to be more pertinent to the situation in Latin America, as the fact that the countries of Latin America are more and more anxious to find Latin American solutions to Latin American problems, through increasingly cooperative action.

Their attitude is based on a new insight into the position of Latin America in the international context, and on the recognition that its relations with the industrial nations have tended to impede rather than to favour its development process. The way in which this attitude has developed seems to confirm the hypothesis that increasing interaction is taking place between national and international politics. In recent years a number of specialists have been drawing attention to the growing links between the domestic policy of individual countries and world affairs, at the level of what they call 'linkage politics'. Clearly the fate of a nation is more and more affected by what happens in the rest of the world. Furthermore, at the present time foreign policy has left the ivory tower from which it was formerly conducted and become steadily more responsive to changes and pressures on the national stage. The new Latin American outlook is an expression of this phenomenon. It is interesting to see how it is being rapidly translated into policies and actions that are shaping what has come to be known as a new 'Latin American nationalism'. This reached its fullest expression to date in the meeting held by the Special Committee for Latin American Coordination (CECLA) at Vina del Mar, Chile, last May.

The Consensus of Vina del Mar

The conclusions reached by the Latin American governments in the document entitled The Consensus of Vina del Mar represent the acceptance of a new thesis. Until recently, official circles continued to act as if the causes of Latin American underdevelopment were primarily endogenous. At Vina del Mar, on the contrary, it was held that what is happening is that the domestic effort of Latin American countries is being eroded by an adverse international framework. Of course, this idea has been voiced from 1950 onwards, primarily in documents of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the work of economists who were at one time or another connected with it, such as Celso Furtado and Osvaldo Sunkel, but until now the idea had not managed to permeate governmental foreign policy.

Even the clearest minds continued to attribute the stagnation of Latin America to domestic 'bottlenecks' which were

impeding social progress and economic growth. Among these structural deficiencies they included an obsolescent agriculture, unequal distribution of income, sharp differences in social stratification, and the lack of entrepreneurial and administrative capability in both the public and private sector. As a rule, the relationship between stagnation and the structure of the world economy was overlooked. Fully convinced of these premises, the Latin American governments only looked outwards to so-called international cooperation. This was viewed as a philanthropic activity undertaken by the industrialised countries (in particular the United States) to aid the poorer countries, and inspired by humanitarian sentiments. The very idea of aid, assistance, and cooperation gave those activities a strong unilateral character and almost completely deprived the recipient countries of any possibility of sharing in their management and design. According to the traditional view, development and underdevelopment are two separate processes. The fact that two-thirds of humanity live in underdeveloped countries is to be explained by their late appearance on the historical scene, by chance, or through their own shortcoming. Not only were industrialised countries innocent of blame for the backwardness of other nations, but they were actually helping these countries by transferring to them a part of their financial resources and technological knowhow, primarily in the form of direct investments. In due time, external aid would have reinforced the favourable effect of these transfers.

The new thesis

The thesis now gaining ground in Latin America is that development and underdevelopment are two aspects of the same process. Both are the consequence of an international division of labour which assigns to some countries the task of producing manufactured goods and to others that of providing raw materials. The domestic bottlenecks already mentioned have not disappeared and their elimination still challenges Latin America. However, the magnitude of the domestic effort made in recent years is steadily becoming visible. Despite the fact that Latin America has the highest population growth rate in the world and is undergoing a more acute revolution of expectations than other developing regions, progress is evident in many sectors, and in some is even impressive. From 1950 to date the gross domestic product has more than doubled. Industrialisation has been increasing at an average annual rate of 6 per cent, which compares favourably with the rate of other more development regions. The annual growth rate in such strategic sectors as steel and power production exceeded 10 per cent in the same period. From 1960, the population with access to adequate urban facilities has doubled. In the same period enrolments in primary and higher education centres increased by 80 per cent and those in secondary schools by 140 per cent. Praiseworthy results were also obtained in the mobilisation of domestic resources. Despite the historic decline in fiscal revenues from foreign trade, tax collection by the central governments increased annually at a rate of 8 per cent in the period 1961-6. Although traditionally the foreign contribution to the gross regional investment has been

in the order of 10 per cent, this proportion has fallen to about 5 per cent in recent years.

Thus, through domestic effort, Latin America has managed to offset the negative effects of its economic relations with the industrialised countries. However, the so-called 'trade gap' - the difference between the cost of the imported goods needed by a country to reach a specified development goal, on the one hand, and the purchasing power generated by its exports, on the other - has continued to widen. Because their exports are concentrated in a few primary products, the economies in the area are extraordinarily vulnerable to market fluctuations. At mid-point in the present decade, three products alone (oil, sugar, and coffee) represented 50 per cent of Latin American exports, while eleven countries in the region depended on a single product for more than half the income generated by their exports. These facts show the magnitude of the impact in Latin America of unfavourable and erratic tendencies in the prices of primary products in world markets. Thus, for example, in the last ten years there has been no improvement in the prices of any of the eighteen products which together generate 80 per cent of the income derived from sales abroad. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the same period the annual rate of increase in the purchasing power of exports has been around 3 per cent - about equal to the rate of growth of the Latin American population.

At the beginning of the decade it was erroneously assumed that international financial cooperation could bridge this gap, and through the Alliance for Progress the United States undertook to supply the greater part of the funds required. Today it can be seen that external financial aid is not a palliative. The market increase in the flow of public funds has been more than offset by a sharp fall in private investments. Furthermore, the indiscriminate use of loans granted under increasingly more difficult conditions led to a veritable external debt explosion, the amount owed rising between 1956 and 1965 from \$4,000 m. to \$12,000 m. Consequently the countries in the area have been obliged to earmark an increasingly larger share of their export earnings to the servicing of foreign debts.

Acceptance of the thesis

There is nothing new in the recognition that Latin American development has encountered unfavourable external circumstances. The novelty lies in the active acceptance of this thesis by the governments and specially in its reaffirmation vis-a-vis the United States. The Consensus of Vina del Mar urges the countries of the area to seek solutions fashioned according to their own criteria, that reflect their national identity. It emphasises that development depends fundamentally on the effort of each country and it favours greater harmonisation of attitudes and policies among Latin American nations. Furthermore, it points out that the achievement of these objectives depends in large measure on the recognition and assumption of their responsibilities by the countries that carry greater weight in world decisions. It therefore recognises

the need for basic changes in the relations between Latin America and the international community, and especially with the United States. In this connection, it states that the agreements reached in many documents of the Latin American system - from the Act of Bogota in 1948 to the Declaration of the Presidents of America in 1967 - have remained in large measure unfulfilled. Among the measures proposed for removing external obstacles hindering the development process of the region are the following:

- To continue action in favour of the elimination of customs duties and other non-tariff barriers which affect the access of Latin American products to world markets, especially to that of the United States, and to insist on compliance with the timetable set by UNCTAD II for agreement on basic commodities, which will guarantee equitable and remunerative prices for Latin American exports.
- To obtain the elimination of the discriminatory preferences militating against the selling of Latin American basic commodities in the markets of certain developed countries.
- To accelerate the establishment of a general, non-reciprocal, and non-discriminating system of preferences to facilitate the export of manufactures from developing countries.
- To revise the conditions governing external financial cooperation so as to make it a real transfer of resources and preserve the receiving country's capacity to take basic economic policy decisions.
- To eliminate the provisions that tie the use of loans to the purchase of goods and services in specific countries, and to strengthen the multi-lateralisation of external financial aid.

Let us, first of all, examine the reasons for this change in Latin American foreign policy and then look at its possible consequences.

Remote and recent background

The causes for this new Latin American nationalism go back to the beginning of the 1960s but its immediate motivation is primarily to be found in the last twelve months. Full credit must be given to the important role played by certain multi-national agencies in laying the ground for the increased regionalisation of Latin American development, which was not always wholeheartedly supported by the member governments of those agencies. The more recent period, on the other hand, is characterised by the fact that the initiative is being transferred to the Latin American governments themselves.

With regard to the first stage in the story, the influence exercised by two regional organisations, the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), cannot be overlooked. It is interesting

to note that neither ECLA nor IDB is part of the Organisation of American States (OAS); indeed, the first is a regional agency of the United Nations, whereas the second is an independent agency within the inter-American system. It is also interesting to note that the establishment of ECLA in 1948 and of the IDB in 1960 were the only important steps taken by Latin American countries in the field of international relations prior to the present year. In establishing both these agencies it was first necessary to overcome the resistance of the United States. The sphere of action of both institutions is different. ECLA is a centre for research and advisory services, whereas the IDB is a financing institution. Viewed in historical perspective, it may be seen that the great influence exercised by ECLA in the 1950s declined in the following decade and was replaced to a certain extent by that of the IDB.

Achievements of ECLA

The history of ECLA shows several accomplishments that were somewhat unusual for an international agency. In the first place, it succeeded in identifying itself to an extraordinary degree with the problems and interests of Latin America. Secondly, it was able to formulate and disseminate a set of very coherent postulates which succeeded in becoming a kind of ideology and later played a leading part in the formulation of the policies of Latin American governments. Thirdly, it was able to create a strong mystique in its officials, especially in the early years. The work of ECLA is essentially linked with its first Secretary-General, Dr Raul Prebisch.

It was Prebisch who first provided a theoretical basis for the process of 'inward directed' growth to which reference has already been made. In pointing out that the benefits of international trade are unequally distributed between a 'centre' consisting of industrialised countries and a 'periphery' formed by the producers of raw materials, Dr Prebisch - and ECLA - made Latin American countries aware of the need to embark on a process of industrialisation designed to prevent, or at least to attenuate, the widening of the breach which separates them from the industrialised countries. This thesis had several corollaries. One of them is that industrial development calls for the formulation of specified priorities by means of a rigorous process of planning. Another is that, if the process of industrialisation is to maintain its momentum, it will be necessary to diversify Latin American exports and to establish a capital goods industry in the region, through the formation of a Latin American common market. Finally, ECLA postulated the need for the Latin American countries to coordinate their trade policies vis-a-vis the rest of the world. In due course all these postulates have been able to influence the actual course of events.

The role of the IDB

The establishment of the IDB represented the accomplishment of a long-standing Latin American aspiration. Although the idea of establishing an inter-American bank was raised on

on several occasions (lastly in 1956) it was necessary to wait several years before the United States gave the green light for this initiative. When she finally did so, it was under the impact caused by the extraordinarily unfavourable reception given by Latin American nations to various high officials of the then Republican Administration, especially to Vice-President Nixon. As in the case of ECLA, the history of the IDB is intimately linked with its President, Sr Felipe Herrera. Whereas Prebisch's main contribution to Latin American development lies in the diagnosis and theoretical analysis of the factors that impede it, that of Herrera must be sought in the creation of working formulas that make it possible to overcome these problems. If Prebisch's thesis insists on the role of 'external strangulation' as a limiting factor, that of Herrera emphasises the catalytic effect of an intelligent process of mobilisation of resources for development purposes.

To date, the IDB has granted more than \$3,000 m. for about 550 specific projects and has thus become the prime source of international public financing for Latin America. But more than the huge amount of money involved, it should be emphasised that the Bank has not ceased to reaffirm its eminently regional character, which has been expressed in various ways. In the first place, its activities are a faithful reflection of the development needs of Latin America, as can be seen in the preferential attention given to the lesser-developed countries and in the balance obtained through its activities in the economic and social fields. Secondly, it has deliberately tried to strengthen the capacity of its member governments to programme and achieve their own development in an increasingly independent way; half its credit portfolio invested in the productive sectors (industry and agriculture) has taken the form of overall loans, channelled through local development institutions, and in direct activities in the fields of pre-investment, higher education, institutional development, and educational training. Thirdly, it has strengthened its multinational approach by reinforcing from the very beginning the technical elements identified with the management, in contrast to the national interests which could have acquired an excessive influence on the Board of Directors.

Until recently it was thought that the movement towards Latin American unity would find expression in economic regional development. This latter process - which was prepared by ECLA and supported by the Bank - was inspired in large measure by the thesis developed by those organisations. Almost ten years after their establishment, many observers fear that both the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Central American Common Market have lost their momentum. Yet in the LAFTA, which represents 90 per cent of the population and of the gross Latin American product, intra-regional trade increased by 150 per cent in the last nine years and doubled as a percentage of the total foreign trade for the participating countries, which shows that their exports within the region have been growing at a more rapid rate than their total exports. However, these results are still far from impressive, and recently the process appears to be reaching an impasse. In addition, progress has, in any event, been confined to trade, since to date only nine agreements for

industrial complementation (several of which are still inoperative) have been signed, and it is intended to postpone until 1974 the adoption of the measures necessary for initiating the formation of a Latin American Common Market, which should have been implemented in 1970 in accordance with the Declaration of the Presidents of America signed at Punta del Este in 1967.

The new nationalism

Precisely at the moment when the sombre predictions of critics and sceptics with respect to Latin American unity appeared to be on the point of being confirmed, the movement found an unsuspected outlet through the meeting of CECLA and subsequent events. It is interesting to note that the Consensus of Vina del Mar is silent about the measures being taken to achieve regional economic integration, whereas it emphasises the confrontation between Latin American countries and industrialised nations and is aimed at strengthening the negotiating capacity of the former in the international field.

The Consensus of Vina de Mar is not an isolated fact but a part of a constellation of circumstances. It might be said that it is the expression, at the regional level, of forces which have been operating on a national and sub-regional scale. What appears to have been taking place is the amalgamation of two types of nationalism. Conventional nationalism, experienced in the past by European countries and which in Latin America made possible the survival of old territorial disputes and hampered better inter-governmental cooperation, is in process of being overcome in the regional context. The new Latin American nationalism is above all constructive and is aimed at promoting more concerted action among the countries of the area. Let us briefly review the events that have surrounded and in large measure explain the Consensus of Vina del Mar.

Perhaps what is happening in Peru is an appropriate symbol of the whole process. Indeed, the initial action taken by the military Government of Peru in October last year appears to be of great symbolic value, both inside and outside the country. The expropriation of the International Petroleum Company in Talara set off an unsuspected chain reaction, despite the fact that in the beginning the Minister of External Relations, General Edgardo Mercado Jarrin, had stated: 'We are not acting against the people of the United States. We are not acting against the Government of the United States. We are not acting against any other company - just a single company, which has claimed sovereignty over the soil, refused to pay taxes, corrupted government, and acted as a law unto itself.'

Today it is difficult to determine the extent to which the new Government was inspired by deliberate purposes or was swept along by circumstances. The fact is that it was soon launched on a bitter collision course with the United States and had to extend the nationalist revolution to the domestic scene, setting in motion a series of structural reforms which culminated last June in the promulgation of a radical agrarian reform law. In the following months, President Frei notified the U.S. companies controlling the large copper mines in Chile of his intention to

revise the agreements that he had signed with them when he took office and to replace them by others which were tantamount to a virtual nationalisation of this basic activity. Soon afterwards, General Ovando took power in Bolivia and announced a dubious programme a la peruana, and even the traditionally disciplined armed forces of Chile launched a limited movement whose real nature is still not clear despite the fact that strictly professional motives have been invoked.

One of the notable features of this process is the fact that, in contrast to the past, nationalistic tendencies have now found expression in multinational understandings. Last May, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Chile speedily signed the Andean Integration Treaty, which had remained blocked for almost three years, without waiting for Venezuela to overcome her hesitation. In this way, there came into being a new economic bloc whose population and combined product is comparable to that of each of the three larger countries of Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico). The Andean Pact also provides for planning instruments, thus endowing the new group with a much more dynamic character than LAFTA. At the same time, Argentina and Brazil succeeded in settling the differences that had prevented them from reaching an understanding about the integrated development of the River Plate Basin, a programme in which Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia are also involved. Although at the present time the economic projections of this agreement are limited, its political implications are very important. Even prior to that, President Onganía had suddenly reversed the position he had hitherto maintained regarding the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and enthusiastically endorsed the position of Brazil, which has refused to sign. This recent understanding between Argentina and Brazil has also shown itself in the concern expressed by both countries about the defence of the South Atlantic. The reaffirmation this year by Chile, Peru, and Ecuador of the doctrine which claims the extension of their maritime sovereignty up to a distance of 200 miles for the purpose of the exploitation of marine resources, and the subsequent capture of further U.S. fishing boats by the Government of Peru, are other indicators of the way the wind is blowing.

The CECLA meeting

These events were the background to the CECLA meeting. It would be interesting to determine the part played by the various Latin American Foreign Offices in the gestation of that meeting and also, incidentally, the part played by the OAS. A few days after taking office, President Nixon had an interview with the recently elected Secretary-General of the OAS. In that interview, he told Sr Galo Plaza that he was interested in learning the views of Latin Americans preliminary to the formulation of a new hemispheric policy. On the same occasion he agreed to send a special fact-finding mission headed by Governor Nelson Rockefeller. Subsequently Sr Plaza met informally with the Latin American Ambassadors accredited to the OAS and informed them of the wish of the new Republican Administration to gain a fresh view of the attitudes of the countries

in the south of the hemisphere. Nothing was said on that occasion about the procedure to be followed. The Chilean delegation suggested that CECLA, an ad hoc committee established by the Latin American countries in relation to the UNCTAD meetings in Geneva and New Delhi, might constitute an adequate framework within which those same countries could again work out a common platform and make it known to the United States. In the days that followed, this suggestion was taken up by the Brazilian delegation which officially proposed a meeting of CECLA. The known facts appear to indicate two things. First, the Rockefeller mission and the CECLA meeting were initially viewed as two different ways of achieving the same goals, the first supported by the United States and the second by Latin Americans. Secondly, and also from the beginning, the Secretary-General of the OAS appeared to have attached more importance to the special mission to be sent by President Nixon than to the proposed meeting of Latin American countries, which explains why he was the only head of a regional organisation not to be present at the meeting in Vina del Mar. Events subsequently proved Sr Plaza wrong and that, with him, the OAS had also taken the wrong course.

With respect to the part played by Latin American Foreign Offices in this process, it is only fair to attribute to Peru the emotional motivation and to Chile the ideological persuasion, but to Brazil, the last convert, the decisive push. The volte-face in the foreign policy of Brazil is surprising, for historically she has always collaborated fully with the United States although, as early as the Vargas era and the Quadros and Goulart Administrations, some attempts had been made to change that policy. When the Agreement for the integrated development of the River Plate Basin was signed in Brazil, the then President Costa e Silva, in an address to the Foreign Ministers of the other participating countries, observed that progress was abandoning the Old World and moving either to the East or to Latin America, depending on where the best prospects were. He then expressed his fear that there could be a repetition of what had happened in the years following the second World War, when the Latin American continent practically 'lost the opportunity of receiving the benefits of civilisation'. In his opinion, in order to prevent this, Latin American countries would have to unite. At the same time, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jose de Magalhaes Pinto, in a speech at the High War College, gave vent to bitter recriminations against the developed countries. In his opinion, 'the Great Powers, in general, protected by their enormous coercive power (technical, economic, and military) are attempting to impose specified goals on the other countries, regardless of whether they suit the conditions of each of them.' After citing the case of the Soviet bloc, the Brazilian Minister acknowledged that there was also coercion in the Western world. As regards Brazil, he cited as examples the pressure exerted by the United States on a series of local industries that were competitors of American groups, from the case of Petobas, in the past, to that recently of a textile plant in Santa Catarina.

In any case, it seems to be clear that the prospects of the new Latin American nationalism are linked to the maintenance

of the current Brazilian position.

Consequences and prospects

The consequences of this new nationalism should begin at home. The events mentioned above are clearly too recent to allow us to anticipate what they are likely to be. However, some straightforward conjectures can be made about the changes which the Foreign Offices as well as the right-wing and the left-wing groups in Latin American will have to face up to as a result of these tendencies.

There is no doubt that the foreign policy of Latin American countries and the agencies responsible for formulating it, the Foreign Offices, are not prepared to draw all the consequences they should from this new international position. Latin American governments have enthusiastically embraced the thesis of external strangulation in so far as this enables them to blame many of their ills on the villain outside the region, namely the United States. Awareness of this antagonism, which has been increasing over the years, has influenced them decisively. Now they must show that the new nationalism is also capable of taking cooperative forms. In the first place, the various Foreign Offices will obviously have to continue to coordinate their external policies. Secondly, the governments must break the icy silence they have maintained since April 1967 (the date of the Declaration of the Presidents of America) regarding regional economic integration. Thirdly, the diplomacy of these countries will have to make a major effort to look beyond the inter-American system and diversify their relations with the rest of the world.

The existing right-wing groups (and military regimes) will have to broaden the basis of their support if they are to meet possible pressures from abroad, as the Government of Brazil tried to do by enacting an agrarian reform law in mid-1969. At the same time, these regimes will be forced to extend their nationalist policies from external relations to domestic affairs, if only to avoid the impression of adopting discriminatory measures against foreign interests.

The radical groups refuse to support the 'anti-imperialist' measures adopted by some military regimes on the ground that these Governments are not prepared to introduce domestic reforms which, together with anti-imperialism, form the programme of Latin American left-wing parties. These groups regard their platform as indivisible and are not prepared to single out certain objectives which might be achieved first by taking advantage of the systems in power. They argue that, by doing so, they would be helping to strengthen these systems and, therefore, the status quo. There is no doubt that this is a static approach, since the achievement of certain goals usually makes further changes inevitable and, in any event, the dominant groups are exposed to the normal erosion produced by the exercise of power and the passage of time. Marx regarded capitalism as a necessary stage in the development of a communist society, in so far as it helped to dissolve feudal bonds and create an

industrial proletariat which was bound to provide leadership of the world revolutionary movement. The Latin American Left should read Marx again more carefully.

This is not the proper occasion for analysing the impact of these Latin American attitudes on the new hemispheric policy of President Nixon, which is still in its early stages. However, the Consensus of Vina del Mar is of extraordinary importance from the point of view of the procedure followed for the first time by Latin American countries in rethinking their relationship with the United States. Up to now the inter-American system has been based on the assumption (supported by Washington) that there is a 'natural harmony of interest' between the United States and her neighbours to the south; the idea of cooperation, as opposed to negotiation, has prevailed in relations between the two parts of the hemisphere. Up to now the inter-American system has served to legitimise these close bilateral relationships, in which the Latin American countries were invariably left in a position of acute dependency; the idea that Latin America should coordinate its own interests before entering into a dialogue with its powerful neighbour awakened strong suspicion. Up to now (and this is the essential point) all the movements that have affected inter-American relations, from the Good-Neighbour policy to the Alliance for Progress, have been decided upon more or less unilaterally by the United States.

The CECLA meeting is the first occasion on which the Latin American countries have taken the initiative, and President Nixon should welcome this new turn of events. According to the views expressed by Henry Kissinger (which have come to be the official line of the White House), the bipolar world which emerged from the last war due to the overwhelming superiority of the United States and the Soviet Union is giving way to an international organisation based on multipolarity. In it, each region of the world should have a larger responsibility in the management of its own interests. The strategy of retreat, which President Nixon is attempting to implement on a world-wide basis, coincides in a certain measure with the views expressed in the Consensus of Vina de Mar. The general tone of the speech of 31 October, in which President Nixon outlined his new hemispheric policy, corresponds to these new ideas, in so far as it announced a 'hands off Latin America' attitude. However, the specific proposals were very vague. Perhaps the best part of his speech was the recognition that it was only 'an invitation for further interchange', and that it did not claim to be the last word. Let him now improve on it.

Mr Luciano Tomassini was assistant to the President of the Inter-American Development Bank from 1967 to 1969; he is at present Baring Research Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) and the London School of Economics. Mr Tomassini's article originally appeared in "The World Today" (published by Chatham House) of December, 1969.

UIT DIE CHAOS HET VREDE GEKOM

deur

John Edlin

Na byna 'n dekade van beroering is die Kongo eindelijk besig om tot rus te kom. Blankes is besig om in groot getalle terug to keer, beleggingsgeld stroom in - en ook Suid-Afrikaanse belange is op verskillende terreine bedrywig.

Verby is die dae van waaghalsige huursoldate wat meer as eens sedert 1960, toe die Kongo sy naelstring met België geknip het, deur regeringshoofde gehuur is om dood te maak.

Vandag belewe die Kongo 'n uitsonderlike tydperk van rus, buite die fokus van die wêreld se soeklig.

Die laaste herinnering aan die dae van wanorde - toe blankes in strate vermoor, huise verbrand en vroue verkrag is - was met die Pase verlede jaar. Toe het die regering, bekommerd oor die toenemende rampokkery besluit om 'n voorbeeld te maak van drie veroordeelde rowers. Hulle is op die stadsplein van Lumumbashi (voorheen Elisabetstad) in 'n feestelike atmosfeer ten aanskoue van duisende nuuskieriges opgehang.

Dit het die misdaadgolf laat bedaar. En moontlik was dit ook 'n bewys van die Kongolese regering se stelling dat in die politiek, by die toepassing van die wet, die kultuur en alle ander dinge, die Kongo heel anders is as die ontwikkelde Westerse land. Wat daar geld, geld nie noodwendig in die Kongo nie.

Deur harde, byna genadelose, metodes het die regering van pres. Joseph Mobutu daarin geslaag om 'n mate van politieke en ekonomiese stabiliteit vir sy land te kry wat baie meer gemagtigde Afrika-leiers nie in hul lande kon bereik nie.

Die hele land is besig om die vrugte te pluk van hierdie nuwe vrede.

Dis nie maklik om hier syfers te kry nie; en as jy dit kry, is dit nie altyd besonder geloofwaardig nie. Maar een plek waar 'n mens wel die terugstroming van blankes kan meet, is Lumumbashi. Daar het die blanke bevolking sedert 1964 tot vanjaar toegeneem van 7,000 of 8,000 tot 13,000.

Terselfdertyd belê buitelandse beleggers en ontwikkelaars groot geld in die land, veral met die oog op ontginning van die land se ryk mineralebronne.

Die Japannese byvoorbeeld, wat altyd maar sku was vir Afrika, stort miljoene dollars in drie mynprojekte in die koperryke Katanga. Een Japanse maatskappy, Sodimico, filiaal van die Nippon-mynmaatskappy, het al 70 miljoen dollars aan navorsing bestee.

Saam met die Kongolese regering, wat 'n belang van vyftien persent behou, sal Sodomico binne twee jaar kopererts begin produseer. En die 150,000 ton per jaar wat aanvanklik uit die eerste myn, Musoshi, gehaal word, sal per spoor deur Rhodesië en die Mosambiek na Japan gestuur word vir raffinering.

Suid-Afrika het 'n betekenisvolle belang in dié projekte. Twee firmas uit die Republiek help om die skema aan die gang te kry. Amco, tak van Anglo American, graawe die skagte by Musoshi, net 'n klipgooi van die Zambiese grens. En Swanepoel-konstruksie is besig om 'n spoorweg te bou om die myngebied met Lubumbashi te verbind.

Dis nie die engiste belang wat Suid-Afrika in die Kongo het nie. Loop maar deur enige winkel of basaar in Lubumbashi of Likasie (voorheen Jadotstad) en u sal oral die Suid-Afrikaanse produkte sien. Die rakke is gepak met elke denkbare soort blikkieskos. Die omslag om die botter, wat in Pretoria vervaardig word, is in Afrikaans. Baie van die klere in die winkels kom van Suid-Afrika of Rhodesië. En niemand is meer verbaas as hy 'n besoekende Suid-Afrikaanse sakeman raakloop wat nuwe markte in Lubumbashi of Kinshasa kom soek nie. By die eerste internasionale handelstentoonstelling in Junie het ek drie sakemanne uit die Republiek ontmoet. Hulle was op pad terug na Johannesburg, dood in hul skik met die verloop van sake en die klomp nuwe klante wat hulle gewerf het. Terwyl hulle in die Kongo was, het hulle ook met regeringsamptenare beraadslaag oor metodes om die handel verder uit te brei.

Dit is 'n openbare geheim dat denkende amptenare meen dat die Kongo goedere moet koop waar dit die goedkoopste is, sonder om hom te veel te steur aan politieke oorweginge. Hierdie houding word onderstreep deur die Kongo se bande met Rhodesië. Amptelik steun hy die V.V.O. en die Organisasie vir Afrika-eenheid se beroep om sanksies teen Rhodesië, maar intussen voer hy 'n verskeidenheid van goedere, soos steenkool, beesvleis en sigarette, uit Rhodesië in. Die ironie van die saak is dat al die goedere per spoor gestuur word deur Zambië, die land wat altyd eerste daar is, as sanksies bepleit word. "C'est le Congo", sê die mense hier as 'n mens op die ongerymdheid wys. "C'est tres different ici."

Generaal Mobutu is self hoofsaaklik verantwoordelik vir die dramatiese verandering in die Kongo.

In 1964, toe ek die land die eerste keer besoek het, was dit in die greep van 'n kommunisties-geïnspireerde opstand in die noorde, en toe was dit nie altyd vir 'n blanke veilig om snags op straat te wees nie. Dit was nie net rowers en diewe

wat gevrees is nie. Die Armee Nationale Congolais (die Kongolese leër) en die polisie het die lewe bitter gevaarlik vir blankes gemaak. In Katanga, minstens, is verskeie blankes bosse toe gesleep en doodgeskiet omdat hulle kwansuis die aanklokreël sou veronagsaam het. Mobutu het die dinge blykbaar alles verander. In die laaste vyf maande het ek deur die Kongo gereis en ek het niks anders as vreedzaamheid en hoflikheid van die polisie, soldate en staatsamptenare ondervind nie.

Mobutu, die Ysterman, wil hê die blankes en die geld wat hulle saambring, moet in die land bly. Sy boodskap is duidelik ontvang deur die soldaat op straat, die sersant in die bos en die poskantoorwerker in die stad. Hul plig is om dinge vir die blanke so aangenaam moontlik te maak. Selfs die eertyds giftige Radio Kinshasa het baie makker geword. Twee jaar gelede is beroepe op die volk uitgesaai om die "Belgiese uitbuiters en rowers" uit die land te jaag. Vandag is sy aanvalle net gemik op mense wat teen die regering is - studente, politici wat in onguns gekom het en die talle teenstanders van die staat wat in tronke sit.

Mobutu se grootste uitdaging kom van die stuk of 10,000 Kongolese studente in die universiteite van Kinshasa, Kisangani of Lubumbashi. Al sy ander teenstanders is uit die land gedryf, in tronke gegooi of selfs tereggestel. 'n Tipiese voorbeeld van Kongolese geslepenheid het hy 'n paar maande gelede openbaar toe hy Peirre Mulele, sy teenstander wat uit die land gevlug het, genooi het om terug te kom as 'n volksheld. Mulele, wat as 'n banneling in Brazzaville-Kongo gesit het, het die kans aangegryp. Hy is soos 'n held ontvang en op die een spoggerige plegtigheid na die ander vereer. Toe het Mobutu hom netjies in die tronk laat gooi, en kort voor lank is hy daar uitgesleep en doodgeskiet.

Net so onverbidlik het Mobutu teen opstandige studente opgetree. Op 4 Junie het 'n paar honderd studente deur die strate gemarsjeer in 'n betoging om meer studiebeurse en algemene beter geriewe by die universiteite. Die optog was heel vreedsaam, totdat die betogers 'n afdeling soldate en konstabels teengekom het. Sonder waarskuwing het die gendarmes en polisie met hul outomatiese vuurwapens losgebrand. Amptelik is die volgende dag oor die radio gesê dat vier studente dood is. Koerantmanne en diplomate het 46 dooies getel.

Tydelik het Mobutu daarin geslaag om 'n regstreekse uitdaging van die studente af te weer. Maar al meer studente behaal grade en vind dan dat ongekwalifiseerde (maar politiek aanvaarbare) mense reeds die poste in die staat, die nywerheid en die handel beklee waarvoor hulle geleer het. Hulle word by die dag meer ontevrede met die Kongo se eie stelsel van werkafbakening.

Dit sal seker nie lank wees voor hulle metodes soek om hierdie toestand te verander nie. Party studente het al selfs gesê dat hulle moet saamsweer om 'n ander regering te kry.

Die kans dat so 'n sameswering kan slaag in 'n land waar die veiligheidsmaatreëls net so streng is as wat die sedes los is, lyk baie skraal. Die Centre Nationale du Documentation (C.N.D.), wat in werklikheid die veiligheids-polisie is, het 'n deeglike netwerk van nuusdraers wat hul base goed ingelig hou oor elke beweging wat lyk of dit 'n bedreiging vir die regering kan wees.

Net so 'n sterk buffer teen binnelandse tweedrag is die weermag van 40,000 wat op alle strategiese plekke gebruik word. Met die ondervinding wat hulle opgedoen het teen die Katangese opstandelinge in 1961, die rebelle in die burgeroorlog van 1964 en die muitende huursoldate in 1967, is die weermag goed toegegerus om selfs die bes georganiseerde opstand te onderdruk. Maar op die oomblik is die soldate se vernaamste taak om die land se grensete bewaak. Daar word gedurig gefluister van 'n moontlike inval deur blanke huursoldate. Kongolese amptenare onthou maar te goed die tydperk in 1967 toe 'n stuk of vierhonderd huursoldate en agthonderd Katangese gendarmes hulle in die vakansiedorp Bukavu ingegrawe het.

Die muiters, wat gegrief was oor verdragings met uitbetalings van hul soldy en sommer met toestande in die algemeen, het herhaalde aanvalle van die Kongolese leër afgeslaan totdat hulle uiteindelik die plek ontruim en na die naburige Rwanda gevlug het. En hoewel hulle destyds belowe het om nooit weer in Afrika te kom nie, het hul leier kol. Jean ("Black Jack") Schramme onlangs gedreig dat hy met 'n groot mag gaan terugkeer om Mobutu se regering omver te gooi.

Sedertien word die Kongolese grense streng bewaak. Op die grens van Angola in die ooste en aan Soedan en Uganda in die noorde, is hulle van aangesig tot aangesig met huursoldate en Katangese gendarmes wat oorkant kampeer. Maar volgens inligting wat ek hier van politieke bronne gekry het, was Schramme nog nooit weer naby Afrika nie. Trouens, hy het stilletjies na Brasilië verhuis waar hy 'n plantasie bewerk. Dit het hy gedoen nadat hy blykbaar op aandrang van België en die Verenigde State, deur die Portugese verlof geweier is om na Angola te gaan om sy manne te reorganiseer. Hy is uit Portugal geskop, het na Spanje gegaan, en het toe as 'n ontnugterde man Europa permanent verlaat en afgesien van sy plan om na die Kongo terug te keer. So vertel diplomatieke bronne.

Intussen bly sy huursoldate, glo 'n stuk of 4,000 tot 5,000, daar op die grens. Of hulle mans genoeg vir die Kongolese

leër sal wees, is nie mooi duidelik nie. Maar as Mobutu sou terugdink aan die laaste inval van huursoldate onderleiding van kol. Bob Denard van België, het hy nie veel om hom oor te bekommer nie. Denard se eenheid van 300 man het die Kongo sowat veertig myl van die Angolese dorp Texeira de Souza binnegedring. Hulle het 'n klein afdeling van Kongolese soldate teengekom, wat hulle terug oor die grens gejaag het. Vir Mobutu moet dit 'n baie gerusstellende herinnering wees.

Mnr. John Edlin is 'n joernalis en 'n Nieu-Seelander. Hy het bogenoemde artikel geskryf na 'n verblyf van vyf maande in die Kongo. Die artikel het oorspronklik in "Die Beeld" van 4 Januarie 1970 verskyn.

WINDS OF CHANGE IN PORTUGUESE AFRICA

by

RENE DE VILLIERS

I should explain at the outset that my winds of change differ from those of Mr Harold Macmillan - they differ in intensity and in direction. Their genesis has something in common, as I shall try to explain.

I am going to talk about Angola and Mozambique and my recent visits to these two territories. (I know little about Guinea and have not been there.) There are a number of things which struck me immediately about our two neighbours: their size (Angola is larger in area than the Republic of South Africa, and the length of the Mozambique coastline is one and a half times that between Cape Town and Johannesburg); their undeveloped state; and their potential (Angola in particular has fantastic potential, agricultural and mineral, while the Cabora Bassa scheme in northern Mozambique should revolutionise life for close on a million people).

But in both territories poverty is desperate, particularly in the rural areas or the outback, of which there is a very great deal. The need for skilled manpower and capital is great, for, without them, progress and development are impossible.

There are only 5½ million people in Angola (compared with our 18 million) and 6½ million in Mozambique. Of these 12 million in the two countries, a little over half a million are White.

While the Portuguese are keen to attract more settlers (as they call immigrants), their future really depends on developing the Black people; educating and training them, and making them an integral part of the citizenry.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in the army. I must have seen hundreds of soldiers while I travelled over vast areas of the two territories. Almost without exception the groups I saw were racially mixed: all dressed alike, all were armed to the same extent. Time and again I was told that this integration of the African into the armed forces paid rich dividends in loyalty and enthusiasm. The Black people feel identified with the Whites, who are running the show at present. The army uniform, invariably a jungle camouflage battledress, has become a status symbol among Black people. The overwhelming majority of officers are White Portuguese, but a pilot, now in civilian life, told me of a Black major in his paratroop division who could hold his own with any White officer. This, however, was exceptional, he added.

This might be the place to say something of the war Portugal is fighting in both Angola and Mozambique. I say Portugal is fighting the war, but that is only partially correct. The war is being directed and financed by Portugal, which has an estimated 100,000 men under arms in the two countries and is swallowing about 40 percent of its national budget. But in the final resort victory will go to the side which enjoys the allegiance

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of the permanent, indigenous population. What I mean is this (and I am largely reflecting thinking in Luanda and Lourenço Marques): as long as the loyalty of the Black populations can be assured, the infiltrators, guerrillas, terrorists, freedom fighters, call them what you will, stand small chance of success. But if they were to turn on the Portuguese and give succour to the enemy from beyond the borders, the future would be bleak indeed.

The Portuguese, knowing this, have adapted their policy accordingly. I will go so far as to say that, in 25 years' time, the Portuguese may well come to see the guerrillas as a blessing in disguise, for it was they who made some in Lisbon and in Luanda and Lourenço Marques realise that two things were necessary if Portugal was not to be bundled out of Africa:

- (1) Energetic and imaginative schemes of economic development to raise the standing of living of the people, particularly the Blacks, and
- (2) A closer identification of the African people with the strivings, the aims and ideals of the White Portuguese. Here was the beginning of the wind of change.

The tremendous challenge presented by the invasion of guerrillas in the 1960-61 period was met imaginatively and vigorously in the decade which followed. It did not take the men in Lisbon or in Africa long to realise that, once the indigenous populations in the infiltrated areas could be enlisted on the side of the Portuguese, the balance of advantage would change.

So, once the immediate military challenge had been met in northern Mozambique and in south-eastern and northern Angola, the Portuguese set about tackling the non-military aspect of the war.

Having seen how vulnerable the scattered, unarmed and unorganised communities in the outback and on the frontiers were, the Portuguese set about collecting and concentrating these people in settlements where they could be given protection and where they could organise their own defence.

I visited half a dozen of these settlements in northern Mozambique and in the Carmona area of Angola. In one case, in the province of Cabo Delgado, west of Nampula, 100,000 Africans had been brought together in 20 to 30 little villages, all neatly laid out and equipped with basic community services, like schools, health services, shops, elementary local government, churches and so forth. But the weakness of the scheme is that the Portuguese have not been able to provide a sufficient economic infrastructure (to coin a phrase) for these new communities.

At the moment the inhabitants are making a living of sorts on the land, but the soil is poor at best and the people are eking out little more than a very basic living. What is needed is a programme which will create local industries that will give employment to those who cannot make a living off the land - very

much like the Israelis do in their new towns where immigrants are located. But for this one needs skill and capital, and the Portuguese are woefully short of both.

Both the Cabora Bassa and the Kunene River schemes (the latter in Angola) should help to bring about this kind of development. In the meantime, however, the new settlements are helping to create a spirit of oneness, of belonging, among the primitive and backward tribesmen and women and their children.

I think it is important to realise that terrorist activity does not at the moment affect more than between six and ten per cent of the territory, and probably not more than five per cent of the total population. Yet, while ultimate victory for the Portuguese is in my view assured, the cost of containing the terrorists is huge and I think it would be unrealistic to expect anything like total peace for many years to come. The function of the army now, and for the foreseeable future, is to protect the civilian population, primarily from threats and molestation, but also from murder and wholesale kidnapping, in the course of which whole families are shipped across the borders.

The men in uniform complain that they seldom if ever come face to face with the terrorists, who operate in small bands and usually in dense bush country. When I asked the Governor of Angola what help South Africa could best give to his country, he answered: "Help us build roads and strengthen our communications in the undeveloped parts of the country." In other words, it is not soldiers or weapons the Portuguese want from us, but material help to enable them to open up the backward parts of their country and raise the living standards of all their own people.

Such opening up of the impenetrable parts of the country and the consequent giving of hope to the indigenous population will enable the army to contain the invaders more easily, and allow time for the civil government to implement its far-reaching policies of economic, educational, medical and social development which are essential to the country's long-term safety and stability.

Officially there is no colour bar in Angola or Mozambique; there is certainly nothing in the legal system which differentiates between people of different colours. In practice, of course, there is a great deal of natural separation between the races - separation based on differing interests, differing backgrounds, cultures, aspirations and levels of development.

But there are no separate schools, for instance, no bar on non-Whites doing skilled work or attaining any position in the civil service or any other sphere. If you ask how many Black or Coloured people there are in the two young universities, for instance, or any of the high schools, you will be told that there are no statistics of this kind: there are x hundred students, that is all.

In a city like Luanda, a pulsating metropolis of about half a million people (where, by the way, the Portuguese settled

100 years before Van Riebeeck landed at the Cape) there is no formal residential segregation, although the Black Portuguese nearly all live in one area, mainly for economic and social reasons. But there is nevertheless a deal of integrated housing. And, of course, there is nothing to stop Black Portuguese from going to the best hotels, restaurants, cinemas or dance-halls; although here again the economic factor brings about a great deal of separation.

The significance of such a policy or approach seems to me that it robs the dispossessed or underprivileged of the resentment and bitterness implicit in a system where differentiation and discrimination have legal sanction.

I must say I was seldom aware of any racial tension in the parts of Angola and Mozambique I visited. I am not suggesting for one moment that there is no racial discrimination or even exploitation. In some of the smaller coffee plantations in the Carmona area of Angola, for instance, I saw Black labourers living in shocking conditions and I found that in some cases their wages are little more than a pittance.

On the other hand, in the skilled work sphere there is equal pay for equal work and training facilities for artisans are on a non-differential basis. At Nova Lisboa, in the railway workshops and in a bicycle factor, Black welders, turners and machine-minders worked side by side with an occasional White man. In a Lobito Bay fish factory, White and Black women sit side by side slicing and packing fish.

In Mozambique I spent a day going over the huge Limpopo colonato - a State settlement where over a thousand families have been given land under irrigation and are producing a wide range of crops, including rice and coffee, as well as dairy products. The significance of this experiment is that ground is allocated to White and Black alike, the only proviso being that the farming must be up to standard. This scheme could well become the prototype for similar undertakings in the northern part of Mozambique once water is available.

Land is no problem - we flew over thousands of square miles of virtually empty land, much of which could be made to produce, given water and fertiliser.

Economically, I would say that Angola is the better prospect today. There are vast deposits of iron ore which the Japanese are already buying; diamonds have been mined for 50 years; gold is known to be available in payable quantities and mining on a modest scale is expected to begin this year; while there is optimism about copper, uranium, sulphur and phosphates.

And finally, of course, there is oil. The Gulf oil field in Cabinda, on the northern banks of the Congo River, in far north Angola, already produces enough to supply the total needs of South Africa. A computer is being installed there and very soon the enormous oil field will be run entirely from Luanda, hundreds of miles away, and with only an engineering maintenance

staff on the field itself.

From the international airport at Luanda we saw smoke rising from another oil field, the Quenquela, which some experts believe may become as important and lucrative as Cabinda.

In all these fields again the Portuguese need capital and skill to speed up development. But there is evidence to show that the rest of the world is taking more and more economic interest in these two countries, Angola particularly.

In the space of six hours in one of the modern hotels in Luanda, you can see and hear a Japanese hi-fi salesman come to inspect his firm's assembly plant, a Texan oil or Detroit motor executive, a group of South African businessmen, a Rhodesian trade mission, a German motor salesman, an Italian selling stoves and washing machines, as well as a number of unidentifiable types, all on business bent, all aware of the country's potential.

South Africa, one is glad to see, is at last becoming aware of both its opportunities and its obligations - opportunities of investing and making money in an expanding market, and obligations of good-neighbourliness.

The attitude of the Portuguese people to South Africa is interesting. The military authorities have very warm feelings for our country and there is believed to be far closer cooperation between the three countries than the public knows about. A man like General Alan Fraser, who spoke here some weeks ago, is held in very high esteem. Public servants talk knowledgably about us; businessmen have pretty close ties with South Africa, more so in Mozambique than in Angola, which is more mother-country orientated and far less dependent on South Africa in such things as tourism and trade.

At the same time there is some embarrassment about the identification of Portuguese Africa with South Africa in the outside world, and just a tinge of fear of South Africa's economic imperialism. If you get the people to discuss the matter at all - they are, on the whole, a very polite people when it comes to delicate political issues - they will say that, while they have every sympathy with us in our endeavour to maintain civilised standards of government and behaviour, they cannot see how apartheid as a policy can succeed in the long run. They believe a good deal of modification will soon become necessary if White and Black are not to drift apart to an irretrievable degree. I am not suggesting that this is a universal view; all I can tell you is what I heard.

Be that as it may, the Portuguese have no intentions of emulating us, or Rhodesia for that matter. Of course, there is little Western-style democracy in either country. Both have representation in the legislative in Lisbon because both Angola and Mozambique are regarded as integral parts of the metropolitan state. And in both countries there are local, district and presidential elections, where voting is on a basis of literacy,

by heads of families or by those owning property, who must be over 21 years of age. The authorities some years ago abandoned their assimilation policy whereby Africans qualified for full citizenship only when they were judged to have attained a level of civilisation. Today, everybody, White and non-White, qualifies for citizenship. The Administration, however, retains a basic blocking power over popular action; but to offset this in a way, the public service has been Africanised to about 45 per cent. The cynics will say there are many ways of killing a cat, many ways of keeping the Black man out. I do not deny this; all I can say is that I was impressed by the obvious sincerity of those Portuguese I met to give the Black man a square deal and to identify him with Portugal and its aspirations.

A young American teacher who had spent several months in Angola when I met him told me he had been impressed with the quality and the outlook of the younger civil servants, particularly those who were being sent out from Europe. He thought he detected something of a new frontier approach in their attitude and behaviour. The trend had started even before Salazar's illness, but it was expected to gather momentum under the new regime. This, of course, is speculation; Caetano faces a measure of opposition to his Africa policy and he will no doubt have to play the situation by ear until he is absolutely sure of popular support at home and abroad.

Let me try to tell you what Portugal itself thinks of the two countries. I quote from "Africa Report", published in Washington, which is described as non-partisan. In it, Mr Marvin Howe, a New York Times journalist of standing, writes from Lisbon:

"Classic colonies, they provide a protected reserve for the mother country's exports, a private source of raw materials and a cheap, plentiful labor force, as well as an important source of foreign exchange. About 26 per cent of Portugal's exports, which compete with difficulty on international markets, are shipped off to the colonies: textiles, clothing, shoes, electric wire and cables, medicines, olive oil and wine. Portugal profits from the colonies' raw materials, but not as much as could be expected because industry is not sufficiently developed to absorb the colonial wealth. However, 15 per cent of Portugal's imports comes from its overseas possessions: cotton, sugar, sisal, coffee, tea, corn, copra, palm oil, peanuts. Both Angola, rich in minerals, and Mozambique, an important communications centre, run a surplus in their balance of payments, which goes to the escudo zone and helps cover Portugal's foreign trade deficit. However, except for a few wealthy families - such as the De Mello family, which owns the powerful industrial combine, Companhia Uniao Fabril; the Espirito Santo banking family; the Borges banking group; steel and cement magnate Champalimaud; oilman Bulhosa; and beer industrialist Vinhas, which have multiplied their fortunes with colonial investments - the Portuguese people have received few economic benefits from the colonies. Emigration to Portuguese Africa is extremely low because

of the lack of ready employment there and the stiff controls on the transfer of money between the colonies and the mother country.

"More significant is the psychological value of the overseas possessions to most Portuguese. There is a widespread apprehension, fostered by the regime's propaganda, that Portugal will lose its national independence if it loses the colonies. This is a bitter perspective for people proud of 800 years of independence. 'Portugal with her overseas territories has a voice in world politics; without them Portugal would become a province of Spain,' a leading figure of the regime says seriously.

"The view of the regime's foremost colonial experts, apparently shared by Caetano, is that Portugal cannot lose the wars in Africa militarily or even economically, but only politically. 'The Algerian war was lost in Paris,' says one authority. 'The Portuguese people must remain firm in their determination to preserve the African provinces and the government must convince nationalists that they are better off with Portugal than without.'"

Whatever the Portuguese at home may say about the future of Angola and Mozambique, you will find nobody in either country who has the slightest doubt about it; "We are here to stay," they will tell you; some will add "under the ground or above: we will not be pushed out."

And certainly the White Portuguese I met were not passers-through: they have become Africans, no matter what the colour of their skins. If there is one word above any other which you must not mention in official circles in Portuguese Africa, it is "colonial". And yet what we are witnessing in Angola and Mozambique is, if I may venture to say so, a neo-colonialism - a colonialism which is inevitably partly exploitive, but which is really based on a form of partnership, or at least cooperation, and in which the objective is the development of the countries and their inhabitants.

It is not easy to define this policy; one knows only that it is different from old-style colonialism. The spirit of the administrators is different, even though there are areas of overlapping and identity with the colonial empires which have now disappeared.

It would be silly to pretend that Angola and Mozambique are faultless - some kind of Heaven on earth. There is limited democracy, as I have indicated; there is an active security branch which has a finger on the political pulse and whose activities no doubt impinge on the rights of the individual; there are restrictions on Press freedom, exercised in various ways, and where there is no freedom of the Press there are restrictions on personal liberty. Since Dr. Caetano came to power, however, there has been some easing of the restrictions on the Press in Portugal itself, and I have no doubt that, sooner or later, this will be reflected in the local Press in

Portuguese Africa.

Can Portugal succeed with this experiment in modern-style colonialism? If she does, she could establish a pattern of race cooperation which could be of profound significance in Africa and also to Africa and all its peoples.

We of Africa have every reason to watch these winds of change blowing through Portuguese Africa with the greatest sympathy and in the hope that our neighbours have found a formula for coexistence which could instruct and perhaps even affect us all in one way or another.

For myself, I wish the Portuguese well - as long as they continue on the road they are now pioneering.

Mr René de Villiers is Editor of "The Star" in Johannesburg. In September, 1969, he travelled widely in Angola and Mozambique.

The above talk was given to the Witwatersrand Branch of the Institute on 29th January, 1970.

SOUTH AFRICAN COMMENT ON THE LESOTHO
EMERGENCY

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On January 27th Lesotho had its first general election since independence. On January 30th Chief Leabua Jonathan declared a state of emergency while the counting of votes was still proceeding, and suspended the constitution. The counting of votes was discontinued. (At this stage it had already been announced that the two main parties, Chief Jonathan's National Party and the Congress Party, each had twenty-three seats out of the total of sixty.) Mr Ntsu Mokhele and the Congress Party's National Chairman, Mr G. Adam Khasu, as well as other members, were arrested.

In declaring a state of emergency, Chief Jonathan said that he had seized power because the opposition had resorted to "violence, murder, rape, intimidation and theft of ballot boxes" in order to win. The Basotho Congress Party (B.C.P.) subsequently sent out an appeal to various world bodies for help and denied allegations about irregularities at the polls.

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Comment by South African Government and Opposition Leaders

On 30th January, the day on which the state of emergency was declared, the Prime Minister, Mr Vorster, said that the Government was watching the situation in Lesotho. All necessary measures had been taken to maintain order on the borders and to ensure the safety of South Africans there. There was no reason for panic.

The same day Sir de Villiers Graaff, Leader of the Opposition, warned that South Africa should keep clear of the Lesotho crisis. He is reported to have said: "From the facts at present available it is uncertain whether Opposition activities in the Lesotho election had been so unconstitutional and violent as to justify the imposition of a state of emergency or whether these activities have been used as an excuse by Prime Minister Jonathan to justify a coup after losing an election. In either event, what is happening is merely additional evidence of the difficulties of making a Western-type democracy work among people not yet economically viable. The assumption of power by the existing Opposition group in Lesotho, with its known leftist leanings, could create a very delicate situation for South Africa. But it is important that any temptation to intervene should be resisted."

On 31st January, Mr S.L. Muller, the Minister of Police,

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confirmed that South Africa had "strengthened" her police position around the borders of Lesotho. "This is the natural thing to do," he said.

Mrs Helen Suzman, Progressive Party M.P. for Houghton, said that the implications for South Africa were significant no matter what happened in Lesotho. However, she could say nothing more about the situation at that stage.

On 2nd February, during the "no-confidence" debate in Parliament, the Leader of the Opposition, Sir de Villiers Graaff, said that what was happening in Lesotho was an indication of the dangers inherent in South Africa's policy of developing the homelands to self-government.

The Minister of Labour and Coloured Affairs, Mr Viljoen, said in reply that what was happening in Lesotho was their own affair and South Africa would not interfere. He said that South Africa would not tolerate any interference with its domestic affairs and, in accordance with this policy, South Africa would also not interfere in the internal affairs of Lesotho. The Leader of the Opposition was overlooking a very important point. This was that the policy of the Government recognised the traditional system of chiefs in African society and this system was built into the Government's homeland policy. This ensured stability. The Leader of the Opposition had also overlooked the fact that the Prime Minister of Lesotho, Chief Leabua Jonathan, was acting against Communism.

On 6th February the Prime Minister, Mr Vorster, told the House of Assembly that the Government's attitude towards Lesotho was exactly the same as its attitude towards Rhodesia. "We are continuing as if nothing has happened," he said. South Africa regarded Lesotho as a neighbouring state which was independent and did in no way wish to prescribe to it or to interfere with it or to have anything to do with its internal affairs. As long as Chief Jonathan remained in effective control of Lesotho, South Africa's relations would continue as they had before.

Mr Vorster added that, as far as Lesotho's state of emergency was concerned, Chief Jonathan had given his reasons for the action which he had taken, namely to combat communism. It was an undeniable fact that the leader of the Basotho Congress Party was a Peking communist.

Selected Comment in South African Press

On Saturday 31st January, 1970, Dawie, political commentator of Die Burger, stated that what had happened in Lesotho was Lesotho's business. He pointed out that Lesotho was a sovereign state and no one on the outside had any right to interfere. The same day, the Rand Daily Mail noted editorially that, although it was essential for South Africa to remain aloof from the

/crisis ...

crisis in Lesotho, the state of emergency was clearly of grave concern to South Africa. According to an editorial in The Star on the same day, the most useful thing South African could do in connection with Lesotho was, as both the Government and the Opposition had indicated, to keep their noses and their presences out of it. Quite the worst thing for South Africa's future relationships with Lesotho itself and Black Africa in general would be to give grounds for a suspicion that Chief Jonathan's actions received any encouragement from Pretoria simply so that it might retain in Lesotho a conciliatory regime.

On Monday 2nd February, Die Burger in an editorial inter alia admitted that the developments in Lesotho had created a problem. How great the problem would be, remained to be seen. It could mean a setback for the Republic's policy of closer co-operation with neighbouring states, but it would not provide any justification for the conclusion that the whole policy was unworkable.

Die Transvaler commented in an editorial that no comparison could be made between the problem in Lesotho and what could possibly happen in the Bantu homelands. Die Vaderland pointed out that every Afrikaner believed in free choice and democracy. It noted, however, that Lesotho was bound to South Africa economically and, if a party elected in Lesotho was hostile to South Africa, then it could not be certain that South Africa would continue to be sympathetic and helpful. The Star said that it was no good trying to gloss over the fact that Chief Jonathan had become an embarrassment to the South African Government.

In an article in Die Beeld of 8th February Dr. Denis Worrall pointed out that when one was reasonably sure of the loyalty of the police and army, suspending a constitution was not difficult. What was difficult was the return to normality. Here South Africa had a part to play. Dr. Worrall noted that, as a kind of Black Rhodesia, Lesotho added to the embarrassment of the Western countries and it added grist to communist mills everywhere. He also pointed out that the general effect would be to confirm the view of those observers who saw the Southern African situation developing into one of the world's main trouble spots in the not too distant future.

Dr. Worrall asked how any new constitution could improve on the old one in terms of incorporating features of the traditional system. At the centre of the recent constitution was the Paramount Chief (the King) and the Upper House of Senate comprised the 22 Principal Chiefs or their nominees. What was more the chiefs had figured prominently in Lesotho's politics.

Dr. Worrall recalled that in the 1965 general election Chief Jonathan's party was no more than 42% of the poll and 31 of the 60 seats in the National Assembly, and Jonathan himself was defeated. Mokhele's party got 25 seats with a poll of 40%, the remaining 4 seats going to the Freedom Party.

Dr. Worrall concluded that it would be advisable to press

/Chief ...

Chief Jonathan to hold properly-supervised, free elections within the very near future, and to insist that he accept the verdict of Lesotho voters. South Africa's national interests, maintained Dr. Worrall, required that sound relations be fostered, not simply with the present government, but with the people of Lesotho as a whole and any government which it might choose to elect.

In News/Check of 20th February/2nd March 1970, the political commentator ("Jan Verkyker") said that Chief Jonathan's unconstitutional seizing of power seemed at the beginning to be a colossal blunder, with condemnation of his move widespread in South Africa. The feeling had been that Chief Jonathan should have accepted the voters' verdict and afterwards contested the alleged voting irregularities in the courts. However, according to "Jan Verkyker", the post-election violence perpetrated by BCP supporters seemed to be proving Jonathan's allegations that there was a BCP plot to take over the Maseru Government illegally.

According to News/Check's commentator, it had become known in Maseru that the South African Government advised Jonathan to maintain constitutional procedures and to hand over power if defeated in the election. Chief Jonathan at first did not wish to act without South Africa's moral backing, but under pressure from his more militant ministers, he finally rejected the South African advice. South African officialdom was not aware of the extent of the irregularities, and only the following week, when the full facts emerged, did the South African Government realise its initial mistake. In conclusion "Jan Verkyker" stated that for South Africa there could have been serious repercussions if Jonathan had acted on the initial advice.

BRIEF REPORTSBotswana General Election

The first General Election since independence was held in Botswana on 18th October, 1969.

The Botswana Democratic Party of which the President, Sir Seretse Khama, is leader, put up candidates in all 31 constituencies and won 24 of them.

The Botswana Independence Party put up candidates in 9 constituencies and won 1 of them. 5 Botswana Independence Party candidates forfeited their deposits.

The Botswana National Front put up candidates in 21 constituencies and won 3. 6 Botswana National Front candidates lost their deposits.

The Botswana People's Party put up candidates in 15 constituencies and won 3. 4 Botswana People's Party candidates forfeited their deposits.

Final state of the parties in the National Assembly:

Botswana Democratic Party	-	24
Botswana Independence Party	-	1
Botswana National Front	-	3
Botswana People's Party	-	3

In the last General Election on March 1, 1965, - before independence - Sir Seretse Khama's Democratic Party won 28 of the 31 seats. The other 3 seats were won by the People's Party.

(Compiled from Botswana Daily News, October 24, 1969, and Africa Institute Bulletin, Vol. VII, No. 8, September 1967, p. 247.)

Strategic Arms Limitation

Newsletter No. 4 (November 1969) contained a short background report on the preliminary strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) being held in Helsinki between the United States and the Soviet Union. On 22 December, 1969, after five weeks of talks, it was announced in a joint communique that the next stage of the negotiations would begin in Vienna on 16 April, 1970.

2/The communique...

The communique stated that the two sides were now better able to understand the views of each other and had reached an understanding on the general range of questions to be discussed in Vienna.

The decision to meet for the next round in Vienna appears to have been a compromise, with the likely proviso that the talks will return to Helsinki at a later stage. Vienna was originally proposed by the United States as the venue, with Helsinki preferred by the Russians. Geneva was also considered, but it is understood that both sides preferred to keep the SALT talks separate from the 26-nation disarmament committee which meets periodically in that city under the auspices of the United Nations.

The following books are among those recently added to the Africa Library and the International Affairs Library at Jan Smuts House:

Africa

ABSHITE, David M. and Samuels, Michael A. ed.

Portuguese Africa: a handbook. London, Pall Mall press, 1969.

HALL, Richard

The high price of principles: Kaunda and the white south. London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1969.

HATCH, John

The history of Britain in Africa, from the fifteenth century to the present. London, Andre Deutsch, 1969.

KIRKWOOD, Kenneth ed.

African affairs, no. 3. London, Oxford University Press, 1969.

LEE, J.M.

African armies and civil order. London, Chatto & Windus, 1969. (Studies in international security: 13).

LOKEN, Robert D.

Manpower development in Africa. N.Y., Praeger, 1969.

NWANKWO, Arthur Agwuncha and Ifejika, Samuel Udochukwu.

The Making of a nation: Biafra. London, C. Hurst, 1969.

International Affairs

CALVERT, Peter

Latin America: internal conflict and international peace. London, Macmillan, 1969. (The making of the twentieth century.)

CORDIER, Andrew W. and Foote, Wilder ed.

Public papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations. vol. 1: Trygve Lie, 1946-1953. N.Y., London, Columbia University Press, 1969.

CROZIER, Brian

The masters of power. London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1969.

De Gaulle, Franco, Mao Tse-tung, Krushchev and Kennedy are some of the men whose policies are analysed.

ENCAUSSE, Hélène Carrère d' and Schram, Stuart R.

Marxism and Asia: an introduction with readings. London, Allen Lane the Penguin Press, 1969.

KEYFITZ, Nathan and Flieger, Wilhelm

World population: an analysis of vital data. Chicago, London, University of Chicago Press, 1968.

LAMBERT, John

Britain in a federal Europe. London, Chatto & Windus, 1968.

What membership of the European community would mean for Britain.

MORGENTHAU, Hans J.

A new foreign policy for the United States. N.Y., Praeger, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1969.

NEWS FROM THE BRANCHES

Reports from the various Branches were last given in Newsletter No. 2 (May 1969). Details of meetings held during the remainder of 1969 are given below.

Cape Town

- 18 June: Dr. G.F. Jacobs, M.P., spoke on Indonesia.
- 17 September: The Annual General Meeting of the Cape Town Branch was held, and an address was given by General D.H.V. Buckle, C.B., C.B.E., on the British Conservative Party and its attitude to South Africa, with particular reference to Defence.
- 15 October: Commodore T.E. Fanshawe, D.S.C., spoke on the Persian Gulf and the Middle East.
- 19 November: Mr. John Miller spoke on "Russia Today".

Eastern Province

- 22 July: The British Consul, Mr. Meir Wilson, gave an address on Vietnam.
- 11 September: Mr. Nathan Melmed, Chairman of the East Cape Zionist Council, spoke on Israel and the Jerusalem Economic Conference.

Natal

- 14 October: The Annual General Meeting of the Branch was held, and an address was given by Mr. H.H. Lank (President of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs) on "Canada - the Enigma and the Opportunity".
- 10 November: Mr. A Levine, Rector of the Springfield College of Education, spoke on "Israel in the Middle East".

Pretoria

- June: The Director, Mr. John Barratt, spoke to the Branch on "The Outward Movement in South Africa's Foreign Relations".
- July: Maj. Gen. Broekmeijer of the Royal Netherlands Air Force, gave a talk on "The Interrelationship of Politics, Economics, Technology and Strategy".

/August: ...

- August: Dr. C.H. De Vlaemynck spoke on "Staatsburgelijke Opvoeding in België".
- November: Dr. G.A. Sonnenhol, German Ambassador, spoke on "The North-South Conflict and German Development Aid".

Witwatersrand

The following meetings were held at Jan Smuts House during the period June to December, 1969:

- 2 June: Mr. John Barratt, Director of the Institute, on "The Outward Movement in South Africa's Foreign Relations".
- 11 June: Professor Peter Harris (University College, Salisbury) on "Rhodesia and Its Constitutions".
- 25 June: Dr. Jack Penn on "A Visit to Gabon".
- 24 July: Mr. Anthony Harrigan (journalist from the United States) on "Nations in the 1970's - Challenge and Response".
- 6 August: Panel discussion on "South West Africa, Now and in the Future", in which the following participated: Mr. W.C. du Plessis (recently retired Administrator of S.W.A.), Professor J.H. Wellington and Professor C.J.R. Dugard (University of the Witwatersrand), Professor C.A. Crause (Rand Afrikaans University) and Professor W.A. Joubert (University of South Africa) as Moderator.
- 26 August: Professor G.M. Sauvage (from Paris) on "Britain, France and the Common Market".
- 24 September: Lord Thomson of Fleet on "The Middle East".
- 7 October: Mr. H.H. Lank (President of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs) on "Canada - the Enigma and the Opportunity".
- 16 October: Professor Thomas Molnar (from New York) on "Contemporary Issues in United States Foreign Policy".
- 29 October: Dr. Charles Fincham of the Department of Foreign Affairs on "The United Nations and International Law". (This was a joint meeting with the International Law Association of South Africa.)
- 11 December: Lt. Gen. C.A. Fraser, O.C. Joint Combat Forces, on "The Strategy of the Revolutionary".

A discussion group meeting was held on August 7, at which Dr. K.W. Grundy, Department of Political Science, Case Western University, Cleveland, Ohio, spoke on "Contemporary Issues in the United States".

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1970 CONFERENCE

"The Impact on International Relations
of the Population Explosion"

Previous Newsletters have provided information about the topics to be discussed at the Conference which is being held at Jan Smuts House in June of this year, and about the financial support being received from companies and individual members. We are now able to provide the following list of distinguished experts from other countries who will be visiting South Africa, as guests of the Institute, to participate in the Conference:

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|---------------------------|---|
| Professor W.D. Borrie | Director of Research School of Social Sciences and Professor of Demography, The Australian National University. |
| Mr. Jean Bourgeois-Pichat | Director, Institut National d'Études Démographiques, Paris. |
| Professor W. Brand | Professor of Economics, University of Leyden, Netherlands. |
| Professor S.P. Huntington | Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California. |
| Dr. Carmen A. Miró | Director, Centro Latinoamericano de Demografía, Santiago de Chile. |
| Professor H.V. Muhsam | Department of Demography, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem. |
| Professor E.S. Munger | Professor of Geography, California Institute of Technology. |
| Professor A.F.K. Organski | Department of Political Science, University of Michigan. |
| Professor G. Ugo Papi | Former Rector of University of Rome. Chairman Italian FAO Committee. |
| Professor J.J. Spengler | Department of Economics, Duke University, North Carolina. |

Professor Kei Wakaizumi International Relations Dept.,
Kyoto Sangyo University, Japan.

Most of the above experts (plus a few others with whom we are still in correspondence) are preparing the main papers on the various topics. Many South African experts, who have been invited by the Institute, will join those from abroad to discuss the papers, with the aim of reaching conclusions on the subject of the Conference.

Reports about the Institute's plans for the Conference have recently appeared in the daily and weekly press. As a result, enquiries regarding attendance are being received from organisations and individuals. The interest shown is gratifying and is a reflection of the importance of the subject. But it is necessary to point out, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, that attendance at the working sessions of the Conference will be by invitation only. Apart from the experts invited to participate in the proceedings, invitations will go to organisations with an interest in the subject to be represented by observers, as well as to all those who are supporting the Conference financially.

This procedure of attendance by invitation only, is unavoidable, because facilities in the Hall, where the sessions will be held, are limited. Special meetings will be arranged, however, during the Conference, when members of the Institute and others will have opportunities to hear talks by the visiting experts. Some of the visitors will also be travelling to the Branches of the Institute in other centres, where meetings will be arranged before and after the Conference.

The opening session of the Conference, which will be held in the Great Hall of the University of the Witwatersrand on Tuesday 23rd June, in the evening, will be open to all members, and a note should be made now of the date.

Financial Support

Since our last Newsletter the following additional firms have undertaken to support the Conference financially:

The Stellenbosch Farmers' Winery Limited

Oceana Group of Fishing Companies

Schlesinger Organisation

Edgar Stores Limited

Volkswagen of South Africa Limited

Sentrachem Limited

Massey Ferguson (S.A.) Limited