

DIE SUID - AFRIKAANSE IN **SAHA ARCHIVES**

VAN

DO NOT REMOVE

INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE

NEWSLETTER/NUUSBRIEF

8

DES./DEC. 1970

THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE

OF

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

S.A.I.I.A.

National Chairman - Dr. Leif Egeland - Nasionale Voorsitter

---o0o---

Chairmen of Branches Voorsitters van Takke

WITWATERSRAND

Mnr./Mr. Gideon Roos

KAAPSTAD/CAPE TOWN

Mnr./Mr. W.T. Ferguson

EASTERN PROVINCE/OOSTELIKE PROVINSIE

Mr./Mnr. A.J. Karstaedt

NATAL

Prof. E.N. Keen

PRETORIA

Vakant/Vacant

---o0o---

Director - Mr./Mnr. John Barratt - Direkteur

---o0o---

Die Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut van Internasionale Angeleenthede

The South African Institute of International Affairs

P.O. Box/Posbus 31596

Braamfontein

Johannesburg

---o0o---

S.A.I.I.A. NUUSBRIEF/NEWSLETTER

Dec./Des. 1970

CONTENTS/INHOUD

---o0o---

Inleidende Notas.....	(ii)
THE AMERICAN SCENE.....	1
Professor George F. Kennan	
THE FUTURE OF SMALL STATES.....	10
Professor Jacques Freymond	
RELATIONS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES.....	12
Press Conferences by Mr. David Newsom and Mr. Beverly Carter in Johannesburg and Washington.	
THE IVORY COAST.....	21
KORT VERSLAE/BRIEF REPORTS	
(i) Konferensie oor die Menslike Omgewing.....	24
(ii) The Indian Ocean - A Soviet Sea?	25
(iii) Relations between West Germany and Eastern Europe.....	27
(iv) The Common Market and African Commonwealth States.....	27
The Library - Recent Acquisitions	28

---o0o---

Please note: All articles in this Newsletter are intended for the information of members of the Institute. Furthermore, all opinions expressed in the articles are solely the responsibility of the respective authors and not of the Institute.

Let Wel: Alle artikels in hierdie Nuusbrieff word vir die inligting van lede van die Instituut bedoel. Verder is alle standpunte ingeneem in die artikels die verantwoordelikheid van die skrywers en nie van die Instituut nie.

---o0o---

Inleidende Notas

Soos alle lede weet het professor Jacques Freymond, Direkteur van die Na-graadse Instituut vir Internasionale Studies te Geneve en ook Vise-President van die Internasionale Komitee van die Rooikruis, in Oktobermaand Suid-Afrika besoek as 'n gas van ons Instituut. Professor Freymond het alle takke van die Instituut en ook vergaderings by die Universiteit van Stellenbosch en Rhodes-universiteit toegesprek. Hy het heelwat Suid-Afrikaanse deskundiges op verskeie gebiede ontmoet, en het ook die Eerste Minister besoek.

Ons hoop om mettertyd afskrifte van professor Freymond se toesprake aan lede te sirkuleer. In hierdie nuusbrief gee ons 'n kort uittreksel uit 'n artikel oor die buitelandse beleid van Switserland (in besonder oor die rol van klein state) wat hy 'n paar jaar gelede geskryf het.

Nuusbrief nr. 4 (November, 1969) het inligting bevat oor die simposium wat in Oktober, 1969 by Jan Smuts-huis plaasgevind het. Die onderwerp was "Die Buitelandse Beleid van die Verenigde State in Streeksverband", en die vernaamste referate (in Engels) is nou beskikbaar in 'n publikasie van die Instituut.

Die Instituut is tans besig met die voorbereiding van die verslag van die bevolkingskonferensie wat in Junie/Julie, 1970 by Jan Smuts-huis gehou is. Die verslag sal waarskynlik in twee volumes gepubliseer word, en hopelik sal een volume, met die tekste van die vernaamste referate, vroeg in die nuwe jaar beskikbaar wees.

Die Direkteur

THE AMERICAN SCENE

by

PROFESSOR GEORGE F. KENNAN⁺

When I undertook to speak to you this evening about the contemporary American scene, I did not realise what a serious and difficult task I was taking on. The fact is that America today is in trouble - in serious trouble - not just in one form of trouble, but in a whole series of inter-acting troubles. And this happens to be a particularly tragic and distressing moment. It is not easy to talk publicly in another country about one's own country. One incurs the risk of being charged at home with running down the country in the eyes of the world. One risks feeding the fires of hostility and dislike in foreign circles who have reason to wish to see the image of one's country tarnished and reduced. One risks stimulating smugness and complacency among one's listeners or readers and encouraging them in the view that their own country has no problems at all.

But I see no reason actually, why countries should be talked about only in good times. On the contrary, I think one gains more sympathy for them when one learns about their problems and troubles than when one is regaled with boasts about their successes. In any case, my own country cannot be understood today except in terms of its problems; and therefore if one believes in international understanding at all, one has no choice but to talk about them.

One other introductory remark. Nothing that I am about to say concerning my own country is said with any view to the possible implications for South Africa. Our problems, and yours, are sometimes superficially similar, they are never entirely the same. It would be dangerous to apply the lessons of one situation to the realities of the other. I must ask you to believe me when I say that what I am proposing to discuss is simply the American scene by direct reference - not the South African scene by analogy.

One cannot hope to cover, in such a talk, the full range of America's problems of the present day. One can only cite a few outstanding ones and let one's listeners imagine, if they can, the multitudinous ramifications, interstices and sub-headings which should go with them.

Let me start with the external field.

I would put first here in seriousness, among our problems, the competition with the Soviet Union - and in an incipient sense with the Chinese - in the development of nuclear weapons. This may surprise you, one tends to forget all this: but not only is there the apocalyptic danger that weapons so assiduously cultivated and so widely proliferated may some day come into use;

⁺ The text of an address as prepared for delivery to a public meeting at the University of the Witwatersrand on 6th May, 1970. There were a few changes in this text before actual delivery.

there is also, meanwhile, the enormous and growing expense of their cultivation - an expense that can be borne only at the sacrifice of more constructive undertakings. An effort of immense importance is of course now being made, in the form of the so-called SALT talks in Vienna, to stabilize at least the present level of this weaponry and to avoid further ruinous and dangerous competition in its development. Had both of the negotiating parties - the Soviet Government and the United States Government - had the courage and enlightenment to halt the development of new weapon systems of this nature while these talks were going on, I think the chances for their success might have been quite favourable. But so far as the layman can judge, neither has had this courage and enlightenment. This is another instance in which fear, suspicion and military ambition seem to have triumphed over hope; and I for one, while fully prepared to be pleasantly surprised, cannot find it in my heart to be optimistic about the outcome. I do not think an atomic war between Russia and America is in the offing. I do fear that another and more costly phase of this futile weapons race is about to begin.

The second great problem we have in the external field is of course Vietnam. We have involved ourselves here in a conflict where, as you all know, we have thus far been able neither to advance appreciably nor to extract ourselves. Many of us had hoped that the present period would be one of rapid disengagement even if it had to take place at a certain momentary cost to our own prestige. In place of this, the conflict, to our immense disappointment and concern, now appears to be widening.

I do not greatly blame our own people entirely for this; our opponent evidently wanted it that way. He, after all, has been making free use of Cambodian soil for years. He has recently ignored a direct request of the Cambodian Government to remove his troops. He had instead extended his operations into an attack on the Cambodian forces, although he knew full well this would tend to widen the conflict.

I also cannot exclude the possibility that our entry into Cambodia might bring us, for the first time in four long years, important military successes, and if it did so, I would consider it warranted; because I have no sympathy whatsoever for our communist opponents there; and in this sort of a contest, success is its own justification.

But it is only too evident that our move into Cambodia is proceeding at an enormous internal cost. Our public was poorly prepared for it. Five years of frustration - five years of rosy promises from the military side but very meagre political results, have made many people sceptical as to whether such a contest can be won by military means at all. Besides, the enormous expense of both these undertakings - the weapons race and Vietnam - is beginning to arouse real concern and resentment among those who pay the taxes.

The move into Cambodia has thus unleashed divisive forces of tragic intensity within our society; and no one can predict the consequences.

I shall return to this presently.

So much for the great external problems. Our domestic problems are perhaps harder to identify. They are multitudinous, and extensively interacting: I cannot attempt, in the course of such a lecture, to give any complete inventory of them. But I might just mention a few outstanding ones.

Let us first take the problem of pollution and environmental deterioration. The dimensions and seriousness of this phenomenon are only now beginning to be understood by our public; but this understanding is gaining ground with great rapidity. You will find few educated Americans today who do not have these matters very much on their minds. If and when the Vietnam involvement is liquidated, this - the restructuring of our urban and industrial society to make it compatible with the needs of a clean and healthful natural environment - will undoubtedly be our next great national undertaking.

Fortunately this effort, while pregnant with difficulties of all sorts, is a constructive one, and not politically controversial. Both political parties recognise its necessity and its urgency. Many of us look forward to the day when we can turn to it in all seriousness. Perhaps it will be the rallying point around which our torn and confused society can rediscover its unity and its confidence in itself.

A second great problem in our country is inflation. It is a process which is not wholly out of control - the government may be able to hold it down to a level of 3 or 4 percent per annum. But I see no possibility, in present circumstances, of the process being halted entirely. The pressures causing it are so powerful that to restrain them would call for greater authority than a democratic government such as our own can muster.

Central among the factors contributing to the perpetuation of the inflationary process are, in my opinion, the labour unions - and particularly the acceptance by our society of the strike as a normal bargaining weapon in labour relations. In settlements forced by the employment of the strike, it is invariably the public that pays the bill; because it is easier for the employer to pass the burden on to the public in the form of higher prices than to stand his ground for a reasonable settlement. In this way, we get the vicious circle of the spiralling of wages and prices; and so long as that goes on, the inflation too is bound to proceed.

It seems to me (and I must confess that I am almost alone in this view) that the strike is not an acceptable means of settling labour questions in this modern age - that it bears, in fact, just about the same relation to justice as did the old personal trial by battle in the middle ages - and that it must sooner or later be replaced by compulsory arbitration. Until that time comes, however, I fail to see how we can hope to eliminate inflation.

Many of our people, and I think some of our economists, see no great harm in a reasonable rate of inflation. I am not an economist, but I cannot agree. Inflation discourages savings and thrift. It reduces financial reserves. It inflates real values, and encourages speculation in them. It forces everyone to think financially in dynamic rather than static terms, to try to discount the sinking value of his money, and thus to inflate all his demands. I sometimes wonder whether it does not lead, inevitably, sooner or later to the welfare state and ultimately to socialism. We at any rate are momentarily committed to it, and it is difficult to see how we can break this commitment without changing our political system.

The next great problem I should like to mention is the state of our great cities - their deterioration, above all, as residential and cultural centres. Their business and shopping districts, as a rule, have remained intact - small bases of sky-scrappers, stores, hotels, theatres and museums in a sort of waste land of decaying community. Around them the blight spreads progressively outward in growing concentric circles, as people of means and influence flee to the outer suburbs and their places are

taken by the immigrant poor. With this change in the character of the population the value of real estate declines, and with it, of course, the capability of the areas for producing taxes, whereas the cost of municipal services, particularly social services and unemployment relief, grows astronomically. Many of the newcomers have no understanding concept of the institutions of local government by which the city is governed, and no idea of how to fulfill their role as citizens in its operation. In the resulting pinch, there is unavoidably a deterioration in the condition of public premises and services generally, as well as in the ability of the police to assure law and order. The process of deterioration thus acquires a cumulative character: the worse the cities become, the more people of education and means tend to flee from them; but the more such people move away, the more room and scope is left for the hoodlums, the gangsters, and the cheap political bosses who prey on the naivety and desperation of ignorant, poverty-stricken people.

I cannot discuss at this point the deeper causes of this phenomenon. I am convinced that it is no-one's fault, exactly: like many another of our troubles it is the product of rapid and uncontrolled technological change, and failure to adjust political institutions to the demands of the modern age. But it is one of our greatest problems. The time has long since passed in my opinion, when it could be solved on a local basis. Sooner or later, it will have to be recognized as a problem for the central, federal authority. When that time comes, it will be found that the causes for it run deep and call for a basic revision of some of our most hallowed traditions and institutions of government. We will have to re-examine, in particular, the principle of freedom of migration within our society, and we shall have to find ways of making life in the rural areas sufficiently attractive so that people will not feel so strongly this urge to accumulate in the great cities. All this, like the environmental problem with which it is so closely related, lies ahead of us, as the next great task of our society when the liquidation of the Vietnam conflict permits us to turn to more constructive things.

We have next the great complex of problems that go under the name of the disaffection of the youth: the political militancy, the wild and angry radicalism, the civil disobedience, the drugs, the cultural revolt, the rejection of parents - in short, this whole strange hysteria of unrest that has swept across our young people, or at least large portions of them, like some contagious, religious fanaticism of earlier ages. This is in its entirety, a phenomenon of enormous complexity: multiple in its origins, varied in the forms it takes. I have written about it rather extensively. I cannot discuss all aspects this evening. But I cannot refrain from saying a word about one aspect of it - the student militancy, and especially with relation to the tragic events that have taken place in these last two or three days.

Before I get into this subject, I should like to make one thing plain. I have been, from the start, an opponent of our military involvement in Vietnam. I made this position plain years ago - as early as 1965 and 1966 - in public statements. On one occasion I testified for five solid hours, all over national television, before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, explaining the reasons for my opposition to this venture. There could have been no-one I think, who experienced a sharper sinking of the heart than I did, when I learned, here in South Africa, of the extension of the hostilities to Cambodia. I have, therefore, no lack of sympathy for the unhappiness of young people in our country over this development. I think our government took upon itself a very grave responsibility when it embarked on a course which was bound to evoke such violent reactions.

On the other hand I cannot identify myself, as I see certain senior educators have done, with the student demonstrations, and I will tell you why.

First of all, I have no confidence whatsoever in the leadership. There are I suppose, variations here; but so far as I know this leadership is usually seized and exercised by leaders of the S.D.S., or related organisations. Many of them are not even technically students, and of those that are most are students only in name. They are not communists in the usual Leninist-Marxist sense. Few, if any, would belong to the American Communist Party, which still retains its affiliation with Moscow. They are anarchists, for the most part, which is quite a different thing. Their idols are Che Guevara, Castro and Mao. (This is rather ironic because neither Castro nor Mao is an anarchist; but it evidently suffices if you just make major trouble for the United States.) I have no doubt that there is some communist penetration and clandestine encouragement of the movement, but the Communists have no need to interfere overtly. The movement serves their purposes excellently without their becoming actively involved.

These militant student leaders are frankly and outspokenly revolutionary. They make no bones about the destructiveness of their purposes. They decline even to defend their destructiveness by advancing anything in the nature of a positive programme to justify it. Their tactics are studiedly provocative, they are out to make whatever trouble they can; they have tried for years to produce just the sort of tragedy that has now occurred. I can imagine their delight and sense of triumph over the death of these four students. Some people may view them as idealists, but in my book they are simply scoundrels.

Secondly, I cannot accept the forms these student demonstrations have assumed and the methods that have been employed. Of course, in this present instance, the soldiers made a terrible mistake to shoot. But one must remember that the students involved were not people just going peacefully and innocently about their studies. They were, if I read the reports correctly, people who had been busy destroying and burning academic or governmental premises in the hours preceding the incident - it was this that had occasioned the presence of the troops there in the first place; and at the time the shooting took place they had been attacking soldiers with stones, calling them pigs, and hurling obscenities at them. This was not unusual. This is exactly the way student mobs have been behaving in dozens of other places whenever the authorities had the temerity to obstruct their activities.

Now such tactics are obviously provocative in intent. The purpose of them is obviously to goad others into rash and brutal actions, and thus to make martyrs. It has been clear for years that eventually something of this sort would have to happen. Even policemen and soldiers are human, and there are limits to their patience and self-control. I profoundly regret that incident; I cannot blame one side alone.

Many people excuse this sort of thing on the ground that the stated objective - the termination of the Vietnam War - is a worthy one. I think one must beware of judging these disorders by the worthiness or unworthiness of the causes to which they are supposed to be devoted. These causes change with great frequency and rapidity. It is clear that they are not the main thing - they are only symptomatic of some deeper subconscious disorder and discomfort. And even where they happen to have merit, they cannot be held to excuse the manner in which they are so often carried forward. The end does not after all justify the means. We are confronted here with another manifestation of a new and fashionable style of political action, by no means unfortunately confined to the youth. It consists

of the effort to influence the behaviour of authority not by reasonable discussion and not by resort to the ballot-box, but by intimidation and obstruction by mass demonstration, screams and pushing and chanting of slogans, by the destruction or occupation of premises, and above all by attempting to assure that nothing normal, nothing constructive, nothing enjoyable may take place until one's own particular demand of the moment has been gratified. It is idle for me to point out that this sort of thing has nothing to do with democracy. It is in crassest conflict with the principles on which our political system was supposed to rest, and if it were to gain currency and to dominate the American scene, the ultimate outcome could only be mob-rule, disorder, chaos and eventual dictatorship.

Two aspects of this phenomenon give me particular concern. The first of these is the feebleness and timidity of the response with which these activities have met at the hands of just those people - public officials, educators, academic administrators, even editors, critics and clergymen - whose duty it was to stand up to them and to insist on orderly procedure and respect for authority. There have of course been refreshing exceptions, but by and large, responsible people have failed seriously in this test. Sometimes they have been bemused by the apparent merit of the causes to which the disorders were ostensibly devoted, and have failed to see that these were simply not relevant to the question of the propriety of the methods used. In many other instances - the majority of instances perhaps in the universities - people would have liked to take a firm stand, but have been prevented from doing so by divisions among the faculty - especially lack of support among junior faculty who have sympathised with the students and shown little loyalty to the institution.

The problems involved for academic administrators were admittedly not easy ones. In many instances, I am sure, order could have been preserved only by a readiness to close the institution entirely, as a means of last resort. The fact remains that almost never, until very recently, was this readiness forthcoming and the result has been that in the great majority of instances people have seen no alternative but to give with the punch, to yield to absurd demands, and to try to buy off by futile concessions people whose only aim in the first place was to destroy the institution and the social fabric which supported it. All this has been disturbing not just because it has played into the hands of the demagogues and brought damage to the institutions, but because it has revealed that confusion of mind and lack of firm moral principle, were not to be found among the students alone - that this sort of intellectual and spiritual dry rot had penetrated far wider circles of the population.

The second disturbing aspect, not just of the student unrest but of the tendency to violent demonstration generally, is the reaction - the so-called backlash - that it is capable of provoking in other sections of the population. If you were to visit our country today, what would probably surprise you would be, not how much of it is disturbed, but rather how much of it is normal. The trouble has been almost exclusively in or near the major urban and academic centres. Go into the hinterland - into the villages - even into the working class districts of some of the larger cities - and you are apt to find people much as they always were: normal, quiet, cheerful, orderly and good-natured. But television has carried the scenes of urban and academic disorder into practically every home, and people are worried about it, and often indignant. They are fed up with these glimpses of angry screaming figures, often dressed in a way that seems intentionally provocative - waving banners, hurling Molotov cocktails, brawling with the police, defying public authority, chanting revolutionary slogans and holding up Vietcong insignia.

They may not have the answers to all the problems at issue, but they know jolly well what they don't like, and this is it. The result is a good deal of muttering, and sometimes a quiet stashing away of weapons; and many of us fear that if this backlash were ever to become physically active it could be fully as violent, and not much more discriminate than the activities that provoked it into existence.

I must, in this connection, mention the important role which television has played not just in arousing resentment of these disorders but also in spreading them. The sight of such scenes, flashed on the screen in every home, may have alienated a great many people, but to others it has given ideas and inspired emulation. Without this medium, I don't think the taste for violent demonstration and disorder would have achieved anything like the currency it has achieved among sections of our public. This is only one of the things that persuades me that television is an extremely sensitive medium with great possibilities for both good and bad. The privilege of flashing moving images on screens in people's living-rooms represents a very serious educational and moral responsibility - and therefore properly a public responsibility; and it ought not to be turned over, as we in our country have done, to the advertiser to be mined for whatever commercial advantage it may present.

I would like, if I could, to expand on this subject of the contemporary vogue of political militancy and radicalism. I would like to discuss the curious phenomenon of its lack of appeal to people who work, and the concentration of its appeal among people who have never been embraced in the process of production - people who have never worked and in many instances never intend to. I would like to examine its faulty philosophic foundations: its lack of humour, its assumption of human perfectibility, its exclusive concentration on man's collective social behaviour, its total neglect of individual ethic, its assumption that any sort of personal beastliness is justified if it serves a worthy public purpose. I would also like to examine its various political blind-spots: its lack of interest in parliamentary procedures, its obliviousness to the importance of an impartial judiciary, its disbelief in the value of free discussion, its intolerance toward contrary opinion, its tendency to try to shout people down rather than to reason with them.

But time does not permit a discussion of these matters, and I shall only add this: I think the crest of this wave would already have passed, insofar as the white students are concerned, if only the problems of Vietnam and the draft had been removed. Without this explosive issue of the conflict in Southeast Asia, I think most of the students would probably soon recover their equilibrium, their joie-de-vivre, perhaps even their sense of humour. With the blacks the question of recovery is more complicated and more questionable. But Vietnam and Cambodia are still very much with us, and meanwhile the structure of higher education in the United States is being grievously damaged by this sort of unrest. Confusion is being created, studies interrupted, faculties bitterly divided, discipline weakened, standards lowered, curricula diluted. Looking at the resulting havoc, I sometimes wonder whether we shall not have to start all over again with new institutions determined to remain aloof from the excitements of the current scene, genuinely devoted to higher learning in the strictest sense of the term, and fully prepared to exclude anyone and everyone who is not seriously interested in it. The only comfort is that, if we do have to make such a new start, we have ample resources - material and intellectual to do it.

The last one of our problems which I must mention, at least briefly, is the racial one. It is perhaps the most baffling, the most recalcitrant, the gravest and most tragic of them all. A great deal, more than in fact for a century in the past, has been done in these last two or three decades to improve the material and social position of the American negro. Plainly,

it has not sufficed to relieve his discomfort and his dissatisfaction as a member of our society. It is clear that we have not yet found fully hopeful and promising answers to the problem. The trouble, obviously, lies deeper than many of us had supposed.

I despair of saying anything here tonight, by way of analysis of this problem, which would not carry misleading overtones and implications with relation to similar questions here. I shall content myself with observing that since the respective racial problems of our two countries, while superficially similar, are far from being identical, and since neither of us obviously has found the perfect answers, I think we should beware of viewing each other's failures as proof that we ourselves are necessarily on the right road.

Now there you have a thumb-nail sketch of some of our difficulties. They are great, indeed, as is natural in the case of a great country. It would be very foolish for us Americans, in particular, to underrate their gravity. They represent in their entirety a major crisis of American civilisation, probably the greatest we have ever known. The causes of them, and the possible cures, cut very deep. We have been slow to bring our concepts and our institutions up to date. We pride ourselves on having the oldest constitution in the world. The same thing could be said of many of our arrangements for local government. But perhaps this should not be a source of pride to us, for it only shows that we have not kept pace, conceptually and institutionally, with our own technological advance. The urban region of New York, for example, can no longer be successfully governed by three hundred and twenty-seven municipalities, strung out across three different states. Some of us wonder whether the country is not indeed too large, and the individual states too small, for successful government - whether we do not need a new regional breakdown of authority to permit the urban and environmental problems of individual regions to be approached effectively.

In addition to this, we have to learn at long last to accept public responsibility for the pace and nature of technological change. We egregiously failed to recognise the dangers involved in the introduction of the automobile as the main basis of transportation throughout our country.

We have been extraordinarily obtuse to the effects of such a medium as television. We have been slow to recognise the dangers of environmental pollution. We are only now learning the bitter lesson that material affluence is not the sinecure for all ills - that if in fact it is not accompanied by some strong moral discipline and dedication, it leaves, particularly in the souls of young people, a vacuum of spiritual boredom and restlessness into which the most undesirable things tend to flow.

In the external field too we have our lessons to learn. The mantle of great-power leadership and responsibility, which others had centuries to grow into and to learn to bear, was thrust upon us with great suddenness, in a baffling time and under unprecedented conditions. We have inevitably made our mistakes. We now have the task of analysing those mistakes, of correcting them and learning how to avoid similar ones in future.

Our work is therefore cut out for us. No sensible American would dispute its difficulty or its magnitude.

But others, I think, should be careful at this point of how they judge us.

We have many ill-wishers scattered across the world. There will be no lack of people ready to gloat over our difficulties and to hail them as proof of the inferiority either of our people or our principles, or both, and the superiority of their own. They will be ill-advised, I think, to do this. There are very few of these problems I have talked about which are ours alone. Pollution; inflation; the relationship of capital to labour; the tendency to the migration of rural poverty into the great urban areas; how many other governments can say they have fully solved these problems? And where else indeed in the advanced countries and among affluent people, has student youth not shown the same sort of extraordinary unrest which ours has experienced? We have disgraceful and tragic scenes on our academic campuses, yes - but I am not aware that they have been any more ugly than similar things that have occurred in Berlin and Paris and a number of other places.

The fact is that, as the pioneer of technological change and modernisation in a great many fields, we Americans have often been the first to absorb the bewildering and unforeseen impacts of these developments. The size of our country has given spectacular dimensions to the problems and difficulties that have ensued. Similarly, in the external field, our wealth and power - and I would also like to say, our conscience - have thrust us into the forefront of that struggle against the disruptive ideological and military forces of Russian and Chinese communism of which every western country is going to have to in some way be a part, if it is to protect in its own life, the spiritual and political values of the western heritage. If we had not stood in this forefront, others might be having a far more difficult time today.

Others are welcome to study our mistakes and to learn from them. But if others - particularly those others who are unwilling to forego the advantages of modern industrial development - profess to hear in the present turbulence of our society the death-knell of America's vitality and meaning as a force in the modern world, then they should take to heart the word of John Donne:

"Send not to know for whom the bell tolls;
it tolls for thee."

I am speaking at a time when my country is enduring a great agony of opinion and decision. I must be forgiven if I choose to see in this agony, tragic as may be its manifestations and its consequences, the reflection not of our inadequacy, but precisely of our vitality, our earnestness and our idealism as a people.

Professor George F. Kennan had a very distinguished career in the United States Foreign Service culminating in his appointment as Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. in 1952 and subsequently to Yugoslavia in 1961. Since 1963 he has been a Professor at the Institute of Advanced Study at Princeton University, and he is the author of many books on United States policies. He has had a considerable influence on foreign policy in the years since World War II.

The above address was given during a visit to South Africa under the auspices of the United States/South Africa Leader Exchange Program.

THE FUTURE OF SMALL STATES

by

PROFESSOR JACQUES FREYMOND

To what extent is there still justification for the existence of small states, like Switzerland? Are such states compatible with the transformation in methods of production and economic structures, the changes in the swing of power between continents, endeavours to achieve continental integration, the expansion of international organisations? Can small states be kept alive? Is it even in the interest of the members of these small political communities to do so? Does not particularism inevitably lead to recession and eclipse in the long run? That it does, is a widespread conviction. Americans and Europeans are in favour of integration. Heads of new states are battling for the establishment of large economic and political coalitions.

Likelihood of survival

And yet it would not seem that the small state is necessarily doomed to disappear. There is after all no basic difference between the situation of the world today and that of Europe in past centuries. The small state of Switzerland has succeeded in existing under a system of European balance. It has survived periods of inter-state rivalry and of irreconcilable ideological conflicts in the 16th century and at the time of the French Revolution.

Today we are living under a system of world balance. The situation is perilous. The end of this critical period is by no means in sight. On the contrary, with the development of China it would seem that the tension will be drawn even tighter. The struggles between the Powers, however, assume various shapes and their profiles are shadowy. The uniting of forces is apt to vary with events and with the different views of individuals stepping into the scene. What is Germany's future to be? What do we know of the relations between China and the Soviet Union? Between India and China? What direction is the Middle-East going to take? And Africa? How are the Latin-American states going to solve their economic and social problems? We have nothing which allows us to affirm that the Great Powers will succeed in establishing the empires or continental coalitions they envisage. On the contrary, in each of the groups or blocs, centrifugal forces can be observed. It is evident that bipolarity is merely a convenient figure of rhetoric.

A further characteristic of contemporary developments, apart from this tendency towards concentricity, is the birth of new states. The membership of the international organisations increases year after year and particularism offers food for nationalism, which is visibly and bitterly asserting itself in the Middle East and Africa.

Finally, scientific and technical progress is not only to the advantage of large states; small nations can also benefit thereby. On the military plane, modern atomic weapons can furnish new means of offense, rather than defense, to small states. On the economic plane, small states can share in and benefit from economic progress, to the extent that they have available brain-power and qualified workers. It is Man that counts, with his intelligence and working capacity, not only equipment. This has been demonstrated recently by several states, Israel in particular, which has succeeded in developing

despite the hostility of its neighbours and an unfavourable geographical position. The victory is threefold: technical, economic and political. And if one stops to think that several of the newborn states of black Africa have turned towards Israel in order to benefit by its experience, it is obvious that it enjoys a certain degree of influence.

It cannot therefore be declared that history has doomed the small state, that it will necessarily be the victim of an irreversible movement. The immutable laws of history have so often been quoted in the course of the last hundred years by founders of empires which today have ceased to exist, or by theorists whose followers have succeeded for reasons which had nothing to do with the lines forecast, that it is advisable to be a little wary in this respect.

But even if the small state is not condemned, there must be the will for it to live. More than any other, it is founded on the will to live together. Its citizens express this will in various ways, by taking part in public life and in the defense of their country. This is especially true of Switzerland.

Professor Jacques Freymond is Director of the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva and Professor of the History of International Relations at the University of Geneva. He is also Vice President of the International Committee of the Red Cross. He visited South Africa in October, 1970, as a guest of the South African Institute of International Affairs.

The above article is an extract from a chapter on "The Foreign Policy of Switzerland" contributed by Professor Freymond to a book entitled "Foreign Policies in a World of Change", edited by Professor Joseph E. Black and Dr. Kenneth W. Thompson and published by Harper and Row, New York, in 1963.

RELATIONS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES

Press Conferences of Assistant Secretary of State

David Newsom and Deputy Assistant Secretary Beverly Carter

- A. The following is the transcript (issued by the United States Information Service) of the Press Conference given by Mr. David Newsom (Assistant Secretary of State) and Mr. W. Beverly Carter (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State) in Johannesburg on 10th November, 1970, during their "familiarisation" tour of South Africa:

1. Opening Remarks by Mr. Newsom

Mr. Carter and I have had a full schedule since our arrival in South Africa. We have met and had full exchanges with the Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, Transport Minister Schoeman, Foreign Minister Muller, Foreign Secretary Fourie, and many other South African officials and private citizens. Of course we have also had discussions with Ambassador Hurd and our other colleagues. People rather than places have figured most importantly in our schedule. We have found our meetings with members of the black community especially helpful to understanding developments in the country. In addition to our meetings we have also visited several industrial installations and senior secondary schools. Mr. Carter and I have been treated to a generous helping of South African hospitality.

The American official attitude toward the policy of racial discrimination in South Africa has been constant. We abhor racial policies which by law separate men and deny them rights solely on basis of the colour of their skin. There is no question of us condoning or acquiescing in these policies. We stand on the side of fundamental human rights in Southern Africa as we do at home and elsewhere.

Likewise, the United States has always sought officially non-violent and evolutionary solutions to these problems. While recognising world-wide concern over these matters, we believe that the matter of solutions between South Africa and the remainder of the Continent, is essentially African.

In making these points, I speak officially for the executive branch of the U.S. Government.

And now I'll be happy to answer some questions.

2. Question: Does that mean that you will not comment on feelers being put out by the Ivory Coast?

Answer: (Newsom) No comment. These are matters that must be resolved between the African countries and South Africa and it has been very clear that matters of this kind must be resolved in that context.

3. Question: What is your Government's attitude towards the latest developments between Britain and Rhodesia.

Answer: (Newsom) We are naturally watching with interest as a world power and a member of the U.N. The contacts between U.K. and Salisbury are naturally in the interest of general peace and stability of this part of the

African continent. We hope that a resolution to this problem satisfactory to parties who are interested in the problem can be worked out.

4. Question: Will the U.S. adhere to sanctions on Rhodesia?

Answer: (Newsom) Yes, we will continue to adhere to the Rhodesian sanctions. We have declared on many occasions our support for the U.N. sanctions on Rhodesia, and this will continue to be our policy.

5. Question: Mr. Secretary, we hear from time to time, as we have heard now, criticism in Washington of the policy of separate development. I believe that it would be fair to assume that if someone rejects a policy they have in mind something better to replace it. Could you perhaps enlighten me on what this alternative is for South Africa that Washington has in mind?

Answer: (Carter) There are copies of a report (opening statement) being passed around. I believe that you have one. Our comments were not on separate development but on the social system.

6. Question: Can I understand from that answer that there is no objection on the part of Washington toward the policy of separate development.

Answer: (Carter) No, this is an internal matter of your Government and it has to be decided upon by your Government and its people.

7. Question: Well this is a matter in which the U.S. Administration is involved. May I just put an axiom first. If there is not to be separate development and an association of separate states in South Africa, then necessarily there must be a united state in South Africa. In that event I would like to be informed why it is, or if it is, that the Washington Administration supposes that the Basuto people, the Swazi people, the Tswana people are more entitled to an independent status than for instance, the Zulus and the Xhosas who have an equally unique culture and who are far more numerous.

Answer: (Carter) We are not going to comment or be argumentative about the way South Africa progresses. At the moment there are no individual states within the Republic of South Africa. So we cannot comment on what might be, we can only comment on what is now. And the statement which the Assistant Secretary read, states our position with regard to the dignity of the individual, and that is as far as we are prepared to go. Once there are other alternatives which have been decided upon by this Government we will react on that basis. We cannot react speculatively.

8. Question: Sir, this position has been taken very definitely by this Government, that there are to be independent states for the Zulus and for the Xhosas, for instance, and here is some - which I think

Answer: (Carter) May I just interrupt. We are not going to be contentious. The decision may have been taken but the fact has not yet been accomplished. We are not going to comment on something that is not yet a fact. May we have another question please?

9. Question: Could we have your personal opinion on the policy of separate development?

Answer: (Carter) No Sir. We are not prepared to comment upon an internal decision of a government. I am a representative of another government. I am not to decide what is proper for another government. I cannot comment in my personal capacity.

10. Question: Mr. Secretary, you have just made a very hard hitting statement about the policy of this government. Has this been strengthened or altered in any way by your visit here?

Answer: (Newsom) No. This is a statement of our position with respect to the

dignity of men and the attitude toward discrimination on race and colour which is consistent with our policy everywhere. If I could just follow up one minute on what Mr. Carter said. We are not here to comment upon the internal affairs of South Africa, but in our capacity as officials of the U.S. Government, dealing both with our own public opinion in the U.S. and dealing with the facts of opinion in black Africa, the general questions of Southern Africa and the system of racial relations in Southern Africa is a question which, whether we like it or not, becomes every day to us a matter of discussion and concern. We are here to gather impressions for our country of the situation in this part of the world which will help us as we carry out our responsibilities. We acknowledge the existence of major problems in this area, even as we have had major problems in our country. We would like to leave it at that.

11.Question: May I please put a point which directly follows my question about Botswana and Swaziland? This is because the U.S. has taken a stand on this matter. It is directly involved. The U.S. Administration has said in so many words that it will assist these three ex-protectorate territories to obtain as far as possible an independent status vis-a-vis the Republic. Now, is it not fair to ask, if an independent state is regarded as fair and equitable for the Basuto and the Tswana and the Swazi people, is it not also equitable for the Zulus and the Xhosas?

Answer: (Newsom) Could I say, Sir, that Swaziland and Botswana have been declared independent. Their independence has been accepted by the world community. They are members of the U.N., and our relations with them are quite appropriately on a bilateral basis. That to me is very clearly and very logically a basis for our relationship with them and our interest in them.

12.Question: Mr. Secretary, are you at liberty to disclose what was discussed with the Prime Minister?

Answer: (Newsom) No, we are here to listen and learn and I do not feel that it is appropriate to discuss individual conversations.

13.Question: What are your reactions to what you have seen so far, Sir?

Answer: (Newsom) We have been in South Africa since Friday. If this is Johannesburg, this must be Tuesday (laughter), and I would be rash indeed to make any pronouncements upon reaction after so few days in your country.

14.Question: Mr. Carter, have you suffered any embarrassment toward you whatsoever during your visit?

Answer: (Carter) No, should I have? (Laughter).

15.Question: Mr. Secretary, the last year or so there seem to have been several gestures on the part of the Nixon Administration toward more conciliatory policy with respect to the Vorster regime. The OK-ing for the sale of various types of civilian aircraft, which will be used obviously by the S.A.A.F., and, more specifically, the reconstitution of the State Department's advisory panel on Africa. The elimination of people like Gwendolen Carter and George Hauser and their replacement with American businessmen and pro-South African academics like Professor Munger. My question is simply this: Do you see this as a more even-handed policy towards South Africa?

Answer: (Newsom) The changes in American policy, if I may say so, which you speak about, seem more reflected in the press in South Africa than in our corridors in Washington, D.C. I might also say that the piece you refer to, which talked about the re-constitution of our Advisory Committee in a manner more satisfactory to South Africa, has been picked up by Pravda and broadcast by radio Moscow throughout Africa. I would like to say in

that connection, without being contentious or taking issue with a particular newspaper, that the item failed to mention that in the reconstitution of the Committee - which was a natural thing at the time of the change of the Administration - it failed to mention that, while some names of people who were known to be more concerned about the situation here than perhaps others, were mentioned, the names of some of those on the new Committee who are equally concerned, such as former Ambassador Franklin Williams who was our Ambassador to Ghana and a very prominent member of our black community, and a number of others similarly concerned about the situation in S.A., were not mentioned. As I have tried to point out in our opening statement, there is a constancy of policy toward this part of the world on the part of the U.S. which springs from our own ethnic composition in the U.S., and from our very keen and appropriate interests in the many independent countries of black Africa.

On the matter of the aircraft, all that has happened there is that some decisions were made which were pending at the time the Administration came into office. And I have been interested in the fact that while a great deal of attention has been given to the fact that we have agreed to license the very limited number of a very particular type of jet executive aircraft which cannot be used for internal security purposes, no mention has been made of the fact that this same statement, which I made in Chicago on 17th September, stated also that we will not license any large transport aircraft. We will continue to maintain our arms embargo. We will continue to maintain our sanctions against Rhodesia. These are items to which less attention has been given than the very small decision related to a very particular limited type of equipment.

16.Question: (From American Journalist) Mr. Secretary, would you characterise these by the words "gestures" and "more even-handed approach" on the part of our Government toward South Africa?

Answer: (Newsom) No, I would characterise my September 17th speech as a report to the American public upon certain decisions that were pending at the time the Administration took office.

17.Question: Mr. Secretary, will American warships be permitted to visit South African ports in the near future?

Answer: (Newsom) At the present time we are not sending our American warships to South Africa, and so far as I know there is no intention to change that policy.

18.Question: Mr. Secretary, in your general administration of South African-United States relations are you necessarily intending to follow the same line of Mr. Mennen Williams?

Answer: (Newsom) I worked for Governor Williams in the early part of the 60's. I was dealing with North African Affairs rather than black African Affairs, and I think that if there is a change in emphasis it is because Africa itself is changing. Governor Williams was Assistant Secretary during the days immediately following the first independence in Africa and during the period of great change from colonial status to independent status. So, very naturally, the outlook of our Government at that time, and its emphasis, was somewhat different than now, when we are dealing with countries that are now ten years into their independent history and perhaps have somewhat different emphases themselves.

19.Question: Have you yet made any decision on the validity of Botswana's and Zambia's claims to a common boundary?

Answer: (Newsom) We are going to assist Botswana in the construction of a road link with Zambia and a road link utilising the ferry which has been in

constant operation for, I think, some 70 or 80 years. We feel that this very clearly establishes the appropriateness of that route.

20.Question: Mr. Secretary, you speak of changes that are occurring in Africa and I think that there are signs today that South Africa's policy of good neighbourliness is beginning to yield fruits far and wide. It seems to me that here is the best promise of the post war years for a peaceful coexistence on the continent. In these circumstances, Sir, will Washington consider persuading certain black militant states who are pursuing a course of confrontation to desist from doing so?

Answer: (Newsom) We have gone on record as hoping for and supporting a non-violent approach to this part of the world, but, as one who has during the course of 1970 made three trips into significant black African countries, I can only state that the problem is not a simple one. There are some very strong feelings about the general question of race on the African continent in moderate as well as militant states. It is a problem with which I am sure we are all going to be living.

21.Question: In view of the picture you have given of your Department's attitude to existing racial policies in South Africa, are you prepared to state what Washington's attitude toward investment in South Africa by U.S. private enterprise is?

Answer: (Newsom) We have, for a long time, through the Johnson Administration and the Nixon Administration, taken the position of neither encouraging nor discouraging investment in South Africa and that remains our position.

22.Question: Does this have anything to do with the fact that U.S. investment in this country is among the highest anywhere in the world? Would the attitude be different if this were not so?

Answer: (Newsom) I don't think so. I would also like to point out that perhaps the full question of American investment in S.A. must be kept in perspective - something which I am quite constantly called upon to do at home. Our present investment in South Africa represents less than a third of our total investment in Africa. Therefore we have to look at it in a much wider context.

23.Question: Could you explain the conflicts between U.K. and U.S. Policy on supply of arms to South Africa?

Answer: (Newsom) It would not be appropriate for me to comment on U.K. policy on arms to South Africa. That is a matter for the U.K.

24.Question: It seems that the British are changing their policy. If they are, can you explain why U.S. wouldn't do the same thing? What is the difference between the two policies?

Answer: (Newsom) I think that the answer lies in 1776.

25.Question: I would like to know about the nationalisation of Banks in Zambia just announced at 1 p.m. Do you have news on that?

Answer: (Carter) Before one? We did have lunch. (Laughter).

26.Question: Mr. Deputy Secretary, as your last post was in an ex-British territory, do you see any significance in the fact that generally ex-French colonies are more moderate toward South Africa whereas the ex-British colonies are militantly anti-South African?

Answer: (Carter) No, I would like to see what happens, and then it would be more appropriate for me to comment. I have not seen the text of the Houphouet-Boigny statement. I don't know where it is going to go. I think that it is entirely possible that the former British parts of Africa may be of a different mind once they see what the arrangements are.

27.Question: The Assistant Secretary suggested that the answer to the question lay in 1776. I think that it might lie in the Indian Ocean. I understand that the Washington position, as far as the Indian Ocean is concerned, is that it would regard with concern any dominance by the Soviets, but that it doesn't believe that that stage has yet been reached. On the other hand, there are innumerable signs that the strength of the Russian Navy in the Indian Ocean is increasing. Would it not be wise in these circumstances to take effective measures in a timely manner, for by the time that the Russian Naval dominance has been established, may it not be too late?

Answer: (Carter) We agreed to meet with you today to comment on the questions that might be on most of your minds, and I don't want to turn this one off. But I think that our position is quite clear. We have made it clear to the South African Government.

28.Question: Would you please tell us what you mean by a familiarisation tour?

Answer: (Carter) Getting to know first hand what circumstances and people are like here. Having a chance to talk face to face with members of the South African Government, with members of African community and with members of the so-called white community.

29.Question: Do you think that the Africans in this country are well-off as compared to Negroes in the slums in the U.S.?

Answer: (Carter) I can only say that in the U.S. they can vote, they can own land, they can run for elective office, they can aspire to whatever they want to aspire to. I have not yet found out all of the limitations on the opportunities for blacks here.

(Newsom) Going back to the gentleman's question on the Indian Ocean, I would just say that he in a sense answered it himself by his initial statement that we would be concerned about the dominance of the Soviets in the Indian Ocean, but that we do not think that point has been reached.

30.Question: Along that line would you have any opinion on the value or the non-value of the base at Simonstown?

Answer: (Newsom) No, I would have no opinion.

31.Question: On the road from Botswana to Zambia, you are probably aware that the South African Government has declared that there is no common border.

Answer: (Newsom) I believe, however, if my understanding is correct, that the South African Government is not interposing any objections to what Botswana wishes to do in this respect.

- - - - -

- B. The following is the transcript (issued by the United States Information Service) of an interview given by Mr. Newsom and Mr. Carter to Voice of America correspondent Ben Gordon, before their departure from Washington on their tour of Southern and Eastern Africa:

1. Question: What is the purpose of your trip to Southern Africa?

Answer: (Newsom) Since assuming this position in the U.S. Government, I have been seeking to acquaint myself with all parts of the African continent. I am responsible for relations of the United States with the many independent countries of Africa, and certainly Southern Africa is an area which everyday is important to our consideration of policies throughout Africa. Therefore it seems incumbent upon me to acquaint myself and to have those of my staff directly associated with me to acquaint themselves with the general situation in this part of the world. This is one of a series of trips to Africa which I have been making since I became Assistant Secretary. I have already visited 28 African countries. There will be five more new to me on this trip.

2. Question: Would you tell us, Mr. Secretary, what you will be doing specifically in the Republic of South Africa?

Answer: (Newsom) Mr. Carter and I will be spending about ten days in South Africa, where we will visit Pretoria, Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban, visiting our posts and officials in these cities. We will, in the process, be familiarising ourselves with the South African situation, and we hope to be able to talk to persons from all the racial groups in South Africa.

3. Question: Do you have any special business to take up with the South African Government officials?

Answer: (Newsom) No, because, as I have said, our primary purpose is to acquaint ourselves with the people and leaders of the countries of Southern Africa as a necessary part of the knowledge and experience we need properly to conduct our relations with these countries.

4. Question: Is a visit by an Assistant Secretary of State to South Africa considered unusual?

Answer: (Newsom) It is entirely normal and, as I have said, I believe it is essential for an Assistant Secretary and responsible officials in the Department of State dealing with Africa to develop a first-hand knowledge of the continent and all of its varied character. My predecessor, Ambassador Palmer, visited South Africa in 1968, and he also visited the other countries of Southern Africa at the same time. My visit does not mark any change in our policies with regard to South Africa, policies which have been clearly enunciated by the President and Secretary (of State) and by myself. It is solely a familiarisation visit.

5. Question: And now I would like to address a question to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Beverly Carter. Mr. Carter is a black American citizen. Sir, is there any special reason you might be accompanying Mr. Newsom on this trip, and do you anticipate any difficulties in South Africa in particular, as you move on this trip?

Answer: (Carter) No, I don't anticipate any difficulties. I am going out as a representative of the American Government and this will be my third trip to Africa. I will be making the same contacts and the same calls that I would be normally making with Mr. Newsom. We're trying to cover a great deal of ground, and, because of the fact that there is so much to do, we have decided

to make this trip together and divide some of the responsibilities. I anticipate no problems.

6. Question: Back to you again, Mr. Newsom. Does your visit to South Africa have any special mission or does it mark any change in our position regarding the South African Government?

Answer: (Newsom) As I said earlier, the trip is to permit us to get to know these countries better. It carries no special mission other than that. I would like to emphasize that it marks no change whatsoever in our policies toward the countries visited. I have personally, and senior representatives of this Government have on many occasions, reiterated our strong opposition to the existence of racial discrimination in every form and to apartheid; we continue to follow this enunciated policy. We will visit, with particular interest, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, for their courageous efforts to build non-racial, democratic societies demonstrate that men of different races can work and prosper on a basis of equality.

7. Question: Gentlemen, concern has been expressed in some African quarters that United States interest in Africa may be cooling off. Is your trip to any extent designed to offset that impression?

Answer: (Newsom) It's a little difficult to know why this question keeps coming up persistently. We have, for the first time, a President who has visited several of the countries in Africa in three trips that he made in 1958, 1963 and 1967. We have the first Secretary of State who has visited Africa while holding that office. We have sought throughout the first two years of this administration clearly to enunciate our interest in Africa and our policies in Africa. While we in African Affairs have suffered, as have those in all branches of the U.S. State Department, from a decline in the resources which may be available for our overseas operations, this represents in no way diminution of our respect for and our very deep interest in relations with the African continent. We are, in the course of this trip, carrying out one particular emphasis on our African policy, which was enunciated in the Secretary's statement of 27th March, and this is the role we see for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland as independent states in the South African context. I hope that during my visit to these countries I will be able to discuss with these governments meaningful ways that we can demonstrate to them our support for their forthright positions.

8. Question: What do you expect from your visits to the former high commission territories of southern Africa?

Answer: (Newsom) In Botswana we have been able to demonstrate our interest by supporting two projects important to the economic development of Botswana, the development of the economic infrastructure for the new mining industry near the Shashi River, and the road from Botswana to Zambia. I'm hoping to be able to observe the development of these projects during my visit and perhaps to carry them forward with some concrete steps. We have responded to emergency drought conditions in Lesotho by providing food to the World Food Programme. I hope my talks with leaders there will help us to find further ways to strengthen our relations with this country. Swaziland, a small country, is making very noble efforts to overcome economic problems. We are already in touch with that Government about the possibility of assisting them in this effort and I shall hope to continue these discussions.

9. Question: I believe you are also planning a visit to Malawi. I wonder if you have any special comment on your stop there?

Answer: (Newsom) No, this again is one of the countries I have not yet had a chance to visit in Africa and I hope that my visit to that country and the talks we will have with its leaders will introduce us to Malawi and bring us up-to-date on affairs in that country.

10.Question: If we may turn once again to Deputy Assistant Secretary Carter, we would like to ask you, Sir, if you have any overall impression of your upcoming visit with Mr. Newsom?

Answer: (Carter) I'm looking forward to it very much. This, as I said earlier, represents the third trip this year to Africa. I have been travelling on that continent now since 1952 and this is a part of the continent I have not seen before, so I'm looking forward to it very much.

11.Question: I believe in addition the State Department announcement about the forthcoming trip mentioned that you will be going on separately after the general tour ends to two additional countries in Eastern Africa, that is to Uganda and Kenya. Does that have any specific significance?

Answer: (Carter) Just as with the other countries, we are calling on them because of our continuing need to keep informed. I served previously in Kenya and am looking forward to returning to that country for conversations with old friends and with colleagues. I'm going on to Uganda because we have not officially visited that country since we have been in this position. We have a new Ambassador there, Ambassador Ferguson, and I'm looking forward to having conversations with him and with Ugandan officials.

THE IVORY COAST

On 4th November, 1970, President Félix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast announced that his Government was planning to call a meeting of African leaders to urge direct talks with South Africa because it considered that force would not solve the problem of apartheid. He said that his Government would contact all African heads of state individually to explain the Ivory Coast's views so that discussions with Pretoria would not be a unilateral initiative. He added that talks did not imply diplomatic recognition of South Africa.

The President said that anti-apartheid measures adopted so far, including the banning of arms, the breaking of diplomatic relations, and forbidding landing rights to South African aircraft were "tragic" and "ridiculous". "We must not under-estimate South Africa. We must not threaten when we do not have the means of following up our threat. However, South Africa could consider itself threatened and build up arms, which could lead it one day to take the offensive."

Negotiations with South Africa would not be easy, the President said, "but we shall be patiently active". He hoped that African diplomats would one day "invade" South Africa peacefully as a prelude to white and black living there together in a spirit of brotherhood. He added that the Ivory Coast also wanted to seek talks with Portugal. +

A special report in "The New York Times" of 9th September, 1970, from a correspondent in Abidjan (Mr. William Borders) referred to the reappraisals and self-examination which had accompanied the celebration in August of the Ivory Coast's 10th anniversary of independence. According to the report, the general conclusion, as expressed by a newspaper editor in Abidjan, was a striking one for Africa: "We think everything is going very well indeed." The report pointed out that, along among its neighbours, the strongly pro-Western Ivory Coast had known only peace and sharply increasing prosperity during a decade that had brought turmoil and unrest to many new African States. The report then continued as follows:

In the years since France granted independence, the annual industrial growth of the country under President Félix Houphouët-Boigny has averaged 20 per cent and exports have tripled, totalling nearly half a billion dollars last year. The prosperity is finally beginning to reach even the average Ivoirian; elementary-school enrollment has doubled in ten years; smallpox, according to the Government, has been all but eradicated, and the number of hospital beds is up 50 per cent.

"Clearly, they are doing something right," commented one of the hundreds of French businessmen who have thronged here, bringing with them not only their francs but their cuisine, their culture and their fashionably dressed wives and daughters.

What the Ivory Coast Government is doing - and its critics think, indeed, that it is not right at all - is holding its doors wide open to unrestricted investment from abroad and allowing foreigners to come here,

make their fortunes and take them back home with ease. President Houphouët-Boigny, who has been the only leader since colonial days, thinks that his rigorously capitalistic and pro-Western policy will benefit his country the most in the long run. But it is scorned by the more nationalistic Africans - in adjoining Ghana, for example - who rigidly limit the involvement of foreigners in their economies. Critics of the Ivoirian policy proclaim with disdain that this modern capital city is not African and that the Roman Catholic President is a "black Frenchman" who has sold out to the colonialists. The allegations do not seem to have any impact here.

The report in "The New York Times" then points out that in West Africa generally the colonial heritage is more evident in former French colonies than in the former British colonies. In the Ivory Coast, for instance, there are 40 000 Frenchmen, which is nearly three times the number at the time of independence. Their influence is pervasive, not only in Abidjan, but also well inland in the coffee and cocoa plantations and the lumber camps. Commercial life remains almost entirely in white hands, despite official efforts to get black men into business. However, according to the report, the process of so-called Africanisation is moving more quickly in the civil service and the Government, where the number of foreigners is finally beginning to decline sharply. The report quotes a foreign diplomat in this connection:

"It used to be that when you called on a minister, there would be two or three white Frenchmen hanging around his desk, telling him what to do. You really don't see much of that any more."

The report then continues:

Dozens of office and apartment buildings are going up in the capital, most of them privately financed from abroad, and there are several neighbourhoods where construction makes the pedestrians' way as difficult as it is in parts of Manhattan. Early in the evening, when the metal shutters come clanging down over shop windows displaying croissants or French perfume or fresh endive flown from Belgium to be sold for a dollar a bunch, Abidjan's bistros and sidewalk cafes begin to fill. The customers include Frenchmen, Africans, Japanese businessmen, Vietnamese, American tourists lured across yet another exotic vacation frontier. "We're making quite a serious appeal to tourists," explained a Government official who spoke enviously of the Europeans and Americans who consider East Africa a major attraction "and fly right over West Africa to get there."

A central element in the tourist effort is the opulent Hotel Ivoire, which has recently opened an ice-skating rink, a casino and a 24-story tower where Bloody Marys and whisky sours sell for \$2.50 each. Next month the hotel complex will be expanded into the beginning stages of a project that its promoters call the African Riviera, a 10 000-acre tract that is to include a golfcourse, cultural centers, a convention hall, several hotels and a zoo. The project is taking shape along one of Abidjan's lagoons in Cocody, the luxurious residential quarter where diplomats, European businessmen and Government ministers have elegant villas that would cost up to \$ 100 000 in America. Also there is one of the several palaces that President Houphouët-Boigny and his family occupy with great style. Only a few miles away are muddy slums with filthy, overcrowded huts and no running water.

It is to the urban slums, where the Ivoirian success story seems remote,

that opponents of the Government have looked for support, so far with little success. "There is a question, I concede, whether the nation's prosperity is trickling down to the average Ivoirian rapidly enough," a high-ranking official volunteered during an interview. He maintained that the Government was trying hard, with such efforts as one of Africa's most advanced public-housing programs, and he said that the gap between the rich and poor used to be considerably greater than it is now in this country of 4.5 million people.

The narrowing of that gap is one reason for the fact that, outside the university community, there is little concerted opposition to the Government, so far as can be measured in a one-party state where opposition is officially discouraged. Another reason often cited is the personal strength of Mr. Houphouët-Boigny, 64, a popular figure here for more than 25 years, who is given to the technique of calling his critics together for long discussions of what is on their minds.

(i)

Konferensie oor die Menslike Omgewing.

'n Konferensie oor die beskerming van die menslike omgewing sal in Junie 1972 in Stockholm gehou word. Dit word deur die Verenigde Volke beplan. By 'n onlangse vergadering in New York van die beplanningskomitee (waarop 27 lede verteenwoordig is) het die Amerikaanse verteenwoordiger, mnr. Christian Herter, gesê dat ekonomiese ontwikkeling en die beskerming van die omgewing nie bloot twee probleme is wat slegs met mekaar in verband staan nie. Dikwels is hulle dieselfde probleem wat hom op 'n verskillende wyse laat geld, en as sodanig is hulle 'n saak wat alle nasies raak.

"Taakstelling in verband met ontwikkeling en omgewing moet nie slegs aanvullend wees nie. Dit moet gesien word as iets wat dikwels identies is," het mnr. Herter gesê. "Ons glo dat dit in die belang van alle nasies is om hulp te verleen aan daardie lande vir wie die belangrikste ontwikkeling nog voorlê. Hulle moet gehelp word om die ontwikkelingsprogram uit te voer sonder dat hulle later die langtermyn-prys sal hoef te betaal wat op die oomblik betaal moet word deur ontwikkelde nasies soos my eie."

Mnr. Herter het by ontwikkelde sowel as by ontwikkelende lande daarop aangedring dat hulle 'n aktiewe rol in die beplanning van die konferensie moet speel. As die konferensie met 'n aksie-gerigte program voor die dag moet kom is dit belangrik dat alle lande moet deelneem en hulle standpunte stel. "Op die lang duur sal dit regerings wees wat in verband met die saak sal moet optree, en daarom behoort dit regerings te wees wat 'n aktiewe rol speel in die uitvoer van voorstelle wat in verband met die omgewing gemaak word." Om seker te maak dat alle nasies in staat sal wees om dit te doen, sal die Verenigde State bereid wees om hulp te verleen aan nasies wat sodanige hulp nodig het teneinde die nodige voorbereidings vir die konferensie te maak. Onder die wetenskaplikes in die Verenigde State word daar alreeds stappe gedoen om hulp in omgewingstreke te voorsien. Soortgelyke aanbiedings is deur Kanada en Swede gedoen.

Mnr. Herter het verder gesê: "In sommige voorbereidings vir die konferensie moet ons waak teen onnodige oorvleueling in die werk wat in hierdie verband deur agentskappe van die V.V.O. gedoen word. Ons moet ten alle koste waak teen 'n ongekoördineerde benadering waarin beperkte internasionale hulpbronne vermors word in oorvleueling of in take wat nie van primêre belang is nie."

Mnr. Herter het ook 'n uiteensetting van die take wat die Verenigde State uit die konferensie in Stockholm tevoorskyn sal kom. Hierdie verskillende optredes en take is vroeër hierdie jaar deur die Verenigde State se verteenwoordiger, Ambassadeur Charles Yost, in die Algemene Vergadering van die Verenigde Volkere uiteengesit. Hierdie take sluit die volgende in:

- Die bepaling van sodanige omgewingsprobleme, vernaamlik die besoedeling van die see en die atmosfeer, wat later op 'n wêreldwye skaal gevaarlik mag word.
- Om planne te beraam om 'n wêreldwye nasporningsnetwerk daar te stel wat 'n oog oor daardie gevare kan hou.
- Die versameling en bestudering van wenke wat deur regering gedoen word en wat as rigsgoere kan dien in die beskerming van die omgewing in ontwikkelde en ontwikkelende lande.
- Die bestudering van die moontlikheid om internasionale standaarde vir die kwaliteit van lug en water op te stel.

(Gebaseer op 'n
Verslag deur die Verenigde
State se Inligtingsdiens).

(ii)

The Indian Ocean- A Soviet Sea?

"The New York Times" of 13th November, 1970, contained an article, entitled as above, by Professor T.B. Millar who is Director of the Australian Institute of International Affairs. In this article Professor Millar referred to the proposed construction of a naval base at Cockburn Sound near Perth on the West Coast of Australia. One of the justifications advanced for the construction of this base was the growing Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean area.

Professor Millar quoted a "prominent East European visitor" to Australia as saying that there were two basic reasons why the Soviet Navy was in the Indian Ocean: (1) there is a Soviet Navy, and (2) there is an Indian Ocean. Professor Millar felt that, however sophisticated this might or might not be as a rationale, it did not go very far towards clarifying Soviet objectives. He then continued: "Although it has occasioned a good deal of comment, some highly exaggerated, the Soviet Navy has not yet been out in strength in the Indian Ocean. According to reports, the number of surface ships has been as low as two or three in the whole ocean at any time, or as high as twenty-five or thirty. Submarines of course are less easily counted. The significance of the Soviet vessels lies less in their quantity than in their novelty, in the fact that they have so little competition, and in their being a part of a collection or pattern of Soviet activities, strategic, political and economic.

"Over the past few years, the Soviet Union has become the principle supplier of arms to nine countries on the Indian Ocean periphery. Through aid to harbour development, it has obtained access to ports and dockyard facilities in places such as Mogadishu and Berbera (Somalia), Hodeida (Yemen), Aden, and Vishakapatnam (India), and to a lesser extent to other key ports such as Mauritius, Singapore, and Port Blair in the Andamans. It has forced its way into the shipping organisations trading between Europe and the Far East and Australia. It is engaged in extensive hydrographic, oceanographic and maritime intelligence activities. It is erecting some kind of military facilities on the island of Socotra at the entrance to the Gulf of Aden (the London Times reported them to be a naval radio station and ammunition depot)."

Professor Millar pointed out that no-one had publicly objected to these developments. The impression in Australia was that the U.S. Navy would like to engage in some competitive appearances well beyond the Polaris programme, but that neither the State Department nor the White House saw that a major American interest would be so served.

"The British Conservative Government is going to keep small naval and other forces in Malaysia and Singapore and perhaps the Gulf for a few years or more. These will be local rather than oceanic. It would like South African co-operation in the southwest of the ocean but may be finding the stated price - arms supplies - a hotter potato than it had realised. Japan has a growing trade across the ocean, and almost all its oil comes from the Middle East through the Malacca Strait; but neither the public mood nor the defence vote is such as to provide protection so far from home. France has its Somaliland, Réunion, and other islands, but no major strategic interest in the area.

"Of the peripheral countries, only India and Australia have navies of any size. India is too dependent on Soviet arms aid and Australia is too small to protest effectively against Soviet activities which are in any case quite legitimate and pose no apparent threat as yet to anyone. Only if Australia had some support from the U.S. or Britain could it demonstrate local superiority against Soviet incursions into its waters."

According to Professor Millar, some commentators believed the Russians were in the Indian Ocean to promote the containment of China. This, he felt, was too simple an explanation, and he considered that at best it provided but part of the answer, most relevantly with respect to India and Pakistan.

"The Chinese have a foothold in Tanzania and are irritatingly active among Palestinian and other Arab guerillas, but China is far from being an Indian Ocean power. To dominate the Suez passage. to have major influence in the oil-producing states; to be able to exert political pressure, with modest military backing, at key points during times of decision; and to trade profitably - these are the Soviet Union's apparent intentions, or the likely effects of their endeavours."

Professor Millar's article concluded with the question: Do these endeavours of the Soviet Union matter? His answer was: "They do, if you live in the area, are a small state, and see no evidence that any major power is interested in either verbal or practical restraint upon the Soviet Union's undeclared but increasing ambitions."

Accompanying Professor Millar's article in "The New York Times" was a chart which included the following details of the growth and modernisation of the Soviet fleet (approximate figures from unclassified data):

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1970</u>
Conventional submarines	450	390	300
Nuclear submarines	3	35	70
Surface ships with guided missiles	10+	57	170
Merchant shipping (million tons)	3.2	7.0	13.7

(iii)

Relations between West Germany and Eastern Europe

Newsletter No. 7 (page 39) contained the text of the Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union, signed in Moscow on 12th August, 1970. Since then a Treaty has also been concluded between the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland, and the German Foreign Minister, Herr Scheel, has stated that negotiations with Czechoslovakia will be started early in 1971.

It should be noted, however, that the German Government has made it clear that there would have to be an improvement in the Berlin situation before the treaties with Eastern European countries would be ratified by the Bundestag. Talks have been taking place between representatives of the four powers responsible for Berlin (U.S., U.K., France and U.S.S.R.). There has at the same time been some harrassment by the East Germans of traffic on the routes to West Berlin.

Foreign Minister Scheel is reported to have stated (in an interview with the Saar Radio on 29th November, 1970): "Ratification of all the agreements concluded by the Federal German Government with the eastern countries presupposes a settlement of the question of Berlin".

Previously the German Government had referred to this condition only in respect of the treaty with the Soviet Union. But now Herr Scheel has stated: "It can be ruled out that the treaty with Poland will be submitted to the Bundestag for ratification before a satisfactory solution to the Berlin problem."

(iv)

The Common Market and African Commonwealth States

It was announced in Brussels on 1st December that nine African members of the Commonwealth would be offered associate membership of the European Economic Community, if Britain joined. This assurance, it was stated, had been given to Britain.

However, the Community was not yet prepared to offer associate membership to Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland, because of their customs union agreement with South Africa. The Community wished to examine the problems posed by these countries, and Britain had been asked to suggest what arrangements should be made for them.

The Community also omitted from the list of countries to be offered associate status all those in the Caribbean and the Indian Ocean. It was pointed out that, as these countries were such large producers of sugar, it would be premature to make association arrangements for them before the results of talks on the future of the Commonwealth sugar agreement were known. (Britain had asked for associate status for all the small developing countries of the Commonwealth.)

RECENT ACQUISITIONS BY THE LIBRARY

The following books are among those recently added to the Africa Library and the International Affairs Library at Jan Smuts House:

Africa

DORO, Marion E. and Stultz, Newell M. ed.

Governing in black Africa: perspectives on new states. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1970.

GERTZEL, Cherry

The Politics of Independent Kenya 1963-8. Nairobi, East African publishing house, 1970.

GEYER, A.L.

Vier jaar in Highveld: diplomatieke ervarings - soms onder dorings - as Hoë Kommissaris in Londen 1950-1954. Kaapstad, Tafelberg-uitgewers, 1969.

HOWE, Russell Warren

The African Revolution. Croydon, New African library, 1969.

INTERNATIONAL Monetary Fund

Surveys of African Economies. 2v. Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund, 1968-69.

v.1: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo(Brazzaville), and Gabon.

v.2: Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Somalia.

JULY, Robert W.

The origins of modern African thought: its development in West Africa during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. London, Faber & Faber, 1968.

MARKOVITZ, Irving Leonard

Léopold Sédar Senghor and the politics of negritude. London, Heinemann, 1969.

International Affairs

ALEXANDER, Lewis M.

World political patterns. 2nd ed. Chicago, Rand McNally, 1967.

CLISSOLD, Stephen ed.

Soviet relations with Latin America, 1918-1968: a documentary survey. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. London, O.U.P., 1970.

HUGO, Grant

Britain in tomorrow's world: principles of foreign policy. London, Chatto & Windus, 1969.

KOLKO, Gabriel

The politics of war: allied diplomacy and the world crisis of 1943-1945. London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969.

LUARD, Evan

Conflict and peace in the modern international system. London, University of London Press, 1970.

SHIRER, William L.

The collapse of the Third Republic: an inquiry into the fall of France in 1940. London, Heinemann: Secker & Warburg, 1969.

STEINER, Zara S.

The Foreign Office and foreign policy, 1898-1914. Cambridge University Press, 1969.