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DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT
VAN
INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE

THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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N U U S B R I E F / N E W S L E T T E R

1971 No. 5

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S. A. I. I. A. NEWSLETTER/NUUSBRIEF

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A PERSONAL VIEW OF AFRICA

Sir Arthur Snelling K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O.,
(British Ambassador in South Africa)

I have called this talk "A personal view of Africa" because I do not want it to be thought that what I say can be taken as representing, in general or in detail, the views of the British Government. Mine is a hot seat. The Conservative Government in Britain and the Labour Opposition probably differ at present more sharply about policy towards South Africa than towards any other country in the world. Consequently, anything I say here is liable to be picked up, relayed to London, and used by either the extreme left or the extreme right wing as a basis for press comment or questions in the British Parliament designed to embarrass the Government by demanding to know whether they agree with or repudiate me. As British Ambassadors of my age have no security of tenure, I am sometimes tempted to decline all invitations to talk on foreign affairs. But that would be cowardly. The only course open to me therefore is to express my own personal opinions, which I hope are not too far removed from what most informed people in Britain who have no special axes to grind think about the problems of this continent.

The question which Britain has to ask about the countries of Africa, just as about countries in any other part of the world, is how she can best conduct her relations with them so as to maximise British prosperity and British security. Shorn of all sentimentality, these are the criteria which any government must have at the forefront of its mind when considering what its policies should be towards any other country or continent.

I propose to look first at the size and nature of Britain's economic interests in White Africa (which I define arbitrarily as South Africa, South West Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories) and Black Africa (by which I mean the whole of the rest of Africa South of the Sahara). These economic interests minister to Britain's prosperity. I then consider the position in this continent in relation to Britain's security. So on to take a closer view at Black Africa from the British point of view, and finally consider in a little more detail Britain's particular concerns in Southern or White Africa.

From the economic point of view, Africa is important to Britain, but not all that important. Britain's economic transactions with Africa constitute about 10% of her global external economic transactions. Africa is much less important to Britain economically than for instance North America or Western Europe. Britain's exports to Black and White Africa together amount to about 8% of her total exports, and are divided almost exactly equally between Black and White Africa. Britain imports a lot more from Black than she does from White Africa. On the other hand, Britain has much bigger investments in South Africa than in Black Africa.

One can only conclude that from the economic point of view Black Africa and White Africa are roughly of the same order of importance to Britain. The political inference to be drawn from this is that, in so far as the British are a nation of shopkeepers, they must conduct their relations with Africa in such a way that they are not forced to choose between White and Black Africa.

Now let us turn to Britain's security interests in Africa. I said that Britain's economic transactions with Africa were 10% of her global transactions. Of course it is not possible to qualify in this sort of way Africa's importance to the security of Britain, but if it is possible to do so, I should expect the figure to come out at something below 10%. The process of declonisation has freed Britain from her responsibility for defending large parts of Black Africa. We retain a few defence facilities in Black Africa but have no defence arrangements there comparable with the Simonstown Agreement. If one were to draw up a list of the areas of the world in which there seemed to be the greatest dangers of land or aerial warfare between East and West within the next decade, Africa would I think figure fairly low in the list. A nuclear war is not likely to break out in Africa. A limited war between East and West could break out in a number of places ahead of Africa. The two greatest military dangers in this continent, as Britain sees them, are first, a racial war between Black and White Africa and secondly, the maritime threat which is imposed by the growing Soviet naval power in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

It is wholly in Britain's interest to do everything possible to ward off the danger of a racial war in Africa. Not only has Britain vast economic interests at stake in countries which would be enemies to one another in such a war; all her humanitarian instincts point in the same direction. Moreover, there are something like 100,000 British expatriates in Black Africa who would become hostages if racial hostilities were to break out. Therefore it is a source of continuous anxiety to Britain that some Black African countries, despite the tenor of the Lusaka Manifesto, speak as though they regarded war as the only solution to Southern Africa's racial problems, and indeed as though such a war had already begun.

In other parts of the world where neighbouring countries have strong antipathies and a state of war or hostility exists between them, Britain has in recent years developed a policy of non-alignment and of thinking very carefully before supplying arms to either of them. We no longer supply significant quantities of arms to India or Pakistan. We have kept out of direct involvement in the Vietnam war and the trouble in the Middle East. In fact the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London has now developed a motto based on those traffic signs you see in Britain, but not in South Africa, where at crossroads or T-junctions diagonal yellow lines are painted across the road and there is a notice saying: "Do not enter box until your exit is clear". The British Government are determined not to get boxed in by supporting any policies in Africa which they judge likely to increase the risk of racial conflict.

But Britain is not non-aligned on East-West issues and is therefore concerned about the maritime threat imposed by the growing Soviet naval power in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans. During the last decade the Soviet Navy has grown into a modern well-equipped force, second in size only to that of the United States, and now operating as a politico-military force on a global scale. We have seen the threat it has been able to pose in the Mediterranean and in certain areas of Africa. We so not want the same thing to happen in this part of the world. Something like a quarter of Britain's ocean-going trade in both directions passes round the South African coast including over half her oil supplies. Any change in

the balance of naval power hereabouts therefore touches Britain directly. We cannot ignore it. Were we to do so, a situation could develop in which we should gradually become intolerably vulnerable to the political pressures which could then be brought to bear against us. These recent developments therefore give Britain a fresh reason for thinking that she must keep in good repair the Simonstown Agreement for the defence of the sea routes around Southern Africa.

Nobody can pretend that the Simonstown Agreement is a defence pact which could align Britain with South Africa against Black Africa. This was indeed recognised by the Prime Ministers of African Commonwealth countries at the Singapore Conference in January: none of them suggested that Britain should terminate or withdraw from it and many of them emphasised that they were not asking her to do so. Nevertheless a number of them said that if Britain were to supply arms for maritime defence directly related to the security of the sea routes under the Simonstown Agreement, she would be giving symbolic support for apartheid. Britain does not accept this view. But its adherents felt so strongly that they argued that the sale of such arms to South Africa could actually assist the communists by helping them to win over key countries in Black Africa. Political as well as military realities thus have to be taken into account by Britain in determining where her security interests lies.

Therefore from the point of view of Britain's security, no less than from that of her prosperity, it is imperative that the British Government should pursue policies in Africa that avoid precipitating the need for her to choose between Black and White Africa, policies that contribute to lowering the tension between the two areas and policies that enable Britain to keep on good terms with both of them. There is an area of common interest between Britain and South Africa in that both of us would be adversely affected by the spread of Communist influence in Africa. But the question which the British Government continually ask themselves over such problems as Rhodesia, or South West Africa, or arms for South Africa or other issues affecting this part of the world, is whether Britain will alienate Black African countries to such an extent that some of them will react against British interests and turn to the Communists in desperation for support.

You may question whether this risk of driving parts of Black Africa into the Communist camp is real or imaginary. For this purpose it is useful to consider what the gains and losses of the Communists have been over the last decade or so in Africa. The Russians were the first Communist power in the field and they started strenuously to woo the Black African countries right from the beginning of the process of decolonisation, which Britain began by giving Ghana her independence in 1957. I was in Ghana from 1959 to 1961 and was able to study at first hand the pattern of events which has since been repeated in many other Black African countries.

In British colonial days the Ghanainan had not been allowed to talk to the Russians and had been warned against them. Almost inevitably, when they first became independent, when plausible Russians appeared bearing gifts and other blandishments, the Ghanaians started to think that this so-called enemy was not as wicked as they had been led to believe. Before long there developed what can only be called a love affair, a rather adolescent love affair, between the newly independent state and the Russians.

One great advantage the Russians then had was that they were economic puritans. To many Black Africans the private enterprise, capital system, which we bequeathed to them, was interpreted at first in such a way that it was the duty of every man to improve as quickly as possible the economic position of himself and his family by whatever means were available. This attitude of mind infected Ministers, Civil Servants, MP's party officials and their wives, no less than the entrepreneurs. Consequently capitalism came to be identified with corruption in the minds of the ordinary people in many newly independent African countries. And of course corruption brought in its train hatred of the few who were benefitting from it by the many who were not. The Russians on the other hand, offered a system which, in theory, involved no corruption.

Nkrumah unwisely tried to combine a pro-Russian policy with one of personal enrichment. Both these policies became so unpopular that eventually the Army flung him out. The beginning of the trouble in Nigeria dates from a revolt against the beneficiaries of corruption. Similar patterns have been repeated in many parts of Black Africa. Later the Russians, foolishly from their point of view, took themselves to dispensing largesse in a way which made them as suspect as the capitalists. But even to this day, in Tanzania for instance, one of the attractions of the Communist system to the rulers is its financial and economic puritanism.

Which brings me to the activities of the Chinese. They have concentrated their efforts first in Zanzibar and then in mainland Tanzania but they have not by any means turned it into a satellite. They no doubt have ambitions in Zambia, but are not going to find it easy going there. They probably have not the means to sustain further ambitions on this continent - apart from relatively inexpensive help to guerilla movements. Moreover just as the Russians suffer from the disadvantage in some parts of Africa of being white, so the Chinese are handicapped by the fact that they are probably the most racially conscious people on this earth. They despise all non-Chinese. The 13,000 or so of them who are now building the Tanzam railway keep themselves to themselves and are not going to find it all that easy to win African friends and influence African people. It is important not to under-estimate the Chinese in Africa, but neither should we exaggerate what they are likely to achieve.

Moreover, it is a mistake to speak of Communist activity in Africa or elsewhere as though the Russians and Chinese were allies working in close co-operation for a common goal. They both believe in the Marxist religion, but they differ from one another on dogma and are as hostile to one another's ambitions as Protestants and Catholics were in the 16th and 17th centuries. The statement that "the purpose of the Chinese in constructing the Tanzam Railway is to engage in subversion" is not, as you might imagine, a quotation from a South African Minister. It was made on Moscow radio which went on to refer scathingly to "Mao-tse-tung's opportunist policy". Even on tactics the Russians and Chinese do not often see eye to eye. Usually the Russians metaphorically wear the diplomats top hat and spend their time cultivating the leaders of Black Africa, while the Chinese prefer the guerilla's beret and aim at inciting what they regard as the "oppressed masses" against the present generation of African rulers. But occasionally and not always successfully the Russians and Chinese swop hats, as for instance when Chou en lai visited Africa a few years ago.

So what have the Communists got to show so far for all their efforts in Black Africa? In West Africa their limited political successes have produced in Guinea an object lesson to Africans of the economic distress which a country can suffer if it goes over to the Communist side. Out of a total of about 30 Black States which have become independent in the last decade and a half, the Communists can count not more than some half dozen successes, some of them only partial and perhaps temporary, and none of them in countries of major importance. But both the Russians and the Chinese are proving adaptable. In recent years they have found that their strongest card in Africa is no longer to preach half-truths about the nationalisation of the means of production or the corruption of the capitalist system, but instead to foment hatred among the Black Africans of the so-called minority regimes of South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories. Antagonism towards white domination is to Black Africa what hatred of Zionism is to the Arabs - about the only unifying forces they possess. The main difference between the moderates and the extremists in Black Africa is about the means to adopt to bring about the political changes which they would like to see in Southern Africa.

However, this difference of opinion about means is important. In Black Africa it corresponds, with a few exceptions, to the division between the ex-British and the ex-French Colonies. On the whole, it is the ex-British Colonies which are most strongly anti-South African, anti-Portuguese and anti-Ian Smith: whilst the ex-French Colonies are, for the most part, in favour of peaceful methods of persuasion.

The reasons for the relative moderation of the Francophone countries are partly psychological. French-speaking Africans do not have a strong sense of identification with those in Rhodesia, the Portuguese territories and South Africa. The French speaking Africans in West Africa live a long way from Southern Africa: they mostly have no common language with Southern Africa and little knowledge of or even interest in the situation, at the Southern end of this continent. And they had a different Colonial Power and therefore different traditions and outlook. On the other hand, the sense of identification of Africans in the English-speaking countries with the Africans in Southern Africa is closer and is probably growing more so all the time through the spread of literacy and the mass media. There are also economic reasons for the differences in attitude between Francophone and English-speaking parts of Black Africa.

In this situation what are the intelligent policies for Britain to adopt? Economically she has her eggs more or less equally divided between the Black African and the White African baskets. Her security interests demand that she maintains her defence relationship with South Africa as a safeguard against the growing Soviet naval threat, but not at the price of driving Black Africa into the arms of the Communists. The strongest card the Communists hold is their encouragement of the implacable opposition of the Black African countries to u.d.i. and apartheid. The ex-British countries feel this more strongly than the ex-French but it is in the former that almost all Britain's economic and strategic interests in Black Africa lie. Meanwhile, both political parties in Britain reaffirm frequently that they abhor apartheid, though they differ almost as much as the English-speaking and French-speaking Africans on the question of how to deal with it.

All diplomacy involves walking tight-ropes and trying continuously to reconcile conflicting interests. The policy which you can be certain is wrong, every time, in all circumstances and in all continents is the one which is simple, clear and completely logical. I was cured of the youthful opinion that ruthless logic was the best guide to the conduct of international relations in 1940 when the Russians invaded Finland. By all the criteria that had led us to declare war on Germany when she invaded Poland in 1939 we should immediately have made an enemy of Russia. Thank heavens we did not. As to Africa, there are two alternative views each of which is completely logical but which start from different premises.

The first view is that racial discrimination is the greatest of all evils, overriding all other forms of injustice: that apartheid involves racial discrimination: and that therefore on moral grounds, by economic pressure, boycotts, ostracism, sanctions and by financial and even military aid to the opponents of the Government of South Africa, Britain should seek to bring down that Government. The second equally logical view starts from the premise that communism is the greatest enemy to both South Africa and Britain; that he who is not against communism is in favour of it; that some countries in Black Africa are already and more may shortly fall under communist influence: and that therefore Britain should on grounds of both morality and self-interest throw her weight wholly on the side of South Africa and accept the view that the South African Government is Britain's only true friend on this continent.

The British Government emphatically reject the logic and the prescription for conduct which is involved in the first of these views. I have already explained why Britain is steadfastly opposed to the use of force in the attempt to solve the problems of Southern Africa. Equally the British Government do not share the views of those who would have South Africa isolated through sporting and cultural boycotts and subjected to economic and trade sanctions. Mr. Heath said earlier this year: "If I look back on the attempts to isolate Soviet Russia in the 1920's, Spain in the 1930's and China in the 1950's it seems to me that in every case it was a mistake. Let us at least learn by the mistakes made in our own lifetime. So I believe it will be in South Africa".

The second view - that Britain should side wholly with South Africa on all issues on which this continent is divided - is put to me by many South Africans. It is based, as I have mentioned, on the assumption that communism is our common enemy and that he who is not against Communism is in favour of it. One of the errors in this argument is the same as that made by Foster Dulles in the fifties when he said that he who is not for me is against me. This is a sure-fire way of converting all the uncommitted, all the neutrals and the non-aligned into enemies. It is not in Britain's interest to make enemies in Africa.

Britain therefore picks her way through the African jungle conscious that down every path there are half-concealed trip-wires. So it is easy to see why there are two views in Britain upon the question whether or not she should supply South Africa with any arms over and above those she has a legal obligation to supply under the Simonstown Agreement, for maritime defence directly related to the security of the sea routes. It is not surprising that the British Government should be proceeding with great

caution in exploring the question whether a possible basis for negotiation with the Rhodesian regime does or does not exist within the framework of the five principles. On South West Africa, whereas our closest ally, the United States, voted for the United Nations Resolution purporting to terminate South Africa's mandate and to vest authority in the United Nations, Britain abstained because of legal doubts about the competence of the United Nations General Assembly to end the mandate and to assign to the UN direct responsibility for the administration of the Territory. This wide South West Africa question is now being studied further in London and in other capitals in the light of the recent World Court advisory opinion. Looming ahead is the question of relations with the Bantustans when they reach full independence. On none of these issues have the British Government reached final decisions.

I started by saying that this was to be a personal view of Africa. I can therefore end only by expressing a personal opinion. This is that as bitter experience teaches me lessons I did not learn in my youth. I am coming to believe that anyone who feels passionately upon any issue is, consciously or unconsciously, closing his mind to something like half the relevant facts. This may be a sign either of approaching senility or of wisdom, according to your point of view. Equally, as I have said, I reject ruthless logic as an infallible indication of wisdom in the conduct of international relations. But if there were to be no passion and no logic, no emotion and no intellect, where should we find the safe rules of conduct? My answer is let us be guided neither entirely by the heart nor entirely by the head but by a judicious combination of both. And above all, let us make a determined effort to understand and to appreciate fully the reasons for the attitudes of other people and other countries. The great need in the modern world is for empathy - the ability to project oneself into and so comprehend the point of view of the other man, whether he be Black or White, unwilling to enter a dialogue with you or ready to do so, Nigerian, or Malawian, or British. If I have been able tonight to do anything to enable you to comprehend more fully some of the problems which Africa presents for Britain, I shall feel well rewarded.

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The above address was given to a meeting of the Natal Branch of the Institute on 26th August, 1971.

THE LAUNCHING OF THE WEST GERMAN DEVELOPMENT AID PROGRAMME

James Alexander Shaw

The International Setting

The forerunners of the present day aid programmes were the United States' lend-lease programme, launched in 1941, the formation of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency and the Government and Relief in Occupied Areas Agency - both during World War II - and the Marshall Plan in 1947. In all these actions the United States predominated. All these assistance efforts, however, lacked the essentials of present day aid, namely that it is overwhelmingly government-to-government and bilateral in nature, that it is long-term, that it encompasses technical support and that it is purportedly not in the donor's interest. Aid has come to constitute an instrument in inter-state relations whereby the dichotomy of a north-south, rich-poor gulf is sought to be bridged and, of course, friends won.

The capital aid programmes of the war and immediate post-war years were supplemented by a technical aid programme announced in Point Four of President Truman's inaugural speech of January 1949. This can be regarded as the birth of the prevailing concept of aid by industrial to developing countries. Its genesis lay in the Cold War which stimulated and fanned it. It is not without significance that 1949 also saw the first Soviet atomic explosion and the commencement of hostilities in Korea. The international power structure was finally split into two blocs, the United States and the Soviet Union, which replaced Europe as the centre of power. In this climate the newly-emancipated colonies adopted a policy of neutralism and non-alignment. A vying for their favour by the super powers followed. Modern communications and the mushrooming of international political forums lent themselves to greater demands by the developing countries. Aid disbursements increased rapidly especially after 1955, when the Soviet Union launched its aid programme. Until that year the United States had dominated the scene. The Soviet decision followed the Bandung conference of 1955, at which an attempt was made to form a Third World bloc. It also followed the death of Stalin in 1953 and a switch from an isolationist policy to one of peaceful co-existence.

Many multilateral institutions which promoted the aid idea of technical co-operation were formed in these post-war years. Many attempted to repeat the success of the Marshall Plan. Mention should be made of the Colombo Plan in south and south-east Asia, various military alliances, the Alliance for Progress in the Americas and the consortia and consultative groups of the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the European Economic Community. Specialised agencies of the United Nations also encouraged a dialogue between industrial and developing countries; indeed the United Nations Charter places an obligation on members to assist developing countries.

Post-War Germany

West Germany launched its technical aid programme in 1956 and its capital aid programme in 1960. By this time aid had come to be accepted as an instrument in inter-state relations. Small contributions were made to multilateral agencies from 1950, and from 1953 a limited number of experts were sent abroad on aid projects. At the outset it should be stated that the official German aid effort was launched unintentionally as a result of the construction of the Rourkela steel mill, a commercial project between the Indian Government and the German firms, Krupp and Demag, which was commenced in 1953. By 1957 the Indian Government found itself in balance of payments difficulties for which reason the German Government agreed, because of the involvement of German firms, to grant credits of 660 Million Deutschmarks at 6% interest, repayable over 3 years - hard terms by present standards. The German Government did not really want to become involved in the aid race, for it felt there were more pressing domestic tasks. But by committing itself to Rourkela it had unwittingly committed itself to a capital aid programme, for Rourkela was a large and prestigious project - in keeping with United States influence at the time. From then on, what had been ad hoc projects on a piecemeal basis, came to be moulded into an ever more homogeneous national programme.

Even without Rourkela, however, the German aid programme would still have got off the ground, for it was during the Fifties that Germany found itself re-emerging as a major nation with international responsibilities and with a role to play. Germany was keen to grasp the opportunity and wipe out its nazi past and isolationist feeling dating back to 1933. It was aware of a new era in inter-state relations with a growing Afro-Asian bloc. In the year 1955 it was once again permitted to promote its own foreign policy by virtue of an amendment to the occupation statute of 1949. It also wished its foreign policy to serve the West thereby eliminating mistrust arising from the post-war economic revival. It is not surprising therefore that the German technical aid programme was launched in 1956; also a year in which nationalists were clamouring for independence in Kenya, Cyprus and Malaya. Up until this time attention had been focussed on domestic issues, such as the introduction of the basic law in 1949, the economic and currency reforms and the implementation of the Marshall Plan. By the latter Fifties attention could be directed beyond the national borders.

Germany was alive to Marshall Plan aid received and keen to demonstrate appreciation. Indeed, the United States kept prodding recipients of Marshall Aid to share the aid burden. This pressure resulted in greater German participation in the Free World aid effort. At the same time Germany felt able to break new ground in bilateral relations with the developing countries; not having colonies like Britain and France, it was not burdened with the odium of colonialism. The colonies Germany possessed prior to World War I were well-administered and German researchers were said to have made a dispassionate study of things African. An attempt was consequently made to divorce aid from the Cold War from the start. The term "development aid", instead of the United States nomenclature "foreign aid", was used. Germany also felt that not belonging to the group of bigger powers would allay fears of imperialism on the part of recipient countries. It was also felt that an aid programme could be tackled with more confidence at that stage, for so many lessons had

been learnt. Even the long-term nature of aid was coming to be realised, although it had initially been hoped that the "wirtschaftswunder" could be repeated in the developing countries. It was for this reason that the direction of the capital aid programme was placed in the hands not of the Foreign Office or the Ministry of Economic Co-operation, especially established in 1961 to co-ordinate the national aid programme, but in the Economics Ministry which had been responsible for the economic revival. After a decade of inter-ministerial rivalry and jealousy, responsibility was eventually transferred to the Economic Co-operation Ministry in 1970.

Motives

Two reasons for the launching of the German aid effort stand out. They concern reunification of the two Germanys and the necessity to cultivate trade markets for the future. Since the watering down of the Hallstein doctrine, the desire for reunification has lost much impetus. But there was always on the one hand a sympathy for the developing countries themselves striving for self-determination, and on the other hand a realisation that the Third World could become a political and economic force to be reckoned with, should the question of reunification ever be settled in the United Nations by a show of hands.

The cultivation of commercial ties is basic to German aid policies probably more so than in the case of any other country. As much as 80% of disbursements flow back to Germany in the form of orders, and Germany probably stands to benefit by a universal untying of aid. It is the world's third biggest industrial nation and second biggest trading nation. As much as 19% of GNP is attributed to exports and the Government has coupled the threat of another depression like that of 1932, when 6 million were unemployed, with the success of the aid programme. In the Fifties the principles of free market trading were imbued in German trade and aid activities by Ludwig Erhard under United States influence, and they have remained a cornerstone of national policy to this day.

Organisational Aspects

The decision to establish a separate ministry to deal exclusively with development aid matters followed the 1961 elections from which a Christian Democratic Union/Free Democratic Party coalition government was formed. The more important cabinet posts were demanded by Union members who had formed the government until then. As the aid programme had so expanded, it was decided to establish the Ministry of Economic Co-operation. Walter Scheel, the present Foreign Minister and Party leader, became the first minister.

The Germans, having not forgotten the excesses of war, have incorporated humanitarian motives in their aid programme. Official publications speak of poverty, disease and ignorance that must be fought in the developing countries, and call on the population for support. Private bodies are especially active in this field, and German aid is peculiar for the large number of such bodies - for Germany did not have a colonial administration to fall back on, and therefore either harnessed existing institutions or set up new ones. Furthermore the 11 "laender" are, by virtue of the federal constitution, each responsible for cultural affairs and consequently each

has machinery for the granting of mainly educational assistance. The language problem also had to be solved, as German is not a "colonial" language. For these reasons co-ordination is of the utmost importance, and it is here that the Ministry of Economic Co-operation has done sterling work. Germans are also aware of the necessity of social security services - in 1969 these constituted 29% of the federal budget. Even GNP is called the gross social product. It follows that Germany would be keen to assist the developing countries on a social services level. Indeed, since the Social Democratic Party took office in 1969, a preference for aiding socialist countries has made itself felt.

Recently the humanitarian motive has been remoulded into a vague desire that aid policies could form a psychological basis for some form of international security through demilitarisation. A "weltinnenpolitik" should contribute to the lessening of world tensions. There have even been calls for the Aid Ministry to be converted into a Peace Ministry and the Chancellor has publicly suggested that a percentage of the Defence budget be transferred to the Aid budget. It is said that international peace and security are incompatible with the existing north-south, rich-poor conflict. Aid should help eradicate the conflict, and the International Development Strategy recently accepted by the United Nations purports to be a step in this direction. Though this theory is debatable, of more substance is the possibility of China joining the "have nots" to oppose the "haves". This may indeed result in a threat to international peace and security.

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Mr. Shaw is a South African Foreign Service Officer and he recently completed a study of the West German development aid programme.

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B R E I F R E P O R T S

- Prepared by the Staff of the Institute -

"Dialogue" - Comments from Lesotho and Botswana

In an Independence Day speech on 4th October, 1971, the Prime Minister of Lesotho, Chief Leabua Jonathan, referred to the question of dialogue with South Africa. He said that, in view of the present day international situation and in an attempt to solve the problems of Southern Africa, he took the lead in proposing contact and dialogue which he was convinced would prove the only answer. "I propose dialogue based on the Lusaka Manifesto", he said, "as the manifesto clearly expressed preference for negotiation rather than violence".

The policy of isolation and confrontation showed no concern for the 20 million Africans. It must be accepted that black and white were in Southern Africa to stay. But Chief Jonathan also rejected the ethnic grouping of people as a solution. Peace would only be maintained in an atmosphere of equality and acceptance of majority rule, irrespective of colour.

The Prime Minister concluded by saying that his policy of dialogue would also prove valuable in easing international tensions, as was already evidenced by the negotiations between the United States and Red China, and the recent Berlin Agreement.

On 25th October, 1971, the President of Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama in a speech opening the newly built Zambian High Commission Chancery in Gaborone, that Botswana's endorsement of the Lusaka Manifesto, which he described as a "fundamental and constructive document", was a matter of public record. "This is why", he said, "Botswana refuses to endorse any proposal for unconditional dialogue with the minority regimes. But, despite our clear assertion that the only dialogue we favour is a dialogue based on the commitment to the principles of human dignity and equality set out in the Manifesto, there are those who continue to group Botswana with certain elements who seem prepared to advocate dialogue on any terms".

Sir Seretse restated Botswana's attitude to reports of attempts to foster a "pro-dialogue" conference in these terms: "Botswana will talk to any African country about steps that can usefully be taken to advance the objectives of the Organisation of African Unity. We will support any practical measures proposed to promote African co-operation and unity. But we are not interested in new groupings which would have the effect of undermining the unity which has been so painfully achieved. We will not assist anyone who hopes to bring about a return to an Africa divided between those labelled 'moderate' and those labelled 'radical'."

Sir Seretse said that the proper channel for exchanges of view on common objectives was the OAU itself which must organise its affairs so that realistic and serious analysis and objective discussion of common problems is possible. Elaborating on Botswana's approach to the dialogue issue, the

President continued: "Our support for the Lusaka Manifesto has in no way diminished. We continue to believe that the offer it contains should remain open. And we could not endorse an interpretation of the Manifesto which would shut the door on meaningful dialogue which has as its mutually agreed objective the ending of minority rule. But until there is a positive response to the Manifesto, no comfort should be given to the minority regimes which have rejected its peaceful and constructive message".

Sir Seretso said further: "Until the Manifesto's challenge is taken up, dialogue will be without significant content and will serve no useful purpose". Addressing himself to powers outside Africa, he said: "Nor would it be helpful if external powers were to encourage meaningless dialogue in the mistaken belief that it is the genuine article. We respect and share the desire that change should come peacefully. Since it is Africa that would suffer most from an extension of violence, it is Africa that has most to gain by working for peaceful change. But change there must be".

(Based on reports in "Lesotho Weekly Bulletin", 9th October, 1971, and "Botswana Daily News", 25th October, 1971).

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Representation of China in the United Nations

After a debate which began on 18th October, 1971, the U.N. General Assembly voted on 25th October on two draft resolutions relating to the question of Chinese representation in the U.N.

The first was a draft resolution submitted by the following twenty-two states, which would declare that "any proposal in the General Assembly which would result in depriving the Republic of China of representation in the United Nations is an important question under article 18 of the Charter".

Australia, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Gambia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Japan, Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritius, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Philippines, Swaziland, Thailand, United States of America and Uruguay.

Article 18 of the Charter provides that "decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting". Adoption of the above draft resolution would therefore have meant that a two-thirds majority would be required for the second draft resolution, submitted by the following twenty-three states, which sought to seat the representatives of the People's Republic of China in the U.N. and at the same time to expel the representatives of the Republic of China:

Albania, Algeria, Burma, Ceylon, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea,

Guinea, Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, Nepal, Pakistan, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, People's Republic of the Congo, Romania, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Sudan, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

The first draft resolution mentioned above was defeated in a roll-call vote by 59 votes to 55, with 15 abstentions. The voting was as follows:

In favour: Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Costa Rica, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Khmer Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxemburg, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Thailand, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil.

Against: Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iraq, Ireland, Kenya, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Republic, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, People's Republic of the Congo, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon.

Abstaining: Cyprus, Iran, Italy, Laos, Malta, Morocco, Netherlands, Qatar, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Austria, Belgium, Botswana.

The second draft resolution was then adopted in a roll-call vote by 76 votes to 35, with 17 abstentions, as follows:

In Favour: Ceylon, Chile, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Libyan Arab Republic, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, People's Republic of Congo, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda,

Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Austria, Belgium, Bhutain, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada.

Against: Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Costa Rica, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Gabon, Gambia, Guatamala, Haiti, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Japan, Khmer Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Paraguay, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Swaziland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil.

Abstentions: Colombia, Cyprus, Fiji, Greece, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Panama, Qatar, Spain, Thailand, Argentina, Bahrain, Barbados.

(Although a two-thirds majority was not required, as a result of the General Assembly's rejection of the first draft resolution, the latter resolution did in fact receive a two-thirds majority in favour.)

A third draft resolution, submitted by the United States and 18 other countries, which would have provided for the seating of both the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China, was not put to the vote in view of the adoption of the above-mentioned resolution, expelling the representatives of the Republic of China, and seating the representatives of the Peking Government as the only representatives of China.

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The United State's policy to have both Chinese governments represented in the United Nations, which was defeated in the above voting, was outlined by Secretary of State William Rogers in a statement on 2nd August, 1971, (before the beginning of the current session of the General Assembly), as follows:

No question of Asian policy has so perplexed the world in the last 20 years as the China question - and the related question of representation in the United Nations. Basic to that question is the fact that each of two Governments claims to be the sole Government of China and representative of all of the People of China.

Representation in an international organization need not prejudice the claims or views of either Government. Participation

of both in the United Nations need not require that result.

Rather it would provide governments with increased opportunities for contact and communication. It would also help promote co-operation on common problems which affect all of the member nations regardless of political differences.

The United States accordingly will support action at the General Assembly this fall calling for seating the People's Republic of China (PRC). At the same time the United States will oppose any action to expel the Republic of China (ROC) or otherwise deprive it of representation in the United Nations.

Our consultations which began several months ago have indicated that the question of China's seat in the Security Council is a matter which many nations will wish to address. In the final analysis, of course, under the charter provision, the Security Council will make this decision. We, for our part, are prepared to have this question resolved on the basis of a decision of members of the United Nations.

Our consultations have also shown that any action to deprive the Republic of China of its representation would meet strong opposition in the General Assembly. Certainly as I have said, the United States will oppose it.

The Republic of China has played a loyal and conscientious role in the UN since the organisation was founded. It has lived up to all of its charter obligations. Having made remarkable progress in developing its own economy, it has co-operated internationally by providing valuable technical assistance to a number of less developed countries particularly in Africa.

The position of the United States is that if the United Nations is to succeed in its peace-keeping role, it must deal with the realities of the world in which we live. Thus, the United States will co-operate with those who, whatever their view on the status of the relationship of the two Governments, wish to continue to have the Republic of China represented in the United Nations.

The outcome, of course, will be decided by 127 members of the United Nations. For our part we believe that the decision we have taken is fully in accord with President Nixon's desire to normalise relations with the People's Republic of China in the interests of world peace and in accord with our conviction that the continued representation in the United Nations of the Republic of China will contribute to peace and stability in the world.

Tunisia - Who will succeed Bourguiba?

Habib Bourguiba founded Tunisia's only political party, the Destour Socialist Party, in 1934, and has led his country since independence in 1956. He is now approaching seventy years of age and severe illness in recent years has kept him away from the country for lengthy periods. He has announced that he will definitely retire at the end of his present term of office, that is in 1974, but some observers doubt whether his health will allow him to continue that long. The problem of a successor has thus become the most important question in Tunisian politics.

The problem is connected with the question of greater liberalisation of political life in the country. The bitterness which built up among Tunisia's farmers against the policies of Ahmed Ben Salah in the period 1964-1969 demonstrated the urgent need for greater contact between the central committee and the people. Thus after Ben Salah's fall from grace in 1969, Bourguiba announced plans for increasing the power of party cells and of the National Assembly. But he appeared to have second thoughts, and after a while it became clear that he was increasingly reluctant to implement the plans, arguing that the Tunisian people were not yet sufficiently mature for democracy and that they should be led to it slowly.

This reluctance to permit a devolution of power is partly, if not principally, based on his determination to select his successor himself. He wants to see his Prime Minister, Hadi Nour, take his place. Nour, a capable administrator and a moderate in economic policies has had some success in reversing the catastrophic co-operative policies of Ben Salah, but he is an uncharismatic figure and an indifferent orator.

The Eighth Conference of the Destour Party, held in October, demonstrated that however highly the party might regard Bourguiba, the majority wanted a say in the election of his successor. Led by Ahmed Mestiri, ex-Minister of Interior, the party voted for a constitutional change empowering it to select a presidential candidate for approval by universal suffrage.

In addition they gave Mestiri the second highest number of votes in the elections to the central committee, while Nour took sixth place. Topping the polls was former Prime Minister Bahi Ladgham, who, with Foreign Minister Mohammed Masmoudi, complete the list of four potential candidates for the presidency.

Immediately after the conference Bourguiba's press launched a strong attack on Mestiri and his membership of the party was suspended. The President thus made it clear that though the party members have decided to select his successor, he is not going to leave the decision entirely to them.

Frolizi

On 1st October, 1971, it was announced in Lusaka that a new guerilla group, Frolizi, Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe, had been formed. The Zambian Government has apparently given up hope of ever healing the bitter and continuous conflicts within and between the Zimbabwe African People's Union, (ZAPU), nominally led by Joshua Nkomo, and the Zimbabwe African National Union, (ZANU), nominally led by the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole. Thus it took the initiative in engineering the formation of this new organisation, which has already received the support of the Liberation Committee of the OAU and the Tanzanian Government.

Frolizi's leader is 29 year old Shelton Siwela. A graduate of Boston University, he trained as a guerilla in North Korea and has been on raids into Rhodesia as a member of ZAPU. He represents a younger breed of nationalist, scornful of the easy life led by many ZANU and ZAPU officials in exile. He aims to revive the guerilla movement by cutting down on bureaucratic functions, overcoming inter-tribal bickering and gaining support among the African youth of Rhodesia.

Two leaders of ZAPU, the acting President, James Chikerema, and the national secretary, George Nyandoro - both Mashona - have left to join Frolizi; as have ZANU's former leader of the guerillas, Godfrey Sawaahu and the director of international affairs, Nathan Shamuyarira - also both Mashona.

Most of the leaders are in fact Mashona, though Siwela himself belongs to the small Ndau tribe. Thus Herbert Chitepo, acting President of ZANU, has labelled it a Mashona tribal party. Should it prove to be such, and not the united front President Kaunda is looking for, its chances of making any greater impact across the Zambezi than its two predecessors seem slender.

SYMPOSIUM ON NATURAL RESOURCES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

A very successful Symposium was held at Jan Smuts House on 3rd and 4th December, 1971, on the theme, "Natural Resources in Southern Africa: Scientific and Policy Aspects". The topics considered in relation to this theme, and the main speakers on these topics, were as follows:

The Total Environment and the
Importance of Natural Resources

- Professor K. H. Mancy,
Environmental Health,
University of Michigan,
United States of America.

Professor C. L. Wicht,
Silviculture,
University of Stellenbosch.

Professor M. H. H. Louw,
International Relations,
University of the Witwatersrand.

Fauna and Flora

- Mr. A. C. Campbell,
Acting Chief Game Warden,
Department of Wild Life and
National Parks, Botswana.

Mr. J. M. C. Uys,
Game Manager,
Southern Sun Hotel Corporation,
Rhodesia.

Mr. D. Joubert,
Secretary-General,
Southern African Regional Council
for the Conservation and Use of
the Soil.

Water Resources and Systems

- Professor K. H. Mancy,
Environmental Health,
University of Michigan,
United States of America.

Professor D. C. Midgley,
Director,
Hydrological Research Unit,
University of the Witwatersrand.

Professor F. A. van Duuren,
Water Utilization and Environmental
Engineering,
University of Pretoria.

The Soil

- Dr. H. Grobler,
Director,
Soils Research Institute,
Department of Agricultural Technical
Services.

Mr. T. C. Robertson,
Technical Adviser,
National Veld Trust.

Dr. N. N. Raditapole, (Lead-in-discussant)
Veterinary Services,
Lesotho.

Mineral Resources

- Mr. J. C. Linde,
Group Geologist,
Johannesburg Consolidated Investment
Company Limited.

Dr. Hans Nel, (Lead-in-discussant)
Geology,
Anglo American Corporation of
South Africa.

The Institute hopes to publish a report on the Symposium, including all the papers presented, early in 1972.

FORTHCOMING CONFERENCE

"ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA"

The following is the text of a statement released on 4th October, 1971, regarding a Conference to be held at Jan Smuts House from 22nd to 25th March, 1972:

The South African Institute of International Affairs and the Rand Afrikaans University, in co-operation with the Foundation for Foreign Affairs of Chicago in the United States, are jointly planning a conference on the subject of "Accelerated Development in Southern Africa", which will be held in Johannesburg in March, 1972.

In addition to experts from the Republic and other states and territories of Southern Africa, invitations are being extended to experts from the United States, Europe, Latin America and Asia, to attend the conference. It is hoped to bring together the perspectives and experience gained by these experts in various regions of the world, in order that the conference can make an effective contribution to thinking and practice in respect of development problems in Southern Africa. In view of the increasing concern with accelerated development in all the countries of this part of Africa, it is felt that the time is ripe for such an undertaking.

The broad theme of the conference has been defined as follows: "Accelerated Development in Southern Africa, including the factors of co-operation, interdependence, stability and human welfare". In relation to this theme the conference will consider firstly the basic concepts and goals of development, and will then proceed to discuss the various dimensions of development, such as politics and government; economic factors; social, cultural and religious factors; education and training; and the question of planning. Under the heading of "International Co-operation", the conference will consider topics such as trade and investment; the forms of development assistance; the policies and interests of both user and donor countries; and multilateral assistance programmes.

The conference will conclude with evaluations of the situation in Southern Africa and discussion of possible priorities and criteria for the future. The emphasis throughout will be on practical considerations, and on the needs of the developing countries of this region, including those within the Republic.

The South African Institute of International Affairs will be host for the conference, which will be held at Jan Smuts House on the campus of the University of the Witwatersrand. This will be the second major conference to be held at Jan Smuts House, the first being the conference organised by the Institute in 1970 on the subject of the "population explosion" and its impact on international relations.

The participation of the Rand Afrikaans University is mainly through its Institute for Development Studies. The primary concern of this Institute, established early in 1970, is to contribute towards a better understanding of the problems of development and towards the finding of solutions to these problems. It is thus co-operating in the University's programme for training development specialists on a multi-disciplinary basis, and it is also engaging in inter-disciplinary research into problems in developing areas.

The Foundation for Foreign Affairs Inc. has had considerable experience in the organising of joint conferences with a German Institute, on various European problems. The forthcoming conference will, however, be its first venture on a subject connected with Africa.

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NUUS VAN DIE TAKKE / NEWS FROM THE BRANCHES

NATAL

The Natal Branch reports that the following speakers have addressed meetings since the last report on Branch activities in the August Newsletter (1971 No. 3):

Sir Arthur Snelling, K.C.M.G. (British Ambassador)	on "A Personal View of Africa"
Professor Barend van Niekerk	on "French Africa"

PRETORIA

Vergaderings is gedurende 1971 deur die volgende persone toegespreek:

Dr. Denis Worrall	oor "Germany and the New Europe"
Mnr. Martin Spring	oor "Japan and the Modern World"
Mnr. Daniel Banmeyer	oor "Madagascar"
Prof. M. Wiechers en Prof. G.M.E. Leistner	oor "Suidwes-Afrika en die Wêreldhof"
Mnr. John Barratt	oor "Dialogue in Africa"
Dr. N. Diederichs	oor "Suid-Afrika en die Monetêre Krisis van die Weste"
Mnr. I.D. Unna (Konsul-Generaal van Israel)	oor "Prospects of War and Peace in the Middle East"

EASTERN PROVINCE

The following speakers addressed meetings during the past year:

Mr. John Barratt	on "Developments in South African Foreign Policy"
Professor M.H.H. Louw	on "Science and International Relations"
Professor H. Muller	on "Some Aspects of the Current International Labour Situation"

Mr. I.D. Unna on "The Current Situation in the
(Consul-General of Israel) Middle East"

Mrs. E. Neethling on "Life in Eastern Hungary Before and After the Second World War"

CAPE TOWN

The following have addressed meetings since the last report on Branch activities in the August Newsletter (1971 No. 3):

Sir Richard Luyt on his visit to seven African countries.

Mr. I.D. Unna on "Is Peace in the Middle East Possible?"
(Consul-General of Israel)

Mr. Basil Lindsay-Fynn on "Malta"

STELLENBOSCH

Die volgende vergaderings is vanjaar, sedert die stigtingsvergadering van die tak in April, gehou:

Dr. Otto von Habsburg oor "Western Europe's Interest in African Affairs"

Professor M.H.H. Louw oor "Die Wetenskap en Internasionale Betrekkinge"

Professor J.H. Moolman oor "Die Dubbelstad-Konsep in die Suid-Afrikaanse Ontwikkelingspatrone"

en "Ekonomiese Interafhanklikheid met die buurstate in Suider Afrika"

Mnr. Al Venter oor "Die Horing van Afrika - Resente Politieke Ontwikkelinge en Vooruitsigte"

Ete en samespreking van die bestuur van die tak met Mnr. Leif Egeland, Nasionale voorsitter van die S.A.I.I.A.

WITWATERSRAND

The following speakers addressed meetings at Jan Smuts House during the period August to December 1971:

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| Mr. Pierre Sudreau
(French politician and author) | on | "Thoughts on the Future: Europe in the World" |
| Advocate E.M. Grosskopf S.C.
and Professor C.J.R. Dugard | on | "South West Africa: The International Court's Opinion and the Future" |
| Dr. J.E. Holloway | on | "The Worth of Gold" |
| Mr. John Barratt
Mr. J. du P. Basson, M.P.
Mr. R.F. Botha, M.P.
Dr. Denis Worrall | | Panel Discussion on "South West Africa, The United Nations and the Future" |
| Ambassador M. Michael
(Chargé d'Affaires of Israel) | on | "The Middle East: Challenge and Prognosis" |

Special Meeting on Iran

A special meeting of the Institute was held at Jan Smuts House on 19 October, 1971, to mark the occasion of the 2,500th Anniversary of the Founding of the Persian Empire by Cyrus the Great. The National Chairman of the Institute, Mr. Leif Egeland, presided and the meeting was addressed by Mr. Gideon Roos (Vice-Chairman of the Institute and Chairman of the Witwatersrand Branch) and Dr. A. Tehrani (Consul General of Iran in South Africa).
