


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THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS



DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE

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**NEWSLETTER**

**NUUSBRIEF**

Vol. 5 No. 4

1973

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THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS  
DIE SUID - AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE

NEWSLETTER / NUUSBRIEF

Vol. 5                      No. 4  
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Alle standpunte ingennem in artikels in hierdie Nuusbrief  
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P.O. Box/Posbus 31596

Braamfontein

Johannesburg

December/Desember 1973

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*Report on*

*T H E C A M P A I G N*

The last issue of the Newsletter (Vol. 5 No. 3) contained an important statement by our National Chairman, Dr. Leif Egeland, on the Institute's current Campaign, in which he explained its motivation and aims. Dr. Egeland also drew the attention of all members and friends of the Institute to the relevance of this Campaign to each of them. He said, for instance:

We are confident that members and friends of the Institute are alive to the importance and relevance of the Institute's work, and that they will wish to see a continuation of the healthy growth of this work. It is our hope, therefore, that they will give serious consideration to ways in which they can help in supporting the current Campaign, for instance by personal contribution to the Institute's Development Fund or by approaches to companies with which they are associated. The success of this Campaign is vitally important for the future of our Institute; otherwise there is no doubt that, with constantly rising costs, not only will the Institute cease to grow, but even its present activities will have to be curtailed. This is an outcome which no one associated with the Institute and its work would wish to contemplate.

If any member missed our Chairman's statement, it is hoped that he or she will go back to the last issue of the Newsletter and read it in full.

The National Chairman also reported on the response to the Campaign at that stage, as regards the increases in annual subscriptions by our Corporate Members, the Companies which had joined as new Corporate Members, and the individual members of the Institute who had contributed. It is now possible to report further developments in the Campaign.

In addition to the Companies listed by our Chairman, the following Corporate Members have agreed to increase their annual subscriptions:

Commercial Union Assurance Co. of S.A. Ltd.  
French Bank of Southern Africa Limited  
Tiger Oats and National Milling Co. Ltd.  
S.A. Philips (Pty) Ltd.  
S.A. Associated Newspapers Ltd.  
Mobil Oil Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd.

We are very pleased to welcome the following additional Companies as new Corporate Members:

Rennies Consolidated Holdings Ltd.  
Massey-Ferguson (South Africa) Ltd.

Apart from the aim to achieve increased and wider regular support from Corporate Members, the Institute has established a Development Fund which will ensure sustained growth in the future and enable the Institute to plan its activities ahead more effectively. Contributions can be made to this Fund, which is referred to in the brochure circulated to all members, either in one sum or in instalments over a number of years. The Institute very greatly appreciates the confidence shown in its future development by the following Companies from which contributions, or pledges of contributions, have already been received:

Gold Fields of S.A. Ltd.  
Anglo American Corp of S.A. Ltd.  
De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd.  
Anglo-Transvaal Cons. Investments Co. Ltd.  
The Standard Bank of S.A. Ltd.  
Commercial Union Assurance Co. of S.A. Ltd.  
Johannesburg Cons. Investments Co. Ltd.  
Union Corporation Ltd.  
Haggie Rand Limited  
United Building Society  
Sage Holdings Ltd.

The Institute is also very pleased to acknowledge the support given to its work by the following organisations which have made special substantial donations or grants:

Johannesburg City Council  
The Smuts Memorial Trust  
The Jan Smuts Memorial Committee  
The S.A. Sugar Association  
Murray and Roberts Holdings

A few individual members of the Institute have made donations since the publication of the list in the Chairman's statement, and this indication of their interest and willingness to support their Institute is greatly appreciated:

Mr. Paul Coombes  
Mr. P.D. Case  
Mr. P. le R. Cantin  
Professor M.A. Hough  
Mr. J.P. Pegram  
Mrs. S.J. Becker

The Witwatersrand Branch took a significant and welcome step at its Annual General Meeting on 12 December, 1973, when it was decided that the Branch itself, from its own funds, would match all contributions to the Campaign from its members, on a rand for rand basis. The Witwatersrand Branch is to be congratulated on this initiative which it is hoped will encourage members to support the Campaign generously, and thus demonstrate a real concern for the future development of their Institute.

John Barratt  
Director, S.A.I.I.A.

Jan Smuts House,  
21 December, 1973.

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S.A.I.I.A. NEWSLETTER/NUUSBRIEF

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*The 1973 International Labour Conference and the  
South African Labour Question*

Lucy Mvubelo

*Introductory Remarks*

Before the promulgation in 1953 of the Native Labour Settlement of Disputes Act, the Garment Workers Union of South Africa was a multiracial body. It has set a very good example to this country in the field of labour relations, and it is for this reason that in our trade union (the National Union of Clothing Workers), which was established for Africans in 1953, we have been able to organise and have our members fairly well unionised - despite the fact that the union is not registered or recognised by law. (It has a membership of approximately 18 000 at present.) It is my belief that, given the necessary leadership, Africans can be the best organised labour. I do not believe that, if White South Africans were to experience our difficulties and problems, they would have as strong trade unions as we have among the African people. Probably this is a consequence of the fact that Africans have always been underprivileged and have suffered so many obstacles, that they will give their wholehearted approval and support to an organisation which can help to rescue them.

Our clothing industry is turning Black, and it is a serious worry to us that, once it becomes totally Black, our members will suffer, because we shall have no one to negotiate for us. We are not allowed to set up the machinery to negotiate agreements and so improve the working conditions and wages of our members. Moreover, it is our view that the Government's efforts to set up some sort of machinery, such as Works Committees, will be ineffective. In Johannesburg alone there are four hundred clothing factories. If each factory should negotiate with each employer individually and separately, what improvements can ever be achieved? We still believe that the trade union is the only body which can effectively represent and articulate the needs of the workers. It speaks with one voice for all workers, irrespective of colour, race or creed, and it is not subservient to any other body.

*The I.L.O. and South Africa*

The International Labour Organisation is a unique international institution. Its tripartite structure, which allows for government, employee and employer representation, together with the fact that it is the only inter-governmental organisation to have survived from the days of the League of Nations, makes it a truly remarkable organisation. The I.L.O. was born in 1919, a product of the First World War. It came into being because of the

heart-felt desire of socially conscious leaders who wanted to build a better world than the one which had preceded the terrible four-year conflict. The high idealism of its founder members - of which South Africa was one - established the guiding principles of the Organisation: to strive to improve the conditions of employment, to raise living standards, and to promote social and economic stability. When people today speak of international attitudes to labour questions in South Africa, it is the attitudes and policies of the I.L.O. which are the relevant ones, because the international trade union movement is part of the I.L.O., and plays the influential role in the formulation of the policies of the I.L.O.

The campaign against South Africa really finds its origins as far back as 1944 when the *Declaration of Philadelphia* was adopted by the I.L.O. The Declaration states that all human beings irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of security and of equal opportunity. The Declaration also emphasises that the objectives and obligations of the I.L.O. include equality of opportunity, the right to bargain collectively and social objectives such as full employment, payment of a living wage, social security, adequate food, housing and recreation.

That Declaration set the stage for an inevitable disagreement with South Africa whose traditional policies included legislation which discriminated on grounds of race. South Africa, as one of the member countries, would be required to adjust her policies considerably to accord with the objectives of the Organisation - as would many other countries. What was called for was a revision of the old order, a departure from a master/servant relationship and a change in the existing labour practices in many countries.

It followed that South Africa's relationship with the I.L.O. would become increasingly uneasy. All experienced observers foresaw a clash as being inevitable. It came in June 1963, preceded by the curtain raiser of the May 1963 meeting of the World Health Assembly which called on South Africa to end its policy of apartheid, since it was detrimental to the physical, mental and social well-being of its population. The South African Government chose to forestall what appeared to be a serious threat of expulsion the following year by withdrawing from the Organisation in March 1964. The reasons advanced by the Minister of Labour in Parliament were that the proposed amendments to the I.L.O.'s constitution would inevitably have led to South Africa's exclusion from the Organisation. His opinion was that the vendetta of Afro-Asian states, backed by the communist countries, made South Africa's continued membership untenable.<sup>+</sup>

We in the trade unions are still of the opinion that the Minister's action in withdrawing was hasty. As a wealthy and powerful country with tremendous resources, we do not think South Africa would have been expelled.

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<sup>+</sup> For an account of the developments in 1963 and 1964, leading to South Africa's withdrawal from the I.L.O., see David Hirschmann, *South Africa and the International Labour Organisation*, in *Newsletter*, 1972 No.3 (Oct.1972), published by the S.A. Institute of International Affairs, esp. pages 11, 12 and 13. (Editor's note).



Moreover, we believe that, had South Africa remained in the I.L.O., many of the experiences of today would not have occurred. The Minister claimed then that recent action in the I.L.O. amounted to a clear case of deliberate interference in South Africa's domestic affairs. He argued that, not only were South Africa's policies her own domestic concern and not the concern of the I.L.O., but also that the Organisation completely disregarded the benevolence of the policies being pursued by the Government, and that it was ignoring grave violations by many other countries of the principles enshrined in the I.L.O. constitution.

### *The 1973 Conference*

At the I.L.O. Conference which took place in Geneva in June of this year there was an extremely tense atmosphere amongst all the delegates - government, employer and employee. We, the South African observers, were treated like a cancer which would spread to anyone coming into contact with us. We were kept in such a remote state we thought that, if only more South Africans would take an interest in these conferences and even attend them, they would realise the dangers and the hardships the Government has caused for the ordinary worker like myself.

Nevertheless, there were a few countries which were sympathetic towards us and, surprisingly, these included the delegations of some African States - Zambia, Ethiopia and Somalia - who came to us and who tried to speak to us to find out exactly what the situation was in South Africa, and how best they could help the African workers here. They went out of their way to try to meet the Chairman of the Workers' Committee, which had adopted the resolutions against apartheid, requesting him to give me an opportunity to speak. As a result of their efforts, I was assured of a hearing in the Assembly, and I was given my number as the 48th speaker.

On the day on which I was supposed to speak, I was approached by the same people who had given me the right to speak. They argued that, if I were given a platform, I might be able to convince other members to vote against the resolutions. Therefore, I was refused permission to speak. I believe this was a disgraceful decision. I realise that I was not a delegate, and only an unofficial observer, but I felt that workers like myself should have given me an opportunity to express the views of the African workers of this country, who have been deprived of so many opportunities at home.

It was clear to me in all these proceedings that, if only the changes taking place in this country on a small scale had been speeded up, many of the resolutions which were passed would have been withdrawn. The big powers, like the United States and Great Britain, refused to express their opinions clearly on the resolutions, although they tried their best to show that they were still willing to extend a hand of friendship to the South African community. I do not blame these countries for not speaking up, because on the one hand they have large investments here, and, on the other, the pressure on them at the Conference was great. The pressure on foreign investment is strong, because it is believed that these investors have accepted the legislation of apartheid and have done nothing to help the underdog.

### *The Resolutions*

If implemented, the resolutions which I shall discuss here, would have the most serious repercussions on this country.

The policy of apartheid was denounced as an inhuman policy, and the racial discrimination involved in that policy described as a crime against humanity, a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and, as such, a threat to world peace and security. It was contended that the most elementary human and trade union rights were continuing to be denied to African workers. The resolution further described the contract and migrant labour system as a disgraceful form of modern slavery; it condemned the system of works committees; and it slated foreign investors as directly or indirectly giving support to the policy of apartheid. The operative part of the resolution called on the world trade union movement to boycott South African ships and aircraft; to ban the importation of all goods from South Africa; and to boycott all sporting and cultural activities in which South Africa took part. It also called on all national trade union organisations to bring pressure to bear on their governments to refuse to supply arms to South Africa and to close their ports and airports to South African ships and planes; and it called for the exclusion of South Africa from the United Nations and all its specialised agencies.

If these provisions were to be implemented, it would be the Black worker who would suffer first, who would be the first to feel the pinch. What has an African done to save his skin? Has he saved for a rainy day? I know that the answer to this is 'no', for I am one of them. An African has always earned such a meagre wage, that his existence has always been from hand to mouth. He has never had the opportunity of saving for his own or his children's future. Thus he would be the first to suffer, where these decisions to be implemented.

The Conference called on all trade union organisations to take all measures within their power to implement these decisions to associate all their members with such action, and, in particular, strongly to oppose migration of skilled labour to South Africa. As everyone knows, Africans have been deprived of training for skilled labour. They have always been the unskilled labourers. Moreover, they have been deprived of their right to training by Government legislation, such as job reservation, the Physical Planning and Resources Act and many other laws. According to this resolution, if immigration of skilled labourers were prevented, Africans would have to receive training.

A further resolution urged pressure on foreign companies with branches in South Africa, through workers employed by such companies in other countries, to abolish wage discrimination against Black workers in South Africa. This is a very good resolution, and I would certainly have voted for it. Such pressure as could be provided by Black groups in the United States and the Trade Union Council in Britain on companies in South Africa - to pay better wages, promote Africans to better positions and generally increase the opportunities of their Black workers - would certainly have a positive effect.

The Conference called on its members to keep the public informed of the situation in South Africa through all information media; to establish at a national level a trade union committee against apartheid, whose task it would be to develop concrete action by workers organisations in this field; and to take an active part in the decade of action to combat racism and racial discrimination, which, in accordance with a decision of the U.N. General Assembly, is to begin on 10 December, 1973 (on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). I believe that 10 December is at hand - we have only a few weeks until that date.

### *Conclusion*

In the very tense atmosphere which prevailed at Geneva you could read on the faces of participants that they meant what they said. That is why, in conclusion, I wish to make a plea. I make this plea because I think a change is taking place. The very fact that today I can be invited to come and address a gathering of this kind proves beyond doubt that there is a change in South Africa. Recently, I also addressed a meeting of the Verligte Action in Cape Town. They wanted to know what was the best action to bring about change.

Even though things seem to be very dark at the moment, I think there are some promising signs. As a leader of African workers, I think there is a change of heart on the part of many Whites. Africans have always extended a hand of friendship to the White people of this country, but the Whites have always withdrawn their hand. We are prepared to join forces with anyone who would like to bring about a change in this country for the benefit of all of us, not only for the benefit of the Blacks. We are prepared to assist, whenever we are called upon, in bringing our minds together to discuss the issues of our country. I believe that we are the people who must try to save this country, not foreign or outside interests. That is why at Geneva in the speech I was to have made, and which every delegate received because I posted it in their boxes, I said to them it was no use trying to debate and formulate solutions outside South Africa; this must be done at home.

The situation is all the more urgent because of the views of our youth, the black youth, who are prepared to reject any instrumental manner of bringing Black and White together. Today the situation is tense and our youth are no longer interested in coming hat in hand to beg for contact with the Whites.

This is not what we want; we want to achieve change harmoniously - without bloodshed. Is there still time to think, and to wait and see? I do not think we have much time. So, finally, I appeal to all Whites to recognise the very urgent need for change, and to recognise the need to establish good relations between all people in the short time that is still left to us.

-----  
Miss Mvubelo is General Secretary of the National Union of Clothing Workers of South Africa.

The above article is based on a talk given by Miss Mvubelo to a meeting of the Witwatersrand Branch of the Institute on 20 September, 1973.

*Verhoudinge tussen Suid-  
en Suider - Afrika.*

T.J.A. Gerdener

Dat Suid-Afrika se binnelandse posisie al meer delikaat raak, sal niemand ontken nie. Rasseverhoudinge het verswak; baie verswaak --- al het die tegnologiese en ekonomiese vooruitgang van die land oor die afgelope 10 jaar hoogtepunte bereik wat met van die treffendste in die buitewêreld vergelyk kan word.

Ons het seer seker geleer dat ons meer geld in die tuislande moet spandeer. Ons het tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat die stedelike Bantoes baie meer hulp en belangstelling verdien as wat ons tot twee of drie jaar gelede besef het.

Ons het, tot tevredenheid van 'n groot deel van die Blanke bevolking, begin skaaf aan die mens-tot-mens-verhoudinge tussen Wit en Swart; aan die lewenspeil van die werknemers wat deur die jare hopeloos te laag gebly het, en aan ons eie naiwiteite en kortsigtighede wat die grootste deel van die blanke bevolking laat glo het dat die nie-blanke vraagstukke opgelos kan word deur eenvoudig die tuislande te konsolideer en te sorg dat almal dâar woon wanneer ons hulle nie nodig het om vir ons te werk nie.

Maar - en dit moet beklemtoon word - ons het nog skaars aan die probleme geraak. Die posisie is in baie opsigte nog aan die versleg. In die gemoed van baie goeie Suid-Afrikaners is daar vandag twyfel of ons ooit op die regte koers is, en intussen het dit baie dringend geword dat ons realisties na die werklike stand van sake kyk.

Suid-Afrika se posisie kan slegs gered word deur sterk, ingrypende, doeltreffende en vreeslose veranderinge aan te bring. En dit geld nie slegs t.o.v. binnelandse vraagstukke nie. Wat binne Suid-Afrika aan die gang is, word gereflekteer in aangeleenthede, vraagstukke en gebeurtenisse wat aan ons grense en in die lande om ons aan die gang is: As die posisie betreffende menslike verhoudinge binne Suid-Afrika versleg het, het hulle tot dieselfde mate tussen Suid-Afrika en die buitewêreld versleg; indien nie tussen ons en die meeste lande in die internasionale wêreld nie, dan ten minste tussen ons en die lande wat aan ons grense lê en saam met ons deel uitmaak van die subkontinent van Suider-Afrika.

Deur die eeue heen is aanvaar dat geen lande staande kan bly en van 'n vreedsame voortbestaan verseker kan wees as òf sy binnelandse òf sy buitelandse menslike verhoudinge verswak nie - in elke geval nie op die duur nie. As albei soorte verhoudinge tekens van verswakking toon - trouens tekens van gevaar toon - kan die toestand tot 'n kritieke versleg.

In die geval van Suid-Afrika is dit verstaanbaar dat binnelandse omstandighede die grootste sorg wek: die vind, kristallisering en toepassing van formules vir die oplos van rasseverhoudinge bly een van die grootste vraagstukke van alle eeue; die omstandighede waarin Suid-Afrika oor die afgelope halfeeue die leiding vir rasse-oplossings moes vind, was nie slegs genadeloos nie, maar op die rand van die onmoontlike. Dat sy leiers terselfdertyd met 'n haas onhanteerbare situasie teenoor die internasionale wêreld opgesaal was, het die taak feitlik bomenslik gemaak.

Tog gaan Suid-Afrika se voortbestaan nie slegs afhang van sy vermoë om sy binnelandse vraagstukke op te los nie. Intendeel: Ons staan aan die vooraand van internasionale verwickelinge wat in die gebeurtenisse net buite ons grense tot een van die geskiedenis se grootste tragedies en dramas kan ontwikkel, en wat soveel kennis en aandag en optrede van Suid-Afrika verdien as die meer bekende aangeleenthede wat hulle daaglik binne die grense van Suid-Afrika afspeel. Suid-Afrika is, om die waarheid te sê, nie verby die stadium waar buitelandse gebeurtenisse hom nie straks kan dwing om sy interne vraagstukke in 'n totaal ander lig as in die verlede te benader nie.

Nietemin, moet dit dadelik en baie duidelik gestel word: Ons is nog nie in 'n stadium waar niks meer aan die saak gedoen kan word nie. Oor-pessimisme en oor-dramatisering is nie slegs gevaarlik nie, maar dit kan vrees, soos Churchill dit eenmaal gestel het, 'n baie groter gevaar maak as die gevaar self. Vir die toenemende probleme wat in die ontwikkelings in die subkontinent realisties in die oë gesien moet word, is en was daar nog altyd moontlike oplossings wat met groter doeltreffendheid en insig as in die verlede aangepak kan word. Laat ons begin met wat die hoof van die weermag onlangs "die ergste van ons bedreiginge" genoem het.

### *'n "Toestand" van Oorlog*

Met verwysing na die dreigemente wat voortdurend en toenemend teen Suid-Afrika gemaak word, het die hoof van die weermag gesê dat die enigste terrein waarop sulke dreigemente tot aksie gelei het, dié aan die terroriste- en sabotasiefront was. En niks kan vir Suid-Afrika se toekoms gevaarliker wees as om die dreigemente betreffende terrosime en sabotasie as maatstaf van die werklike dreigemente teen ons te beskou nie. Waar afsonderlik gekyk word na al die verskillende dreigemente waarmee Suid-Afrika te doen het, is die skietery en geweldpleging aan ons grense waarskynlik een van die mins belangrike.

Wat waar is, is dat die dreigemente betreffende terrorisme diep in-eengestrenge is met al die ander: 'n Besonder geslaagde aanval, bevoorbeeld, kan daartoe lei dat die lande wat die terroriste huisves, daartoe oorgaan om baie groter hulp aan hulle te verleen. Daarby kan dit die aanneemlikheid en betekenisvolheid van die terrorisme in die internasionale wêreld 'n nuwe status gee; aan kommunistiese lande die kans gee om hul invloed by die terroriste-bewegings te verhoog; en dit kan die terroriste

se optrede tot 'n selfs aggressiewer houding by die Organisasie vir Afrika-eenheid laat ontwikkel.

Op sy beurt kan hierdie ontwikkeling tot 'n wydverspreide internasionale versteuring lei wat proteste, stakings, sabotasie en ander vorms van wêreldwye geweldpleging ten gevolge kan hê. En dit sal geloofwaardigheid verleen aan die aansprake van die radikales in die VV wat nou vir die eerste maal kragtige bewyse sal hê vir hul bewerings dat Suid-Afrika sonder twyfel 'n bedreiging vir die wêreldvrede geword het. Niemand moet homself wys maak dat so 'n toestand nie tot die stomiteit van ingryping deur die VV in Suider-Afrika kan lei nie. En niemand moet homself wysmaak dat so 'n soort ontwikkeling nie kan lei tot wat Mao Tse Toeng in sy boek "Verlengde Stryd" 'n uitgerekte oorlog met 'n lae profiel - of, anders gestel - 'n wêreldrevolusie noem nie.

Hierdie soort oorlog, is die soort ding waaraan Suid-Afrika en ander lande in Suider-Afrika wat vrede en voorspoed nastreef, ongelukkig niks kan doen nie: Hoewel dit 'n oorlog is met 'n lae intensiteit, is dit terselfdertyd 'n oorlog wat geen korttermeynde in sig het nie. Dit kan jare sleep - 'n dekade of meer. Dit is 'n soort oorlog wat aanvanklik deur baie mense afgeskryf word omdat hulle nie die lae intensiteit daarvan as gevaarlik beskou nie, omdat hulle nie beseft dat die inisiatief vir die verlenging, en aanhoudende verlenging daarvan, altyd in die hande van die aggressor bly, en omdat hulle nie weet dat die meeste Westerlinge (soos die Amerikaners so goed in Vietnam bewys het,) eintlik nie veel weet van wat die uiteinde van sulke kruip-en-stilstaan-oorloë op die duur kan wees nie.

Die aanvaller kan verloor; hy kan vyf keer verloor, en sy vermoë om te verloor word nie deur enigeen van die verliese aangetas nie - nie as hy die hele wêreld se steun agter hom het. Die verdediger daarenteen, kan slegs één keer verloor, en die rede is eenvoudig: As hy optree vanaf 'n gebied waar die mense nie almal met hom in die veld wil staan nie, kan hy nog voordat hy van sy eerste groot terugslag herstel het, van agter in die rug gesteek word. Binne 'n kwessie van dae kan dit hom verhinder om weer reg te kom en sy vyande aan alle kante van hom aan te pak.

Vir 'n gevaar van hierdie aard, kan aan slegs 'n enkele teenvoeter gedink word. In die geval van Suid-Afrika sal die blanke moet sorg dat hy die oorgrote meerderheid van nie-blankes aan sy kant het sodat hy nie deur gebrek aan binnelandse veiligheid van agter en op die mees gevaarlike oomblik in die rug gesteek word nie. Waar dit die blanke in Suider-Afrika is wat hom vir die moontlikheid van so 'n aanslag moet voorberei - 'n aanslag wat skynbaar reeds begin het - sal hy ook moet sorg dat hy die steun het van die swart state wat deel uitmaak van die blok van die meerderheid lande in die subkontinent.

#### *Die Houding van die Swart State*

Soos sake binne die grense van Suid-Afrika agteruitgegaan het, het die posisie in Suider-Afrika in die afgelope jaar dieselfde neiging getoon. Dit word in geen opsig beter weerspieël as in 'n ontleding wat die Suid-Afrikaanse

Instituut van Internasionale Aangeleenthede: gemaak het van die wyse waarop lande van Suider-Afrika gedurende die jare 1971 en 1972 in die Algemene Vergadering van die V.V.O. gestem het nie. + Die stempatrone van almal in die suidelike blok is noukeurig nagegaan. Die lande was Portugal, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Zambië, Madagaskar, Mauritius en Suid-Afrika self.

Die besluite, waarin hul stand- en gesigspunte weerspieël word, het gegaan oor sake waarby Suidwes-Afrika, Rhodesië, die twee Portugese gebiede (Mosambiek en Angola) en Suid-Afrika regstreeks betrokke was, sowel as die algemene besluite oor rassediskriminasie, sogenaamde dekolonisasie en wêreldsekuriteit wat spesifiek na die probleme van Suider-Afrika verwys. Die metode waarvolgens die houdings van die lande bepaal is, was wetenskaplik genoeg, en die belangrikheid van die bevindings lê daarin dat die houdings van 1971 met dié van 1972 vergelyk is ten einde vas te stel of hulle oor die afgelope jaar vernader het.

Dis nie nodig om Suid-Afrika se stempatroon te bespreek nie. Daar was wel 'n geringe verskil in die patrone van die twee jaar, maar dit was nie beduidend nie. Van groot belang en betekenis is egter die agteruitgang in rassebetrekkings wat die stempatrone aandui in die geval van vyf van die Swart state:

*Lesotho* : Die mees dramatiese beleidsverandering oor die tydperk van twaalf maande word weergegee in wat in Lesotho gebeur het. Waar die Lesotho-vertegenwoordigers in 1971 in net 64,22% van die gevalle ten gunste van anti-Suider-Afrika-besluite gestem het, is hulle klaarblyklik amptelik aangesê om in 1972 baie sterker op te tree. Gedurende hierdie jaar het hulle met die meerderheid in 95,59% van die gevalle "teen" Suider-Afrika gestem.

In Desember 1971 get Hoofman Jonathan nog sterk gepleit vir dialoog met Suid-Afrika, maar net 'n maand later slaan hy 'n ander toon aan. Hy staan nie alleen meer krities teenoor Suid-Afrika nie, maar hy begin goedgesinde verklarings oor "bevrydingsbewegings" in Suider-Afrika doen. Hy doen dit sonder om uitdruklik die gebruik van geweld teen sy belangrikste buurstaat te steun.

*Botswana* : Soos algemeen bekend, het Botswana jarelank konsekwent 'n beleid van politieke afsydigheid teenoor Suid-Afrika en van afkeuring van Suid-Afrikaanse beleidsrigtings gevolg. Oor die algemeen het Botswana hom daarop toegelê om in nouer voeling te verkeer met Zambië, Suid-Afrika se gedugste vyand in Afrika, en met ander Swart state wat hulle steun toegesê het aan terroriste in dié se aanvalle op die "Wit" Suide.

Uit die ontleding van Botswana se stempatrone by die V.V., blyk dit dat hulle vyandigheid teenoor Wit Suid-Afrika, wat in 1971 op 89,22% gestaan het, in 1972 tot 95,59% toegeneem het.

+ Hirschmann, David, Southern African Voting Patterns in the U.N. General Assembly, 1971 and 1972, uitgegee deur die S.A. Instituut van Internasionale Aangeleenthede, Johannesburg, 1973.

- Zambië:* Van al die lande in die Suidelike blok bly Zambië die mees onverbiddelike en bestendige "vyand" van die Blankes. Reeds in 1971 is elke voorstel wat in die Algemene Vergadering van die V.V. teen die Wit man op die subkontinent ingedien is deur Zambië gesteun. In 1971 was sy telling alreeds 100%. Dit spreek vanself dat dieselfde stempatroon in 1972 gevolg is - weer 'n volle en gedugte 100%.
- Madagaskar:* Hoewel hierdie land nie deel is van die subkontinent self nie, het sy vyandigheid binne 'n jaar met 10% toegeneem. Daar was 'n verandering van regering in Madagaskar en die nuwe regering het 'n sterker houding teenoor die Blankes ingeneem. Elke voorstel teen Portugal, Suid-Afrika en Rhodesië is deur hom gesteun.
- Mauritius:* Die Eerste Minister van dié land het nie veel gesê om die geweldige oorskakeling van beleid te verduidelik nie, maar nadat hy die terroriste-aanval op die Blankes goedgepraat het, het sy land se vyandigheid teenoor Blanke Suid-Afrika met nie minder as 37% in een jaar toegeneem nie - van 59,05% in 1971 tot 96,32% in 1972. Oor baie van die voorstelle het hy in 1971 geswyg, maar verlede jaar het hy duidelik getoon aan wie hy voorkeur gee.
- Malawi:* Daar is weinig oor Malawi te sê. Sy stempatrone het nie werklik verander nie. Hoewel die regering van dié land al jare teen afsonderlike ontwikkeling gekant is, het hy soos in die verlede 'n groot mate van vriendskap teenoor Suid-Afrika getoon. Malawi is die enigste Swart staat in Suider-Afrika wat deurgaans 'n beleid van kontak, dialoog en verbinding met Suid-Afrika gevolg het. Malawi se "vyandigheid" in sekere sake wat regstreeks met die probleme van Suider-Afrika verband hou en by die V.V.O. bespreek is, staan op sowat 40% en bly min of meer dieselfde.
- Swaziiland:* Een besondere verandering ten goede kom uit Swaziiland: In 1972 het sy stempatroon veelseggend van 73,28% in 1971 tot 55,88% in 1972 *afgeneem*. Sy Minister van Buitelandse Sake het sy land se gevoelens vertolk deur minder klem te lê op die probleme van Suider-Afrika. Hy het gedurende die algemene debat gepraat en 'n duidelike poging aangewend om die aandag van die V.V.O. op botsings in ander wêrelddele te vestig. Om ander redes moet sy land se verandering van stempatroon nogtans versigtig benader word; dit hoed nie noodsaaklik op 'n betekenisvolle verandering van beleid te dui nie.



Om die posisie in die algemeen op to som blyk dit dat die vyandigheid van die sewe Swart State van Suider-Afrika, gemeet aan stempatroonsyfers, op gemiddeld 67% te staan gekom het. Gedurende die één jaar het dit gemiddeld met 7,5% per land toegeneem. In die geval van vyf van die lande staan die persentasie van vyandigheid teenoor die Wit Suide op tussen 95 en 100 persent.

Geen realis sal ontken dat Suid-Afrika hom as gevolg van hierdie wending in 'n ongelukkige en gevaarlike posisie bevind nie.

### *Mosambiek en Angola*

Om totaal ander redes, het Suid-Afrika se posisie ten opsigte van die provinsies Angola en Mosambiek in die afgelope jaar verswak.

Vanselfsprekend het dit nie van die kant van die twee gebiede gekom nie. 'n Studie van die wyse waarop Portugal hom in die wêreldliggaam teenoor Suid-Afrika gedra het, die graad van "vyandigheid" - as van so iets gepraat kan word - het nie slegs laag gebly nie, maar sy doen en late het ook glad nie om dieselfde redes as in die geval van die Swart State verander nie. Die posisie het eenvoudige moeiliker geword omdat die buitewêreld se aanvalle op Portugal skerper en meer geslepe geword het, omdat magtige groepe dwarsdeur die wêreld besig is om Portugal met beloftes van geld uit Afrika te probeer dryf en omdat die sterk Rooms-Katolieke Kerk steun begin verleen het aan die gedagte dat Portugal hom binnekort uit Afrika moet onttrek.

Laat ek met die opvallende propaganda-veldtogte teen Portugal begin - aanvalle wat 'n nuwe skerpte, 'n nuwe geslependheid en 'n ongekende berekendheid omvat. Ek hoef u nie aan die sogenaamde massa-moorde te herinner nie. Waar of nie, bewys of nie, 'n gruwelmisdad of nie ... die feit staan: Die dood van 'n klompie mense is in 'n omnesien in elke land ter wêreld verhef tot een van die onmenslikste oorlogsmisdade sedert die Tweede Wêreldoorlog in 1945 geëindig het. Deur meer as 'n helfte van die 160 lande in die wêreld, deur middel van elke moontlike kommunikasiemiddel - emosioneel, met opvallende haat en wraaksug - is met geykte skelwoorde en lang beskrywings teen die klein Portugal te velde getrek. "Nazi-misdadigers", "Fasiste", "kolonialiste", "Wit honde", "onderdrukkers" en "slawedrywers" is soms tot 20 maal per dag oor radiosenders gehoor. Aan die gebeurtenis by Wiriamu is gruweldade soos Sharpeville, Viëtnam, en Algerië geknoop.

Belangrik i.v.m. die raaksie op die bepaalde insident is nie so seer die aard van die reaksie en die ongebalanseerdheid en omvang van die propaganda-aanslae nie, maar die onderliggende en duidelik berekende beplanning: Agter alles, was daar 'n duidelike en goed-georganiseerde patroon - 'n omvattende en duidelike poging om Portugal uit Afrika uit te kry.

Skielik voel ook Europa verantwoordelik vir die welsyn van die inwoners van Afrika - die Swart man wat uit die juk van die Blankes bevry moet word. Hiervan hoef 'n mens slegs enkele vae beelde te noem:

In talle Europese lande ontstaan skielik sogenaamde anti-fasistiese vegters of komitees van solidariteit met die volke van Portugese kolonies, wat natuurlik gedurig propaganda maak vir terroristegroepe en wat gevalle soos die sogenaamde massamoorde as hefboom gebruik.

Op onbevestigde en twyfelagtige getuienis af is 'n geweldige veldtog teen die besoek van dr. Caetano aan Brittanje geloods.

Groot propaganda kom vir die terroriste en tēn Portugal uit die besoek van 'n Frelimo-afvaardiging aan Wes-Duitsland se Sosiaal-Demokratiese Party by implikasie neer op 'n erkenning van Frelimo deur die regeringsparty.

Talle Europese lande vra om 'n internasionale ondersoek na die sogenaamde massamoorde en beplan 'n bespreking van die saak by die V.V.O.

Die Wêreldraad van Kerke gee sy skok en afkeurig te kenne (alhoewel erken word dat die Raad geen bevestiging van die massamoorde het nie). Daardeur word ook die eerbare stempel van die "Kerk" aan die veldtog verleen.

'n Wêreld wat nie baie bekommerd was oor Hongarye, Nigerië-Biafra, Boeroendi, Oeganda se Asiate en toestande agter die Ystergordyn nie, openbaar 'n houding waaraan weinig gedoen word. Die propagandaveldtog oor die jare teen Portugal (en Suid-Afrika) is slegs 'n middel en nie op spesifieke onreg gerig nie. Dit gaan nie daarom of Portugal reg optree nie, maar dat hy in Afrika is.

Die fout wat reggemaak moet word is op die ou end Portugese (en Blanke) teenwoordigheid in Afrika. Daarom dan ook die klaarblyklike dubbele standaarde, en woede oor elke klein of groot gebeurtenis in die Portugese gebied. Die twee Kommunistiese reuse het net een doel (en Europa raak al meer daarby betrokke) en dit is nie om onreg reg te stel of selfs te sorg vir swart meerderhede nie, maar om 'n revolusie in Afrika aan die gang te sit.

Wat veral in die afgelope maande duidelik geword het, is dat 'n nuwe strategie aan die ontwikkel is - nie net in die Kommunistiese wêreld nie, maar ook in Europa en die Verenigde State; die opbou op wêreldwye grondslag van die aanslag op Portugal moet die eerste fase van die aanslag op Suid-Afrika dek. "Veel makliker en uitvoerbaarder", sê van die sterkste leiers wat die finale aanslag op die subkontinent probeer beplan. En agter die plan lê 'n metode wat niks anders as omkoperij genoem kan word nie: Portugal, die armste van die lande wat in die Westerse Wêreld sy man teen die samesweerders moet staan, wat reeds sowat

52% van sy totale begroting aan die oorlog in Afrika moet bestee, verneem in toenemende mate dat van die wêreld se sterkste geldmagte gewillig is om dit vir hom moontlik te maak om sy ekonomie in Portugal tot groot hoogtes op te bou. Talle nywerhede sal binne sy grense ontwikkel word - maar dan spreek dit vanself dat die weldoeners die enorme opofferings alleen sal onderneem as Portugal die stryd in Afrika gewonne gee.

Hoe twyfelagtig dit ookal mag wees dat die trotse Portugese aan versoekings van hierdie aard toegee, word die probleem moeiliker omdat die magtig Katolieke Kerk ook in dié verband 'n kentering ondergaan. Meer en meer word stemme in dié kring gehoor wat daarop dui dat baie van die Kerk se leiers die proses van onttrekking uit Afrika steun.

Die vraag waarvoor Suid-Afrika mettertyd te staan sal kom, is of die magte met nuwe geweld en nuwe lis om sy vriend en buurman van honderde jare toesak, nie uiteindelik vir hom te sterk kan word nie. As die ergste moet gebeur, is dit net so wel dat ons nou reeds die werklikheid in die oë staar. Portugal se onttrekking uit Afrika kan net één ding beteken; vir Rhodesië en Suid-Afrika kan 'n onmiddellike krisis ontstaan wat op die duur 'n katastrofe oor die hele subkontinent van Swart Afrika kan laat onvlam.

#### *Redes vir Agteruitgang*

Om die redes vir die agteruitgang van verhoudinge tussen Suid-Afrika en die wêreld om hom aan te stip, is om die geskiedenis van drie of vier dekades op die agterkant van 'n vuurhoutjie-dosie te probeer skryf. Dit is 'n ontmoontlike taak - sō ontmoontlik inderdaad dat die hele ondergang van die Weste, die uitbreiding van die Kommunisme en die ontluiking van die vasteland van Afrika uit sy eeue-oue slaap daarby betrek sal moet word. Veel gepaster - en van baie meer waarde - is 'n kort ontleding van die optrede van Suid-Afrika self binne die raamwerk van die grotendeels onontwikkelde subkontinent.

Laat ek kortliks verwys na die vraag of hy die kanale waardeur hy as die leidende en mees ontwikkelde land die lande om hom by hom gehou het en hul buurskap ten beste benut het, dan of alles wat die verhoudinge toenemend gestrem het toegeskryf moet word aan omstandighede waaroor hy geen beheer gehad het. Baie van die faktore wat tot die verswakking van Suid-Afrika sy posisie bygedra het, moet vanselfsprekend gewyt word aan dinge waarteen hy as 'n jong land met 'n klein bevolking en legio vraagstukke eenvoudig nie kan staan nie. Om te sê dat Suid-Afrika die subkontinent tot 'n vreedsame en sterk entiteit kon ontwikkel het as hy slegs 'n ander rassebeleid as dié van afsonderlike ontwikkeling gevolg het, is niks minder as wensdenkery nie. In elk geval is dit twyfelagtig of die rassebeleid die enigste of selfs die grootste oorsaak was van alles waarteen Suid-Afrika hom in die tydperk ná die Tweede Wêreldoorlog vasgeloop het.

Naas die ideologiese stryd waarin die wêreld gedurende die 20ste eeu verwickel geraak het, naas die humanistiese invloede wat gespruit het uit

opvattinge van vryheid en gelykheid wat 'n normale siklus in die menslike geskiedenis weerspieël het, naas die verheffing van die swart man wat eene lank deur haas elke land in die Weste verdruk en misbruik is, het ook ontwikkel die besef dat die militêre waarde van die Kaapse roete een van die belangrikste internasionale besittings vir die Weste sowel as die Ooste geword het. Dit spreek vanself dat besit van Suid-Afrika self mettertyd gesien is as een van die belangrikste lande waarom die koue stryd tussen die grootmoonthede en verdeelde wêreldmagte gegaan het. Aan die werklikhede van hierdie basiese feit was daar min of niks wat Suid-Afrika in die afgelope jare kon gedoen het nie.

Wat dan van die kwessie van hulp - hulpverlening aan die ontwikkelde lande wat in en aan Suid-Afrika lê en waar die lewenstandaarde oor die algemeen van 'n aard was - en nog is - dat massiewe steun van buite nodig is om hulle tot 'n bestaan van menswaardigheid te verhef? Dat Suid-Afrika sy houvas op, en goeie verhoudinge met, sy buurstate deur méér effektiewe en baie meer hulp kon versterk het, moet in 'n mate toegegee word, hoewel hy nooit in 'n stadium was waar hy teen die mededingers van buite taktiese oorwinnings kon behaal nie.

Om 'n enkele voorbeeld te noem: Jare reeds het die Verenigde Volke deur sy United Nations Development Programme (die sogenaamde UNDP) op die toneel verskyn, en 'n pas is aangegee wat vir Suid-Afrika eenvoudig buite die kwessie was - nie dat Suid-Afrika nie wou help nie. Tegnieese voorligting en samewerking op verskillende administratiewe terreine is aangebied, maar die internasionale aanbiedinge het teen so 'n tempo gestyg dat feitlik elke Swart staat in Suider-Afrika sy hande na die buite-wêreld se bronne van hulpverlening uitgestrek het.

Onder die organisasies wat in 'n enkele land (Zambië) deur die UNDP aan die werk gespring het, was die FAO, die Wêreldvoedingsprogram, UNICEF, WHO, UNESCO, ILO, ITU, UPU, ICAO, WMO, IAEA en die United Nations Industrial Development Organisation. Die getal deskundiges wat deur die UNDP in Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi en Zambië werksaam is, beloop 321 teenoor 28 beamptes van Suid-Afrika. Daarby is daar honderde tegnieese van ander lande wat die groepie Suid-Afrikaners se hulpverlening na 'n kleinheid en vir baie onbelangrikheid laat verkramp het.

#### *Vir Suid-Afrika: 'n Aktiewer Rol*

Die prentjie wat ek tot dusver geskilder het, is nie 'n aantreklike een nie. Dit is ook nie bedoel om dit te wees nie. Die aangeleentheid van groot belang is nie die graad van ageruitgang wat Suid-Afrika in die Suider-Afrika-konteks beleef het nie, *maar die positiewe stappe wat nog deur Suid-Afrika gedoen kan word om die situasie in die bestaande omstandighede te verbeter en indien moontlik te herstel.*

In die loop van my praatjie het ek drie fasette genoem (daar is heelparty meer wat 'n mens kan noem) wat toenemend gevaarlik kan word indien van die kant van Suid-Afrika nie aktief en sterk opgetree word nie; indien ons nie die Suider-Afrika-posisie in 'n baie ernstiger lig beskou as wat ons tot dusver toe gedoen het nie.

Teenoor die situasie waarin Suid-Afrika homself nou bevind, het dit nodiger as ooit geword dat ons 'n duidelike, positiewe en doelgerigte beleid vir Suid-Afrika se optrede in Suider-Afrika stel, en dat ons 'n baie hoë prioriteit verleen aan die toepassing van so 'n beleid. Die eenvoudige rede daarvoor is dat die verdere verslegting van die toestand, naas ons binnelandse gevaar, Suid-Afrika se grootste enkele bedreigingsvlak geword het.

- + Dit is duidelik dat Suid-Afrika op die duur in 'n toestand van permanente oorlogvoering kan beland as hy nie die hulp van ander state in Suider-Afrika het nie.
- + Dit is duidelik dat enige verdere verwydering tussen hom en die Swart lande in Suider-Afrika die Kommuniste en terroriste in staat gaan stel om die wig tussen Swart en Wit lande al dieper in te dryf en dat Suid-Afrika se kans om staande te bly al verder gaan verswak.
- + Dit is duidelik dat as druk van buite daarin slaag om die Portugese uit Suider-Afrika te laat terugtrek, Suid-Afrika letterlik met die rug teen die muur sal staan.
- + Dit is duidelik dat die Swart State van Suider-Afrika en die Swart State wat mettertyd in Suid-Afrika ontstaan, 'n deurslaggewende rol in enige konfrontasie sal en moet speel.

U sal ongetwyfeld - en met reg - sê dat dit maklik is om te praat; veel makliker as om in hierdie late stadium positiewe stappe voor te stel wat die proses van agteruitgang tot stilstand kan bring, indien nie in 'n teenoorgestelde rigting laat swaai nie. Daarmee stem elkeen saam.

'n Basiese plan vir die konsolidasie van Suider-Afrika moes 20 jaar gelede aangepak gewees het, maar in daardie dae het Suid-Afrika ander probleme gehad. Buitendien was daar in daardie tyd geen militêre bedreiging van terroriste nie, geen Tanzam-spoorlyne en geen Sjinese wat stilweg 'n groot deel van Suider-Afrika in die palm van die hand probeer kry nie, en geen werklik georganiseerde buitewêreld wat daarop mik om die Witman vir eens en altyd uit die subkontinent te gooi nie.

Maar ek glo ook dat daar nog baie gedoen kan word om die proses van agteruitgang te stuit. En as die nodige prioriteit en doelgerigtheid aan positiewe stappe gegee word, behoort die dreigende gevare, al is dit op die oppervlakte, vir nog baie jare afgeweer te kan word.

Oor my eie prioriteite het ek geen twyfel nie, en u sal my dit nie verkwalik dat ek hulle duidelik en beslis aan u stel nie:

- (1) Ons kan maak en dink net wat ons wil, maar as ons die bestaande Swart leiers van Suid-Afrika self nie eers aan ons kan kry, sal ons geen komende konfrontasie op die duur die hoof kan bied nie.

- (2) In die blok van agt lande in Suider-Afrika sal alles in werking gestel moet word om 'n toestand van vrede en samewerking tussen Blank en Swart tot stand te bring.
- (3) Ten einde ons eie Bantoe-leiers en die leiers van ander state in Suider-Afrika daarvan te oortuig dat hul plek in die voorste linie langs ons 'n moet wees, sal ons hulle van twee kardinale dinge moet oortuig:
  - (a) Dat die beleid van afsonderlike ontwikkeling tot hul volle afhanklikheid sal lei, dat hulle deur Suid-Afrika (en nie deur Sjina) gehelp sal word om hul state ten volle lewensvatbaar te maak nie, en dat hulle, as onafhanklike lande, aan geen diskriminasie of onbillike beperkings onderhewig sal wees nie.

Dit, moet ons aan hulle sê, sal nie slegs in die tuislande gebeur nie, maar ook in die stedelike gebiede.
  - (b) Dat die Kommunisme vir hulle net soveel gevaar inhou as vir die Blanke, en dat dit vir hulle sowel as ons, absoluut noodlottig sal wees as hulle nie saamstaan en die Kommunisme en ander vorms van ekstremisme uit Suid-Afrika te weer nie.
- (4) Ons sal die ander lande in Suider-Afrika daarvan moet oortuig dat ook hulle toekoms slegs in die saamstaan met Suid-Afrika die subkontinent van kommunistiese oorheersing kan vrywaar, en dat die heil van Suider-Afrika slegs in samewerking tussen die verskillende lande lê.

Vir die behoorlike administrering van sodanige samewerking - sonder dat dit ingryping in die huishoudelike sake van lidlande beteken - sal die skep van 'n gemenebes van nasies op 'n grondslag van anti-kommunisme verreweg die beste resultate vir Wit sowel as vir Swart state lewer.
- (5) Ons sal die ander lande in 'n Suider-Afrika-gemenebes - as soiets nog in hierdie stadium tot stand gebring kan word - daarvan moet oortuig dat dit hulle nie sal verhinder om hul nasionalistiese aspirasies op drie verskillende vlakke te beoefen nie: dié wat beperk is tot die grense van elke land en sy eie soewereine onafhanklikheid; dié wat te doen het met sy lidmaatskap van 'n anti-kommunistiese Suider-Afrika-blok; en dié wat hom in wyer verband 'n lid maak van 'n groter Afrika-eenheid.

Dat Suid-Afrika in sy pogings om groter eenheid en dus groter veiligheid in die subkontinent se skep veel aktiewer sal moet optree op ook 'n aantal laere vlakke, val nie te betwyfel nie:

- (a) Terwyl Suid-Afrika nog nooit die geld gehad het om met ander lande te kompeteer in die verskaffing van tegniese en geldelike hulp nie, bly dit onverstaanbaar waarom hy nie sy diplomatieke diens in Suider-Afrika tot 'n baie groter mate uitgebrei het as wat tans die geval is nie. Per slot van sake is goeie verhoudinge met die lande om Suid-Afrika vir sy voortbestaan belangriker as goeie verhoudinge met sommige Westerse lande wat tog niks van Suid-Afrika wil weet nie.
- (b) Soos in talle ander lande in die wêreld, moes Suid-Afrika lank reeds 'n soort ekonomiese liggaam vir Suider-Afrika geskep het. 'n Internasionale of streekontwikkelingsagentskap sou 'n groot rol kan speel in nie slegs die ontwikkeling van onontwikkelde buurstate nie, maar kan 'n sterk veelvolkige band tussen die verskillende nasies in Suider-Afrika skep.
- (c) Die aanstel deur Suid-Afrika van 'n ambassadeur of adjunk-minister om die leiers van state in Suider-Afrika gereeld te besoek, mag op die duur van meer as nominale waarde blyk te wees.

Opsommend kan ek net dit sê:

Suid-Afrika se toekoms gaan tot groot hoogte bepaal word deur die verhoudinge wat hy met sy Wit en Swart bure kan skep - méér so as die verhoudinge wat hy met baie oorsese lande het. Hierdie verhoudinge kan hy alleen tot die voorspoed en veiligheid van almal uitbou deur direk met sy bure te onderhandel en deur te verseker dat hy nie uiteindelik heeltemal geïsoleer en alleen teen die dreigende gevare moet staan nie.

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*THE PART PLAYED BY NAVAL FORCES  
ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE*

Commodore A.F.C. Wemyss O.B.E.

*Introduction*

It must be remembered that World War II ended some 28 years ago and that the vast majority of Royal Navy Officers have not had World War II sea experience. I first went to sea in the Royal Navy in September, 1945, three weeks after VJ Day and therefore my practical experience has been limited to the period of the Cold War and the numerous confrontations that the United Kingdom has had with some of her now ex-Territories, or when some other area of vital interest has been endangered. I would therefore like to discuss the use of Limited Naval Force, or what is sometimes popularly called "Gunboat Diplomacy", in the post World War II era. And here I must acknowledge the work of Mr. James Cable of the British Diplomatic Service, who has written a book entitled "Gunboat Diplomacy".

Gunboat Diplomacy is often used as a term of abuse, a metaphorical epithet for almost any kind of attempt by one government to exert an unwelcome influence on the policy of another. It is often applied to situations involving no threat or use of naval force, sometimes even to disputes in which the only pressures employed are economic or diplomatic. This degeneration of a phrase, that was once exactly descriptive, stems from the belief that gunboat diplomacy is a technique as obsolete as the vessels that used to sustain it. Both are vaguely supposed to have vanished with the passing of Victorian Imperialism, the first under the pressure of altered political attitudes, the second in response to the advance of naval technology. However, although gunboats as such still exist in some navies today, I am not discussing the Gunboat as a particular type of warship, but the use of limited naval force as one of the instruments of foreign policy under the popular term of Gunboat Diplomacy.

I shall endeavour to define the concept of Gunboat Diplomacy or the use of limited naval force and then discuss instances where and when it has been used - particularly since World War II. Limited naval force is a peace-time technique, although it may be employed during an actual war as a method of exerting pressure on allies or neutrals.

*Definition*

Gunboat Diplomacy can be defined as the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage, or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or juris-



diction of their own state. As an example, on 19 November, 1961, U.S. warships appeared off Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic, when the U.S. wished to secure the expulsion of the family of the late Dictator, General Trujillos, and the establishment of a government acceptable to the United States. Intervention by the 1 800 embarked U.S. marines was not actually required to achieve the necessary results; the threat was sufficient. Three and a half years later 22 000 men were landed by the U.S. Navy in the Dominican Republic to protect U.S. citizens and ensure a government acceptable to the U.S.

### *Principles and Precedents of Limited Naval Force*

Having defined gunboat diplomacy, I should now like to discuss the principles of limited naval force. These have been laid down by James Cable as:

- a. Definitive Force
- b. Purposeful Force
- c. Catalytic Force
- d. Expressive Force.

### *Definitive Force*

Definitive Force is the use of local force to create or remove a *fait accompli*. The two classic examples of Definitive Force are probably the rescue of British prisoners of war from the German naval tanker Altmark by H.M.S. Cossack from inside neutral Norwegian territorial waters in February 1940, and the capturing of U.S.S. Pueblo by the North Koreans in 1968.

In the first incident the Commanding Officer of the Norwegian torpedo boat capitulated to the threat of superior force from H.M.S. Cossack and allowed her to enter the fjord and release the prisoners from the Altmark. Force was limited in that both the British and Norwegian naval officers understood that no more was intended than the release of the prisoners from the German ship. The task had been given to Captain Vian of the Cossack personally by Mr. Churchill, with the Foreign Secretary's concurrence, and he was told:

If Norwegian torpedo-boat interferes, you should warn her to stand off. If she fires upon you, you should not reply unless attack is serious, in which case you should defend yourself using no more force than is necessary and cease fire when she desists. Suggest to Norwegian destroyer that honour is served by submitting to superior force.

The Norwegian Commanding Officer knew that he was confronted by superior force and that the British aim was limited to the release of the prisoners with minimum violence.

In the Pueblo incident a virtually unarmed U.S. electronic surveillance ship was captured by the North Koreans just outside territorial waters. Four patrol craft, with two fighter aircraft as escort, were used for the capture. Pueblo was summoned to heave to, and when she ignored the signal fired on till she complied, and then, obedient to further directions, followed her assailants towards the coast before being boarded and taken into Wonsan as a prize, and her crew imprisoned. This use of limited naval force, before U.S. forces could intervene, was successful from a North Korean point of view in putting a stop to the use of American vessels for close electronic surveillance of their coast.

These two cases provide an interesting comparison, in that the success in both cases was not dependent on the overall capability of Britain and North Korea, but on the local superiority at the point of issue. The North Koreans were stronger and used their naval forces which, though relatively insignificant, were on the spot, to create a *fait accompli*.

#### *Purposeful Force*

Limited naval force is employed purposefully in order to change the policy or character of a foreign government or some organised group, where relationship to the assailant is, for practical purposes, substantially that of a foreign government. In its purposeful application, force does not itself do anything; it induces someone else to take a decision which would not otherwise have been taken: to do something or to stop doing it, or to refrain from a contemplated course of action. This is a less direct and hence less reliable expedient than definitive force, which itself removes the cause of dispute, because purposeful force depends for its success on a choice made by the victim. Once the North Koreans decided to attack Pueblo, there was no option open to the United States government, which could have been exercised to prevent the capture of the vessel and her crew, but the subsequent exploitation of the hostages only succeeded because President Johnson decided that their lives and liberty were worth the concessions demanded.

An example of the successful use of purposeful force was the Kuwait Incident in 1961. On 25 June of that year, the government of Iraq, headed by General Kassem, broadcast over Baghdad Radio an announcement that they regarded the neighbouring state of Kuwait as an integral part of Iraqi Territory. This was followed the next day by a note to diplomatic missions in Baghdad setting out the historical arguments for the Iraqi claim and reported movements of Iraqi troops in the Basra area near the Kuwait border. On 26 June, the government of Kuwait announced their intention to defend their national territory and, on 30 June, they formally requested British assistance under the Anglo-Kuwait Treaty concluded ten days previously. The British government responded the same day by announcing their intention of taking normal precautionary measures in the face of declared threat of annexation to this small independent state. On 1 July the Commando Carrier H.M.S. Bulwark landed 600 Royal Marines supported by tanks from a tank landing ship. The Bulwark had

steamed from Karachi and the tank landing ship was at that time stationed in the Persian Gulf. This initial contingent was rapidly reinforced by sea and air, reinforcements included two aircraft carriers among 45 warships. A defensive perimeter was established five miles from the Iraqi border and the presence of the British forces successfully deterred any actual attack. By mid October, forces were withdrawn from Kuwait and although there were subsequent naval movements in response to further threats in the months following, no British forces were actually landed.

The success of this operation was that British reaction to Kuwait's need was swift, and that the necessary limited force of tanks and air cover could only have been provided by a naval force within the required time scale. Therefore, for purposeful force to be effective, the force used must not only be appropriate to the situation but also be capable of immediate application.

#### *Catalytic Force*

Thus far, we have been concerned with the use of limited naval force to achieve objectives defined in advance, to liberate prisoners, seize a ship, deter a foreign government from an expected course of action. But often force is applied for vaguer purposes.

A situation often arises which is pregnant with formless menace or offers obscure opportunities. Something, it is felt, is going to happen, which might be prevented if force were available at the critical point. Advantages, their nature and the manner still undetermined, might be reaped by those able to put immediate and appropriate power behind their sickle. These are situations peculiarly favourable to the exercise of limited naval force. Warships can cruise for long periods awaiting the most auspicious moment for their intervention. As long as they remain on the high seas they are uncommitted. Even after they have intervened, they can easily be disengaged and withdrawn. Air forces and armies, unless they enjoy the advantages of an adjacent frontier, are cumbrous instruments, dragging a long tail behind their teeth, ill adapted to the tactics of tip and run, to the limited, tentative, non-committal probe. A ship, a task group or task force, can as well float off one coast as another.

Of course, even for navies, the circumstances must be suitable. The presence of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Straits since the 1950s has ensured the independence of that island from China, but that is more accurately described as an example of the purposeful use of force.

As an example of the catalytic mode we need to turn to the Mediterranean and the part played by the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Lebanon in 1958. Here a government, favourable to the U.S., was under threat from within and without. After rioting and attacks by Syria, the U.S. was asked for assistance and, on 11 May, the Sixth Fleet was alerted and President Chamoun told it would stand by. In fact, it was not until two months later, and immediately after the murder of King Feisal of Iraq, that intervention was requested and marines were landed within 24 hours. It was five days before

airborne troops reached the Lebanon because overflight permissions were required. The landing of the U.S. marines was not in pursuence of a defined objective: their purpose was to hold the situation and to gain time in which the United States Government could decide what their objective should be. A clear case of catalytic force.

The Soviets were not in a position to challenge in 1958 as they had no fleet in the Mediterranean at that time. However, 11 years later when a somewhat similar crisis erupted in the Lebanon, Soviet ships were in the Mediterranean and no one in Washington contemplated intervention. The Sixth Fleet was no longer alone and the Soviets were also in a position to take part in gunboat diplomacy.

In the words of one Soviet Admiral:

The presence of the Soviet navy in the Mediterranean is a most important factor for stabilisation in that troubled area of the globe.

#### *Expressive Force*

The last and least of the uses of limited naval force in the objectives of foreign policy is the expressive force. Here, warships are employed to emphasise attitudes, to lend a semblance of truth to otherwise inconvincing statements, or to provide an outlet for emotion. Its distinction from the threat of purposeful force, on the one hand, and mere flag-showing, on the other, is vague and uncertain chiefly as a result of its employment. Yet a definition should be attempted, because the expedient force is more common than it is valuable.

The continuation of the Beira patrol in support of United Nations resolutions can best be described as expressive force. At its inception in 1966 when a tanker was stopped, it was the purposeful use of limited naval force, but, as the years roll by, the purposeful character begins to wear a trifle thin.

As another example, in 1969, when changes in the Spanish Government prompted newspaper speculation that the claim to Gibraltar might no longer be so vigorously pressed, the Spanish aircraft carrier Dedalo and twelve supporting warships arrived in Algeciras Bay and anchored in sight of the Rock. A point was made without embarrassment of words. However, the British retort was as taciturn and equally traditional, when the Spaniards arrived, a football match was being played ashore on the Rock between teams from the aircraft carriers H.M.S. Eagle and H.M.S. Hermes.

#### *Examples of Gunboat Diplomacy*

Having discussed the various principles of limited naval force, I should like to outline some of the post World War II instances of the use of limited naval force - not always successfully.

In 1946 the Royal Navy was involved in two separate incidents. First, in July a cruiser and a frigate were sent to Basra after rioting at the British Oil Refinery at Abadan had been fermented by the Soviet-backed Tudeh party. The despatch of these warships was followed in August by the landing of troops, and although actual intervention in Iran did not prove necessary, the eventual outcome was satisfactory to British interests and entailed a setback of Soviet influence in Iran. This was a successful example of the purposeful use of limited naval force.

The second occasion was in October of that year and unsuccessful. In May two British cruisers had been fired on by Albanian shore batteries when passing through the Corfu Straits between Albania and Corfu. In October two other British cruisers supported by two destroyers were ordered through the Straits to assert the right of innocent passage but the two destroyers were severely damaged in a freshly-laid minefield. Although most of the mines were subsequently removed by British minesweepers protected by a substantial naval force in November, the initial use of force was unsuccessful and attempts through negotiation, the Security Council and the International Court, to obtain redress all failed.

Over the same period, and lasting many months, the British Mediterranean fleet was involved in patrolling the Eastern Mediterranean to intercept and seize ships carrying Jewish illegal immigrants to Palestine, thereby hoping to placate Arabs and facilitate the agreed solution of the Palestine problem. Although many ships were intercepted, some got through and the diplomatic effort was a complete failure.

In 1948 the Royal Navy was more successful, two cruisers were sent to Belize to deter Guatemala from presenting by force her claim to British Honduras. This was repeated again, successfully, in 1972 when Guatemala made another move, this time a frigate was sent and an aircraft carrier positioned in the area, flying off aircraft at over 1 000 mile range to patrol the borders.

1949 was the turn of the Far East, where British and American ships were involved in China; H.M.S. Amethyst was attacked and driven aground by Chinese communist artillery fire when proceeding up the Yangtse to protect the British embassy in Nanking. Attempts to rescue Amethyst by other ships failed, but she managed to escape 3½ months later and rejoin the fleet. However, the purposeful use of force to protect the British Embassy had failed. Temporary success was achieved however by British and American warships in protecting their nationals in Shanghai.

In 1951 and 1952, during the Korean War, it was the turn of the Middle East. In 1951, a cruiser was sent to Abadan for the protection of British subjects during a dispute with Iran, in which force was not employed. Eventually, British subjects were evacuated. At the same time the Royal Navy became involved with the Egyptians who were molesting merchant shipping in the Gulf of Akaba. Eventually British warships were employed to keep the Suez Canal open to shipping when Egyptian labour was withdrawn and clearance denied to British merchant ships. Cruisers were used to provide a protected labour force until the Egyptians resumed normal working. These

were examples of both the purposeful and definitive use of limited naval force.

The next year, 1952, a successful example of catalytic force was demonstrated when, after a coup d'etat in Egypt, a large British naval force was assembled off the Egyptian coast in case intervention was needed to protect British nationals.

In 1953, Argentine naval vessels landed a party and erected buildings to signify occupation of the disputed British territory of Deception Island. The buildings were subsequently demolished and intruders arrested and expelled by H.M.S. Snipe from the South Atlantic station. This Argentine act, which was unsuccessful, was both expressive and definitive.

The Americans used their powerful Sixth Fleet to demonstrate disapproval in an expressive role against the British and French fleets at the time of Suez. This chiefly involved getting in the way of flying operations, but it made the point, although it carried less conviction than other measures. The Americans followed this up by landing marines at Alexandria and other points in the Middle East to evacuate their nationals.

In 1958 the Royal Navy was involved protecting trawlers in Icelandic Waters when the Iceland government banned British fishing within 12 miles of their coast. After six months, and the foiling of 65 Icelandic attempts to arrest British Trawlers, H.M. Government conceded to the Icelandic case. The use of limited naval force had been unsuccessful in the purposeful and catalytic roles. This lesson was not forgotten by the Royal Navy when Iceland extended her waters unilaterally to 50 miles on 1 September, 1972. For 8 months naval forces were not directly used for the protection of trawlers: but when the Icelandics started to open fire on trawlers, in addition to cutting trawl sweeps, the Navy was once more ordered in to protect trawlers. This situation is current today and it is difficult to see how it is going to end.

It should not be thought that "Fish Wars" and "Cod Wars" are the special preserve of the British. In 1963 the French sent a destroyer to the fishing grounds off the north-east coast of Brazil after three French lobster boats had been seized by Brazilian warships 60 miles off the coast. The Brazilians countered with a cruiser, five destroyers and two corvettes and the French withdrew.

Only last month, the Libyans arrested four Italian fishing boats off their coast. The Italians responded by sending a Corvette which the Libyans attacked with two aircraft wounding two seamen. At the time the Italian warship was thirty miles off the coast.

The problems of safeguarding the fishing rights of one's territorial and traditional waters are becoming universal and more complex as fishing fleets are deployed world wide. This is a task that navies are increasingly involved in, for example, the United Kingdom maintains a force of ten minesweepers, sister ships to the South African minesweepers, exclusively for fishing protection duties in U.K. waters.

Diverging still further from "Gunboat Diplomacy", I believe we are going to see the increasing use of naval forces to protect national interests such as:

- a. Oil and mineral developments from the seabed.
- b. Sea traffic supervision in high density areas, such as the English Channel, where separation lanes have had to be established. These have also been established off the Cape.
- c. Anti pollution patrols and disaster control forces.

#### *The Position of the Soviet Union*

I have perhaps restricted myself by examples to the Western maritime nations in their use of naval forces to support diplomacy. However, we must acknowledge the fact that the Soviets have now the capability and ability to indulge in Gunboat Diplomacy on a world scale. We have seen how the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean has been counter-balanced by the Soviet presence and so had their options reduced.

The Soviets have stationed their naval units in Egyptian and Syrian ports in support of their Middle Eastern policies, and for a period in 1967, in Admiral Molochov's words, they were ready "to co-operate with Egyptian armed forces to repel any aggression." As a clear-cut case of the purposeful threat of limited naval force, this offers some support to the claims of various Soviet admirals and to the theory that "the aim of the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean is not wartime combat with the U.S. Sixth Fleet, but the furtherance of Soviet policy objectives at a much lower level of risk and in an environment considerably less drastic than one of the total U.S. - Soviet hostility."

The Soviet Union now maintains, or has recently maintained, surface units in the Caribbean, off Guinea, in the Gulf of Aden and Persian Gulf, and in the Pacific. When the Americans mined Haiphong Harbour and other North Vietnam ports in 1972, the Soviets built up a considerable naval force in the South China Sea as a diversion. They have learnt the lesson of Cuba where lack of surface warships in the Area prevented them from confronting the Americans and they had to back down. They will not make the mistake again.

#### *Strength of the Soviet Navy*

Today the Soviets have the necessary surface ships to maintain a naval presence practically anywhere they wish, and supported by a growing number of modern naval auxiliaries. At the same time, their large Merchant Fleet is centrally controlled and available to support naval units, and it frequently does. The Fleet from which they can select a force to provide a presence consists of:

|     |                            |
|-----|----------------------------|
| 2   | Aircraft carriers building |
| 2   | Helicopter cruisers        |
| 15  | Guided missile cruisers    |
| 16  | Gun cruisers               |
| 42  | Guided missile destroyers  |
| 64  | Gun armed destroyers       |
| 100 | Amphibious ships           |

I have not included the Soviet submarine force of 45 nuclear powered strategic missile submarines, 67 nuclear powered attack submarines, and 300 conventional powered submarines, because the submarine is not a suitable vehicle for use in gunboat diplomacy, nor have I included the 150 missile firing boats, of the type that sank the Israeli destroyer Eilat in 1967, as these are not deployable world-wide.

#### *Strength of the United States Navy*

To counter-balance the Soviets, what is the position of the United States Navy, now that it is disengaged from Vietnam? It is the only navy with sufficient and combat-experienced forces that can undertake any type of naval operation on practically any scale, anywhere in the world. This ability is largely vested in the force of 14 attack aircraft carriers, supported by 5 anti-submarine aircraft carriers, which can provide the necessary superiority, but even they take time to reach the threatened point, as in the case of the Pueblo.

It is arguable that the present American mood of disenchantment with the troubles of the outside world is more likely to lead to military than to naval withdrawal. As foreign garrisons are reduced, overseas bases abandoned, allies urged to cultivate the virtues of self-reliance, the diplomatic and political functions of the U.S. Navy may actually expand. Once the ships have been re-fitted and the men rested after Vietnam, the U.S. will be better able to confront the Soviets at sea.

#### *Other Nations*

Many other nations also have the capability of using naval forces to support their diplomacy, by the nature of the size and shapes of their fleets. The degree to which they can be employed depends on their ability to provide the necessary superiority of force at the *moment critique*.

Apart from the Nato and Warsaw Pact countries, the following countries maintain substantial navies with the sort of required capability to influence affairs in their spheres of interests, if not further afield: Argentine, Brazil, Chile, Peru, India, Japan, Spain.

#### *Conclusions*

My concluding thought is that navies have played their part in international affairs short of war in recent years and that they are likely to



continue to do so. Every nation with maritime interests, be they shipping, seabed mineral wealth, the sea as a source of food, or economic ties, requires some form of naval force to safeguard its interests. And into this category must come the Republic of South Africa.

One nation can threaten or apply pressure on another more easily at sea than on land: frontiers do not have to be crossed, air space violated, women and children involved, nor the whole scene of action surrounded by the world press. But the diplomatic results achieved may be just as valid.

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Commodore Wemyss is Senior British Naval Officer in South Africa. The above article is based on an address he delivered to the Cape Town Branch of the Institute on 22 October 1973.

*DIE ROL VAN DIE MASSAMEDIA  
IN DIE INTERNASIONALE POLITIEK*

Dr. C.E. Mulder

Die begrippe Massamedia en Internasionale Politiek is twee sulke omvangryke begrippe dat hulle selfs wesenlike elemente vorm van twee wetenskappe - van die wetenskap van die openbare kommunikasie, en van die wetenskap van die politiek. Dit is egter interessant dat mens hierdie twee omvangryke begrippe so kan reduceer, dat hulle deur twee enkele beroepsbeskrywings gesimboliseer kan word - die massamedia deur die joernalis, en die internasionale politiek deur die diplomaat.

Op die oog af wil dit dikwels lyk asof daar net verskille tussen die twee bestaan, so asof hulle byna natuurlike vyande is. As ek egter aan hierdie verskille dink, dan moet ek byna altyd eers aan die verskil tussen 'n diplomaat en 'n dame dink! Waaneer 'n diplomaat ja sê, bedoel hy miskien. Waaneer hy miskien sê, bedoel hy nee. Wanneer hy nee sê is hy nie 'n diplomaat nie. Wanneer 'n dame nee sê, bedoel sy miskien. Wanneer sy miskien sê, bedoel sy ja, en wanneer sy ja sê is sy nie 'n dame nie!

Moontlik is die verskille tussen 'n joernalis en 'n diplomaat minder subtiel. Dit sou egter verkeerd wees om aan te neem dat daar net verskille bestaan. In my ervaring het ek al vasgestel dat daar ook opvallende ooreenkomste is. Beide ontleed situasies, beide probeer ontwikkelings vooruit bepaal voordat dit openbaar word, beide vergelyk en toets hulle kennis by kollegas, lees die koerante baie intensief, probeer om die subtielste van 'n bekendmaking of aankondiging peil, beide beskerm hulle bronne van inligting, beide is verplig om skemerpartye en ontvangste by te woon en om besonder hoflik teenoor die vrouens van hulle base te wees, beide probeer hulle hoofkantore met hulle berigte beïndruk. Maar hier eindig ook die ooreenkomste.

Die diplomaat berig per verseëlde pos en deur kode boodskappe. Die joernalis langs oop telex-lyne en per lugpos. Die diplomaat wil nie aangehaal word nie, die joernalis streef juis daarna. Die diplomaat gee aan sy regering inligting om 'n besluit te neem, die joernalis gee aan die publiek materiaal om 'n opinie te vorm. Die diplomaat moet uiteraard soms die waarheid kompromiteer anders sal hy nooit by die kompromie uitkom nie. Die joernalis daarenteen soek juis die konflik, die drama, die botsing van belange, die prikkelende situasie, want dit is wat die konsumente van sy inligting wil hê, en wat hy die beste kan oordra.

Ek het by hierdie verskille stilgestaan en sommige selfs oorbeklemtoon, omdat ek dit duidelik wil stel dat internasionale verhoudings in ons tyd nie meer die uitsluitlike terrein van die diplomaat is nie - die joernalis in die massamedia speel vandag 'n baie belangrike rol op die gebied, dit is egter 'n ander rol as die van die diplomaat want sy belange is anders. Ek het voorheen die woord "waarheid" in die konteks van internasionale verhoudings gebruik. Laat my in samehang met die woord waarheid, wat mens beter met die woord werklikheid moet omskryf, nog een belangrike verskil noem. Die diplomaat berig met woorde en hy doen dit hopelik presies, logies en feitelik. Hy doen verslag aan mense wat hopelik deskundiges is op die gebied van internasionale verhoudings. Die joernalis aan die anderkant skryf of saai uit aan 'n veelvoud, 'n massa van mense, baie van wie nie eens geïnteresseerd is

in dit wat hy meedeel nie. So is die radio of televisie in staat om deur sy luidsprekers woorde oor te dra, maar hulle krag lê daarin dat die radio voorstellings in die mense kan oproep en die T.V. selfs beelde kan wys - geen wonder dat hierdie media daardie gebeure verkies wat hulle leen om deur beeld aangebied te word, en wat moontlik van veel minder belang kan wees as die werklike inhoud nie. Geen wonder nie dat woorde van verduideliking gouer vergeet word as die uitgebeelde ontploffing, die brand, die botsing, die seëvierende oorwinnaar. Daardie werklikheid wat die massamedia letterlik uitbeeld, is dikwels niks anders as emosionele snelskrif nie, 'n uittreksel van die waarheid, 'n saamgeperste dikwels kunsmatige weergawe van wat werklik gebeur het. Want die werklikheid het meesal meer fasette as wat presies in die 20 bladsye van 'n dagblad, of die 10 minute van 'n nuusuitsending pas. Die massamedia konsentreer dus op die aksie eerder as op die oorsaak, op die gebeure eerder as op die probleem, op die skokkende eerder as op die verduideliking, op die persone eerder as op die gedagte.

Wat is egter meer presies die invloed van al heirdie kenmerke van die massamedia op die internasionale samelewing? Laat ons by een van die sentrale en die oudste elemente van internasionale verhoudings begin - konfliktsituasie of oorlog. 'n Massamedium soos T.V. beeld 'n oorlog byna uitsluitlik uit in terme van gewondes en geweld. Nou kan mens vra wat daarmee verkeerd is, want oorlog is tog niks anders as geweld en dooies en verminktes, en nie 'n opeenhoping van heldedade nie. Die gevaar lê egter daarin dat die massamedia hierop kan konsentreer ten koste van daardie idees en vraagstukke wat oorlog veroorsaak. Die media vra nie intensief genoeg na wie verantwoordelik is nie, na waarom dit gebeur nie, na wat die alternatief is nie. Maar dit is nie al nie. Die massamedia kan deur omstandighede slegs in staat wees om oor die een kant van die situasie te berig - so het ons oor die Vietnamoorlog byna uitsluitlik berigte van Amerikaanse en Suid-Vietnamese optrede gesien - die wreedhede van hierdie oorlog is soms aan ons gesuggereer as komende van slegs eenkant - en sal enigiemand betwis dat die wreedhede deur die kommunistiese Vietcong gepleeg, minder wreed was as die deur die Suid-Vietnamese gepleeg? Hoeveel het ons egter daarvan ervaar deur die massamedia? Ons het dus die situasie bereik dat ten spyte van 'n geweldige tegniese ontwikkeling van die massamedia ons nogtans nie instaat is om 'n enigszins betroubare beeld te kry van wat in 'n baie groot deel van die wêreld aangaan nie. Dit is onvermydelik dat dit 'n profunde uitwerking moet hê op die openbare mening in die vrye gemeenskappe van die Weste - veral waar die massamedia in hierdie gemeenskappe in 'n posisie verkeer waar hulle kritiek aan hulle eie gemeenskappe kan lewer, asook in daardie gemeenskappe waar die massamedia vryheid van beweging het. Die ewels in totalitêre gemeenskappe word egter nie naasteby so goed deur die massamedia gedek nie. Logieswyse lei dit tot 'n totaal verwronge beeld van die wêreld.

Die Vietnam oorlog is op 'n keer deur die B.B.C. kommentator Robin Day as "the first television war" beskryf, en daar bestaan min twyfel oor die effek dat feitlik elke huisgesin in Amerika heirdie oorlog elke aand in hulle huis gesien het, 'n diepgaande uitwerking op die Amerikaanse openbare mening, en uiteindelik op die V.S.A. se onderhandelingsposisie in die vredes-beraadslagings gehad het nie. Waar in die verlede soldate vertrek het om op verafgeleë plekke te gaan veg, het die Amerikaners die Vietnam-oorlog aand vir aand met hulle ete aangebied gekry.

Mens kan hieruit die vraag stel of 'n demokratiese staat in die toekoms nog suksesvol aan 'n oorlog kan deelneem terwyl sy tuisbevolking in staat is om deur middel van 'n ongesensureerde massamedia soos

T.V. aan elke afgryslike besonderheid van die oorlog deel te hê. Langdurige blootstelling aan die brutale beeld van 'n oorlog op T.V. kan so skokkend en skrikwekkend wees dat die wil tot weerstand van 'n nasie so kan verminder dat dit teen die magte van aggressor nie meer opgewasse is nie.

Waar mense so geskok word oor die bloedvergieting en verminking, word hulle moeilik oortuig dat 'n hoë ideaal op die spel is. Die gesig van 'n dooie kind, 'n brandende huis, 'n bloedoorstroomde soldaat, kan so 'n sterk impak maak dat abstrakte begrippe en ideale soos „vryheid” en „veiligheid” heeltemal verdring word. Natuurlik is daar diegene wat sal vra dat indien die massamedia 'n bondgenoot van die pasifisme geword het, dit dan nie 'n hoopvolle ontwikkeling is nie? Die antwoord is natuurlik of daardie gene glo in vrede om elke prys! Ek wil dus 'n eerste gevolgtrekking maak, die een naamlik dat veral die massamedium T.V. deur sy visuele trefkrag, en waar dit relatief vryelik nuus en inligting kan versamel en versprei, reeds 'n uitwerking toon op die morele weerbaarheid van die inwoners van 'n staat, en dus in sy eind-effek ook op die speelruimte wat so 'n staat in sy internasionale optrede het.

Indien ons oorlog as die abnormale toestand van die verhoudings tussen state beskou, dan is dit logies om ook na die meer vreedsame relatief normale diplomatieke verkeer tussen state te kyk en wat die massamedia intussen daar uitgerig het.

Een van die opvallendste ontwikkelings van die verkeer tussen state, as die mees algemene organisasievorm van volke, groepe en gemeenskappe, is die hoë mate van spesialisasie wat daar in hierdie verkeer plaasgevind het, veral sedert W.O.II.

Tot betreklik onlangs was die amptelike tussen-staatlike verkeer beperk tot die aktiwiteite van sogenaamde beroeps diplomate, wie se taak vaagweg omskryf was as die behartiging van 'n Staat se buitelandse belange en die handhawing van goeie verhoudings. Op sy eenvoudigste gestel, het dit tot redelik onlangs toe in die praktyk beteken dat heirdie persone moes probeer verhoed dat daar geskille tussen state ontstaan, en waar dit wel ontstaan, te probeer verhoed dat dit in krisis en nog verder in oorloë ontaard, m.a.w. in abnormale toestand word.

Twee tegnologiese ontwikkelings het heirdie klassieke diplomatieke praktyk totaal verander. Eerstens het die ontwikkeling van die sogenaamde elektroniese kommunikasiemedie daartoe bygedra dat gebeure, ontwikkelings, krisis en oorloë binne 'n verbysterende kort tydjie, nie slegs aan miljoene mense bekend word in die sin dat hulle daarvan hoor of lees nie, maar ook visueel deur middel van 'n reprodutiewe massamedium soos televisie dit kan ervaar, en daaraan deelneem. Daar word dus tereg gesê dat die opkoms van die elektroniese media tot 'n „openbaarmaking van die diplomatie” gelei het. Die geweldige ontwikkeling van die nuus- en inligtingsmedia, het dus daartoe bygedra dat die verhoudings tussen state, uitgelig is uit die feitlik uitsluitlike sfeer van 'n relatief klein groepie van persone wat wedersyds na lande se buitelandse belange omgesien het, sonder dat die publiek skerp daarvan bewus was van wat daar in heirdie sfeer aangegaan het.

'n Tweede ontwikkeling wat die verhoudingssituasie tussen state beïnvloed het, is die feit dat die tegnologiese ontwikkeling van die

internasionale lugverkeer dit tans moontlik maak om letterlike miljoene mense, in 'n geweldige kort tydjie oor groot afstande te vervoer. Deur die massatoerisme van ons tyd is miljoene mense in 'n posisie om self eerstehandse of primêre indrukke van ander volke en state op te doen (hierdie indrukke mag natuurlik meesal oppervlakkig en feitlik altyd gestereotipeer wees). Deur heirdie primêre ervaring van ander mense en lande, gekoppel moet die groot hoeveelheid beskikbare inligting in die massamedia oor ander lande en mense, maak dit vir 'n regering al moeiliker om byvoorbeeld aan sy publiek te suggereer dat ander state of lande bepaalde oogmerke of doelstellings nastreef ten opsigte van die eie staat, eenvoudig omdat dit nie met die primêre ervaring van die eie publiek ten opsigte van die bepaalde ander staat mag ooreenstem nie.

Hierdie ontwikkelinge op grond van tegnologiese ontdekkings, te same met die geweldige vervlegting van die hedendaagse internasionale handel en die vooruitgang van die natuurwetenskap, het die klassieke diplomatie feitlik totaal ontgrens, in die sin dat dit vandag nie net nog maar gaan om die behartiging van 'n Staat se buitelandse belange nie, maar om veel breër veld van 'n groter aantal belange van 'n Staat in die buiteland. Diplomatie as die politieke kommunikasie tussen state het dus as gevolg van die ontwikkelinge hierbo geskets, gedeversifiseer en gespesialiseer geraak, daardeur dat dit nie meer net primêr op die politieke vlak plaasvind nie, maar daarbenewens op verskeie ander vlakke of raakpunte.

Hierdie ontwikkelinge is natuurlik nie altyd onproblematis nie. Waar die klassieke tussen-staatlike proses, beslissingsnemers tot 'n baie groot hoogte van die berigte van hulle verteenwoordigers in ander state, en hul interpretasie van gebeure afhanklik was, het die volume van beskikbare inligting soos dit in die nuus- en inligtingsmedia verskyn, so geweldig toegeneem dat hulle inligting en hulle interpretasie van gebeure en moontlike ontwikkeling 'n uiters belangrike bykomende inligtingsbron in enige besluitnemingsproses geword het! Omdat daar dus 'n groter hoeveelheid menings en interpretasies beskikbaar is van dikwels ingewikkelde internasionale samehange, lei dit egter veelal tot onsekerheid by beslissingsnemers, wat op sy beurt na 'n hernieude vraag na meer inligting lei, ten einde die onsekerheid te verminder en om moontlike toekomstige ontwikkelings vooruit te probeer bepaal.

Hieruit volg dat die effektiwiteit van kommunikasie tussen state afhang van die effektiwiteit waarmee beslissingsnemers wesenlike inligting ontvang, verwerk en interpreteer - inligting afkomstig van 'n groot aantal beskikbare bronne.

Daar dit verder vir kleiner en middelslag state nie altyd moontlik is om beslissingsnemers in ander lande direk via die normale diplomatieke kanale te bereik nie. (In die groot hoofstede van die wêreld is daar feitlik deurgaans meer as 100 diplomatieke sendings wat in hulle aktiwiteite almal gerig is op dieselfde relatief klein groepe van beslissingsnemers en opinieleiers) word daar gepoog om hulle op indirekte wyse te bereik daardeur dat inligting in sulke kanale ingevoer word soos die elitê dagblaaie en tydskrifte; belangegroepes, opinieleiers en selfs individue van wie daar aangeneem of vermoed word dat hulle as inligtingsbronne vir die beslissingsnemers onontbeerlik is. M.a.w. bepaalde inligting word in bepaalde kanale ingevoer in die hoop dat dit op een of ander stadium na 'n bepaalde beslissingsnemer(s) die weg sal vind, en in die toekoms 'n bepaalde effek of invloed mag uitoefen.

Hierdie metode word oor die algemeen in Wes-Europa en in Noord-Amerika gevolg waar daar 'n verskeidenheid van sulke kanale, en gevolglik 'n meningspluralisme bestaan, en waar daar dus 'n wisselwerking van idees en menings tussen individue en groepe binne die sogenaamde sone van politieke beslissing in land of gebied aangetref word. In lande waar die wye vloei van inligting en die wisselwerking van menings, deur wetgewing, tradisies, ideologië, vooroordele of owerheidsmanipulasie sterk beïnvloed word, word heirdie inligtingstegniek prakties nutteloos aangesien die sone van invloed daardeur geweldig vernou word. In sulke lande waar die meningsvloei en wisseling bewustelik aan beperkings onderworpe is, en waar die groep van opinieleiers neig om met die regering identies te wees, is die inligtingswerk soos heirbo beskryf byna 'n tevergeefse moeite. In samehang met die vloei van inligting en die graad van meningsvryheid, (dus ook persvryheid), ontstaan 'n interessante terugkoppelingseffek. In lande waar 'n meningsveelvoud bestaan, met ander woorde waar 'n beslissingsnemer 'n groot keuse van inligting het, ontstaan 'n duidelike versterkingsneiging, dit wil sê daar word steeds meer en meer vertroubare inligting in die beskikbare inligtingskanale in gevoer omdat die voorsieners van inligting die gevoel het dat 'n verskeidenheid van kanale ter beskikking is, wat oop is, en dat die inligting ook 'n wesenlike gedeelte van die ontvangers en/of teiken-gehoore bereik.

In lande waar 'n vrye vloei van inligting aan direkte of indirekte beperkings onderhewig is, gebeur net die teenoorgestelde, daar die voorsieners van inligting voel dat die beperkings dit nie die moeite werd maak om meer inligting in die kanale te plaas nie. Dit beteken dat in die meningspluralistiese lande 'n inligtingsplus heers, en dat die beskikbare inligtingsaanbod steeds groter word, terwyl in die lande waar beperkings op menings- en persvryheid heers daar 'n inligtingstekort bestaan wat neig om steeds akuter te word. Indien hiervan 'n normatiewe afleiding gemaak word sou mens dit ook soos volg kan formuleer naamlik: Hoe groter die meningsveelvoud, en hoe wyer die vloei van inligting, hoe beter die aanbod, kwantitatief en kwalitatief, en die verskeidenheid daarvan. Die teendeel lui dan: Hoe kleiner die meningsveelvoud, en hoe beperkter die vloei van inligting, hoe swakker word die aanbod en die eensydigheid daarvan.

In Suid-Afrika se kommunikasie met ander state word heirdie tendens duidelik weerspieël deur die aktiwiteite van die Departement van Inligting. Al die Departement se kantore in die buiteland bevind hulle, met een uitsondering in state waar 'n meningsveelvoud heers. In Suid-Afrika se internasionale kommunikasie vervul die Departement van Inligting dus 'n sleutelrol, aangesien hy by uitstek die taak het om die meningsveelvoude, opinieleiers, en invloedsgroepe te identifiseer, hulle relatiewe invloed te bepaal, en die inligtingskanale wat daar tussen hulle, en binnê hulle sones van politieke invloede bestaan, te open, en inligting daar in te voer, wat met die oog op die groot aantal vlakke waarop die wedersydse verkeer tussen state tans plaasvind, moontlik in die toekoms relevant kan wees.

Daar my referaat reeds vernou is tot die rol van my Departement in Suid-Afrika se kommunikasie met ander state wil ek afsluit met 'n paar opmerkings oor die effek wat die massamedia op S.A. se internasionale posisie gehad het - meer bepaald watter bydrae hulle gelewer het tot die beeld wat daar van S.A. in die buiteland bestaan.

Die geografiese struktuur van die wêreld bestaan vandag uit ongeveer 160 gebiede waarvan die meeste vandag as state beskryf word en wat outonoom is. Hierdie internasionale gemeenskap is op sy beurt verdeel in sogenaamde "topdog" state (die groot moondhede), en "underdog" state (die res). Elkeen van heirdie topdog state het onder hom, of rondom hom, 'n groep van underdog state wat polities, ekonomies, militêr, kultureel of geografies op een of ander wyse of graad van hom afhanklik is. Vir die V.S.A. is dit hoofsaaklik Latyns-Amerika en dele van die Verre-Ooste, vir Frankryk die Communauté Francais. Vir Groot-Brittanje die Britse Statebond, vir die Sowjet-Unie sy satelliet-state. As mens heirdie indeling nagaan, blyk dit duidelik dat ook die massamedia in 'n topdog staat onvergelykbaar meer berig oor persone en gebeure in die underdogstate van sy groep state as van ander gebiede. Ook die nuusmedia van die underdog state binne 'n bepaalde groepering berig meer oor hulle topdog land en oor mekaar as wat hulle van ander gebiede berig. Dit blyk duidelik daaruit dat daar veel meer berigte oor S.A. in die Britse, en die Statebond se massamedia verskyn as in ander state. Omgekeerd vind mens in die Suid-Afrikaans pers, beide Engels- en Afrikaanstalige pers, veel meer berigte uit die Engelssprekende dele van die wêreld as uit anderstalige gebiede.

Wanneer mens heirvandaan teruggaan na die spesifieke kenmerke van nuus, dan het dit 'n bepaalde uitwerking op die beeld van S.A. in die buitewêreld. Die volgende kenmerke of 'n kombinasie daarvan moet verkieslik in veral buitelandse nuusberigte voorkom.

Nuus oor die leidende persone in state. (Buitelandse nuus oor S.A. is dus byna altyd iets wat die Eerste Minister of 'n ander relatief bekende persoon gesê of gedoen bv, 'n hart wat prof. Barnard oorgeplant het).

Nuus van 'n negatiewe aard oor leidende persone m.a.w. 'n mag-skonflik (bv. meningsverskille of botsings tussen die Eerste Minister en die leier van die Opposisie, of tussen die Suid-Afrikaanse regering en die tuislandleiers.)

Nuus van 'n negatiewe aard oor 'n gebeurtenis m.a.w. 'n katastrofe (bv. 'n mynrampe, 'n ongeluk, 'n oorstroming).

Ander nuus van 'n onverwagte of buitengewone aard.

Byna alle nuusberigte oor Suid-Afrika in die buiteland bevat een of meer van die nuselemente wat ek pas genoem het, en die feit dat buitelandse massamedia juis met voorliefde reeds oor 'n tydperk van 25 jaar oor S.A. se beleid van Afsonderlike Ontwikkeling berig, is juis omdat dit volgens die vreemde nuusmedia, die latente moontlikheid van botsing of konflik bevat. Omdat heirdie beleid, weer eens volgens die nuusmedia, feitlik teen die sogenaamde wêreldmening van nie-diskriminasie indruis - omdat nie integrasie nie maar apartheid as grondslag het, is dit buitengewoon, uitsonderlik en daarom nuuswaardig. Dit verklaar dan ook waarom die reëlmatige voortontwikkeling van hierdie beleid nie interessant is nie, maar wel die problematiese aspekte van die beleid.

Maar nuus moet nie net by voorkeur oor leidende of bekende persone gaan nie, maar verkieslik ook nog oor sulke persone in leidende state, m.a.w. topdog state. Waar 'n gewone mens dus min geleentheid om die nuuskolomme te haal tensy hy iets buitengewoons aanvang, geld

dieselfde ook vir state. Gevolglik bestaan die meerderheid van nuus in die massamedia dus uit berigte oor leidende persone in leidende state.

Indien mens hierby nog die fisiese, psigiese en tegniese faktore tel waaraan nuus onderworpe is, en waaroor ek nie hier in besonderhede wil uitwei nie, dan het dit die volgende kumulatiewe uitwerking op S.A. se beeld in die buiteland:

Eerstens - omdat S.A. geografies afgeleë is van die massamedia van die Westerse wêreld, en nie onder die leidende moondhede tel nie, is die beriggewing oor die land sporadies en dikwels onsamehangend omdat dit aan 'n taamlik hoë graad van seldsaamheid of onverwagsheid moet voldoen, teneinde internasionale nuus te word.

Tweedens - omdat gebeure in S.A. in 'n afgeleë land plaasvind, moet die beriggewing by voorkeur ondubbelsinning en maklik verklaarbaar wees teneinde vir 'n leser in die buiteland wat S.A. nie ken nie, enigszins verstaanbaar te wees. Beriggewing moet dus vereenvoudig word.

Derdens - Nuus oor S.A. moet in 'n verwagtingskema pas. So sal 'n voorval in S.A. wat op 'n rassekonflik in 'n situasie dui, makliker tot nuus word, as 'n voorval of gebeurtenis wat op 'n goeie samewerking tussen rasse dui - die rede is dan dat 'n rassekonfliksituasie meer in die verwagtingskema van persone in die buitelandse massamedia pas. Rassespanning word 'n a-priori geloofwaardigheid verleen, terwyl rassesamewerking dikwels as 'n kwasi-gebeurtenis gesien word. Gevolglik ontstaan die beeld van S.A. as 'n afgeleë land, waar daar min verandering plaasvind en min vooruitgang is - waar daar na willekeur regeer word, waar dinge skielik en sonder samehang gebeur, en, waar hulle tóg plaasvind, dit die gevolg is van die manipulasies van die heersende groep.

Die vraag het moontlik nou al by u opgekom wat daar gedoen kan word om heirdie beeld van S.A. wat daar deur 'n groot deel van die massamedia aan die buitewêreld voorgehou word te verander. 'n Verandering lyk my op twee plekke moontlik te wees - 'n Verandering hier by ons, en 'n verandering by die massamedia in die buiteland. Die verandering hier by ons sal moet gaan in die rigting van 'n versnelde, 'n dramatiese versnelling, in die ontwikkeling en ontplooiing van die beleid van afsonderlike ontwikkeling - dit lyk my dat dit nog die oortuigendste argument gaan wees om die buitewêreld te oortuig van ons erns oor afsonderlike ontwikkeling. Daar is vir my ook tekens dat die kwaliteit van beriggewing, veral in die sogenaamde elite-dagblaaie van die wêreld, steeds aan die verbeter is. Dit is enersyds toe te skryf aan die invloed van die massamedium T.V. se invloed. Heirdie medium bereik van dag tot dag meer mense, maar vanweë sy vlugtigheid veroorsaak dit dat daar 'n steeds groter vraag ontstaan na die verklaring en in-perspektiefplasing van daardie gebeure wat die T.V. slegs vlugtig wees. Dit bring mee dat hierdie rol tot 'n not groter mate as tot dusver, deur goed opgeleide, ervare en wydereisde redakteurs en skrywers vervul moet word. Die kommunikasiekundige departemente aan Europese en Amerikaanse Universiteite kan heirdie mense lewer, en ons kan hulle ook in S.A. kry om hier persoonlike kennis en ervaring tekem versamel. Daardeur sou ons kan bereik dat beriggewing oor S.A., m.a.w. inligting wat ook die beslissingsnemers op internasionale vlak bereik, 'n sterker beklemtoning van die opbou en ontwikkeling in S.A. bevat, sodat gebeure in



S.A. nie net langer weerspieël word as 'n ketting van los dramitese gebeure nie, maar as 'n deurlopende ontwikkelingsproses. U sal egter gewis kan sê dat hierdie verklarende agtergrond materiaal in 'n elitê dagblad slegs deur 'n klein klompie mense gelees word, en dat die groot massa nie daarin belang sal stel nie. U is daarmee korrek, maar dan wil ek byvoeg dat diegene tot wie sulke inligting sal deurdring juis daardie mense is wat vandag aan die internasionale politiek sy dinamiek gee. Slegs daardie persone wat optimaal ingelig is, wat oor die agtergrondmateriaal vir al die moontlike alternatiewes beskik, is nog in staat om in die enorme kompleksiteit van die hedendaags internasionale politieke proses, en in die letterlike vloedglof van inligting, enigsins 'n oorsig te behou. Dit is daardie persone, en nie in die eerste plek die massa nie, wat ons moet probeer bereik.

Dr. Mulder is Hoof van Opleiding in die Departement van Inligting. Heirdie referaat is op 5 Desember 1973 by 'n vergadering van die Pretoria-tak van die Instituut gelewer.

### AUSTRALIA'S OVERSEAS AID

In the past two decades Australian assistance to developing countries has grown from about \$20,000,000 annually to more than \$200 million in 1972. Assistance in the form of money, materials, equipment, and technical advice now goes to many countries of the developing world, with the effort concentrated on Australia's neighbours in Asia and the South Pacific. In addition, people from Asia and Africa are taking training courses in Australia under another important sector of the nation's international assistance.

Australian financial aid is particularly valuable to developing countries because it is almost entirely in the form of direct grants which free the recipients of the heavy burden of loan and interest repayments. Australian technical aid is designed to help other nations help themselves, and some major successes have been recorded in projects associated with fields such as sheep breeding, road building and irrigation in which Australian technology excels. This article outlines recent developments in Australia's aid policies and programs.

In 1972 Australia's Official Development Assistance (ODA) was just over \$228 million, a 28 per cent increase over the previous year.<sup>+</sup> Expressed as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) this assistance was 0.61 per cent as against 0.52 per cent in 1971.<sup>++</sup> However, despite the substantial increase in ODA in 1972 there was a significant decrease in other official flows and in the net flow of private resources which led to a decrease in the total net flow of Australian financial resources to developing countries. For the first time since 1969 this fell below one per cent. The total flow for 1972 was \$354.2 million, or 0.95 per cent of GDP.

#### *Development Assistance Policy*

After the Labor Government assumed office in December 1972 it made a number of important development assistance policy decisions. The new Government decided that Australia would contribute to the UN Fund for Population Activities and the International Planned Parenthood Federation. The contributions were \$200,000 and \$100,000 respectively. This decision was taken in the light of the important role population programs have in the economic and social development of many developing countries. The Government also decided that Australia should contribute to the UN Educational and Training Program for Southern Africa (\$10,000), the UN Fund for Namibia (\$5,000) and the UN Trust Fund for South Africa (\$5,000).

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<sup>+</sup> Each year Australia submits a report of its aid record to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This article summarises the main features of the 1972 report. All figures quoted are for calendar years.

<sup>++</sup> Since 1972 official development assistance has been expressed as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product instead of Gross National Product.

On 24 May, 1973, in a statement to Parliament on International Affairs, the Foreign Minister said, inter alia:

The Government intends not only to expand present programs in Asia, the Pacific and Africa, but will be working towards an official aid target of 0.7 per cent of Gross National Product (GNP) by the end of the decade.

This target is in keeping with the aims of the International Strategy for the Second Development Decade<sup>+</sup> adopted unanimously in the United Nations General Assembly in October 1970 which states inter alia:

. . . Each economically advanced country will progressively increase its official development assistance to the developing countries and will exert its best efforts to reach a minimum net amount of 0.7 per cent of its Gross National Product at market prices by the middle of the decade.

With regard to aid projects the Government has decided that in future greater social orientation and emphasis will be given. On 7 June, in a statement to the Ministerial Council Meeting of the OECD, the Australian Treasurer said:

We will place greater emphasis on projects that have greater social welfare, employment and distributional effects. Our aim will be to have more Australian aid projects in rural areas with greater mass participation and benefit.

#### *Aid Administration*

In April 1972 the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs set up a Sub-Committee to study Australia's aid policies and programs against the background of their historical and international setting. The enquiry and debate generated a high level of public interest. The report of the Sub-Committee, which has been laid before Parliament, has yet to be considered by the Government.

The Sub-Committee concluded, inter alia, that the organisational structure of Australian aid administration needed to be reviewed in the light of increased complexities and sophistication of development assistance and to accommodate the administration of aid to an independent Papua New Guinea. Accordingly it recommended:

That consideration be given either to the strengthening of the Aid Branch of the Department of Foreign Affairs to administer all aid, including multilateral aid and aid to an independent Papua New Guinea, or to the establishment of an authority responsible to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Subsequently, at the direction of the Prime Minister, a Task Force comprising representatives of the Departments of Foreign Affairs, External Territories, Education and the Treasury investigated and reported on the options available to the Government for the future organisation of Australian aid programs.

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<sup>+</sup> See 'Current Notes', November 1970.

### *Assistance Programming*

To assist recipient countries' development planning Australia has committed itself to various programs of assistance extending over several years. Papua New Guinea has been given an assurance of continuing aid over the three-year period of its Improvement Program beginning in 1974-75. A second three-year program for Indonesia amounting to \$69,000,000 began in July 1973. In July 1972 a three and a half year program of \$15,000,000 began for South Pacific countries. Allocations of expenditure under all of these programs are subject to continuing negotiation with the recipients.

Australian aid is given in response to requests from recipient countries. Through consultation the requests for assistance are harmonised with the recipients' own development plans and other assistance being given to that country and are related to Australia's ability to meet the request. In addition, Australia is a member of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) consultative groups for Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Korea and Sri Lanka, the South Pacific Commission, the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia and the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research through which it attempts to harmonise its assistance with that of other donors.

### *Financial Terms of Australia's Aid*

Australia continued to provide almost all of its aid in grant form. This avoids contributing to the serious problem of growing debt burden which confronts many developing countries. An exception is a loan of \$3,000,000 to the Administration of Papua New Guinea to enable the Investment Corporation of Papua New Guinea to purchase from the Australian Government its shareholding in Commonwealth New Guinea Timbers Ltd. In 1972 Australia also offered a loan of \$2,280,000 to Fiji to help finance reconstruction of the Nadi-Suva road in conjunction with the IBRD and New Zealand.

A proportion of Australian aid is tied to the purchase of goods and services in Australia. However, a certain amount of flexibility is exercised and some items not available in Australia are purchased elsewhere. Financial assistance to Papua New Guinea, which constitutes the largest portion of bilateral ODA, is not tied in this way.

Australia has participated actively in discussions in the Development Assistance Committee on the Draft Agreement on Untying. Australia has agreed to new arrangements with UNWRA whereby our contribution has been completely untied and with UNICEF where the requirement for tied aid has been reduced from 80 to 50 per cent.

Australia's project aid is normally a joint undertaking with the recipient government which involves maximum mutual co-operation between the donor and the recipient. Local costs are met by the recipient whilst Australia meets the foreign exchange costs and supplies the technical expertise.

As distinct from project aid Australia has made substantial contributions to the availability of local revenue for development proposals through the provision of food aid and participation in foreign exchange and budget support programs. In 1972 Australia's food aid and budgetary support assistance totalled \$21,830,000, nearly 10 per cent of bilateral aid.

### *Geographic Distribution*

In 1972 Australia's bilateral aid was distributed as follows:

|                  |    |    |    | \$A<br>million | %           |
|------------------|----|----|----|----------------|-------------|
| Europe           | .. | .. | .. | 0.01           | -           |
| Africa           | .. | .. | .. | 1.20           | 0.6         |
| America          | .. | .. | .. | 0.04           | -           |
| Middle East      | .  | .. | .. | 0.08           | -           |
| India            | .. | .. | .. | 0.26           | 0.1         |
| Pakistan         | .. | .. | .. | 1.35           | 0.6         |
| Bangladesh       | .. | .. | .. | 8.26           | 3.8         |
| Indonesia        | .. | .. | .. | 20.52          | 9.5         |
| Malaysia         | .. | .. | .. | 2.86           | 1.3         |
| Thailand         | .. | .. | .. | 3.62           | 1.7         |
| Viet-Nam         | .. | .. | .. | 4.08           | 1.9         |
| Other Asia       | .. | .. | .. | 10.49          | 4.8         |
| Papua New Guinea | .. | .. | .. | 163.23         | 75.2        |
| Other Oceania    | .. | .. | .. | 1.18           | 0.5         |
|                  |    |    |    | <hr/> 217.17   | <hr/> 100.0 |

Australia's aid thus continues to be concentrated on countries in Asia and the Pacific region. Papua New Guinea is the major recipient of bilateral aid, receiving \$163,230,000 or 75 per cent of total aid in 1972.

### *Assistance to Papua New Guinea*

The administration of Australia's assistance to Papua New Guinea has been primarily the responsibility of the Department of External Territories.

Up to 1970-71 financial assistance took the form of a lump cover grant as general assistance to finance the annual Papua New Guinea budget. Since July 1970 the Australian Government has adopted the policy of directly financing the bulk of the personal emoluments of expatriate public servants employed by the Papua New Guinea Government, and of progressively channelling the remainder of its aid mainly to development projects and other specific forms of aid rather than to a grant-in-aid for general budget support.

Australian technical assistance to Papua New Guinea is provided principally through Australian personnel employed permanently on a fixed contract in the PNG Public Service.

In 1972, 303 Papua New Guineans received training in Australia of whom 165 received training under the Practical Training Scheme and 138 at the Australian School of Pacific Administration. In the period to self-government the emphasis is to be on administrative and specialised training to indigenous officers to enable accelerated advancement within the Papua New Guinea Public Service. A further 281 Papua New Guineans were trained in Australia at other than Australian Government expense. Most of these attended schools and a few attended universities and other tertiary institutions. These students include those sponsored by the PNG Government, by awards such as WHO scholarships and by private organisations and individuals.

An amount of \$450,000 has been appropriated in the 1972-73 Australian budget for the training of Papua New Guineans under the Practical Training Scheme and \$500,000 for training at the Australian School of Pacific Administration.

#### *Food Aid*

In 1972 Australia provided food aid worth \$15,520,000 to eight countries and the World Food Program. The largest recipients were Bangladesh (\$4,920,000), Indonesia (\$6,730,000) and Pakistan (\$1,170,000).

Under the Food Aid Convention of the International Wheat Agreement, Australia undertook to supply 225,000 metric tons of wheat (or its equivalent in flour) each year to developing countries for three years beginning in 1971-72.

In 1972-73, special needs were met in Bangladesh with a larger than normal allocation of 66,600 metric tons. Food aid was supplied to the Philippines for the first time in 1971-72 and it received a similar allocation in 1972-73.

#### *Emergency Relief*

The Australian Government's response to the Bangladesh crisis took the form of food aid valued at \$4,920,000 and the expenditure during 1972 of \$3,300,000 on rehabilitation and relief aid.

During 1972 Australia contributed \$250,000 to famine relief in the Papua New Guinea Highlands, \$20,000 to the Philippines (typhoon disaster), \$25,000 to Fiji and Gilbert and Ellice Islands (hurricane 'Bebe') and \$20,000 to Vietnam as part of the refugee relief effort. In addition to the normal contribution of \$263,000 for UNHCR during 1972, commitments for and additional \$113,000 were entered into to assist in the care, maintenance and resettlement of displaced persons from Uganda.

#### *Project Aid*

Project aid continues to place emphasis on telecommunications, road construction, systems of water reticulation and assistance to agriculture. Most projects are long term, and spread over a number of years. While projects of

this type will continue to play an important role in Australia's aid programs, increased emphasis will be placed on those which have greater social welfare, employment and distributional effects. For example, the forthcoming 'Improvement Program' in co-operation with the Government of Papua New Guinea will be directed towards the achievement of greater economic equality, self-reliance and rural improvement.

A number of projects initiated and under consideration in 1972 were concerned with agriculture. For example, in India, assistance is being given to the establishment of an Indo-Australian dairy cattle breeding farm at Hissar and an Indo-Australian deep frozen semen centre at Gauhati. The experimental sheep breeding and demonstration centre already established at Hissar is currently Australia's biggest project in India. In Indonesia, Australian scientists together with Indonesian authorities are preparing to establish an Animal Research Institute at Bogor.

Other major Australian projects being considered involve assistance in the development and management of water resources in Indonesia and Malaysia. In Indonesia the feasibility of a scheme to develop irrigation and water storage facilities in the Serayu River Basin in south central Java was studied by the Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation and their proposals are now being examined by the Indonesian Government. Similarly Australian experts have undertaken a study of the Pahang River Basin in Peninsular Malaysia to encompass a master plan for water use and measures for flood mitigation in the light of present and future socio-economic developments in the region.

In South Viet-Nam some emphasis has continued to be given to town water supplies where a number of new schemes have been proposed. These include a water supply scheme for Da Nang and Vung Tau and the provision of pipes, fittings, water meters and valves for improvements and extensions by the Directorate of Water Supply and the Saigon Metropolitan Water Office. Equipment and expert assistance is also being provided for extensions and improvements to electricity distribution systems and telecommunications in South Viet-Nam.

### *Training*

About 2,000 overseas students, including trainees from Papua New Guinea and those financed by UN agencies or their own governments undertook international training courses in Australia in 1972. Only a minority attended universities and other tertiary educational institutions for formal academic courses. International training has tended to move towards informal short courses and ad hoc training in Australian departments and other organisations. This trend reflects the preferences and needs of recipient governments. Twenty-six International Training Courses were organised by the Department of Foreign Affairs. The holding of the first course in Health and Hospital Administration led to a significant increase in the total number of trainees in the medicine and health field. For the first time, Australia co-operated with New Zealand in conducting two International Training Courses, undertaking part of the two courses in each country.

More than 30,000 private students from developing countries have studied in Australia since 1950 and about 20,000 of these have returned home on completing their studies. Almost 1,000 arrive each year. Some attend private schools and colleges whilst others go to schools, universities and other institutions subsidised by government funds. In 1972 this cost represented an addition of about \$11,250,000 to expenditure on the normal aid program.

Provision is also made for a limited amount of training in third countries such as Papua New Guinea, Thailand and at the University of the South Pacific. In 1972 the first grant of \$5,000 was given to the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines to finance scholarships for participation in the Institute's training programs.

#### *Technical Assistance*

Whenever circumstances are appropriate, technical assistance and capital aid are integrated as fully as possible. A typical major project in the Australian program is one in which Australian experts and equipment are used to fill a gap in the available resources of the recipient country. The experts have an important training function as well as a purely construction one, and arrangements are made for local counterpart staff to receive training in Australia and return to play a more effective part in the project.

As aid projects in the aid program increase in number and complexity greater use is being made of the services of private Australian consulting firms. A number of these now has extensive experience and expertise in Asia.

#### *Assistance to Research*

Australia has provided assistance to agricultural research institutions such as the Chainat Research Station in Thailand with research into agricultural problems connected with the extension of irrigation, the Central Arid Zone Research Institute in India and the Institutes for Animal Health and Animal Virology in Indonesia. Research activities are also taking place at sheep breeding projects in India and Korea, with the basic aim of upgrading herds and adapting them to local conditions.

In India an important agricultural research project involves co-operation in soils analysis between the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and the Indian Council for Agricultural Research. Australia has also been engaged in a project for the use of atomic absorption spectrophotometers in nine agricultural research centres in India to speed up analysis of mineral plant and soil samples.

In the Philippines, Australia has undertaken to design and supply a phytotron for use by the International Rice Research Institute. This unit will enable the Institute to expand its research work in developing new and improved rice varieties.



### *Multilateral Aid*

Australia's multilateral aid increased from \$10,000,000 in 1971 to \$11,140,000 in 1972. This aid accounted for less than five per cent of official development assistance. Although multilateral disbursements are relatively small these will grow as Australia fulfils forward commitments to the International Development Association and Asian Development Bank.

During the year Australia made a further payment of \$US250,000 to the Asian Development Bank's Technical Assistance Special Fund. Australia also agreed to contribute the full amount of its subscription to the increase in the Bank's authorised capital in each of three years 1973 to 1975. Australia paid its first instalment of the capital increase amounting to \$US3,700,000 in cash and \$US5,500,000 in the form of promissory notes in April 1973.

In December 1972 Australia made a second instalment contribution to the International Development Association. Australia's voluntary contribution of \$US16,000,000 has been credited against Australia's obligations under the Agreement.

### *Voluntary Aid*

The total flow of private resources to developing countries was \$122.3 million in 1972. The largest component of this was direct private investment which amounted to \$75,900,000.\*

The Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) which is an officially supported co-ordinating organisation for voluntary aid agencies reported that its members contributed \$14,600,000 in 1972. Bangladesh, India, Indonesia and South Viet-Nam were the major recipients. The Council in furtherance of educational and research activities has established a Resource and Research Centre at its National Headquarters.

Australia's only national program of overseas voluntary service, Australian Volunteers Abroad (AVA) had 130 volunteers in service. Volunteers have worked in Asia, Africa and the Pacific and included secondary and tertiary teachers, engineers, medical staff, agriculturalists, and social workers. Volunteers assist experienced workers in existing institutions and projects where there are not yet enough local people trained to carry out the same task and are employed by overseas governments and community groups at the local level of income or lower.

Missions operating in Papua New Guinea have made an important contribution to the development of that country.

In 1972 the Action for World Development Campaign of the Australian Council for Churches and the Catholic Church did much to stimulate public interest in development and aid matters and presented a number of petitions urging the Australian Government to increase its level of official aid.

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\* For the financial year 1971-72.

*The Future*

Australia's participation in the process of world development will continue to be an important aspect of its relations with other countries, particularly with those of Asia and the Pacific. By focussing on this region where needs are great, Australia believes it is making a more meaningful contribution than would be the case if its resources were spread more thinly over a wider area.

Australia's aid is vitally important to the Papua New Guinea development program and budget and is likely to continue for some time to be a major sustaining force of the economy of that Country. The Australian Prime Minister has indicated that Papua New Guinea will continue to have first call on Australia's foreign aid program. Indonesia, with a further three-year program, beginning in July 1973 will also continue to receive a large proportion of development assistance.

Australia's continuing responsibilities in these areas, and the demands of post-war reconstruction in Indochina indicate that a high level of assistance will be maintained.

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B R I E F R E P O R T S / K O R T V E R S L A E

- Voorberei deur die Instituut se Personeel -  
- Prepared by the Institute's Staff -

*Commonwealth Conference, 1973*

The 19th Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference since World War II took place in Ottawa from 2 to 10 August, 1973. Leaders from all but one of the 33 Commonwealth Governments were present. (The exception was Nauru which does not attend Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conferences. Since the Singapore Conference in January 1971 the Commonwealth has been joined by two new members, Bangladesh and the Bahamas, and one state has left, namely Pakistan.)

There was some dissatisfaction at the Singapore Conference in 1971, regarding conference procedure and with the tendency of leaders to make set speeches designed after for release to the press and for home consumption, the informality and intimacy of previous small conferences was adversely affected. It was agreed therefore that before the next Conference the question of procedure should be carefully examined. As a result the procedure at the Ottawa Conference appears to have been improved, according to the *communiqué* issued on 10 August:

Having agreed to new procedures designed to ensure informality and free discussion, the leaders put aside set-piece speeches and addressed themselves directly both to each other and to the pressing questions before the meeting. When unanimous agreement was not possible, mutual understanding of conflicting viewpoints was achieved. It was agreed that in this regard the meeting established a most useful precedent for future Commonwealth consultations. The Commonwealth had been greatly strengthened by the event and heads of government were heartened by this.

At a press conference on 9 August the British Prime Minister, Mr. Heath, gave his assessment of the Conference as follows:

This Conference has been good value. It has been positive, it has been constructive, and it has given the Heads of Government the opportunity individually, in some cases collectively, to discuss how some problems can be solved. A Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference today is not the occasion when we reach firm conclusions or take decisions or formulate policies. What happens is that by listening to each other we influence each other, and this is later on reflected in the policies which are followed by individual Governments.

Among the many international issues discussed at the Conference, the following issues received special attention:

*French nuclear tests:* This question was brought before the Conference by the New Zealand Prime Minister, Mr Kirk, supported by the Australian Prime Minister, Mr Whitlam. After a lengthy discussion, the Conference avoided condemnation of France, but agreed to a statement reaffirming 'unfailing support' for the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the concern of the governments to ensure its universal observance, as well as appealing to all powers to take up as an urgent task the negotiation of a new agreement banning all nuclear tests in all environments.

*Southern Africa:* The Conference expressed 'intense concern' with the situation in Rhodesia, as well as appreciation of the efforts which the British Government had been making towards finding a solution. The Conference also discussed how Commonwealth countries, especially those with economic interests in Southern Africa, might best bring influence to bear to promote change. The *communiqué* recorded that:

Heads of Government reviewed the efforts of the indigenous people of the territories in southern Africa to achieve self-determination and independence and agreed on the need to give every humanitarian assistance to all those engaged in such efforts. The British Government reserved its position in relation to the last proposal in circumstances in which assistance might be converted into military purposes.

*International economic relations:* As recorded in the *communiqué*, the Conference discussed a wide variety of issues under this heading, including links with the enlarged European Economic Community, development assistance and the role of private foreign investment.

This was the first Commonwealth Conference to be held following *Britain's accession to the European Economic Community*. The following comment on this question is taken from *Overseas Review* (No. 87, October, 1973), published in London by the Conservative Political Centre:<sup>+</sup>

If it (the Conference) showed one thing it was that this major development in Europe, far from detracting from the importance of the Commonwealth to Britain or vice-versa, has invigorated Commonwealth relations and has given a new relevance to Commonwealth exchanges of the kind that took place in Ottawa.

Some had feared that EEC entry would lead to a substantial loosening, if not a severing, of Britain's links with Commonwealth countries. This was a groundless fear once the negotiations had successfully produced arrangements which protected Commonwealth economic interests and paved

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<sup>+</sup> The quotations above are also taken from the same issue of *Overseas Review*.

the way for a new relationship between Commonwealth countries and the enlarged Community. As political organisms the Commonwealth and the EEC are entirely different and not mutually exclusive, as has many times been pointed out. Whether Britain, once in the EEC, remained actively interested in the Commonwealth was therefore basically a question of political will on the part of this country, and there should never have been any doubt that this existed.

It is of no small importance to Commonwealth countries what sort of relationship they themselves establish with the enlarged Community. What objectives individual Commonwealth countries wish to pursue in contacts with the EEC is obviously for them as independent countries to determine, as is the question of how they conduct their negotiations. Britain is not negotiating on their behalf. At the same time Commonwealth countries know that in Britain they have an EEC member who is sympathetic to their needs and preoccupations. And they know that on the wider issues of international trade and economics, where the EEC is today such an important factor, they are talking to a country which has a major influence on EEC decisions.

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### *The Energy Crisis*

#### *(a) Oil Reserves*

The following table gives a list of countries with largest known oil reserves. (The figures are for the last full year available.)

|                           | <i>Reserves</i>                  | <i>Production</i> | <i>1971 Wells Drilled</i> |
|---------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------|
|                           | <i>(Millions of Metric Tons)</i> |                   |                           |
| Saudi Arabia              | 20 945                           | 429               | 63                        |
| USSR                      | 10 200                           | 394               | 11 061                    |
| Kuwait                    | 9 459                            | 160               | 16                        |
| Iran                      | 8 783                            | 291               | 20 plus                   |
| United States             | 6 116                            | 552               | 29 325                    |
| Iraq                      | 4 840                            | 84                | 17                        |
| Libya                     | 4 000                            | 132               | 87                        |
| United Arab Emirates      | 2 716                            | 51                | 44                        |
| Peoples Republic of China | 2 700                            | 25                | (not available)           |
| Venezuela                 | 1 984                            | 185               | 506                       |
| Algeria                   | 1 590                            | 36                | 109                       |
| Nigeria                   | 1 579                            | 75                | 55 plus                   |
| Indonesia                 | 1 400                            | 47                | 287 plus                  |
| Canada                    | 1 368                            | 66                | 3 097                     |

#### *(b) The Search for Oil*

The rise in prices for energy have spurred on extensive search for oil and natural gas in the United States, the North Sea, Africa, Indonesia and

other parts of the world. The Arab oil embargo has added urgency to this search.

An estimated 1 400 million dollars a year was spent for oil exploration in the three years in 1968-70 by non-communist nations. The American Petroleum Institute has said that almost 200 times that amount will be needed for exploration in the next 10 years -- much of it in the United States. Nearly all the favourable regions of the non-communist world are being explored by the oil companies, according to the vice-president of the Standard Oil Company of California. He has said that: "In recent years my company, for example, has been exploring in some 40 countries on six continents."

More wells are drilled each year in the United States than in all other countries combined -- partly because the United States uses about one-third of all the oil consumed on earth. Of the shores of the United States more than 900 wells a year are drilled, more than all the offshore wells drilled in the rest of the world. Nearly all of these have so far been in the Gulf of Mexico, and it is considered that the greatest unexplored potential for discovery still lies offshore. Approximately 17 per cent of all oil produced comes from offshore wells, and that amount is expected to rise to 30 per cent by 1980.

An American petroleum analyst has commented that the North Sea "is the biggest exploration play to hit the oil industry since the Middle East", and a U.S. oil executive has said the biggest efforts at present are being made in the North Sea and also in Indonesia. North Sea oil and gas could supply over 15% of West Europe's energy needs by 1985, according to some authorities. Britain already obtains 90% of its natural gas from the North Sea, and by 1980 it expects to obtain half its oil from there. The British North Sea and the Sirte Basin in Libya are said to be among the most rapid in production growth.

Indonesia accounted for about half of all the oil produced in the Far East, while the People's Republic of China produced one-fourth. Indonesia was called "a major hope of oilmen" in a Wall Street Journal article which added that Indonesia is "coming of age in its long-promised oil boom". Indonesian output is expected to reach 47 million metric tons in 1973, and an estimated 1 400 million more tons is recoverable.

Offshore drilling rigs are probing the African continental shelf. Nigerian production (the largest in Black Africa) jumped from 8 million tons in 1968 to 75 million tons in 1971. Oil is also produced in Angola, and other African countries, where there is some production or where discoveries have been registered, include the Congo (Brazzaville), Cameroun, Gabon and Zaire.

The East China Sea has been called a potentially prolific oil area, with exploration at present being undertaken in Korea, Thailand, South Vietnam and the Philippines.

The search in Australia has been productive - Barrow Island and Bass Strait fields are expected to produce up to 70 percent of the country's needs. Lately, the northwest coast has been the site of drilling. New Zealand is also exploring.

Venezuela produces twice as much oil as all other Latin American nations combined. In Venezuela more wells were drilled in 1972 than in any of the past 10 years. There was a dramatic increase in production in 1972 in Ecuador, plus significantly higher volumes in Bolivia and Trinidad, as well as smaller increases for Peru and Argentina.

In Canada there are still potentially large oil reserves which are mostly undeveloped.

The United States Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Mr. William J. Casey, has commented that the task of finding the needed quantities of oil throughout the world is not an impossible one, "but it is one which will require huge amounts of capital, effort and goodwill, if it is to be achieved in a stable and secure manner."

The data and viewpoints given in the above two brief reports (a) and (b) are taken from "USA News Digest", Vol. 12 No. 48, 28 November, 1973.

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*Australian Policy towards Uganda, Portugal and Rhodesia*

In September, 1973, in the Australian Senate, the Minister representing the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Senator the Hon. D.R. Willesee) was asked the following questions by Senator Rae:

(1) Will the Minister make a statement to Parliament outlining Australia's attitude to the following actions of the Government of Uganda - (a) the expulsion of Asian residents, (b) the expropriation of their property, (c) the apparent persecution of Asian and other minority groups in that country, and (d) allegations of mass murder and executions.

(2) Will he also make a statement of Australia's attitude and policy towards the Governments of Mozambique and Rhodesia, and allegations made in relation to the alleged persecution of

minorities in those countries.

(3) If such statements are made, will the Minister endeavour to outline the actions taken by the Australian Government in the United Nations Organisation and elsewhere in relation to each of the three Governments referred to, and the distinctions justifying any differences in the policy adopted by Australia in relation to those nations and their Governments.

On 12 September, Senator Willesee gave the following replies:

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has supplied the following answer to the Honourable Senator's question:

It is not proposed to make a general statement to Parliament on the matters raised by the Honourable Senator, but the following information is provided in respect of each of the points raised by him:

(1) (a) (b) (c) and (d): Although the Australian Government deplores recent events in Uganda, the internal affairs of that country are not the direct concern of the Australian Government, especially as no Australian citizens have been involved.

(2) Southern Rhodesia is a British colony whose rebel regime has been the subject of mandatory sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council. Australia has therefore denied the regime any form of recognition or assistance and has been scrupulous in observing its sanctions obligations. Australia supports the British Government's Five Principles for a settlement of the Rhodesian problem, especially the Fifth Principle, namely that the British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. Meanwhile, the British Government remains constitutionally responsible for all the people of Rhodesia. The Government deplores, of course, the illegal regime's discriminatory policies against the Asian minority as much as it deplores the exercise of such policies against the African majority. Australia considers that the Portuguese territories in Africa are *de facto* colonies whose aspirations for independence on the basis of majority rule by the indigenous people should be recognised. The Government is not aware of any recent allegations of the persecution of minorities in Mozambique. If the allusion is to the recent allegations of massacres by Portuguese forces, the Government has no evidence either to prove or disprove the specific allegations that have been made. The Government believes, however, that if Portugal wishes to clear itself of these charges, it should heed the call of the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonisation to allow competent United Nations authorities to undertake an impartial on-the-spot investigation. This call was supported by Australia.

(3) The Ugandan question has not been raised at the United Nations and Australia does not intend to take any initiatives in that regard. On the other hand, the questions of Rhodesia and the Portuguese African territories have been raised and are the



subject of intense concern at the United Nations where Australia has enunciated the policies described in (2) above.

*(Australian Foreign Affairs Record, Sept. 1973)*

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### *Israel's Relations with Black Africa*

#### *(a) Breaking of Diplomatic Relations*

In 1971 Israel had diplomatic relations with 31 Black African States. The following chronological list gives the states which have broken relations during 1972 and 1973, the crucial date being 6 October, 1973, when the fourth Arab-Israel war broke out.

|      |           |  |
|------|-----------|--|
| 1972 | March     | Uganda   |
|      | November  | Chad   |
|      | December  | Congo (Brazzaville)  |
| 1973 | January   | Niger, Mali  |
|      | May       | Burundi  |
|      | September | Togo   |
|      | October   | (4th October) - Zaire  |
|      | October   | (after 6 October) Rwanda, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Tanzania, Madagascar, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Zambia, The Gambia, Senegal, Ghana, Gabon, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Ivory Coast. |
|      | November  | Botswana.  |

At the end of 1973 there were four Black African states which still maintained diplomatic relations with Israel:

Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Swaziland.

#### *(b) O.A.U. Statement*

At the Rabat summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity in 1972 an anti-Israel resolution was adopted. At the summit meeting in Addis Ababa in May, 1973, the final communique included a general pledge of African solidarity with the Arabs. Members unanimously stood behind the "legitimate struggle to recover all occupied Arab land and to safeguard the rights of the Palestinian people", and they condemned "organised Israeli obstruction" of all efforts towards peace as well as its "negative attitude" to the initiative launched by ten Arab heads of state. The communique, noting Israel's non-compliance with UN and OAU resolutions and its expansionist

designs on Arab territories, declared that its "obstinacy and refusal to abide by the will of the international community constitutes a challenge to the security of the continent". Israel was enabled to persist in this defiance by virtue of the military, political and economic backing extended by certain foreign governments.

The OAU delegates undertook not to recognise any changes in the occupied territories "leading to *fait accompli* or which are likely to endanger the unity of the countries that are victims of the Israeli aggression", and warned that "Israel's attitude might prompt the member states to take political and economic measures, collectively or individually, in accordance with the charters of the OAU and the UN". Members would in any case continue to give support, "positive, active and effective, until all Arab lands occupied in the war of June, 1967 are liberated".

(*African Research Bulletin*, Vol. 10 No. 10, 15 November, 1973, pages 3023 C and 3024 A.)

(c) *Zambian Statement on Relations with Chile and Israel*

The following press release (No. 51/73) was issued by the Zambia Information Services on 26 October, 1973:

Zambia has broken off diplomatic relations with Chile and Israel. A spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said today that the Government of the Republic of Zambia had followed the developments in Chile since the military coup on 11th September and the brutal assassination of President Salvador Allende Gossens. Zambia, like all progressive countries, deploras these developments which constitute a set-back to the Chilean revolution.

Briefly giving the background to the decision to break off with Israel, the spokesman recalled the developments since the 1967 Arab/Israeli conflict. The Arab countries concerned, he pointed out, had consistently sought a peaceful and just solution to the Middle-East problem in the content and in compliance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967. They co-operated fully with the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring.

On her part, Zambia has not only followed the developments but also consistent with the Organization for African Unity 1971 decision by which a committee of ten Heads of State was created, has earnestly tried to play her part, the spokesman went on. Most regrettably, there has been no positive response from Israel, and the net result has been the current tragic hostilities which had been inevitable in the circumstances, he said. The latest Israeli communications show that Israel's negative and arrogant attitude remains basically unchanged, the spokesman said.

The spokesman also recalled a warning by His Excellency the President that Israel should not assume that the Arab countries would always remain weak. The courage with which the Arab countries have waged their battles in the present conflict confirms the President's view, the spokesman pointed out.

Zambia, he concluded, would always stand on the side of peace, justice and fair play. It condemns and will always condemn the acquisition of territory by force.

(d) *Trade Figures, 1969 -- 1972*

Prior to the extensive breaking of diplomatic relations in 1973, the balance of trade with African states was as follows:

|                           | 1969                       | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 |
|---------------------------|----------------------------|------|------|------|
|                           | <i>millions of dollars</i> |      |      |      |
| Israeli exports to Africa | 34.2                       | 41.5 | 47.0 | 45.1 |
| African exports to Israel | 31.2                       | 29.9 | 25.0 | 31.7 |

(Figures taken from *Africa Research Bulletin*, Vol.10, No. 10, 15 November, 1973, page 3024 A. No indication given as to whether or not trade with South Africa is included.)

SOME RECENT ACQUISITIONS IN THE LIBRARY AT JAN SMUTS HOUSE

ADAM, H., ed  
South Africa : sociological perspectives. Oxford University Press,  
1971.

BARRIE, G.N.  
Die betekenis van die internasionale lugvaartreg vir Suid-Afrika.  
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Foreign resources and economic development: a symposium on the  
report of the Pearson Commission. Cass., 1972.

The CHANGING balance of power in the Persian Gulf: the report of an  
International Seminar at the Center for Mediterranean Studies,  
Rome, June 26th to July 1st, 1972. American Universities Field  
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Does God say Kill? An investigation of the justice of current  
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H. Koenigsberger and others. International Urbanization Survey,  
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Ford Foundation, 1972.
- KAHN, H.  
Things to come: thinking about the seventies and eighties.  
Macmillan, 1972.
- KEITH, K.J., ed.  
Defence perspectives: papers read at the 1972 Otago Foreign  
Policy School. Price Milburn for the New Zealand Institute of  
International Affairs, 1972.
- KEITH, K.J.  
International implications of race relations in New Zealand. New  
Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1972.
- LARSEN, K.S.  
Aggression and social cost. Canadian Peace Research Institute, 1973.
- LEA, J.P.  
Underlying determinants of housing location: a case study from  
Swaziland, 1973.
- SALTMAN, J.  
The economic consequences of disarmament. Canadian Peace Research  
Institute, 1972.
- SERETSE KHAMA, African Chief  
Botswana - a developing democracy in Southern Africa. Scandanavian  
Institute of African Studies, 1970.
- SIMMANCE, A.J.F.  
Urbanization in Zambia. International Urbanization Survey, Ford  
Foundation, 1972.

1972/1973 INSTITUTE PUBLICATIONS AVAILABLE

The following occasional papers issued during 1972 and 1973 are available:

Chinese Foreign Policy, W.A.C. Adie

Southern Africa: Intra-Regional and International Relations, John Barratt

Southern African Voting Patterns in the United Nations General Assembly, 1971 and 1972, David Hirschmann

Economic problems and policies of South Africa's neighbouring black African States (2nd printing), G.M.E. Leistner

Some Reflections on the General World Situation, Charles Malik

Peking and Moscow: The Permanence of Conflict, Stefan T. Possony

The Bridge and the Laager (Student Essay) South Africa's Relations with Africa, with Specific Reference to Malawi, David C. Preiss

U.S. Foreign Policy toward Southern Africa: Continuity and Change, John Seiler

Rhodesia Quo Vadis? The Rt.Hon. Sir Roy Welensky K.C.M.G.

The Roots of American Foreign Policy, Robin W. Winks

Questions Affecting South Africa at the United Nations, 1971

Questions Affecting South Africa at the United Nations, 1972

The price of these papers is 30c each.

Members of the Institute may request copies of occasional papers at no charge to them, provided such requests are received within a reasonable time after the papers are issued. Information about recently issued papers is always given in the *Newsletter*.

NEWS FROM THE BRANCHES / NUUS VAN DIE TAKKE

EASTERN PROVINCE

The following speakers addressed meetings of the Branch during the past year:

- |                    |  |
|--------------------|--|
| Mr. C.J.A. Barratt | on "The War in Mocambique"                         |
| Mr. John Seiler    | on "The American pre-occupation with South Africa" |

STELLENBOSCH

Vergaderings is gedurende 1973 deur die volgende persone toegespreek:

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| Mnr. G. Hilterman                         | oor "Wendinge in die Internasionale Politiek"                          |
| Mr. John P. Mackintosh -<br>M.P. (Labour) | on " Britain and the Commonwealth"                                     |
| Professor Robin Winks                     | on "The Current Revolution in the USA"                                 |
| Filmvertoning:                            | The Wall of Shame (Berlin)<br>The Common Market<br>The 20th July 1944. |

CAPE TOWN

The following speakers addressed meetings during 1973:

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| Mrs. Catherine Taylor M.P.              | on "Whither America?"   |
| Mr. R.R. Gosende                        | on "The Mechanics of American Foreign Policy"                   |
| Mr. I.F.A. (Derick) de<br>Villiers M.P. | on "Future Trends in International Relations"                   |
| Mr. Robin Hallett                       | on "Contemporary Nigeria"                                       |
| Mr. A.G. Mountain                       | on "The Possibility of a Common Market for Southern Africa"     |
| Commodore A.F.C. Wemyss<br>O.B.E.       | on "The Part played by Naval Forces on the International Scene" |
| Mrs. Craig Schuler<br>McGeachy          | on "The Meaning of the International Council of Women"          |

- Professor J.F. Beekman on "Variety in Communist Thinking"  
Mr. David Loshak on "India, Pakistan and Bangladesh:  
Mankind's Greatest Challenge"

NATAL

The following speakers addressed meetings of the Natal Branch in 1973:

- Mr. John P. Mackintosh on "Can the European Economic Community  
M.P. (Labour) Develop a Common Foreign Policy?"  
Mr. C.J.A. Barratt on "The War in Mocambique"  
Professor Kurt Glaser on "Background and Implications of the  
European Security Conference"  
Professor John Dugard on "Defining International Terrorism"

PRETORIA

Die volgende vergaderings is vanjaar gehou:

- Mr. P. Peterson on "The Vietnam Peace Negotiations"  
Mr. Otto Krause on "Impressions of America"  
Mr. D.F.S. Fourie on "The Russian Navy and the Indian  
Ocean"  
Mr. John Chettle on "United States - South African  
Relations"  
Professor J.A. Lombard )  
Professor C.F. Nieuwoudt )  
Professor J.H. Moolman )  
Commodore R.A. Edwards )  
Sy Edele die Minister van )  
Buitelandse Sake Dr. )  
Hilgard Muller: )  
Col. P.J. Howard-Harwood on "The Middle East from the Israeli  
Viewpoint, as seen by a Foreigner"  
Professor C.F. Nieuwoudt oor "Die Buitelandse Beleid van die  
Sowjet-Unie"  
Professor C.J.R. Dugard on "Defining International Terrorism"  
Mr. Wilf Nussey on "Southern Africa with Special Ref-  
erence to the Security Situation  
in Mocambique and Rhodesia"  
Mnr. T.J.A. Gerdener oor "Verhoudinge tussen Suid- en Suider-  
Afrika"



- dr. H. Olivier oor "Die Belang van die Cabora Bassa-  
Projek vir Suider-Afrika"
- Mr. Harry Hurwitz on "The Conflict in the Middle East"
- dr. C.E. Mulder oor "Die rol van die Massamedia in  
die Internasionale Politiek"

WITWATERSRAND

The following meetings took place at Jan Smuts House during 1973:

- Mr. C. Brocklebank-Fowler  
M.P. (Conservative) and  
Mr. R. McLennan M.P.  
(Labour) on "Britain's Entry into the Europ-  
ean Common Market"
- Mr. C.S.A. Barratt on "The War in Mocambique"
- Mr. John Mackintosh M.P.  
(Labour) on "Can the EEC Develop a Common  
Foreign Policy?"
- The Rev. Michael Bordeaux on "The Position of Minority Groups  
in Russia"
- Mr. Alexandre Ammoun on "Lebanon and the Middle East"
- Professor C.J.R. Dugard on "Defining International Terrorism"
- Professor Robin Winks on "The Current Revolution in America"
- Professor Kurt Glaser on "Background and Implications of  
the European Security Conference"
- Mr. John Chettle on "United States - South Africa  
Relations"
- Professor Leonard Doob on "The Conflict Situation in Northern  
Ireland"
- Professor A.S. Prest on "Political Economy and Tax Reform"
- Mr. John Barratt )  
Professor Ned. Munger )  
Mr. D. Hirschmann )  
Mr. Otto Krause )  
Mr. Alister Sparks )  
Mr. D.F.S. Fourie )
- Mr. Ariston Chambati on "The Rhodesian Situation and the  
Role of the African National  
Council"

- Mr. Avraham Harman on "Israel and the Jews in the Twentieth Century"
- Mrs. Lucy Mvubelo on "International Attitudes to Labour Questions in South Africa"
- Dr. Jeremy Keenan on "Algeria: The Misunderstanding of a Revolution"
- Mr. Wilf Nussey on "The Security Situation in Southern Africa with special reference to Mocambique and Rhodesia"
- Mr. Israel Wamala on "Recent Developments in Africa, with special reference to Uganda and East Africa"