


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THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS



DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE

NEWSLETTER

NUUSBRIEF

Vol. 6 No. 1

1974

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DIE SUID - AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE

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All opinions expressed in articles in this Newsletter are
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Huis Jan Smuts / Jan Smuts House

Posbus / P.O.Box 31596

Braamfontein

Johannesburg
2017

Maart / March 1974

S.A.I.I.A. NUUSBRIEF/NEWSLETTER

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INTRODUCTORY NOTES

The Campaign

This issue of the Newsletter contains the Report of our National Chairman, Dr. Leif Egeland, to the Biennial Meeting of the Institute's National Executive Council, which was held in March of this year. The Report will be of interest to all members and friends of the Institute; it deals with the Institute's present Campaign and, in particular, with the plans for the development of our various programmes during the next few years. The ability of the Institute to carry out these plans will depend largely on the continued and growing support of our Corporate and individual members.

In the last issue of the Newsletter (Vol. 5 No. 4) mention was made of the S.A. Sugar Association, among those organisations which had made special substantial donations or grants to the Institute. It is with great pleasure that we can now record that the Sugar Association has in fact become a Corporate Member of the Institute, and we heartily welcome this support from an important South African organisation.

We are also very pleased to be able to express appreciation here to S.A. Breweries Ltd., a leading supporter of the Institute for many years, which has decided to increase substantially its annual corporate subscription and to contribute to the Institute's Development Fund; and to General Motors South African (Pty) Ltd., which has agreed to become a full Corporate Member this year, having made an initial contribution last year. We welcome with appreciation the following additional Companies which have become Corporate Members since our last report on the Campaign: Woolworths (Pty) Ltd., The Leyland Motor Corp. of S.A. Ltd., The Messina (Transvaal) Development Co. Ltd. and South African Marine Corporation Limited.

Since the Report in the last issue of the Newsletter, the following individual members of the Institute have made donations to the Campaign, thus giving concrete expression of their interest in and support for the Institute's work:

J. Berry	O.C.H. Krause
A.L. Bostock	G.E. Lavin
D. Brown	E. Levin
R.D. Calvert	J. Lewsen
I. Camerer	I.D. MacCrone
A.P. Cartwright	S. McCrum
J.H. Chettle	H.H.J. Nel
R.M. de Villiers	J. Raikes
P.J. Edginton	G.D. Roos
G.C. Garlick	R. Rose
H. Gluckman	A. Rosewitz
J. Haddad	F.G. Roux
W.O. Heimann	C.B. Strauss
E. Hellman	F.J. van Wyk
E.J. Jammie	D.E.G. Vieler
S. Kabak	G.N. Barrie
J. Kowen	

We reported in the last Newsletter on the decision of the Witwatersrand Branch to match all contributions to the Campaign from its members, on a rand for rand basis. A further welcome and generous initiative has since been taken by the members of the Executive Committee of the Branch, who agreed that they would personally give a lead to Branch Members by making donations to the Development Fund. Their names are included in the above list.

Publications

As usual, a list is given at the end of this Newsletter of occasional papers issued by the Institute, which are available to members on request, or for sale to non-members. (Members are entitled to request one copy of each paper at no charge, but must purchase any extra copies they may require.)

A new printed publication of the Institute has recently appeared, namely *SOUTH WEST AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL COURT*, which contains articles by Advocate E.M. Grosskopf and Professor John Dugard, as well as an Introduction by Professor Marinus Wiechers and a Foreword by Advocate D.P. de Villiers. An order form for this publication is enclosed with this Newsletter, and it will be noted that there is a special price for members.

A major publication of the Institute, *ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA*, edited by John Barratt, Simon Brand, David S. Collier and Kurt Glaser, will shortly be available. This book, which is based on the proceedings of the Institute's 1972 Conference, is being published by Macmillan in London, and members will be informed as soon as copies are available.

Cape Symposium

Mention is made in the Chairman's Report, which follows, of the Symposium to be held by the Institute, in association with its Cape Town and Stellenbosch Branches, in Cape Town in September of this year. The dates will be 5 and 6 September and the subject "South Africa and the Future of World Energy Resources". Details of the programme and speakers will be circulated in due course to all Corporate Members, whom it is hoped will be well represented at the Symposium, and individual members will also be informed.

John Barratt
Director, S.A.I.I.A.

Jan Smuts House,
31 March, 1974.

*REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CHAIRMAN, Dr. LEIF EGELAND,
TO THE BIENNIAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL,*

14 March, 1974.

The Institute is now at a crucial stage in its development, as a result of the important decision taken at our last Biennial Meeting. We agree, when we met in Cape Town in February, 1972, that a concerted effort had to be made to place the Institute on a secure financial foundation. Faced as we were then with a critical situation, due to rising costs and increasing demands on the Institute, the Council wisely decided that we should not simply attempt to increase our income to meet the immediate requirements, but rather that the necessary resources should be found to ensure that there would be no curtailment of the continued healthy growth of the Institute's work in the future.

During the following months the Administrative Committee considered how best to carry out this positive decision of the Council, and we sought the advice of a number of leading businessmen and industrialists who supported the aims of the Institute and who agreed to form an Advisory Committee. They met at Jan Smuts House in November, 1972, and on the basis of their advice our Campaign was launched early in 1973 - approximately a year ago.

Considerable thought was first given to the planning of a brochure which would not only set out concisely the Institute's motivation in its appeal to companies and individuals for greater support, but which would also outline the programmes which we intended to implement once the financial resources were available. These programmes planned for the future were based on results already achieved and experience gained in the Institute's activities, and the growth envisaged during the next decade was set within modest limits. It was estimated that to enable this modest growth to take place the joint income of the Institute and of the Smuts Memorial Trust (which supports the work of Jan Smuts House) would have to be doubled from approximately R35 000 to R70 000 per annum. In present day circumstances this is a very conservative target, and we are clearly not over-estimating our needs.

To achieve this increased income we have sought in the Campaign firstly to widen our support from South African companies by increasing the number of Corporate Members. When the Campaign began, the Institute had 46 Corporate Members; we now have 60, and we hope that this number will further increase during the coming months, so that we can reach a figure of at least 90.

In addition, we are asking our loyal supporters of many years to give a lead in this Campaign, and we have not asked in vain. Several existing Corporate Members, conscious of the value of the Institute's work, have agreed to raise their annual subscriptions, in some instances very substantially. We are very grateful indeed for their initiative.

It was also decided that the Institute should have some financial underpinning to secure it against any fluctuation in annual income and enable it to plan its programmes ahead with confidence that it could carry them out. To this end a Development Fund has been established, which it is intended to build up over the years with donations from companies and from individuals.

The Campaign is now well under way, and the results so far are very encouraging. But much more remains to be done before we can feel satisfied that the future development of the Institute is secure.

It is a source of pride for the Institute and for those who support it, that our work is financed entirely by South African organisations. We receive no funds from outside South Africa. It is also important to stress that the Institute is not subsidised in any way by government funds. Even though its headquarters at Jan Smuts House are on the campus of the University of the Witwatersrand, this building is not owned by the University, and the Institute receives no financial assistance from the University. It is, therefore, a fully independent Institute, privately supported by those who appreciate the value of its work. This means that it must constantly prove that its work is relevant and of importance for South Africa as a whole, in order to justify the support that it is receiving.

Although the Campaign is still proceeding, careful thought is already being given to the implementation of plans envisaged when the Campaign began, in order that constructive use can be made of the increased support. Briefly these plans include the development of the following programmes during the next few years:

1. The Institute's conference programme is already well established. Two major conferences have been held - in 1970 ("The Impact on International Relations of the Population Explosion") and 1972 ("Accelerated Development in Southern Africa") - and the next major conference is scheduled for December, 1974. This will be a follow-up to the 1972 conference and will concern "Strategy for Development", concentrating on the practical developmental needs of the countries and territories of Southern Africa.

In addition, the Institute will continue to organise smaller conferences or symposia on relevant international issues of particular concern to South Africa. For instance, we are now preparing for a symposium to be held in Cape Town in September of this year on the subject: "South Africa and the World Energy Crisis". A number of leading South Africans will participate in this Symposium which will be organised in conjunction with our Cape Town and Stellenbosch Branches. It will be recalled that last year an important symposium was organised under the auspices of our Pretoria Branch on "International Relations in Southern Africa".

At its conferences the Institute is able to bring together many leading experts, from within and without South Africa, of differing political viewpoints, from the business, academic, government and other fields, for meaningful exchanges of information and views on important and relevant international topics. The success which it has already had in this area ensures that, with the necessary financial resources, it will be able to continue to develop its conference programme constructively.

In the planning and organisation of conferences, the Institute has been able to co-operate very fruitfully with other bodies. Special mention should be made of our co-operation with the Rand Afrikaans University and the Foundation for Foreign Affairs Inc. in Chicago in jointly sponsoring the 1972 and 1974 Development Conferences.

2. The area where lack of adequate resources has hampered the Institute most seriously is that of original research and in-depth study of international questions, particularly those directly affecting South Africa. It is our intention in the immediate future to begin to fill this gap in our activities by encouraging study and research on South Africa's foreign policy and external relations, both in the political and economic fields. One of the means to this end will be the establishment of study groups composed of Institute members from the academic, business and other professional sectors, who will work with the small Institute staff to produce reports on particular subjects or areas of importance in South Africa's external relations. Special attention will, for instance, be given to inter-state and inter-territorial relationships in the southern region of Africa, as well as to South Africa's relations with major world powers.

The Institute will also sponsor or assist research by qualified individuals, where this is considered to be within the Institute's field of interest. We have already been able during the past year to assist in a modest way with two research projects.

3. The sponsorship and organisation of research and study will, we hope, also lead to the more regular publication of works of a high standard on international affairs. The Institute already has a fair record of publications, including in particular those which have resulted from Institute conferences. The proceedings of the conference on Accelerated Development will, for instance, shortly be published by Macmillan in London, who also published the report on the earlier conference on the Population Explosion. The Institute's quarterly Newsletter, which has a wide circulation in South Africa and abroad, will be joined, as soon as the financial position permits, by a regular journal of a high academic standard to provide a forum for original work by South African scholars on international relations.
4. The need to extend our contacts in Africa and overseas is one of which we are very conscious. Our Institute is in a unique position, as a private, non-governmental, independent organisation, to promote non-official communication and dialogue to the benefit of all our peoples. This is already being achieved through our conferences, through the many private meetings arranged for important visitors to South Africa, through the occasional invitations which we are able to extend to overseas experts, and through the exchange of publications with many overseas bodies. Our contacts with similar institutes in other countries is providing channels of communication at a non-governmental level, which are often not open at the official level, and the Director has been able to extend some of these contacts by personal visits during the past year. Further visits and exchanges are envisaged in the coming year.
5. The Institute's Library at Jan Smuts House has grown steadily over the years to become an important centre for reference and study on international questions. It is in fact the only specialised library in international relations, with an emphasis on African affairs in the country. To keep this library up to date, both as regards its invaluable collection of periodicals from all over the world and its collection of books and documents, is becoming increasingly costly.

It is, however, essential that it be maintained and developed effectively for the use of students, our Corporate Members, visiting scholars and many others with a serious interest in international affairs. Funds must therefore be ensured for this purpose.

We greatly value the cordial co-operation with the Library of the University of the Witwatersrand, which assists in the administration of our Library, in view of its extensive use by University staff and students.

6. To most of our individual members who are not directly involved in many of the activities referred to above, the important continuing function of the Institute is the regular meetings arranged by our six Branches throughout the country, which enable members and their guests to hear visiting and South African authorities speaking on a variety of relevant international topics. This function has expanded greatly in recent years, and mention should be made in particular of the excellent programmes arranged during the past two years by the Witwatersrand, Cape Town and Pretoria Branches. It is recognised that the local circumstances of the other smaller Branches are different, and that in some cases there have been special problems. Nevertheless they have also been able to provide useful services to their members.

Attention must be given to ways of assisting the Branches more effectively in the future, particularly as regards good speakers, so that each Branch can become an effective and recognised presence of the Institute in its own area. The basic role of the Institute to encourage a wider and deeper understanding of international affairs among the informed public can only be fully carried out through the activities of the Branches.

Consideration is being given to the establishment of new Branches in centres where there are sufficient persons interested in promoting our work as a truly national South African Institute.

When one looks at the present disturbed world scene and at our own continent of Africa, one is very conscious of the fact that the international order is in a dramatic process of change. As South Africans we must face this fact and its implications for us, in particular as regards current developments in the southern part of Africa. In these circumstances the work of our Institute becomes more relevant and important than ever. There is an urgent need for us to be better informed, in order that our understanding of changes affecting us can be clearer and deeper. It is our earnest hope that this Institute will increasingly be able to help in meeting this need.

This year marks the 40th anniversary of the Institute's founding in 1934, and the 14th anniversary of the establishment of Jan Smuts House in 1960. The latter event was a landmark in the Institute's history, and a firm foundation for further development has been laid since then. Let us hope that in the future we may be able to look back to 1974 as the beginning of a new period of sustained growth in the Institute's work.

*VERSLAG VAN DIE NASIONALE VOORSITTER, DR LEIF EGELAND,
AAN DIE TWEEJAARLIKSE VERGADERING VAN DIE NASIONALE UITVOERENDE RAAD,
14 Maart, 1974*

As gevolg van die belangrike besluit geneem op ons jongste tweejaarlikse vergadering is die Instituut nou op die kruispad. Ons het toe op ons vergadering in Kaapstad in Februarie 1972 ooreengekom dat 'n gesamenlike poging aangewend moet word om die Instituut op 'n gesonde finansiële grondslag te plaas. Toe ons in daardie stadium in 'n kritieke toestand verkeer het as gevolg van stygende kostes en toenemende eise wat aan die Instituut gestel is, het die Raad wyslik besluit dat daar nie net gepoog word om die inkomste te verhoog om aan die onmiddellike vereistes te voldoen nie, maar dat die nodige bronne eerder gevind word wat sal verseker dat daar geen belemmering sal wees in die volgehoue groei in die Instituut se toekomstige werk nie.

In die daaropvolgende maande het die Administratiewe Komitee ooreenstemmend geskenk aan die beste manier waarop hierdie positiewe besluit van die Raad tot uitvoering gebring kan word. Kers is opgesteek by 'n aantal vooraanstaande sakemanne en nyweraars wat die ideale van die Instituut onderskraag en wat ingestem het om 'n Advieskomitee te stig. Hulle het in November 1972 by Huis Jan Smuts byeengekom en op grond van hulle aanbeveling is ons Veldtog vroeg in 1973 - sowat 'n jaar gelede - van stapel gestuur.

Aanvanklik is heelwat aandag geskenk aan die beplanning van 'n brosjure wat nie slegs op saaklike wyse die Instituut se motivering in sy beroep om maatskappye en individue om groter ondersteuning uiteen sal sit nie, maar wat ook 'n aanduiding sal gee van ons doelwitte wanneer die nodige finansiële bronne beskikbaar is. Hierdie programme wat vir die toekoms beplan is, is gegrond op resultate reeds bereik en ervaring opgedoen in die Instituut se bedrywighede; die groei wat in die vooruit sig gestel word vir die volgende dekade is binne redelike perke. Volgens berekening sal, om hierdie matige groei moontlik te maak, die gesamentlike inkomste van die Instituut en die Smuts-Gedenktrust - wat die Huis Jan Smuts onderskraag - verdubbel moet word van ongeveer R35 000 tot R70 000 per jaar. In die huidige omstandighede is dit 'n baie konserwatiewe mikpunt en ons is definitief nie aan die oordryf ten opsigte van ons toekomstige behoeftes nie.

Ten einde hierdie verhoogde inkomste te verkry, het ons in ons veldtog eerstens getrag om groter ondersteuning te verkry van Suid-Afrikaanse ondernemings deur die aantal Korporaatlade te verhoog. Met die aanvang van die veldtog het die Instituut 46 korporaatlede gehad. Tans het ons 60 en ons hoop om dit in die volgende paar maande verder te verhoog om die syfer tot tenminste 90 te verhoog.

Hierbenewens het ons ook diegene, wat ons oor baie jare ondersteun het, gevra om ons in hierdie veldtog te help - en dit was nie tevergeefs nie. Verskeie van ons Korporaatlade, bewus van die waardevolle werk van die Instituut, het hul jaarlikse bydraes verhoog - in sommige gevalle baie aansienlik. Ons is baie dankbaar vir hulle aansporing.

Daar is ook besluit dat die Instituut een of ander vorm van finansiële ondersteuning behoort te hê om dit te beskerm teen enige skommeling in jaarlikse inkomste sowel as om dit in staat te stel om sy programme voor-

uit te beplan in die vertroue dat dit wel tot uitvoering gebring sal kan word. Met hierdie doel voor oë is 'n Ontwikkelingsfonds gestig wat oor die jare opgebou moet word met behulp van skenkings van sowel maatskappye as individue.

Die Veldtog is nou goed onderweg en die resultate is tot dusver baie bemoedigend. Daar is egter nog baie om te doen voordat ons gerus kan voel oor die toekomstige ontwikkeling van die Instituut.

Die Instituut en sy ondersteuners kan daarop trots voel dat sy werk uitsluitend deur Suid-Afrikaanse organisasies gefinansier word. Ons kry geen gelde van buite die landsgrense nie. Dit is ook van belang om daarop te let dat die Instituut geensins van owerheidsweë gesubsidieer word nie. Ten spyte van die feit dat sy hoofkantoor in Huis Jan Smuts op die kampus van die Witwatersrandse Universiteit geleë is, behoort die gebou nie aan die Universiteit nie en ontvang die Instituut geen finansiële bystand van daardie inrigting nie. Dit is dus 'n heeltemaal onafhanklike Instituut wat onderhou word deur private instansies wat die waarde van sy werk besef. Dit bring mee dat hy voortdurend bewys moet lewer dat sy werk ter sake en van belang vir Suid-Afrika as geheel is ten einde die steun wat hy ontvang te kan regverdig.

Hoewel die Veldtog nog aan die gang is, word reeds sorgvuldige aandag gewy aan die uitvoering van die planne wat beoog is toe dit van stapel gestuur is, sodat daar op konstruktiewe wyse gebruik gemaak kan word van die toenemende steun.

Kortliks behels hierdie planne die ontplooiing van die volgende programme in die komende paar jaar:

1. Die Instituut se konferensieprogram is reeds goed gevestig. Twee belangrike konferensies is gehou - in 1970 ("Die Uitwerking van die Bevolkingsontploffing op Internasionale Betrekkinge") en in 1972 ("Versnelde Ontwikkeling in Suidelike Afrika") - en die volgende belangrike konferensie is beplan vir Desember 1974. Dit sal aansluit by die konferensie van 1972 en sal handel oor "Strategie vir Ontwikkeling" met die klem op die praktiese behoeftes vir die ontwikkeling van die lande en gebiede van Suidelike Afrika.

Hierbenewens sal die Instituut voortgaan om kleiner konferensies of simposiums te belê oor internasionale aangeleenthede wat van besondere belang vir Suid-Afrika is. Ons is byvoorbeeld op die oomblik besig met voorbereidingswerk vir 'n simposium wat in September in Kaapstad gehou sal word oor die onderwerp: "Suid-Afrika en die Internasionale Energie-krisis." 'n Aantal vooraanstaande Suid-Afrikaners sal deelneem aan hierdie simposium wat in samewerking met ons takke in Kaapstad en Stellenbosch gereël word. Daar sal onthou word dat onder die beskerming van ons Pretoriase tak daar verlede jaar 'n simposium gehou is oor "Internasionale Betrekkinge in Suidelike Afrika".

Op sy konferensies bring die Instituut baie vooraanstaande deskundiges bymekaar van sowel binne as buite die landsgrense - mense van verskillende politieke sienswyses, mense uit die sakewêreld, akademië, regeringsvertegenwoordigers, ens. - om belangrike inligting aan mekaar te verstrek en menings te wissel oor belangrike en relevante internasionale onderwerpe. Die welslae wat reeds op

hierdie gebied behaal is, is bewys dat die Instituut met behulp van die nodige finansiële bronne in staat is om sy konferensie-program verder op konstruktiewe wyse uit te bou. In die beplanning en organisering van konferensies kon die Instituut met vrug gebruik maak van die samewerking van ander liggame. Hier moet spesiale vermelding gemaak word van ons samewerking met die Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit en die Foundation for Foreign Affairs Inc. van Chicago wat gesamentlik hulle beskerming verleen het aan die Ontwikkelingskonferensies van 1972 en 1974.

2. Waar die gebrek aan toereikende fondse die Instituut die meeste gekortwiek het is op die gebied van oorspronklike navorsing en diepgaande studies in verband met internasionale sake, veral dié wat Suid-Afrika regstreeks raak. Ons is voornemens om in die onmiddellike toekoms 'n begin te maak met die aanvulling van hierdie leemte in ons bedrywighede deur studie en navorsing aan te moedig in verband met Suid-Afrika se buitelandse beleid en betrekkinge, sowel op politieke as ekonomiese gebied. Een van die planne om dit te bereik is die vorming van studiegroepe bestaande uit lede van die Instituut in die akademiese, sake- en ander professionele sektore wat met die klein personeel van die Instituut sal saamwerk om verslae uit te bring oor spesiale onderwerpe of sake wat van belang is vir Suid-Afrika se buitelandse verhoudinge. Spesiale aandag sal byvoorbeeld gewy word aan tussenstaatse en tussengebiedse verhoudinge in die suidelike deel van Afrika, sowel as aan Suid-Afrika se betrekkinge met die groot moondhede van die wêreld. Die Instituut sal ook help met navorsing deur deskundiges waar dit nodig geag word as deel van sy taak. In die afgelope jaar het ons reeds op beskeie wyse steun kon verleen aan twee navorsingsprojekte.
3. Ons hoop dat die borgskap en organisering van navorsing en studie ook sal meebring dat werke van hoë gehalte meer gereeld gepubliseer sal word. Die Instituut kan reeds spog met 'n taamlike aantal publikasies veral dié wat die vrug was van sy konferensies. Die verrigtinge van die konferensie oor Veronelde Ontwikkeling sal byvoorbeeld binnekort in Londen uitgegee word deur Macmillan, wat ook die verslag van die vroeëre konferensie oor Bevolkingsontploffing uitgegee het. Die Instituut se kwartaallike Nuusbrief, wat 'n wye leserskring in sowel Suid-Afrika as die buiteland het, sal sodra die finansies dit toelaat, aangevul word met 'n gereelde tydskrif van hoë standaard wat 'n forum sal aanbied vir oorspronklike werk oor internasionale aangeleenthede deur Suid-Afrikaanse geleerdes.
4. Ons is terdeë bewus van die behoefte aan die uitbreiding van ons kontakte in Afrika en die buiteland. As 'n private, onafhanklike organisasie verkeer die Instituut in die unieke posisie dat hy nie-amptelike kommunikasie en dialoog tot stand kan bring tot voordeel van al ons mense. Dit word reeds bereik, deur ons konferensies, deur die vele private byeenkomste wat vir belangrike besoekers in Suid-Afrika gereël word, deur die uitnodigings wat ons af en toe rig aan buitelandse deskundiges en deur die uitruilings van publikasies met verskeie buitelandse liggame. Ons kontakte met soortgelyke institute in ander lande voorsien kommunikasiëkanale op nie-regeringsvlak wat dikwels nie op amptelike vlak beskikbaar is nie, en die Direkteur het in die afgelope jaar sommige van hierdie kontakte kon opvolg met persoonlike besoeke. Verdere besoeke en uitruilings word vir die komende jaar in die vooruitsig gestel.

5. Die Instituut se Biblioteek by Huis Jan Smuts het oor die jare voortdurend aange groei en is vandag 'n belangrike sentrum vir die naslaan en bestudering van publikasies oor internasionale sake. Om die waarheid te sê, is dit die enigste gespesialiseerde biblioteek in die land wat internasionale aangeleenthede betref, met spesiale klem op Afrika-sake. Om by te hou veral wat sy waardevolle versameling tydskrifte van dwarsoor die wêreld betref en sy versameling boeke en dokumente, word al duurder. Dit is egter noodsaaklik dat dit in stand gehou en uitgebrei word vir die gebruik van studente, ons Korporaatslede, besoekende geleerdes en baie ander mense wat ernstig belangstel in internasionale aangeleenthede. Dit is dus noodsaaklik dat fondse vir hierdie doel opsy gesit word.

Ons waardeer die vriendelike samewerking met die Biblioteek van die Witwatersrandse Universiteit wat met die oog op grootskaalse gebruikmaking deur die personeel en studente van die Universiteit ons in die administrasie van ons Biblioteek bystaan.

6. Vir die meeste van ons individuele lede wat nie regstreeks betrokke is by baie van die bedrywighede hierbo genoem nie, is die belangrikste funksie van die Instituut die gereelde vergaderings wat deur ons ses Takke dwarsdeur die land gereël word en wat lede en hulle gaste in staat stel om te luister na wat besoekende en Suid-Afrikaanse deskundiges te sê het oor 'n verskeidenheid internasionale sake. Hierdie funksie het in die jongste jare aansienlik uitgebrei, en daar moet ook gewag gemaak word van die uitstekende programme wat in die afgelope twee jaar gereël is deur die takke van die Witwatersrand, Kaapstad en Pretoria. Ons besef dat die plaaslike omstandighede van die ander kleiner takke anders is en dat daar in sommige gevalle spesiale probleme ondervind is. Hulle het in elk geval ook waardevolle dienste aan hulle lede gelewer.

Daar moet aandag gewy word aan die verlening van effektiewe hulp aan takke in die toekoms, veral wat goeie sprekers betref, sodat elke tak 'n effektiewe verteenwoordiger van die Instituut in sy eie omgewing kan wees. Die basiese funksie van die Instituut om 'n breër en dieper begrip van internasionale aangeleenthede by die ingeligte publiek te bevorder, kan alleen ten volle vervul word deur die bedrywighede van die Takke.

Daar word aandag geskenk aan die moontlikheid van die stigting van nuwe takke op plekke waar 'n voldoende aantal persone is wat sal belang stel in die bevordering van ons werk as 'n ware nasionale Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut.

As 'n mens vandag die verontruste wêreldtoneel aanskou, insluitende ons eie vasteland van Afrika, is jy baie bewus van die feit dat die internasionale orde besig is om 'n dramatiese verandering te ondergaan. As Suid-Afrikaners moet hierdie feit onder die oë sien asook die implikasies wat dit vir ons inhou, veral wat die huidige verwickelinge in die suidelike deel van Afrika betref. In hierdie omstandighede word die werk van die Instituut meer tersake en belangriker as ooit. Dit is uiters noodsaaklik dat ons beter ingelig word sodat ons begrip van die vernaderinge wat ons raak duideliker en grondiger kan wees. Dit is ons opregte hoop dat die Instituut in toenemende mate in hierdie behoefte kan voorsien.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CABORA BASSA FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA

Dr. Henry Olivier

The Cabora Bassa Project, now nearing completion, is a Portuguese concept for the benefit of all the Portuguese citizens in Mocambique. As now designed, the immediate short-term objective is the export of electrical energy in bulk to South Africa. Thus it may be said that it is just another power project, like its predecessor upstream on the Zambesi : Kariba. However, in its long-term role this project, as regards both direct and indirect benefits, is destined to play a fundamental part in the development of Southern Africa.

The pioneer project in the engineering philosophy of making the Zambesi "work for Africa" is of course the Kariba project. This was followed by the harnessing of the Zambesi tributary - the Kafue. Thus the first stage of Cabora Bassa now under construction is the third step in the master plan for the ultimate full utilisation of the water resources of the Zambesi catchment which embraces an area of some 1,2 million km², with water donations from Zambia, Zaire, Angola, Botswana, Rhodesia, Tanzania and Mozambique.

Cabora Bassa is therefore part of a very large concept and will fulfil its role in partnership with many other technical and commercial associations. The engineering philosophy is that, as it receives water donations from many African countries, so will its benefits ultimately flow to many African countries for the benefit of all.

It is in this context, the significance for Southern Africa, that I wish to speak of Cabora Bassa here. With a massive project like this, it would be easy to blind the audience with statistics, and this I would like to avoid, except for purposes of comparison or to make a specific point. But first let us look briefly at the history of the project to date.

In the mid-1950's the Portuguese Government established a commission called the Missao do Formento e Povoamento do Zambeze (M.F.P.Z.) to study the possibilities of development and settlement in the upper Zambesi valley in Angola and the lower Zambesi valley in Mocambique. One of the reports by the M.F.P.Z., produced in 1959, gave a preliminary assessment of the advantages of a major power development at Cabora Bassa.

I first became aware of a growing interest as regards potential hydro-electric development in the Kebrabassa gorge on the Zambesi in Mocambique when a party of Portuguese Engineers visited us at Kariba in 1959, when that project was nearing completion. I was informed that there was a magnificent site for an arch dam and that the word "Kebrabassa" in the local language meant "The end of the work". Apparently this title was given to the gorge by the slaves who rowed the boats upstream from the coast, past Tete, until the start of the gorge, when they could not proceed further by boat. Their task was then over, and they turned back again to drift and row downstream.

In 1858 Dr. David Livingstone, thrusting his way up the Zambesi in his steam launch MaRobert, came upon a wholly unexpected obstacle - a ravine where the river ran so swiftly and in such a long succession of rapids and cascades that the MaRobert, struggle as she might, was forced back. A dream was born.

It was a dream in keeping with the character of the man; for this fearless little man - irascible, obdurate, deeply suspicious about the honesty and the motives of others, an essential solitary who was impossible to work with - could face any danger and any hardship supported by his dreams. The greatest of these dreams became that of a huge waterway into the very heart of the dark continent - "God's highway to the interior". His concept was that by precept and example the natives of the Zambesi Valley could be brought slowly but surely into the civilised fold.

A century later the dreams were revived in the vision of others. But by now this involved the wonderful possibilities of hydro-electric power, as a yeast factor in the concept of "baking the bread" of a vast expanding economy, with immediate calculable or direct benefits and a long-term judgment of indirect benefits both for Mocambique and Southern Africa.

The inauguration of the Kariba project in early 1960 by H.M. the Queen Mother demonstrated:

firstly that a major project of this nature could be executed in Africa with international contractors working in perfect harmony with local talent and that such projects, properly planned and managed could be completed on time and within the cost estimates;

secondly, that international finances could be marshalled for the execution of such projects provided the pre-planning and market surveys were adequate and the guarantees of returns on money invested were convincing;

thirdly, that the example of Kariba could be repeated for Southern Africa, indeed for Africa.

The concept of Cabora Bassa was put up or published in 1965 in the Engineering Journal of Mocambique: "O Aproveitamento de Cabora-Bassa" by Hidrotecnica Portuguesa, the firm of Consulting Engineers employed by the Ministry of Overseas for the specific project.

It was towards the end of 1965 that the late Dr. van Eck, Chairman of the Industrial Development Corporation (I.D.C.) first mentioned to me that South Africa was becoming interested in participating with the Portuguese Government in two major hydro-electric projects: one located on the Zambesi in Mocambique (Cabora Bassa) and the other on the Cunene river in Angola. He was interested in importing large blocks of relatively cheap energy for South Africa, and at the same time in helping the Portuguese in their courageous concept of stabilising conditions and improving living standards in these territories, with special reference to Mocambique.

In mid-1966 the Portuguese authorities began to make enquiries about the possibilities of organising two or three international consortiums of contractors to compete as regards offers to undertake the hydro-electric project on a turnkey export credit financed basis. At the same time Dr. van Eck asked if I would visit the site and let him have my opinion of the proposition, as regards engineering viability and the possibilities of maintaining time schedules and operating reasonably within cost estimates, if the project were to receive sanction to proceed. The visit was organised by courtesy of Engineer Fernando

de Castro Fontes, Chefe da Missao de Fomento e Povoamento do Zambesi and took place on 30 June, 1966. Access was pretty rough and we entered the gorge by helicopter, landing on a series of "postage stamp" ledges carved out of the almost vertical faces of the valley at various levels down to the water surface.

On 8 July I reported to Dr. van Eck in London that in my opinion it was one of the finest sites for a concrete arch dam that I had ever seen, that I anticipated the rock conditions for the underground power station to be even better than at Kariba, and that, in my opinion, with proper planning and experienced management, there would seem to be no reason why the project could not be completed on time and reasonably within cost estimates. Although the Portuguese designs had not been finalised by then, it was clear that, subject to financing conditions, the cost of energy delivered in the Republic would be competitive with that of the best, i.e. largest, thermal stations then under construction in the Republic.

The great attraction of the concept lay in its extensibility. Thus an additional 2 000 megawatts could be produced merely by constructing a second under-ground power station on the North Bank. Water and storage capacity would be adequate. The incremental cost of such additional energy would be nearly half that for the first phase as contemplated.

By late 1966 three international contracting consortiums had been put together to compete for the turnkey project: one British-led, one South African-led and one American-led. The evaluation of the offers, complicated by different proposals for providing credits and loans proved difficult, and various political complications also arose. Thus it was not until September, 1969, that a contract was signed in Lisbon between the State of Portugal and the international consortium *Zameco*, composed of German, French, Italian, Portuguese and South African partners, with export credits from Germany, France and South Africa, and loans from South Africa. The shortfall in funds was covered by cash contributions from Portugal.

Now, near the end of 1973, an average overall assessment of the progress is that the project, despite many problems, is on schedule, is about 80% complete, and indeed, the twin Direct Current transmission lines, 1 400 km in length, to convey the energy from Cabora Bassa to Apollo, Irene, near Pretoria, will be completed this year - a year ahead of schedule.

The greatest problems encountered to date have been in providing tolerable living conditions for the large international labour force, and organising reliable supplies of food and cement, which latter commodity is now consumed in the dam wall at a rate of 12 000 tons per month. The greatest technical feats were the successful closure and diversion of the river in July, 1971, and the performance of the upstream rockfill cofferdam, some 120 feet high, when it was overtopped by the Zambesi on 22 February, 1972, and remained submerged for a period of four weeks.

The present forecast, therefore, is that the first function of the Cabora Bassa project, i.e. to deliver power to South Africa, will be achieved on schedule, and the energy will enter the South African Escom grid by mid-1975.

As presently conceived, the project consists of a concrete arch dam on the Zambesi, located approximately 130 kilometres upstream from Tete, some 170 metres high, and an underground power station located on the South bank to house ultimately 5 turbo-generators each of 400 Megawatt capacity, or three times the present Kariba capacity.

At this point the Zambesi average flow is approximately double that at Kariba. The two lakes will compare as follows:

<u>Description</u>	<u>Kariba</u>	<u>Cabora Bassa</u>
Live storage	34 400	48 000 million cubic metres
Dead (unusable) storage	116 000	4 000 do.
Flood storage	23 400	14 000 do.
Total storage	173 800	66 000 do.
Surface area	5 200	2 665 square kilometres

It will be noted that, whereas the Kariba lake is roughly twice the Cabora Bassa lake in surface area and the total volume stored nearly three times as great, the actual usable or live storage of Cabora Bassa reservoir is nearly fifty per cent greater. The cost per unit of usable storage provided at Cabora Bassa is nearly double that at Kariba, but the cost per kilowatt installed is half that at Kariba.

Cabora Bassa is the highest dam in Africa and fifth in the world. The full potential power installation at this site alone ranks only after Krasnoyarsk in the USSR (5000 Megawatts), Brastsk in the USSR (4500 Megawatts) and Churchill Falls in Canada (4500 Megawatts).

What motivated this first stage partnership?

Recognising the fact that power is the leavening factor to stimulate most other activities, and the fact that the Zambesi "bisects" the vague region which we call Southern Africa, it becomes pertinent to assess the power potential of this river. Taking into account the complete Kariba project, the potential of Kafue, promising sites downstream of Kariba, such as at Mtola, and the full development of the Cabora Bassa and Mepanda-Uncua potential, the power potential of the Zambesi is conservatively estimated at 11 000 Megawatts; that is equivalent to 18 present Karibas or more than the present installed capacity of the Republic of South Africa. Approximately 65 per cent of this power yield would accrue from the optimum development of the potential in the Cabora Bassa gorge.

It is natural and good economic policy that Mocambique, or any country in possession of such a valuable asset, should develop careful long-range plans to ensure maximum benefits for its entire population. Its water resources will form the keystone to its future prosperity; the catalyst to spark both agricultural and industrial development.

Mocambique is about three-quarters the size of the Republic of South Africa, with a total population of 7 million, of which 100 000 are Europeans; the remainder living on a subsistence economy. Continued surveys and investigations by the Portuguese Government, now well advanced, reveal an immense economic potential as regards

mineral, agricultural and water wealth. In Mocambique, where at present the only industrial activity of importance is the 300 000 tons of coal mined yearly at Moatize (near Tete), the backbone of industrialization eventually will be mining. Near Tete a shallow, 177 kilometres long, 19 kilometres wide, seam of cokeable coal has been proved. Surveys have indicated some 35 million ton reserve of titaniferous magnetites, containing significant amounts of vanadium. Some geologists estimate that this deposit may extend to 200 million tons. There is copper, fluorspar, manganese, nickel, chromium and asbestos in the region. Apparently the industry to receive top priority will be the electrofusion of some 4 million tons of magnetites a year to yield iron, titanium and vanadium which, with plentiful power and water, would lead to an iron and steel industry near Tete.

It was recognised that regulation of the river by massive storage reservoirs will open irrigation farming in tributary and coastal regions. The ultimate potential for cultivation within the Zambesi valley is assessed at some 2,5 million hectares, of which 1,5 million hectares will be irrigated and the remainder dry-farmed. It is understood that plans under consideration allow for cattle, citrus and food crops in the highlands, and sugar, cotton and jute in the lowlands. Generally, however, the rate of irrigation development is necessarily a slow process compared with an industrial or a power programme. Expansion, of course, can be expedited by rapid industrial development.

How then can development and the improvement of standards of living be sparked off? An agricultural programme traditionally takes years to develop. Industrialization is faster, but needs a considerable infrastructure development and the comparable mobilization of finances required. The quickest return is from power, provided a ready market can be found. The 'immediate' market was found in the Republic of South Africa, and the problems of delivery, i.e. transmission of energy over a distance of some 1 400 kilometres, were overcome by the adoption of the recent technique developed for converting alternating to direct current by the "Thyristor" or "Solid State" solution. Thus it has become possible to transmit direct to South Africa, by high voltage direct current network, massive blocks of power at a price which will be competitive with South Africa's 1000 Megawatt thermal stations. Unlike Mocambique, South Africa, on the one hand, is a water scarce country and, on the other hand, it has a rate of increase in consumption of electrical energy which over the past 40 years has been remarkably steady, involving a redoubling of capacity every ten years.

Now the *short term* interest of the Republic in importing such a block of hydroelectric power, derived from the following considerations:

- (1) The competitive price of the energy delivered at Apollo, and the reliability of supply. The Agreement provided for a price of 0,3 cents per kilowatt hour which compares favourably with our best (large) thermal stations and very favourably indeed with the average cost of production of power in the Republic, which is in excess of 0,5 cents per kilowatt hour.
- (2) Avoiding the use of scarce water for cooling purposes in thermal generation. The equivalent of Cabora Bassa in thermal generating capacity would evaporate more than 30 million gallons of water per day for this purpose.

- (3) Avoiding capital expenditure in thermal plant. At the time the capital cost of such a thermal plant would have been of the order of R140 million at least and, at the time capital resources were scarce. As it is, the Escom commitment to Cabora Bassa is of the order of R58 million. The entire South African commitment, including Escom, is of the order of R140 million, but the difference is in interest bearing credit and loans to be redeemed over a certain period.
- (4) Husbanding of coal resources. The first stage Cabora Bassa project will save coal use in the Republic at a rate of about 7 million tons per annum.
- (5) Furthermore, the injection of such a block of energy, amounting to some 8% of the energy generated in the Republic would provide a breathing space to help in long-term considerations, such as the final preparation of a National Water Plan, and the eventual integration in the National Power grid of Nuclear power.

Thus the deal is mutually beneficial in a straight economic sense to both parties: the Portuguese can commence the development of this potentially rich area, and the South Africans derive the economic benefits already referred to, and they have an option to enter into further agreements regarding this very extensive project.

In this connection it must be remembered that at the time Cabora Bassa was launched the Republic also collaborated with the Portuguese authorities in launching another big hydro-electric and irrigation project: the Cunene Scheme in Angola.

We come now to long term considerations. When the Cabora Bassa contracts were signed there were doubts expressed in many quarters. Will Zamco perform in this remote territory? Will the cost estimates hold? Will Frelimo retard or destroy the scheme? Will the very new and untried Thyristor solution work and deliver the juice? Now, four years later these doubts have been dispelled by progress and events. In the intervening period, however, many new factors have entered into the picture which affect the long term outlook. The oil and energy crisis have burst on an unsuspecting, one could almost say "dopey" Western World. The anti-pollution campaigns have reached almost hysterical proportions.

South Africa is about to enter, on a serious scale, the exports of iron ores, semi-refined iron products and coal. At the same time, for iron and steel manufacture, she needs high quality coking coals which are in short supply. So we face here an import problem.

As long ago as 1965, when the Cabora Bassa and Orange River Projects were first discussed with the late Dr. van Eck, we visualised the possibility of an energy crisis in Southern Africa, which could impede the steady and meaningful development of the sub-continent. We did not at the time have in mind oil in this context. What we were aware of was, firstly, that all forms of development can only be based on power, and secondly, that history has shown how durable are the ties between nations which are connected by an electrical transmission grid which could be used to export and import power, as may be required, thus optimising the economic benefits for all parties. If there is a glut in agricultural produce, then you can either change

crop patterns or export. In power production you cannot export, unless you have interconnection facilities. The best examples are the Union for the Co-ordination of Production and Transport of Energy in Western Europe, which links 13 countries in a highly beneficial export/import relationship. Nearer home, the Kariba project has yielded untold economic benefits to both Zambia and Rhodesia, and is now being extended.

We were also aware that the foresight of Escom, in creating the national South African energy grid, made it possible to consider seriously the integration of thermal, hydro, and nuclear energy before the turn of the century.

The pan-African grid then envisaged has already evolved much further than people realise. The South African grid is a fact. The Rhodesian/Zambian grid is a fact. Cunene is under construction, and the grid will proceed southwards to join the South African grid and could extend northwards. In Zaire contracts have been awarded recently for a power transmission line from the Inga site on the Congo river to the Tungu Fungeruma mining development area near the Zambian border. It is to be noted that the distance is of the same order as that between Cabora and Pretoria.

When it is proved in 1975 that a large block of power can be transmitted successfully and economically over 1 400 km, a new era will dawn for Southern Africa. From Tungu Fungerum it will be a very short connection to Cabora Bassa, either through the Zambian grid or via Malawi. The engineers from Zaire have already advised that they are keeping a close eye on the Cabora Bassa performance, and, if this is successful, they would upgrade the Inga line so that the full potential of the mighty Congo river can be realised. Other lines could then also be built northwards to link with the Owen Falls Scheme and Kenya and southwards to link with the Cunene projects.

The full potential of the Congo river is estimated at 27 Karibas with energy costs well below 0,1 cents per unit. The Shire project in Malawi has significant power potential and is only some 300 kilometres from the Cabora Bassa complex. Further north there is known to be considerable hydro-electric potential in the Rovuma and Rufiji river basins. Rhodesia is in a key geographical position of such a Southern African power grid.

We are also aware of a considerable hydro-electric potential in the Transkei and Tugela rivers - comparable to the famous Snowy Mountain Authority Scheme in Australia.

Hydro-electric energy is the only instance of generation which can only become cheaper in a world bedevilled by escalation and inflation. What will coal and labour, water and electrical generating plant, and therefore the thermal generated kilowatt hour, cost in the year 2000?

Although hydro schemes are capital intensive, once the loans credits have been amortized, say in 10 or 20 years, as has been demonstrated by Kariba, the operating and maintenance costs are negligible - about 1% of capital cost. The schemes are operated by very few people and can even be run by remote control. In the aluminium industry, for instance, a price of 0,1 cents per unit compared with 0,5 cents per unit makes all the difference in the world.

The other major advantage of hydro-power is the speed with which it can be brought on load. This makes it a valuable source for supplying peak power. As grids extend, so one becomes more exposed to the risks of not having generating capacity at moments of peak demand. A national "black out" on account of peak power failure has immense impact as regards economic loss. Nuclear generators cannot be regulated yet, as regards rate of output, and thermal stations can only be brought on load slowly at critical moments. Hydro stations can be brought on load in between 5 to 15 seconds.

Another great advantage foreseen for such a grid is that the coal resources of countries like Swaziland, Botswana, Rhodesia, Mocambique and Zambia could be utilised in such an integrated hydro-thermal system.

The question is whether all this will come about, on account of political considerations. This is difficult to answer at this stage, but my experience has been, in the main, that economic considerations and the ultimate well being of the population have always triumphed.

It is possible here to make only brief reference to two major factors of significance to Southern Africa arising from the completion of the Cabora Bassa complex, that is apart from cheap, reliable, and flexible electricity supply.

South Africa has a growing need to obtain good quality metallurgical coal. One of the best metallurgical coal deposits is at Moatize near Tete. The cost of transport over an inland rail system would be prohibitive. The Ministerio do Ultramar of Portugal has recently commissioned Consulting Engineers specialising in sea-going barge transport to make a study of the navigability of the Zambesi downstream of Tete which is 12 km from Moatize. According to our own calculations the additional draught (reliable depth) provided by 1978, arising from the regulation of the Zambesi through large storage capacity at Kariba, Kafue and Cabora Bassa and other reservoirs, will make the use of sea-going barges of the order of at least 1 000 tons capacity feasible. Iscor is naturally interested.

The navigation facility need not be confined to seaborne export of coal from Moatize: there are the other minerals and products.

When Mpanda Uncua dam, some 40 km downstream from Cabora Bassa, and some smaller dams at Boroma and Lupata are completed it will be possible to operate cargo and passenger hovercraft all the way from the Zambian border to the sea with immense economic benefits to Zambia, Rhodesia, Mocambique and the Republic. If and when a dam is built at Feira on the Zambesi at the Mocambique border between Cabora Bassa and Kariba, there will then be continuous lake surface from just below the Victoria Falls to Tete and a navigable river from there to the sea.

All this is possible within the next two decades. It would revolutionise transport in these regions: Rhodesian products such as Wankie coal, Zambian products such as copper, Malawi products such as bauxite, and Mocambique products could then be exported on an economically viable basis. Similarly, import of materials to these regions by water will result in significant economic benefits to the regions.

The other factor is the strategic advantages of these lake barriers. Kariba lake at present constitutes a natural "barrier" some 280 km long, protecting the border between Zambia and Rhodesia. When Cabora Bassa reservoir commences to fill

next year another water barrier some 200 km long will be added, to offer protection against southwards infiltration of hostile elements. The Mpanda Uncua dam downstream will add a further 40 km, and so on.

In conclusion, let me repeat that the benefits of making the Zambesi work for Africa will not be confined to the territories promoting the particular project. Large coal resources now lie fallow in some of these underdeveloped territories. The revenues and royalties earned from exploiting these resources, by virtue of the existence of such an international power grid, could make a material contribution to national budgets and standards of living in these territories. There will be further by-products, such as the infrastructure requirements which will help materially to "open up" the remote regions.

If all this comes to pass, we shall truly have "engineered for peace". The Zambesi will become the greatest work force and influence for refinement of civilisation in the region, and it will undoubtedly become the model for all Africa, as regards river basin development.

Dr. Henry Oliver recently retired from the Chairmanship of LTA Ltd., a South African company involved in the construction of Cabora Bassa. He has had world-wide experience as an engineer in thermal-electric, hydro-electric and irrigation schemes.

The above address was given to the Pretoria Branch of the Institute on 7 November, 1973. Dr. Oliver will be speaking on the same subject to the Witwatersrand Branch on 3 April, 1974.

A VISIT TO DAR AND LUSAKA

John Seiler

Our first approach to the Dar airport was from the north, over land, through a rain squall, beating horizontally against the plane. The East African Airline flight from Nairobi was entirely filled, because an Alitalia flight had been grounded in Nairobi with mechanical trouble and its Dar passengers had joined ours. We came around two or three times, each circle through pitch black clouds, with the ground apparent only when we got within a few hundred feet of it. My seatmate was a staff member of the U.S. State Department's Inspectorate General, seemingly composed and even indifferent to our plight; and in his presence it seemed undignified, even unpatriotic of me, to be frightened; but I was.

We came in for what surely was the final descent, only to pull up sharply, and with one wing at an angle. Then, we flew out to sea, to the east, no more than a thousand feet above the water, circled about and approached Dar once more. From this point of the compass, we could see the harbour and the city, with the dark clouds hanging to the west and north. This time, we found a way in below the clouds and landed in a heavy rainstorm, brakes squealing and plane shimmying as we stopped at the very end of the runway.

Passport control consisted of two men in a small shed-like area, and in the fluster of the landing and the rain, I forgot my adroit plan for handing him my passport open to the Tanzanian visa (artfully extracted from the Tanzanian embassy in Washington, via a tactful phone call from the State Department), thus minimizing the chance that he would see my South African residence permit and the multiple re-entry visa which permitted me entry into the Republic and South West Africa. He was too busy to be attentive to that detail. Customs was equally preoccupied, and my bags went through without inspection. I was met by my host, an American AID official; and we drove to his house north of the city. I later discovered that the Tanzanian government had just halted a short-lived general policy of forbidding entry to all visitors holding South African visas and instead was confining its application to visitors arriving by private transport or hitchhiking.

The north sea road was my entreport to Dar for the next three days. It is an undistinguished road, with a large number of embassies scattered alongside it. It comes closest to the ocean at the Celander Bridge, at which point I could see five or six ships anchored off the harbour waiting their turn to unload. The bridge itself is a short span of dubious concrete crossing a marshy river mouth. It was bombed several years ago, although only minor damage was done. A South African freelance journalist was arrested and sentenced to two years imprisonment earlier this year for taking photos at the bridge. A police station is now located at its southern end, and a policeman armed with rifle walks slowly on the footpath paralleling the bridge to keep pedestrians or vehicles from stopping near its underpinnings. My first temptation was to dismiss the bombing and spy scare as paranoia, because of the bridge's physical insignificance; but my host reminded me that this is the only tarred road from Dar to the north and its destruction would be a central act in any attack or attempted disruption of the city.

Dar itself is pleasantly ramshackle. I cannot say, not having been here before, whether it has run down since colonial days or was always this way. Certainly it lacks the neatly-defined urban centre of Nairobi - with the Kenyatta conference centre, the Hilton Tower, the older Parliament block - but there are some new office blocks scattered about; the Co-operative headquarters and the Ministry of the Interior are most conspicuous among government buildings. Away from the Askari Monument at the foot of Independence Avenue and a block of hotels and banks nearby, with tourist facilities but few tourists evident, the rest of the city is characterized by three- or four-storey older flats with ground-level stores. Muslims were common, both Black and Arab, recognizable by their skullcaps. It was hot, and this difference might explain the slow pace of street activity compared to Nairobi's hurlyburly.

I made a point of looking in bookstores, and I was pleasantly surprised in the Tanzania Publishing House (TPH) at their willingness to sell their publications to South Africans. Their explanation was free of guile and the mirror image of Prime Minister Vorster's attitude toward Black Africans interested in separate development: "We want them to learn the truth". And while the TPH does not compare in scope or quantity with the East African Publishing House (which has a Dar office, although it is based in Nairobi), its educational materials (mostly in Swahili) are widely used in both regular schools and the many adult education programs.

I was more interested in the relatively few English-language publications. One collection of essays by church people discussed "The Arusha Declaration and Christian Socialism". A series, *Tanzanian Studies*, contains three monographs: "Toward Socialist Planning", "The Silent Class Struggle", and "Tourism and Socialist Development". All represent interesting and generally successful efforts at rigorous analysis of the evolution of Tanzanian socialist development. While the first two consist of contributions from academicians and officials, the last is even more interesting, because it consists mostly of letters to the editor of the *Standard*, in which sometimes untutored people take seriously their responsibility to make contributions to the dialogue about the proper role of tourism in the development of a socialist Tanzania. Another series of three papers comes from the University of Dar-es-Salaam political science department: "The Cell System of the Tanganyika African National Union", "Building Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania", and "Essays on the Liberation of Southern Africa", edited by Nathan Shamuyarira.

The basic purpose of my visit was to meet colleagues at the University. I spent several hours in informal discussions with political scientists there. All members of the department are Africans and most are men of some distinction, known in North America and Europe for their academic achievement: Professor Anthony Rweyemamu, Dr. Yashpol Tandon, Dr. John Okumu and Nathan Shamuyarira. Mr. Shamuyarira was a journalist, but now shares the academic virtues of a firm intellectual grounding and an awareness of the scholarly literature. He is also surprisingly dispassionate about Southern Africa.

Mr. Shamuyarira and his colleagues listened attentively to my informal discussion of the basic character of South African foreign policy and the general nature of political dynamics within the Republic. As I did everywhere, I stressed two factors: the foreign policy was in large part unaggressive and, if anything, naive in its hopes for contacts and links with Black African states, both south and north of Zambesi; change was continuous within the country, but all that could be attributed to external pressure was some enhancement in the articulation of government policy and some acceleration in the implementation of separate development. While they had reservations about my assessment of the impotence of Afrikaner

business interests in the shaping of foreign policy, their basic dissatisfaction was with separate development, which they saw as inherently racist in both origin and evolution. Shamuyarira quietly expressed what seemed to be their shared view that a commitment to violence was probably necessary to bring about the kinds of change outlined in the Lusaka Manifesto.

I talked with a few university students before a lecture by a West Indian UN official on the problems of administration in developing states. They were bright and alert, and they shared vague misgivings about the uncertainty of employment on graduation. They must be third-generation: the first and second generations of university graduates hold the high and middle-level posts and are still too young for retirement. Government is the largest employer, and although pay is small, they genuinely desire to serve productively and not merely hold some bureaucratic sinecure.

The University itself is modern and attractive, perched on a hill inland from the city. Most of its students live in the campus multi-storey residence towers. Inevitably there must be a sense of elitism, felt both by the students and by Dar's young men and women who do not qualify for university. While most students are Black, there are some Arabs and even a few white Americans. Other departments than political science still have expatriate lecturers.

I wandered into the auditorium where I saw two anti-apartheid posters, both printed in Ghana. One read simply: "All white South Africans are taught to shoot Blacks".

While none of the political scientists was antagonistic toward me for being in South Africa, a student clerk in the department was surprised when he heard of my teaching post at Rhodes. I suggested facetiously that his government could not be totally disgusted by South Africa, since it did allow Swissair to fly from Dar to Johannesburg and back once each week. His reply was altogether serious, even grim: "It shouldn't be allowed".

The Tanzanian judge in sentencing the South African journalist earlier this year made clear his conviction that he was in the employ of the South African government. Despite the Celander Bridge bombing and the rhetoric of this trial, there is no scare atmosphere in Dar about inroads from the White south. On a very few occasions one or two light planes have flown over the country dropping leaflets, sometimes purporting to come from Oscar Kambona, once a close ally of Nyerere and now occasionally in residence in Lisbon. There are few police and no soldiers in the streets. There has been little censorship or control of books and newspapers entering the country, but as I left Dar I saw a freshly-posted circular in Swahili depicting acceptable and unacceptable clothing for Tanzanians.

There is an informed and shrewd awareness of South Africa, perhaps best characterized during my visit by the *Daily News* analyses of Dr. Diederichs' Nairobi visit (11 October 1973, page 7) and of the South African defence budget (13 October 1973, page 4). Shamlal Puri characterised the Diederichs' Nairobi interview as a "grotesque" failure to persuade Black Africa of the South African government's good faith. Puri recounted discriminatory practices in South Africa and concluded "It is time we realised that South Africa is not serious to come to terms with free Africa ... What we need now is an accelerated approach to end discrimination on the African continent. Mere resolutions are not the answer to the call of urgency from our enslaved brothers in South Africa. We will have to shed our blood to fight for their rights."

A "correspondent" compared the weaknesses of Black African armies with the strength of the South African forces to conclude that the South African buildup could not be explained in terms of a threat from Black African governments and must therefore have "as much to do with the internal security situation and the constant need for white South Africans to reassure themselves that they are on top ... It is an expensive form of self-indulgence".

Before I left Dar I applied for a multiple re-entry visa. The affable Interior Department clerk promised to write me in Grahamstown whether the decision was positive or negative. In order to do research in the country, I will need to apply at least six months ahead to the University for its imprimatur, a prerequisite for final government approval.

On a return visit, I should like to do several things. First, I want to visit one or more of the Communist embassies which have prominent roadside bulletin boards and periodic cultural open houses. Chinese railway laborers are not conspicuous. I saw three in a large lorry, just before I left Dar. I should like to meet some of them. I understand that American diplomats and Chinese ones have met socially at other delegations' social affairs, although the Chinese sense of diplomatic propriety forbids them from inviting the Americans or accepting any American invitations until such time as ambassadors are exchanged by the two countries. While I did ride on a few miles of the American-built Great West Road, which more or less parallels the TanZam railway, I should like to see much more of the road and catch a glimpse of the railway. Finally, having successfully bargained for a freshly carved abstract Makonde sculpture at a carver's roadside hut, on my return I want to buy a massive traditional one carved from ebony. All Makonde carvings symbolize the unity of life and the community of man. It would be ironically apt to send mine from Dar to Johannesburg by Swissair.

The Dar - Lusaka flight was uneventful. We flew parallel to the Great Western Road and occasionally I thought I could see traces of the TanZam railway line from our 30,000 feet altitude. Tanzania is surprisingly forested, but, once west of Lake Malawi and over the Makutu mountains of Eastern Zambia, the landscape becomes uniformly dry and flat. October in Zambia is the driest and hottest month of the year.

For no comprehensible reason, the Lusaka airport passport processes were remarkably slow. The two men on duty were solemn and uncommunicative, only marginally less to Blacks than to Whites. Paradoxically, while it took thirty minutes to get to the counter for passport inspection, no particular interest was shown in my South African visa; and there was no inspection at all of any of the passenger luggage from the Dar flight. The Rand was quoted at the airport foreign exchange, unlike Dar and Nairobi, where it is anathema.

Both the Lusaka airport and the Great East Road from the airport to the University of Zambia present almost-symbolic contrasts with the Dar airport and its egress road. The Dar terminal functions adequately, although its facilities are meagre and its building unpretentious. The road into Dar is narrow, heavily-trafficked, and breaking down to potholes. The Lusaka terminal is large and modern, even more substantial than Nairobi's. The Great East Road has four lanes from the airport some ten miles from Lusaka to the perimeter of the city. It is perhaps twice the width of Tanzania's best road, the American-constructed macadam road running west from Dar to Zambia. I stayed at the University guesthouse, just off this highway, and the roar of trucks continued through the night.

The city itself has no functional centre. It has Los Angeles's implications in smaller dimensions. Cairo Road, at the very western edge, is the primary shopping area; while the government buildings are spaced across still-open field as far as three miles to the east. I saw few tourists, except for one group of American students roughing it in a Landrover, but there were many whites driving cars with Zambian license plates. Walking about Cairo Road shops, and in and out of some of them, I encountered neither hostility nor any special interest in me as a White man with an expensive-looking camera. The only encounter I had was with a Black man who warned me to watch my wallet as I passed an area of itinerant peddlers of carvings and malachite jewelry. A number of substantial, but aesthetically innocuous office buildings line both sides of Cairo Road: Barclays; Gridleys; the new Bank of Zambia building; several Ministries; the central post office; a large department store, Zambia OK (in which the South African firm has a substantial investment); and several quick-service eating places called Zambis' like (in the most banal ways) the Wimpies creeping over the urban centres of South Africa.

I walked from Cairo Road to the government centre past substantial houses and flats, laid out with considerable gardens and intervening space. The Anglican Cathedral of the Holy Cross, a modern structure laid out in the form of a cross, dominates the Cathedral Hill area. But "dominates" is an exaggeration, because the open spaces are so large that its nearest neighbours seem near the horizon in any direction. The entire administrative area lacks either a planned unity or the marvellously unkempt integrative mechanism that city centres in Nairobi, New York and other large commercial centres tend to develop. Most government buildings stand alone. I like most the High Court, its soft red stone facade a warming contrast to the concrete most commonly used. Mulungushi House is more typical. A six-eight storied serpentine-shaped building housing several ministries, it lacks any distinction. And while I took photos at the High Court and the U.S. Embassy and U.K. High Commission, probably irrelevant self-preservation instincts kept me from doing so at Defence Headquarters and the security police training camp not far from the State House.

It was in Mulungushi House that I found the map sales department of the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources. I bought several maps that I had seen and wanted - one of the entire country, one of Lusaka - and then found irresistible a detailed map lying on the counter, almost like an advertisement - a 1/20 000 map of Livingstone-Victoria Falls, produced in Federation days!

The University of Zambia has lavish facilities for its small student body of 2000, but because almost all the buildings are the same monochromatic concrete and are laid out in one long line - except for the residences and the library - the effect is monotonous. The setting also lacks the dramatic perspective of Dar-es-Salaam. But it is a substantial campus, into which obvious planning and pride have gone.

The university bookstore was interesting for its range of materials. While it has all the publications of the old Rhodes-Livingstone Institute and the African Institute of the University of Zambia, it also has for sale an extensive portion of the lists of the East African Publishing House and the Tanzania Publishing House (TPH). There are a number of books on South Africa, mostly in the Penguin series; but I can recall none by contemporary South African academicians, whether published overseas or in South Africa.

The publications of the National Educational Company of Zambia (NECZAM) are given prominence. Like TPH, NECZAM specializes in books for formal and informal education. Unlike TPH, NECZAM must use English and eight African languages. Contrary to TPH,

NECZAM offers little in the way of political ideology, beyond a number of speeches by President Kaunda on various aspects of Zambian development and a treatise on "Zambian Humanism" by J.B. Zulu, who has been Governor of the Bank of Zambia since 1967. The only extended analysis of Zambian development is in the collection of essays, *After Mulungushi: The Economics of Zambian Humanism*, published by the East African Publishing House in 1969.

The absence of serious political analysis is not NECZAM's fault. The fault must be shared by President Kaunda, the party and academicians. Symptomatic of the superficiality and banality of political dialogue is the plethora of posters, printed by the government exhorting all Zambians to carry out the dictates of humanism. One pedantic variant spells out the implications for bureaucratic behaviour in a list with a dozen items, but my own favorite (now facing me in my study) says simply (and, in political terms, simplistically): "Please remember - Do unto others as you would have them do unto you - Humanist".

The political science staff, at least, may be made impotent ideologically by its totally expatriate nature. Only one man is a Black African, and he is Nigerian. The rest are Canadian, American and English. Some of them have had previous teaching and research experience in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. Their material life style in Lusaka is comfortable and their commitments made intentionally finite. They have contracts of from 3-5 years. A few Zambians are completing Ph.D.s in political science overseas and should take up posts soon.

Because housing is difficult to come by and costly, most live in University houses for which they pay a nominal annual rent amounting to less than 10% of their annual salaries. (Admittedly, salary scales are low even by South African standards). My brief exposure to staff social life was fragmentary and perhaps misleading, but the primary ingredients were expatriates (and a very few Zambians), beer, rock music and dagga. Casual conversations elicited uniform criticism of Zambians as being phlegmatic, unapproachable, and perhaps even genetically incompetent.

Paradoxically, most of the staff have an instinctive and genuine sympathy for Black Africa in general and Zambia in particular. They ought not to be faulted for their residual cultural perceptions and needs, except that they suffer by comparison to Dar expatriates. The latter live more simply, in part because Dar lacks the creature comforts available in Lusaka; but more basically because the genuine puritanism forced on Tanzanian civil servants by low salaries (a restraint lacking among their Zambian counterparts) makes thoughtful expatriates exercise some combination of practical and moral prudence before any conspicuous consumption from their own "topped-off" salaries.

There is also among some of the younger Americans a vocational radicalism. Instincts and relatively inelastic Marxist determinism come together in an analytical rhetoric about Whites and Blacks in southern Africa in which evil and good are allocated with little overlap between the races. This attitude came to bear in a staff seminar on my research on South African foreign policy, during which the dogmatic radicals simply could not allow themselves to deal directly with the data I proffered as the basis for my analysis. On the other hand, and at first surprising, a much more open (although equally critical) approach came from the two South Africans in attendance. While one made a few relatively mild comments, the other suggested that I had

been taken in by white South African values in that I characterized South African policy as restrained and in some measure even defensive, rather than aggressive. He did make several pertinent points, despite his anger with me and mine with him. The more academic one had to do with the difficulty of defining in a conflict situation the meaning of "restrained", "aggressive", and "defensive". The more practical one, which fitted closely with the academic point, was his insistence that I was ignoring substantial activities by BOSS and the SAP not just in Zambia, but in all the Black states bordering South Africa.

The students whom I talked with in a class on southern Africa also refused to see South Africa as anything but aggressive. Later, when I discussed with a larger student group my views of racial relations in the Republic, students raised substantial and significant questions about South African processes of change. Some were mystified that I could find any satisfaction teaching only white students, while being cut off from Black students and universities because of Afrikaner fear of alien ideas and teaching approaches. Others, despite my critical comments, suggested that I must be a tool of the South African government for suggesting that homeland leaders like Chief Buthelezi deserved serious attention and support from them. I did strike a positive note by suggesting that casual surveys among some urban Blacks in South Africa showed that they keep informed of events in Black Africa and that President Kaunda is one of their primary heroes, along with Chief Buthelezi and Mrs. Helen Suzman. The very next day, the *Times of Zambia* reported that suggestion on its first page.

I can only guess at the possible disjunction between innocuous Humanism posters, the ambivalent status of expatriate staff, and the very lively political interest of the Black students whom I met. Symptomatic of disjunction, or at least government fear of it, is that no embassys' staff is allowed to visit the university without a specific permit from the Zambian government.

According to a well-informed observer, with whom I discussed the recent incidents of letter bombs and land mine explosions, South African involvement in the former is not at all evident, but in the latter it appears probable. In addition to the three publicized letter bomb explosions -- the Chinese embassy, the regional government office and outside the central post office -- there was also an explosion at the Soviet embassy shortly after the Chinese embassy explosion. Unlike the other three explosions, no deaths occurred at the Soviet embassy. A number of other letter bombs -- more than a dozen -- have been discovered before explosion. All originated from outside Zambia. While there are hints, perhaps dropped intentionally, about their origins -- one came in a carved-out volume of Mao's *Little Red Book*, another was preceded by a warning call from a man who was said to have a South African accent -- The Zambian government has not revealed what, if anything, it knows.

The landmine explosions and air bombings which President Kaunda discussed with U.N. Secretary-General Waldheim on his Zambian visit did take place. Mines have been laid repeatedly, people killed and injured, and vehicles damaged or destroyed, on a number of paths and roads north of the border from Caprivi east to Kariba. Occasional bombings from the air are said by the Zambians to have emanated from Caprivi. They also say that the responsibility of South African units for the Caprivi defensive perimeter suggests that they are responsible for the mines laid north of that area. Rhodesian units may have laid mines to the east, although South African units are also on duty at points on this perimeter adjacent to landmine explosion points.

The Zambian belief about the origin of the land-mines helps to explain the ill will which I felt from University staff and students. Its percolation down into the ranks of the Zambian army helps to explain (but certainly not to justify) the erratic behaviour of Zambian border patrols.

Therefore, it is no surprise that the Zambian attitude is that neither Rhodesia nor South Africa can be trusted. President Kaunda said in a September interview with *Africa* magazine (No. 25, September 1973, pages 42-50) that the Rhodesian border closing was "... not an isolated case at all. It is part of the Southern African racial confrontation - Black versus White, and it therefore must be taken seriously as part of the general attack or as a counter attack of the minority regimes against the Black majority or against movements in Southern Africa" - (page 42). The Zambian government published a brochure on the border closing: "A valuable lesson for Smith".

As for Zambian relations with South Africa, they are best characterized in the Zambian government White Paper, "Dear Mr. Vorster ... details of exchange between President Kaunda of Zambia and Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa", released on 23 April, 1971. The heart of that White Paper is the Zambian government's evidence that shows that the repeated initiative for dialogue between the two heads of government had come entirely from the South African side, and that President Kaunda had never in his correspondence given any indication of immediate interest in a personal meeting with Prime Minister Vorster.

Despite some accessibility to South African passport holders, its willingness to exchange Kwachas for Rands, and a much vaguer political ideology than Tanzania's, Zambia is more apprehensive than Tanzania about South Africa.

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PRESSURES OF AFRICAN STATES
ON APARTHEID

David Hirschmann

I

South Africa is a country in which there are tremendous disequilibria in the allocation of both political power and material benefits. Axiomatically, it is the very people who are dispossessed economically who are disenfranchised politically, and who, therefore, lack effective political channels and mechanisms to exert pressure for changes advantageous to themselves. The role of foreign influences in South Africa should, therefore, lie in bolstering those forces within the country - too weak in themselves - which are attempting to reallocate political power and economic resources more justly, and to add urgency to that process of reallocation.

When attempting to judge the impact of any particular pressure or category of pressures - in this case we shall be considering those originating on the African continent - it is essential to emphasize that each influence exerted should not be seen in isolation, but rather as part of a complex system of more or less unconnected external inputs, which in turn must link up with domestic forces.

More specifically, it may be observed that for a particular external interest to elicit some positive response, certain conditions should prevail.¹ (This does not concern radical change.)

1. Most significantly, the foreign pressure must interlock with, and be reinforced by, local influences working towards the same end. The most dramatic recent example involved the working conditions of Black labour. Clearly, the momentum here found its source in local conditions and derived its strength from the workers themselves. But it is also clear that the movement was encouraged by a meshing of these forces with the numerous overseas elements prevailing upon companies with interests in South Africa to disinvest, or, alternatively, to improve radically the working conditions of their black employees. The potential of such a combination is suggested by the 1973 Natal strikes and by Adam Raphael's reports to *The Guardian*² on the starvation wages paid by British firms in South Africa.

2. The specific issue raised must be one which the government itself or a vocal group in the National Party perceives as a defect; or, though less effectively, it must be one which the opposition or the press have turned into a potentially sensitive one. For example, as soon as it was noted outside the country that meaningful contact between Mr. Vorster and the Bantustan leaders was almost non-existent, the Prime Minister moved to rectify this. Clearly also, any issue (even if it is not seen as a weakness) attached to an economic threat will have to be taken seriously.

3. The pressure source must be one to which the government feels it an obligation, or an advantage, to respond. Thus when a denunciation

1. The following conditions are included in the writer's article, "Pressures on Apartheid", in *Foreign Affairs*, New York, Vol. 52, No. 1, October 1973, p. 175-6

2. See *The Guardian Weekly* (London and Manchester) for the weeks ending 17, 24 and 31 March, 1973, for Raphael's articles and the widespread response to them.

originates from a conservative Western government or is voiced through an international body of which South Africa is still a member, Pretoria finds it necessary in the first case, and advantageous in the second, to respond.

4. The development or alteration of its policy which the government judges would dilute overseas criticism must also be one which it feels it can get away with, for it has to keep an eye on the electorate and its own more reactionary wing. In cases where it feels it may have overstepped the mark, it immediately takes a counter-balancing step which both demonstrates that it has not strayed from the path, and also serves to divert attention. Thus immediately after the Natal strikes, which momentarily wrested the initiative from the government, it neutralised any doubts its supporters may have had by banning sixteen student leaders.

5. For a particular foreign influence to impinge on the government requires a background of more extreme pressures linked to more threatening sanctions. A decade of war in the Portuguese-administered territories, increased guerrilla activity in Rhodesia, sporadic incursions into the Caprivi Strip, as well as the ever-present, but effectively suppressed, threat of violence inside South Africa itself, provide such a background to all peaceful inroads. But within the spectrum of non-violent forays against apartheid the gravity of the threat also varies. Thus, while Pretoria does not particularly approve of Washington posting a Black diplomat to South Africa, or of all the talk of communication-for-change, it nevertheless tolerates it in the knowledge that the policies of a Democratic administration might well be far more severe than those of the Nixon administration. Similarly, it would not really enjoy the sight of President Banda running around South Africa trying, in his words, to "kill apartheid with kindness", were it not for the almost solid wall of isolation which it confronts in the rest of Africa. So, too, the pressures for improvement of Black working conditions have to be solved, because the alternative pressures are for disinvestment.

II

Any attempt to evaluate the impact of those pressures on South Africa, which find their source on the African continent, must, therefore, firstly, be made in terms of this whole complex web of foreign influences. Secondly, it should be pointed out that much of what Africa has achieved in its struggle against apartheid and colonialism have become so much part of everyday life, that they tend to be overlooked. Thirdly, such an evaluation should note at the outset that in the early sixties the newly independent African states overestimated considerably their potential to bring the South African government to its knees.

One may mention in regard to this third point a debate which took place in the Nigerian Parliament in 1961. The Nigerian Foreign Minister, Jaja Wachuku, was bitterly criticised for supporting a U.N. General Assembly resolution which called for an end to all colonial rule by not later than 1 December, 1970. The disapproval was based on his not having voted for a resolution which set the deadline as the end of 1962. It was argued at the time that a 1970 deadline was the equivalent of sentencing colonial peoples to perpetual subjection. Wachuku replied that 1970 was the more realistic date³, but this did not diminish the criticism.

3. See House of Representatives Debates, Nigeria, 15-30 November, 1961, p. 142-3; and U.N. General Assembly, Plenary Meeting 1050, 10 November, 1961, paras 9-62.

Two years later, Wachuku reminded Parliament that the course of events appeared to be upholding many of his predictions:

".....I remember somebody then suggested 1962 as the year in which the whole of black Africa should be free. Another Member said 1963. The year 1962 has come and gone, 1963 is almost over and very soon we will have 1964 and this House will be dissolved, and yet the whole of black Africa will still not be free. A new Parliament will come to discuss the question of freedom for the whole of Africa, and perhaps it may well be that 1970 - the target date - may come and go and the whole of Africa may still not be free."⁴

It is now 1974, and still the white governments of South Africa and Rhodesia retain their power and the Portuguese their provinces of Angola and Mocambique. Some observers have judged the effectiveness of African pressures with reference to original promises and timetables, and concluded, on that basis, that Africa has failed. This is, however, too simple an analysis of the processes involved. Certainly, all the target governments remain where they were, but this does not mean that Africa has had no effective impact.

Briefly, we may list some of the pressures which African countries have brought to bear.

They have structured a continent of almost total opposition to South Africa, and a regional organisation, the Organisation of African Unity, a cornerstone of which is the objective of ending the policies of the South African government. They have taken about 40 anti-apartheid votes into the United Nations and about a dozen into the Commonwealth of Nations. They have gained the sympathy and support of the leaders of Coloured nations throughout the world, of the Communist countries, and of a number of "socialist/labour" governments in the West, so building a powerful international voice of condemnation for apartheid. South Africa has been excluded from participating in a number of international organisations and agencies, such as the International Labour Organisation, the Food and Agriculture Organisation and the Commonwealth, and numerous sporting bodies; and her continued presence in others has been made very uncomfortable.

On 25 June, 1963, about nine months before South Africa withdrew from the Organisation, the South African Minister of Labour, Senator A.E. Trollip, in discussing anti-South African measures being taken by the International Labour Organisation, told the South African Parliament:

"The Afro-Asian states, with the aid of the Soviet bloc, are transforming the I.L.O. from an essentially non-political organisation devoted to the interests of the workers to a platform from which ideological political disputes are conducted without regard to the primary purpose of the Organisation."⁵

To the extent that this refers to matters affecting southern Africa, this statement is valid, the African countries have been prepared to make use of each and every platform in an effort to achieve their objective. But the

4. House of Representatives Debates, Nigeria, Vol. 11(b), 16 April-3 June 1963, p. 912.

5. House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 8, 10/6 - 28/6/1963, col. 709.

consequences for South Africa's membership of these bodies is a measure of Africa's effectiveness in international organisations. In a world troubled by confrontation, violence and the effects of widespread poverty - all of which present themselves as issues competing for, and deserving of, urgent international attention - the African states have kept questions relating to southern Africa at the forefront. In 1971 the U.N. General Assembly considered over thirty resolutions which directly or indirectly referred to southern Africa. By never permitting developments in this part of the continent to become a low-key issue, they have gone a long way to forcing many governments - particularly Western governments - to take a stand, however much some of them may have preferred to avoid doing so.

In the field of economics, a fairly comprehensive trade blockade has been maintained against South Africa. Of course, there are numerous examples of South African firms trading with countries to the north, and Africa in any case has never been regarded as a major market for South African goods. An accurate measure of the effectiveness of the blockade would, however, require some form of comparative analysis incorporating an assumed figure for what trade with Africa could have been - in view of South Africa's geographical proximity to African markets - had it not been for the embargo.

Militarily, they have helped sustain guerrilla warfare of varying intensity and effect in Angola, Mocambique, Rhodesia and the Caprivi Strip, by supplying funds, training and bases, as well as acting as channels for funds, arms and trainers from other parts of the world. Over and above their military role, these wars - or in some cases, incidents - have a political function in providing a focal point of attention and support for anti-apartheid and anti-colonial movements throughout the world. They also supply the "background of more extreme measures", referred to in point 5 above, which enables less threatening influences to have greater impact on the South African system.

Not only have the African states thwarted Pretoria's outward movement to gain friends and increase trade with Africa, but they have - for the time being at least - turned the tables by encouraging two of South Africa's neighbours, Botswana and Lesotho, both comprehensively dependent on South Africa, to take up strongly antagonistic political postures towards apartheid. As measured by voting registered in the U.N. General Assembly, on the average hostility of the Black states of southern Africa towards the "white-ruled" states increased noticeably in 1972, as compared with 1971⁶.

This "counteroffensive" was symbolised in July 1973 by the visit to Gaborone of the O.A.U. Secretary-General, Nzo Ekganki. In a speech opening the Gaborone Trade Fair, Ekganki said that he appreciated the constraints which geographical facts placed on the activities of Botswana; nevertheless, he called on the leaders and people of that country to summon forth all the moral pressure they could exert, which in combination with military and political pressures, would be brought to bear on the white south. The reaction of the crowd in front of him, as well as that of the cabinet ministers behind him shared strong approval of the point he was making.

The real significance of Africa's blocking of the outward movement is not so much that Pretoria's relations with Africa are not making much progress, but more that it interferes with South Africa's ties with the rest of

⁶. See the writer's paper, *Southern African Voting Patterns in the United Nations General Assembly, 1971 and 1972*, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, August 1973.

the world. The South African Foreign Minister, Dr. Hilgard Muller, and others have admitted that relations with Africa are the key to Pretoria's international relations in general. Improved linkages with states to the north would facilitate the normalisation of contacts with Western governments, many of which would be relieved to see such progress.

Thus, while it is true to say that African pressures have not brought down the governments of the white south, and that by themselves they are unlikely to do so, nevertheless their thrust has had more than a marginal impact.

The countries of Africa have succeeded in making it much more difficult and costly for Ian Smith to hold on in Rhodesia (as well as for Britain to compromise on Rhodesia's independence), a great deal more expensive and problematic for the Portuguese to continue controlling their provinces/states, so hastening the day when Lisbon might decide to cut her losses and leave Africa; considerably more complicated and embarrassing for South Africa to continue her mandate over South West Africa/Namibia; perceptibly more difficult for Western governments to go on ignoring the issues of southern Africa, or to carry on normal diplomatic and commercial relations with South Africa; and substantially more tricky for Pretoria to find friends and trading partners in that part of the world which is Coloured, and that includes the vast majority of nations.

Partly by initiating, partly by bolstering, always by persevering with, this barrage of extra difficulties and constraints on South Africa's relations with the world, the African states have made their influence relevant to developments in South Africa.

David Hirschmann is an MA graduate in International Relations from the University of the Witwatersrand. From 1971 to 1973 he was on the staff of the S.A. Institute of International Affairs at Jan Smuts House, and he is now engaged in a research project in Lesotho.

An article by Mr. Hirschmann, entitled "Pressures on Apartheid" appeared in the October, 1973, issue of the American quarterly review *Foreign Affairs*, published by the Council on Foreign Relations.

In the next issue of the *Newsletter* a comment on this subject by Otto Krause, South African journalist, will be included. Both Mr. Hirschmann and Mr. Krause were members of a panel which discussed the question of "External Pressure on South Africa" at a meeting of the Witwatersrand Branch of the Institute in August, 1973.

BRIEF REPORTS / KORT VERSLA E

- Voorberei deur die Instituut se Personeel -

- Prepared by the Institute's Staff -

UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING ROLE : AMERICAN VIEWS

In a speech on 28 November, 1973, in the Special Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, Ambassador Schaufele of the United States said that recent events had shown that U.N. peace-keeping operations could play an important role in easing tension, strengthening international security and thus fulfilling the major purpose of the Organisation. The United States believed that it was possible to build on the experience of the U.N. Emergency Force in the Middle East to accelerate the establishment of guidelines for future peace-keeping operations.

Ambassador Schaufele said that the Middle East experience showed that the Security Council could act with despatch when there was basic agreement among the powers directly concerned, and he recalled previous United States efforts to seek agreement on peace-keeping guidelines. In this connection he quoted Secretary of State Kissinger who, in a speech to the General Assembly on 24 September, had said:

"We should delay no longer. The time has come to agree on peace-keeping guidelines so that this organization can act swiftly, confidently and effectively in future crises. To break the deadlock, the United States is prepared to consider how the Security Council can play a more central role in the conduct of peace-keeping operations. If all countries concerned approach the problem with a desire to achieve a co-operative solution, the United Nations can achieve a major step forward during this session."

Ambassador Schaufele maintained that the peace-keeping operation launched by the Security Council in October, 1973, was encouraging, firstly, because it demonstrated that the U.N. could interpose itself in certain conflict situations, not only by helping to calm a situation, but also by providing a means by which the parties to a conflict could construct a permanent settlement of their differences. He continued: "There is reason to believe that we are entering a new era in which we can turn from sterile confrontation, relax tensions and find realistic solutions to old conflicts and prevent new ones. We must now increasingly turn our attention to the broad and long-range task of building structures to safeguard the peace of the world which is so important to all of us. In the last analysis, peace can only be achieved, of course, if it is based on an equitable settlement of the issues which give rise to tensions and hostilities. But peace-keeping by consent, which is peace-keeping with the concurrence of the parties directly involved and with the support of the powers most concerned, can play a most important part in building the necessary foundation."

Secondly, according to Ambassador Schauffele, the U.N. action was encouraging because in this case "there was no argument at all about the primacy of the Security Council in such operations. This, too, is as it should be. The Secretary General proposed the terms of reference for the operation and the Council approved them. The Security Council wisely enlisted the full co-operation of the parties concerned, since this is a consent operation, not an enforcement action. The Council defined the mandate; it set the size of the force; it provided for equitable financing of the operation and it gave its consent to other decisions before the operation could be launched.

The United States believes that possibilities now exist for reconciling differences which have hitherto held up agreement on peace-keeping guidelines. We see a possibility of agreement on the basis of these principles: First, excessively detailed guidelines may be self-defeating and may deprive members of the Security Council of the desirable and necessary flexibility called for by particular circumstances. Second, we believe ways can be found whereby, on the one hand, not every detail needs to be submitted to the Security Council before a peace-keeping operation can be launched, but on the other hand the right of the Council to consider such features could nevertheless be protected. Third, we believe there are ways and means to reassure all the members of the Security Council that specific operations will not transcend the bounds of the original mandate.

The United States believes that any guidelines agreed for future peace-keeping operations should retain sufficient flexibility so that appropriate account can be taken of the views of the host countries and the parties directly concerned, and of the professional qualifications of potential troop contributors, as well as of the views of members of the Security Council. Circumstances will differ from case to case.

The United States would recommend that insofar as geographical representation is concerned, the emphasis be placed on qualifications and impartiality of the troop-contributing country regarding the particular issue at hand or the parties concerned. There are potential troop contributors that have specially trained contingents available on a standby basis. They should be given priority consideration providing they meet the criteria of qualifications and impartiality.

The United States has long accepted - and we believe there is wide consensus on this - that the Security Council should define the purpose and mandate of a mission, determine the approximate size by setting an upper limit to the number of observers or troops, establish the duration of a mission and the manner of its termination, and indicate the manner of financing, subject to the General Assembly's authority to apportion expenses. As far as the choice of the commander and the composition of a force is concerned, we believe ways can be found to protect both the primacy of the Security Council and the flexibility that is needed to avoid getting bogged down in lengthy and unproductive debates in negotiations when an operation needs to be launched. As the deployment of the U.N. Emergency Force in the Middle East has demonstrated, the need for quick and decisive action can be met, for instance, by having the Secretary General name an interim commander and field certain elements while the ultimate decisions remain pending.

There are also a number of proposed procedures designed to assure that the mandate is carried out according to the wishes of the Council. One government, for example, has suggested that specific orders and instructions issued to a force be subject to periodic review and regular reporting to the Security Council. In this connection the U.N. Emergency Force terms of reference state that the Secretary General shall keep the Security Council fully informed of developments relating to the functioning of the force. In addition to fashioning general guidelines there are other ways in which the Security Council could helpfully prepare the ground for future peace-keeping operations. A number of countries have foresightedly earmarked specific elements of their armed forces for possible U.N. duties. To encourage other countries to emulate their example, the United States believes the Security Council should authorize the Secretary General to draw up models of U.N. agreements with host countries and possible troop contributors. We also believe it would be useful to revive an earlier idea that the Security Council authorize the Secretary General to compile an inventory of troops and equipment available for U.N. duties and a roster of potential commanders after consulting the countries concerned."

Source: *Backgrounder*, 10/73, 12 December 1973,
issued by the U.S. Information Service.

CONFERENCE OF OIL CONSUMER COUNTRIES

The following communique was issued on 13 February, 1974 at the end of the Washington Energy Conference:

Summary Statement

1. Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States met in Washington from February 11 to 13, 1974. The European Community was represented as such by the President of the Council and the President of the Commission. Finance Ministers, with responsibility for energy affairs, economic affairs and science and technology affairs also took part in the meeting. The Secretary General of the OECD also participated in the meeting. The ministers examined the international energy situation and its implications and charted a course of actions to meet this challenge which requires constructive and comprehensive solutions. To this end they agreed on specific steps to provide for effective international co-operation. The ministers affirmed that solutions to the world's energy problem should be sought in consultation with producer countries and other consumers.

Analysis of the Situation

2. They noted that during the past three decades progress in improving productivity and standards of living was greatly facilitated by the ready availability of increasing supplies of energy at fairly stable prices. They recognized that the problem of meeting growing demand existed before the current situation and the needs of the world economy for increased energy supplies require positive long-term solutions.

3. They concluded that the current energy situation results from an intensification of these underlying factors and from political developments.

4. They reviewed the problems created by the large rise in oil prices and agreed with the serious concern expressed by the International Monetary Fund's Committee of Twenty at its recent Rome meeting over the abrupt and significant changes in prospect for the world balance of payments structure.

5. They agreed that present petroleum prices presented the structure of world trade and finance with an unprecedented situation. They recognized that none of the consuming countries could hope to insulate itself from these developments, or expect to deal with the payments impact of oil prices by the adoption of monetary or trade measures alone. In their view, the present situation, if continued, could lead to a serious deterioration in income and employment, intensify inflationary pressures, and endanger the welfare of nations. They believed that financial measures by themselves will not be able to deal with the strains of the current situation.

6. They expressed their particular concern about the consequences of the situation for the developing countries and recognized the need for efforts by the entire international community to resolve this problem. At current oil prices the additional energy costs for developing countries will cause a serious setback to the prospect for economic development of these countries.

7. General conclusions. They affirmed that, in the pursuit of national policies, whether in the trade, monetary or energy fields, efforts should be made to harmonize the interests of each country on the one hand and the maintenance of the world economic system on the other. Concerted international co-operation between all the countries concerned including oil producing countries could help to accelerate an improvement in the supply and demand situation, ameliorate the adverse economic consequences of the existing situation and lay the groundwork for a more equitable and stable international energy relationship.

8. They felt that these considerations taken as a whole made it essential that there should be a substantial increase of international co-operation in all fields. Each participant in the conference stated its firm intention to do its utmost to contribute to such an aim, in close co-operation both with the other consumer countries and with the producer countries,

9. They concurred in the need for a comprehensive action program to deal with all facets of the world energy situation by co-operative measures. In so doing they will build on the work of the OECD. They recognized that they may wish to invite, as appropriate, other countries to join with them in these efforts. Such an action program of international co-operation would include, as appropriate, the sharing of means and efforts, while concerting national policies, in such areas as:

- The conservation of energy and restraint of demand.
- A system of allocating oil supplies in times of emergency and severe shortages.
- The acceleration of development of additional energy sources so as to diversify energy supplies.
- The acceleration of energy research and development programs through international co-operative efforts. (1)

10. With respect to monetary and economic questions, they decided to intensify their co-operation and to give impetus to the work being undertaken in the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD on the economic and monetary consequences of the current energy situation, in particular to deal with balance of payment disequilibria. They agreed that:

- In dealing with the balance of payments impact of oil prices they stressed the importance of avoiding competitive depreciation and the escalation of restrictions on trade and payments or disruptive actions in external borrowing. (2)
- While financial co-operation can only partially alleviate the problems which have recently arisen for the international economic system, they will intensify work on short-term financial measures and possible longer-term mechanisms to reinforce existing official and market credit facilities. (3)
- They will pursue domestic economic policies which will reduce as much as possible the difficulties resulting from the current energy cost levels. (4)
- They will make strenuous efforts to maintain and enlarge the flow of development aid bilaterally and through multilateral institutions, on the basis of international solidarity embracing all countries with appropriate resources.

11. Further, they have agreed to accelerate wherever practicable their own national programs of new energy sources and technology which will help the overall world-wide supply and demand situation.

12. They agreed to examine in detail the role of international oil companies.

13. They stressed the continued importance of maintaining and improving the natural environment as part of developing energy sources and agreed to make this an important goal of their activity.

14. They further agreed that there was need to develop a co-operative multilateral relationship with producing countries, and other consuming countries that takes into account the long-term interests of all. They are ready to exchange technical information with these countries on the problem of stabilizing energy supplies with regard to quantity and prices.

15. They welcomed the initiatives in the UN to deal with the larger issues of energy and primary products at a world-wide level and in particular for a special session of the UN General Assembly.

Establishment of Follow-on Machinery

16. They agreed to establish a coordinating group headed by senior officials to direct and to coordinate the development of the actions referred to above. The coordinating group shall decide how best to organize its work. It should:

- Monitor and give focus to the tasks that might be addressed in existing organizations;
- Establish such ad hoc working groups as may be necessary to undertake tasks for which there are presently no suitable bodies;
- Direct preparations of a conference of consumer and producer countries which will be held at the earliest possible opportunity and which, if necessary, will be preceded by a further meeting of consumer countries. (5)

17. They agreed that the preparations for such meetings should involve consultations with developing countries and other consumer and producer countries. (6)

NOTE: (1) France does not accept point nine in its entirety.

(2) (3) (4) In point ten France does not accept these paragraphs.

(5) France does not accept point 16 in its entirety.

(6) France does not accept point 17 in its entirety.

Source: *Official Text*, 2/74, 20 February, 1974,
issued by the U.S. Information Service.

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

On 11 March, 1974, the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Mr. Joseph Sisco, made a statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in which he gave a "broad overview" of U.S. policy positions and future directions of policy in four areas. Excerpts from his statement follow (as given in *USA News Digest*, Vol. 13 No. 12, 20 March 1974):

Our interests, our strengths and our resources compel an active and responsible American role in the world. This does not mean there is or should be a Washington blueprint for every international conflict -- military or economic. It does mean a policy of selective engagement on the critical problems of our time.... It would be a mistake for any of us to take for granted a future of peace. Each of the achievements of recent years is only partial -- foreign policy is a process, not a final product. The danger of nuclear weapons is still self-evident. While our relations with Moscow and Peking are improved they are still competitive. Peace in the Middle East and Indochina is not yet secure. Therefore, the central challenge before Americans today is not any particular issue but our willingness to persevere, to pursue a consistent framework of policies over a sustained period of time....

Let me devote the remainder of my remarks to the four areas in which our willingness to pursue steady purposes can have the greatest impact on our future.

1. *Allies:* We are convinced that at the very heart of a stable world must be the community of nations sharing common goals, common ideals and a common perspective of how to deal of how to deal with the problems and threats confronting us. New relationships with countries with different systems and outlooks are only possible if old relationships with allies remain strong.... The problem before us is whether the nations of the Atlantic area and Japan, faced with self-evident problems that affect them all, can develop a common approach or whether this relationship is dominated by nationalistic rivalries. The United States has made clear its choice. In speeches last April and December, Secretary Kissinger made a number of specific proposals to revitalize our alliances. He said:

-- We have intensified all levels of consultation with our allies, but consultation must be a two-way street.

-- We wish to make steady progress toward the issuance of joint declarations to define the future of our relationships.

-- We encourage the development of Western European unity, but not at the expense of the Atlantic unity that is essential to European security and to the resolution of a growing list of global issues.

There can be no higher priority than to encourage Japan and Western Europe to join us in giving fresh creativity to our alliances based on our common objectives.

2. *New Relationships:* Our debate about the future has centred principally on the kind of relationship we should seek with the Soviet Union and China.... These relationships have been described as détente....

In our relations with the Soviet Union, détente is rooted in the recognition that potential adversaries can bring damage to each other -- mutual destruction in the case of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. -- and they have a common interest and responsibility in structuring their relationships so as to prevent this risk.... In this context, we have made a concerted effort to agree upon rules of conduct that will encourage mutual restraint. We have agreed on basic principles designed to minimize the use of conflict and to prevent nuclear war. We have established communications between the top leaders that make it possible in time of crisis to avoid the danger of accident or miscalculation. We have sought through an organic network of agreements to develop a framework for mutual interests that will give durability to an improvement in Soviet-American relations.....

In 1973 our relationship with the Soviet Union was sorely tested by a war in the Middle East which neither of us sought. This tense period demonstrated once again that we cannot take our relationship for granted, that we must work to institutionalize the relationship we have forged.

The realism of Soviet-American relations in 1974 is demonstrated by the fact that we are engaged with one another in an unprecedented range of negotiations which address the hard political and security issues confronting us and seek to build greater stability.....

Our new relationship with the People's Republic of China is also contributing to a more hopeful environment for peace, particularly in Asia. In 1973 we strengthened our dialogue by establishing liaison offices in each other's capitals, by Secretary Kissinger's two visits to Peking, and by a substantial expansion of economic and other exchanges. In 1974 we will strive to deepen our dialogue, to give durable form and content to our relationship. We have indeed come a long way since our first efforts in 1969 and since the President's trip to Peking in 1972. But we have a long way still to go.....

3. *Middle East:* The recent Middle East and energy crises have clearly demonstrated that our efforts to achieve common international objectives are more than intellectual exercises. Our labour in this critical area demonstrates our willingness to persevere, to take bold diplomatic moves in the knowledge that the seeds of war remain, and that there can be no lasting structure of global peace without a durable peace in the Middle East.

The fourth war in a quarter century between Arabs and Israelis has changed the objective conditions in the area. It has also changed the perception of each side towards the other. From four recent trips to the area, I have the impression that people there are weary and desirous of raising their sights.

In these circumstances, there is hope in the step-by-step approach we have adopted. Both sides want the U.S. to play a constructive role. Both Egypt and Israel have gained from the disengagement agreement achieved this past January. This first step towards a final settlement has been implemented with impeccable good faith by both sides....The Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement could become in time the kind of practical test of peace on the ground which can build confidence between adversaries and help break the shackles of past suspicions.

The task at hand now is to seek to achieve something similar on the Syrian-Israeli front. The Israeli Government is sending a high-level representative to Washington within two weeks, and Syria has agreed to do the same in the near future. This is no more than a beginning, but a significant beginning in a slow and agonizing effort to reconcile objectives that in many respects seem contradictory.....

4. *Emerging Issues:* Following the second World War we erected a monetary and trading system which channeled the pursuit of economic gain into peaceful competition. Now a whole set of emerging problems - energy and raw material shortages, food and population imbalance, rampant global inflation - threaten to overwhelm the system and return the world to the sort of economic conflict which traditionally has led to war..... New races have begun: for the Earth's limited resources, for the oceans, for technology, for capital.... We must now work to deter new economic chaos. To overcome these potential obstacles to peace, we must assure that all nations - rich and poor, resource producing and consuming - have a stake in an expanding global economy. Only then will all have a vested interest in the stability of the international order.....

A prosperous multilateral trading relationship is one of the bases of the political approach that we have adopted in our relationship with the advanced industrialized nations of the West since World War II. A breakdown in this system would be contrary to our interests.

The recent energy crisis has demonstrated the risks inherent in nations trying to resolve their problems unilaterally. The recent Washington energy conference was an initial step toward recognition of the necessity to deal with multilateral problems on a multilateral basis.

On the question of trade, our approach has been that all the major trading nations must act in concert and in the common interest. We have recognized the necessity of expanding the flow of trade. One way we seek to do this is by the extension of a system of generalized tariff preferences to developing countries. In short we seek:

-- To reduce trade barriers among the industrialized countries and to help meet the demands of developing countries by the expansion of their exports so that they can proceed with the tasks of economic and social development;

-- To normalize trade relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe; and

-- To enhance global economic relationships of a multilateral basis, for the benefit of the world's peoples.

BRITISH FIRMS IN SOUTH AFRICA

In early March, 1974, the Trade Sub-Committee of the Expenditure Committee of the House of Commons issued a Report on the wages and conditions of African workers employed by British firms in South Africa. This report was the result of an enquiry initiated in 1973, following press allegations that British firms were paying their African employees below the minimum level required for subsistence. From its survey of 141 British companies the Sub-Committee found 63 instances of companies paying minimum wages below the so-called poverty datum line (PDL).

The Sub-Committee believes that the remedy for this situation must lie in the adoption of a code of practice to be observed by British firms. The parent companies in Britain would be required to take an interest in the policies of their subsidiaries, with a view to using all available opportunities for improving the conditions of employment of their African labour force. British companies should, in the Committee's view, aim to pay their African workers at rates not less than the so-called minimum effective level (MEL) and should establish a timetable to achieve this. (The MEL was reckoned at 50 per cent higher than the subsistence level wages represented by the poverty datum line). In addition the following is recommended:

- that workers committees of African employees should be set up and African trade unionism encouraged;
- that benefits in kind (e.g. lodgings and help in the education field) should be provided;
- that the differentials between average pay for White and African workers should be reduced;
- that the advancement of Africans into more qualified and better positions should be pressed ahead with, full use being made of the possibilities of obtaining exemptions from legal job reservation.

The Sub-Committee urges that the British Embassy in South Africa and the Department of Trade should abandon their 'fairly passive role' and keep a close watch on companies' employment practices. It also considers that British companies should be asked to submit regular reports on their employment practices and conditions of their African employees to the Department of Trade. All British companies operating in South Africa should carry out a regular review of their employment practices so that they may be in a position to satisfy shareholders seeking information. Recognising that this question was bound to be of continuing public interest, the Committee's Report states that:

"Future investigations should concentrate on those companies who do not pursue good employment practices, and if the policies which have been recommended appear to have failed in their objectives, tougher measures should then be anticipated. We anticipate the subject will continue to command the interest and vigilance of the House."

The above summary of the Trade Sub-Committee's conclusions is based on a report in *Overseas Review*, No. 92, March/April 1974, published by the Conservative Political Centre, London.

NUUS VAN DIE TAKKE/NEWS FROM THE BRANCHES

WITWATERSRAND

The Executive Committee of the Witwatersrand Branch, elected at the Annual General Meeting in December, 1973, held its first meeting on 17 January, 1974. At this meeting Mr. Gideon Roos was re-elected Chairman of the Branch, with Mr. A.L. Bostock, Mr. D.E.G. Vieler, Mr. J.C. Williams and Dr. C.B. Strauss as Vice-Chairmen. To the great regret of the Branch, Dr. Strauss has recently had to resign from the position of Vice-Chairman and from membership of the Committee, in view of his transfer to Durban, where no doubt the Natal Branch will benefit from his support.

STELLENBOSCH

By 'n onlangse Algemene Vergadering van die Tak (3 April 1974) is Professor W.B. Vosloo as Voorsitter herkies, met Professor J.L. Sadie en Professor D.J. Kotzé as Onder-Voorsitters en Mnr. G.K.H. Töttemeyer as Sekretaris. Ander lede van die nuwe Komitee is: Dr. J.J. Fouché, Professor S.P. Jansen, Dr. J.O. Jeppe, Professor C. Hanekom, Professor S.P. Cilliers en Dr. M. Grut.

Die volgende vier persone is aangewys as die Tak se verteenwoordigers op die Nasionale Uitvoerende Raad: Professor W.B. Vosloo, Professor J.L. Sadie, Professor D.J. Kotzé en Mnr. G.K.H. Töttemeyer.

NATAL

At the Biennial Meeting of the Institute's National Executive Council, held in Johannesburg in March, an expression of thanks was recorded to Professor E.N. Keen who had had to resign as Chairman of the Natal Branch at the end of 1973, in view of his move to the University of Cape Town. Mr. G. Newman took his place in a caretaker capacity and at the recent Annual General Meeting of the Branch on 4 April, 1974, he was formally elected as Chairman, with Mrs. Ros Burn as Secretary. Other members of the Committee elected at the meeting are: Mr. H. Bridgen, Dr. D. Caiger, Mr. T.M. Downie, Mr. H. Feist, Mr. E.W. Stanton and Mr. G.L. Woodhead.

EASTERN PROVINCE

After the resignation towards the end of 1973 of Mr. C.M. Thatcher, who assisted the Branch for several years as Hon. Secretary, this position was taken on for a few months by Mr. O.J. Gibson, until his transfer from Port Elizabeth to Johannesburg. He has now been succeeded by Mr. K. Bryer.

DIRECTOR'S VISITS TO BRANCHES

In March the Director paid a brief visit to the Eastern Province Branch and addressed a meeting of the Branch in Port Elizabeth, on the subject "External Pressures on South Africa".

The Director also visited the Cape Town Branch in March, for discussions with members of the Committee on the organisation of the Symposium to be held in Cape Town in September, and for a meeting of the Branch

which he addressed on the subject "The War in Mocambique".

Early in April the Director visited the Natal Branch for discussions with the Committee on Branch activities, and to attend the Annual General Meeting of the Branch, which he also addressed on "External Pressures on South Africa".

The Director is due to address a meeting of the Pretoria Branch on 1st May.

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