


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THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS



DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE

NEWSLETTER

NUUSBRIEF

Vol. 6 No. 3

1974

S.A.I.I.A. NEWSLETTER

VOL. 6 No.3

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The contents sheet of the Newsletter refers to "Introductory Notes" in error, as there were no such notes prepared for this issue.

We wish to apologise to member for the late appearance of this issue of the Newsletter. The delay has been unavoidable, because of the pressure of work on the Institute's small staff, in connection mainly with the preparations for the important Conference *Strategy for Development*, which is being held at Jan Smuts House from 4 to 7 December, 1974.

Members of the Institute have been fully informed about the Conference which is a follow-up to the one held in 1972, entitled "Accelerated Development in Southern Africa", and which is again being jointly sponsored by our Institute, the Rand Afrikaans University and the Foundation for Foreign Affairs, Inc., of Chicago in the United States.

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All opinions expressed in articles in this Newsletter are solely the responsibility of the respective authors and not of the Institute.

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September 1974

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*SOUTH AFRICA AND THE FUTURE OF
WORLD ENERGY RESOURCES*

A Symposium on the above subject was held in Cape Town on 5 and 6 September, 1974. This was the first project in the Institute's conference programme to be organised in the Cape, where there are two Branches of the Institute (Cape Town and Stellenbosch), and it was an indication of the growth of the Institute's activities in that region, and of the intention of our National Council to strengthen further the presence of the Institute there.

The topics discussed at the Symposium were:

Energy in Relation to Growth
International Political Aspects of the World Energy Crisis
World Oil Supply and Demand
The Use and Conservation of Coal Resources
The Future of Nuclear Energy
The Future of Thermal Power Generation in Southern Africa
The Development of Hydro-Electric Power in Southern Africa

The main speakers and discussants on these topics were : Dr. N. Stutterheim, Professor R.J. van Wyk, Professor M.H.H. Louw, Senator Dr. Denis Worrall, Mr. I.F.A. de Villiers, M.P., Mr. A.R. Hough, Mr. George Clark, Mr. George Palmer, Dr. J.W.L. de Villiers, Mr. F.W. Stutterheim and Dr. Henry Olivier.

The Chairman of the Symposium was the Institute's National Chairman, Dr. Leif Egeland, and the Chairmen of individual sessions were : Mr. W. Marshall Smith, Mr. D.G. Milne, Dr. M. Grut, Dr. N. Stutterheim and Mr. W.T. Ferguson.

The Symposium concluded with a panel discussion on "The Future of South Africa's Resources in Relation to World Development", in which Professor R. Dutkiewicz, Mr. R.J. Friedland, Mr. George Palmer, Dr. N. Stutterheim and Senator Dr. Denis Worrall participated. The Chairman of this panel was Dr. Etienne Rousseau.

The papers presented and the discussions were of a high standard throughout the Symposium, and the Institute is very appreciative of the contributions made to the success of this undertaking by all the speakers, as well as by the Chairmen of the sessions.

The Institute is also very gratified by the valuable participation in the Symposium of representatives of a number of our Corporate Members, as it is the support of these Members which made this undertaking possible. It is our hope that this support from South African companies will increase, so that the Institute's work can continue to grow constructively. In particular, we hope that this very successful Symposium will have demonstrated to organisations in the Cape the value of the Institute's role, and that it will have encouraged wider support in that region for the activities of the Cape Town and Stellenbosch Branches, as well as for the Institute's work on a national level.

In view of the success of the Symposium and the wide interest in this highly relevant subject, it is our intention to produce a publication which will include the papers presented on the various topics, and some of the comments of other participants. It will also include the important speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. the Hon. Hilgard Muller, on the occasion of a dinner given by the Institute on September 4, 1974 at which Dr. Muller, who is one of our Honorary Presidents, was the guest of honour.

Dr. Muller's speech and the introductory remarks of our National Chairman are reproduced below, and the following article contains the paper presented at the Symposium by Professor Michael H.H. Louw.

A. *SPEECH BY DR. LEIF EGELAND, NATIONAL CHAIRMAN*

In welcoming you all this evening, I wish to recall that the South African Institute of International Affairs was first established in Cape Town in 1934, at a time when similar Institutes were being established in other independent states of the Commonwealth. Like its sister Institutes in Australia and Canada, it was then affiliated to the Royal Institute in London. In the fast changing world of the past forty years and in the growth of our own country, the Institute has, of course, not been unaffected. It has grown with South Africa, and, since the coming of the Republic in 1961, has been a fully independent, national body. It has now six Branches throughout the country, with a seventh about to be founded, and its headquarters in Johannesburg at Jan Smuts House (completed in 1960) has become a centre for international studies, recognised not only in our own country, but in many other parts of the world.

While much of the Institute's rapid growth and activity in recent years - notably its conference programme, has been centred in Johannesburg (on which all Branches are represented) is resolved to do whatever it can to ensure an increasingly effective role in this region. The establishment of a Branch in Stellenbosch in 1970 was a significant and important contribution to this goal. Now for the first time we are holding a national conference here, with the active co-operation of both our Cape Branches.

This event is a sign both of the Institute's growth as a truly national organisation and of our recognition of the importance of the Cape in the Institute's work. It is our hope, therefore, that it will serve to make the Institute's role better understood, and that it will encourage wider support and participation by individuals and organisations.

It is not my intention to refer here to the highly relevant and important topics which will be discussed at the Symposium beginning tomorrow morning. The distinguished authorities who will be playing a leading role are present here this evening. I merely wish to express the Institute's profound gratitude to them and our confidence that their contributions will make this a successful and constructive Symposium.

On this important occasion, which is truly historic for the Institute, it is highly appropriate that our distinguished guest of honour should be Dr. Hilgard Muller, whom we welcome here tonight in two capacities. In the first place, we welcome him as Minister of Foreign Affairs. There is no need to emphasise the relevance of the work of the Minister's Department to the field of study of the Institute. Although the Institute is fully independent of any Government Department, and it cannot as an Institute support or oppose any particular policy, its work would be impossible if it had no meaningful communication with the Department of Foreign Affairs. I am pleased to say that we have very cordial relations with that Department, which have been encouraged by the Minister, and by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Brand Fourie, who to our regret has been prevented by other commitments from joining us.

In the second place, we welcome the Minister as an Honorary President of the Institute. In graciously accepting this office, Dr. Muller continued the tradition set by former Foreign Ministers from the time of General Smuts. As you may know, our other Honorary Presidents are the Chief Justice of South Africa, the Leader of the Opposition and the Chancellor of the University of the Witwatersrand, on whose campus the Institute has its headquarters. In this regard we regret that Sir de Villiers Graaff was not able to be present tonight.

Before asking the Minister to address us, I wish to say how pleased we are to have several distinguished Ambassadors, as well as other diplomatic and consular representatives, present here. We owe a special debt of gratitude to Heads of Mission and their staffs for the support which they give to the work of the Institute by their willingness to address meetings of our Branches, by the provision of material for our Library, and by their cordial co-operation in other ways. I am sure that this co-operation stems from a recognition of the importance of the work of an Institute of International Affairs in any country, and it helps us in our function of fostering understanding through exchange of views and personal contacts in an objective, non-narrowly political, spirit. All this is vital in leading to regional co-operation, as well as wider international co-operation, both of which are essential, if satisfactory solutions are to be reached to the grave challenge posed by the subject of our Symposium tomorrow.

Finally, in welcoming you all most cordially, I must make special mention of the representatives of our Corporate Members in the Cape region. Our Institute depends for its continued growth on the support of those companies which are aware of the importance for our country of a serious and balanced study of international relations; of the encouragement of a more informed public interest in international issues, including in particular issues of direct relevance to South Africa's external relations; and of contacts and communications with Africa and the rest of the world. These are the endeavours of our Institute, but they can only be fulfilled with continued and ever wider support from South African companies. We are confident that increased support will not be lacking from the Cape.

Now, on behalf of the Institute -- in particular our oldest and youngest Branches of Cape Town and Stellenbosch -- I have the honour to call on Dr. the Hon. Hilgard Muller, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

B. *TOESPRAAK DEUR SY EDELE DR. HILGARD MULLER, MINISTER VAN
BUITELANDSE SAKE EN ERE-PRESIDENT VAN DIE INSTITUUT*

In die loop van volgende twee dae sal u as individue of verteenwoordigers van organisasies, en ander belanghebbende persone gedagtes wissel oor een van die belangrikste wêreldvraagstukke, naamlik die toekoms van die wêreld se energiebronne, veral sover dit Suid-Afrika raak. Daar sal van Suid-Afrika se bekendste wetenskaplikes en deskundiges op die gebied van energiebronne, as hoofsprekers optree. Ek sal nie vanaand probeer om hulle kalklig te steel nie - trouens ek sal dit nie eers waag om selfs tot 'n geringe mate hulle gebied te betree nie. As 'n leek sal ek slegs as 'n leek kan praat; maar daar is natuurlik aspekte van die vraagstuk in verband met die wêreld se energiebronne wat ons almal raak, deskundiges sowel as leke. En daar is ook aspekte wat 'n direkte verband hou met ons internasionale verhoudings in die algemeen. Dit is daarom gepas dat u Instituut hom in die aangeleentheid interesseer, en miskien ook toepaslik dat ek iets oor daardie sy van die saak moet sê.

In die jongste tyd het nywerheidsontwikkeling in meeste dele van die wêreld teen versnelde tempo voortgegaan. Hierdie ontwikkeling was grootliks afhanklik van 'n bepaalde energiebron, naamlik olie, waarvan die voorgesette toevoer as vanselfsprekende aanvaar is. Dit is wel waar dat heelwat navorsing bestee is aan die ontwikkeling van nuwe oliebronne en die ontwikkeling van alternatiewe energiebronne. Die harde feite is egter dat die wêreld se nywerheidsproduksie in 'n groot mate afhanklik was en nog is van olie - en dat daardie olie van slegs 'n beperkte aantal lande verkry kan word. Op 'n sekere stadium het daardie lande, altans die meeste van hulle, besluit om saam te staan en om, as 'n middle ter uitoefening van politieke druk, óf geheel en al die verskaffing van olie aan hulle gereelde kliënte te staak, óf te verminder. Terselfdertyd het hulle as voorsieners die pryse aansienlik verhoog.

The result must have surprised even themselves. In the United States, for example, even though only some ten per cent of the oil the country consumes was imported, a situation bordering on the chaotic rapidly developed in their road transportation system, with trucks stranded all over the country and the distribution of even some food items temporarily disrupted. In England, where the oil shortage coincided with industrial strikes, much of the country went on to a 3-day working week. Almost everywhere, the ordinary individual, the man in the street (especially if he was normally a motorist in the street) felt the impact, by way of restriction on his supplies of petrol, curtailment of his accustomed freedom of movement and the like. We are all familiar with the effect here, in terms of limitation on our motoring speeds and a shortening of the hours when petrol can be bought.

This standing together of a small group of producer countries, mostly Arabs, was certainly an impressive show of strength, but it had certain unforeseen consequences too. It was aimed primarily at the major industrial

countries of the West; to compel them to refrain from assisting Israel in the latter's confrontation with the Arabs; but inevitably it had an important effect also on the poor and developing countries, with whom the Arabs are generally bracketed in descriptions such as "The Third World" or the "non-aligned". For as oil supplies were restricted and the oil price shot up, and later when the restrictions on supply were largely removed but the price continued to rise, so did the prices of other things affected by the oil price - which proved to be basic to a very wide range of other goods. The impact was felt especially in the "three F's" - beside the original F for fuel - namely on food, fertilizer and freight, all absolutely fundamental to countries in process of development. One spectacular result was that the whole of the increase in direct aid promised during the last session of the United Nations General Assembly nearly a year ago by the advanced industrialised countries to the developing countries was more than wiped out by the increased price of the goods involved and the cost of getting them to their destination.

To begin with, the developing countries looked on the coup pulled off by their Arab friends with admiration, and accepted unquestioningly their argument that, after years of exploitation, the producers of this vital raw material were at last standing up for and actually getting what they deserved for their natural resources. In fact there was excited talk about other countries following their example, and unilaterally determining the prices of the commodities they produced for export, such as bananas or cotton. After a while, they had to accept rather ruefully that such things lacked the qualities that had given the oil producers their strength, namely essentiality for the world economy, scarcity of sources of supply, and the ability of all the producers to combine effectively.

Thereupon, they began to look less kindly on their Arab partners, and some skilful window-dressing became necessary; even the holding of a Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly last April and May, concerned with raw material supplies and other economic issues, to prevent an actual split within the hitherto fairly solid ranks of the so-called non-aligned group of countries. There is indeed now recognition that within that large and very amorphous grouping, there are marked gradations of prosperity and advancement, that there are "least developed" within the general category of "developing" countries, that even if all the members are equal, some are more equal than others. The hard fact is that, in consequence of the oil producer's action, especially in its pricing aspect, a major redistribution of resources has got under way which, in terms of the calculations of certain experts, will see within a generation the concentration of 90 per cent of the world's wealth in the hands of 5 per cent of the world's population.

Now where does South Africa stand in this new set-up?

In the first place, although we have so far not located economically exploitable deposits of oil within our own boundaries we do have immense deposits of another traditional source of energy, namely coal. We have therefore been less dependent on oil to provide energy for our economic

activity than many other countries and were thus relatively better able than they to withstand the problems posed by a sudden drop, in the availability of imports.

Secondly, we are fortunately endowed - exceptionally well endowed - with our own supply of the energy source material of the future, namely uranium. At the risk of trespassing in the experts' field, I quote what I have been told, that while nuclear power reactors will supply about 50,000 megawatts of electricity in 1976, the figure should be over 550,000 by 1985 and double that by 1990; and that nuclear energy will supply 23 per cent of total world requirements of electricity by the year 2000, compared with less than one per cent at present. Since enriched uranium is the fuel used for most nuclear power reactors, and since we are moving towards the stage of doing our own enrichment on a commercial scale in this country, we are in this sense too very fortunately placed compared with most other countries.

Are we then to sit back and just look after ourselves, thankful for the good luck to have been naturally so well endowed? Thankful we must certainly be, and careful for our own interests, but to be so selfish is not and has never been our aim. Perhaps I can quote here what I said in the course of my statement in the general debate at last year's General Assembly of the United Nations, last October 5th, on the then developing energy crisis:

It is necessary that there be the closest co-operation between the developed and the developing nations in the consideration of this matter, for after making due allowance for the need for protecting the quality of our environment, energy is the key to the material development of man's estate. We are faced with the possible gross depletion of the total known reserves of all source of energy if energy is in future consumed at the rate forecast today. It is therefore essential for all of us that the different energy-producing resources of the earth be rationally exploited in the interest of mankind as a whole.

Ek herhaal hierdie laaste woorde "in belang van die mensdom as geheel", want ek glo dat dit veral belangrik is. Ek het hierdie woorde gebruik, nie omdat ek wil voorgee dat Suid-Afrika spesiaal grootmoedig of onselfsugtig is nie, maar omdat wat in belang van die mensdom in geheel is, natuurlik ook in ons eie belang is - of uit 'n ander oogpunt beskou, as ons alleen ons eie belange oorweeg en die res van die wêreld ignoreer, sal onsseersekerlik uitvind dat ons onself op die lang duur 'n ondiens bewys het.

Alhoewel Suid-Afrika immenging deur andere in ons eie sake teenstaan, en sal voortgaan om dit teen te staan, glo ons nie in isolasie nie. Daarom kan daar gesê word dat ons, ten opsigte van energiebronne in die eerste instansie strewe na die behoud vir onself, as 'n produseerder van waardevolle en skaars grondstowwe, van genoeg energie om in ons eie toekomstige behoeftes te voorsien. Hier dink ek o.a. veral aan die vinnig groeiende

industrialisasie wat ons kan verwag in die snel ontwikkelende swart tuislande. Maar terselfdertyd is dit ook ons strewe en beleid om 'n gedeelte van ons eie bronne aan die res van die wêreld beskikbaar te stel, veral daardie bevriende lande wat nie so goed bedeed is met natuurlike hulpbronne as ons nie.

Ekself en ander woordvoerders van die Regering, het menigmaal by die Verenigde Nasies en ander forums, beklemtoon dat Suid-Afrika gewillig is om saam te werk met en die hand van vriendskap te reik aan alle ander vreedeliewende nasies en in die besonder nasies met wie ons die vasteland van Afrika deel. Die voorsiening van energiebronne is een gebied waarop ons graag hierdie inderneming wil uitvoer. Die voorwaardes wat ons stel sal slegs wees dat die reëlins ordelik geskied, en in 'n gees van vriendskaplike samewerking tussen ons en die betrokke lande en dat dit tot onsgemeenskaplike voordeel strek. As dit uraan is wat ons voorsien, sal daar natuurlik bevredigende waarborge moet wees om te voorkom dat dit aangewend word vir doeleindes wat nie vreedsaam is nie. Ons wil seersekerlik nie medepligtig wees, onwetend of andersins, aan die vermeerdering van die aantal lande wat atoomwapens in hulle arsenele het nie.

These are hard times, uncertain times, for most of the nations of the world. Change, sometimes rapid change, is a feature of the times we live in and as several speakers noted at the Special U.N. Session I referred to, after what has happened to create this new energy situation, the world will never be the same again. We in South Africa ought not and do not want to set our face against change as such. What has happened in respect of the world's supply of oil in the past twelve months amounts to a fundamental change in the balance of economic power in the world as a whole. This change is continuing and we, who have already been affected by it, have our part to play in the future too, as the pattern unfolds and new international relationships develop. With the supplies of alternative sources of energy over which we are fortunate enough to dispose, we in this country are in fact in a position to make a material contribution to the new equilibrium which has still to be found. I believe there is no reason to be pessimistic about the shape of things to come or our part in them; but we must keep our heads, we must be objective and sensible and not be overcome by the temptation to exploit the situation just for our own short-term advantage. In short, we must recognise that we have obligations to the wider society of nations too and that the future of our own nation cannot be seen in isolation from that of the world at large. Let us, therefore, in charting our own course wisely and deliberately, along the lines and in accordance with the standards we have set for ourselves, consider also how best we can fulfil our duty, in best disposing of our resources, to ensure the maximum benefit for all!

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE WORLD ENERGY CRISIS

Michael H.H. Louw⁺

1. *Introduction*

During the last two decades man has, for the first time in history, been brought to face and question an issue which is fundamental to his survival, viz. his age-old assumption about the unlimited extent of natural resources. The Arab oil embargo against the United States and the Netherlands, and the frantic responses to it, have dramatically demonstrated that the availability of oil can be limited by political fiat as well as by exhaustion. This episode has thus introduced a political dimension into what was previously considered to be a matter mainly for scientists and businessmen.

The source of all energy on earth is the sun, which provides not only the energy at present consumed in living things but has also created vast masses of hydrocarbons (formerly living matter) locked up in the crust of the earth. These hydrocarbons, in the form of coal, gas and oil, are deposited in a geological configuration over the whole of the earth's crust. This crust in turn has, from a political point of view, two major overlays, each with a different configuration of its own: first, the land masses which comprise about 30% of the surface of the earth, and which are divided into many parts, each of which is regulated or governed by a juridical and political entity called a nation-state, colony, or principality, and second, the areas covered by the sea, comprising the remaining 70% surface, over which (except for narrow strips of territorial sea along the coasts of states) no jurisdiction exists.

Jurisdiction over a territory or water area means full and unquestioned jurisdiction and power over the resources fortuitously present in or absent from the earth's crust below its surface. Jurisdiction over the high seas (and deep ocean beds) in the form of an international regime, is now being discussed by the international community at the Conference on the Law of the Sea in Caracas, Venezuela.

Up till now, world needs and demand for energy resources have been regulated by the free market mechanism which operated internationally in all the processes related to energy, viz. capital, management, exploration, extraction, transport, refining and marketing. Some recent developments, however, have thrown into sharp relief a number of asymmetries in this pattern. First, the countries in which the energy resources are situated often lack the capital and managerial and technical ability to exploit them; other states with no energy resources have capital and know-how.

⁺Professor Louw is Jan Smuts Professor of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand. This paper was presented at the Institute's Symposium on "South Africa and the Future of World Energy Resources", held in Cape Town on 5 and 6 September, 1974.

Although on the surface this might appear to be a situation of complementarity, actually, bargaining takes place between unequal negotiators, viz. states and private companies (with their patron states in the background) and felt inequities were often redressed by unilateral action, usually by the producer states, with a resultant distortion of the market. A further complicating factor also developed: as the demand for oil-derived energy increased, investment in the oil industry increased, especially in the producer states, where the plant and installations came under the control of the governments of those states. In time, these governments became aware of and began using, first for economic, and later for political purposes, the leverages made available to them through their physical control of the oil installations and pipelines as well as through policies on extraction rates, export and refinery quotas, taxes, royalties and shareholding. There was thus (because of the critical nature of oil for industrial countries) a significant shift of operational decision-making to the oil producer (and exporting) countries and with the increasing participation of patron states, an irrevocable "politicization" of the oil industry, i.e. political considerations have become an important item in the decision-equation of the states participating in the total oil industry.

The development of serious international problems, mainly of a political nature, thus became inevitable. Some of these problems, stated in very general terms, revolve around the following major issues:

(a) *Control of Resources*

Should the country in which the energy resources (especially oil) are situated have the only and final say about their extraction and use?

(b) *Political Agreement as a Basis for Oil Industry*

Should the countries with advanced technology, capital and skills, permit the private companies which control these, to negotiate and operate oil industries without a political agreement between the states involved?

(c) *Relation between Consumer and Producer Nations*

If the major oil producer (and exporting) countries have succeeded, through the coordination of their quotas, prices and extracting policies, to exert pressure (sometimes for political purposes) on the consumer countries, to what extent can and should the latter group "retaliate" and how? Or should collective agreements between producer and consumer countries make better sense?

(d) *An International Energy Policy*

Seen against the background of an ever-increasing demand from an oil-hungry world, is it not essential now to begin developing an international energy policy in which research on alternative sources and proper priorities in the use of oil and fossil fuels can be established?

(e) *Energy Policy as Part of Foreign Policy*

To what extent should nation-states begin to include a national energy policy as an input to or a component of their respective foreign policies?

(f) *The Role of International Institutions*

What role can or should international institutions, those existing, or those still to be established, play in a world energy plan?

2. *Major Actors in the World-wide Oil Industry*

The major actors in the energy situation (which is of necessity of international dimensions) and thus in the interplay of political forces, may be briefly identified:

(a) *The Consumer Countries (CC)*

They are mostly industrialized and dependent to an increasing extent on oil as an energy source, even those which produce a portion of their oil needs from their own resources. Their need is for a regular, assured and reasonably priced inflow of oil which is used for direct combustion, electricity production and public and private transport. Because of the very limited extent to which substitutes for oil as a source of energy can be used, consumer countries are generally, in terms of bargaining power and leverages at the mercy of the producer nations. This situation is all the more serious in view of the fact that the security situation of these countries in an age when modern military equipment is so dependent on oil-derived fuels, becomes affected by a reduced flow or high cost of storage of reserves.

The consumer states have often been criticized for excessive and wasteful consumption of oil (in relation to available resources and to the rest of the world) and for increasing the prices of their industrial products exported to the oil producing and developing countries.

(b) *The Producer and Exporting Nations (EC)*, on whose territory either on land or in their territorial sea, the major oil reserves are being exploited and oil extracted and sometimes refined. Their participation in this exploitation (which comprises exploration, extraction, transport, refining and marketing) may vary from minor to majority shareholdings, or complete state ownership. But what is important is their juridical and unquestioned right to take the major political decision on exploitation, i.e. permitting the surface activities of exploration, extraction, transporting and refining, the extent of these activities, the volume of extraction and export, and the prices and taxes payable on the removal of oil. Their political power lies in the leverage provided by their control of these activities.

This power of the producer countries is of course dependent on world demand and on market conditions which might produce conditions of competition between them and thus neutralize this power among themselves. However, if they can co-operate among themselves and agree (on the basis of a cartel or monopoly) on volume of exports and prices, then their collective bargaining and political power, especially vis-a-vis the consumer nations, becomes formidable. This has in fact happened with the formation of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and of a linked Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC).

Although their basic purpose is to maintain a steady market and fair prices, the ability of these nations to regulate supply and, under conditions of artificially induced scarcity, prices, gives them such a key hold on the economic and security interests of major consumer countries, that the temptation to use this power for political purposes, becomes, at times, difficult to resist.

On the other hand, they are faced today with a single and a dwindling economic asset: after the existing resources in their territories have been extracted, they will have to fall back on other resources and on the industrial base and infrastructure they had managed to build up from royalty and other incomes during the lifetime of their oil wells. This lifetime of oil resources has been variously estimated at between 20 and 40 years, calculated on a world-wide basis.

The EC's have been criticized for unilaterally increasing the world prices of their product and of imposing quotas on exploration and extraction. The most serious criticism, however, has been of the recent reduction, by some Arab oil states, (also unilaterally) of the export to certain selected countries, of oil from their territories, for purely *political reasons*. Such action was taken by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait against the United States and the Netherlands because of their support of Israel during the recent war in the Middle East.

- (c) *The Oil Companies*, mostly multinational corporations (MNC) which are private organisations which explore, extract, refine and market oil products in terms of a global operation. Thus their activities of mobilising capital, obtaining and training managerial talent, exploring, extracting, transport, refining and marketing are spread over many countries throughout the world and they operate under many different kinds of laws, quotas, tax systems, directives and incentives.

Their main interest is in making a reasonable profit and operating under relatively stable local, national and international conditions, conditions determined largely by the political decisions of states, and especially those of the consumer and producer nations. While their levels of profits may sometimes be high, they are the major risk takers in the international oil operation. Exploration through test drilling (and the variation in the existence and in the quantities and types of underground oil supplies) might be very risky and consume vast amounts in terms of money, skills, time and infrastructure investment, and, after discovering oil, the companies may still be faced with many political and economic uncertainties.

They have been criticized for making excessive profits, for not reducing retail prices and for making participation difficult in their enterprises (especially shareholding and management) by national governments of producer countries and their citizens.

- (d) *The International Community of States* which, though playing a passive role in the triangular struggle between CC's, EC's and MNC's are (mostly as consumers) in an ultimate sense dependent on the outcome of the oil struggle. In addition, the world community is deeply concerned about some basic principles on the basis of which the resources of the world on a global scale could be regulated. This concern is demonstrated by the present Caracas Conference on the Law of the Sea and its search for a regime over the open seas and the seabed. The Principles so far generally articulated are: full access or availability of important natural resources to all peoples of the earth and at a fair price; decisions by producers and consumers should be for economic and not political reasons; decisions should not be taken unilaterally but after consultation or agreement between producers and consumers. A number of proposals for the application of these principles to oil resources, in the interest of the whole international community, have already been made.

3. *Some urgent Problems*

Some of the major political-technical problems which will have to be settled through diplomacy or international collective action may be mentioned.

- (a) *The Formulation of a World Resources Policy.* This should cover critical resources such as energy sources (oil, coal and hydro-systems) certain minerals and certain types of food and fibre. Such a policy would naturally cover exploration, extraction, conservation, prices, distribution, access, marketing and regulation.
- (b) *The Technological Shift in the Use of Resources.* This involves the development of alternative sources of energy, thus making scarce resources (especially oil) available for the chemical industry rather than to use them for burning. This would involve a form of world-wide planning and technological adaptation.
- (c) *Closer Agreement between the Groups of CC's and EC's* (after each group having reached a consensus among its own members) on availability, prices and a moratorium on the use of oil leverages for political (as distinct from economic) purposes.
- (d) *Special Concessionary Arrangements* for developing countries which lack the leverages of the CC's and the EC's.
- (e) *Regulation of the MNC's in the Oil Industry,* i.e. under some form of agreement on a world-wide basis, of their activities and pricing policies.

4. *Conditions for Negotiations*

Some major conditions to ensure that negotiations begin at all and end in some agreements, are:

- (a) *Symmetry*: when the national interests of many countries converge, i.e. become identical, regarding the production and distribution of energy sources;
- (b) *Complementarity*: when the goods, services or materials which some countries produce, fill the needs of other countries and vice versa;
- (c) *Great Power Responsibility*: when the major powers, or the super-powers, with greater capabilities (economic, military, political) are considered to have a special responsibility to bring about minor as well as major agreements.

SOUTH AFRICANS VISIT WEST AFRICA

The following statement was released on August 20, 1974, by the Africa Institute of South Africa, which sponsored the visit to West Africa referred to therein. The statement was drawn up jointly by the five South Africans concerned.

The brief report by Mr. John Barratt, which follows the joint statement, is based on an address to a meeting of the Africa Institute in Pretoria on August 29. Mr. Barratt's report is followed in turn by the report of Dr. G.M.E. Leistner on the Conference of the Society for International Development, which the South African group attended in Abidjan. Dr. Leistner's report is also based on an address to the meeting on August 29.

A representative group of South Africans returned yesterday from a brief visit to Senegal and a visit to the Ivory Coast where they attended the week long 14th World Conference of the Society for International Development (SID) at Abidjan. The visits were arranged by the Africa Institute of South Africa.⁺

Apart from Prof. J.H. Moolman, Director of the Africa Institute, the group included Mr. John Barratt, Director of the South African Institute of International Affairs; Prof. W.M. Kgware of the University of the North; Dr. G.M.E. Leistner, Deputy Director of the Africa Institute and Mr. J.N. Reddy, Managing Director of The New Republic Bank Limited.

During its stay in Senegal, the group met President Leopold Senghor; the Minister of Cultural Affairs, the Secretary General for Foreign Affairs; the Head of the Political Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Editor of the daily newspaper "Le Soleil"; and other members of the press.

The meeting with President Senghor was marked by a frank and friendly exchange of views in which all members of the South African group took part. The group found the discussion most instructive, and was impressed by the extent to which the President was *au fait* with the South African situation.

In the extensive discussions with the other persons in Dakar, an equal awareness of the actual position was encountered. The group's attention was *inter alia* drawn to the significance being attached by Black African countries to the Lusaka Manifesto of 1971, and certain aspects thereof which the Senegalese felt were not being fully appreciated in South Africa.

⁺ The visit was sponsored by the following South African companies: Volkskas, Sanlam, The Anglo American Corporation, the United Tobacco Corporation and the South African Sugar Association.

Searching questions about the rate and direction of change in South Africa were put to the group in an extended meeting with pressmen. The latter conveyed their views about South Africa and emphasized the need for contact and communication. In all its meetings, the groups was struck by the friendly spirit in which it was received, and by the desire expressed that a solution be found for the South African situation which in the Senegalese view was at present unacceptable. There was full recognition that *all* groups in South Africa should play a full part in working towards a solution.

In Abidjan (Ivory Coast) the group met the Minister of Planning, Mr. Mohamed Diawara; the newly appointed Minister of Information, Mr. Laurent Dona Fologo; the Managing Director of the Ivorian Development Bank, Mr. Dibby; the Chairman and Managing Director of the Ivorian Maritime Transport Company, Mr. Gomis; as well as leading figures in television, the press and other fields.

The delegation was greatly impressed by the dynamism, realism and sense of purpose shown by Ivorians in building up a modern society and a strong, diversified economy. Although a nation of only about 5 million people, and lacking significant mineral resources, a judicious blending of economic liberalism and official guidance has enabled them to mobilize internal as well as external resources so as to become one of the most prosperous and stable countries in Africa.

Gross national product rose by an average of 11 percent a year between 1960 and 1972 - 4,5 per cent a head in constant prices - amounting to about R1280 million or R250 per head in 1972. Approximately one-fifth of GDP is being invested in the physical and social infrastructure and in new productive ventures annually. Recognizing that agriculture is the basis of its economy, the country is expanding its plantations of palm-oil trees, cocoa trees, coffee and pineapples, and is introducing new crops such as cotton and sugar cane. Processing of agricultural raw materials and import-substituting manufacturing are growing apace. Already exportation of textiles and furniture is taking place, and by 1975 manufactured goods are expected to account for 35,3 per cent of total exports as compared with 18,8 per cent in 1965.

Whereas formerly the Ivory Coast was the preserve of French business, investors from all the major industrial nations are now increasingly gaining a foothold in this thriving economy. Major new projects that will accelerate and geographically spread development are the R190-million Kosson hydro-electric scheme and the deep-water harbour at San Pedro. Considerable investments have already been made, and will continue, to promote the country's tourist potential.

Among many other noteworthy features, the Ivory Coast's successful use of television for educational purposes may be mentioned. Twelve hours daily are devoted to TV programmes designed to provide a high level of instruction and alleviate the shortage of teachers.

The SID Conference, focussed on the theme "Confrontation or Co-operation", united more than 800 delegates from countries all over the world. Among the many topics discussed were the world energy crisis, the role of multinational corporations, population policy, co-operation among developing nations, rural and regional development, education and training in a changing world, environmental preservation and development, world mineral resources, science and technology, international movements of manpower and industrial location, and psychological attitudes towards development.

The conference was very efficiently organised and took place in the Hotel Ivoire - undoubtedly one of the most beautiful and imaginatively designed hotels in the world. Added to that, the lavish entertainment, such as colourful traditional dancing, displays of local art, and excursions arranged by the Ivorian authorities, made this an unforgettable experience for all participants.

The fact that people attended in their individual capacity rather than as delegates of their respective countries, helped to give the conference discussions a frankness and a readiness to listen to other viewpoints such as is not normally encountered at international gatherings.

One of the outstanding features of the discussions was the acknowledgement by many from the less-developed countries that they must rely on their own efforts in order to develop, rather than on aid from their former colonial masters and other industrial nations.

On the one hand, there was a refreshing desire to seek solutions to development problems at the grassroots level of individual and communal effort and in the attitudes and motivation of the human beings involved, rather than in grandiose, global schemes. On the other hand, it was widely acknowledged that the old division of nations into "developed" and "developing" (or "rich" and "poor") was fast losing its relevance in a world which is increasingly compelled to face issues affecting each and everyone of its inhabitants: shrinking natural resources, the energy crisis, environmental pollution, the problems of feeding the world's exploding population, the threat of local conflicts escalating into a global holocaust, and so forth.

From the South African viewpoint, it was striking that in discussions of African problems, South Africa was never even referred to. It was simply ignored, even though some of the participants from South Africa made positive contributions from the floor. However, the fact that these contributions were taken note of and also appreciated became clear in subsequent private conversations. It should be stressed, though, that South African participants never experienced an unfriendly attitude and in fact enjoyed many cordial contacts with people from the most diverse countries.

The striving for greater self-reliance noted above indicates an important challenge for South Africa. While we should be under no illusion with regard to the hostility with which our country is regarded, especially by African

countries (and during the conference it was made clear on more than one occasion that any semblance of development, and even compassionate, aid from South Africa would be rejected by most of them) there are yet many possibilities that can be explored on the level of academic and scientific contacts.

While in Abidjan, members of the group took part in excursions arranged in order to show development projects and areas of scenic interest. A particularly interesting visit was that to the Institut Africain pour le Développement Economique et Social, known as INADES. This is a private institution, established in 1962, and has proved highly successful in its objective of promoting social and economic development by addressing itself to those who are the primary agents of change: peasants, agricultural extension workers, teachers, low- and medium-level courses and seminars, supported by simply worded and illustrated booklets on topics such as mothercraft, care of the soil, and animal husbandry, as well as a correspondence course on the basics of economic development, INADES is contributing towards progress at the grassroots. The fact that since its modest beginnings in Abidjan, the Institute has been invited by most francophone and several anglophone African countries to establish local branches, testifies to the soundness of its concepts. Within individual countries, too, requests for guidance by INADES are the result of demonstrated successes.

On August 9 and 10, prior to the SID conference, the Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") held one of its periodic international meetings of directors of research and training institutes in the field of social and economic development. Dr. Leistner participated in that meeting which dealt with problems of collaboration in development research and training, with particular emphasis on institutional and organisational aspects. The meeting was of particular interest in that it dealt with arrangements to co-ordinate development research and training on a regional basis in Africa, Latin America, Asia and Europe.

After the SID conference, Prof. Moolman, accompanied by his wife, left for Switzerland, and he will also travel to Israel, The Netherlands and Belgium, where he is to visit various research and training institutes.

REPORT ON A VISIT TO SENEGAL AND THE IVORY COAST

John Barratt⁺

A visit of less than two weeks to West Africa is too short for one to be at all categorical in drawing conclusions, either about the development of that region itself or about attitudes there to the problems of the South. But the recent visit by a small group of South Africans, of which the writer was one, to Senegal and the Ivory Coast provided a special opportunity to assess the attitudes in Francophone Africa towards South Africa. The group, which included Black, Indian and White South Africans (the latter both Afrikaans and English-speaking) was organised under the auspices of the Africa Institute of South Africa, and it was able to meet a wide range of leaders in various spheres.

In Dakar (Senegal) the group was privileged to have a private meeting with the President Leopold Senghor, which gave the South African group a good insight into the President's approach to African and world problems. In common with many others, the visiting South Africans were greatly impressed by the wisdom and deep humanity of President Senghor and by his desire for the peaceful resolution of differences, not only in Africa, but throughout the world - and he has on a number of occasions brought his influence to bear in the cause of reconciliation.

Others with whom members of the group were able to have in-depth discussions included senior officials of the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, and the Editor of the main daily newspaper with several members of his staff.

In Abidjan (Ivory Coast) the members of the South African group met the Ministers of Planning and of Information, as well as leading figures in the university, press, television and business fields.

In addition to the meetings with leaders in Senegal and the Ivory Coast, the group participated in the 5-day Conference of the Society for International Development which was held in Abidjan and which was attended by over 700 participants from all continents and the industrialised and developing countries. The theme of the Conference was "Confrontation or Co-operation" (with reference in particular to relations between the industrialised and developing nations). Apart from the formal proceedings of the Conference, the occasion provided almost limitless opportunities for contacts and discussions with people from many walks of life in countries around the world, including many African states.

⁺Mr. John Barratt is Director of the South African Institute of International Affairs.

The purpose of this brief article is not to discuss the Conference itself, which is a subject of its own, but rather to give some impressions and tentative conclusions in regard to South Africa's relations with the rest of Africa, on the basis of the private discussions in Senegal and the Ivory Coast, as well as during the Conference in Abidjan.

Firstly, it must be stressed that the members of the South African group visited these countries and participated in the Conference as private individuals; they were not a delegation representing any organisation, let alone South Africa. It is important to make this point, because the South Africans were only received by the senior Government officials of the two countries on the basis that their visits were private and not official or of a political nature. It would be wrong, therefore, to draw the conclusion that these discussions were an example of a dialogue between South Africa and the African countries concerned, or that they represented a relaxation of the official position on the so-called dialogue issue.

Nevertheless it can be said that there is a willingness - even an eagerness in some cases - to talk to South Africans, in order both to learn more about the changing situation in the South, and to convey the views of Black Africa. The friendliness and openness with which the South Africans were received made a deep impression and underscored the fact of the lamentable lack of communication and contact between South Africans of all groups and their fellow Africans in most parts of the continent, especially in the Francophone countries. While the South Africans were left in no doubt of the strong disapproval of any policies and practices in the Republic which discriminated against Blacks, the readiness to meet and talk with White and Black South Africans gives reason for hope that more communication on a non-official and non-political level will be possible in the future.

This factor is of importance for South Africa's future relations with the rest of the continent, because it indicates a surprising lack of bitterness or hostility (at least in Francophone Africa) towards White South Africans as such. (There are not the same bitter divisions as there are, for instance, between Jews and Arabs, or between Greeks and Turks.) This impression is reinforced by the categorical assurances given to the South African visitors on a number of occasions that the Whites are fully accepted as Africans; that there is no desire to chase them out of Africa; and that the importance of their role in Africa is fully recognised - with the important qualification, of course, that it cannot be accepted that Whites have special privileges vis-à-vis Black Africans.

There are possibilities, therefore, of communication and of some removal of misunderstanding on both sides. This is, however, not dialogue, as normally understood, which applies to official exchanges.

*THE SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE OF THE WORLD: CAN IT SERVE
AS THE BASIS OF A PRODUCTIVE FOREIGN POLICY?*

John Seiler

I am pleased to have this opportunity to share with you some ideas about South African foreign policy. While I make no apologies for my attention to this topic, since it is the focal point of my research, and I have been in South Africa for the past two years, I do want to grant to each of you the same cathartic rights that I exercised when I first attended a meeting of this branch just two years ago. Professor Robin Winks, of Yale, sometimes rumored to be a successor in Pretoria to Ambassador John Hurd, gave a brilliant lecture in Nixon foreign policy in which he linked together the basic structural change in American national character from the traditional optimistic expansionistic attitude to a more introspective pessimistic attitude with the Nixon foreign policy. He left the explicit and totally wrong impression that President Nixon was so close to and open to the concern of Americans that he had sensed this change and that his foreign policy reflected this awareness on his part. But, of course, it was apparent to some of us even in 1972 that President Nixon's style of policy-making, however one might judge the outcome, was largely cut off from direct contact with the American public and even from the bulk of the federal bureaucracy. That insight is, of course, obvious to all of us.

My basic argument is quite simple. I want to suggest that a number of significant gaps exist between principle and practice in South African foreign policy. The continued existence of these gaps reduces the prospects for increased productivity in South African foreign policy. These gaps rest basically on errors in the general perspective of the world which impels foreign policy decisions, although it might be argued that my academic colleagues (and to a lesser extent, foreign policy specialists among journalists) deserve a share of the responsibility for the failure to explore more carefully the perspective itself and the evolving nature of this country's foreign policy.

The South African perspective of the world takes a variety of expressions, but there is remarkable agreement about the nature of the outside world. The 1973 Defence Department White Paper put most pithily for the Government a view shared by most of the Afrikaans press, the SABC, most Afrikaner academic specialists and probably most white South Africans: "Like the rest of the free world, the Republic of South Africa is a target for international communism and its cohorts, leftist activists, exaggerated humanism, permissiveness, materialism and related ideologies".

I should make very clear at this point that this statement - whatever its moral and psychological satisfaction to a government under considerable international pressure - bears little relationship to either

the general condition of the international political system as most competent observers understand it or the considerable variety of values and organizational activities which are directed critically at South African domestic policies and the South African administration of South West Africa. Among its many faults, it confuses coincidence for conspiracy. It would be tempting to dismiss the statement as moral rhetoric, but unlike the more pragmatic Western European and North American governments whose moral statements can almost always be discounted, this basic world view and the several operational principles which go hand in hand with it do matter very much to the formulation and implementation of South African foreign policy.

The two central operational principles are nonintervention in the domestic policies of other states and economic mutual interdependence. The former grows out of a general commitment to international law and an appreciation for South African interests of the United Nations charter provision prohibiting such intervention, but it also reflects a striking disinterest in the detailed nature of political dynamics in other states which is shown in the generally low quality of governmental and media political analysis. The latter principle has usually focused on Southern Africa with a vague goal of an economic commonwealth of some sort, but with the recent talk by Dr. Kissinger of interdependence at the international level there is some discussion of a wider range for the principle in South African relations with Latin America, Iran, France, and even Black Africa. But towards this continent, the implications of the principle remain vague. There is a harkening back to the halcyon days of South African participation in African regional economic and technical organizations. The Prime Minister has said: "We belong to Africa ... We need make no apologies for being here ... And because we understand Africa and its peoples better than anybody else, we are prepared to lend technical and other aid to Africa, insofar as we are able". (*To the Point*, 29 Jan. 1972, pp. 48-51). And Dr. Paul S. van der Merwe, the chairman of the NP⁺ parliamentary foreign policy committee, has spoken of the "golden opportunity" which the West African drought has given the Republic to provide such aid. (House of Assembly foreign affairs debate, 8 May 1973, Hansard 13, col. 6053.) While the naïveté of the latter statement requires no rebuttal, you need do no more than explore the thriving communities of international development specialists in Maseru, Gaborone, or Mbabane to realize that professional South Africans now know less about Black Africa and therefore have less to contribute than do professionals from those governments which have been at work in Black African development since 1960.

Working in consonance with these two principles is an element of pragmatism. It has been evident in the economic realm, at least since the disinvestment emergency of 1960-61, and it now flowers in Dr. Diederich's steady optimism about the Republic's international economic role and in practice (in a less coherent and secure way) in the build-up of economic ties with France, Iran, Latin American governments, and (until recently) Japan. I call it "pragmatism" because it often takes place without full diplomatic recognition and its only motive is as contribution to the Republic's stability. Moralizing about Western Christian democracy is curi-

⁺ National Party

ously absent. Relations with Paraguay are only an end point in what is a general pattern. And to make the pattern altogether clear, it is necessary to know that continued bilateral trade, albeit on a relatively small scale, has been carried on between this country and most Communist countries, including the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. (House of Assembly, Economics Minister Muller in response to Parliament question as reported in *Rand Daily Mail*, 15 June 1973, p. 6, and *Financial Mail*, 9 March 1973, p. 863.)

Pragmatism in the political realm has been practised for some time, but the evidence remains sketchy and usually circumstantial. Here I refer to the probable intervention by this government in the domestic affairs of neighbouring Black States. Relations with Lesotho suggest this has occurred more than once and perhaps as recently as early this year. I have an article in the latest issue of *New Nation* which records the widely-held conviction in Black African capitals by both Blacks and careful foreign observers that the South African government has played some role in the letter bomb death of Tiro, the SASO leader, and in a number of incidents of mines placed on Zambian roads and paths near the Caprivi Strip. There is also the political-economic intervention to forestall the placement of various competitive industries in Lesotho and Swaziland which Hennie Serfontein has reported in the *Sunday Times* and which my own research has verified. Finally, there is the consciously calculating pragmatism in information activities for which Eschel Rhodie gets credit. These information activities rest on a healthy scepticism about the actual level of interest in South Africa in various Western countries, whatever one thinks of the manipulative aspects or their possible impact on more traditional diplomatic approaches.

But it seems to me that these various elements of moral pre-occupation, adherence to basic principles, understandable concern about international pressures, and scepticism about the depth of international sentiment toward the Republic do not come together in a coherent and productive way in the various basic aspects of South African foreign policy. Let me make clear that it is far easier to recognize the disparities than to resolve them, precisely because of the unfriendly international atmosphere. And it may appear especially presumptuous for me to suggest disparities and make suggestions for their reduction but this is after all the academician's burden which he must carry, not without sympathy for the much-less-logical situations in which policy makers must make their actual decisions.

First, let me start with the view of Communist aims and conspiratorial linkages suggested in the Defence Department White Paper. I do not deny the continued ideological commitment of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China to a world made over in their own images, but the very word *images* - instead of *image* - should convey that they no longer agree about ultimate ideological goals and have done so decreasingly since at least 1960. Their near-confrontation at their common border has been for

some time the most threatening world political conflict because of the massive troop commitments involved and the genuine prospect that nuclear weapons of some size might be brought to bear. Their mutual preoccupation has led to the most productive part of U.S. foreign policy - at least in the detente with China, although questions remain about the possible asymmetry of the US-Soviet detente.

At least two implications emerge for South African policy. First, it makes no sense to assume that either Communist power is for the foreseeable future either able or willing to devote any substantial share of its human or economic resources to the support of guerrilla organizations in Southern Africa. True that the Chinese contribution to the TanZam railway is the largest Communist-aided project in Africa, next to the Aswan Dam, but the Soviet difficulties with Egypt and the entire history of failure and frustration faced by both governments in their efforts to manipulate African governments by way of aid programs should make observers here less morbid. Second, an economic pragmatism so free of value judgment as to include Paraguay in its realm of acceptability should have even less difficulty in considering both the Soviet Union and China as prospective partners in trade and outlets for capital investment. This on the assumption that mutually-rewarding interdependence might have the crucial benefit for the Republic of slowing down or even halting the increase in aid by these two governments to South African guerrillas based on Tanzania and Zambia.

The other counterproductive implications of a world view based on a Communist-manipulated conspiracy lie in the dampening impact on domestic criticism (which is beyond my terms of reference in this discussion) and on the general tendency to lump together a disparate assortment of external critics. Let me note in passing my own disappointment on one small aspect of this general shortcoming. There are at least a few prestigious American specialists on South Africa - I think particularly of Gwendolen Carter, Vernon McKay, Thomas Karis, and Richard Dale - who cannot at this time get visas to do research in this country. Their basic and important distinction from a growing body of more radical critics (most of whom, ironically, have never been to South Africa) is that both explicitly and by their avoidance of activist anti-apartheid organizations, they have made clear their commitment to honest research and to peaceful change. Their free access to this country would undoubtedly produce critical research, but nothing more critical than that published by some South African scholars or by South African newspapers, both of which are available to those relatively few Americans who really care to keep up with South African developments. And the same argument follows for resident correspondents from the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, or the *Los Angeles Times*. Here it is encouraging that Dr. Mulder apparently discussed in the U.S. the prospect of a *New York Times* correspondent.

The current information policy and strategy looks woefully inadequate set against this visa policy. If there is any merit in gearing a policy toward an American audience, instead of recognizing that Black African governments and elites are the determinative audience from whom other governments and elites tend to take their cues, it is crucial to be realistic not just about where power lies in Washington (the Information Department's contacts with Vice

President Ford and various conservative Congressmen make clear it understands this factor) but where it lies in the media and in academic life. Untrammelled access to both academicians and journalists would not make South Africa more loved, but it would produce better analysis in the U.S. and it would remove the inevitable suspicion which attaches to Government information activities, even the reasonably balanced "Comment and Opinion".

But I want to suggest that relations with Black African governments are the central key to the improvement of South Africa's world position. I have suggested the naïve arrogance of assuming that South African knowledge of Black Africa is considerable and South African development competence necessary for Black Africa. Probably growing out of the same misperceptions, but even more hazardous to productive policy, are two related assumptions: that political instability in Black Africa helps to explain the failure of the Republic's "outward policy"; and that the opposition to South Africa rests on what "Current Affairs" calls an "ideological commitment" which, if not always impelled by or manipulated by the Soviet Union or China, plays directly into their hands. These assumptions lead smoothly into an equally unproductive corollary: if these ideological commitments were put aside, then Black African governments would recognize their long-term economic interdependence with South Africa, and a mutually beneficial network of economic arrangements, without regard to political differences, could evolve first for Southern Africa and perhaps on a broader continental basis.

The key to an understanding of these faulty assumptions lies in an examination of Zambian and Tanzanian policies toward South Africa, toward guerrilla movements, and toward the two Communist powers. Of course, their policies have not been identical. A considerable ideological component does exist in Tanzanian domestic and foreign policy, which does influence all three of these relationships. But Nyerere still shares some of the Christian humanism which is the impelling force of Kaunda's policies. Indeed, it is arguable that Zambia should have a more coherent political philosophy, instead of the vague rhetorical references to humanism which govern Kaunda's behaviour. But to start with, since both these men have ruled their respective countries since independence, accusations of political instability which were directed after the 1972 coups in Malagasy and Ghana to explain their subsequent turn from South African policy could hardly fit Zambia and Tanzania. Further, Zambia in particular but Tanzania as well have both acted strenuously to keep various nationalist representatives and activities housed in their countries from casting a decisive influence on domestic politics, especially on university students. I agree that the possibility of Chinese subversion exists in Tanzania, but I also believe these two leaders do all they can to maintain their political independence.

But the heart of the misperceptions lies in the wilful refusal to recognize that these men in particular, but almost all Black Africans I have ever met, regardless of their political stance in general or in particular toward South Africa, believe that Black human dignity in the Republic is degraded. How to deal with their near universal indictment is a complex, and perhaps insoluble problem; but surely to dismiss it under the rubric of "ideological commitment" makes no sense at all. And to suggest that putting aside "ideological commitments" would solve all the conflict between Black Africa

and South Africa is obviously unrealistic and insulting to these Black Africans who see issues of human dignity and individual rights at the center of their concern with the Republic.

Nigeria is the latest case in point. Current Affairs has taken a superficial statement by President Gowon about not hating white South Africans to mean that he might accept separate development and then Nigeria and South Africa could wander off arm-in-arm to higher realms of economic interdependence. But while Nigeria is a capitalist society so that on a purely economic plane some relations might well develop, it is foolish to ignore the impact of nearly thirty years of elite conviction in that country that Blacks are ill-treated in this country. In short, instead of the common South African polarity of economic interdependence as against ideological commitment, let me suggest that issues of individual rights are at least as important even to those immediate neighbours of the Republic, who in fact do depend on this country to some extent.

It is in its vision of Southern Africa that the South African perspective is most unrealistic. As my own research suggests, and a mass of government statements and newspaper reports make clear, the governments of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland are doing whatever they can to reduce their dependence on the Republic. Their policies are not ideologically motivated, and their concern with human dignity is not abstract, since they themselves suffer some indignity whenever they visit the Republic and most have friends and relatives whose work in South Africa provides similar experiences. I am not suggesting that these attitudes necessarily must produce unstable regional relationships, given the underlying economic preponderance of South Africa, but a wider recognition of their existence ought to bring about the reduction of those South African situations which are so humiliating to foreign Black visitors and workers.

And let me go a step further. I agree with those South African scholars who have proffered Lesotho as a model for future independent homelands. It is the centrepiece in their benevolent vision of a peaceful regional economic commonwealth. But since Lesotho is in fact a model of calculated independence under the most constraining circumstances, I believe the Transkei, (for one) will follow Lesotho's lead and also work in conjunction with Lesotho to lessen their common dependence on the Republic.

Symptomatic of the misunderstanding about the driving force of Black African dislike for South African policy has been the recent rash of speculative writing by Otto Krause, Cas de Viliers, and the *Rand Daily Mail*. They discuss the prospect that changed South African policy toward Rhodesia might make clear to Black Africa the integrity of South African separate development policies and thus release the "outward policy" logjam. The simplest knowledge of post-World War II history should make clear that for Black Africans the Republic was a focal point for concern before either Portuguese Africa or Rhodesia. It is possible that an early and unequivocal South African initiative might have impact, making clear that all public and private South African political, military, and economic support for the present Rhodesian government would end unless that government carried through prompt negotiations leading to legis-

lative parity within no more than 5-10 years. But if the initiative is slow in coming and/or equivocal, as the Rhodesian situation gets more unstable, South African motives will be increasingly distrusted.

Finally, I believe a major initiative must be taken over South West Africa in order to substantiate the sincerity of any Rhodesian initiative. All of you have read of the Ovamboland situation. If there was ever any serious question of Chief Elifas' failure to establish his legitimacy among educated Ovambos, a Stellenbosch PhD thesis by Gerhard Töttemeyer removes any lingering doubts of Elifas' unpopularity and the corresponding popularity of Bishop Auala and local SWAPO leaders. I understand that the Prime Minister and Töttemeyer have discussed this thesis at great length. This encouraging interest should lead to changes. Surely the Government's argument for non-intervention in Ovambo affairs was never less justified than it now appears to be. But beyond immediate ameliorative steps, the Government ought to consider the renewal of its offer of a plebiscite on South West Africa's future. There are a number of international critics, including Republican Congressmen and lawyers, who are not strong critics of separate development but who are deeply troubled by what they see as South Africa's failure to meet its international legal obligations. Nixon's first Secretary of State, William Rogers, hardly a radical, was very firm on this point and was personally responsible for the removal of investment guarantees for U.S. corporations in South West Africa.

None of what I have said is meant to suggest that Black African perceptions of South Africa are without their own disabling errors nor am I personally in favour of violence in conflict resolution. But there are at least two reasons for concentrating on South African perspectives. First, South African military and economic power remains much greater than that available in sum to all the Black governments in and on the fringes of Southern Africa, including Zambia, Tanzania, and Zaire. (I take Nigeria not to be a significant factor now.) And second, in any hopeful reduction of conflict, it makes sense to start with the perspectives nearest to home. You may be comforted after these few comments, that I tried to be as candid in discussing Zambian and Tanzanian perspectives of Southern Africa during recent visits to those countries.

John Seiler, an American political scientist, is on the staff of the Political Studies Department of Rhodes University in Grahamstown. The above text is based on a lecture Mr. Seiler gave to the Witwatersrand Branch on 9 July, 1974.

PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET BOIGNY COMMENTS

ON DIALOGUE WITH SOUTH AFRICA

Extract from the text of a press conference given by H.E. President Houphouet Boigny of the Ivory Coast, during a visit to Yaounde, Cameroun, on 15 August, 1974. +

Question :

Mr. President, the Ivory Coast is one of the very few African countries which has not as yet recognised the People's Republic of China. Could you indicate your position regarding that country, and also would you tell us what is happening to dialogue with South Africa?

President

Houphouet Boigny:

I have not yet recognised the People's Republic of China. I am not the only one; my turn will come. It is a great country which cannot be ignored. The day will come when we normalise our relations with Peking; for the time being we are among those who have not done so, but surely we will do it later.

As regards dialogue with South Africa, the President had this to say:

As you know we honestly believe that through dialogue we should avoid resorting to force. As Black people the situation prevailing in South Africa cannot but revolt us. But there are two ways to bring it to an end.

One way would be to resort to war, but I consider this to be an internal problem - revolting as it is. Therefore, it is not possible to advocate war to settle it. With regard to dialogue, the other way, White South Africans should, of course, engage in dialogue with Black South Africans. But we consider that it would be good, in spite of this revolting situation, if we could talk to the Whites of South Africa. They should meet with Black people

+ Translated from the French, as reported in "Fraternité Matin" (Abidjan) of 17/18 August, 1974.

from other countries; they should go to them and see for themselves that they make a grave mistake by persisting in an outdated racism.

Not all Black Africans wish to see the White people leave that part of our continent, they consider them as fully fledged Africans. In the North of our continent Arabs coming from the Arabic peninsula have settled and have become our brothers; White people left Holland and England, and they settled in the South; they are brother Africans. All we ask of them is to behave like brothers and not to perpetrate this racism which degrades man.

In as much as this appeal will be heard; in as much as they are willing to accept the dialogue by humanising their relationship with our Black brothers, we will persist, because we are passionately lovers of dialogue.

THE INDIAN OCEAN : AUSTRALIA'S ATTITUDE

The following statement of Australian policy regarding the Indian Ocean appeared in the April, 1974, issue of *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*, published by the Department of Foreign Affairs in Canberra.

The Indian Ocean is an area of major significance to the economies of the West, of Japan and of Australia from the point of view of its oil resources and especially its shipping lanes. The presence of super powers in the Indian Ocean is nothing new: the United States has, since 1949, maintained a small presence in the Persian Gulf and supplemented by occasional visits from the Pacific Seventh Fleet. The Soviet Union has long used the Indian Ocean, among other purposes for the transit of its naval forces between the eastern and western parts of the USSR. In recent years, however, the level of naval deployments by the super powers in the Indian Ocean has risen substantially, in the opinion of some littoral states to a degree beyond the independent legitimate interests of each of them in the area. This represents a situation of great power rivalry which is not in the interests of littoral states of which Australia is one.

Along with the majority of other States bordering on the Indian Ocean, Australia has endorsed the general concept of an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace as a long-term objective. This looks to a situation in which great power rivalry is eliminated from the Indian Ocean. Australia has joined a United Nations ad hoc committee established to examine the implications of the Peace Zone proposal. No specific concept has been defined and agreed in the ad hoc committee, whose discussions last year revealed at least five different concepts. Australia advocated a realistic step-by-step approach, with due regard to the security interests of regional states, the major powers, and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean.

On 8 February this year, following the United States-British announcement about the development of United States naval facilities at Diego Garcia, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Willesee, stated that the building up of facilities by any great power in the Indian Ocean, or the introduction of additional naval forces did not contribute to the achievement of Australia's long-term objective that the Indian Ocean should be an area free from great power rivalry. In addition, Senator Murphy said on 21 March in answer to a question on notice in the Senate, that Australia would in no way favour or encourage the further growth of Soviet military and naval power in the Indian Ocean. Senator Murphy also expressed the Government's view that the most effective way of moving, with the littoral states, towards the long-term objective for the Indian Ocean would be for both super powers to agree to exercise mutual restraint there.

On 22 and 23 March, Australian representatives in Washington and Moscow urged the United States and the Soviet Union to consult each other with a view to agreeing to exercise mutual restraint so that a further escalation of rivalry can be avoided in the Indian Ocean. These representatives were an expression of the Government's views on the matter and in no way constituted a protest. Both the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to study our proposal.

It is the Government's hope that the United States and the Soviet Union can come to some arrangement on mutual restraint and limitation of forces in the Indian Ocean. If they can, it will be the first significant step towards the longer-term goal that Australia and the other members of the region have set for themselves.

ONLANGSE SUID-AFRIKAANSE KOERANTKOMMENTAAR

OOR BETREKKINGE MET RHODESIË

Die Transvaler, 4 Junie 1974.

Dalk moet S.A. buurman druk

deur Otto Krause
(„Klip in die Bos" rubriek)

Seker die grootste struikelblok in die weg van Suid-Afrika se uitwaartse beleid in Afrika is Rhodesië.

Die dramatiese uitroep van UDI, die vesting van blanke heerskappy deur die Smith-bewind, sy uitdaging van sowel mnr. Harold Wilson se destydse Arbeidersregering as die hele swart Afrika, en die feit dat hierdie blanke Rhodesië byna nege jaar later nog staande bly - dis alles 'n groot ergernis vir swart Afrika.

En die ergernis spruit waarskynlik net soseer uit swart Afrika se besef van sy eie onbeholpenheid in die Rhodesiese situasie as uit die wete dat 'n swart meerderheid in Rhodesië deur blankes oorheers word.

Waar Suid-Afrika dan sy steun verleen aan 'n blanke bewind in Salisbury, wat heel onrealisties enige medeseggenskap aan die swartes vir ongeveer die volgende 50 jaar wil ontsê, is dit baie moeilik om 'n uitwaartse beleid gegrond op wedersydse vertroue in swart Afrika te voer.

Op die lange duur is ons blanke volk in Suid-Afrika vir die res van die vasteland aanneemlik, omdat ons die beginsel van onafhanklikheid vir alle volke in Afrika wil toepas. Reeds het ons die daad by die woord gevoeg en só van ons opregtheid getuig.

Ons kan verder sê dat toe ons ná 1965 ons steun aan blanke Rhodesië toegesê het, ons volgens daardie beginsel gehandel het. Blanke Rhodesië wou sy vryheid vestig, en ons was bereid om hom daarin te help - net soos wat ons enige ander volk se vryheidstrewa behoort te help.

Maar blanke Rhodesië self wil aan die ander kant nie daardie einste beginsel aanvaar nie. Hy het al baie duidelik enige gedagte aan afsonderlike vryhede verwerp. Hy besig 'n lippetaal oor samewerking tussen die rasse in 'n enkele Rhodesië en terselfdertyd skuif hy werklike magsdeelgenootskap op die lange baan.

Onbevredigend

Rhodesië se beleidsopset is dus net so onbevredigend soos dié van die Verenigde Party in Suid-Afrika, en dit is ook geen wonder nie dat die ANC-hoofbestuur die naweek die skikkingsvoorstelle tussen biskop Abel Muzorewa en die Smith-bewind verwerp het.

Die enigste teken van hoop is dat die biskop se African National Congress nog bereid is om verdere samesprekings te voer.

Waar staan Suid-Afrika egter in hierdie omstandighede? Die omwenteling in Portugal se Afrika-gebied het 'n dinamiese uitwaartse beleid van ons kant af noodsaaklik - en selfs dringend - gemaak. Nou, meer as ooit tevore, moet ons tot 'n vergelyk met swart Afrika kom; en waar ons op stuk van sake tog altyd vir ons volk se voortbestaan sal veg, is ons ook nie daarop uit om skoor te soek nie.

Ons Regering het al hoeveel maal ons bereidwilligheid tot samewerking met swart Afrika gekonstateer; ons het ook telkemale ons welwillendheid betuig; en t.o.v. die groot Afrika-beginsel van vryheid vir elke volk (iets waarin ons geskiedkundig die voortou geneem het) het ons verder bewys gelever dat ons dit ook vir ander wil laat geld.

Die blanke Rhodesiërs is natuurlik ons eie vlees en bloed, en dit is verstaanbaar dat ons sal omsien na hul belange en veiligheid. Ons het ook groot geduld t.o.v. hulle uitgeoefen, selfs terwyl hulle verset teen die beginsel waarvoor ons staan, ons eie belange in Afrika in die wiele gery het.

Remskoën

Daarby was dit altyd Suid-Afrika se tradisionele beleid om hom nie in te meng in die interne sake van ander volke nie.

Maar waneer jou buurman se doen en late jou eie sake vertroebel, is jy darem geregit om hom daarop te wys en selfs druk op hom uit te oefen om dinge in die reïne te bring.

Rhodesië behoort te beseef watter remskoën hy vir ons goeie betrekkinge in Afrika is, en ook dat hy self moet begin kies tussen óf afsonderlike vryhede óf 'n opregte samewerking met daadwerklike medegenskap vir die swartes.

Dis tyd dat ons dit duidelik aan die Rhodesiërs stel.

Rand Daily Mail, 5 June 1974.

Vorster's Choice

(Leading Article)

There is much merit in what Mr. Otto Krause said about South Africa and Rhodesia in yesterday's *Die Transvaler*. We are in wholehearted agreement with him that Rhodesia has chosen neither integration nor separate development: while paying lip-service to the idea of co-operation between the races in a unified country it has at the same time pushed real power-sharing into the realm of the long-term. And, as Mr. Krause said, South African support for Rhodesia acts as a brake on our achieving good relations with the rest of Africa.

We have frequently expressed such thoughts. We have also previously set out Mr. Krause's conclusion - that if a neighbour's acts and omissions disturb your own affairs, you have every right to exert pressure on him. Indeed that is what we said last November 15 in the context of the petrol crisis. It caused the Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, to apologise publicly to Rhodesia (although it seemed he had misread our leading article).

But with the same theme now sounded in *Die Transvaler*, will Mr. Vorster apologise again - or will he act?

Die Vaderland, 5 Junie 1974.

Rhodesië by die kruispad
(Hoofartikel)

'n Skikking was nog altyd beskou as die wenslikste oplossing vir Salisbury, nie net ter wille van Suid-Afrika nie, maar in besonder ook vir Rhodesië self. In die huidige omstandighede en met die oog op komende verwikkelinge in Suider-Afrika het daardie wenslikheid nou sterker as ooit tevore geword.

Dat Mosambiek onafhanklik sal word, ly min twyfel. Die vraag is egter wat 'n onafhanklike regering daar se houding jeens Rhodesië gaan wees.

Om die lang grense van Rhodesië vanaf Mosambiek tot Angola teen terroriste te verdedig, is 'n geweldige taak. En as Beira as hawe gesluit word, beteken dit dat alle in- en uitvoere vir Rhodesië deur Suid-Afrika moet kom.

Laasgenoemde sal 'n geweldige ekstra las op Suid-Afrikaanse hawens plaas. En so 'n grensverdediging sal ook aansienlike groter hulp van Suid-Afrika verg.

In dié omstandighede sou dit ons buurstaat geen guns bewys om hom onder die indruk te bring dat die Republiek nie bekommerd is oor sulke moontlikhede nie.

Terselfdertyd durf ons egter ook nie 'n politieke rewolwer voor premier Ian Smith se kop druk om teen elke pryse te skik nie, veral nie as 'n skikking blote oornamie sou beteken nie. Veral sou dit besonder onbillik wees om die hele verantwoordelikheid vir skikking op die skouers van mnr. Smith en sy regering te wil afskuif.

Biskop Muzorewa en die African National Congress het ewe seer 'n belang en verantwoordelikheid. Ook van hulle kant moet die saak met billikheid benader word.

Mnr. Smith en sy regering het reeds die beginsel van magsdeling aanvaar. Dit kan nie wegredeneer word nie. En hulle sal ook moet besef dat ontwaakte Swart nasionalisme te ongeduldig is om 50, of selfs tien jaar te wag vir betekenisvolle deelname in landsbestuur.

Die ANC op sy beurt is waarskynlik onder 'n sterk versoeking om 'n skikking te vertraag met die hoop dat gebeurde in Mosambiek hul hand sal sterk om groter eise te stel. (Die feit dat die ANC na 'n jaar se onderhandelings nou die finale voorstelle verwerp wek so 'n suspisie.) Dit mag so gebeur. Maar dit mag ook in die hand werk dat ekstremistiese Swart elemente soos Zapu en Zanu die Swart politiek by die meer gematigde ANC oorneem.

Die Blankes hou op die oomblik 50, die Swartes 16 setels in die parlement. Mnr. Smith is gewillig om nog ses af te staan aan Swart verteenwoordigers. Die ANC vra tien, sodat die Swartes 'n blok van 'n derde het om te verseker dat geen konstitusionele veranderinge sonder hul medewerking kan geskied nie.

Dit is sake waaroor Rhodesiërs, Swart en Wit, self moet besluite wat in verantwoordelikheid met die belange van Rhodesië as maatstaf geneem moet word.

Volgens Rhodesië se ingeslane beleid kan sinvolle politieke magsdeling nie van die Swartman in die gesamentlike parlement weerhou word nie.

Ewe seer kan Rhodesië slegs skade ly as 'n skikking 'n groot uitvloei van Blanke ondernemerstalent en kapitaal tot gevolg moet hê.

Die Transvaler, 6 Junie 1974.

Rhodesiese Gesprek

(Hoofartikel)

Die situasie in Rhodesië het in Suid-Afrika heelwat koerant-kommentaar uitgelok. In *Die Transvaler* het twee rubriekskrywers, Otto Krause en Cas de Villiers, die standpunt ingeneem dat Rhodesië realistiese politiek moet voer deur die wyse waarop aan die swartmense medeseggenskap gegee word, en dat Suid-Afrika hierby ten nouste betrokke is.

Hierop het Antikom, by monde van ds. C.C. Colijn, skerp gereageer met argumente wat daarop neerkom dat Rhodesië 'n moedige bolwerk van die blankedom is, 'n vennoot in die stryd teen die Kommunisme en terrorisme is, en dat dit ondoenlik is om oorgevoeligheid te openbaar ten opsigte van die eise van swart Afrika en van die ANC by name.

Antikom se reaksie het 'n onderstroming van wensdinkery en gebrek aan gevoeligheid vir politieke realiteite, sowel as 'n misvatting oor die eintlike saak wat die rubriekskrywers wou stel. Daarom gaan ons nie verder daarop in nie.

Suid-Afrika se houding teenoor Rhodesië bly steeds gebou op twee uitgangspunte: dat ons ons die inmeng in hulle interne aangeleenthede nie, en dat ons positiewe buurskap - met al die waardering en hulpbetoon wat buurskap inhou - steeds handhaaf.

Hoewel ons glo dat die beleid van afsonderlike ontwikkeling in Rhodesië vrugbaar toegepas kan word, bly dit hulle saak as hulle magsdeling tussen wit en swart as beleid aanvaar. Ons het wel beland by die hele verhoudingspolitiek in Suider-Afrika.

Die Republiek se strewe is om geen kolonialistiese model te volg nie, maar om die nasionale aspirasies van die swartman te erken en aktief mee te doen om vir die swartman sy politieke vryheid en selfbestikkingsreg te verseker. Billikheid, regverdigheid, morele verantwoording en praktiese uitvoerbaarheid is die boustene van ons verhoudingspolitiek. Waar dit nie nagekom word nie, het ons onself verbind om te wys op knelpunte.

As Rhodesiëse verhoudingspolitiek teen voorgenoemde 'indruis, is ons volkome geregverdig, juis omdat ons goeie bure is en gemeenskaplike belange het, om hulle daarop te wys. Ons kan en mag ons nie identifiseer met die beleidsrigtinge van mense wat nie voldoende ruimte bied vir die vryheid en onafhanklikheid van die volke in Afrika nie, al is hulle blankes en Christene en anti-Kommunisties.

Ter wille van ons buurskap en verwantskap en ter wille van die vennootskap van al die nasies in Suider-Afrika, is die gesprek met Rhodesië nodig.

Daar is ook genoegsame bewyse dat Rhodesië steeds groei in die besef dat 'n regverdige oplossing die enigste weg is, en dat dominasie die doodsweg is. Die formule van magsdeelgenootskap lewer inderdaad probleme wat hulle self sal moet oplos om reg aan beide groepe te laat geskied. Ons betrokkenheid hiërby is dat hulle oplossing die belange van Suider-Afrika moet dien.

Rapport, 9 Junie 1974.

Rhodesië moet alles weet

deur „Pollux“

Dit raak dringend tyd dat ons dinge duidelik met Rhodesië moet uitpraat. Selfs duideliker as tot nog toe. Ek glo daar bestaan 'n kommunikasiegaping tussen ons wat, met die Portugese pot so vinnig aan die kook, eenvoudig nie mag bly voortbestaan nie.

Ek vrees party van mnr. Smith se manne in Salisbury, soos ek hulle ken, gevangenes van die „Engelse” siening van die Afrikaner en die Nasionale regering.

Hulle glo nie dat ons dit opreg bedoel met afsonderlike ontwikkeling nie. Hulle dink, tipies, aparte vryhede is 'n „kolossale bluf”. Hulle sien nie in dat aparte vryhede 'n saak van ons hoë eie belang is nie.

Daarom het hulle die gerustheid dat hulle nog altyd op 'n „verkrampste” Suid-Afrika sal kan staatmaak om hulle te steun in hul droom van 'n langdurige blanke baasskap.

In dié waan weier hulle om selfs onder mekaar alternatiewe te bespreek. Vir hulle soos vir ons, is die keuse onontkombaar: òf eie nasieskap met 'n vergunning van volle nasieskap aan die swart mense, òf samewerking binne 'n veelrassige raamwerk.

Ons het, na ingrypende debat, die moeilike weg van afsonderlike vryhede gekies.

Hulle het nog nie eens oor die keuse begin debatteer nie.

Dit raak laat, Rhodesië, dit raak laat.

Vir ons, ongelukkig, saam met julle.

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