


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THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS



DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE

NEWSLETTER

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Vol. 6 No. 4

1974

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December 1974

S.A.I.I.A. NEWSLETTER / NUUSBRIEF

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INTRODUCTORY NOTES

Conference "Strategy for Development"

The Conference held at Jan Smuts House in December, 1974, was a follow-up to the one held in 1972 (which was entitled "Accelerated Development in Southern Africa"). As in 1972, the Institute's co-sponsors were the Rand Afrikaans University and the Foundation for Foreign Affairs, Inc., of the United States, and the Institute was very pleased once again to be able to co-operate with these two bodies in organising what turned out to be a highly successful and fruitful conference.

The statement of the Institute's National Chairman, Dr. Leif Egeland, at the opening session of the Conference on 4 December is reproduced in this *Newsletter* (pages 34-35).

The Conference was attended by over 200 persons, from all parts of the Republic (Homelands, urban areas, Universities and other research bodies, Government Departments, commercial and industrial firms, etc.), from neighbour states and territories in Africa, from the United States (a distinguished group of sixteen, sponsored by the Foundation for Foreign Affairs) and from the United Kingdom. Among the South African participants we were privileged to have five Homeland Chief Ministers.

As members of the Institute know, the proceedings of the 1972 Conference were published early in 1974 by Macmillan (London) in a book with the same title as that of the Conference itself. (Macmillan also published the proceedings of the Institute's 1970 Conference, the first major conference to be held at Jan Smuts House, in a book entitled "International Aspects of Overpopulation"). A book based on the December 1974 Conference will be published as soon as possible, and it will include the main papers presented, as well as a summary of the issues raised and the conclusions reached in the extensive discussions which took place.

The Financial Campaign

The last report on the Campaign appeared in the Introductory Notes to the *Newsletter* issued in March, 1974 (Vol. 6 No. 1). We are now very pleased to be able to mention, with appreciation, that since then the following Companies have become Corporate Members of the Institute:

Retco Ltd.
Siemens (Pty) Ltd.
Caltex Oil (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd.
Sasol Corp. Ltd.
Federale Volksbeleggings Bpk.

We welcome these new Corporate Members and look forward to fruitful co-operation with them in the future.

We can also now mention that, since the last report, the following Corporate Members have generously agreed to increase their annual subscriptions:

African Cables Ltd.
The Argus Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd.
Cayzer, Irvine South Africa (Pty) Ltd.
Babcock and Wilcox of Africa (Pty) Ltd.
African Oxygen Ltd.
Shell S.A. (Pty) Ltd.
A.E. and C.I. Ltd.
Hill Samuel (S.A.) Ltd.
White's Cement Ltd.

The continued and increased support of these Companies, together with all our other Corporate Members, is greatly appreciated.

A full list of Corporate Members, as at the end of 1974, appears at the end of this *Newsletter*. It is the hope of the Institute's National Council that 1975 will see many more additions to this list, as it is only through wider and increased support from South African companies, especially in this time of inflation, that the Institute's work will be able to continue to develop constructively.

A special donation to the Institute was received in 1974 from Nasionale Pers Bpk., and this is gratefully acknowledged.

It is not possible to mention here by name all the individual members of the Institute, mostly of the Witwatersrand Branch, who have donated varying amounts to the Campaign; they have all received, or will be receiving, letters of appreciation. But it should be mentioned that, as a result of the special effort of the Witwatersrand Branch - led by the members of the Branch's Executive Committee - a total amount of approximately R2200 has been received from Branch members, up to the end of 1974, plus an amount of R1000 from Branch funds, in terms of a decision by the Annual General Meeting in December, 1973.

The special Campaign effort of the Witwatersrand Branch will continue in 1975, and it is confidently expected that many more individual members will take advantage of this opportunity to show in a tangible way their appreciation of the value of the Institute's work and thus help to ensure its continued development.

Among our Country Members (not attached to any particular Branch) special mention must be made of a further generous donation received towards the end of 1974 from Mrs. H.D. Hugo, which is very greatly appreciated.

Publications

Attention is drawn to the list of Institute publications available, which appears as usual at the end of this *Newsletter*. The occasional papers issued from time to time are not automatically circulated to all members of the Institute, but members may request copies at no charge (one copy of each paper per member).

In addition to the book on the 1972 Conference, *Accelerated Development in Southern Africa*, which is published by Macmillan, it will be noted that the Institute has published a report, entitled *Education for Development in Southern Africa*, which is based on the proceedings of a special Workshop held in conjunction with the 1972 Conference, and on work done subsequently on this subject. Copies of this report are now available.

As members will have realised, the Institute's publications programme has been developing very satisfactorily in recent years. More still needs to be done, especially in view of the many new developments in South Africa's external relations and the growing interest in international affairs generally. However, the present rapidly increasing costs impose a serious limitation on the Institute in this regard. One of the main aims of the Financial Campaign, therefore, is to provide the resources to develop further our research and publications programme. But at the same time greater support from members for this vital aspect of the Institute's work, particularly by purchasing Institute publications, would be most welcome and useful.

John Barratt
Director, S.A.I.I.A.

SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE FUTURE

D.P. de Villiers⁺

To try to avoid being controversial, would be as futile as it would "unto (m)ine own self" be untrue! Let me hasten to add, therefore, that I speak exclusively in individual capacity. Admittedly, "no man is an island, entire of itself"; and I gratefully acknowledge the wealth of information and insight provided for me by others, in discussions and through their writings. Yet for any opinions I may express, I take sole responsibility. Indeed, my objective is far from selling hard-and-fast plans, policies or courses of action to you: it is much rather to share some thoughts, hopefully as a contribution to your own thinking (or, in the charming expression used to me by an American friend, "tossing a few balls in the air for you to play with".)

Very recent events have spot-lighted Southern Africa even more than before. Certain official pronouncements have been supplemented by a spate of in-depth reporting, editorial and columnist comment in newspapers and magazines, at home and abroad, special articles, T.V. interviews and so forth. In the course of all this, various points have repeatedly come to the fore, imbuing a sense of urgency to the whole matter. While we must take due note of these, some care is needed to do so in context, i.e. with some sense of history as well as of values in future outlook, as I shall try to illustrate.

We may start with the common-place that Southern Africa's concern with group or race relations is basically a matter of internal importance and secondarily a source of pressurising, of varying intensity, from outside. The internal quest is for peaceful, constructive and just relations, as an all-important end in itself. There is growing consensus on the need for:

- . change and transition from old frameworks to new ones,
- . doing away with controls and discriminations on a White/Black racial basis, whether colonialist paternalistic or otherwise,
- . seeking means of genuine power-sharing, whether by common institutions, separate or distinct institutions, or a combination of these, and
- . overall co-operation in the economic, technological and educational spheres with a view to raising living standards and providing opportunities for maximum self-realisation for all.

⁺ This article is based on notes for a speech delivered in Salisbury on 14 November, 1974. For further details see end of article.

Those inside of Southern Africa not in agreement with these broad ideals must be a dwindling minority, either eccentric relics of the past or in league with some foreign ideology. There are, of course, amongst all of us large question-marks and substantial disagreements about matters of timing and method.

From outside of Southern Africa there are well-known pressures with a view to change. Some proceed from ideological or other ulterior roots, resulting in radical demands which cannot be countenanced. Others come from states who would prefer constructive relations with Southern Africa but who for political reasons raise conditions precedent to normalising those relations. These deserve, and receive, serious consideration in Southern Africa: but in terms of the best thinking (to my mind) they are treated with great caution as instruments of change, the primary consideration being what is internally recognised as just and desirable.

Points made in the most recent coverage by the press and other media, are the following:

- Certain of the states of Black Africa, including Zambia, have given indications that they no longer regard the Republic of South Africa itself as a colonial residue which requires to be "liberated", and that they are willing to make a deal with the Republic on certain conditions.
- The states concerned are influenced by their assessment on the one hand, of South Africa's military power, and, on the other hand, of its economic strength and technological ability to play an important role in the development of a sub-continent which is at peace and not at war with itself.
- They, however, see South West Africa and Rhodesia as colonial vestiges which cannot, in their present form, be tolerated by Black Africa; so they expect South Africa in these cases to act as it did in respect of Mozambique, i.e. not to bolster up any particular regime but to accept change as it might come and to live with it.
- In addition, they insist on changes away from hurtful discriminations on a racial basis within South Africa.
- The three major Western Powers (United Kingdom, United States and France) who in the Security Council vetoed the recent motion for the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations, for reasons of economics and general international strategy, do not want to be at loggerheads with either Black Africa or South Africa: consequently they favour detente and try to encourage it.
- These Western Powers broadly support the Black Africa states in their attitudes about South West Africa, Rhodesia and racial discrimination within South Africa. In these respects their veto (and South Africa's probable dependence on it in future) implies pressure on South Africa to meet the demands of Black Africa.

It is against the background of this kind of open discussion that rather facile inferences have been drawn by commentators, (as illustrated in a recent T.V. interview) e.g. that Mr. Vorster is "twisting Mr. Smith's arm" and that South Africa is ready to "ditch" or "sell out" White Rhodesia. A final conclusion (by commentators) is that White Rhodesia is under extreme pressure to settle quickly and at best with Black Rhodesia, or suffer dire consequences.

I do believe that jumping to such conclusions, on that kind of reasoning, is somewhat hasty, perhaps even panicky, and at least due to serious oversimplification. Various other factors have to be brought into the picture for proper perspective. There is among South Africans a very real understanding of the situation of White Rhodesians, perhaps nowhere stronger than among political supporters of the present Government. So action by the latter which can be represented as a "sell-out" hardly seems feasible, certainly at the present time. While there does appear to be every reason to assume concern on the part of the Western Powers that there should be a settlement between South Africa and Black Africa, there is no question of dictation. The same applies to the South African Government's understandable concern, which has been openly stated over a long period, that White and Black Rhodesia should reach agreement.

Furthermore a Rhodesian settlement, though obviously of key importance in a larger Southern African detente, will not in itself make peace between South Africa and Black Africa. There would be other hurdles to overcome, not the least being the matter of official racial discriminations in South Africa; and the road to agreed settlements in South West Africa may prove long and arduous. Another over-simplification lies in the apparent assumption that the present regime in Rhodesia would, on withdrawal of South African support, be doomed to almost immediate collapse in the face of guerilla onslaughts. Indeed, my main objection to the somewhat panicky reasoning under discussion is its suggestion of a sort of gun-point constraint towards settlement - which overstates the pressure elements and by the same token misses a more healthy outlook upon the future of Southern Africa.

Having said all this, I must, however, immediately add and stress that in this matter I am on the side of the doves. I advocate very positive endeavours, as a matter of the highest priority, towards agreements for peaceful progress in Southern Africa, including crucial agreements concerning Rhodesia. My point is that the basis or approach should be seen more broadly and constructively.

On the negative side, failing such agreements, there are prospects of rising confrontation between Black Africa and the "White South", with rather horrible implications. Rhodesia is very much in the front line of the present physical impacts, the terrorist onslaughts along the Zambezi and the economic sanctions being applied against Rhodesia. Prolongation and escalation, too, must in the first instance affect Rhodesia. But obviously she is not alone in this. It is common knowledge that the sanctions are seriously injuring Zambia, and that the new regime in Mozambique would like to see an end to them. The terrorists operate mainly from Zambia and Tanzania. There is the danger of South Africa on the one hand and Zambia, Tanzania and other Black states on the other being drawn further and further into the struggle, in which event the danger would increase of intervention by major powers - particularly in

the light of known activities and interests from the side of the Soviet Union and Red China - and so Central and Southern Africa could become another Middle East situation, with all it implies. Even if the struggle is contained within narrower confines than just indicated, mere prolongation implies negative use of time, energy and manpower, and losing out on constructive activities and opportunities for advancement.

There can be no doubt that the recent events in Mozambique are, rightly or wrongly, seen by large numbers of Black Africans as fruits of the use of force through guerilla warfare, and as an encouragement to do likewise elsewhere. There are moderate African leaders who recognise relevant differences in circumstances, e.g. the fact that resistance to the guerilla movements in Mozambique depended on troops from Portugal, where in course of time strong public reaction grew to being bled to death through their young men. There are less moderate African leaders who do not want to know: some are already in the frame of mind that they do not have to negotiate, because they consider that the fruits will before very long fall from the tree for them.

Obviously, then, if a Rhodesian settlement can be reached which is acceptable not only in that country but also in Zambia and Tanzania, it would mean an end to the negative catalogue which I have (no doubt incompletely) sought to draw. An "internal" settlement of this kind should serve to ward off anything extreme from the outside world, in other words stop the sanctions as well as the guerilla warfare. Seen in this light alone, settlement or agreement must be a highly coveted prize, notwithstanding the known difficulties about achieving it.

I prefer, however, to see the matter in a much more positive light than a mere avoidance of injurious consequences. The whole sub-continent of Africa offers tremendous opportunities for the further development of its resources, the advancement of its peoples and the best relations between all of them - provided it can find a framework which is based upon broad agreement between all concerned, of all races, colours and groups, rather than something imposed by some upon others. In order to be a practical project, such a framework would have to take due account of the diversity of the peoples living on the sub-continent, their material and social circumstances, their political aspirations, even fears and prejudices, where these exist, and consequently the desire of some to be politically autonomous, even internationally independent states, *vis-a-vis* the wishes and interests of others to be part of a large political whole with, perhaps, decentralised forms of government. In other words the framework would ideally have to cater, in a flexible way, for all this diversity, while at the same time promoting the maximum of practical co-operation, particularly economic and technological (in which I include educational). Most important, ideally, is that there must be bonds of common loyalty to this "unity in diversity" concept, as the basis for maintaining peaceful and constructive relations within the sub-continent and for showing a large measure of common front in relations with the rest of the world.

Obviously formidable difficulties would have to be overcome before such an ideal could be attained. I am putting it forward to you as something to be "examined in doubt", as the maxim runs, but if decided upon, to be "pursued in faith".

What I am strongly convinced of, is that there are at the present time opportunities which, if properly seized by leadership on the White and Black sides, could lead to valid and decisive progress towards attainment of the ideal, but which, on the other hand, if frittered away now may never occur again, or at any rate not as favourably as at the present.

I have already intimated that there does not seem to be any change of policy in regard to Rhodesia on the part of the South African Government, and no reason to assume "arm-twisting" tactics. At the same time there are clear indications that, since the advent of the new regime in Mozambique and in the light of the most recent exchanges at the United Nations, the South African Government views the matter of coming to agreement Black Africa in a much more urgent light than before; and, as indicated, this includes the all-important aspect of a Rhodesian settlement. The South African Government is well aware of the problems involved and can be expected to be sympathetic towards genuine attempts at a realistic solution, apart from its own interest in an overall Southern African detente.

Much the same applies to enlightened public opinion in South Africa. The need for early and positive action in this sphere is generally accepted. And the sympathies with White Rhodesia, though strong, are accompanied by a fervent hope, even expectation, that there will be a corresponding acceptance of that need here. You will realise for yourselves how detrimental it could be if South Africa and White Rhodesia should seriously fall out of step in this respect; and the danger, if there is indefinite delay in making progress, is not to be underrated.

Equally there are indications that on the side of Black African leadership (not all of them but those that matter most) the time may be opportune for an attempt at reaching a Southern African settlement. After the change-over in Mozambique, the moment has arrived for them to consider whether guerilla operations are to be carried further in an onslaught on South Africa itself. In the light of droughts and famine or near-famine in parts of Central Africa, changes in the internal South African society that are in fact occurring and are on the programme, and the factors of South African military and economic power and technological ability as mentioned before, there must be considerable inducement right now to a constructive approach on the Black African side.

On the Black African as well as on the White African side there are known difficulties about reaching the kind of agreement envisaged. On both sides leaders moving towards detente would want to know that they could carry their followers with them. The Black African leaders would moreover want to know that they could stand strongly enough against inective and worse from more militant Black Africanism, some under Red influences. For that reason arrangements which may have the image of indefinitely protracting situations which are colonial in their eyes, are bound to be "not on". This in itself understandably causes apprehension and concern amongst certain White communities, notably in Rhodesia and South West Africa, and the question of protection and guarantees for them in future political developments looms large. In considering options, I would suggest serious thought on whether the best possible security is not to be achieved along the following lines:

- Agreement with moderate leadership, while it exists and is interested in achieving agreement, as distinct from a stage when time might have run out and hasty accommodations have to be made at gun-point. This can at least secure time during which transitions agreed upon are made in an orderly manner, as a firm basis for further developments. To put it differently: would the best terms that can now be achieved, even with the more moderate leadership, even if not ideal from the White community's viewpoint, not almost inevitably be much better than what that community may be forced to submit to in future if no agreement is reached fairly soon?
- Acceptance of the fact that Black needs White and White needs Black on our sub-continent, irrespective of who may be in political control of the particular part we may be talking about, whether the Transkei or the Southern Transvaal, Ovambo-land or Windhoek, Lusaka or Salisbury. These needs are practical and relate to development opportunities: so they bring you and me, of the private sector, to the fore, in addition to governments.
- Becoming part of a sub-continental framework of which the *whole* rests on agreement between responsible white and black leadership, which, while realistically accepting the plurality of the population, puts the main emphasis on common interests and on co-operation towards attainment of joint ideals in the best interests of all.

Considering the peculiar problem in which the Rhodesian regime has found itself in the past in endeavouring to "normalise" relations with Great Britain, the above approach may well have a further major advantage. If Rhodesia, after internal settlement between White and Black, becomes part of a larger Southern African entente, that might well politically let the British Government off the hook, in this sense: it could then correctly claim that the new Southern African arrangements were a *fait accompli*, based substantially on the will of the peoples concerned, that any outside interference was bound to be harmful rather than helpful, and that there was no further need for the British Government itself to pursue the arduous course of trying to achieve detailed agreement with Rhodesia.

The above pre-supposes that new and unchartered courses are to be pursued in shaping the future of Southern Africa. However, the course to the moon was unchartered too, yet man landed there. What is important is that the achievement flowed from a mastery of existing scientific knowledge plus inventive innovation. The same requirements must surely apply in the present case. We need all the best brains, in a team effort. We need the closest liaison and most intensive dialogue throughout the sub-continent at all levels, governmental, professional, economic and technological.

In 1972 an international conference on Accelerated Development in Southern Africa[†], held in Johannesburg, reported as follows:

"A point that was strongly emphasised at several sessions was that, to be viable, economic co-operation must presuppose true participation of all communities, groups and regions in all decisions affecting their respective interests, and must preclude the subordination of some of the participating entities to centralised decision-making vested in one or a few of them".

The message is clear; so is the practical task for all of us, and the need to apply this approach not only to the economic sphere but to the whole spectrum. Black Africa must truly feel that its interests as well as those of the White South, have been duly accommodated in the entente.

The accommodations in ex-colonial Africa, north of the Zambezi, have mostly been made under pressure, not blueprints. Why do we not try agreement based on proper planning, while there is time? And co-operation thereafter. Then we could make parts of Southern and Central Africa some of the main food arsenals of our hemisphere; we could live in peace internationally, and we could set an example in human relations to the whole world.

Advocate D.P. de Villiers, S.C., is Managing Director of Nasionale Pers Bpk. He was leader of the South African Government's legal team at the Hague during the South West Africa Cases before the International Court, 1960 - 1966, and co-leader during the proceedings before the Court in connection with the 1971 Advisory Opinion.

[†]This conference was sponsored by the S.A. Institute of International Affairs, in association with the Rand Afrikaans University and the Foundation for Foreign Affairs Inc. of Chicago. (See page 39 in regard to the book based on the Conference proceedings.)

JAPANESE - SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONS

Martin C. Spring

There are very few real Western experts on Japan, because the Japanese are a unique people with some very strange cultural traditions which outsiders find extremely difficult to comprehend. I remember a prominent American businessman who has lived in Tokyo since shortly after the War telling me that a *gaijin* - that is the Japanese word for a Westerner - spends ten years living in the country before he is confident that he understands what it is all about. Then the disillusionment gradually sets in, and after twenty years he is convinced that he does not really understand anything about the Japanese! Please treat my remarks with circumspection, as the random views of a South African who has visited Japan half a dozen times, loves the country and its people, and is equipped by his professional training quickly to grasp the essentials of economic, sociological and political situations.

South Africans generally know little about Japan. Their images of the Japanese - when they ever have any - are stereotypes shaped by wartime propaganda and the romanticists of the last century. The word "Japan" conjures up thoughts of sadistic army officers with mouthfuls of teeth and long swords, of houses with paper walls, of doll-like ladies in kimono shuffling along under the cherry blossoms. The one new image is of Japan Incorporated - a land of factories filled with robot-like workers trying to drown the world in a tidal wave of industrial products, yet slowly choking to death in their own fumes. Of the warmth, friendliness and even passion of the Japanese - far surpassing mere formal courtesy - we know nothing. Of their vibrant cultural life, their deep concern with human betterment, their massive campaign against environmental pollution, we are ignorant. Japan is our second biggest export market, exceeding in importance both the United States and West Germany, yet how many South Africans know this, and have considered its longer-term implications?

There are many reasons why the relations between our two countries, at the people-to-people level, are so tenuous. For a start, there is physical distance. By air it is more than 14 000 km from Pretoria to Tokyo, and by land and sea, even farther. Communications, except for shipment of goods, are poor. Until a couple of years ago there were no direct flights between South Africa and Japan, and even now there is only one a week in each direction. South African Airways only opened its first route to the Far East this year, and for the moment its one-a-week scheduled flight terminates at Hong Kong which is 2 800 km short of Tokyo. Telephone calls are routed more than halfway round the world, via California.

Secondly, there are no historical bonds between the two countries. As colonies, republics and a dominion, South Africa's relations were with Africa and Europe; even in the Second World War, South Africa had little to do with the struggle against the Japanese. Countries like the United States and Britain have a century of various kinds of relations with Japan; newer nations like Australia have been forced into relations more recently as Japan has emerged as a world power; but South Africa, still groping its way painfully

towards full nationhood, still psychologically dependent on its relations with European countries, has shown neither necessity nor desire to build bridges to Japan except in the realm of trade, and even there development is of comparatively recent origin.

Thirdly, there is a certain suspicion on both sides rooted in racial hostility. South Africans recognize quite clearly that Japanese are not Whites, whatever our laws may pretend, and therefore their attitudes towards them tend to be associated with discriminatory attitudes towards "Non-white" people generally. Then there is the influence of "Yellow Peril" type thinking (hardly any South Africans are able to discriminate in their thinking between Japanese and Chinese, although the two peoples are quite different). Then there are those same elements of thinking which influence most Caucasian (that is, White) attitudes towards the Japanese around the world: fear, disdain, cultural barriers, misinterpretation, which add up to a generalized Nipponphobia. Which, while usually concealed, is sometimes openly expressed.

The Japanese, on their side, tend to see the South African as the archetype of the anti-Japanese Caucasian racist. South Africans have openly structured a society based on Caucasian domination which reflects in microcosm an existing world order structured on Caucasian domination (a world order which the Japanese resent, and intend to change).

This is not to gainsay that once South Africans actually visit Japan, meet the Japanese, and come to know them better, they usually develop a real admiration for them and are more positive in attitude towards them than most other Caucasians. This seems to be especially true of Afrikaners, who recognize in the Japanese such traditional qualities as a strong family life and a fervent patriotism, for which they themselves have a particular high regard.

Nor can it be denied that most Japanese who have come to live among us develop a strong affection for South Africa, and often say that they are generally treated far better here than in theoretically non-racial countries such as Britain and the United States.

The point that I am making is that the number of South Africans who have personal acquaintance with Japanese, and vice versa, is so small as to have little influence on the mutual suspicion of the citizenries of both countries towards each other; a mutual suspicion which discourages the development of closer relationships.

The fourth obstacle is, of course, politics. Japan is extremely sensitive about its international image because, in their way, the Japanese are no more popular in other countries than we are. The last thing the Japanese want to do is to attract even more criticism by appearing to favour the land of apartheid. But there are practical limits to what Japan can do in anti-South African actions, as I shall explain later. It does, however, take a public posture of hostility, and this has unfortunate effects.

For instance, the Japanese Government positively hinders cultural, educational and sporting exchanges, which, if they were encouraged instead, could only enhance understanding and approval of things Japanese among South Africans.

On our side, the Department of Foreign Affairs seems to regard Japan as barren ground for positive diplomacy (not without reason, I might say) and concentrates its attentions on other, much less important, nations in Africa and Latin America. The South Africa Foundation, which has Man-to-Man Committees for several minor European countries, and frequently invites to the Republic important visitors from Europe and North America, virtually ignores Japan.

Against this unpromising background, how have relations actually developed between South Africa and Japan?

In the diplomatic field it has been very poor. For many years representation has been exchanged at the consul-general level only. South Africa would very much like to raise the status of this exchange to ambassadorial level, but the Gaimusho (Japanese Department of Foreign Affairs) will not agree to this because it fears that such a move would be interpreted as evidence of closer Japan-South Africa relations. In South Africa, the Japanese Consul-General is treated exactly as if he were an ambassador. In Tokyo, the man South Africa appoints as its Consul-General is always of ambassadorial rank. The present Consul-General, Mr Anthony Hamilton, for instance, was formerly Ambassador to Spain. But our Consul-General in Tokyo is not treated as if he were an ambassador. In the past this has caused significant grievance.

South Africa's treatment of Japanese visitors, both officially and privately, has steadily improved over the years. In the early Sixties, for instance, Japanese businessmen being transferred to South Africa to represent their companies for several years at a time were refused visas for their wives; now they are actually encouraged to bring their wives, as our authorities have discovered that it helps prevent embarrassing incidents involving liaison between the Japanese visitors and South African girls. Previously, all visa applications had to be referred to the Department of the Interior in Pretoria, which led as recently as 1970 to the notorious Japanese Jockey Incident. Now visas are granted on a routine basis in Tokyo by the Consul-General, acting on behalf of the Department of the Interior, with only applications of a sensitive nature being referred to Pretoria, and thus incurring a delay. It is now extremely rare for a visa to be refused to a Japanese applicant. Individual Japanese tourists, however, are not encouraged, because it is feared that their lack of knowledge of our complex racial laws, and the backwoods mentality still to be found in some parts of our country, could lead to unpleasant incidents. The Government prefers organized parties which keep to the beaten track.

The Japanese who are normally allowed permanent residence here are almost always company representatives and their immediate families for a period of four to five years. The reasoning behind this seems to be that the Government does not want the slightest risk of the emergence of a settled, cohesive group of young Japanese able to claim South African nationality by birth.

The Japanese community resident in South Africa now numbers about 500 of whom the majority live in Johannesburg. The leader of the community is the Consul-General, Mr. Nishizawa. Social life is focused on the activities of the Nippon Club of South Africa. There is a school for young

Japanese children, built by the Transvaal Provincial Administration and staffed with teachers from Japan. For their secondary education, most children go back to Japan, although a few of them have been put into private schools here. The Japanese keep very much to themselves, although the menfolk mix to some extent with local business contacts. The Japanese love to play golf, so they play plenty of it here, where facilities are so much cheaper than in Japan. They travel quite a bit around the country, but usually keep to the main centres, where there is a minimal chance of racial incidents.

Some years ago there were a number of unfortunate incidents of discrimination against Japanese, such as hotels refusing to admit them, restaurants refusing to serve them, buses refusing to allow them aboard. However, South Africans have become more used to Japanese, and as racial attitudes have been liberalized, this insulting behaviour has almost disappeared. I understand that resident or visiting Japanese are encouraged to report such incidents to their Consul-General, who takes them up with our Government and that for at least two years no such incident has been reported to the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Japanese residents are, as you know, classed as "honorary Whites" in terms of our race laws. But, contrary to popular opinion, this status does not apply to Japanese alone, it is extended to all "Nonwhite" visitors of foreign nationality, apart from Blacks from neighbouring territories who are here on a permanent or semi-permanent basis. However, it should be noted that this "honorary White" status does not go as far as allowing marriage between Japanese and South Africans. The position under the Anti-Miscegenation Clause of the Immorality Act is obscure, but no Japanese has ever been prosecuted under this clause and I think it most unlikely that one ever would be.

The Japanese themselves seem to have mixed reactions to the "honorary White" status. Some of them seem to interpret it as an accolade to their race that South Africans, who at least nominally are the most racist of the Caucasians, should publicly acknowledge them as equals. Others are either amused or offended, arguing along these lines: "We are not Whites. We are Asians. Why on earth can't we be accepted as such?"

Most Japanese seem to enjoy living in South Africa, however, and many of them return to Japan reluctantly when their visas are not renewed or they are recalled by their head offices. They particularly like the spaciousness, the climate, the beauty and the high living standards of our country, but in some cases Japanese develop a strong liking for South Africans and admiration for the development and administration of the country. In Japan itself there is a small group of Japanese who are strongly and openly pro-South African as a result of their experience of living or visiting here. Some of these are quite influential people, especially in the business community. And the business community is more powerful in Japan than in any other country.

The most sensitive racial issue between the two nations is our treatment of Japanese married to South Africans. Many Japanese, disapproving of miscegenation with any non-Japanese, do not consider this a matter of consequence. But many do, because they interpret our treatment of Japanese spouses as inferring inferiority, as symptomatic of secret anti-Japanese racism.

This is an acutely difficult problem for our Government, as the Mixed Marriages Act is quite specific in its prohibition, and in its non-recognition

such marriages contracted outside South Africa. To amend the Act would be extremely difficult. Firstly because liberalization of racial attitudes does not appear to include lessened hostility to miscegenation, about which South Africans tend to feel strongly. Secondly, because a change of this kind would violate one of the fundamental tenets of separate development, and although the political trend in our country appears to be strongly towards more justice and more human dignity, it does not appear to be away from the principle of separatism as such. Thirdly, because excluding Japanese from the prohibition in the Act would create an anomaly which would be hard to defend. If we recognized marriages with Japanese, why not with Koreans? And if with Koreans as well, why not Chinese? And if we recognized marriages with foreign Chinese, why not with South Africans of Chinese race? And if with Chinese South Africans, why not with Indian South Africans? And if with Indians, why not with Coloureds?

I cannot foresee any fundamental change in this position for the foreseeable future. What we are more likely to see is a more tolerant *de facto* attitude towards marriages contracted abroad between South Africans and "Non-whites" which would allow such couples to visit the Republic more freely and stay for longer. A few years ago we not only refused visas to such couples, we even discriminated against the "Nonwhite" spouses of foreigners. All this has fortunately changed for the better, and I expect further change in that direction. However the non-recognition of South African-Japanese marriages, the refusal to allow such couples to live permanently in the Republic, and similar racial aspects of our laws and their administration, will remain a permanent source of friction between the two countries. And not such a minor source, either. Every time there is a racial incident it tends to receive fair prominence in the Japanese Press, and to damage our image in Japan. To plead that Japanese are also subjected to racial discrimination in other countries, which is true, is pointless. Largely because such discrimination is legal here, whereas elsewhere it is usually not, makes it more sensational news.

Whereas the way we treat Japanese is very important to the Japanese, the way we treat Blacks is not - contrary to the impression you gain from reading the Press, including reports of sometimes extreme anti-South African public statements made by Japanese officials to curry political favour among the Afro-Asians.

The Japanese were themselves colonizers, instead of being colonized by others which gives them a more balanced perspective of some of the complex issues involved when an advanced minority lives in a country cheek-by-jowl with less advanced groups. There are racist elements in their own thinking, and they tend to place Black peoples rather low in their hierarchical ranking of foreign communities. They are reasonably well informed about the true conditions in South Africa, which somewhat tempers their criticism. In official circles there also seems to be some recognition that while Black African leaders are extreme in their public hostility towards the White South, in private their views are much more moderate. The essence of Japanese criticism of our racial policy is not that the Whites dominate, but that they do it in a way which is patently offensive. The Japanese, strongly influenced by their own social ethic to believe in compromise rather than confrontation, object to the method rather than the objective of our policy. In fact they think our honesty is just stupid.

All this does not mean that Japan will not make more empty gestures against South Africa in the future. On the contrary. Black Africa is rising in Japan's priorities as a long-term source of oil and essential minerals. Yet Japan cannot afford to make any substantial gestures against South Africa, which is also becoming an increasingly important source of essential commodities. The only way out of this dilemma is to try to curry favour with Black Africa by making empty gestures (which will not goad South Africa to the point of acting against Japan's vital interests) while continuing to do business with South Africa.

The most recent and most dramatic of these empty gestures was the announcement by the Japanese Government in June (I was in Tokyo at the time) that in future it would refuse to grant visas to South Africans wishing to visit Japan for cultural, educational and sporting purposes. Simultaneously it was announced that there would be stronger pressure on Japanese nationals voluntarily to eschew visiting South Africa for similar purposes.

The origins of this move can be traced back to OPEC's rationing of oil supplies a year ago. Japan, which depends more on imported energy than any other industrialized nation (and most of that energy is imported in the form of oil) suddenly found itself dangerously exposed. It was a traumatic and humiliating experience -- not only the sudden realization of weakness, but also the Arabs' blackmailing tactics to force Japan to abandon its previously neutral stance on Israel. The Japanese came to the conclusion that they had tended to neglect the Middle East. A side-effect of this was a review of policies towards other sensitive regions, including Africa. Nigeria is already a major oil producer and looks like becoming a much bigger one. There are other Black African oil producers. Japanese companies have already struck oil in Nigeria, so Black Africa could develop into a smallish but nevertheless significant supplier of oil. Japan also draws a substantial amount of copper from Black Africa, and is hopeful of gaining control over supplies of other vital materials. Uranium is one example. In addition, Black Africa could become more important as a market for Japanese goods, especially if a world trade war breaks out and barriers are imposed against Japanese imports by countries such as the United States. Africa north of the Zambezi, taken as a whole, is already more important to Japan than South Africa, with two-way trade totalling \$1,7-billion last year compared with \$1,1-billion in South Africa's case. The Gaimusho, traditionally the hawks on the South African issue because of Japan's exposure to constant criticism at the United Nations, had acquired a new argument for action against the Republic.

However, as I understand it, the Gaimusho was opposed as usual by MITI (the powerful Ministry of International Trade & Industry). MITI are traditionally the doves on the South African issue because they do not believe that politics should be allowed to interfere with trade. MITI is more conscious of South Africa's critical importance to Japan as a supplier of essential commodities such as maize, wool, sugar, chrome, manganese, uranium, iron ore and coal. It also recognizes that South Africa is a small but valued market for Japanese exports, especially motor vehicles, textiles and capital goods.

Now the whole structure of Japanese government is quite different from that of other countries. In the case of a conflict of this nature between two powerful ministries, you would expect the Government to rule in favour of one or the other. But the Japanese do not do things that way. They pre-

fer to seek a compromise. And that is what happened on the South African issue this year. The Gaimusho wanted tougher action, MITI did not want any. The compromise was a kind of action which fell within the Gaimusho's field of responsibility, and to which MITI could hardly object, because none of its interests were involved. A ban on visas for tourists, for instance, would affect the Japanese tourist industry -- a MITI responsibility. But cultural, educational and social exchanges are none of MITI's business, so the Gaimusho felt free to prohibit them.

The practical effects of the ban have been minimal, as there have been no more than a couple of dozen South Africans a year travelling to Japan for cultural, educational or sporting purposes. The only people who have been inconvenienced have been those who were actually about to leave for Japan for such purposes at the time the ban was imposed, and those who continue to embarrass the Japanese consular authorities by honestly asking for visas for such purposes (which have to be refused) rather than dishonestly pretending that they want to visit Japan for tourist purposes (in which cases visas are issued promptly without any further questions being asked).

Nevertheless, the ban seems to have been a pointless exercise even from a Japanese point of view. Black leaders who have been calling for a cut-off of Japanese trade links with the White South are hardly likely to be mollified by formal suspension of cultural, educational and sporting exchanges; indeed, they may interpret this compromise as an insult to their intelligence.

Japanese interests in South Africa have certainly been harmed, even if only to a minor degree. Inevitably it has been pointed out that if the Japanese are sincere in their public view of South African racial policy, then they should be promoting cultural, educational and sporting exchanges in order to influence South Africans towards change. Japan already suffers from a rather unfavourable image in South Africa and this image damages its business interests. Correcting this image becomes a difficult task when Japan itself behaves in a way which tends to confirm some of the South African public's stereotyped and deeprooted prejudices, rather than dispel them.

Another point which should be made is that although Japan very much wants its trade with South Africa to prosper, it is already paying a penalty for its policy of public political hostility, and I fear that that penalty will become heavier with the passing years.

In Establishment circles in this country there is a real fear of Japanese business power and suspicion of Japanese motives; the adverse political factors enhance these and influence the authorities to favour Japan's trade rivals.

More important, Japan prohibits investment in the Republic except for such minor purposes as establishing local commercial offices. Although a handful of Japanese companies circumvent this ban by investing via third countries, Japanese investment in South Africa remains minimal.

This has two important effects. One is that there is no "captive market" here for Japanese intermediate and capital goods flowing to their locally-controlled subsidiaries, as in the case of British, American, German and French companies.

The other is that Japan is unable to assure its supplies of various vital South African minerals, raw and processed, by taking equity stakes in mining companies here. The Japanese were confident, for instance, that they would be the principal foreign beneficiaries of the Sishen-Saldanha developments. They have been surprised, and a little upset, I understand, to discover that their European trade rivals will now enjoy those benefits, to their almost total exclusion, because of Tokyo's ban on direct investment in the Republic.

This sort of trend is disturbing for Japan at a time of critical shortage of many minerals and a worldwide scramble for control of natural resources, especially as South Africa is now the only major mining country without legislation discriminating heavily against foreign interests.

South Africa enjoys other important advantages as a supplier of commodities and the Japanese are well aware of them. It dominates the world market as a supplier of one vital mineral: platinum. It is a major supplier, with very few competitors, of chrome, asbestos, manganese and uranium. It is a useful source of sugar, maize and wool, copper, vanadium and fluorspar. It has the potential to be a major supplier of coal and iron ore. It has the managerial, technical and capital resources to provide many of these materials in processed form: ferro-alloys, steel semis, enriched uranium. Now Japan is the world's biggest importer of raw materials, and the sheer volume of its requirements means that to some extent it cannot avoid dependence on South Africa.

Another aspect is that South Africa is perhaps the most reliable of the major raw material exporting countries, with consistently high quality control, an old-fashioned sense of the sanctity of contracts, freedom from disruptive strike action, and a government which can be relied on not to resort to unexpected export embargos. This reliability of supply is important for Japan because space and financial considerations militate against massive stockpiles of materials at the factories, and in favour of a steady flow of supplies from abroad.

It is possible that Japan could take further political-inspired action against South Africa such as putting pressure on its trading houses to cut down on their purchases of commodities such as sugar, wool and maize which could be obtained elsewhere; making it harder for Japanese exporters to provide acceptable financing of their shipments to us; extending the visa ban to tourists. Such moves cannot be excluded, but at the moment they look to be outside risks. The fact that the Japanese have committed themselves quite recently to long-term contracts to buy our coal, platinum, uranium and iron ore seems to indicate that Tokyo is only prepared to make gestures which could marginally affect Japan's trade with South Africa, does not want to do any real damage to that trade.

Of course, there is reciprocal dependence to some extent. We usually run a much more favourable balance of trade with Japan than with our other major trading partners, and some of our industries, like sugar, already depend on sales to Japan. In the long term, as a major exporting nation, we could not afford to be excluded from the world's biggest and fastest-growing market for commodities.

One apparent source of friction in our trading relationship with Japan is the use of South Africa as a halfway house by businessmen dealing with Rhodesia, which Japan supposedly boycotts. There was a rumpus about this earlier this year when the United Nations committee which polices sanctions pointed out that, according to the official statistics of both countries, Japan imports much more chrome from South Africa than the Republic exports to Japan, the inference, almost certainly correct, being that much of the so-called "South Africa" chrome that Japan imports is in fact Rhodesian. The Japanese Government is trying to tighten up its control over imports and exports which could involve deals with Rhodesia, but personally I doubt whether doubling the quantity of fake documents in circulation will achieve anything. Japanese businessmen are determined to continue trading with Rhodesia, and I cannot see how it can be stopped.

The importance of Japanese - South African trading links are summarized in the following brief statistics. Japan is our second largest export market (after Britain) and our fourth most important foreign suppliers (after Britain, the United States and West Germany). Since 1965 both our export to and imports from Japan have more than quadrupled in value. Exports last year were worth \$418-million and imports \$596-million. This year our exports are up only slightly, but there has been a phenomenal increase in Japanese shipments to South Africa -- 85 per cent for the first seven months of the year.

Our most important exports to Japan are sugar and maize. Japan usually buys more than half our sugar exports and up to half our maize exports, paying the current world price. Both these commodities enjoy an excellent reputation among Japanese consumers for their very high and consistent quality. The next most important commodities in our export trade are platinum and iron ore. Japan takes about one-quarter of our platinum exports, and every ton of iron ore that we export. Other important exports are pig iron, asbestos, wool, ferro-chrome, manganese ore, ferro-manganese, copper and fluorspar. There is also a substantial business in uranium. Details of this are kept secret in South Africa, but according to Japanese private sources we now provide about 43 per cent of Japan's requirements, the other big supplier being Canada. Most of our yellowcake is shipped to the U.S. for enriching.

Easily the most important Japanese export to South Africa comprises motor vehicle components for assembly here into Toyota, Datsun, Mazda, Daihatsa and Mitsubishi cars and trucks. Japanese makes have captured a third of our market, and Japan has overtaken Britain to become the most important country of origin of motor vehicles sold in South Africa. Other important Japanese exports to South Africa are textiles (particularly woven fabrics made from artificial fibres) and capital goods (especially steel-making equipment for Iscor).

If the present growth rate of two-way trade continues, Japan will overtake Britain, West Germany and the United States to become South Africa's biggest trading partners before the end of the Seventies. Needless to say, this trend will require some adaptation on our part if we are to enjoy the maximum benefits of Japan's emergence as a superpower and as our most important foreign market. We desperately need to encourage more interchange with Japan at the people-to-people level to enhance our general understanding and

appreciation of the Japanese, and I am sure that ways can be found to do this despite the rather silly visa ban on cultural, educational and sporting visits. There is no ban on tourism which is a pretty broad concept.

Personally, I would like to see a Japan Society established in South Africa, by South Africans, to promote understanding of things Japanese. I would like to see more South Africans visiting Japan (only 2 800 went there last year) and more Japanese visiting the Republic; a Japan-South Africa Leader Exchange programme; better air services between Jan Smuts and Tokyo, and concessionary fares, like we have to Europe, so the masses can travel. I would like to see teaching of the Japanese language in our universities and even our schools; the Australians do it, why should we not do the same?

Japan's emergence as a superpower demands far-reaching changes in the thinking of all Westerners. Our technology, arms, culture and mores have effectively dominated the world for several centuries. This has given all of us who are Caucasians an unconscious arrogance. Because our ways have dominated for so long, we automatically assume that they are best, and that other races should be "Europeanized", accepting *our* standard of public welfare, private morality and progress.

Now comes Japan, which shares no part of our tradition, accepts few of our basic ideas, yet embraces our technology and our economics, and makes them work in many respects better than we have ever been able to. Now comes Japan to shatter the centuries-long total dominance of things Caucasian.

It is time for Westerners to start making compromises, and I would like to see my own country in the vanguard. Our own complex society makes us acutely aware of the difficulties of building bridges between different races, but it also sensitizes us to the practical possibilities and the tremendous opportunities. What we certainly cannot afford to do is to continue largely ignoring our relations with Japan.

Mr. Martin Spring is Editor of the South African Financial Gazette. He has on several occasions in the past addressed Branches of the Institute on Far Eastern topics. The above article contains the text of an address to the Pretoria Branch on 28 November, 1974.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND AFRICA

Donald B. Easum ⁺

I. *Lusaka Manifesto Revisited*

As you well know, Black American interest in and concern for Africa are not of recent vintage. This interest and concern span many years. They can be found in the various, often philosophical, "Back to Africa" themes that date to the 18th century.

One of the first Black American scholars to focus on Africa was the late Dr. W.E. B. DuBois. He gave expression to many of his views while serving as editor of *The Crisis*, the organ of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, popularly called the NAACP. In 1916, for example, Dr. DuBois proposed to the NAACP board that an Encyclopedia Africana be published in 1919 to mark the 300th anniversary of the permanent landing of Black slaves at Jamestown, Virginia. Dr. DuBois suggested in 1917 that the association take steps at the Versailles Peace Conference to secure recognition of the rights of Africans.

The NAACP was in the vanguard of organized efforts to help the African peoples. The organization supported the various Pan-African congresses organized by Dr. DuBois. A manifesto issued at the second such congress, held in London in 1921, contained these words:

This is a world of men, of men whose likenesses far outweigh their differences, who mutually need each other in labor and thought and dream, but who can successfully have each other only on terms of equality, justice and mutual respect.

The decades since World War Two have witnessed a dramatic flowering of these concepts of equality and justice. For Black Americans, this period saw important advances in making a reality for all Americans of the statements and goals of our declaration of independence and our constitution. For Africans, this was a period of great transition as colonialism gave way to independent nationhood in most of the vast African continent.

The period of the sixties saw a remarkable growth and strengthening of programs of Black studies and African studies on American campuses. These programs have served to broaden both the base and the scope of Black American interest in Africa, as well as substantially inform the American White community regarding the Black experience in both the old and the new worlds. This rising awareness of the Black experience has brought a greater knowledge of and interest in the issues of racial equality and decolonization in Africa.

⁺ Donald B. Easum is U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. The article contains the text of a speech delivered at the University of Kentucky on 26 November, 1974, shortly after his return from a visit to ten African States, including South Africa. This text was made available by the United States Information Service in Johannesburg.

II. *The Southern Tier and the Lusaka Manifesto:*

It has been in the southern tier of Africa that DuBois' prescription of "equality, justice and mutual respect" was least observed. This is where - in Mozambique and Angola - 14 million Blacks were ruled by 600,000 Whites, and the basic decisions concerning peoples' lives were being made thousands of miles away in Lisbon. This is where - in Rhodesia - a White minority regime representing 250,000 Whites refused to provide more than 5 million Blacks with adequate human and civil rights in the society.

This is where - in South-West Africa, or Namibia as it is properly called - South Africa defied United Nations demands to permit self-determination for a territory in which Blacks constitute 88 percent of a total population of some 750,000. And this is where - in South Africa - 21 million non-Whites (18 million Blacks, 2.5 million Coloreds, 700,000 Indians) are relegated to the separate and unequal status of apartheid by the decisions of a government representing 4 million Whites.

At a meeting in Lusaka in April 1969 the leaders of thirteen independent East and Central African states issued a statement of their position on this state of affairs. The countries were Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Zambia. Their unanimous affirmation of certain principles was to be called the "Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa". In this manifesto the thirteen countries declared, "The principle of human equality, and all that flows from it, is either universal or it does not exist. The dignity of all men is destroyed when the manhood of any human being is denied."

Before addressing themselves to the particular condition of equality and freedom in the Portuguese African territories, Rhodesia, South-West Africa and the Republic of South Africa, the signers of the Manifesto had this to say concerning their commitment to these principles:

By this Manifesto we wish to make clear, beyond all shadow of doubt, our acceptance of the belief that all men are equal, and have equal rights to human dignity and respect, regardless of colour, race, religion or sex. We believe that all men have the right and the duty to participate, as equal members of the society, in their own government. We do not accept that any individual or group has any right to govern any other group of sane adults, without their consent, and we affirm that only the people of a society, acting together as equals, can determine what is, for them, a good society and a good social, economic, or political organisation.

We recognize that at any one time there will be, within every society, failures in the implementation of these ideals. We recognize that for the sake of order in human affairs, there may be transitional arrangements while a transformation from group inequalities to individual equality is being effected. But we affirm that without an acceptance of these ideals - without a commitment to these principles of human equality and self-determination - there can be no basis for peace and justice in the world.

None of us would claim that within our own states we have achieved that perfect social, economic and political organization which would ensure a reasonable standard of living for all our people and establish individual security against avoidable hardship and miscarriage of justice. On the contrary, we acknowledge that within our own states the struggle towards human brotherhood and unchallenged human dignity is only beginning. It is on the basis of our commitment to human equality and human dignity, not on the basis of achieved perfection, that we take our stand of hostility toward the colonialism and racial discrimination which is being practised on Southern Africa. It is on the basis of their commitment to these universal principles that we appeal to other members of the human race for support.

If the commitment to these principles existed among the states holding power in Southern Africa, any disagreements we might have about the rate of implementation, or about isolated acts of policy, would be matters affecting only our individual relationships with the states concerned. If these commitments existed, our states would not be justified in the expressed and active hostility towards the regimes of Southern Africa such as we have proclaimed and continue to propagate.

The truth is, however, that in Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia, South-West Africa and the Republic of South Africa, there is an open and continued denial of the principles of human equality and national self-determination.

III. *The Two Predominant Issues:*

It was five years ago that the Lusaka Manifesto was issued. What is the situation today?

I have just returned - only two days ago - from a five-week trip to the countries of Southern Africa, three of these countries were signers of the Lusaka Manifesto; three were among its targets.

In Lusaka, I attended Zambia's tenth independence anniversary celebrations as an official guest of President Kaunda. In Zaire, I visited one of the world's largest hydroelectric power installations, located downstream from Kinshasa in the gorges of the Zaire River near the sea. In Tanzania, I participated in discussions of U.S. assistance programs in education and transportation. In Malawi, President Banda invited me to attend the opening of his parliament and tour the new capital city of Lilongwe. In Botswana, I examined one of the world's largest beef slaughter houses and packing plants. In Lesotho, government officials reviewed with me the status of joint U.S.-World Bank efforts to help combat erosion and solve the rural employment problem. In Swaziland, I discussed Peace Corps activities in teaching and health, and looked at new possibilities for U.S. private investment. I spent a week in the Republic of South Africa, visiting Cape Town, Johannesburg, Pretoria and Durban - including areas where Blacks and Coloreds are assigned to live in the outskirts of Johannesburg and Cape Town, respectively. And I have just come from Mozambique and Angola, the last two stops on my trip, both of which are moving to full independence from Portugal.

I met with the Presidents or Prime Ministers of every country I visited, but I also talked with traditional chiefs and village mayors, with trade union leaders and churchmen, with students and civil servants, with businessmen and politicians, and with teachers and farmers. I can report to you that two major issues dominated the thoughts of my hosts. They concerned, first of all, human dignity and racial equality in Southern Africa - and, secondly, decolonization and national self-determination. And these same issues were dominant daily themes in the press, the radio and - where it existed - the television output in these countries during the period of my visits. It was as if the Lusaka Manifesto had been issued only yesterday rather than five years ago.

IV. *Racial Equality*

Why were human dignity and racial equality of such important concern to the people with whom I met? Let me illustrate why.

In the Republic of South Africa today, the life of every citizen of whatever race or color is controlled by a system - which is also a philosophy - called "apartheid" or "separateness". This "apartheid" concept is institutionalized and endorsed by an elaborate set of laws, regulations and practices that imposes separate status on the almost 21 million members of the South African society that the government classifies as non-White. Within what are called their "Bantustans" or "Homelands", South African Blacks will be able to vote, own property, and move freely from one place to another. They will not have such rights elsewhere. These Homeland areas constitute 13 percent of the national territory. Some 70 percent of the nation's population is being assigned to live in these areas. This is a system legislated by the South African Parliament, where seats are held only by Whites. The other racial groups are not represented in this parliament.

This is what many of the people I met on this trip wanted to talk about. Remember that of the nine countries I visited outside the Republic of South Africa, six border on the Republic or on South-West Africa. One of these - Lesotho - is totally surrounded by the Republic of South Africa. Another - Swaziland - is bordered on three sides by South Africa. Hundreds of thousands of workers from these countries are employed in South African mines, farms and factories, where they learn about and are subject to apartheid.

South Africa's system of separateness restricts both Whites and non-Whites to designated living areas, strictly circumscribes the rights of Blacks to own property or engage in trade, and excludes Blacks from entering White urban areas unless they are required to be there to serve White employers. The system excludes Blacks from most skilled jobs, and does not allow them to join registered trade unions or to bargain collectively.

The South African Government says that these practices are necessary to protect and advance its policy of "separate development". Separate development, as currently defined by South African Government officials, means the creation of a bloc of Black states that are to be politically independent and economically interdependent. One of these eight Homelands, the Transkei, is scheduled to become at least nominally independent within the next few years.

This vast program requires moving masses of people, both Black and White but primarily Black, from the places they now inhabit to new locations. If you are Black, you are assigned to the Homeland designated for the particular racial group to which you belong - or "tribe", to use the term one encounters in South Africa.

The theory behind the elaborate structure of rules and regulations designed to keep the races apart in the Republic of South Africa is that the separation is necessary in order to avoid ethnic frictions and thus preserve harmony and stability in the society. These conditions are believed to be essential for the protection of traditional cultures - including White culture - and for the continuance of the economic growth that is bringing increasing prosperity to both the White and non-White populations.

V. *Decolonization:*

The second major preoccupation of Black leaders in the countries I visited was decolonization and national self-determination. This is no new concern. Ever since the full tide of self-determination in the 1960's which brought many of these countries to full independence, African leaders have worked to bring about the decolonization of these parts of Africa where self-determination was still denied. With regard to the choice they made between force or peaceful means for achieving decolonization, the Lusaka Manifesto was once again instructive.

It spoke as follows:

We have always preferred and we still prefer to achieve (liberation) without physical violence. We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill ... if peaceful progress to emancipation were possible in the future, we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change.

But while peaceful progress is blocked by actions of those at present in power in the states of Southern Africa, we have no choice but to give to the peoples of those territories all the support of which we are capable in their struggle against their oppressors.

Thus it was that the independent countries of Black Africa and their Organization of African Unity encouraged and gave support to a variety of liberation movements - sometimes called terrorists, sometimes called freedom fighters, depending on one's point of view - in an effort to bring freedom from continued colonial rule.

VI. *Portuguese Territories:*

But African leaders remained open to the possibility of dialogue and peaceful persuasion if circumstances were to permit. And, indeed, following the change of government in Lisbon in April of this year, circumstances did so permit in three of the territories to which the Lusaka Manifesto addressed

itself - that is, Portuguese Guinea, Mozambique and Angola. With the assistance of such countries as Senegal, Algeria, Zaire, Tanzania and Zambia - to name only the principal ones - talking replaced fighting.

As a result of negotiations between the new Portuguese Government and the leaders of the PAIGC Liberation Movement, Portugal recognized the independence of the new Republic of Guinea-Bissau in September. The United States warmly welcomed the Portuguese action. In Mozambique, where I had conversations with the Portuguese High Commissioner, Admiral Crespo, and with the Prime Minister of the transitional government, Joaquim Chissano of the Frelimo Liberation Movement, independence is scheduled for June of next year. In Angola, where I met with members of the junta, the Portuguese have offered independence to the territory and have begun discussions with the liberation movements on ways to bring it about.

VII. *Rhodesia and Namibia:*

These developments in Portuguese-speaking Africa have been greeted with great enthusiasm and gratification throughout Black Africa, where they are viewed as a giant leap forward toward complete decolonization in Southern Africa. But those with whom I spoke insisted that effort could not be slackened so long as self-determination was not yet a fact in Rhodesia and Namibia. Let's look at those two cases for a moment.

You will recall that the minority White government in Rhodesia unilaterally declared its independence of the United Kingdom in 1965. The United Kingdom has never accepted this action, and the United Nations has imposed economic sanctions against the illegal regime. Negotiations have consistently faltered because of the Rhodesian regime's unwillingness to offer terms acceptable to the Black majority and the U.K.

As for Namibia, the United Nations in 1966 terminated South Africa's mandate from the League of Nations to administer this territory. The World Court in 1971 affirmed the validity of the United Nations decision, and held that South Africa's continued administration of the territory is illegal. But South Africa has refused to give up its control of the area.

Black African leaders with whom I met, without exception, stressed their conviction that self-determination in Namibia and Rhodesia is now more than ever a pillar of their countries' policies in Southern Africa. They see South Africa as holding the key to solutions of both problems. They believe these solutions can and must be achieved by peaceful persuasion and negotiation rather than by force or violence.

They want South Africa to withdraw from Namibia and permit the area to decide its own future. They want South Africa to remove its police forces from Rhodesia, and to cease all support of the Smith regime and apply economic sanctions against it as provided for by U.N. decisions. Finally, they want South Africa to abandon its present racial policies and take prompt steps to assure full dignity and equality for all South Africans, of whatever race or color.

VIII. *U.S. Policies:*

What is the position of the U.S. Government on these issues?

With regard to Rhodesia, the United States continues to look to the United Kingdom as responsible for achieving a constitutional solution to Rhodesia's illegally-declared independence, which is not recognized by any nation. The U.S. Government would welcome a negotiated solution that would be acceptable both to the United Kingdom and to the Black majority of the Rhodesian population. We are convinced that a solution to the Rhodesian problem can and must be found through peaceful rather than violent means. We believe the Lusaka Manifesto still speaks to this point.

Economic sanctions voted by the United Nations are intended to provide Rhodesians with an incentive to reach a peaceful settlement. With the exception of imports of chrome and certain other Rhodesian minerals under the Byrd Amendment, the record of U.S. adherence to these sanctions has been good. In December of last year the Senate voted repeal of this amendment. President Ford has expressed his support for repeal, and we are hopeful of a favorable vote soon in the House.

The U.S. has supported the U.N. call for withdrawal of South African police and armed personnel from Rhodesia. We note with interest Prime Minister Vorster's recent statement that "all who have influence" on the Rhodesian problem "should bring it to bear upon all parties concerned to find a durable, just and honorable solution".

With regard to Namibia, the U.S. accepts the conclusions of the World Court advisory opinion of 1971 affirming the United Nations' decision of 1966 which declared terminated the South African mandate from the League of Nations for South-West Africa. This decision obliges all states to avoid acts that would imply recognition of the legitimacy of South Africa's administration of the territory.

The U.S. Government carefully avoids any such actions. The U.S. Government discourages U.S. investment in Namibia, has cut off official commercial facilities for trade with Namibia, and has made clear that it will not intervene on behalf of the interests of any American investor who engaged himself in Namibia after October 1966. The U.S. closely follows developments in the territory and has protested South African violations of the rights and well-being of the inhabitants. We hope that a formula may soon be found that would provide for prompt and peaceful self-determination by the people of Namibia. We are heartened by recent public indications that the South African Government is willing to accept the principle of self-determination in the territory, with all options open.

I need not remind this audience of the U.S. Government's position concerning South Africa's racial policies. We have many times, in many forums, condemned South Africa's approach to the question of race and color. Apartheid, or enforced separation of the races, is utterly repugnant to us.

South Africa's racial policies continue to inhibit our official relationships with that government. We have since 1962 maintained a strict embargo on the sale or shipment of arms or military equipment of any sort to South Africa. This is despite contrary military supply policies of certain other governments and continuing pressure, for balance of payments and other

reasons, for resumption of U.S. sales. We continue to maintain the ban instituted seven years ago on U.S. naval visits to South Africa. We have no intention of embarking on any kind of military or naval collaboration with South Africa.

While we impose these and other constraints on our relationship with South Africa, we maintain lines of communication open to all elements of South Africa's population - non-White as well as White - in our continuing efforts to elicit understanding of our policies and to contribute to a non-violent resolution of South Africa's racial problems.

We (with Britain and France) recently vetoed the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations in the belief that South Africa should continue to be exposed, as Ambassador Scali said, "to the blunt expression of the abhorrence of mankind to apartheid". Furthermore, expulsion was opposed because it would set a precedent which could gravely damage the United Nations structure.

Basic to U.S. policy are efforts to encourage positive change in South Africa. Consequently, the U.S. Government encourages American firms in South Africa to adopt, maintain or expand enlightened employment practices in their dealings with all their employees.

It is a matter of record that non-White workers in South Africa are not accorded equal treatment with White workers, a condition that has led some American citizens and organizations to demand that American firms, which now total more than 300, withdraw from South Africa.

The U.S. Government does not control decisions by American firms to invest in South Africa. Such decisions rest entirely with the companies and their shareholders. Withdrawing from or remaining in South Africa is an issue to be weighed by the companies and shareholders concerned. The U.S. Government has no legal authority to take action in either direction.

Many South Africans of all racial groups have made it clear that they want American firms to remain and to take the lead in raising the level and quality of employment and in increasing educational and training opportunities for non-White employees.

The U.S. Government shares this view. About two years ago, the Bureau of African Affairs sent to American firms doing business in South Africa a message which discussed employment practice goals that would improve the working conditions of their non-White employees in South Africa. This message suggested mechanisms that could be used or were being used by American companies to achieve these goals.

The industrial relations picture in South Africa is undergoing change. We have recently asked American companies in South Africa to give increased attention to improving their channels of communication with their employees of all races, including being prepared to engage in collective bargaining with representatives of unregistered Black trade unions. Our request stresses the desirability of discussions and negotiations with legitimate representatives of Black workers. It was read by a U.S. official at the annual meeting two months ago of the Trade Union Council of South Africa.

It has been well received. The Johannesburg Star called this development "a commendable step" and the Rand Daily Mail observed that "once again the stimulus to change in South Africa's labor field is coming from abroad".

All this supports our belief that American trade and investment can be useful in improving the lot of non-White South Africans.

We welcome recent statements by Prime Minister Vorster concerning South Africa's desire to work for peace and stability in Southern Africa. We welcome the words of the South African representative, Ambassador Botha, at the United Nations when he stated: "Let me put it very clearly: The Whites of South Africa, as well as the Government of South Africa, are as much concerned about the implementation of human rights, human freedoms, human dignities and justice, as any other nation or government of the world." We and all the world await news of the implementation of these declarations.

IX. *Conclusion:*

The talk of change in South Africa was being heard on all sides during my recent visit there. Many South Africans cited a variety of changes that they said had already taken place over the past few years. Many of these changes had to do with what South Africans themselves call "petty apartheid", such as separate beaches, park benches, buses and elevators for different racial groups. Some people argued that these changes in fact presage the eventual end of the apartheid structure. But how far away is this eventuality?

Whatever the answer to that question, there is an air of expectancy in Southern Africa today. Black African leaders in the Republic and outside are watching carefully for actions by the South African Government that will match words.

Just a week ago the President of Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama, made the following statement before the opening of his parliament. (I remind you that Botswana is a country whose southern border joins South Africa across a distance of more than 800 miles.)

We have always made clear that before there can be any prospect of a peaceful solution to the problems of this region of Africa, the governments of the White-ruled states of the region should first demonstrate positively a willingness to change their racial policies. Without such a commitment to change, violence will remain the only way to bring about change in White-ruled Southern Africa. This is the message which we put out to the world in the Lusaka Manifesto.

Now, at last, there are indications that the South African Government is not only ready to bring about the desired changes in South Africa itself, but is prepared to use its influence to bring about similar changes in Rhodesia. This, indeed, as President Kaunda recently observed, is the voice of reason for which we have long been waiting. Given this attitude on the part of Mr. Vorster's Government, there is every hope that the

problems of Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa will be resolved without further bloodshed. This, in turn, will open up unlimited prospects of stability, cooperation, and development in Southern Africa. For these reasons, I welcome the recent indications of possible change in this part of Africa.

The U.S. has many times both privately and publicly made it clear that it, too, welcomes these indications.

Southern Africa is a region of vast resources, rich and diverse, human and physical. Their alchemy could be uniquely contributive to the growth and prosperity of all of Africa - and beyond - provided the warning of fifty-three years ago by the second Pan-African Congress is heeded.

Let me remind us all of just what that warning was:

This is a world of men, of men whose likenesses far outweigh their differences; who mutually need each other in labor and thought and dream, but who can successfully have each other only on terms of equality, justice and mutual respect.

In closing, I would like for you to journey with me back to the England of 1647, an England that had experienced civil war. In the parish church of St. Mary's in Putney, England, representatives of the army gathered to hold one of the most important political debates of all times. Men of the stature of Oliver Cromwell met to discuss the future of their country, with debate centered mainly on human rights versus property rights.

Cromwell's son-in-law, Henry Ireton, argued persuasively that unless a man owned property he should not have a voice in government. This view was rejected by Colonel Thomas Rainborough, who countered with an argument as persuasive and as valid today as then:

"I think," said Colonel Rainborough, "that the poorest he that is in England hath a life to live as well as the greatest he; and therefore, truly, Sir, I think it clear that every man that is to live under a government ought, first, by his own consent, to put himself under that government."

THE FUTURE OF BRITISH DEFENCE COMMITMENTS.

This is the text of a statement to the House of Commons by Mr. Roy Mason, British Secretary for Defence, on 3 December 1974.

On March 21, I announced the start of the most extensive and thorough review of our system of defence ever undertaken by a British Government in peacetime. The proposals which I will now outline are the result of a careful study of all the relevant considerations - defence, political, industrial and financial. They are designed for the circumstances which we must expect over the next ten years.

They take account, on the one hand, of our economic situation and, on the other, of the threat to our national security, the overriding importance of NATO, our position as a leading European Power, and our responsibilities overseas. They will provide for a modern and effective defence structure, and will make a significant contribution to establishing our economic health and, thus, to strengthening the alliance.

The Government has decided that it should reduce defence expenditure as a proportion of GNP from its present level of 5½ per cent to 4½ per cent over the next ten years. The long-range estimates of defence expenditure as they stood in March 1974 would have amounted to 6 per cent of GNP in 1978-9, and 5½ per cent in 1983-4. By comparison with those plans, our decision will save £300 millions in 1975-6, about £500 millions a year by 1978-9, and some £750 millions a year by 1983-4 - or a total over the whole period up to that date of about £4,700 millions. This is fully consistent with our repeated pledges to reduce the cost of defence as a proportion of our national resources.

We are today beginning our consultations with our allies in NATO. These consultations will be thorough and genuine. They are likely to last into the new year. We are also consulting our Commonwealth partners concerned, and the other Governments in other parts of the world who will or might be affected. We shall also now consult both sides of industry.

First, I will describe the general principles that we have followed in conducting the review. NATO is the lynchpin of British security, and will remain the first charge on the resources available for defence. We therefore propose to concentrate as a first priority upon those areas in which we believe that we can most effectively contribute to the security of the alliance and of the United Kingdom itself.

These consist of our contributions of land and air forces in the central region of Europe; of sea and air forces to the Eastern Atlantic and Channel areas; and in the defence of the United Kingdom and its immediate approaches. We shall also maintain the effectiveness of our Polaris force.

We shall, however, be discussing with our NATO allies all aspects of our contribution including, particularly, our force declarations to NATO in the Mediterranean and the specialist reinforcement forces that we committed to the alliance in 1968. In the NATO area we propose to maintain our land and air contribution to the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force, but to reduce our other NATO declarations of specialised reinforcement forces to an airportable Brigade Group and a Royal Marine Commando Group, with the necessary accompanying sea and air elements. These latter declarations would be available for the central region or the northern flank of NATO, with the commando group especially trained and equipped for Arctic warfare.

The priority we are giving to our NATO contribution necessarily requires a contraction in our commitments outside the alliance. We have reviewed these commitments case by case, bearing particularly in mind the decisions taken by the Labour Government in 1968 about the reduction of the British presence East of Suez.

We have concluded that substantial reductions in our forces and defence facilities can be made. But we shall not act precipitately, and we shall discuss our proposals in detail with our allies and partners in the Commonwealth and elsewhere before taking final decisions, recognising that the timing and method of the changes we propose may be of particular importance.

Subject to these provisos, I wish to tell the House what we have in mind. We shall, of course, maintain our obligations towards our remaining dependent territories. We intend to keep our forces in Hong Kong, although we propose to make some reductions in them, and to seek from the Hong Kong Government a larger percentage of its cost when the present cost-sharing agreement runs out in 1976.

In accordance with the military facilities agreement concluded in 1972 with the Government of Malta, we shall remain there until 1979. In Cyprus, we propose to make some early reductions, particularly in our air forces stationed there. We propose to withdraw our forces stationed under the five-power defence arrangements in South-east Asia with the exception of a small group which we shall continue to contribute to the integrated air defence system.

The consultative provisions of the five-power defence arrangements would, however, remain in force, and it would certainly be our intention to maintain close links with the armed forces and defence authorities of our partners. We would, of course, maintain our membership of CENTO and SEATO, but without declaring specific forces to either.

We propose to withdraw from Brunei the Gurkha battalion at present stationed there. We would withdraw our forces from Gan and Mauritius. We do not think it would be right, in present circumstances, to make any changes in the arrangements we have with the Sultan of Oman. We intend to enter into negotiations with the South African Government with a view to terminating the Simonstown Agreement.

Given the effects of these decisions in the Indian Ocean area and the Soviet naval presence there, we have decided to agree to proposals from the United States Government for a relatively modest expansion of the facilities on the island of Diego Garcia which it enjoys, jointly with us, under an existing agreement with her Majesty's Government.

Its use of the facilities other than for routine purpose would, however, be a matter for joint decision of the two Governments. We and the United States Government have also agreed to pursue consultations with the aim of developing realistic progress towards arms limitation in the Indian Ocean.

In working out the implications of these principles in terms of force levels and their effects on the three Services, priority has been given to maintaining as far as possible the level and quality of our front-line forces. We shall equip them in a manner commensurate with their roles and responsibilities, and restructure and reduce the support area to match the new size and shape of the front line. The effects of our proposals on the forward plans of the three Services, as they stood in March 1974 would be broadly as follows:

The Royal Navy's planned numbers of frigates, destroyers, and mine counter-measures vessels would be reduced by about a seventh; of conventional submarines by a quarter; and of afloat support by a third. Planned new ship construction would be reduced accordingly, including the abandonment of plans to replace our amphibious ships with new purpose-built vessels.

Ship refitting would be concentrated on the royal dockyards, all of which will be retained. The nuclear powered submarines and the cruiser programmes would be continued. We would reduce the numbers of the Royal Marines by one seventh, disbanding one Commando in due course.

The army's re-equipment plans would be substantially modified to reduce the growth of their cost. Measures would include the cancellation of the Vixen wheeled reconnaissance vehicle; withdrawal from the collaborative RS-80 project for long-range rocket artillery; and reductions in the planned purchases of light helicopters and reconnaissance vehicles.

The Government attaches great importance to the negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments in Central Europe. We are committed to seeking an outcome which, while preserving undiminished security for all the countries concerned, would help to create a more stable relationship in the area at a lower level of forces.

We hope that the negotiations will be successful in achieving this objective. We do not propose, however, in advance of mutual and balanced force reductions, to reduce the forces which we maintain in Germany in accordance with our Brussels Treaty obligations.

In adjusting the size and shape of the army to meet the framework of priorities I have described, and the demands of economy, the Government will make every effort to avoid a significant impact on the regimental system with its historic loyalties and traditions. The Brigade of Gurkhas will be retained, mainly serving in Hong Kong. We shall maintain the size and roles of the Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve.

In the case of the Royal Air Force, we intend to preserve, and in some instances improve, the combat air forces committed to NATO on the Continent and in the United Kingdom, and to continue with the MRCA collaborative programme, though we may have to make a reduction in the planned rate of deliveries over the period.

However, in accordance with the revised tasks envisaged, there would be some reduction in maritime patrol aircraft, the RAF transport force would be

progressively reduced by half, and the planned helicopter force by a quarter.

There would also be some reduction in the RAF Regiment; and some 12 RAF stations in the United Kingdom would be closed.

We shall reduce planned expenditure on research and development by some 10 per cent, and continue vigorously to support the efforts being made within the alliance to increase standardisation in equipment and eliminate duplication in research and development.

Our proposals would involve reducing manpower by about 35,000 servicemen as compared with the strength in April this year, and by about 30,000 directly employed civilians, about half of whom would be civilians locally entered abroad. In the interests of efficiency, and equally of the wellbeing and morale of the forces themselves, the changes we propose will be carefully planned and introduced progressively over the next few years.

The reductions in the planned defence programme are likely to reduce employment in the defence industries by only some 10,000 or 4 per cent over the period up to 1978-9, but there will be problems in certain areas, and for certain firms. But the changes in our equipment programme will be made as smoothly as possible, and with the maximum of notice to enable industry to adjust its plans.

After we have completed the process of consultations on this thorough and wide-ranging review, and taken our final decisions, I am confident that Britain will continue to play her full part in preserving the strategy and cohesion of the NATO alliance, and in meeting effectively her remaining commitments outside NATO.

The Royal Navy, the Army, and the Royal Air Force will remain highly effective forces, equipped to the highest standards as required by their front-line NATO tasks; and the services and the Ministry of Defence in spite of the changes we will be making, will continue to offer a wide range of fine career opportunities in the years ahead.

Early next year, when our consultations with our allies and with industry have been concluded, I will publish for parliamentary consideration a White Paper setting out our decisions in detail, and saying how they are to be put into effect. But before this we wish not only to consult our allies and partners, but to learn the views of Rt Hon. and Hon. Members upon these matters; and the Government will be ready to arrange through the usual channels for an early debate.

The above statement is reproduced from *The Guardian Weekly* of 7 December, 1974.

JOINT UNITED STATES-SOVIET STATEMENT ON STRATEGIC ARMS.

The following is the text of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint statement issued in Vladivostok on 24 November, 1974. The statement is taken from the *News Digest* (Vol 13 No 49) of the United States Information Service, Johannesburg, dated 4 December, 1974.

During their working meeting in the area of Vladivostok on November 23-24, 1974, the President of the USA Gerald R. Ford and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU L.I. Brezhnev discussed in detail the question of further limitations of strategic offensive arms.

They reaffirmed the great significance that both the United States and the USSR attach to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. They are convinced that a long-term agreement on this question would be a significant contribution to improving relations between the U.S. and the USSR, to reducing the danger of war and to enhancing world peace. Having noted the value of previous agreements on this question, including the interim agreement of May 26, 1972, they reaffirm the intention to conclude a new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, to last through 1985.

As a result of the exchange of views on the substance of such a new agreement, the President of the United States of America and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU concluded that favorable prospects exist for completing the work on this agreement in 1975.

Agreement was reached that further negotiations will be based on the following provisions.

1. The new agreement will incorporate the relevant provisions of the interim agreement of May 26, 1972, which will remain in force until October 1977.
2. The new agreement will cover the period from October 1977 through December, 31, 1985.
3. Based on the principle of equality and equal security, the new agreement will include the following limitations:
 - a. Both sides will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles;
 - b. Both sides will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with Multiple Independently Targetable Warheads (MIRVs).
4. The new agreement will include a provision for further negotiations beginning no later than 1980-1981 on the question of further limitations and possible reductions of strategic arms in the period after 1985.

5. Negotiations between the delegations of the U.S. and USSR to work out the new agreement incorporating the foregoing points will resume in Geneva in January 1975.

STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPMENT

Opening Statement at the Conference

held at Jan Smuts House from

4 to 7 December, 1974

Leif Egeland

In 1972 the South African Institute of International Affairs was host to a Conference on "Accelerated Development in Southern Africa", held here in Jan Smuts House, and co-sponsored by the Rand Afrikaans University and the Foundation for Foreign Affairs of Chicago in the United States. We are very pleased to welcome you again this evening to the Opening of the Conference "Strategy for Development", which is co-sponsored by the same three bodies and which has been planned to carry on where the last Conference left off. The Institute is very pleased indeed that the fruitful co-operation achieved in 1972 with both the Rand Afrikaans University and the Foundation for Foreign Affairs has continued so effectively and has made possible the holding of this further Conference on the subject of Development.

The last Conference covered a wide field and dealt with various aspects of development - political, economic, social, cultural, etc. - from both a theoretical and practical viewpoint. It was felt that for the follow-up Conference an attempt should rather be made to concentrate on certain areas and focus on specific practical questions. It was hoped that in this way the Conference would serve a useful purpose for those actually involved in development programmes and projects. We shall therefore at this Conference devote special attention to agriculture, industrialisation and development administration, trying to look at the problems and opportunities arising at the grassroots level among the people who should be at the same time both the agents and the beneficiaries of any sound development programme. The means of motivating and involving the people concerned will therefore be the primary theme in all the discussions at this Conference.

Our pleasure at being associated once again with the Rand Afrikaans University and the Foundation for Foreign Affairs in the organisation of a major Conference is tempered by regret that neither Professor Viljoen, Rector of the Rand Afrikaans University, nor Mr. Henry Regnery, Chairman of the Foundation for Foreign Affairs, are able to be present in person. A further disappointment is that, at the last minute, Dr. David Collier, Director of the Foundation, has been prevented from coming to South Africa because of ill health. As the man primarily responsible for the cordial co-operation from the American side, over the past few years, with both the Institute and the University, Dr. David Collier will be sorely missed here by his many South African friends.

It is, however, a pleasure to welcome Professor Mönning who is representing Professor Viljoen personally and his University this evening, and Professor Kurt Glaser of Southern Illinois University, who is well known to many of you and who is representing the Foundation for Foreign Affairs.

A special word of welcome is due to the very distinguished group of American participants who, under the auspices of the Foundation for Foreign Affairs, have travelled here to contribute to our deliberations and to the success of this Conference. There is no doubt that each of them on the basis of training, research and experience, has a great deal to offer us, and that we shall all benefit from the exchange of views with them over the next few days.

We are also very pleased to be able to welcome the participants from our neighbouring countries in Africa. They are all intimately involved in one way or another in the problems of development, and their contribution will be invaluable in ensuring a balanced and practical approach to these problems.

While I have mentioned the United States and our African neighbours, I should mention that amongst those who have travelled to the Conference from these countries (where they are working at present) are participants from Nigeria, Uganda, the United Kingdom and Canada. To them we pay a special word of welcome.

Last but not least, we should like to welcome to Jan Smuts House and to this Conference many old and new friends from all parts of South Africa, who come here as representatives of Homeland Governments, central Government Departments, Universities, commercial and industrial firms, and various other important organisations, as well as individual experts. We are especially privileged to have the participation of five distinguished Chief Ministers of Homelands in this Conference. Their willingness to accept invitations to attend this Conference and to devote several days of their very busy time to these discussions, testifies to their interest in and concern for the development of their peoples. We confidently hope that they will find the discussions here useful in helping them to deal with the many day-to-day problems they encounter, but we also look forward confidently to the contribution which they will be able to make to the Conference, based on their wide experience.

In opening the Conference in 1972, I expressed the hope that it would serve as an example of dialogue in action, and that it would lead to more effective communication between individuals and peoples within our region of Africa, and between them and the United States and other countries overseas. At that time the Conference was in many ways a pioneering event, particularly as regards the wide representation from within South Africa itself. We have come a long way in the past two years, and it is no longer unusual for a gathering of this nature to take place here. We believe that in some measure our Conference in 1972 contributed to the constructive change taking place.

The year 1974 has seen dramatic and far-reaching changes in Southern Africa, the implications of which are only beginning to be felt. One can say without doubt that 1975 will be a year of highly significant developments for our region of Africa, and this Conference is meeting at a time of flux, when old ways of thinking are being seriously challenged and new avenues for co-operation are being sought. It is the hope of our Institute, as I am sure it is of all present here this evening, that this Conference will make a constructive contribution towards change in the direction of co-operation and of sound development for all our peoples.

Dr. Leif Egeland is the National
Chairman of the South African
Institute of International Affairs.

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