


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DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE

**NEWSLETTER**

**NUUSBRIEF**

Vol. 7 No. 1

1975



DIE SUID - AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE

THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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March 1975

S.A.I.I.A.

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## DIRECTOR'S NOTES

A brief look at the contents page which follows these notes, will indicate that this issue of the *Newsletter* reflects the current intense interest in the question of *détente* in Southern Africa. It also reflects the Institute's practice of presenting (both at its meetings and in its publications) various, and often differing, viewpoints on current international issues. This practice is basic to the Institute's approach to its work, because it is important that our members and associates - and the interested public generally, for that matter - should be able to form their own conclusions on the basis of the widest possible range of reliable information and significant opinions. As a fully independent, non-partisan organisation, which in terms of its Constitution cannot *itself* express a viewpoint on any of these issues falling within its field of work, the Institute is in an excellent position to carry out its task of providing information and a forum for the expression of a wide variety of viewpoints.

*Southern Africa Record*

As a further development of this role, the Institute will shortly be producing the first number of a new publication which will be issued from time to time, containing the original texts of important statements on international relations in the southern region of Africa. The intention is that such policy statements, mainly by political leaders of countries in the region and outside, should be available for information and reference purposes, and they will be reproduced and issued in *Southern Africa Record* not necessarily in chronological order, but rather as the texts become available to the Institute. The first number of the *Record* will, for example, include *inter alia* the South African Prime Minister's Senate speech on 23 October, 1974, and the statement of the South African Ambassador in the Security Council on the following day, as well as an official American statement on Southern African developments. In addition to statements on issues of current concern, it is intended to include in future numbers of the *Record* some significant policy statements of the past, which have a direct bearing on the development of international relations in Southern Africa.

*Corporate Membership*

We are able to record here, with pleasure and appreciation, that the following companies have joined the Institute as Corporate Members, since the last issue of the *Newsletter*:

Foschini Ltd  
Reef Lefebvre (Pty) Ltd  
Truworths Ltd

We welcome the ever-growing widening support for the Institute's work from South African organisations, a full list of which is given at the end of this *Newsletter* (as at the beginning of March, 1975). It is not only the fact that the Institute, having no other source of regular income, depends on the financial support of its Corporate Members for the continuation and development of its work, which makes the co-operation of these organisations so important; it is also mainly through this co-operation that the Institute is able to perform its role effectively of gathering and disseminating information and analyses, and of generally helping to create a more informed understanding of international questions.

In recent weeks the Director and the Administrative Secretary, together with

Mr. Deon Fourie of the University of South Africa (and currently Vice-Chairman of the Institute's Pretoria Branch) were able to visit a number of our Corporate Members in Cape Town and Durban, as well as several other companies which it is hoped will shortly become Corporate Members. The interest shown in the Institute's development was very encouraging, and the advice and suggestions received will prove most useful in the planning of the Institute's programmes. With the Institute's headquarters in Johannesburg, regular contact with Corporate Members in the Witwatersrand area has always been easier to maintain, but an effort is now being made to keep in closer touch also with Corporate Members in other centres in the Republic, where the Institute operates through its Branches.

#### *New Border Branch*

It is through its Branches and their individual members that the Institute reaches out to the public throughout South Africa, and the inauguration of a new Branch at a meeting in Grahamstown on 19 March, 1975, was therefore an important event in the Institute's history. The new Branch - which is the seventh in the Republic - is to be known as the Border Branch, and it will cover the Grahamstown, East London and Ciskei regions. The Director was present at the inaugural meeting, at which Mr. Justice N.C. Addleson was elected Chairman.

The Border Branch is to be wished every success in the planning of its own programme of activities and in generally pursuing the aims of the Institute in its area. It is hoped that fruitful co-operation will develop with the neighbouring Eastern Province Branch, which is located in Port Elizabeth.

#### *Pretoria Symposium, June 1975*

Members will recall the successful Symposium held by the Pretoria Branch, in co-operation with the University of Pretoria, in 1973 on "International Relations in Southern Africa". On 5 and 6 June of this year a Symposium will be held in Pretoria on the general theme: "South Africa and the World: The Realities". Full details of the plans for this Symposium, including the names of the main speakers, will be circulated to members in the near future. The programme will include discussion of South Africa's position in relation to the world monetary system; world trade; international politics; the current world strategic situation; African culture; and African politics. The topical relevance of this Symposium is thus clearly evident, and it is hoped that many Institute members and representatives of Corporate Members will be able to attend.

SOUTH AFRICA'S ROLE IN AFRICA :  
OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE

Panel Discussion:

Professor J.E. Spence, Mr. Laurence Gandar,  
Mr. Arthur Hammond-Tooke, Mr. Dirk Richard

At the Summer School of the University of the Witwatersrand in January, 1975, a course of lectures on South Africa's external relations was given by Professor J.E. Spence. The course included also a panel discussion, held on 25 January, which is summarised below.

*Professor Spence* dealt in his introductory statement mainly with the question of the moves for a Rhodesian settlement. He said that there were certain factors in the present situation, which gave cause for cautious optimism, including: a coincidence of interests of the main parties, chiefly South Africa and Zambia; more flexibility on both sides; the fact that both South Africa and Zambia had influence ("cards to play") in the negotiations between themselves and with other parties involved.

He pointed out that Mr. Smith was being asked to dismantle White minority rule, which was ironic in view of the position in South Africa.

He asked who would monitor the settlement. This would be necessary and there were several possibilities, including Britain, Zambia and South Africa. He felt that the UN would be unacceptable.

He referred to the effects of a settlement on the progress of détente and on future relationships in Southern Africa. This could lead to the growth of co-operation, particularly between Zambia and South Africa. On the other hand, it could give further encouragement to the Black African States (after the collapse of both Portuguese and White Rhodesian rule) to put further pressure on South Africa.

*Mr. Laurence Gandar* said that the potential use of South Africa's technical and economic strength had for a long time been a major plank in South African foreign policy with regard to Africa. The aim was to establish a region of "co-prosperity" in Southern Africa. There was a better chance to achieve this aim now than ever before, and he referred to certain special circumstances, namely: the sharply increased oil price which was having a severe effect on African economies; the fact that the prices of primary products on which several African countries depended had slumped; and the disastrous droughts in parts of Africa. All these factors had led to a new mood of economic realism in Africa. At the same time the ability of the Western countries to assist the developing countries was

being limited by economic recessions and there was also some disillusionment in the industrialised countries with regard to development aid.

In South Africa's case the effects of the oil price increase had been largely off-set by the increase in the gold price. Furthermore, South Africa had some of the few commodities whose prices had remained fairly high, e.g. sugar and tin. South Africa therefore stood out as a potential source of economic assistance.

He felt that Zambia's interest in détente was not only due to alarm at the possible extension of Guerrilla War (which was waged from its territory), but was also due to concern about her own economic difficulties. For this reason more normal relationships were desired in Southern Africa.

Referring to Mozambique, *Mr. Gandar* said that in spite of the left-wing nature of the Frelimo government, it was at present willing to co-operate with South Africa in economic and practical matters. He gave the examples of the co-operation with South Africans at the Cabora Bassa project (which he had been informed was very good); co-operation at the Port of Lourenco Marques; and the continued flow of labour to South African mines (of which there had been no reduction, and possibly even some increase).

*Mr. Gandar* said that the Lusaka Manifesto (1969) had been realistic in recognising that time was needed for change in South Africa. There were now the beginnings of change in South Africa, and these might accelerate. Then South Africa would have a big role to play in Africa.

*Mr. Hammond-Tooke* said that there was evidence that there had been a great deal of preparation in Zambia for the détente moves. There was evidence, for instance, that information had been spread down to the village level, and that this had begun in mid-1974. To some extent the preparation had in fact begun at the time of the adoption of the Lusaka Manifesto (1969). However, he challenged the proposition that economic requirements provided the main motivation of African countries to seek a closer contact with the Republic. It had to be realised that for South Africa the internal demands of economic development, for example the Homelands, combined with the demands of many African states, would be enormous and more than South Africa could cope with. In any case economic considerations were not as important for people in the African states as was often thought. In fact it could be argued that the harsher the economic circumstances, the less likely would be the chances of détente.

He argued that the main advantage for South Africa from détente would be that this would be come a more stable part of the world. Then it would be possible to develop the potential of the region, for example by importing technology and capital on a much larger scale. It would only be by continued economic growth that the aspirations of Blacks and their rising expectations could be met in South Africa.



He maintained that the question of détente was wider than the Rhodesian settlement issue, and that the crucial question was the degree of contact which South Africa could develop with other territories in Black Africa on the basis of common interest.

An important criterion for the success of détente would be whether South Africa could gear itself up for adequate economic assistance and whether at the same time the South African economy could be spurred on to further growth.

Mr. Dirk Richard said that the requirements for healthy relations with Black Africa were: (1) A settlement in Rhodesia; (2) A settlement of the South-West Africa issue; and (3) Rearrangements within South Africa itself.

South Africa had for many years appeared to turn its back on Africa. This was ironic because South Africa had an anti-colonial history. Rhodesia, it must be realised, was only relatively recently colonised, and the White Rhodesians had over the years been very pro-British and anti-Afrikaner. Nevertheless, South Africans had come to rely on them as a buffer against Black Africa.

After the sudden shock of the change in Mozambique, South Africans now had to think of their own future.

South Africa had been during the past decade or more a unifying issue in the OAU. In the future the Republic should take its rightful place with the other major African States.

The need for changes in South Africa and South West Africa would have to be sold with missionary zeal to the slow-moving electorate. The present détente could be broken not only on the banks of the Zambesi, but also at the polling booths in South Africa. The requirements of détente could amount to a thorn in the flesh of the National Party.

Détente would not bring change overnight, but it would result in the casting of a strong light on the process of change in South Africa. The big question therefore was whether White South Africans would find the ways to share meaningfully with their fellow Africans.

Mr. Richard said he was optimistic because he had faith in both President Kaunda and Mr. Vorster.

#### DISCUSSION

In reply to a question regarding the monitoring of the changes resulting from a settlement in Rhodesia, Professor Spence said that it was not possible at this stage to prophesy who would be involved, except that he felt it would not be the United Nations. He considered, however, that if the changes were to take place peacefully, there would have to be some control, and very flexible diplomacy would be required from all the parties concerned during this period of change.

In reply to a question as to whether there would not be Communist efforts to disrupt and frustrate détente and in particular South Africa's economic role, *Mr. Gandar* said that there would be such a danger if the changes here did not take place quickly enough. The question of Communist influence in Southern Africa depended to a large extent therefore on the success or failure of détente. He pointed out that most African leaders were "very shrewd" in their dealings with the Communist powers, and were not inclined to let themselves become subservient to foreign influence again.

*Professor Spence* commented that, as regards the possibility of guerrilla warfare against South Africa, the South African situation was "sui generis" and other models of guerrilla warfare did not apply. If there was some penetration of South African borders, it would be possible for South Africa to cope with this militarily, but what would be important would be the negative effect of such a development on opinion in the outside world - even if there were only isolated incidents between Black and White on South African soil.

A member of the audience suggested several reasons for the moves to détente including: (1) The disappearance of the "buffer" states; (2) The dangers of instability in Mozambique and Angola (fear of which was shared by both South Africa and Zambia), and the threat of the Communist powers taking advantage of such instability; (3) The economic problems of the African states; (4) South Africa's serious international and domestic political problems; (5) The progress in the implementation of the South African Government's policy of "separate freedoms", as a result of which the Prime Minister could feel confident that the risk of that policy being undermined by the contacts with Black African states had been minimised.

*Mr. Dirk Richard* commented that there was still need for greater effort to be put into the development of the Homelands. He said that this was a national need and that it should be taken out of party politics. It should be pursued whatever the different views were about political aspects of the Homelands policy.

A question was asked about the time factor in the détente moves. *Mr. Hammond-Tooke* said that current moves followed a "dramatic sequence" of events, rather than a rational evolution. He said that the leaders in Southern Africa had now got themselves into a negotiating posture, and he pointed out that the big World Powers outside were probably unaware of exactly what was happening. But, if there was no settlement in Rhodesia, the centre of gravity or influence would move away from Southern Africa to Peking, and/or Moscow. It was essential that the Rhodesian settlement should come about quickly, so that the momentum of events was maintained in order to avoid this development and keep the initiative within Southern Africa and existing political groupings.

The question was asked as to whether change in South Africa was in fact possible (without which détente would eventually not lead to anything).

*Mr. Richard*, in reply, asked about the position of the English-speaking people who, he said, would have to decide what they wanted. He admitted that the Afrikaners still had some "baasskap" in their make-up, but they were moving away from this. They had to learn to accept the Blacks as persons, and not to judge them on the basis of colour.

In response to a question about the attitudes of South Africans living abroad, *Professor Spence* said that he detected an erosion of political boundaries in the Republic and a shifting of alignments. He also detected a new sense of South Africanness among Whites, and also a recognition among English-speaking people that the Government which had been in office for so long, had guaranteed their stability and prosperity.

A questioner referred to the "dilemma" for the Afrikaners in the demands for change in South Africa. If there was change, in a direction required by Africa, the Afrikaners would be in danger of losing their separate identity.

In reply, *Mr. Richard* argued that all people had to belong culturally somewhere, and the change required in South Africa was not a question of abandoning identity. (The question of Afrikaans/English relationships was pursued further in the discussion, and considerable interest and concern was shown about this in the audience.)

*Mr. Hammond-Tooke* commented that the present issues in the détente moves were much bigger than the small differences between Whites in South Africa. *Professor Spence* pointed out that the people of the different language groups now had much more in common in the industrial and technological society which had developed in South Africa.

A questioner maintained that the international isolation and pressures had been used for many years by the Government as a reason for unity among the Whites. What would the effect of détente be?

*Mr. Richard* maintained that the Afrikaner was realising the importance of Africa (while he did not care about the position of the United Nations), and he referred to the change in the Afrikaans press, which he said was very significant. He referred, for example, to the changed attitude towards Zambia and Dr. Kaunda.

*Professor J.E. Spence*, a South African, is at present head of the Department of Politics at the University of Leicester.

*Mr. Laurence Gardar* is former Editor of the *Rand Daily Mail* (Johannesburg).

*Mr. Arthur Hammond-Tooke* is chief economist of the South African Federated Chambers of Industries.

*Mr. Dirk Richard* is Editor of *Die Vaderland* (Johannesburg).

*DÉTENTE AND SOUTH WEST AFRICA:  
COMMENTS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER*

In the South African House of Assembly on 3 February, 1975, the Leader of the Opposition proposed his annual motion of no confidence in the Government. On this occasion the Motion *inter alia* referred to the Government's "failure to appreciate adequately" the need "to promote regional initiatives with the object of achieving interstate agreements" in respect of defence and strategic planning. (Five other interstate areas were also mentioned, namely migrant labour, rights of minorities, transport and communication, mutual economic and technical aid, and energy resources.)

Immediately after the Leader of the Opposition had proposed his motion, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Dr. H. Muller) stated *inter alia*:

It is unnecessary for me to have to remind the House about the progress that has been made during the last few months, especially since the now historic speech by my leader in the Other Place.<sup>+</sup> Every South African is aware of it and most South Africans, regardless of their political affiliations, appreciate the efforts of the Prime Minister, of the Government and of those in South Africa and outside South Africa who are assisting us. Even the English-language Press in South Africa does not hesitate to acknowledge the important role which the South African Prime Minister has played and which he is continuing to play.

With regard to the specific references in the Motion to defence and strategic planning, the Minister commented as follows:

The most encouraging development in Southern Africa lies in the willingness of leaders now sincerely to seek, instead of sterile confrontation, the solution to certain fundamental problems which placed obstacles in the way of co-operation in the past and which still do so today. However, enough has already been said about this. Let us be realistic now. After all, first things come first. Defence and strategic planning fall into the most sensitive sphere of inter-State co-operation. One has to adopt a long course of co-operation in a region before one can venture into this sphere. If the hon. the Leader of the Opposition wants us to stifle the present healthy development at its birth, he must now insist on agreements in this extremely sensitive

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<sup>+</sup>The Senate, 23 October, 1974.

sphere. I can give him the assurance that it is not our intention to come forward with such untimely matters at a time when such serious attempts are being made to avoid conflict, but that we must first eliminate those problems which block further development.

As a general principle in this sphere I want to remind hon. members of the willingness of our Prime Minister to conclude non-aggression pacts with all freedom-loving, non-communist States in Africa. I have made that offer repeatedly at the UN, and it still stands today. At the right time the first step in this direction will be taken. When the time is ripe we will in fact hold talks with others in the military sphere. In any case, all the States in Southern Africa know that we are not a threat to anyone, because we do not interfere in their affairs. Sufficient proof of this has been given in practice. Because our neighbouring States have nothing to fear from us in the military sphere they know that they do not have to spend large amounts of money on defence. In this regard I want to reiterate, by way of summary, that we in Southern Africa should concentrate first on the elimination of problems which are conducive to confrontation. We simply must persevere in this, because the alternatives, in the words of the hon. Prime Minister which were also quoted by the hon. the Leader, are 'too ghastly to contemplate'. Fortunately other leaders in Southern Africa are in agreement with us in this regard, and, practically-speaking, this is the strongest motive behind the détente attempts which are in progress.

The motion of no confidence also criticised the Government for failing to appreciate the need "to achieve a rapid and honourable settlement of the *South West Africa issue* based on the wishes of all the inhabitants after effective consultation". In this regard the Minister said that these words in fact reflected the policy of the Government, which had been stated "repeatedly and unequivocally", namely that the only solution to the problem of S.W.A. was "that the peoples of South West Africa be allowed to decide their own future without being hampered or disturbed". He continued:

Hon. members will be aware that the National Party of South West Africa has taken the initiative in this connection. They took the initiative by resolving last year that positive steps should be taken to encourage and to hold discussions between the various population groups in the territory in order, eventually, to achieve a final agreement on the constitutional future of the territory. Virtually all the population groups reacted favourably to this initiative. To get the exchange of ideas into full swing now, it is necessary for the various population groups to designate their spokesmen for these discussions.

At the time when the initiative was announced, the Government of Ovambo reacted positively. Before they sent representatives to the talks they wanted to ensure that no one had any doubts whatsoever as to whether or not those representatives represented the Ovambo people. The Ovambo Government repeatedly made it clear that, *inter alia*, an election was being held to eliminate all doubts as to who the recognized leaders of that people were. The election took place. A high percentage of votes was polled, in spite of attempts to boycott the election. And now,

in the words of the Chief Minister of Ovambo, the Ovambos are able to send true representatives to the proposed talks among the various population groups. Other population groups are also engaged in this task, and we wish them success.

He stated further:

We have been devoting attention to the South West African issue for many years. Everyone who has the true interests of the inhabitants at heart, knows that there are no instant solutions to this difficult issue. Only a well-considered solution which is acceptable to all the population groups has any chance of success.

It is a pity the hon. the Leader of the Opposition did not indicate precisely what his solution to the matter was. Nor is it for the Government of South Africa to say that a solution to this problem should be found rapidly. However much we would like to find a solution, it is not for us to determine the pace. The sooner the solution is found, the better for all concerned. But in the last resort it is the inhabitants themselves who have to decide at what pace they wish to move towards a final solution, just as it is they and no one else, who have to ensure what the nature of that solution is.

Surely to try to create the impression now, as the hon. the Leader of the Opposition is doing, that we are leaving the inhabitants of the Territory to their fate, to struggle along and muddle through as they please, is totally misleading. We are in constant contact with those people: we are in contact with all the groups. We have permanent representatives there. We are proceeding with the development of the Territory in every possible sphere, including the political sphere.

Nevertheless, Sir, I want to repeat that on the basis of new developments in South West Africa, it is the view of this Government that the population of the Territory could reach the stage it would be prepared to exercise its right of self-determination considerably sooner than the ten years which were envisaged during the contacts with Dr. Waldheim a few years ago. As far as we are concerned, we would of course be ready and eager to render assistance in order to achieve a rapid solution; and what could be more honourable than a solution worked out and accepted by the people who are involved and whose future is determined by it? This much as far as South West Africa is concerned.

*Note:* In his speech the Foreign Minister also dealt at length with the question of South Africa's relations with neighbouring States in regard to migrant labour, transport and communication, mutual economic and technical aid, and energy resources. Full extracts from his speech, as well as from the speech of the Leader of the Opposition, will be reproduced in a forthcoming issue of *Southern Africa Record*, published by the Institute.

PRESIDENT KENNETH KAUNDA'S VIEWS ON DETENTE

In issue No 42. (February 1975) of the monthly periodical *Africa* there appeared an interview with President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia by Mr. Raph Uwechue. A summary of, including some extracts from, this interview is given below.

President Kaunda was asked to comment on the atmosphere of détente, which appeared to have replaced that of confrontation in Southern Africa. He replied that the contacts which had taken place recently between "the minority regimes in Southern Africa" and certain African countries, including Zambia, were very different from the early calls for dialogue. "The present contacts have come as a result of a decision taken by the OAU, as embodied in a document called *The Manifesto on Southern Africa*, now generally referred to as the 'Lusaka Manifesto'. This document, which was the result of serious discussions and decisions taken by the 5th Summit Conference of East and Central States here in Lusaka (1969), was later taken to the OAU which accepted it and adopted it formally as an OAU official document. From there it was taken to the United Nations and again it became a document of the United Nations.

"In the present developments, whatever contacts have taken place between Tanzania, Mozambique's Frelimo, Botswana and Zambia on one hand, and the minority regimes led by Mr. Vorster on the other, have been based entirely on the *Manifesto on Southern Africa*. This Manifesto, as you know, is very specific on what should be done. It states clearly that when the minority regimes appear to change, they should be given an opportunity to say what they are prepared to do; that Africa must not close its doors until it has proved what their objective is. And for us, there can only be one objective. This is that these countries should be free."

Referring to the changes in Portuguese Africa, President Kaunda stated: "And so we are now left specifically with Rhodesia which is a British colony in rebellion. We are left with Namibia and, of course, with the Republic of South Africa, although it is an independent country. The OAU recognises it as such and I think paragraph 20 of the Manifesto also states that South Africa is a sovereign state. But it goes further and condemns without reserve the abominable policies of apartheid". He stated that the philosophy of the Lusaka Manifesto had been a guideline, and the present initiative was very different from individual calls which were made on the dialogue question. "Those were calls made without the approval of and quite outside the framework of the OAU."

President Kaunda was then asked about the Mogadishu Declaration which had been adopted by the OAU in 1971. President Kaunda stated that "the Lusaka Manifesto and the Mogadishu Declaration are really two sides of one and the same coin. First of all, we offered peace in the Lusaka Manifesto. That offer of peace still stands. But it is not peace offered from a position of weakness. Let there be no mistake about that. It is peace offered from strength in the knowledge that whatever the minority regimes might wish to do today, tomorrow or the day after, they cannot really expect that independent Africa will sit idly by while they oppress the majority of their fellowmen, basing this entirely on colour. What the Mogadishu Declaration did was to make this clear and to say that if they don't negotiate on terms outlined by the Lusaka Manifesto, an intensification of the war must take place as our only viable alternative. In other words, the Mogadishu Declaration has had the element and function of a final warning impressing upon the minority regimes the need to negotiate in time if they chose to negotiate."

President Kaunda stated further that Presidents Julius Nyerere, Seretse Khama, Samora Machel and himself saw the contact, which they (i.e. "the minority regimes") had made to begin negotiations, within the context of the Lusaka Manifesto, as showing that the alternative of the peaceful solution was the one they might now prefer.

That contact was being explored in good faith. Regarding South Africa's Prime Minister, President Kaunda stated that Mr. Vorster and his Advisers had understood the message conveyed by both the Lusaka Manifesto as well as the Mogadishu Declaration. The latter had not in any way replaced or contradicted the former, but it was more or less a warning by African leaders that, unless the minority regimes were willing to negotiate, they faced grave dangers.

President Kaunda was then asked about the support which he and the other three Presidents had so far enjoyed from other Heads of State in Africa. President Kaunda replied that he and his three colleagues had been very much aware that what they were trying to do was being done on behalf of the OAU. When "the first hopeful sign" reached him, he had contacted the current OAU Chairman (General Siad Barre of Somalia), and the Foreign Ministers of Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana had gone to various African countries to discuss the developments. The Zambian Foreign Minister (Mr. Vernon Mwaanga) had visited about 14 countries. President Kaunda continued: "In terms of actual support, one is very heartened to see that we received many messages from our brother Heads of State and Government to the effect that they prayed for what we were doing and that they supported the move and hoped that something positive will come out of these contacts. The general understanding, in short, is that we are acting with their support and on their behalf."

President Kaunda was asked about the role of Mr. Vorster in regard to recent developments in Zimbabwe and also whether favourable developments could be expected in Namibia and the Republic of South Africa itself. President Kaunda replied that "there is no doubt at all that the Southern African minority regimes are really led by Mr. Vorster. Now, as to what he has done to translate his speeches into action, this, of course, I must admit is a very hard question to answer at this material time, because in this very delicate situation one must understand that Mr. Vorster has got his constituency and it is a big and complex one, where there are both supporters as well as opponents of current developments. Therefore, anything we say at the moment may endanger or complicate his own position and quite honestly we do not like to do that at all. We want to say only in general terms that we know Mr. Vorster is playing some important role in so far as the minority regimes are concerned. He is the unquestionable leader, and therefore certainly he is at the heart of all these things in so far as their side is concerned. So really, you will excuse me if I appear not to be forthcoming on this issue, because I think it is important at this stage that these matters are kept where they belong until the problem is solved. Then historians and you militants in the press can dig out the facts at the appropriate time. Right now we are more concerned with achieving results that hopefully will bring peace and justice to Southern Africa and effectively put an end to the suffering of our people there."

With regard to aspects other than the Rhodesian issue, President Kaunda continued: "We certainly have not dealt with the Manifesto on Southern Africa piecemeal. We reviewed the Southern African situation as a whole. It would be wrong to do otherwise, although naturally concentration has got to be on one issue at a time. But really all these three issues - Rhodesia, Namibia and apartheid are part and parcel of one main question and that is the obnoxious racial oppression in Southern Africa. At the moment settlement of the Rhodesian issue is a priority, even if it is not our only concern. For us the birth of Zimbabwe is a must and we are working for an early and, hopefully, peaceful birth. In so far as Namibia is concerned, again here, we are equally committed. We cannot leave Namibia out of these talks, as it is an integral part of the one basic problem of Southern Africa. Contacts and discussions that have occurred so far, include Namibia. They also include the situation in South Africa itself. I should, I think, reveal here that on the question of South Africa itself Mr. Vorster generally becomes understandably very sensitive. But he also agrees or at least he knows that if nothing is done to change the situation in South Africa, although the UN recognises that country as an independent state, certainly the masses



there will not remain dormant indefinitely. He also knows that Africa has promised them support in whatever measures they take against oppression. So this I think Mr. Vorster is clearly aware of. One only hopes that he will be able to use his influence in his own circles to try and make changes before it is too late."

"Well, in fact, I think I can say that for those of us who have been making these contacts, there is no shadow of doubt in our minds that Mr. Vorster, in spite of the very difficult situation in which he finds himself, is certainly determined to play some role to bring about comparatively peaceful changes in Southern Africa as a whole. All indications are so far that he has recognised the need for change, in Zimbabwe, Namibia and within South Africa itself. Now, how far and how quickly he is prepared to go by way of peaceful discussion will unfold as matters progress. We like to feel reassured that he knows the magnitude of the danger in Southern Africa and as I said earlier on and as he has himself put it very well, the alternative to a negotiated settlement is 'too ghastly to contemplate'".

With reference to "favourable" developments in Rhodesia, President Kaunda was asked whether he thought this "sudden change of weather" would last and whether he felt that a peaceful settlement was possible. President Kaunda stated that on the whole he was hopeful, because the situation was now quite favourable in Southern Africa, as a result of the change in the former Portuguese colonies. "Now as we stand today, perhaps more so in the case of Mr. Vorster than Mr. Smith, this new situation is seen very clearly. It is no longer a question of a small common border between Zambia and Zimbabwe which worries Smith. The situation has changed in such a way that, if Frelimo decided to put pressure on Smith at any given time, this would be a serious and decisive form of pressure with which Smith's forces simply cannot cope. It would be possible now for the freedom fighters from Zimbabwe to use a very long border which exists between Zimbabwe and the rest of us."

Finally, President Kaunda was asked whether the unity which the Zambabwean liberation movements had found was solid and was likely to last. He replied that at least he hoped and prayed that it would last. "It's the one thing that will shake Smith and his colleagues, because, if they know that they can divide the majority side in Zimbabwe, then certainly they will play that game. They are old masters in the game of divide and rule. Again, I must say very, very seriously that unless our brothers and sisters in Zimbabwe hold on to this unity, they cannot expect real help from the rest of Africa. This is a matter of must, they must be united, the whole of Africa has put in so much trying to unite our brothers and sisters in Zimbabwe, and now that this has come about, I hope that they hold to it firmly. They need it; we need it; all of us need it. So this is a key thing as far as I am concerned."

### *Dubious Relations*

In spite of all these strong links between Rhodesia and South Africa, their relations have been somewhat dubious, particularly after UDI when South Africa was forced to make a choice to support Rhodesia in defiance of the UN. Even long before UDI, South Africa was not happy when Rhodesia looked to the north and joined the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. There were aspects of the Federation which the South African Government never liked, especially the notion of multi-racialism and the policy of partnership. Therefore relations between the two countries during the days of the Federation were ambivalent, as the two countries appeared to be moving in different directions.

### *UDI*

UDI in 1965 had many disadvantages for South Africa. It was a setback in her effort to win friends in black Africa. The South African Government did not want to appear to be supporting white supremacy outside its own borders. She was confronted with very hard choices to make. South Africa found itself having to support Rhodesia for a variety of reasons. There was also the factor that South Africa could not support UN sanctions. To do so would have meant that South Africa was using sanctions against its ally and good neighbour. Furthermore, South Africa could not afford to support the idea of sanctions, a weapon with which she herself had been threatened and which has indeed been employed by the OAU against South Africa.

South Africa's attitude and position towards the Rhodesian situation was that it was a domestic matter which concerned Britain and Rhodesia. She declared that she did not believe in boycotts and economic sanctions or in any interference in domestic affairs. She therefore refused to co-operate with the UN in this connection.

The Republic found herself in a very unhappy position, in that the South African government recognised not only the fact that Rhodesia constituted an obstacle to the outward policy, but also the fact that Rhodesia was vulnerable to guerrilla incursions. In 1967 the South Africans found themselves having to send their men to assist Rhodesia against guerrilla incursions, although the announced reason was to prevent South African ANC guerrillas from crossing Rhodesia to the Republic. During all this period South Africa recognised the fact that normalisation of relations with the African countries, particularly with Zambia was not possible, while the situation in Rhodesia remained unresolved. President Kaunda made this point very clear in his letter to Mr. Vorster in 1968, when he told the South African Prime Minister that it was not possible to reach understanding between Zambia and South Africa as long as the Republic assisted the 'illegal regime'.

It is thus clear that the South African Government wanted to see the situation in Rhodesia resolved through negotiations, and yet on the other hand it was South Africa's actions which made it possible for the regime to survive.

I want at this point to refer briefly to a development which complicated South Africa's position vis-à-vis the Rhodesian issue, and this was the closure of the Zambian border by Mr. Smith's Government. It became very clear from statements made in South Africa and the reaction of the South African press in general that South Africa's interests were not necessarily tied to those of Rhodesia. It became obvious that South Africa was very unhappy that Mr. Smith had taken such a course of action, without even consulting South Africa.

Since the closure of the border in January, 1973, a number of prominent South Africans began to call upon their government to re-examine and to re-assess its attitude towards Rhodesia. The result was that the questions of relations with South Africa became an election campaign issue in Rhodesia in 1974. The Rhodesian Party in its call for a negotiated settlement, pointed out that South Africa was getting tired of having to rescue Rhodesia.

The most significant development was, of course, the coup in Portugal on 25 April, 1975. Most observers of the Southern African political scene agreed immediately that this event would lead to dramatic changes in Southern Africa. But the speed with which events have taken place since the Lisbon coup has been unexpected, because analysis of the southern African situation was based on unchallenged assumptions, such as South Africa's unquestionable support for white rule in Rhodesia.

After the coup in Portugal, the scenarios of the past decade, on which the situation in southern Africa was assessed, changed overnight. The South African Prime Minister acknowledged immediately that the situation in Mozambique following the Lisbon coup would have far reaching consequences upon Southern Africa and welcomed the possibility of a Frelimo government there, provided such a government was responsible and a good neighbour. The South African government made it clear that it would do nothing to oppose the transfer of power and that it would seek co-operation with the revolutionary government. This policy continued to be reflected in various government and other official statements. The response of Mozambique's transitional government to the South African statements was positive, thus creating an atmosphere which led to détente between South Africa and Zambia on the Rhodesian issue.

In Rhodesia the RF Government assured the white population that events in Mozambique resulting from the coup in Lisbon did not have any relevance to developments in Rhodesia and warned that those who believed otherwise were grossly misreading the situation in Rhodesia. It would appear that Mr. Smith's remarks were also directed towards Mr. Vorster who had quickly acknowledged that the situation in Mozambique was bound to have profound effects upon developments in the region. We see here a divergence of

views, if not sharp differences, between Mr. Vorster and Mr. Smith, at least on how to respond to the situation created by the coup in Portugal. It became obvious that South Africa's interests were not necessarily tied to those of Rhodesia.

Throughout 1974, after the coup in Lisbon, the South African press (particularly the Afrikaans press) became more critical of the regime in Salisbury for its inflexible attitude and for failing to come to terms with the ANC. The press and many leading South Africans, from both the English-speaking and Afrikaans community, urged the South African government to reassess its position and attitude towards the Smith regime.

#### *Developments after Mr. Vorster's Senate Speech*

After Mr. Vorster's Senate speech of 23 October, 1974, and President Kaunda's response welcoming Mr. Vorster's initiatives as "the voice of reason for which Africa has been waiting", events in Southern Africa began to move with amazing speed. I am sure that Mr. Vorster's and President Kaunda's speeches were made after there had been considerable consultations behind the scenes. The first major breakthrough resulting from the new situation after the coup in Portugal was the agreement among four Governments - South Africa, Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana - to work together on the Rhodesian issue. The four Governments appear to have agreed to bring some pressure to bear upon Mr. Smith's Government to modify his behaviour and to seek a settlement with the true leaders of the African people and not the chiefs.

In November last year Mr. Smith released the African nationalists, Joshua Nkomo and Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole of ZAPU and ZANU, respectively, and some of their associates. The importance of this move can only be understood when put into an historical context. In brief, these leaders have been in detention for more than ten years and throughout these years Mr. Smith had refused to talk to them, saying that they were criminals who did not represent the African people. In November, 1974, he did not only release these African leaders, but they were flown to Lusaka as the true representatives of the African people.

The question to be asked at this point is why Mr. Smith decided to release his enemies to negotiate with them for a ceasefire and for a settlement. The answer is now obvious, namely, that there have been some pressures exerted upon him to act in this manner. It is also obvious that the pressure which made Mr. Smith move came from South Africa.

The second question to be asked is why did South Africa decide to exert pressure upon Mr. Smith's Government. The Rhodesia issue has been regarded by policy-makers in Pretoria as an obstacle to the outward policy throughout the period between 1965 and 1974, and it was clear that the failure to achieve a Rhodesian settlement had the effect of undermining South Africa's objectives in the region as a whole, as already indicated

above. The Rhodesian impasse had the twin consequences of focusing world attention on South Africa as the main sanctions buster, and of compelling South Africa to aid Rhodesia, economically and militarily (i.e. the presence of S.A. Police in Rhodesia). If South Africa were to establish good relations with Mozambique and to normalise relations with Zambia (which had been compelled to concentrate its foreign policy thrust away from the South and towards the East African states), the Rhodesian issue had to be resolved first. President Kaunda made his point clear in his letter to Mr. Vorster in April, 1968, when he told the South African Prime Minister that the normalisation of relations between Zambia and South Africa was not possible as long as South Africa continued to support "the illegal regime".

Zambia has long been recognised in South Africa as a key country to the question of dialogue in the region for various reasons - political and economic. It has also been the home and the major base for the liberation movements, a factor which gives President Kaunda a certain leverage. There is thus a community of interest between Zambia and South Africa in seeking a settlement of the Rhodesian problem, including the fact that Zambia faces economic problems which could be alleviated by a Rhodesian settlement.

#### *Achievements*

At this point it is important to look at the achievements and progress made in the Southern African region in general and in Rhodesia in particular, as a result of these pressures.

1. There has been an atmosphere characterised by *détente* since November last year, and this has made it possible for Zambia and South Africa to co-operate in an effort to resolve the Rhodesian question. This, in my considered opinion is not a small achievement.
2. The second achievement was the bringing together of the three Zimbabwe liberation movements, ZAPU, ZANU and FROLI-ZI, under one organisation, the ANC. Again, bringing these movements together, particularly ZAPU and ZANU, after a decade of being arch enemies, is not a minor achievement.
3. The third achievement, to which I have already referred, was to get Mr. Smith to agree to release the detained African leaders and to fly them in an aircraft belonging to the RF Government to Zambia, a country with which Rhodesia has been in effect at war for a long time, as characterised by the closure of the border with Zambia in January, 1973.
4. Then there was the Lusaka agreement between the Rhodesian African leaders and the Rhodesian Government, witnessed by four African Presidents - Kaunda, Nyerere, Khama and Samora Machel. The agreement included among other things a ceasefire, although this has since been a subject of dif-

ferent interpretations by the two sides.

All these achievements have been both remarkable and dramatic.

### *Future Prospects*

In this kind of analysis one has to ask oneself questions as one looks at the picture that seems to be emerging in Southern Africa. The question one should ask at this stage is whether these achievements are likely to lead to a settlement of the Rhodesia constitutional crisis. In my opinion, it appears very doubtful that a negotiated settlement can be reached in the near future. I say this in spite of my belief that Mr. Smith's Government has now come to the end of the road. (I shall attempt in my conclusion to demonstrate this latter point.) My pessimism about the possibility of a settlement is based on several factors.

1. Mr. Smith's behaviour after the Lusaka agreement appears to indicate that he has had second thoughts about that agreement. It is, of course, not uncommon for the Rhodesian Prime Minister to have second thoughts about agreements. It is obvious that at the Lusaka talks the question of majority rule must have been talked about as an objective of the African leaders. The question to be decided at the constitutional conference was one of time during which majority rule would be introduced. Therefore, Mr. Smith's behaviour and pronouncements reaffirming his statement that there would be no majority rule in his lifetime would tend to suggest that he has been under some pressure from his own party not to give in to African demands. Mr. Smith's behaviour in this regard appears to be at variance with the attitude of South Africa towards the question of a negotiated settlement.
2. My pessimism is also based on the fact that there continues to be a difference between the RF and ANC about the question of a venue and the chairmanship of the constitutional conference. The African leaders would like the conference held outside Rhodesia, under the chairmanship of the British Government, thus reducing the Rhodesian issue to the colonial status to which it belongs. For Mr. Smith this is unacceptable, as this would indicate that he is no longer in command and control of the situation. This to him would be tantamount to renouncing UDI.

It appears from these factors that a constitutional conference may not ever be held, until perhaps additional pressures are exerted.

### *Conclusion*

Let me now return to my thesis that Mr. Smith's Government has come to the end of the road. I say this because the situation has got out of his control, and the initiative now lies in Pretoria and Lusaka. Given the present situation in which South Africa seems to have made a major breakthrough in its outward policy, it is doubtful that Mr. Vorster would want to continue giving military support to the Smith Government, without which Rhodesia would find it impossible to cope with guerrilla activities.

Should a constitutional conference break down, the alternative is a return to the battlefield, and in that event the Rhodesian army will find itself faced with a combined ZANU, ZAPU and FROLIZI force, and that could prove formidable. Moreover, with the independence of Mozambique in June this year, Rhodesia will have to contend with an additional 1100 km long border with Mozambique, in addition to the Zambian border which is 690 km long, and the border with Botswana which is 770 km long. That makes the Rhodesian border with potentially hostile African states 2 560 km long. The border with South Africa is only about 200 km long. All this, coupled with the fact that Mozambique is likely to apply UN economic sanctions against Rhodesia, would make it almost impossible for her to win a guerrilla war. South Africa has long recognised that Rhodesia could not win a long drawn out guerrilla war.

It would appear to me that the present Rhodesian Front attitude towards a settlement, characterised by Mr. Smith's refusal to accept, even in principle, the idea of majority rule, is based on certain assumptions. These assumptions include the belief that in the event of a large scale guerrilla war, South Africa would put its full weight behind Rhodesia. In my opinion such a development would not be in South Africa's long term interest, both in the domestic and international fields.

The second assumption is that the situation in Mozambique after independence in June this year, would erupt into inter-tribal fighting, leading to a Congo-like situation, and that such a development would alter the present attitude of the South African government in favour of Rhodesia. Even if the situation in Mozambique were to develop in that direction, that would not be in the interest of South Africa, as the situation would invite UN and OAU intervention, the two organisations whose presence in Southern Africa, would not be welcomed to the Republic of South Africa.

The third assumption is that the African nationalist leaders would split into warring factions, and in that event the RF would point out to South Africa the futility of giving power to the people who are not ready to govern themselves. Mr. Smith would try, and I am sure that he is already busy trying, to split the ANC, in order to isolate the so-called extremists, so that he can try to achieve a settlement with the "moderates". This will not work, because the African nationalists are united on the question of majority rule; the only difference that exists in the ANC

are based on tactics and strategy. So long as there is a goal which transcends these differences, the Africans will strive to achieve that objective.

Given all these factors, which I have attempted to analyse, I return to the thrust of my thesis that Mr. Smith appears to have reached the end of the road. I accept that certain developments may enable him to stretch his road a little longer, but at a ghastly price.

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*RHODESIAN ARMY COMMANDER SPEAKS ON DÉTENTE*

The following speech by the Commander of the Rhodesian Army, Lieutenant General G.P. Walls, was made at a Round Table Dinner at Sinoia on 8 March, 1975.

Before Rhodesia became involved in this Détente business, in fact before Mr. Vorster and Dr. Kaunda made their dramatic statements which brought the exercise into the open, I warned in an address at a Medals Presentation, in Umtali on October 24 last year, that a massive psychological campaign was about to be waged to drive a wedge between South Africa and Rhodesia.

We all know how news media have reacted since then. Many and varied have been the comments on the situation. However, I do not believe that too much notice should be taken of these and other comments. Too many people, with little or no knowledge of the true situation at the time they make their comments, rush into giving their verdict, and often stating that they are giving the verdict of their public, on anything that happens. We have been assured, for example, that any comment in a South African newspaper is not necessarily an expression of Government policy, and I believe that we would be wrong to think that it is always a correct reflection of how the vast South African public is thinking.

Later, at another Medals Parade in Salisbury, I stated my opinion that Rhodesia had never been in a more serious position. I was taken to task by some people for saying this, but not by anybody in the Government or anybody who had any idea of what was going on. I still believe that the situation has been serious for the past couple of months and still is, but this does not mean that I do not believe in a bright future. I simply mean that we have reached a very critical stage in our progress, where it is necessary for all concerned to keep a cool head and proceed extremely carefully, because a false step could cost us dearly. And by "us", I mean all the peoples of Rhodesia - I do not simply mean the Government. We have been plunged into a vast whirlpool of conflicting pressures and strains. And it seems to me that Détente for Rhodesia depends almost entirely on the good will and efforts of those who have stated their anxiety and willingness to help.

On the one hand we have South Africa, and on the other we have the four Presidents of Zambia, Mocambique, Tanzania and Botswana. Unless all of these countries are willing and capable of playing the part which they have promised to undertake, there is not the slightest chance of Détente being successful.

May I try and illustrate the situation by painting a word picture which may not be a completely accurate analogy, but will certainly show you how I see the exercise of Détente as far as we are concerned. It is rather as though we are on a long journey through sometimes pleasant, but often rough country, making for a destination which is the ideal constitution.

Our friends the South Africans, who are journeying with us, although on a different path, have indicated to us that there appears to be a short cut to our destination, across a yawning chasm. They have found this chasm and have established contact with the people on the other side, the Zambians, Mocambiquans, etc. They have persuaded us, and we accept, that, although without any doubt we would ultimately reach our destination by our longer and slower route, there are tremendous advantages in taking the short cut across the chasm, and they have managed to throw a rope across which has been seized by the people on the other side.

There are many wishful thinkers in South Africa, who think that they are already on the other side of this chasm, because their different route has taken them to their destination by another short cut. But make no mistake about it, they are very definitely on the same side of the chasm as us, and there is even reason to debate

whether, if we get across the rope, they will necessarily be able to follow us.

However, they are now encouraging us to use the rope to get across. As I see it, it will be a pretty difficult crossing. In fact there only appears to be about a one in a hundred chance of us successfully using this tightrope, because we could easily sway or fall or slip or what-have-you in making the crossing.

But one thing is crystal clear. However hard we try, we aren't going to get across the tightrope unless it is held absolutely taut on each end, not only by the South Africans on our side, but by the Zambians and their colleagues on the other side. In other words, unless both sides pull their weight and keep it taut, the rope will sag, and in fact, if the Presidents on the other side do not play their part by putting sufficient pressure on the people they sponsor and the terrorists, it could be likened to them letting go of the rope, thus making it impossible for us to get across. I would say that if this happens there is a moral obligation on the South Africans who persuaded us to try and make the crossing, to pull us back by lifelines, which surely they must consider their duty to have tied to us, in case the people on the other side broke faith and did not pay their part. Furthermore, they must see us safely back on our original path in this event.

Some of you may well ask whether I think that, in addition to the Zambians and their colleagues pulling on the one side, and the South Africans pulling on the other side of this Détente rope, Rhodesia is making a contribution. I put it to you that Rhodesia is making the most massive contribution towards Détente. Who else is taking all the risk at this stage. To change the analogy, who else has thrown open their house completely, unbarred the doors, left the windows open, left all the cupboards open, left all the valuables out and trusted that no marauders will take advantage of it. I do not believe it is provocative or controversial for me to say this. On the contrary I think it needs saying. Too many people are taking it for granted that all the effort is coming from other quarters.

Before the exercise started, and it was agreed on all sides that there would be an end to terrorism, we were thrashing the daylights out of these terrorists. Think back to the record in those days - November last year and the few months before it. We had destroyed much of the terrorist leadership; the calibre of terrorists operating in certain areas had been considerably reduced; and the morale of terrorists everywhere was comparatively low.

If I remember correctly, and I merely recall as an example the last week before our Prime Minister made his announcement, we killed something like 26 terrorists and captured many more. It is idle chatter and deliberate misrepresentation on the part of anybody to say that the terrorists had achieved a state of affairs where they could talk on equal terms. It could be argued that we could have continued with our Security Force operations until the terrorists ceased to operate in the country, but we were prepared to join with South Africa, Zambia, Mocambique, and Botswana, in giving Détente a try. We deliberately halted operations to give leaders of all races, and factions, and parties, a chance to show goodwill and honest constructive endeavour to reach a settlement. Let nobody say that we have not made a contribution to Détente. We have made by far the greatest contribution.

There are accusations, from both sides, about breaking of undertakings regarding the cessation of terrorism, dubbed by the news media as a cease-fire. But, it seems to me, critics outside Rhodesia are not prepared in many cases to judge these accusations impartially. There has been a marked increase in terrorism activity since the beginning of January and incidents too numerous to mention of deliberate ambushes, planting of landmines, murders and intimidation, all initiated by the terrorists. But these are either not believed or are brushed aside as being

of no consequence. On the other hand, the Security Forces are accused, in some quarters, of deliberately spooring terrorists and hounding them down to destroy them, which is alleged to be a sign of bad faith. Surely all reasonable people accept, and I understand the Zambians and Frelimo have from time to time indicated their acceptance of this point of view, that the authorities in Rhodesia have a responsibility to all inhabitants, including Black as well as White, to maintain law and order. I cannot understand why there should be a complaint about us doing just that.

In any country, if a crime is committed, what do the forces of the law do? They test for fingerprints, they search for clues, ask questions of possible witnesses, and carry out any other investigations or activities which will help them to find the criminals, apprehend them, and prevent them from committing further crimes. This is all that the Security Forces have been doing. We have played our part in the spirit of Détente to the limit of our ability, and I may say, well beyond the reasonable limit of our patience. The weekly toll of Rhodesians, Black and White, who are being murdered, badly injured or molested, sickens me any any other ordinary person with compassion and concern for the lives and welfare of other human being.

There has been some derision and speculation about the detention of one of the leaders of the ANC. Perhaps I could offer a thought about this. I was not part of the decision to detain him. In fact, the Army knew nothing about it until it had taken place, so I can offer a comment from the spectator stands, as it were.

Now that, because of my privileged position, I know something of the evidence upon which the Government took its action, I would make this comment: I have neither the right, nor the competence, to offer an opinion as to whether the Government action was right or wrong, or the best possible action, but one thing I know for absolute certain - it wasn't the slightest bit of use them only wringing their hands and saying 'we wish this hadn't come up' - because there's one thing they could not do, and that was to do nothing. I wonder, again as a simple soldier, what Governments in other countries confronted with the same problem would have done. Why don't all critics, who immediately rushed into condemnations and gloomy forecasts of disaster, await the conclusions of the impartial court of justice, where full legal representation has been allowed. For that matter, I discerned a lack of judgement and ability, one might say even irresponsibility, on the part of certain leaders of the community, who were far too hasty in taking up stances.

I am glad to say, however, that certain newspapers, including some outside the country, have expressed a view similar to mine. But I note, cynically, that other newspapers outside the country have opined that this latest detention could lead to renewed terrorist activity, and there have been references to the possibility of "an escalation of terrorist activity" and "a new guerilla war". They must be joking, but it is a sick joke. As I have already said, there has been no cessation of terrorist activity overall, although in places the ceasefire appears to have been observed, albeit a little re-stocking of arms and ammunition caches has been tried. In fact, there has been an escalation of terrorist activity in certain sectors over the past two months or more. So much for the threat of increased activity - we have had it since just after Détente started.

The best advice that anybody inside Rhodesia, or in other countries, could be given is to keep cool and not over-react to incidents, statements, circumstances. As a simple soldier, not connected in any way with the political scene, or negotiations, or constitutional talks, I would urge that all the people who could be involved in these, should maintain calm equilibrium and responsible caution which the country has a right to expect of them. Instant rejections and denials, inflammatory and provocative comments, can have no useful place in the tightrope walking upon which we are now embarked. There are a hell of a lot us us, of all races, who form the

silent but vitally interest majority, who are watching closely the men who find themselves in a position in which history will judge whether they have been constructive, compassionate, patriotic, and faithful to the hopes and fears of their children and children's children. I urge all of these men to be willing to obey their consciences rather than the dictates of the extremist minorities who inevitably shout the longest and loudest.

And talking about the silent majority, let us have some clarity of thought on this phrase "majority rule". The simpleminded, ignorant, or knavish, refer to majority rule as a case of Black ruling White. How stupid and ridiculous such a statement is. There is no such thing as a Black party, or a Black faction, or a Black tribe, which embraces all Black men. A percentage of the Black men in Rhodesia are Amandebele, and I think you all know that they have not the slightest intention of being ruled by the Va Shona. The same applies to the Tonga, the Venda, the Shangaan and others. In any case the Va Shona are not one vast nation. There are at least seven major groups within the Va Shona, we are told, and those seven groups are split into many other minorities. I believe one can possibly identify as many as 25 significant subdivisions. None of the groups wishes to be ruled by any of the others. None of the minorities is happy at the prospect of another having power. None of them is particularly happy about trying to share power with some of the other groupings. There is no such thing as a majority, in the sense that is being used. Are we asked by some advisers who have, of course, nothing personal at stake, to revert to a kind of inter-tribal rivalry? Or do we build up a nation based on a civilised and constructive approach to electoral responsibility. This is what has to be hammered out.

Finally, I would like to make a public appeal to the people of Rhodesia to throw open their hearts and homes to the men of the South African Police stationed here during this difficult time. They are servicemen just as I am - they are not politicians and they are not responsible for political decisions. They simply do the job of work that is required of them by their superiors. They have done us proud over the past several years, and they have played a significant part in containing and defeating terrorism. However, at the present time they are no longer taking part in the maintenance of law and order in Rhodesia.

It is a difficult time for them, and the maintenance of their morale and welfare is of paramount importance. We hope to arrange for many of them to visit Salisbury and Bulawayo and other centres, now that their duties permit, on what we call R and R, and some of them are stationed here now in Sinoia, where I hope they will be made very welcome. We are planning to show our appreciation of what they have done for Rhodesia by looking after them well when they are on such visits. I appeal to the public to show them true Rhodesian hospitality and our appreciation for their being up here. I hope details will be released soon of how people can help us to look after them, particularly in the bigger centres.

I hope I have not bored you with too long a monologue on what my thoughts are, and I sincerely hope that nobody will take anything I have said as being provocative or controversial or likely to upset the delicate balance of the current situation. My thoughts are merely offered as a soldier's impartial commentary, and a background to more important opinions.

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NIGERIAN EDITOR INTERVIEWS RHODESIAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN

PRIME MINISTERS

On a tour of East and Southern African countries in February/March 1975, the Editor of the Nigerian Sunday Times, Mr. Bgolabo Ogunsanwo, visited Rhodesia and South Africa. He met Mr. Ian Smith and Mr. John Vorster, and the interviews with them, prepared for publication in his newspaper, are given below, as reproduced in the Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) of 1 and 15 March, 1975, respectively.

*Interview with the Prime Minister of Rhodesia, Mr. Ian Smith*

My interview with Mr. Smith took place in his sparsely furnished office in the centre of Salisbury. He shot off by welcoming me to Rhodesia and expressing the view that the Rhodesian case had been misunderstood by the outside world.

*Mr. Ogunsanwo:* A number of Africans have said that Rhodesia is an embryonic apartheid state.

*Mr. Smith:* This is a typical distortion. I don't see how anybody could substantiate such a claim. Under the apartheid system, as you referred to it, there are separate countries and separate governments. But here in Rhodesia there is only one government and Africans are represented there and we all vote for Members of Parliament.

*Mr. Ogunsanwo:* What is your government's attitude on the issue of Black majority rule? You are on record as saying Rhodesia can never have African majority rule in your lifetime. Is this still your present position?

*Mr. Smith:* Once again, you see, somebody has distorted the position. I have said that we have certain basic standards and I am satisfied that under these standards there is no chance of achieving an African majority rule in my lifetime. This is an opinion I have and which one can work out mathematically to determine the number of Africans who would have the necessary qualifications to qualify, and that they will be accepted not only by the Whites but by the Blacks as well.

There are many thousands of Black Rhodesians who have told me the last thing they want is African majority rule. They want Rhodesian majority rule, and that is what we have now: the people who qualify by our standards.

*Mr. Ogunsanwo:* How would you describe the present Black-White situation?

*Mr. Smith:* I am pleased to tell you that it is a very happy state. Unfortunately, because of this new exercise of detente, the mischief-makers have had an opportunity of trying to aggravate race relations.

One of the most frequent comments I hear from visitors to this country is that some of the happiest Black faces they have seen anywhere in the world, they have found in Rhodesia. You'll find very cordial relations between the races, there is a relaxed atmosphere.

*Mr. Ogunsanwo:* While still on relations, would you care to assess the present state of relations between you and your next-door neighbours, Zambia and South Africa?

*Mr. Smith:* Unfortunately, our relations with Zambia are strained at the moment. They have been for quite a while because Zambia has been providing a base for terrorists operating against Rhodesia. I should imagine that if your next-door neighbour was providing a base for terrorist operation against you this would bring about strained relations between your country and this other country.

It was because of terrorist activities against us from Zambia, and the fact that they would not even agree to a meeting between any of my Ministers and their Ministers to discuss our problems that we were forced to close our border. We subsequently opened the border because we received an undertaking that the Zambians would do all they could to prevent terrorism.

However, the Zambians have since decided not to operate through Rhodesia and to trade with us. At the moment that is the situation.

It is quite different with South Africa. Our relations are normal with her - the same as they have always been, and also with Mozambique.

*Mr. Ogunsanwo:* I was coming to that. I was going to ask you how you view the prospects of an independent Mozambique next door to you this June. What will happen should the Frelimo Government decide to close the ports of Beira and Lourenco Marques to you, and in keeping with its public commitment to the liberation of Southern Africa allow Rhodesian guerillas to operate from this area?

*Mr. Smith:* At the moment our relations are quite normal with Mozambique and we will do everything we can to maintain the situation. If the situation deteriorates it would be most unfortunate.

I believe they will also regret it because the main business in Beira comes from Rhodesia and if they close it they are not facing up to economic facts. It would be unfortunate for Rhodesia, but it would be even more unfortunate for Mozambique.

If they allowed terrorists to operate from their land, there is nothing we can do about it. We would deal with them in the same way we deal with other terrorists. We hope this situation will never arise but if it does, we will face up to it and we will cope with it.

*Mr. Ogunsanwo:* If you were to do a bit of crystal-gazing, how do you see the future of Rhodesia in the next five to 10 years, and in particular the position that the Black Rhodesian will occupy in the scheme of things?

*Mr. Smith:* A lot depends on whether we can achieve the settlement we talk about. I believe that if we are to achieve a settlement the future is very bright. I think you will see development and expansion which is almost unprecedented.

Obviously, with all this you raise the standards of living of all your people, you bring about greater happiness, greater understanding between them.

If there is no settlement, then it is going to get more difficult, it is going to take longer but I don't think there is going to be any change in our philosophy, because we are satisfied that the great majority of Rhodesian Africans agree with us in our philosophy.

We would like to be given a chance to prove this. And it is the outside world which is interfering in our affairs and trying to stop us from doing this.

*Mr. Ogunsanwo:* A number of leading Africans have warned that the Rhodesian issue would have to be solved by war, if necessary, if peace talks do not succeed. What do you think of the possibility of a racial conflict in Rhodesia?

*Mr. Smith:* We hope we can avoid this. As far as I am concerned we are always prepared to talk.

However, if the Black Rhodesians - and this is only a certain number of them, I assure you - decide to fight, perhaps we shall have to fight. We have been doing it for the last 10 years and so we have learnt to live with this.

We can get on very well even under these conditions. We do not have many problems, as you yourself can see.

*Mr. Ogunsanwo:* Thank you very much Mr. Smith. It has been useful talking to you. I certainly have a better perspective of the Rhodesian situation now. You are doing a good job of defeating the sanctions. I could see your shops are full.

*Interview with the Prime Minister of South Africa, Mr. B.J. Vorster*

*Mr. Ogunsanwo:* Mr. Prime Minister you must have heard the news that the Nigerian Government will not grant visas to South African editors to visit Nigeria in May this year to take part in the International Press Institute's conference. What is your reaction to this?

*Mr. Vorster:* (lighting a cigarette): You have communist organisations in Niberia.

*Mr. Ogunsanwo:* No, but we have some groups committed to socialism.

*Mr. Vorster:* If you do not approve of communism why then do you have diplomatic relations with communist governments?

*Mr. Ogunsanwo:* Because our government believes that whatever political beliefs the governments of communist countries have is their business.

*Mr. Vorster:* But the fact remains that you nevertheless do not share a belief in their domestic policies. Why then do you allow editors from these countries in and refuse to allow in South African editors?

*Mr. Ogunsanwo:* I do not think that the analogy holds true. We believe that we have a legitimate interest in what happens in South Africa. It is our business because we believe that the destiny of the Black man north of the Limpopo cannot be separate from his destiny south of it.

*Mr. Vorster:* So you approve of Idi Amin.

*Mr. Ogunsanwo:* No.

*Mr. Vorster:* OK let's get on to something else.

*Mr. Ogunsanwo:* For many years South Africa has been at war with Black Africa. All of a sudden you decided on a change of policy, seeking a new

accommodation with Africa. What explains the new South African attitude?

*Mr. Vorster:* I do not agree with you that our policy was new. A former Prime Minister of South Africa said it was in our interest to have relations with all countries of Africa.

When I took over from Dr. Verwoerd I stated in public that one of my priorities was to establish relations with African countries, beginning with countries north of our border in the Southern African sub-continent.

*Mr. Ogunsanwo:* Does your present exercise of detente represent a basic commitment to a change of your apartheid policy, or else how do you intend to come to terms with Black Africa which has declared it as opposed to apartheid?

*Mr. Vorster:* The aim of my policy is to normalise relations with African countries and I think this is in the mutual interest of both parties, but my Government's policy remains that of separate development and it will be our policy for as long as the Nationalist Party remains in power.

The policy of separate development is not against human rights and values. On the contrary, it gives full expression to these. It has created the platforms on which the Black leaders of South Africa stand.

*Mr. Ogunsanwo:* Your homeland policy has been a subject of severe criticism in many parts of Black Africa on the grounds that it is a classic of the divide-and-rule principle; that the policy seeks to play on the things that divide Black Africans rather than on those that unite them. In any case, Africans in the so-called homelands have never been allowed to say, through an internationally acceptable way like a referendum, that they would like to balkanise the country.

*Mr. Vorster:* The Bantustan Policy is not an ethnic policy and it certainly is not a divide-and-rule policy. The various ethnic groups in South Africa are really different nations - each different in every sense of the word from all the other groups.

Had it not been for the British who annexed them they would have been completely independent entities with independent nationalities. I do not agree with your view that the people were not consulted over this policy.

*Mr. Ogunsanwo:* What about the question of land?

*Mr. Vorster:* The fact of this matter which has been clouded by a lot of emotionalism, is that the land which today belongs to the Black people is the land which they have practically inhabited. In addition to this, in 1936 the Government decided to add 15-million acres of land belonging to Whites to the Black homelands and the Whites have had to buy it at their expense costing millions.

*Mr. Ogunsanwo:* We never quite got round to examining in full aspects of the detente. A number of radical African countries, for example, Guinea, have not shown any enthusiasm about the detente exercise. They hold the view that Africa should have nothing to do with South Africa until we can see a revolutionary change in your internal policy.

*Mr. Vorster:* That is to be expected from a communist country like Guinea. My sole aim in the detente is to normalise relations with African countries because it is in the interest of all of us.



*Mr. Ogunsanwo:* How do you react to the forthcoming independence of Mozambique and the possibility that Mozambique might give active co-operation to African agitation against South Africa?

*Mr. Vorster:* I have made my position on this very clear, namely to establish friendly relations with all our neighbours and that naturally applies to Mozambique. We would under no circumstances interfere in Mozambique's internal affairs but on the other hand we are prepared to render such assistance as we can.

But, and I want to warn, if South Africa is attacked from Mozambique we will hit back with all the power at our command. It is as plain as that. The leaders of Mozambique have made it plain they have no such intention and that they would not allow their territory to be used as a springboard for an attack against South Africa and I accept that.

*Mr. Ogunsanwo:* Would you withdraw your troops from Rhodesia?

*Mr. Vorster:* Zambia and all affected countries know South Africa's stand that our police will be withdrawn the moment terrorist violence ceases.

*Mr. Ogunsanwo:* Let's now talk about apartheid. How do you justify it?

*Mr. Vorster:* I don't know what you mean.

*Mr. Ogunsanwo:* How do you explain separate facilities. Separate shop entrances, separate residences etc?

*Mr. Vorster:* There is not a single shop in South Africa having separate entrances for the races. There are different queues and entrances in post offices but not in shops. This is because of our policy of separate development of the races. We do not discriminate against anybody on account of race.

Certain measures are taken to avoid friction between peoples and furthermore it is the policy that different peoples should be served by their own people and that job opportunities are created for Black people which never existed before.

It is only since this government came to power that Black postmasters came into being. Previously there were equally no Black policemen. It is my Government that made it possible for Blacks to become professors, school heads, etc. If and when we find it no longer necessary for the reasons I said to have this policy, it will be abolished - otherwise it will remain.

*Mr. Ogunsanwo:* But how can you possibly defend influx control? I have heard a number of South African Government functionaries defend it on the grounds that the policy aims to stop labour from swamping job opportunities, and I have always retorted that influx control would not be necessary if the Government had acted to develop the whole country economically at the same pace.

*Mr. Vorster:* That is exactly what we are now doing. We can't force industrialists to open industries where we want them. We can only do what we can - we have created the infrastructure in the homelands.

*Mr. Ogunsanwo:* Would you agree with me if I said that the series of strikes and industrial agitation which you witnessed in South Africa last year could be interpreted as a form of social protest by Black workers?

*Mr. Vorster:* No, I won't agree. In the first place, there were no strikes only work stoppages, and they only lasted for a few days. I am sure that you will agree with me when I say that in other countries you have strikes for weeks - people go on strike today, return to work tomorrow and go off again on strike the day after and these go on for weeks. The work stoppages we had has nothing to do with social protest, they were only related to wages.

*Mr. Ogunsanwo:* Is there any possibility that African political detainees would be released some day to lead normal lives.

*Mr. Vorster:* I don't have any political detainees. Nelson Mandela and Co are not political detainees, they are serving sentences. They were convicted by judicial courts, after being found guilty of having committed overt criminal acts. In Nigeria, they would have been shot. As far as Robert Sobukwe is concerned, he is under a banning order.

*Mr. Ogunsanwo:* Finally, Mr. Prime Minister, let me ask you - could you bring yourself to think of the possibility of African majority rule in South Africa in the immediate or remote future?

*Mr. Vorster:* Oh yes. There will be African majority rule in South Africa - in Zululand, in the Transkei, in Ciskei, in BophuthaTswana.

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

*Statement on the State of the Nation<sup>+</sup>*

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt

1 *Two States in Germany*

Thirty years after the end of the Second World War and 25 years after the establishment of the two German States no one can any longer ignore the reality of their existence; the fact that they exist simultaneously governs to a large extent the state of the German nation. There are many questions over which the two German States are at odds. But they also have many things in common. They both call themselves German - no other State in the world calls itself German. The Germans do not want to - and if anyone wanted to they could not - deny that they belong to the German nation. Ernst Bloch was right when he said on 7 October 1974: ".... one simply cannot by a decision of the People's Chamber rule that one has had no part in two millennia of history, nor in .... what has been created and developed by a civilised nation".

That is why the relationship between the two German States has, in our view, a special character indeed. We stick to this view even if the leadership of the GDR mistakenly regard this as an attempt by the Federal Republic to impose an inferior status on the GDR. The Federal Government is of the opinion that recognising the special nature of the relationship with the GDR does not constitute an attempt to meddle with the latter's sovereignty but merely underlines the fact that Germans live in both States and that we Germans are entitled to determine our national destiny according to our own free will.

This is the conviction by which the Federal Government will continue to be guided. It will also in future create whatever possibilities it can for the people in Germany to live as one nation. This policy is consistent with the mandate of the Basic Law, Article 116 of which protects the principle of one nationality.

This has natural consequences for any Federal Government; one of them was clearly explained once again by the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs last week on a given occasion.

My colleague, Herr Genscher, said:

"If a German within the meaning of the Basic Law seeks the protection of one of our consular missions abroad then he is given such protection. In this the Federal Government is following to the letter a decision taken by the Bundestag Legal Affairs Committee on 22 March 1973."

That decision reads as follows:

"All German nationals are entitled, also after the entry into force of the Basic Treaty, to the protection by the diplomatic and consular missions of the Federal Republic of Germany abroad."

The Federal Government has no intention of diverging from that decision. The Federal Government's position on this question is consistent with the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court on the Basic Treaty. This is also understood outside Germany. In seeking appropriate arrangements we have no need - not have we ever had any - to interfere with the internal affairs of third countries.

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Text of an address delivered to the Bundestag on 30 January, 1975.

I underlined it in my policy statement of 17 May 1974 and I emphasize the point again today: Despite all difficulties and setbacks we shall not relax our efforts to improve relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.

Developments up to now have shown that a successful intra-German policy above all requires plenty of staying power. The Federal Government has warned just as much against pessimism and resignation as against gullibility and illusion.

What Willy Brandt said on 5 April 1973 from this rostrum is still valid:

"We are not kidding ourselves as far as the complications and problems between the two States in Germany are concerned, but we do not allow ourselves to be kidded either."

The reason for this attitude is that as far as German problems are concerned there would be little point in appealing to ideals and the kind of understanding which the GDR leadership do not have. It has not been possible to agree on crucial fundamental issues owing to the fact that the two German States belong to quite different, in some respects antagonistic, social and political systems and that they have many conflicting interests. All the same, there are also parallel interests and above all there are various possibilities for each party to the treaty to meet the other's interests.

It is therefore important for the development of our relations to find out the areas of concurring or at least complementary interests. We negotiate with this in mind - with the aim of reaching agreements. Progress will not be forthcoming, however, unless both sides respect the present agreements.

## II *Strains*

In taking stock of the situation, I will turn first of all to the strains. Our relations with the GDR are indeed subjected to heavy strains. The wall, the barbed wire, the death strip, and the frontier guards, who are under orders to shoot, have still not lost their inhumanity. And everyone knows it would be illusory to believe that protests would help. However, we do not acquiesce in this situation but are perseveringly trying to change it. We know that the time when we shall have overcome the present situation can only lie at the end of a very long process.

Our view is that the principle of proportionate sanction and humanitarian responsibility must also apply particularly in a State that wants to be socialist.

Today still, inhumanity harsh prison sentences are passed by courts in the GDR on people accused of helping East Germans escape to the West. I am surprised the GDR leadership do not realize that terror judgements are bound to be regarded as signs of uncertainty.

In the spring of 1974 the GDR Government badly impaired its relationship with the Federal Government by means of a very serious case of espionage; and the waters are still troubled.

The GDR placed a heavy strain on our existing contractual relations by temporarily resorting to measures not covered by the Transit Treaty after the Federal Environment Agency had been set up in Berlin.

And the GDR Government subjected the conditions underlying some of our agreements subsequently to considerable strain. The unilaterally imposed increase at the end of 1973 of the minimum daily amount of currency to be exchanged by citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany travelling to the GDR caused a sizeable drop in their number which had been rising sharply before. I have

given special attention to this question and the result has been a considerable reduction of the exchange requirements. I will not conceal that it was by no means easy for the GDR leadership to accept this reduction. The number of visits by people from the Federal Republic and West Berlin last December was almost 50 per cent higher than the figure for December 1973, which the doubling of the exchange rate requirement had cut back considerably. But it is also higher than the figure for December 1972.

But although we are pleased with this improvement we must still say that if the GDR repeats unilateral measures which violate the spirit or letter of existing agreements we cannot simply carry on as if nothing had happened, not even if the damage should have been remedied.

What we are concerned about is not merely how we should assess the GDR as a partner to agreements with us. What we are likewise concerned about is the progress of détente in Europe. As a State in the heart of Europe the GDR must be willing to bear its share of the responsibility for this progress. If East Berlin had taken a different attitude we might today have been farther along the road.

### III *Progress*

So we see, the GDR Government has at no time made it easy to develop the system of intra-German agreements. Nonetheless, it has in many cases been possible, often in protracted negotiations, to make progress in the interest of the people in East and West after all.

The Permanent Representations in East Berlin and Bonn have commenced their activities. Our Representation at the seat of the GDR Government is dealing every day with matters which we had no opportunity of attending to previously. The two States are now in permanent contact about political and practical questions, without having to wait for the next meeting of special representatives.

In addition, the numerous delegations and commissions are continuing the negotiations begun at an earlier date and they have proved successful. For example, there is the agreement on health protection measures, two transfer agreements, and the understanding between the top sporting organizations.

The new swing agreement opens up for trade and industry long-term perspectives for the further development of supply arrangements. This will also help the Federal Republic's own economic and employment situation. And it is a policy which Chancellor Kiesinger blueprinted in his policy statement of 13 December 1966.

The permanent commissions for border questions, traffic, and Berlin transit have done useful work as regards both fundamental issues and individual cases. The border commission has come up with a proposal for regulating the overall Lübeck Bay complex.

The various negotiations with a view to developing our co-operation in the economic sphere are still going on; the same goes for the volume of trade.

I assume, moreover, that those parts of the Federal Government's written replies to major parliamentary questions concerning the organization and development of our contractual relations with the GDR have been given particular attention in the House. I would also like the public to be more widely informed about our wide-ranging contacts with the GDR. Unfortunately, the problems besetting German-German relations are often given wider and more spectacular coverage than the favourable results.

I will at any rate mention that with regard to our efforts to resolve

individual humanitarian problems, work which has not been made public for the sake of all concerned, the GDR leadership has of late widened the scope for reuniting and repatriation of families.

There could, of course, again be setbacks in any of these areas in the future. We have no illusions about this.

In his policy statement on 28th January 1973, Chancellor Willy Brandt said:

"We realize that the road is long and stony. After many years of non-relations and hostility, the people and those in government in the two German States will have to experience and to learn to deal with each other. We shall not be spared difficulties and frictions."

That sober assessment holds true for the future, too.

#### IV *Berlin*

One of the major issues in this year's negotiations will be the extension and improvement of the transit routes between Federal territory and Berlin. I believe this is of great importance; for despite all the efforts of previous Federal Governments, it is something new for both Governments to be talking about improving the transit routes, and this means facilitating the ties between the Federal Republic of Germany and Berlin. We shall not throw away this opportunity.

Under the agreement I reached in September with Herr Honecker, we shall be discussing a whole range of projects of varying magnitude. With some we shall be able to make relatively rapid progress. Other projects will require more time both for the negotiations and for the implementation. We shall take care throughout to ensure that there is a reasonable relation between costs and benefits both for ourselves and vis-à-vis the GDR; but, in weighing up costs against benefits, we shall not confine ourselves to economic considerations, but shall also place in the scales the human and political improvements.

The viability of Berlin remains for us of cardinal importance. In the future, too, we shall do all in our power to maintain and strengthen the ties which have developed between Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany and whose maintenance and development were confirmed and strengthened by the Quadripartite Agreement.

On 16 December, 1974 I had discussions in Berlin with leaders of industry and the trade unions. We set up private working groups on several topics. All participants were united in their desire to continue to exploit fully all possibilities for Berlin's economy to develop in harmony with that of the Federal territory. They were also unanimous in their assessment that the situation of the city and its economy today is far better than in previous years.

In this connection I should like to quote the American Secretary of State who said last year:

"Berlin's potential as Europe's perennial flashpoint has been substantially reduced through the Quadripartite Agreement. The United States considers strict adherence to the Agreement a major test of détente."

The Federal Government shares both these views. This applies also to all our allies, who at the North Atlantic Council session held in December 1974 in Brussels emphasised "the importance to the viability and security of the city of all the provisions of the Quadripartite Agreement. They also emphasised that there is an essential connection between détente in Europe and the situation relating to Berlin."

#### V *Co-ordination of Negotiations*

The scale of the contacts between the Federal Government and the Government of the GDR naturally makes co-ordination necessary. The negotiations in progress on the follow-up agreements to the Basic Treaty are being conducted by the delegations and commissions set up for this purpose. Their composition reflects the competences and expertise of the different ministries involved.

For the negotiations to be opened shortly we shall set up a delegation headed by State Secretary Gaus, the composition of which will vary depending on the issue under negotiation, but which will always include a representative of the Federal Ministry for Intra-German Relations.

Since 1973 the Federal Minister for Intra-German Relations had headed a co-ordinating committee, at whose meetings are present, according to the subject under discussion, the heads of the negotiating delegations, of the commissions and of the Trusteeship Office for Interzonal Trade, as well as representatives of the Federal Chancellery, the Federal Foreign Office and the Senate of Berlin.

This committee prepares the negotiating positions, on which the leaders of the Opposition will be informed in detail. The Federal Chancellery, for well known reasons is and will remain competent for the GDR Representation in Bonn, and similarly, our Permanent Representation in East Berlin is under the authority of the head of the Federal Chancellery.

I myself will continue to intervene personally in questions connected with our intra-Germany policy whenever, in the light of the circumstances, this appears appropriate.

#### VI *Continuity of our Road*

The policy pursued by the Federal Government is the only possible road towards regular co-operation in Germany. As for this road I should like to express my great respect and make the following observations:

It is the historic achievement of my predecessor, Willy Brandt, that he, together with Walter Scheel, succeeded just in time - that is when the two super-powers were in the process of agreeing to dismantle, on a scale hitherto unanticipated, their long-standing conflicts and confrontations - in preventing the emergence of a situation in which world politics in the 70's would simply bypass us Germans as a nation and turn to its own agenda which would not have been ours. The contractual foundation of the Ostpolitik which we achieved together with our allies also considerably expanded the capacity for German action and made peace - also and especially in Berlin - more secure.

This policy has rested - and will continue to rest - on the two pillars of renunciation of force and co-operation. If the Government in the other part of Germany has not, to date, entirely renounced force, nor been willing to co-operate with us without reservations, this cannot cause us to change this policy. For the fact is that within a relatively short period it has achieved results which, back in the 50s and 60s, would have been sensational.

Let us recall again the dangerous conflict situation which emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War.

From its inception the Federal Republic, together with its Western partners, had to prove itself in the conflict of political systems. It had to give substance to and defend our own value concepts of democracy, freedom, the rule of law and the open society, without at the same time neglecting external security. But there was also a natural demand among the overwhelming majority of the Germans for reunification in one State. Looking back today, it is apparent that since 1953 there has been no real possibility of this, although there were declarations of intent, e.g. by the signatory States to the Bonn Conventions.

At the beginning of the 60s for the first time the view began to develop among the three Western powers that it was necessary to come to terms, on the basis of the status quo, with the super-power in the East, as the Soviets would, under no reasonably conceivable conditions, accept German reunification. In the light of this change of view (with different motives in East and West) the intra-German policy then pursued by the Federal Republic was for the first time seen in the West as an obstacle to the emerging possibility of détente.

We remember only too well the diplomatic immobilism which thought to use a "doctrine" as a weapon against the international upgrading of the other German State and to possess a pawn which would allow the German question to be kept open. For years, despite the existence of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the inherent possibilities for a German policy, closely co-ordinated with the West, towards the East remained unexploited.

Instead we experienced in 1958 the Khrushchev ultimatum; the Berlin crises, the building of the wall. At Checkpoint Charly the tanks were ranged within sight of each other. The present leader of the Opposition was at that time a senior civil servant of the then Federal Government. He will remember this - also the fear in which he and all of us at that time lived. Today nobody fears that in Berlin the tanks will start advancing! What an immense transformation of the situation. Whoever denies the enormous progress we have achieved must have a pretty poor memory.

But even after the settlement of the Cuban missile crisis, even after the first steps towards détente between Washington and Moscow, the policy then pursued by Bonn, I am thinking for example of the movement expressed by the Peace Note of March 1966, still failed to make the urgently needed new beginning in the German Ostpolitik. For, even with good will, in 1966 the other side could only regard such a policy as an attempt to bypass it. The German-German development remained rigid and confined as a result of the policy of mere non-recognition.

None of this should we forget. Nor have we forgotten how afterwards the ground for the change of course in German policy was prepared by new



intellectual approaches: discussion papers of the Protestant Church in Germany and the Catholic Bensberger Circle, the exchange of open letters, the attempt to organise an exchange of speakers between the SED and the SPD, and finally, at the end of 1966, the formation of the Grand Coalition, when it was clear from the start that, with the Social Democrats in the Government, the intra-German policy and the Ostpolitik were to explore all possibilities conceivable in our position and to enlarge our capability to act. Likewise let me recall the draft general treaty between the two German States which the F.D.P. submitted in 1968.

Not until the social-liberal coalition did it become possible, after 1969 on the secure basis of the military and economic alliances in the West, to make our historic contribution to détente in the world and at the same time to promote the cohesion of our own nation. We must recognise that this course was only possible under certain international conditions, that it can only be successful in the future under certain international conditions, and that we have a considerable but nevertheless limited influence on the maintenance of these conditions.

The first and foremost condition is: If the mutual efforts of the two world powers should cease or even change to the reverse, the continuity of our course would be threatened; for the desire of Washington and Moscow to create a constructive mutual relationship was and remains the essential condition not only for the Quadripartite Agreement, but also for our whole Ostpolitik and its success. This desire is reflected in a continual process known throughout the world as "détente" - that is a process, not some final state now or in the future.

Or, to emphasise one important aspect of this situation: only as long as the Soviet Union remains interested in the continuation of this process, can the continuity of the course of our Ostpolitik and our German-German policy be safeguarded. We are consciously doing our part to ensure that the Soviet leadership remains interested in the continuation of the process of détente and normalisation. This must include the continued interest of the East European countries which are allied politically and by treaties with the Soviet Union. This also applies to the GDR, which attaches decisive importance to the objectives and interests of the Soviet Union and its other allies.

All these partner countries, however, must also be able to learn that their interest is not just a product of wishful thinking, but that it is of advantage and benefit to them to participate in this process. The benefit for them lies in particular in the more secure foundation of universal and their own peace and in the promotion of their economic development.

This underlies our desire to expand economic, scientific and technological exchange with the Soviet Union, with the other States of the Warsaw Pact and with the GDR. This underlies also our active effort to obtain good results from the Geneva Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Vienna Conference on Mutual Balanced Force Reduction. This accounts also for our positive interest in SALT.

But not just because all these efforts are of advantage and benefit to our Eastern neighbours and partners, but also because they are of advantage and benefit to our Western partners, in the North Atlantic alliance and in the European Community, are all these processes possible at all.

And, to spell out clearly the most important aspect for the West: Only as long as the USA and our Western partners and allies are interested in the continuation of the process of détente and the progress in co-operation, shall we be able to safeguard the continuity of our Ostpolitik, our intra-German policy and our Berlin policy. The West, too, also France or England, must be able to obtain advantages and benefits - with regard to the safeguarding of peace, in the economic sphere and in all other spheres.

Up to now no State and no people in Europe has been harmed by this process of détente - on the contrary, they all recognise its advantages. We have reason to be grateful, for we Germans, at any rate, gain a further advantage, for which other European nations have no need because they do not have to live in a state of national division. We Germans gain the additional advantage that we can regulate and improve in mutual agreement the relations between the two divided parts.

I could only touch briefly here on the international conditions for the success of our policy towards the GDR. But I should like to reiterate in another form what I said at the beginning of this passage: We have only a limited but nevertheless considerable influence on the maintenance of these international conditions. It is not the influence of a great power we can throw into the scales but the weight of an industrious, economically efficient State in the heart of Europe which is firmly rooted in its internal democratic order. To do so in the cause of safeguarding peace and promoting co-operation is incumbent on us, as a moral obligation but likewise on account of our own national interest.

#### VII *Common Ground*

The continued existence of the nation will ultimately depend on the behaviour of all Germans in their entirety. The vitality of our sense of national solidarity can neither be eliminated by East German decisions nor can that vitality be strengthened by West German postulates and declarations of loyalty alone. In fact, the preservation of our common substance will ensue from our actions.

The Federal Government would greatly appreciate if it could continue to pursue that policy for the one nation in co-operation with the Opposition. It would be following a dictate of self-respect if that policy for the one nation could be realised in co-operation between Government and Opposition.

One prerequisite for this would be that the Opposition would make up their minds to treat the agreements concluded with binding effect as what they are and not as if they were no treaties at all, in other words, that they would face the facts and accept the legal situation as created by the applicable agreements.

Only recently, on 19 December, I said in this House, that, as far as the rejection of ideological concessions is concerned, we agree even with Herr Erich Honecker, and certainly so in this House.

But surely one cannot - to quote our colleague, Herr Marx (Dr. Werner Marx, CDU) - "do things in common to cover up differences". True, I also ask myself, whether people who publicly accuse us of having "shown ourselves susceptible to blackmail", are indeed willing to develop common approaches. And I fail to see any indication of common ground as long as it is maintained that the Federal Government does "not have the resolute and purposeful intention to keep Berlin alive and build a future for that city".

Today it is a fact: whatever has been done in the past five years for Berlin and for improved relations in the interest of the people in both

German States - and our allies, too, think it is a great deal - had to be carried through against the resistance of the Opposition.

As long as this remains so, however, the Social-Liberal coalition and the Federal Government will have to do without the co-operation of the Opposition in this field.

The ideas and intentions of the CDU-CSU are contradictory in themselves as could be seen from the reactions of the party leadership to the visit of our colleague, Herr Leisler Kiep to East Berlin; up to now we have, therefore, not been able to detect any decisive influence exerted by forward-looking forces.

Nevertheless, despite passionate political arguments there had been, until some time ago, a minimum of trustful information and exchange between Government and Opposition, which was necessary in the interest of the country and in the interest of the cause involved. But even that minimum was rejected in 1973 by the new leadership of the CDU-CSU parliamentary group. I will not speculate on what motivated them at the time, now that the Opposition Leader has recently requested to be provided with better information, which he has received. From my point of view this is how it should remain.

#### VIII *Mandate: The Nation*

At present there exists neither in this House nor anywhere else in the world any practicable concept which could serve as an alternative to our intra-German policy. We must therefore not allow ourselves to be discouraged from continuing our policy for the German nation; this goes also for any events or decisions taken in the GDR; for neither the GDR Constitution of 1968 nor its Amendment of 1974 will essentially alter German history.

Throughout centuries, we Germans have lived on difficult terms with our nation. Finally we envied other people for the unquestioning manner in which they united to form a nation State, for we ourselves had but rarely been able to overcome our inclination towards fraternal strife.

Dynasties fighting for power, regional particularism and religious conflicts have often enough made the Reich, which by its name claimed to represent the German nation, the battleground of Germans against Germans. And that with the - sometimes decisive - participation of foreign powers.

True, other nations also had their revolutions, civic wars and coups d'état. But in Germany, German states fought against German states, for example in the 17th and in the 18th century. In the 19th century national unity for which many hopes had been roused by the Frankfurt National Assembly, was obstructed by the power-political conflict between Prussia and Austria.

All too often, contending German parties thought their particular power-political interests to be more important than the common destiny of the Nation. After 1945 we Germans again found ourselves in that same mental attitude for a long time and neither here nor on the other side has it already been entirely eradicated. But it may be necessary to remain conscious of the historic German fraternal strife - a heritage which we should not foster but indeed overcome.

We do not want to cover up nor minimize our ideological differences of opinion on what a society, a State, a democratic system or personal freedom should be like, differences which are deeply rooted in our moral convictions. But both in the GDR and here we should bear in mind that Karl Marx was born in Trier, Friedrich Engels in Barmen, and that Hegel came from Stuttgart. And I would add: Luther was born in Eisleben, Kant's home was in Königsberg,

Ferdinand Lassalle came from Breslau, Johann Sebastian Bach from Eisenach, Gerhart Hauptmann came from Silesia, Caspar David Friedrich from Greifswald, but then Bert Brecht was born in Augsburg, Schiller on the Neckar and Goete on the Main. They all belong together! And would they want to forget on the other side that Erich Honecker was born and brought up in the Saar and Ernst Thälmann in Hamburg? Or that our colleague Barzel comes from East Prussia, our colleagues Wehner and Mischnick from Dresden and our colleague Genscher from Halle?

These are only few of the names that could be given to testify to our common destiny, a common destiny which cannot just be talked away, or decided away, or decreed away!

I for my part am confident that the nation will continue to prove a strong element. But we must contribute our share to that.

The wars of Germans against Germans in past centuries did not extinguish the German nation; nor has the Cold War in the second half of this century been able to do so. We are in favour of overcoming it, and indeed we are about to overcome it.

There is no alternative to this; and this, too, is exactly how everybody sees it, including our allies, our neighbours in East and West, and so does the Soviet Union. Nevertheless we shall have to argue with Erich Honecker and his colleagues about many things, about their trend towards restrictive delimitation, about the concept of the nation, and especially about which content and form of society and State are better for the people who live in them.

But such arguments need be no hindrance to us in our practical co-operation for the benefit of both sides. They need not hinder us from breathing life into the Basic Treaty by means of follow-up negotiations. They must not be allowed to hinder us if we want to serve our own people and our neighbours and the common cause of peace.

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*THE O.A.U. AND THE APPOINTMENT OF THE U.S. ASSISTANT  
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS*

The text of a letter (released to the Press on 24 February, 1975) from the U.S. Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, to the Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity, Mr. W.A. Eteki Mboumoua, is given below. This letter was written after the O.A.U. Council of Ministers had expressed concern about the nomination of Mr. Nathaniel Davis as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, in succession to Mr. Donald Easum.

Dear Mr. Secretary General: The text of the 'Consensus Resolution' of the OAU Council of Ministers, commenting upon the nomination by the President of the United States of Nathaniel Davis to the important position of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs has been brought to my attention by press accounts. The selection of senior officials for posts in the United States Government is a function of American sovereignty. Unlike the established procedures for accrediting ambassadors for whom agreement is sought, the selection of Assistant Secretaries of State remains a purely internal, domestic concern. The United States Government would never comment publicly upon the choices of other sovereign governments in filling any of their public offices. Under commonly accepted principles of international decency it has the right to expect the same of other governments, particularly of those whom it has regarded as friends. You will understand, Mr. Secretary General, the depth of my dismay in learning from the press of this unprecedented and harmful act of the Council.

Ambassador Davis, as you know, is a brilliant career officer in our foreign service. President Ford and I repose particular trust and confidence in him. Indeed, he has served with great distinction in high posts in our public service under Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon as Deputy Associate Director of the Peace Corps, Minister to Bulgaria, Ambassador to Guatemala, Ambassador to Chile and as Director General of the Foreign Service. He is not yet fifty years old. The post to which he has been nominated by the President is one to which we attach very great importance. Mr. Davis was selected in order to give new impetus and inspiration to our African policy. I have full confidence in his ability to fill this vital position with distinction. I am certain that the African statesmen with whom he will be dealing will learn to respect him as I do.

I cannot believe, Mr. Secretary General, that the members of the Council were aware that Ambassador Davis, while serving in the Peace Corps under President Kennedy, travelled widely in Africa, that he was a marshal in the great 1963 civil rights march in Washington led by Dr. Martin Luther King, that he has served for periods totalling five years as an assistant professor at Washington's leading Black institution, Howard University, and that he has devoted many years of his spare time as a volunteer worker among the disadvantaged Black citizens of Wash-

ington. I am truly saddened to learn of the manner in which the Council has besmirched the reputation of this outstanding man who was selected precisely because we believed that he possessed the breadth of view and the compassionate understanding for a new approach to this vital post. To suggest that such a man has a mission to "destabilize" Africa, a continent with which we have enjoyed excellent relations and in whose development it is our policy to assist, is unacceptable and offensive. (I might also add that the word 'destabilize' is one coined by a newspaper reporter, not one ever used by any U.S. official to describe our activities in any country.)

I would ask you to communicate to the African heads of state at the earliest possible moment the text of this message, in order that the regret felt in the United States over this unfortunate and unfair action is well understood.

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