


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THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS



DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE

**NEWSLETTER**

**NUUSBRIEF**

Vol. 7 No. 3.

1975

S.A.I.I.A.

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DIE SUID - AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE

THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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Alle standpunte ingeneem in artikels in hierdie Nuusbrief is die verantwoordelikheid van die skrywers en nie van die Instituut nie.

All opinions expressed in articles in this Newsletter are solely the responsibility of the respective authors and not of the Institute.

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2017 Braamfontein

South Africa

September, 1975

## DIRECTOR'S NOTES

*Appointment of Assistant Director*

Mr. Peter Vale, who has been Assistant to the Director since October, 1973, will be resigning from the Institute's staff at the end of September, 1975, in order to continue his post-graduate studies in international relations at the University of Leicester in the United Kingdom.

With effect from the beginning of October, the Institute's Council has appointed Mr. Denis Venter to the new post of Assistant Director. Mr. Venter will be coming to Jan Smuts House from the University of Pretoria, where he has been a lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Politics. He has also been for several years Secretary of the Institute's Pretoria Branch.

In addition to his duties as Assistant Director of the Institute, Mr. Venter will become Secretary of the Witwatersrand Branch, a position held until now by Mr. Vale, and for the time being he will also continue as Secretary of the Pretoria Branch.

*Corporate Membership*

Since the last issue of the *Newsletter*, three new Corporate Members have joined the Institute:

McCarthy Rodway Ltd.  
Otis Elevator Co. Ltd.  
Schindler Lifts (S.A.) (Pty.) Ltd.

The Institute is very pleased to be able to welcome these new Members. (A full list of Corporate Members is given on the inside back cover of the *Newsletter*.)

*New Institute in Rhodesia*

The first article in this issue of the *Newsletter* is by Senator Dr. Denis Worrall, and it will be noted that it is reproduced from a publication issued by the Institute of International Affairs, Salisbury. This is in fact the first publication of a new sister Institute which has recently been established with the encouragement and assistance of our Institute. The decision to establish the Institute in Salisbury was taken at a well-attended meeting in that city on 7 May, 1975, at which the S.A. Institute was represented by Mr. Deon Fourie (a member of the National Executive Council and Vice-Chairman of the Pretoria Branch) and the Director.

It is confidently hoped that close co-operation will develop between the two Institutes, and members of the South African Institute who visit Salisbury in the future, and who wish to establish contact with the Institute there, may use the following address :

Dr. George Smith  
Hon. Sec: Institute of International Affairs,  
c/o Institute of Adult Education,  
University of Rhodesia;  
P.O. Box MP.167  
MOUNT PLEASANT, Salisbury.

### *Publications*

It will be noted from the list of recent Institute publications on page 51 that a new publication entitled *South Africa and the Future of World Energy Resources* is available and may be ordered from the Institute. It contains articles by a number of distinguished South African authorities, dealing with questions such as the current world oil supply and demand, coal resources, the future of nuclear energy and the development of electric power in Southern Africa (including both thermal generation of electricity and hydro electric power). Two important general subjects dealt with are: "Energy in Relation to Growth" and "International Political Aspects of the World Energy Crisis".

The contributors to this publication are : Dr. N. Stutterheim, Professor M.H.H. Louw, Mr. I.F.A. de Villiers, M.P., Senator Denis Worrall, Mr. A.R. Hough, Mr. George Clark, Mr. George Palmer, Dr. J.W.L. de Villiers, Mr. F.W. Stutterheim and Mr. Henry Olivier. Their contributions are based on papers presented at a Symposium organised by the Institute in Cape Town in September, 1974, in association with the Cape Town and Stellenbosch Branches of the Institute.

A full list of Institute publications has recently been produced, and it is enclosed separately with this *Newsletter*.

JOHN BARRATT  
Jan Smuts House  
September, 1975

## S.A.I.I.A.

## NUUSBRIEF / NEWSLETTER

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## THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND DETENTE \*

Senator Denis Worrall

Although I am speaking to you tonight as a Nationalist politician, I am reminded of a point which Maurice Cowling of Cambridge makes in a very excellent little book called *The Nature and Limits of Political Science* (1). He is rather sceptical of political scientists who suppose that by studying the outer manifestations of government, light will be thrown on the way governments actually work - as though to quote Cowling:

those who govern make public the factors which determine the decisions they take. Not only is it unlikely that their explanations will reveal their intentions: it is likely, on the contrary, that they will conceal them. And not only in trivial or unimportant matters but in important matters also: the more important the matter, the more likely is concealment to occur ..... Those who govern are apt to take actions for which the reasons cannot be given: and often the reasons that are given are designed to lead those who study them as far away from the true reasons as possible. (2)

As a political scientist I *believed* this to be true; as a politician I now *know* it to be so. And therefore although I speak to you tonight as a parliamentary representative of the ruling party in South Africa, this must necessarily be a personal interpretation of South Africa's policy towards Southern Africa.

### *South Africa in the post-World War II Period*

There are probably three primary reasons why South Africa has drawn more international attention in the post-World War II period than its size, resources, and general importance warrant. Firstly, there is the fact of colour. South Africa's policies have been seen to conflict with the non-discriminatory and integrational norms generally advocated and expounded in such documents as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Secondly, South Africa has drawn attention to itself as a carry over from colonialism. It has been viewed in the same light as former European-colonised territories in East and Central Africa, and has been seen to represent a reaction to the epochal developments based on majority rule and self-determination which have changed the political configuration of the African continent. And thirdly, South Africa has drawn attention to itself because of its strategic importance both with respect to its precious mineral resources and its geographic location.

During the Fifties, South Africa under pressure withdrew from certain international organisations which it deemed less than useful (e.g. UNESCO), but it clung to its membership of those organisations which served a practical value. Despite the great increase in the number of states in the world, South Africa's diplomatic relations remained more or less static.

The Republic's alienation within the international community reached new

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\* This article is based on an address given by Senator Denis Worrall of the National Party to a meeting of the Institute of International Affairs (Salisbury) Rhodesia on 26 June, 1975. It is reproduced from a publication of the Salisbury Institute (September 1975).

extremes in the early Sixties. Out of the Commonwealth and no longer cushioned by Britain, the early Sixties saw a massive increase in demands for trade sanctions, and boycott movements proliferated. In influential circles abroad there was a feeling, almost an expectation, that internal change induced by violence was just around the corner. South Africa's race relations policy stood out against the movement towards independence in the rest of Africa and rudely contradicted the hopes of those who, during the infancy of independent African politics, saw in Africa a kind of renaissance of man: African states, it was believed, would achieve democracy without the growing pains of industrialisation; African states, it was believed, would achieve the kind of Pan-African unity leaders like Nkrumah preached, without having to pass through the traumas of nationalism.

In the early years of the Sixties South Africa sat out tightly. As an insurance against embargoes and sanctions the search for oil was commenced and SASOL was expanded. The armed forces were reorganised and a massive military build-up undertaken. On the race relations front the Homeland policy was delineated more boldly and the Odendaal Commission(3) was appointed to draw up detailed proposals for South West Africa. Concerned by the effects on South Africa's trade, of Britain's possible entry to the European Economic Community, a determined effort was made to diversify the Republic's international trade.

#### *The Outward Policy of the Sixties*

Several developments in the mid-Sixties contributed to the question of a more favourable international climate as far as the Republic was concerned. In the first place the economic boom in the country of 1964 and 1965 put South Africa high up on the list of important trading countries, a fact which, combined with its greater military strength and armament self-sufficiency, put an end for the time being to talk of military invasions and economic sanctions. Racial tension in Britain and elsewhere, and the slow-down of the civil rights movement in the United States as it had been conceived in the years following Supreme Court's decision in *Brown vs. the Board of Education* of 1954, was another factor favouring South Africa: without implying approval of South African policies, these developments underlined the intractability of race problems and the improbability of instant solutions. The failure of African states to realise the early hope held out for them should be added to this factor.

The development of super-tankers and the closing later of the Suez Canal focused attention on the Cape sea route; and although there is disagreement about its strategic value in a nuclear age, an old argument for meaningful co-operation with the Republic was given new substance. Finally, among the factors which changed the international environment as far as South Africa was concerned, was the independence of Black states in and around the Republic. Apart from the fact that their dependence on South Africa was not lost on South Africa's detractors, the situation was created which forced policy-makers in the Republic to face up to the question of relations with independent Black African states. These were the circumstances which gave rise to the so-called "outward policy". In essence this policy involved a determination on South Africa's part to define its foreign policy objectives more ambitiously than in the past and to pursue these goals with greater vigour. There appeared to be three facets to this policy, the economic, the diplomatic, and the informational.

On the economic front the Republic was determined to expand its trade relations as widely as possible. The old reliance on Britain, while undoubtedly of continued

importance, was seen to contain hazards; and hence trade relations were expanded to other European countries and extended to South America and the Far East. On the diplomatic front the "outward policy" had as its objective the generation of a strong sense of Southern African regionalism through the establishment of diplomatic and other relations with these states. Also a part of the diplomatic/political facet of the "outward policy" was the Republic's expressed desire to play a role in conjunction with certain South American countries and Australia in the defence of the Southern hemisphere. On the informational front the goal of the "outward policy" was the promotion of a more positive image of South Africa, combined with a more flexible response to criticism of South Africa's policies. In this regard it took advantage of the greater uncertainty which existed and continues to exist in informed circles in Western countries in particular as to what should be done about South Africa and its problems.

#### *The First Dialogue Movement*

The "outward policy" was not specifically directed at Africa, though it represented a change in gear of South Africa's foreign policy in general. However in the period 1969 to 1971 the Republic achieved a relative break-through in its relations with the rest of Africa. On 7 November 1969 Dr. K.A. Busia, Ghana's new Prime Minister, announced that he favoured dialogue with Pretoria, and despite criticisms from within Ghana he reiterated this view in November 1970. However, the overthrow shortly afterwards of Busia's government ended this possibility as far as Ghana was concerned. A more significant initiative for contact with South Africa came in particular from the Francophone states of West Africa. The lead here was taken by President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast who, on 4 November 1970, announced that he intended calling a meeting of African leaders to promote direct talks with South Africa. Within a matter of days, several other African heads of government, including President Philibert Tsiranana of Madagascar, President Omar Bongo of Gabon, President Leopold-Sedar Senghor of Senegal, and President Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic, came out in support of contact with South Africa.

Support for dialogue grew in 1971, when at a major press conference in Abidjan on 28 April, President Houphouet-Boigny confirmed that he would continue with dialogue and try to persuade other African heads of state to support him. On this occasion he also intimated that he would visit South Africa if the initial contacts proved fruitful. The Africa Institute of South Africa regards this press conference as marking the high-water mark of the movement towards West African/South African dialogue in the period 1969 to 1971, because two months later the OAU expressed itself in opposition to dialogue, except on the basis set out in the Lusaka Manifesto of April, 1969.<sup>(4)</sup>

#### *The Coup in Lisbon*

Diplomatic relations between South Africa and other countries in Africa was officially at a standstill in the period from mid-1971 to mid-1974, although trade, of course, continued. Then somewhere during 1972, a decision was taken to switch the focus of South Africa's foreign policy to Africa. The course of the South West Africa issue at the United Nations and developments in the Portuguese territories and Rhodesia will have influenced this decision. But what was crucial was the realization that South Africa was wasting its time trying to make an impact on Western countries as long as it failed to demonstrate some measure of acceptability in Africa itself.

It would come as no surprise to me if Prime Minister John Vorster figured in this decision. Mr. Vorster is a hard-headed realist with an acute understanding of the nature of power. He is a resourceful negotiator and very effective in person-to-person contacts and not to be under-estimated. However, possibly the main significance of his contribution to South African foreign policy to date is the fact that under his leadership South Africa, for the first time, has become completely Africa-orientated. Previous Prime Ministers to a varying degree all started from the premise that South Africa was a part of Europe in Africa. Mr. Vorster broke with this shortly after becoming Prime Minister, when he spoke of white Africans as "being of Africa; Africa has been kind to us; and we intend paying back to Africa something of what we have received from Africa" - a sentiment which runs through many of his major speeches on South Africa's relations with the rest of Africa. But whatever the decision, and regardless of who was responsible, when historians get down to writing up the course of South African foreign policy during the years 1972 to 1974, I have a feeling that they will find that our foreign policy efforts were greatly increased during these years, particularly the exploring of possible contact with Africa.

Of course what brought the issue to the surface was the coup in Lisbon and, more specifically, the subsequent decision of the new government to withdraw from Africa, but this is not to suggest that the Lisbon coup suddenly transformed South Africa's perception of the southern African situation. On the contrary, the South African response, as reflected publicly in the speeches of both the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister was, to quote the Africa Institute, "...the logical continuation of the South African government's long-standing policy of seeking co-operation and sound relationships with others, and adhering to the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of its neighbours on the continent of Africa."(5)

In other words, the South African response to events in the Portuguese territories was the only one South Africa could logically adopt. Surprising, therefore, is the fact that there were nevertheless fears at the time that South Africa would intervene. The Prime Minister's interview in *Newsweek* of 16 September 1974 must have gone a long way towards putting these fears to rest. The South African Prime Minister received full marks for his diplomatic correctness in handling this situation. But more important than this, South Africa probably demonstrated its *bona fides* to other African countries. The Africa Institute puts it like this:

It is possible that in the eyes of President Kaunda and certain other African leaders this consistent application of South African principles in practice seemed to supply surprising, but convincing, proof of the South African Prime Minister's credibility and of the fact that he is just as sincerely concerned about peace and co-operation as any other responsible African leader. President Kaunda's philosophy is clearly another important factor which would have had a positive bearing on such a demonstration of good faith.(6)

### *First Public Moves in Détente*

With his speech in the South African Senate on 23 October 1974, Mr. Vorster moved beyond a single response to events in the Portuguese territories, for with this speech he publicly committed South Africa to a wider détente movement. To quote the Prime Minister's central theme:

I believe that southern Africa has come to the cross-roads. I believe that southern Africa has to make a choice. I think that that choice lies between peace on one hand and an escalation of strife on the other. The consequences of an escalation are easily foreseeable. The toll of a major confrontation will be high. I would go so far as to say that it would be too high for southern Africa to pay ... But there is an alternative way. That way is the way of peace. The way of normalizing of relations, the way of sound understanding and normal association. I believe that southern Africa can take that way. I have reason to believe that it is prepared to take that way. And I believe that it will do so in the end.(6)

The main themes of the Senate speech were underlined the next day by South Africa's Ambassador at the United Nations, Mr. Pik Botha, in an address to the General Assembly.(7) Mr. Vorster himself returned to the same themes in a speech in his own constituency of Nigel on 5 November (this was his widely reported "give us six months" speech) (8) and at a political rally in Zeerust a week later.

Of very considerable significance was the Zambian response, Dr. Kaunda on 26 October(9) described Mr. Vorster's speech as the "voice of reason". He went on to say "that African countries will not take up arms and fight South Africa. The people of South Africa will face the primary task of shaping their own destiny". The significance of the Zambian response lies in the fact that, although there was a frank exchange of letters between the Zambian President and the South African Prime Minister between April and August 1968, relations between the two countries had been severed since June 1967 when the Zambian government prohibited Zambians from working in South African mines (an estimated 6,000 Zambians were involved). The extent of the break-down of relations which followed is reflected in the sudden decline - from 25,000 in 1965 to a standstill - of South African tourists to Zambia.

Why the change in attitude implicit in President Kaunda's response to Mr. Vorster's speech? Mr. C.J.A. Barratt, Director of the South African Institute of International Affairs, in an article in *The World Today*(10) points out that developments in the Portuguese territories and in particular in Mozambique also had an effect on Zambia:

Although Dr. Kaunda had worked for the ending of Portuguese rule in Mozambique, he was suddenly faced in 1974 with the prospect of becoming involved, together with Mozambique, in a direct confrontation with the remaining bastions of White rule.

He must have realised that a confrontation with South Africa in particular would be very different in kind from anything else which had happened in southern Africa, and might engulf the whole of the region in uncontrollable violence.<sup>(11)</sup>

Zambia also, for economic reasons and the fact that the Tanzam railway line and the East African Community have lost a lot of their original glamour, has a direct interest in the maintenance of political stability in Mozambique. And the significance of this, as Barratt points out: "It seems clear therefore, that there is now a coincidence of interests between Zambia and South Africa in regard to the avoidance of direct confrontation in southern Africa and, in particular, in regard to the stable development of Mozambique".<sup>(12)</sup> This community of interests embraces also the achievement of a constitutional settlement in Rhodesia, for, as Barratt put it: "While Rhodesia remains in the middle (politically and economically, as well as physically), South Africa and Zambia cannot move effectively to negotiations about economic relations and eventually about political differences".<sup>(13)</sup>

But whatever the precise reasons for Zambia's positive response to the South African Prime Minister's speech of 23 October, there is little question that Zambia has a direct interest in the avoidance of confrontation and conflict in southern Africa. (Interesting in this regard is Mr. Colin Legum's account of the emergence of détente. According to him, the OAU and Zambia took the initiative and invited Pretoria to respond.)<sup>(14)</sup> Moreover, this interest expressed in fairly extensive, formal government-to-government contacts with South Africa. As a matter of fact, according to the Africa Institute<sup>(15)</sup>, between 5 October 1974 and 12 February 1975 there were no fewer than fifteen meetings in Cape Town, Pretoria, Lusaka, and Salisbury between representatives of the two governments, and on 9 February the South African Foreign Minister, Dr. Hilgard Muller, visited Lusaka. This visit was described by Zambian television as "epoch-making". Shortly afterwards a South African Broadcasting news team, the first since the 1964 Independence, and the Director of the Africa Institute, Dr. J.H. Moolman, and two of his senior researchers, visited Zambia. Both groups were cordially received.

However, South Africa's contacts over the past eighteen months have not been limited to Zambia, but have ranged very widely over Africa. Apart from the subsequently highly-publicised personal visit of Mr. Vorster to the Ivory Coast for discussions with President Houphouët-Boigny, and his visit to Liberia for discussions with President Tolbert, it may be assumed that South Africa has been in touch with other governments in Africa. The primary and obvious purpose of these contacts has been to inform these states of South Africa's objectives and, where possible, to gain their support. South Africa can also not be unmindful that contacts made beyond the southern African periphery serve as justification for leaders closer to home for whom dialogue is not simply an emotional or ideological issue.

#### *Détente and its Issues*

But what are South Africa's objectives in the détente process; what is it that South Africa hopes to achieve? With Maurice Cowling's cautionary words in mind

I would prefer to rephrase the question in terms of the main issues which are involved, for the mysterious ways of politicians aside, the fact is that a Community interest has emerged, or certainly appears to have emerged, among states in southern Africa, so that the same goals are in varying degrees shared. The main issues then, seen from a South African point of view, are the following: (1) The normalization of inter-state relations in southern Africa specifically and in Africa generally; (2) The resolution by peaceful means of the outstanding international problems of the region; and (3) The recognition in regional association terms of the inter-state relations which already exist among the several states and territories of southern Africa.

(1) The Normalization of Inter-state Relations: In one sense the concept of *normalized* relations is of course a relative concept - for relations between states vary in their intensity, their extent, and their amity. What is more, relations between states vary according to political personnel, changes in party, shifts in ideology, and of course perceptions of national interest differ. But on the other hand certain minimal assumptions underlie the regular relations between states: state recognition; non-interference in internal affairs; and the encouragement of trade and other non-political relations where these naturally and logically occur. Diplomatic relations as such are not a pre-requisite of normal relations - depending as they do on a country's resources and priorities in the international community - although certain minimal standards of "civilized" discourse are a requisite for normal relations.

By these standards, relations in southern Africa are certainly not normal. Although several of the national economies in the region are inextricably linked to the South African economy, and although inter-regional trade has actually continued to increase (official disclaimers notwithstanding), South Africa has diplomatic relations with only one other country in the region (Malawi); its right to survive is openly questioned; the most blatant forms of interference in South Africa's internal affairs are practised or permitted by other states in the region; which states also join in the hostile comment which is directed at South Africa at the United Nations and elsewhere; and which states also reject South Africa's *bona fides* as far as its internal policies are concerned. When, therefore, Mr. Vorster spoke of "normalization" he may be taken to have been referring to changes with respect to these aspects of inter-state relations in southern Africa.

To describe normalization of relations as an issue of *détente* in these terms is not, as some might think, to evade what many regard as the main cause of South Africa's international estrangement, namely its governmental structure, its political processes, and pattern of race relations. Normalization, in fact, *détente* as such, does have unavoidable implications for South Africa (and also for Rhodesia), measured in terms of that country's domestic policies, and I will return to these presently. But up till now, our African, like so many of our critics elsewhere, have approached South Africa dogmatically and have tended not to see what developments have occurred or to recognize the generally changing character of the South African policy. If normalization of inter-state relations is explicitly acknowledged in official statements to be an issue in southern African *détente*, so are the reasons for wanting relations normalized. The first is unquestionably the need to put an end to violence in the region and so negate the dangers of an escalation of strife. This is what the Prime Minister was referring to in his Senate speech when he said: "On considering South Africa on this occasion it is clear to all of us that for a decade or more southern Africa has unfortunately been characterized by violence and strife". Seemingly intent on clearing away all

possible misunderstandings in this regard, and allaying any fears that may be, Mr. Vorster again repeated his government's willingness to enter a non-aggression pact with " ... any government which requests this and which may perhaps harbour any misgivings on that score". But while he promised " ... that although no incidents would be provoked on the part of South Africa, and no problem caused", he cautioned that " ... South Africa has the elementary right to defend itself with all the power at its command, and South Africa's power in that regard is not inconsiderable".(16)

South Africa also considers normalization of relations as desirable in view of the threat of Great Power rivalry and involvement in Africa. In his Senate speech the Prime Minister referred to this when he said:

"I believe that we have reached the stage where Africa should give serious consideration to itself and to its future, where Africa should in all earnest ask itself where it is going and where it wants to go, particularly if we take cognizance of what is happening in the Indian Ocean and of the disturbances which are being caused by that."(17)

This is not a new position as far as South Africa is concerned. In fact it figured in the earlier "dialogue" movement and was strongly echoed at that time by President Houphouët-Boigny. In a widely publicised press interview on 14 May 1971, the Ivory Coast leader urged dialogue with Pretoria because, he said, the real danger to Africa was not South Africa, but rather communist expansion.

South Africa furthermore believes that normalization of inter-state relations is necessary if African countries are to achieve satisfactory levels of economic development. In his Senate speech the Prime Minister, as on other occasions, committed South Africa to contributing its share to the continent's needs in this respect.

(2) The settlement by peaceful means of the international problems of the region: The two major problems of international concern in the region, namely South West Africa and Rhodesia, have for some time been points of friction; and in present circumstances they constitute obstacles to the normalization of inter-state relations in southern Africa. It is encouraging that settlement of these problems by peaceful means is entailed also in the community of interest which has emerged in southern Africa. Apart from earlier statements by President Kaunda, indicating a preference for negotiated settlements, and a similar commitment by Sir Seretse Khama on 18 November(18) when opening the Botswana parliamentary session, according to Mr. Legum(19) the Lusaka Agreement reached between the parties to the Rhodesian dispute in December 1974, represented the first concrete joint Black African commitment to the principle of a negotiated non-violent settlement of, specifically, the Rhodesian issue. That agreement was witnessed and backed by Zambia, Botswana, Tanzania, and Mozambique. This position was endorsed and extended to include also South West Africa at the April meeting of OAU Foreign Ministers at Dar es Salaam.(20)

On the other side, if proof were needed of South Africa's commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes in the region, this is present in Mr. Vorster's speech in the Senate, with its reference to "... the toll of major confrontation

being too high for southern Africa to pay", and also in his speech in Nigel where he spoke of the choice before Africa lying between "either peace on the one side, or escalation of violence on the other; either co-operation on the one side, or confrontation on the other; either progress on the one side, or destruction on the other; either development on the one side, or stagnation on the other".(21)

South West Africa has been an issue of dispute between South Africa and the United Nations since the League of Nations was dissolved in April 1946. The question arose then of the future of South West Africa, and four courses suggested themselves: (1) The territory be placed under international trusteeship; (2) It be annexed by South Africa; (3) It become independent; and (4) The prevailing situation be maintained. Even before the dissolution of the League, the Legislative Assembly of South West Africa asked that the territory be incorporated into South Africa. And this was the request which General Smuts made to the United Nations in 1946. But this request was refused and South Africa was asked to transfer the territory to the new Trusteeship Council of the United Nations. South Africa declined to do so, adopting the position that she was under no legal obligation to the United Nations. By 1947 it was clear to South Africa that the United Nations would never agree to incorporation, and in June of that year the government informed the United Nations that it had no intention of pursuing this course: it would continue to administer the territory in the spirit of the mandate, and it undertook to furnish the United Nations with voluntary progress reports.

However, the new Government in 1948 decided to discontinue this practice. In consequence the United Nations asked the International Court for a legal opinion on the legal status of South West Africa, and for a statement of South Africa's obligations under the mandate. This is not the place to describe in detail the course of the dispute from this point on, with its several references to the International Court, the General Assembly's unlawful revocation of the mandate, and the increasing involvement of the Security Council, right down to the exercise earlier this month (June, 1975) by the United Kingdom, France and the United States of their veto of a mandatory arms embargo proposal. However, what is relevant in the light of détente is South Africa's present position on South West Africa and the steps which it has, and is, taking in that territory.

South Africa has repeatedly stated that it has no claim to South West Africa or to any part of its territory. In the letter the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hilgard Muller, wrote to Dr. Waldheim on 27 May 1975, Dr. Muller wrote:

My government has repeatedly stated that it recognised the distinct international status of South West Africa, and that it does not claim one inch of the territory for itself. Its sole concern has been to develop the territory to the best interest of all its inhabitants and to prepare them for the orderly exercise of their right to self-determination.(22)

South Africa has also repeatedly stated that its goals for South West Africa are self-determination and independence. This much was confirmed by the Secretary-General following his meeting with the South African Prime Minister in March 1972. In his report Dr. Waldheim declared: "With regard to the question of Namibia, the South African government confirms that its policy is one of self-determination and independence".(23) However, it is precisely on this aspect that differences of opinion occur. Most of South Africa's critics at the United Nations understand self-determination to mean self-government on a majority rule basis, regardless of the great demographic and cultural diversity of the population. By contrast, the South African government has stressed the heterogeneity of the population, and the fact that the country is composed of many peoples, each of which has a right to maintain its cultural identity. However, the South African government has also consistently emphasized that the political future of South West Africa must be determined by the people of South West Africa themselves. In his letter of 27 May 1975 to the Secretary-General, Dr. Muller expressed this point as follows:

As is well-known, the basis of the South African Government's approach to the question of South West Africa is that it is for the people of South West Africa themselves to determine their own political and constitutional future in accordance with their own freely expressed wishes. This presupposes that they should exercise their choice freely and without interference from South Africa, the United Nations, or any other outside entity. All options are therefore open to them - including that of independence as one state, if that is what they should choose.(24)

In a nutshell, therefore, South African policy with regard to South West Africa is one of self-determination and independence in a form to be decided upon by the peoples of South West Africa themselves and they are in the process of taking this decision right now.

South Africa's attitude towards Rhodesia, both before and after UDI, is perfectly clear. In October 1965, Dr. Muller flatly said that South Africa would not interfere should Rhodesia declare independence unilaterally: "This is a matter which only concerns Rhodesia. South Africa's policy is not to interfere in other countries' affairs".(25) On 12 November, the day after UDI, Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, the then South African Prime Minister, said that "... in accordance with our policy of non-intervention, we did not try to tell either Great Britain what we thought it should do or Rhodesia what we thought it should do".(26) This, therefore, was the official position, whatever reservations there were in government-supporting circles regarding the wisdom of the UDI course. This attitude was also clearly reflected on 25 January 1966, in the first comprehensive statement of the South African standpoint which Dr. Verwoerd gave the South African parliament. The South African position rested on two principles, which it had tried to uphold from the time of General Smuts. The first of these

... is that we do not allow interference in our own matters, and, if we do not allow such interference, then we should not interfere in those of others. The moment we interfere, we would sacrifice our own principles ... The second major

principle of our policy is this: since we have been threatened over and over again with, and to certain extent have experienced, boycotts and sanctions, we have taken a clear attitude that under no circumstances, be it under pressure or under force, will we participate in either boycotts or sanctions.... Naturally, in upholding such a principle, one has to uphold it equally towards all. I have been attacked for saying that we would be prepared to send coal to Zambia if coal were ordered. But this is a symbol, a clear-cut symbol, of our preparedness to uphold this principle towards all sides.(27)

With the exception of one small, but significant, change, South Africa has consistently maintained this policy towards Rhodesia down the years. The change related to the United Kingdom's role in the matter. At the time of UDI and immediately afterwards, South Africa saw the issue as a dispute between the United Kingdom and Rhodesia. (Dr. Verwoerd's statement of 12 November 1965, illustrated the point. For this reason, too, South Africa was critical of Britain for taking the Rhodesian issue to Security Council.) More recent South African statements have stressed that a settlement is a matter to be worked out by the Rhodesians themselves. With the exception of this change, and it is a change which simply reflects the reality of the situation, South African policy on Rhodesia has been completely consistent.

In his Senate speech, Mr. Voster set out South African policy towards Rhodesia in detail. And in his Nigel speech of 5 November he answered newspaper reports which suggested that South Africa was applying pressure to Rhodesia to reach a settlement with these words:

The truth of the matter is that South Africa and Rhodesia talk to each other. The truth of the matter is that we give each other advice. The truth of the matter is that we bring the realities of the situation to each other's attention and discuss them in depth. But Rhodesia is just as much a part of Africa as we are. Their hearth and home is also here... I want to make it very clear tonight that Rhodesia is not a subordinate of South Africa. It does not receive orders from South Africa. The Rhodesian government makes its own decisions.(28)

If these and other official statements of South African policy towards Rhodesia are analysed, South Africa's position will be seen to rest on the following four assumptions and propositions:

- (1) That South Africa is committed to the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states;
- (2) That South Africa is generally opposed to sanctions and boycotts;
- (3) That South Africa believes that a peaceful settlement is in the interest of Rhodesia, South Africa, and southern Africa as a whole; and

(4) That while South Africa is willing to assist with the creation of a climate in the region which is conducive to a negotiated, non-violent settlement, the form itself of the settlement is a matter for the Rhodesians to agree upon.

Regarding the presence since August 1967 of South African Police in Rhodesia, which is often interpreted as conflicting with South Africa's commitment to non-intervention, it should be pointed out that, in the South African view, this is not an act of involvement in Rhodesian affairs. The immediate reason for dispatching the South African Police was the participation by the banned African National Congress of South Africa in terrorist operations across the Zambesi. Thus, the South African representative told the United Nations, in October 1967, that this action was intended "to deal with terrorists of South African origin en route to South Africa for the purpose of committing subversion".(29) He went on to say that countries which allowed terrorists to operate from their territory had only to end that practice and the need to have South African police in Rhodesia would fall away. South Africa's reason for this step was therefore fully understood at the United Nations and in southern Africa at the time it was taken, and this is also the background to the decision of March of this year to withdraw the South African Police from active duty along the Rhodesian border.

As far as official policy towards Rhodesia is concerned, no changes have been made since 1965. The same basic assumptions apply. However, some observers detect a falling off in South Africa of popular support for Rhodesia. Thus Mr. Barratt, in the article referred to previously, writes that "... the strongest pressure Rhodesia must be feeling is the increasing evidence that support in South Africa for the *status quo* (in Rhodesia) is not very deep, in spite of wide emotional support in the past among South African Whites".(30) I am obviously in no position to say whether this is felt as a pressure in Rhodesia, but Barratt's observation is otherwise correct - that is, if popular opinion follows newspaper editorials. This is a development which, one wishes to stress, has little or nothing to do with official policy, and one can only speculate on possible reasons. But among them are probably the fear (particularly in the wake of Vietnam) of being sucked into a prolonged and uncontrollable war of attrition; awareness of the relatively narrow parameters which define South Africa's military strategy; impatience with Rhodesia because it is presented, particularly by Opposition newspapers, as holding up détente; and a greater consciousness of the very fundamental difference in principle between the internal policies of the two countries and the kind of political order each is committed to bringing about. Whatever the explanation, however, I wish to make it very clear that this is a development which cannot be attributed to official policy or to official policy statements.

The promotion of a southern African regionalism: A striking characteristic of international relations over the past twenty-five years has been the development of institutions linking countries at different levels of inter-state activity. Although "regional arrangements" and "agencies" are specifically recognised in Art. 33 and 52-54 of the UN Charter as means for preserving international peace and security, and for the peaceful settlement of disputes; the framers of the Charter could not have foreseen the mushrooming of regional associations which has in fact taken place.

South Africa has been committed for many years to the realization in southern Africa of a system of independent, inter-acting states, characterised by a spirit of good neighbourliness. As unquestionably the most economically and industrially

developed country in the area, South Africa is very conscious of the extensive inter-state links which already exist within the region - links of a financial, economic, trade, labour, communications, and transportation kind. Also contributing to a community of interest in functional terms is the compelling need to develop the natural and physical resources of southern Africa jointly. Moreover, these links involve all the states and territories of southern Africa.

Both generally and as far as specific bilateral relations are concerned, South Africa regards functional inter-state relations as very useful, if not necessary, objective conditions for political stability - particularly in a region containing so markedly different, yet inter-acting, political and economic systems. That South Africa wishes to contribute to the development of this regionalism is evident in its official pronouncements and actions. Thus the Prime Minister in his Senate speech said:

"I want to say that South Africa is prepared, to the extent that this is asked of it, and to which it is its duty, to play its part in and contribute its share towards bringing and giving order, development, and technical and monetary aid as far as this is within its means, to countries in Africa, and particularly to those countries which are closer neighbours.(31)

#### *The Implications of Détente for Internal Policy*

Black African states have not hesitated to prescribe the kind of political order they would like to see in South Africa. The Lusaka Manifesto of 1969(32) goes so far as to stipulate a change in the direction of policy in South Africa as a pre-condition for dialogue. And even those countries which have favoured contact with Pretoria have almost always justified this in terms of the influence they feel they will be able to exercise in this way on South Africa's internal policies.

One consequence of this is that the impression is left that there is a contradiction between South Africa's professed hopes for southern Africa and the goals of its internal policies. This is demonstrably not the case. In fact, properly understood and seen in transitional terms - as is true of so much else in Africa - the values and goals underlying South Africa's internal policy should not cause affront elsewhere in Africa. And I wish to explain this in relation to three important areas of social policy.

In the first place, South Africa is committed to the dismantling of the minority government structures inherited from a previous era, and to transferring political power on territorial lines as far as the Black nations are concerned. This policy does not answer all the questions that can be posed of it at present, but like any political policy it is a developing policy, an evolving policy, which must either accommodate new political forces as they are generated or collapse. But so far this policy has worked and is working - to the point where the first of the Homelands (The Transkei) is likely to take its place in the international community as an independent state next year. This course of political development which we are following in South Africa is fundamentally different from the course which you in Rhodesia have adopted. Political change in this country is premised

on the existence of a single political system serving all of Rhodesia's peoples, and progress in your case is measured in terms of the widening of the base of that system to include all Rhodesians. Secondly, South Africa is committed to the elimination of discrimination on grounds of colour. This goal and South Africa's commitment to it, were candidly put to the General Assembly on 24 October 1974 by the South African Ambassador, Mr. Pik Botha, in these terms:

"The fact of the matter is that we are all human beings, and with the exception of some elements which you will find in any country, white South Africans have the same feelings of humanity towards a black person as they do to any other person. Despite this, I know that many members of this Organization will say to us: Well that all sounds very fine, but if you really feel as you say you do, why is it that the policies of your government are discriminatory? Why is that your legislation or some of it anyway, distinguished between persons on grounds of colour and race? We do have discriminatory practices and we do have discriminatory laws, and it is precisely because of this that the greatest misunderstandings occur and our motives are most misrepresented. But that discrimination must not be equated with racialism. If we have that discrimination it is not because the whites in South Africa have any "Herrenvolk" complex. We are not better than black people; we are not more clever than they; What we can achieve so can they. Those laws and practices are a part of the historical evolution of our country, they were introduced to avoid friction and to promote and protect the interests and the development of every group, not only the whites. But I want to state here today very clearly and categorically: my government does not condone discrimination purely on the grounds of race and colour. Discrimination based solely on the colour of a man's skin cannot be defended. And we shall do everything in our power to move away from discrimination based on race or colour. (32)

And thirdly, South Africa is committed to the goal of a more equitable distribution of the country's resources by way of closing the largely-historically-determined "wage gap" and by economic and industrial decentralization.

There are therefore no inconsistencies, no anomalies, between South Africa's hopes for southern Africa and the internal objectives which it has set itself. And the process of détente neither adds to nor detracts from South Africa's internal policies. But this it does do: it challenges our commitment by reminding us of the expectations we have created over the years. We can hardly blame other people for wanting us to fulfil these commitments - for this is the price of being taken seriously. And the same point, incidentally, applies also to Rhodesia: over the years you have created certain expectations - what they are, you know better than I - and you can hardly hold it against others for looking to you to fulfil them.

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24. See Footnote 22 above.
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GLOBAL CHALLENGE AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION<sup>+</sup>

Henry A. Kissinger

Ten days ago our nation entered its two hundredth year. We begin our bicentennial with justifiable pride in our past, a recognition of the challenges of the present, and great hope for the future.

The world in which we live is poised uneasily between an era of great enterprise and creativity or an age of chaos and despair. We have, on the one hand, developed weapons that could destroy us and our civilization - we have, on the other, created a world economy that could - for the first time in history - eradicate poverty, hunger and human suffering.

This complex of unprecedented opportunity and unparalleled danger is at the heart of the great challenge that has faced the United States with increasing urgency since the close of World War II. And it is our generation that must make the choices which will determine success or failure. It is a burden that we can shoulder with fortitude or ignore with peril - but it is a burden we cannot shed. Our nation has come to symbolize man's capacity to master his destiny. It is a proud legacy that has given hope and inspiration to the millions who have looked to us over the past two centuries as a beacon of liberty and justice.

Today's generation of Americans must be as true to its duty as earlier generations were to theirs. When weapons span continents in minutes, our security is bound up with world peace. When our factories, farms and financial strength are deeply affected by decisions taken in foreign lands our prosperity is linked to world prosperity. The peace of the world and our own security, the world's progress and our own prosperity are indivisible.

*The Structure of Peace*

We have a proud foundation on which to build. We have maintained stability in the world, ensured the security and independence of scores of nations and expended blood and treasure in the defense of freedom. Our economic support helped our major allies regain their strength - we contributed to a global trading and monetary system which has sustained and spread prosperity throughout the world. With our encouragement, the new nations took their place in the international community and set out on the path of economic development. At our initiative, many long-standing disputes were settled by peaceful means. Conflicts were contained and global war was avoided.

We have provided more economic assistance than any other nation in history. We have contributed more food, educated more people from other lands, and welcomed more immigrants and refugees. We have done so because we are a generous people - for which we need not apologize - and because we have understood that our self-interest is bound up with the fate of all mankind.

These successes have brought great change. The rigidities of the cold war period have fragmented. Power and wealth, ideology and purpose have become diffused and have transformed the international scene. The re-emergence of Europe and Japan, the rivalry amongst the communist powers, the growth of military technologies, the rise and increasing diversity of the developing nations have produced a new global environment - a world of many centers of power, of persistent ideological differences

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<sup>+</sup> Text of a speech delivered by the U S Secretary of State before the Institute of World Affairs at the University of Wisconsin in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, United States of America on July 14, 1975.

clouded by nuclear peril and struggling for economic security and advance. The central focus of United States foreign policy is to help shape from this environment a new international structure, based on equilibrium rather than confrontation, linking nations to each other by practices of co-operation that reflect the reality of global interdependence.

Our task begins at home, to be strong and effective abroad, we must be strong and purposeful at home. To preserve peace, our military strength must be beyond challenge. To promote global prosperity our domestic economy must prosper. To carry forward our international efforts we must be a united people, sure in our purposes and determined to build on the great achievements of our national heritage.

Our first responsibility abroad is to the great industrial democracies with whom we share our history, our prosperity and our political ideals. Our alliances across the Atlantic and with Japan are the cornerstone of our foreign policy. Today they are more than responses to military threat, they are instrumentalities of social and economic co-operation as well. The ultimate objective of our alliances has always been to ease, not to freeze, the divisions of the world. In the past few years the United States has taken a number of steps to resolve concrete problems with the Soviet Union and lay the basis for more positive endeavours. We have also forged a new relationship with the People's Republic of China. There can be no lasting international stability unless the major powers learn habits of restraint and feel a stake in international peace - all our hopes for a better world require that they use their power for the benefit of mankind. The scores of new nations that have become independent since the Second World War are now major actors on the world scene. In their quest for their own progress, they present a challenge to the rest of the world - to demonstrate that the international structure can give them a rôle, a fair share, dignity and responsibility.

All of us - allies and adversaries, new nations and old, rich and poor - are part of a world community. Our interdependence on this planet is becoming the central fact of our diplomacy. Energy, resources, environment, population, the uses of space and the seas - these are problems whose benefits and burdens transcend national boundaries. They carry the seeds of political conflict over the coming generation - they challenge the capacities of the international community with new requirements for vision and statemanship.

Much of our current agenda is therefore global in nature and must be dealt with on a global basis. Within a few weeks there will be two meetings of the most prominent international organization, the United Nations. A special session of the General Assembly will be devoted to economic issues and the 30th regular session of the General Assembly will address the broad range of international problems. Therefore, I would like to use this occasion to place before you and our fellow members of the United Nations a candid assessment of how the United States government views the contemporary U N - its capacities and its limitations, its promise and the trends which threaten future progress.

### *The Record of the United Nations*

Thirty years after the founding of the United Nations, its achievements have been substantial and its promise is great. Most of the world is at peace. Beyond the absence of armed conflict, there has been a transition from a preoccupation with security to a new concern for the economic and social progress of all mankind.

Yet, at the very time when interdependence impels international co-operation and when the membership of the U N is most universal, the international organization

is being tested by a new clash of ideologies and interests, and by insistent tactics of confrontation. Such tendencies diminish the prospects for further achievement and threaten the very institution itself. Let me place these tendencies in historical perspective.

The end of the Second World War brought on a period of idealism and hope. Victory in war against tyrannical regimes - by nations united for that purpose - seemed as much a triumph for liberty as for peace. The end of the colonial era was shortly to begin, and was clearly in prospect. The awesome power of nuclear weapons ironically gave hope that the imperatives of collective security and peaceful settlement of disputes would at last impress themselves on mankind. The League of Nations had failed, but the cost of another failure now seemed so overwhelming that it was possible to hope that the nations of the world would be obliged to make the United Nations succeed.

No nation embraced this hope more genuinely than the United States. No country more seriously looked for the United Nations to replace force and domination with co-operation. No government more earnestly sought to create a world organization with a capacity to act. It is worth recalling that a year after the San Francisco Conference, when the United States was the sole possessor of nuclear weapons, we offered to turn this entire technology over to the United Nations.

Even then American spokesmen were careful to insist that there were realistic limits to the scope of the new organization. Of these limits the most important, even is perhaps the easiest to overlook, is that the U N is not a world government - it is an organization of sovereign states. It is not an entity apart from its membership. It reflects the world context in which it operates : its diversity, its imperfections, its many centers of power and initiative, its competing values, its worldly compound of nobility and tragedy.

The founders' hope for peace rested not on a naive belief in the perfectibility of man but on the hope that the major powers, given a dominant role in the Security Council, would be able to concert together to keep the peace. This hope, of course, proved stillborn when the U N became an arena for the confrontations of the Cold War. A generation later, its record in maintaining the peace shows both success and failure. There have been local wars, yet there has been no general war. More than once, small conflicts which had led in the past to great ones have been contained through the efforts of the United Nations. Time and again - in the Eastern Mediterranean, in the Middle East, in the Congo, in Kashmir - the peacekeeping rôle of the U N has proved indispensable for settlement, guarantees and prevention of major power intervention. While a far cry from the concept of collective security originally envisioned, these operations have proven valuable and increasingly indispensable. They represent the most advanced manifestations of international co-operation for security yet achieved.

The United Nations has understood the principle that peace is not the same as the status quo, but must embrace procedures for peaceful change. Whether by special commissions or mediators or through the expanded rôle of the Secretary General within his broad responsibilities under Article 99 of the Charter, the U N has offered a flexible instrument of pacific settlement on a score of occasions since its founding. The U N has provided a forum for debate and negotiation on regional or global problems and for multilateral efforts for arms control and disarmament. The talks provide a safety valve and a sounding board - in the corridors quiet progress is often being made.

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#### Article 99

The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

We found early on that there were limits to United Nations action on behalf of peace and security. Its writ can run no further than the agreement of its members. And on the sweeping issues of war and peace, it is the great powers, by virtue of their size, military strength, economic power and political influence, who bear the principal responsibility for world stability and security. Of late, as the great powers are learning the practices of co-existence, there is hope that the U N can find renewed possibilities for effective action in accordance with the vision of its founders.

The United Nations, originally concerned primarily with issues of peace and security, has been the focus of increasing attention to economic and social issues. The U N Charter contains a commitment "To employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples". Today, roughly nine-tenths of expenditures within the U N system relate to economic and social co-operation. We welcome this evolution and have contributed generously to it. Indeed it is in these fields, that the work of the U N has been most successful and yet the most unheralded. Its specialized agencies have been effectively involved with countless areas of human and international concern : speeding decolonization; spreading education, science, and technology; organizing global co-operation to combat hunger and disease; to protect the environment, and to limit population growth; regulating international transport and communication and peaceful nuclear power; advancing human rights and expanding international law among nations and in outer space and on the seas; preserving the priceless cultural heritage of mankind. It is striking, and of great importance for the future, that the United Nations has been able to respond creatively to so many of the challenges of the modern age.

Thus the U N is of considerable importance for the world's future. It has accommodated our traditional security and political concerns to the new conditions of international diplomacy. It has extended its reach - even before most nations did - toward the new agenda that now confronts the world community. The U N is both a symbol of our interdependence, and our most universal instrument for common progress.

In this connection, I want to pay tribute to the outstanding leadership given to the U N by its Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim. He is tireless and totally dedicated to peace, fairness and the future of the United Nations. The rapidity and efficiency with which he organized and despatched peacekeeping forces to the Middle East in late 1973 was but one example of the many services he has rendered the organization and the international community.

#### *The United States and the United Nations*

Yet with all these achievements, the future of the United Nations is clouded. Much that has transpired at the United Nations in recent years gives us pause at the very moment when great power confrontations are waning, troubling trends have appeared in the General Assembly and some of its specialized agencies. Ideological confrontation, bloc voting, and new attempts to manipulate the Charter to achieve unilateral ends threaten to turn the U N into a weapon of political warfare rather than a healer of political conflict and a promoter of human welfare.

The United Nations naturally mirrors the evolution of its composition. In its first phase it reflected the ideological struggle between the West and East and during that period the U.N. generally followed the American lead. Time and again in those days there were some 50 votes in support of our position and only a handful of communist bloc members against.

Ten years later, when membership had grown to more than 80, our dominance in the General Assembly no longer was assured. Neither East nor West was able to prevail in the Security Council. The American position was still sustained, while the Soviet Union was required to cast veto after veto in order to protect what it considered to be its vital interests.

But with the quantum leap to the present membership of 138, the past tendencies of bloc politics have become more pronounced and more serious. The new nations, for understandable reasons, turned to the General Assembly in which they predominated in a quest for power that simply does not reside there. The Assembly cannot take compulsory legal decisions. Yet numerical majorities have insisted on their will and objectives even when in population and financial contributions they were a small proportion of the membership. In the process, a forum for accommodation has been transformed into a settling for confrontation.

The moral influence which the General Assembly should exercise has been jeopardized and could be destroyed if governments - particularly those who are its main financial supporters - should lose confidence in the organization because of the imposition of a mechanical and increasingly arbitrary will.

It is an irony that at the moment the U.S. has accepted non-alignment, and the value of diversity, those nations which originally chose this stance to preserve their sovereign independence from powerful military alliances are forming a rigid grouping of their own. The most solid bloc in the world today is paradoxically, the alignment of the non-aligned. This divides the world into categories of North and South, developing and developed, imperial and colonial, at the very moment in history when such categories have become irrelevant and misleading.

Never before has the world been more in need of co-operative solutions. Never before have the industrialized nations been more ready to deal with the problems of development in a constructive spirit. Yet lopsided, loaded voting, biased results and arbitrary tactics threaten to destroy these possibilities. The utility of the General Assembly, both as a safety valve and as an instrument of international co-operation is being undermined. Tragically, the principal victims will be the countries who seek to extort what substantially could be theirs if they proceeded co-operatively.

An equally deplorable development is the trend in the specialized agencies to focus on political issues and thereby deflected the significant work of these agencies. UNESCO, designed for cultural matters and the international labour organization have been heavily politicized. A serious recent case came in the World Food Council in Rome where the very nations who desperately need and would most benefit from food assistance, threatened to abort its work by disruptive tactics unworthy of an international organization. This Council grew out of the American initiatives at the World Food Conference last year. It reflects our deepest humanitarian concerns - it represents a serious effort on our part to eliminate hunger and malnutrition. Abuse by

those whom we are trying to help, attacks on our motives by the beneficiaries of our efforts threaten to undermine the very fabric of co-operation in a field of curcial long-range importance to mankind.

We realise that those of us who wish to surmount the current crisis must show some understanding of its origins. The major powers have hardly always set a consistent example of altruistic or benevolent behaviour. The nations which would seek to coerce the industrialised countries have themselves been coerced in the past. History haunts us all, but it is precisely to transcend that history that the United Nations was founded and it is precisely to arrest such trends that the United States is calling attention to them today.

The process is surely self-defeating. According to the rules of the General Assembly, the coerced are under no compulsion to submit. To the contrary, they are given all too many incentives simply to depart the scene, to have done with the pretense. Such incentives are ominously enhanced when the General Assembly and specialised agencies expel member nations which for one reason or another do not meet with their approval.

Our concern has nothing to do with our attitude towards the practices or policies of the particular governments against which action is being taken. Our position is constitutional. If the U.N. begins to depart from its Charter, where suspension and expulsion are clearly specified prerogatives of the Security Council, we fear for the integrity and the survival of the General Assembly itself, and no less for that of the specialised agencies. Those who seek to manipulate U.N. membership by procedural abuse may well inherit an empty shell.

We are determined to oppose tendencies which in our view will undermine irreparably the effectiveness of the United Nations. It is the smaller members of the organisation who would lose the most. They are more in need of the U.N. than the larger powers such as the United States which can prosper within or outside the institution.

Ways must be found for power and responsibility in the Assembly and in the specialised agencies to be more accurately reflective of the realities of the world. The United States has been by far the largest financial supporter of the United Nations, but the support of the American people, which has been the lifeblood of the organisation, will be profoundly alienated unless fair play predominates and the numerical majority respects the views of the minority. The American people are understandably tired of the inflammatory rhetoric against us, the all-or-nothing stance accompanied by demands for our sacrifice which too frequently dominate the meeting halls of the U.N.

The United States, despite these trends, intends to do everything in our power to support and strengthen the United Nations in its positive endeavours. With all its limitations and imperfections the world body remains an urgent necessity.

We are eager to co-operate, but we are also determined to insist on orderly procedures and adherence to the Charter. The U.N. was never intended as an organisation of likeminded states, but rather an arena to accommodate and respect different policies and different interests. The world needs co-operative, not arbitrary action; joint efforts, not imposed solutions. In this spirit the United States will do what it can to make the United Nations a vital hope for a better future.

*The Agenda Before us*

This then is the promise and the problem of the United Nations. We must ensure that the promise prevails because the agenda we face makes the institution more necessary than ever before. The United Nations, first, faces continuing and increasing responsibilities in its mission, in the famous words of the U N Charter, "To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war".

One of the central issues of our time is the Middle East conflict, and the U N Security Council continues to play a vital rôle in the quest for a solution. Resolution 338 of 1973 launched a negotiating process which has borne fruit and proved durable. Secretary General Waldheim convened and addressed the first session of the Geneva Conference. Resolution 242 of 1967 stated general principles for a comprehensive peace. The stationing of United Nations forces was an indispensable element of the recent disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Syria in 1974.

But despite these and other real achievements, the global perils of local conflict continue to loom large. The world has dealt with them as if it were possible to contain conflict perpetually. But such tolerance tempts conflagration. That is how the first two World Wars began. We must not have a third, for with modern weapons there would not be a fourth.

It is not enough to contain the crises that occur, we must eradicate their causes. President Ford is therefore determined to help bring about a negotiated solution in the Middle East, in Cyprus, and in other areas of dispute. And peacekeeping and peacemaking must be a top priority on the United Nations agenda.

Another problem of peace which the world community must urgently address is the spread of nuclear weapons. Their awesomness has chained these weapons for almost three decades and their sophistication and expense have long helped limit the number of nations which could possess them. But now political inhibitions are crumbling. Nuclear catastrophe - whether by plan or mistake, accident, theft or blackmail - is no longer implausible.

It is imperative to contain - and reverse - the nuclear arms race among the major powers. We are now engaged in translating the principles agreed to in Vladivostok between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev into a new accord between the United States and the Soviet Union that will, for the first time, place a long-term ceiling on the strategic weapons on both sides.

As we strive to slow the spiral of nuclear arms, we must work as well to halt their spread. This requires both political and technical measures. In these areas the work of the United Nations has been important and could be crucial.

The non-proliferation treaty of 1970 was an important beginning. The recent conference held under U N auspices to review the treaty, and the adherence of additional countries to its provisions, have been valuable further steps. The priority now is to strengthen the safeguards on the export of nuclear materials for peaceful uses. The oil crisis adds fresh urgency to this task, because it has made the development of nuclear energy essential for an increasing number of nations. This means wider availability of materials, such as plutonium, and of equipment which might be used to develop nuclear explosives.

Future generations have a right to expect of us that commercial competition among the industrial exporting countries will not be so reckless and irresponsible that it accelerates the spread of nuclear weapons and thereby increases the risks of a nuclear holocaust.

Therefore, the United States has begun confidential discussions with other nuclear exporting countries to develop stronger and generally accepted safeguards. In this task, the rôle and work of the U N 's international atomic energy agency is vital. As peaceful nuclear programs grow in size and complexity it is crucial that suppliers and user nations agree on firm and clear export standards and strengthened I A E A safeguards. An effective world safeguards system will minimize nuclear risks while fostering the development of peaceful nuclear energy. The control of nuclear weapons is one of the most critical tests of this generation. The United Nations can crucially help decide whether we will meet this test.

#### *The New Agenda - the Problem of Interdependence*

In the last few years the world economy has undergone a series of shocks and strains.

- Nations have suffered both severe inflation and deep recession on a worldwide scale.
- The price of the world's most essential commodity, petroleum, has been precipitously and arbitrarily increased, burdening the economies of all consuming nations and imposing the most serious hardships on the poorest countries.
- The world's food reserves have dwindled alarmingly in only a few short years. Unless massive efforts are mounted, the gap between population growth and food production could reach disastrous proportions.
- The pursuit of economic growth is complicated by the fact of interdependence and it can no longer be pursued by national efforts but requires co-ordinated, global actions.

This September's special session of the General Assembly will focus on the new global economic concerns.

It will be an early and important test : will the rich nations and poor nations identify common goals and solve problems together, or will they exacerbate their differences? Can we turn our energies from rhetorical battles to practical co-operation? Will nations strive for empty parliamentary victories or concrete progress?

The United States has made its choice. We believe strongly in a co-operative approach. We believe that the time has come to put the technological and economic genius of mankind into the service of progress for all. We will approach the special session with determination to make progress - we intend to make concrete and constructive proposals for action across a broad spectrum of international economic activities such as trade and commodities, world food production and international financial measures.

The session will consider structural changes to improve the U N's capabilities in the field of economic development. A group of experts appointed by Secretary General Waldheim has just completed a study of this subject. We will offer specific comments on these recommendations during the Assembly debate.

In this spirit let me speak directly to the new nations who have pressed their claims with increasing fervour. We have heard and have begun to understand your concerns - we want to be responsive. We are prepared to undertake joint efforts to alleviate your economic problems. Clearly this requires a posture of co-operation. If nations deal with each other with respect and understanding, the two sessions this fall could mark the beginning of a new era in which the realities of an interdependent world economy generate a global effort to bring about peaceful and substantial change.

At the same time we are obliged to speak plainly, to the question of what works and what does not. We believe that economic development is in the first instance an internal process.

Either societies create the conditions for saving and investment, for innovation and ingenuity, for enterprise and industry which ultimately lead to self-sustaining economic growth or they do not. There is no magical short-cut and no rhetorical substitute. To claim otherwise suggests a need for permanent dependence on others.

In this quest for development, experience must count for something and ideology is an unreliable guide. At a minimum, we know which economies have worked and which have failed and we have a record of what societies have progressed economically and which have stagnated. We know from our own experience that investment from abroad can be an important spur to development. We know also that it is now in short supply. In the future as in the past, there will be competition to attract capital - therefore those who do not wish investment from abroad can be confident that they will not receive it. By the same token those countries which are eager to industrialize must also be ready to create the conditions that will attract large-scale investment.

The voting records of the blocs in the General Assembly simply do not reflect economic reality. The family of less developed countries includes both producers and consumers of energy, importers and exporters of raw materials, and nations which can feed their populations as well as those which face the spectre of famine. These divergent interests must be accommodated and reflected in practical measures - they cannot be resolved from the unreality of bloc positions.

At the same time the industrial world must adapt its own attitudes to the new reality of scores of new nations. At bottom the challenge is political, not economic - whether the interests and weight of the less developed nations can be accommodated in the international order. Their political objectives often represent legitimate claims. Yet at the same time the new nations must not expect us to make only political decisions, with no thought for economic consequences. If they want truly to serve their peoples, there must be practical concern for effective results.

If the industrial world wants to overcome the attitude of confrontation between nations, it must offer equitable solutions for the problems of the less fortunate parts of the world. Just as we are rightly concerned about the economic impact of exorbitant oil prices, so we should show understanding for the concerns of producers of other raw materials whose incomes fluctuate so radically. As for the operation of our companies abroad, we consider it in our interest, as well as in the common interest, to promote an environment of mutual benefit, in which our international businesses can continue to be both profitable and beneficial to the countries in which they operate. We will address this issue more fully at the special session. Above all, the industrialized countries must recognize that many developing countries have had frustratingly slow rates of growth. Rather than a comfortable margin of progress, they face an abundance of obstacles and a surplus of despair.

The future of international politics over the next generation - the kind of world our children will inherit - will be determined by what actions governments take now on this spectrum of economic issues.

### *Conclusion*

Dag Hammarskjöld once predicted that the day would come when people would see the United Nations for what it really is - not the abstract painting of some artist, but a drawing done by the peoples of the world. And so it is, not the perfect institution of the dreamers who saw it as the only true road to world harmony and not the evil instrument of world domination that the isolationists once made it out to be.

Rather it is, like so many human institutions before it, an imperfect instrument, but one of great hope nonetheless. The United States remains dedicated to the principles upon which the United Nations was founded. We continue to believe it can be a mighty and effective vehicle for preserving the peace and bridging the gap between the world's rich and poor. We will do all we can to make it so.

The past decade - and particularly the past several years - have been a difficult time for America. We have known the agony of internal dissension and political turmoil, and the bitter costs of a lengthy war. But our nation has come through all this, and its most difficult constitutional crisis since the civil war, with our institutions intact and our people resilient. And we have seen that the world still looks to us for leadership in preserving the peace and promoting economic advance for all mankind.

But the past decade has also surely shown that - strong and prosperous as we are - we cannot remake the world alone. Others must do their part and bear their responsibility for building the better world we all seek for the generations that will come after us.

In this endeavour, the United Nations plays a central rôle. It is there that each nation, large or small, rich or poor, can - if it will - make its contribution to the betterment of all. It is there that nations must realize that restraint is the only principle that can save the world from chaos, and that our destinies are truly intertwined on this small planet. It is there that we will see whether men and nations have the wisdom and courage to make a reality of the ideals of the Charter, and in the end, to turn the Parliament of Man into a true expression of the conscience of humanity.

*INTERDEPENDENCE IN COMMERCE AND TRADE  
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA<sup>+</sup>*

A. Hammond-Tooke

Your National Chairman has said that it is the objective of your Association "to make a genuine attempt to further co-operation and understanding between people". It is to this objective that I wish specifically to direct what I have to say to you today and to relate this to the Southern African scene.

Having had the privilege of travelling fairly widely in the region and having been professionally associated with many of the problems and policies of some of the countries which we are considering, I have learned that "co-operation" implies understanding. It is not enough to have the knowledge, ability and willingness to help others. People cannot be assisted if they do not want to be helped. To force aid, new ideas or even a better way of life on others is a definition of paternalism.

Human inter-activeness is the most baffling of all subjects to study. It is difficult enough for the anthropologist to determine structural inter-relationships in a relatively static and homogenous society. However relax these constraints and introduce accelerating political, social and economic change and ethnic and cultural diversity, and reliability and predictability rapidly approach zero.

In preparing this address, I felt that it would not be inappropriate to sound a note of warning. You are well aware that in considering the economic implications of the recent détente moves in Southern Africa, it would be dangerous to see these developments only from the standpoint of the Republic of South Africa. The Congress convenors were sensible of this point when they invited representatives from other countries in Africa to be present. The fact is that détente, like happiness, is different things to different people. We must therefore guard against ethno-centricity in our thinking if we are to achieve any real understanding of co-existence or inter-dependence in Southern Africa.

I would like to remind you that some fifteen years ago President Nkrumah gave an injunction which has guided many developments in Africa over this period. He said "Seek ye first the kingdom of politics and all other things will be added unto you". Many today still rally to the call of these words. The fact that these sentiments still endure is perhaps surprising in that in the fifteen years since they were uttered, Africa has seen unity and dis-unity, compromise and conquest, division and détente.

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<sup>+</sup> Text of a paper delivered at the Congress of the International Association of Commerce and Economics Students (AIESEC) held on 4 July, 1975 at Bellville, Cape, on the theme "Interdependence".

Considerable thought and attention is being given at this Congress to expanding the limits of economic rationality into a continent which boasts 23 of the 35 most under-developed countries of the world. In spite of the O A U's development decade of the sixties and the second development decade now in progress, the majority of countries in the area suffer from disabilities of exploding populations, chronic unemployment, fragmented economic development and high illiteracy levels.

By comparison, the economy of the Republic of South Africa bestrides the southern continent like a colossus. Fully diversified, broadly based, with its roots deep in agriculture and mining, it is an industrialised economy, firmly locked into trading relationships with the developed economies of Western Europe. Fifteen years ago trade with African territories accounted for some 19 percent of South Africa's foreign trade. Today the figure is 14 percent, indicating that, in spite of the obstacles which have been placed in the way to free trade with independent African territories, the Republic has continued to trade with Africa. She has never fulfilled the promise as seen by Rhodes and Smuts of becoming the workshop of the southern continent, and it is a nice question to ask whether she should.

A mass of literature exists on economic and political inter-relationships in Southern Africa. Books, documents, articles and memoranda have been written by experts from a wide spectrum of disciplines and from an even wider range of opinion. Looking through this documentation, I have been greatly surprised to see how certain books and articles have become pivotal in determining the attitudes and actions of the world towards South Africa.

In spite of their diversity of authorship and direction, in the majority of studies of Southern Africa substantial areas of agreement exist. A sort of reluctant unanimity is expressed over three points.

Firstly, prior to the 25th of April last year, the White-ruled countries in Southern Africa were seen as a stable political bloc, and that while it remained intact, all the scenarios envisaged that the bloc was stable enough to resist political onslaughts from a hostile world.

The second thesis, over which there appeared to be unanimity, was that the backbone of the White-ruled countries of Southern Africa was the strength of the Republic's economic machine which dominated the economies of neighbouring countries, giving the region the stability of economic dependence on the Republic.

Thirdly, it seemed to be argued by most writers that (making allowance for their personal and individual judgement as to whether this stability of the Southern African continent was a good or a bad thing), South Africa's dominant position in the entire region imposed on her great contingent liabilities.

An analogy has been drawn between the dependent status of Latin American countries upon the United States and those between Southern African countries on the Republic. Inter-dependence implies a measure of dependence and in many instances this dependence is resented. I believe that much political fulmination against the Republic can in fact be seen as contra to the fear of economic dependence by South Africa.

A happy thought would have been to suggest to the convenors of this Congress that "co-existence" rather than "survival" or "inter-dependence" would have been the better choice of topic. Unfortunately inter-dependence is the correct term. South Africa's economic dominance expressed in the oft quoted figures of 22 percent of continental G D P, 40 percent of manufacturing output, 53 percent of energy consumption for the entire continent make this softer word inappropriate.

I have approached this topic in this way, because I believe it is only right that we see the changing face of Africa and South Africa's rôle therein with the clearest perspectives. It would be foolish for anyone in South Africa to believe that great new vistas of economic imperialism have been opened up, or even that South Africa can, and should, become the great catalyst for development in the continent. I believe that we in South Africa have an important and indeed vital rôle to play in the future of Africa. I do not believe, however, that we should be apostles for a new Pan Africanism, preaching the kingdom of economics as the new religion of salvation of the continent.

Notwithstanding the changes which have occurred over the last few months, and the South African names which have been recorded in the inter-continental hotels of Africa, South Africa's trade and commercial relationships with independent African states remain largely unpublished, though the extent of South Africa's penetration into African markets is indeed considerable. It is furthermore growing at a very rapid rate. Details of this trade are known to a small group of people in this country. It is also pretty closely held information in countries which receive South Africa's goods or who, in other ways have entered into trading relationships with the Republic. I have no intention of making an exposé of the extent or direction of South Africa's economic penetration into countries in Africa. It is part of my general thesis that the publication of this information would not be in South Africa's interest nor, I believe, in the interests of those countries with which she has such relationships.

I will approach this topic from a rather different standpoint. I wish to attempt a structural analysis of Southern Africa's trade and economic relationships as they exist and as they have developed over the recent past. By comparing this picture with the development needs and aspirations of the countries in the sub-continent, it should be possible to develop one or two scenarios. South Africa can then be projected into the picture. From this I hope it will be within our power to extract some guidelines for the trade relationships of South Africa within the Southern African bloc.

First of all let us define the area at which we are looking. We are talking about some 43 different states and areas from Reunion in the east, to Cape Verde in the west, and from Kenya to Cape Town. This, as has been pointed out, is twice the size of the United States, of a similar population size to that country and in a decade from now its population will have grown to some 325 millions or at an annual compound rate of 2,9 percent.

Other speakers have indicated the richness of this area in scarce resources. However, in spite of the abundance of land, minerals and labour, in one of the few last remaining areas of the world which has a great developable potential, the 43 countries that we are concerned with are widely spread

over the steps of the development ladder. It is perhaps significant that one of the poorest, Lesotho, is closely bound to South Africa.

It is difficult to come to grips with such a vast area, but let us take a look at the whole picture. In the period 1960 to 1972 gross domestic product in Africa, excluding South Africa, rose at an annual compound rate of 4,4 percent in constant prices. This gave a rise of 1,8 percent in real wealth per head of population of these countries. During the same period exports increased at a little under 6 percent while imports increased at a little over 4 percent. Industrial output for the region grew at an annual real rate of 6,7 percent.<sup>(1)</sup> These figures, however, do not tell the entire story. Continental per capita incomes are extremely low and in 1970 average income per head was only R157. Again, excluding South Africa, the equivalent figure for the countries in Southern and Equatorial Africa was R155. Some indication of the great diversity of per capita incomes are given by the incredible low of R41 in Luanda to oil rich Libya's R1 370 and the Republic's own R552. It will be apparent from this that the high percentage real growth figures which apply to the area must be seen strictly against the very low base upon which they are being applied. Or put another way, the standard of affluence of many of these countries is 1 percent of that of the average citizen of the United States or Western Europe.

With the notable exception of countries such as Kenya and to a lesser extent Angola, which have attained a certain measure of industrialization, and certain areas in Zambia, Zaire and Botswana where vast mineral wealth is being exploited, the countries are locked into rural poverty and a subsistence economy. It is notable also that to escape from this a substantial proportion of the population is drifting towards the towns. The urban population of eastern and middle Africa is growing between two and three times the rate of growth of the overall population of the territories. This drift to the towns has enormous social and political consequences. It is caused by the growing gap between urban and rural standards of living and employment expectations. President Kaunda has warned that the present trend is towards the creation of two nations in Zambia, and is likely to generate a dangerously aggrieved rural sector. The rate of urbanisation in Africa is the highest in the world. Some of the largest urban centres of Kenya are growing at a rate between 8 and 10 percent a year. However, the urban areas are quite incapable of providing gainful employment for more than a fraction of the workseekers in most independent African territories and unemployment is increasing apace. Professors Singer and Jolly, leaders of the 1971 I L O mission to Kenya say<sup>(2)</sup>

"This creates a special problem in that it implies the frustration of the aspirations not only of a younger, better educated people, on whom the hopes for the development of the country must rest, but also of their parents and families

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(1) Source : Year Book of National Accounts and Statistics, United Nations, 1973, Volume 3.

(2) H Singer and R Jolly "Unemployment in an African Setting - Lessons of the employment strategy mission to Kenya" - International Labour Review, 107(2) February 1973, p.106

who have invested in their school fees often desperately hard-earned capital. Taken together, these two groups represent a powerful political force".

These development problems are of a frightening magnitude. Essentially there are two problems. The first is the need to increase rural incomes through the modernisation of the agricultural sector in order to stabilise the rural population and to expand the food base, while providing agricultural raw materials for processing and export. The second problem is to generate sufficient employment opportunities within the urban areas themselves.

With regard to the first of these problems, it should be noted that it is an alarming fact that the food production of Africa is decreasing by about 2 percent per capita per annum and in some states it is decreasing at a rate of 7 percent a year. Thus Africa is increasingly losing its ability to feed its rapidly growing population. This is, of course partly the result of the great droughts which have occurred south of the Sahara. However, according to United Nations, some 70 percent of the world's population produce only something like 44 percent of the world's food supplies and are thus becoming increasingly unable to feed themselves.

What the problems of rural re-development are, may be well known to you. They include the land tenure system, the fact that agricultural surpluses are so small that no possibility exists in many cases of sufficient capital formation in the rural sector to improve agricultural techniques, the system of low input low output farming, while an insurance against disaster, militates against all forms of technological improvement. Above all, in rural Africa, an intense lethargy exists related to the low expectation of agricultural workers.

This attitude contrasts sharply with the high expectations and high frustration levels of the unemployed in urban areas. United Nations figures have shown that to provide a single job opportunity to the industrial sector a total social capital investment in the vicinity of R10 000 has to be made. Where will the vast capital sums required for the industrialisation of under-developed African states come from? Certainly the ability of these territories to generate their own capital needs is extremely limited.

The position is aggravated also by low productivity levels and high wages paid to workers, and more particularly the elite, in these territories. Here the effect of socialism and the absence of an effective wage policy is a major factor in slowing down the rate of employment creation and of development generally. Leistner has said (3)

"After independence the new rulers were unable to restrain the pent-up

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(3) "Employment opportunities for Africa's exploding population"  
G M E Leistner, S A Journal of African Affairs, Volume 4,  
No 1, 1974, p.3

expectations of high material rewards amongst the politically dominant groups including civil servants and organised labour. As a result their salaries and wages have increased out of proportion to their productiveness and the vast income gap that used to exist between ex-patriate colonial officials and Black staff is being perpetuated and widened as between the new Black elite and the broad mass of the population".

Leistner quotes statistics to show that between 1964 and 1968 the wage earning sector in Zambia increased its earnings by 32 percent while Zambia's present population, which amounts to approximately 80 percent of the total, increased its earnings by a mere 3,4 percent. He shows also that whereas in the United Kingdom and the United States of America the level of a Permanent Secretary's salary amounted to some ten times that of the average per capita income, in Kenya, during 1966, it was twenty-four times as much and in Uganda it went as high as 112 times the national average.

The effect of these excessive wages causes great distortion in the economies of many African states. It discourages the expansion of employment opportunities by stimulating labour saving investment and it accelerates the rate at which the civil service in these territories grows because of the fabulously high salaries paid by this unproductive branch of the economy. With these built-in distortions, the development prospects for many of the countries to which we are referring are bleak indeed.

However, let us look at the effect of the unprecedented changes in world economic conditions. Since late 1973 when the quintupling of the oil price and the broader effects therefrom drastically altered the balance of payments prospects for most developing countries of the world, and particularly for those countries which are not petroleum exporters. The change in oil prices had an immediate direct impact on the cost of imported industrial inputs as well as on the cost of internal transport of goods. In under-developed countries there is little scope for developing substitutes for imported oil in the short and medium run. In addition, the related increase in the cost of fertilizers has created substantial difficulties in maintaining existing levels of food production. These problems have been compounded by shortfalls in several important food producing regions as I have already mentioned.

The higher inflation levels in industrial countries resulted in an increase in import prices of capital goods and other industrial products. These price increases reached close to 15 percent during 1973 and were above this figure during 1974. Thus, although some raw material exporting countries (particularly those exporting mineral products) have benefitted from the unusually large cyclical upswing in commodity prices, the poorest developing countries have experienced a sharp decline in their terms of trade. This means that their imports of manufactured goods, food, fertilizers and petroleum products have all increased at a far greater rate than the prices of their exports.

United Nations agency such as U N C T A D, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have given consideration to the problems of these countries which have been called "the most seriously affected countries", of which 22 or two-thirds are within the African continent. Emergency aid has been given to these territories, mainly in the form of balance of payments assistance in addition to normal flows of aid. Aid has also been granted by Arab members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries and from the United States of America. The World Food Programme has, furthermore, assisted in providing assistance in food and fertilizers.

Indications exist that 1975 will be an even more difficult year than 1974 for these countries. World inflationary pressures are expected to cause further increases in the price of imports and similarly the slowdown in industrial countries and current recessionary conditions are causing lower prices for the exports of these territories. Thus indications are that the balance of payments situation of these countries will worsen substantially in the current year, with a deficit rising to over R1 000 million in under-developed African states.

I have deliberately painted this rather depressing picture of Africa's aggregate economic development prospects, because I feel that it is necessary to dispel the present aura of euphoria which has tended to creep into thinking in South Africa. Détente no more ushers in the Age of Aquarius than did the landing of the first American astronaut on the moon.

If South Africa is to assist these countries, we must be fully cognisant of the real problems that face them in development. We must, in fact, be able to see in clear perspective the value of so many thousands of issues of Onderstepoort vaccine. I do not wish, of course, to belittle the attempts which South Africa is making to provide assistance to Africa. But we must beware of the self-righteousness of the Samaritan who gave alms to the poor.

I have done little more than set the scene for consideration of South Africa's trade relationships with the territories in Africa. I now wish to give some consideration to the analysis of Africa's trade in order to come closer to evaluating the importance and potential for South Africa's trade and economic relations with these independent African states. During 1966, which is the last year for which complete figures are available, 67 per cent of Africa's exports went to the European Community and Great Britain. By comparison, only 4,5 percent of Africa's exports were inter-regional, namely, going from one to another African territory. So the pattern of Africa's imports remains much the same : 54 percent of the continent's imports came from Britain and the Economic Community; 11 percent derived from North America while 8,4 percent came from Japan; and 4,7 percent of the imports of African countries were from other African states. This factor is of central importance if one is to understand Africa's trade and the potential for the Republic's trading relations in the territory.

There are basically two reasons why Africa's trade is locked in with European developed countries. Firstly, the colonial legacy in terms of which these countries were initially developed as primary producers of industrial raw materials and importers of finished manufactured products.

Secondly, the development structures of the majority of these territories. Being largely at a similar stage of economic development, the manufactures of one country tend to be products which could be manufactured in other countries in the territory. Thus, for instance, the textile and clothing industry of Zambia is in direct competition with that of Kenya. Given that employment creation is a major preoccupation in each country, the opportunities for trade in competitive products have tended to be restricted rather than to be expanded. To put it the other way round, those products which are imported by African territories tend to be those which are not manufactured in other African states, or if they were, their importation would compete with struggling industries in the importing territory.

These factors can be seen more clearly if one looks at the composition of African commodity exports. U N C T A D has estimated that for 1975, 48 percent of Africa's exports will be foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials, 14 percent of base metals, while only 10 percent will be manufactured commodities. The balance, some 28 percent, is made up of petroleum exports and these exports are exclusively from four or five countries, only one of which, Angola, is within the area under consideration. The picture of external trade is complete if imports are considered. During 1973, Kenya's main imports were machinery, chemicals, petroleum, iron and steel, motor vehicles, paper, textiles, sugar and non-ferrous metals. To this list, imports for Zambia included foodstuffs and electrical energy. However, none of these products are manufactured by any country in the territory, other than South Africa and to a lesser extent, Rhodesia.

At the moment, as the figures show, the trading relations of territories in Equatorial and Southern Africa are based on the production for export primarily of agricultural products and minerals in exchange for capital equipment and raw materials required in the developed process. We have seen, to a very large extent, that these countries are dependent on trade with the European Economic Community. Very little inter-territorial trade exists and while a very high proportion of the countries in the territory import goods from South Africa, this trade is a fractional proportion of South Africa's own external trade which, typical of Africa, has the same pattern of dominant trading relationships with Europe and, to a lesser extent, America and Japan.

We have also seen that the under-developed territories in Africa are locked into a "low level equilibrium trap". Their rural sectors are stagnating, their urban populations are exploding and employment opportunities, mainly through industrialisation, are being hampered by foreign exchange shortages, distortions within the economic system, low internal capital formation, low productivity and high wages. Sidney Dell(4), has said that "a major trade objective for the 1980's would be to achieve a greater geographic diversification of African exports and imports. This would involve cultivating larger markets and sources of supply in North America, the Socialist Countries and within Africa itself". He points out that the trade agreement between the European Economic Community in African

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(4) DELL, Sidney, Trade Blocs and Common Markets, Constable, 1963.

countries, the Yaoundé Convention, has perhaps tied the hands of African countries in attaining greater regional trade, for the Convention makes it impossible to negotiate reasonable arrangements with neighbouring countries which would involve discrimination against the E E C. The structure of the economies of many African countries has been built up over a period of decades on the basis of preferential treatment for their exports in European markets. The benefits which they enjoy individually represent a life-line for many of these states who would not be able to survive any disorganisation of their economic life through an abrupt termination of the existing preferences. At the same time, the very dependence of these territories on European trade has tended to operate as a brake on their own internal industrialisation.

The central point at which we have arrived is to put to ourselves the question : "Is it in the interests of Africa for the Republic of South Africa to supplant Europe as the major trade partner of developing African states?" There seem to be strong arguments for and against. Firstly, let us look briefly at some of the experiences of economic integration in developing African territories. This will give us some idea of the difficulties which have been experienced in bringing about regional inter-dependence in African countries of similar development status. Secondly, we must look at a different form of economic inter-dependence, namely that between the Republic of South Africa and the B L S territories of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.

Two divergent tendencies have appeared in Africa since independence. On the one hand there has been the growing consciousness of a common cause amongst all African peoples. On the other hand, there have been divisions on the continent imposed by colonial rule, which have exacerbated the regional and tribal differences of what was essentially a pre-feudal society with poor communications and vast distances. The lines of state division in Africa have largely been arbitrary. They have been an accident of history. And yet, in spite of the illogicality of frontiers, the geographic and ethnic sovereignty of each country has withstood both explosive and implosive tendencies. It is significant that one of the strongest arguments used against the Republic at the 9th Extraordinary Session of the O A U Council of Ministers in Dar-es-Salaam in April of this year against South Africa's policy of apartheid, is that it accepts divisionism and separatism amongst people which have been thrown together by the accident of colonial boundaries.

While preferential treatment given by the British and French to their former colonies and E E C preferences to associated countries have been a disintegrating factor in Africa which have tended to perpetuate the cleavage between the British and French zones and have been a divisive force between adjacent countries, several notable attempts have been made towards economic integration and co-operation in the territory. I will single out only two of these. The first is the East African Economic Community and the second is the South African Customs Union.

The treaty of East African Co-operation was signed by the three Presidents of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania in June 1967 as an acknowledgement of the close commercial, industrial and other ties which had linked the three countries and in the interests of regional integration. An East African

Legislative Assembly was set up together with a Common Market Council, a Communications Council, Economic Consultative and Planning Council, Finance Council and Research and Social Council. A Common Market Tribunal was also established to decide on alleged treaty violations and its decisions were to be final. The infrastructural services of the three countries were centralised with Corporations established for the Railways, Harbours, Post and Telecommunications and Airways. An East African Development Bank was founded and an attempt made to harmonise the taxation and fiscal structures of the three territories. The entire unit has the blessing and assistance of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.

It is common knowledge that the East African community is in danger of break-up. In the first place the Common Market no longer exists in the strict sense of the term. A transfer tax system which was introduced to replace the quantitative restrictions previously imposed on inter-country trade in manufactured goods to protect industries in one country from industries in another. This can be said to have limited the extent to which viable industries in each country can be set up. It has also been said that this tax

"deliberately encourages competitive rather than complementary industrial development, leading to the appearance of excess capacity in existing industries, the inability of both new and existing industries fully to exploit internal economies of scale (because of the restricted size of individual national markets) and the probable misallocation of scarce resources".<sup>(5)</sup>

It is well known that tensions in the East African Community, over the shares of infrastructural services and the various payments which have to be made from one country to another, have seriously rent the fabric of co-operation. A more telling charge, however, is that the major beneficiary of the economic growth of the total region has been the more developed state of Kenya which has attracted to itself resources from the total area and has been able to exploit markets in the other territories at the expense of their industrial development.

This is the old story familiar of the arguments leading to the break up of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It was alleged that Malawi and Zambia were paying for the development of Rhodesia while the economies of the two less developed countries stagnated. It is the argument which we hear today in the European Economic Community where the Regional Development Fund is considered totally inadequate to offset this centripetal effect of resources being concentrated in the already developed and growing areas. It is an argument to which we in South Africa must give particular attention in thinking about regional inter-dependence and trade in Southern Africa.

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(5) Nixon, F I : Economic Integration and Industrial Protection, Longman, 1973.

To illustrate this point, we must turn now to the second example, the South African Customs Union; specifically to get a closer appreciation of the inter-dependence between the B L S territories and the Republic. The South African Customs Union has its roots in 1889 when, under British rule, the four colonies initiated a customs union on a free trade basis between the colonies and the state in the Southern African geographical area. This was extended to Bechuanaland, Basutoland, Southern and North Western Rhodesia and Swaziland by 1903. The original agreement, which was to last for 59 years was concluded at Potchefstroom in 1910, made allowance for common external customs tariff, the interchange of manufactured products, the payment by South Africa to its territories of the share of the customs revenue pool and conformity of all tariff laws.

There is no doubt that this customs agreement has been in the interests of the Republic of South Africa who, over this period of time, has enjoyed a high rate of economic growth, and particularly, a high rate of industrialisation. Without being negative, I wish to suggest that there is evidence that the Customs Union Agreement has not assisted in the industrialisation of the B L S territories. You are all familiar with the long range battle that has occurred between mining and industry in the Republic of South Africa. Gold mining interests have repeatedly argued that customs tariff protection ultimately drives up the cost of the extract of industries.

It has been argued also that tariff protection creates employment at the expense of eroding the competitiveness in world markets for the primary producing sectors. Secondly, it is argued that tariff protection discourages foreign imports and so reduces the total amount of taxable revenue which could have been distributed under the Customs Agreement to the other territories. And thirdly, since within the free trade area the protection of industry against imports from stronger partners is prohibited, it becomes difficult for the less developed countries to increase their own rate of industrial development.

These are the arguments against a customs union between countries of very different levels of economic development. On the other side, it is of course argued that access to the total market is of benefit to producers in the less developed countries. It can permit also the exploitation of economies of scale for their industries which would be otherwise denied them. The movement of capital within the region and their availability to entrepreneurship and other scarce skills is a considerable plus factor. The argument has also been adduced that the sharing of administration, particularly customs administration, is a source of saving to the smaller countries.

Where does one find a balance, however, between the advantages and disadvantages of the system? It is salutary, therefore to read the words of the Report of the Economic Survey Mission for Bechuanaland, 1965<sup>(6)</sup>.

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(6) United Nations special commission of the situation with regard to the implementing of the declaration on the granting of independence on colonial countries and peoples; Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, May 1965, p. 710.

"The Customs Agreement, whilst relieving Botswana of the burden of costly customs administration, means that the increase in revenue accruing to the Exchequer from this source is not related to the growth in economical activity within the country. The actual tariffs levied are determined by South African interests. High protective duties imposed to protect South African industry tend to diminish the total revenue collected and, therefore, that part accruing to the Botswana Exchequer. In such cases the diversion of consumers from cheaper overseas imports to more expensive South African manufactures, result in the transfer of spending power from Botswana consumers to South African producers or, in other words, the subsidisation of South African industry by Botswana. A customs union between a rich and a poor nation normally produces a polarity of economic development with the better endowed areas growing at the expense of poor areas".

It was arguments like this which led to the 1969 re-negotiations of the Customs Agreements. In the words of Turner<sup>(7)</sup> -

"the most significant victory for the B L S was the implicit acceptance by South Africa of the principle of compensation for polarisation of development, price raising effects and the loss of financial discretion".

The 1969 re-negotiations essentially more than doubled the share of the customs revenue pool going to the B L S territories, from one-and-a-third to three-and-a-half percent. Significantly, a multiplier was inserted to increase the share of the pool to these territories to compensate the smaller countries for the disadvantage of being in a customs union with a more developed territory. Commenting on this, Vale has said -

"It is quite clear that the fact that South Africa is the most developed industrially, means that she would seek to protect her established industries against the results of successful competition from newcomers".<sup>(8)</sup>

Article 17 of the 1969 Agreement itself provides for a "mutually acceptable" solution making no provision for the aggrieved party unilaterally to impose restrictions on competitive imports.

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(7) Turner, B : "A fresh start for the Southern African Customs Union", African Affairs, Volume 70, no. 280.

(8) Vale, P : "The Southern African Customs Union" - unpublished thesis, 1972.

Doubtless, I will be accused of being extremely neagative. However, I have sought to place the theme of inter-dependence in a more sober, if sombre, light. The development problems of emergent Africa are real, they are immense and they are deserving of every assistance which can be given by developed and developing countries alike. Moreover, South Africa, as integrally bound up with Africa, is more closely associated than many countries with these problems. It has been said that South Africa is probably better equipped than most other countries to render aid to the economically under-developed peoples of Southern Africa. This is because she is neither fully-developed nor an economically retarded country and has ample experience of the problems of economic development in transitional African society.

Let us look at certain guidelines for South Africa's trade and techno-economic relations with other countries in Africa. Within the prevailing political climate of greater inter-regional co-operations trade with neighbouring territories may once again become a major element in the economic growth of the Republic. The erosion of northern trade links from the late 1950's depressed the external sector of South Africa's economy and necessitated a re-allocation of resources and involved a diversion of trade to alternative markets in which the Republic had a lesser advantage. It necessitated also a more aggressive export technique and the assistance to exporters which has been given in terms of the recommendations of the Export Commission's<sup>(9)</sup> reporting in 1973.

During the 1950's and early 60's much of South Africa's trade with hinterland territories was based on re-exports and C K D<sup>(10)</sup> assembly, with relatively low domestic valued added, but lucrative to South Africa since it permitted the exploitation of local economies and unsophisticated manufactures with which the Republic then had a relative advantage. The falling away of this trade probably had a net retarding effect on industrial development in South Africa, due to lower turnovers and to the extra input required to enable South African exports to enter more sophisticated markets. In addition, the dislocation of the traditional north/south transportation flows and the development at high cost of an alternative route for traffic to and from neighbouring countries in the sub-continent, has lost for South Africa considerable export earnings and has caused a slowing down in the growth of tertiary services associated with entrepôt activities.

However, in considering closer inter-regional inter-relationships within the territories, major dangers can be seen on two fronts. Firstly, that South Africa might become to be pictured as the font of all aid and economic assistance and that claims upon her from neighbouring territories (and indeed her own Homelands) may become an intolerable burden on our economy. The second danger is that a reduction of inter-regional tensions and the freeing of trade and capital movements could, within a relatively short period, give rise to centripetal economic forces running counter

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(9) S.A. Republic Commission of Inquiry into the Export Trade.  
Report 1972. Chairman: Hendrick J.J. Reynders. RP 62/1972.

(10) Counter Knock Down.

to the economic nationalism of our weaker neighbours. To allay this it would then be necessary for South Africa to step up economic and technological assistance to such countries much as she has done with the B L S territories to offset politically undesirable trends. The Republic's recent relations with Mocambique are another case in point.

It is apparent, therefore, that while a relaxation of tensions in Southern Africa opens vistas of opportunity, it flings wide the door to accusations of new colonial penetration which have so often embittered relationships between Black and White in Africa.

There is no doubt that if Africa is to survive in the economic world of the late 70's and 80's she will have to increase regional inter-dependence and to mobilise her collective resources to sustain her populations and meet their rising aspirations. South Africa is uniquely placed to strategically provide economic aid and assistance and to benefit therefrom both economically and politically, not the least by expanding her trade boundaries northward into the continent. In doing so, however, she must become acutely aware of the fact that inter-dependence implies a measure of dependence, that it may be necessary for her to consciously offset the polarisation of economic activity which can occur once political barriers diminish in importance.

A decrease in inter-regional tensions in southern Africa creates the possibility of considerably improved trade relationships with hinterland territories. However, claims for techno-economic assistance on South Africa from other countries in the sub-continent can be anticipated to increase very substantially because of South Africa's overwhelming economic stature and (with the freer interplay of economic forces) because of requests to offset the tendencies towards economic concentration. Whereas a portion of these claims for assistance will be met from the proceeds of increased trade, South African business must timeously expand the Republic's production capacity in the expectation of new trade and aid demands. Furthermore, since our own resources will need to be supplemented, a need is indicated for an increased inflow of financial and technical resources to the Republic from more developed countries.

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Economist with the S A Federated  
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in Pretoria.*

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*UNITED STATES LEGISLATION ON RHODESIAN CHROME IMPORTS*

The following statement by Mr. Nathaniel Davis, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, was made before the House of Representatives Armed Services Subcommittee on Sea Power and Strategic Materials on the 21 July 1975. concerning legislation to repeal the "Byrd Amendment" that permits U.S. imports of Rhodesian chrome:

Thank you for this opportunity to appear before the subcommittee to discuss H.R. 1287, a Bill to amend the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 so as to halt the importation of chrome ore and certain other materials from Southern Rhodesia.

As the subcommittee is aware, such importation is permitted, in violation of U.N. economic sanctions against Rhodesia under Section 503 of the Military Procurement Authorization Act of 1971 -- the Byrd Amendment. This legislation has as a stated major objective the lessening of U.S. dependence on the Soviet Union as a source of chromium ore imports.

In fact, since the enactment of the Byrd Amendment, imports of chromium ore from the Soviet Union have remained above 50 percent of total U.S. imports while imports of the same ore from Rhodesia have climbed only slightly, from 10 percent of the total in 1972 to 13 percent in 1974. The Byrd Amendment has not accomplished its stated objective of lessening our dependence on Soviet supplies. It has instead provided the illegal Smith regime in Rhodesia with much needed foreign exchange and psychological support. In providing assistance to the Smith regime, this measure has acted to undercut our basic foreign policy objective of encouraging a negotiated peaceful settlement in Rhodesia, acceptable to the population of Rhodesia as a whole. It has also made our relations with the overwhelming majority of Africans less cordial than they could be because it is perceived by African and other nations as American support for an illegal minority regime which is based on racial discrimination.

The Administration strongly supports repeal of the Byrd Amendment, in order to restore the United States to full compliance with United Nations economic sanctions which we supported and voted for in a unanimous Security Council decision. If we continue in our failure to honor our commitment to the United Nations by retaining the Byrd Amendment we cast doubt on our willingness to abide by other international commitments that we make. We thus contribute to undermining the rule of law in the international community.

Our basic position, as set forth by Secretary Kissinger is that the Byrd Amendment "is not essential to our national security, brings us no real economic advantages, and is costly to the national interest of the United States in our conduct of foreign relations." As the committee is aware, President Ford, shortly after assuming the Presidency, stated through his press spokesman his support of repeal of the Byrd Amendment, in fulfillment of our international obligations.

Recent developments in Southern Africa - set in motion by the Portuguese decision last year to grant independence to its African territories -- have made early repeal particularly important, in terms not only of our foreign policy objectives but also in terms of our longer-range economic interests. Most Black African states regard a just settlement of the Rhodesian issue as a matter of fundamental importance to their national interest. Our failure to appreciate the significance they attach to our continued violation of the Rhodesian sanctions could seriously affect our future political and economic relations with these states. We remain the only nation in the world that has enacted legislation to countenance an open violation of the Rhodesian sanctions.

As you know, Mozambique, a nation with a 700-mile common border with Rhodesia, became independent on June 25. The possibility of the closing of Mozambique's borders to Rhodesian trade has placed additional pressures on Rhodesians to begin meaningful negotiations. (It is estimated that over 50 percent of Rhodesian exports and imports go through Mozambique.) Leaders of the neighbouring states of Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Botswana and South Africa are seeking to promote a peaceful solution in Rhodesia and avoid confrontation. There are signs of a growing perception within the Rhodesian regime itself that its present course can lead only to further violence and tragedy and that it would be preferable to enter into serious negotiations with representatives of the African majority on the future of Rhodesia.

Repeal of the Byrd Amendment at this time would add to these positive influences toward a peaceful settlement by indicating to the Smith regime that the United States does not support it in its reluctance to arrive at a negotiated settlement. Failure to pass the repeal Bill at this critical time could have the unfortunate effect of encouraging the Smith regime to believe it can continue to deny majority rule. Given recent developments and converging forces in Southern Africa, it is realistic to assume that majority rule will come to Rhodesia and that we may find ourselves faced with a successor government to the Smith regime which could base its relations with other nations in the degree of support provided for majority rule. To the extent our repeal of the Byrd Amendment can help influence the Smith regime into negotiating a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia, we would also be playing a part in sparing that country further bloodshed and civil disorder.

TOUR OF WEST AFRICA BY CANADIAN MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

*Report on Views Expressed on Southern Africa*

The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Hon. J. Mac Eachen, visited five West African Countries (Nigeria, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Ghana) from 13 to 26 April, 1975. On 19 June, he reported to the House of Commons in Ottawa on his tour, and his report dealt with four general themes, as well as with Canada's bilateral relations with each of the five countries. The general themes were: (1) Relations between the industrialized world and the developing countries; (2) the political situation in Southern Africa; (3) development and economic co-operation; and (4) the international French-speaking community and the Commonwealth.

The section of Mr. Mac Eachen's report dealing with Southern Africa is given in full below.

*The Political Situation in Southern Africa.*

Honourable members know that Southern Africa has been for some months in a state of political flux. In the wake of decolonization in the Portuguese territories, some movement -- if not yet concrete action -- has been discernable in the racist and the colonialist positions maintained until then by Pretoria and Salisbury. Many felt some hope that these deplorable situations would perhaps now be liquidated through peaceful negotiations. I was therefore looking forward to my discussions with the Foreign Ministers of the countries I visited, since my journey through West Africa came immediately after the meeting of the Ministerial Council of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) in Dar-es-Salaam which dealt precisely with these issues.

My colleagues' assessment was a sobering one but confirmed that indeed progress by peaceful means towards political stability in Southern Africa could be achieved, provided the Salisbury regime negotiated in good faith with transitional arrangements to majority rule and the South African government recognized the fundamental quality of all men, whatever the colour of their skin. The Dar-es-Salaam meeting sought to reaffirm Pan-African solidarity on these issues. The conclusions of the Ministerial Meeting were fully consonant with the 1969 Lusaka Manifesto, I was told, in which the OAU pledged to word towards negotiated settlements and stated that the use of force could only be a last resort.

It was explained to us that the meeting had been found necessary because recent contacts between South Africa and neighbouring states had given rise to concern that the Pan-African consensus on these issues was being eroded. In addition, recent calls for "dialogue" in Africa had made it imperative for the OAU to determine the conditions under which such a dialogue could be conducted with South Africa. Finally, it was explained to us that

recent developments had given additional weight to the implicit strategy which seemed to underpin of late the OAU's approach to Southern African questions: priority to the ending of the illegal white minority rule in Rhodesia; second, concerted action to end the equally illegal occupation of Namibia by the South Africans; and third, renewed efforts to end the deplorable situation prevailing in South Africa herself.

We were informed that these issues had been thoroughly discussed at the Dar-es-Salaam meeting and that Pan-African solidarity had been reaffirmed in terms which did not discourage the exploration of avenues for change in Southern Africa. Naturally, our hosts pleaded for enhanced support from the international community for their difficult struggle, which may be entering its crucial phase. All of them, however, expressed their appreciation for Canada's policies toward Southern Africa and, where these policies fall short of African expectations, their understanding of the motives underlying the Canadian approach. Thus, although OAU members have consistently refused to establish diplomatic contacts with South Africa, we were not pressed to sever our own relations with Pretoria. Similarly, we justified the maintenance of limited trade links between Canada and South Africa given the long-standing Canadian policy not to bring political matters to bear upon international trade, short of specific U.N. sanctions and the commercial relations which some African countries have been led by economic necessity to conduct with South Africa.

We explained to our hosts that although the Canadian Government had serious doubts about the effectiveness of international sanctions, we had supported such action against Rhodesia at the United Nations and had scrupulously observed our commitments under the Charter in this regard. We added that we would consider seriously any further action that could be undertaken within the United Nations to facilitate the accession of Namibia to self-government; but that in our view the expulsion of South Africa from international bodies would be counter-productive and merely reduce the international community's influence on that country's government. We finally assured our hosts that the Canadian Government would continue to exert pressure upon the South African authorities to bring about the relaxation and eventual abrogation of that country's racist laws and institutions.

As was to be expected, however, we found that the Pan-African consensus within the OAU allowed for a variety of views and differences in emphasis between the five governments with whom we discussed these issues. The position of the Nigerian Government was expressed by Foreign Minister Arikpo at a dinner given for our delegation. I quote:

"Much as we welcome economic co-operation, we also recognise the fact that such co-operation can only be truly effective in a political climate which recognises the basic right of every nation and people to order their own affairs. I have only recently returned from Tanzania where I attended a meeting of the Ministerial Council of the OAU. It was a meeting where we discussed, in great detail, the situation in Southern Africa and the continuing danger posed to the peace and security of the world by the policy of apartheid and by the intransigent attitude of the white minority rebel regime of Zimbabwe. Our renewed and unequivocal collective condemnation of apartheid was never in doubt, nor were we deceived by the so-called

shift in policy of the South African racist regime aimed at perpetuating its detestable policy of apartheid through a manoeuvre designed at sowing discord among independent African nations. Our vehement and uncompromising opposition to the continued illegal occupation of Namibia by the South African regime was also clearly restated. There was equally no doubt about our determination to see the immediate end to a rebellion which certainly would have collapsed a long time ago but for the support, both open and clandestine, given to Ian Smith by his friends. With the happy outcome and welcome developments in the territories which, until recently, were under Portuguese administration, we are fully convinced that the Vorster regime in South Africa now realizes that Black majority rule in Zimbabwe is inevitable and that its continued occupation of Namibia will soon be untenable.

"It is for these reasons that Mr. Vorster decided to re-open his recent peace offensive against independent African nations. The extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers reaffirmed the stand that no independent African country has the legal or moral right to negotiate on behalf of any liberation movement except on the express request of that movement and with the knowledge of the OAU. The recent effort to negotiate a settlement in Zimbabwe was done at the request and full consent of the ANC under the leadership of Bishop Muzorewa. As for Nigeria, we remain firmly committed to continue to support the liberation movements to prove to Mr. Vorster that it is not in the interest of South Africa to continue to maintain an army in Zimbabwe, it is not in the interest of South Africa to help Ian Smith to circumvent U.N. sanctions and it is not in the interest of South Africa to continue its policy of apartheid.

"I would wish here to place on record our appreciation of the sympathy and support which the Canadian Government has always shown and given to the cause of the liberation struggle in Africa."

In Ouagadougou, Foreign Minister Zerbo pointed out that several resolutions had been adopted at the Dar-es-Salaam meeting concerning the independence and territorial integrity of Namibia and recognition of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO). The members of the OAU also reaffirmed their economic boycott of South Africa and called upon developed countries, and particularly Europe, to follow suit. African states were asked once again to refuse landing rights to aircraft bound for South Africa. They also criticized those industrialized countries which, through trade with South Africa, strengthened the economy of that country and therefore buttressed the apartheid system. Mr. Zerbo nevertheless concluded that dialogue could be useful, but he insisted that it should be "disciplined", that is, associating the representatives of the liberation movements in order to obtain the assurance that this dialogue would really contribute to the liberation of the peoples of Southern Africa.

The House is aware that the President of the Ivory Coast has long been a proponent of dialogue in Southern Africa; we were therefore grateful that he expounded at some length on his views regarding the problems of Southern Africa in the presence of Canadian journalists, when he received me at Yamoussoukro.

Africa, noted Mr. Houphouet-Boigny, can be broken down into three main areas: North Africa is inhabited by Arabs, who settled there many centuries ago and who have become our brothers, he said; in the South came the Dutch and then the English, and they have become our brothers to the same extent as the Arabs, he went on to say; and in between these two groups live the black Africans, the natives. Nobody denies the African character of South Africa, noted the Ivorian President; but the government of that country pursues a policy of apartheid which is repugnant to all Africans.

It is nevertheless necessary to avoid a confrontation with that country, according to Mr. Houphouet-Boigny. There are two ways to bring an end to apartheid and to prompt white South Africans to reconsider their relationship with their black brothers: violence or dialogue. The Ivory Coast has opted for dialogue because if by misfortune war broke out between whites and blacks, the Ivorian authorities do not believe that the western powers would sell a single bullet to the blacks, whereas the attitude of the East would be quite different.

But the economic potential of Africa is so great that the West could not tolerate a penetration by the Eastern powers in Southern Africa, Mr. Houphouet-Boigny continued. This eventuality should suffice in time to convince the whites in South Africa that they would do better to learn to live on decent terms with the black population of their country. Such is the position that the Ivorian Foreign Minister expressed in Dar-es-Salaam.

The Cameroonians for their part stressed the "hybrid nature" of the Namibian case, since the legal status of this territory is quite similar to that of Cameroon and Togo in former years, with the important difference that the South African tutor has persistently refused to grant independence or even to return the administration of Namibia to the United Nations. They have also expressed a strong preference for negotiated settlements in Southern Africa; and they asked for the assistance of Canada and other countries so that Africans might not have to resort ultimately to force. What worried African leaders before the Dar-es-Salaam meeting was that recent contacts with South Africa might have called into question the Mombassa Agreements and therefore undermined African solidarity.

Finally, Ghana's Commissioner for External Affairs also summarized the views of the government at the dinner he hosted for us. Said Lt. Col. Baah:

Momentous events have recently taken place on the freedom front of Africa with the collapse of fascism in Portugal. Having seen the writing on the wall, those who deny even today the equality of the races and the right of all to share fully in the governance of their nation and the bounty of their land, have embarked upon a campaign of deceit to divide and weaken

the forces against injustice in Southern Africa. As the head of state and chairman of the National Redemption Council has emphatically stated, we shall not truck with the racialists of South Africa.

Ghana opposes this so-called dialogue today as it did yesterday, not because of an inherent aversion to reasoned exchange of views, but because of our strong conviction that for dialogue to be meaningful, there must at least exist a climate of respect, mutual trust and willingness to be just. How can we truck with those who even in this age of enlightenment still believe the black men of South Africa were destined by God to be hewers of wood and drawers of water for them? It will be the height of folly to expect that we Ghanaians can support freedom for Zimbabwe and Namibia at the sacrifice of freedom and justice for the black men of South Africa. Freedom is indivisible or it is no freedom."

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