


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THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS



DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE

NEWSLETTER

NUUSBRIEF

Vol. 7 No. 4.

1975

DIE SUID - AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE

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Suid-Afrika

South Africa

Desember/December, 1975

DIRECTOR'S NOTES

Director's Study Visit to West Germany and the United Kingdom

The National Director, Mr. John Barratt, is on a month's study visit to West Germany at the invitation of the *Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst*. He is visiting various institutions concerned with West German foreign policy and with research on African developments, *inter alia*, the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* and the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik*. Cities that he will visit include Bonn, Hamburg, Berlin and Munich.

In addition, Mr. Barratt will pay a brief visit to the United Kingdom for discussions with the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), The Institute for the Study of Conflict and The International Institute for Strategic Studies, with which Institutes the SAIIA has special links. At the latter Institute he will also give an address. He will be attending the Annual Conference of the British International Studies Association.

Corporate Membership

Since the last issue of the *Newsletter*, one new Corporate Member has joined the Institute:

The Stellenbosch Farmers' Wineries, Ltd.

The Institute is very pleased to be able to welcome this new Member. (A full list of Corporate Members is given on the inside back cover of the *Newsletter*.)

The Institute also welcomes again as Donor Members:

United Building Society

and

Credit Guarantee Insurance Corp. of Africa, Ltd.

New Transkei Branch of the Institute

A new Branch of the Institute was established at Umtata in the Transkei at a general meeting of interested people on 29 October, 1975. The Constitution of the Branch was adopted at a meeting on 12 November, 1975, and the following Executive Committee was elected:

Mr. I.W.S. Mdledle	-	Chairman
Mr. C.M. Kobus	-	Vice-Chairman
Mr. A.T. Sigcu	-	Vice-Chairman
Mr. E.M. Mtshontshi	-	Secretary
Mr. G. Sineke	-	Treasurer
Mr. H.S. Calaza		
Mr. T.M. Mbambisa		
Mr. H.M. Lusu		
Mr. A. Nkonyeni		
Mr. W.T.T. Mbetse		

At this early stage the Branch already has a membership of fifty-six. The first speaker's meeting will be held towards the middle of January, 1976.

DENIS VENTER
Assistant Director
Jan Smuts House
December, 1975

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NUUSBRIEF / NEWSLETTER

Vol. 7 No. 4
1975

INHOUD / CONTENTS

	Page
DIRECTOR'S NOTES	iii
WEST GERMANY: WHAT SOUTH AFRICANS SHOULD KNOW ABOUT EUROPE'S POWERHOUSE	1
Dr. Rudolph Gruber	
DÉTENTE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: TIME FOR STOCKTAKING	15
Dr. the Hon. Hilgard Muller	
CURRENT OPPORTUNITIES AND PROBLEMS FOR SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY	21
John Barratt	
DÉTENTE IN SUIDER-AFRIKA: TERUGBLIK EN VOORUITSIGTE	29
Denis Venter	
ENERGY: SOME INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS	36
I.F.A. de Villiers	
VIETNAM AND AMERICA'S WORLD ROLE	40
Carl Landauer	
THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF UNITED STATES SECURITY ASSISTANCE	43
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SUPPORTS UNITED NATIONS; BUT FINDS IMPORTANCE LESSENED	47
RECENT ACQUISITIONS IN THE LIBRARY AT JAN SMUTS HOUSE	50
SOME RECENT INSTITUTE PUBLICATIONS	53
CORPORATE MEMBERS OF THE INSTITUTE	Inside Back Cover

WEST GERMANY: WHAT SOUTH AFRICANS SHOULD KNOW ABOUT EUROPE'S POWERHOUSE

Dr. Rudolph Gruber

I did not realise, until I went to Germany four years ago, how little I knew of that country, and I do not suppose that in my ignorance I was any different from the majority of my countrymen in South Africa. Therefore, the idea occurred to me to give you a brief introduction to some of the more important aspects of German life and institutions which are not well-known in this country. Also I thought I could draw your attention to some of the aspects of German society which are interesting in themselves and which in practice may serve as models for ourselves.

When looking at Germany today, one is struck by an overriding fact. Germany is not a great power politically speaking, but she is a great economic power. In terms of gross national product, she is the third most powerful state in the world, exceeded only by the United States and the Soviet Union. In trade terms, according to provisional figures for last year, Germany is the most important trading nation in the world, having overtaken the United States.

Last year, despite the oil crisis which led to massive and disturbing balance of payments deficits in all other industrialized countries, West Germany ended the year with a whopping P12 000 million trade surplus. She now has gold and foreign currency reserves totalling P26 000 million, or, in other words, greater than those of the United States in its heyday. She has the hardest currency in the world, and an inflation rate below 6 per cent - and falling. She, alone of all industrial countries, presents a picture of economic stability and strength which we can only envy.

This achievement is all the more remarkable when set in historical perspective. It is after all, only 30 years ago since the end of the Second World War. What it meant for Europe, particularly for Germany, I need hardly emphasize, but a few points could be mentioned. At the end of the War, Germany as the loser lost one third of its pre-war territory, the most productive agricultural land to Poland and the Soviet Union. The population from those regions, 11 million in all, were displaced overnight, with no more than they could carry. They arrived in West Germany to find the land totally destroyed and dislocated; great cities, like Hamburg, Berlin, Frankfurt and Cologne, were 95 per cent destroyed. The scene of desolation was so complete that, in the case of Cologne for instance, men like Adenauer despaired of ever rebuilding the city and toyed with the idea of leaving the ruins and starting Cologne on another site. There are still mountains near Munich and near Berlin, reminiscent of our own mine dumps, consisting of rubble from the ruins of these cities. One has to see this to begin to realise what was involved in those years.

The industrial potential of this country was largely destroyed, and what little was left was dismantled under the terms of the reparation settlements. Despite this, and the fact that what remained of Germany had been divided initially into four occupation zones, and later into two states, West Germany has brought itself to this extraordinary point of economic strength and stability. She is an important element in the world and, from our own point of view in South Africa, a factor of which we must take note. In 1973 for example, West Germany overtook the United States as our second most important trading partner. Last year, for the first time in our history, she overtook

Great Britain as our leading supplier of imported goods. If only our exporters, our businessmen, would awake to the potential of the German market, there could be little doubt that in a very short space of time, this market, fully developed by us, could make Germany our most important trading partner. German investment in South Africa in the last ten years has increased by the phenomenal figure of 2000 per cent.

In giving an introduction to German life, institutions and society, I shall, of necessity, have to be selective and brief. There are so many aspects that could be dealt with, and if I omit any feature it is not that I consider it unimportant. Let me deal first of all with the political structure. The important thing to remember about West Germany, is that in a double sense, she is a child of her history. On the one hand, she is, as I said earlier, a truncated state, a provisional state, hoping for the day when a reunited Germany can emerge. On the other hand, she is also, in her constitution and political institutions, the embodiment of an attempt to learn from the past, to profit from experience, and to prevent a repetition of earlier mistakes. In her political structure, she is deliberately a federal state, consisting of 11 *Länder* or federal states. Three of them, Hamburg, Bremen and West Berlin are city states; the remainder are provinces as we in South Africa know them, but the decentralization of West Germany goes much further. Bonn is the capital of West Germany virtually by accident. There is an old joke in Germany that Bonn was chosen as the capital because Rhöndorf, just across the river, where Adenauer lived, was, with its population of 500, actually too small. The truth of the matter is that Bonn was chosen as the capital because Frankfurt, the obvious choice, might have developed into a genuine capital, and so rival Berlin in the event of reunion. Consequently, to this day, we find a far reaching decentralization of the major institutions of Government: for example, Parliament and the ministries are in Bonn, but we find the patents office in Munich, the Archives in Koblenz, the central employment bureau in Frankfurt, the central statistical office in Wiesbaden, the supreme constitutional court in Karlsruhe, the environment protection agency in Berlin, to name but a few examples. This high degree of decentralization is, politically speaking, the most striking feature of Germany.

There is one other aspect, which as a South African, seems to me to warrant attention, and that is the nature of the electoral system. The *Bundestag* is elected every four years by an interesting and, as far as I know, unique system. Each adult, over the age of 18 has the franchise, but actually casts his vote twice during a general election. Once for the candidate of his choice in the constituency in which he resides, once for the party of his choice, not necessarily the party to which the candidate of his choice belongs. This means, that parties representing minority interests, which may not be strong enough to capture an individual constituency, can none the less, on the basis of their representation in the *Land* or province, have members in the *Bundestag*, provided that in any *Land* they secure more than 5 per cent of the votes. This hurdle of 5 per cent is a typical example of the lessons which the Germans drew from their experience in the Weimar days, when every party, no matter how small its support or how splinter-like its affiliations, was able to obtain representation in the *Reichstag* - a state of affairs which greatly added to the instability of that parliamentary institution. The hurdle of 5 per cent is there to prevent instability, while the two-tier electoral system enables minority interests to be represented. The system works well.

A further feature is the absence of by-elections, because any vacancy

is automatically filled from the ranks of the party to which the previous incumbent belonged, thus maintaining the numerical relationship. Therefore it is reasonably certain that once the Government and Chancellor are elected to Parliament, they will see the electoral period through unless there are defections of existing members. The Chancellor's period of office is four years, and if his policies lead to temporary or abiding unpopularity, he need not be deterred, as he need not be influenced by the vicissitudes of the electoral popularity from month to month. As a result, he is able to pursue his policies provided his party stands behind him. This is an important advantage, the benefits of which are evident in the present circumstances in Germany, where a social-liberal coalition, despite waning popularity among its own electors, is pursuing anti-inflationary policies, which increase the number of unemployed, as it regards them to be in the national interest.

The electoral system has one other aspect which is worthy of consideration. In Weimar days it was possible for any random combination of parties, or members, to topple a Chancellor; much as in our own House of Assembly, or in the House of Commons, it is possible, by a vote of no confidence, to topple the Government. The German constitution provides that a Government can only be overthrown if at the same time as the motion of no confidence is put forward, an alternative candidate for the Chancellorship is proposed. In other words, there can be no gap in Government, since a successor Chancellor with a working majority has been automatically elected. It is an interesting device, and one that I think could be adopted with profit in some other countries - Italy, for example. The political system then, is an ingenious one, certain aspects of which might well be emulated in our own country to meet the challenges of the developing situation.

One further aspect is worthy of mention. The political parties all receive support in the form of state subsidies. The idea of this, is that a small party, representing perhaps poor people or the working class, should not be penalised as against a rich party representing employer interests, industrial interests and landowners. Of course, there is nothing to prevent wealthy people or trade unions contributing to the parties of their choice; but there is a modicum of financial support to enable the small parties to carry out their political work provided they are represented in the *Bundestag*.

Let us turn now to the economic picture. In West Germany, all the major political parties are dedicated to what is called the *Soziale Marktwirtschaft*. It is difficult to translate this into English. The nearest equivalent is perhaps "free enterprise with a social conscience". There are two basic ingredients to this. One is free enterprise - a dedication to the idea that market forces ought to prevail, that supply and demand should determine price and that there ought to be open competition between the factors of production. This is accepted by all the parties, including the Social Democrats. Simultaneously, it is recognised that although people who possess either property or skills should be free to use these to their own advantage in the market place; they should not ignore the responsibilities and obligations which their power bestows upon them. In other words, property and skills create not only rights but obligations. It is not proper, and not permissible for those in society who are weak and handicapped, who are old or ill, to be driven against the wall in a market economy. It should be a free enterprise system with a social conscience. The latter aspect is also supported by the two conservative sister parties, the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union.

I would like to deal with the two protagonists in economic life: the trade unions and the employer associations. The trade unions, too, have learnt from the lessons of the past and learnt well. Trade unions in Germany are organised on an industry-wide basis, not on a regional or historical basis. For example, all those in metal working and engineering are in one giant union; all those dealing with chemicals, glass and ceramics are in another union; all those in agriculture, forestry or fishing are in another; and all those in commerce, banking or insurance are in one union. There are sixteen in all, each covering whole branches of industry. This has the great advantage, that inter-union disputes as we know them in Britain, for example, simply do not occur. The situation in which a firm like Leyland, for example, finds itself with no less than 43 unions represented on its shop floor, does not arise in Germany, where all motor workers belong to the IG-Metall. The great strength of numbers which the unions thus have in Germany means that they have the resources to undertake research projects into the economic structure of their industries, for example, and that enables them to be much more knowledgeable and effective in bargaining in the interests of their members. Simultaneously, the employers are grouped together in association on a roughly similar industrial basis. Generally, once a year, the Trade Union and the Employer Association for any particular industry meet to consider wages and employment conditions for the people in that industry for the next twelve months.

It is interesting to observe what procedures have to be followed, and negotiations are often very hard. If they break down, an Arbitrator has to be called in order to establish whether it is not possible to bridge the gulf. If he cannot bridge the gulf, the Trade Union may decide on strike action, provided 75 per cent of its members endorse such a decision by postal vote; but it may not strike for an unlimited period. After two weeks, new negotiations must be resumed; if they break down again, then, once again, recourse must be had to the ballot. If the members support a renewed strike, a further period of two weeks is authorised. The employers for their part are entitled to lock out all workers in a dispute, including of course, non-union labour. They do not often make use of this right but it is theirs, and, in the last resort, it can be invoked. In practice this system works very well, as is shown by the fact that Germany has the best strike record of any industrialised country, that is to say the lowest number of working days and man hours lost through strike action.

In most countries, the effect of rising prices upon workers is generally to encourage them to try to beat inflation by demanding wage increases in excess of the anticipated rise in prices for the twelve months ahead. In Germany, we find the situation in which for example a strong trade union like the Metal Workers Union settled for and disciplined its members to accept a pay rise which did not exceed the inflation rate for the preceding 12 month period. There are, of course, on occasions, wildcat strikes, but the figures show that discipline is strong and that when the bargaining is over - and the bargain is often very hard - it is adhered to by both sides.

There is one further aspect of the labour situation of which we should take note, and that is the desire of the West German Government to introduce co-determination in industry. The legislation on this is still under consideration, and as yet no final picture has emerged, but very roughly something on the following lines is likely to come about. In any industry with more than two thousand employees, of the twelve persons who normally make up the supervisory board, six must represent capital - the shareholders - and six the employees. The Social Democrats would like to see half of the

six employee representatives elected by the workers on the shop floor, and half nominated by the trade union to which those workers belong. The latter stipulation will enable the trade union, if it wishes, to hire highly trained professionals to represent employee interests on the supervisory board. The Free Democrats, on the other hand, would like to see only four members representing the workers and two representing management. Whatever form it takes, some form of co-determination will emerge as a means of reconciling the interests of capital and labour thus minimizing the likelihood of industrial disputes.

Let us now turn to the social security system. It is a common feature of most Western countries and this includes our own, that pensioners, particularly in a time of inflation such as we are experiencing, are the least privileged members of the community. While prices rise, their pensions remain relatively fixed, and in many cases old people seek out their last days in real need and deprivation. In West Germany since 1957, a scheme has been in operation in which pensions are indexed to the wage level; in other words, pensions are adjusted annually according to the average increase in wages. Last year, for example, the average wage increase was 11,6 per cent and accordingly pensions were raised by the same amount, while inflation was only about 6 per cent for the same period. Since 1957 pensions have, in fact, not only kept pace with the value of money, but have, together with wages, improved on it. The idea is that the working generation should not only benefit from a rising standard of living, but should also help those who have done their bit in the past to participate in the increased affluence.

Unemployment insurance is another element of which we could take note. There is nothing more damaging to society and its stability than unemployment on a large scale, and Germany experienced this in the early 1930's: the unemployment rate was massive, one out of three persons was out of work and the dislocation, the misery, the frustration and the despair which resulted played a considerable part in bringing about the rise of National Socialism. Consequently, great attention is paid to ensuring that this kind of instability will not arise again. An unemployed person today can, during the first six months of his unemployment, expect unemployment benefit representing 68 per cent of his former gross wage, free of tax. This places him in only a slightly worse off position than he enjoyed as an employed person paying tax. There is, however, every incentive in the system to ensure that, when offered a job in his field, he is ready to accept re-employment. The *Arbeitsamt* is obliged to offer him up to three jobs in his field - if he refuses all three, the benefit is gradually scaled down, and ultimately is reduced to social relief only.

Another interesting aspect is health insurance. Virtually everybody, in West Germany, is covered by health insurance. Those under a certain income level, contribute to a General Health Insurance Scheme. The beneficiaries are entitled to go to any doctor registered under the health scheme and receive medical attention from him. The fees for various treatments are laid down by agreement between the administrators of the health scheme and the doctors or dentists associations. Those above a certain income level are free to join this scheme if they wish, but can also take out a private health insurance which is highly developed in Germany, and enables them to select the doctor or dentist of their choice; while no ceiling is put on the cost of treatment or medicines. This combination of security, coupled with freedom of choice, works very well, although it is expensive.

I wish now to discuss the sphere of cultural life. In accordance with

Germany's federal system, its cultural life too is decentralised. This is an old tradition. As you will remember, Germany formerly consisted of many minor principalities and states, each of which had their own cultural institutions. The ruling Prince was expected to foster the Arts in his principality and this role has now passed to the State. There are 85 first class symphony orchestras in West Germany compared with 9 in a country of comparable size and population like Britain. There are 166 theatres of international reputation throughout Germany. I do not know what the figure for Britain is, but as you know the National Theatre in Britain, incorporating the Royal Shakespeare Theatre company at Stratford-upon-Avon and the Aldwych Company in London, (hopefully with new premises on the South Bank at some stage in the future), is the only theatre company which has state support. The others are commercial theatres and often put on entertainment which is trivial and ephemeral rather than a serious contribution to the cultural scene.

I would like to refer to one other aspect in this context, namely the book market. Germans are great readers, although if you listen to booksellers and book publishers, you would think that this is not the case. To give you some comparable figures: in Britain and Northern Ireland - certainly countries with a literate, interested and intelligent people and moreover countries who publish for English-speaking communities in many parts of the world, 33,000 new books were published in 1973, while in France 22,000, in West Germany 40,000 and if you add East Germany, 45,000 were published. The Frankfurt Book Fair, held annually, is the major book occasion of the world. Last year there were over 3,000 publishers represented, and the number of new titles, in many different languages, was over 350,000.

I would feel a talk on Germany inadequate if I did not also deal with the churches. This is a most interesting aspect, in two respects. Germany is the land of the Reformation, the country in which Christianity was split 450 years ago. Roughly half the population is Roman Catholic, and the other half Protestant. Interestingly, unlike Protestant denominations in other countries which have separately retained their identity, their poverty, and in many cases their ineffectiveness, the Protestants in Germany, partly as a consequence of the experiences of the War, and the period of Nazi rule, have come together. There is a single United Evangelical Church incorporating all Protestants in the three major communities: the Lutheran, the Calvinist and the Unitarian. The Catholics of course, have historically always been united.

A second interesting fact about the Church scene is the existence of a church tax. This differs slightly from province to province. Generally it is 10 per cent of the income tax one pays, and is collected by the state along with income tax and passed on to the Churches. Surprisingly, only 0,1 per cent of people previously Church members have resigned in order to save Church tax. The Churches, however, remain powerful both in money and influence. It is interesting to note that the German Protestant Church, by virtue of its income and strength, contributes 40 per cent of the budget of the World Council of Churches - if only it had 40 per cent of the influence.

What about the picture provided by the media? There were in 1971 (the most recent figures I have been able to find), over 13,000 daily newspapers in Germany. It is said that 70 per cent of the adult population reads a daily newspaper. The figure in South Africa among our white population is a great deal lower; the latest figure I have been able to obtain is under 40 per cent. In West Germany, because broadcasting is a responsibility not of the Federal State, but of the individual *Länder* or provincial states, there

is great diversity in broadcasting and television. This is particularly true of the radio, as each *Land* has its own broadcasting authority and produces its own programme. In Bonn, because of its location, it is possible to hear the broadcasts on FM from a number of the surrounding *Länder*, this giving a choice of 11 programmes. Generally, each transmitting authority has 3 and, in some cases, 4 programmes: one is usually devoted to popular entertainment and pop music, another may be called a general interest transmission, providing a selection of news and current affairs, drama and music, a third is serious and highbrow with serious music, drama, lectures and documentaries. In some *Länder* there is a fourth transmitter which broadcasts in foreign languages for the sake of the *Gastarbeiter* providing news broadcasts and services in Turkish, Greek, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian and other languages which are spoken by the roughly 3 000 000 foreign workers resident in Western Germany.

Television presents a broadly similar spectrum. The broadcasting authorities of the *Länder* have combined in what is called a Working Community of the Broadcasting Authorities to disseminate two programmes. One is the general interest programme, consisting of programmes made in different *Länder* and broadcast nationally on the same network. In other words, they divide up production between themselves and share the results. The second German channel is a national one, and is also basically a general interest transmitter. An interesting feature of the two general interest transmitters is that programmes of a type are made to correspond; for example, when a current affairs programme is shown on the one transmitter, a different current affairs programme is shown on the other. This contrasts with the system in Britain, for example, where the transmitters always complement one another; if a serious programme was shown on the one, there was something light on the other, providing a choice. In West Germany, however, the authorities take the view that it is good for the public to be informed, and therefore, when current affairs, political and educational programmes are broadcast, they have the choice between two such programmes or switching both off.

A talk of this nature would not be complete without a look at West Germany's foreign policy in relation to South Africa. When looking at West Germany's foreign policy, one is impressed by the fact that it is dominated, and formed, by four factors: geographical, historical, economic and military. Geographically, and this is something we should never lose sight of, West Germany is a country with many neighbours, twelve in all if you include Scandinavia across the Baltic. It is right in the middle of Europe, at the crossroads between North and South, East and West. Therefore, in the first place, she has to concern herself with what goes on, not merely in Western, but in Eastern, Southern and Northern Europe.

Historically, West Germany's foreign policy is influenced by the fact that a mere 30 years ago it was a defeated nation, which, during the preceding five or six years, had invaded or occupied all its neighbours, except Sweden and Switzerland. As a consequence of these acts, it incurred the displeasure of all its neighbours, who, since then, have had to be placated.

Economically, West Germany emerged from the War as a truncated country, having lost its agricultural land in the East. Therefore, it found itself in the position of having to trade in order to live, of having to import raw materials and foodstuffs for its people and having to manufacture goods and sell them abroad in order to pay for its imports. It is a nation that lives by trade - one in five people in Germany live by export. This fact is never

lost sight of in the Chancellery in Bonn.

Finally, there is the military factor. Germany lost the War and was divided by the allies. East Germany was occupied by the Red Army, a Red Army which, in terms of modern logistics, was only a few hours from West Germany's capital on the Rhine; a Red Army which in the initial years after the War, appeared to flex its muscles and take its bearings towards the West. If the West Germans required any reminder of Russian intentions towards them, they needed to think no further than the Berlin Blockade. Berlin remained as Krushchev described it, "a fishbone in the Russian throat", something that he was determined to spit out, and conceivably West Germany was *delicatessen* which he was bent on devouring.

These four factors have determined West German foreign policy. They involve a concern with their neighbours, through the geographical factor; a desire to mend fences with the neighbours, through the historical factor; a desire to trade, through the economic factor; and a desire to find friends and bed itself down in the Western alliance on account of the fears of insecurity generated by the Russian presence.

In the initial post-war years, the policy was directed at reconciliation and integration with the West. There are still difficulties in this sphere; it cannot be said that all adverse memories have been eliminated in countries like the Netherlands, Denmark and, although she was not occupied, Great Britain. However, the progress has been remarkable considering the situation 30 years ago, especially in relation to France. This is something truly pleasing for those who have an interest in the stability and strength of Europe. For 600 years, no French Head of State had paid a visit in peace and friendship to Germany or vice versa, and indeed in the last 100 years, Germany and France had fought three disastrous wars against each other. As a consequence of the Franco-German Treaty there exists a close, cordial and warm relationship between these two countries, and an exchange on both unofficial and official levels. There are regular reciprocal visits every six months between senior cabinet ministers of the two countries, while youth exchange programmes are greatly encouraged. It cannot be said that everything is perfect, although the transformation is so enormous that it borders on the miraculous.

Following the improvement of relations in Western Europe, Chancellor Brandt, in particular, turned his attention to achieving the same in Eastern Europe. It was a much more difficult exercise, because, in the West no territory had been sacrificed, no population had been expelled. One third of pre-war Germany, however, had been annexed by Poland and Russia; 11 000 000 people were expelled from this territory overnight and now represent a strong domestic political factor in Western Germany. Herr Brandt came to the conclusion, rightly or wrongly, that there was little hope in an ultimate peace treaty after so many years of failing to get the Poles and the Russians to vacate their booty. Not only that, but the people who had been cruelly expelled, had established new homes and had integrated themselves into Western Germany. Chancellor Brandt felt that the most important cause of continuing fear and dissention, of disagreement and difficulty, between Germany and her Eastern neighbours should be removed by recognising what had emerged as the *status quo*. Consequently, in a series of treaties, the Moscow Treaty, the Warsaw Treaty, the Prague Treaty and others, West Germany recognised not only the Oder-Neisse line as the Western boundary of Poland, but also the existing boundaries of Czechoslovakia.

The permanent division of Germany is, however, not accepted. Although a basic treaty exists with East Germany, and the latter has been recognised as

a State, it is not a foreign country in terms of West German law. Thus an East German who comes to West Germany is automatically entitled, if he so desires, to a West German passport, to the vote and to full citizenship rights. The representative of East Germany in Bonn is not an Ambassador, but a so-called Permanent Representative and vice versa.

The two countries are not alien territories to each other and a special concession has been made within the terms of the European Community in that there are no real tariff boundaries between East and West Germany; the only barrier to trade is the inability of the East Germans to find sufficient hard currency to import all that they might wish. They are consequently free, through their access to West German markets, to export to the other countries in the European Community. The hope of an eventual peaceful reunion remains, albeit in the hearts of some people a diminishing prospect. It continues to be a political issue and the ultimate goal. Firstly, the idea of the *Ostpolitik* was to bring about the removal of fear in Eastern Europe, of a war to regain the lost territory in the East, resulting from the revival of German reunification ideas; and secondly, a bid to normalise relations and, within the context of normal relations in Europe, ultimately relax conditions. An attempt was made to persuade people, by a process of what Brandt called "small steps", that a reunited Germany within the heart of Europe would not be a menace, but would be a factor for stability and peace. That is still a long way off, but remains the ideal, the hope and the objective, in fact the first objective of West German foreign policy.

In conclusion, a brief word on West German policy and attitudes towards South Africa. West German foreign policy is guided by five principles: firstly, a fundamental desire to promote peace and stability, not only in its immediate environment, but in the world; secondly, non-aggression: it will not start a war and it will not attack anyone; thirdly, the right to self-determination of all people - the compelling factor here being that if it did not stress this point, it could not hold the view that the other half of divided Germany has the right to self-determination; fourthly, non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries; fifthly, this applies of course, particularly to us, a rejection of discrimination of any kind, and in particular racial discrimination - this is a legacy of past experience.

In relation to Africa, West German policy emerges relatively clearly. At the end of January, 1975, 35 West German Heads of Mission in African countries south of the Sahara, including the West German Ambassador to Pretoria and the West German Consul in Windhoek, assembled in Nairobi for a conference to review West German relations with Africa. This was the first time since 1968 that such a review conference had been held. This fact is significant as it shows the relatively low priority given to Africa in German foreign policy considerations. Europe is the first, and as I said earlier, the dominant interest area. Also, and this was not regarded as significant, the conference was supposed to have been chaired by the Foreign Minister, but he decided to go to Finland instead, because the East Germans were proposing to conclude a Consular Agreement with the Firms which might have brought about a recognition of a separate East German citizenship and nationality contrary to West German ideas. Thus, the Foreign Minister went to Helsinki and the conference in Nairobi was chaired by the State Secretary.

The conference began with a review of West German relations in Africa over the last six or seven years, and in the assessment of the Ambassadors, three basic points emerged in recent African developments. The first, was

the enhanced assertion of an African identity, manifesting itself politically through bodies such as the Organisation of African Unity and a more aggressive or militant posture in the world; economically, through a tendency to the formation of blocks; and culturally, through rather assertive attitudes in the field of sport, culture etc. A strange phenomenon was also noted: whereas bi-lateral relations between Bonn and most African capitals were very good, when the Africans met in a multilateral context, in the United Nations or some of its subordinate bodies, they were quite capable of taking decisions, passing resolutions or adopting postures that could only be regarded as contrary to the good bi-lateral relations which the countries individually had with Germany. A further factor, as the West Germans saw it, was the increased emphasis in Africa on Southern Africa - a desire to end what the Africans saw as the last remnants of racialism and colonialism.

What attitude should West Germany adopt? The Ambassadors decided, and it was confirmed in Bonn, to continue the recipe as above; the five basic principles should be observed. In relation to South Africa, they were adamant that while they did not approve of those practices in our country which are discriminatory, and would prefer to see these practices discontinued, they did not feel it proper to interfere in the domestic affairs of a sovereign country. They also agreed that politics and trade should not be mixed. They saw South Africa as an important supplier of raw materials, an area of investment for industry, a market for their goods and a source of employment for their workers at home through manufacture of exports. They were not prepared to allow anything to interfere with their economic relations with South Africa, but they were conscious of the fact that certain practices and policies in South Africa created difficulties in their relations with individual African states.

It was also decided that the problem of the discrepancies between bi-lateral and multi-lateral relations would be approached in a more positive manner, in the sense that issues like South Africa would not be left to world forums (e.g. the United Nations, UNCTAD conferences etc.) where West Germany would be abused *en bloc* by the Africans. West Germany's interests and policies would be made known at ambassadorial level in the individual African territories, using the normally good relations with those Governments to impress upon them that West Germany also had to look after her interests in the world.

As far as Rhodesia was concerned, it was decided that while West Germany preferred majority rule the existence of a substantial White minority should be recognised. This recognition of the right to existence and the right to development of the White minority, should facilitate an agreement. They decided that this view should also be made known in the African capitals.

On the question of South West Africa, they aligned themselves with the view that South Africa no longer legally speaking, had a right to a presence in that territory, and that the only solution was ultimate independence. They insisted on maintaining their consular presence in South West Africa, even though it was contrary to the United Nations resolutions, demanding the withdrawal of all foreign representatives. They based their argument on the fact that there were people of German nationality and citizenship in that territory which required consular attention and assistance. They said that this was their first priority and that they would fulfil this obligation until the United Nations or some other authority could guarantee equal attention and care. Therefore, they have maintained their Consulate in South West Africa, although it was also decided at Nairobi to make it clear that it was the general interests as citizens and not their privileged position as Whites which the Consulate was there to protect.

I have gained the impression in West Germany that public opinion does not allow itself the kind of moral rectitude about the sins of others which is often encountered in some European countries. This indeed, to me as a South African, is the most refreshing thing I find in Germany. The radio, television and the newspapers are free of the degree of national prejudice and resentments and old stories which, alas, still do the rounds about neighbours in other countries. Thus, they do not allow themselves the degree of moral rectitude about our frailties and follies which some of the nations of the world allow themselves. Generally speaking, they neither condone nor accept racial discrimination. In particular, they do not condone the payment of differential wages for the same job, and would like to see things changed. They also would not support any approach of violence, coercion, terror and bloodshed. Their viewpoint, as Herr Brandt once made clear in a famous speech, is that they have not the right to indulge in "the pointing of the finger", and their task should therefore be in a strife-torn world to help build bridges and work for peace and reconciliation. As far as the situation in Southern Africa is concerned, Germany would be found on the side of those who seek improvement and reform through evolutionary change. The standpoint of Chancellor Schmidt and his Government is essentially the same.

DISCUSSION

(An edited version of the transcribed tape-recording of the discussion period during the meeting at Jan Smuts House on 20 March, 1975.)

Question: Can you expand on the relationship between the German churches and the World Council of Churches, particularly on the question of funds for the liberation movements in Southern Africa?

Dr. Gruber: The general budget of the World Council of Churches is contributed to by all of its roughly 270 member churches, the size of the contribution being based on an assessment of income, and the Evangelical Church, the strongest financially speaking, makes the biggest contribution. It is, however, important to distinguish between contributions to the general revenue and contributions to the programme to combat racialism, which is a programme of which we in South Africa have had occasion to take note in recent years. The Evangelical Church has consistently refused to contribute a penny to that, and, virtually alone of all member churches in the World Council of Churches it has opposed this programme. Not the programme, as a programme to combat racialism because it is against racialism, but it would prefer to see such a programme placed in a wider context as a programme about human rights generally in the world. But it is absolutely adamant that it will not give a penny to a programme which, without sufficient checks or controls, gives money allegedly for humanitarian purposes to organisations which are engaged in terrorism. I was present in Berlin last August when the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches met and this programme came up once again for discussion and renewal. It was an interesting experience, in an emotionally charged debate, to see how absolutely steadfast the German delegation was on that score. So this is an important distinction, and one that we should bear in mind.

Indeed, if it had not been for the stand taken by the Evangelical Church, the programme itself which was, after a five year period, up for rethinking and renewal, would have been renewed in a form that would have gone well beyond its previous shape. If the World Council of Churches Secretariat had had its way, the anti-racism programme would have been transformed into a vehicle for

anti-Western propoganda from the viewpoint of the Third World. However, the programme as it had previously existed was already too much for the Evangelical Church, and its absolute opposition saved the World Council of Churches from an even bigger folly.

Question: Could you expand on the views of the East German people on *Ostpolitik* and the current devision of Germany into two parts?

Dr. Gruber: We speak of a West German economic miracle and such there certainly was, but this pales into virtual insignificance in comparison with the East German miracles. It must be remembered that East Germany, with its population of 17 000 000 people, was basically agricultural land, except for the big industrial centre of Berlin. Its cities too, had been destroyed, Dresden most dreadfully of all cities in the last war in the famous or notorious fire bomb raid. What industries it had, had been dismantled, and, under Russian occupation, East Germany, although basically agricultural, was obliged to pay as much to the Soviet Union in reparations as West Germany received in Marshall Aid. In addition, until the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, it lost a lot of its younger, its better educated, its more mobile citizens. The total figure is something like 3 million in all, and these were people in their best years.

Since the building of the Wall, East Germany has undergone something of an economic miracle. It now has a standard of living comparable to that of Great Britain. It has a gross national product twice that of South Africa. It has the highest standard of living in Eastern Europe - 50 per cent higher than the Soviet Union. It is in geographical size, the 97th state in the world; in terms of population the 37th; in terms of economic power the 17th. It has a growth rate of roughly 7 per cent in real terms and it has sustained that over the last 10 years. We must take East Germany seriously. The explanation for this is a complex one, although I personally believe that an important ingredient in this revival, under so adverse a system as the socialist system, is the fact that East Germany is what used to be Prussia, and the old Prussian virtues of getting on with the job of working hard, of discipline, of thoroughness are still part of the make-up of the population of East Germany. They have resigned themselves to simply being in the state that they are, although several thousand still escape annually, at immense danger to themselves, to the West. In fact, when one sees the Wall, the barrier between East and West Germany along the entire length of the frontier and the mine fields, the trip wires, automatic shooting devices that exist, it is amazing that anyone, let alone several thousand people escape each year through those hazards. None the less, the bulk of the population has resigned themselves to the system. They take the attitude that they may as well improve their lot, and they have knuckled down to it with diligence and perseverance, energy and initiative, and they have made a success of Communism, as far as this can be, in East Germany.

I think that if you were to ask me what they feel about *Ostpolitik*, I really can only give the opinions of people who regard themselves as informed and perhaps can be considered so, namely that the ordinary people of East Germany have not given up hope of reunification. They have resigned themselves to the present plight. They have accepted that anything that brings about an improvement in their lot, which can bring about a traffic in ideas and people between East and West, is a good thing, and since unquestionably the basic treaty between East and West Germany has, albeit with handicaps and shortcomings, improved the flow of people and also of ideas, this is probably welcomed by them.

Question: What are the factors that have made for Germany's sound economy, as exemplified in the low rate of inflation of only 6 per cent?

Dr. Gruber: The reason is historical. Twice in the lifetime of many Germans alive today they have lost all their possessions, all the wealth they had worked for and saved. The inflation of 1923 was an absolute catastrophe - within the space of 18 months the Mark inflated one thousand million times, and eliminated the savings of the entire middle class. After the Second World War, it was back to square one. With the currency reform in 1949, every man and woman started out with 50 Marks new hard currency in their pockets. All previous money became valueless and savings were wiped out overnight. Thus there is in the marrow and bones of the German people, a knowledge of what inflation means in terms of insecurity and the destruction of social and economic values, and the determination to see that this does not repeat itself is very strong.

One of the mechanisms which is beneficial is the fact that the *Bundesbank*, the Reserve Bank, is completely independent of the Government and can take its decisions regardless of what the Government feels or thinks. I imagine that there is consultation behind the scenes, but ultimately the *Bundesbank* is responsible for the value of the currency and it takes its own decisions. It came to the conclusion, supported by Government, that the key to this question is money supply, while in almost all other Western countries, Governments have funk'd this basic issue. When they have run into problems, they have simply printed more money. In order to maintain what has come to be considered full employment and rising economic standards, they printed money. They postponed the real discipline, and delayed taking action on the issues. In West Germany, and this is the surprising and remarkable thing, a Social Democratic Government, or rather a Social-Liberal coalition took important basic decisions to protect the value of the currency, despite the fact that it would lead to unemployment. Indeed, even when, in the wake of the oil crisis, certain sectors of industry began to feel a cold wind of depression - above all, the motor industry - they were absolutely firm. They said: "This is a free enterprise economy. In the good days when you made profits, you were allowed to make them and you did not want any Government interference. Now with all your losses, you want Government support, and there will be none. This industry is overblown for the needs of the time and it will have to slim down to a more healthy state."

The Government does, however, alleviate the hardship and the suffering of people, in that it provides adequate unemployment insurance, incentives to labour mobility, subsidies for retraining and the like. The hand on the rudder is kept down with an iron grasp, both by the Ministry of Finance and by the *Bundesbank*. I believe this to be perhaps the most important ingredient.

Question: What is Germany's attitude to Development Aid and more especially development aid to South Africa's Homelands?

Dr. Gruber: Your question concerns West Germany's attitude to its obligations abroad. It has long been conscious of the need for development aid and its record on this is a very good one. Although I do not have figures at hand, I believe that, together with France, it heads the world league if one considers development aid as a percentage of G.N.P.

In recent times, under the new Minister of Development Aid, they have developed an interesting new concept which I think, could be taken up with advantage by other countries. They have taken account of the new situation that has developed, where you have the oil producing countries, with huge currency reserves; the industrialized countries with industrial capacity and technical

know-how, but suffering balance of payments deficits and galloping inflation; and the Third World suffering from poverty, aggravated by the oil crisis and low prices for commodities. The situation is getting progressively worse, and the new concept developed by Germany is a three-cornered one. The oil producing countries should put up money for development projects in the Third World - industrialization, development of agricultural resources and the like. These should be carried out by trained personnel from the industrialized countries, backed by the industrial capacity of the latter. The Minister of Development Aid has tested this idea in the Sudan. I think if it got under way, it would be a real contribution and, perhaps, part of a solution to this problem.

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The above article is based on a talk given to the Witwatersrand Branch of the SAIIA at Jan Smuts House on 20 March, 1975, and was specially rewritten for the *Newsletter* by the author.

DÉTENTE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA : TIME FOR STOCKTAKING.

Dr. the Hon. Hilgard Muller

It is an appropriate moment in time for me to address Chatham House, as it is about twelve months since the latest moves towards détente in South Africa started, and it is time for some stocktaking. Developments over the next twelve months, particularly in Rhodesia and Angola, are vital for the future of Southern Africa, and while I have learnt not to prophesy, I think I could well try to identify some of the considerations that come into play.

The search for détente, both on the international stage as well as the smaller Southern African stage, is based on two simple propositions : firstly, that the power of modern weapons has made the cost of war too high for reasonable men to contemplate, and secondly, that in a world of limited and increasingly expensive resources, international co-operation - in the economic, technological and political spheres - is no longer an ideal but an imperative.

The Principles of Détente

The basic rules of détente are simple and universal. They were expressed as follows in the agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States which was signed in Moscow in May, 1972:

"Both countries...will proceed from the common determination that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting their mutual relationships on the basis of peaceful co-existence. Differences in ideology and social systems...are not obstacles to the bilateral development of normal relations based on the principles of sovereignty, equality, non-interference and mutual benefit".

This formula is almost, word for word, the same as that which South Africa has been propounding for years.

We also have determined that there is no alternative to peaceful co-existence. We also believe that ideological differences should not be obstacles to resolving common problems. We also take our stand on the principles of sovereignty, equality, non-interference and mutual benefit.

On the world stage the forces involved in détente have, needless to say, been those of the great power blocs - of the West and the Communist world. In Africa the division has been between the emergent Black states and the White states of the South. For many years both situations were characterised by intransigence, hostility and the threat of violence. For all involved the choice was the same : on the one hand lay confrontation and the possibility of conflict; on the other hand, détente and peace.

The Alternatives

The choice between these two alternatives was clearly expressed by Prime Minister Vorster in the speech which he delivered to the South African Senate on 23 October, 1974. Southern Africa, he said, was at the crossroads; in one direction was the road to peace, and in the other was the road to the escalation of strife. The toll of confrontation would be high, too high for Southern Africa to pay. Therefore Africa should choose the way to peace, the way of normalising relations.

The Consequences of Conflict

Allow me to spell out in a little more detail exactly what these alternatives would mean for Southern Africa. Violence in Southern Africa would lead to unmitigated disaster for all the people of the sub-continent. Once unleashed, it would not be easily contained. It would not be a question of yet another dissipated army wasting away on foreign battlefields in an alien environment, nor of a metropolitan population disenchanted by the expense of a remote war. We would not be dealing with a desultory guerilla war, but with an all-out struggle for survival. As usual it would be the innocent people - of all races - who would suffer. The economic and the social fabric of all the countries involved would be destroyed. Southern Africa could be devastated and only the Jackals - of both animal and human varieties - would prosper.

The Possibilities of Co-operation

On the other hand there is the road to peace. It is not an easy road as we have learnt from our own experience. There are dead-ends and detours and it is uphill all the way. Sometimes it is difficult to persuade one's own people not to lag behind. There are stragglers on both sides and there are those who advocate the downward path.

Southern Africa has enormous potential. We are richly endowed with natural resources and with people willing to develop them. If men of goodwill can come together there is no reason why we should not create a thriving community of politically independent and economically interdependent states in our region. There is no reason why Southern Africa should not realise its potential as one of the world's great storehouses of food and of mineral wealth.

Fortunately, there are strong considerations which work in favour of co-operation between the nations of Southern Africa. Although we have different social and political systems, these differences are counterbalanced by our economic interdependence, by the rising aspirations of our peoples, and by the common interest in maintaining peace in the sub-continent. There are more and more voices advocating the solution of problems by political means, by contact, discussions and negotiation. This is a call to which we can respond, as we have indeed responded over the years to similar calls that have come from Africa.

Progress in Détente

A little more than a year ago Prime Minister Vorster asked for six months grace and told a sceptical world that it would be amazed at where South Africa would be standing at the end of that period. Since then events have borne out the Prime Minister's prognostication. Contacts have been made and new doors opened. During this period numerous visits have been made to Black African capitals by South Africans, including the Prime Minister and myself, in pursuit of co-operation and understanding and missions from Black African countries have, in turn, visited South Africa.

During this period we have maintained our scrupulously correct stance of non-interference with regard to developments in Mocambique and Angola.

In South West Africa we have done all that we can to support the steps which are being taken by the peoples of the Territory to determine their own future without interference from external forces. It is indeed a commentary on our times that these moves have not received the support of the non-Communist world which they deserve. I should like on this occasion to express appreciation of the

British Government's attitude in this regard, as expressed recently by Mr. Ennals. One would have hoped that the tragic events in Angola, involving groups in a struggle for power, would have moved our critics to re-assess the solution and time-scale they advocate for South West Africa.

Together with the Presidents of some of our neighbouring states in Southern Africa we have used all our influence to encourage and enable the people of Rhodesia to come together to seek a constitutional settlement. The fact that the Victoria Falls talks did not lead to such a settlement was, of course, a deep disappointment for all of us. I suggest that the lasting message of the talks was not the setback experienced in the search for a constitutional settlement in Rhodesia. The point that will go down in history is that for the first time black and white Southern Africans openly came together to encourage the solution of a common problem by political means.

Since the historic meeting on the Victoria Falls bridge, the Rhodesian issue has been further complicated by a split in the ANC and by the fact that Mr. Nkomo's subsequent election as President of the Organization is not recognized by Bishop Muzorewa, the Rev. Sithole and their followers. During the absence of the latter two leaders from Rhodesia, three meetings have taken place between Mr. Smith and Mr. Nkomo and further meetings in the near future are envisaged. These discussions are of the utmost importance and we all wish them success. South Africa will gladly render any assistance which may be required to keep the Rhodesians around the conference table. The ball is, however, now in their court - a big responsibility rests upon the Rhodesian leaders, black and white, to find a solution. We welcome the statement on the 31st October by Mr. Callaghan emphasising that the prime responsibility to find a lasting settlement now lies with Rhodesians of all races. Time is, however, running out, and we hope that they will soon arrive at a settlement which will be acceptable to their own people and to others who have an interest in the future of Rhodesia.

Misconceptions about détente

There are some who, for reasons of their own, are unwilling to accept the principles of détente. They are sceptical about the efforts of my Prime Minister and other African leaders to find peaceful solutions to political problems. In their criticism of our search for peaceful solutions they have generated certain misconceptions about our policies which must be answered.

Dialogue within South Africa

One of the most common criticisms is that there should be dialogue within South Africa before détente can be successfully sought between South Africa and the black states of Africa.

Such an attitude betrays ignorance of current developments within South Africa. Regular and meaningful consultation has regularly taken place and continues to take place at the highest level between the white South African Government and the leaders of the other national groups in South Africa. Unlike many other leaders in the Third World and unlike the leaders of the PAC and ANC operating abroad, our non-white leaders hold their positions because they enjoy the support of their people. This support has been manifested time and again in free elections in which millions of black and brown voters have cast their ballots for the candidates and party of their choice. Separate development has created authentic platforms for the expression of the political wishes of all our peoples and has made it possible for the South African Government to hold meaningful discussions with genuine non-white leaders.

Détente not a new policy

Another misconception put about is that South Africa has suddenly embarked upon its détente policy because the withdrawal of the Portuguese sovereignty has seriously weakened our strategic position. Anyone who has observed our foreign policy will know that we embarked upon this course many years ago, while the Portuguese were still firmly entrenched in Africa. Call it what you will - "the outward policy" or "dialogue" or simply our Africa policy - the purpose was always the same : the avoidance of violence and the normalisation of relations. Recent events in Southern Africa have undoubtedly made the need for peaceful solutions more pressing for the black states as well as for ourselves. The fundamental changes that have taken place in Southern Africa in the last two years make the search for peace mere commonsense. The end of the twenty year old process of decolonisation in Africa marks the beginning of a new era where sovereign state can talk to sovereign state on a basis of equality.

Internal Developments in South Africa

I have said on other occasions that South Africa's foreign policy and our internal policies are necessarily inter-related. We would be blind not to acknowledge this. There is, I believe, an ever-growing awareness in the world of the complexity of our problems and of the sincerity of our intention to follow through to the logical consequences of our policies. There could be no better illustration of our honesty of purpose, than the coming of independence next year of the Transkei, a process which started fifteen years ago. The South African Government's willingness to proceed to the last step of independence has consistently been questioned by our critics, who will now get their answer next year.

Within our borders we have a fair reflection of the cultural, ethnic, religious and language diversity of the world, issues which, together or even alone, have so often resulted in major friction in various parts of the world. One does not have to look far to see countries in travail because of conflict arising from just one of these diversities within their borders. We have them all, and we have evolved policies to take account of the many aspirations they give rise to. Our policies provide protection and scope for minorities. Of course, some other countries are also characterised by their ethnic, cultural and economic diversity, but nowhere are the ratios involved as close to those of the world as a whole as they are in South Africa, and no other country has to the same degree that crucial issue of our time, relations between black and white.

We South Africans believe that we have nothing to hide. We therefore welcome visits to South Africa from Black Africa. We would like Africans to see what things are like in our country so that they can form their own impressions based on first-hand investigation. That this can only lead to better understanding has been demonstrated many times in our experience. Among the prominent visitors to South Africa from Africa recently, was the Minister of Information of the Ivory Coast. One of his most illuminating comments on his return was, that if one sees apartheid, as he calls it, and its consequences, the manner in which it has been developed in a modern country, then one cannot criticise it out of hand. Apartheid, he said, is in many respects the same as the authenticity campaigns which are being conducted by many African leaders, the campaigns which aim at realising the African's wish to have his own culture, language and civilisation.

Unbiased critics will not seek to judge South Africa by the standards evolved for a homogenous society over many centuries. They will assess our achievements against the complexities of our problems and against the realities in the

world. They will measure our success, over a long time-span, in doing away with discrimination on the grounds of colour, in recognising the human dignity of all, in raising living standards, in creating opportunities for economic advancement and political expression, and in establishing an harmonious society and community of nations. These are objectives which we have gone a long way in achieving.

I will be the first to concede that the situation in South Africa has shortcomings - as is the case in any country. I would, however, submit that the remarkable thing is that we have made so much progress under such difficult circumstances.

It is not unreasonable to ask our critics to consider the present position in South Africa in its true context. Before passing judgement, they should weigh up the situation as it was, say twenty, or ten, or even three years ago. They should also take into consideration my Government's declared policies for the future - policies which we are consistently and conscientiously implementing.

Pattern of Future Contact

The OAU has been concerned about bilateral contacts between South Africa and other countries in Africa outside the framework of the Lusaka Manifesto. At Dar-es-Salaam earlier this year, it gave limited endorsement for contacts in connection with Rhodesia and South West Africa, but reiterated its stand on other contacts strictly within the context of the OAU and the Lusaka Manifesto. I am glad to say that contacts on a bilateral basis between African States and the Republic have continued, often on a confidential basis, but also openly.

For our part we do not let considerations of approval or non-approval of domestic policies enter into our attitude towards contact and communication. In our contacts with Africa we have, in fact, made it clear that we do not propose to deviate from our policies for the sake of acceptance. Our policies are, of course, always developing and evolving in time with changing circumstances, and we are at all times prepared to discuss our policies and all their nuances with those who are interested.

The Lusaka Manifesto

There are negative parts in the Lusaka Manifesto, such as the distorted representations of South African policies, and threats of action against South Africa, which are unacceptable. But there are indeed many positive aspects in the Manifesto which we can accept as they accord with our own approach and policies : for example, the need for human dignity for all, the insistence on the right of self-determination, the preference for negotiation rather than conflict, and the recognition of the need for transitional arrangements while transformations take place. There is common ground here for discussion. Let African leaders look again at our ideals and objectives, and they will find there is not such a wide gap between us.

The European descended people of South Africa are not a temporary extension from Europe into Africa. Over the centuries we have evolved a national identity which is just as valid as that of any other nation's. Although we had our origin in Europe, I want to emphasise that we are as much an African nation as any other people on our continent. It is gratifying that more and more African leaders are prepared to recognise this.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I repeat that the choice in Southern Africa is between peaceful solutions attained by discussion, negotiation, goodwill and understanding, and sustained hostility and confrontation, retarding progress and hazarding the lives of millions. The way to peace lies through détente, the recognition of the principles of sovereignty, equality, non-interference and mutual respect. I am convinced that in spite of many problems there is movement in the right direction. It is not impossible that things could go wrong, but if they do not, Southern Africa is moving towards a great future.

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The above article is the text of an address given to a joint meeting of the Royal African Society and the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House, London, on 18 November, 1975.

*CURRENT OPPORTUNITIES AND PROBLEMS
FOR SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY*

John Barratt

The past eighteen months have seen a dramatic development of South Africa's foreign policy and a decided change for the better in South Africa's international position, especially in Africa. But, although much of this change in South Africa's position stems from the events in Portuguese Africa after the coup in Lisbon in April, 1974, a shift in approach and of direction on South Africa's part had been taking place for some years before that. South Africa's reaction to the events in Mozambique and Rhodesia over the past year and a half has not been based on a sudden new approach in its foreign policy, but rather on the changes in approach which have been going on for the past decade. The words used to describe South African foreign policy, before the currently over-popular "détente", namely the "outward" policy and "dialogue", were indicative of this changing approach, even though there was not much at first to show in the way of concrete results.

It is worth looking at some characteristics of South African foreign policy of past years, in order to appreciate the changes in the situation now. This may also indicate some of the current opportunities which did not exist before, even if many of the previous problems still remain.

In the first place, South African foreign policy, from the time of Union in 1910 until 1961, was based primarily on membership of the Commonwealth. Although this gave South Africa considerable benefits, through its links to a major power (the United Kingdom) and other countries within a world-wide group, it meant in effect that South Africa was inhibited from developing a fully independent foreign policy. It was only after South Africa was more or less forced to leave the Commonwealth, that it had out of necessity to develop a distinctive policy of its own.

Secondly, the factor of international political isolation has been an important factor, and has been considered by many to be the basic characteristic of South Africa's external relations since the Second World War, as a result of various factors both internal and international.

Related to the second point is the third one, namely the close link between our foreign policy and our domestic situation. To a greater or lesser degree this link between domestic and foreign policies exists in most countries, but certainly one can say that South Africa's case is a special one, and many scholars writing about South Africa have analysed South African foreign policy almost exclusively in terms of world attitudes to its domestic racial policies. For instance, one American Professor who has written extensively about South Africa's foreign relations has said: "The foreign policy of South Africa has become almost totally a defence of its racial policy against the hostile pressure of nearly the whole world." (Professor Amry Vandenbosch in "South Africa and the World", published in 1970.)

Whether or not this assessment is entirely true is at the least debatable, but in any case this factor has led in the past to a highly defensive approach by South Africa in its relations with the rest of the world - and this is the fourth point to be made about the past. In fact, in the years following the Second World War South African foreign policy became increasingly defensive and consisted largely of reactions to external stimuli, such as the criticism and threats which became more and more frequent from other Governments, in the

United Nations and in certain other organisations. Even the attempts to reply to these attacks aggressively, for instance by pointing out the double standards in the United Nations and the fact that conditions were worse in many other countries, were based on an entirely defensive posture, with no serious diplomatic initiatives.

Looking at these four characteristics of South African foreign policy in the past, one can, I believe, recognise differences in the current situation. The removal of the inhibiting factor of Commonwealth membership, in South Africa's peculiar circumstances, has allowed - and even forced - the development of a distinctive foreign policy based on South Africa's own interests - or at least the Government's interpretation of these interests. The factor of isolation politically in the world still exists, but there is a growing realisation (even among observers outside the country) that isolation is only one dimension, and that there are other dimensions in our foreign relations in which South Africa is by no means isolated. In fact, in other areas such as trade, our external relations have flourished, in spite of intensified external criticism on the apartheid issue.

With regard to the question of our domestic policies being the central issue in our foreign policy, there is now an important difference in approach - even though the facts of the situation, affecting our relations with other countries, may not have changed much. Previously the Government denied vigorously that internal policies were relevant in a consideration of external relations, and there appeared to be an unwillingness to face the reality of the situation. This stand was based on good traditional international legal grounds, as reflected in Article 2, paragraph 7, of the United Nations Charter, namely that the domestic affairs of a sovereign state are not the concern of other governments or international organisations. Gradually over the past decade there has been a greater willingness to face the political fact, whatever the legal position, that our domestic racial policy is the central issue which divides us from other countries, particularly in Africa. The Government has not given up its legal stand in principle on this question, but it has been willing to discuss the matter with other governments, even to the extent of implicitly allowing it to become a subject of negotiations in the détente efforts.

Furthermore, the speech of the South African representative at the United Nations, Ambassador Botha, in the Security Council in October last year, when he referred to the Government's intention to move away from discrimination, was a recognition of the fact that any substantial improvement in our external political relations depended on internal change.

At the same time this does not mean that the development of South Africa's external relations is entirely dependent on what happens internally. As already indicated, the external relations of any country have various dimensions, and foreign policy operates in a number of different areas. It is possible for healthy relations to develop between two countries in one area, e.g. trade, while there are strong differences in other areas, e.g. the ideological. It would therefore be wrong to become obsessed with the differences which exist over "apartheid", to the exclusion of other dimensions in our relations with other countries. It is possible that in the past South Africa allowed itself to be overwhelmed by the strongly expressed attitudes on "apartheid", and this had a stultifying effect. It also resulted in the highly defensive posture which I mentioned as the fourth characteristic of past attitudes. This defensiveness has not disappeared. But now, at least, there is a more discriminating approach, and opportunities are sought for the development of our foreign policy on different levels.

Against the background of these changes in approach to our external relations, we can look at some of the current opportunities and problems. It is not possible to consider all the opportunities and problems separately, because in most cases they are closely connected - almost like the opposite sides of the coin in each case.

(1) The change in the approach, which has been mentioned, itself provides greater opportunities for South African foreign policy. The South African approach now is much more confident and much less defensive. There is better co-ordination both between the various dimensions of policy and between the various areas in which this policy is implemented. For instance, there is a greater appreciation of the fact that our relations with the countries of the West depend on an improvement in our relations with the rest of Africa. Similarly, it is recognised more clearly that at the United Nations we are not dealing simply with one monolithic organisation, but rather with several groups of states, and that our approaches to each of these groups has to be somewhat different, according to the particular interests which they each have.

This development of a more confident and sophisticated approach means that South Africa is for the first time taking initiatives in its foreign policy; it is seeking and taking advantage of opportunities which arise; and it is using diplomatic methods more effectively. On the latter point we have seen over the past year, probably for the first time, the tool of negotiation being seriously used in the attempts to solve differences between ourselves and other States in Africa. One can also add that over the years greater expertise has been developed by the people who have to run our diplomacy.

Although we are witnessing this more positive, sophisticated and confident approach in the exercise of foreign policy, this does not mean to say that there are no problems in this regard. Regrettably, there are indications that the defensive attitude still prevails in some circles. Apart from statements which simply reject criticism as completely unfounded, the defensive attitude still lurks behind the efforts of some to point fingers at other countries in attempts to show that conditions there are worse than here. This type of approach has been proved to be fruitless in the past when, for instance, it was pursued by the late Mr. Eric Louw as Foreign Minister. It may give us some satisfaction to be able to compare ourselves favourably with other countries, but frankly this is an evasion of the real issue, and it does not help fundamentally in our external relations.

There is also the danger that the confidence, to which I have referred, can be exaggerated into aggressiveness, which again may give us some self-satisfaction, but which will be counter-productive if it antagonises others. The tendency in South African diplomacy, during the difficult years of the past decade or more, has been to keep a low profile, to avoid raising the temperature unnecessarily in disputes with other countries, and always to act responsibly and with dignity. This has had the effect frequently of earning respect even from those who disagree strongly with South African policies, and the credibility of our diplomats has thus been high. But the recently reported remarks abroad seem to deviate from this established standard of calmness and responsibility, and, while such statements may make good reading in South Africa, it is doubtful whether they will gain any friends overseas.

Patience, perseverance and quiet diplomacy have brought rewards in Africa; let us hope that this approach will not be thrown overboard in favour of short-term propaganda gains.

(2) I have mentioned the confidence which is now a characteristic of South Africa's foreign policy. One cannot ascribe this confidence to any fundamental change in the South African political scene, or to any fundamental and wide-spread improvement in political attitudes abroad towards South Africa. This confidence may be based partly on the fact that the criticisms and the threats of boycotts and other actions against South Africa, which began seriously in the early 60's, have been going on now for nearly 15 years and have had no major adverse effect on South Africa. But more important has been South Africa's growing strength, relative particularly to the rest of Africa and to other developing countries. This includes economic and military strength, together with the continuing stability in the country, in spite of the serious political problems.

There is in addition the growing realisation, both here and abroad, of the importance of South Africa's position as a rich store-house of important natural resources, and as a producer of food in a world facing serious shortages. These are factors which will become increasingly important, and there is no doubt that they give South Africa a great opportunity internationally. As Lord George-Brown said in an address to our Institute in Johannesburg recently (16 October, 1975), South Africa and her resources are needed in the world, and this need will grow. This fact of the international situation is also reflected in the refusal of countries in Western Europe, e.g. Germany and France, to break their economic and technical relations with South Africa - in spite of the political pressures on them.

It would, however, be foolish to be over-confident on this score, and to assume that, because of South Africa's growing importance as a supplier of scarce resources and as a natural power-house and store-house in Southern Africa, we therefore need not worry about political problems facing us in relations with other countries. It is also a fact of international life that economic considerations are not always the ones which are finally paramount in the policy decisions of governments. There are clear examples of this in Africa, especially in the relations of African States to South Africa and Rhodesia in the past. If the opportunities offered by South Africa's strength are to be effectively used, then they must go hand-in-hand with improvement on the political level, so that it is politically possible for other States to have more normal relations with us.

One should also, by the way, recognise here that the current economic and financial difficulties which South Africa is experiencing, have a direct bearing on our external relations, because they limit South Africa's ability to develop economic ties with other countries and they also force a slow-down of internal development - both political and economic - on which our future will ultimately depend. Therefore, it is crucial for both external and internal reasons that our present economic difficulties should be overcome as quickly as possible.

(3) The third opportunity, with its associated problems, arises from the dramatic changes in Southern Africa during the past eighteen months. It is not my intention to go into detail here on the current developments in this region, which are very much in the front of people's minds at present. Let us rather look at some of the wider implications of what has been happening, against the background of the changing nature of South African foreign policy.

It was paradoxically the collapse of the Portuguese in Africa which set in motion the specific train of events, called "détente" in South Africa. But, as indicated above, changes were already taking place in the South African approach, and we had gone through the phases of the "outward movement" and "dialogue".

These earlier policies, insufficiently formulated and inadequately co-ordinated as they were, indicated nevertheless an increasing desire in South Africa to become fully part of this continent, rather than an appendage of Europe, and - perhaps more important - the beginnings of a realistic assessment of our international position. This assessment involved a recognition that our international unpopularity, to put it mildly, was due primarily to the fact of the strong differences between the Black African States in general and South Africa. Even if our vitally important economic relations were not with African States, it was realised that it was only through an improvement of political relations with the rest of Africa that a possible continued deterioration in our relations with the industrialised countries of the world could be prevented. Acceptance in Africa became therefore both an end in itself on one level, and the key to improved relations with other countries of the world on another level.

Against this background, the dramatic changes in Mozambique and the other Portuguese African territories happened in 1974, and they suddenly faced both South Africa and the Black States of the region with the threat of serious confrontation, if the trends of the preceding years were to continue. These trends included a mounting international campaign against Portuguese, Rhodesian and South African White rule - in which campaign the three Governments were always linked and attacked as "an unholy alliance" - and an increasing recourse to "armed struggle" as the way to bring about the changes advocated in Southern Africa. This approach, namely the use of force rather than negotiations, was becoming legitimised through resolutions of international bodies and statements of governments even in the West. Therefore, when the Portuguese collapsed in April, 1974, it was widely assumed by observers here and overseas that this was a major vindication of the method of "armed struggle", which would now be continued with renewed vigour, in order to overthrow the remaining bastions of white or colonial rule, first in Rhodesia and then in South Africa.

This assumption was, as we know, at least premature. While violence has, it is true, continued in Rhodesia, with some occurrences in S.W.A., too, considerably more emphasis has been placed by the Black States directly concerned on the attempts to find a peaceful resolution of differences through negotiation. This has amounted to a decided change in direction of the trends in Africa, and this change has provided the South African Government with probably its greatest opportunity so far to effect a major improvement in its international position.

There are no doubt various reasons for this change of direction, in which President Kaunda of Zambia has played a leading role, but fundamental was the shock effect of the change in Mozambique, which brought the countries of the region face-to-face with the very real possibility of escalating violent confrontation, into which all parties might be sucked, unless something was done to call a halt to this process. Related to this was, and is, Zambia's parlous economic situation, in view of which the Zambian Government could not afford to become involved in major violent conflict. The threat of violent confrontation is also a very real one for South Africa. While our defence capabilities are such that in the short term the Black States would suffer much more, the long-term political and strategic consequences of violent conflict with neighbouring Black States would be disastrous for South Africa.

Therefore, South Africa obviously has had much to gain from this change of direction in Africa and in fact has sought to encourage it by reacting positively to the new Government in Mozambique (in spite of strong ideological differences) and by attempting to assist in finding a settlement in Rhodesia. In addition, there have been moves on the South West Africa front, in the hope that the dispute with Zambia and other countries over that issue can be removed. South Africa

also has much to offer Africa, as the Prime Minister has often pointed out, which could make co-operation mutually beneficial - provided that the political differences can be reduced.

Seen thus in the wider context of South Africa's relations with Black Africa and of the efforts to deflect, at least, the trends towards violent confrontation, the specific issue of Rhodesia (which attracts most of the public attention) is only one element. Other elements are Mozambique (both its relations with its neighbours and its own internal development); South West Africa; the tragedy of Angola; the relations of South Africa with its small Black neighbours, the B.L.S. countries; and South Africa's own internal political development. One could add to this other elements, such as the position of Tanzania, the position of Zaire, the influence of outside powers, such as the two major Communist countries, as well as those from the West, and so on. But the central element in all this is, I believe, the South African/Zambian relationship, both politically in the negotiations between Mr. Vorster and President Kaunda, and in the wider sense as regards present and potential economic and technical co-operation. Through the development of relations between these two countries, leading away from conflict towards normalisation and then hopefully on to co-operation, wider links can potentially be developed in Africa. However, if this developing relationship should founder on one or other of the political problems in the region, then it is difficult to see what other avenues there would be towards peaceful change and progress in our region.

With all the present uncertainty in the region, one cannot be over-optimistic, and there are certainly no grounds for complacency. *Détente* has been achieved to a limited degree in Southern Africa, although I would prefer to call it a *moratorium* in the conflict situation. And this moratorium is being used to find peaceful solutions, or directions of change, through negotiation. But the *détente*, or moratorium, cannot be an end in itself; it can only be a means towards a more permanent form of relationship with our neighbours and other African states; and it cannot last indefinitely without progress on the various issues which divide us. The foremost of these issues are Rhodesia and South West Africa, because they have been indicated by both sides as the subjects of current negotiations. But Mozambique and Angola are also relevant issues which could have a significant effect on the course of negotiations; and, let us not fool ourselves, behind all these issues is the question of internal change here at home. As the Minister of Finance is reported to have said in Durban recently (11 October, 1975): "If *détente* in Southern Africa is to succeed, we must first have it succeed within South Africa. What is the use of perfecting relations with other countries if there are problems of race relations which have not been resolved here?" (Quoted in *Rand Daily Mail*, 18 October, 1975.)

(4) The so-called "outward" policy which began to develop in the second half of the 1960's, was aimed at counteracting the trends towards political isolation of South Africa. While this policy was largely seen in terms of relations with Africa, it was in fact also directed towards other regions of the world, on both the economic and diplomatic levels. As a result, trade has increased with countries of Asia, notably Japan, and important links have been established with Iran in the Middle East.

Japan is sensitive about its relations with South Africa, mainly because of the importance it attaches to its role in the United Nations, and it has therefore made some gestures to U.N. majority opinion by barring South African sporting and cultural visits, and by preventing Japanese investment. But this attitude of political caution does not seem to have affected the development of

trade, and there is no doubt that the importance of South Africa's natural resources is fully appreciated by the Japanese.

Latin America has become a major area of interest for South African foreign policy, and in recent years there has been a considerable expansion of diplomatic links, together with efforts to develop economic relations with several of the South American countries. It seems that some of the smaller countries especially are interested in South African technical and financial assistance, and Paraguay is a notable example in this regard.

There are clearly opportunities for the further development of relations with Latin America, which could benefit South Africa's position in the world generally. But our ability to engage in a programme of assistance is limited by internal demands for development, e.g. in the homelands, and by the needs of other African countries, which must remain our first international priority.

(5) Finally, there are a few comments to be made on relations with countries of the West which are our traditional trading partners, and with which the Whites are also linked by ties of culture and sentiment.

The countries of Europe and also the United States have been vitally important to us economically, and are bound to remain so. But the ties with the West have had a negative effect on our relations with the rest of Africa and with other regions. For too long we regarded ourselves simply as an appendage or outpost of Europe, and we have allowed the Western countries in a sense to take us for granted. In the eyes of Black Africa, South Africa has been seen as an ally of the colonialists, and it is only comparatively recently that we have tried to change this image by emphasising our role in, and commitment to, Africa.

This change in attitude, given substance by the Government's efforts over the past year to settle differences with our neighbours, creates the opportunity at long last for South Africa to break its ideological commitment to a particular grouping of states, which long ago ceased to have any commitment to South Africa. The opportunity now exists, given also South Africa's growing strength, for us to develop a distinctive position of our own in the world as a regional power, pursuing our own interests and those of our neighbours and not aligning ourselves with any other outside group or power, unless it is clearly in our own interests to do so on particular issues.

Africa is our natural sphere of interest, and the vast potential benefits of co-operation in Africa should be a powerful incentive to settle differences. Then there will be no need almost to beg Western countries for support - as sometimes we still seem to do; they will deal with us because it is in their interests to do so, just as we will deal with other powers and regions on the basis of our interests.

An example of this automatic commitment to the Western states, without any reciprocal commitment on their part, is still found, for instance, in our attitude to the Indian Ocean. We are seen by other Indian Ocean States as being tied to outside powers, whereas we should be working towards closer relations with other littoral states in the same way as we are developing relations with states across the Atlantic. This may seem a difficult task at present, given the political differences, but it should at least be our *aim* to join a group of Indian Ocean states which Iran, for instance, has proposed, and to work with them to exclude the permanent presence of outside powers in this Ocean - whether they be Russian, American, Chinese, French or British.

It is in this direction, I believe, that our foreign policy is now beginning to point, and this will lead to increasing opportunities for all of us in Southern Africa - provided, of course, that we can make progress in overcoming our immediate problems in the region.

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The above article is based on talks given to meetings of the Natal and Eastern Province Branches of the Institute in October, 1975.

DÉTENTE IN SUIDER-AFRIKA : TERUGBLIK EN VOORUITSIGTE

Denis Venter

Portugese Dekolonisasie in Angola en Mosambiek : Gevolge vir Suider-Afrika.

Vir Suider-Afrika het die Portugese staatsgreep van 25 April 1974, wat die outoritêre regime van meer as vier dekades tot 'n val gebring het, gewis ver-reikende gevolge ingehou. 'n Proses van snelle dekolonisasie is daardeur in die Portugese Afrikagebiede geïnisieer, ten spyte van generaal Antonio de Spínola se aanvanklike voorneme om die proses ietwat te vertraag. Na Spínola se bedan-king in September 1974 is die pas van ontvoogding egter aansienlik versnel. Dit het reeds gelei tot die onafhanklikheidswording van Mosambiek in Junie 1975 en van Angola in November 1975. In Mosambiek het die FRELIMO-Regering daarin geslaag om 'n onbetwisbare gesagsbasis te skep en sodoende stabiliteit te ver-seker. Verhoudinge met Suid-Afrika kan as koel, dog korrek beskryf word. Aan die anderkant is Angola in algehele chaos gedompel en heers daar 'n volskaal-se burgeroorlog tussen die MPLA en FNLA-UNITA. Die aktiewe inmenging van die USSR en Kuba aan die kant van die MPLA kompliseer die situasie verder aansien-lik. Daarteenoor ontvang die FNLA-UNITA-alliansie taamlik halfhartige steun uit Westerse oorde, asook van Sjina. Die direkte en indirekte betrokkenheid van groot moondhede in Angola, skep gevolglik 'n potensieel plofbare situasie wat katastrofiese gevolge vir vrede op die sub-kontinent kan hê.

Indien die Marxistiese MPLA in Angola aan bewind kom, mag dit 'n revolu-sionêre element in die Suider-Afrikaanse situasie inbring wat détente ernstig mag strem en selfs totaal kan verongeluk. Dit mag Zambië in 'n onhoudbare posisie plaas en swaar druk mag deur die MPLA en FRELIMO op beide flanke teen Zambië uitgeoefen word. Van die vier Swart Presidente wat die détente-inisia-tiewe in Suider-Afrika in die afgelope jaar gesteun het, is President Samora Machel van Mosambiek en President Julius Nyerere van Tanzanië taamlik huiwerige partye. In die geval van Mosambiek het ekonomiese realiteite miskien die grootste gewig gedra en die FRELIMO-Regering genoodsaak om, ten minste tydelik, die soeke na vreedsame oplossings vir die probleme van die sub-kontinent te steun. Aan die anderkant het die oorredingsvermoë van President Kaunda heel-waarskynlik die Tanzaniese Regering se militantheid ietwat getemper en gevolg-lik President Nyerere 'n ewe huiwerige party tot vredespoginge gemaak. Wat egter belangrik is, is dat Mosambiek en Tanzanië wel partye in die détente-po-ginge is en dit is daarom gebiedend noodsaaklik dat die momentum van die ont-spanningspolitiek in Suider-Afrika gehandhaaf moet word. Indien die Moskou-georiënteerde MPLA egter daarin slaag om die FNLA-UNITA-alliansie in die wed-loop om beheer oor die hele Angola na die kroon te steek, mag dit blyk dat détente maar slegs 'n verposing of moratorium in 'n potensieële konflik-situasie was.

Oogmerke van die USSR met Inmenging in Angola : Die Rol van die Russiese Vloot

Na die skielike ineenstorting van Suid-Viëtnam vroeg in 1975, voel die Sowjet-Unie hom blykbaar nou in 'n sterk genoeg posisie om 'n meer aggressiewe buitelandse beleid na te volg. Reeds na die mislukking van Nikita Khrushchev se waagpolitiek in Kuba in 1962 het die Kremlin besef dat sy vloot nie oor die nodige plooibaarheid en beweeglikheid beskik om voldoende logistiese ondersteuning aan subversiewe bedrywighede in ander wêrelddele te bied nie. Die nodige aan-passings is met groot ywer deur admiraal Sergei Gorshkov uitgevoer, soveel so dat die USSR vandag oor die effektiefste vlootmag in die wêreld beskik. Vandag is die Russiese vloot in staat om die rol te vervul wat nie in die Kubaanse missiel-krisis van 1962 moontlik was nie. Afrika lyk na 'n vatbare teiken vir subver-

siewe bedrywighede en dit word weerspieël deur Russiese penetrasie in Somalië, Uganda, Madagaskar, Mauritius, Mosambiek, Guinee-Bissau en die Kaap Verdiese Eilande, Guinee, Nigerië, Ekwatoriaal-Guinee, die Kongo (Brazzaville) en Angola.

Sedert die Sesdaagse Oorlog tussen Israel en die Arabiese state in 1967 het die Russiese vlootteenwoordigheid in die Middellandse See al merkbaarder geword. Met die onttrekking van die Britte oos van Suez in die laat sestigerjare is die vakuum in die Indiese Oseaan deur die USSR gevul. Die vasberadenheid van Moskou om die MPLA as die enigste wettige regering in Angola te vestig, dui op 'n strewe na basisfasiliteite in Angola. Dit mag die Russiese vlootteenwoordigheid ook na die Suid-Atlantiese Oseaan uitbrei en Westerse skeepsroetes ernstig bedreig.

Oor die aanwending van die Russiese vloot vir politieke oogmerke maak Jürgen Rohwer, Voorsitter van die Wes-Duitse Werksgroep vir Verdedingsnavorsing, die volgende interessante opmerkinge:

In the light of nuclear parity, an all-out conflict between the superpowers has become improbable. Beneath the strategic-nuclear threshold, however, manifold conflict possibilities are becoming manifest, particularly in the Third World, that can rub against the interests of the great powers.

The Soviets apparently have learned the lesson that Americans had demonstrated to them for some 20 years - namely, that naval forces can have a political punch as 'maritime power' in peace as well as in conflict. The US Navy today can throw its full weight onto the scales only where it exercises a 'sole presence' either because its regional opponent has no naval forces (as was the case in Vietnam) or because the enemy is disinterested in the conflict. By maintaining a maritime presence in crisis areas, the Soviets can neutralize the superior naval power of the United States with their own inferior forces - that is, so long as the United States is reluctant to do battle. This was one of the lessons of the Six-Day War in the Middle East in 1967. On the other hand, where the Soviet Union commands a 'sole presence' - such as along West Africa and in the Arabian Sea - it can bring its own 'maritime power' to bear in influencing developments in the littoral states in accordance with its interests.¹

Suid-Afrika en Détente : Die Realiteite van die Suider-Afrikaanse Situasië.

Suid-Afrika is inderdaad ook deur die gebeure van April 1974 genoodsaak om 'n ernstige herwaarderding van sy posisie, nie net alleen in Suider-Afrika nie, maar ook in Afrika as geheel te maak. Die dialoog-beleid met Afrika, wat so belowend in die begin van die sewentigerjare gelyk het, het totaal in duie gestort, enersyds omrede die onverkwiklike houding van sekere militante Afrika-state en andersyds as gevolg van besluitloosheid, onvermoë tot snelle optrede om potensieel gunstige situasies te benut en selfs growwe mistastings aan Suid-Afrika se kant. Tog was daar 'n besef dat dit absoluut essensieel is dat die

proses van dialoog of kommunikasie heraktiveer moes word en daarom die huidige détente-poginge.

Die Republiek sou in die toekoms nie meer langer van die res van Swart Afrika deur 'n buffersone of *cordon sanitaire* - Angola, Rhodesië en Mosambiek - afgeskei wees nie. Die realiteite van hierdie nuwe situasie moes dus onder die oë gesien word. Dit het gebiedend noodsaaklik geblyk dat dinamiese nuwe inisiatiewe van die Suid-Afrikaanse Regering sou moes uitgaan, ten einde een of ander *modus vivendi* met Afrika te beding. Beleidsrigtinge in Suider-Afrika sou veral hier van kardinale belang wees en wel om klaarblyklike redes.

Voorvereistes vir die Sukses van Détente : Die Bepalinge van die Lusaka-Manifes en die Mogadishu-en Dar es Salaam-Deklarasies

'n Triargiese of driehoofdige verdeling vorm die basis waarop détente en die normalisering van Suid-Afrika se verhoudinge met Swart Afrikastate geïntegreer moet word: eerstens, die noodsaak vir 'n bevredigende skikking van die Rhodesiese vraagstuk; tweedens, die gewensdheid van 'n bedinging van die Suidwes-Afrika-kwessie; en derdens, die behoefte aan 'n beter bedeling vir die nie-blanke rasse-groepe in Suid-Afrika deur die eliminering van rasse-diskriminasie. In hierdie verband is die Lusaka-Manifes van April 1969 en die Dar es Salaam-Deklarasie van April 1975 van besondere betekenis. Die Lusaka-Manifes verwerp die aanwending van geweld in die oplossing van geskille tussen state,² dog plaas 'n hoë premie op onafhanklikheid vir Rhodesië en Suidwes-Afrika op die grondslag van swart meerderheidsregering.³ Besondere klem word ook gelê op die aanvaarding van die beginsels van menswaardigheid en gelykheid in Suid-Afrika, alvorens 'n basis vir vreedsame naasbestaan op die sub-kontinent kan ontwikkel. Daarom word verklaar:

The signatories of this Manifesto assert that the validity of the principles of human equality and dignity extend to South Africa just as they extend to the colonial territories of Southern Africa. Before a basis for peaceful development can be established on this continent, these principles must be acknowledged by every nation and in every State there must be a deliberate attempt to implement them.⁴

Suid-Afrika het 'n ernstige flater begaan deur in sy buitelandse beleidsbeplanning nie vroeër munt uit die positiewe aspekte van die Lusaka-Manifes te slaan nie. Gevolglik is die Lusaka-Manifes summier verwerp en dit sou lei tot die terugkeer na 'n meer militante houding by Afrikastate met die aanvaarding van die Mogadishu-Deklarasie in 1971:

We, the leaders of East and Central African States, therefore, do declare at this meeting in Mogadishu, that there is no way left to the liberation of Southern Africa except armed struggle to which we already give and will increasingly continue to give our fullest support; that the policy of dialogue advanced by a small group of African leaders which had already been rejected by the OAU is again rejected....⁵

Die Mogadishu-Deklarasie is dus die teenkant van die Lusaka-Manifes en die Dar es Salaam-Deklarasie. As alle pogings tot kommunikasie en onderhandeling misluk, sal teruggekeer word na 'n toestand van konfrontasie en konflik.⁶

Die Dar es Salaam-Deklarasie herhaal in der waarheid in breë terme die

belangrikste bepalinge van die Lusaka-Manifes, dog beklemtoon interne détente in Suid-Afrika self: "... if the spirit of détente is to have any meaning at all, it must first and foremost be from within South Africa..."⁷ Afrika is dus bereid tot die vreedsame skikking van die probleme van Suider-Afrika, insluitende dié van Suid-Afrika. Alleen as vreedsame middele nie sukses oplewer nie, sal daar na gewapende optrede teruggekeer word.⁸

Die Kruispad vir Suider-Afrika : Die Weg van Vrede of die Weg van Konflik

Die détente-poginge in Suider-Afrika het met die Eerste Minister se nou bekende Senaatstoespraak op 23 Oktober 1974 van stapel geloop toe hy onomwonde verklaar het dat Suider-Afrika die keuse tussen vrede enersyds en eskalاسie van konflik andersyds sal moet maak. Die klaarblyklike weg is die weg van vrede, normalisering van verhoudinge, goeie verstandhouding en normale assosiasie.⁹ Die volgende dag het Ambassadeur R.F. Botha, Suid-Afrikaanse Permanente Verteenwoordiger by die Verenigde Nasies, aan die Veiligheidsraad die versekering gegee dat die Suid-Afrikaanse Regering alles in sy vermoë sal doen om weg te beweeg van diskriminasie wat op ras of kleur gebaseer is. Hy het ondermeer gekonstateer:

... I want to state here today very clearly and categorically: My Government does *not* condone discrimination purely on the grounds of race or colour. Discrimination based solely on the colour of a man's skin cannot be defended. And we shall do everything in our power to move away from discrimination based on race or colour.¹⁰

Die groen lig is van die kant van die Swart State gegee toe President Kenneth Kaunda van Zambië op 26 Oktober 1974 'n versoenende trant teenoor Suid-Afrika in 'n toespraak tydens 'n gradeplegtigheid van die Universiteit van Zambië ingeslaan het. Hy het onomwonde verklaar:

... if the South African Government is ready to follow the way of peace to achieve for this continent and its people the best that is possible, than all I can say is that Africa, in accordance with the principles laid down in the Manifesto on Southern Africa, stands ready to help create conditions for peaceful change. ... We do not desire to see an escalation of conflict in Southern Africa. The consequences of such an escalation are too grave both in material and human sacrifice to be permitted either by design or by default.¹¹

Die Rhodesiese Geskil

Met die Vorster-Callaghan-samesprekinge in Desember 1974 het die hoop skerp opgevlam dat daar spoedig konstitusionele samesprekinge sou kon plaasvind wat 'n einde aan die Rhodesiese skaakmatsituasie sou maak. Onversetlike standpunte aan die kant van sowel die Rhodesiese Regering as die Rhodesiese *African National Council* (ANC) het 'n uitgerekte dooie punt tot gevolg gehad. Dit is uiteindelik op 9 Augustus 1975 verbreek met die bereiking van die Pretoria-Ooreenkoms waarvolgens konstitusionele samesprekinge by *Victoria Falls* sou begin. Die samesprekinge het egter op die dooie punt beland en sou in Oktober 1975 lei tot 'n skeuring in die ANC tussen die meer gematigde binnelandse vleuel onder leiding van

Joshua Nkomo en die meer militante buitelandse vleuel - ook bekend as die *Zimbabwe Liberation Council* (ZLC) - aangevoer deur biskop Abel Muzurewa, eerw. Ndabaningi Sithole en James Chikerema. Dit blyk nou dat premier Ian Smith besluit het om die tweespalt in die geleedere van die ANC te benut en te kyk of hy nie tot 'n wedersyds aanvaarbare vergelyk met die gematigde Nkomo-groep kan kom nie. President Kaunda van Zambië het ook te kenne gegee dat as Nkomo tot 'n skikking met die Rhodesiese Regering kan geraak wat 'n swart meerderheidsregering sal verseker, dit aan die verwagtinge van die Afrikastate voldoen en gevolglik aanvaarbaar sal wees.

Suid-Afrika het nog altyd in sy buitelandse verhoudinge sterk aangeleun op die beginsel van nie-inmenging in ander state se huis-houdelike aangeleenthede. Nie-inmenging impliseer egter nie onverskilligheid met betrekking tot toestande wat Suid-Afrika se nasionale belange direk raak of kan beïnvloed nie. Dit hoef dan ook geen verbasing te wek as die Eerste Minister, mnr. Vorster, in sy samesprekinge met premier Ian Smith tog die porstok gebruik het om die Rhodesiërs te oortuig dat die spoedige byeenroeping van 'n konstitusionele konferensie gebiedend noodsaaklik is vir die momentum van détente en die uiteindelijke sukses daarvan.

Die Suidwes-Afrika-Kwessie

Konstitusionele samesprekinge waarop alle bevolkingsgroepe in Suidwes-Afrika verteenwoordig was, het in September 1975 in die Turnhalle in Windhoek begin. Die Suid-Afrikaanse Regering het dit duidelik gestel dat alle weë oop is in die soeke na 'n konstitusionele toekomsbedeling vir die gebied. Die toekoms van Suidwes-Afrika sal dus deur sy eie mense beslis word en sal nóg deur Suid-Afrika, nóg deur die Verenigde Nasies gedikteer word.¹² Na aanvanklike prosedureprobleme het die beraad met sy werksaamhede begin en is 'n omvattende verklaring van voorneme opgestel. 'n Veelrassige afvaardiging van die beraad het daarna die VSA en Europa besoek en een van die bemoedigendste resultate was dat die Britse Regering nou verklaar dat hy nie meer die *South West African Peoples Organization* (SWAPO) as die enigste verteenwoordiger van die bevolking van Suidwes-Afrika erken nie. Teen die einde van November 1975 het die beraad vir 'n kort sitting byeengekom vir die verkiesing van die verskillende komitees wat oor 'n wye reeks aspekte aan die beraad verslag moet doen wanneer dit weer in Maart 1976 sy sitting hervat. Feit is egter dat dit 'n goeie begin is om 'n konstitusionele formule te probeer vind wat vrede en stabiliteit in 'n onafhanklike Suidwes-Afrika sal verseker en sal lei tot die skikking van die geskil wat vir bykans drie dekades tussen Suid-Afrika en die Verenigde Nasies oor die Suidwes-Afrika-kwessie bestaan.

Suid-Afrika se Interne Beleid

Suid-Afrika sal ook moet aanvaar dat aanpassings in sy binnelandse beleid een van die voorvereistes vir die sukses van détente is. Die bewustelike verbetering van menseverhoudinge moet daarom die prioriteit van elke Suid-Afrikaner wees. Die menswaardigheid van anderskleuriges - Indiërs, Bruinmense en Swartes - moet erken en gerespekteer word. Daar moet inspraak en kommunikasie tussen die Republiek se eie bevolkingsgroepe onderling wees en dit sal aan Suid-Afrika 'n grondslag van sterkte verleen vanwaar hy ontspanningspolitiek met Afrika kan bedryf. Die grense tussen binnelandse en buitelandse beleid het in die hedendaagse wêreld vervaag en dit sou dwaas van Suid-Afrikaners wees om die

wisselwerking tussen en die invloed van die Republiek se interne rassebeleid op sy verhoudinge met Swart Afrika te ignoreer.

Suider-Afrika kan in die toekoms 'n toonvenster van suksesvolle inter-staatlike samewerking op 'n regionale vlak word. Dit sal egter 'n moeisame weg wees, besaai met vele struikelblokke. Taktvolle, omsigtige en tog waagmoedige staatsmanskap sal in die oplossing van hierdie probleme van beide Wit en Swart vereis word. Alleen dan sal détente 'n kans op sukses hê.

Voetnotas

1. Rohwer, J., *Superpower Confrontation on the Seas : Naval Development and Strategy since 1945*, The Washington Papers, Vol III, No 26, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills and London, 1975, p. 82.
2. "The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa", *Southern Africa Record*, Number Two, The South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, June 1975, p. 3 : "On the objectives of liberation... we can neither surrender nor compromise.... We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill. We do not advocate violence, we advocate an end to the violence against human dignity.... If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible, or if changed circumstances were to make it possible in the future, we would urge... the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change...."
3. "The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa", *Southern Africa Record*, Number Two, The South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, June 1975, p. 5 : "...Rhodesia, like the rest of Africa, must be free, and its independence must be on the basis of majority rule...."; "... Namibia should now have been a sovereign, independent State with a government based on majority rule...."
4. "The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa", *Southern Africa Record*, Number Two, The South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, June 1975, p. 7; Vergelyk ook p. 6 : "South Africa is itself an independent, sovereign State and a member of the United Nations. It is more highly developed and richer than any other nation in Africa. On every legal basis its internal affairs are a matter exclusively for the people of South Africa. Yet, the purpose of law is people and we assert that the actions of the South African Government are such that the rest of the world has a responsibility to take some action in defence of humanity."
5. "Mogadishu Declaration", *Southern Africa Record*, Number Three, The South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, October 1975, p. 34.
6. Vergelyk onderhoud deur Raph. Ewuchue met President Kenneth Kaunda in *Africa*, No 42, February 1975, p. 11.
7. "Dar es Salaam Declaration on Southern Africa", *Southern Africa Record*, Number Two, The South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, June 1975, p. 39; Kyk ook pp 40 en 41 oor Rhodesië (Zimbabwe) en Suidwes-Afrika (Namibië).

8. *Ibid*: "... the Lusaka Manifesto.... was unambiguous in ascertaining Africa's preference to achieve freedom and human dignity for our continent by peaceful means. But the OAU has also made it clear that if peaceful progress towards its objectives is blocked the OAU will support the armed struggle.... This remains the unshakeable position of the African States, as clearly defined by the Mogadishu Declaration."
9. "Statement by the South African Prime Minister, the Hon. B.J. Vorster, in the Senate, Cape Town", *Southern Africa Record*, Number One, The South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, March 1975, pp 4 - 5 : "... I believe that Southern Africa has come to the crossroads. I think that Southern Africa has to make a choice. I think that that choice lies between peace on one hand or an escalation of strife on the other. The consequences of an escalation are easily foreseeable. The toll of major confrontation will be high. I would go so far as to say that it will be too high for Southern Africa to pay.... However, ... there is an alternative, there is a way. That way is the way of peace, the way of normalizing of relations, the way of sound understanding and normal association."
10. "Statement by Ambassador R.F. Botha, Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations, in the Security Council", *Southern Africa Record*, Number One, The South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, March 1975, p. 21.
11. "Address by H.E. The President of Zambia, Dr. K.D. Kaunda, on the Occasion of the Conferment of the Degree of LLD (Honoris Causa), University of Zambia", *Southern Africa Record*, Number Two, The South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, June 1975, p. 17.
12. "Excerpts from the Opening Address by the Prime Minister, the Hon. B.J. Vorster, at the Annual Congress of the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut in Windhoek", *Southern Africa Record*, Number Two, The South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, June 1975, p. 50 : "The South African Government.... cannot and shall not interfere in the taking of decisions on the constitutional future of the people of South West Africa. The inhabitants of South West Africa themselves and nobody else will decide upon their future.... We for our part have not brought and shall not bring pressure to bear upon them as to how they must go about this. Our sole interest is that they should freely and voluntarily reach agreement on their constitutional future as soon as possible."

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ENERGY : SOME INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

I.F.A. de Villiers

It is now generally agreed that energy is the key to the revival of the Western world and, in the longer run, to the survival of man on this planet. Events in this last half of the twentieth century have brought home to us the reality that natural resources are not unlimited and that many may be rapidly depleted if present rates of consumption continue.

The most dramatic and alarming phenomenon of our times is undoubtedly the pressure which the population explosion is putting on the world's food resources. It took more than sixteen centuries for the world's population to double from about 250 million to 500 million, but only two centuries for it to double again to one billion. The next doubling took one century, raising the total world population to 2 billion in 1930. Another two billion was added between 1930 and 1975 - a period of only 45 years. If the present rate of growth continues we shall reach the position before the middle of the next century where as many people will be added in one year as were added in the sixteen hundred years to which I have referred.

These figures are projections, not prophecies. Already in the more highly industrialised countries of the West population growth has tended to level off, and there have even been cases of negative growth. But these trends are the product of prosperity and high living standards. In the poorer countries birth rates increase rather than diminish. Indeed, it is not over-population that is the cause of poverty, but poverty that is the cause of over-population.

The spectre of famine is already a familiar one in many parts of the world, including our own continent. Grain reserves are inadequate to meet the demands of those who - unlike the USSR - lack the means to buy them. Fishing catches are diminishing and certain kinds of edible fish face extinction. Fertilizers are in short supply and are fast falling behind the needs of developing countries. Water is an even greater cause for anxiety: far from being able to irrigate barren areas and turn them into cultivated land, we are witnessing a rapid advance of the deserts.

It is mainly by the application of energy that we can extract from the earth's thin crust the means to remedy, at least in part, this growing disparity. Our main fossil sources of energy - oil, coal and gas - are themselves located in the earth's crust and they are in turn increasingly needed to extend its agricultural potential. Let us examine for a moment the uses of energy in modern agriculture :

LAND must be cleared, levelled, ploughed and maintained;

SEED must be grown, collected, transported, stored and sown;

WATER must be dammed, stored and pumped;

FERTILIZERS must be mined, manufactured, transported, stored and applied;

PESTICIDES must be mined, manufactured, transported, stored and sprayed;

HARVESTS must be gathered, transported, processed, distributed and cooked.

In modern agriculture almost the entire system is mechanised and depends essentially on a supply of cheap and abundant energy. Two-thirds of the world's

soya bean crop - that humble bean which plays so large a part in relieving famine - is produced not in the hungry Third World, but in the USA.

The same is true of the other materials and artefacts required by man. All are extracted by energy from the earth's thin crust and converted by energy into usable form.

I hope you will forgive this long preamble of well-published facts, but it does serve to emphasise my contention that energy has international implications of the utmost importance.

International conflicts have often been, and sometimes still are, caused by the pursuit of national self-interest at any price, including the use of violence. In an era of relatively low populations and unexploited resources, there was often something to be gained by territorial expansion. The population explosion and shocked realisation of our limited natural resources now compel us to accept new dimensions in the planning and conduct of foreign policy. One such is that the national advantage may be better achieved by restraint. Another is that the creation of balanced and renewable energy resources is vital to the survival of us all.

When I visited Washington in August for talks with the Energy Administration and the State Department, I found that these concepts had gained deep acceptance. The many journeys of Dr. Kissinger, for example, are essentially motivated by the need to achieve détente, to relax international tensions, so as to create a climate in which a new philosophy of planned growth and systematic restraint may be born.

There can however be no restraint, in the feebler sense of inactivity, in regard to the husbanding of our remaining fuel resources and in the discovery of new sources of supply. Conventional energy resources are finite, but there are other partly undeveloped or wholly untapped sources of energy that may well satisfy mankind's essential needs in the long-term future. I refer, of course, to nuclear fission (with the fast breeder already in prospect), nuclear fission and the hydrogen economy, solar energy, geothermal energy and so forth.

There is nevertheless a real danger that we may run out of conventional sources before the high costs and skills of substitution can be made available. Much depends on planning the right spectrum of energy use and development between the means available, and even more perhaps, on the conservation of energy. At present we very often put more energy into things than we get out of them. It may become important to consider, for example, whether the energy put into the production, gasifying and liquifaction of coal by SASOL is not greater than the energy provided by the final product.

We are not yet in a state of energy penury, to the extent of irremediable calamity. If we escape calamity, we may have cause to give thanks to OPEC and the sheikhs of Araby for their timely warning. The increase in oil costs has undoubtedly hit the world economy very hard, not least in the poor countries. Fertilizers, in particular, have become costly and in short supply. The SA Journal of Science reports, for example, that last year's fertilizer shortage cost India 10 million tons of grain, a year's supply for 50 million Indians. Already, however, there are encouraging signs that the energy crisis caused by OPEC will give rise to new forms of national and international endeavour in the critical field of energy.

Last year the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development set up an International Energy Agency to deal with future emergencies and to create a system for long-term co-operation on all energy matters.

Earlier in the year the ubiquitous Dr. Kissinger had himself outlined a world energy policy at the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations as follows :

- (i) The global economy requires an expanding supply of energy at an equitable price. This will require a massive co-operative effort to develop new and renewable fuel sources.
- (ii) The global economy requires that both consumers and producers escape from the recurrent cycle of raw material shortage and surplus. The resources of this planet must be related to man's needs and for this purpose an international long-range forecasting and planning system must be evolved.
- (iii) The global economy must achieve a balance between food production and population growth. Additional agriculture capacity is essential and the world oil producers could play a significant role by using their raw materials and capital to produce fertilizers on a massive scale.
- (iv) The global economy cannot allow the poorest nations to be overwhelmed.
- (v) In a global economy of physical scarcity, science and technology are becoming our most precious resources. Science must help solve the problems it has helped to create.
- (vi) The global economy requires a trade, monetary and investment system that sustains civilization and stimulates its growth.

I must confess that I have less confidence in UN resolutions than I have in the determination and ability of the Western nations to ensure their own survival. The population-food-energy crisis has indeed posed the question of man's survival, and it may well be that the OPEC challenge and their response will open up a new era in international relations and in human endeavour.

What of Southern Africa? This is a subject on its own and I want to do no more than leave a few thoughts with you.

South Africa has abundant resources of coal and uranium, but these too are finite. It is not too early to plan a comprehensive energy policy designed to achieve a more balanced and less wasteful use of our fuel resources, to reduce our dependence on imported oil and to develop a long-term strategy.

In a striking paper read to an Energy Symposium of this Institute in Cape Town last year, Dr. Henry Olivier drew attention to the vast hydro-electric potential of the great rivers to the north of water-thirsty South Africa. These rivers, including the Zambesi, the Shire, the Congo, the Rufigi and the Rovuma, have, he said, a potential capacity of 40 000 Megawatts - three times the total installed electrical capacity of South Africa in 1975.

If détente can be made to succeed, if the countries of Southern Africa can learn to accept and develop their fundamental interdependence, this sub-continent could become one of the most productive and prosperous regions of the world.

Seen as a whole, it is not only richly endowed with natural wealth and a large reservoir of undeveloped human resources, but possesses the energy potential to quicken them both into a vast productive and peaceful endeavour.

In this interdependence, I firmly believe, lies our main hope for the future.

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The above article is the basic text of a talk given to the Cape Town Branch of the SAIIA on 8 October, 1975.

VIETNAM AND AMERICA'S WORLD ROLE

Carl Landauer

Today the overwhelming majority of Americans is convinced that the United States should never have sent troops into Indochina. So far, so good. Like many others, I was from the outset opposed to the venture. But if we are to learn from the difficult experience, it is necessary now to determine how and in what sense the war was wrong.

A fight to achieve total victory in Southeast Asia was beyond our power from the very beginning: it would have required so large a commitment as to leave our more vital domestic and foreign interests unattended. This we should have foreseen. War, moreover, has its own logic, and since Vietnam strained our patience, making us feel cornered, we pursued cruel expedients; we came close to the paradox of trying to protect a country by destroying it. This, too, we should have foreseen.

Why did we get involved in the first place? Not for economic reasons; there was no American investment to speak of in Vietnam, and future economic opportunities seemed remote and doubtful. We intervened because we regarded North Vietnam and its followers in the South as a spearhead for World Communism, and we believed such aggression could not be allowed to succeed anywhere beyond the Iron Curtain lest a fatal precedent be set and countries everywhere start to fall. In other words, we felt obliged to play the role of universal policeman against Communism.

At present, ridicule and contempt are being heaped upon that thinking, it is widely regarded as a sign of arrogance that has finally met with its nemesis. Yet would the world not be a better place if one nation had power enough to be the global guardian of peace, assuming it had a concept of government and international relations more conducive to liberty and happiness than competing concepts? Only a minority outside the Communist nations would say that the pluralist notion of political relations America feels committed to is not vastly superior to its Communist rival from a humanitarian point of view. Nor can it be validly argued that the United States is unfit to be a protector of liberty and tranquility because it is no paragon of virtue. Moral purity is not an indispensable qualification for preserving peace either on the domestic or on the international scene. The Roman peace was a boon for the peoples of antiquity although much in the Empire was evil.

A good case can of course be made for the proposition that a group of countries, instead of one, can best fill the role of guardian. This was the original inspiration behind the United Nations. But in reality no trustworthy collectivity now exists in the world, and there was none at the time America intervened in Indochina. The U N General Assembly has clearly been unwilling to censure even the most palpable acts of aggression when these have served what the majority of member states regards as the struggle against imperialism, and the Security Council more often than not has been paralyzed by the veto. An optimist might imagine détente advancing sufficiently to permit the United States and the Soviet Union to keep the peace together. At the moment, though, such an arrangement is not possible, and in the 1950's, as the initial decisions on Vietnam were being made, its impossibility was, if anything, greater still.

Consequently, when the U S sought to become a universal policeman, it

tried to do something no other nation or collectivity could do, and something that would definitely have made for a better world. The tragedy of Vietnam was due to an error in judgment, not a fundamental moral defect. Condemnation of U S efforts there was deserved only because, in any political effort, one has an obligation to measure the means required for the end and to estimate what might be thought necessary, should it turn out that one has overrated one's strength. This the United States failed to do.

Yet, to repeat, American aims in Southeast Asia were eminently worthwhile and went beyond mere national interest. Therefore, to reprove the U S for its "arrogance of power", as many have done, is to raise an objection based on a half-truth. Nations, political groupings or individuals pursuing a laudable objective rarely remain free from extensive pride, from undue pleasure in a virtuous endeavor; that a policy maker succumbs to the temptations of hubris does not detract from the value of his goal.

Nor is that goal negated by the need to work with those who are essentially unsympathetic to it. The United States has often been blamed for allying itself with reactionaries. Indeed, it is indisputable that Washington has frequently accepted anti-Communism as the only credential necessary for its support - without considering a government's moral qualities or carefully examining what contribution the regime might make to the strengthening of the American cause. In this way we have acquired "friends" whose methods were neither more democratic nor more humanitarian than those of our Communist adversaries.

Still, critics of American policy have often underrated the limitations objective circumstances impose on the selection of allies. If a country controls straits, ports or other vital locations, or possesses raw materials we would need in the event of a conflict with the Soviet Union or China, we have to seek its friendship irrespective of its internal policies. Even if a nation has no strategic significance, and from a democratic standpoint is no better than the Soviet Union and its satellites, the fact that it is not part of a hostile worldwide bloc could make its existence important for the United States. A lover of liberty in the 1950's or 1960's may have found little to choose between Saigon and Hanoi, yet North Vietnam's allegiance to an utterly repressive global philosophy rendered its expansion much more undesirable than a continuation of South Vietnam's homegrown despotism. (That one cannot always choose one's allies, I should also point out, was demonstrated on the grandest scale during World War II: The only justification - but a sufficient one - for fighting on the side of Stalin was the recognition that Hitler represented the larger immediate threat to democracy.)

The Soviet Union is not now posed for an attack on the United States or its allies, it is not even trying to eliminate America's global prestige and power, because it both hopes to profit from our economic strength and needs us as a counterweight to China. To ignore the possibilities a relatively relaxed atmosphere opens up would be a great mistake; on the other hand, to assume that the potential for conflict has entirely disappeared, that we are no longer confronted by a serious rival, would be at least as great an error. We must continue to expect the USSR to take advantage of opportunities where it finds them. The Mideast is one example. There is also reason to believe - despite the absence of conclusive evidence - that Moscow has given free rein to the Portuguese Communists, because Communist influence in Portugal would weaken NATO without offering the United States an occasion for effective counteraction.

In the light of all this, to play the role we must play, an adequate military is clearly a necessity - though, whether we need the nuclear overkill capa-

city we have, or whether our conventional armaments and those of our allies are sufficient, are questions I do not have the expertise to answer.

We should recognise our mistakes in Vietnam. We should not try to minimize their consequences. Yet we should realize as well that, in the main, our errors originated not in arrogance or in a lust for power, but in striving for an unattainable goal that, could it have been attained, would have benefited everybody.

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THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF UNITED STATES SECURITY ASSISTANCE

The following was adapted from a statement by Mr. Carlyle E. Maw, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, to the United States House of Representatives International Relations Committee on 11 November, 1975.

In the last several years, it has become evident that the community of nations has entered a significantly different era than the one we have known since 1945. The US Security Assistance Program proceeds neither from future prospects of order and peace, nor from past illusions of unlimited American power and resources.

The program is rather the product of present necessities, which include:

- The necessity of building more rational and reciprocal relations with communist countries. History tells us this is possible only if we deal from a position of strength and allied unity.
- The necessity of helping to bring about an enduring peace in the Middle East. Our effort and our influence crucially depend upon our capacity to provide economic and military assistance.
- The necessity for building a new era of co-operation among all nations. This requires us to respect the security concerns of nations which seek our help. It requires us to be concerned about the state of regional power balances.

Thus it is the United States' belief that security continues to be the starting point for the formulation of foreign policy and for the establishment of conditions requisite for international cooperation.

There is no more vivid example of the stake that we have in the world around us, and the decisive contribution that this nation can make, than the situation in the Middle East. For the United States, a substantive role in the Middle East is not a preference but a matter of vital interest. We have a historical and moral commitment to the survival of Israel; we have important concerns in the Arab world - an area of more than 150 million people and the site of the world's largest oil reserves; we have an ongoing need to mute disputes and to resolve crises in the area because upheaval would jeopardize the world's hopes for economic recovery, and would threaten the well-being of industrialized nations; ultimately, tension in the Middle East increases the likelihood of great power confrontation with attendant nuclear risks.

For these reasons, the Middle East portion of our security assistance request is large, more than 70 per cent of the entire program. But, as Secretary of State Kissinger has noted, it is matched in magnitude by the United States' national interests that it is designed to protect.

For the fiscal year that ends June 30, 1976, we are requesting authorization and funds for a program of 3,383 million dollars for the Middle East region. The program is almost equally divided between economic support assistance and military assistance. We are requesting 100,8 million dollars in grant military assistance (MAP), 1,575 million dollars in foreign military sales (FMS) credits, 1,657,5 million dollars in supporting assistance, and 50 million dollars for the special requirements fund. With respect to the 1,500 million dollars

FMS credits to Israel, authority has been requested to forgive interest and re-payments on half of that total.

After the Middle East, the remainder of our proposed program is to be allocated along the following lines, (in millions of dollars):

- Europe	MAP	129.9
	FMS	240.0
	Supporting Assistance	<u>164.1</u>
		534.0
- East Asia	MAP	150.2
	FMS	298.2
		<u>448.4</u>
- Latin America	MAP	16.0
	FMS	180.0
		<u>196.0</u>
- Africa	MAP	14.2
	FMS	31.5
	Supporting Assistance	<u>22.8</u>
		<u>68.5</u>

This comes to a total of 1,246.9 million dollars.

As you know, we have greatly modified our security assistance programs in the past five years to encourage other nations to bear the primary burden for their own defense. But in specific situations, military assistance, in the form of MAP and FMS credits, must continue to play a significant role. The bulk of our grant assistance, excluding the Middle East, is to be directed to Korea, Greece and Turkey. In each nation we have very substantial security interests. The rest of the program will provide modest amounts of material and training to nations in Asia, Latin America and Africa.

I wish to take note of two additional points at this juncture. Firstly, the Administration has omitted a specific request for Spain pending conclusion of an agreement relating to the United States military bases in that country. The agreement is to be submitted to Congress for approval, and we plan to forward a security assistance budget amendment to Congress at the same time.

Secondly, I wish to underscore a significant change that has taken place in our security assistance program. As you know, we have made strenuous efforts to decrease the reliance of friends and allies on grant military assistance and to move them towards greater dependence on foreign military sales and commercial purchases. The Administration proposals for East Asia reflect this trend.

For the first time, the foreign military sales component of the program outweighs grant military assistance - 298 million dollars to 142 million dollars respectively. In addition, the Korean force modernization plan that was introduced in 1970 and placed such great emphasis on MAP is today more dependent on the availability of FMS credits for its successful completion.

Comparable changes reflecting movement towards self-reliance on the part of friends and allies are to be encountered in other regions. As a result, there are 65 percent fewer military assistance advisory personnel assigned to our overseas missions today than in 1970 and we also have fewer MAP material country programs than at any time in the history of security assistance.

The question of security assistance and arms transfers has taken on a greater complexity in today's world. It is a subject of fresh concern in both the legislative and executive branches as well as in public and foreign opinion. In the Cold War era, debate over security assistance rarely went beyond technical

specifics. The rationale for the United States role as a major arms supplier was accepted; we sold or gave arms to countries which tended to share our concern with containing the communist bloc.

Today, changes in the international scene have made arms transfers a much more controversial issue. There has been a proliferation of sovereign nations with a variety of defense needs and objectives often unrelated to the central strategic balance. An increasing number of countries now have their own arms production industries - multiplying the sources of supply and often bringing new regional imbalances. Finally, there is an increasing number of wealthy countries who can afford to pay cash for arms from anywhere in the world, reducing the influence which our security assistance programs gave us in an earlier era.

We all recognize that the world of nations is constantly changing and growing. The total now approaches 150. All have some kind of armed force, and few judge themselves capable of insuring international order or of maintaining the integrity of their territory without external sources of military supply. Furthermore, no government can be indifferent to its security, however it defines the term.

It is likely therefore that the level and quantity of military transactions between nations will be substantial. Most of the world's nations have no arms industries. Their equipment and related services must be acquired from the more industrialized nations on a cash, credit or grant basis.

The United States is not seeking to meet the defense needs of all nations; nor do we wish to become the principal supplier of most. Indeed, we have introduced rigorous standards and criteria in the field of international arms sales, and they are being carefully monitored and closely complied with. We do not cater to extreme expectations by purchasing nations and we endeavor to exercise maximum constraint in the so-called Third World.

While the overall level of our military export sales has risen sharply in recent years, there are several aspects to this rise that are important to note:

- The amounts involved, while substantial, do not always and everywhere involve the sale of lethal end-items. A study we have recently concluded, indicates that only forty percent of our military exports are for such end-items; the remainder is for construction, spare parts, training, and support equipment, such as trucks, jeeps, transport aircraft, etc.
- These sales are not part and parcel of a world-wide explosion in the acquisition of arms. As reported recently by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the "growth of real world military expenditures has apparently decelerated in the seventies."
- Military sales are not an indirect form of foreign aid.
- Widespread inflation has distorted the costs and growth rates in defense budgets and in the apparent expenditures made for new goods and material.

The United States is, for a number of countries, the supplier of choice. The basic requirement for us is to make the best possible judgment in the light

of the totality of United States interests. At the same time, we are willing to take the lead in seeking to draw arms producing nations together in an effort to set international standards in this sphere.

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*UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SUPPORTS UNITED NATIONS ; BUT FINDS IM-
PORTANCE LESSENE*

An overwhelming majority in the US House of Representatives supports the United Nations in general despite widespread feelings in Congress that the UN is becoming less important to American foreign policy.

A survey conducted by the United Nations Association, a private group dedicated to informing the US public on UN activities, finds 84,5 per cent of the Congressmen feel it is important to the United States that the UN continue to exist. The survey also found, however, that 51,1 per cent feel that the UN is becoming "less important" or "much less important" to US foreign policy. Only 6,8 per cent feel that the world organization is becoming "more important" in that respect. The remainder either have "no opinion" or feel that the UN's importance to US foreign policy remains at about the same level as it has since the organization's beginnings.

Why the difference between the overwhelming 84,5 per cent generalized support for the United Nations and the 51,1 per cent negative evaluation of the organization's importance to American foreign policy? The answer rests in replies to other questions and commentary from respondents in the survey.

Most members, the survey found, strongly support UN peacekeeping efforts on Cyprus and in the Middle East and favor UN efforts to ease world food and population problems. There is no doubt but that such activities contribute to a positive attitude about the UN in the Congress.

In analyzing Congressional views on the lessening importance of the United Nations to US foreign policy, the survey commented:

Many respondents explained that such a reaction mirrors the perceived role of the United Nations in such recent US foreign policy issues as the war in Vietnam, détente with Soviet Union, and a Middle East settlement.

The survey then carried its analysis one step beyond, asking if UN activities in 1974 had been "helpful or harmful to improved international relations" generally. The response was that roughly one-third of the respondents (35,5 per cent) were either neutral or had no opinion, while another one-third (27,5 per cent) felt that the actions of the UN last year were "helpful to improved international relations", and a final group (37,2 per cent) felt that the UN's actions in 1974 were "harmful".

In a comparison of Congressional attitudes on the importance of the UN to US foreign policy and on the effect of UN actions on international relations, the survey found that the work of the UN in 1974 appears to have been looked upon more favorably (or less negatively) than the general importance of the organization to US foreign policy.

The low Congressional regard both for the importance of the UN to US foreign policy and the beneficial effects of UN activities on international relations generally, are reflected in a pronounced Congressional unwillingness to increase US contributions to the world organization.

When it comes to US funding of the United Nations, the survey found - not

surprisingly - that "there is a widespread feeling in the Congress that US contributions to the United Nations should either remain at their present levels or be reduced." Only 8,6 per cent felt US contributions should be increased. This low level of support for increased funding is consistent with the 6,8 per cent who felt the UN is becoming "more important" to US foreign policy.

The 84,5 per cent generalized support for the world organization however, finds reflection in the 82,4 per cent "positive" response on UN Middle East and Cyprus peacekeeping efforts. With the remainder spread across "neutral", "no opinion", and "negative" positions - the latter being statistically insignificant.

On the issue of Korea, where, the survey noted, "UN peacekeeping and US military commitments are intertwined", Congressional support dropped to 57 per cent. The "neutral" and "no opinion" positions increased substantially, but the "negative" position remained low at 7,4 per cent.

"The growing interdependence between the United States and other nations is one of the most important factors leading to a greater Congressional role in foreign policy-making", the survey says, adding that Congress sees a "fairly large" role for the UN in "managing such global problems as food reserves or ocean mining."

As to prospective United Nations management of world food reserves, the survey said, 62,1 per cent of the members responded positively with only one-fourth as many (16,5 per cent) replying in the negative, and, surprisingly, only 12 per cent having "no opinion".

When it comes to support for UN world population programs almost three-fourths of the Congressmen (72,5 per cent) reply positively and only "a slim 6,4 per cent negatively", the survey found. However, as to UN regulation of multinational companies, there was only a 36,6 per cent positive response.

Other findings of the survey:

- A majority of the House supports the principle of foreign aid, particularly Congressmen from the Northeast and Midwest. About one out of every three oppose it, mainly representatives from the Southeast and Southwest.
- Opposition to military aid is strongest among freshmen Congressmen, who support a "mostly economic" foreign aid program by more than ten-to-one.
- Overwhelming support exists in the House for the principle of détente, but there are reservations on Administration implementation of it, and
- There is general satisfaction in the House with the disarmament policies of the Nixon and Ford Administrations, although a large group holds no opinion.

The survey - which included 41 separate questions answered by 309 members of the 435-member House - was conducted in January. The findings were released October 10. The 71 per cent response is regarded as one of the highest response rates for any such survey of the US Congress.

The results were tabulated by the Brookings Institution and analyzed by the United Nations Association's Washington staff. The Association says the 309 responding members "correspond fairly closely" to total House membership in party, length of service, and areas within the United States.

Although events in the UN and its specialized agencies in the intervening months would appear to have led to a decrease in Congressional support, the survey notes, the polling took place after such 1974 incidents as the Yassir Arafat visit to the UN and the granting of UN observer status to the PLO. Such events as these - and the UNESCO actions against Israel in November of 1974 - brought strong criticism of the United Nations from large numbers of members of both the House and the Senate. They represent part of the events of 1974 which led to the comparatively low one-third positive evaluation of the effect of UN activities on international relations.

This report was written by James S. Aldrich and reproduced from the *USA New Digest*, Vol. 14, No. 39, October 22, 1975, published by the United States Information Service.

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