

NEWSLETTER SAIIA NUUSBRIEF

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DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE
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DIRECTOR'S NOTES

This is the second issue of the *Newsletter* in its new format and, judging by the response to the last issue, the change has been welcomed by our readers. As members of the Institute have been informed, the *Newsletter* will in future appear only three times a year, instead of quarterly as in the past, since it began in 1969. (In 1971 there were five issues.) Recently a *Subject and Author Index* for the years 1969 to 1975 was published and it is hoped that this is proving useful for reference purposes.

The Institute's publication *Southern Africa Record* is also now appearing in a new format. This publication, which reproduces the texts of major policy statements on international relations in the Southern African region, is available on subscription at R1,50 per issue (three or four issues a year). There is a growing list of subscribers to the Record from within Southern Africa and abroad, but it is very much hoped that more members of the Institute will give their support to this venture by subscribing to it and thus ensuring as wide a circulation as possible.

Members are reminded that the Institute's *Occasional Papers* are available to them at no charge. These papers are not automatically circulated to all members, but they are always listed towards the back of each *Newsletter*, and members can write in for copies. Much highly useful and interesting material appears in these papers, and it is a pity that more members do not take advantage of their right to obtain them. (Country members receive the *Occasional Papers* automatically, as do some other members who have asked to receive them regularly.) Other publications of the Institute are also listed in each *Newsletter*, and the special price for members is indicated. The latest important publication is *Strategy for Development*, published by Macmillan on behalf of our Institute, the Rand Afrikaans University and the Foundation for Foreign Affairs in the United States. Details of this book have been sent to all members, and a limited number of copies is available for purchase by members from the Institute. Otherwise the book can be obtained from booksellers.

A fairly new development in the Institute's work has been the formation of Study Groups concerned with particular international issues related to South Africa's external relations. A short article about these study groups is included in this issue of the *Newsletter*. Although this is a new development in the recent history of our Institute, the groups now in existence are not the first ones. Twenty-five years ago, in 1951, the Oxford University Press published *Africa South of the Sahara: An Assessment of Human and Material Resources*, which was prepared by a Study Group of the Institute under the chairmanship of Major-General Sir Francis de Guingand. In a Pre-

face to the book the late Dr. W. J. Busschau, at that time Chairman of the Institute, said that the study was undertaken as an attempt to elucidate the nature and significance of contemporary problems and policies in Africa south of the Sahara. In his Foreword, Sir Francis commented: *Conclusions concerning the future development of Africa must necessarily be of the most tentative kind. It is evident, however, that, whatever political relationships are ultimately established, both the human and natural resources of Africa will be of growing significance to the world.*

Preparations are well in hand for the Institute's Conference in Umtata from 24 to 27 November, 1976, on *The Transkei: International Implications of Independence*. Against a background of some controversy over the issue of Transkeian independence, the Institute hopes, as an independent non-partisan organisation, to be able to provide a forum at this conference for an objective assessment of the implications of the change in the constitutional status of the Transkei, both for that country itself and for the rest of South Africa. The programme will provide for the consideration of the Transkei's position in Southern Africa, particularly its relations with the rest of South Africa, of the attitudes of African countries and organisations generally, and of the position of the Transkei as a developing country in the world at large. While prepared papers will be presented, as much time as possible will be allocated for in-depth discussion of the various topics on the programme.

Two distinguished authorities in the field of international relations are at present working at the Institute's headquarters at Jan Smuts House. Professor Leon Gordenker of Princeton University in the United States has arrived to spend five months here as Visiting Smuts Professor of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand. He will be working with Dr. Dirk Kunert, who was appointed Senior Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the beginning of 1976, and who was previously at Rhodes University. In addition to his commitments in the Department, Professor Gordenker will be contributing to the Institute's work and will be addressing meetings of the Institute's Branches throughout the country. He will also participate as a main speaker in the Transkei Conference in November.

The second visitor is Professor J. E. Spence, Head of the Department of Politics at the University of Leicester in the United Kingdom, who is spending a month here, during which time he is assisting the Institute and visiting all the Branches, as well as lecturing to the students of the Department of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand. He is also visiting our sister Institute in Salisbury. Professor Spence, who is a South African, has published widely on Southern African questions, particularly South African foreign policy.

The Institute has suffered a sad loss in the death of Dr. W. J.

Busschau on 11 June, 1976. Dr. Busschau was National Chairman from 1950 to 1958 and an Honorary President since 1975. At a meeting of the *Administrative Committee of the Institute's National Council*, our present Chairman, Dr. Leif Egeland, paid a warm tribute to Dr. Busschau as a great South African and recalled his invaluable contribution to the development of the Institute and particularly his initiative which led to the founding of Jan Smuts House as a centre for international studies.

John Barratt
Director

August, 1976



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STOCKTAKING OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

D. P. de Villiers

Only months ago there were hopes of at least some sustained progress towards a Southern African *détente* – meaning a cessation of hostilities and terrorism – and calculated to produce even *entente* or agreed forms of constructive co-operation on a regional basis. Now, two of the leading personalities in the peace overtures, the Presidents of key states, are reported to have said that war in Rhodesia is inevitable, *reaffirming intensified backing for the Zimbabwe nationalists in their armed struggle and pledging unconditional support for the freedom fighters in South Africa against apartheid.*¹ On the face of it, the hopes are dashed by this sabre-rattling and battle-cries. However, international affairs are seldom really cut and dried. The bearers of hope could well have borne in mind words written, in a different though related context, by a Canadian Commission presided over by the late Lester B. Pearson: *Even in the best conditions, development will be untidy, uneven and ridden with turmoil. Great forward movements in history often are.*²

In various pronouncements, the Black African states identified their “liberation” campaign as being aimed at the termination of “colonial rule” and “racial discrimination” in the White-controlled areas of Southern Africa. The Lusaka Manifesto of 1969, expressed preference for *peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change*, but proclaimed a need to support armed struggle *while peaceful progress is blocked by the actions of those at present in power . . .*³ In the years immediately preceding 1974, the accent fell heavily on the need for armed struggle (e.g. in the Mogadishu Declaration of 1971 and subsequent UN and OAU resolutions). But, after the army coup in Lisbon in April 1974, and following its effects on Mozambique and Angola, there was a reassessment and in particular a realisation that an escalation of violence in Southern Africa would cause untold harm to all concerned. Aided by well-timed diplomatic initiatives emanating from South Africa, the states concerned found a community of interest in avoiding confrontation.

While this was particularly true of South Africa and Zambia, the

Adv. de Villiers, SC, is Managing Director of *Nasionale Pers, Bpk.*, and was previously leader of the South African legal team at The Hague during the South West Africa Case before the International Court (1960–1966), and co-leader during the proceedings before the Court on the 1971 Advisory Opinion. This article is an edited version of notes for a talk to the Cape Town Branch of the South African Institute of International Affairs on 28 April, 1976.

¹ *The Argus* (26 April, 1976).

² Quoted in *Newsletter*, Vol. 7, No. 2, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, June 1975, p. 22.

³ “The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa” (April 1969), in *Southern Africa Record* (Number Two), South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, June 1975, p. 3.

latter's President Kenneth Kaunda was supported by the Presidents of Mozambique, Tanzania and Botswana in taking a strong stand in OAU circles in favour of applying the "peaceful methods" formula of the Lusaka Manifesto, the approach being endorsed – although after very critical and suspicious scrutiny – by the OAU Council of Ministers in the Dar es Salaam Declaration of 10 April, 1975. High priority was accorded to peaceful termination of the "colonial situations" in Rhodesia and South West Africa, and "apartheid" in South Africa was to be eliminated by pressures and persuasion – all, however, with the rider of reversion to armed struggle if the peaceful alternatives should fail. Western powers generally, and the major powers in particular, also welcomed and encouraged the attempts at Southern African détente in the sense that, if successful, it would relieve them of the need to show preference for Black or White interests, let alone to become actively involved in clashes.

What unfavourable developments have there, however, been meanwhile? Apart from some indirect aspects of probably no more than peripheral importance, the only real factor has been the failure of negotiations in Rhodesia between the Smith government and the ANC leaders – notwithstanding all efforts and encouragement by Prime Minister Vorster and the four so-called "front-line" Presidents. Closely viewed, the reactions of Presidents Kaunda and Samora Machel are therefore not altogether surprising. In the context of the Lusaka Manifesto and the Dar es Salaam Declaration, the onus was put on them to demonstrate results to their more sceptical and doctrinaire colleagues in the OAU, as well as to real or potential critics in their own countries. At the Dar es Salaam Conference in April 1975, the then Foreign Minister of Zambia, Mr. Vernon Mwaanga, had been at pains to demonstrate the favourable results the peaceful approach of negotiations and communication had already yielded at that stage: these included the release of certain Black nationalist leaders in Rhodesia and the withdrawal of the South African police forces from that country.

The first acid test of this approach, however, proved to be the settlement talks in Rhodesia. The very high priority Zambia and Mozambique accorded to success on this score, derived partly from an emotional approach which endowed the issue with almost symbolic significance, and partly from practical considerations. As a result of their struggle against the Smith regime, both the Zambian and Mozambique borders with Rhodesia have been closed; and while both have declared their intention of maintaining border-closure until black majority rule has been achieved in Rhodesia, their economies – already in a parlous state – are suffering and stagnating more and more.

An interesting facet of the developing situation in Southern Africa concerns the Machel Administration in Mozambique. Itself the

product of revolutionary fervour and with strong ideological commitments of a socialist nature in the so-called "liberation" cause, the regime had to face the reality that direct confrontation with South Africa was likely to be disastrous. Too much emphasis on co-operation with the White South African regime, on the other hand, held the danger of criticism from radical elements in its own country and elsewhere in Africa. So, some political observers have long been expecting that the Machel Administration might welcome an opportunity of striking at Rhodesia, as being more vulnerable to insurgency than South Africa, thereby answering or silencing radical criticism. In line with this view is a significant statement made by President Kaunda of Zambia in February 1975, in an interview with *Africa*, where he generally expressed himself very favourably on the prospects of détente and the role Mr. Vorster was playing in this regard. He, however, commented thus on Rhodesia: *It is no longer a question of a small common border between Zambia and Zimbabwe which worries Smith. The situation has changed in such a way that, if Frelimo decided to put pressure on Smith at any given time, this would be a serious and decisive form of pressure with which Smith's forces simply cannot cope. It would be possible now for the freedom fighters from Zimbabwe to use a very long border which exists between Zimbabwe and the rest of us.*⁴ It seems evident, therefore, that Zambia and Mozambique are now engaged in a move which has long been at the back of their minds and which is designed to put very strong pressure on the Rhodesian regime.

Bearing this background in mind, it follows that the present attitudes of Presidents Kaunda and Machel do *not* mean that all is lost and that there is no prospect of negotiations being resumed successfully. These seem to be tactical moves which, apart from rhetoric, concern pressure on Rhodesia only, and it is at least open-ended as regards possible resumption of attempts to find a negotiated settlement. There is a striking similarity in the attitude of President Nyerere of Tanzania. As reported, on the one hand he stated that the war of liberation for Rhodesia had already started, and on the other hand agreed with the US Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, that a settlement in Rhodesia should be reached by means of negotiation.

It is moreover clear that Mozambique and Zambia are taking a big gamble. The practical considerations which originally favoured détente from their particular point of view have not changed. In the case of Mozambique, President Machel is reported to have said that as a result of the MPLA victory in Angola, *the myth of South African military superiority was reduced to cinders.*⁵ But in the obvious absence of factual foundation, the statement sounds like big talk: he is showing no sign of putting it to a practical test. All reports on the economy of

⁴ Quoted in *Newsletter*, Vol. 7, No. 1, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, March 1975, p. 11 (the accent on the phrase in bold type is mine).

⁵ *Cape Times* (27 April, 1976).

Mozambique stress the parlous state thereof – President Machel himself repeatedly emphasises precisely this point, together with his country's dependence on international aid in order to maintain sanctions, let alone open warfare against Rhodesia.

In Zambia's case, the copper price has fallen from R1 750 to R960 per ton in less than a year – a level at which sales are no longer economical – and this has resulted in the escalation of the trade deficit to nearly R220 million. The Benguela rail outlet remains closed, as well as those through Rhodesia to Beira and Maputo. In addition, the Tanzam railroad cannot carry all Zambia's exports and imports, due to port congestion and excessively high harbour dues at Dar es Salaam. This, in turn, has resulted in a shortage of imported goods and an inflation rate of the order of 30 percent, worsened by the fact that the maize crop was one-third less than initially budgeted for. Until quite recently, there were strong pressures within the executive of UNIP (the sole political party) in favour of reopening the railroads through Rhodesia. A recent report states that there is no prospect of the Zambian economy even beginning to show some improvement within the next twelve months. President Kaunda has furthermore had to exercise emergency powers and even had to close the University in Lusaka. His continued opposition, until very recently, to the MPLA regime in Angola resulted in pressures from that quarter, as well as from within the OAU. In addition, his recent visit to Mozambique bears the stamp of a bid to return to the fold to regain some acceptance. No wonder some of his rhetoric has been so extravagant as to draw from Mr. Vorster a warning against "over-stretching the bow". That President Kaunda must be fully aware of the extent to which he is gambling, is evident from a statement which he was reported to have made as late as September 1975, to the effect that Zambia was determined to seek a peaceful solution to the Rhodesian problem, inasmuch as war in Southern Africa would cause Zambia to lose all that had been built up during the last ten years.⁶

Enough, then, to indicate that there is a lot of pressure being put on Rhodesia, but no death-knell to the broad détente idea as such. What it holds for Rhodesia remains to be seen. Mr. Smith is now moving in the direction of *ad hoc* appointment of Blacks to his cabinet: he has just announced his intention of appointing four ministers and three deputies (three more to be appointed). As an experiment in introducing some immediate sharing of power it must have some value, but how far it would go towards an eventual overall settlement must necessarily depend on various factors, particularly:

- the type, merit, standing and influence of the individuals to be appointed; and

⁶ See *Die Burger* (2 September, 1975).

- the rate at which progress can be made towards evolving a constitution – whether unitary, federal or confederal – acceptable to a sufficiently large portion of the total population, so as to bring about stability and put an end to ideological warfare.

Even in the prevailing tense circumstances, it remains important to keep all options open.

Outside Rhodesia the position remains much the same as before. With regard to South West Africa, most of the sting has been taken out of the issue as a result of the South African government's stand of putting the responsibility squarely on the shoulders of the inhabitants of the Territory to decide on the substance, as well as the timing of change and of the form a future constitution will take. A potentially explosive issue is participation in the current deliberations and negotiations going on in the Turnhalle in Windhoek; some statemanship will be required to avoid the risk of an agreed settlement subsequently being attacked by SWAPO and its supporters among the African states. In addition, after recent events in Angola, the situation along the northern border of South West Africa will have to be controlled with due regard to security on the one hand, and restraint on the other, so as to prevent circumstances arising which could be said to threaten international peace and security and thus to justify intervention and enforcement measures by the UN Security Council.

A similar balance must be struck in South Africa itself, between maintaining security and effecting reforms where necessary. While there are legitimate and differing ideas about method and timing, nothing has vitally changed of late in this respect. To my mind the answer still lies in building upon present foundations and to an ever-increasing extent, drawing all sectors of the population – through duly elected representatives – into processes of consultation, decision-making and a common shaping of the future. Together with sustained economic growth, there can be no better anti-insurgency base.

After Angola, a disturbing question-mark hangs over the whole Southern African region: what is the possibility of the same sort of Russian and Cuban intervention in other parts of the sub-continent? I doubt that any conclusive, concrete answer is possible under present circumstances. The rather ominous aspects of the question cannot, however, be denied. Earlier assumptions that South African military strength can make short shrift of anything likely to arise around the Republic's borders, become open to doubt. Dr. Kissinger, on the other hand, has warned that *the United States will not accept further Cuban military interventions abroad, nor permit the Soviet Union or its surrogates to become the world's policeman.*⁷ But, after the Angolan events there is understandable scepticism in Southern Africa whether any

⁷ *New York Times* (24 March, 1976).

United States Administration would receive the necessary Congressional backing to put such warnings into effect – and on this score the *New York Times* itself questioned the credibility of these warnings.⁸ There is another, almost ironic aspect to warnings of a United States/ Soviet-Cuban confrontation on an issue such as the Rhodesian one. If not explained with a great deal of circumspection, these warnings may give rise to an assumption that the Soviet-Cuban forces would back Black militants and that the United States would then necessarily be aligned with the White minority regime!

This was exactly the line taken by President Kaunda when he said that war was inevitable in Rhodesia and the West was to be blamed. Unless minority rule was ended in Southern Africa, the liberation groups would get communist arms and the West would end up fighting for Rhodesia and South Africa.⁹ Quite conceivably to avoid such interpretations, Dr. Kissinger was very cautious in his pronouncements during his African tour. He simply stated that the United States did not plan to give military aid in any form to the nationalist movements in Africa; and he left it to a senior official in his group to add the modification that Washington would take a second look at this policy if the experience of Angola was repeated. This was understood to refer to a possibility of there being warring factions amongst the nationalists in a struggle to overrun Rhodesia and one of them receiving massive aid from the Soviet Union and/or Cuba – the United States would then consider giving aid to the other group. In view of mounting evidence of dissension and strife between various factions of the so-called “freedom fighters”, the contingencies thus posed are not altogether unrealistic or in the realm of mere phantasy.

Even so, the prospects of a clash between big powers on Southern African soil, with all the attendant risks of escalation, is certainly not an attractive one. It is perhaps this danger, above all, which underscores the desirability to proceed, not in panicky haste, but certainly with all deliberate speed along the lines that are known to be necessary for achieving equilibrium and a *pax africana*.

⁸ See *Ibid.*

⁹ See *The Argus* (26 April, 1976).

SOUTH AFRICA AS AN AFRICAN POWER: THE NEED FOR A PURPOSEFUL DÉTENTE POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Denis Venter

South Africa's involvement in Angola has, once again, brought the Republic's role in Africa into sharp focus. It emphasised anew the need for South Africa to be primarily an *African* power and highlighted the relationship between this reality and the process of détente in Southern Africa.

The internationalisation of the "apartheid" question in the era after World War II and the progressive deterioration which this brought about in South Africa's external relations forced the Republic to make an earnest effort to formulate a purposeful African policy. It was realised that South Africa's relations with Africa were indeed the key to full acceptance by the world community, and that only a normalisation of relations with Black Africa could prevent further deterioration. The Republic was also seen as an inextricable part of Africa and for this reason an attempt was made systematically to conclude relations with African states. It seems, however, that South Africa's foreign policy, especially towards Black Africa, is still too strongly based on reaction and action of an *ad hoc* nature.

For Southern Africa, the Portuguese coup of 25 April, 1974 was a watershed because of its far-reaching and often traumatic consequences for the whole region. It upset the apple-cart of rather balanced political forces in the region and forced South Africa to make a serious reassessment of its position, not only on the sub-continent, but also in Black Africa as a whole. Dialogue with Africa, which appeared so promising at the beginning of the Seventies, had by then largely collapsed, not only because of the unflinching hostility of a number of militant Black African states, but also as a result of vacillation, lack of quick action to exploit potentially favourable circumstances, and even indiscretions on South Africa's part. It also became apparent that the Republic would shortly no longer be separated from the rest of the continent by a buffer zone or *cordon sanitaire* - the Portuguese African territories and Rhodesia. The realities of this new geo-political situation would thus have to be taken into account and therefore it was absolutely essential that dynamic new initiatives should be launched by the South African government and the process of "dialogue" or communication should be re-activated

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on a more meaningful basis, in order to reach some or other *modus vivendi* with Africa – for its own sake, and not simply as a key to relations with the West. Hence the détente initiatives of the past two years, which are primarily aimed at a diffusion of the tense political situation in Southern Africa.

In this regard, developments in Southern Africa were of cardinal importance, and for quite obvious reasons: the imminent decolonisation of Mozambique and Angola; the need for an early and mutually acceptable negotiated settlement of the Rhodesian question; a resolution of the dispute which has been dragging on for decades between South Africa and the United Nations over South West Africa; and the desirability of a better dispensation for all population groups in the Republic by a pronounced move away from racial discrimination (abolition of “the harsher aspects of apartheid”). South Africans often commit a basic error of judgment by putting the last three problem areas in a specific order of preference, or sequence – Rhodesia, South West Africa and then South Africa’s internal policies. The Black African states, however, regard these problems as of equal importance and they want to see parallel progress in all three spheres simultaneously.

The Rhodesian question is of the utmost importance for South Africa’s relations with Black Africa, because Rhodesia has always been the main obstacle in the way of a normalisation of relations: initially with the outward-looking movement and dialogue and now with the détente initiatives. Both the Lusaka Manifesto and the Dar es Salaam Declaration put a high premium on independence for Rhodesia on the basis of Black majority rule¹ and the Republic’s consistent support for Rhodesia has therefore made it rather difficult for South Africa to attain its objectives in Africa. Black Africa also regards Rhodesia as a test case for the Republic’s credibility in the search for peaceful solutions to the problems of Southern Africa. Ariston Chambati reflects the viewpoint of the African states when he asserts that *South Africa has a strong leverage upon the Smith Government... (and) is therefore, expected to ensure, that... constitutional talks produce positive results.*² Unfortunately, the hopes for a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia have not yet been realised. Hostilities of a rather low intensity over the last few years have already been superseded by a disturbing escalation of violence and this is coupled with the even graver danger of the same sort of involvement of non-African powers, which has given rise to such concern in Angola.

As the major power in the Southern African region, South Africa

1 See “The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa” (April 1969), in *Southern Africa Record* (Number Two), South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, June 1975, p. 5; and “Dar es Salaam Declaration on Southern Africa” (10 April, 1975), in *Ibid.*, p. 40.

2 Ariston Chambati, *Détente – An External View* (paper delivered at a conference on *South Africa in Africa: An Evaluation of Détente*, on occasion of the 46th Annual Council Meeting of the South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 21–23 January, 1976), p. 11 (the accent on the phrase in bold type is mine).

cannot avoid involvement, in one way or another, in the political turbulence of this sub-continent. The Republic has always, in its foreign relations, put strong emphasis on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Non-interference, however, does not imply indifference to conditions that directly affect or might influence South Africa's interests. Hence it need not surprise anyone if the urgent necessity for a constitutional settlement is constantly pointed out to the Rhodesian government – through the proper diplomatic channels. A mutually acceptable settlement between White and Black in Rhodesia is essential for the momentum of détente in Southern Africa. It will therefore be highly unfortunate if the détente initiatives prove to have been only a relaxation or moratorium in a potential conflict situation. Détente cannot be an aim in itself; it can only be a means (or a process) to a more permanent pattern of relations between South Africa and its neighbour states in Southern Africa; and it cannot generate movement indefinitely without any progress in the issues that cause division. This is as true for the South West Africa problem as it is for Rhodesia and for South Africa's internal policies.

South Africa must also accept – in the light of the pronouncement made by Ambassador R. F. Botha in the Security Council of the United Nations on 24 October, 1974, when he said that the government would do everything in its power to move away from discrimination based on race or colour³, as well as in the general climate of détente – that adaptations to its internal policies are an absolute prerequisite for the success of the détente policy. The conscious improvement of human relations at all levels must therefore have priority with every South African; the human dignity of people regardless of colour must be acknowledged and respected; and there must be a greater degree of communication between the Republic's different population groups. In this regard it must be pointed out that the Lusaka Manifesto puts strong emphasis on the **acceptance of the principles of human dignity and equality**. A firm **commitment to these principles and a deliberate attempt to implement them**⁴ could create a sound basis for peaceful co-existence on the sub-continent. The divisions between internal and external policies have become blurred in the contemporary world and it would be foolish of South Africans to ignore the inter-action between them and the influence of the country's internal racial policies on its relations with Black Africa.

Gradually over the past decade there has been a greater willingness by the South African government to face the political fact, whatever the legal position on non-interference in domestic affairs,

³ See "Statement by Ambassador R. F. Botha, Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations, in the Security Council", in *Southern Africa Record* (Number One), South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, March 1975, p. 21.

⁴ "The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa" (April 1969), in *Southern Africa Record* (Number Two), *op. cit.*, pp. 2, 3 and 7 (the accent on the words in bold type is mine).

that the Republic's domestic racial policy is the central or core issue which divides it from other countries, particularly in Africa. The government has not given up its legal stand in principle on this question, but it has been willing to discuss the matter with other governments, even to the extent of implicitly, although perhaps unwittingly, allowing it to become a subject of negotiations in détente efforts. The question remains, of course, as to how the South African government can implement a commitment to human dignity and equality within the limits of its separate development policy. This policy is categorically rejected by Black African states as a means of achieving these ends, but the government insists that this policy is the only way, and it hopes to convince other states accordingly. This dispute over principles cannot, however, be eliminated simply by endless explanations; it can only be ended by firstly, meaningful change within the South African situation, thus removing the grounds for disagreement; and secondly, through negotiations in which accommodation can be made by both sides, in order to reduce the area of disagreement and provide for a gradual normalisation of relations. In the meantime there will be no co-existence between Black Africa and the Republic as this implies acceptance of the "apartheid" system. Therefore, efforts to ostracise or isolate South Africa will continue as a pressure for change.

Under these circumstances, the Republic has made a serious mistake in its foreign policy planning by not at least capitalising on the positive aspects of the Lusaka Manifesto – the rejection of violence to solve disputes between states⁵ – at an earlier stage. The summary rejection of this document – mainly because of its unacceptable criticism of South Africa's internal policies,⁶ especially in paragraph 22 – eventually led to the adoption of a more militant posture by the Black African states with the Mogadishu Declaration and its rejection of dialogue with South Africa.⁷ The Mogadishu Declaration and the Lusaka Manifesto are therefore "two sides of one and the same coin", as President Kenneth Kaunda put it. Africa is prepared to seek peaceful solutions to the problems of Southern Africa. If all attempts at communication and negotiation fail, however, the only alternative will be to revert to conflict and confrontation. This is stressed by the Dar es Salaam Declaration⁸ and indicates a dual strategy: the strategy of parallel alternatives, namely armed struggle and negotiation. The choice for Southern Africa is therefore clear: peace or an escalation of conflict. The apparent way is that of peace: normalising of relations, better understanding and the creation of conditions for peaceful change.

⁵ See *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁶ See *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁷ See "Mogadishu Declaration" (October 1971), in *Southern Africa Record* (Number Three), South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, October 1975, p. 34.

⁸ See "Dar es Salaam Declaration on Southern Africa" (10 April, 1975), in *Southern Africa Record* (Number Two), *op. cit.*, p. 39.

The détente period has shown (as indicated in the Lusaka Manifesto and Dar es Salaam Declaration) that South Africa is accepted as an independent African state⁹, however strong the differences may still be regarding its internal policies, and that it can work with other African states in attempts to settle differences peacefully. It has shown, too, that it is possible for states with strong ideological differences, such as South Africa and Mozambique, to coexist and even to co-operate on a practical level, if it is in their interests to do so. Moreover, it has taught the Republic to take its relations with the rest of Africa seriously, as a matter of vital national interest. The experience of Angola has reinforced this lesson, and above all it has brought South Africa face to face with the realities and the responsibilities of its role as a regional African power, rather than an outpost of "the West".

That Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola had to be opposed in one way or another was clear to South Africa from the outset – its strong traditional anti-communist policy simply dictated it. This was also the Republic's dilemma, for any action or lack of action would necessarily have negative consequences. Without passing any judgement on the merits of South Africa's so-called "limited involvement" in Angola, the government's decision to intervene militarily in the territory – all factors taken into account¹⁰ – could be seen as a serious military and diplomatic miscalculation.¹¹

Unfortunate pronouncements have been made in government circles that South Africa became involved in the Angolan conflict to safeguard so-called "Western interests". Since the late 1950's, the Republic has persistently tried to be accepted by Black African states as part of Africa. It was, therefore, stated clearly that South Africa regarded itself as an African state and *not* as an appendage of Europe. Thus, the Foreign Minister, Dr. Hilgard Muller (when still South African Ambassador to the Court of St. James in 1962) told a joint meeting of the Royal African Society and the Royal Commonwealth Society in London: . . . *South Africa has never been a suburb of Europe. She is inescapably part of Africa.*¹² Likewise, former Foreign Minister, Mr. Eric Louw, already in 1957 declared that (*South Africa must*) *accept its future role in Africa as a vocation, and must in all respects play its full part as an African power.*¹³ However, the idea of Africa as the key to relations with "the West" always persisted and government statements during the Angolan conflict – that the Republic was fighting a war for "the West" and "the free world" against com-

⁹ See "The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa" (April 1969), in *Southern Africa Record* (Number Two), *op. cit.*, p. 6; and "Dar es Salaam Declaration on Southern Africa" (10 April, 1975), in *Ibid.*, pp. 38 and 39.

¹⁰ For an excellent analysis of these factors see John Barratt's article "Southern Africa: A South African View", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 55, No. 1, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., New York, October 1976 (to be published).

¹¹ See the author's article "The Lesson of Angola: Time to be an African Power" in the *Rand Daily Mail* (9 March, 1976); and *Strategic Survey 1975*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1976, p. 37.

¹² *Why Apartheid?*, Department of Information, Pretoria, n.d., p. 7.

¹³ *Fact Paper 33*, State Information Office, Pretoria, April 1957, p. 9.

munism – seem to contradict this Africa-policy objective and return to the earlier approach. This excessive emphasis on “Western” connections may place insurmountable obstacles in the way of complete acceptance of South Africa by Black African states and may even bring South Africa’s full commitment to Africa into serious doubt, in spite of vigorous government assurances to the contrary.

The time is surely very much overdue for the Republic to recognise realistically that it is not part of any vague “Western grouping of states” and that it has a character of its own, which should be expressed in a fully independent foreign policy. There clearly is a need for a positive and more realistic approach to foreign policy planning in South Africa; an approach taking into account the realities of a changing world situation and seeing the Republic more as a *regional power*, with a role to play in Africa in general and in Southern Africa in particular. South Africa should therefore be seen as a stabilising factor in Southern Africa, rather than a mere link in a world-wide “Western” defence network. Policies must thus be formulated on the basis of the Republic’s own national interests, as well as that of Southern Africa, rather than attempting to keep up an irresolute “alliance” with the so-called “Western world”. This unqualified prior commitment to “the West” leaves South Africa with very few foreign policy options and no leverage whatsoever in its foreign policy implementation. This does, however, not imply that the Republic should summarily sever all links with “the West”. There are many fruitful economic, trade, cultural and other links with “Western states” which should realistically be retained to their mutual benefit. The argument is simply that links with “the West” must be *less strongly emphasised*.

One lesson South Africa has learned from its Angolan involvement is that it must be accepted realistically that it will have to depend upon its own military and civil preparedness in future. There can be no guarantee of US or West European protection against any threat to the Republic’s security; especially not after the severe hammering the credibility of US resistance to Soviet expansionism, in areas that fall outside the usual Soviet sphere of influence, has taken in Angola. American assurances to the contrary are viewed with much cynicism in this region – by both White governments and moderate Black states. This knowledge must, however, not breed a laager-mentality amongst South Africans. Rather, there should be an increasing awareness of the imperative necessity for the Republic to reduce drastically its political differences with Black Africa, despite ideological and other differences. The urgency of this leaves no place for arrogant self-confidence or corrosive pessimism in the new politics of Southern Africa: realistic optimism must be the catchphrase and must continue to be so. In addition, tactful, circumspect and yet daring statesmanship will be demanded from both Black and White Southern Africans in the crucial times ahead.

THE CONFLICT SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Dirk Kunert

THE STRATEGY OF "NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLES"

Once one divests oneself of outmoded notions of military conflict in terms of major conventional or brushfire-type wars, preceded by the "civilised" act of an officially declared state of bellicosity – a legalism often dispensed with from the earliest times – one stark fact immediately comes into sharp focus, when only sketchily surveying the whole of the African scene; i.e., for almost a decade and a half the African continent has been the staging ground for and the theatre of revolutionary wars, often euphemistically called "wars of national liberation" – a term employed to lend to what would otherwise be regarded as a messy affair a touch of sanctified respectability, at least in some quarters. The conflict situation South Africa finds itself in, and has been in for some time, is distinctive in terms of its multi-dimensional nature; with shifting emphases, it is being waged on the political, economic, cultural, racial, psychological, religious, as well as military fronts. In the context of the existing "balance of terror", this irregular, unconventional and protracted conflict is a low-risk war that skirts the tripwires of major nuclear conflagration, while permitting a policy of leaping forward into *terra nova* especially in the Third World.

In many, but certainly not all, of the recorded cases the driving force behind these revolutionary wars have been either indigenous Communist parties or movements fuelled by the fanaticism generated by "Marxist-Leninist" ideology. This has been demonstrated by events that have racked Indochina for the last quarter of a century. In Africa, especially in the southern region of this continent, "wars of national liberation" have more often than not tended to follow this pattern. The ultimate objective pursued by these revolutionary movements should not be confused with the causes proclaimed, which are usually invoked to obscure the real motives. The cause for which the war is fought might thus well change during each successive phase of the protracted conflict. Ideally, the cause should appeal to a broad spectrum of the population in terms of their specific grievances and expectations. In most cases the revolutionary movements address themselves to the vital interests of those to be mobilised against the established governments and/or rulers, who

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are invariably branded capitalist exploiters, grafting landlords, flagrant perpetrators of crimes committed against racial and religious groups, and Judases to the national interests in cahoots with foreign powers. The cause invoked does not matter, as long as it appeals or can be pawned off on the gullible section of the populace – the self-styled “intelligentsia” often included. Whenever the cause is weak or lacks persuasive force, the vanguard of the revolutionary movement will put a premium on forging a highly effective organisation operating through an underground network. As Sir Robert Thompson observes somewhere: *If the organisation, as opposed to the cause, is the vital factor, the communist party will not be defeated by reforms designed to eliminate the cause. It will only be defeated by establishing a superior organisation and applying measures designed to break the party organisation.*

The already formidable constellation of forces in Southern Africa has become sharply accentuated as a consequence of recent developments in Angola and Mozambique. Massive Soviet military assistance and logistical support, as well as direct intervention by Cuban proxy forces against the contending black groupings of the FNLA and UNITA – commanded by Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi respectively – and regionally generated units of the South African armed forces, have resulted in the Angolan triumph for which Moscow can take full credit. More importantly in the long-run, the Kremlin leadership has been showing the various governments in Southern Africa on which side their bread is buttered. The developing situation has become the more serious and critical as the Western powers demonstrated paralysis in the face of overt Soviet expansionism. With the Angolan and Mozambique beachheads established, closing in on the so-called “white redoubt” in Southern Africa, the revolutionary thrust will initially be directed against Rhodesia, South West Africa and possibly an independent Transkei, subsequently against the Republic of South Africa, and eventually against the fence-sitting governments and pro-Western rulers in the economically significant and strategically important sub-Saharan region. However, during the intermediate phase certain of the Black governments and the USSR will make common cause. Moscow is pursuing its anti-Rhodesian and anti-South African objectives because the Pretoria and Salisbury regimes are pro-West, both states being endowed with important natural resources, the flow of which to the capitalist industrialised countries is either to be halted or to be impeded. Certain of the Black governments are shifting into higher gear in their protracted struggle against Rhodesia and South Africa and several others are playing the unenviable role of the sorcerer’s apprentice.

THE POLITICS OF HYPOCRISY

Politics in this continent have become rampantly hypocritical. The demagoguery displayed and the incendiary rhetoric uttered at national and international fora, has escalated beyond the point of rational discourse. The intellectual pollution, resulting from an arrogantly rhetorical posturing, has imposed upon the public discourse a structure of ideas that is suffocating in its narrowness. A sense of humility and a readiness to lower one's voice might still succeed in redressing the balance between a hypertrophy of uncontrolled moralising and callous Machiavellism. To strike a balance and to regain a sense of proportion some indubitable facts should therefore constantly be kept in mind, and other features, which are debatable in any deliberative process, should be highlighted. Parenthetically, I should hasten to add that one's perspective should be an ecumenical, as opposed to a parochial one; one's horizon should not be bounded by national frontiers. It would be highly regrettable if the local Council of Churches imitated the role performed by the "Germanic Christians" during the 1930's, this time South African-style. Apart from the topic, which already compels one to broaden one's vistas and look outward – I am not foreclosing the option for those who like to engage in the act of self-flagellation – one's moral sensibilities should not be ringed in by an impenetrable iron curtain that coincides with the frontiers of the Republic of South Africa. It should be porous enough to let oneself be affected, and touched, by what transpires – evil, as well as good – in the whole of Africa, because these events and occurrences, too, have a bearing on what happens in the southern region of this continent.

But, allow me to list some of the indubitable facts and some of the debatable issues. When discussing South Africa, one must consider what is likely to be the development of affairs in all of Africa south of the Sahara. First, a cacophony of voices and ideologies prevails. Secondly, this continent has for generations been engulfed in inter-tribal hostilities and warfare. Thirdly, if one is trapped in the cage of assuming that rhetoric implies conduct in this part of the world, at least at certain junctures concrete circumstances are likely to jolt the observer out of his cocoon woven by threads of delusions. To give only one example: "majority rule" has become a catch-phrase almost devoid of substance in the context of the African body politic. The path of African political development is studded with upheavals engendered by military *coups d'état* and the elevation to power of one-party systems. Most of the African regimes are authoritarian or dictatorial, sometimes benevolent but sometimes viciously malign, and in several cases outright barbaric. Several of the emergent Black states have gone through the traumatic experience of psychic and physical terror, as opposed to the so-called "institutionalised violence", if one has resort to the terminological concoction often

employed to render meaningful the political situation prevailing in South Africa. Other Black states have been plunged into the vortex of genocide; due process of law and open debate are mirages; famine and corruption are rampant; and often the most savage and atrocious punishments are meted out. All of these highly depressing facts are not meant to belittle the harshness of the South African policy of apartheid or separate development. But the mere listing of these incontrovertible facts is instilling a sense of attempting to keep a more balanced perspective of activities perpetrated in the Dark Continent.

If the one policy is seen as constituting a threat to peace and tranquility in this part of the world, only by a mental act of legerdemain can the domestic and external policies of South Africa's neighbours be construed as necessarily advancing the cause of international peace in this region. One can possibly go so far as to argue that the incessant talk about bloodshed and violence, in the event of so-called meaningful change failing to take place in South Africa, is acting as a self-fulfilling prophecy; that is, all the repeatedly verbalised prognostications about the likelihood of violent revolution eventually engulfing this country might finally succeed in igniting a wave of upheavals and mindless terrorism that could never have succeeded otherwise, and in turn induce repression that is highly regrettable and deplorable. Large-scale violence in this country is bound to disturb the peace of the wider region. The situation is potentially explosive enough for debaters at political banquets artificially to stimulate racial antagonism and crisis situations, with its inevitable external implications. Furthermore, but in the same vein, one wishes that foreign governments – on this continent and beyond the oceans – would be more perspicacious in their assessment of the counsellings and promptings coming forth from travelling emissaries of the organisationally profligating anti-South African regime movements, and rather remember the wisdom expressed by Niccolo Machiavelli, who, in *The Discourses*, entitled a chapter "How Dangerous it is to Trust to the Representations of Exiles". Acting as partisans – and I am not questioning the sincerity of some of the critics of the South African situation – they offer as much clarification on the complexity of the problems as distortion of the issues. Misperception of the totality of the South African situation on the part of the continental and overseas public and policy-makers is least conducive to coming to grips with what transpires in this part of the world. Ideas naturally have consequences, often unintended ones, with repercussions reverberating throughout the region.

To structure one's ideas in terms of a suffering-situation, along the lines of a Manichean dichotomy of "oppressors" and "oppressed victims", is likely to lend itself to falsifying reality, which is more complex than the neat simplicity implied in this conceptualisation of

the surrounding world. In its actual operation this suffering-situation structure tends to absolve the violent acts, since this kind of argument partly rests on the assumption of natural goodness on the one hand, and an almost innate or irremediable disposition to evil on the other. By structuring reality in terms of the suffering-situation, one allows the potential revolutionary to make out his own credentials as a victim of the situation. There are, admittedly, many who suffer and are victimised by this kind of situation, but their actions may also be motivated and fuelled by a lust for power – the *libido dominandi* – an obsession to rule and lord it over, in order to make their secular religious theories and practice meet in the revolutionary act. They may also be driven by envious hatred or propelled to act because of a neurosis that overwhelms them, and perhaps is overwhelming the whole of Africa. The last observation possibly explains the petulance of some who are burdened with conducting the affairs of their nations in this part of the world. The springs of action, with far-reaching implications for the general situation in this region, may have their source in personality dispositions, as well as in the domestic structure and ideological assumptions. Transnational activities have their origin also in events transpiring in the external environment, because nations usually tend to react to stimuli that originate outside their frontiers.

APARTHEID AND FOREIGN POLICY

There are two points that have already been touched upon, but should be brought into sharper focus because they have a bearing, direct or indirect, upon the appraisal of the situation confronting South Africa. First, a major bone of contention, exacerbating the situation, causing ever-increasing bitterness, and thereby generating mounting tensions in this part of the world and beyond, relates to South Africa's policy of separate development. There are some hopeful signs – and future developments will show whether these expectations are reasonable – that some of the more humanly degrading restrictions of petty apartheid are going to be removed from the statute books. But this picture has to be rounded out by pointing to one seemingly permanent fixture; i.e., the majority of the white electorate is not likely to renounce the basic tenets of the policy of separate development. Buckling under the well co-ordinated and orchestrated pressures of the United Nations and Organisation of African Unity, and scuttling the existing political system, would amount – in their mind – to committing collective suicide. The white population is not in any way seized by an urge to act out the lemur-syndrome. Rather, the inclination to preserve the essentials – the core values and assumptions – of the policy of separate development has been strengthened by the recent exodus of approximately one million Angolans and Mozambicans. To expect a complete change of heart – a

transvaluation of existing political values and a drastic transformation of the whole structure – is “to wait for the shrimp to whistle”. On the other hand, and in terms of Prime Minister Vorster’s initiated policy of “dialogue” and “détente”, the continuation of the present domestic system constitutes one of the major stumbling blocks on the road to reconciliation on this continent. The voluminous records of high-sounding declarations issued by the Organisation of African Unity are replete with resolutions to this effect. It is thus no use blinking the facts of African political life.

To admit this does not, however, automatically foreclose the raising of a counter-question: If South Africa fails to pass the litmus test of moralising sensitivity and sensibility, how come that diplomatic intercourse exists at all among African states? None of the African states operates in an ecclesiastical universe and/or by angelic standards, and the presumption to act out the role of political deacons merely reinforces the sneaky suspicion of hypocrisy being on a rampage on this continent. If the criteria applied to South Africa were to become the operative yardstick, most if not all of the African embassies would have to close their gates. To wait for them to open again, till their political standards have reached the high moral plateau to which South Africa is expected to ascend, would mean to wait *ad calendas Graecas*. If a roll-call were taken and the heads of Black African states were asked to present their credentials to be placed into the morality scales verbally polished by OAU debaters and their acolytes, it would not take much imagination to predict the outcome.

But by raising these questions and by bringing up some of the more sordid facts of African political affairs, one does not in itself succeed in cutting the Gordian knot. The question still remains of how to go about untying the knot, or breaking the deadlock. One can either steadfastly adhere to one’s uncompromising position, and thereby make the obstacles on the path to defusing the volatile political situation almost insurmountable, or one can grudgingly admit with James Madison (as stated somewhere in his contribution to *The Federalist Papers*) that men are not angels. But this act of admission would explode some of the Promethean notions on the wings of which several of the more outspoken African critics, as well as the professional militants elsewhere, of the South African system remain airborne. A change of heart would also entail a reaffirmation of that clause of the UN Charter which encapsulates the concept of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other nations. It would, above all, mean to surrender the notion that *what is good about international politics is that it gives opportunity to preach what one cannot practice*. As Professor Charles Burton Marshall sarcastically observes, one does not demonstrate “one’s fidelity” to such vaunted concepts of “majority rule” and “free and universal elections” by abrogating

them "in one's own country, but by being for them in far-away places".

AFRICAN-STYLE CONTAINMENT POLICY

This excursion leads to the crucial question whether African governments, keeping in mind their own shortcomings to put it mildly, should not attempt to match former President Nixon's far-reaching decision when he resolved a similar problem now confronting Black regimes on this continent. US foreign policy throughout most of the post-war period was based on the so-called "containment" principle, which contained as one plank in the total policy platform the belief (hope, expectation, or however one wants to put it) that the basic thrust of Soviet policy could only be channeled into more peaceful directions if a profound transformation in the domestic order of the Soviet Union were to occur. In 1971, Nixon renounced this ultimate objective of American containment policy, when he made it quite clear that *"the internal order of the USSR, as such, is not an object of our policy, although we do not hide our rejection of many of its features. Our relations with the USSR, as with other countries, are determined by its international behaviour."*

African states could make a major contribution to the lessening of tensions on this continent and beyond, if they could muster enough courage to revise at least one crucial feature of their African-style containment policy, which not only tends to embitter inter-African relations between themselves and the so-called "white redoubt", but also to further – because of the unflinching adversary stance vis-à-vis South Africa – the progressive intrusion of foreign influence and alien ideologies. If continuing unchecked, these trends are most likely to imperil the political integrity and independence of several of the Black African states and to subvert their indigenous socio-political philosophies. The prospects of war in the Southern African region are increasing in proportion to the escalation of an evermore expansive African containment policy, with a spiralling aggressiveness in its wake. As in so many other cases, Africa is emulating some of the less endearing features of modern, ideologised, Occidental politics. If the urge to imitate is irresistible, there still is the Bismarckean notion of politics as the art of the possible on to which one could latch. More to the point and at the risk of trespassing on the Church's sanctum where "progressive" flowers bloom, figuratively speaking, Black African statesmanship – and there are notable examples – still has to match White African statesmanship in its declared willingness to pursue a policy of dialogue that is striving to push on from the probationary to the mature stage of the whole détente spectrum. There has to be a readiness to deal with what one might consider unsavoury characters. If in war there is no substitute for victory, as the late General MacArthur once apocalyptically

formulated, there is no substitute to talk to each other if the fragile structure of peace is still to be salvaged. Peace is a precious and precarious matter, and for that reason not to be allowed to become a football for parties not willing to abide by some of the basic ground-rules of interstate behaviour.

THE CULTURE-CLASH

In terms of practical politics, an ever-widening gulf has opened up between White and Black Africa. Taking this constellation as a matter of fact of present political life, I would like to probe a bit deeper. Possibly, the cultural cleavage is more fundamental to the situation than some of the surface manifestations of hostility sketched so far. If that is to be the case, the clash need not be fatal. The situation is, however, in spite of what follows, not beyond remedy. But the resolution of the conflict situation will, to some extent at least, have to proceed on the basis of the observations just made.

There are few words that have titillated and preoccupied the Occidental mind as much as the term "law". Law, order and organisation are indeed interwoven. What is, however, fundamental and primary to the Occidental legal concept is "the person" and it was in this cultural environment that the notion of citizenship and individualism was nurtured. Human relations were organised contractually and constitutionalism became the hallmark, as distinct from despotism and arbitrariness. True, all or most of these concepts were intermittently flouted, but they always, until recently, remained the normative principles by which Occidental life and relationships were to be guided. Within this intellectual climate certain principles of international order became crystallised, as encapsulated in Grotius' "The Rights of War and Peace". Standards were set, though not always abided by in the practical conduct of affairs, to serve as guidelines for international behaviour. Peace, war, diplomacy, unity, understanding and retribution assumed distinctive meanings. Peace, to give one example, was "ethically superior and politically preferable". It was the notion of "international law" that formed – and served as the cornerstone of – the entire international system. The Grotian law of nations eventually issued into the principles of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of the United Nations. These normative principles have, however, been diluted when invoked by those for whom the Occidental ideal of international law does not convey much meaning. For the more militant spokesmen of this continent they amount to not much more than an alien concept foisted upon them by colonial powers, to be thrown on the scrap-heap of history. Western scholarship bears much responsibility for covering up natural diversity and disorder in human affairs; in its craving for levelling, it has failed to differentiate. By bandying around certain concepts, one does not automati-

cally accept the normative principles underlying them. Allow me to be a bit more specific, for what follows has a direct bearing on the political antagonism that has shaped up in this part of the world.

Not only European power and influence have been rolled back from this continent, but so have Occidental notions of law, peace and constitutionalism receded, with traditional African beliefs and institutions having become revitalised. In Africa, the regime of the soldiers has initiated a process of retribalisation, political re-traditionalisation, re-Africanisation and a partial revival of the warrior tradition.¹ To highlight some of the distinctive African features, Adda Bozeman's probing analysis shall be closely followed, with no holds barred in terms of her refreshing determination to cut through the layers of myths that have been heaped upon each other: *(The emphasis upon speech, the moment and personal encounter explains . . . why future-oriented thought, essential in the Occidental literate scheme of law and political organization, is not easily accommodated in Africa.*² The emphasis is on "action", as Nkrumah pointed out in Ghana's CCP's first pamphlet (1949). Written constitutions have almost become meaningless; individualism, civic rights and responsibilities, bills of rights and individual rights are alien in a cultural setting dominated by kinship and tribalism. The stress is on community and not on "the person". Hardly any of the Black African states can therefore be called law states or legal systems.

Is there a linkage between these cultural-political traits and Black Africa's conduct of external affairs? Professor Bozeman contends that *since it is difficult in such conditions to fathom the concept of "the national interest" as an organizing axiom in inter-African affairs, foreign policy-making, like government, must perforce become the preserve of leading personalities and of the parties or other organizations they control*³, and she goes on to argue: *It thus appears that interstate relations are in large measure extensions of relations between personalities who symbolize the idea of the nation . . . that foreign rather than domestic policy is viewed as the arena of action most favorable to the enhancement of personal power and prestige. . . . Here, as on domestic levels of politics, one observes great tolerance for conspiracy, verbal abuse, and all manner of belligerent and violent intervention in the domestic affairs of neighboring states.* And she concludes: *In fact conflict seems to be accepted everywhere not only as the ruling norm but also as the major and sustaining source of politically significant normative thought and behavior. International peace, as this term has long been understood in the Occidental region, is by contrast an alien concept.*⁴ If these modes of behaviour are characteristic of much that transpires in inter-African affairs, the

1 See Ali A. Mazrui, "Soldiers as Traditionalizers: Military Rule and the Re-Africanization of Africa," *World Politics*, XXVIII, No. 2 (January 1976), pp. 246-272.

2 Adda B. Bozeman, *The Future of Law in a Multicultural World*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1971, p. 91.

3 *Ibid.*, pp. 115-116.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 169.

clash between White Africa and Black Africa was almost bound to emerge, particularly at a juncture in contemporary developments when ethnic interests seem to dominate over all other considerations.

This being the case, certain trends have, however, made White South Africa's brief for ethnicity evermore untenable and offensive. The dramatic improvement in the international system of communication has brought about – what Nathan Glazer has called – the “universalisation of ethnicity”, whereby *the international community of public opinion is refusing to accept as moral the exploitation or persecution of an ethnic (group) by a state*. The world increasingly refuses to accept this as an “internal” matter, he concludes. That is to say, South Africa's racial policies have affected the country's relations with other nations to the point whereby the outside world feels disinclined, to say the least, to accept the Republic's ethnic policy as simply an intra-state issue.⁵ Ironically, this state of affairs has come about at a juncture when White South Africa became “Africanised” to the extent that it began to fill Occidental terms of “sovereignty” and “self-determination” with African content; i.e., “pigmentational self-determination”, “racial sovereignty” and “biological patriotism”.

THE USSR'S SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA

What has meanwhile aggravated an already volatile situation is the intrusion of outside powers, on a massive scale, into Southern African affairs. To put it bluntly, not even the most perfect agreement hammered out by those involved in discussions and deliberations in South West Africa and Rhodesia is bound to survive Soviet imperialism. From the very beginnings of Soviet Russia's participation in international affairs, the Kremlin leadership has left no stone unturned, whether initially in Europe and Asia and currently in Africa, to exploit existing antagonisms between two contending factions or blocs in order to further its own objectives. Working through its proxies and satellites, revolving around the Moscow sun – i.e., the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), FRELIMO, the MPLA, SWAPO and ZAPU – the USSR is determined to incite racial hatred in this part of the world.⁶ One should brace oneself for the not unlikely happening of the phalanx of the political juvenile delinquents – that are periodically staging their *panem et circenses*, UN-style – to extend recognition to the ANC and/or PAC as the legitimate representatives of “Azania”. Some militants of the new creed of “revolutionary Christianity” might already be itching for this vision to become part of reality soon.

Pressure will therefore be kept on Rhodesia, South West Africa

⁵ See Nathan Glazer, “Ethnicity: A World Phenomenon,” *Dialogue*, 8, No. 3/4 (1975), pp. 34–46.

⁶ See endnote 1.

and the Republic of South Africa, as well as on the moderate Black governments, including the Transkei. But the initial thrust will be directed against those regions and/or countries that superbly lend themselves to exploiting ethnic conflicts. Having embarked on a policy of ascending adventurousness, this spiralling process is going to continue without let-up. With beachheads conquered in Mozambique and Angola, Moscow will, in the immediate future, consolidate its hold on these unfortunate states, through a process of totalitarisation of the existing movement-regimes. It will simultaneously do its very best to escalate the conflict, at a level of low-risk policy. The Kremlin's immediate objective is aimed at torpedoing any peaceful resolution or defusion of the crisis situation. The USSR's long-range objective envisages the broadening and extension of its Southern African base in pursuit of its political, military-naval and raw materials strategy.

Revolutionary warfare against the so-called "white redoubt" has thus been stepped-up over recent months. The question that remains is whether or not Moscow is going to supply its clients with the necessary military hardware to enable them to escalate the conflict from the phase of revolutionary to the stage of conventional warfare. As events in Southeast Asia and Angola have shown – Marxist and non-Marxist, leftist mythology apart – revolutionary war by itself is not likely to clinch the case. On-going Southern African developments are not going to invalidate this judgement. Moscow's policy of conquest through proxies will only be crowned by success as a result of massive and large-scale conventional warfare, if at all.⁷ The tide will only be stemmed and reversed, if moderate Black and White African leadership succeed in orchestrating their already launched policy of dialogue and deterrence. Otherwise, Vice-President Rockefeller's dire forebodings will become brutal reality, with White and Black Southern Africans falling victim to the Kremlin's expansionist thrust. As the American Vice-President put it recently in a speech delivered at Frankfurt, West Germany, in the presence of a prominent audience that included President Walter Scheel and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt: *We face a new and far more complex form of imperialism, a mixture of czarism and marxism with colonialist appendages.*

Whether Soviet Russia is going to succeed in building up "a new empire on which the Soviet sun never sets", depends on whether or not responsible Southern African leadership will face up to the challenge by striving to submerge their immediate major differences, while continuing in their pursuit of bringing about a gradual amelioration of degrading conditions on both sides of the demarcation line by means available and acceptable to them under prevailing circumstances. The very first step should be to proclaim a moratorium

⁷ See endnote 2.

on hyperbole and, at the same time, to wrest the initiative from those forces and powers that have already advanced far enough in their drive to impose totalitarian regimes, alien ideology and political paramountcy on this region of the continent.

Endnotes

- 1 Those who should know better but still cling to the image of the so-called "national liberation movements" as modern African Robin Hoods, are advised to page through the more recent issues of *World Marxist Review*, the authoritative journal of Communist and Workers' parties, through which Moscow issues its ukases to the Kremlin-controlled revolutionary organisations. The whole *World Marxist Review* set-up may be regarded as the successor to the COMINFORM, which Stalin founded in 1947 and which his followers disbanded in 1953. The "Marxist-Leninist" position has clearly been adopted by the following movements: MPLA, FRELIMO, ANC (South Africa), ZAPU and SWAPO. See statements by Alves Bernardo Batista, CC Political Bureau Member, People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), Minister for Internal Administration, People's Republic of Angola, "Groundwork for People's Rule"; Jorge Rebelo, CC and Executive Member of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), Minister of Information, People's Republic of Mozambique, "Formative Period"; Alfred Nzo, General Secretary, African National Congress of South Africa, "Vorster's Double Strategy"; Jason Moyo, Chairman, External Administration of the Zimbabwe African National Council (Rhodesia) and George Silundika, Member of the External Administration, African National Council, "Despite Intrigues, for the Unity of Fighters"; and Moses Garoeb, Member of the National Executive Committee and Administrative Secretary, South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), "For a State of Workers and Peasants", *World Marxist Review*, Vol. 19, No. 6 (June 1976), pp. 91-111.
- 2 By 1968-1970, the Communist, revolutionary Vietcong had suffered a devastating defeat, with their underground network almost completely demolished. This turn of events caused Nguyen Giap to switch over to massive conventional warfare and by July 1972 most of the North Vietnamese divisions had been wiped out, with the exception of one division stationed on Loation territory. South Vietnam had thus won a major round in the conventional struggle. Saigon's position was, however, undermined by a series of subsequent decisions: the ceasefire agreement of 1973 and the eternally disgraceful resolutions passed by the Congress of the United States in 1974/75, clamping down an effective arms embargo on South Vietnam. With 60 percent of the South's air force grounded and an almost total lack of ammunition and artillery, Nguyen van Thieu's armed forces were a pushover for the massively re-equipped North Vietnamese regular divisions in 1975.

THE CONTEXT OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS (SALT)

Michael H. H. Louw

It is now almost two years since President Gerald Ford and Mr Leonid Brezhnev signed the Vladivostok Accords in November 1974, which – in adopting the principle of parity – encouraged widespread expectations for a real break-through agreement on nuclear arms control, to be called SALT II. This has not happened and, except for the later ratification by the US and the USSR of a treaty on the limitation of the size of underground tests to 150 kilotons, the whole evolutionary process of a reduction in the strategic nuclear arms race appears to have become bogged down.

Ironically, it would appear that, in spite of the spirit and action of détente in which Dr Kissinger and Mr Brezhnev have repeatedly expressed profound belief, as well as the general “confidence-building” act of faith in the signing of the Helsinki agreement, the major ostensible obstacle to SALT seems to be technical rather than political. In concrete terms, unbridgeable differences seem to have arisen on the question whether, and to what extent, two important recently developed weapons should be included in the ceilings for launchers (2 400, of which 1 320 are permitted for MIRV-equipped launchers), viz. the US cruise missile and the Soviet “Backfire” bomber. Many observers of this drama, perhaps the most potent and potentially cataclysmic (*though un-fanfared*) one on the international scene, are now wondering how a seemingly minor matter like a relatively small number of weapons under development, and not even in production yet, could prevent the signing of a major arms control agreement; which was intended, furthermore, to have led to reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. To explain this strange break in a promising chain of political evolution, it might be helpful to examine not only the mere numbers of weapons, but rather the context within which they represent surface manifestations of more profound factors in the negotiating situation.

Historically, SALT (which began in 1969, towards the latter stage of the negotiations on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty – NPT), in effect evolved as a mutual teaching exercise for the two superpowers, towards a better understanding of their respective strategic situations and philosophies. This also included matters of genuine common concern, such as the accidental firing of nuclear vehicles (which led, e.g. to the “hot line” arrangements) and the limitation of defensive anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems to two (and in 1974

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to one) for each country – which, in effect, increased the vulnerability of each and thus, by implication, the mutual trust of each that the other would not exploit it; in itself a profound political act of faith. But this agreement was based on an evaluation of the then existing weapons technologies and on a preoccupation with the numbers, rather than with the quality of weapons. After Vladivostok not only new technologies but also the intention – articulated by both super-powers – to develop and exploit new technologies for weapons purposes, introduced a chilling new reality into the arms control calculus, which meant that not only future technological (and linked production) *advances* by them, but also the *intent* of their future use, became destabilizing factors.

In addition, some other developments had begun to complicate the simple bilateral juxtaposition of the two super-powers, e.g. their re-examination of their respective obligations to use nuclear weapons in defence of their allies. There were also the visible signals that nuclear proliferation was on the move; e.g. NPT-non-signatory India had exploded a nuclear device; and complete nuclear technologies – to which weapons production could be linked – were being exported freely as commercial transactions by a number of countries, some of them – like France – also non-signatories. Thus, nuclear power as a technology – for the good or for the destruction of mankind – was back again heading the list of priorities for world, and therefore for super-power decision-makers. It was inevitable, therefore, that policy-makers had to shift their thinking from a state-centric to a world-centric focus.

The reasons for the post-Vladivostok snag in SALT should therefore be sought against the background of an assessment by each of the super-powers of these two factors, viz. possible future technological advances and the intent of the other super-power. This new and different problem poses a special dilemma for policy-makers and negotiators, whose traditional backgrounds and world-views had to be brought into some congruence with the new realities.

- Firstly, instead of a state-centric, or even ethno-centric view (and its derived mores, in terms of which the priorities of survival and national interest legitimate any demand), decision-makers now had to develop a wider world-view in which there must be the necessary convergence – not merely reconciliation – of national interests.

- Secondly, instead of a time-frame related to history and to the present (whose overriding virtue, as a data source, is its reality and tangibility), policy-makers now had to think of the future (immediate and distant, and perhaps ultimate) – not as mere extrapolation of the known present, but as a serious exercise in constructs of reality. This situation was further complicated by the fact that, apart from two rather small atomic bombs dropped on Japan, there was no experience of nuclear warfare involving an exchange of fire to

extrapolate from: They were thus dealing with a doubly unknown future.

- Thirdly, instead of taking the articulations – in words, documents and deeds – of the other party at their two-dimensional face-value, negotiators now had to try and understand the other's intent, i.e. the reasons and motivations behind its articulations and the rationales for specific positions, propositions or actions. Rationales for policy positions and thus for decisions on nuclear weapons are, of course, based on the complex processes of structuring, reconciling, co-ordinating and crystallizing different views expressed, demands made and forces exerted by many groups and actors within a particular political society, as well as within the politics of its allies. A simplistic demonology of the opposing state, facing the virtuous pantheon of one's own, is just not very useful; its policy-making must be assumed to be based on rationales too.

- Fourthly, policy-makers generally respond to crises and pressures from opponents, interest groups or constituencies which all articulate their respective demands, needs and threats, and thus partially structure the dialectic duel for which the particular policy or decision is intended to be a solution. But, in the case of SALT, there are – because of the fact that there are still a large number of important non-signatory states and because now, after the uninspiring performance over five years of the NPT and its 1975 Review Conference, as well as the artificial and inconsequential resolutions of the UN General Assembly – practically no structurings of the on-going dialogue, or real and hard pressures from outside powers on the super-powers to push SALT into meaningful results. The initiative to move SALT forward must therefore come from the two negotiating super-powers themselves, as an expression of their conviction that an unlimited nuclear arms race, with its ever-increasing demands for resources, can never produce real security for either of them, but only the relative security of parity or stabilization; which, in the final analysis, creates an unsatisfactory cost-benefit-risk ratio. This logic would obviously lead to the position that it would be in the national interest of each super-power to purchase relative security or stabilization at a lower price than that of an unlimited arms race – i.e. at a level of agreed limitation of nuclear arms capability. However, this logic is a matter of self-perception for each of them.

- Fifthly, the partially articulated basic assumption, and therefore objective, of both the negotiating super-powers seems still to be some form of balance of power (or, to some observers, terror) called “stabilization”; or if stated negatively, the elimination or control of “destabilizing” factors. Such destabilizing factors are the quality (accuracy, payload) of weapons, research and production capabilities, and intent (ideology, motivation) – all complex characteristics, which are difficult or impossible to quantify and therefore

to enter into a formula or equation for stabilization. To illustrate this area of non-quantifiable complexity, the requirements of the US Department of Defence for strategic stability – as stated by one of its senior officials – may be mentioned: essential equivalence of strategic forces, high survivability of forces, flexible response options and accurate mutual perceptions of one another's nuclear capabilities.¹ In view of the qualitative nature of these factors, how can a balance be attained, and an equilibrium maintained, to prevent a "tilting" of strategic advantage in favour of one party, leading to the only alternative the other party may perceive it is left with, viz. a first or pre-emptive strike? There may actually be an inherent contradiction here: if the fundamental means, in a national security policy based on a balance of power, is the maximization of power, how can a government justify the reduction of the means of that power; and among others of nuclear weapons? Theoretically, this can be done on the basis of a proportionate, credible and demonstrable reduction of power by the other government; but that government equally, will then have to justify its particular reduction of power.

What further bedevils the processes of traditional and known negotiation are a number of unique characteristics of SALT as a diplomatic exercise:

- For example, the *quid pro quo* relationship of a normal negotiating pattern contains, in the case of SALT, no constructive elements which require positive action or resources; it contains only negative commitments *not* to exceed certain limits in weapons production and deployment. How can negative quantities, i.e. various versions of zero, be measured?

- Further, political considerations (on which any government, in the last analysis, bases its security position) are not affected: the Soviet Union has repeatedly stated that its ideological commitment to "proletarian internationalism" is excluded from SALT. This open-ended situation naturally creates a serious asymmetry on the level of ideology and intent.

- Finally, certain sub-conflictual, competitive postures (including visible demonstrations of capability, such as the world-wide Soviet naval manoeuvres OKEAN I and II) are certainly not helpful in persuading the other super-power that its national security can be fixed at a lower level – and in thus reaching a desirable "stabilized" weapons formula for both powers.

If the negotiations stick to the narrow path of numbers and negatives, it is unlikely that SALT will arrive at any viable and operationalizable stabilization formula. The present competition between the super-powers in weapons numbers is already becoming

¹ Testimony by Mr. James P. Wade, Jr., before the House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, *The Vladivostok Accord: Implications to US Security, Arms Control and World Peace*; 94th Congress, 1st Session, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1975, pp. 138–149.

competition in weapons quality, which, in turn, will lead to competition in research capability, leading to competition in increasing resources allocated for weapons research (and reduced resources for other social necessities), which – ridiculous as it may seem – may lead in the last analysis to the situation where nuclear competition is being waged not between launching systems, but between the respective ministries of finance and economics. Over all this will remain hovering the shadow of uncertainty of intent and ideological commitment. Along that road, which has now almost become a fixation on numbers, the chances for meaningful transactions are meagre.

It might well be that the time has arrived for the SALT participants to explore alternative avenues of negotiation. To begin with, there is already a demonstrable convergence of the respective national interests of the two super-powers in preventing the proliferation of nuclear technology, and especially of nuclear arms. In fact, their interests being identical, they are arrayed on the one side, against the rest of the world (qualified, of course, by the special position of the Western nuclear states, Britain and France) on the other. While it may be true now that the two super-powers are vastly superior in quantity and quality of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them, is it not conceivable that – if a large number of the other states develop a nuclear weapons capability of their own – the super-powers will both be faced with multiple and unknown, rather than single and known threats? Would nuclear proliferation not in the long-run be more inimical to their respective conditions for national security than now, when at least a moratorium on weapons development, agreed to between them, would perhaps not be impossible to negotiate?

The real and mutual distrust between the super-powers rests, of course, on the non-negotiable factor of intent or ideology, which is concerned with their respective value systems, world-views and basic philosophical premises; which, in turn, are non-arguable, non-quantifiable and non-comparable, and thus beyond the reach of rational processes. However, one may bear in mind that an ideology, if it holds out the possibility of a millennium, only fulfils its function as a value instrument if peoples are persuaded of its superiority by other means than the threat of extinction. If this is so, then global ascendancy, by nuclear means or otherwise – which, according to its own scenario, the Soviet Union considers as its ultimate objective and at the same time compatible with “co-existence” – is a rather pointless and expensive enterprise in establishing exclusivist universal discipleship among those peoples who remain alive after the sanction of extinction had had to be used on some of them. In fact, some Soviet scholars now depart from the assumption of “the inadmissibility of nuclear conflict”.² It might, therefore, be useful now to

² See Milstein, Michael A. and Leo S. Semelko, “Problems of the Inadmissibility of Nuclear Conflict”, in *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 1, March 1976, pp. 87–103.

explore the areas of mutual political tolerance and a moratorium on ideological imperialism; the spirit of that unique document, the Helsinki Act of 1975, with its emphasis on confidence-building measures and co-operation on urgent matters of modern concern, including "humanitarian and other fields", points after all in the direction of a new humanism, a new challenge and a new future.

PRINCIPLES OF WEST GERMAN DEFENCE POLICY

An interpellation addressed to the West German Federal Government by the parliamentary party of the CDU/CSU gives the Government an opportunity to explain once again its security and defence policy before the German *Bundestag*. The principles governing this policy, as laid down in the Federal Government's policy statement of 18 May, 1974, continue to be valid without any change. That is:

- The Western Alliance is indispensable to our own security and that of our allies.
- Peace is only safeguarded by an equilibrium of forces between the East and the West. To ensure that equilibrium, an adequate counterpoise to the military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact must be maintained in Europe. The Federal Republic of Germany does its share in preserving equilibrium through its co-operation in the Alliance and through its force contribution.
- It is of utmost importance, both for political and military reasons, that the presence of American forces in Europe be continued without any substantial reduction. The European-American relationship is governed by identical security interests.
- The European allies strengthen NATO's collective defence through close military co-operation and improved conventional forces.
- The Federal Government is maintaining and improving the combat effectiveness of the Federal Armed Forces by restructuring and modernising them.
- Together with its allies, the Federal Government continues its policy aimed at bringing about arms control and reduction. This policy is only possible on the basis of solid defence and undiminished security.

The policy of security and détente pursued by the Federal Government is devoted to peace, the independence of this country, and the freedom of its citizens. It forms part of a policy which is designed to develop and maintain good relations among all nations and to remove economic, social and humanitarian problems through international co-operation. Our active participation in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, and our endeavours to help achieve mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe, are part of this policy of peace.

This statement, with minor editorial changes, was made by Georg Leber, the West German Minister of Defence, on 2 October, 1975, in reply to an interpellation addressed to the Federal Government by the parliamentary party of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) in the German *Bundestag* concerning West German defence policy (*Bundestag-Drucksache 7/3874*). It is reproduced from *The Bulletin* (Archive Supplement), Vol. 2, No. 12 (11 November, 1975), issued by the Press and Information Office of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

I. THE OVERALL SITUATION

The security situation, the relative strategic force capabilities and the balance of forces in Europe are presented in detail in the 1973/74 White Paper on "The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces", as follows:

The Security Situation

War in Europe implies world-wide conflict. The world's two largest alliance systems – NATO and the Warsaw Pact – stand face to face on our continent, forming a dense concentration of forces and arms in a confined area. Negotiations and agreements between the East and the West have as yet not been able to change this situation.

Balance of power, however, lessens the danger of military aggression or political pressure. A balanced force ratio paves the way for negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. The aim of these negotiations must therefore be to achieve a parity of forces on both sides on a lower level of the balance.

The West European countries make up only a small portion of the Eurasian land mass. Despite their population density and high productivity they are not in a position, either individually or collectively, to form a counterpoise to the military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact. The political and military balance in Europe is therefore dependent on the United States. For that reason and because of the political and economic intermeshing of Europe with the other parts of the world, the European scene must be viewed in a global context. Thus, peace and security in Europe are influenced by changes in world politics, not least by the development of the relations between the world powers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Relative Strategic Force Capabilities

Nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union does not mean that their arsenals are identical. Yet, the two nations are comparable as regards nuclear striking power and vulnerability to nuclear attack. Taken as a whole, Soviet and American nuclear weapons are equivalent in terms of quality and quantity. Both powers are capable of destroying each other by the use of nuclear weapons.

Following the first Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement (SALT I), the United States and the Soviet Union have utilised their agreed freedom of action by making further armament efforts. The Soviet Union increased its lead in the field of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and nearly pulled even with the US in the number of sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). During the same period, the United States modernised its intercontinental and sea-launched missiles by fitting them with MIRV warheads.¹ In addition,

¹ MIRV: Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle.

it continued to develop the Trident nuclear submarine system, which will replace the Polaris submarines at the end of this decade. Missiles of the Trident system will have a range of nearly 10 000 kilometers. Even if launched in American off-shore waters, they will be capable of striking targets in all parts of the world. In the United States a long-range bomber fleet, the B-1 bomber system, is to replace the B-52's by the end of the 1970's.

Pursuant to the SALT I Agreement, the United States and the Soviet Union are each allowed to deploy 200 antiballistic missiles (ABM) to protect their capitals, and one ICBM launch site in each country. The Soviet Union has already deployed 64 operational missiles around Moscow. In the US, a comparable ABM system only became operational by the end of 1974.

Compared with the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, the nuclear inventories of Britain and France are but of minor size. Britain has committed its nuclear weapons to use by NATO. France refuses to integrate its nuclear weapons in Alliance planning, because of the special character of its relationship with NATO. It is difficult, therefore, to assess the political significance and combat value of France's nuclear weaponry, as compared with the nuclear weapons of the other powers. Even taken together, the nuclear weapons of Britain and France could not nearly match the capabilities of the Soviet Union. France's 18 land-based and 32 sea-based medium-range missiles with a second-strike capability, which it has produced in the meantime, have hardly narrowed this gap.

The nuclear capabilities of the People's Republic of China are having an ever greater bearing, both politically and militarily, on the power structure in Asia. Faster than had been expected, China developed hydrogen bombs with a yield of several megatons. Silos for medium-range ballistic missiles are being built in western China. Intercontinental-range delivery vehicles appear to be lacking as yet.

Globally, the naval forces of NATO are superior to those of the Warsaw Pact. During the past few years the Soviet Union has made every effort to parallel the strength of the Western navies. Soviet naval forces operate in all the oceans of the world. This development is of serious concern to the Western states since, unlike the Warsaw Pact countries, they are dependent on a global, secure system of sea lines of communication.

The stress of Soviet naval construction is on nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, ocean-going surface ships armed with surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, and the modernisation of the naval air arm, including the construction of aircraft carriers. Large-scale exercises have demonstrated that the Soviet naval forces are capable of operating even when far away from their home bases.

This component of Soviet power is supplemented by the world's largest fishing fleet comprising 75 000 seamen, and by the largest research fleet numbering 200 ships. Ships of the Soviet merchant fleet travel nearly all important sea routes of the world.

The Balance of Forces in Europe

The Warsaw Pact has increased its superiority by improving and reinforcing its conventional forces. In addition, Soviet supremacy in the Warsaw Pact ensures greater commonality of weapons and equipment, command and control system and mobilisation process. In contrast, the equipment of NATO's forces is less uniform. Moreover, political factors impede the Alliance's capability to respond to changes in the political and military balance. However, the tactical nuclear capabilities of NATO in Europe are great enough when viewed against the background of the strategic nuclear arsenal.

LAND FORCES

The Soviet Union is maintaining its divisions in a high state of readiness, on the glacis of Soviet territory. This also applies to the divisions in the western military districts of the Soviet Union, and to the greater part of the forces of the other Warsaw Pact countries. Remaining units need from several days to several weeks to establish operational readiness.

In the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Czechoslovakia and Poland, 29 Soviet and 31 indigenous divisions stand ready for action at short notice. The average strength of these divisions is 8 000 to 12 000 men, whereas the divisions of NATO number between 7 000 and 17 000, the difference being due to the support and logistic units which are part of the NATO divisions. On the other hand, the Warsaw Pact divisions have more weapons and equipment and a larger proportion of combat troops.

The Warsaw Pact forces deployed on the western glacis of the Soviet Union are equipped with about 15 500 main battle tanks. Thirty Soviet divisions, totalling about 340 000 men and roughly 6 800 main battle tanks, are stationed in the three western military districts of the Soviet Union (Baltic, Belorussian and Carpathian Districts) and can be brought forward without delay as reinforcements. There are four Soviet divisions with a total of redundant older equipment, including main battle tanks, mechanized combat vehicles, artillery and anti-air weapons, that were used to activate new units or were stored on site in depots.

The strength of the land forces of NATO, comprising 28 divisions and 6 200 main battle tanks in Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Benelux countries, has scarcely changed in the past years. Stationed in the territory of Germany are a total of 640 000

troops, comprised of the *Bundeswehr* and personnel from six other NATO nations.²

AIR FORCES

Also, as far as the air forces in Europe are concerned, the Warsaw Pact is preponderant. This becomes evident above all when tactical combat aircraft are compared. Between 1971 and 1973, all Warsaw Pact countries replaced older aircraft models with new ones, which are capable of operating in both the air offensive and the air defence roles. During the same period, the Warsaw Pact equipped its air defence forces with mobile air defence missile systems and anti-aircraft guns. Thus, the air defence capability of the land forces of the first strategic echelon has become greater, both qualitatively and quantitatively, also while units are in motion. The conversion programme, furthermore, increasingly liberates tactical fighter forces for offensive tasks.

So far, NATO has not been able to offset this advantage of the Warsaw Pact in respect of air forces and air defence capability. The Federal Republic of Germany is improving its contribution to the Alliance: from 1974 onwards, the Air Force will equip four of its wings – two interceptor wings and two fighter-bomber wings – with F-4 F *Phantom* aircraft. In 1973, the Army – as well as the Air Force and the Navy – started to introduce the 20mm anti-aircraft gun for point defence, and will, in 1976, begin introducing the *Gepard*, an anti-aircraft armoured vehicle.

NAVAL FORCES

The Soviet Union's geographical extension in Europe and Asia necessitates the division of its naval forces. Three fleets are deployed in Europe, which can operate independently of each other: the Northern Fleet has its command centre in Severomorsk near Murmansk; the Baltic Fleet in Kaliningrad; and the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol. The constant interchange of units between these three fleets and common exercises have increased their ability to operate together. It is obvious that the Soviet Union takes into account the importance of the sea routes around the West European Peninsula for the Alliance's sea lines of communication. It therefore exploits the political influence potential of its naval forces in peacetime.

On the northern flank of NATO, the Soviet fleet, which operates from bases on the Kola Peninsula, has been reinforced. It includes some 180 submarines, most of them with a large radius of action and many of them missile-equipped and nuclear-powered. This submarine fleet operates not only in North European waters, but also in the Atlantic as far as off the American coast. In this way it de-

² Canada, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States.

monstrates its ability to severely disrupt vital re-supply from the United States to Europe.

The Atlantic Ocean and the North and Baltic Seas are strategically interrelated. In the strategy both of the Warsaw Pact and of NATO, the North Sea and the Baltic constitute an integral whole. The superiority of Warsaw Pact naval forces in the Baltic facilitates co-operation with the Northern Fleet, and common operations during exercises have confirmed this. The 60 fast patrol boats of the Soviet *Osa* type, equipped with surface-to-surface missiles, are especially well-suited for employment in the Baltic. By comparison, NATO has available for its defence of the Baltic – a task devolving upon Denmark and the Federal Republic – not more than six comparable vessels.

Contrary to what is maintained in Soviet publications, the Baltic is – under international law – part of the high seas: beyond territorial waters, ships – including warships – of all nations may navigate without any restrictions. All NATO allies thus are free to exercise units of their fleets in the Baltic. Defence in the Baltic Sea and of the Baltic approaches is therefore a prerequisite for securing the northern flank of NATO, without which Europe's central region cannot be defended.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE

In the talks of the two world powers on the limitation of strategic nuclear arms, the Soviet Union has demanded that forward-based systems (FBS) be included in the negotiations. The Soviet Government understands forward-based systems to comprise all strategic systems of the United States other than land and sea-based intercontinental weapons, which are capable of reaching targets in the Soviet Union. For the Alliance, forward-based systems are weapon systems which belong neither in the category of battlefield nuclear weapons (example: nuclear artillery), nor in the category of central intercontinental systems (example: operational *Minuteman* missiles in the United States). The forward-based systems include *Starfighter* and *Phantom* aircraft capable of delivering nuclear strikes. These weapon systems are also called "non-central systems".

The nuclear capability of NATO, which is integrated in the conventional forces, is above all the link between the conventional forces in Europe and the strategic nuclear weapons of the United States. (The Soviet Union could regard supplementing its conventional weapons, as an additional option, with tactical nuclear weapons.) In the Nuclear Planning Group, NATO develops the political guidelines governing the release and employment of nuclear weapons. Understanding and frankness between the allies on these critical issues has grown in recent years.

SUMMARY

The strategic nuclear parity between East and West has remained unchanged. It is true that the Soviet Union has caught up with the United States quantitatively and in some fields also qualitatively, but the United States is determined to maintain its overall qualitative lead. The capability of either side to deliver a second strike, i.e. a retaliatory strike, in response to a nuclear attack continues to exist.

By now, the Soviet Union has developed its naval forces into an instrument enabling it to carry out centrally controlled world-wide operations, as shown by the OKEAN 75 spring exercise. In this respect it has pulled even with the United States. As to the number of ships, the Warsaw Pact has not yet reached parity with NATO, but, unlike the NATO nations, the Pact has not to rely on the assured availability of sea lines of communication. The average age of Soviet ships is less than that of the ships of the NATO nations, and Soviet ships are armed with modern missile systems. What continues to be a drawback for the Soviet Union is its disadvantageous geographical situation from the point of view of naval strategy.

In Europe, changes in conventional forces have not resulted in a fundamental shifting of the former relative conventional force capabilities. In northern Europe, the ratio of land forces continues to be unfavourable to NATO, while the ratio of air forces is approximately balanced.

On the southern flank of NATO Europe, the numerical ratio of land forces, which has been hitherto rather well-balanced, is now being jeopardised by the intention of the Italian Government to reduce the number of Italian divisions. The repercussions of the Greek withdrawal from the integrated military structure of NATO and Turkish notice of termination of the use of US bases in Turkey, are not yet clearly foreseeable. In air forces, the Warsaw Pact is superior in this region. As to naval forces, the US Sixth Fleet helps the West to maintain a balanced ratio of forces.

In Central Europe, the numbers of army, air force and naval units have remained the same on either side for several years. However, the Warsaw Pact has improved the combat effectiveness of its forces. The five Soviet divisions deployed from the Soviet Union to Czechoslovakia in 1968 continue to be stationed there.

The conversion of the Soviet troops deployed in the German Democratic Republic to new types of tank, with the old types continuing to be available, has increased the total number of main battle tanks by about 2 000. The number of artillery guns has, furthermore, increased by more than 50 percent. Two years ago, the conversion of combat troops to modern full-track armoured personnel-carriers was initiated. The majority of motorised rifle units, however, has still to rely on the older wheeled armoured personnel-carriers.

For years now, the number of Warsaw Pact combat aircraft has essentially remained unchanged; at almost twice the number available to NATO. The West has, however, improved its anti-armour and anti-aircraft capabilities substantially. The number of combat units will also be increased by two US brigades.

The troops deployed in Central Europe by both sides are fully combat-ready and immediately available for action. By mobilisation and deployment of reinforcements, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact are able to increase the numbers of their divisions on the spot, the marked superiority of the Warsaw Pact being preserved in the process. The air forces are also capable of being reinforced at short notice.

The long-standing capability of the Warsaw Pact to mount military operations with limited objectives, within a negligible period of time for preparation, has remained unchanged. Acts of aggression with global objectives, would require preparations that would afford NATO a military warning period. If the necessity arose, this period would have to be utilized resolutely for defence preparations by both the political decision-makers and the military commanders-in-chief. Aggression would probably also be preceded by a prolonged period of deterioration of the political climate, from which appropriate conclusions could be drawn.

The military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact clearly exceed its defence requirements. Nevertheless, the Federal Government feels that the present situation does not involve direct military and political risks to the West. It remains, however, necessary for the NATO Alliance to maintain its defence capability and readiness. This is one of the prerequisites for the Federal Government's policy of détente, combined with the preservation of security.

EXPENDITURE

Any comparison of the expenditures incurred by the NATO nations for their armed forces with those incurred by the Warsaw Pact countries is highly problematical. An exact comparison is rather difficult because many of the facts and figures cannot be reduced to a common denominator. Moreover, the budgets of the Warsaw Pact nations reflect merely part of their expenditure, as a lump sum, without any breakdown. The problems of relating the official rates of exchange to real purchasing power, add even further to the difficulty of comparisons.

II. THE ALLIANCE

NATO's Concept of Defence

The validity of NATO's concept of defence remains unchanged.

The most recent occasion when this was confirmed was when the ministerial guidance for NATO planning for the period from 1977 to 1982 was drawn up.

The effectiveness of this concept depends on the balance of the three elements supporting it – conventional, tactical nuclear and strategic nuclear forces. None of these elements can be replaced by another. NATO must be capable of deterring aggression at any level and, if need be, counter it effectively. This requires sufficiently strong conventional forces, especially in the light of the forward defence concept. Therefore, the Federal Government supports all measures suitable to maintain and improve the conventional defence capability of NATO. This is the perspective in which our new force structure and the modernisation of essential weapon systems of the Federal Armed Forces, as well as the deployment of another two US brigades in Central Europe, must be seen.

Tactical nuclear weapons, forming the link between the conventional and strategic components, confront an aggressor with an unacceptable risk. The planned modernisation of these weapons will provide options for gradual response – and is consistent with NATO's strategy. In this field the Federal Republic of Germany makes its contribution by providing nuclear delivery vehicles and by cooperating in the Nuclear Planning Group of NATO. This allows German interests to be represented effectively within the Alliance.

An important element of NATO's deterrent capabilities is constituted by the strategic nuclear forces. The modernisation of strategic weapons and the development of selective strategic options emphasise the fact that the United States is determined to maintain the credibility of this element of the deterrent. As we have found, new weapons technologies will not lead to fundamental changes in NATO strategy, but are capable of broadening the spectrum of flexible response.

The Political State of the Alliance

The Atlantic Alliance has proved its mettle. But, this fact must not distract from the present problems confronting the Alliance in the political, economic and military spheres. These problems, most of which originate outside the area of responsibility of the Federal Republic of Germany and cannot be influenced by it, have to be taken seriously.

The conflict over Cyprus does not only put a strain on the relationship between Greece and Turkey. It is also fraught with risks to the military-strategic position of NATO in the Mediterranean. The announced withdrawal of Greece from NATO's integrated military structure and the notice of termination of the use of US bases in Turkey are added uncertainties. In the forthcoming negotiations be-

tween NATO and Greece on continued military co-operation and between the United States and Turkey on the problem of military bases, attempts will be made to find solutions that will not change the strategic situation on the southern flank of the Alliance to its disadvantage.

In spite of the decision to reduce its forces, the United Kingdom will continue its presence in the Mediterranean and its participation in NATO exercises. The French decision to strengthen its naval forces in the Mediterranean is a valuable contribution, because it strengthens the Western forces, although the French navy is not part of the integrated military structure of NATO.

On the whole, the political situation prevailing in the Mediterranean entails risks to Western security. The allies must be prepared to take such action within their capabilities as will contribute to the stabilisation of the political, economic and military conditions in that region.

The Federal Government will continue to pursue its policy of a well-balanced approach to the Cyprus crisis and of granting economic and military aid to both Greece and Turkey. The Federal Government will bring to bear its influence to achieve a strengthening of defences on the southern flank and will support appropriate measures within the limits of its capabilities.

The security of the free nations of the West is also influenced by economic difficulties that may result in a restriction of defence capabilities. Social and political instability are able to endanger internal security. These interrelations were pointed out by the Federal Chancellor at the NATO summit meeting held on 30 May, 1975. In addition, dependence on energy and raw material imports from third countries is fraught with dangers to the security of the European NATO nations. Therefore both economic stability and an assured energy and raw material supply are essential to internal and external security.

The Federal Government supports co-ordinated efforts of the Western industrialised countries aimed at solving these problems. In doing so, the Federal Government's guiding principles are co-operation and equitable consideration of the interests of the developing countries, as well as of its own. The Federal Government has therefore repeatedly presented positive proposals, the most recent one at the *United Nations General Assembly's seventh special session*.

The energy policy pursued by the Federal Government also takes into account the changed basic situation in the world's energy markets. The Federal Government supports the development of a common energy policy by the European Community, the adoption of common positions by the EEC countries in their dialogue with the developing countries about energy, raw material and development

problems, and therefore took part in the preparation of the International Energy Programme and the establishment of the International Energy Agency under the OECD.

Co-operation within the Alliance

Developments in the economic sphere have brought about an intensification of the efforts at rationalisation, standardisation and unification of tactical and operational concepts, which have been underway within NATO. The goal of all these efforts is a more effective utilisation of available resources and an improvement in the conventional defence capability of the Alliance.

In the field of co-operative development, production and procurement of defence equipment, the Federal Republic of Germany has made particular efforts to foster co-operation among the NATO allies. This has resulted in almost all significant weapons systems designed for the Federal Armed Forces being developed and provided under bilateral or multilateral co-operation agreements, and in more than 50 percent of our research and development funds being spent on projects based on international co-operation.

The Federal Government has encouraged such equipment collaboration as has been going on in the EUROGROUP. This form of collaboration will, however, not be sufficient in the future. The objective is for the countries concerned to co-ordinate research, development and introduction of defence equipment. It is only in this way that decisive cost savings can be achieved. In the procurement of American and European defence equipment it should be sought to arrive at a good balance. At the same time, it must be sought to develop a procedure of equipment collaboration within Europe and also with the United States, which will co-ordinate not only isolated projects but complete programmes, so as to ensure equal industrial participation, job security and preservation or extension of the available technical know-how in the long-run. Rationalisation and standardisation are long-term processes. Action taken today, will not result in a marked relief before the Eighties.

European Defence Co-operation

Any progress towards European union and the associated development of a collective European foreign policy, would remain incomplete if the aspects of European security and defence were not included. But, in the foreseeable future, Western European security can only be safeguarded by the Atlantic Alliance. Therefore, European defence can only be built as a European pillar within the Alliance. Nothing must be left undone to achieve progress towards European defence co-operation. At present, attempts to this end are being made in many ways at bilateral and multilateral levels, especially in the EUROGROUP in whose work the Federal Republic of

Germany takes an active part.

In principle, the Federal Government advocates establishment of a European Institute for matters of strategy, security and defence policy. The Federal Government feels, however, that such an institute – side by side with the existing institutes in Europe – would only hold out prospects of being an asset, if it were established conjointly with the development of European co-operation in defence policy and were then funded by all European countries. In view of the present conceptual, organisational and financial difficulties, however, the establishment of such an institute appears problematical and premature.

German-French Co-operation in Defence Policy

German-French relations in security and defence matters are based on the German-French Agreement of 1963 and the German-French Administrative Agreement on the stationing of French forces in Germany, concluded in 1966. Co-operation with France is close and diversified. It is maintained by periodic exchanges of opinion at top-level and continual contacts between the respective ministers of defence, periodic general staff talks, mutual exchanges of military units, participation of students in each other's military courses, joint exercises and affiliation between German and French units.

France is, next to the United States, the most important partner of the Federal Republic of Germany in equipment collaboration. In co-operative weapon development, France ranks second to none as a partner among our allies. The present possibilities of bilateral defence co-operation are fully exploited. The Federal Government follows with interest the discussion on defence policy going on in France and strives to arrive at a further rapprochement in regard to the security policy concept.

III. UNDERSTANDING OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

The citizens' will of self-preservation and their readiness to defend themselves are requisite to an effective defence. The vast majority of our citizens understand the broad context in which defence policy must be seen. The Federal Government will, however, continue its efforts at fostering understanding of national defence. The main task of a pertinent public relations exercise will continue to be the explanation of the mission assigned to the Federal Armed Forces in the German Constitution. According to Article 87 (a) of our Basic Law, the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany are exclusively designed for defence purposes. Restriction to defence is the constitutionally necessary complement to the ban on preparations for aggressive war, laid down in Paragraph 1 of Article 26 of the Basic Law. The structure of the *Federal Armed Forces* is therefore in keeping with these constitutional principles. Their training and equipment are also governed exclusively by these principles.

IV. SECURITY IN A WORLD OF CHANGE³

Interdependence and Collaboration

Together with other peoples and nations of the world, the Federal Republic of Germany is confronted by *challenges* which all countries will have to meet together and in unison. Political unrest, ideological controversy and warped economic developments may threaten peace. The *interdependence* between countries with differing social and economic structures has increased. In that fact lie opportunities and hazards. Strong bonds of dependence can promote peaceful co-operation on a world-wide scale, but they can also plunge countries into conflicts in other regions. Politically, militarily and economically, the Federal Republic of Germany is interdependent with other countries. Its external security is guaranteed only in the Western Alliance. Its economic stability – a prerequisite to external security – depends upon the economic development of its partners in trade, upon open export markets and upon an adequate supply of energy and raw materials.

It is not only the supply of energy and raw materials which persuades the Western industrial nations to collaborate with the countries of the Third World. *Collaboration* is at the same time a means of settling political conflicts without violence and of reducing tension. Collaboration must take the form of a just balancing of interests. Security is not limited to the military aspect, but depends more and more upon economic decisions and developments. However, foreign policy and economic policy are props of security; they cannot be a substitute for the ability of a country to defend itself.

Efforts at Détente

The NATO countries continue their *efforts at détente* with a view to improving relations with the East. But progress with negotiations is slow. Meanwhile, the military effectiveness of the Warsaw Pact is growing, with particular emphasis placed on the Soviet Union's maritime power and its acquisition of naval bases. The balance of military forces between West and East therefore remains indispensable if there is to be a stable international order. The security situation and discernible tendencies confirm the need to maintain the Alliance, and, with it, the ability to deter aggression and defend ourselves.

Structures, potentials, strategies and possibilities, of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, are decisive *factors influencing security* in Europe. The peace and security of the world and, by no means least, of our own country depend upon the balance of power between the two

³ This is a number of excerpts and highlights, with minor editorial changes, from the 1975/76 White Paper on "The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces". It is reproduced from *The Bulletin*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (27 January, 1976), issued by the Press and Information Office of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

alliance systems being retained. Yet, the two alliances appear to have certain things in common: two superior world powers are protecting, in their own interest, a group of medium and small countries in Eastern and Western Europe which, if left to themselves, would be unable to maintain the balance of power and to assure their own security.

The White Paper analyses the two alliance systems with regard to their differing structures, ideologies, societies and defence motivation. The policies of the Warsaw Pact and NATO are compared, leading, in turn, to statements related to military strategies, a general comparison of capabilities and a comparison of military forces.

However, the *leading roles* played by the United States and the Soviet Union and the positions of their respective allies, are vastly different. In its relations with its allies, the Soviet Union cracks the political, ideological and military whip. On several occasions, the Soviet Union has used military force to enforce its claim to hegemony. The United States, however, is the leading power in an alliance of countries with pronounced autonomy in respect of domestic and foreign policies, and with democratic changes of government on the basis of free elections – countries which politically are extremely multifarious. The sovereign freedom of decision of the parties to the Alliance is a boon that is protected by NATO, but also a weak point with which the Alliance repeatedly has to cope.

In democratic countries there is a multiplicity of contending ideas; various philosophies exist side by side; there are conflicts; and even in questions of defence opinions differ. This multiplicity is opposed by an inflexible system of state and society in the group of communist countries.

In every country belonging to the Warsaw Pact, *defence motivation and defence readiness* play an essential role in the ideologically uniform indoctrination of society and armed forces. Military thinking pervades state and society. The liberal democratic order which is the trade-mark of the state structure and system of society of our country, does not acknowledge or accept any form of militarisation. Defence preparedness in a liberal democratic state is based upon harmony between the citizen and the basic order of his country. Hatred for an enemy is not a defence motive. Defence readiness which evolves from the solidarity of free citizens is more reliable than the will to fight, that is prompted by coercion and propaganda.

The *policy of the Soviet Union* and the Warsaw Pact clings to communist ideology and to traditional power and security interests. Besides being marked by a consolidation of its own area and the urge

towards economic and technological progress through "peaceful co-existence", the policy of the Warsaw Pact is characterised by efforts to delay, for as long as possible, the accretion of the West European countries to a unified entity capable of acting in concert, and to reduce the influence of the United States in Europe.

NATO Policy

NATO policy continues unchanged along the lines resolved by the NATO Ministers of Defence in 1967, when they stated that the Atlantic Alliance had two main functions. The first is, to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure, and to defend the territory of the member states in the event of aggression. The Alliance considers its second function to be to continue the search for progress in the direction of lasting relations conducive to solving fundamental political problems. Military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory, but rather mutually complementary.

The salient feature of *military-strategic thought in the Soviet command* is the conviction that, in any military conflict with NATO, a strategic offensive must be the basis of Soviet operations. Proceeding from the principle that, in the event of war, a decisive victory can be scored over the main enemy only with offensive tactics, the command doctrines and the strength, order of battle and training of the Warsaw Pact forces are of an offensive nature.

NATO's military strategy aims at maintaining peace through deterrence, and, in the event of war, at depriving aggression of success through the medium of defence. Deterrence calls for powerful forces and the manifest political will to use them for defence purposes. NATO's ability and will to defend itself are the elements of a credible deterrence. NATO's deterrent strategy calls for a balanced structure of the deterrent potential: conventional, tactical nuclear and strategic nuclear weapons. No single component in this triad can replace another. Its deterrent effect depends upon the escalatory interlinkage of all three components.

The strategy of *flexible response* demands that NATO at the same time be capable of using each component of the triad individually, and of maintaining the compound of all three components by preparedness to escalate. Gapless deterrence is impossible without the final stage of escalation, viz. the threat to use strategic nuclear weapons. Conventional defence forces alone – especially in the light of the balance of power in Europe – would limit the risk to an attacker.

The relative force capabilities of NATO and the Warsaw Pact are discussed in greater detail than in previous White Papers. It is concluded that security is not merely a question of military forces.

Rather every factor, every resource and every possibility available to a potential attacker and a defender must be taken into account.

Power is also determined by space, by the geostrategic position, by economic capabilities, and by human and technical performances and ability. A comparison of *military potentials* records the forces and capabilities of the Warsaw Pact and arrays them against our own. What is compared are measurable factors, above all figures and not intentions, upon which no reliable statement is possible. Intentions can change. What is important is what the Warsaw Pact can do, not what it wants to do. This comparison of forces is by no means an indicator of whether the balance of military power, upon which our security rests, is in flux or stable.

Objectives

The objective of security policy is to preserve peace and the integrity of our territory, to safeguard the freedom of the people and to ensure the Federal Government's political freedom of action. This also means being able and prepared to ward off political blackmail and defend the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Germany by armed force, if need be.

The basic principles of security policy are identical with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. These objectives are:

- To preserve world peace and international security, and to prevent and eliminate threats jeopardising peace;
- To develop friendly relations among nations, based on the acknowledged equal status and the right of self-determination of all peoples; and
- To resolve, through co-operation, international problems of a political, economic, social, cultural and humanitarian nature.

The external security of our country is assured by virtue of its membership of the Atlantic Alliance. Without the Alliance, peace would not be safeguarded. That is why our security policy is, first and foremost, *Alliance policy*. Membership of NATO has first priority. Together with the other parties to the Alliance, the Federal Republic of Germany joins in all international efforts that promote détente.

The White Paper describes in detail the significance of the United States' political and military commitment to Europe, examines the role of the European members of the Alliance including France, and draws attention to the contemporary problems and difficulties besetting NATO. Special importance is attached to the issue of equipment collaboration within the Alliance.

The North Atlantic Council agreed, in December 1975, to set in motion Alliance-wide *equipment collaboration*. As proposed by *EUROGROUP*, moreover, possibilities of an increased measure of equipment collaboration by European countries are to be examined – and transatlantic dialogue is to be prepared – by an independent working party, in which France has been invited to participate.

In the *European Community*, the Federal Republic of Germany, as a partner of the eight other member nations, seeks to foster closer economic co-operation. As a result of the co-operation of the West European nations in the spheres of security and defence, the Federal Government expects a strengthening of transatlantic partnership and of Western security in future.

European security policy can reach true effectiveness only when it is pursued by a unified Europe. For the time being, only small steps in that direction are possible. In the meantime, *EUROGROUP* will continue to be a serviceable instrument of European co-operation. Its activities are paving the road that leads towards the realisation of a European security and defence policy within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. But, even a politically unified Europe will have to rely on the protection afforded by the strategic nuclear potential of the United States of America.

The White Paper goes on to describe *détente* as a process which is to lead from *confrontation* to *co-operation* and to peaceful co-existence.

However, the differing vantage points and ideological designs of East and West mark the extent to which *détente* is possible. The Federal Government is aware of the risk involved, namely that *efforts at détente* may be taken for *détente* itself. The Federal Government observes that a strong defence capability is, and will continue to be, the foundation from which steps towards *détente* might be promising. International efforts at *détente* have led to the adoption of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki. Through its *Ostpolitik*, the Federal Republic of Germany contributed decisively to this positive development in Europe.

CSCE

The *Final Act of the CSCE* is not a binding international treaty, but rather a joint declaration of intent.

Giving heed to the interests of our country, the European Community and the North Atlantic Alliance, it is important to note the following:

- CSCE does not perpetuate the *status quo* in Europe nor does it prejudice a peaceful solution to the German Question or to European unification;

- the solidarity of the parties to the European Community and to NATO withstood an important test;
- CSCE gives evidence that the United States of America and Canada have a political role to play in Europe; and
- the complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security has been expressly acknowledged.

The Federal Government attaches a great deal of political weight to these confidence-building measures. This was demonstrated when our government, as a party to CSCE, took the initiative and notified of the annual autumn manoeuvres, as stipulated in the Final Act. Furthermore, the Federal Government invited all parties to CSCE to send observers to attend exercise CERTAIN TREK in Bavaria. None of the Warsaw Pact governments replied to the invitation. The Vienna *MBFR negotiations* between NATO nations and the Warsaw Pact have – not unexpectedly – been exceedingly difficult, because the parties negotiate from diametrically opposed positions.

NATO aims at achieving parity in strength of ground forces in the area of reductions, in order to give greater stability to the military situation in the centre of Europe. The *Warsaw Pact* proposal aims at an equal reduction, first in quantitative and then in percentage terms, of ground and air forces and nuclear delivery units in central Europe, with a view to enshrining, in an international agreement, its present military superiority in this region.

In December 1975, the NATO countries agreed to present important *additional proposals* in Vienna, which included a limited number of US nuclear armaments in first phase reductions. In making this unique offer, the NATO nations expect and presuppose that the Warsaw Pact would now agree to the aim of approximate parity in ground forces and the reduction of disparity in armour strength.

The Federal Government will resolutely continue to exploit every promising chance of détente, in order to gain greater security. A policy of détente is, however, a time-consuming process which must be pursued with perseverance and a sharp eye to opportunities and risks. There is no reasonable alternative to this policy.

Under the general heading *The Future Development of the Bundeswehr*, the second part of the White Paper deals with the subjects of the armed forces as an instrument of security policy, and the serviceman in his vocational and social environment.

From the task of the *Bundeswehr*, the military strategic conditions, the areas of operation, and the projected threat, it is concluded what the army, air force and navy must and can accomplish, and what types of weapons and equipment they need to enable them to accomplish their task. A separate chapter in the White Paper is devoted to the subject of equipment planning. The White Paper also emphasises the defensive character of the armed forces, which

is evidenced by the personnel strength, organisation, equipment and training of the *Bundeswehr* as stipulated under the provisions of the Basic Law.

The New Force Structure

The *new force structure* is tailored to the threat from the Warsaw Pact and is consistent with the principles of NATO strategy. It will eliminate weaknesses, take due account of technological progress and increase the combat effectiveness of the armed forces. Major changes include the restructuring of the Army forces, the adoption of the standby readiness system and the centralisation of functions common to all services.

The key element of the new Army structure will be the brigade. It will continue to be the mainstay of forward defence. Since 1 April, 1975, three new armoured brigades have been in process of activation, which will raise the number of brigades in the Army from 33 to 36. This will meet a long-standing commitment to and strengthen the conventional posture of NATO. The 36 brigades of the Army will include 17 armoured infantry and *Jäger* (mechanised infantry) brigades, 16 armoured brigades and three airborne brigades.

In addition to activating the three new armoured brigades, two of the present brigades will be reorganised in accordance with the Armoured Infantry Brigade 80 model. (The Brigade 80 will have a larger number of combat companies and battalions.) Following their activation or reorganisation these five model brigades will be subject to a one-year field trial.

The duration of the *field trial* and the number of model brigades to be tested, is to ensure that the eventual decision as to the kind of organisation to be adopted for all brigades will be placed on a sound footing. The principal objective of the reorganisation of the brigades is to enhance their operational readiness and combat effectiveness without mobilising. With its new organisational structure and the new home defence forces, the units of the Army will have a larger number of main battle tanks, artillery pieces and anti-tank missile systems, than they have at present.

On 24 January, 1975, the *Bundestag* unanimously passed the Ninth Amendment to the National Military Service Act, introduced by the Federal Government. It came into force on 1 January, 1976. The Amendment introduces a *standby readiness system* to replace the former three-month ready reserve service. Under this system, conscripts that have completed basic military service, and discharged short-service volunteers, may be subjected to a twelve-month standby readiness obligation. The standby readiness system ensures provision of an ample pool of trained personnel, from which to augment units to full strength.

BRIEF REPORT

GLOBAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES REACH AN ALLTIME HIGH

While the rate of growth of military expenditures has been decelerating in the developed countries since 1969, it has, in contrast, been accelerating in the Third World. In 1974 world military expenditures exceeded \$315 billion compared to about \$280 billion in 1973, nearly \$235 billion in 1970 and approximately \$160 billion in 1965. According to the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) report entitled "World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1965-1974", the world *gross national product* (GNP) in 1974 amounted to about \$5 trillion, of which roughly 6 percent was spent on military expenditures. Of the \$315 billion 1974 total, the developed countries accounted for \$260 billion and the developing countries \$55 billion. This compares to the developed countries' spending \$142 billion in 1965 and the developing countries over \$17,5 billion. The rate of growth of military expenditures has thus been slowing down in the developed countries and increasing in the Third World.

While the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) countries – consisting of the United States, Canada, West Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal, Greece and Turkey – in 1974 spent \$135,5 billion as against \$79 billion in 1965, the military expenditures of the Warsaw Pact countries – the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria – reached nearly \$119 billion in 1974 compared to approximately \$60 billion in 1965. The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) – made up of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Gabon, Libya, Nigeria, Indonesia, Ecuador and Venezuela – markedly increased their military spending, from \$1,8 billion in 1965 to a record high of \$13 billion in 1974. This significant increase was substantially attributable to OPEC countries in the Middle East. Latin America's military expenditures increased from \$1,82 billion in 1965 to \$4,79 billion in 1974; Africa's from \$0,93 billion to \$3,75 billion; and Asia's military spending showed the same accelerating pattern – rising to \$28,55 billion in 1974 from \$11,71 billion in 1965.

The Soviet Union remained the country with the largest military expenditures – \$103 billion in 1974 as against \$52,4 billion in 1965. The United States was second with nearly \$85 billion in 1974 compared to \$51,8 billion in 1965. Comparative figures are: for West Germany, from \$7,7 billion in 1965 to \$13,8 billion in 1974; China, from \$6,5 billion to \$17 billion; France, from \$6,1 billion to \$10,6 billion; and the United Kingdom, from \$5,9 billion in 1965 to \$10,1

billion in 1974. The country that experienced the largest military expenditure increase between 1965 and 1974 was probably Iran – rising from \$347 million to \$5,28 billion, thereby becoming the world's seventh largest military spender.

Among the developing countries, India's military expenditures rose from \$1,47 billion in 1965 to \$2,4 billion in 1974; Pakistan increased its military spending from \$357 million to \$631 million; Nigeria, from \$86 million to \$850 million; Brazil, from \$550 million to \$1,9 billion; Egypt, from \$479 million to \$2,1 billion; and Saudi Arabia, from \$102 million in 1965 to \$1,45 billion in 1974. After Italy, Israel ranked ninth in military expenditures – increasing from \$269 million in 1965 to \$3,84 billion in 1974. In terms of percentage of GNP devoted to military expenditures, it is estimated that Israel spent over 35 percent of its GNP in 1974 on armaments – the world's highest, followed by North Vietnam, over 22 percent and Egypt, about 20 percent.

The total value of arms transferred from country to country declined from a high of \$9,55 billion in 1973 to \$9,23 billion in 1974, of which the developed countries' share amounted to \$8,76 billion and that of the developing countries \$463 million. The major arms supplier in 1974 was the United States – its sales reaching a level of \$4,16 billion or 45 percent of the worldwide total. The Soviet Union was the second largest supplier of armaments – \$2,8 billion or 30 percent; followed by France, \$561 million or 6 percent; the United Kingdom, \$463 million or 5 percent; China, \$322 million or 3 percent; and West Germany, \$233 million or 2 percent. Sweden exported \$37 million worth of arms in 1974 and Switzerland exported \$23 million. During the period 1965–1974 arms transfers totalled over \$64 billion. The developed countries received in excess of \$17,8 billion and the developing countries \$46,5 billion.

The total armed forces throughout the world reached 25 740 000 of which there were over 10 million in uniform in the developed countries and 15,6 million in developing countries. The armed forces of the Soviet Union – the largest in the world – increased from 3 320 000 in 1970 to 3 940 000 in 1974. Those of China increased during the same period from 2 850 000 to 3 360 000 (not including paramilitary forces); and the armed forces of the United States, in contrast, declined from 3 070 000 to 2 170 000.

INSTITUTE STUDY GROUPS

The Institute has made a significant start in the last two years with the establishment of Study Groups composed of members from the academic, business and other professional sectors. These groups are a means of fostering the Institute's function of study and research in the international relations field.

One group is engaged in a study of the role of the international (multinational) corporation in the world, with particular reference to South Africa (the chairman is Professor J. Poolman of the Rand Afrikaans University). Flowing from the discussions of this group, several occasional papers have been published by the Institute: a *Select Bibliography on the Multinational Corporation*, compiled by Peter Vale and Gail Rogaly; *The Multinational Corporation: An Introduction*, by Peter Vale; and *The Multinational Corporation: A Lawyer's View*, by Dr. George Barrie. Further study by the group will be based on data currently being assembled, concerning the involvement of international corporations in the South African economy.

A second Study Group is concerned with the international implications of Homeland independence (the chairman is Professor John Dugard of the University of the Witwatersrand). In view of the wide-ranging nature of the subject, this group includes representatives from as many disciplines and relevant professions as possible, with a cross-section of political viewpoints. Specialists in particular fields are also invited, from time to time, to assist with aspects of the group's work. So far, the group has concentrated on aspects of the Transkei's forthcoming independence. Working papers already discussed at meetings of the group include: *The Implications of Transkeian Independence*, by Otto Krause, Professor P.J. Nieuwenhuizen and C.J. van der Merwe (published as an occasional paper); *Agriculture in a Developing Country: The Case of the Transkei*, by Elize Moody; and *A Developing Economic Nexus in Southern Africa: The Relationship between South Africa and the Transkei*. In addition, a discussion was held on the Transkei Constitution, especially as regards the sensitive issue of Transkei citizenship. An important task of this group has also been to give advice on the programme for the Institute's November conference in Umtata on *The Transkei: International Implications of Independence*.

It is intended that further Study Groups will gradually be established to deal either with special projects or with international questions of on-going concern. For instance, a special research project on South African/United States relations has recently been launched by the Institute, and as part of this project a study group will shortly be formed. Other examples of subjects for research by groups in future are strategic questions affecting South Africa (e.g. the Republic's role in the Indian Ocean area, and Soviet and Chinese strategies in Africa) and economic and other aspects of interstate relations within the Southern African region.

Denis Venter
Assistant Director

THE JAN SMUTS HOUSE LIBRARY

The function of the Institute's Library at Jan Smuts House is to provide material for the study of international affairs – encompassing its political and economic facets together with pertinent information on the internal situation in different countries, which is important to the understanding of their foreign policies.

The main emphasis in this Library is on Africa – in its political, social and economic contexts. However, the only material purchased on the Republic of South Africa is that relating to its foreign policy and external relations with the rest of the world. (This includes some material on Homeland development.) Gubbin's Library on the Campus of the University of the Witwatersrand specialises in South Africa and, in this way, unnecessary duplication is avoided. No historical Africana is purchased. Other areas of specialisation include the foreign relations of as many countries as possible; the theory of international relations; and broad topics, such as population, pollution, strategic studies, environment and development.

Since its inception in 1934, and particularly since the establishment of Jan Smuts House in 1960 as a centre for international studies, the Library has increased its collection of monographs to some 9 000. In addition, the serial publications form an important part of the Library. At present there are approximately 250 subscriptions to current journals, and about 160 Government publications are received regularly. An accessions list is compiled quarterly. The extensive pamphlet collection and the Institute's press cuttings files are used frequently as additional sources of information.

Since January 1972, the Library has been administered in co-operation with the University of the Witwatersrand. Its staff comprises the Librarian, an assistant and a part-time Librarian who is responsible for the valuable collection of United Nations material. Until 1970, this Library enjoyed the status of a limited UN depository library, which meant that all official records of the major United Nations bodies were received gratis. Unfortunately, due to a UN economy drive, this arrangement was discontinued and the Institute is now required to purchase UN records. Recently the University agreed that Jan Smuts House Library, because of its international orientation, should become the International Organisations Centre on the Campus. Consequently, all League of Nations, United Nations, OECD, FAO, UNESCO, etc. material is housed here.

Apart from the library at the Department of Foreign Affairs in Pretoria, the Library at Jan Smuts House is unique in South Africa in its specialisation on international relations. Corporate and individual members of the Institute are reminded that this material is at their disposal and that reference queries are welcomed.

Hours: 08h30–13h00

14h00–17h00

(Closed on Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays)

Loan Period: 2 weeks

Maximum Number of Books: 4

An extensive press cuttings collection is maintained by the Institute in Jan Smuts House. Although not part of the Library, it forms an invaluable adjunct to the Library's services, and it is available for the use of Institute members. This collection covers mainly South African foreign policy and relations with other countries in Africa and throughout the world, but it also includes a series on the foreign policies of other countries, especially the major powers, and on the development of the South African Homelands.

Jackie Kalley

Librarian

RECENT ACQUISITIONS IN THE LIBRARY AT JAN SMUTS HOUSE
ONLANGSE AANWINSTE IN DIE BIBLIOTEEK TE JAN SMUTS-HUIS

- Adie, W.A.C., *Oil, Politics and Seapower: The Indian Ocean Vortex*. Crane, Russak, 1975.
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OCCASIONAL PAPERS/GELEENTHEIDSPUBLIKASIES

Select Bibliography on the Multinational Corporation. Compiled by Peter C.J. Vale and Gail Rogaly.

The Multinational Corporation: An Introduction, Peter C.J. Vale.

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South African Foreign Policy in Today's World, Professor J.E. Spence.

"Reserves" as a Leading Indicator to Future Mineral Production, Dr. W.C.J. van Rensburg.

South West Africa and the United Nations, South African Letter addressed to the UN Secretary-General, on 27 January, 1976.

"Namibia and Human Rights": A Report on the Dakar Conference and its Implications for the South West Africa Issue and Détente, Professor John Dugard.

South West Africa/Namibia: A Symposium, Professor J. D. van der Vyver, Professor John Dugard and J.H.P. Serfontein.

The Angolan Conflict: Internal and International Aspects, John Barratt.

The European Economic Community: A Guide to the Game of Marbles, Peter C.J. Vale.

The Implications of Transkeian Independence, Otto Krause, Professor P.J. Nieuwenhuizen and C.J. van der Merwe.

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Dr. Moynihan and the Amalekites: The United States and the United Nations, Professor Ronald Ballinger.

An Anatomy of Chinese-American Relations, Professor James C. Thomson, Jr.

The price of all the abovementioned papers is 50 cents per copy. Members of the Institute may request copies of occasional papers free of charge, provided that such requests are received within a reasonable time after the papers have been issued.

BOOKS, CONFERENCE/SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS AND REFERENCE DOCUMENTATION

BOEKE, KONFERENSIE-/SYMPOSIUMVERRIGTINGE EN NASLAANDOKUMENTASIE

International Aspects of Overpopulation, Macmillan, London, 1972.

Edited by John Barratt and Michael Louw. (This volume is based on the proceedings of a Conference at Jan Smuts House, in June 1970.) Price: R6,00.

Accelerated Development in Southern Africa, Macmillan, London, 1974.

Edited by John Barratt, Simon Brand, David Collier and Kurt Glaser. (This volume is based on the proceedings of a Conference

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- Strategy for Development*, Macmillan, London, 1976. Edited by John Barratt, David Collier, Kurt Glaser and Herman Mönnig. (This volume is based on the proceedings of a Conference at Jan Smuts House, in December 1974.) Price: R15,00 if ordered from the Institute.
- Education for Development*, SAIIA, Johannesburg, 1974. Edited by David Hirschmann and Brian Rose. Price: R2,50.
- International Relations in Southern Africa*, SAIIA, Johannesburg, 1974. Edited by Denis Venter. (Revised proceedings of a Symposium organised by the Pretoria Branch of the Institute, in June 1973.) Price: R1,00.
- South West Africa and the International Court: Two Viewpoints on the 1971 Advisory Opinion*, SAIIA, Johannesburg, 1974. Professor John Dugard and Advocate E. M. Grosskopf (with an introduction by Professor Marinus Wiechers and a foreword by Advocate D. P. de Villiers).
- South Africa and the Future of World Energy Resources*, SAIIA, Johannesburg, 1975. Edited by John Barratt. (Revised proceedings of a Symposium held in Cape Town, in September 1974.) Price: R2,50.
- South Africa in the World: Political and Strategic Realities*, SAIIA, Johannesburg, 1976. Edited by Denis Venter. (Revised proceedings of a Symposium organised by the Pretoria Branch of the Institute, in June 1975.) Price: R2,50.
- Questions affecting South Africa at the United Nations 1973*, SAIIA, Johannesburg, 1975. Compiled by John Barratt, Peter Vale and Gail Rogaly. (Proceedings of the Security Council and the General Assembly - 28th Session.) Price: R1,00.
- Southern Africa Record*, Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 in series. (Number 6 to be issued shortly.) Contains the text of official policy statements on international relations in Southern Africa. Price: R1,50 per copy - Number Five and subsequent issues. (Previous lithographed issues - Numbers One to Four - can be obtained at R1,00 per copy.)

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