

NEWSLETTER SAIIA NUSUSBRIEF

THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

NOT TO BE REMOVED



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DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE
THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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The Newsletter is supplied free of charge to members of the Institute. Copies are available on request (75 cents per copy).

Die Nuusbrief word gratis aan lede van die Instituut verskaf. Kopieë is op aanvraag beskikbaar (75 sent per kopie).

DIRECTOR'S NOTES

THE INSTITUTE'S FUNCTIONS

We are often asked by foreign visitors and interested South Africans what the functions of the Institute are, and there may even be many of our members who are not familiar with all the various aspects of the Institute's work. It may be useful, therefore, to give here a break-down of the Institute's functions in the form of eight brief headings of the general areas of the Institute's activities. These are: branch activities; research; publications; library services; conferences; visitors and private meetings; external contact and exchange; and extension activities (which include the area of public education, the provision of information and press relations). Further information about any of these functions can be obtained by members – corporate and individual – from the Institute.

The function which is in the most critical need of development is that of *research*. Given the current developments in Southern Africa and in our relations with the rest of the world, there is an obvious and urgent need for more in-depth research and critical analysis of numerous aspects of our external relations, on a non-partisan and non-ideological basis, than is at present being done in South Africa. The Institute's ability to contribute more constructively to this essential work is limited only by the lack of the necessary financial resources. Special attention is, however, now being given to the matter, and it is hoped that it will not be long before an effective and well-planned research programme can be launched and that it will receive the support it deserves.

An area of the Institute's activities which has grown dramatically in recent years is that of discussions with *foreign visitors* at Jan Smuts House, which has become an important centre of contact and exchange. During 1976, for instance, 164 visitors to South Africa from 13 foreign countries have held discussions at Jan Smuts House on external relations and the implications of internal developments. They were all authorities in their various fields, and included political leaders, diplomats, businessmen, academics and journalists.

BRANCH ACTIVITIES

All eight branches of the Institute have continued to meet during the past year to hear addresses by an impressive variety of visiting and local speakers. While some of the branches in the larger centres have been more easily able to arrange regular monthly meetings than the smaller branches, all local chairmen, secretaries and executive members are to be congratulated on their efforts to promote the Institute's work throughout the country. A great debt of gratitude is

owed to these local officers of the Institute, who all serve in honorary capacities, and who so willingly give of their time and energy to the Institute.

It is hoped to publish in the next issue of the *Newsletter* a full list of all branch meetings held in 1976.

TRANSKEI CONFERENCE

The Institute's conference on "International Implications of the Independence of Transkei" (24 to 27 November, 1976) was attended by approximately 140 participants from within Southern Africa and abroad. Twenty-four prepared papers on the various topics were presented by a wide range of Transkeian, South African and overseas authorities, representing numerous academic disciplines and other professions, as well as differing political viewpoints. The programme allowed for as much time as possible for full discussions on the topics, and both the papers and discussions proved most fruitful in identifying and clarifying many issues of importance for Transkei, South Africa and other countries. A brief article in this issue of the *Newsletter* gives some personal impressions gained from the discussion in particular of the issue of recognition of Transkeian independence.

A limited number of copies of the papers presented at the Conference is still available and may be requested from the Institute (at a cost of R5,00 per set). As soon as practicable, the Institute plans to publish a special volume based on the Conference proceedings, which will include revised versions of the papers, as well as full reports on the discussions.

The Institute and all participants are especially grateful to the companies which, through their financial support, made this Conference possible: in particular, Barclays National Bank Ltd., Barlow Rand Ltd. and the South African Breweries Ltd., as well as AECI Ltd., Frankpile SA (Pty) Ltd., Grinaker Holdings Ltd., Reef Lefebvre (Pty) Ltd. and Total SA (Pty) Ltd.

JOHN BERRY

The Institute was saddened by the recent death in Johannesburg of Mr. John Berry who was a member of the Institute from its early years and who served for over twenty-eight years on the Executive of the Witwatersrand Branch. He also represented the Branch for many years on the Institute's National Executive Council. At a meeting of the Council's Administrative Committee on 9 December, John Berry's long and devoted service to the Institute was recalled with deep gratitude.

John Barratt

Director

December 1976



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CURRENT TRENDS IN SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY

J. E. Spence

In January 1975, the *détente* exercise was in full swing. Mr. Smith was under considerable pressure to come to a settlement with the forces of African nationalism; Mr. Vorster's reputation stood high among Western decision-makers as they recognised that his co-operation was vital, if meaningful change was to be effected in Rhodesia. There was talk then of the possibility of disengagement from Namibia, although this assumed that South Africa's objective in Rhodesia would be realised in a way acceptable to the white electorate in the Republic. There was also the widespread assumption that the success or cultivation of *détente* abroad would require a price in domestic terms, namely a clear and purposeful commitment to move away from the existing pattern and structure of race relations in the Republic (e.g. Mr. Vorster's famous speech in the Senate in October 1974, followed by that of Mr. Pik Botha at the United Nations). Thus, it was argued by commentators and analysts that the traditional emphasis on keeping foreign and domestic policy in separate compartments – and this, after all, was a key assumption of the outward movement in the Sixties – would have to undergo significant modification, if not be abandoned altogether.

Throughout those early and heady days, which reached their climax at the Victoria Falls meeting between Mr. Vorster and President Kaunda, one thing that the outside observer was struck by was the Prime Minister's capacity to take his electorate with him on the question of, for example, the desirability of a Rhodesian settlement. Of course, this meant in effect – as everyone knew – an ultimate end to white minority rule in that territory. The role of the Afrikaans press seems to have been crucial, and it may be that one important reason for the support given to Mr. Vorster, across party lines, was the growing conviction among many white South Africans that at last their government appeared capable of playing a positive and useful role in international affairs; a role markedly in contrast with the defensive and negative posture that had characterised its performance in earlier decades.

Of course, there has always been legitimate disagreement among commentators about the motives governing the behaviour of the various protagonists in the *détente* exercise. There are those who argued that the South African government was simply intent on

Professor Spence is head of the Department of Politics at Leicester University in the United Kingdom. He is, *inter alia*, joint editor of the *Journal of Southern African Studies* and editor of the *British Journal of International Studies*. This article is an edited version of a talk given to a meeting of the Witwatersrand Branch of the South African Institute of International Affairs, on 12 August, 1976.

liquidating its external commitments in the face of the radical change that had taken place in the local balance of power – represented by the abdication of power by the Portuguese in their former colonial territories. It was also argued that this policy was really a demonstration of a brutal and rational appreciation of where South Africa's true interests lay. Further it was claimed that disengagement from Rhodesia and Namibia need not imply any commitment to initiate change at home; that the exercise was in effect (so it was claimed) designed as a preliminary to the creation of a garrison state with more secure and defensible borders.

But even if the Government had conceded the desirability of internal change, such change would only occur within the perimeters of existing policy rather than be based on some fundamental reassessment of relations between black and white. Thus it was claimed all that could be expected, if all went well abroad, was an acceleration of homeland development, an easing of restrictions of petty apartheid and perhaps marginal concessions to the urban African. But, in contrast, there were those who argued that the purpose of the détente exercise was to buy time from the signatories to the Lusaka Manifesto. These states, in their capacity as hosts to the liberation movements, were after many years of impotence – thinly disguised by ideological bluster – at last in a position (so it was claimed) to force awkward choices on the Republic with respect to the future of both Namibia and Rhodesia. The argument went that the time bought would be used to implement changes within the Republic, of a kind sufficient to satisfy at least in the short term, those African states with whom it was in the Republic's interest to establish a measure of détente, but possibly entente as well. These states, after all, had much to gain from economic co-operation with the Republic within some wider framework of a regional community; and of course that aspiration was a traditional one, running back in South Africa's foreign policy to the end of World War II.

Finally, a third view of détente came from those who claimed that even if disengagement from Rhodesia and Namibia was successfully achieved, the breathing space afforded the Republic would be minimal as the OAU prepared itself for the final bout of liberation of the "White South" by the traditional methods of revolutionary war.

Now, what then has happened over the last eighteen months and how did the events affect this variety of perceptions of the utility of détente? It seems sensible to begin by looking at the implications of the South African intervention in Angola.

First of all, the Republic's military involvement came as something of a surprise to outside commentators and, no doubt, to South Africans as well. There was, after all, a plausible case for saying at the time – before the intervention took place – that the constraints which operated against military intervention in

Rhodesia, would operate with equal force for other neighbouring territories. Indeed, the most important imperative governing the Republic's policy towards Rhodesia was based on the recognition that intervention there, to prop up an ailing Smith regime, would have counter-productive political and military consequences. Therefore, it seemed reasonable to assume that Pretoria would strictly observe its often expressed commitment to non-interference in the affairs of neighbouring states in much the same way as it greeted the emergence of FRELIMO in Mozambique. In retrospect, one could have argued that an alternative strategy to intervention would have been for South Africa to strengthen its military presence on the Namibian border as the civil war gathered momentum. This, no doubt, would have been objected to by the OAU and radical elements elsewhere, but moderate opinion would hardly have quarrelled with South Africa's need to protect its borders against spill-over from the civil war. However, intervention was decided upon – and it must be made clear that in a sense it is simply attempted to impose some kind of framework on events as they developed at the time – partly because the confused circumstances of a civil war in Angola must have seemed a heaven-sent opportunity to deal with SWAPO bases in the southern part of Angola. Even this degree of intervention, had it stayed at that level, might be described as limited, both with respect to the means employed, the geographical area involved and the objectives sought. But this was rapidly superseded by the wider objective of helping one faction in that war, namely UNITA, to install itself as the government in Luanda.* This was an objective which – although there is obviously no hard evidence for it – met with the approval of the Republic's more moderate partners in the détente exercise. The South Africans came close to the achievement of their objective, but Cuban intervention on a massive scale and the unwillingness of the United States to back up South Africa, forced the latter's withdrawal.

Trying to analyse the implications of this particular intervention, one is inevitably involved in a kind of strategic speculation. It could be argued that the intervention was a classic example of a situation in which the military definition of reality prevailed over political considerations. That in fact, broke the cardinal rules for successful intervention as had been laid down by a host of theorists and practitioners of war, from Clausewitz onwards. In other words, if the use of force is contemplated, then its utility as an instrument of policy depends upon the politician setting himself clear, unambiguous and limited political objectives. Furthermore, as the experience of the great power since World War II amply demonstrates, successful intervention depends not simply on relating military means to political

* *Editorial note:* It would be more true to say that it was the objective of the South African government to get a properly constituted Angolan national coalition government installed in Luanda. This would have included all three movements, namely UNITA, FNLA and MPLA.

ends and on keeping the former subordinate to the latter, but also on the possibility of rapid disengagement once the original objective has been attained.

There are plenty of successful examples of such intervention in the post-war period: the British intervention in Kuwait in 1958; the British intervention in East Africa in 1964; and even the American institution of a blockade on Cuba in 1962. This rubric for successful intervention does provide us with a set of criteria for judging the South African performance in Angola. Even if we discount the view that the politicians were over-impressed by military arguments, on the analogy of Kennedy's experience during the Bay of Pigs fiasco; even if we cast aside, because of lack of evidence, the view that the major reason for the intervention lay in the fact that the structure of civil-military relations had not really been tested since World War II and is therefore liable to miscalculation – as politicians grappled with an unfamiliar problem, namely the conduct of war in a neighbouring territory; even if we cast aside what would otherwise be a very attractive explanation – if anything, because it satisfies the academic's longing for single-cause explanations and his penchant for analogy – these still remain legitimate grounds for criticism.

Let us assume for the sake of argument that the politicians were in control; that the political objective of installing a friendly government in Luanda had been achieved. Can we assume that a defeated MPLA would have accepted the adverse change in its fortunes? Would they not have done precisely what UNITA appears to be doing now, namely taking to the bush – to harass the newly-installed government in its post-war effort to impose not simply physical control across the length and breadth of the territory, but in effect also its efforts to establish itself as legitimate in the eyes of its enemies. It seems there is no point in instituting or installing a friendly government in a neighbouring state by military means, unless one has the means and the commitment to remain; to back up that government's efforts to become legitimate – and this is precisely what the Cubans appear to be doing in post-revolution Angola. The question is: could South Africa have done the same without incurring the wrath of Black Africa and creating political, and indeed military problems, from which it would become progressively difficult to extricate itself? It is rather doubtful, but victory – if this can be defined in the case of Angola – would have been costly and perhaps ultimately self-defeating, giving pertinent evidence to those who have always claimed that apartheid is indeed a threat to international peace and security. Paradoxically, South Africa's withdrawal from Angola perhaps saved it from a worse fate, namely the beginnings – perhaps apocalyptically – of the Vietnamisation of Southern Africa. That is, a situation in which an occupying power desperately struggles to prop up an insecure government, harassed from within and from

without, and denied international legitimacy because of its status as a puppet of the intervening power.

Nevertheless, the consequences of that intervention have had profound implications for the détente policy. One can see why the use of military force seemed attractive at the time. Détente up to that point had been a diplomatic exercise. The civil war in Angola presented the opportunity to back-up the diplomatic offensive with military muscle; to do something for South Africa's partners that they were precluded themselves from doing, namely, deal with the revolutionary movement that might have dangerous inputs into their domestic systems and disturb the delicate balance of power they are in. But in deploying military force, the Republic weakened its capacity to continue to play a constructive diplomatic role in the affairs of Southern Africa. Attention was diverted away from the critical issue of Rhodesia; indeed, Mr. Smith might well have taken comfort from the Angolan episode. He may have been confirmed in his judgment that if the worst happened in Rhodesia and full-scale insurgency developed, Mr. Vorster would ultimately come to his aid. The scepticism of Tanzania and Mozambique towards détente was confirmed and even a moderate leader like Seretse Khama of Botswana could be heard castigating the Republic in distant Peking.

Another consequence was that those African states who might have been expected to be hostile on principle to super-power intervention, in whatever form, quickly swallowed their doubts when the facts of South African involvement became known. Thus, the pursuit of a flexible diplomacy, the essence as it was of détente at its height, has been made immeasurably more difficult, and such allies as South Africa has on the African continent have found the cards stacked against them at the OAU and at the United Nations.

In a famous passage in his classic works on war, Clausewitz, the great German military theorist, talks of war between states as embracing a reciprocal relationship. War, he declares, is an act of violence pushed to its utmost limits as one side dictates the law to the other; there arises a set of reciprocal actions which logically must lead to an extreme. Now, as a little ingenuity doing some injustice to Clausewitz, this proposition can be applied to our subject under discussion. The use of force in Angola has strengthened the hands of those, especially in the liberation movements, who have never doubted that the final solution to the problems of Southern Africa must be by violence. It has weakened by the same token the attempts of the politicians to control the liberation movements. In these circumstances it becomes increasingly difficult for politicians in the region – whether black or white – to keep the diplomatic lines open; to resist pressures from within and without; to define the situation exclusively in military and bellicose terms.

This brings me back to the premise on which détente was originally based, namely the mutual recognition by black and white leaders in the region of the need to redefine their relationships in political and diplomatic terms, rather than persist with seemingly outmoded postures of ideological antagonism and military confrontation, albeit in the vastnesses by proxy in the Zambezi valley. Of course, détente assumed that both sides would stop making threatening noises against each other and more positively, that each would take steps to de-escalate the military struggle building up at that time in Rhodesia. Hence the call for a ceasefire, backed by the Zambian, Tanzanian and Botswana governments. Hence South Africa's withdrawal of its para-military units from Rhodesia.

This joint willingness at that time to subordinate short-term military and strategic considerations to the achievement of long-term political goals, in my view floundered on the rock of the intervention in Angola. Thus, the failure of the Republic to achieve its objectives in that territory undermined both the achievements and the promise of the earlier phase of détente, and it is hard to see how the political and diplomatic initiative can be recovered. Indeed, it is significant that the United States in the person of Dr. Kissinger, has now become perhaps the major actor in the drama, desperately anxious to get peaceful settlements in both Rhodesia and Namibia. It could, of course, be argued that one valuable by-product of the Angola affair was the subsequent involvement of the United States. It could also be argued that Dr. Kissinger's talks with Mr. Vorster and the rumours of yet more talks to come, would seem to indicate that the Republic is still recognised as having a key role to play especially in terms of the leverage that it might still be able to exert on the Rhodesian regime.

On the other hand, American involvement does mean the end of any hopes that the local protagonists, both black and white, could promote change in the sub-continent without great power involvement; and this aspiration was a dominant one in the early phase of the détente policy. Furthermore, the Western powers now find themselves in a position where it is much more difficult for them to defend and justify South African initiatives on issues such as the constitutional future of Namibia. Their task has been made doubly difficult by the Soweto disturbances and by what has followed those disturbances. These two developments, Angolan intervention – the product of a self-conscious, short-term calculation – and Soweto – the product of a long-standing decay in the body politic – have conspired to put the Republic on the defensive, reducing its credibility as an agent for peaceful change in the Southern African region. This is in sharp contrast to the standing of the Republic some eighteen months ago. What if anything can be rescued from this gloomy situation, depends – among other things – on the outcome of the

Namibian constitutional talks and its reception at the UN.

It is hard to accept the conclusion that the Republic, in sharp contrast to its position in the 1960's and the early 1970's, now increasingly finds itself having to react to events, both within and without its borders; being forced into situations where awkward choices have to be made and where there is always the possibility of major error. No longer can it manipulate or no longer does it give the appearance, at least, of manipulating the internal and external environment. To this extent the Republic has in certain respects become the object of competing policies pursued by other actors on the international and indeed the internal scene, rather than being capable of demonstrating a capacity to act as a subject in its own right. To the same extent it has become an object of other powers, rather than a subject in its own right, and to that extent then the hopes and promises of détente appear to have failed.

This is a gloomy conclusion, but it does require qualification. The Russian and Cuban success in Angola needs to be put in global perspective. That victory was a limited and local achievement made possible by the unwillingness of the United States to indulge in what is fashionably called "crisis management", i.e. that curious mixture of competition and co-operation which has characterised the behaviour of the super-powers when their proxies – whether in the Middle East, Vietnam or Cuba – have drawn them into conflict with each other. Effective "crisis management" requires the fulfillment of two conditions: firstly, that each super-power, in the initial stage of the crisis, be perceived by its rival to be willing to back up its proxy with diplomatic and military support; secondly, that both super-powers are capable – as the crisis increases in intensity – of restraining their proxies for the sake of the super-powers' joint interest in avoiding escalation to the level of direct "eye-ball to eye-ball" confrontation and all that implies in terms of a nuclear-armed world. These rough and ready guidelines to "crisis management" – and there is nothing sacred about them; they can very easily go wrong – have in a sense become conventions of super-power behaviour. Precisely because each recognises the danger of being dragged unwillingly into conflicts with the other, because of their proxies' tendency to view their own local conflicts with each other in "all or nothing", "life or death" terms. These conventions cannot operate if, for one reason or another, one super-power is paralysed by domestic constraints from substantial participation in the crisis. This was certainly the case with respect to the United States in the Angolan civil war. Its proxy, South Africa, failed to get official and public support following the Cuban intervention, and the Soviet Union obviously capitalised on the inability of its super-power rival to sustain its involvement in the crisis.

The paradox is that the United States' failure to check its rival may in retrospect have been the appropriate policy. Leaving aside the mood of Congress, as well as the legacy of Vietnam as explanatory factors for American policy, it could be argued that the techniques of "crisis management" were really not appropriate to the Angolan situation. Civil wars are notoriously difficult to fit into the rubric of "crisis management", if only because the factions involved are not easily subject to the restraints that can be brought upon well-established proxy-states – such as Israel or Egypt – in their conflicts. A massive involvement of the United States in Angola and a corresponding increase in Soviet commitment would have effectively destroyed the social fabric of that society and have had devastating repercussions for the security of the states in the surrounding region. If one assumes that the Soviets would have backed down in the face of such massive American commitment, the business of pacifying the region – of maintaining control – would have done untold damage to American interests elsewhere on the continent, particularly if the United States had been seen to be co-operating with the Republic. Perhaps – just perhaps – those liberal Senators and Congressmen who opposed intervention and effectively cut off funds to support it, were right in their appreciation of what constituted American national interest in Angola.

Moreover, it could be argued that American policy ought to be aimed instead – in situations like this – at encouraging states, however ideologically opposed and however ideologically distasteful their domestic regimes might be, to establish viable, neutralist foreign policies; that American interests could best be served by using its economic expertise and those of multinational companies to exploit the resources of such states as Angola, and thereby gain a degree of influence by economic rather than military means. Nor does it follow that the Russian success in Angola will automatically and inevitably lead to Russian and Cuban intervention in Rhodesia, Namibia and eventually in the Republic. (There is no room here to make fine shades of discrimination about the possibilities in each case and obviously, in a sense, all of them are bracketed together for the sake of argument.) It may be that intervention is more likely in Rhodesia than it is in Namibia, but in general there are a number of constraints on Soviet policy.

- First of all, the Russians cannot be sure of forbearance on the part of the United States similar to that exercised by them in Angola. Indeed, Dr. Kissinger's new-found interest in Africa is no doubt in part designed to create at least a degree of uncertainty about ultimate American intentions in the mind of the Soviet Union – and an element of uncertainty about one's intentions can and does contribute to the strengthening of a deterrence posture vis-à-vis a rival power.

- Secondly, Angola has some claims to be considered a special case, in terms of its relevance to "crisis management". It does not follow that the fortuitous combination of events which gave the Russians *carte blanche* will re-occur; namely, an American – barely recovered from the chastening experience of Vietnam – and a President and Secretary of State hamstrung by the exigencies of electoral politics and indeed having genuine doubts about the legitimacy of "crisis management" in a region which, up to that time, had not figured largely in the calculation of American interests.
- Thirdly – and this is an important point – there is the commitment of the Soviet Union to maintaining and consolidating the détente which the two super-powers have laboriously built up over the last ten years. This strikes one as the crucial factor in any analysis of Soviet behaviour on the international scene. It is crucial insofar as it inhibits the Russians from pursuing policies which could conceivably bring them into serious conflict with the United States. Like the United States, the Soviet Union has an interest – a very real interest – in restraining or imposing restrictions on the arms race; an arms race which is proving prohibitively expensive. Hence these long drawn out negotiations over the last four years, which have met with some considerable success. Of course, related to this point is the fact that the Soviet Union, like most industrialised states, is beginning to face a clamour of rising expectations from its own people, and its resources for meeting these expectations are not infinite. Hence their willingness to import Western technologies of various kinds. They also realise the dangers implicit in any serious conflict with the United States; of a sudden and sharp rise up the escalatory ladder to the stage of nuclear conflict.
- Fourthly, there is the factor of Sino/Soviet competition. This was a strangely neglected feature in the discussion of the Angolan intervention and it is important to realise that Soviet moves in the Third World are as much, if not more, designed to counter Chinese influence as they are to make life difficult for the West. Therefore, Soviet policy must in part at least be governed by the need to avoid backing itself into a corner, facing an informal Peking/Washington axis – and stranger things have happened in the past in international politics. It also follows that policies which might have seemed appropriate for the West when it was engaged in a bipolar struggle with the Soviet Union at the height of the cold war, are not necessarily the most appropriate in situations where the world is now essentially three-cornered. An example in this context would be the potential of Western response to the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. One of the reasons for that presence, is to prevent in advance, or nullify where it already exists, Chinese influence on the African littoral. It does not there-

fore automatically follow that the optimum solution for the West is to incorporate the Republic into its defence arrangements for the area. If the struggle between the three super-powers is for political influence, it may be that other more subtle strategies of an economic and political kind may be required by the Western powers; and here, indeed, one thinks of the prestige the Chinese have gained by simply building a railway across Africa without any navy to back it up. This is the kind of strategy which is difficult for the West to counter, but it may be that in a sense it suggests the kind of problem which Western governments face when they traditionally think in terms of the deployment of military force. The difficulties, of course, in defining what their strategies should be – deploying naval power to counter the Soviet presence – is all very well, but what shall it profit a great power if it gains the oceans only to lose influence in the Third World for want of a strategy to match those employed by its rivals on land?

Where does all this leave the Republic? Under pressure, is the short answer. Détente as it was originally conceived, assumed an order of priorities. First, the Rhodesian settlement; then conceivably disengagement from Namibia; and finally, the creation – as a result of these successes in foreign policy – of a climate of opinion for instigating change at home. But, the failure of events to follow this neat, predetermined course and the introduction of new actors, ranging from Dr. Kissinger and the Cubans to the youth of Soweto, has in a sense telescoped events. Thus, the Government has been forced to act simultaneously on a variety of fronts, none of which can be kept logically distinct to suit the preferences and the convenience of policy-makers.

Yet, one must recognise that détente has had certain important by-products which are not to be despised.

- First, Mr. Vorster appears to have persuaded his electorate that Rhodesia could not survive in its present form; the clear indication being that South African interests would not be served by military intervention to support a regime under attack by guerrilla movements. This is no mean achievement when one considers the sympathy which Mr. Smith's stand initially evoked when UDI was first declared. Of course, it remains to be seen whether this posture of non-intervention can be sustained if and when guerrilla incursions increase in scope and intensity to the level of full-scale revolutionary war.
- A second by-product of détente has been to concentrate the minds of a variety of interest groups on the need for change of a meaningful kind on the domestic scene. I refer here to the attitudes of *verligte* Afrikaner intellectuals with whom in recent months I have had several fascinating and interesting discussions; to the attitude of the Afrikaans and the English Press; and the statements of out-

spoken elements in the Nationalist Party. Indeed, perhaps in this context, one must take into account the departure of the Reformist element from the United Party. What strikes the outside observer is the agreement among such groups on specific issues, such as the position of the African in the urban areas. Their diagnoses sound remarkably similar as to the solutions they propound. Of course, bodies such as the Institute of Race Relations have been emphasising these issues for years, but it is refreshing to see the spread of concern for the plight of the urban African to a wider constituency.

At the height of *détente* some eighteen months ago, it was forcibly argued that the price of good relations with the African states – the price of an ambitious, flexible and positive foreign policy – was clear evidence of substantial reform within the Republic, and for a brief moment it seemed that Mr. Vorster, flushed with success on the external front, could move his party and his country as a whole in the direction of major reforms. But, of course, the political universe rarely displays such neat symmetry and the failure to get a settlement in Rhodesia – for which Mr. Vorster really cannot be blamed – inevitably meant a reduction in incentive to make changes at home. Nevertheless, the domestic situation is as urgent as ever, and it may be that a successful outcome of the Namibian issue will provide the Government with the confidence and the incentive to address itself squarely to the problems which the disturbances of recent months have highlighted in the urban areas.

This may sound a curious doctrine, namely that change and reform internally engineered as a deliberate act of policy, depends on success abroad in the field of foreign policy. If that proposition is true – and it is put forward only as a suggestive hypothesis – then it makes the business of internal change much more risky, depending on the willingness of both friends and enemies abroad to adopt a patient and flexible approach to the Republic's efforts in the field of external relations. Hence the importance of a Namibian settlement and the need to make it acceptable to Western governments at the very least. But the difficulty here – and specifically in the context of the recent disturbances – is the wide-spread tendency in the West, to view South African foreign and domestic policy as part of a single whole. The judgment of outside powers in the West about the merits and demerits of the Republic's performance in the field of external relations is bound to be affected by their perception of the internal scene; and signs of weakness, of lack of control, or of unwillingness to reconsider traditional assumptions about relations between black and white, make it difficult for Western governments to adopt a patient and flexible attitude.

Perhaps this is the appropriate juncture to introduce some brief comments on the homelands and Transkei in particular as factors in

South African foreign policy. I do not propose to discuss in any detail the complicated legal arguments about the question of recognition for Transkei, following its independence in October 1976. Very briefly, it has been argued by an influential school of international law that Transkei does not fit the legal definition of self-determination required for recognition as an independent, sovereign state. United Nations practice over a period of thirty years has, according to this school of international law, elevated this definition to the status of customary international law; thus self-determination as a prerequisite for recognition is now commonly defined in racial terms and deemed applicable only in a colonial context. Therefore, the major obstacle confronting Transkei's claim to self-determination arises from the wide-spread tendency to define the principle in racial terms.

Related to this problem is the question of the unit to which it is deemed appropriate to apply the principle. According to Dr. Rossalyn Higgins, a leading lawyer in this field, self-determination refers to the right of a majority, within a generally accepted political unit, to the exercise of power. This definition has been accepted for three reasons:

- Firstly, the unit has to be generally accepted, otherwise there is the obvious danger of fragmentation of the international system. In other words, a line literally has to be drawn somewhere.
- Secondly, without some clearly understood means for determining who is eligible for national self-determination, conflict across state boundaries would be encouraged.
- Thirdly, the great majority of new states has demonstrated a willingness to accept the frontiers inherited from their colonial masters.

Given this definition, it is not difficult to envisage the arguments that will be levelled against any proposition advanced for recognition of Transkei.

- Firstly, it will be claimed by the Republic's enemies that Transkei is not a generally accepted political unit, but rather the artificial creation of the South African government.
- Secondly, the OAU might be expected to claim the unit that is eligible for self-determination and hence international recognition, is not Transkei but the Republic as a whole, and that the majority in question is the African population of the Republic as a whole.
- Thirdly, that nothing should be done to dismember the South African State, as this majority could be expected to achieve self-determination in due course. Thus, one sees here the clear connection between self-determination conceived in racial terms and the principle of majority rule, as it has been enunciated over three decades of United Nations practice.

Ironically, Transkei's case for self-determination might have had an easier passage had the old Wilsonian doctrine of self-determination, applied at the end of World War I, still been in operation. At that time, the criteria – by and large employed by the Versailles peacemakers – were language and culture, and as a consequence, a number of states came into being on the collapse of the old Central European empires. The criteria, however, changed rapidly after World War II. As Rupert Emerson has put it: "Ethnic identity is essentially irrelevant, but decisive indeed; ordinarily the sole consideration being the existence of a political entity in a guise of a colonial territory."

From the point of view of the OAU and the United Nations, South Africa is a colonial situation though not in the sense that the South African government would no doubt prefer to construe it; i.e. Pretoria as the metropole and the Bantustans as colonics moving towards independence. But it is a colonial situation in a sense that one has (so the argument runs) a white minority regime, illegally exercising power over a dispossessed black majority. Thus, for the Republic's critics, Transkei does not fit the orthodox definition of self-determination and its admission to the UN and the OAU seems unlikely. These legal arguments will not necessarily be decisive for individual governments, whose decisions on whether or not to recognise Transkei will depend in part on their perception of how far recognition will enable the homelands to play a helpful and constructive role in promoting change throughout the Republic. (At present, the best that can be hoped for is that Western governments, who have not yet declared themselves, will adopt an attitude of "wait and see".) They will want clear evidence for example, that the Transkei government is playing such a role. They will certainly need to be convinced that the structure and process of governments in the homelands is genuinely promoting the well-being of their inhabitants in ways very different from those pertaining to South Africa itself. It must be admitted that the signs so far are not promising; reference is made here, of course, to the incorporation of certain features of the South African Constitution into the Transkei Constitution. This is not likely to impress governments who might be wavering on the question of recognition or otherwise.

The difficulty is that even if it could be conclusively shown that the homelands were playing this created bargaining role in the Southern African context, there would still be major constraints on Western policy, namely the degree to which recognition would open the way to accusations from influential leaders in their own countries, as well as from the African states, that apartheid in general was thereby acquiring international legitimacy. Here one needs only to recall the intense hostility generated in the Netherlands over the issue of whether or not to sell nuclear reactors to South Africa. Re-

cognition of Transkei might well provoke similar hostility and no Western government is willing to give hostages to its opponents without some massive or obvious *quid pro quo* being forthcoming from the Republic to counterbalance the discomforts arising from domestic and external friction.

Finally, a brief word on the nuclear aspiration. This is a theme that is currently under discussion with the sale of French reactors to South Africa. The fact that the Republic has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has led to speculation that South Africa is reserving the option to become a nuclear power. Of course, in a sense every state that does not sign the NPT is reserving the option, but I have always been sceptical about the view that acquiring nuclear weapons would in fact serve South Africa's national interests. There are a number of reasons for advancing this proposition:

- Firstly, there will be no point in South Africa signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty blindfolded; that is to say, without getting something – a *quid pro quo* – in return. States like Sweden and Canada can sign the treaty and indeed accrue prestige in so doing, because in a sense it confirms their liberal image in international politics. For South Africa to sign the treaty would certainly not do much to confirm any kind of image of the Republic. So there is a real difference between the incentive driving states like Canada and Sweden to sign the treaty and the lack of incentive, at this point in time, for South Africa to do likewise.
- Secondly, it has always seemed that the price for South Africa's signature might well be construed as the need to get some Western involvement to help develop the Republic's nuclear technology. Of course, this would fit in with the general aspiration – an aspiration maintained ever since World War II – of integrating South Africa more closely into Western economic and technological structures. It may be that the uranium enrichment process is one such process in which South Africa might welcome overseas involvement. This might be the price of its signature to the treaty and it is perfectly legitimate for a government, under these circumstances, to say that it wants something in return for its signature to a treaty as important as the NPT.
- Thirdly, in a military sense it is difficult to see the strategic utility of nuclear weapons. South Africa, after all, is not likely to be engaged in the kind of conflict where it might be seen as having any relevance. If guerrilla warfare does become a feature of South African life, then nuclear weapons would not be relevant. In any case, there is plenty of conventional air power to act as both a deterrent and a defence against conventional attack from outside. So it is hard to see what the strategic argument would be for acquiring nuclear weapons.
- Fourthly, the outside world sometimes quite wrongly assumes

that so-called "wicked states" will automatically and inevitably take up every wicked option – as to say, an option like nuclear weapons. It seems that this does not follow at all and South Africa is not unique in this respect. If it has to make a decision about nuclear weapons at some stage in the future, it will have to base its calculations on precisely the same kind of considerations upon which other states make decisions of this kind, and it seems nonsensical to argue that there is some kind of internal dynamic which drives a state like South Africa to the acquisition of nuclear-power status.

- Fifthly, there is genuine concern in Pretoria about the safeguards provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. After all, if a state signs that treaty it opens itself up to inspection by hordes of inspectors from Vienna who can go tramping around its nuclear plants to see that there is no diversion of plutonium to the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The argument that has been put forward by South Africa – which seems quite a respectable argument – is that there is a real danger in those particular circumstances of industrial espionage, and this is something against which any state rightly wants to guard. One must, too, be sceptical about talk of undercover deals in the nuclear field, involving Israel or West Germany. One is struck by the fact that South Africans, by and large – Angola perhaps excepted – display a concern for appearing to act correctly in international affairs; display a concern for propriety in international affairs; and certainly the performance of South Africa's delegation at meetings of the International Atomic Energy Authority has been very impressive, in the sense that these delegations quite rightly have insisted that the organisation concern itself with technical matters and not get bogged down in ideologically divisive issues. It also ought to be borne in mind that this is one of the most important organisations, indeed one of the few organisations, that South Africa belongs to and where it can and does in fact play a very important role, if only because of its technology and its vast resources and near monopoly of uranium.
- Finally, going nuclear at this stage would hardly improve South Africa's efforts to revive détente and could rather profoundly irritate those Western governments who are committed to halting nuclear proliferation – even though the problems of halting nuclear proliferation are immense. If there is a gathering rush, by a variety of states over the next ten years, to become nuclear – let us assume that ten, or eleven, or twelve states decide to go nuclear – then it does not really matter whether South Africa is the ninth, or the tenth, or the eleventh, because by then the whole atmosphere of non-proliferation will have broken down completely. But it does make a difference whether the Republic elects to become the

seventh nuclear power, as even India (the sixth) found slightly to its cost. The cost to South Africa in electing to go nuclear at this stage would be very, very considerable indeed - in political, diplomatic and economic terms.

THE POLITICAL OUTLOOK IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

John Barratt

In a paper presented to the 13th Business Outlook Conference, about two years ago, the author stressed the importance of taking fully into account the political context in which business decisions had to be taken. He suggested that there was an unfortunate tendency to try to separate economics from politics, but that in fact this was not possible and that ultimately it was the political decisions (domestic and international) which determined the direction of a country's development in all its facets, including the economic. Perhaps now, after the events of the past two years, it is unnecessary to make an issue of this again, because the interplay of economic and political forces and their effects are all too clear.

Confidence in a country's future depends both on sound economic conditions and a stable political environment. But it is equally true that a lack of confidence can itself create negative results, and therefore confidence is a necessary ingredient for stable development. Business leaders have a vital role to play in this regard, but it is the task of the political leaders – more than anyone else – to create the grounds for confidence in the future, not by pretending that problems do not exist but rather by facing the realities squarely and by being prepared, when necessary, to make the required accommodations.

Various political constraints, internal and external, are now hampering development in Southern Africa and affecting the attitudes of people abroad in such crucial areas as investment. If these constraints can be removed, there is no reason to doubt the potential for healthy economic development in South Africa and the whole region of Southern Africa. The natural and human resources for such development are immense and the opportunities they hold for all the peoples of the region provide the incentive to overcome the present political constraints. It is clear that this fact is appreciated by those engaged in the current efforts to settle disputes in this region by peaceful means. Dr. Henry Kissinger has constantly stressed the opportunities for economic development through regional co-operation, and the plans for settlements in Rhodesia and South West Africa include specific proposals to stimulate the development of industry and agriculture through investment and development aid. All this helps to create the confidence in the future which is necessary, if the immediate political problems are to be overcome.

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Two years ago there was a consciousness of the dramatic changes set in motion by the overthrow of the Portuguese government in April 1974. In spite of these changes, which threatened to lead to confrontation between militant black nationalism and the white-ruled countries of Southern Africa, there was good reason for hope then that this confrontation would be avoided. It was the beginning of the so-called *détente* period; Prime Minister Vorster and President Kaunda had made their well-known speeches at the end of October 1974, choosing the way of peace and negotiation. Serious confrontation has been avoided in the intervening two years – which is an achievement in itself. But events have moved unevenly and some new elements have now affected the situation in the region. It is thus worth looking briefly at the changes since the *détente* period began; changes on which one's outlook must now be based.

- Rhodesia was the main critical issue on which the *détente* negotiations at first focussed. There were considerable hopes that a settlement could be found through negotiations between the parties immediately concerned, without outside intervention. But these hopes were in the end frustrated and the level of violence increased notably, while the economic outlook for the country deteriorated.
- In Angola, where it was hoped that the three nationalist movements could reach agreement to form a government to which Portugal could hand over power, there developed instead a civil war into which outside powers were drawn. While it was known that the Soviet Union supported the MPLA against the other two movements, the degree of Russian intervention was not expected and, in particular, the active involvement of Cuban troops was a surprise. This led to the unhappy experience of the South African intervention, but also to a greater American and European concern with the developments of this region.
- Meanwhile, in South West Africa the trends towards a negotiated settlement were more hopeful than elsewhere. In September 1975, at the very time when the Angolan war was escalating seriously, the Turnhalle Conference gathered to begin its search for a solution to the Territory's political problems. However, the Angolan war and the eventual victory of the MPLA encouraged greater militancy on the part of SWAPO, and have led to some increase in guerrilla activity in the north of the Territory.
- The most serious recent development has been the violent disturbances which have erupted throughout South Africa, since the Soweto riots began in mid-June of 1976. Whereas in 1975, during the *détente* negotiations, one could look at the issues of Southern Africa as having an order of priority – with South Africa's internal problems less acute than those of Rhodesia and South West Africa – these issues now *all* require urgent attention.

The Angolan conflict had a profound effect on the course of events in Southern Africa. It affected the attitudes of many, inside and outside this region, and created the impression that increased violence was the inevitable trend. Although this trend is not in fact being fatalistically accepted, and although one is now witnessing a much more serious effort than ever before to find negotiated solutions in Rhodesia and South West Africa, those who see violence and the armed struggle as the only way to achieve solutions, have been encouraged by the results of the Angolan war, especially in their hopes for military assistance from outside.

The most significant and far-reaching effect of the Angolan conflict has been the direct involvement of non-African powers in the domestic and regional disputes of Southern Africa. New dimensions, including super-power rivalry, have thus been introduced into the Southern African situation. It is no longer possible to look simply for regional solutions, as was being done during 1974 and 1975; and for South Africa and other countries the circumstances in which their foreign policies must operate have now changed dramatically. These new circumstances, which include the current initiatives of the American Secretary of State, are affecting all the region's critical issues. There is now, as the Americans would say, a "new ball-game" and this game is in the "big league", with super-power interests directly involved in the region for the first time. This certainly makes the issues more critical and more complicated, because they now have to be settled in a world arena where not only the interests of the peoples directly concerned have to be taken into account, but also the interests of various outside powers. But this new situation also gives some ground for renewed hope, in that the determined interest of the United States and other Western powers provides assistance to those who seek peaceful and negotiated solutions – assistance which they did not have before.

THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER

Behind all the rhetoric in the many statements of political leaders in Southern Africa and abroad, one is in fact now witnessing a struggle for power on various levels. This struggle is still mainly political, but a military dimension has been introduced on some levels, and there is the real threat that this military dimension will take on much greater proportions. This is the reason for the urgency of Western initiatives in the region, aimed at defusing the conflict situation and reducing the threat of escalating violence. But the complexities of the situation defy any attempts at easy answers. (Dr. Henry Kissinger has in fact admitted that this is the most complex situation he has ever tried to deal with – which is a considerable admission from the man who was responsible for negotiating agreements in Vietnam and the Middle East.)

The struggle for power is not a simple one between black and white – as it was often seen from the outside in the past. There is certainly an underlying racial element in all the conflict situations in the region, with white control being challenged in Rhodesia, South West Africa and South Africa. But there is also a struggle for power among the various black movements which are challenging white power. Then, if one moves to another level, one finds a struggle for influence between different systems among the independent black states involved – the so-called “front-line” states. On the one hand, there are Mozambique and Angola, seeking the extension of their systems (claimed to be Marxist) in Southern Africa. On the other hand, there are Zambia and Botswana, with different systems, and there is Tanzania somewhere in between.

Dr. Kissinger has said that “the task of diplomacy is to find common ground among the differing objectives of the multitude of nations and groups involved” in the current negotiations. He believes there is common ground, but he has also said that “black nationalist groups competing for power must bridge their differences if there is to be early progress to majority rule”. He has urged these groups “not to jeopardise everything by personal competition for power”.¹

Overshadowing all these regional power struggles, there is the global struggle between the super-powers, with Southern Africa as one of its focal points. The intervention of the Soviet Union, with Cuban assistance, in the Angolan conflict and the extension of Soviet influence in Mozambique have brought this super-power element into the regional situation. The United States could not simply stand aside, when the Soviet Union made this clear move to extend its influence and thus threatened to disturb the world balance of power. So the United States saw the problems of Southern Africa for the first time as a matter of vital national interest. Dr. Kissinger has explained that “America’s peace and safety rest crucially on a global balance of power” and that the US “could not remain indifferent to the trends” in Southern Africa, which had “implications not only for the peace, independence and unity of Africa, but for global peace and stability”.²

The question for the immediate future is, therefore, whether these struggles for power at various levels will engulf Southern Africa in widening conflict and violence, or whether they can be resolved by peaceful means on the basis of the common ground which Dr. Kissinger believes exists. A major effort is now underway to find these peaceful means through a complex process of negotiations. The complexity results from all the different interests involved and the various struggles for power going on, as well as from “the legacy of

1. “Address by US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, in Philadelphia on 31 August, 1976”, in *Southern Africa Record* (Number Six), South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, September 1976, p. 29.
2. “Address by US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, to the Annual Conference of the National Urban League in Boston, 2 August, 1976”, in *Southern Africa Record* (Number Six), *op. cit.*, pp. 4 and 5.

generations of mistrust" which have to be overcome – as Dr. Kissinger has put it.³

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WEST

At this stage these negotiations concern mainly Rhodesia and South West Africa. But one should not be under any illusion that South Africa's own internal conflict situation is being overlooked and that somehow if only the other two questions can be settled satisfactorily, it will not become a serious international issue. Nor should one be under any illusion that the pressures now building up will somehow decline if South Africa contributes positively to settlements in Rhodesia and South West Africa. Such a contribution to the peaceful settlement of differences will be of great importance in creating a better climate in the region, improving the Government's credibility in negotiations, and also no doubt in gaining time. But peace and stability in the region will not be achieved until there is a settlement within South Africa itself, and this will ultimately be the most difficult and complex question of all.

There is good reason to believe that Western governments, led by the United States, are now becoming determined to find ways of settling the conflicts of this region, because these conflicts are becoming increasingly embarrassing to them politically. They have a stake in the region and in Africa as a whole, which they do not want to lose, and they see a clear threat to their position in a continued black/white conflict situation, where the West is perceived by Black Africa as simply supporting the whites and the *status quo*.

This external Western pressure for change is therefore becoming of vital significance for South Africa's future political and economic development. It is no longer a question simply of critical statements in the United Nations and elsewhere, and of occasional diplomatic protests; ways are now being sought to bring effective influence to bear on the South African system. Such interference may seem intolerable, but South Africa's economic and political dependence on the West, of which it claims to be part, will make it impossible to ignore these efforts to influence the direction of change. In this regard, let it not be forgotten that the Government has in the past constantly invited the West to take a greater interest in this region. It may now be found that this invitation is accepted with a vengeance!

The danger is that the motivation for these external pressures is based, in the first place, on the interest of the countries outside and not on the interests of the peoples directly concerned in Southern Africa. It would have been much better if differences could have been settled between the parties in the region themselves, without outside interference. But efforts in that direction during the 1974 to

3. "Address by US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger in Philadelphia on 31 August, 1976", in *Southern Africa Record* (Number Six), *op. cit.*, p. 28.

early 1976 *détente* period did not succeed, and now the external involvement is an unescapable fact. The positive side, however, is that Western interest in, and commitment to, the stable development of the region is now being clearly demonstrated, and it can be hoped that this will be a constructive influence for the long-term benefit of the peoples of the region. What will have to be appreciated, perhaps, is that one cannot have this commitment simply on one's own terms, and if the advantages of this commitment are to be retained – and there are potentially great advantages for the future – one will have to be prepared for changes more radical than presently contemplated.

In view of this developing external influence on South Africa's political development, it may be useful to look more closely at the American approach to Southern Africa, before turning to examine briefly the outlook for the two particular critical issues in Southern Africa – namely Rhodesia and South West Africa – which are the subjects of the current negotiating process.

THE UNITED STATES APPROACH

In the past (with the exception perhaps of a brief period in the early 1960's) the real political interest of the US in Africa has been minimal. In general, American governments have been content to leave the European, ex-colonial powers to make the running on policy towards African questions (e.g. Rhodesia). This has clearly changed now, and for the first time a Secretary of State has become directly and personally involved in Southern Africa. An important part of the motivation behind the new American involvement is concern about possible Soviet intentions since the Angolan episode. This is linked with the growing appreciation of the strategic importance of the resources of Southern Africa, and perhaps also of the strategic location of this region between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans – although this latter point has been exaggerated by South African spokesmen.

However, an equally important element in American motivation relates to developments within the field of race relations in the United States itself. This is a complicated question which is still developing, but there are three aspects which can be mentioned:

- The question of race is no longer a significant issue in the American political system. There may still be marginal problems to be settled, such as that of school bussing, but there is no political leader, north or south, who is prepared to defend policies based in any way on racial separation, let alone discrimination.
- American blacks are now playing an increasingly significant role within the political system. It is not simply the number of blacks, concentrated as effective voting groups in certain important states; it is rather the increasingly important role of black leaders in political and other spheres. It has been said in this regard that

black leaders have now come off the streets (i.e. the protest movements) and into government, industry and other professions.

- Although the question of race is no longer at issue in the American political system, racial conflict is a matter of recent history, and there is a fear that a racial conflagration in Africa could have a profoundly negative effect within American society. The prevention of such a conflagration, for this very reason, is said to have been an important part of Dr. Kissinger's motivation in his current initiatives – apart from the fears about the effects on world peace.

So it must be appreciated here and elsewhere in Southern Africa that the US is acting in its own national interests (external and domestic); and these interests will not permit it any longer to give support to the *status quo*, i.e. to the continuation of white domination anywhere. This is not a question of advocating revolution or even demanding immediate radical change. But South Africans must be in no doubt about the fact that, if American support for peaceful change and constructive development is to be retained, there will have to be clear and active commitment to change in the presently white-ruled countries.

The nature of change in South Africa's case must obviously be determined here, in the interests of its own people. But this determination cannot be made by whites alone for the blacks and other groups. There will have to be effective participation by all in the decision-making about a joint political future – as has already been recognised by the South African government as necessary in the cases of South West Africa and Rhodesia. This is a basic requirement for internal peace and order; for acceptance in Africa; and for normal relations with the rest of the world – including the United States whose support, and even protection, South Africans are presently seeking.

It appears that an important part of Dr. Kissinger's approach to Rhodesia and South West Africa, as well as to South Africa, is that the goal of economic development – on the basis of the Republic's considerable natural and human resources, with Western assistance – can provide the incentive to all groups to make the accommodations required for peaceful and acceptable change. The economic capability of the United States gives it the means to back up its initiatives in a meaningful way. This is an advantage which the Soviet Union does not have; its influence at present is based mainly on its ability to supply weapons.

Another advantage which the Soviet Union does not have, is that the United States can talk to all sides (or most of them) in the Southern African conflicts. The American expectation, no doubt, is that if violence can be stopped and replaced with a reasonable hope on all sides that negotiations can be fruitful, then the Russian

influence will decline. This is precisely what happened in the Middle East.

Finally on the American approach, there must be one further note of caution about the outlook. While there is a determination now about the approach to Southern Africa, future policy is not predictable with certainty, given the fact that Administrations and Congresses change, as does the mood of the American public. If American efforts in this region are seriously frustrated, and if another crisis in the world develops to absorb American attention, it is conceivable that the US could simply "throw up its hands", cut its losses in the region, and leave Southern Africa to its own devices – and to the devices of more persistent world powers. This development may seem unlikely now, in view of the apparent importance of the region's resources to the West, but a breaking-point may come if the Republic is unable to put its own house in order.

RHODESIA

What the outlook will be for the whole of Southern Africa in the next few years depends largely on the settlement moves in Rhodesia. There is more reason for hope now than there has been for some time, but obviously there are still many obstacles to be overcome in this tremendously complex situation. One cannot begin to describe this situation adequately here, and it would be a very rash man who attempted to forecast the outcome of the current negotiating process. It may be useful, however, in considering the present developments, to draw up a very tentative balance sheet of the negative and positive factors at this stage.

On the credit or positive side one can make the following brief points:

- The ruling Rhodesian Front Party, under Mr. Ian Smith, has accepted the realities of its own position and of South Africa's untenable position vis-à-vis Rhodesia, if the present unsettled state of affairs continues. After the settlement proposals and the alternatives were presented to Mr. Smith and his Ministers by Mr. Vorster and Dr. Kissinger, the Rhodesian Prime Minister responded positively and clearly in his statement of 24 September, 1976. On the basis of this response the way forward to settlement negotiations should be open from the white side, even though Mr. Smith has indicated that he would not have chosen this way (if he had a choice), and even though there are some points at dispute in his response.
- There is a firm determination now on the part of the United States and the United Kingdom to bring about a settlement and thus to stem the spread of Soviet influence in the region. This offers the assurance of continued Western political influence in the region, to balance that of the Soviet Union – something that

has been missing in the past.

- There is an appreciation of the need to make some provision for the protection of minorities, which is intended to reassure whites, and this is spelt out in economic terms in the proposed plan to guarantee compensation for pensions, property, etc., on the basis of an international Trust Fund to be set up.
- There is also an appreciation of the economic opportunities for Rhodesia and a willingness to undertake measures to stimulate development through investment and aid.
- An early lifting of sanctions is promised. According to the present proposals, this would take place as soon as an interim government is formed and would not await a final settlement.
- As a result of these reassuring elements in the present package of proposals, the attitude of businessmen in Rhodesia seems to be fairly positive towards the settlement plans. This is very important, as the confidence of the business community is essential if the plan is to work. In this regard the lifting of sanctions is the crucial factor and is more important than the financial aid which may be forthcoming.
- In spite of the divisions among black groups, there are now more serious efforts to form a credible nationalist front for the purposes of negotiations (although these efforts have not yet borne fruit).
- There is a substantial number of blacks in Rhodesia with a stake in the economic system, and this is appreciated by at least some of the nationalist leaders. As Rhodesia is far more advanced economically than Mozambique and Angola, there is much more to lose by disorder, and this provides an incentive for compromise.
- The concept of an interim government is in itself a positive factor of considerable importance. Previously the settlement attempts were based on efforts to agree first on a final constitution; then the negotiations became bogged down in details. There is a chance now that black and white leaders can first learn to work together in running the country and develop some mutual trust on which a final constitutional solution can be based.

On the debit or negative side one must place the following items:

- There is a serious legacy of mistrust between the black nationalists and the white government, as a result of the many previous abortive attempts at finding a settlement, the escalating war situation, etc.
- The divisions and rivalries between the black nationalist groups and between their leaders, constitute probably the most serious obstacle in the way of a viable settlement. As already indicated, there is now a struggle for power going on, and it is difficult to see how this will be resolved. It will be impossible to negotiate meaningfully if there is no credible, unified nationalist voice.

- Among the black "front-line" presidents, the militant influence appears to be increasing. These presidents have a vital role, both in bringing about unity among the nationalists and in assuring that a settlement will be acceptable externally. But it is difficult to predict how effectively they will perform this role, and to determine whether they are all motivated in the first place by the interests of the inhabitants of Rhodesia, or by their own ideological interests. A decision to continue or to stop the war is largely in their hands and, if the war does not stop within a reasonable period after the formation of an interim government, it is unlikely that negotiations for a final settlement will be able to continue.
- Related to the latter point is the question of Russian influence. Judging by the Soviet government's statements, it will do what it can to prevent the American initiatives from succeeding. But the extent of Russian influence on the various nationalist movements is not yet clear.
- There is a lack of confidence among many whites, who largely hold the economic power. This lack of confidence could have a serious effect on the stability of the country, if it grows and causes an exodus of whites.
- A particular difficulty relates to the different interpretations of parts of the Vorster/Kissinger/Smith agreement. Specifically these differences relate to the role of the proposed Council of State, and to the two portfolios (Defence and Law and Order) which Mr. Smith says will be retained by whites in the interim government. In view of the strong stand taken on these points by the "front-line" presidents, as well as by nationalist leaders in Rhodesia, Mr. Smith's government may be required to make some further concessions. In this case there is the danger that Mr. Smith may decide to withdraw from the agreement, which would mean starting all over again in a rapidly worsening situation.

In view of the critically important question of disunity among the black groups, and of who will emerge to lead the nationalist side in the interim government and in the negotiations for a final constitutional settlement, it may be useful to indicate briefly the apparent line-up at this stage of the nationalist groups under their respective leaders. The three leaders in the present struggle for influence, both internally and externally, are Mr. Joshua Nkomo, Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Mr. Robert Mugabe.

Joshua Nkomo is the leader of longest standing in the nationalist struggle and head of the first nationalist movement to be founded (ZAPU) in the late 1950's. He has an effective organisation throughout Rhodesia (not only among the Matabele, as often alleged), but there are doubts as to the extent of his internal support, particularly in the towns, compared with that of Bishop Muzorewa.

However, he also has some military strength in the ZAPU section of the so-called Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA). His section of ZIPA operates from Zambia and Botswana.

Externally, it appears that Mr. Nkomo has considerable support among the "front-line" presidents, and that he is also favoured by the Western countries. In addition, Mr. Nkomo has links with the Soviet Union, as ZAPU in the past was always the movement supported by the Soviet Union (while ZANU was supported by China). This all puts him in a strong position, in spite of the doubt about his internal support.

Bishop Abel Muzorewa only came to prominence in 1972, when he was chosen to head the new African National Council (ANC) within Rhodesia, formed to oppose the settlement agreement reached between Mr. Smith and Sir Alec Douglas-Home. Then, when the Vorster/Kaunda détente initiatives began at the end of 1974, the ZAPU and ZANU movements agreed (under pressure from Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere) to unite under his leadership. He has thus always had a unifying role, although he has never been regarded as a strong leader himself. It is clear that he has considerable internal support, as witnessed by his reception on his return to Salisbury at the beginning of October 1976, and many observers regard his following within Rhodesia as overwhelmingly greater than that of any other nationalist leader. However, he has been rejected by the "front-line" presidents, and he apparently – at this stage has no section of ZIPA owing allegiance to him.

Robert Mugabe has come fairly recently into prominence as a nationalist leader. He belongs to the ZANU faction which at the beginning of the 1960's broke away from ZAPU under the leadership of the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole. While in detention with Sithole, Mugabe tried to supplant him as leader, which he now seems effectively to have done. For some time he has been out of circulation, almost in detention in Mozambique, while attempts were made to find a new leader from among the ranks of ZIPA, the so-called "Third Force". No effective leader emerged, however, and very recently Mr. Mugabe has appeared as the political spokesman of the ZANU section of ZIPA, which is the larger section compared with the ZAPU section loyal to Mr. Nkomo.

Mr. Mugabe has no internal organisation and his strength therefore is dependent on the Army, which operates from Mozambique, and on the support of President Machel. It is thus not clear to what extent he is a political leader in his own right, or whether he is almost a hostage of the Mozambique government and ZIPA. In any case, he is adopting a hard line publicly towards the settlement proposals and appears to be reflecting a Mozambican view in this regard.

There have been attempts by the "front-line" presidents to bring Mr. Mugabe and Mr. Nkomo together in a common front for the purposes of the settlement negotiations, and talks in this regard have been going on in Maputo. An alliance between their respective groups, however, is unlikely to be an easy one.

The next few weeks will be crucial for the three main nationalist groups, and for the settlement plans. At present the groups all have significant elements of strength, and there could be serious problems if any one of them actively opposes the settlement arrangements. It would seem important, therefore, that some level of agreement should be reached between all three (or at the very least between two of them), if there is to be both sufficient internal support for a settlement and a halt to external incursions.

The obstacles thus appear to be considerable, but it is most important that the momentum of the negotiations should be kept up — that the proposed conference to form the interim government should be held as soon as possible; that the interim government should be installed, even if it does not initially have full support from all parties. If the negotiations get bogged down in details and in personal rivalries, the considerable progress that has already been made will fast be dissipated. Then there is likely to be a rapid deterioration of the situation, with violence seen by all parties as the only available course and with little hope of a peaceful settlement.

SOUTH WEST AFRICA

Apart from the special case of Rhodesia, South West Africa is the only remaining substantial territory in Africa that is still in a colonial situation. In this regard it is worth mentioning here that South Africa itself is in a different position vis-à-vis the rest of Africa. The official OAU policy, as reflected in the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969⁴ and the Dar es Salaam Declaration of 1975⁵, is that South Africa is recognised as an independent African state, although its internal policies are not accepted, while Rhodesia and South West Africa are regarded as colonial territories which must still achieve legitimate independence. In both cases, South Africa's role in making such independence possible is considered crucial, particularly in the case of South West Africa, where South Africa is in effect the colonial power. Dr. Kissinger has based his diplomacy on this approach, regarding the South African government as holding the key to the settlement of these "colonial" issues.

In the modern world, with colonialism having almost disappeared, the status of South West Africa as a dependency of South Africa cannot be maintained. This issue, which has for so long had a

4. See "The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa" (April 1969), in *Southern Africa Record* (Number Two), South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, June 1975.

5. See "Dar es Salaam Declaration on Southern Africa" (10 April, 1975), in *Southern Africa Record* (Number Two), *op. cit.*

negative effect on the Republic's external relations, must be settled through the granting of independence. The alternative of incorporation of the Territory within a larger South Africa could not be seriously pursued, and the Government recognised this more than a decade ago. It then began to talk about self-determination and independence for the Territory, but it advocated this on the basis of the separate development of different ethnic groups. This was, of course, not acceptable to the international community, nor to the majority of the people within the Territory. The realisation therefore gradually grew that if this issue was to be removed from the international agenda and if the dispute with the rest of Africa was to be ended, the independence of the Territory as one state would have to be accepted. This acceptance has become clear since the Turnhalle Conference began in September 1975 with its Declaration of Intent, and it was confirmed by the announcement of the Constitutional Committee of that conference on 18 August, 1976 that the intention was for the Territory to become independent as one unit by 31 December, 1978.

South West Africa/Namibia is therefore moving towards independence, but the structure of the future independent state has not yet been settled, and *this remains a very controversial issue.*

The Constitutional Committee of the Turnhalle Conference has proposed, in its most recent statement, a three-tier system of government for South West Africa. There is, of course, nothing original in a three-tier system; one already exists in South Africa with the national government, the provinces and the municipalities. But in the case of South West Africa the intention with this system is that it should make provision for at least some measure of self-government for the different ethnic groups in the Territory. This would be the purpose of the *second tier of government*, while the *first tier* would be the national government, and the *third tier* municipal. Several important and controversial questions remain to be answered, when the Committee continues its work on the proposed constitution:

- Will all significant powers be vested in the national government, with only certain restricted powers of a regional and perhaps cultural nature delegated to the second tier governments?
- Will the second tier governments be based on purely ethnic group lines, or will they be regional governments with perhaps particular groups dominant in most of the regions?
- Will the national government be elected directly by the people of the whole Territory, with a formula perhaps to ensure adequate representation of minorities, or will the national government simply be nominated by the group or regional governments of the second tier?
- Will the third tier government, i.e. the municipalities, be multi-racial, or will there be an attempt to maintain ethnic divisions, i.e.

separate towns for whites, coloured, blacks, etc?

It can be seen that behind all these particular questions lies the central issue of whether a proposed constitution for an independent South West Africa/Namibia is to be based on ethnic divisions. There is no doubt that there are significant language, cultural, educational, economic and historical differences between the various groups in South West Africa and, if a workable settlement is to be achieved, these must be taken into account. But it has to be appreciated – if one is to be realistic – that a political system based primarily on ethnic divisions, rather than on the national unity of the new state, will not be acceptable internationally – even to the countries of the West, let alone those of Africa. Moreover, it is unlikely to be acceptable internally either, because there is a growing sense of national identity in the Territory, particularly among the more politically sophisticated, who will after all be those who will have to run the new state. Internationally and internally an over-emphasis on ethnic groups will simply be seen as an attempt to entrench a watered-down version of separate development – and it does seem clear from their statements that the Turnhalle leaders do wish to avoid this. In addition, there are the very real practical difficulties of creating an efficient government based on ethnic groups, many of whose members are scattered all over the Territory.

The South African government has maintained firmly that it is up to the people of the Territory themselves to decide on their future, and in this regard the Government places its hope in the Turnhalle Conference. But, as the colonial power in this case, South Africa cannot simply stand aside in the international arena. Negotiations are therefore now proceeding, with Dr. Henry Kissinger as the go-between, aimed at finding an acceptable process through which an international agreement over the future of the Territory can be reached. While it is true that a permanent settlement must be based first on an internal agreement, South Africa has always acknowledged the international character of the Territory and therefore must work for acceptance of an independent South West Africa/Namibia by the international community.

South Africa's experience with the United Nations has not been a happy one and it may thus seem an almost impossible task to obtain UN approval for a South African-sponsored solution. But here it must be borne in mind that what is essential is agreement with the African states; once that is obtained, UN acceptance will follow almost automatically and many of the countless UN resolutions of past years will then become irrelevant.

If agreement is to be reached with the African states – or at least a majority of them – then there would seem to be two basic requirements. Firstly, every effort must be made to enable and encourage the people in the Territory to express themselves freely and indepen-

dently. If the Turnhalle Conference is to be the vehicle for the expression of the people's wishes, it must demonstrate its independence, firmly establish its credibility as a truly representative body, and find ways of effectively countering the allegations that it is being manipulated to serve the interests of South Africa and of the white group in the Territory. Even if one can prove that the Conference is the most representative gathering to have been held in the Territory, *one has to face the fact that it is not fully accepted as such in Africa or anywhere else in the world.* Some Western governments are inclined to be more objective and give some attention to the deliberations of the Conference, but even they are not prepared to accept it as fully representative and therefore entitled to determine, on its own, the future of the Territory.

This brings one to the second and most controversial requirement, related to the position of SWAPO. *It is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain the degree of support which SWAPO has in the Territory.* It has not participated in those ethnic group elections which there have been, and it cannot operate openly without restrictions. Claims made by SWAPO about its support can be taken to be exaggerated, but then so can the claims from the other side about SWAPO's lack of support. At least it can be said that, among the many political parties in the Territory, SWAPO is the strongest one on a national basis, and particularly within the Owambo group which constitutes 46 percent of the total population. However, while this question of internal support cannot be answered conclusively, there is no doubt about the external support which SWAPO has. It is recognised by the African states, and therefore also by the UN, as the sole authentic movement representative of the people. Although not recognised as such by most Western governments, it does nevertheless have access to those governments, who regard a settlement without the participation of SWAPO as almost meaningless.

This does not imply that the United States and other Western governments advocate simply a hand-over of power to SWAPO. In fact, this is probably almost the last thing they would want, given SWAPO's increased militancy and Marxist tendencies since the Angolan war. But they consider that, if an independence settlement is to be credible and acceptable internationally, SWAPO must somehow be brought into the negotiating process and some way must be found of objectively testing SWAPO's strength in the Territory. One can speculate perhaps that their hope would be that, if the Turnhalle leaders can demonstrate their independence from South Africa and its policies, then they will increase their internal strength and draw support away from SWAPO.

SWAPO itself has indicated in recent months that it is willing to negotiate with the South African government as the colonial power, but not with the Turnhalle leaders. South Africa insists that such

negotiations should be with the Turnhalle Conference. Some way must now be found of getting around these positions of principle, in order that there can be negotiations on the basis of the realities, and in order that there can be a settlement which will be acceptable internally and internationally. With some compromise on both sides, it should not be too difficult to arrange such negotiations, possibly in the form of a conference outside the Territory, and it is believed that this is the aim of Dr. Kissinger's current initiatives. The Constitutional Committee of the Turnhalle Conference is reported to be considering this question now, and there have been discussions between the Americans and SWAPO.

It is obviously too early to say what the outcome of all these discussions will be, but if a meeting takes place in some form with SWAPO then one of the questions to be dealt with will presumably be the holding of elections or a referendum in the Territory before independence, in order to test the acceptability of a constitution and/or the degree of support for SWAPO. The problem here is that the UN Security Council has demanded that there should be UN supervision of elections, and in particular the UN's Council for Namibia is expected to be given a role. This will be difficult for the South African government and probably for the Turnhalle Conference to accept, although there is no doubt that some form of international supervision or observation of elections or a referendum will have to be accepted.

Although there are still problems ahead, one can conclude that the outlook for South West Africa is a reasonably optimistic one. If independence can be achieved, hopefully by the end of 1978, which is generally acceptable internally and internationally, then the new state can look forward to a bright future economically. With the likelihood of increased investment from outside, there is considerable potential for the development of the mining industry, for example. With the political constraints removed, there can be hope for the growth of other sectors too, and also for international aid for education, training, etc., to stimulate development generally.

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA: PAST FAILURE AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

John Seiler

What can South Africans (both white and black) expect from a Jimmy Carter Presidency beginning in January 1977? Although my answer to this question involves considerable speculation, the elements of the answer are clear: the history of US policy toward Southern Africa in the past two decades; the efforts of liberal critics to influence that policy; the more recent attempts by blacks to superimpose their own policy preferences; the impact of the current Kissinger initiative to achieve regional stabilisation; the potential orientation of Carter's senior foreign policy advisers and staff; and Carter's own impact on Southern African policy – the least calculable factor of all, but the crucial one, because it will determine which perspectives will govern regional policy and what degree of commitment officials will give to policy implementation.

Looking at the broad sweep of US Southern African policy over the past twenty years since Ghana's independence in 1957 (a key date marking the emergence of Black African states as a potent force in the United Nations), the elements of continuity seem more conspicuous now than the highly-dramatised changes from the Eisenhower to Kennedy Administrations and from the Johnson to Nixon Administrations. Southern African policy was almost always a very low priority, which meant that it was carried out at the lower levels of the vast official system, by men who had themselves little power, and with only rare intercessions from either White House staff or the President himself. As a result, instead of policy, there were *policies*. Different parts of the official system emphasised those priorities which mattered most to them, with no effective co-ordination among policies. At one extreme, the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs and Bureau of International Organisation Affairs sympathised with black nationalism and manifested this sympathy in their primary responsibility for speeches and votes at the UN. At the other extreme, "business as usual" dominated the activities of the Commerce Department (which encouraged US business to invest and trade with South Africa), the Defense Department and NASA (which set up space tracking facilities in South Africa), and the Atomic Energy Commission (which purchased over one billion dollars of South African uranium ore from 1952 to 1966).

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But, it would be wrong to suggest a wide range between these two extremes. From the very beginning, the Kennedy Administration's most liberal officials, including G. Mennen Williams, were motivated by a complex set of concerns, among which sympathy for black nationalists was the lowest priority. There was an overriding preoccupation with Soviet challenges. When these developed, as in the Congo in 1960 and potentially in Angola in 1961, Africa became a focal point for US policy. Lacking a perceived Soviet threat, there was no incentive to pull together the disparate elements of a Southern African policy. More specifically, faced with Black African demands for UN sanctions against South Africa starting in 1961, the US response was a consistently ambivalent one. On the one hand, it pledged its support for peaceful processes of self-determination, whose outcome might or might not be preference for independence (in the case of South West Africa, Angola and Mozambique) or majority rule (in the case of Rhodesia). At the same time, the US representatives made clear their opposition to the imposition of either economic or military sanctions. In 1966, Williams first honestly articulated this limited policy in testimony to the House of Representatives African Affairs Subcommittee. He spoke of limited US influence on regional events and the primary power of the white regimes to determine the direction of developments.

Nothing basic in regional policy changed during the Johnson Administration. The two dramatic steps – support for Rhodesian sanctions and support for the UN General Assembly resolution “ending” South Africa’s South West Africa mandate – were no more than hyperbolic interruptions from continued equivocation about what stand to take in the region. Sanctions were supported primarily because Johnson felt it was important to give Harold Wilson an endorsement, and little thought was given to their efficacy. The South West African resolution was endorsed, against the opposition of most officials, because Ambassador Arthur Goldberg interceded directly with Johnson to approve it.

The Nixon Administration did *not* change regional policy; it codified it. As part of an elaborate policy review process, with which both Nixon and Kissinger felt comfortable, Southern African policy was assessed in the now-famous NSSM 39 study. Five policy options were outlined at the end of that study: unequivocal support for the white regimes; “communication” with these regimes to induce liberalisation; “straddling” black and white regimes; giving greater support to black nationalists, from the pragmatic (some might say cynical) calculation that doing so would reduce the likelihood of their turning to the Soviets or Chinese; and withdrawing from regional involvement, in order to minimise being caught between black nationalists and white regimes in the inevitably deepening regional war which most analysts foresaw. Several things should be apparent

about this set of options and the one adopted: "communication". Unequivocal support for black nationalists was not even considered, because it would involve (so officials argue) a commitment of economic and (potentially) military resources the US should not make. On the other hand, the officials failed to recognise (or perhaps to acknowledge) that continued economic involvement, especially in South Africa, but also in Angola and South West Africa, meant sustaining white regimes.

The "communication" option chosen was meant to provide a calculated prospect over some five years for the white regimes to liberalise policies free of the nagging pressures of rhetoric, UN speeches and spasmodic symbolic acts. At best, it was a very uncertain proposition, but it was doomed to failure from its start in early 1970. First, Kissinger in transmitting the National Security Council (NSC) recommendation to the President modified it to include elements of "straddling", which meant that the end result was less markedly different from the intended policy of earlier Democratic Administrations. Then, the NSC staff failed to keep control over State Department liberals who ignored the self-restraints on rhetoric implied in the new policy. Third, senior White House staff – John Ehrlichman, Peter Flanigan, Clark MacGregor – overrode objections from the State Department and the NSC, using their control of access to President Nixon to ensure that the Byrd Amendment would pass the Senate, a step which was not intended by NSSM 39's endorsement of "communication". Finally, and most significantly, there was no clarity about testing the success or failure of the "communication" option, which meant inevitably it would lapse into an equivocal "business as usual" policy, with less critical rhetoric than that exhibited in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. By the time of the April 1974 Portuguese coup, US Southern African policy had fallen back into a state of incoherence, in which UN rhetoric and votes wrongly suggested a marked shift toward support of South Africa, when in fact they were more often than not a cranky protest against Black African radicalism.

During this entire period, from 1957 to 1974, very few Americans took any interest in Southern African policy. Conservatives were undoubtedly content with *de facto* policy, with its emphasis on relatively unencumbered trade and investment, and felt no need to criticise except when sanctions were applied to Rhodesia. Liberals, both white and black, did increasingly attack the failure of US policy to encourage political change in the white regimes, but they had no impact on the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. During the Nixon Administration, some of these liberals joined warily with white and black radicals to attack fiercely what they saw as moral abdication in favour of the white regimes. This momentary coalition also failed to influence policy and fell apart quickly. One contentious

point was whether to win over prospective Democratic Presidential nominees to a more radical policy or to ignore the two-party system and form a black party. In fact, George McGovern's Southern African platform was drawn up by a small group of radical scholars, but his enormous defeat (and the absence of campaign attention to Southern Africa) left unclear the utility of this approach.

The US intervention in Angola during 1975 marks a major turning point for US policy. In the first place, almost every senior official argued *against* taking sides in the Angolan civil war. The CIA Director stressed the similarity of the three movements, their vague socialism, and openness to US influence and aid. Efforts toward reconciliation – a political intervention – were preferable. Kissinger was alone in advocacy of indirect military intervention on the side of UNITA and the FNLA, by a rapid increase in financial support for them. Because of his special ties with President Ford, he won the day, but at the cost of considerable alienation of his colleagues and subordinate officials, Congress and the media. Radical interest groups took new hope from this policy failure, arguing that support for the MPLA would have been the ideal policy. The continued refusal of the US to recognise the MPLA government, and the strong suggestion of continued CIA support for UNITA, give these radicals potential to build wider support among liberals who feel Kissinger is overstating the Soviet and Cuban regional menace.

Kissinger began his present intricate regional initiative as a device to obscure his profound failure in Angola. The Soviets, but more especially the Cubans, were to be blamed for Angola, but in doing so it became necessary to put Southern Africa into the context of cold war competition. Kissinger did this instinctively. He had no previous interest in the complexities of regional politics. His basic intellectual framework is that of super-power competition. It is ironic that all his subsequent commitment of energy and prestige to Southern Africa rests in this framework, because if his efforts fail to achieve a stable solution to the political problems of Rhodesia and South West Africa in the next few months, they will have the paradoxical result of increasing Soviet and Cuban regional involvement in support of disgruntled black nationalists in Rhodesia and South West Africa.

It would be hazardous to suggest the course of the Kissinger "shuttle" diplomacy at this early stage, but some of its basic elements are already apparent. First, much like his extensive Middle East "shuttle", this one contains the central paradox of Kissinger, the conceiver of grand international schemes for order, acting in extremely pragmatic (and even disorderly) ways. In the Middle East, this meant that Sadat on one occasion, and Rabin on another, were able to win his endorsement of specific proposals which reflected their own immediate preferences. Much the same thing may be

happening now (in mid-September 1976), between Kissinger and Ian Smith. Their apparent agreement is hard to understand, unless it amounts to a modest extension of Smith's recent moves to add blacks to his Cabinet and to the House of Assembly, rather than Smith's acquiescence in a timed transition (two to five years) to black nationalist rule; an alternative which would require that black nationalists (rather than chiefs and apolitical blacks) have the controlling voice in the transitional Cabinet. For Kissinger – to give more credit to his technique than it may deserve – acceptance of such a moderate change on Smith's part is probably no more than a device, rather than a commitment on principle. Kissinger can now turn to Kaunda, Nyerere, Khama and Machel. Their insistence on black nationalist government in Rhodesia could then be transmitted to Smith, with Kissinger holding to the role of disinterested mediator, doing no more than pleading with Smith to maintain the continuity of the negotiation process by making an additional concession to this point of view.

There are two obvious shortcomings to this technique. Firstly, at best it means a compromise which is almost certain not to be acceptable to most Rhodesian black nationalists. Secondly, because Carter is likely to be elected in November, Kissinger's term as Secretary of State will end in January 1977, and his ability to persist in renewed rounds of negotiations with Smith and Vorster will end. The same shortcomings apply in somewhat different detailed ways to South West Africa and South Africa itself. Toward South West Africa it is improbable that Kissinger will be able to complete the mediation between the Turnhalle participants and SWAPO before 20 January, 1977. Toward South Africa, the obvious cost of concentrating diplomacy in such personalised efforts, and depending on Prime Minister Vorster to apply indirect pressure on Smith, is that no effective pressure on South Africa itself can be expected as long as Kissinger still hopes for a "constructive" South African role in settling the Rhodesian and South West African disputes.

That brings us finally to the Carter Administration. Faced with loose ends from the Kissinger "shuttle", what would a Carter Administration do? Speculative as the following must be, the constraints at work are remarkably clear. Firstly, Carter will depend for advice on a small group of men, all of whom are liberals. They will *not* recommend support of either the Rhodesian or South African governments. Among them, there will be a substantial split between those who give relatively little weight to race and human rights – Zbigniew Brzezinski, Cyrus Vance and George Ball fall into this category – and those who give it greater weight – Congressman Andrew Young, Tony Lake, Don McHenry and Roger Morris. But, somewhat like the similar split in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, there is considerable overlap between the two groups.

The former are not unaware of moral dilemmas to policy; the latter, all former government officials, are painfully aware of the difficulties of translating morality into effective policy. On the whole, their consensus will be for continued pressure on both white governments, and at a higher level than that now involved in the Kissinger exercise.

Carter himself is a mystery. His own attitude toward race in Georgia was evolutionary rather than radical; but his staff endorsed a Southern African platform at the Democratic National Convention which was almost as punitive as that endorsed by McGovern in 1972. His much publicised support from Andrew Young and Martin Luther King, Sr. will be offset to some extent by his support from conservative Southern whites. He must balance these two sources of support, whose views of Southern African policy tend to be antithetical. Finally, in trying to assess his decision-making style to judge how likely he is to intervene personally on Southern African issues and in what ways, another paradox emerges: he talks of open government, but he is also a man remarkably sure of the wisdom of his own views.

But, the situations which a Carter Administration must face, suggest what will be done – and will not be done. The Rhodesian fighting is unlikely to end, assuming that Kissinger cannot get Smith to accept black nationalist predominance in the transitional government. The fighting in South West Africa may increase, with the MPLA and the Cubans providing support to SWAPO, but not playing any direct role in the skirmishes. Black unrest in South African cities will almost certainly grow, given the lack of government response, the indeterminate detention of most of the black leaders who had some chance of channeling the unrest, and the deepening depression-inflation whose impact of greater unemployment and higher living costs will fall most strongly on urban blacks. The difference between the Carter Administration and the Nixon-Ford Administrations will therefore be a matter of inclination, rather than a massive shift in policy. As Kissinger forced an inclination *toward* the white governments, the values shared by some of Carter's advisers, and Carter himself, will force a shift *toward* the black nationalists.

There will also, however, be contradictory pressures. Most important, Brzezinski – certain to be Carter's "Kissinger" – while himself a Polish expatriate and determinedly anti-Communist, seems to have a more flexible view of Soviet challenges to US interests than does Kissinger. He is unlikely to see the present Soviet-Cuban involvement in Angola, or even its piecemeal extension to Rhodesia *via* Mozambique or to South West Africa, as a high-level threat to basic US interests. This basic assessment will argue against a deepening US intervention *on either side* of the regional black/white conflict.

Carter himself has spoken of limiting US political intervention in regional disputes, although it is not clear whether he also applies this dictum to the Southern African racial disputes. What can be expected in the first year of the Carter Administration is a gradual redirection of the Kissinger initiatives to give greater weight to the preferences of SWAPO and the various Rhodesian ANC and "Third Force" leaders. An increased Soviet-Cuban-MPLA role in support of increased fighting in Rhodesia and South West Africa is unlikely to generate an equivalent US response. Certainly there will be no open support for either the Rhodesian or South African governments.

In the longer run, over the full four years of a Carter Administration, the prospects grow for increased and, for the first time, effective pressure against South Africa. The motivation will come from growing anxiety among American liberals over the South African government's inability to deal with its urban black problems. The effective instrument will be the US ability to further lower the gold price – a power which the US has always held, but never consciously used for this end. The US dominance in the IMF and, if need be, its ability to sell gold from its own reserve stocks could be a crucial potential pressure. That pressure, too, is constrained by growing counter-pressures from European governments, whose support for the US matters more than being able to put pressure on South Africa. But, nonetheless, the potential pressure remains very strong, because from the US point of view fairly small sales of gold (not offensive to European interests) will be enough to keep the price down to a level which is obviously inadequate to meet South African monetary and developmental requirements.

THE ROLE OF SOUTH AFRICA IN FUTURE US FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY

Clark Murdock

Before turning to what must be a fairly speculative analysis of the likely approach of a Carter Administration, a review of past and current US policy towards South Africa is necessary; and then the political, military and economic stakes involved in Southern Africa, from the perspective of the United States, may be analysed.

Until very recently, South Africa – in fact Africa in general – was close to a non-issue for the American public and a very low priority issue for the American government. Policy-making with respect to South Africa was characterised by non-crisis decision-making – that is, *little public awareness or interest in policy outcome*, relatively few interest groups involved in decision-making, infrequent involvement by top-level decision-makers, and bureaucratically-determined policy that was inherently conservative and not amenable to change except in response to external events.

In terms of policy substance since World War II, there developed an increasing gap between US verbal criticism of South Africa's racial policies – made largely in response to Third World pressures – and the reality of growing US economic stakes in South Africa and informal, though declining, military co-operation between the United States and South Africa. US exports to South Africa had been \$66 million in 1939, \$230 million in 1946 and were approximately \$500 million in the early 1970's. More significantly, the United States has consistently run a favourable balance of trade with South Africa – in 1971, South Africa imported \$332 million more from the United States than it exported to the US. United States direct foreign investment in South Africa virtually doubled in the 1960's – totalling between \$750 million and \$1 billion in 1970, with average yearly returns of about 17 percent (approximately twice the rate of return on domestic investment).

Although the United States resisted South African efforts to win admission into NATO, thus avoiding any formal alliance relationship with South Africa, the United States after World War II did receive the benefits of a tacit military relationship – favourable settlement of lend-lease debts (totalling \$100 million), a South African presence in the Berlin airlift and the Korean War, and the promise of fervent anti-communist support in the cold war struggle with “international communism”. After the Korean War, military co-operation gradually declined – joint military exercises ceased in the

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early 1960's, the US Navy stopped using South African ports in 1967, the US announced a unilateral arms embargo in 1963, and so on. The United States did establish space tracking stations in 1960 and 1962 and co-operated with South Africa in the field of nuclear energy.

The declining level of military co-operation was largely a reflection of US responses to increasing pressure from the Third World, particularly as it was expressed in the United Nations. During the Truman Administration, US foreign policy was dominated by the cold war conflict – leading the US to treat South Africa as an informal European ally on the African continent – and the US took the position that the United Nations could not interfere with the internal affairs of any member state. The United States did, however, oppose South Africa's position on South West Africa (claiming that it violated international law) but did not support the imposition of sanctions. During the Eisenhower Administration, the changing composition of the United Nations resulted in a greater number of resolutions condemning South African racial policies. The United States continued to abstain, holding to the position that the internal affairs of member states was beyond the purview of the UN. In 1958, the US did recognise the right of the UN to express itself on South Africa – agreeing that it constituted a threat to peace in that area – and voted for a resolution expressing “regret and concern” about South Africa's racial policies (having earlier opposed the use of the word “condemn”). The United States, however, continued to oppose any resolutions that included sanctions.

In official utterances, the United States avoided any direct comment on South Africa's internal affairs – six days before the Sharpeville incident on 21 March, 1960 the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Joseph C Satterthwaite, told a Congressional Committee that the US was “not free to make gratuitous statement on the internal affairs of a foreign country”. The domestic political reaction in the United States changed that policy, however. A week later the State Department declared: “The United States deplores violence in all forms and hopes that the African people of South Africa will be able to obtain redress for their legitimate grievances by peaceful means. While the United States, as a matter of practice, does not ordinarily comment on the internal affairs of governments with which it enjoys normal relations, it cannot help but regret the tragic loss of life resulting from the measures taken against the demonstrators in South Africa.” While the issue soon lost public visibility within the United States, the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations brought an increase in official criticism of South Africa, with the US supporting anti-apartheid resolutions that did not include sanctions. The US did support a 1963 Security Council resolution calling for an arms embargo of South Africa, a policy that

was pursued fairly rigorously by the Johnson Administration.

The Nixon Administration brought a change in policy – sometimes called a “tilt towards Pretoria” – that saw a cooling of anti-apartheid rhetoric, an easing of the arms embargo (for Johnson, a *Lear* jet was a weapon, for Nixon and Kissinger, it was not) and a counterbalancing increase in the US commitment to Black African countries, particularly those in Southern Africa. Until 1975, however, little consistent attention was paid to Southern Africa and the gap between anti-apartheid rhetoric and the reality of economic co-operation remained.

Current policy towards South Africa has been elevated from its previous non-crisis or low priority status. First the Angolan civil war brought Southern Africa forcefully to the attention of Secretary Kissinger. Kissinger possibly viewed the Angolan conflict first as a test of whether the United States could conduct an activist foreign policy in the post-Vietnam and post-Watergate environment, and secondly as an issue that must be viewed as part of the super-power conflict with the Soviet Union. The American public and the Congress, however, did not share Kissinger’s alarm at the expansion of Soviet influence, but reacted to the spectre of an American covert intervention in another civil war – in December 1975 the Senate vetoed any more covert aid to Angola.

Kissinger’s worries about Soviet influence in Southern Africa were further inflamed in 1976 by the increasing violence within Rhodesia – “unofficial” reports indicated that the US feared a violent transfer of power in a year – and the approaching UN deadline for independence in South West Africa. Kissinger therefore initiated the Zürich meeting with Prime Minister Vorster. Events in Southern Africa, received great public visibility within the United States, however, not with the Rhodesian question or the issue of independence in Namibia but with the continuing civil disturbances within South Africa that began with Soweto on 16 June. In the same way that Sharpeville eroded official reluctance to comment on apartheid policies within South Africa, so did Soweto, and the ensuing disturbances elevated Southern Africa to prominence on the US foreign policy agenda.

At the same time, Kissinger himself faced an imminent departure from government service, creating a desire for one more “success” on the scale of the Middle East negotiations, and President Ford – as an underdog in the Presidential election – wanted a dramatic success to help overcome Candidate Carter’s lead in the polls. President Ford, therefore, acknowledged that the “crisis” in Southern Africa warranted a “major effort” to obtain a diplomatic solution in South West Africa and Rhodesia. He declared that US policy had three objectives:

- to prevent an escalation of violence which in time could threaten

America's national security;

- to realise popular aspirations while guaranteeing minority rights and ensuring economic progress; and
- to resist the intervention of outside forces in the African situation.

The events following Kissinger's visit to Pretoria that resulted in the current meetings in Geneva, are all familiar. President-elect Carter has to date supported the Kissinger initiatives in Southern Africa, although he has given some signs of significant changes in policy to come. Before turning to that subject, the stakes involved for the United States in Southern Africa must be reviewed.

The economic stakes are far less important to the US than either radical critics arguing the economic content of US foreign policy or conservative supporters of the existing regimes in Southern Africa would have one believe. Total American investment in South Africa represents less than 11 percent of total US direct foreign investment (about 40 percent of investment in Africa) and US trade about 1 percent of total trade (about 30 percent of trade with Africa as a whole). The presumably "vital" mineral imports (chromium, vanadium, platinum and asbestos) in no single case represents more than 40 percent of US imports; moreover, US reliance on South African sources has been declining (the Soviet Union is South Africa's chief competitor) and – unlike oil – all these minerals can, and have been, stockpiled. More significantly, US corporations – and the US government – have become considerably more sophisticated in dealing with radical regimes; they know that the US multinational corporation controls the international market and that a radical regime needs the multinational corporation and the American market more in the short-run than the United States needs it. US/Libyan economic relations, or the fact that Gulf Oil continued royalty payments to the MPLA throughout the Angolan conflict are certainly illustrative. US economic interests in South Africa are relatively small and, what is more, their maintenance does not demand, and is not perceived as demanding, the preservation of the *status quo*. In fact, one could argue that since the economic interests of the US are both greater in Black Africa and growing at a faster rate than in South Africa, the political *status quo* in South Africa is inimical to the long-range economic interests of the United States.

With respect to the military stakes involved, they as well tend to be overstated. With the decline of the cold war the possibility of political conflict expressing itself in military terms has decreased. In any case, the military importance of land bases or local seaports has greatly declined and a Soviet naval base in Durban will not greatly increase the capability of the Soviet Union to interfere with the Cape oil route, much less increase the likelihood of the Soviet Union risking a major confrontation by such an interdiction. The United

States' physical presence is limited to the space tracking stations which can be located elsewhere.

The political stakes involved for the United States are considerably more difficult to analyse. Considerable dispute exists over how important the Soviet "success" in Angola is – certainly similar such "successes" in Africa or the Middle East in the past have proven to be transitory. The Soviet Union may discover, as the US has, that the costs of actively supporting Third World regimes frequently outweighs the benefits. Whatever its importance – and one would argue the United States has come to feel that it is considerably less important than it once did – the US is certainly constrained in its response to Soviet initiatives. Domestic public opinion will not currently support either direct or indirect military participation in Southern Africa – both Kissinger and Carter have explicitly proscribed it. Moreover, US political interests in South Africa cannot be separated from its political interests with Black African countries in general – and here US political support of the existing regime in South Africa is a distinct liability. As President Nixon stated in his 1971 Report on Foreign Policy: "The third broad area in which Africans seek our assistance is the search for racial and political justice in Southern Africa. There is perhaps no issue which has so pernicious a potential for the well-being of Africa and for American interests there. It is for many, the sole issue by which our friendship for Africa is measured." Secretary Kissinger stressed carefully and explicitly that US policies must, above all, receive the support of the Black African countries: "Every step that has brought us here has been carefully discussed with the leaders in Africa and especially with the front-line presidents. Every step we will take in the future will be closely co-ordinated with the front-line presidents. We will do what we are asked to do, we will do nothing that is not requested, we will take no initiatives that are not invited and whatever progress will occur depends on the attitude of the parties and the goodwill of the participants."

Reinforcing the US desire to woo Black Africa, of course, is the composition of the domestic public within the United States. Politically no US politician can overtly support white minority rule in Southern Africa – Kissinger sandwiched his trip to South Africa with anti-apartheid statements ("South Africa's internal structure is incompatible with any sense of human dignity") and when in Pretoria, Kissinger met with black opposition leaders to the Vorster regime – an implicit denial of the legitimacy of the regime with which he was negotiating. That President-elect Carter will be more responsive to Black American opinion can hardly be doubted – 94 percent of the blacks voted for him and the black vote provided the margin of victory in seven states.

One final US stake in South Africa must be mentioned – that is

the interest that the US might have in making its foreign policy consistent with its ideals. Though often violated – perhaps more often than observed – basic ideals of American political culture (such as racial equality, self-determination, human rights and majority rule) are violated by South Africa's racial policies, and to the extent that US policy is perceived as supporting that regime there can be political costs both within and outside the United States.

In summary, the concrete or physical stakes involved for the United States (that is, economic and military) are absolutely not that important and are declining in importance. Moreover, it is also not clearly the case that they are served by support of the *status quo* within Southern Africa. To the extent that US officials and the domestic public perceive that in another decade or so Southern Africa will consist of nothing but black majority states, long-range material interests will certainly not be seen as served by continued support of the *status quo*. In terms of the super-power conflict, it can be argued plausibly that US interests are served by increasing US appeals to Black Africa – the US is constrained by its own political climate from active support of the white regimes in Southern Africa and thus the US may have to counter Soviet influence with policies appealing to Black Africa (the example of Egypt comes to mind) rather than supporting regimes opposed by Soviet “clientele” states. Finally, US political stakes with respect to Africa in general, its domestic public and consistency between principal and practice all argue against the continuation of policy as it existed until 1976.

How does the election of Jimmy Carter affect this calculus, which holds for any American administration facing Southern Africa as a high priority issue? While Carter has heavily criticised Kissinger's style – “lone ranger, one-man policy of international adventure” – and contrasted Kissinger's devotion to “balance of power politics” with his own advocacy of “world-order politics” and an “aggressive policy for peace”, he has supported the Kissinger initiatives but has promised an “increase in our diplomatic commitment, in our foreign policy efforts to achieve a lasting peace in Africa, a peace built on majority rule with protection of minority rights”. In addition, Carter has insisted that the American people and Congress will be more involved in foreign policy-making – “no more secret diplomacy” – and that foreign policy in a Carter Administration would be more consistent with American ideals.

What all this means is not terribly clear. Carter, as Kissinger, favours a peaceful transition to multiracial governments in Rhodesia and South West Africa. The United States is clearly advantaged if the transition is peaceful, since a violent transfer of power usually brings to power a more radical regime more inimical to the United States – though, as has been argued, US material interests can be

achieved even with radical regimes. Kissinger's initiatives in Southern Africa were based on the premise, however, that the issues of Rhodesia and South West Africa could be dealt with separately from the issue of internal change within South Africa – this is Vorster's policy as well. The continuing civil disturbances within South Africa made this policy more difficult to follow within the United States but, nevertheless, that assumption persisted. Carter's rhetoric has tended to emphasise Southern Africa as a whole, rather than dividing it into three separate issues. In addition, Carter's political debt to black support in the election, his campaign promises about more public involvement in foreign policy and more morality in foreign policy all make it harder for him to de-couple internal change in South Africa from Rhodesia and South West Africa.

Carter, as Kissinger, has rejected the use of economic sanctions and he has repeated the familiar government line about the impact of American investment: "I think our American businessman can be a constructive force for achieving racial justice within South Africa. I think the weight of our investments there, the value the South Africans place on access to American capital and technology can be used as a positive force in settling regional problems." In the past, when Southern Africa was a low priority issue with little public visibility, the United States could adhere to this policy, even when there was no demonstrable change in South Africa's internal policy, as has been the case. If there continues to be little evidence of change, the political pressures on Carter – some of them induced by his own campaign promises, but many resulting from the basic calculus of US interests in Southern Africa – to pursue an activist policy will be great. South Africa, in any case, will experience economic sanctions deriving from the market place – the net capital inflow into South Africa in the second quarter of 1976 dropped to \$102 million from a quarterly average of \$545 million in 1975, the drop in revenue from the sales of gold (approximately \$1,15 billion in 1976), increased unemployment and inflation, and so forth. But Carter will experience both domestic and international political pressure to pursue a more activist policy – including economic sanctions – on behalf of anti-apartheid policies if there is little internal change within South Africa and domestic disturbances continue.

The extent of this pressure depends to a considerable extent on the public visibility of Southern Africa within the United States. Events in Rhodesia – whatever the outcome in Geneva – will ensure some visibility and while the question of South West Africa has temporarily receded, that is unlikely to persist. The principal factor causing high visibility within the United States is, in my opinion, the presence of racial turmoil within South Africa. If that subsides without significant internal changes in policy, that will reduce the pressure on Carter to treat Southern Africa as one issue rather than a

divisible issue – his own personal predilections aside. This assumes that the issues of Rhodesia and South West Africa can be solved and removed from the centre of the US foreign policy agenda.

If, however, racial turmoil persists – even if the problems of Rhodesia and South West Africa are solved – this not only underlines the ineffectiveness of a US policy emphasising the role of its economic presence as an agent of peaceful change, but also increases the pressure on the Carter Administration to pursue a policy more similar to that which South Africa recently pursued with respect to Rhodesia. In either case, the most important factor in determining US policy towards South Africa – a factor which has increased in importance with the election of the Carter Administration – is the level of internal stability within South Africa.

TRANSKEI: THE QUESTION OF RECOGNITION

IMPRESSIONS FROM THE UMTATA CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER 1976

John Barratt

In 1959, when Dr. Verwoerd introduced the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill, which duly became law, he said: "If it is in the power of the Bantu to develop towards full independence, (they) will develop in that way." But this idea of eventual independence was not taken very seriously then, not even when Transkei became the first homeland to accept self-government (which came into effect with the passing of the Transkei Constitution Act of 1963). Dr. Verwoerd's policy was a controversial one – inside and outside South Africa – and it was heavily criticised for not being an answer to the real political problems of South Africa, and even for compounding them. This criticism has not diminished. But the policy was also criticised for being a sham, because very few believed that the Government seriously intended to take the final step of granting any homeland full independence. It was only comparatively recently that this has been taken seriously, and perhaps for many it is only now – since 26 October, 1976 – that the fact is sinking in that Transkei is no longer part of the Republic of South Africa.

The *de facto* situation of an independent Transkei will become clearer as time passes, whether this is approved or not. There are already changes within Transkei, which are fairly dramatic for South Africans – e.g. the complete removal, almost overnight, of apartheid restrictions in hotels and elsewhere. But more significant will be the efforts of the Transkeian government to demonstrate independence from South Africa, as it will have to do, if it hopes some day to achieve international acceptance and recognition as an independent state.

No country has yet recognised Transkeian independence, except South Africa. Why is this? The answer cannot be found in strictly international legal terms, as far as the normally accepted criteria for international recognition are concerned. It is rather the political realities which affect the recognition issue, and three general reasons for non-recognition can be given:

- Firstly, Transkei is perceived in the world as a product of the South African government's policy of apartheid, and recognition would imply international support for that policy. This would have been a major political problem at the best of times, but in the present circumstances in Southern Africa, especially since the

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Soweto disturbances began in June 1976, no other government wants to be put in the position of even appearing to give support to South African domestic policies.

- Secondly, there is the strong opposition from Black African states, which culminated in the mandatory resolution adopted at the last OAU Summit Meeting in July 1976, forbidding member states to recognise Transkeian independence. Apart from the opposition to apartheid which this resolution demonstrated, it was based on the firm African policy (since the foundation of the OAU in 1963) against secession, partition or any alteration of the boundaries of African states inherited from the colonial powers. While there may have been some compromises with this policy, it has generally been adhered to (even at the cost of violent wars in Nigeria, Sudan and Ethiopia), for the pragmatic reason that, if any attempt were begun to rearrange boundaries more realistically to fit ethnic and other realities, this would be a never-ending and very disruptive process. These attitudes and policies of the African states towards South Africa and Transkei obviously affect, and may even determine, the attitudes and policies of states elsewhere in the world, including those of the West.
- Thirdly, reinforcing the above two reasons, is the opposition of other blacks in South Africa generally to the homeland independence concept – or at least no indication of wide support. An argument of other governments is that partition of South Africa could only be accepted internationally if it was clearly supported by a majority of *all* South Africans. The controversy over Transkei citizenship for people living outside Transkei itself has aggravated the situation, increasing opposition within South Africa and strengthening the reaction abroad.

The question of economic viability is not a crucial one in the context of recognition, because obviously there are many states which are in a similar position of economic dependence. So, it is not necessary to pursue this aspect, important as the question of economic development is for Transkei itself in giving real substance to its independence.

It is not the aim of this brief article to argue the merits or demerits of independence from a South African point of view, i.e. in the context of the Government's separate development policy. The intention is rather to indicate (on the basis of impressions gained at the Umtata Conference of the Institute in November 1976) some of the answers which the Transkei government is giving to justify independence and to gain recognition.

The first thing to be said is that Transkei's case is very different from the arguments used by South African official spokesmen, and it is probably true to say that it is not well-known to most South Afri-

cans (black and white), partly because the media have not appeared to be very interested in presenting it.

Firstly, from the Transkei side there is the denial that Transkei is simply a product of South African policies and that it is, or was, a homeland like the others. It is admitted that separate development made independence possible, but a unique position for Transkei in the South African system is claimed. Historical arguments are used to show that Transkei should have achieved independence in the same way as Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, and Britain is blamed for handing the Transkeian Territories to South Africa in 1910.

In an address to participants, before the Umtata Conference began, Chief George Matanzima (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justice) ascribed the hostile attitude towards his country to "ignorance about the historical background of Transkei as a territorial entity independent of the Republic of South Africa", and he maintained that the world community appeared "to be so obsessed" with South Africa's racial policy that it was unable to appreciate "simple facts like the historical right of the Transkeian people to govern themselves". Chief George then continued as follows:

"The regions comprising the Republic of Transkei were annexed by the British government to the Cape Colony (i.e. the present Cape Province of the Republic of South Africa) between the years 1879 and 1894, and in the same way as the present Republic of Botswana was annexed to the same Cape Colony by the same British government in terms of the Cape Act No. 4 of 1895....

"... in 1910 the British government, instead of granting Transkei a dominion status, allowed my country to be drawn into the then Union of South Africa without any regard to the political aspirations of my people and on a matter on which they were not even consulted....

"I need hardly remind you that the end result of the hardships we suffered under the various South African governments was the final breakaway of our territory from that country on 26 October, 1976. I think it is now clear to you that the independence of Transkei is based on historical grounds coupled with the natural will of the people to attain nationhood, and is not necessarily based on the twenty-eight year old policy of racial discrimination presently followed by the South African government, although this policy might have prompted the latter to agree to granting us independence.

"I must now appeal to all peace-loving countries of the free world to judge Transkei on its own policies and not to penalise it for policies of the South African government over which it has

never had any control. Transkei is a non-racial state and it is an insult to its people to accuse it of promoting racial ideologies by establishing a society free of racial discrimination. I, however, feel that a greater responsibility rests on the British government to tell the truth about Transkei which, as the first colonial power, must be in possession of authentic documentary proof about the political history of our territory."

In a paper presented to the Conference, Mr. Tsepo Letlaka (Minister of Finance) referred to Transkei as still being "an area of freedom up to the middle of the last century", in spite of "the rampages of European imperialism in Africa". However, by a process of annexation all the peoples of Transkei were brought under British rule at a time when "there were in Southern Africa the aggressive and competitive land-grabbing forces of the Boer and the Briton. Annexation by the British was perhaps a much safer haven for the people of Transkei in a world that had suddenly become dangerous and insecure. After a series of disastrous military encounters with the Boers, the Basuthos were constrained to a similar view; so were the Tswanas." Mr. Letlaka continued:

"After the Anglo-Boer War, Transkei was unilaterally and without consent of, or consultation with, her people handed over by Britain in 1910 to the white-dominated Union of South Africa. In 1961, South Africa became a republic with white hegemony firmly entrenched. The people of Transkei, like all other black people in South Africa, became victims of discriminatory laws passed by the all-white Parliament in Cape Town without their participation and consultation. It was under such circumstances that Transkei had to struggle for its freedom."

Mr Letlaka also quoted from a statement of Prime Minister K. D. Matanzima, referring to independence, as follows:

"It is a manifestation and culmination of the struggle by the indigenous people of the Transkeian Territories for liberation and independence since the Union of South Africa in 1910 – the darkest year for black South Africans."

Secondly, it emerged from discussions at the Conference that independence now is not seen as meaning necessarily a final and permanent break with the rest of South Africa. At least some of those in authority look to the possibility in the future of fairly radical changes in South Africa and Southern Africa generally – in other words a restructuring of the political system, in which Transkei would play a part. A form of federation in the future is, for example, not excluded as a possible political system. Thus in a sense, independence is perceived as open-ended and as part of a process towards wider change in the region.

Although this idea of "open-endedness" emerged more clearly in discussions (and not explicitly in prepared papers), one can at least see an indication of this thinking in the paper of Professor M. Njisane (Ambassador to South Africa), where he refers to a more fully-developed African personality as the "growing tip" which will "jolt South Africa back into sanity politics of re-union". He continues: "This will be a true union of equals with no master-and-servant laws. *The political consequence of all this will mean, in a capsule, getting back to square one; to re-examine and re-define a new negotiated order.* This is the only dependable basis of co-existence, discovering the art of living together even with bad neighbours. This type of relationship must be constantly worked at and reconstituted."

Thirdly (a point related to the previous one), there is the denial that Transkeians are cutting themselves off from the rest of the black people of South Africa and from their concern, suffering and demands. It is argued instead that Transkeians will be a more effective liberating influence now that they can operate independently, with their own power base – small as that may be.

Professor Njisane argued, for instance, that new methods to bring about change had to be found:

"After years of more of the same and worse since Western white domination was firmly established and entrenched by the Union of South Africa Act of 1910, there is no justification or excuse on the part of blacks in South Africa to repeat the monotonous cycle of hope and disillusionment. Reasonable criteria of political success and failure having collapsed, it was only natural that many Africans living under what seemed an unchanging hardened system began to wonder whether or not it was time for them to seek alternative ways that would result in some measure of public action. Inaction and increasingly desperate forms of response to the problem added to a growing sense of powerlessness; more and more people began to see wisdom in Nkrumah's dictum: 'seek ye first the political kingdom and all else shall be added unto you', rather than the eternally elusive integration."

What of the future? It can be expected that the Transkeian government, using the arguments referred to as well as actions to assert Transkei's independence, will engage in a campaign to convince at least some parts of world opinion. Africa and the OAU will be a prime target, as was indicated by Advocate Digby Koyana (Minister of Foreign Affairs) in his paper at the Conference. He concluded, for instance, that the basic problem was that "we have been found guilty by association, without having been given even a hearing.... It has been plainly stated that our acceptance by our brothers would be tantamount to acceptance by them of apartheid. Let everyone

know that the policies of apartheid of the South African government are fundamentally irrelevant to the question of freedom and liberation for the people of Transkei." Minister Koyana also stated:

"We do not wish to join the OAU just for the fun of it. We wish to make our contribution to the struggle against racism from a position of strength, and that strength will flow from our working hand in hand with our brothers in the OAU. I know that behind the expressions of doubt and the diplomatic cautions, there is much goodwill for Transkei and her people - there lies our greatest opportunity."

Efforts will also be made to change opinion in Western countries, which are now adopting a "wait and see" attitude, not cutting off all contacts with the people of Transkei. Western attitudes will, of course, be effected by any change in attitude in Africa.

Given the present outlook in Southern Africa, with areas of developing conflict, the Transkeian government's task will not be an easy one. But given also the strongly motivated case which Transkeian Ministers present, as well as the impression of effectiveness and efficiency which the top levels of Government create, one can conclude that they stand a good chance of some eventual success.

Much will depend, of course, on the development of relations with South Africa, and on how South Africans respond to an independent Transkei as it develops its own special character. Transkeians hope, for instance, that South Africa will avoid any attempts to make propaganda out of independence, because they feel that this will make their task more difficult. For instance, it is argued now that the South African effort to "sell" independence over the past year, seriously harmed the case that Transkeians were trying to put themselves, and caused them to suffer from "guilt by association". While the facts of economic dependence are appreciated by Transkeians, they hope that South Africans will develop greater sophistication about the political relationship. It can be expected, in any case, that Transkei will seek to do all it can to lessen to some degree the economic dependence on South Africa - in the same way as the other small neighbour states have done, with mixed success.

What is true for the South African government's approach to Transkeian independence, is true also for the private sector and especially for the press. In the past, the press generally, both English and Afrikaans, has been so concerned (sometimes obsessed) with either criticising or supporting South African racial and homeland policies, that it has not been ready to listen to another voice putting a new and different case which deserves to be heard, before it is judged.

BRIEF REPORTS

CHINA AFTER MAO TSE-TUNG

Almost immediately after the news flash that announced Mao's death, pointless questions were being asked ("how do you assess the impact...") and pious unfacts enunciated ("he was a humble man, a man of peace..."). The more sensible agreed that Mao was a "great man". As Solon of Athens observed: from storm clouds comes lightning, and from great men comes despotism and destruction. Mao himself was the first to deny that he was a man of peace, or that the Chinese people as a whole are as peace-loving as is often alleged.

This is not the time to perpetuate myths that go back to Herodotus, with his archetypal travellers' tales of a happy people beyond the snows of Central Asia. These classical allusions, however, are not as irrelevant as one may think. On 5 April, 1976, some 100 000 people rioted in Peking's main square and proclaimed that they "do not want another First Emperor", but "genuine Marxists who will modernise China's defence and economy". This was quoted in the official *Peking Review*, which has carried many historical articles in recent years explicitly pointing to the analogy between Mao and the first Ch'in Emperor, who united China in 221 BC by conquering the independent nation-states and warlords that existed in Herodotus' time.

This analogy is not at all far-fetched. Born 82 years ago, Mao represented a China in which rural society was essentially neolithic, and the top-hammer of empire a survival from what, for us, was the Graeco-Roman era. Like the Caesars he brought peace of a kind to a world weary of warfare. But he could not devise a system for peaceful succession, nor for non-antagonistic relations with foreigners or "barbarians". Truce with the strong, the better to divide and liberate the weak, was the nearest he could get to such a concept. Given the dialectical unity of war and peace, what counted was the *timing* of the switch.

Disorders after Chou's death

What counts for us is not to weigh Mao's achievements and crimes, but to foresee what comes next; who will take charge (if anyone), and will he/she/they change the anti-Soviet policy of rapprochement with the USA, Japan and Europe implemented by Chou En-lai, with Mao's authority? All that can be said with certainty is that *only the surprising can happen; there may even be no chaos*. But the results of Chou En-lai's death should provide a preview – apart from what was officially called an organised, planned

This is an edited version of a report written by Professor Ian Adie of the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia, and published as a research paper (19/1976) by the *Foreign Affairs Research Institute*, Arrow House, Whitehall, London.

and premeditated counter-revolutionary political incident and sabotage at Tien An Men Square in the capital, followed by the dismissal of Chou's heir, Teng Hsiao-ping, from all his posts in and out of the Party. Similar riots took place in several other parts of China, notably Honan and Hopei provinces and remote Yunnan in the south west. Local radio stations revealed signs of political and social unrest in about a third of China's provincial-level administrative units. In Honan, for example, the First Secretary of the Provincial Communist Party Committee told a mass meeting that the Peking riot was "not accidental or isolated".

Other Party leaders reiterated the standard call for search and destroy operations against counter-revolutionaries. The official media in Fukien, the "front" province facing Taiwan, typically warned that "class struggle in our province is very acute . . . there should be no establishment of inter-unit ties, no organisation of fighting groups of any kind and no ganging-up in factions". The terminology used by the authorities in Fukien and other provinces was clearly meant to indicate that a breakdown of order, such as occurred during the Cultural Revolution (1967-69), was imminent. In July, the sudden death of the commander of the Foochow Military Region, "as a martyr at his post", was announced in an unusual manner that drew attention to the unrest in his fief (Fukien and Kwangsi). It was thus not surprising that Teng was replaced by Hua Kuo-feng, Minister of Public Security, as a holding operation.

Radicals versus Pragmatists

However, it soon became clear from the central media, largely controlled by the so-called radicals or Cultural Revolution group (with power base in Shanghai and the Palace, *chez Madame Mao*), that they were not satisfied and wanted Teng arraigned for masterminding the disturbances, as a means of ousting his supporters still in power in the provinces. The latter, however, soon began to use the central slogans about tracking down saboteurs, not to root out the so-called moderates or pragmatists – supporters of the modernisation plans of Chou and Teng – but to suppress those who allegedly were "sabotaging the revolution by sabotaging production": in other words, the radicals. During the Cultural Revolution, this ploy of "waving a Red Flag to bring down the Red Flag" was brought to a fine art, and since it is now being employed again it will be hard for foreign analysts of the Chinese media to figure out who is on which side. But it does seem clear that the main reason for the riots was that after Chou's death his policies for speeding up China's acquisition of modern defence and industrial technology by ties with the USA, Japan and Europe, were being dismantled under the influence of the radicals, under such slogans as "self-reliance" and "defending the achievements of the Cultural Revolution".

After Teng's dismissal, the radical faction leaked alleged position papers drawn up by him and his staff in the ideological journal they publish in Shanghai. He had apparently asked friends in the Academy of Sciences and other brains-trusters to write guidelines for the rehabilitation of the economy from the wounds of the Cultural Revolution; science and technology were to be put first, not ideology, and in order to accelerate industrial development, there must be proper management and more control from Peking over large enterprises in the provinces. In order to provide the necessary skilled manpower, Teng also called for a report on education. The radicals charged his group with undoing the Cultural Revolution and restoring elitism.

The Role of the Army

Putting science and technology first is liable to attract support from the military, but central control of mines and factories in outlying provinces by ministries in Peking cannot please commanders of the eleven military regions, who have enjoyed considerable autonomy since 1969, although they were reshuffled after the Lin Piao affair. If a power struggle is to follow Mao's death, much will depend on the attitude of senior commanders like Ch'en Hsi-lien, who was brought to Peking from Manchuria by the reshuffle. This, it seems, was a reward for his handling (and perhaps provocation) of the March 1969 border incidents with the USSR which furthered the plans of Mao and Chou En-lai for using Nixon as a "stepping stone"¹ to get at the US and its allies and confront the Soviets – plans which were opposed by the Central Army Command under Lin Piao. The struggles preceding the latter's fall, also afford clues to the present situation. While he was in charge, China greatly increased expenditure on military hardware, especially aircraft and missiles.

The year 1971 saw the beginning of a new Five Year Plan – like 1976. Articles and broadcasts then began to discuss, in the usual veiled terms, how certain "political swindlers" (i.e. Lin) saw electronics, atomic technology and jet-engine technology as the answer to all China's problems and the way to finish off "all imperialists". The "correct" line of Mao and Chou was to develop basic industry, e.g. steel; first, mechanise agriculture and use diplomatic and economic links with less dangerous imperialists, to contain the really bad ones in Moscow, while thus building up a really broad infrastructure for an all-Chinese, all-modern military establishment.

After Lin's fall, Peking stopped overspending on its own military hardware and overspent instead on Japanese, European and US petrochemical plants and so forth. By the end of 1974, it had spent almost as much as it did on Soviet factories in the First Five Year

1. Literally, 'cross-ford person', as an official briefing for the troops put it.

Plan period. The development of energy sources – oil and coal – was given high priority. Strange as it may seem to those who still believe China is the land of Blessed Hyperboreans, not men, these gritty questions of resource allocation – whose bailiwick gets a new plant, for example – are of just as much concern to the military-industrial complex in China as in the USA or USSR. Since Madame Mao and her “Shanghai radicals” are not known to have overwhelming military support, their power base seems to consist largely of the media (which magnifies their apparent influence) and possibly some of the factory militias, notably in Shanghai itself, though their reliability has proved doubtful. Just as in Rome, the Army of the Rhine could put up their General for Emperor, and the Praetorian Guard, say another. So, now key military regions such as industrialised Manchuria, the Shanghai-Nanking area and the central south (including Canton), and the loyalty groups of officers who served in the same mountain-top guerrilla unit or Field Army before 1949, will have something to say about the policy and composition of any collective leadership that emerges to succeed the irreplaceable Chou and incorrigible Mao. They will influence the decisions as to who eventually drops the others and establishes himself as *primus inter pares*, Father of the Fatherland, Tribune of the People, Helmsman, Teacher, etc., etc.

The provincial reports of disorder, and travellers’ tales of armed bank robberies and other crimes rare in China, suggest that the army and public security troops will have to take over, as in 1969. The probable result will be a regime more similar to that of the Soviet Union and even a limited and tactical accommodation with Moscow, if only in order better to handle the triangular relationship with it and Washington/Tokyo, from a position nearer equidistance. If the factional fighting becomes as bad as it was during the Cultural Revolution, it is to be feared that the USSR would seek to exploit the situation, if only by threatening moves to strengthen the hand of what it would assess as “healthy elements” in the military.

The forces on Taiwan are not negligible in themselves and it is conceivable that in the context of irreconcilable struggles between power-holders on the mainland, someone might find a way to bring them into play. But it is to be hoped that the men from the black limousines around the Great Hall of the People can manage to avert chaos – not only for the sake of the long-suffering Chinese masses, but because the whole American policy of détente largely depended on a stable China helping to balance Russia. It was, as the *Peking Review* said (quoting Rostow)² “an anthology of error”.

2. *Peking Review*, No. 34, 20 August, 1976, p. 24, quoting *Strategic Review*, No. 2, Spring 1976.

SECRETARY KISSINGER EMPHASISES US COMMITMENT TO AFRICA

When we met here a year ago, I said that America's policy toward Africa was founded upon three principles:

- that self-determination, racial justice, and human rights spread to all of Africa;
- that Africa attain prosperity for its people and become a strong participant in the international economic order; and
- that the continent be free of great power rivalry or conflict.

I think none of us could then have foretold the dramatic events which have taken place this past year in pursuit of each of these goals.

Political Progress

A year ago, events in Rhodesia seemed to be moving inexorably and swiftly toward war – a war that would have had devastating consequences for that country and its neighbours. There was every prospect of conflict that would leave a legacy of bitterness, division and confrontation that could well set back the progress of Southern Africa for generations. Today, as a result of the resolute determination of the African people and the responsible and far-seeing decisions of their leaders, the situation has changed dramatically. A breakthrough has been achieved; negotiation is about to begin; the framework of a settlement exists. An opportunity is now before us for a peaceful transition to a majority-ruled multiracial society in Zimbabwe.

A year ago, the prospects were dim that the Namibian problem could be rapidly or satisfactorily resolved. Today, the inevitability of Namibian independence is accepted by all parties concerned. More important, a way toward agreement among Namibia, South Africa and the United Nations now appears open. Determined efforts are now underway to bring about a constitutional conference at a neutral venue under United Nations aegis – in which all authentic national forces, specifically including SWAPO, will be able to fashion a design for the new state of Namibia.

Also, in the course of the past year, the forces of change have asserted themselves dramatically in South Africa. It is manifest that the internal political, economic and social structure of that country must change. A system based on institutionalised injustice, which brings about periodic violence and upheaval, cannot last. The leaders of South Africa have taken responsible steps to help facilitate a process of change in Rhodesia. The world now looks to them to exercise the same wisdom to bring racial justice to South Africa.

Economic Progress

The past year also has brought the beginnings of what could be a new economic era for Africa. It is clear that, ultimately, it is economic development which will determine whether the aspirations of the African people for progress and human dignity will be fulfilled.

Africa's great natural wealth and considerable potential for agricultural and industrial development have long been impeded by an array of problems:

- recurrent drought and natural disaster;
- heavy reliance by many nations on the production of a single commodity and, as a result, extraordinary dependence on the vagaries of the world economy; and
- a crushing historical burden of poverty.

In the past year the international community has laid the foundation for an attack on all these problems. It is increasingly recognised that in place of sporadic relief efforts to ease the after-effects of natural disaster, what is needed are comprehensive international programmes to address fundamental conditions. Last May in Dakar, I outlined one such programme – a programme for international co-operation to help the nations of the Sahel develop additional water resources, increase crop acreage through modern agricultural techniques and improve food storage – all aimed at making the Sahel less vulnerable to crisis in the future.

Broad-based multinational co-operation has been accelerated to reform the global economic system for the benefit of the developing nations. In the past year – since the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations – major steps proposed at that session have been implemented and promising new measures discussed. Steps have not only been proposed, but carried out – to expand agricultural production world-wide; to improve the earnings potential and market stability of key raw materials; to reduce trade barriers on tropical product exports into the United States; to help those hard hit by increasing energy costs; and to stimulate the flow of modern technology, so as to promote growth and diversify economies now excessively dependent on a single commodity. Africa is a principal beneficiary of these reforms in the international economy.

Africa's trade with and investment from the United States and the industrial nations of the West are crucial and expanding. Africa wants to earn its way. But for some, particularly the poorest and least developed, trade and investment are not enough to overcome the legacy of pervasive poverty. United States bilateral assistance programmes will therefore concentrate increasingly on these countries, and in sectors where the need is greatest.

The United States also believes that closer co-operation among the industrial democracies of North America, Western Europe and

Japan can mean a much greater contribution to the economic development of Africa. Therefore we welcome the proposal of President Giscard d'Estaing of France for a fund to organise and co-ordinate Western assistance efforts to Africa. We hope to move ahead on this proposal and we are seeking to further strengthen co-ordination through the OECD, to ensure that the collective efforts of the industrial nations are efficiently organised to bring the maximum benefit to Africa.

Economic development is a painful and long-term process which depends most of all on the sustained and substantial efforts of the developing countries themselves. But this has been an historic year in the effort of the community of nations to narrow the gulf between North and South, both economically and politically. All those who seek either order or progress are beginning to recognise that we can have neither unless the last quarter of this century is an era of international co-operation.

Independence

The advances made toward racial justice and economic progress – if they are maintained and built upon – can strengthen the basis of African unity and self-determination, and thereby serve as a bulwark against outside intervention in the affairs of the African people. The United States is firmly committed to the concept of Africa for the Africans. That is why, for example, we have agreed with the Presidents of Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia that non-African nations should not deal directly with the liberation movements of Southern Africa. The United States seeks no bloc, and plays no favourites among groups or leaders; we will not oppose any African faction or group, regardless of its ideology, if it is truly independent and African. We will continue our firm opposition to the extension of great power rivalry or conflict to the African continent.

The Need to maintain Momentum

Thus, in the course of the past year, Africa's drive for justice, for progress, for true independence, has been severely tested in every dimension. Africa has survived those tests and finds itself at a possible turning point in its history. The statesmanship of Africa's leaders has won widespread recognition. The resilience of Africa's economies and the determination of its peoples to achieve racial justice, have been amply demonstrated to the world. But progress achieved will not continue automatically. Difficult decisions must be made, additional statesmanship must be shown, if just solutions are to be achieved.

Yet, continued progress is crucial: for we are all aware that the important steps toward peace and justice in Rhodesia, steps to avert bloodshed and widening war, can easily be undone. There are those

who, for their own purposes, do not want to see a peaceful settlement in either Rhodesia or Namibia.

Together, African states, the United Kingdom and the United States have, however, fashioned an opportunity for peace and a foundation for progress in Southern Africa. Essential elements of a negotiated settlement have been achieved:

- The authorities in Rhodesia have accepted the principle of majority rule within two years.
- The parties have agreed that an interim government will be established immediately.
- Agreement has been reached on the time and place for a conference.
- A number of Western governments have agreed to participate in a fund to facilitate the transition to majority rule and to enhance the economic future of an independent Zimbabwe.

For the first time in eleven years, a rapid, satisfactory and peaceful end to the Rhodesian crisis is within reach. To lose this opportunity would be a monumental tragedy; to seize it can mean a new day of hope for Southern Africa. History will not forgive a failure to seize the *moment*. Whether by neglect or design, such a failure will be tantamount to a decision to choose violence, chaos and widening destruction over a rapid and peaceful solution. No country in Southern Africa will be spared either the pain of warfare or the judgment of history.

Continued movement toward an accord for Namibia is also crucial. My talks with leaders of Black African states, the South African Prime Minister and Mr. Sam Nujoma of the South West African People's Organisation lead me to believe that those involved want a peaceful solution and are willing to modify their positions in order to achieve it. As in Rhodesia, success is not assured. Nevertheless, with determination and a readiness to compromise, the parties are now in a position to end the dispute that has been a source of serious international discord for almost three decades.

The focus of the moment is on the southern part of the continent, but the United States' commitment applies to all of Africa and to all the great issues I have mentioned – justice, progress and independence. Last year I said to the permanent members of the OAU who met with me that strengthening the relationship between the United States and Africa is a major objective of American policy. It was then, it is now and shall continue to be so in the future. Africa can count on us. There can no longer be any question that America is committed to Africa's goals and to working with the nations of Africa to solve the continent's problems. In return, we expect to find respect for our concerns and perspectives.

Let us set aside the suspicions of the past and work for our common future. Together we can reconstitute the community of man on

the basis of mutual benefit and shared endeavour. We can show that races can live together – that there is an alternative to hatred. If Africa succeeds, it will have much to teach the world and so much to contribute to it.

PRESIDENT-ELECT JIMMY CARTER'S VIEWS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

Financial Mail: *It took intervention in Angola by a Soviet-backed Cuban expeditionary force to re-awaken America's interest in Southern Africa. Under your Presidency, will American involvement in African affairs lessen or increase?*

Carter: If you mean, do I contemplate a physical involvement in Southern Africa, such as we had in Vietnam, let me say I do not see it. But I think you will see an increase in our diplomatic commitment, in our foreign policy efforts to achieve a lasting peace in Africa, a peace built on majority rule with the protection of minority rights.

Right now we are playing catch-up in Africa after fifteen years or more of neglect. And the Ford Administration has essentially been operating on an *ad hoc* policy basis with the single aim of keeping Southern Africa from blowing up into a shooting war.

What I envisage, what I will work for, is a more permanent effort, not just through one-man peace-keeping missions, but using the whole array of America's peace-keeping arsenal, its technological assistance, its help in developing Southern Africa's resources. I do not see this as just do-good charity either. There are resources which only Africa can supply us and there is technology to develop those resources which only America can provide.

Positive programmes for peace aside, how serious a threat are the current tensions in Southern Africa to world peace, compared, say, to the various crises in the Middle East, in Asia, and so on?

Frankly, my judgment at the moment is that the potential for a shooting war that could involve the US and the Soviet Union are the greatest in the Middle East. There is no doubt about it.

I believe that we also face a serious challenge to our own national security in the increased tensions in Korea. Having said that, I do not mean to diminish the seriousness of the problems of Southern Africa. As long as the Soviet Union is willing to sponsor aggression and unrest there, the threat to the US is a serious one.

One thing that I must add on a positive note is that I think the solutions to many of the critical tensions in Southern Africa are not as hard to unravel as they might be elsewhere. Rhodesia must move to majority rule as soon as possible. South Africa must move just as

quickly towards independence for Namibia.

Once those solutions are achieved then we can move to stabilise the Angolan situation and achieve a removal of the Cuban troops there. The steps that need to be taken are clearly laid out. It will not be an easy path to follow, but it clearly is the only one there is.

Given how difficult peace will be to achieve in Southern Africa, why do you rule out direct military aid as well as direct military intervention, as likely American responses in Southern Africa?

I have not ruled out any such responses. I cannot do that.

But they are unlikely, are they not?

I really hope so. For one thing, past American policy, and it has been wrong I believe, has been to send arms and to sell arms, often to both sides in a struggle, as an alternative to really working toward peace.

You have said that there are many similarities between the American position in the Middle East and its position in Southern Africa. Yet the US provides arms to both Arab and Israeli forces. Is there not a contradiction?

There is no reason to repeat a mistake in the Middle East in Southern Africa.

Without military aid, much less military intervention, what intervention, what influence can America have in the region?

America alone cannot have much influence throughout the entire Southern African region. We must work in concert with other relevant powers, such as Britain which has real influence in Rhodesia, and in those nations such as Zaire and South Africa where we have some clout of our own.

What kind of influence do you think the US has in South Africa for example? How would you quantify it?

Very great. Our economic presence in South Africa gives us a greater influence on that government than its government has over Rhodesia, for example. I think our American businessman can be a constructive force achieving racial justice within South Africa. I think the weight of our investments there, the value the South Africans place on access to American capital and technology can be used as a positive force in settling regional problems.

Among those positive forces, do you count the threat of economic sanctions against South Africa?

Not really. I think such sanctions could be counter-productive.

Would you free up American investment through Export-Import Bank loans and

otherwise encourage an increase in private American lending and corporate activity in South Africa?

Yes indeed. Other interviews have quoted me saying I intend to follow "an aggressive policy for peace". That sounds contradictory although it is accurate enough. It might be more accurate to say I intend to follow a positive policy toward peace in Southern Africa. Economic development, investment commitment and the use of economic leverage against what is, after all, a government system of repression within South Africa, seems to me the only way to achieve racial justice there.

Can you say whether you will extend diplomatic recognition to Transkei?

Not at this time. I think we will have to examine Transkei's true national status before we make such a move.

Because your campaign depends so heavily on the support of black Americans will your Presidency automatically be pro-black?

I do not know how much more committed I can be to majority rule in Africa, with or without black American support.

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