


SAIIA ARCHIVES

DO NOT REMOVE

THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS



DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE

NEWSLETTER

NUUSBRIEF

Vol. 5 No. 2

1973

BRANCHES

CAPE TOWN

C/o Mrs. G. Donnal, (Secretary),
Cape Town Branch of S.A.I.I.A.,
C/o Faculty of Education,
University of Cape Town,
RONDEBOSCH,
Cape.

EASTERN PROVINCE

C/o Mr. A.J. Karstaedt,
S.A.I.I.A.,
Eastern Province Branch,
P.O. Box 2144,
PORT ELIZABETH.

NATAL

C/o Professor E.N. Keen,
S.A.I.I.A.,
Natal Branch,
C/o Department of Anatomy,
P.O. Box 39,
CONGELLA,
Natal.

PRETORIA

S.A.I.I.A.,
Pretoria Branch,
P.O. Box 27528,
Sunnyside,
PRETORIA.

STELLENBOSCH

C/o Professor W.B. Vosloo,
S.A.I.I.A.,
Stellenbosch Branch,
C/o Dept. Political Science and Public Administration,
Stellenbosch University,
STELLENBOSCH,
Cape.

WITWATERSRAND

S.A.I.I.A.,
Witwatersrand Branch,
P.O. Box 31596,
BRAAMFONTEIN,
Johannesburg.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
DIE SUID - AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE

NEWSLETTER / NUUSBRIEF

Vol. 5 No. 2

1973

All opinions expressed in articles in this Newsletter are
solely the responsibility of the respective authors and
not of the Institute

Alle standpunte ingeneem in artikels in hierdie Nuusbrief
is die verantwoordelikheid van die skrywers en nie van die
Instituut nie.

Jan Smuts House/Huis Jan Smuts

P.O. Box/Posbus 31596

Braamfontein

Johannesburg

June/Junie 1973

S.A.I.I.A.

National Chairman - Dr. Leif Egeland - Nasionale Voorsitter

- - - - -

Chairmen of Branches Voorsitters van Takke

WITWATERSRAND

Mr./Mnr Gideon Roos

CAPETOWN/KAAPSTAD

Mr./Mnr. W.T. Ferguson

EASTERN PROVINCE/OOSTELIKKE PROVINSIE

Mr./Mnr. A.J. Karstaedt

NATAL

Prof. E.N. Keen

PRETORIA

Mr./Mnr. D.F.S. Fourie

STELLENBOSCH

Prof. W.B. Vosloo

- - - - -

Director - Mr./Mnr. John Barratt - Direkteur

S.A.I.I.A. NEWSLETTER/NUUSBRIEF

Vol. 5. No. 2.
1973

CONTENTS/INHOUD

	<u>Page</u>
LEBANON AND THE MIDDLE EAST	1 ○
✓ Alexandre Ammoun	
UNITED STATES AND AFRICA	8 ○
✓ David D. Newsom	
UNITED STATES AND SOUTHERN AFRICA	
✓ i) Report of the Secretary of State	14 ○
✓ ii) Report of the President to Congress	17 ○
✓ iii) Business Involvement	18 ○
PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS	22 ○
A BLACK RHODESIAN'S VIEWPOINT	31 ○
✓ Interview with Aristone Chambati	
BRIEF REPORTS/KORT VERSLAE	
✓ United Kingdom and South Africa	34 ○
✓ Swaziland - Government Statement on Constitution	36 ○
✓ Lesotho - Foreign Policy	37 ○
✓ Chief Minister of Gazankulu visits United States	39 ○
SYMPOSIA	
Working Group on Accelerated Development	40 ○
International Relations in Southern Africa	41 ○
SOME RECENT ACQUISITIONS BY THE LIBRARY	42
RECENT INSTITUTE PUBLICATIONS AVAILABLE	44

LEBANON AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Alexandre Ammoun⁺

Lebanon is a small country on the Mediterranean shore. Because of her geographical position and other factors which shall be described, she holds an important strategic position in the Middle East. Her population is only about two and a half million inhabitants comprised of Christians and Moslems. In fact, Lebanon, with its seventeen recognised communities, is a mosaic of religions, a citadel of racial and religious diversity.

Lebanon has always served as, and remains today, the crossroads for East and West, commercially, spiritually and culturally. In Lebanon there are also people of many nationalities including a fairly substantial Jewish community in Beirut. It is also a beautiful country with most attractive facilities for tourists and it is an important educational centre. It has, for its small population, no less than four independent autonomous universities. The Arabic language is official; French and English are widely spoken.

Modern Lebanon is a parliamentary democracy. Its Constitution, promulgated during the French mandate, in 1926, was amended in 1943 to eliminate the articles which contradicted the establishment of national sovereignty.

All citizens, male and female, are eligible to vote at the age of 21. Women are also eligible to run for office. Parliamentary elections are held every four years and the Deputies themselves elect the President of the Republic. His term of office is for a period of six years and cannot be extended. According to established custom, a balance is maintained among the religious communities in selecting all public officers. For example, the President of the Republic is always a Maronite Catholic. The speaker of the House is a Shiite Moslem and the Prime Minister a Sunni Moslem.

Lebanon bases her internal policy on the freedom and responsibility of the individual citizen, her liberal economic policy on enlightened, disciplined free enterprise, and her foreign policy on the principles of neutrality and the Charter of the United Nations. Lebanon supports the cause of the Palestinian people, a contribution she considers essential if peace with justice is to come to the Holy Land and indeed, the entire Middle East.

Since 1948 Beirut has been a free foreign exchange market where gold and the currencies of other countries are bought and sold on the open market, and capital can enter or leave the country completely free of government restrictions. Since Lebanon gained her independence, Beirut has developed into the major banking centre of the Middle East. The number of banks has grown from nine in 1945 to over 75, more than a

⁺ His Excellency, Mr Alexandre Ammoun, is the Consul-General of the Lebanon in South Africa. This article is based on an address given by Mr. Ammoun to the Witwatersrand Branch of the Institute on 12 April, 1973.

third of which are branches of the largest international houses. There is also a small Beirut Stock Exchange. 75% of Lebanon's national income has traditionally come from trade and tourism.

There are 52 political dailies, published primarily in Arabic, of course, but also in French, English, and Armenian. In addition, nearly every European and American magazine and many foreign newspapers can be found in Beirut. Lebanese citizens spend about 24 million pounds a year on their newspapers.

Lebanon became independent in 1943. A declaration of her Prime Minister, in October, of that year, stated that the Lebanese would from then on reject any protection from the Western world as well as any project of unity or federation with the Arab world. The declaration was accepted by all factions of the population, Christians and Moslems, and was later called 'The National Pact of 1943'. Lebanon thus renounced any foreign protection in exchange for the respect by the Arab countries of her territorial independence and integrity.

From this it may be gathered that the Lebanon is a hub of diverse activity, besides being a focal point of Western civilisation in the Middle East. It is, therefore, easy to understand why Lebanon, small as it is, is expected to play so important a role in the Middle East situation. For this reason it is essential to discuss her relationship with Israel, the Palestinians and the whole Arab-Israeli situation. Thus it is necessary at the outset to refer briefly to certain facets of the history of Lebanon, and thereafter to refer to the development of the Zionist philosophy and, finally, the setting up of the State of Israel. In this regard, reference will be made to the intervening situations which bring into focus and prominence the Palestinian and the Arab-Israeli situation.

The Lebanon is composed of people who originated from the ancient Phoenicians who had themselves been joined, towards the end of the 4th century, by Arameans and Cananeans, mainly arriving from Palestine and Syria. They were converted to the Christian faith by Saint John Maroon. Paganism gave way to Christianity and the Phoenicians, themselves of Cananean origin, were also converted to the new religion. Aramaic, the language of Christ, became the common language, Arabic was not yet spoken.

How then did the Arabic language assume its place in the Lebanon? During the 6th century, with the call of Islam as a newly born religion, the Arabs embarked upon a conquest of Europe. They invaded, the Lebanon en route. They settled along the coast line of Lebanon but did not at any time infiltrate the mountainous regions. It was only much later in the 12th century, during the Crusades, that the Arabs succeeded in infiltrating various sectors of the mountainous regions.

The composition of the population of the Lebanon at that time was both Phoenician and Aramaic, that is to say of semitic origin like the Arabs. It is therefore understandable that they readily accepted the Arabic language, which they found to be allied to their mother tongue. Gradually the Arabic language became more commonly used throughout the Lebanon, gradually replacing Aramaic.

The Ottoman domination started in 1516, when the Lebanon was governed by Emirs or chiefs of state of Arab origin. The Emir of Lebanon was at

that time subject to the Ottoman Sultan. Special mention must be made here of the regime of the Emir Fakhreddine II, who, under the pretext of putting an end to crimes and robberies, succeeded in reuniting under his jurisdiction the major portion of what today comprises the country of Lebanon. He appointed representatives to the Vatican, France, Venice and Florence. By 1572, the Lebanon already enjoyed a certain measure of autonomy which it was never to lose. After the death of Fakhreddine II by assassination the battle of the Emirs or leaders of State continued without interruption against the Turkish Sultanate.

It was also during the 16th century that the missionaries of Europe became attracted by the autonomy enjoyed by the Lebanese districts under the direction of their Emirs. All these contacts, the communications with Rome and the protection accorded to the Christians by the Kings of France, in 1535, contributed in great measure to the progress of the country.

The Franciscans, who had settled in Lebanon after the Crusades, were followed by many other congregations. In Lebanon proper seminaries were instituted for the preparation of an educated clergy. Schools were opened for the teaching of scholars. The education established in Lebanon, during the 400 years of Ottoman domination and Arab decline, has never been suspended.

But it was only from the 17th century that the Christians started to study Arabic. Towards the end of the 17th century the national dialect, Aramaic, gradually ceased to be used. The Arabic language slowly replaced Aramaic and circulated throughout the Lebanon. At the time of the Arab decline, the Arab writings, thoughts and languages, found a sort of refuge in the schools and convents of the Lebanese mountains, where manuscripts were conserved and where Arab grammar continued to be taught.

Thus as a result of the foregoing circumstances the first movement of the Arab Renaissance found its point of departure in Lebanon. This Arab awakening or awakening of the Arab nation, had its first demonstration in Beirut in 1875. This resulted primarily in the rehabilitation of the Arabic language - at that time still in decadence - and led to a battle against general ignorance. The Lebanese were of the opinion that ignorance and the abandonment of a common Arabic culture was a sufficient reason for explaining the elements of discord and sectarian fanaticism which prevailed at that time in the Arab World.

It was in particular the intellectual Christians of Lebanon and of Syria, trained in the image and spirit of Europe, who launched the concept of an Arab nationalism, a concept of Eastern origin born according to the principles responsible for the nationalism of European countries at that period.

In 1875 a secret society was constituted in Beirut by five young students of the Syrian Protestant College which is today the American University of Beirut. These persons propagated their ideas by way of fixing posters by night on the walls of Beirut. At the beginning, they satisfied themselves by focusing on the horrors of the Ottoman régime. But soon thereafter, in 1880, they turned to actually writing their sentiments and their specific demands of independence and official recognition of the Arabic language in their country. Thereafter, several other secret societies were created in Beirut and Damascus. The movement was not to be stopped.

In 1909 the régime of Abdel Hamid, the Sultan of Constantinople, was overthrown by the liberal young Turks, who drafted a new constitution and proposed to the Lebanese that they should denounce their administrative autonomy and integrate themselves wholly into the Ottoman society. They refused because they preferred their liberty. Then the new Turkish régime authorised Chérif Hussein, a descendant of the Prophet and in exile for 16 years in Constantinople, to return to Mecca. Chérif Hussein returned to Mecca. He had ambitions. His dream was to unite the Syrian Arab provinces - and that included Palestine - under his authority. He wanted Damascus - fertile Damascus - as a capital. Through the agency of his son, Faycal, he made contact with the secret Syrian and Lebanese societies for the total liberation of the Arab territories. Arab nationalism then entered a period of much activity. Thereafter, Chérif Hussein and his son Faycal were to meet a person, a British officer, who promised to help them realise their dream of Arab Unity. The British officer's name was Lawrence. By this time World War I was about to break out.

Now that we have acquainted ourselves with the nature of Arab nationalism as it was at that time, let us look briefly at what Zionism was doing and what direction it was following:

The concept of a homeland for the Jewish people was first formulated at the end of the last century, precisely in 1896. The purpose was to find a definite settlement for the Jewish peoples of Europe, the victims of discrimination. In the book entitled "The Jewish State" published in the same year, Theodore Herzl, a noted Austrian journalist, stated that the creation of a Jewish State was the only solution to overcome anti-Semitism. His choice fell on the Argentine or Palestine, homeland of the ancient Hebrews. But in Argentine, wrote Herzl, the infiltration of the Jews could cause discontent amongst the local population. As regards Palestine, the author made no reference regarding the reaction of its inhabitants, the Palestinian Arabs.

Pursuing his initial plan, Herzl called the first Zionist Congress in Basle in 1897. The Congress did not approve the idea for the creation of a Jewish State, but decided that the aim of Zionism should be to establish a national centre for the Jewish people in Palestine as they considered that this latter country was of religious and sentimental meaning to the Jews.

Thereafter, Herzl turned to the Kaiser of Germany, from whom no response was received. He then addressed himself to the Sultan, Abdel Hamid, since Palestine was then a province of the Ottoman Empire. Herzl wrote: "If His Majesty the Sultan offers us Palestine, we will take upon ourselves to compensate him by settling the finances of Turkey." The eloquent reply of Abdel Hamid was "The Turkish Empire does not belong to me, but to the Turkish people".

Herzl then turned to the British Government to whom he suggested that Uganda should be ceded to him for colonisation. The British Government accepted the proposition. But Herzl died in 1904 and the Seventh Zionist Congress rejected the British offer, specifying that Zionism was interested only in Palestine.

It should be noted that the aim of materialising the Palestine project was born during a period when Zionism was completely unaware of the Palestinian reality of the times, and without having effected any kind of contact whatsoever with that country.

The Zionist plan remained dormant until the outbreak of the First World War. The expected rupture of the Ottoman Empire, to which Palestine belonged, caused a new ray of hope to be born in the Zionist organisation. The leadership of the organisation was taken over by Dr. Chaim Weizman, a Russian born professor of Chemistry who had settled in England.

From 1915, the date of commencement of the war of France and England against Germany and Turkey, developments in the Near East favoured the aims of Zionism. The idea was then born of forming a buffer state between Syria and Egypt, which would be Palestine. Palestine had to be granted an international ordinance. This resulted in the agreement known as the "Sykes-Picot Agreement", stipulated in 1916 between France and England, and which remained secret in order not to irritate the Arabs to whom independence had already been promised.

Taking advantage of this situation, the Zionist movement gained ground. A political committee of the Zionist organisation submitted a memorandum of six points to the British Government. The first point claimed the recognition in Palestine of a Jewish nationality, distinct from other nationalities. It is this memorandum which formed a basis for what was later called the "Balfour Declaration". The final text of this declaration, approved by the Governments of France and of the United States of America, was made public on 2 November, 1917, by means of a letter addressed to Lord Rothschild, which reads as follows :

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine".

It is important to note that at the time of the Balfour Declaration, the number of Jews living in Palestine totalled 56 000, that is, approximately 8% of the Arab population which numbered 644 000. The Balfour Declaration was described as a document in which one nation solemnly promised to a second nation the country of a third.

But it is interesting to note that at no instance did the Declaration mention the establishment of a Jewish State, and that in the spirit of its promoter it was concerned solely with the creation of a spiritual and religious centre. Although the declaration promised to the Palestinian Jews the same rights as those granted to the other inhabitants, it was never a question of one religious or ethnic group dominating the other. Sir Winston Churchill, then Colonial Secretary, declared in front of a delegation that the national centre did not signify "Jewish Government dominating the Arabs as my country will not tolerate the expropriation of one group in favour of another".

The Palestinian Arabs were the most affected by the "Balfour Declaration". Stipulated during 1917, its contents were made known to them only during 1920.

In a book entitled "Seat of Pilat" published in 1959, John Marlowe, a noted scholar of British Politics in the Middle East, states that a satisfactory analysis of the different causes and pressures existing on the subject is almost impossible. Reasons are both political and sentimental. It is certain, however, that the initiative came from the Zionists.

The role played by Weizmann was considerable. It is necessary to consider, however, that the situation which Weizmann found in England, was favourable to his cause.

In January, 1916, an agreement was reached between Britain and Chérif Hussein and, on 10 June, of the same year, the Turkish garrison based at Mecca was attacked by the Bedouins. The Arab revolt had started. In October, 1918, the British General, Allenby, and Faycal, son of Chérif Hussein, entered Damascus together. The Arab participation in World War I meant for the Arabs a prelude to independence. But dreams of Arab unity soon vanished. The Balfour Declaration was made public. The "Sykes-Picot Agreement" between France and Britain was also made public.

Arab nationalism was defeated. It was replaced by Arab resentment. Palestine came under British mandate. Jewish immigration began and clashes between Palestinians Arabs and Jews took place in 1921, 1929 and 1936.

In 1939, the British Government became convinced that continued Jewish immigration to Palestine would cause serious prejudice to the rights and position of the Palestinian Arabs. Accordingly, it issued a White Paper declaring its intention to limit Jewish immigration to 75 000 persons over the next five years and to grant Palestine its independence at the end of ten years. The Zionists fought this White Paper by a campaign of violence.

Unable to permit any further Jewish immigration, plagued by Zionist demands for more immigrants, the Mandatory Government, in 1947, referred the question of the future of Palestine to the United Nations.

The United Nations recommended the partition of Palestine. The Arabs opposed the proposal, on the ground that it was incompatible with law and the principle of democracy. The Zionists mobilised all their forces to secure a UN vote and succeeded when the resolution of the General Assembly was adopted on 29 November, 1947, by a vote of 33 to 13 with 10 abstentions. In the view of the Arabs, the partition resolution was illegal. It trespassed on the sovereignty of the original inhabitants of Palestine and gave away to alien immigrants a large part of the territory, denying to the Palestinians their natural right of self-determination.

War is the means by which the Israelis have realised their ambitions in Palestine. By the war of 1948 they implanted themselves in Palestine, in 1956 in the Gulf of Akaba and in 1967 they seized the rest of Palestine, the Sinai and the Syrian Golan Heights. Contrary to Israeli expectations the war of 1967 did not solve the Palestine problem nor enable them to impose their diktat upon the Arabs. In fact the last Israeli aggression released the Palestinian forces of resistance which had been contained for 20 years by illusions and faith in the UN and its resolutions.

The Security Council adopted a resolution in 1967 which aimed at the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. It emphasised the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by war, and it affirmed the necessity to achieve a just solution to the refugee problem. Israel did not accept this. The Arab States were split in their attitude. The Palestinians rejected it. If what is meant by a just settlement was the repatriation of the refugees to their homeland, the attitude of Israel toward them was unjust and one is entitled to doubt the practicability of the suggestion. In a State where nationality is based on the Jewish religion, what chance have the Moslems and

and Christians of living in peace and dignity?

Assuming that the Arab States were to conclude a settlement with Israel over the head of the Palestinians, what would be its legal and practical value? The Palestinian sovereignty over their country is inalienable and indivisible. Therefore, if they are really interested in seeking a just solution and not merely a realistic political solution, is not the proper course to have the matter tested by an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice? The International Court of Justice exists for this very purpose.

The Israelis have repeatedly declared that the parties with whom they want to negotiate are the Arab States, not the Palestinians. Now, the Arab States do not own Palestine and cannot dispose of any part of it in favour of anyone. Unable to deny the rights of the Palestinians, the responsible leaders of Israel, have come to deny their very existence. Prime Minister, Levy Eshkol, in reply to the question put to him by an American journalist representing *Newsweek*, "If the Jews are entitled to a homeland, aren't the Palestinians similarly entitled to their own country?" replied, "What are Palestinians? When I came here there were 250 000 non-Jews, mainly Arabs and Bedouins". He went on to say that it was a desert and completely underdeveloped. Levy Eshkol's reply is untrue. His description of the inhabitants as being mainly Arabs and Bedouins conveys a false impression of a nomadic population; in fact, the Palestinians, had been living in Palestine since the dawn of history.

Mrs Golda Meir said recently to the *Sunday Times*, London : "There is no such thing as Palestinians". This again is simply untrue. She refers to the Palestinians as Arabs who normally should go and live with other fellow Arabs, noting the fact that they belong to the same race, speak the same language and pray to the same God. What would the Mexicans say if they were transplanted by force to the Argentine? According to Mrs Meir's declaration, the operation should be easy. The two people speak the same language, have got the same religion and belong to the same race.

The aforesaid statements do not help to portray the realities of the situation nor to promote understanding between opposing groups. It must be reiterated that a start should be made towards bringing about contact between Israel and the Palestinians, rather than upholding the present nature of Arab-Israeli relationships. After all is said and done, it is the Palestinians themselves who comprise the injured group.

Having said all this, the question may be posed as to what role the Lebanon may be able to play. Here it is suggested that this role could be the portrayal of the spirit and image of Lebanon which small as it is, is nevertheless and hopefully will remain, a country of peace and goodwill, and a veritable mosaic of religions, peoples, cultures and general diversity.

Israel must learn to consider the Palestinian Arabs as Palestinian Arabs. The day when the Israelis realise this, everything will be changed in that part of the world, naturally for the best. This is, to say the least, the wish that every logical person, Arab, Jew or total stranger will want to make for the sake of peace.

UNITED STATES AND AFRICA

David D. Newsom

Today I wish to speak to you about the relationship of the United States to Africa. It is most appropriate that I do so in this Commonwealth atmosphere since this relationship involves not only key African members of the Commonwealth but also a whole series of questions posed for Africa by the association of the United Kingdom with the Common Market.

The United States relationship to Africa is both old and new. It has been both romantic and realistic. It has been positive and negative. Central to our relationship to Africa is the ethnic tie, the enforced migration to America of slaves, largely from the West African areas of Nigeria, Dahomey, Togo and Ghana.

One of the most neglected realities of American history is the fact that our nation started out as a multi-racial society. Nearly one-fifth of the persons living in America before the American Revolution were of African descent. The census of 1790, virtually the first national act required of the Federal Government by the new Constitution, counted 3 929 000 persons of whom 757 000 were black, including some 60 000 free men and 697 000 slaves. The enormous waves of immigrants from Europe in the 19th century and the early 20th century tended to diminish the proportion of all the original groups in the total population, but persons of African descent still form about 11 per cent of our population. In their search for their roots in Africa, for their identity as Afro-Americans, and in their contribution to our own and world culture lie much of the dynamism of my country's link with Africa.

The existence of our own civil rights problems means, also, that the complex issues of Southern Africa are seen, whether rightly or wrongly, as mirrors or extensions of our own racial difficulties. There is, consequently, among both blacks and whites a special attention to these problems. There exists, not unnaturally, the same divergence of opinion toward these problems that one finds toward our own domestic issues.

The black community's interest in Africa goes back to the early 19th century when freed slaves, with the help of white contributions, formed the American Colonization Society to found settlements in West Africa which eventually became the Republic of Liberia. Still today, the Nation of Liberia, while not tied to the United States in any political way, remains a special symbol of our links with Africa. The 19th century saw the romantic period. Americans followed with fascination and admiration the adventures of European missionaries and explorers making their way into "the dark continent". Henry M. Stanley's exploits brought the African scene closer to home. The first U.S. missionary activities in Black Africa began in the early 1800's in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

* The text of an address delivered by the US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, David D. Newsom, to the Royal Commonwealth Society in London on 14 March, 1973.

American trade with Africa began in the very early days of our Republic as clipper ships from Massachusetts rounded the Cape of Good Hope seeking spices and timber in East Africa and beyond. We signed a treaty with Zanzibar and Muscat in 1832. As political movements began in Africa in the 20th century, their leaders found special interest in the history of the American colonies, if you will forgive me, in their struggle for freedom. The writings of Paine, Jefferson and others struck responsive chords. Some of the dissimilarities were overlooked and the similarities seized upon. Many of the political leaders in independent Africa were educated in the United States - Nkrumah of Ghana, Banda of Malawi and Azikiwe of Nigeria. The result of these ties was that African nations entered their independence with great expectations of the United States.

With knowledge of the Marshall Plan still fresh in the minds of many African leaders, there was expectation that the United States would provide massive assistance to Africa. With an awareness of the writings of the early Americans and of Lincoln, there was the expectation that we would take the lead in supporting the struggle for independence in Africa. Strong sentiments on existing independence movements were expressed frequently in the United States, giving further support to this expectation. A knowledge of the power and wealth of the United States fed expectation to a degree of influence that could, if it wished, change the internal policies of African Governments and right the wrongs of colonialism and apartheid.

Each of these positive expectations had, in a sense, a reverse side. The fact that Africans identified with America's support for independence fed concern among expatriates and former colonial powers that we were out to replace them. Natural rivalries of commercial competition served further to feed these anxieties about our intention. The image of the wealth of the United States held by some Africans served to create apprehensions regarding the exercise of that wealth. The United States became feared - and envied.

The impressions of U.S. influence, sparked by such books as *The Invisible Government*, gave rise to fears and allegations of U.S. political manipulation. The CIA became an ogre and a symbol.

The last few years have been spent getting the United States and its relationship with Africa in focus. Particularly has this been true during the past four years when, in the words of President Nixon, we have sought a relationship of candour: "Africa's friends must find a new tone of candour in their essential dialogue with the continent. All too often over the past decade the United States and others have been guilty of telling proud young nations, in misguided condescension, only what we thought they wanted to hear. But I know from many talks with Africans, including two trips to the Continent in 1957 and 1967, that Africa's new leaders are pragmatic and practical as well as proud, realistic as well as idealistic. It will be a test of diplomacy for all concerned to face squarely common problems and differences of views.

The United States will do all it can to establish this new dialogue. Our policies toward Africa rest, to start with, on a clear definition of U.S. interests in Africa. First, there is the historic and ethnic interest in Africa. While, in many ways, the black groups in America still concentrate almost totally on domestic issues and have not yet developed a visibly effective constituency for Africa, the interest is there. No

American policy toward Africa can ignore this deep and growing interest in a meaningful relationship to the continent by so large a group of our citizens.

Secondly, and closely tied to the first, is the keen interest in the humanity of Africa on the part of blacks and many whites. Whether it be a problem of famine or war or a problem of human rights, the American policy maker is continually made conscious of the strong empathy which exists toward Africa.

More traditional diplomatic and economic interests also exist. As a major power, we desire effective diplomatic access to the Governments of Africa, representing as they do almost one-third of the members of the United Nations. In full recognition of the sensitive nationalism of the newly independent nations, we desire fair opportunities for trade and investment.

The United States does not desire - even if it had the capabilities and resources to do so - to replace the former colonial powers in trade and economic relations with the African nations. We appreciate and wish to be responsive to the desire of the African nations to diversify their economic relations. We continue to believe, however, that the traditional ties of language, education and business that link these nations with the metropole nations in Europe are important to both partners, and to the extent each desires to retain them they should be encouraged. The question frequently is raised, particularly on this side of the Atlantic, of the U.S. military interest in Africa. We count this a lesser interest. We have two remaining military communications stations in Africa which we shall presumably need until technology makes them unnecessary. We recognise the importance to Europe of the Cape Route we do not, however, give this interest priority over other more direct concerns in Africa.

The pursuit of the interests of any nation in Africa requires, also, an understanding of African interests and concerns. No policies are going to be effective which fail to take these into account and to seek in some measure to be responsive. From my own frequent travels in Africa and my own discussions with African leaders, I would define African interests as three : nation-building and true sovereignty, survival and development, and a resolution of the inequities of Southern Africa. American policies seek meaningful responses to each of these African concerns.

There is the strongest desire among Africans to build the nations inherited from the Colonial Era with boundaries fixed by that era, and with institutions compatible with the customs and traditions of the peoples. We recognise that there have been and will be changes in the institutions left behind by the colonial powers. We accept that there will be variety in forms of government and philosophies and that we can deal with nations, regardless of their institutions, on a basis of mutual respect and common interest.

We recognise that Africans do not wish to be pawns in a great power conflict. We accept their relations with all nations. We ask only that they be true to their non-alignment in the balanced treatment and understanding they give to all. We do not accept that there can be a double standard, according to which the United States can be condemned for certain actions while other nations are not. Neither do we accept that African nations can turn blind eyes to human disaster within their own continent

while seeking the condemnation of others. In an African continent understandably sensitive on the issue of sovereignty, we Americans have had a special myth to overcome : the myth of manipulation. I hope that this is dead. I hope that we have been able to convince the African Governments that we are not involved in any way in seeking to determine how they are governed or by whom.

African leaders understandably are preoccupied with critical economic problems. Many search for the resources needed for development. Others, less fortunate, search for the resources needed for survival. Sixteen of the poorest countries of the world are in Africa. I will not deny that the response to Africa's economic needs has presented us with some very difficult problems. As I pointed out, African expectations of what we might provide were high. We have not come up to those expectations.

As Americans, however, coming late into the scene in Africa, we feel that we have made a substantial and meaningful contribution to African development. Bilateral assistance, both that given directly in country programmes and that provided on a regional basis, has been maintained at approximately the same level through the past ten years - about 350 000 000 dollars per year. If one adds another 200 million dollars provided through international institutions such as the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank, the United States contribution represents about 20 per cent of all aid going in to Africa.

In attempting to assert their independence from the developed countries, which are the major suppliers of traditional aid, the African countries are seeking increased control over investment and assured market conditions for their primary commodities. As a major supplier of foreign investment and consumer of primary products, the United States has an important interest in these matters as well. With each side looking at these matters from its own perspective, however, there is not always an identity of perceived national interests.

The United States strongly believes that private foreign investment, as a carrier of technology, of trade opportunities and of capital itself, and as a mobiliser of domestic resources in turn becomes a major factor in promoting economic development. Another factor is the increasing need of the United States for energy sources and other primary resources, an important share of which will come from Africa. Yet the terms on which private capital will accept investment risk in African countries at times conflicts with the strong desire of the African nations for a greater share in both the equity and management of investment projects.

Terms such as "Africanisation" and "nationalisation" frighten some investors. They are considered to be political necessities in many parts of Africa. Fortunately, the result, so far in Africa, has been in most cases a sincere effort to find, through negotiations, ways to meet the needs and respected rights of both parties. I detect in American business a greater recognition of the desire of a number of African states for participation in investment. I detect in many African countries a greater recognition of the important and beneficial role played by the private foreign investor. I hope both trends continue.

African countries, such as Ghana and the Ivory Coast, with a heavy dependence upon single agricultural commodities, have pressed for international commodity agreements, particularly in coffee and cocoa. They have received strong support from Latin America. The United States

played a leading role in supporting that agreement. For most of that period, the agreement operated in the interests of both producers and consumers, since it was designed to meet the particular circumstances which obtained at that time. On cocoa, we were active participants in the long series of negotiations which led to conclusion of an agreement last fall. We did not sign it, however, because we believe that it is seriously flawed and may not achieve its purpose of stabilising cocoa prices and earnings.

With regard to commodity trade in general, we see a growing need for attacks on the underlying problems, and for new approaches which are not trade restrictive, but trade creating in nature. We will, however, continue to consider proposals for traditional commodity agreements on a case-by-case basis. Next year will be the year of a renegotiation of the Yaounde Convention linking the European community to Africa. Already consultations have started on how the Anglophone countries will fit into the older arrangements. Both trade and aid are involved. The United States recognises the importance to the African signatories of the Yaounde Convention. At the same time, we strongly oppose the system of special and reverse tariff preferences which forms a part of the present agreements. In this we are not alone. Canada and Japan oppose these reverse preferences, and we note that African countries increasingly are questioning their desirability. While our trade with Africa does not compare with more traditional suppliers and markets, we strongly believe that Africa will benefit if it is open to all on a non-discriminatory basis. This too is a critical and difficult element in our response to Africa's economic needs.

This leaves our response to the third African preoccupation - the complex issues of Southern Africa. These issues pose very special problems for the Commonwealth - as they do for us. The American attitude toward this area is clear. It was defined in President Nixon's Foreign Policy Report of 1972 in these words : "... As I have repeatedly made clear, I share the conviction that the United States cannot be indifferent to racial policies which violate our national ideals and constitute a direct affront to American citizens. As a nation, we cherish and have worked arduously toward the goal of equality of opportunity for all Americans. It is incumbent on us to support and encourage these concepts abroad, and to do what we can to forestall violence across international frontiers."

In our approach to the issues of Southern Africa, we proceed on several premises. First, in this day and age, the influence of any nation, however powerful, in the internal affairs of another is severely limited. The idea that the United States, by any action - including the use of economic and military force, if that were realistic - could bring about fundamental changes in another society is without foundation. We certainly cannot do it in Southern Africa. If change comes, it must come primarily from within.

Secondly, the United States cannot pursue policies which simply accept the situation in Southern Africa as it is, or contribute to its perpetuation, nor those which endorse violence as a means to change. Consequently, we conscientiously pursue an arms embargo policy toward all sides in both South Africa and the Portuguese Territories. We exercise restraint in our commercial and government-financing activities in both.

Thirdly, we believe that if we are to contribute meaningfully to change in the area, it is not through the pressure of isolation but through keeping open the doors of communication with all elements of the population, particularly in South Africa. If peaceful change is to come, in our view,

it will come through a general recognition of the unacceptability of present policies in those areas brought about by continuing contact with the world outside.

One commonly held idea in the United States is that official insistence on the withdrawal of our private investment in South Africa would bring effective pressure for change. We do not think so. Our investment represents only 16 per cent of the total foreign investment in South Africa. It is closely interlinked with South African interests. It is doubtful that it could be repatriated, even if we decreed it. It is not only our view, but also that of many black South Africans, that it is far better to encourage those firms which are there to lead the way to upgrading the work and social conditions of the non-white labour force. This we do.

Rhodesia, as you all well know, represents a special case. Except for the symbolically significant, but economically insignificant breach of Rhodesian sanctions by the action of our Congress, we fully support the economic sanctions against Rhodesia and believe they are having an effect. We are deeply conscious of the grave problem the Rhodesian situation presents for our British friends. We hope that your patience will yet find a way of getting black and white in Rhodesia together for a workable solution.

The United Nations is another special situation. The problems of Southern Africa are discussed frequently at the United Nations and action is sought increasingly that exceeds the ability of the organisation to implement.

While sympathetic with the objectives of many of the resolutions, the United States does not find that it can support what it considers unworkable solutions, sometimes based on unfair judgements. Such resolutions also frequently raise questions of precedents and budget which further prevent our support. By the simple vote we sometimes appear to be anti-African when the issues are far less simple.

The United States does welcome and support those efforts which emerge within the United Nations to bring about discussions between the parties directly concerned with these problems.

Such an effort is that undertaken by Secretary-General Waldheim on Namibia. An effort was implied in the vote in December in the Security Council on the Portuguese territories, but has yet to come to fruition. In our view, whatever the fate of the liberation approach, talks must ultimately come between those involved in the problem. However frail may be the chances, we hope ways can be found to start.

To the nations of the Commonwealth, as to the United States, the African continent has a special significance. In that continent are the last hard-core problems of achieving self-determination, problems which have both built and divided the Commonwealth. In that continent lie continuing problems of human dignity and human rights, of such great concern to all our peoples.

I should like to assure you today that the United States recognises these problems and the need for their solution. The United States is neither "neglecting" Africa nor giving it a "low priority". Out of the conflicting pressures for policies and resources upon and within a major nation, the United States seeks to respect Africa's independence, to be responsive to Africa's needs, and to stand ready realistically to be helpful in furthering trends of change.

UNITED STATES AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

(i) Report of the Secretary of State

The following extracts are taken from *United States Foreign Policy 1972*, a report of the Secretary of State, William P. Rogers, to the United States Congress, dated 19 April, 1973. (p 448-9 and 469-472).

The United States has supported Africa's insistence on racial justice and self-determination. We have consistently urged peaceful change in southern Africa through constructive alternatives to the use of force. We have sought to maintain communication with a wide spectrum of the South African population. This policy has its critics, but it is one widely desired by those non-white elements in South Africa most affected by apartheid. Our assistance to the majority-ruled states of southern Africa - Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland - is another manifestation of our support for the process of peaceful change in this area.

We have observed a strict embargo on the shipment of arms to Portugal for use in its African territories and have also embargoed arms for South Africa. In the case of Namibia, we strongly supported the proposal of the United Nations to have the International Court of Justice take up the question of South Africa's continued administration of the country. We accepted the Court's conclusions that the South African presence in the territory is illegal, and we support the current efforts of the U.N. Secretary General to work toward self-determination for Namibia.

The illegal status of the Smith regime in Rhodesia has posed a series of problems for us. We closed our consulate in Rhodesia when Southern Rhodesia attempted to sever its ties with the United Kingdom. We continue to favour majority rule in Rhodesia and voted in favour of U.N. economic sanctions as an alternative to a violent solution. We have enforced these sanctions as conscientiously as any nation and more so than most. We opposed legislation passed by the Congress which made limited exemptions to our full implementation of sanctions. This legislation permits the importation of certain strategic materials from Rhodesia. Because of the open and official nature of this U.S. action, public attention at the United Nations and within Africa has tended to overlook the far more extensive sanction violations of other countries.

We believe the problems of southern Africa can only be resolved by the people themselves. The policy restraints on our own relations with the minority-controlled countries of southern Africa are directly related to our support for self-determination and human dignity for the peoples of the area.

South Africa

The continuation of policies of racial discrimination, enforced separation of races, and the lack of any political role for the non-white majority continued to impose restraints on relations between the United States and South Africa. The restraints were exemplified by the

strict embargo on military and security equipment and by low-key commercial promotion. The modest signs of greater openness in the South African scene observed in 1971 were less apparent in 1972.

We have continued our efforts to sustain systematic contacts with all elements of the South African population. U.S.- sponsored social activities are frequently singled out for praise by black South Africans, many of whom have suggested that other foreign diplomatic and consular missions in South Africa should emulate the U.S. example. Our greatly expanded leader grantee programme, by which we have brought leaders of all races to this country, has attracted considerable attention in South Africa.

The U.S. Government has provided information and suggestions for raising the wages and otherwise improving the working conditions of black employees, consistent with South African law, to those U.S. firms operating in South Africa which have sought this government's help.

Within the limits of the constraints on our relations with South Africa, we plan to continue our efforts to communicate with all segments of that country's populace and to encourage peaceful change.

Namibia (South-West Africa)

The U.N. Secretary General reported to the Security Council on November 16, 1972, on the contacts he and his representative have had with the parties in the Namibia problem pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 309 and 319. On December 6 the Security Council voted to continue these contacts. There was growing concern, however that the contacts were not leading to more rapid progress toward self-determination by Namibia. The United States supports continuation of the contacts.

Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland

Secretary Rogers' 1970 policy statement on Africa recognised the special political and developmental problems of the three majority-ruled states of southern Africa - Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland- and affirmed the Administration's intention to expand assistance to them. Since then we have helped attack their common problems of low agricultural productivity, shortage of qualified manpower, and insufficient roads to support the development of exploitable resources.

In Botswana, in 1971, we joined in an unusual example of international governmental and business cooperation to make possible the exploitation of an otherwise economically marginal copper-nickel deposit. The project, which will yield substantial revenue for rural development, is progressing rapidly and should begin production in 1974. A model of multinational financing, this project includes among its shareholders some 45 000 individual American investors, the largest number of individual U.S. shareholders in any African firm. In 1972 the United States agreed to lend Botswana \$12.6 million on concessionary terms for the construction of a road linking Botswana to its northern neighbour, Zambia.

In Swaziland, disbursement of a \$2.2 million agricultural development loan committed in 1971 has begun. In the past year, an additional agreement was concluded covering a total of \$1.8 million of technical assistance to support the country's rural development programme. In Lesotho, we are currently negotiating a joint project with the IBRD to bring under control serious soil erosion and assist some 12 000 farm families to increase crop and animal production, and have initiated a

maternal and child health extension programme. The United States is continuing its support of the regional University of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland with grants for the construction, equipping, and staffing of the university's campuses in the three countries.

Southern Rhodesia

Seven years after the Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence, the territory's status remains unresolved. An attempt at settlement failed this year when the Pearce Commission reported that the majority of Rhodesians rejected proposals agreed upon by the Smith regime and the British Government. The white minority regime remains in firm control with the African majority of 95 per cent effectively excluded from political life. All three parties involved - white settlers, black Africans, and the British Government - desire a settlement. But they appear far apart on acceptable terms.

The United States continues to recognise British sovereignty in Rhodesia and would welcome attempts to resolve the issue on the basis of eventual majority rule. We uphold the U.N. economic sanctions programme except for importation of certain materials such as chrome ore from Rhodesia authorized by Congress. While this action by Congress is not consistent with our international obligations, these imports represent less than 5 per cent of total Rhodesian exports.

Portuguese Territories

It is the U.S. policy to support self-determination for the Portuguese territories in Africa - Mozambique, Angola, and Portuguese Guinea. The question of the future of these territories is still a serious problem in the relations of the United States with independent African nations. Their expectations of the influence the United States might be able to bring to bear on Portugal remained unrealistically high.

The most hopeful sign during the year was a desire on the part of Africans and the Portuguese to discuss their problems, although there appeared to be, as the year ended, little progress on this matter. In a unanimous resolution of the U.N. Security Council passed in November, the United States underlined its continuing adherence to the principle of self-determination. Hopes were expressed that the resolution might lead during 1973 to meaningful discussions.

During 1972 Portugal issued its overseas law which upgraded the status of Angola and Mozambique to that of states and made various other legal changes for the African territories. Although the law has gone into effect, the changes it will produce remain unclear.

UNITED STATES AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

(ii) The President's Report to Congress

The denial of basic rights to southern Africa's black majorities continues to be a concern for the American people because of our belief in self-determination and racial equality.

Our views about South Africa's dehumanizing system of apartheid have been expressed repeatedly by this Administration in the United Nations, in other international forums, and in public statements. As I said in my Foreign Policy Report two years ago, however, "just as we will not condone the violence to human dignity implicit in apartheid, we cannot associate ourselves with those who call for a violent solution to these problems."

We should also recognize that South Africa is a dynamic society with an advanced economy, whose continued growth requires raising the skills and participation of its non-white majority. It is particularly gratifying that some American companies have taken the lead in encouraging this. They recognized that they were in a unique position to upgrade conditions and opportunities for all their employees regardless of race, to the fullest extent possible under South African laws.

In addition we have sought to maintain contact with all segments of South African society. We do not endorse the racial policies of South Africa's leaders. But we do not believe that isolating them from the influence of the rest of the world is an effective way of encouraging them to follow a course of moderation and to accommodate change.

In the Portuguese territories, we favour self-determination. We have clearly expressed this position in the United Nations, and we shall continue to do so.

The United States continues to enforce - more strictly than many other countries - an embargo on sales of arms to all sides in South Africa and in the Portuguese territories. While we favour change, we do not regard violence as an acceptable formula for human progress.

We do not recognize the regime in power in Rhodesia ; as far as permitted by domestic legislation exempting strategic materials, the United States adheres strictly to the United Nations programme of economic sanctions. In Namibia, we recognize United Nations jurisdiction and discourage United Nations private investment.

No one who understands the complex human problems of Southern Africa believes that solutions will come soon or easily. Nor should there be any illusion that the United States can transform the situation, or indeed, that the United States should take upon itself that responsibility. This is the responsibility of the people who live there, not of any outside power.

It is important that all who seek a resolution of these problems address them with seriousness, honesty, and compassion.

UNITED STATES AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

(ii) Business involvement

The following is the text of the statement made on 27 March, 1973, by the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, David D. Newsom, before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa.

I welcome this opportunity, as always, to meet with this committee to discuss aspects of our foreign policy relating to Africa.

It is my understanding that the committee seeks, this week, to examine U.S. business involvement in South Africa, Namibia, and the Portuguese territories in Africa. Prior commitments involving official visitors from Africa will not make it possible for me to meet with the committee on the two subsequent days. I would like today, therefore, to make some general comments on our official policies and actions with respect to the involvement of U.S. private enterprise in these areas of Southern Africa. Mr. Smith, our highly qualified Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, who has followed these matters particularly closely, will be on hand for each of the sessions.

I am assuming that the primary interest of the committee in this set of hearings is in the extent of U.S. business involvement in each of these areas and our official policies relating to that involvement. At the base of the committee's inquiry, I am certain, is the question of whether this involvement supports or serves to perpetuate institutions or policies of racial discrimination or the continuation of white-minority rule in Southern Africa. Conversely, I would assume there is also the question of whether there are feasible actions which could restrict or curtail this involvement as a means of influencing change in that region.

Basic to a review of the U.S. Government's relationship to this issue is an understanding of the economic programmes which fall within the scope of current governmental authority and a comparison of these programmes as they are applied in Southern Africa to how they may be applied in other areas. Specifically, these are the activities in which there is governmental authority to engage in economic programmes:

1. Under voluntary direct investment controls administered by the Department of Commerce, varying schedules of investment are permitted in different countries according to their level of development. Schedule A is the most liberal in this connection, Schedule C the most restrictive. (This programme was initiated, of course, to protect the U.S. balance of payments rather than to restrict investment per se.)
2. The Export-Import Bank can assist U.S. exporters in various ways by direct loans, by discounting bank loans, and by extending credit to foreign banks to enable the latter to finance imports from the United States.
3. The Department of Commerce in consultation with the Department of

State can govern the degree of official activity on behalf of U.S. exporters and U.S. products, this involves trade promotion, trade mission's participation in fairs, and the facilitation of direct contacts between U.S. businessmen and prospective foreign customers.

4. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation can offer insurance to firms operating in developing areas of the world. With respect to Angola and Mozambique OPIC does consider applications for insurance against the political risks of currency inconvertibility and expropriation. These applications are referred to the Department of State for foreign policy guidance. Otherwise OPIC is not involved through the remainder of white dominated Southern Africa.

Now, before dealing with each of these areas in turn in connection with Southern Africa, let me briefly put U.S. investment in, and trade with, South Africa into perspective. The United States today has approximately 1 billion dollars in investments in South Africa, represented by about 300 firms. Trade with South Africa amounted in 1972 to 597.1 million in exports; 324.7 million in imports. To put the investment into perspective, this represents approximately 15 per cent of total foreign investment in South Africa. For the United States, this represents 25 per cent of our total investment on the African continent. During the past five years our total investment in other parts of the continent has been rising at a rate of 15 per cent annually, in contrast to an annual increase in investment in South Africa of 12.8 per cent. Our trade with South Africa, similarly, has been rising at a lower rate than our trade with the rest of the continent. Further, it has been rising at a substantially lower rate than South Africa's trade with other developed countries. Japan's trade with South Africa, for example, has risen 174.5 per cent in the past five years.

South Africa is, with its growing market, sophisticated infrastructure and generally favourable climate for investment, particularly attractive to much of the U.S. private sector. Nevertheless, consistent with its declared policy of opposition to the apartheid system in South Africa, the United States has exercised official restraint in the promotion of both investment and trade. The agencies of the U.S. Government responsible refrain from any promotion of either investment or trade of the type carried out in other countries. We counsel with prospective investors on the situation in South Africa to be sure they understand the economic as well as the political and social conditions in that country. We neither encourage them nor discourage them. We extend neither guarantees nor insurance on investment nor any official financing. South Africa, by the advanced nature of its economy, is under Schedule C, the most restrictive schedule of the Foreign Direct Investment Programme.

Despite the fact that we have a major balance of payments problem and that South Africa is a major and economically attractive market, we limit our commercial activities in South Africa to low-key facilitative services. We do not participate in special promotions, in trade missions, or trade fairs. The Export-Import Bank restricts its facilities to discount loans through private banks with a limit of 2 million dollars per transaction. It extends insurance and guarantees but no credits. We have been particularly conscious of the implications of involvement in any major South African Government enterprises.

As the subcommittee is aware, we adopt a much more restrictive policy

with respect to Namibia, particularly because of our position that South Africa's presence in the territory is illegal since the termination of its mandate in 1966. (The legal soundness of this position has subsequently been established authoritatively by the ICJ advisory opinion of June 21, 1971.) Since May, 1970, we have followed a policy of discouraging further American investment in the territory and have advised potential investors that we will not intercede to protect their investment against claims of a future legitimate government in the territory. The Export-Import Bank and OPIC provide no facilities for activities in Namibia. Any American firms which have decided to invest there since 1970 can be presumed to have done so in spite of their awareness of U.S. policy. In this connection, I am aware of the subcommittee's concerns that we might not have reached all potential investors to advise them of our policy. I believe we have. We are checking the files to confirm this and will provide the facts for the record. We do not have complete figures on the total American investment in Namibia. The bulk of it, some 45-50 million dollars in the Tsumeb Corporation, predated the termination of South Africa's mandate for the territory and the announcement of our policy on discouraging investment there.

U.S. investment in the Portuguese territories amounts to about 220 million dollars. Most of this is represented by the operations of the Cabinda Gulf Oil Corporation in Angola. We do not formally discourage trade and investment with the Portuguese territories, but neither do we make an effort to encourage it. Despite the obvious losses to U.S. exporters, we have not encouraged involvement in major projects in these territories.

I know how important this issue is to members of this committee and to many in this country concerned with the situation in Southern Africa. I am keenly aware that there are two sincere points of view toward the relationship between our business involvement and change, particularly in South Africa. One calls for withdrawal of U.S. investment. This point of view believes that this would encourage change; some who hold this view believe that, even if it did not, it would at least register the moral indignation of this country at the continued existence of racial discrimination in South Africa and would withdraw us from involvement in it. The other point of view suggests that, if U.S. firms are to remain in South Africa, they should then seek to have an impact through improving their own labour practices and their own attention to the social and educational needs of their non-white employees.

While sharing the views that we should contribute to peaceful change in Southern Africa, we in the Department do not look upon either withdrawal of investment or trade embargoes as feasible courses of action. Our investment in Southern Africa is, in many cases, closely tied to South African corporate structures. There is a real question whether U.S. capital as a practical matter could be withdrawn from South Africa. There is little to suggest that other major investing countries would follow suit; some would be inclined, rather, to fill the gap.

Our experience with trade embargoes against even smaller countries has not been salutary. Also, there is a genuine question regarding the opinion of non-white South Africans on this question.

We were impressed by the many with whom we have talked who wish U.S.

investment to stay provided it can positively promote better conditions. Finally I must again point out the positive balance of payments this country enjoys through its trade and investment in South Africa.

Officially, therefore, we have seen the more feasible exercise of influence to be through those U.S. firms willing actively to upgrade the practices and policies toward their non-white employees. We have been prepared to counsel with them generally on how this may be done, both in Washington and in South Africa. We can furnish to the committee for the record examples of our presentations on this subject. We have, further, in our consultations with other major investing countries encouraged their attention to this issue, since we cannot be blind to the competitive aspects of extra expenditures in these areas.

U.S. private interests are involved in a complex and controversial area in Southern Africa. The United States Government recognises this and, within the limits of its authority, seeks to make that involvement constructive.

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The House of Assembly's debate on the 1973 budget vote of the Minister of Foreign Affairs took place at three sittings of the House : Monday 30 April, when the Minister delivered his statement, and on Tuesday 8 and Wednesday 9 May. Speakers devoted a good deal of time to domestic policies - although, in general, this was linked to the question of overcoming external pressures - as well as to fairly generalised statements on developments in the world and in Africa, and to the question of the appointment of suitably qualified diplomats. The following extracts, placed under subject headings, represent some of the more significant contributions to the debate. Quotations are from *House of Assembly Debates (Hansard)* No. 12, 30 April - 4 May 1973, and No. 13, 7 - 11 May 1973.

DIALOGUE AND AFRICA

Minister of Foreign Affairs : One of those disappointments was the termination of the fruitful co-operation which we had with the previous Government of the Republic of Madagascar. However, that Government was unseated as a result of internal troubles with which we had nothing to do.

Another disappointment to which I want to refer here, is that the decision taken by the South African and Lesotho Governments, to which I referred last year, namely that we would exchange consular representatives with each other, could not be implemented in practice as a result of factors beyond our control. As hon. members know, Prime Minister Jonathan has over the past few months been effecting major changes in his country, which eventually resulted in the establishment of a new Parliament, which met last week. I want to give the assurance that the matter of opening consulates in the two countries, which is to my mind very important, will receive our further attention as soon as the Government of Lesotho has solved the problems it has in that regard.

Now it is true, Sir, that dialogue with the African states and ourselves did not develop in the manner and to the extent which was expected by some. Unfortunately dialogue with us is also discouraged by some at U.N., but this attitude is mainly confined to a number of militant African leaders, assisted and abetted by the Communists. But there are a number of Black African leaders who continue to carry on dialogue with us and who continue to advocate it strongly. I would in this context like to refer you to a speech which Dr. Banda delivered at a State banquet in Blantyre in October last year. The banquet was in honour of the members of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, which held its annual conference in Malawi last year. Dr. Banda took this opportunity to make out a very convincing case for dialogue and co-operation between African states and the Republic of South Africa. I saw some of the delegates after this conference, and according to them most of the delegates who had attended the conference, became convinced that dialogue provided the solutions to the problems of Southern Africa

Sir, let us hope that the efforts of Dr. Banda, and those who share his views, will not be in vain and that their statesmanship and vision will bring about a turning point and a new era of peace and progress in our sub-continent. In the meantime discussions between ourselves and certain Black African states continue. These discussions are mostly bilateral and of a confidential nature. I believe that, for some time at least, this pattern, i.e. bilateral and confidential, will be maintained and that the time is not yet ripe for dialogue on a multi-lateral basis. Multi-lateral co-operation in existing regional organizations in Southern Africa will, of course, continue as in the past.

Mr. J.D. du P. Basson (U.P. Bezuidenhout) : Botswana, one of our neighbouring states, has, as far as we can see, conspicuously drifted away from us. Strategically and politically this country is of special importance to us. It was one of the first Black states, or rather non-racial states, who after independence offered to establish friendly political ties with South Africa. Almost six years have elapsed since Sir Seretse Khama, president of Botswana, made it clear, in 1967, that Botswana would exchange diplomatic representatives with South Africa provided "the Botswana was accorded in South Africa the same treatment the South African would receive in Botswana"; and he added -

"As I see it now, the ball is in the South African court and it is up to South Africa to make the next move."

Hon. members will remember that on this side of the House we encouraged the Government to draw Botswana closer to us, and I remember pointing out at the time to the hon. the Minister that a new country is always most sensitive about being admitted to the older political society immediately after the act of independence. But the Government chose to rely on what was called diplomatic contact by telephone, and the position now is, as I see it, that Botswana has solidly joined the Dar-es-Salaam-Lusaka axis.

With Lesotho our relations seem to have turned even more sour. No exchange of any representatives has so far taken place, and the Prime Minister of Lesotho has not only personally expressed support for to quote him, "the liberation movements in Africa", but recently his representative at the United Nations supported the admission of guerrilla representatives to the Trusteeship Committee as observers. Sir, I would like to know what the hon. the Minister has to say, but I sincerely doubt if all this has much to do with the uncertain political conditions within the country itself. Several issues seem to lie at the root of our present unsatisfactory relations. It seems to me that the failure of our two countries to come to a satisfactory arrangement about the price of water eventually to be delivered to South Africa, and the future of the so-called "Conquered Territory" in the Free State, which has become a matter of political prestige to the Prime Minister of Lesotho and his party, and also dissatisfaction over what is called the treatment of Basothos in our country, lie at the root of our present relations and difficulties with Lesotho.

Mr. R.F. Botha (N.P. Wonderboom) : It is true. There have been set-backs. It was not necessary for the Minister to admit this. One does not admit something for which one is not responsible. He indicated that to a certain extent there had been set-backs. But to what is this attributable? South Africa still displays the same goodwill towards all the African states as it has always done. Recently, for the first time in the history of

the Republic, a Black head of state paid a visit to this country. This is an indication of our goodwill. That same hand of friendship which previous Governments held out to Africa under more difficult circumstances, it still being held out. Set-backs are nothing new. You will remember that in the early 'sixties South Africa attended congresses in cities such as Addis Ababa and Lagos. In those days we made contributions in various forms to African countries. Subsequently there were set-backs in regard to our relationships. After a period of the utmost hostility, the idea of dialogue came to the fore again. However the basic standpoint of the Government throughout has been that it holds out its hand of friendship; for it can make a contribution to the welfare and development of Africa. If there are countries in Africa who do not want to accept it, then they simply do not do so. We can do nothing about it, and that is where the matter ends. The Government cannot do more to prove its goodwill than its deeds in the past. But goodwill is a quality which can only grow if it comes from both sides.

Minister of Foreign Affairs : Sir, at half past two yesterday afternoon it was possible for all of us to read in the reading room here in Parliament a very interesting report in *The Argus* in connection with a debate which had just taken place in the Lesotho Parliament, from which I want to read a few extracts to you. This report stated, amongst other things, the following -

Two Opposition leaders, one of the Basutoland Congress Party and one of the United Democratic Party, called on the Lesotho Government to restore the good neighbourly relations which existed between the two countries in the past.

One of them said -

Lesotho and other smaller states in Africa must not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.

This is remarkable -

The other one quoted Mr. Vorster's attack on Chief Jonathan after the Lesotho Prime Minister had condemned the South African apartheid policy in 1971, delay in holding the meeting between Chief Jonathan and Mr. Vorster and Lesotho's support for liberation movements at the Guyana meeting of non-aligned nations.

The hon. member criticized us for what he considered to be delay in exchanging representatives with our three neighbouring states. When I referred in the past to the financial implications, the heavy financial burden, which something of that nature would entail for poor neighbouring states, hon. members opposite laughed at me, but listen now to what was said by the Deputy Prime Minister of Lesotho, also according to this report which appeared in *The Argus* -

Chief Maseribane said Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland had not yet established diplomatic relations with South Africa because of their financial limitations.

Mrs H. Suzman (P.P. Houghton) : There has been a general hardening of attitude even amongst those Governments which formerly were in favour of dialogue with South Africa. I should like to mention in particular

the case of Chief Jonathan who has made it quite clear that racial discrimination is the main stumbling block. He made major speeches last year in which he stated this. We are still waiting for a date to be announced when the meeting between Chief Jonathan and the Prime Minister of the Republic is to take place. In November last year the Prime Minister told us that it was just a matter of time and it was just a matter of fixing the date. Nearly six months have passed since then and we are still waiting for the date to be fixed. Generally speaking I think the hon. the Minister must admit that we have to make far more progress in the race relations field before we are going to soften the attitude of the Black leaders in Africa.

Mr. I.F.A. de Villiers (U.P. Von Brandis) : The hon. the Minister said (in a speech in Stellenbosch in February) that our *bona fides* would not be accepted generally until we have developed this policy (i.e. the homelands, independence policy) to its ultimate consequences, in other words, until the homelands have become independent states. That is the case especially with the African states, even with those with whom we have friendly relations or contacts. The hon. the Minister was at pains to make clear that he saw this as the kernel, the nucleus, of what we have to project abroad. Now I take leave to disagree with him.

One of the facts is this : that the majority of Black people in South Africa live outside the homelands. This is highly relevant to the question of what image we are projecting and what case we are making. Because people abroad know that the majority live outside their homelands and that they will continue to do so and that if the economic and statistical projections are correct, they will continue to do so in increasing numbers.

I say that if we have to depend, as the hon. the Minister suggests, for a breakthrough in international relations, for a restoration of our position on the diplomatic front, for the ability to re-commence normal relations with the other countries of the world - for all this - on the ultimate achievement of our homeland policy and the independence of the homelands, then we have a very long wait. I do not believe that we have all those years in hand.

UNITED NATIONS

Minister of Foreign Affairs : Moreover the entry of Red China into the U.N. and Red China's membership of the Security Council does not augur well for us in South Africa.

At the U.N. the extremists and communists once again used their preponderance of votes, just as they had done previously, for piloting through numerous resolutions in the General Assembly, resolutions condemning us and our policy and urging the Security Council to agree to sanctions against us, to give more positive support to the terrorist movements and in general to bring greater pressure to bear against South Africa in order to compel change here in South Africa. If Hon. members want to form an idea of the methods applied there and the language used there, they should take a look at the document I tabled in regard to our relations with the U.N.

I should also like to refer to another most unprecedented and dangerous step that was approved during the past session of the U.N. I am referring here to the admission, as observers, of representatives of terrorist movements to certain committee meetings of the Organization when South African affairs are discussed there. It is not necessary for me to emphasize that South Africa vehemently objected to this step.

More encouraging was the Secretary General's initiative, his efforts to induce the international community to condemn and combat terrorism. I may tell hon. members that to me personally it was really encouraging to sit there and listen to the unconditional condemnation of terrorism by numerous foreign ministers and other representatives of foreign countries who participated in that general debate.

SOUTH WEST AFRICA

Mr. J.D. du P. Basson : I have made as regularly as possible, a study of the proceedings at U.N. as they affect South Africa and our administration of South West Africa, but I have looked even more intently at the scene since the Government opened direct negotiations with the U.N. and since Dr. Waldheim and Dr. Escher came into our lives. One thing is certain - that there is little for our comfort in the latest developments.

Firstly the question of South-West Africa is now firmly in the hands of the Security Council which is the strong arm of the U.N. It is one organ of the U.N. which may order the use of force. Last year the Security Council met for a series of 13 meetings in Addis Ababa. This was the first occasion in its 26-year history that the council had met away from its headquarters in New York, i.e. in Africa, which illustrates the preoccupation of the Security Council with Africa affairs. There it occupied itself with four items, and two of these were South West Africa, and Apartheid in South Africa. In the Security Council the Soviet Union now blatantly advocates the use of collective action to force a settlement of the South-West Africa issue. The Soviet Union too has committed itself to material support for the terrorist movements in Africa.

As far as ambassador Escher is concerned, his report has been accepted both by Dr. Waldheim and the Security Council as categorical proof that the majority of the inhabitants of South-West Africa favour the withdrawal of South Africa from the Territory and want South West Africa as a whole to become a united, independent state. In fact Dr. Escher's findings are looked upon as an unofficial plebiscite, and every action is now based on this assumption. Finally, after years of futile effort by the U.N. Council for Namibia, as it is called there, to get one or more of the big powers to serve on it and to participate in its activities, both China and the Soviet Union have recently jumped on the bandwagon and now it is a matter of prestige to be associated with this council. The membership of the council was recently enlarged to 18, including two of the five super-powers of the world, namely China and the Soviet Union. A further significant development is that this U.N. Council for Namibia now virtually acts as a provisional government for South-West Africa, issuing travel documents on its behalf, operating a fund for the Territory and representing South-West Africa at international congresses.

Mr. R.F. Botha : I wish to ask (Mr. Basson) ... what he really finds in Dr. Waldheim's report as being the standpoint of the South African Government on self-determination which he will not also find in the speech of the Prime Minister in this House as recently as 19th February this year. What will he find? On that day the Prime Minister rose and

explained his policy in South West Africa in detail. He explained in detail repeatedly that all options were being left open to the population groups to decide for themselves, because he said that he was not forcing systems on people. He went on to appeal to us to pass the measure in question, which was before the House with as little discussion as possible and to afford the people concerned in South West an opportunity of acquiring the necessary experience in self-government to enable them in due course to take their own decision on their future.

Minister of Foreign Affairs : While I would very much like to place as much information as possible about the South-West Africa issue at the disposal of the House, it will be realized that there are many waiting to pounce on anything that would help them to wreck the present effort to find a realistic solution to the South-West Africa question. The so-called Council for Namibia, for example, wrote to the Secretary-General even before the recent discussions had taken place in Geneva, expressing its opposition to the continuation of dialogue.

Our policy, as the hon. the Prime Minister stated on the 19th February this year, is also aimed at affording the peoples of South-West Africa the necessary opportunity of acquiring experience of self-government, experience which is vital to them and obviously an essential element in the process leading to self-determination. Without such experience what people would be in a position to make a meaningful choice? As the Prime Minister stated in the House on that occasion, no final step has been taken in that regard. All that has been done has been to lead, *inter alia*, the Ovambo to a certain level in order to give them experience of Self-government. While the advisory council for South-West Africa which was recently established, is still in a formative phase, the Government intends to make the council, under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, a meaningful consultative instrument for the Territory. To this end the Government hopes it will include members truly representative of all the different groups and that it will study and advise the Prime Minister in all matters of Territory-wide concern, including matters relating to the future of the Territory. Thus it is hoped that the council will be of assistance to the Government in facilitating self-determination and independence. It is the Government's intention that, as the council becomes more experienced and effective, it should progressively become an instrument for the development of co-operation and understanding among the inhabitants of the Territory as a whole. It will depend on the contribution of and interest displayed by the members as to how the council will develop in practice.

Mrs H. Suzman : There is one question which the hon. the Minister did not answer, the question which was put to him yesterday by the hon. member for Bezuidenhout. It is certainly a question which I too intended putting to him. How does the Government's statement that all political parties - this is part of the Prime Minister's statement - of South-West Africa will have full and free participation in the process leading to self-determination and independence, conform with the recent arrest of the three Opposition leaders? As far as I understand from a Press cutting, three of the main Opposition leaders were arrested when they led something like 3 000 people to the Chief Minister's place and protested with placards against the establishment of a self-governing Owambo. I think the House is entitled to some information about that. I should also like to ask the hon. the Minister whether it is not contemplated that the emergency proclamation under which people can be detained etc.,

which was introduced after the strikes in Owamboland in January last year - I think it is Proclamation R17 of 1972 - should now be lifted since this too, I believe, would be an important argument in South Africa's favour in the deliberation over South-West Africa.

THE ISSUE OF WAGES

Minister of Foreign Affairs : There is one matter which I want to raise here, to a certain extent because I became involved in it during my visit to Britain two weeks ago. This matter is the political implications - please note, political implications - of this campaign for increased wages for non-White workers in South Africa in the case of foreign companies operating here in our country. As hon. members will perhaps know, several pressure groups and the United States have over a period of years waged such a campaign against us. Now this phenomenon has also reared its head in Great Britain and, according to reports received this weekend, in West Germany as well. As hon. members may perhaps know, the British Labour Party insisted on and also succeeded in ordering a parliamentary sub-commission to inquire into this whole matter. The object of the commission is to inquire into labour practices of British firms doing business in South Africa. Of course, the relations between the British Parliament, the British Government, on the one hand and the British industrialists on the other hand, are no concern of ours, but quite a different complexion is put on the matter if a parliamentary committee of another country should want to come here - I am not saying that they want to do so - which is what some people want, to inquire into a matter which is a purely South African domestic affair. I discussed this matter fully with the British Foreign Secretary when I saw him a few weeks ago. We do of course have nothing to hide in this regard. Now it appears that the Department of State of the United States of America published a guide which is being distributed among American firms doing business in South Africa, a guide urging *inter alia*, that higher wages be paid to non-Whites employed by these American firms. I want to say here that there ought to be no uncertainty or misunderstanding in the mind of any person as to what the South African Government's policy in regard to wages is, for this has repeatedly been made clear, here in this House as well. It should be remembered by those waging this campaign that we in South Africa have a system of free enterprise, and that foreign firms are receiving the same privileges here as do South African firms, and that we accept that they ought to undertake the same responsibilities. This includes the obligation to improve the welfare of their employees and to ensure equitable labour practices. There would be no objection if the Department of State of the United States of America were merely to encourage such firms in general to treat their people well. Nor would that clash with our Government's policy, but it is a horse of a completely different colour when such a channel should be used for interfering in our domestic affairs, for criticizing us or for dictating to the South African Government in this regard. Improvement in conditions of service, narrowing the gap in the wage structure between Whites and non-Whites, has been Government policy for a long time, although our hon. Prime Minister has rightly warned against excessive and reckless action in this regard. A great

deal has already been accomplished in this regard. We are telling the outside world that we are proud of it. Notwithstanding our exceptionally difficult problems as a result of our heterogenous population, we have accomplished great feats in this sphere. It would therefore be incorrect and misleading - yes it would even be presumptuous - to want to pretend that improved labour practices in South Africa had their origin in foreign firms.

Mr. J.D. du P. Basson : We on this side of the House are, of course, very much in favour, as has been said quite often enough, of South Africa closing the wage gap as fast as possible. I think nobody can have any objection to people from abroad coming to South Africa and having a look at conditions in our country. As the Minister said himself, we have nothing to hide. But I fully agree, that when it comes to an organ of another Parliament wanting to conduct investigations in our country, it would be improper, unless, of course, they are invited by the South African Government. Our attitude on this point is that normally people belonging to other governments should be welcome to South Africa, to see what they want to see; but I fully agree that it would be improper for an organ of another Parliament to come and hold an official investigation in South Africa without being invited to do so.

Mrs. C.D. Taylor (U.P. Wynberg) : At the present time, as the hon. the Minister himself mentioned in his overall report at the beginning of this debate, there is increasing concern both in the United States and in the United Kingdom concerning the wages paid to Black and Coloured workers in the Republic, that is to say : those who are employed by American and British firms or by their South African subsidiaries. We all know that a lot of this stems from an attempt at political interference from outside, but I do hope that we will not lose our sense of perspective because of that. I think it is agreed that the pressures in this field are about to increase, instead of decrease, in the years ahead. Since we ourselves have recently experienced a good deal of non-violent but nonetheless genuine labour unrest, I think that the hon. the Minister will probably agree that a pragmatic and constructive approach by the Government and the Opposition to this problem can do a great deal to assist both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and all of our diplomatic representatives overseas.

Where foreign companies and their subsidiaries in South Africa are concerned, there is obvious evidence that this scrutiny is continuing and will continue in future. The pressures will build up and not diminish. I suggest that there is one really effective way of meeting this situation. The hon. the Minister should try to persuade his colleague, the hon. the Minister of Labour, to appoint a permanent multi-racial wage review commission on which representatives of commerce and industry, the trade unions, the Government, parliamentarians, economists and other professions, should sit for the express purpose of narrowing wage gaps and assessing current wage rates for all population groups in relation to their productivity, training and skills and the fluctuations in the cost of living index.

DIPLOMATS OF ALL RACE GROUPS

Mr. J. D. du P. Basson : The Government should give attention to the training of people from all sections of the population so that they may take part in the struggle in the international sphere. I feel that if the Government is really in earnest about its policy of making the Bantu areas independent, it should in any event be helping those people now with the training of candidates for foreign service. I think that we should start sending multi-national teams abroad so that they may act there on behalf of the whole of South Africa and also on behalf of South-West Africa. I am convinced that the day we have reached that stage, we shall achieve much greater success in our foreign relations. I think that all sections of the population should have the opportunity to lend a hand in the defence of South Africa.

Minister of Foreign Affairs : The hon. member again raised the question of the training of non-Whites as diplomats and asked whether the time had not arrived for us to send multi-racial teams abroad. I must point out to the hon. member, as I did in the past, that others, the former colonial powers to be specific, tried to do the same thing prior to the independence of the subordinate nations, but that it failed. What happened at the United Nations was that those persons were discredited in the eyes of their own people, because they had allegedly, according to their attackers and accusers, colluded with the White oppressors. It simply did not succeed. It would be much better if South African non-Whites went abroad under their own steam, by invitation - and this is a frequent occurrence - and were then to put their case. Then they would be able to do so with much more conviction, even though they should often criticize us abroad and tell the outside world that they did not like everything we are doing here, but that they nevertheless co-operated with us. In fact, that would be much more effective than it would be for us to use them for going there and doing the work being done by us Whites at the moment, because we are governing the country at the moment and that responsibility is actually resting on our shoulders.

A BLACK RHODESIAN'S VIEWPOINT

An interview with Aristone Chambati

Aristone Chambati recently undertook a study visit to South Africa with the assistance of the South African Institute of International Affairs. During his stay in the country David Hirschmann of the Institute conducted this interview with him. It is appearing in the July/August issue of *New Nation*

Mr. Chambati, after an absence from Rhodesia of ten years, has recently taken up an appointment as Research Fellow in the Department of Political Science at the University of Rhodesia. In the period spent abroad he studied at Princeton, New York and Oxford Universities and served for eighteen months with the Commonwealth Secretariat.

Question : As a Rhodesian who has spent a long time away from home, and has both an internal and external perspective, how do you evaluate the African National Council as a political movement relevant to Rhodesia's needs?

Chambati : I think the formation of the ANC is one event which leaves some room for hope in Rhodesia. Here is an African movement which accepts that the White man is part of Rhodesia and is there to stay, and is committed to a non-racial or multiracial society. It has put the interests of the country first and in order to arrive at a compromise with the present Government the ANC has abandoned the idea of one-man-one vote and majority rule now as immediate goals. Its leaders also believe that a solution to the problem can be found within Rhodesia itself. I was in England when Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues came there. He made a very favourable impression in England and on the British Government. I see the ANC as a very level-headed and realistic movement, and I find it most unfortunate, if not tragic, that the Government has not taken advantage of its offer of full-scale negotiations, which would include all the various political groups in the country, in an effort to find solutions.

Question : How do the ANC constitutional proposals differ from the terms of the Smith-Home agreement?

Chambati : I am afraid that I do not know what sort of constitutional proposals the ANC intends to put forward during negotiations with the Rhodesian Front Government. But judging by statements of its leaders I should say that what the ANC leaders would like to see is a constitution which will enable the Rhodesians to abandon the present racially based franchise by establishing a common voters' role. I do not know what qualifications the ANC leaders would set for such a franchise and how much time they would require before there is majority rule. But their aim would be unimpeded progress towards majority rule, which, of course,

Swaziland - Government Statement on Constitution

On 12 April, 1973, King Sobhuza II repealed Swaziland's Independence Constitution and assumed full judicial, legislative and executive powers. Commenting on this move the leader of the opposition Ngwane National Liberatory Congress, Dr. Ambrose Zwane, - who was later detained - described the King's action as a "seizure of power by forces of facism". The Government, he said, wanted a system of rule where the individual counted for nothing. "The rule of law had been suspended and the clock put back years in Swaziland." He denied that his party had been guilty of subversive activity - a reason given for repealing the Constitution. "Not a drop of blood has been shed in this country. We were careful not to rock the boat. The Government cannot quote one incident of subversion on our part. It is simply power-hungry and wants to grab this power from the people."

This sort of criticism was repeated by a number of foreign newspapers, and on 10 May, 1973, the Swaziland Government issued the following statement in response :

(a) Since the restoration of Independence, it has been publicly stated that the Independence Constitution - which was drafted and enacted in Westminster for the Swazi people - was unsuitable in so far as : (i) it did not fully accommodate the kingdom's way of life; (ii) it was too rigid and so entrenched that even attempting to amend it through the Westminster procedure was frustrating; (iii) it had inherent in it potentially divisive elements; (iv) it was manifestly unworkable. (b) All political organisations in the country were unanimous in declaring the Constitution unsuitable and incompatible with the Kingdom's political status; (c) In its election manifesto, the Imbokodvo National Movement pledged itself to amend the Constitution and was overwhelmingly returned on that basis; (d) In May, 1972, the Swazi Nation called upon His Majesty's Government to amend the Constitution without delay; (e) On March 19th, His Majesty the King made it known to the Nation that the Constitution was being closely studied with a view to making it consonant with the spirit of Sovereign, Independent Swaziland; (f) On April 12, 1973, the Swazi National Council and both Houses of Parliament unanimously adopted a resolution calling upon His Majesty the King-in-Council to "forthwith resolve the crisis" resulting from the unworkability of the Constitution; (g) In response to the Nation's call, the will of the people expressed finally through Parliament and the Swazi National Council, His Majesty repealed the Independence Constitution in the presence of over 20 000 people who unmistakably received the news with unqualified jubilation.

Undisputed approval by the Nation of the action taken by His Majesty is not only the acclamation of those present at Lobamba on 12th April but also the peace and calm which have prevailed throughout the Kingdom since the Constitution was repealed. Activities of the Public Service and the private sector continue normally. (It should be borne in mind that): (a) It is by far better to obey and to respect the will of the people than to please a handful of excited and misguided pressmen who may not even be aware of the people's

aspirations; (b) The repeal of the Constitution is meant to enable the Swazi people to tailor a Constitution of their own choice, a Constitution calculated to preserve and to promote national unity, peace and prosperity; (c) The people of this Kingdom have all the right to shape their destiny as they see fit - unfettered by foreign interests; (d) The best judges in the situation are the people of Swaziland themselves who have done nothing more than exercise their God-given right to choose what is best for the Kingdom of Swaziland which is sovereign and independent.

Lesotho - Foreign Policy

The first session of Lesotho's Interim Assembly was opened in Maseru on 27 April, by King Moshoeshoe II, who also delivered the Speech from the Throne, laying down the Government's programme for the forthcoming session. During his speech he announced that the Government would introduce legislation to establish a Boundaries Commission for negotiation of the common border with South Africa, and said the Government also intended to proceed with negotiations with the South African Government on the Malibamatso Water Development Project scheme as soon as possible, and when the South African Government was ready for such negotiation.

In moving the motion thanking the King for his speech, the Prime Minister, Chief Leabua Jonathan, made the following comments on foreign policy :

I wish to reiterate that the foreign policy of this country continues to be determined by our national interest, but it is not static. Because of our geographical situation and other considerations, such as our economic situation, we continue to strengthen our links with the countries with which we have enjoyed bilateral relations and in the true spirit of the seventies we are seeking more friends and we are not going to be stopped by ideological differences to have friends in those areas in which cooperation can be achieved with all members of the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organisation of African Unity.

We shall continue to accept aid and loans from any country as long as such assistance has no political strings attached. Ideologies cannot prevent us from establishing contact.

We shall continue to advocate dialogue in our domestic and foreign policy rather than the use of force, and as committed members of the Organisation of African Unity we shall not cease to give moral and any other possible support to our fellow men in the

SYMPOSIA

WORKING GROUP ON ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT

On 25-26 May 1973, the Institute, in cooperation with the Rand Afrikaans University, organised a Working Group on Accelerated Development in Southern Africa, at Jan Smuts House. The following is a list of topics discussed, chairmen of sessions and discussants :

1) Opening Session

Chairman : Prof Anna Steyn, Rand Afrikaans University
Discussants : Prof. S.S. Brand, Deputy Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister, South Africa
Prof. G.M.E. Leistner, Africa Institute of South Africa

2) Agriculture

Chairman : Prof. the Hon H.W.E. Ntsanwisi, Chief Minister, Gazankulu
Discussant : Mr. G. van de Wall, Department of Bantu Administration and Development, S.A.

3) Industrialisation - Rural and Urban

Chairman : Prof. J.H. Moolman, Director, Africa Institute of South Africa
Discussants : Mr. G.C.R. Fölscher, Rand Afrikaans University
Mr. Ron Legg, Southern Africa Technology Development Group

4) Role of the Politician in Development

Chairman : Mr. G.J. Thula, Chairman Inkatha KaZulu Investment Company
Discussants : Prof. M.H.H. Louw, Witwatersrand University
Mr. A.M. Chambati, University of Rhodesia
Dr. Denis Worrall, Witwatersrand University

5) Training for Development Administration

Chairman : Dr. J.W. Bodenstein, Department of Health, South Africa.
Discussants : Mrs Nancy Charton, Rhodes University
Mr. F.R. Wilson, Commonwealth Development Corporation, Southern Africa

6) Economic Relations Within Southern Africa

Chairman : Mr. S.M. Motsuenyane, President, National African Federated Chamber of Commerce, South Africa
Discussants : Prof. J.A. Lombard, Pretoria University
Prof. S.B. Ngcobo, University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland

7) Universities and Research Coordination

Chairman : Mr. K.B. Hartshorne, Department of Bantu Education, South Africa
Discussants : Prof. D.H. Reader, University of Rhodesia
Prof. L. Schlemmer, University of Natal

8) Conclusion

Chairman : Mr. C.J.A. Barratt, Director, South African Institute of International Affairs

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

On 7 June, 1973, the Pretoria Branch of the Institute in cooperation with the University of Pretoria, organised a Symposium on International Relations in Southern Africa, at the University of Pretoria. The symposium was attended by about 170 participants. The programme was as follows:

Morning Session :

Opening Address - Dr. Leif Egeland, National Chairman, South African Institute of International Affairs

Economic Relations in Southern Africa - Professor J.A. Lombard, University of Pretoria

Political Relations in Southern Africa - Professor C.F. Nieuwoudt, University of Pretoria

Rapporteur : Prof. M.H.H. Louw, University of the Witwatersrand

Afternoon Session :

Technical and Scientific Cooperation in Southern Africa - Prof. J.H. Moolman, Director, Africa Institute of South Africa

Problems of Security in Southern Africa - Commodore R.A. Edwards, S.M., South African Navy.

Rapporteur : Mr. C.J.A. Barratt, Director, South African Institute of International Affairs

Evening Session

South African Foreign Policy in a Southern African Context - Dr. the Hon. Hilgard Muller, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Conclusion - Dr. the Hon. Wentzel du Plessis, Councillor, University of Pretoria

June 1973.

SOME RECENT ACQUISITIONS IN THE LIBRARY AT JAN SMUTS HOUSE

ARKHURST, Frederick S. *ed.*

Africa in the seventies and eighties : issues in development.
Praeger in co-operation with the Adlai Stevenson Institute of
International Affairs, 1970.

ARMSTRONG, Hamilton Fish, *ed.*

Fifty years of foreign affairs. Praeger for the Council on Foreign
Relations, 1972.

ATLANTIC STUDY CONFERENCE ON EDUCATION

8th. Oxford, 1970

Learning about international institutions in secondary schools.
Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers, 1970.

BARBER, Noël

The war of the running dogs : how Malaya defeated the Communist
guerillas, 1948-60. Collins, 1971.

BEHRENS, Catherine Betty Abigail

Merchant shipping and the demands of war. London : H.M.S.O., 1955.

CHILCOTE, Ronald H. *ed.*

Protest and resistance in Angola and Brazil : comparative studies.
University of California pr., 1972.

CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE

Basic instruments and selected documents G.A.T.T., 1955-

CRONJE, Suzanne

The world and Nigeria : the diplomatic history of the Biafran war
1967-1970. Sidgwick & Jackson, 1972.

DAVIDSON, Basil

In the eye of the storm : Angola's people. Longman, 1972.

DU PLESSIS, Jan A.

Revolusionêre vrede - die oorsprong en betekenis van die wêreldkommunisme.
Sentrum vir Internasionale Politiek, Potchefstroom Universiteit, 1972.

EINZIG, Paul

The destiny of gold. Macmillan, 1972.

HARRIMAN, William Averell

America and Russia in a changing world : a half century of personal
observation. George Allen & Unwin, 1971.

HARRISON, Horace V., *ed.*

The role of theory in international relations. Van Nostrand, 1964.

HIGGINS, Benjamin Howard

Economic development : principles, problems and policies. Rev. ed.
Constable, 1958.

- HSIA, Adrian
The Chinese cultural revolution. Orbach & Chambers, 1972.
- HYMANS, Jaques Louis
Léopold Sédar Sengor : an intellectual biography. Edinburgh Univ. pr., 1971.
- ISRAEL. *Misrad ha-huts. Mahleket Mehkar*
The Arab view. (The Ministry), 1972.
- JOYAUX, Francois
Mao Tse-Toung. L'Herne, 1972.
- KOJIMA, Kiyoshi
Japan and a Pacific Free Trade area. Macmillan, 1971.
- LEE, John Michael
African armies and civil order. Chatto & Windus for the Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969.
- MAGEE, James S.
ECA and the paradox of African cooperation. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1970.
- MASON, John Brown, *ed.*
Research resources : annotated guide to the social sciences. ABC-Clio 1968 - 71.
- MASON, Philip
Patterns of dominance. Oxford Univ. pr. for the Institute of Race Relations, 1970.
- MAXWELL, Neville
India's China war. Cape, 1970.
- MUNDELL, Robert Alexander
Man and economics. McGraw-Hill, 1968.
- MURRAY, Keith Anderson Hope
Agriculture. London H.M.S.O., 1955.
- MURRAY- BROWN, Jeremy
Kenyatta. George, Allen & Unwin, 1972.
- MUTHARIKA, B
Toward multinational economic cooperation in Africa. Praeger, 1972.
- PERKINS, James Oliver Newton
International policy for the world economy. George Allen & Unwin, 1969.
- POTHOLM, Christian P.
Swaziland : the dynamics of political modernization. Univ. of California pr., 1972.
- RHOODIE, Nicholas Johannes, *ed.*
South African dialogue : Contrasts in South African thinking on basic race issues. McGraw-Hill, 1972.

RECENT INSTITUTE PUBLICATIONS AVAILABLE

Rhodesia Quo Vadis? by the Rt. Hon. Sir Roy Welensky K.C.M.G.

This paper contains the text of an address by the former Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland to a meeting at Jan Smuts House, and it includes the replies to questions during the discussion period.

The Economic Problems and Policies of South Africa's Neighbouring Black African States by Professor G.M.E. Leistner.

This paper was presented by Professor Leistner, the Deputy Director of the Africa Institute of South Africa, to a Conference on Southern Africa organised by the Africa Institute in September, 1972.

Chinese Foreign Policy by W.A.C. Adie

This paper by Mr. Adie of the Australian National University is based on an address given to an Institute meeting at Jan Smuts House, and it includes the replies to questions during the discussion period.

Southern Africa : Intra-regional and International Relations

by John Barratt

This paper was presented by Mr. Barratt, the Director of the S.A.I.I.A., to a Conference on Southern Africa organised by the Africa Institute of South Africa in September, 1972.

U.S. Foreign Policy toward Southern Africa : Continuity and Change

by John Seiler

This paper prepared for the Institute by Mr. Seiler (an American presently lecturing at Rhodes University) is drawn from a larger body of research on the formulation of US policy toward Southern Africa.

N.B. The above five papers are available to members on request at no charge. Price for non members : 30c.

The Library of Jan Christian Smuts

A catalogue arranged and edited by Ursula Brigish (in two parts) - Published by the University of the Witwatersrand and the Smuts Memorial Trust, in co-operation with the South African Institute of International Affairs.

Price : non-members : R10, members : R5

International Aspects of Overpopulation, Edited by John Barratt and Michael Louw

Proceedings of a Conference held by the South African Institute of International Affairs at Johannesburg. Published for the Institute by the Macmillan Press Ltd., London.

Price : R8-75 (if ordered through the Institute)

South African Institute of International Affairs

CORPORATE MEMBERS AND DONORS

African Cables Ltd.
African Explosives and Chemical Industries Ltd.
African Oxygen Ltd.
Anglo American Corporation of South Africa Ltd.
Anglo-Transvaal Consolidated Investment Co. Ltd.
Argus Printing & Publishing Co. Ltd.
Babcock & Wilcox of Africa (Pty) Ltd.
Barclays National Bank Ltd.
Barlow Rand Ltd.
B.P. of Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd.
Cape and Transvaal Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd.
Cayzer, Irvine S.A. (Pty) Ltd.
Cementation Co. (Africa) Ltd.
C.N.A. Investments Ltd.
Commercial Union Assurance Co. of S.A. Ltd.
De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd.
Dunlop South Africa Ltd.
Ford Motor Co. of S.A. (Pty) Ltd.
French Bank of Southern Africa Ltd.,
General Mining & Finance Corporation Ltd.
Gold Fields of South Africa Ltd.
The Goodyear Tyre & Rubber Co. (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd.
Haggie Rand Ltd.
Hill Samuel S.A. Ltd.
Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co. Ltd.
Legal & General Assurance Society Ltd.
The Metal Box Company of South Africa Ltd.
Mine Labour Organisations (Wenela) Ltd.
Mobil Oil Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd.
Nasionale Pers Bpk.
Natal Tanning Extract Company Ltd.
Nedbank Ltd.
H.F. Oppenheimer, Esq.
Pretoria Portland Cement Company Ltd.
Price Waterhouse & Company.
Rembrandt Tobacco Corporation (S.A.) Ltd.
Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd.
S.A. Associated Newspapers Ltd.
S.A. Breweries Institute.
S.A. Phillips (Pty) Ltd.
S.A. Sugar Association.
The Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd.
Syfret's Trust Company Ltd.
Tiger Oats & National Milling Company Ltd.
Total South Africa (Pty) Ltd.
Toyota South Africa Ltd.
The Trust Bank of Africa Ltd.
U.D.C. Bank
Unilever S.A. (Pty) Ltd.
Union Acceptances Ltd.
Union Corporation Ltd.
White's Cement Co. Ltd.