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Non-State Social Protection in Ethiopia: Characteristics, Governance and Policy Relevance

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Abstract

Non-state actors (NSAs) in Ethiopia play a vital role in providing social protection services to address poverty, inequality and vulnerabilities affecting livelihood. However, information about them, an essential component in planning, is scarce in both official records and in the literature, particularly for informal NSAs. This study aimed to map NSAs and their services and examine their governance, responsiveness to gender considerations and impact on policy formulation.

The study was conducted in Addis Ketema and Dire Dawa city administration, representing urban areas, and Welmera and Shinile, representing rural areas. The first phase mapped the NSAs while the second phase was an in-depth study of selected beneficiaries. A list of formal NSAs was compiled from a literature review; structured questionnaire interviews were undertaken during mapping and the in-depth study to obtain primary data. Beneficiary focus groups provided insight into NSA services. Data were analysed using SPSS software.

Of the 1,094 NSAs mapped, over 60 per cent were in urban centres. NSAs focused on livelihood promotion, and welfare, social and advocacy services. Their main beneficiaries were households affected during drought, orphans and vulnerable children, people living with HIV and AIDS, the elderly, people with disabilities and commercial sex workers. Up to 45 per cent of the beneficiaries received services from four or more NSAs.

Formal NSAs were categorised based on their funding sources. Most—but almost no informal NSAs—interacted with state institutions, which they considered beneficial for their performance. Few NSAs engaged in policy or rights advocacy. NSAs were responsive to gender considerations, with women accounting for slightly more than half of their beneficiaries. Gender balance in NSA staffing was poor, especially among managers.

The Ethiopian Government can strengthen NSAs capacity to deliver services by providing them with a conducive operating environment, engaging them in policy development, building their technical capacity and facilitating their networking and engagement for learning and information sharing.

Keywords: Ethiopia, social protection, non-state actors, policy relevance, gender, governance

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Abbreviations

AU	African Union
CBO	community-based organisation
CCRDA	Consortium of Christian Relief and Development Association
CSA	Charities and Societies Agency
CSO	civil society organisation
DfID	UK Department for International Development
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FBO	faith-based organisation
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
ILO	International Labour Organization
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
ISSA	International Social Security Administration
NGO	non-governmental organization
NSA	non-state actor
SPDPG	Social Protection Development Partners Group
WAI	weighted average index
WHO	World Health Organization

Definitions of local terms

Awraj/muday	A support mechanism mainly found in the Amhara region that helps minimise the household burden associated with marriage.
Buussa gonofaa	A voluntary or obligatory contribution of livestock for families that lose theirs.
Dabare	A system of transferring livestock (mainly cattle) from better-off people to the poor.
Debo/Jiggi	A seasonal labour mobilisation scheme to help labour-poor people during the main cropping season.
Extended family system	Strong family ties exist in Ethiopia where parents may live with their grown children even after these have formed families.
Gudifecha	An Oromo concept meaning adoption. A better-off family adopts a child from a poor family for the child's labour, e.g. to look after livestock. Gudifecha now refers to the legal adoption process.
Iddir	An informal, traditional, community institution to address mainly death-related shocks.
Iqqiub	A community-based traditional saving mechanism where individuals in a neighbourhood contribute money regularly for allocation on lottery basis or according to need. The iqqiub concept is now the basis of a resource mobilisation strategy big businesses are using to start or expand operations.
Kebele	The lowest administrative structure in rural areas and regional towns in Ethiopia, with an average population of 5,000. The kebeles in Addis Ababa have been upgraded to districts.
Ketema	A subdivision (sub-city) of a major city.
Mahiber	A membership get-together that takes place on a particular religious day of the Ethiopian calendar to create social harmony within a group with the same religious beliefs. It is also used to console members in grief. In its modern form, a mahiber is an alumni association of people who went to the same school.
Regional state	The second highest administrative structure in Ethiopia.
Semi-formal	A transitional institutional structure between formal and informal structures. Iddirs are classified as semi-formal.
District	An administrative structure just below the regional state, known locally as woreda.

1 Introduction
1.2 Background

Social protection is a response to vulnerabilities that people face. It can enable poor people to participate in and benefit from economic activities. The importance of social protection is increasingly being recognised worldwide, especially with the food price and global economic crises, and has become the concern of both state and non-state actors (NSAs). However, research on social protection in the developing world concentrates mostly on state institutions and state social spending (Mares and Carnes, 2009; McGuire, 2010). In Africa, interventions funded by governments and bilateral or multilateral donors are the main focus.

Many developing world governments cannot provide adequate social protection services, and recent policy discussions have started to emphasise understanding of the social protection provided by NSAs such as multinational corporations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community-based organisations (CBOs), and families and other social institutions. NSAs have important roles in the governance and accountability of social protection systems if they are to function coherently and effectively. And they play these roles largely or completely independent of the state. However, in many African countries this role is not well understood, particularly its scale, impact or policy significance. Despite NSAs' growing visibility and importance, in almost all African countries information on what they are, their services or beneficiaries, and their interaction with other NSAs or state social protection providers is scant. Much of the social protection literature is devoted to state policies or programmes, and although it acknowledges the role of NSAs, it is rarely sufficiently explicit about the scale and scope of their role or impact for their meaningful inclusion in a comprehensive national framework.

Large African populations are not covered by state social protection (Holzmann and Koettl, 2010; Mkandawire, 2006). Estimates indicate that participation in state and non-state social protection is not an 'either/or' proposition and some people may obtain services from both, and that data on social protection coverage by state programmes may mask gender issues, as most state programmes such as social security often link entitlements to formal employment, from which most women, who are concentrated in the informal sector, are excluded (Luttrell and Moser, 2004; Werding, 2010). In some African societies, women have limited access to property such as land and livestock while in others boys have priority over girls in education, so many women cannot compete in the labour market (Osei-Boateng, 2011). Therefore, gendered social protection programmes are particularly important in Africa.

Over the last five years, Ethiopia has seen a policy momentum around social protection issues, motivated by the concern to move from dependency on emergency food aid. The country is vulnerable to several internal and external shocks and a large proportion of its people have limited coping mechanisms. Poverty is generally a key determinant of vulnerability, as well.

In 2009 Ethiopia ratified the African Union's (AU) social policy framework that requires states to improve their social protection plans of action. Ethiopia does not yet have a systematic social protection plan, but a large number of activities constitute its de facto strategy. The lack of social protection literature means that the government may be generally aware of the presence of NSAs but not their other details or numbers.

The choice of social protection as a research theme is also informed by the level of priority it is accorded by African governments, the donor community and regional intergovernmental bodies like the AU, which believe that inclusive growth and development cannot be achieved without a system of social protection that ensures accessibility of social protection services to all citizens. Such a system would also ensure synergy between state and non-state social protection provision to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of their services.

A previous study mapping NSAs in Ethiopia identified over 1,000 such organisations (Cerritelli et al., 2008), but it did not focus on social protection. From the Ministry of Justice's data, more than 3,000 registered NGOs provide social protection services (Rahmato et al., 2008). From the most recent estimates, formal NSAs total about 4,000 (NGO Law Monitor,

2013), and up to 90 per cent of Ethiopians belong to at least one informal group or support system.

It is likely that many NSAs are involved in social protection, ranging from informal family or clan units through the more formal local and national faith-based organisations (FBOs) to the large international NGOs. This diversity provides considerable scope for researchers to explore the potential connection with state social protection, and examine important governance features such as patron–client relations and mechanisms to support voice and accountability.

Social protection debate is relatively new in Ethiopia, but formal social protection has been going on since the early 1960s (Figure 1). Informal community-based support mechanisms have a longer history and continue to be important, with some non-formal systems acting as the first line of response to shocks and vulnerabilities.

Ethiopia was among the few countries in Africa in the early 1960s to respond to the International Labour Organization's (ILO) declaration for decent work and social security for citizens, and since the 1970s has been using emergency response mechanisms as a first line of response to shocks. In the constitution promulgated in 1995, the government committed to "… provide rehabilitation and assistance to the physically and mentally disabled, the aged, and to children who are left without parents or guardian" (FDRE, 1995, Article 41(5)). As the first step towards this goal, the government formulated a developmental social welfare policy in 1996 to define the vulnerable groups to be targeted, and drafted action plans to guide social protection interventions. This policy was not fully implemented mainly for lack of funding.

Besides their transfers and employment-generation roles, the productive safety net programmes launched in 2005 galvanised the debate on the need for more systematic and institutionalised social protection for all citizens. Experience from implementing these programmes formed the basis for the design of a national social protection policy, which is a significant improvement over its predecessor in terms of concept and instruments.

Figure 1: Evolution of social protection in Ethiopia (Source: Devereux and Amdissa Teshome (2013)).

Government poverty reduction strategies give varying attention to social protection. The Growth and Transformation Plan, the most recent strategy paper, considers social welfare as a concern for various institutions. Ethiopia also is one of the countries developing a social protection policy and strategy. In response to pressure, the government introduced social security for private sector employees with provisions similar to those for the public sector. The Private Organizations' Employees Social Security Agency was established to manage the private social security fund (FDRE, 2011).

In Ethiopia, social protection policies and programmes are dominated by the state with little focus on NSAs. It is relevant, therefore, to assess the features of non-state social protection.

1.2 Scope of the research

The scope of the research is limited in two ways. First, it has limited coverage of the vast array of informal support mechanisms in Ethiopia. Systems such as the debo/jiggi, gudifecha, dabare, buussa gonofaa, awraj/muday and the extended family system are excluded because their services are difficult to trace or map; some are declining in importance and they hardly interact with the state or amongst themselves, so their policy relevance is difficult to determine.[1] Second, geographically it is limited to two urban centres (Dire Dawa and Addis Ketema Sub-city) and two rural districts (Welmera and Shinile). It excludes urban centres found in the rural districts and rural villages found in the urban centres.[2]

1.3 Objectives

The main objective was to determine the characteristics and policy relevance of non-State social protection in Ethiopia. Specifically, the research aimed to:

- Map and understand the nature and extent of non-state social protection service providers;
- Assess the governance features of non-state social protection service provision;
- Investigate the extent of responsiveness of non-state social protection services to gender;
- Analyse how formal and informal NSAs contribute to social protection policy formulation in the country.

1.4 Key research questions

Four main questions guided this research:

- What is the nature and extent of non-state social protection service providers in Ethiopia?
- What are the governance features of non-state social protection service provision?
- To what extent are the non-state social protection services responsive to gender issues?
- How do formal and informal NSAs contribute to social protection policy formulation in the country?

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[1] The exception is gudifecha, which has become a formal adoption process.
[2] For example, Holeta town in Welmera District is excluded from the study as are some rural villages in Addis Ketema sub-city.

2 Literature review

Social protection is a central public policy component for countries addressing poverty, vulnerability and inequality. It improves the effectiveness and efficiency of investments in agriculture, hygiene and health, education and water, thus accelerating the attainment of the development goals. Although the Ethiopian government committed to the provision of social protection in Article 41/5 of the constitution (FDRE, 1995), this goal remains unachieved and requires mechanisms for implementation. NSAs can play a role in this.

2.1 Defining social protection

Several concepts are widely used in relation to social protection: social security, social welfare, safety nets, unemployment benefits, and pension schemes. But social protection has emerged as an umbrella term since it captures better than other terms the holistic nature of the protection that citizens require (Devereux and Amdissa Teshome, 2013; Amdissa Teshome, 2010). Institutions such as the African Union (2008), Asian Development Bank (Ortiz, 2001), Department for International Development (DfID, 2007), ILO (van Ginneken, 1999), International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI, 2008), Overseas Development Institute (Norton et al., 2000) and the World Bank (2004) define social protection as addressing a narrow set of economic problems or livelihood shocks. This excludes many important concerns, particularly 'social risks' such as child labour, domestic violence, armed conflict and ethnic discrimination. These institutions each prioritise a unique set of problems such as low levels of income or living standards, or downward fluctuation in incomes or declining living standards. But social protection should address both types of livelihood threats: the vulnerability associated with 'being poor'—for which social assistance is needed—and the vulnerability associated with the risk of 'becoming poor'—for which social insurance is needed—as well as social injustice arising from structural inequalities and abuses of power—for which 'social equity' is needed. The definitions also refer to the state as the provider of social protection, ignoring formal and informal social protection providers.

Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2008) provide the most comprehensive description of social protection:

> … all public and private initiatives that provide income or consumption transfers to the poor, protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks, and enhance the social status and rights of the marginalised; with the overall objective of reducing the economic and social vulnerability of poor, vulnerable and marginalised groups.

This definition sees social protection as the set of all public and private initiatives that provide social assistance to extremely poor individuals and households, social services to groups that need special care or would otherwise be denied access to basic services, social insurance against the risks and consequences of livelihood shocks, and social equity to protect people against social risks such as discrimination and abuse.

Informal social protection is not served well by the social protection discourse in which it is viewed in terms of public measures such as social insurance, social assistance and the delivery of social services such as universal education, health waivers and microfinance. This does not consider the crucial role of the family or community.

An emerging body of literature is recognising both formal and informal mechanisms of social protection (Mamo Hebo, 2013; Verpoorten and Verschraegen, 2010), acknowledging that intra-household and inter-household transfers constitute a basic form of social protection in developing countries. Others identify defining features differentiating the two components of social protection, such as Oduro (2010), for whom 'legal status' is the key distinguishing parameter and 'agents' providing the service are an important parameter. Reciprocity is the most commonly identified defining feature (De Coninck and Drani, 2008; Mamo Hebo, 2013). According to De Coninck and Drani (2008), mechanisms based on reciprocity tend to exclude the very poor, who cannot reciprocate, exchange favours or contribute cash or in kind. Amdissa (2013:99) defines informal social protection as

> Asset and/or financial transfers made to protect the livelihoods and to some extent the standard of living of poor families/communities and governed mainly by the principle of reciprocity and exchange and customary laws of social institutions.

2.2 Dimensions of social protection

The ILO framework classifies social protection measures into protective, preventive and promotive categories (Guhan, 1994). Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2007) build on this to include the category of transformative measures.

Protective measures are basic transfers to stop vulnerable groups from starving, for example public employment schemes, feeding programmes, etc. Preventive measures stop people from falling into destitution and help them maintain their dignity and withstand modest shocks, e.g. contributory social security, universal child allowances, etc. Promotive measures boost real incomes and capabilities with livelihood-promoting interventions such as micro-financing or skills development for unemployed people so that they can find work. Transformative interventions create an enabling legal and policy framework for the advancement of citizens' rights and development. They aim to address social equity issues such as poor labour standards and discrimination against specific disadvantaged groups.

Protective and promotive interventions are concerned with the chronically poor and the importance of ongoing support to address their day-to-day needs, aiming interventions at breaking the cycle of poverty. For preventive approaches, the critical point is that social protection responds to risks and shocks that cause people to fall into poverty and to stay poor. However, these are by no means mutually exclusive. For example, an integrated community development programme could be designed to be protective (e.g. to provide regular cash transfers to HIV and AIDS patients), preventive (e.g. to encourage savings and insurance), promotive (e.g. to provide skills training for unemployed youth) and transformative (e.g. to advocate child rights). To make the classification more representative of the views of various policy actors, the research team adopted complementary, not alternative, categories, which were livelihood promotion, social services, welfare services, and advocacy. These might overlap.
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2.3 Actors in social protection

The social protection policy agenda involves key development actors including multilateral and bilateral organisations, international and local NGOs, the government and its agencies, research institutes and NSAs.

International actors

ILO has traditionally led in advocating and supporting social protection, and has been in large part responsible for the growth in social protection institutions in developing countries. Its tripartite governance system involving trade unions, employers' associations and governments has proved effective in gathering support for the extension of social protection for organised workers.

The World Bank developed a social protection strategy in the mid-1990s as a response to the impact of structural adjustment in developing countries and the failure of social dimensions and safety-net approaches. The Bank's Social Protection Group initially focused on labour market and pension reform and safety nets but more recently has started focusing on a wider range of instruments including cash transfers. The Bank is now a major player in social protection, catalysing change through technical assistance and financial support. Other agencies of the United Nations that have adopted social protection policies include the United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Children's Fund, United Nations Population Fund and World Health Organization. Increasingly, bilateral institutions such as DfID, GTZ and United States Agency for International Development are developing and supporting social protection policies (SPDPG, 2010).

State actors

The state is the principal duty bearer to its citizens and is expected to lead in social protection. The state is often seen in the roles of a direct provider and a facilitator. Increasingly, governments are developing social protection strategies in an effort to consolidate and institutionalise cross-sectoral policies. In middle income countries, such strategies have involved the reform of social insurance schemes and a strong effort to

develop effective social assistance. In low income countries, the strategies have developed around second-generation poverty reduction papers in an effort to have proactive and integrated social protection policies. In low income countries in Africa, pilot programmes on cash transfers also are spearheading efforts to create social protection strategies and institutions (Barrientos and Niño-Zarazúa, 2011).

Non-state actors
A non-state actor is an agency that operates outside the state machinery but within the policy and regulatory environment provided by the state. For this research project, non-state social protection actors were classified as formal organisations, which have a legal identity, structure and recognition such as the various NGOs, not-for-profits and charities; and informal bodies, which have as their basis collective action, e.g. community, family, neighbourhood or traditional solidarity networks, etc., but which might have neither a legal identity nor, at least in some cases, formal governance or management structures (PASGR, 2012). An emerging 'semi-formal' category encompasses community-initiated groups that gradually move towards formalisation by introducing rules, regulations and structures when they grow too big to be managed solely by informal means or if their interaction with the state or other NSAs requires some degree of formality. These NSAs largely are providers of social protection and, to a limited extent, facilitators of advocacy for national social protection.

NSAs provide social protection services by designing and implementing them directly, implementing interventions designed by others or contributing funds to programmes designed by the public sector.

Traditional support mechanisms are the first line of defence against personal or community shocks. Support systems like iddirs and iqqiubs are institutionalised while others are based on family or neighbourhood networks. Unlike state social protection, NSAs have received little attention despite that they are active at a significant scale and they might offer important lessons about fragility and adaptability of actors and interventions, plus non-state social protection serves a variety of functions and involves diverse actors.

2.4 NSA governance
Governance can be broadly defined as:

> The manner in which the vested authority uses its powers to achieve the institution's objectives, including its powers to design, implement and innovate the organization's policies, rules, systems and processes and engage its stakeholders (ISSA, 2011).

For the World Bank (2007), governance is "the manner in which public officials and institutions acquire and exercise the authority to shape public policy and provide public goods and services". Governance, in the context of social protection can be seen as the set of incentives and accountability relationships that influence the way in which providers are held accountable for their behaviours and ability to deliver services with quality and efficiency (Bassett et al., 2012). In terms of service delivery and interaction among actors, governance can be applicable in social protection programmes including those that provide cash, in-kind benefits or services.

Defining social protection governance as the set of incentives and accountability relationships implies that from an operational perspective, efforts to strengthen governance can broadly be categorised into rules of the game that define the context for accountability relationships, roles and responsibilities of the actors, and controls and mechanisms that ensure accountability.

- **Rules of the game:** clear rules are a prerequisite for accountability relationships among policy-makers, service providers and citizens to work. At the programme level, this is the legal framework governing the social protection programme and includes legislation, secondary regulations, and operational guidelines such as the criteria for entry into or exit from programmes and the mechanisms for setting benefit levels.
- **Roles and responsibilities** are the obligations of principals and agents in the accountability triangle. Clear roles and responsibilities in the organisational structure of

NSAs are key ingredients for making accountability relationships work, and balancing incentives at all levels of a system or programme. Mechanisms for strengthening the roles and responsibilities in NSA operations include establishing reporting relationships, clarifying job descriptions and establishing performance incentives.

- **Controls and accountability mechanisms** are the broad oversight processes and implementation procedures for ensuring that the right benefit gets to the right person at the right time. These include both supply-side measures—such as verification, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) procedures such as audits, quality control mechanisms, policies to ensure access to information, and formal grievance redress mechanisms—and demand-side elements that involve citizens in oversight such as social audits, third party monitoring and information provision through report cards.

In this research, NSA governance encompasses features like organisational and management structures and accountability obligations to the communities, the government and resources providers, and how these affect the performance of non-state social protection. Governance is also interpreted as interaction of NSAs with one another and with the state in the provision of social protection.

2.5 Measuring performance of NSAs

Medina-Borja and Triantis (2007) argue that "survivability of non-profit social service organisations is contingent upon their capability of measuring and evaluating performance". Although NSAs do not need to show shareholders the value created, they face pressure from stakeholders to show they are performing well. Zimmermann and Stevens (2006) show that the requirement from external stakeholders is the most frequent motivator and reason for measuring performance, next is the need to increase accountability and effectiveness, and then the goal to get more funding to improve services. Sawhill and Williamson (2001) note that NSAs should measure performance to get the whole organisation working towards the same mission and goals, to have an overview of organisational deficiencies and a chance to discover improvement needs and where rationalisation is most urgent.

Medina-Borja and Triantis (2007) present an integrated performance measurement system for NSAs with four dimensions: resource generation, capacity creation, customer satisfaction and outcome achievement (Table 1). These indicators, which this study adopted, originate from the private sector but apply also to non-profits.

Table 1: NSA performance indicators

Indicators	Definition	Examples
Resource generation	Every resource that is needed to carry out the organisation's goals	Funds, staff, materials, etc.
Capacity creation	Organisations' ability to provide services with generated resources (efficiency)	Quantity of work performed, services delivered or work teams trained [managerial and technical]
Customer satisfaction	Extent to which beneficiaries are satisfied with services provided by the NSA	Expectations met, vulnerability reduced or assets accumulated
Outcome achievement	Degree to which the organisation achieves its mission and goals (effectiveness)	Changes that are the result of the organisation's activities

Source: Medina-Borja and Triantis (2007)

2.6 Gender and social protection

'Gender' refers to socially determined women's and men's roles and responsibilities (WHO, 1998). Gender inequality is influenced by other forms of inequalities between households or groups in a society such as those related to race, class or ethnicity, and intra-household inequalities related to age, marital status and physical ability. Women are more likely to be

disadvantaged in work opportunities and to be excluded from formal social protection programmes (Sabates-Wheeler and Kabeer, 2003). Because shocks affect men and women differently, it is useful to think of them as different constituents in any analysis and to tailor social protection accordingly.

> An important linkage exists between gender-specific risks and the roles of men and women as social protection providers. One risk for women is that they are the first—and often the only—providers of social protection. This suggests that assistance should be provided to women in this role through strengthening informal household and community-level social protection mechanisms, ensuring that the gender sensitivity of existing informal mechanisms is maintained or increased.

> Understanding and incorporating gender considerations will do more than merely tackle gender discrimination: it will generate huge benefits for pro-poor growth. Some of the most innovative and successful social protection mechanisms are those developed with, and not for, women. A strategy often used to achieve gender equality is based on the dual or twin-track approach. According to Holmes and Jones (2011), gender needs to be mainstreamed in all aspects of policy and programme design for social protection, including beneficiary targeting, linkages with complementary services, institutional arrangements, awareness raising and M&E.

2.7 Rural–urban dimension

The rural and urban sectors of an economy are interconnected economically, financially and socially (IFPRI, 2005), and ideally resources such as capital and labour should move freely between them. In an undistorted economy, marginal returns to production factors should be equal, meaning that labour productivity, and consequently per capita income, should be the same. Many have argued that there should not be any distinction between rural and urban sectors, and there is a growing interest in development literature on the links between rural and urban development (DfID, 2003).

In many developing countries, the relationship between urban and rural sectors is characterised by an economic dualism, i.e. the coexistence of a modern urban sector and a traditional rural sector. This arose because many developing countries pursued heavy industrialisation based on the transfer of resources and labour surpluses from the rural to the urban sector, which favoured the urban sector.

Today, the physical distance between rural and urban areas and access to regional urban networks and the overall system are easily overcome by the mobility of people and commodities. What is re-emerging is a modified form of the natural progression of processes that took place in the early 1970s but was held back. There is a long history of remittances among urban residents supporting family members and relatives in rural areas (Johnson, 2008). The relationship between urban and rural areas in Ethiopia, though, is still slightly uneven and also characterised by reciprocity.

Rural and urban life in Ethiopia at the micro level is meshed together as dynamic and deeply rooted familial and sociocultural relationships, aspirations, roles, responsibilities and obligations. Bevan and Pankhurst (2006) noted that

> Wider blood and affinal kin, neighbours, friends and patrons provide complex networks of social support which may be used for economic development, human development or social protection while close family and household members are key in the sharing of resources.

3   Methodology

The research had two phases. First, the major types of NSAs[3] were mapped and their characteristics and services examined. Second, an in-depth study of beneficiaries of randomly selected NSAs was undertaken.

3.1 Sample selection for the mapping exercise

Ethiopia is a vast country with an area of 1.1 million square kilometres and over 80 million people. It has nine regional states and two chartered cities. It was not possible to undertake representative research given the time and resources available. Nevertheless, to have credibility, a study of such significance must give an indication of the extent and nature of non-state social protection from as diverse sources as possible. To meet this self-imposed requirement, the research team adopted a four-step, systematic sample selection process that involved identifying the four study regions for mapping, narrowing them down to two for the in-depth study, selecting the NSAs for the in-depth study using the mapping results as the sampling frame, and selecting the beneficiaries of these NSAs.

Selecting regions

NSAs registered by the Federal Charities and Societies Agency (CSA) and the Consortium of Christian Relief and Development Association (CCRDA) were used as the sampling frame. The study targeted urban centres of Addis Ababa, with 1,455 registered NSAs, and Dire Dawa city administration with 360 registered NSAs, and the rural areas of Oromia and Somali regional states (Figure 2). Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are growing rapidly and host larger numbers of vulnerable groups such as orphans, street beggars, people with physical disabilities, etc., than do other urban centres.

Figure 2: Study areas

Ethiopia Somali is the largest region in terms of geographic coverage. It occupies about 60 per cent with sparse settlement and pastoralism as the main economic activity.

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[3] The team visited all kebeles (sub-districts) in Welmra district but only a sample in the other study areas. Therefore, it should be understood that not all the NSA institutions were inventoried. Locating NSAs in Addis Ketema sub-city was particularly challenging.

Rural Somali region is vulnerable to risks such as drought, flooding, food insecurity, market disruptions and livestock diseases, and to challenges from poor infrastructure and government services, including in education and health (Cerritelli et al., 2008). Some 315 NSAs were registered in Somali region (CSA, 2012).

Oromia is the second largest region in terms of geographical area, occupying about 30 per cent of the country and having a population of over 30 million. The region often suffers major livelihood and food insecurity resulting from recurrent droughts (Cerritelli et al., 2008). Over 1,000 NSAs were registered in Oromia.

Selecting the rural districts and urban centres
Addis Ketema sub-city and Dire Dawa were selected to represent urban centres. Addis Ketema, one of the 10 sub-cities of Addis Ababa, has 9 kebeles and 255,000 people, and is the most densely populated with 25,560 persons per square kilometre. The high population density exposes the sub-city to vulnerabilities of environmental pollution, poor sanitation and congestion, and the associated diseases. The population also deals with high food prices.

Dire Dawa comprises 12 urban and 38 rural kebeles. The study focused on the 12 urban kebeles that constitute Dire Dawa city. The city's population is 223,224. The city suffered a major flood-induced disaster in 2006 and remains vulnerable to flooding. The collapse of the Addis Ababa–Djibouti rail severely affected the livelihoods of the residents.

Welmera District in Oromia region and Shinile District in Somali region were selected to represent rural areas. Welmera is 44 kilometres west of Addis Ababa. It has 24 rural kebeles and 6 urban centres. Of the population of about 114,480, about 82,805 are rural and 31,677 are urban. The population structure mirrors the national structure, with the young accounting for 44 per cent, the economically active for 51.7 per cent and the elderly for 4.3 per cent. Welmera is relatively food secure in the sense that it has not suffered drought-related food shortages, which might explain the low number of formal NSAs operating there. Nevertheless, it still has chronic poverty as manifested in poor rural infrastructure, low productivity, and high illiteracy rates and prevalence of various illnesses. The rural communities depend greatly on informal support mechanisms.

Shinile is 527 kilometres east of Addis Ababa. It is adjacent to Dire Dawa, which was a criterion for its selection. Based on the 2007 CSA census, the Shinile population is 102,574. Shinile suffers frequent droughts, causing food and water shortages and livestock and crop disease outbreaks.

3.2 Sample selection for the in-depth study
The in-depth study focused on one rural and one urban centre and was based on the performance and challenges during the mapping exercise. In terms of coverage, Dire Dawa had 46 per cent of all NSAs, Addis Ketema 20 per cent, Welmera 17 per cent and Shinile 15 per cent. Dire Dawa and Welmera had more NSAs than their counterparts and therefore were selected for the in-depth study. Besides their low number of NSAs, Addis Ketema and Shinile were excluded because of the tremendous challenges the team faced during the mapping exercise.

From the sample frame of NSAs, the team distilled those working purely on social protection and selected about 10 per cent and 762 of their beneficiaries (Table 2), applying the necessary statistical principles (see Annexes 1–3).

Table 2: Participant selection for the in-depth survey

Site	Mapping coverage (%)	NSAs working in social protection only	Sampled NSAs	Estimated beneficiaries of the sampled NSAs	Sample size
Dire Dawa	46.4	460 (of 508)	46	34,650	381
Welmera	17.0	177 (of 186)	21	11,350	381
Total		637 (of 694)	67		762

3.3 Data collection and analysis

The researchers first reviewed international and local literature on social protection, and particularly CSA and the CCRDA records, to compile a list of NSAs operating in the country and in the study sites. Since no such records existed for community-based organisations (CBOs), local knowledge was used to estimate their numbers. Both the mapping and the in-depth surveys each used a structured questionnaire to collect primary data. Beneficiary focus group discussions helped to get insight into social protection services.

Quantitative data from the mapping and beneficiary surveys were analysed with SPSS software and descriptive statistics generated. Scores from the qualitative data were aggregated and quantified by weighting and scoring, and index values were computed for ranking (Zikmund, 1990). A weighted average index (WAI) was applied for all the variables collected using the Likert scale, for the comparison to be easier and clearer (Miah, 1993). The index value was obtained by multiplying the statement to its corresponding weight and dividing the outcome by the total number of responses, which may be stated as follows:

$$I = \sum F_i W_i / N$$

Where,

I = WAI
F_i = frequency of responses for a particular statement
W_i = weightage of statement
N = total responses

The index of the level of agreement employed in the data analysis was:
Index (I) = (F1W1+F2W2+F3W3+F4W4+F5W5)/5

Where:

F1 to F5 represent the frequency of the responses 'strongly agree', 'agree', 'neither nor', 'disagree' and 'strongly disagree' in that order. W1 to W5 represent corresponding weights applied to the response classes (W1 = 2, W2 = 1, W3 = 0, W4 = –1 and W5 = –2). n = total responses. 'No-opinion' responses also were considered as 'neither nor'.

The index ranges applied and their interpretation are shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Weighted indexes and their interpretation

	Scale	Interpretation
F1	1.41–2.0	Strongly agree
F2	0.25–1.4	Agree
F3	-0.24–0.24	Neutral
F4	-0.25–(-1.4)	Disagree
F5	-1.41–(-2)	Strongly disagree

Qualitative data from the key informant interviews and focus group discussions were analysed thematically together with the quantitative data.

3.4 Engagement with policy actors

The research team's engagement with policy actors occurred before commencing research, during the research and after the research dissemination phase. Before data collection, an inception workshop was held with representatives from NSAs and academic and research institutions to get comments on the research questions and methodology. Visiting the leaders in the study areas before data collection ensured their buy-in and their facilitation of the research process, for example by writing letters of introduction to the kebele leaders, which ensured access to key grassroots informants and community focus groups.

Between the mapping phase and the in-depth study, the team briefed local policy actors on the key findings from mapping pertinent to their area. This was necessary to secure collaboration for the in-depth study. Participants at these briefings were satisfied with the mapping results and were particularly pleased with the emphasis given to CBOs such as iddirs and iqquibs. CBOs have a long history of addressing social and economic problems in the communities and have survived numerous economic, social and political turbulences. They have ample resources that could be invested to generate good returns, but no government institution exists to support them.

The research results were presented at the International Conference on the Ethiopian Economy. This meeting generated considerable interest in the research and its outputs, with participants posing questions on issues such as the effect of government policy on NSA operation, the benefits of social protection services, the effectiveness of NSAs, and corruption. They recommended the results be disseminated to policy-makers, academicians and other stakeholders through policy briefs and other publications. These suggestions contributed to the design of the research results dissemination strategy.

4   Research findings
4.1 Distribution of NSAs
Most formal NSAs were established by foreign countries to assist drought victims during the famines of the 1970s, and many NSAs have now transformed to address long-term social and economic problems. Formal NSAs are estimated at 4,000 (NGO Law Monitor, 2013), but accurate data are lacking and official records are inadequate. But data such as those in Tables 4 and 5 give a broad indication of the types of NSAs and their regional concentration.

Another source of data on formal NSAs is the 2011 CCRDA[4] directory (Table 5). Of the total CCRDA membership, 73 per cent are Ethiopian residents' charities and 27 per cent are foreign. The concentration of NSAs in Oromia and Addis Ababa (Tables 4 and 5) is partly attributable to those locations' relatively high level of vulnerabilities and existence of infrastructure and services necessary to manage NSAs. Informal CBOs have equal importance in urban and rural areas. Also, they have the highest membership.

Table 4: Distribution of NGOs, by region

Region	INGOs	National NGOs	Regional NGOs	Total	Percentage
Oromia	53	176	0	229	27.0
Addis Ababa	44	173	0	217	25.6
SNNPR	28	70	0	98	11.6
Amhara	34	41	15	90	10.6
Tigray	14	9	43	66	7.8
Somali	22	17	15	54	6.4
BNGM	14	3	24	41	4.8
Afar	11	7	0	18	2.1
Dire Dawa	5	6	1	12	1.4
Gambella	7	1	4	12	1.4
Harari	3	8	0	11	1.3
Total	235	511	102	848	100.0

Source: CSA (2012)

Table 5: Distribution of CCRDA members in the study areas

Research location	No. of CCRDA members	Percentage
Oromia	196	44.04
Addis Ababa	178	40.00
Dire Dawa	35	7.87
Somali	36	8.09
Total	445	

Source: Computed from CCRDA directory (2011)

No register of informal NSAs exists, but from government estimates 39 million people participate in iddirs, 21 million in iqquibs and 9 million in a variety of self-help organisations (Ministry of Capacity Building, 2005). According to Zewge (2004) about 87 per cent of Ethiopians in urban centres and close to 70 per cent of those in rural areas belong to an

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[4] CCRDA is an indigenous, non-profit umbrella organisation for NGOs and CSOs. It was formed initially to coordinate efforts of organisations that responded to the humanitarian emergencies of the 1973/74 famine, but has expanded its services and membership and shifted to development, advocacy and good governance efforts (www.ccrdaethiopia.org).

iddir, making this the most widespread type of self-help community group in the country. Though the accuracy of these estimates is debatable, they serve to indicate the extent of informal associations in the country from which a large proportion of the population derives various benefits. Rahmato et al. (2008) note that at the local level most people get social and economic benefits from traditional organisations.

Local knowledge presupposed that Addis Ketema had about 1,500 formally registered and about 500 informal NSAs, but only 226 NSAs were found during the mapping exercise (Table 6). Shinile had 62 formal NSAs, comprising 5 NGOs, 28 associations and 29 cooperatives. Despite the scattered nature of pastoral districts, which often makes estimation of informal NSAs difficult, through discussions pastoral elders estimated the NSAs to be 252. The mapping survey generated 174, which is 69.1 per cent of the potential number of NSAs in the district. Therefore, Shinile had the best performance in terms of generating high proportion of the potential number of NSAs in the district (Table 6).

Dire Dawa was said to have 426 registered NSAs. The number of informal NSAs per kebele was estimated at 8–20 iddirs, 10–15 iqqiubs and 5–10 mahibers to add up to about 413 informal NSAs and bring the potential total of NSAs to 839. The mapping exercise identified 60.5 per cent of the estimated total, making Dire Dawa the second best performing study area.

Welmera had only four active registered NSAs, indicating that most of its NSAs were informal. District officials estimated that each kebele had 10–15 informal NSAs, meaning that with 24 kebeles, Welmera had 240–360 informal NSAs. Using the mid-point, we estimated that about 300 informal NSAs existed in Welmera. The mapping exercise identified 186 NSAs, including 4 NGOs (Table 6), which was just over 60 per cent coverage and put Welmera at par with Dire Dawa in performance. On the average, the mapping exercise identified 32.2 per cent of the potential NSAs in the study sites.

Table 6: Proportion of mapped NSAs to potential number of NSAs

District	Potential no. of NSAs based on local knowledge	Actual no. of NSAs mapped	Actual no. mapped as a % of the estimate
Addis Ketema	2,000	226	11.3
Dire Dawa	839	508	60.5
Shinile	252	174	69.1
Welmera	304	186	61.2
Total	3,395	1,094	32.2

Source: NSA Mapping format and interview with local key informants

4.2 Geographical scope of NSA services
The location of an NSA is not necessarily its geographical area of operation. Generally, international and national NGOs had national and regional scopes, meaning that they operated in two or more regions and two or more zones, respectively. All informal NSAs operated at the village level. Out of the 1,094 NSAs in the survey sites, only 40 operated nationally (Table 7). Most were local, and of these CBOs were the most abundant.

Figure 3: NSA distribution by geographical location

Table 7: Geographical location of NSA services

NSA type	National	Regional	District	Kebele	Village	Total
International NGO	10	8	0	0	0	18
National and local NGO	19	11	34	0	0	64
Business organisation	0	12	9	31	24	76
FBO	2	4	2	7	4	19
Self-help group	0	0	8	13	35	56
CBO	0	0	0	39	452	491
Association	0	26	103	123	11	263
Cooperative	4	14	16	16	11	61
Other	5	1	20	7	13	46
Total	40	76	192	236	550	1,094

Source: NSA mapping

4.3 Typology of social protection services

Of the 1,094 NSAs identified, 702 were involved in livelihood promotion, 635 in welfare services, 173 in social services and 40 in advocacy services, mainly sensitisation and rights campaigns. Advocacy services were designated for Ethiopian charities only, which raised 90 per cent or more of their funds from local sources.

This study mapped NSAs' service locations not their base. An NSA with the head office in the urban area but with services targeted to a rural area was counted as rural. Out of the 702 NSAs involved in livelihood promotion, 462 targeted urban beneficiaries while 240 had rural beneficiaries. Some 426 of those in welfare services dealt with urban residents compared with 209 for rural beneficiaries. In social services, only 54 NSAs worked in rural areas, against 119 for urban areas. For advocacy, 29 targeted urban populations and 11 targeted rural residents.

The services' typologies were distributed more or less evenly between formal and informal NSAs (Figure 4). Livelihood interventions were implemented by 373 (51 per cent) NSAs in that group and 43 per cent of informal NSAs. Informal NSAs provided more welfare services (51 per cent) than did formal NSAs (34.8 per cent).

Figure 4: NSAs by social protection service typology

Source: NSA mapping

4.4 Beneficiaries of NSA services

Thirteen categories of beneficiaries of NSA services were identified during the mapping study. Although there were overlaps, the categories for the poor, destitute and drought-prone groups accounted for over 78 per cent of the beneficiaries (Table 8). The more specific groups such as orphaned and vulnerable children, people living with HIV and AIDS, and commercial sex workers were important. All beneficiary categories included men and women, and in seven categories women exceeded men. Overall, women accounted for 51.6 per cent of the beneficiaries, which is a good indicator of NSAs' service delivery.

Table 8: Beneficiaries of NSA services, by sex*

Beneficiaries targeted	Male	Female	Total	% female in each category	NSAs targeting the group
The poor	209,952	313,027	522,979	59.9	193
Destitute people	201,123	103,647	304,770	34.0	44
Drought-prone households	55,630	66,835	122,465	54.6	14
Orphans and vulnerable children	41,621	48,917	90,538	54.0	125
People with HIV and AIDS	3,620	13,390	17,010	78.7	63
Elderly people	692	773	1,465	52.8	64
Physically disabled people	507	416	923	45.1	36
Commercial sex workers	6,756	9,418	16,174	58.2	7
Informal sector people	665	235	900	26.1	8
Youth	2,837	2,701	5,538	48.8	135
Domestic violence victims	470	341	811	42.0	9
All community members	44,362	43,863	88,225	49.7	99
Members of groups	15,002	17,753	32,755	54.2	810[+]
Total	583,237	621,316	1,204,553	51.6	1,517[#]

Notes:

* These data are a self-reported, so they should be treated only as indicators of beneficiary levels.

[+] NSAs targeting members of groups include self-help groups; traditional CBOs such as iqquibs, iddirs and mahibers; and cooperatives.

[#] Some NSAs reported targeting more than one beneficiary category, so double counting was inevitable.

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The study also sought to determine which beneficiaries benefited from which NSAs. About 92 per cent of beneficiaries received benefits from formal NSAs compared with 1.7 per cent for informal NSAs (Table 9). This is probably because formal NSAs had more resources.

Table 9: Beneficiary categories served by the three NSA categories

Beneficiary category	No. of beneficiaries served by NSA category			
	Formal	Semi-formal	Informal	Total
Drought-prone households	812,518	0	17	812,535
The poor	561,235	1,739	987	563,961
Destitute people	304,598	168	330	305,096
Orphans and vulnerable children	90,880	1,024	582	92,486
Whole community	90,351	54	20	90,425
Members	23,297	9,153	30,837	63,287
Informal sector people	50,411	0	22	50,433
People with HIV and AIDS	17,874	98	126	18,098
Youth	5,452	308	675	6,435
Commercial sex workers	4,074	0	0	4,074
Elderly people	1,652	119	246	2,017
Physically disabled people	789	21	174	984
Domestic violence victims	593	4	214	811
Total	1,963,724 (91.7%)	12,688 (0.6%)	34,230 (1.7%)	2,010,642

The urban–rural distribution shows that 59.3 per cent of beneficiaries in Dire Dawa received services from one NSA while the equivalent for Welmera was 6.6 per cent (Table 10). That means that 93.4 per cent of the beneficiaries in rural areas and 41 per cent in urban areas obtained services from more than one NSA. This might indicate that rural people had access to more service sources than did their urban counterparts, that the beneficiaries were getting complementary services to enable them overcome multiple problems and graduate into a more sustainable livelihood trajectory. On the negative side it could mean that the targeting was so poor that individuals were manipulating the system, and so effective targeting was needed; that some people did not have access to NSAs by virtue of their location i.e. people in remote locations might have been denied services; or that the NSAs were allocating their limited resources to the few areas where they could operate easily.

Table 10: Beneficiaries receiving services from multiple NSAs

No. of NSAs	Dire Dawa (n=381)		Welmera (n = 381)	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
1	226	59.3	25	6.6
2	121	31.8	63	16.5
3	21	5.5	122	32.0
4	8	2.1	85	22.3
>4	5	1.3	86	22.6
Total	381	100.0	381	100.0

4.5 NSA governance and accountability

Favourable environment for NSA establishment in the early days

Foreign charities came into Ethiopia in the 1950s, and their number increased exponentially in the 1970s during the famines. Local NGOs mushroomed after the fall of the Derg regime that ruled the country between 1974 and 1991 (NGO Law Monitor, 2013). Among the 1,094 NSAs mapped, 9.1 per cent started between 1971 and 1990, and 87 per cent between 1991 and 2012 (Table 11). The 36 CBOs established between the 1950s and 1970s are still active.

Table 11: NSA period of establishment

Type of NSA	Period established				
	1919–1950	1951–1970	1971–1990	1991–2012	Total
International NGO	1	3	0	14	18
National and local NGO	0	2	4	58	64
Business organisation	0	0	1	75	76
FBO	0	1	1	17	19
Self-help group	0	0	1	55	56
CBO	6	30	91	364	491
Association	1	3	1	258	263
Cooperative	0	0	1	60	61
Other	0	0	0	46	46
Total	8	39	100	947	1,094

Regulation of NSAs and implications for their service delivery

The Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009 (FDRE, 2009) requires all formal NSAs to register with CSA, and about 50 per cent of the NSAs mapped were registered (Table 12). The unregistered NSAs were largely CBOs. The long-standing burial societies known as iddirs are increasingly becoming formalised and were operating with a semi-formal status. This arose with the diversification of their services to include support to HIV and AIDS patients, care of orphans and other community development activities.

Table 12: Registration status of NSAs

Type of NSA	Formally registered (%)	Semi-formal (%)	Informal/ unregistered (%)	Total (%)
International NGO	1.6	0	0	1.6
National and local NGO	5.9	0	0	5.9
Business organisation	6.2	0	0.7	6.9
FBO	1.7	0	0	1.7
Self-help group	2.1	0	3.0	5.1
CBO	0	6.3	38.6	44.9
Association	24.0	0	0	24.0
Cooperative	5.6	0	0	5.6
Other	3.0	0	1.2	4.2
Total	50.2	6.3	43.5	100.0

The proclamation of 2009 classified NSAs into three categories. Ethiopian charities are formed and managed by Ethiopians and cannot obtain more than 10 per cent of funding from foreign sources. Foreign charities are established in foreign countries, are formed and managed by foreign nationals, or receive all their funds from foreign sources. Ethiopian resident charities are created under Ethiopian laws, are managed by Ethiopian residents and can raise up to 90 per cent of their funds from foreign sources. Informal NSAs are not subject to these requirements and function more or less as they have done over the years.

Among the 618 registered NSAs in the study, 28 per cent were Ethiopian charities, 68 per cent were Ethiopian resident charities and 4 per cent were foreign charities.

This categorisation has two fundamental implications. First, NSA activities were restricted, depending on the source of funding. Ethiopian charities were allowed to engage in all types of activities including service provision and advocacy on rights and governance issues. Ethiopian residents' and foreign charities could work on only service provision. The restrictions were meant to reduce donor dependency and encourage domestic resource mobilisation and to restrict political advocacy financed by outsiders. For all the charities and societies, administrative expenses were not to exceed 30 per cent of the funds, and 70 per cent of the budget was to go to project objectives. This restriction ensured that funds raised in the name of the poor reached them and were not hijacked for executive salaries, consultancy fees or purchase of vehicles.

There was no consensus however on what constituted administrative or project objectives. For example, the regulation considers a short-term consultancy to evaluate a project's impact as an administrative activity, but to NSAs it is an activity to meet project objectives. It is important to establish the rationale for the government's change from being a facilitator of the NSA sector development in the early 1990s to becoming the designer of the most restrictive NSA regulation in the first decade of this century.

NSA staff profile and organisational structure
Male dominance was evident in NSA staffing and prominently among managers, where women accounted for only 35.3 per cent of the staff. Women fared better in executive committees and finance positions (Figure 5).


Figure 5: Key NSA personnel roles, by sex

Some 362 NSAs reported having and using a documented organisational structure, while 311 NSAs had an undocumented structure. Informal institutions often have but do not use management structures. The remaining 421 NSAs did not have an organisational structure. Formal NSAs were required to have an organisational structure for reporting, communication and accountability purposes, but not informal CBOs, which did not need to report their plans or performance. CBOs used informal means of communication and reporting to members.

Governance and accountability mechanisms
NSAs have various mechanisms to ensure accountability to the government, beneficiaries and donors. These include defining who makes the strategic decisions and ensuring the use of operating rules and the presence of an M&E system and auditing and reporting mechanisms (see Annexes 4 and 5). In international NGOs, strategic decisions were made

by the management or the executive committee and the board of directors, while for the other NSAs the general assembly commonly did this.

The survey found that 87 per cent of all the NSAs had operational rules and procedures and 81.3 per cent had M&E mechanisms. Those without such tools typically were CBOs and associations. About 76 per cent of the NSAs reported having internal but not external audits. This result was highly influenced by the dominance of informal NSAs in the survey. Some 73.5 per cent of the NSAs reported their performance periodically to the relevant bodies.

For the beneficiaries, the factors relating to an NSA's accountability and governance concerned its frequency of communicating with them; mechanisms for communication; rules, regulations and performance reporting; extent of cooperation with them; and perception of its accountability to them (see Annexes 6–10). Monthly was the most common interval for communicating with beneficiaries and was mentioned by 50.7 per cent of beneficiaries in Dire Dawa and 74.5 per cent of respondents in Welmera, which shows the prominence of informal institutions in those sites that often meet every month. Meetings were the most important communication channel, with 78 per cent of beneficiaries in Dire Dawa and 96.6 per cent of beneficiaries in Welmera citing them. In both locations, just below 50 per cent of the respondents acknowledged the existence of strong collaboration between NSAs and their beneficiaries. Generally, both urban and rural beneficiaries considered NSAs as acting in an accountable manner towards them (see Figure 6 and Annex 10).

$$y = 0.797x - 0.000$$
$$R^2 = 0.769$$

Figure 6: Rural and urban beneficiary ranking of NSA accountability.

The channel most frequently used by NSAs to report on performance was the general assembly (Figure 7). Ad hoc reporting was cited by most NSAs, which were mainly CBOs, business organisations and cooperatives. Most formal NSAs reported to the concerned bodies mutually and regularly, depending on their operations and reporting requirements, with 283 NSAs reporting annually, 238 quarterly, 152 monthly, 108 biannually and 375 on an ad hoc basis.

Figure 7: Channels of NSAs reporting

4.5.5 Targeting as an accountability mechanism

Targeting, the process of identifying and selecting beneficiaries for a social protection service, is necessary for efficient use of resources. Targeting ensures that people who do not need the benefits do not receive them and those who deserve them do. A targeting system requires at least a definition of the selection criteria and a body that will undertake the targeting. Targeting is used also for ensuring accountability to beneficiaries, the government and funding agencies.

In both locations, NSA officials selected 50.7 per cent of the beneficiaries. Self-targeting was cited by 35.7 per cent of beneficiaries in Welmera and 24.7 per cent of Dire Dawa beneficiaries. These were mostly CBO beneficiaries. Government officials targeted 8.1 per cent of Dire Dawa beneficiaries and 7.3 per cent of those from Welmera. Others, including neighbours and village committees, selected 16.5 per cent of the beneficiaries in Dire Dawa and 6.3 per cent of Welmera beneficiaries.

NSAs used several criteria to select beneficiaries (see Figure 8). For CBOs, cooperatives and self-help groups, the ability to make cash or in-kind contributions was important. Some 472 NSAs used a variety of criteria.

When the selection criteria were distributed by type of NSA (Figure 9 and Annex 11), we found that formal NSAs mostly used unemployment, low income, asset depletion, and age as their key criteria, whereas informal NSAs generally used diverse criteria. For example, less than 50 Formal NSAs used 'landless youth' as criterion. Almost none of the semi-formal and informal NSAs use this criterion. By and large, we see that formal and informal NSAs are criteria based.

NSAs in the study area defined the criteria jointly with local government officials. They shared information among themselves to minimise exploitation of the system (fewer beneficiaries benefiting from multiple sources).

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
Figure 8: NSA criteria for targeting beneficiaries

Figure 9: Distribution of targeting criteria, by NSA type.

NSA interaction with the state and with other NSAs
Interaction with the state and other NSAs is important in governance and accountability. In the survey 55.5 per cent of the NSAs indicated collaborating or interacting with one or more state institution (Table 13). All international, national and local NGOs interacted in one form or another with state institutions, but most CBOs did not.

Table 13: Interaction of NSAs with state institutions

Type of NSA	Interaction of NSA with state institutions		
	No	Yes	Total
International NGO	0	18	18
National and local NGO	0	64	64
Business organisation	20	56	76
Faith-based organisation	7	12	19
Self-help group	15	41	56
Community-based organisation	348	143	491
Association	72	191	263
Cooperative	14	47	61
Other	11	35	46
Total	487	607	1094

Figure 10 shows the administrative level of state institutions with which NSAs interacted. In some cases, NSAs interacted with multiple state bodies. Those interacting with state institutions at district and kebele levels mainly were CBOs, cooperatives, associations, business organisations and self-help groups, mostly for reporting and supervision. NSAs interacting with state institutions at the regional and national levels were mostly international, national and local NGOs and FBOs. The most important state institutions with which the NSAs interacted was CSA, and this was for licenses. These NSAs also interacted with sectoral bureaus that followed their performance, including those for health, finance and economic development, labour and social affairs, education and water.


Figure 10: Level of NSA–State interaction

Some 796 NSAs reported interacting with other NSAs, and 396 out of 491 CBOs interacted with one or more NSAs. Associations, business organisations and cooperatives ranked second, third and fourth in interactions with other NSAs. Few formal NSAs interacted with other NSAs.

4.6 Gender considerations in NSA services

The study recognised the commitment of NSAs to addressing the issue of gender and that strategies to mainstream gender were included in programmes. The research examined this issue with respect to capacity building, beneficiary selection, and credit and grant provision (Figure 11). Among the NSAs addressing gender issues, capacity building in the form of training and education was their dominant mechanism for doing so.


Figure 11: Programme areas that mainstream gender (Number of NSAs and percentage of total)

The research sought beneficiaries' perceptions of whether NSA services addressed the needs of vulnerable men and women equally or one more than the other. This was measured per the scale given in Table 3. Both urban and rural respondents agreed on gender equity in NSA services (Table 14). Respondents were generally consistent and logical in their perceptions except for those from Dire Dawa who tended to agree that there was equity in the services but also that women were favoured.

Table 14: Beneficiary perceptions of how NSAs address gender issues

Gender parameter	Dire Dawa (n=381)	Welmera (n = 381)
Addresses the needs of both vulnerable men and women equally	0.84	0.91
Addresses the needs of vulnerable men more than women	−1.09	−1.18
Addresses the needs of vulnerable women more than men	0.16	−0.52
Does not address the needs of vulnerable men and women	−1.54	−1.52

To determine beneficiary views on the extent to which participating in NSA social protection programmes had changed gender relations, beneficiaries responded to eight statements reflecting both practical and strategic gender relations views (Table 15). Although more egalitarian control of incomes was the third most common perceived change, control of assets was not viewed as such and ranked last. Rural and urban beneficiaries had a positive relationship with respect to perception of change in gender relations (Figure 12).

Table 15: Beneficiaries' perceptions of gender relations

| Perceived change in gender relations	Dire Dawa (n = 381) Yes (%)	Welmera (n = 381) Yes (%)	Average	Rank
More respectful relationship	92.9	96.6	94.75	1
More egalitarian division of labour	66.9	73.2	70.05	2
More egalitarian control of incomes	42.3	53.0	47.65	3
Less intra-household tensions or physical violence	32.3	62.5	47.4	4
Consideration of time and geographic constraints improved by NSAs	40.5	51.5	46.0	5
More joint decision-making about and care for children	43.6	45.7	44.65	6
Men have increased knowledge on gender equality	34.0	53.8	43.9	7
More egalitarian control of assets	26.0	49.6	37.8	8

Figure 12: Relationship of urban and rural beneficiaries on perception of change in gender relations.

4.7 NSA policy engagement and implications

The research examined policy engagement at the levels of institutional participation in policy design and advocacy, and beneficiary participation in policy design.

Institutional policy engagement

The mapping survey found that only 6 per cent of the NSAs were engaged in any form of policy advocacy or rights issues. This was attributed to the regulation of 2009 governing the work of formal NSAs and sources of their funds. The key informants believed that the regulation made NSAs' rights and policy advocacy work difficult. In some cases, NSAs established to advocate against violations such as female genital mutilation were directed to focus on treatment of victims, e.g. helping with the medical expenses rather than advocating for prevention of the violations.

The government and selected NSAs have established a National Social Protection Platform to work on a social protection policy and strategy. This process has been praised as an exemplary and innovative way of accessing NSAs' rich knowledge and expertise in social protection. However, participation is limited to a few formal NSAs and predominantly the bigger international NGOs, leaving out CBOs.

Beneficiary policy engagement
The in-depth research sought to find out the extent to which beneficiaries were consulted on social protection policy issues affecting their lives. For both survey locations, 70 per cent of the respondents said that they had not been consulted. As shown in Table 16, for beneficiaries who said they have been consulted (18 per cent in Dire Dawa and 23 per cent in Welmera), local government officials were most likely to have consulted them (Dire Dewa = 9 per cent; Welmera 15 per cent).

Table 16: Stakeholders consulting beneficiaries on policy issues

Stakeholder	Dire Dawa (n=381)		Welmera (n= 381)	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Local government officials	34	8.9	57	15.0
Council members	0	0.0	6	1.6
NSA officials	25	6.5	3	0.8
Regional sector bureaus	8	2.0	17	4.4
Others	2	0.5	4	1.0
Total	69	17.9	87	22.8

Besides government laws and regulations, NSA representatives mentioned many challenges to their operations such as shortage of funds, insufficient knowledge on policy processes, policy processes that left out NSAs, policy-makers who did not see NSAs' evidence as credible, and difficulties recruiting sufficient staff owing to restrictions on their administrative budget. The role of NSAs in government policy aspects needs attention to facilitate their participation so that they can contribute to policies and learn about the effects on their operations.

4.8 Performance of NSAs
NSA performance was measured using five indicators: interaction with the state and other NSAs, resource generation, capacity creation, customer satisfaction, and outcome achievement.

NSA interaction with the state and other NSAs
Among the 578 NSAs that interacted with state institutions, 492 viewed this as contributing to demonstration of transparency in their operations and as instrumental in getting administrative assistance. Similar views were expressed for interaction with fellow NSAs by the 260 of the 270 NSAs involved in it.

Resource generation
NSAs that can mobilise resources should more satisfactorily achieve their objectives than those that cannot do so. NSAs in the survey had diverse funding sources, but 922 relied on members' contributions, reflecting the dominance of informal NSAs in the survey. External sources supported 128 NSAs, private sources 118 NSAs, internal donors 64 NSAs, and the community 33 NSAs. Internal and external donors were the main sources of funds for formal NSAs. NSAs that rely on members' contributions can have more sustainability in provision of services than those depending on donations, which cannot be guaranteed.

All the surveyed NSAs were unable to implement their plans for 2012/13 owing to budget shortfalls (Table 17). The average implementation gap was highest for CBOs, next was NGOs. In the in-depth survey, most NSAs reported that financial limitations highly restricted their goal to improve their services.

Table 17: NSAs' average and actual budget plans for 2012/13 (birr)

Budget	NGOs	Cooperatives	Associations	Semi-formal CBOs	Informal CBOs
Planned	63,200,000	112,000	559,180	200,000	6,180
Actual	33,500,000	75,500	359,180	194,400	3,210
Gap	29,700,000	36,500	200,000	5,600	2,970
Gap (%)	47	33	36	3	48

Human resource and assets

This study assessed the average planned and actual levels of managers and technical and support staff for selected NSAs for the 2012/13 budget year and found the biggest gaps among cooperatives and NGOs (Table 18). The large gaps in availability of vehicles for NGOs, cooperatives and associations (Table 19) might be an indication of their limited ownership of assets, a critical handicap in their effectiveness.

Table 18: Average planned and actual number of staff during 2012/13

Staff	NGOs	Cooperatives	Associations	Semi-formal CBOs	Informal CBOs
Planned	441	17	15	13	8
Actual	297	11	12	12	6
Gap	144	6	3	1	2
Gap in %	32.65	35.29	20	7.69	25

Table 19: Average planned and available vehicles during 2012/13

Vehicles	NGOs	Cooperatives	Associations
Planned	80	1	3
Available	55	0	2
Gap	25	1	1
Gap in %	31.25	100	33.33

Beneficiary satisfaction

Beneficiary perceptions of the adequacy and effectiveness of NSA services were more positive in Welmera than in Dire Dawa (Table 20).

Table 20: Beneficiary perceptions of NSA service delivery

	Dire Dawa (n = 381)			Welmera (n = 381)		
Satisfaction factor	Yes (%)	No (%)	Not sure (%)	Yes (%)	No (%)	Not sure (%)
1. The social protection services provided by NSA are adequate for the vulnerable people in the operation site	45.1	41.7	13.2	58.0	35.2	6.8
2. NSA is effectively operating to benefit the vulnerable groups rather than maximising its interests in the operational area	65.6	27.0	7.4	82.2	12.3	5.5

When specific indicators were used to measure effectiveness of the services, all satisfaction factors received positive scores, except wealth accumulation (Table 21). There was a positive relationship between satisfaction levels of urban and rural beneficiaries, implying that, other things being equal, both groups were satisfied with NSA services (Figure 13).

Table 21: Beneficiary satisfaction with social protection services

| Satisfaction factor	Weighted average index	
	Dire Dawa (*n* = 381)	Welmera (*n* = 381)
1. I was satisfied with the length of time I had to wait for the service	1.44	1.19
2. The facility is at a convenient distance from my home	1.16	1.11
3. The staff were readily available	1.11	0.81
4. The facility had all the necessary services and supplies I need	1.07	0.98
5. Service fees and costs [if any] were reasonable	0.63	0.46
6. I received the necessary information that I want without any difficulties	1.23	0.88
7. The staff were courteous and helpful to me	1.39	1.25
8. I received good attention by qualified staff of my service provider	0.89	0.91
9. My exposure to risks reduced	0.73	0.72
10. I changed my life and accumulated wealth better than before	−0.02	0.47

Figure 13: Beneficiaries satisfaction with services, by location.

5   Major findings and conclusions

Most NSAs were in Oromia and Addis Ababa, for the reasons that Oromia is the largest regional state and Addis Ababa is the capital city with good infrastructure that formal NSAs often require. Some 1,094 NSAs were characterised, which were about 32 per cent of those that local knowledge had said to exist in the study sites. This was considered a sufficient sample to generate the required information to inform public policy and contribute to the body of knowledge.

Formal NSAs were concentrated in urban areas where vulnerability levels were high and infrastructure and social amenities were good. CBOs were important in urban and rural areas. Broadly speaking, NGOs had national and regional scope, while informal NSAs operate at the village level.

NSAs are perceived to address the needs of vulnerable groups. The poor and destitute account for about two-thirds of the beneficiaries, and women for more than 50 per cent in 7 of the 13 beneficiary categories and for nearly 80 per cent among the people living with HIV and AIDS.

Some beneficiaries received services from more than one NSA, probably for multiple problems or because beneficiary targeting was so poor that they exploited the system.

A restriction on engaging in advocacy was introduced in 2009 for NSAs with foreign fund sources, most likely to reduce donor dependence or prohibit policy advocacy financed by foreigners.

Beneficiaries were selected for services by NSAs, local officials, neighbours or themselves. Selection criteria included unemployment, low income and asset depletion, age, gender, and ability to make cash or in-kind contributions (for membership groups). NSAs share information to minimise exploitation of the system. Beneficiary targeting is a key area for collaboration between the state and NSAs and of common concern.

 Poor gender balance exists in NSA staffing with women accounting for only 35.3 per cent of managers. NSA interventions had positive effects on gender relations, particularly for respect in relationships, division of labour and control of income.

A platform comprising selected state and non-state actors was established for the design of social protection policy and strategy, but informal NSAs were not included.

6 Governance and policy implications

To be effective in providing social protection, NSAs need governance and policy support that provides:

- A conducive environment: This entails improving the regulatory mechanisms and resolving the issue on expenditure restriction for administrative functions. At the very least, NSAs should be involved in decision-making on this.
- Opportunities to engage with the public sector in formulating social protection policies and strategies.
- Assistance to improve their democratic functioning and strengthen their service delivery and resource mobilisation capacity. This could involve establishing a government agency for transforming and supporting NSAs.
- Opportunities for networking and sharing experiences for formal, international and informal NSAs to allow informal NSAs to engage in policy formulation and improve service delivery.

The findings of this study were communicated in various venues to inform public policy, beginning with presentations in Welmara and Dire Dawa to local administrators, sector offices and formal and informal NSAs, which equipped them with evidence to engage in public policy formulation. The research was also presented at the International Conference on the Ethiopian Economy where policy-makers and implementers were present.

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