PREVENTING AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN SOMALIA:
A MAPPING REPORT

Author: Hussein Yusuf Ali

November 2020

The Somali Institute for Development Research & Analysis (SIDRA)
Garowe, Puntland State of Somalia

Cell Phone:
+252 5 846 044

Email:
info@sidrainstitute.org

Website:
https://www.sidrainstitute.org

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Somalia's perennial, multifaceted, continuous conflicts and recurring political instability, orchestrated mainly by the Al-Shabaab insurgency, but largely influenced by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), have resulted in a deterioration of security and peace in the horn of Africa state. Efforts to build a functioning state have faced numerous challenges amidst insurgency and violent extremism caused by the collapse of state institutions, including the judicial system, the emergence of extremism, conflicts between clans, youth unemployment and poverty which has in turn caused havoc in Somalia and the region at large.

The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISSAfrica) describe radicalisation as a process whereby people adopt an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, encourage or facilitate violence with the aim of promoting an ideology or political cause as a means of obtaining social transformation. The nature and wide range of possible drivers of violent extremism and insurgency, diverse local contexts and nascent evidence around responses makes it empirically difficult to define violent extremism. From a wider perspective, structural "push" factors (that are socioeconomic, political and cultural in nature) are important in understanding violent extremism. This study adopts the definition used by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) which is one of the more concrete definitions by any organization. It defines violent extremism as "advocating, engaging in, preparing or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic or political objectives."

In advancing its efforts towards preventing and countering the growing national and regional terrorism, the Somali government has developed policies, most notably the National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, which was adopted in September 2016. The strategy defines violent extremism as "the beliefs and actions of people who support or use ideologically motivated violence to further social, economic, or political objectives." Besides the strategy, institutional coordination and collaboration between the federal government and federal member states were also initiated to stop the spread of extremist ideologies within the fragile nation.

In spite of the numerous efforts put in place, Al-Shabaab and ISIS continue to be a threat to peace and security in Somalia and the entire Horn of Africa. This reality has compelled the Somali government and its international partners including neighbouring countries and other troop-contributing countries to engage in a shadowy and complex fight against violent extremism. This, among other military interventions including but not limited to drone assassinations, often inadvertently kills innocent civilians in remote areas, and in still intimidation and fear among locals. Accordingly, best practices and community-owned strategies to prevent and counter violent extremism are needed. Their central objective must not to be to simply degrade and destroy Al-Shabaab but rather to ensure human rights and seek public approval of the peace rebuilding efforts through active participation and involvement of the general public aimed towards a people owned and driven process.

There is a wide range of research studies on the prevention and countering of violent extremism in Somalia. There is, however, little evidence that the policy recommendations and actions have made a significant practical impact on the current situation in the country. In spite of the rich library of knowledge in this field, mainly facilitated by international research centers, institutes and individuals, questions need to be asked on whether (I) the findings and literature are in touch with the reality on the ground (ii) the findings and recommendations are practically applicable in the Somali context, and (iii) whether the findings and recommendations are available to local policy makers and other relevant actors.

Somali federal government programming on the Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism (P/CVE) must be informed by evidenced-based research and analysis to ensure the interventions have a positive impact on the target communities, groups, individuals and local institutions. A community driven process involving local leadership and aggrieved factions will ensure the already strained resources are optimally utilized to yield a more sustainable impact.

Definition of Key Terms

Violent Extremism	Refers to the process and or act of advocating, engaging in, preparing or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic or political objectives
Countering Terrorism	This term is used to denote the efforts targeting individuals or groups either already in extremist groups or deemed at risk of joining with an aim of changing their course
Preventing & Countering Violent Extremism	This term is used to denote more 'upstream' activities targeting the structural factors that may 'push' individuals or communities to undertake violent extremism.
Radicalization	Is defined as a process through which an individual adopts an increasingly extremist set of beliefs and aspirations. It may include, but is not limited to, the willingness to condone, support, facilitate or use violence to further political, ideological, religious or other goals. It can further be understood as the process by which individuals adopt violent extremist ideologies that *may* lead them to commit terrorist acts, or which are likely to render them more vulnerable to recruitment by terrorist organizations

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The UN Security Council (UNSC) referred to preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) for the first time in Resolution 2178 in September 2014. On February 2015, the US convened a three-day White House summit on CVE that discussed countering ISIS and violent extremism. In 2016, the UN Secretary General presented his action plan on preventing violent extremism to the General Assembly. These international efforts have also been complemented at the regional level with member states of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) seeking to be involved in CVE interventions. IGAD validated its Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in 2017, which aims to provide a roadmap to guide the region in addressing violent extremism in a more collaborative and cooperative manner. Kenya has launched a National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism and Somalia has developed a National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism. Other countries in the region are also working in their country-specific strategies.

Somalia remains one of the most fragile and insecure states in the Horn of Africa due to continuous conflict and recurring natural disasters. After numerous efforts by the government to employ local measures to bring back peace and security failed, the unending conflict led to the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to support the federal government. This was particularly important in addressing the overarching conflict threatening neighboring countries. The need to deploy AMISOM to improve regional security was arrived at after wide consultations with regional and local leaders. With the concerted efforts and support from AMISOM, international bodies and Civil Society Groups and humanitarian Organizations, there have been tremendous milestones achieved over the last decades in the war against Al-Shabaab and other insurgent groups. Nonetheless, much still needs to be done though. Innocent civilians have been killed in drone strikes and air raids, resulting in a backlash and more grievances with risks of sympathy or support for Al-Shabaab fighters rising day by day. 1

With the support of AMISOM and the US government, the Somali National Army (SNA) has regained control over a vast territory from Al-Shabaab and greatly reduced its capacity to conduct significant operations in Somalia and across the borders, save for sporadic attacks. However, the government has been criticized for failing to hold on tightly to the new territory. Mogadishu has blamed deficiencies in its own military as well as poor intelligence and information gathering mechanisms and lack of cooperation from local communities afraid of reprisals from the Al-Shabaab and ISIS affiliated insurgent groups.2

Counterterrorism expert Catherine Zimmerman and other analysts believe that without shifts in approach, the stage is set for the collapse of the gains made to date against Al-Shabaab.3 They argue that a strong military force with adequate skills, equipment and logistics including proper salary payments must be established along with strong intelligence institutions and the development of community policing to gather first-hand information to thwart Al-Shabaab and ISIS.

Al-Shabaab continues to maintain its operational capacity – advancing its extremist ideologies, adopting conventional and unconventional tactics including suicide and roadside bombings as well as assassinations of government officials and civilians in Somalia and neighbouring countries. Poor coordination among relevant Somali security and intelligence agencies led to the country witnessing the worst ever attack carried out by Al-Shabaab in Somalia on 14 October 2017. The attack claimed the lives of over 500 people at Zoppe Junction, the highest ever numbers witnessed in the recent times.4

This was followed by an attack on the Nassa Hablood II hotel two weeks later and the Ex-Control Afgooye attack on 28 December 2019.5 Al-Shabaab also claimed responsibility for the attack that killed 10 people including high ranking government officials including the Mayor of Mogadishu, the governor of the Benadir Regional Administration, three district commissioners and other senior officials,, The group also claimed the killing of Abdisalan Hassan Hersi (Gu'jir, The governor of Nugaal Region, and Ahmed Muse Nur, Governor of Mudug Region.

The two attacks which were separate but almost similar bore the hallmarks of Al-Shabaab's operations. Al-Shabaab's sporadic attacks in different parts of Somalia are clear indications of its resilience despite major loses in the territory, sources of revenue and recruitment capacity due to continuous airstrike's by the US and ground operations by the Somali National Army and AMISOM.

The federal government has its National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and has since 2018 been in the process of setting up a national P/CVE coordination unit under the prime minister's office. However, the unit is struggling with limited financial resources, leading to a shortage of human resources which may negatively impact its capacity to oversee and guide the relevant stakeholders and actors in this fight.

A holistic approach to counterterrorism strategies has been found to be more effective. This approach addresses the twin tasks of reconciliation and state building by devising relevant policies, laws, programs and strategies that represent the interests of the widely disillusioned citizens whose futures have been shattered by violent extremism. Al-Shabaab's support, particularly among marginalized communities, is still to a large extent fuelled by both inter and intra-clan conflicts and lack of justice. Thus, addressing community reconciliation and reintegration of all disengaged combatants is vital to preventing the extremist resurgence in recovering areas and their expansion into new areas. This should be done in strict consideration of both judicial/legal and local traditional conflict resolution processes.

Countries can only achieve prosperity, economic freedom, development and attract local and foreign investment when there is peaceful co-existence among the population and within its borders. The fastest developing nations are those that are peaceful and tranquil, with the best security structures. A peaceful and secure environment is critical to every society since it affects all aspects of economic and social development including the realization of human rights. Empowered and engaged communities play a key role in strangling the efforts of extremist groups. Attaining long lasting peace and prosperity requires the use of pragmatic and coherent approaches to address the root causes of violent extremism. Preventing and countering violent extremism requires a bottom up approach that is Somali led and owned.

P/CVE responses need to be driven by evidence and strategies that articulate clearly the approaches geared towards eliminating direct and perceived threats to the local, national and regional populations. This compounded with methods that are context specific, formulated and implemented with the participation of all relevant stakeholders, including government, communities, non-state actors such as business communities, religious leaders, local NGOs, community-based organizations and women's and youth organizations.

The Somali Institute for Development and Research Analysis (SIDRA) was commissioned to conduct this mapping study on P/CVE in Somalia. The study sought to produce evidence-based research that can be applied at the policy, programming and discourse levels to prevent and counter violent extremism in Somalia.

1.1. Objectives of the Study
The objectives of the study were to:

1. Map the P/CVE programs, projects and activities in Somalia (implemented by government, civil society and communities) and determine whether they are P/CVE-specific or P/CVE-related
2. Investigate how key stakeholders including government, donors and local communities in Somalia perceive and define P/CVE
3. Explore the driving and predisposing factors contributing to the radicalization and violent extremism in Somalia
4. Document and analyze P/CVE policy processes and their implementation in Somalia

1.2. Study Questions
The following research questions guided the literature review and key informant interviews:

1. What are the current programs and activities by government and civil society in Somalia aimed at P/CVE?
2. What are the perceptions of key stakeholders including government, donors and local communities towards P/CVE?
3. What are the driving and predisposing factors contributing to the radicalization and violent extremism in Somalia?
4. What are the existing P/CVE policy processes and how are they implemented in Somalia?

2.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study adopted a qualitative research design. It employed the use of Key Informant Interviews and a desk review of secondary sources of information to gather in-depth secondary information on P/CVE as described in detail below. The process of the research study was guided by scientific principles of data collection, analysis and presentation. Qualitative information was gathered in a participatory manner using multiple data collection techniques that are informed by the general and specific research objectives and guided by the scope of work in the terms of reference. Tools for the research were developed by the SIDRA team in line with the objectives and scope of the research. The respondents in the research study were purposely selected targeting victims of violent extremism, government officials directly involved in policy and legal formulation, religious and local leaders, CSOs and the international community whose works revolve around combating violent extremism. To ensure that information collected is representative of all segments of the population, a deliberate effort was made to capture the opinions of women, youth, minority groups, internally displaced persons (IDPs), local authorities, security experts, community leaders, civic organizations and religious leaders, representatives from federal and regional governments, the international community and reformed militias.

2.1. Scope of the Study
The mapping study was carried out in five towns considered to have been adversely affected by Al-Shabaab radicalization and violent extremism: Kismayo, Baidoa, Mogadishu, Galkayo and Bossaso.

2.2. Data Collection Tools and Methods
Information for the mapping study in Somalia was collected using multiple data collection methods that involved qualitative techniques and an extensive review of documents to provide useful secondary data. Specifically, the study team used the following methods:

2.2.1. Desk Review
The team carried out a thorough review of relevant documents to provide secondary information to build a solid background and literature review. The documents included Resolution 2178 of the UNSC from September 2014; The IGAD Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism of 2017; the UN Secretary General action plan on preventing violent extremism of 2016; and the Somalia federal government's National Strategy and Action Plan for Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism. Information from these documents informed the development of the inception report. The survey also involved a further review of documents for secondary data from sources that have rich information on P/CVE in the context of Somalia, such as Somalia's Political Agreement on National Security Architecture.

2.2.2. Key Informant Interviews
Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with the use of semi-structured interview guides were conducted to gather in-depth and factual information relating to the study. The KIIs were conducted with heads of local authorities, conflict analysis and resolution experts, security experts, community leaders, civic organizations and religious leaders. All respondents were asked to discuss the local context of radicalization, including the drivers of radicalization and violent extremism, resource mobilization strategies and how vulnerable individuals and groups are receptive to radicalization and recruitment by extremists and the best ways to rehabilitate them. Additional information on the existing P/CVE programs and activities being undertaken by government and civil society actors was also sought from these respondents with the aim of mapping out the various initiatives and to understand the perceptions around them. Federal and regional representatives were key in dissecting the milestones made in policy formulation and implementation and the challenges therein. For the security of the researchers and the research participants, the key informants were selected through carefully established guidelines owing to the sensitivity of the subject matter. The guidelines took into consideration their standing in the community and their level of knowledge about the issues under investigation.

2.3. Study Sampling and Data Collection

A team of three research experts led the data collection process with the lead consultant taking the overall supervisory role and participating in the interview process to provide the necessary support to the enumerators/research assistants. The interview schedules/guidelines used in the study were developed by the SIDRA team in conformity with the scope of the study as defined in the ToR and study objectives. The sample size is outlined in Table 1 below.

entire process may also have hindered crucial data collection.

Table 1: Sampling plan for qualitative data collection

S/N	Type of interview	Total
1	KII with local authorities	5
2	KII with security experts	5
3	KII with community leaders	5
4	KII with civic organizations	10
5	KII with religious organizations	10
6.	KII with security institutions/personnel	10
7.	KII with defectors from extremist organizations	10
8.	KII with federal and regional parliamentarians	5
9.	KII with youth and women's organizations/leaders	5
10	KII with conflict analysis and resolution experts	10
	Total	**75**

2.4. Data Analysis

Qualitative data were analysed by sifting and coding it into themes using the analytical framework before inferences were drawn. We also used NVivo software for the analysis of the qualitative data to improve on data analysis and the interpretation of results. Results within and across different groups of people interviewed were collated and triangulated, and the integrated information used to compile this report

2.5. Study Limitations

The limitations of the study included:

The sensitivity of the subject matter for the researchers, respondents and government authorities. There were cases where the respondents appeared not to have shared all the information required for fear of retaliatory attacks and intimidation.

Insecurity in some areas limited the scope of the data collection process. Mistrust by some respondents towards the enumerators/qualitative researchers and the

3.0. STUDY FINDINGS

This section presents the study findings, including: national conflict, local grievances and drivers of violent extremism; mapping of P/CVE programs, projects and activities in Somalia (implemented by government and communities as well as international donors) and determining whether they are P/CVE-specific or P/CVE-related; Investigating how key stakeholders including government and local communities perceive and define P/CVE; and documenting and analyzing P/CVE policy processes and implementation. Additional findings are presented on the practical challenges of monitoring and evaluating P/CVE interventions.

3.1. National Conflict, Local Grievances and Drivers of Violent Extremism

Somalia witnessed a brief era of political stability and economic growth based on Soviet-style socialism and social cohesion between 1960 and 1977. This eventually culminated in violent conflict which lasted for over a quarter of a century. The causes, predisposing factors and consequences are distinct but intertwined and multifaceted. Chief among the multiple problems are inter/intra communal resource-based conflicts mainly over water and pasture, direct or proxy wars involving neighbouring states, the interests of regional and international powers, multiple failed international interventions, and factional fighting - all of which have made Somalia the quintessential failed state. Complex inter clan rivalries and power relations, nepotism in government appointments, both in the public service and the military, coupled with massive corruption has further fuelled animosity among the citizenry towards the country's leadership. Local grievances are often politicized and manipulated by leaders to paint a picture of victimization of the locals. Such actions create an opportunity for extremist groups to instrumentalize their perceived victimization as a justification for extremist violence.

As a result, the general population, about 60 percent of which is rural, have been exposed to various existential threats, further predisposing them to destructive forces including illegal migration, piracy and violent extremism. Available figures indicate that there have been approximately 4,000 civilian casualties as a result of Al-Shabaab attacks over the last decade. This figure, however, is debatable due to the lack of clear casualty tracking frameworks and guidelines to ensure accuracy and accountability for all civilian deaths and casualties and may even be higher than estimated. The most notable is the Zoppe attack that claimed the lives of over 500 civilians and the recent Ex-Control Afgoye police checkpoint attacks that killed more than 80 civilians. This conflict affects civilians in many different ways and has led to massive losses of innocent human lives. They include the targeting of those suspected by the militant groups of having links with the federal government; the using of civilians as human shields; and the increasing use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide bombings in places where civilians gather. Innocent civilians caught in the crossfire of unpredictable frontline fighting between Somali government forces and insurgents have put more lives at risk.

DRIVERS OF POVERTY, VULNERABILITY AND LOW RESILIENCE IN SOMALIA

Figure 1: Priority interventions by region (Source: DINA 2018)

Decades of civil war, insecurity and political fragmentation have made Somalia one of the poorest nations in the world and one of the least developed in Africa. Parts of southern and northern Somalia, largely inaccessible due to the presence of Al-Shabaab, are the most affected and experience lower standards of living. The social and economic progress in these areas is hindered by the volatile security situation, meaning the government is focused on restoring safety rather than conferring economic benefits.

The five cities sampled for this study shared common characteristics that make the people living there, especially the youths more prone to radicalization and violent extremism. Baidoa and Kismayo proved to be the most vulnerable and have one of the highest rates of youth radicalization, both in the cities and the surrounding rural areas. The two cities were battlegrounds between AMISOM forces and Al-Shabaab, partly because of their territorial and geographical

significance but also the thriving charcoal trade and piracy. This lured many youths eager for quick cash from the illegal trades. Unfortunately, the majority of these unsuspecting young people were recruited to join Al-Shabaab, which used the proceeds of the illegal charcoal trade and piracy to finance its operations.

Primary data reveal that Bossaso and Galkayo have experienced lower rates of radicalization, but are subject to the influence of IDPs from southern zones of Somalia who can sometimes fall victim to Al-Shabaab exploitation or are already members of the group. Differences between clan dialects mean that these displaced individuals do not blend easily into host communities, increasing their vulnerability to exploitation. As a result, Al-Shabaab prefers to use outsiders from south-central Somalia within the growing internally displaced populations. Communities of IDPs are sometimes marginalized and discriminated against because they often belong to minority groups or separate from the protection of their clans. The diverse communities in the south-central zone is most affected by violent extremism. These communities report many deaths and massive destruction of property in the wake of Al-Shabaab attacks. This has forced members of the affected communities to seek safety, employment, and business opportunities in Somaliland and Puntland. While many young people have been convinced to join Al-Shabaab after internal displacement or forced migration, others were motivated by a desire to expel foreign forces from the country.

Although the influence of Al-Shabaab is powerful in the southern regions, there remains only modest loyalty to the group in this area. Concerted efforts by local and regional leaders coupled with the heavy presence of AMISOM troops means the population here speak openly, and with relatively little fear, of the militants. In Bossaso and Baidoa, however, discussion of Al-Shabaab is taboo due to fear of reprisals. In Galkayo, which is least affected by militant groups, Al-Shabaab is discussed fearfully and in low tones because of its tendency to carry out sporadic attacks aimed at government officials. Fear is widespread in Galmudug, which was dominated by the Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca forces before December 2017 power-sharing deal with the state administration kicked off its reintegration into the national army. In particular, the phrase "the walls have ears" resonated among the respondents in and around Galkayo, suggesting that Al-Shabaab or ISIS may be nearby. Despite the fact that the militant groups seem to have little physical influence, they do control some coastal parts of Galmudug state.

Al-Shabaab defectors told researchers that young people from the south-central zones of Somalia tend to become foot soldiers, while those from Puntland and Somaliland generally hold leadership positions in the operational,

administrative and management divisions although it has kept on changing from time to time and region by region depending throughout the past decade or so. The predominance of individuals from generally privileged clans (from Mogadishu, Puntland or Somaliland) is due to their pre-existing qualifications and loyalty to the leaders. However, there is also the opportunity for upward mobility within the ranks of Al-Shabaab, as demonstrated by the elevation to senior leadership roles of non-Somali foreign fighters, the Al Ameriki from the US and Africans such as Fazoul Abdallah Mohamed and Zubair Al Muhajir. It was common during the reign of Ahmed Abdi Godane to find commanders originating from marginalized communities, creating loyal lieutenants for the Al-Shabaab leader and encouraging others to join the group.

Residents of Mogadishu live in fear of unpredictable and regular suicide attacks by Al-Shabaab such as the storming of public or private premises, remotely detonated car explosions, suicide bombers or IEDs. Despite the imminent threat posed by the militant group, the inhabitants of Mogadishu have in recent years focussed less on the activities of Al-Shabaab. They have increasingly continued with their daily businesses and focussed more on the government actions and interventions; issues of justice, law and reconciliation; and foreign interventions.

The residents of Kismayo and Baidoa are those most affected by the adverse socioeconomic challenges resulting from the battle for control of the region between Al-Shabaab and AMISOM. Fear about when the next explosion will occur is a phenomenon the people here have to live with on a daily basis. Those living in Bossaso and Galkayo fears Al-Shabaab, but as a result of the more effective security apparatus do not feel significantly threatened on a daily basis.

Al-Shabaab mainly targets individuals under the age of 18 due to their vulnerability when exposed to ideological concepts. This also supports this study's view that education is another key factor in potential radicalization. Under the Somali education system, children under 18 are mainly educated in Quranic schools and those over 18 rarely continue their education unless retained as assistants to the Quranic school teachers. The data also suggest that Al-Shabaab is more active in the southern regions of the country (the Bay, Bakool, Banadir and Shabelle regions) where it targets younger children who are less likely to migrate than older individuals.

3.1.1. Al-Shabaab Recruitment Tactics and Strategies

Research suggests that social solidarity is a key factor for Al-Shabaab is trying to influence youth. The organization's strategy involves: (1) creating social capital through the restoration of lost hope, (2) assisting individuals and communities towards achieving their dreams of justice, (3) encouraging their sense of belonging, and (4) reviving feelings of social cohesion.

Al-Shabaab employs a number of different tactics to attract recruits. The most common is identifying problems faced by young people and claiming to offer solutions. For example, Al-Shabaab offers recruits responsibilities that are particularly tailored to their individual skills, expertise and training. It positions itself as an organization that addresses marginalization and empowers young people with responsibilities and rights, including the right and opportunities to take up leadership positions. Many young Somalis feel isolated from society, and the group offers a sense of belonging as part of a Muslim Ummah in which all are considered equal. On one hand, the group attempts to address the high illiteracy levels among its recruits by providing education based on their strict interpretation of Islamic teachings while on the other hand, they lured the youth with the promise of a job with guaranteed income/stipend, a lifeline to many idle young people in Al-Shabaab-controlled areas.

The majority of ex-combatants interviewed had received both military and ideological training. The courses were tailored to each individual's technical abilities, interest and skills and included bomb making and military tactics, intelligence gathering, public speaking, motivational speeches, use of social/mainstream media and suicide missions. Each course lasts about six months, and the group has a number of mobile vocational training centers, including Al-Hayaa (life center), which mainly trains female suicide squads. Approximately 70 female suicide bombers are believed to have graduated from this center. The Abdalla Azam Centre trained former MP Salah Badbaado who carried out a suicide attack at Mogadishu airport in July 2016. Other notable military training centres include Buale and Raaso.

Al-Shabaab has a strong culture of strategic generosity, particularly relating to education and providing opportunities for individuals to develop their skills. It has established a disciplined, effective and efficient decentralized system of governance. Al-Shabaab has established a uniform taxation system that accompanies effective service delivery and exerts tight financial controls. However, its revenue generation is very much weakened by recent developments, including the loss of territories where they used to tax both small businesses and the big companies in Mogadishu, Hargeisa and Garowe. The second significant factor which gravely reduced their resource mobilization is the new momentum of the Somali federal government.

Violent Extremism in the face of Al-Shabaab has increasingly been viewed as exhorting followers to free themselves from any form of occupation. It has taken the leadership of the group to use all the possible mediums to communicate this extremist message directly to young people in a manner that resonates well with them. Propaganda videos enabled Al-Shabaab to communicate with young people, referring overtly to their needs and grievances. One of the most frequent messages is that they are viewed as a resource for peace and development, as well as potential liberators of their home country. These messages used to be shared through social media accounts operated by the Al-Shabaab communication wing Al-Kataib.

However, these propaganda messages are now being drowned out by the growing hope and available opportunities for Somali youth. Various entrepreneurship and innovation hubs were set up in the big cities and annual thematic symposiums take place in Baidoa, Garowe, Hargeisa, Kismayo and Mogadishu, all organized by youth and intended to inspire, empower and advocate for young people. Unlike previous administrations, politicians participate in these platforms to show solidarity and maximize their approval ratings. The gap between youth and the politicians is slowly narrowing due to the level and frequency of interaction and the sense of hope created through youth-related opportunities.

During the peak of Al-Shabaab's insurgency, an additional motivation for radicalization was fair, with a number of interviewees afraid of being victimized if they didn't join the group. Groups viewing the national government as evil considered the extremist group to be a liberator.

3.1.2. Radicalization Process

predicament of young people and dictating what role

Vast majority who are influenced by general grievances but not using violence	• Poverty • Unemployment • Political marginalization • Frustrations
Smaller group who are susceptible for violent message and could end up using violence one day	• Willingness to act on frustrations • Attracted to a message of violence • Pull factors
Small Group that use violence to express their political beliefs	• Will to use of violence • Actively pursuing political goals with any means

Figure 2: Psychosocial and political factors attributed to radicalization (Source: Royal United Service Institute [RUSI] 2016)

i) Reputation: Al-Shabaab strives to be known by the local population as a liberating force, fighting for the rights of citizens and committed to improving their lives. This branding works in certain situations and contributes to the organization's resilience and resource mobilization strategies.

Ii) Indoctrination about going to heaven: Young people are taught that they should be ready to fight for Islam and that they will get into heaven if they die for this cause. At the same time, Al-Shabaab presents itself as fighting to revive the caliphate and has vowed to usher in an era of justice that will ensure everyone is treated with dignity and according to the Islamic Sharia.

Iii) Oppression by the national government: Ordinary citizens tend to view existing authorities as hostile and therefore feel isolated, leading many to seek a sense of belonging by joining radical groups. Some have sought revenge from authorities that may have wrongly used power to oppress them or members of their immediate family or community.

Iv) Strategic communications: The PR campaigns employed by Al-Shabaab are both appealing and enticing, offering solutions to issues experienced by young people, particularly those the government has failed to address. Resources are spent on tailored messages for their target audience, explaining the

they should play in rectifying the situation. Al-Shabaab tells young people living in the diaspora that the countries where they live are causing death, destruction and plundering the natural resources of Somalia. They target alienated youth wishing to return to their country of origin to contribute to its liberation from infidels and a government they consider as apostate.

V) Social media: Social media has become an important tool for Al-Shabaab. Since 2013, it has been producing and disseminating documentaries and online videos, showing daily life in the south-central region which is under the control of militant groups. They condemn "outsiders" who they view as dominating their land. They also focus on the interference of external powers in Somalia and the exploitation of its natural resources. Social media has enabled Al-Shabaab to reach a large number of young people by means of a discursive battlefield on which issues relating to social and political divisions are narrated and presented as being caused by external, non-Muslim forces like Ethiopia and Kenya.

Vi) Jihad films: The group plays, films for young people focusing on jihad in order to lure them into adopting their ideologies while also promoting a connection with their peers in the wider diaspora. They focus on the suffering of Muslims in other countries, encouraging a strong urge to protect, or avenge, fellow Muslims.

Vii) Promise of poverty alleviation: Al-Shabaab is able to attract those experiencing poverty with stipends and the prospect of well-paid employment.

Viii) Offering leadership positions: One of the major contributing factors in radicalization was identified as the exclusion of the younger generation from leadership. By contrast, the insurgency promises leadership positions to young people wishing to exercise their leadership skills.

Ix) Inclusion: Another key factor in radicalization is providing recruits with a sense of inclusion and belonging, as most young people feel isolated from society. Al-Shabaab created a sense of belonging as part of a Muslim Ummah in which all are considered equal. Followers are taught that Islamic education is a means of addressing the issue of illiteracy, offering guidance on issues that have either been ignored or forgotten within Somali society. The interpretation of the verses of the Holy Qur'an and the Sayings of the Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) is used by Al-Shabaab to suit their interests.

X) Facilitating marriages: Some respondents noted that the traditional Somali system of marriage has deviated from true Islamic teachings in which marriage is straightforward. Al-Shabaab warns parents of harsh punishments if they place stringent financial or other societal preconditions on the marriage of their daughters, including expectations concerning a proper family lineage, dowry, a desire for expensive furniture and utensils and expensive wedding parties. This reduces the cost of marriage for underprivileged and discriminated against young people. Al-Shabaab also covers the wedding expenses of young people when parents consider differences in socioeconomic status as a barrier to a union.


Figure 3: Role of social networking in the radicalization process (Source: RUSI)

3.2. P/CVE programs, projects and activities and whether they are P/CVE-specific or P/CVE-related

Supported by its international partners, most notably the World Bank, the IMF and the African Development Bank, the federal government has seriously engaged in numerous efforts and initiatives geared towards socioeconomic transformation in an effort to alleviate the impacts of violent extremism in an already vulnerable society. The government has increasingly called on the private sector, both in private and in public, to spearhead the economic transformation that is set to take place in the country. This unprecedented public and private sector interaction has, to some extent increased the trust between the business community and policymakers at the expense of Al-Shabaab and ISIS.

The government has also approved a national disability law. For the first time there is a directorate of disabilities. It is located at the office of the president and its director is a person with special needs. The Hormuud Telecom foundation has set up the Al-Nuur Blind School, which enables many young men and women to receive primary and secondary education and qualify for university. The private sector has employed a number of graduate youth with disabilities including Premier Bank. Private companies, diaspora organizations and local youth organizations have initiated a project to support couples from marginalized communities, from IDP backgrounds and with disabilities to get married. These community-led empowerment initiatives have helped to address grievances about deep social inequities which Al-Shabaab/ISIS have used to recruit new fighters.

Families and local communities are vital to P/CVE. Their role includes shaping behaviors and attitudes towards non-violence; serving as immediate actors in identifying signs of possible radicalization and violence; preventing radicalization at latent stage; and intervening in the radicalization process. Many families, especially mothers, have provided self-employment for their children to keep them away from radicals, purchasing motorcycles, tricycles, and taxis and sometimes providing funding for sustainable small businesses. Remittances from the Somali diaspora have reduced the vulnerability of some families while returnees have created businesses and made investments to provide youth with employment, reducing the likelihood of them joining extremist groups.

Two sets of government-led non-punitive processes have been undertaken to complement the efforts in combating violent extremism in the country: 1) ad hoc political deals with so-called high-value defectors who, in exchange for defecting along with their followers, receive protection and red-carpet treatment from the government and face no accountability or scrutiny for their past behaviour; and 2) DDR-like rehabilitation programs for Al-Shabaab defectors who, according to Somali intelligence officials' assessments, pose a low-risk of returning to violent terrorism, proselytising or providing logistical support for Al-Shabaab. Defectors who are assessed as high-risk as well as high-risk detainees are sent to military courts, in which some of the human rights organizations and activists believe that it does not adhere to international human rights standards and have often issued the death penalty.

3.2.1. National Rehabilitation Program for Disengaged Combatants (SERENDI)

Policymakers and practitioners are currently confronting the growing threat from violent extremism through the development of counterterrorism strategies. There has been a general interest in P/CVE programming among all the diverse actors involved in Somalia.

As the country continues with its journey to complete recovery, the federal government has focused on developing a number of strategies, including initiatives that move beyond policy development and into implementation. The research team highlighted the lack of capacity for Somalia's federal and regional gove--rnments to manage prevention and countering violent extremism initiatives without external assistance. However, rather than relying on external assistance, there should be an emphasis on the responsibility of local communities and partners to deliver the countering violent extremism strategy. Such efforts should be geared towards changing the mindset of local communities away from the retrogressive extremist ideologies, offering support to government interventions and participating in education and awareness creation efforts for the youth and vulnerable populations. In addition, communities can set up their own local mechanisms to receive, rehabilitate and protect reformed Al-Shabaab militia and oversee their reintegration into society with minimal stigmatization and retaliation from the affected communities. These, among other efforts, would strengthen community resilience against the threat posed by Al-Shabaab.

At the national level, an operational framework has been drafted setting out a coherent and transparent process for integrating disengaged Al-Shabaab combatants back into society with reception, screening, and rehabilitation and reintegration programs. The Serendi Project in Mogadishu is receiving multi-agency funding both locally and internationally and is a first of its kind in Somalia. It is supporting the re-integration of low risk combatants by:

- Creating an outreach and communication campaign both online and offline to inform target groups of the procedure for disengaging and renouncing violence against the state
- Informing target groups about the process and benefits of the Reception, Rehabilitation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (4R) program
- Receiving, rehabilitating and reintegrating up to 5,000 combatants according to the principles of international humanitarian law, human rights law and restorative justice
- Introducing a coherent policy and legal framework alongside the federal government to cover disengaged combatants in line with international law
- Supporting individuals who have been through the rehabilitation process to successfully reintegrate into society by providing livelihood opportunities, employment and access to other relevant services without fear of victimization.

Stages of the Rehabilitation Program

a) Reception phase
The reception phase takes place over 48 hours during which disengaged individuals are met with face-to-face to be screened and disarmed and their basic details noted. Principal activities include (1) interviews, (2) analysis and interpretation, (3) civil-military outreach, (4) capturing basic details and data (including fingerprints), and (5) passing on the name of each ex-combatant to the Ministry of Internal Security (MOIS).

b) Screening phase
Ex-combatants are screened into high and low risk groups. High-risk cases are transferred by NISA to specialized or civilian courts under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. Low-risk cases are transferred to rehabilitation facilities.

c) Rehabilitation phase
Those considered low-risk remain in a rehabilitation facility which prepares them for reintegration into their community. This includes skills training, civil education and religious counselling.

d) Reinsertion phase
Disengaged combatants ready to return to their communities will be supported through reinsertion schemes in their chosen area. Reinsertion schemes consist of short-term interventions designed to offer temporary alternative livelihoods to the rehabilitated former combatants. These schemes also target members of the community (young people and vulnerable groups) who are direct beneficiaries of efforts to underpin reconciliation and early recovery at the community level.

e) Reintegration phase
Disengaged combatants eligible for reintegration are referred to existing programs or newly-developed schemes implemented by various agencies. The ultimate goal of these interventions is the reintegration of former combatants following the process outlined below:

- Economic reintegration: ensuring beneficiaries gain an education and are able to earn a living and will not face discrimination in schools or the labor market
- Social reintegration: ensuring beneficiaries maintain social links with mainstream society (including their families and other graduates from the program) and will not face isolation and ostracism
- Civic reintegration: ensuring beneficiaries are able to participate in a non-violent manner in governmental and democratic processes
- Rehabilitation facilities were established in line with the national rehabilitation program. They include:
- Serendi Rehabilitation Facility (Mogadishu)
- Hill Walaal Rehabilitation Facility (Beledweyne). This has since been closed due to lack of financial resources and the death of its director.
- The Rehabilitation Facility in Baidoa. There is also a dedicated rehabilitation facility in Baidoa for disengaged female combatants and their dependents.
- A fully functioning rehabilitation facility has also been established in Kismayo, and a separate rehabilitation center is also operating in Mogadishu under the auspices of the Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre, a local NGO based in Mogadishu.

3.2.2. Stakeholder Reflections on the Rehabilitation Program

The researchers found that the situation in rehabilitation centers had improved. Ex-combatants and returnees who used to face harsh conditions noted that they had been well treated and had:

- Adequate health care and clothing
- Good accommodation (with beds and mattresses)
- A healthy and nutritious diet
- Respect and proper communication with guards
- Preaching from knowledgeable Islamic scholars
- Soft and hard skills training within the facilities

However, this study revealed a number of gaps with the reception, screening, rehabilitation and reintegration processes, including the long and tiring process at both the reception and screening stages. The main issue which resonated across all respondent interviews was the failure to implement the reintegration process. Defectors tended to be simply released back into the community which may endanger their lives, forcing them to either flee the country or be killed by Al-Shabaab as a reprisal for defecting.

Researchers identified the need for a comprehensive and sustainable program of reinsertion and reintegration. The partial failure of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs can be attributed to:

- The generic nature of its mandate
- The limited capacity of government to provide the resources required to implement the recommended strategies as most of the resources are devoted to the physical fight against the insurgents
- Low capacity in the institutions trusted to implement the programs
- Limited coordination and cooperation between the central government and state governments

The respondents said that unless the situation improves the chances of re-radicalization are high, with some defectors returning to Al-Shabaab. This study has identified a pressing need to develop a national framework and curriculum to ensure successful reintegration, setting out a systematic and joint intervention program to be run in collaboration with Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration programs.

3.2.3. National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Somalia

In April 2019, President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo endorsed the Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS) which recognizes that the problem of radicalization and extremism is linked to the lack of economic opportunities for youth. CAS aims to: enable state and federal authorities to provide security to citizens; enable the operations of AMISOM; develop the capacities of various ministries and authorities; stabilize the programs of federal member states; and prevent and counter violent extremism.

Strand four of CAS specifically addresses the drivers of violent extremism. It lays out targeted interventions on P/CVE that need to be carried out by the international community and the UN in Somalia, including deradicalization programs, civic education, rehabilitation and reintegration and strategic communication. These programs were ongoing even before the strategy was put in place but lacked a coherent document to guide its operationalization and contextualization in the local community and at the national level. It also includes the strategic guidance and political assistance that is needed from the UN and international partners if the federal government is to implement the P/CVE strategy adopted in September 2016.

Somalia's National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism also comes under strand 4 which is intended to provide a long-term plan to defeat those who engage in acts of violence. It is based on understanding the drivers of violent extremism and the process of recruitment. It recognizes that Somalis have suffered greatly at the hands of violent extremists and that more effort is required to prevent more lives being lost. It also aims to develop the capacity of communities to be more resilient.

The core objectives of the strategy include strengthening research as a key pillar in countering extremism as well as communicating effectively. Research exposes the real push and pull factors, making it easier to come up with solutions that are targeted and specific. Research then informs strategic communications. The strategy recognizes the importance of influencers who can be used to change the perceptions of vulnerable people.

Intensive campaigns can build confidence in government institutions as they seek to counter extremists' narratives of violence and destruction. A successful campaign may require devising a campaign slogan in the Somali language. Social media are identified as an important platform that can be used to counter the activities of extremist groups.

The handling of disengaged combatants is also highlighted in the strategy. Combatants considered low risk will be reintegrated back into the community and their rights protected. The process will be handled within a human rights compliant context. Denying disengaged combatants their fundamental human rights encourages wider sympathy and support for violent extremism and disincentivizes combatants from moving away from violence.

The federal government has developed several P/CVE-specific and/or related policies and programs to address the existential threat affecting general society and other vulnerable groups and to foil the strategies employed by Al-Shabaab and ISIS to recruit new combatants. These P/CVE-specific and/or related policies and programs have played an important role in countering the influence and existence of Al-Shabaab while at the same time ensuring that the fundamental principles of human rights are upheld when treating defectors and those captured by the security apparatus as indicated in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Government P/CVE-specific and/or related policies and programs

Policy and legal, regulatory framework	P/CVE-specific or P/CVE-related programs	International/national partners	CSOs/target groups	Goal of interventions
National P/CVE strategy	• Adoption of P/CVE strategy and action plan	• FGS • United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) • Turkey • FMS	• Ex-combatants • Youths • Religious Leaders	• Countering, preventing and combating violent extremism and terrorism • Reduction of push and pull factors
National youth policy	• Security and peace • Promoting healthy lifestyles • Youth protection • Improving youth participation and programs • Justice and reintegration of radicalized youth	• • FGS • UNFPA • SWEDEN • Mercy USA • UNFAO • UNHABITAT	• Banadir Youth Organization • National women's organizations • FMS ministries of youth • Religious leaders • University student unions • Youth organizations	• Creation of alternative sources of employment • Inclusive youth programs • Coded online and offline counter messages • Provision of equitable justice •
National Development Plan	• National security architecture • Adoption of national security council •	• • FGS • FMS • NSA • NSC • UN • International development partners	• Countrywide • Women's organizations • Youth organizations • NGOS and INGOs	• Promotion of inclusive politics • Equal access to justice and rule of law
A national public awareness strategy	• Combating terrorism through youth participation • Fostering citizenship and patriotism to reduce destruction and violence	• FGS • UNSOM • FMS • AU • Diplomats	• Somali Women Journalist's Rights Association • Somali Youth Association • Somali women's groups • Religious leaders	• Promotion of patriotism and cohesion • Enhancing youth participation and involvement in combating terrorism through youth friendly/appealing strategies
National Rehabilitation Program	• Intensive rehabilitation and reintegration of Al-Shabaab defectors (vocational training and psychosocial support)	• MOIS • German government • IOM • UNSOM • AU • FMS line ministries	• Ex-combatants • CSOs • Youth	• Rehabilitation, reintegration, reinsertion and livelihood provision of ex-combatants
Somalia employment policy **Social protection policy** **Women's charter**	• Creation of national employment program for sustainable job opportunities for vulnerable populations such as youth and women	• FGS • ILO • UN	• Youth •	• Strengthening the private sector • Strengthening the labor market • Inclusive and non-discriminatory employment for all

3.2.4. Operationalization of the National Strategy and Action Plan for P/CVE

The UNDP tasked the Office of the Prime Minister with operationalizing the P/CVE strategy. This included coordinating between the national government and federal member states, civil society, women's group, families and youth leaders. There were also stakeholder consultations and research that was intended to inform the revision of the national P/CVE strategy and the development of a second phase project document. These efforts resulted in the following outcomes:

- Enhanced cooperation and coordination among the line ministries at both the federal and member state levels
- Mobilized civil society groups (particularly youth and women), educational institutions, the business community, religious institutions and think tanks
- Formative research conducted on drivers of violent extremism in Somalia for the internal use of the unit
- Experience and expertise sharing trips undertaken in countries in the region and beyond
- Effective strategic communications strategy prepared that is tailored to target audiences
- In-house training provided for staff at P/CVE coordination unit

3.2.5. National Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Coordination Unit

The government's readiness and capability to expand its P/CVE efforts down to the district and village levels captured from the insurgents comes at a time when the SNA and AMISOM are making considerable progress in liberating territory from Al-Shabaab dominance. In spite of the numerous challenges associated with the interventions, the considerable steps made by the federal government and other related state agencies won't go unmentioned. The government wants to engage and empower communities to identify and articulate drivers and root causes for radicalization, and to develop locally-owned solutions for the prevention and countering of violent extremism, supported by approachable, inclusive, responsive and accountable governance structures.

To help achieve this goal, the national coordination unit for preventing and countering violent extremism held a series of meetings with member states and federal government focal points on how to improve the P/CVE programs. Activities carried out by the coordination unit

included:

- National religious scholars' conference on their role in the process of peace building and reconciliation
- An international religious scholars' conference on P/CVE
- Police training on P/CVE in Galkayo
- Creation of a communication and outreach task force to enhance dissemination of P/CVE messages
- Public meetings to counter the negative impact and spread of violent extremism
- Video and radio awareness messages produced and disseminated
- Town hall meetings in nine districts of the Banadir Regional Administration

Conferences with religious leaders discussed the role scholars can play in diffusing messages from the insurgents through sermons on the effects of radicalization and extremism. Taking forward the recommendations from the conferences, the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Hirshabelle state, the national P/CVE focal point and the religious leaders of Jowhar town have developed a P/CVE curriculum to defy the misuse of religion by Al-Shabaab and other violent extremist groups through registration and standardization of religious schools and madrasas. Efforts need to be made towards establishing a multi-stakeholder/sectorial engagement involving local CSOs, international partners working in Somalia, local leaders and other partners to improve and adopt the curriculum so it can be used in other training and sensitization initiatives.

Elders' consultation meetings were organized in December 2019 in member state capitals on their role and engagement in P/CVE activities and peace and state building processes. These consultations were the preparatory phase for a national-level elders' consultation in Mogadishu, which brought together 360 elders from around the member states. This was a step in the right direction towards instilling community ownership for interventions towards the prevention and countering violent extremism. Communities have been increasingly receptive to programs and activities aimed at improving peace and security in the country. The ease and confidence in providing information by local communities, victims and defectors to the relevant security arms immensely impacted on the intelligence reports essential in combatting the Al-Shabaab militia.

P/CVE public platforms were organized in 10 districts, including areas that had been exposed to Al-Shabaab influence and ideological indoctrination for years. The platforms were meant to expand efforts in places most affected by violent extremism, to proactively engage, enlighten and empower communities to identify and articulate the drivers and root causes for violent extremism and radicalization.

Training for police officers from Galkayo in Puntland focused on introducing the officers to the national P/CVE strategy, highlighting key strategic priorities and federal and state-level mechanisms for coordination and monitoring. The coordination unit is also planning to conduct research on how to address the challenges of violent extremism in the member states while measuring the impact of the targeted programming intervention on the degree of violent extremism, both in terms of actions and attitudes. This research will start in Jowhar, Bal'ad, Daynile, Baidoa, Adado and Galkayo this year. This will be followed by a documentary film on the challenges and positive impacts of the interventions.

To foster coordination between different ministries and committees, a P/CVE communication strategy was developed to improve communication across all government institutions including the member states. All the P/CVE task force members are tasked with developing their own institutional narratives to support the development of the Somali tolerance and dialogue, strategic narrative (that is, zero tolerance to violent extremism) and to connect with local and international partners in developing it. The Office of the Prime Minister P/CVE Coordination Unit plays the central management role in coordinating the task force. It reports regularly to the social and justice task force constituted by relevant line ministries and steered by the office of the Prime Minister on the progress of the strategy and provides recommendations for policy decisions. The policy decisions will enhance the performance of the national action plan on PCVE premised on the belief in tolerance and dialogue.

3.2.6. P/CVE Coordination Structures
National P/CVE coordination structures are under the office of the prime minister indicated in Figure 4 below. National and state, focal points collaborate and coordinate with line ministries and other stakeholders. State members' coordination is done at the regional level following the guidelines of the policies and programs developed by the national security committee.

Figure 4: National P/CVE coordination structures

Table 3: P/CVE-related Programs for Youth and Women by INGOs and NGOs

S/N	NGO	Sector	Projects	Expected outcomes
1	Saferworld	Peace, democratization and good governance	Thinking beyond countering violent extremism in Somalia	Mindset change on the approaches of counter terrorism strategies in Somalia
2	DRC	Protection, WASH	Mine action and armed violence reduction (AVR) programs	Create a safe environment free from armed violence and the remnants of conflict
3	Mine Advisory Group	Security	Arms management and destruction (AMD)	Build capacity to address the remnants of war and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Somalia
4	Save the Children	Child protection, education	Alternative basic education	Alternative education for young adults
5	Somaliland Association for Youth Salvation (YAYS)	Youth empowerment, protection	Safety net programs (the Social Protection Project)	Shock responsive services to poor and vulnerable families
6	Somaliland youth and voluntary organization	Youth empowerment	Talent shows, Girls education project	Provide platforms for youth to showcase talents
7	Concern Worldwide	Resilience	Building resilient communities in Somalia	Help to create disaster resilient communities
8	Integrated Development Focus (IDF)	Peace and governance	Peace and governance programs	Encourage sustainable peace building and conflict mitigation measures
9	International Organization for Peace building (Interpeace)	Leadership and governance Peace building	Talo Wadaag (Social Contract)	Advancement of peace building processes across the Somali region
10	Lifeline-Gedo	Strengthening communities	Cash for work	Job opportunities for youth and women to provide alternative sources of income
11	Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)	Economic empowerment	Vocational skills	Provide training to youth to curb terrorism

	NGO	Sector	Projects	Expected outcomes
12	ADRA	Education	Strengthening access to and quality of education (SEAQE Project 2014-2018)	Increased enrolment in children (including with disabilities) in supported schools
13	Adeso	Education (technical skills)	A Brighter Future for the Young Men of Badhan, Somalia	Enhancing youth self-employment by teaching technical skills
14	Chemonics International (CI)	Peace and stability	Support to Four Assemblies (SFSA)	Strengthened government capacity and promoting a peaceful and stable Somalia
15	ActionAid	Food security	Drought needs assessment in Somaliland	Improvement of food security and stabilizing livelihoods
16	African Education Trust	Education	Mother and girl-friendly spaces	Create friendly spaces for mothers in Puntland and Somaliland
17	ACTED	Emergencies	Responding to Emergencies and Building Disaster Resilience	Building a disaster resilient communities
18	ADO	Resilience	Community resilience in Somaliland and Puntland (CRISP)	Building resilient communities
19	Catholic Relief Service (CRS)	Gender-based violence	Helping Survivors Heal in Somalia	Reduction of stigma associated with gender-based violence
20	CESVI	Mother and child-care	Access to adequate medical and obstetrical care.	Guaranteed access to medical care for mothers
21	Comitato Internationale per lo Sviluppo dei Popoli (CISP)	Education	Capacity building and development of Somali civil society organizations	Strengthened capacities of local organizations to enhance durable solutions
22	Concern	Resilience	Building resilience in communities	Building resilience by tackling food crises and increased food production in rural areas
23	Cooperation Internationale (COOPI)	Water, health, food security, nutrition security	Cash-based assistance to disaster-affected Somali households	Improved access to food, water and health
24	GIZ	Health	Maternal and child health	Improved maternal health care and advisory services for pregnant women, newborns and young children Training of young adults as obstetricians, nutritionists and midwives
25	Development Action Network	Sanitation, food security	Food and Wash Integrated Project	Heightened awareness of food security and water storage mechanisms
26	Diakonia	Women's empowerment, Social justice	Puntland Legal Aid Clinic (PLAC) Lobbying for legislations to prohibit FGM	Put in place legislation and policies to end and prohibit FGM

26	CEFA	Agriculture and food security	Food Security and Sustainability in Fragile Situations (FSSFS)	Expanded production of sesame and improved beekeeping practices
27	Ganaane Organization	Education, health, nutrition, livelihoods	El-Adde Education Project Jubba Technical Project	Increased educational opportunities for post-secondary education in Jubba
28	Handicap International	Empowerment	Inclusion project	Improved political participation for people with disabilities, especially women and children
29	Humanitarian Initiative Just Relief Aid (HIJRA)	Healthcare, WASH	Health facilities and access to safe water	Access to water, hygiene and sanitation in rural areas
30	International Rescue Committee	Education, empowerment, safety, economic wellbeing	Gender-based violence project	Empowering young girls and women
31	Islamic Relief	Education	Projects to build new schools	Construction of a new school in Bal'ad
32	Kaalo	Protection	Protection Project for Refugees and Asylum Seekers	Protection of the rights of refugees and asylum seekers
33	Mercy Corps	Education	Education in emergences	Increasing education, economic and civic participation opportunities for youth to reduce instability
34	Muslim Aid	Food security	Saka Distribution	Distribute relief food to drought-stricken families
35	Network Against FGM/C in Somaliland (NAFIS)	Protection	FGM	Advocates against FGM in Somaliland
36	New Ways Organization	Education, Health	TVET	Technical skills trainings for youth
37	NRC	Resilience	Building Resilient Communities in Somalia	Improving the resilient levels of communities
38	One Earth Future Foundation (OEF)	Economic empowerment	Helping Somali fishers Encouraging small business	Promote best practices in fisheries management and enhanced monitoring and control
39	Oxfam	Humanitarian assistance	Water tracking in remote communities	Strengthen communities' recovery capacities against the impacts of limited access to safe water

40	**Physicians for Social Responsibility Finland (PSR Finland)**	Safe livelihoods, equality and peace	Tuberculosis program Social Responsibility in Healthcare	Treatment of tuberculosis patients in Mogadishu
41	**Plan International, Inc (PII)**	Child protection, education and youth economic empowerment	Child protection	Increased opportunities for youth through education
42	**Polish Humanitarian Action (PAH)**	Livelihood	Safe drinking water through drilling and rehabilitating existing boreholes	Construction and rehabilitation of existing boreholes and water sources
43	**Population Service International**	Health care	SAHAN Demand Creation for Health Services program	Create a health services program
44	**Qatar Charity**	Housing the poor, water, income generation	Emergency WASH project	Increase WASH awareness in Beledweyne
45	**Qatar Red Crescent Society (QRCS)**	Public health awareness, medical services, local development	Multi-sectoral emergency intervention program	Provision of food assistance, establishment of medical camps for eye surgeries, provision of services for the support and operation of the Anti-Tuberculosis Centre
46	**Relief International**	Education, health	Educate girls End Poverty	Break the cycle of poverty through education of girls
47	**Rural Education and Agricultural Development Organization (READO)**	Food security	Good Agricultural Practice for IDPs	Promoting modernized agricultural practices for internally displaced persons
48	**Samofal Development Organization (SDO)**	Protection	Capacity building trainings for other local organizations, particularly women's organizations, at no cost	Training of women's CSOs
49	**Social Research & Development Institute**	Research	Developing platforms for dialogue	Improve dialogue for better political participation
50	**Solidarity Youth Voluntary Organization**	Women's education	Empowering through continued training	Empowering women through civic education
51	**Somali Women's Study Centre**	Protection	Violence against women and girls in emergencies.	Protect women and girls against violence by raising awareness in emergency settings

51	**Somali Children's Welfare and Rights Watch**	Education	Vocational skills	Vocational skills trainings for youth
52	**Somali Socioeconomic Development Organization**	Empowerment	Economic empowerment of youth and women.	Economic empowerment of households headed by women in rural areas
53	**Somaliland Skills Training Association (SOSTA)**	Vocational skills	Building furniture, electrical skills	Technical and vocational training of youth in Somaliland
54	**SOS Children's Villages International**	Healthcare	Mother and child health	Improvement of pre and post maternal health for mother and child
55	**FAO**	Fisheries	Fisheries Sector Support Program in Somalia	Enhance Somalia's capacity to contribute to preventing illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing through policy support, capacity building and joining international commissions The enhanced local capacity to build safe, efficient boats according to international standards and improving the availability of such vessels in Somalia Promote fish consumption and demand through the development of, and training in, a low-cost way of processing a dried fish product of high nutritional value which has the potential for income generation
56	**Sustainable Developments & Peace Building Initiatives**	Peace building, development, humanitarian work	Capacity building on agronomical skills	Training framers in Beledweyne on the best agronomic practices
57	**Tadamun Social Society (TAS)**	Education, Protection	Somali Humanitarian Fund Integrated Education	Expanding access to education in emergencies and facilitating civic protection services
58	**SOS Children's Villages International**	Healthcare	Mother and child health	Protection of children in emergencies
59	**Candlelight**	Education	Somali Girls Education Promotion Program (SOMGEP)	Construction and rehabilitation of schools, training of teachers, vocational trainings and pastoral education
60	**FAO**	Food security	Resilient, Inclusive and Competitive Agriculture Value Chain Development in Southern and Central Regions of Somalia	Strengthened Somali food, nutrition and livelihood security at the household and community level; thereby ensuring greater resilience to shocks such as those caused by conflict, drought, flood, disease or economic crisis.

Table 4: Youth-Specific Programs

Project title	Organization/ partner/donor	Scope/objective	Project date	Impact
Youth participation in parliaments and peace and security	Inter-Parliamentary Union	Increase youth participation in political decision-making processes	27/06/2018	Increased youth participation in parliament helps to build more peaceful and stable societies
Critical Choices: Assessing the Effects of Education and Civic Engagement on Somali Youths' Propensity Towards Violence	Mercy Corps	Put political will and investment in youth education and civic society pillars of the Somalia National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

Ensure that youth education programs with violence reduction goals work to simultaneously improve access to school | 30/11/2016 | Increased access to formal education and civic engagement opportunities for youth participation in, and support for, reduction of violence

The program improved access and quality of education of youth.

The program also created a community-engagement opportunities through student clubs and youth-led community-improvement initiatives |
Youth as Agents of Peace: Somalia	World Bank	Engage with young people and their communities against a backdrop of continued conflict, insecurity and violent extremism	12/03/2019	Increased engagement of youth in addressing unemployment, insecurity ad violent extremism
Somali youth in peace efforts	UNSOM	Strengthen the UN's engagement with young Somalis and their involvement in political processes and peace building initiatives	15/09/2019	Discussions of a quota for youth representation in parliament as a way of including young people in the country's decision-making processes
Youth Skills Employment Program	Youth Volunteers for Development and Environment Conservation	Prevent piracy through vocational training for youth at risk in Berbera	2015	Successful training of 60 youth in steel fixing and fish vending and cooling systems
Peace and Culture Project	Somaliland Youth Development and Voluntary Organization	Creating links between cultural heritage and job opportunities for peace and cohesion in the Togdheer region	2018-2020	Contributed to the protection and promotion of Somaliland culture in Togdheer

Fostered initiatives aimed at creating jobs for youth and vulnerable groups in the Togdheer region and Burao |

National Employment Policy for Somali Youth	ILO, UNDP, FGS, Banadir Administration	Open up opportunities for youth, women and vulnerable groups to access decent employment opportunities. Creation of national employment policy	27/02/2019	Strengthened private sector and promoted micro, small and medium-sized enterprises Supported productive economic sectors for job creation Strengthened labor market governance
Socioeconomic Reintegration of Ex-Combatants and At-Risk Youth in Somalia (SRECYAR) Project	AFDB	Rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants and youth at risk	17/01/2020	Expanded opportunities for youth employment through job creation and skills development Supported training of staff in selected ministries at the federal and regional levels Developed key policy and strategic documents to improve technical capacity in the government for youth empowerment programming

Table 5: Research and Analyses on Al-Shabaab's Violent Extremism, Radicalization and Terrorism in Somalia

S/N	Project title	Scope/objective	Project date	Key findings
1	Al-Shabaab and the Exploitation of the Subject Network Model	Conceptual framework of various network models taken on by terrorist organizations

The ruling clan effect that has governed Somali communities in both pre- and post-colonial times will also be addressed

Consider the postcolonial state of Somalia as it has struggled for a national identity taking into consideration several colonial resistance movements and feuding warlords | 2010 | Recruiting of Westerners to carry out Al-Shabaab operations will continue as long as Somali identity is tied to resistance against Western governments

Al-Shabaab monetary support will continue uninhibited as long as black markets and piracy operate free of internal or external policing |
2	Creating space for fresh approaches to peace building	The report aimed at applying peacebuilding theories to a real context of encouraging creative thinking on policy options for Somalia by engaging a group of researchers with a solid background in peace and conflict studies	2011	Policy options discussed by decision makers inside and outside Somalia are based primarily on global and regional security concerns and tend to overlook the local complexities and the potential for nonviolent conflict transformation that exist in the context. In particular, the blacklisting of Al-Shabaab prevents one of the main stakeholders from participating in the mainstream political process and discourages interest in dialogue from all sides
3	Alternatives for Conflict Transformation in Somalia: A snapshot and analysis of key political actors' views and strategies	The study mapped out relevant actors, political, social and religious, to explore their roles, views and strategies in the prevention and countering of violent extremism in Somalia	2014	Somalia – particularly south-central Somalia – is much more diverse politically than the binary terrorism–counterterrorism categorization suggests. Even though almost all Somali political actors profess allegiance to Islamic values and intend to enforce Sharia, the faith-based Islamist movements themselves display a wide range of ideologies, opposing political objectives and divergent plans to achieve those objectives
4	Terrorism in Africa: a manifestation of new wars	A study into Africa's most prominent terrorist groups – Nigeria's Boko Haram and Somalia's Al-Shabaab	2019	Due to the complexity and lethality of terrorism in Africa, there is a need to reconsider new strategies for conflict resolution, such as human security-based approaches, which are prerequisites for effective counterterrorism measures
5	An assessment of the socioeconomic impacts of terrorism in East Africa: the case of Al-Shabaab in Kenya	This study examines specific acts of terror that have been experienced in Kenya.

Focus on Al-Shabaab as a terror group and their motives in East Africa | 2013 | The entry of the KDF into Somalia has resulted in an increase in attacks by Al-Shabaab in Kenya |

6	Contemporary US Counterterrorism Strategy Towards Somalia	The objective of this dissertation is to determine the nature of contemporary counterterrorism strategy undertaken by the United States toward Somalia and to understand how it has been determined and sustained over time	2018	The combined counterterrorism strategy is especially broad, which enables the US to prioritize a light military footprint without becoming heavily involved. The malleable nature of this strategy allows the United States to shift resources and tactics with relative ease
7	Somali Thesis: Al-Shabaab	What do the Al-Shabaab movement believe in?	2014	Al-Shabaab considers that force should be used to eradicate Westerners from their communities Al-Shabaab is against Western culture and wants sovereignty of their own land
8	Understanding Drivers of Violent Extremism: The Case of Al-Shabaab and Somali Youth	The push and pull factors of youth radicalization in Somalia	2012	There's a need to develop programs centered on bolstering the personal identities of vulnerable youth while also addressing the relevant push and pull factors driving them into militancy
9	Global Jihadism in Somalia. Analyzing Al-Shabaab Legitimization Discourse	The research is concerned with how the group is legitimizing its cause in Somalia	2015	The proponents of global jihadism call for a polarized world, and for endless conflict and bloodshed with all those who do not support their view. This ideology is a challenge to world peace and stability, and no efforts should be spared to counter it
10	The impact of foreign elements over Somalia's Al-Shabaab	Explores many of the ways in which foreign elements have impacted on Al-Shabaab's behavior	2015	Foreigners have provided Al-Shabaab, with quality fighters and trainers and have effectively enabled it to outmaneuver its adversaries and establish a position of dominance within Somalia
11	Manipulating State Failure: Al-Shabaab Consolidated Power in Somalia	To study the capabilities of terrorist organizations in the context of state failure in Somalia	2015	The adoption of asymmetric tactics explicitly targeting foreign non-Muslim civilians have become standard fare for their operations outside of Somalia
12	Financing Al-Shabaab: the vital port of Kismayo	How Al-Shabaab raises money in Kismayo and its environs	2011	Al-Shabaab uses extortion and taxations on the port and businesses and gains access to vital information in the port.
13	Somalia's Al-Shabaab Down but Far from Out	To access the impact of US airstrikes on Al-Shabaab in Somalia.	2016	Airstrikes have taken down a few notable jihadists, but civilian casualties have angered the population
14	Women and Al-Shabaab's Insurgency	The role of women in Al-Shabaab	2019	Women form an important social base for the Islamist Al-Shabaab insurgency in Somalia. Some help it recruit, generate funds and carry out operations

14	Addressing Violent Extremism with a Different Approach: The Empirical Case of At-Risk and Vulnerable Youth in Somalia	Examining a non-traditional reintegration initiative conducted in Somalia between 2011 and 2015 which included elements of preventing and countering violent extremism	2017	Political rehabilitation is at the core of successful integration efforts in Somalia and there is a need to end social stigma
15	Effect of foreign military intervention and controlled territory on the operational tempo of Al-Shabaab attacks	Analyze the effects of foreign military intervention and the ability of the group to control territory on the operational tempo of Al-Shabaab's terrorist campaigns	2017	There is a need to employ multivariate models of intervention to weaken Al-Shabaab
16	After Westgate: opportunities and challenges in the war against Al-Shabaab	Challenges and opportunities in the war against Al-Shabaab	2014	Al-Shabaab's forced reinvention has seen it enter the beginning of its political end game. Power is now consolidated in its extremist fringe and its continued terror tactics are unlikely to win it more supporters within Somalia
17	Have Al Shabaab Activities Decreased?	A look at Al-Shabaab activities in Somalia	March 2020	During the past decade suicide attacks increased yearly, but started to decrease in the last three years. The ratio of combatant to civilian is 60:40 US airstrikes, SNA improvement and restructuring, the increased defence budget and the opening of a military academy lead to the decrease in Al-Shabaab attacks
18	Brothers in Arms: The Phenomenon of Complex Suicide Attacks	A study into complex attacks in Somalia	December 2019	The findings reveal that complex suicide attacks reduce civilian casualties compared to simple suicide attacks. This is contrary to the group's intent and official guidelines to target foreign entities

The findings illustrate that domestic targets bear the brunt of most complex suicide attacks |

| 19 | Building peace from the margins in Somalia: the case For political settlement with Al-Shabaab | Political settlement with Al-Shabaab | February 2018 | Many local Somalis consider that building peace from the bottom in Somalia is as important as the need for regional and global peace

Al-Shabaab remains a real albatross around the neck of East African countries and has eluded any internal and external attempts aimed at defeating it once and for all

This article challenged the mainstream security analysis that security is fundamentally tied to the state, but the empirical evidence suggested a reflective re-conceptualization of what security or insecurity means for ordinary Somalis under Al-Shabaab-controlled areas

There is no group in southern Somalia, which can supersede, or is even at par with, Al-Shabaab in terms of utilizing public grievances to achieve domestic legitimacy |
| 20 | From Al-Itihaad to Al-Shabaab: how the Ethiopian intervention and the war on terror exacerbated the conflict in Somalia | The role of Ethiopia in exacerbating the war in Somalia | 2018 | Two factors are working against the re-constitution of a unified central Somali state. First, the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia retained the old Ethiopian regime policies of supporting the fragmentation of the Somali state. Second, the active interference of Ethiopia in the Somali conflict helps explain why Somalis cannot reconcile themselves to achieve a lasting peace for their country.

Over the long term, the current regime in Ethiopia will only allow either a flimsy or a fragile 'federal' government for Somalia, preferably plunging itself into no peace, no war situation. Both Somalis and non-Somalis agree on this point.

The constitutional declaration that only two regions could form a federal state in Somalia has created a trap that puts every emerging mini-state in Somalia under Ethiopian influence as each one had a border with Ethiopia. |

21	From Pre-Colonial Past to the Post-Colonial Present: The contemporary Clan-Based Configurations of State building in Somalia.	The configurations of state building in Somalia	2018	Since the early 1990s, state formation projects in southern Somalia have been engineered by either Ethiopia or the international community. The international community and neighboring Ethiopia have had a strong hand in reshaping the structure of the Somali state, while the African Union Forces (AMISOM) stationed in southern Somalia are nurturing the government in Mogadishu with a life-support machine. However, the main challenge to the contemporary clan-based state structures, springs from the Al-Shabaab militant movement, which seeks to impose a rule, not necessarily on Somalis, but on all Muslims in Somalia based on a strict interpretation of Islamic Sharia.
22	Thinking beyond 'countering violent extremism' in Somalia: local views on an international 'project'	Is countering violent extremism helping Somalia?	2016	Somalia's National Action Plan on CVE does not mention the impact of authorities or security forces, or common grievances among Somalis about civilian casualties and corruption
23	Preventing violent extremism in East Africa: Lessons from Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania and Uganda	The approach used by organizations in tackling P/CVE	2019	Youth was the primary group in most of the P/CVE projects discussed in the study and perceived to be the group most likely to affect change if given the right opportunities P/CVE actors are applying informal evaluation methods based on local realities.
24	They are from within us: CVE brokerage in South-central Somalia	To explore the impact societal actors in Somalia on transnational politics of countering/preventing violent extremism through a political sociological approach to militarization	2019	Somali NGOs have gained a newfound social status through their access to transnational networks of funding and influence. This access provides benefits such as vocational training, grants and contracts and networks with global organizations. However, their participation in a form of counterinsurgency against their communities is transforming and potentially delegitimizing the sources of their social power.

3.3. Common Perceptions on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Somalia

The duration and process of radicalisation differ from person to person and region to region. Although it is commonly accepted that the process occurs gradually over a period of time, conscious decisions to join a terrorist organization or use violence for political ends are not made suddenly but are a gradual process that includes a multitude of occurrences, experiences, perceptions and players. When interviewed, the respondents cited anger as one of the most common attributing factors associated with violent extremism and terrorism, emanating from real and perceived historical injustices, widespread corruption and nepotism in government agencies, marginalization and victimization/killing of innocent souls in the fight against terrorism.

Counterterrorism efforts have produced rising unease within Somalia, especially in the south where foreign troops are seen as invaders and occupiers. The use of missiles and air strikes as a strategy to curb terrorism has caused civilian casualties over the decade, increasing the magnitude of hatred for foreign troops and killing the hopes of many. Some respondents noted that the presence of AMISOM and the US Air Force acted as a motivating factor to join Al-Shabaab. The general public view on these strategies of fighting terror is that they are empty and don't yield fruits. The programs run within the strategy are not holistic and often experience gaps in funding or stop running, as seen in the rehabilitation program for ex-combatants who have been released back to the society without proper counselling and face discrimination and society rejection due to lack of awareness within the community.

The respondents emphasized the need to focus on communities directly affected or on actors engaged in curbing violent extremism. Likewise, Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration interventions and programs in Somalia are still considered by the respondents to be small scale, with a center already closed in Kismayo due to limited funds and a focus exclusively on ex-combatants and Al-Shabaab defectors and less on the armed clan militias or irregular groups.

The respondents revealed that the P/CVE programs are also limited by the lack of operational effectiveness, sustainability, transparency and accountability. P/CVE programs and Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration programs are mostly donor funded and

often experience financial gaps, limiting the effectiveness of the interventions. These interventions should be integrated within P/CVE strategies and policies for more effectiveness and sustainability. This would also shift and ease budget strains.

Many policy actors and CSOs working in Somalia alluded to the fact that strategies countering violent extremism should be informed by a better understanding of why people join terrorist organizations; this should be based on empirical evidence and not guesswork or analysis of completely different organizations in other countries or regions. Those interviewed showed pessimism on the government led strategies for preventing and countering violent extremism.

3.4. Practical Drivers and Challenges to PCVE Interventions

Measuring the end impacts of interventions to combat the emergence of violent extremism and terrorism is important as it gives a refined understanding of the approaches, applications and strategies as well as their ramifications and limitations. It also provides a better understanding of the actual drivers of violent extremism in a specific geographical setting. Designing counter terrorism monitoring and evaluation tools and effective curbing measures require stakeholders to learn from the impacts and the success rate of similar interventions.

Owing to the sensitivity and security issues surrounding the subject matter, the country lacks the framework to monitor and track progress, casualties and victims to violent extremism. This makes it difficult to measure the effectiveness of some of the multisectoral interventions and strategies. For instance, military action and air strikes haven't deterred the group from committing atrocities such as assassinations, roadside bombs, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks. The respondents noted that it is therefore time to look back at the strategies both institutionally and technically to evaluate the lessons, gaps and shortcomings of the interventions. Many respondents see the involvement of foreign states in the fight against Al Shabaab as political interference and fostering their agendas within Somalia, which pushes many of the youth to join Al-Shabaab and ISIS.

The respondents noted the limited capacity of the national P/CVE coordination unit to ascertain the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of these projects which is among the many gaps in the policies and programs implemented by the national preventing and countering violent extremism coordination unit. The respondents revealed that the measuring tools for the impact of the unit's projects are not available and therefore gauging their sustainability and consistency is a problem.

The respondents noted that the federal government's policies in preventing and countering violent extremism are not organized and the inclusion of the federal member states is very minimal and skin deep. The research participants from the member states said that the P/CVE policies are made at the national level with little involvement of communities affected by violent extremism and stakeholders such as women and youth-led organizations. This was substantiated by security experts who noted that the process of policy making is mostly performed without a clear plan on how they can be implemented. The security personnel who participated in the mapping study revealed that the complexity of these policies also makes them difficult to implement and affects their efficiency. They also often overlap with activities being carried out by international partners who mostly keep re-applying ineffective strategies.

Programs and projects initiated by the federal government and its partners in the fight against violent extremism have fallen short of addressing the root causes, push and pull factors and engaging the most vulnerable. The programs have failed to alter their approach, despite the lack of tangible results. The absence of needs assessments during the initial planning stage made the policies that underpin the programs vague and their implementation incoherent. The national preventing and countering violent extremism coordination unit lacks continued and consistent programs due to its dependence on donor funds.

Youth employment schemes were agreed between the federal government and the United Nations to expand and foster employment opportunities for young men and women with the aim of reducing the number of people who join militias. The scheme was based on enterprise creation and vocational trainings and rehabilitation of infrastructure through labor-intensive employment methods. Temporary and inconsistent youth employment projects have been used by most organizations as a means of curbing violent extremism, but their economic impact is dismal and youth may opt for permanent incentives for radical groups. The sustainability and efficiency of most interventions is also in question as most organizations are reliant on the availability of donor funds, thereby derailing the timely interventions of the programs.

Interventions by international organizations have limited scope for several reasons: they are limited to big cities due to budget constraints or operate in limited areas due to insecurity. They therefore have difficulties reaching the grassroots where radical views are incubated. Differences in strategies and procedures between different implementers have also contributed to the limited impact of the projects and have created dependence on donor projects by some beneficiaries. Sharing reasons for project failures is not done by organizations publicly so as to gauge their effectiveness and reduce the chances of future projects failing for the same reasons. Donors also fund the same projects for different organizations, bringing duplication and concentration of services in a sector or project area.

P/CVE community resilience programs implemented by local organizations focus on the south-central part of Somalia with sporadic interventions in the north, which limits the reach of their counter terrorism strategies and policies.

The territories captured from the insurgents are not held for long by government forces, forcing communities to comply with insurgents' taxations and other rules to avoid reprisals. Al-Shabaab also holds strong control over areas from which it fled after defeats in battle because communities fear the withdrawal or limited presence of government forces will jeopardize their safety, making the process of fighting radicalization and extremism more complex.

The P/CVE interventions do not seek to address the individual and group dynamics that force people to join Al-Shabaab and carry out violent activities. The policies should address the influence of clan or families and radical religious scholars, as well as behaviors and attitudes that lead to self-radicalization or being radicalized.

In addition, such policies must continue, strategically offer support and solutions to the gaps in governance frameworks to ensure that strategies developed are effectively executed for the betterment of the larger majority. Community-driven development is an important aspect of countering violent extremist narratives in Somalia. USAID's Transition Initiatives for Stabilization activity increases Somalia's stability through participatory processes that promote good governance and community cohesion. Tangible stabilization and development outcomes achieved through this approach improve government service delivery and demonstrate good governance processes, thereby improving citizen confidence in government and reducing the appeal of violent extremism. There is a need to re-strategies, apply new approaches and gauge the impact of these interventions to measure their relevance and effectiveness.

Educational initiatives that seek to increase individual capacities and divert young people from armed groups are not maintained, lack the resources to sustain them and are focused on children's education rather than vocational and technical trainings. The absence of government-provided, free education and a universal educational curriculum is also a deterrent to many youths going to school. This creates idle human labor that can be swayed with incentives, making them vulnerable to extremist groups. Educational programs are particularly limited in areas controlled by the insurgents, leaving many young people vulnerable to the radical madrasas controlled by insurgents.

There is a gap in communicating P/CVE programs for the affected or vulnerable communities due to the limited involvement of established Somali scholars who could increase the reach of anti-radicalization messages. Radio programs on P/CVE are not available in Al-Shabaab-held areas. Increasing these programs, sharing them on social media platforms and widening their reach will broaden the fight against violent extremism and raise awareness, especially among the youth.

Health projects by national and international organizations have paid off as they have decreased the dependence on Al-Shabaab and the facilities in their territories. Established health centers improve the legitimacy of the federal government and build trust among the public, promoting stability and preventing future conflicts. Projects implemented have improved

the lives of many, especially during catastrophes and increased the rate of referrals from Al-Shabaab strongholds. This is an important step towards prosperity and attaining a peaceful society. Although much focus has been placed on mother and child hospitals, there is also a need to increase interventions in other health sectors, especially in mental health services for young people. There is a commendable increase in mental health interventions in cities and this has decreased recruitment to insurgents.

Large-scale interventions in food security have greatly improved life in rural areas and created self-reliant agro pastoralists and farmers. For instance, the UN's World Food Program (WFP) and the Food and Agriculture organization (FOA) have in the past provided agricultural inputs, tools, technical expertise and markets to support Somali farmers. Although similar projects have been repeatedly implemented in riverine areas, support has also reached non-riverine farmers in many parts of the country. There are also reduced food consumption gaps and stabilized food prices, but communities still have little resilience to famine and other catastrophes.

As food insecurity is identified as one of the principal drivers of radicalization in Somalia, particularly in south-central regions, there is a need for durable and consistent interventions aimed at alleviating the burden of food scarcity on communities. With the majority of the population being pastoralists, there is need for emphasis on interventions geared towards improved livestock production to lessen the impact of food insecurity. This, therefore, calls for more demand driven interventions in this sector. Inadequate access to water in rural areas has forced pastoralists to move around the country, passing into territory controlled by insurgents. This has led to the imparting of radical views on pastoral children and youth. In the camps and conflict affected areas, access to water is imperiled, jeopardizing the health and safety of the occupants, with some going back to the conflict areas due to poor access to water.

Al-Shabaab's relationship with NGOs and other humanitarian organizations has always been antagonistic and seen with suspicion from both ends. Al-Shabaab largely characterizes humanitarian organizations as spies or agents of foreign intervention, but equally seeks to exploit their presence for material gain.

Securing and sustaining access to Al-Shabaab-controlled areas have always been a delicate balancing act and equally challenging for the numerous humanitarian organizations. Al-Shabaab's antagonism toward humanitarians has been displayed in its banning of organizations, demands for payments, looting of humanitarian goods and the kidnapping and killing of aid workers. This has affected service delivery, depriving already marginalized people of essential food, health and social development aid. Floods, locust invasion and drought are continuing to increase the vulnerability of citizens to extremist groups. Fisheries sector interventions have drawn in young people and improved the efficiency of fishermen and their tools which in turn reduced unemployment and vulnerability to radical groups. Livelihood programs have focused on improving daily living conditions, including short-term distribution of cash and food vouchers. In some areas, organizations have also constructed access roads, markets and other important utilities to improve living standards.

Community-based interventions have also done their fair share in the fight against terror. Middle class families have created jobs for their sons and daughters by starting small businesses and buying taxis and motorcycles.

4.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1. Conclusion

From the study process the following conclusions were drawn:

- Since 2011, the Somali government and its partners have engaged the insurgents and liberated territories from them. The government also initiated policies and programs to prevent and counter violent extremism and radicalization.
- Understanding the impact of strategies to address the challenges of combatting violent extremism requires an understanding of the suitability of the approaches, the geographical aspects, the multiplicity of push and pull factors, the underlying drivers, as well as reduce the unintended negative impacts associated with the programs. This will help in better understanding the complex situation.
- Government policies are too general, while institutions dealing with preventing violent extremism lack the technical and institutional capacity to carry out their mandates. There is a gap in the strategic implementation of planned strategies resulting from an incoherent framework and incapacities within the line institutions and agencies.
- There is an absence of tools to monitor and evaluate the interventions being made to fight violent extremism. Critical evaluation of projects and programs across all institutions and organizations involved will breed more insights into what works and what doesn't. Better collaboration between stakeholders is essential for this to succeed.

- Al-Shabaab is far from being defeated. The group uses effective religious rhetoric and misinterpretations, as well as social and political narratives and ideologies to attract recruits. Al-Shabaab troops are bolstered by foreign fighters from around the world. The group relies on bombings, suicide bombings, propaganda and assassinations.

4.2. Recommendations

From the study process and the literature reviewed the following recommendations are drawn:

Policy Based

- National P/CVE policies should be inclusive with youth involved as decision makers rather than beneficiaries in all related policies. Broadening policies to encompass different sectors of society will widen the scope of the projects and make them more successful.
- The division of responsibilities between the federal member states and the federal government in addressing P/CVE should be clear in all policies to ensure clear roles and active participation.
- Taking an evidence-based approach to policy makes effective use of resources, the best guidance available and effective implementation strategies. This will help enrich the policies, identify gaps and contribute to effective program design and improvement.
- The government should include funds for P/CVE programs in the national budget instead of relying on donor funding. This will reduce gaps in the running of program activities.
- Creating a national resilience committee would foster collaboration and coordination between the multiple stakeholders in the sector. An independent monitoring and evaluating team to assess the impact of projects would enhance their viability.

Research Based

- Research institutes and centers should make research available in different languages, especially Somali, to improve the national reach of their reports.
- Taking an evidence-based approach to policy makes effective use of resources, best guidance available and effective implementation strategies. This will help enrich the policies, identify gaps and contribute to effective program design and improvement
- Improving access to research and knowledge resources would also impact on the diverse development and peace objectives of the multilateral sectors.

Community Based

- Involving religious scholars in weekly online and media outputs on the radio will help to refute the false narratives of extremism and will reduce the spread of radical views among youth. Creating anonymous radio programs for communities to speak out against violent extremism will increase the reach of anti-radicalization messages and reduce terrorist reprisals.
- Establishing a resource center and a hub to allow public access to research projects would improve the reach of information and heighten public awareness.
- Support VE rehabilitation and community-based reintegration programs guided by tailor-made risk and needs assessments. Ideology is sometimes a cover for other, deeper motivations that need to be addressed.

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ABOUT

SOMALI INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS (SIDRA)

SIDRA is a registered non-governmental, not-for-profit institution for research and analysis, policy support, development projects planning and implementation based in Somalia.

SIDRA provides quality research and development services to the public and private entities in Somalia. It offers technical innovative solutions to key development issues facing Somalia through knowledge-based dialogue, research, independent analysis, insight and expertise in development projects from needs assessment, planning, design and implementation to output monitoring and impact evaluation in three thematic areas of: Good Governance and Rule of Law, Gender and Women's Empowerment and Socio-economic Development.

VISION

To be a leading development research and policy support think tank and development project management and consultancy that advocates for and empowers Somali people, government institutions, civil society organizations and the private sector to build an inclusive, sustainable and prosperous Somalia.

MISSION

Our mission is to generate knowledge, influential ideas and solutions to contribute to the attainment of the sustainable development goals especially poverty reduction, peace and state building and social and economic transformation of Somalia through dialogue, research, civic engagement and evidence-based development programme design and implementation.

ADDRESS

Office: Garowe, Puntland State of Somalia
Telephone: +252 5 846 044
Website: www.sidrainstitute.org
Email: info@sidrainstitute.org
Facebook: SIDRA Institute
Linkdin: The Somali Institute for Development Research and Analysis SIDRA
Twitter: SIDRA Institute