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Center for Policy Research and Dialogue (CPRD)  
and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS)



**Regional workshop on**  
**'PROMOTING SSR IN**  
**THE HORN OF AFRICA'**

The background of the lower half of the page features a large, light-colored map of the Horn of Africa region, centered on the continent. The map is overlaid with a grid of concentric circles and a checkered pattern. Below the map, there are five white circles of varying sizes arranged in a horizontal line.

13 – 14 July 2006, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

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Center for Policy Research and Dialogue  
P.O. Box 24721/1000, Bole Sub City Kebele 03  
House No 2199, Addis Ababa, ETHIOPIA  
Tel: 251-1- 61 46 49 Fax: 251 1- 63 76 74  
e-mail: [cprd@ethionet.et](mailto:cprd@ethionet.et)  
[www.cprdhorn.org](http://www.cprdhorn.org)

Institute for Security Studies  
PO Box 1787, Brooklyn Square  
Tshwane (Pretoria) 0075 SOUTH AFRICA  
Tel: +27 12 346 9500/2 Fax: +27 12 460 0998  
email: [pubs@issafrica.org](mailto:pubs@issafrica.org)  
[www.issafrica.org](http://www.issafrica.org)

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# 1. Overview

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On 13 and 14 July 2006, a regional workshop on “Promoting SSR in the Horn of Africa”, was organized in Ethiopia by the Center for Policy Research and Dialogue (CPRD) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). The workshop took place at the African Union Conference Hall with renowned ambassadors, academics and practitioners deliberating on the important topic of “Security and Security Sector Reform.”

The workshop was a precursor to the long term Security Sector Reform (SSR) process to be undertaken in the Horn sub-region. The participants were practitioners, members of parliament, academics and members of civil society from the IGAD countries, South and West Africa.

The workshop recognized that Security Sector Reform programmes were being implemented in many African countries. It was acknowledged that there is an urgent need to change the way threats are perceived by African politicians and the people they govern. Along with attempts to do so, the workshop discussed the commonly faced challenges and constraints that are often experienced in some African countries in general, and the Horn of Africa in particular. Some recommendations and suggestions were put forward for discussion on how to tackle the challenges in such a way that SSR could result in sustainable security establishments, processes and programmes.

Most of the experiences shared were presented in the form of papers backed up with slide presentations, and resulted in

discussions at the end of every plenary session. There were a total of 15 presentations, listed below:

- Theory and complexity of SSR: Lessons learned, Prof. Robin Luckham
- SSR in Africa: An Overview, Prof. Eboe Hutchful
- Parliamentary Oversight of Defence Transformation: the South African Experience, Hon. Thandi Modise
- SSR and the Sierra Leone Experience, Osman Gbla
- Sustaining Civil Military Relations in a New Democracy: the South African Experience, Tsepe Motumi
- SSR and Its Challenges in Uganda, Edith Mwanje
- Regional Security – The role of ISDSC in Promoting Human Security. Challenges to The Operationalization of The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, Brig Gen. Paulino Macarique
- Porosity of Borders and Regionalized Civil Wars, Its Impacts on SSR, Gen. Majak d’Agoot
- SSR Challenges in the Horn of Africa, Medhane Tadesse
- DDR and SSR Challenges in Somaliland, Ali Yusuf
- SSR Challenges in The Sudan, Amb. Osman A/Sayed
- SSR Challenges in Eritrea, Herui T/Bairu
- Group report: DDR and post Conflict Stability, Gen. Tsadkan G/Tensae
- Group Report: Civil military relations, Maj Gen (Rtd). Ishola Williams
- Group Report: Defence and Security Reviews, Maj Gen (Rtd). Len le Roux



# 2. Workshop proceedings

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## 2.1 PLENARY SESSION 1: OPENING

**Chair: Dr. Kassahun Berhanu, Board Chairman of CPRD**

### Keynote speech

**Ambassador Said Djinnit (Delivered by Geoffrey Mugumya, Director, Peace and Security, African Union Commission)**

The keynote speech began by asking, “security for who?” as a launching pad for a discussion on SSR in Africa. The speech defined SSR, with a special emphasis on evaluating risks and threats (both real and perceived), while also listing reforms. It noted that military and security institutions and services constitute the instruments of violence of the state and this necessitates proper governance and regulation; an informed and active legislature; a clear governmental policy framework and laws; effective civilian executive authorities; and an active civil society to hold the sector accountable. Ultimately, the goal is to ensure that security institutions are governed according to the principles of democratic control and accountability. This presentation ended by identifying the goals of the conference as furthering the agenda for long-term SSR in the Horn, and furthering the establishment of a network to enhance such a process.

### Theory and Complexity of SSR – Lessons Learned

**Professor Robin Luckham, Chair of the International Advisory Group to the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR)**

Professor Luckham noted that, historically, SSR was an old, indigenously organized African principle, long before it became an international issue. He described security as “a multi-headed monster with different layers,” and without one agreed-upon meaning. According to him, the foundation of SSR should be predicated on the need for human security. Because of this, civil oversight and the process of accountability are of fundamental importance. In addition, both political and civil society must be sufficiently literate and versed in the security debate in order to be effective. He noted that 15 or 20 years ago, discussions on this topic would have been inconceivable in the Horn because many of the governments in this region were military governments. Thus, this agenda is connected to those of democratisation and good governance.

The fundamental changes that have occurred over the last 15 to 20 years include:

- Economic liberalisation has led to the opening up of markets in conflict goods, leading to the commercialisation of conflict – a huge problem for security sector reform that is further complicated when governments are involved.
- Increasing emergence of new paradigms of security: human security and states’ responsibility to protect their citizens (see UN report on larger freedom).
- Increased visibility of conflict and increased engagement of international institutions in conflict and humanitarian assistance, noting that while there has not been a change in the amount of conflict, what has changed and led to change is people’s perception of conflict.

Professor Luckham identified some features of the expanding agenda for SSR. These include:

- Learning: Codification and diffusion of good practice e.g. the South Africa experience.
- Expanded definitions of the security sector that include the police, intelligence and justice services.
- The mainstreaming of SSR in terms of a larger good governance agenda.
- A focus on process rather than formal structures (e.g.: less interest in the size of a military budget, and more on how budgeting occurs).
- The linking of SSR to wider national security priorities, because SSR can’t exist without a definition of what security is, or the identification of threats.
- Increased attempts to establish national ownership.
- More explicit linking of SSR to poverty reduction and a focus on the impact of the security sector on the poor and marginalized.
- An increasing focus on how the security sector is involved in peace agreements.

He cited the following three main pitfalls of reform:

- Mismatched paradigms. How relevant are the general norms to highly contested environments and cases of state failure?
- Parallel agendas. International security and developmental concerns might be superimposed on national priorities, e.g. the war on terror.
- The restructuring of key state security institutions is inevitably political in that it changes the balance of power and thus benefits some, while possibly disempowering others. It is therefore highly contested.

He concluded by giving advice on how these pitfalls might be avoided. This included better analysis of the real problems;

more attention to legitimacy, accountability and transparency, also by the international actors; careful and critical engagement; internalising reform; and regional and national coalition building.

## SSR in Africa: An Overview

**Professor Eboe Hutchful, Director of African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR)**

This paper presented the findings of a survey of security system reform (SSR) in African countries. The survey suggests that changing political, economic and security circumstances have obliged virtually all African governments to consider some degree of reform in their security institutions. Nevertheless, there have been few SSR programmes in Africa conforming to the OECD-DAC definition; even SSR terminology has yet to become fully familiar to African policy makers and securocrats. Instances of SSR have been largely limited to countries that are coming out of conflict and are often — though not always — conducted under donor guidance. This is not to say that 'reforms' are not occurring in the security system of African states — on the contrary — but that these are often piecemeal, narrowly focused and short-term in character. Nevertheless, they do form essential entry points and building blocks for more ambitious SSR programmes.

The paper discussed case studies in Southern Africa, West Africa, East Africa and the Horn, Central Africa and North Africa. The analysis identifies some points of difference in these studies, including regional contexts, national contexts, drivers of reform, and the scope of the respective initiatives. Constraints to these processes include donor driven agendas, lack of local ownership and political will, lack of funding for implementation, lack of adjustment to domestic institutional capabilities, non-holistic ad-hoc approaches, lack of coordination, lack of national security policy frameworks, the conflict between fiscal imperatives and security imperatives and, finally, that approaches were often narrow, seeing security only from the state perspective and not the broader human security perspective.

In going forward with the SSR agenda in Africa, the following issues should be considered:

- Post-conflict situations are not always homogenous, and different transitional policies lead to different SSR approaches.
- A piecemeal approach is no longer going to suffice. Instead what is required is a thorough and comprehensive remaking of societies, including the security sector.
- Resources and international commitment will be key as was the case in Sierra Leone.
- The integration of SSR into peace agreements needs to be addressed from the outset.
- The great need for African-centred models and local ownership.
- SSR is currently inadequately assisted by empirical research and this needs to be rectified.
- The need for SSR to be based on the human security paradigm and yet take cognisance of international and national security requirements.
- The need for the integration of DDR and SSR processes.

- The sequencing of SSR and peace operations in the context of developmental peacekeeping.
- SSR is the weakest link of the whole post-conflict strategy in the AU. Thus, we need a collaborative relationship to make sure that regional institutions develop the appropriate capacities

## Discussion

### Questions and comments

We are not asking the right questions. The four fundamental questions are: Security for whom? Security against what? With what resources? Where are those resources coming from?

There is a tendency to look at these issues from an academic point of view. What we need to focus on are public safety and communities; internal stability; regional security cooperation and national self-defence. This all translates into national security.

Africans should tailor our national security strategies rather than importing them.

We first need to settle conflicts either within or between countries. An example is Sudan: it will be impossible to speak about SSR while the Southern Sudan problem persists. Thus, the first concern must be to settle the political problems that exist in Africa. This must enjoy priority.

There must be peace before trying to engage in SSR. There must also be properly constituted security institutions; how can you speak of reforming something if it doesn't exist? Still, it is worthwhile to talk about SSR in the context of preventing conflicts and having proper security mechanisms in place. The fact that there is a lot of conflict in the Horn might be an important entry point to SSR in the future.

To what extent do we require political stability before we can engage in SSR? The first problem we have is that security systems themselves are the main reasons for political problems. Thus SSR is an entry point. However, SSR must be accompanied by a comprehensive approach dealing with stability, poverty, democracy and politics.

What comes first: political stability or SSR? The general agreement is that SSR must be seen in a comprehensive way, but in certain cases, there are elements of reform that can be initiated before other crisis are solved. Thus, certain parts of SSR initiatives may be able to run parallel to political solutions.

It is easy to identify challenges, but hard to prioritize them. The speaker prioritized political aspects of SSR. The twin pillars of power are resources and politics. SSR is important and requires engagement with the leadership in different countries that have to become involved. Local ownership is synonymous with political ownership.

What are the intentions of donors in security sector reform when they make contributions? We do have a global village in terms of security; one country's security impacts on others. Approaches to SSR come from leaders as well. We must look critically at our leaders and ask if they are democratic. We must also have peace before SSR. For example, Sudan is emerging from war, and a peace agreement is regionally signed. This could be the entry point for SSR.



Another issue is that when people can't see results, they become frustrated. The problem is normally that we have chosen the wrong entry points. Thus, where do we start? Can we even afford holistic reform? Is there really a domino effect to some of the entry points?

Which comes first: conflict resolution or SSR? SSR is a mechanism for conflict resolution, which complicates the issue. Thus SSR should not wait for conflicts to be settled. How and when do you bring SSR into peace agreements and how do we sequence SSR and DDR?

### **Responses by Eboe Hutchful**

SSR is important to conflict prevention, and thus you don't have to wait for conflicts to end before SSR begins. One key deficit of peace agreements is that people come to the table ill-equipped and ill-prepared to talk about the issue of security. It is usually tacked on at the end. In this way, peace doesn't necessarily mean the end of the process; it might open up a whole new kind of conflict.

The more we expand the realm of SSR, the more we have to confront the human and resources deficits that exist in African countries. What can we do? Celebrate the small manifestations of reform that are emerging. There has to be a strategy to build on existing limited initiatives and make them into something more comprehensive by focusing on this element and providing resources.

Referring to a Laurie Nathan paper, we have to unpack what we mean by national ownership. Leaders are in a position to co-opt and deflect processes and thus SSR activities suffer from this deficit. What we need to do is create broad coalitions so that leaders will have to respect the process. This also applies to the problem of warlords who are involved in democratisation processes.

### **Responses by Robin Luckham**

He first remarked on the number of retired generals and other senior officers involved in the workshop and the issue of SSR in general. He believes that this is a positive contribution, due to their experiences in the field. They can play an important role between civil society and the security establishments.

The major question is how we are to deal with imperfect situations where you have regimes in power that have a vested interest in continuing conflict? We must think laterally. Africa's history of transition from military to democratic governments saw the emergence of constituencies that can be tapped.

SSR should be part of conflict resolution. What we need to think about is how to do this more coherently and systematically, and we must recognize that conflicts are profitable enterprises (with conflict entrepreneurs) and thus we must address the incentives as well. In this coordinated process, SSR plays a role in making peace sustainable.

### **Further comments**

The most important issue is the relationship between a country's security organs and those they need to defend. Current thinking about SSR can go in one of two directions:

- Pursuing SSR in its prescriptive manner, technical by nature.
- Anchoring SSR on larger strategic national security doctrine. In so doing it would become a national security issue and local ownership would be enhanced. If the security agenda is linked to a national transparent political process, there won't be a problem.

There have been missed opportunities with the AU to promote the national security debate with member states. There is a fear that other opportunities will be missed on the sub-regional level. Can we use SSR to promote the national security debate; can we find a way to anchor it in doctrine?

SSR is a nation-building project. Armies in the Horn of Africa are really institutions of civil war, and thus SSR research efforts should be anchored in this reality. In order to have policy, we need a strong idea of what SSR means. If we are discussing this on a normative level, we need to create institutions to which we can allocate SSR issues.

We have missed chances in the AU, but also in Sudan where people thought peace in Sudan would be an entry point for peace in the Horn. As we address political issues, we must also address security ones.

There is a need to broaden this debate beyond the generals. We need to address capacity building. How do we empower more segments to engage in this discussion? This will give us a broader agenda.

### **Response by Robin Luckham**

Yes, there must be a broader debate. Building capacity is important, and a network is important because it is part of the process of building capacity and widening the debate. This will enhance legitimacy of the SSR debate.

## **2.2 PLENARY SESSION 2: SHARING EXPERIENCES**

**Chair: Gen. Majak D'Agoot, Centre for Finance & Management Studies, University of London**

### **Parliamentary Oversight of Defence Transformation – the South African Experience** **Honourable Thandi Modise, Speaker of the South African North West Province Legislator**

The speaker provided first-hand insight into the South African defence transformation experience. She noted that the apartheid South African security structure hurt those it was pretending to help. In terms of defence, there were many military structures in South Africa, consisting of the SA Defence Force, the four 'homeland' armies and self-protection units, as well as the two liberation armies, MK and APLA.

In the process of negotiations for change, the two major parties in the defence debate were the ANC and the South African Defence Force (SADF). What was important was that those who were in the ANC argued for a different military structure because the ANC had civil control over MK. Also, the political leadership of the ANC had the people's popular

support and always made sure that it was acting in the interest of the people.

Some of the major issues addressed in the transformation process in South Africa that influenced defence transformation were:

- The South African Constitution ensures separation of powers, providing for the role of Parliament in ensuring oversight and accountability.
- The crux of the SA defence transformation process was to align the DOD and new National Defence Force (SANDF) with the principles of defence in a democracy.
- The Constitution made provision for a parliamentary committee on defence to enact the oversight function.
- The South African defence review process was an open and participatory process involving all interest groups in South Africa. Parliamentarians not only approved the resultant policy, but actually participated in working teams to develop and formulate the policy.
- The military cannot be deployed unless the President authorises such deployment, but even then Parliament could override such a decision. Parliament thus maintains ultimate responsibility for the SANDF.
- SA has developed an Act (the National Conventional Arms Control Act) governing the sale of weapons by South Africa to the outside world. This is to ensure that SA arms are not used to ignite and perpetuate conflict.
- To encourage debates detached of any fear of appraisal in Parliament, the South African Parliament enacted the *Powers, Privileges and Immunities Act* in 2004. This legislation prohibits any person from interfering in the parliamentary work of those who serve as public representatives.

**SSR AND THE SIERRA LEONE EXPERIENCE:** *Osman Gbla, Senior Lecturer and Head, Department of Political Science, University of Sierra Leone*

This presentation offered observations on the SSR experiences in Sierra Leone. The speaker noted that this was not truly a post-conflict issue. He stated that security sector recruitment was based on nepotism, not skill. In Sierra Leone, the national programmes set the pace, and prioritizing security was a base for moving the country forward. Sierra Leone's poverty reduction programme prioritized good governance, peace and security. Security sector intervention was meant to maintain stable democratic governance, giving priority to building a strong Ministry of Defence and also a police force to maintain internal security. It also provided an opportunity to citizens to debate their security needs and perceptions. One of the problems of SSR concerned parliamentary oversight and civil society. The presenter stated that before SSR could be successfully tackled, there needed to be a coordinated security debate.

When presenting lessons learned, this speaker noted the following:

- It is advantageous to pursue a security sector wide approach.
- SSR will be more effective if it comes out of a national reform process.

- SSR needs sustained financial support.
- SSR needs a strong national coordinating system.
- Civilians should be part of the process itself.
- There needs to be equal planning capacity in all parts of the security sector.
- SSR must not be done in isolation of other reform programmes.

**SSR AND ITS CHALLENGES IN UGANDA:** *Edith Mwanje, Director and Head of the Defence Reform Secretariat spearheading implementation of Uganda's defence reforms*

The presenter expressed the necessity of comprehensive approaches to SSR and mainstreaming the concept together with poverty reduction and efforts to strengthen civil society and other weak institutions in Uganda. She noted some of the challenges and constraints experienced in Uganda as the following:

- Recurrent conflicts hindering SSR implementations and resulting in ineffective outcomes such as inappropriate utilization of skills and resources.
- The definition of security and the context in which it is understood.
- Lack of political will and ownership.
- Attempts to bring about a coherent understanding of SSR and to engage civilians in strategic planning need to be an ongoing endeavour.

**SUSTAINING CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN A NEW DEMOCRACY: THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE:** *Tsepe Motumi, Chief of Policy and Planning, South Africa Defence Secretariat*

The presenter began with a discussion of the historical legacy of defence and security in SA. The starting point was 1910, when the Union of South Africa created the Union Defence Force (UDF). During this period the Ministry of Defence was staffed by the British. The promulgation of the Land Act, preventing black South Africans from owning land, saw an increase in dissent. The UDF became a means of suppression. The post WW II period, with the National Party coming to power and more oppressive apartheid laws being enacted, ushered in increased oppression, as well as resistance. With liberation in 1994 a total review of defence policy was called for. This was manifested mostly in the White Paper and Defence Review processes.

Consultations for the White Paper on Defence were very broad, and included many different sectors. It recognized the challenge of sustaining civil military relations in a new government. The White Paper touched on diverse issues such as the challenge of transformation, civil-military relations, the roles and functions of the SANDF, human resource management, land and the environment, etc. A key part was the chapter on civil-military relations. The White Paper was prepared in the spirit of a new democratic era in South Africa.

It was noted that defence took a significant cut to its budget during the era of democratization. Today the role of the armed forces has been redefined; they are not only meant to provide security to the state, but also to the people.

This speaker noted that civil-military relations are enhanced in South Africa by the civilianisation of the defence ministry

and by the creation, empowerment and capacity building of the civilian Defence Secretariat. The Defence Secretary is the head of department and Accounting Officer, and also the principal policy advisor to the Minister. The Secretariat plays an important role in promoting civil oversight. Even in a democratic process, vigilance is continuously needed.

### **Regional security – the role of ISDSC in Promoting Human Security. Challenges to the operationalization of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security**

**Brig Gen. Paulino Macarinque, Centre for Defence and Security Management, University of the Witwatersrand.**

The presentation gave a general overview of the roles and the main objectives of the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) of SADC. The main objectives of SADC are to reduce economic dependence, to mobilize resources and to create economic liberation in collaboration with international institutions.

He emphasized the intensity of natural and man-made threats to human security and characterized such threats as the following:

- Food insecurity and drought as well as lack of access to clean water.
- Health related diseases and most importantly HIV/AIDS.
- Land degradation and pollution.
- Reluctance to share power with other entities in decision-making.
- Seclusion of civil society.
- Lack of transparency in governance.

He concluded his presentation by indicating the need for SSR in terms of operational procedures, structures, doctrine and the achievement of interoperability within the homogenous SADC states. This will be done by taking into consideration the situation of each country involved.

## **Discussion**

### **Questions and comments**

How does the review process on security sector reform in Uganda relate to the ongoing war in Northern Uganda? Has the reform process really touched the people of Northern Uganda and how?

Uganda's contribution: institutionalizing Uganda's security plan within the poverty reduction plan perpetuates the security process because every time these auxiliary issues are considered, security is also considered. In Northern Uganda, conditions for war coincide with conditions of peace. Reforms need to be seen as becoming part of the everyday life of the people who are in that situation. It needs to become normal, and fully integrated. In the case of Northern Uganda, the presence of the military is everywhere, but where are the other security organs: police, prisons, etc.? Now, a more holistic approach is being applied to the North, using reforms that have worked in other parts of the country.

How has SSR in South Africa impacted on other social issues? Examples are an increase in crime and the existence of shantytowns, which have generated their own security threats.

Does the history of the ANC itself have to do with post-apartheid security? The anti-apartheid movement's main feature was political (versus other parts of Africa where the primary feature is/was military). Over a long period of time, the supremacy of the ANC political wing has been thoroughly established (it was born in 1912). How does this political aspect then affect post apartheid security?

### **Response by Edith Mwanje**

SSR should be flexible, but it requires resources and capacity, which is where the challenge is.

### **Response by Thandi Modise**

Addressing critical crime problems in SA, especially those that are a by-product of regional organised crime networks and interlinking, Thandi Modise stated that forming an interstate regional network, which promotes the idea of good neighbourliness (e.g. immigration and refugee rights), has affected national policies by opening up the SA borders. In such a situation secondary problems arise (this policy allows others to enter the country for malevolent reasons, which thus gives rise to other challenges). There are allegations that people with military experience from Zimbabwe are coming into SA. Thus, we see how economic depression in a neighbouring country affects another. Within SA, though there are many different peoples living together, we see in the above examples the challenges that this poses to the nation as a part of a regional system. The challenges, though, are not only regional; there are internal difficulties as well. Within the context of this issue, there is the problem of internal migration, especially to urban areas, so the regional aspect is not the only element of such policies or considerations.

The ANC adopted four pillars for the revolutionary struggle, of which the military (MK) was only one quarter. Thus, it was never the motivation of the movement to have a military victory. Modise stressed that, sometimes, national issues get lost in regional issues, even though regional issues are further reaching.

## **2.3 PLENARY SESSION 3: SSR CHALLENGES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA**

**Chair: Abdul Mohamed, Inter Africa Group**

### **Porosity of borders and regionalized civil war, its impact on SSR**

**Gen Majak d'Agoot, Centre for Finance & Management Studies, University of London**

The speaker began by noting that the proneness of politically fragile states with porous borders is not a new subject. Changing ideological contours, shared ethnicities, uneasy economic relationships, etc. have largely complicated the

pattern of neighbourliness. If these countries become strife-ridden, autocratic, weak, or failed, there will be severe consequences for the sustenance of professionalism and integrity of the security sector.

This discussion draws on a hybrid of theory and practitioners' experiences. It applies these principles to the Horn of Africa region with specific emphasis on their impact on security sector reform. This speaker's own personal background is in economics, but he has encountered conflict from a practitioner's point of view and that informs his views.

The study of war has identified that neighbourhoods characterized by porous borders engender positive and adverse bearings on both national and regional peace and stability. Furthermore, relationships, linkages, limited capacity, and other common characteristics multiply. When borders are porous and those regions are democratic, there will be a positive effect: trade, sharing of information, etc., but when the states are weak they are prone to the overflow of intra-state problems and interstate conflicts.

Civil wars are internationalized or regionalized because of political systems or strategic alignments, and thus, these systems do have a spill-over effect. As for political systems and geo-strategic alignments (premised upon clashes between ideological blocs), these are exemplified in the clash between post cold war blocs, or the clash between post cold war poles.

Other elements of internationalisation include shared ethnicities. For example, in Eastern Congo, whatever affects them generates interest across the border, the Darfur Region, which is important for Chad, and Ethiopia's ethnic Somalis in Ogaden. Economic drivers can also internationalise wars. Resources are some of the main tools that can internationalise wars (e.g. land, ecological fragility, like Darfur, etc), as can territorial claims: border disputes and territorial ambitions.

The speaker presented two hypotheses: First; porous borders generate trans-border and internationalised strife. If it takes the form of an armed conflict, this becomes an internationalized civil war. Secondly, if a large number of highly volatile and antagonistic states are included in a single land mass, the internationalised civil conflict multiplies to draw in many actors and subsequently widens the scope and sphere of the conflict. This depends on the capacity of states to export conflict.

The speaker demonstrated that all conflicts in the Greater Horn of Africa have been internationalised. The only place to just have received conflict is the Central African Republic because it is relatively weak. Implications of porous borders on Security Sector Reform are:

- Institutional instability and weak professionalism in the armed forces, police and security. Examples: Ethiopia 1991, Rwanda 1994, Uganda 1979 and 1986, Congo DR 1996, Somalia 1991, Chad, Central African Republic, Sudan 2004.
- Outliers: Tanzania, Kenya, Djibouti. These countries have shown relative stability and are outliers in this sample.

Regarding security reforms, they have the leanest, elitist officered armed forces. The size of the armed forces is also reasonably lean. There are however doubts if they represent a model of the region that should be emulated.

- Proliferation of small firearms, banditry, piracy, etc.
- The cycle of violence and phenomenon of a new generation of rebels.

The following conclusions were drawn:

- Neighbourhoods affect the risk structure for both interstate and intrastate wars. These violence-ridden relationships have a two dimensional effect i.e. support my opponent and I will also support your opponent. Simply put, we all live in glass houses, so let's not throw stones. Or: if both states have internal capacity to export civil wars, they will do it in a two dimensional way.
- Weapons of the previous civil wars have not been decommissioned nor turned into ploughshares or "freedom trees" as in the case of Mozambique. Stockpiles have been kept to supply the rising demands in the new theatres of war.
- The regional diffusion of these conflicts are strictly linked to porous borders and volatility of the political environment.
- This volatility and spatial effect have compounded the difficulties for efficient methods of security sector reform in the Greater Horn of Africa Region.

## SSR challenges in the Horn of Africa

### *Medhane Tadesse, CPRD*

The presentation gave an overall description of the obstacles to SSR in the Horn of Africa region. The presenter stated that the unique challenge faced by countries of the Horn is the inability to maintain and sustain a Security Sector Reform programme. He characterized the challenges as the following:

- Underdevelopment: A general lack of resources (skills, funds and infrastructure) to run SSR programmes.
- The nature of the states: Not representing the interests and needs of the population.
- Inability to define long and short term national security strategy.
- Lack of political will: Resistance to change from institutions and different actors, and lack of leadership to drive reform at different levels i.e. political, civil society and grassroots.
- Lack of know-how on how to implement SSR from donors as well as a lack of donors.
- Heavily militarised region, as many of the armed and security organizations emerged from the background of the liberation fronts.
- A political culture of militarism: Decisions are taken by small elites of security officers and military commanders in power, without reference to the legislatures or civilian colleagues in government.
- Ideological projects: Oriented not to accommodate others' view, narrow ideological interests vs. broad national interests, which do not go hand in hand.
- The war on terror and its impact on democracy, reform and human rights. It reinforces a militarized political culture.

As possible recommendations to tackle such challenges, the speaker suggested “a different path for SSR” that reflects the unique problems, challenges and opportunities for in the IGAD sub-region as the following:

- Programmes should be realistic in their ambition and recognize the inherent risks.
- Reforms introduced should be sustainable financially and in terms of local capacity.
- Programmes must be flexible enough to adapt to changing circumstances.
- SSR in the Horn of African sub-region requires a long-term commitment and flexible plan of action.

The indicated suggestions will only be practical when the necessary political will and space for reform with regards to the Security Sector are put into place. What is needed, are realism, flexibility and sustainability.

### DDR and SSR challenges in Somaliland

#### *Ali Yusuf, DFID advisor to the Sudanese on security arrangement and disengagement in Darfur*

The speaker began by explaining how Somalia has been an internationally neglected state and thus has its own unique way of addressing and dealing with issues. The speaker then presented some of the challenges towards implementing SSR in this region as the following:

- The aftermath of war: the country is physically devastated and many people were displaced all over the Horn, thus losing their properties and homes; civil service and the police also disintegrated.
- Escalation of conflicts.
- Factions involved in a power struggle.
- Every citizen is armed.

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) is a high priority and should serve the following objectives:

- Disarming all clans and armed militia so the state can take ownership of all weapons.
- Stabilization of peace and security efforts.
- Restoring peace and stability in the region.

As a concluding note the speaker explained that an agreement on the sole ownership of light and heavy artillery by the state has been reached, although there are continued unresolved issues and discussions on ownership rights.

### Discussion

#### *Questions and comments*

We shouldn't be pessimistic as such when addressing the issues of the legacies of liberation struggles.

What are the implications of reconsidering demarcation of the borders?

Looking at peace talks in many African states, they seem to have a conceptual framework of their own that is redundant. There are instances of applying the same approaches and frameworks of peace talks from one country to another. After having such comprehensive peace talks, implementation lags behind. Replicating others' experiences is crucial but

one should be considered utilizing local resources that are available at hand.

#### *Response by Medhane Tadesse*

I agree that we should not be pessimistic, but most importantly we should be realistic.

#### *Response by Brig Gen. Paulino Macarinque*

The solution is not to change or redraw borders; the idea is to create systems that can be mutually favourable to neighbouring countries.

### SSR Challenges Continued

#### *Chair: Dr. Attala H. Bashir, Executive Director of IGAD*

### SSR Challenges in the Sudan

#### *Osman Sayed, Middle East and Africa Studies Center*

Sudan is unique in that it is the largest country in Africa, and that the previous conflict in Sudan was the longest in African history, with the problems starting as early as 1955. This discussion included a historical glance at the CPA. Sudan now has a Vice President from the South, and has a government in which the southern government is very well represented. Some problems include the devolution of wealth and power, Darfur, and the NDA agreement signed in Cairo.

This speaker believes that if political agreements had not been reached in Kenya, Nigeria, Cairo, etc., it would have been impossible for the security and defence system to have been reorganized and amended.

The main challenge now is to ensure that the peace agreements be maintained because this is the only solution to these serious problems, which have impacted many neighbouring countries, including Ethiopia. Ultimately we must make sure that the CPA continues to exist, as should other peace agreements. The key is to think in terms of collective security.

### SSR Challenges in Eritrea

#### *Herui Bairu, Secretary General of the Eritrean Congress Party*

This presentation began with an analysis of the historical context of today's problems in this country. In 1961, Eritrea engaged in an armed struggle for independence, which led to an extreme form of self-reliance and ultimately militarization of Eritrean society. The process of militarization was completed when Eritrean militias were turned into a standing army. Issyas played a large role in militarizing nationalism and building a one-man state. He also launched a campaign with himself as the hero of the Eritrean revolution; today this personality cult has become one of the most violent dictatorships.

Eritrea is still at the stage of an institutionalized guerrilla army. The EPLA captured Eritrea, but then Issyas removed the leadership of the EPLA. It can be asserted that from 1997 onwards, Eritrea was transformed into a guerrilla state run by a guerrilla army. From an economic point of view, Issyas replaced a free labour market with indentured military labour. Eight of

the last 15 years of independence have been years of war. This means that Eritrea is a failed state. From a human rights point of view, their people have become hostages of the system.

The Eritrean war came without warning. In fact, the people came to know about the conflict only after war broke out. Overall, not only did Eritrea cause these problems, it did not agree to help solve them when the opportunity was presented.

The speaker presented the following lessons and challenges:

- Security is hidden from the public.
- There is no hierarchical chain of command in the army.
- There are no civilian authorities that exercise political control.
- If there appears to be peace on a regional level, it is only because the voice of the people is muffled.
- There are no human rights or constitutional laws.

The following solutions were offered:

- Mobilization of regional pressure.
- Organizing a caretaker government in exile.
- Recognizing that the immediate goals of Issyas are about control; security and nation building are guises for state legitimacy.

## Discussion

### Questions and comments

How do we look at the implementation process to SSR and peace agreements in Sudan? What are the unique features and challenges faced by Sudan? What are the prospects for a successful transition in Sudan?

Is Sudan a federal republic? How do you plan to tackle the two different peace agreements that have taken place?

One word of wisdom to the political elites is to manage a credible transition; it requires extraordinary leadership skills to manage this problem in the current destabilized state of Sudan

The challenges facing SSR in Sudan, with the neighbouring nations harbouring its refugees, should be looked into.

Issues of the CPA and its implementation depend on the opinions and interests of the people of the state concerned.

### Responses by Osman Sayed

The peace process in Sudan is unique in references to its neighbouring countries. Guerrilla warfare lasted for a longer period of time but with two separate powers prevailing in the end. And yes, SSR is part and parcel of the peace agreements that are taking place.

Sudan is not yet a federal state as such. The southern region has a lot to deal with, such as issues of religion and so forth, as opposed to the other regions.

## 2.4 PLENARY SESSION 4: DISCUSSION ON THE OUTPUT OF WORKING GROUPS

July 14th 2006, the morning session until lunchtime was dedicated to group discussions. All participants chose one

of the three discussion groups and the outcome of the group discussions was delivered at the Plenary Session 4.

### Remarks by the Chairperson

#### **Prof. Eboe Hutchful**

Good will and cooperation is needed from all the bodies involved in implementing SSR in the region. Regarding Sudan, there is also a need for a mechanism that will consistently monitor the comprehensive peace agreement. Perfection is impossible, but political will on both sides will make the most of the intended objectives attainable.

### Group I: DDR and Post Conflict Stability

#### **Chair: Gen. Tsadkan G/Tensae; Rapporteur: Dr. Martin Rupiya**

The key issues that were discussed in the group were:

- Each DDR process is context-specific and should be planned accordingly.
- DDR is a long term process. Reintegration specifically needs a long term focus and even longer term follow-up.
- DDR is linked to and is affected by regional dynamics.
- It is important to address each of the elements of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in an integrated and iterative manner. Not one is complete until all have been successfully completed.
- Financial considerations of the country in which DDR is taking place are fundamental. DDR needs sustainable funding.
- Humanitarian and other civil society organizations should be maximally involved in the DDR process.
- Gender is a major issue in DDR. This is not currently well understood and needs dedicated research.
- DDR is part of peace building and post conflict reconstruction. There is a close linkage between DDR and SSR.

## Discussion

### Questions and comments

Q. Is DDR a financial management tool or peace-making instrument? How can the image of DDR be improved from the public's point of view?

A. It depends on who is in power and how that body perceives and interprets DDR.

Q. What are the entry points for DDR and their influences?

A. DDR is context specific and so there aren't any regional templates that can be implemented generically.

**Comment:** The comprehensive peace agreement in Sudan is given much of the attention; DDR is not. The conceptual framework to understand DDR is undermined. Even the budget put in place to implement DDR is not compatible.

**Comment:** There are various DDR programs implemented in the whole of Africa but the outcomes and experiences vary from one country to another.

Q. DDR is about demobilizing the foot soldiers, but there's also the leadership problem, which hasn't been discussed.

A. This is about the decision-making process, and DDR is clearly a political issue – so the generals won't easily be disarmed.

## Group II: Civil Military Relations

**Chair: Gen Ishola Williams; Rapporteur: Amb Adhanom G/Mariam**

Key issues discussed were mainly focused on the core principles of democratic civil-military relations. These include:

- The armed forces should be under the control of a democratically elected authority.
- The armed forces must adhere to the rule of law: the armed forces are part and parcel of society.
- There should be transparent planning and budgeting.
- The armed forces should have respect for human rights and a culture of civility.
- There should be a culture of engagement with civil society.
- Professionalism of the armed forces should be improved.
- The armed forces should be supportive of collaborative peace and security.
- The military should not be involved in political affairs.
- The police and justice institutions should work according to the rule of law.
- The armed forces should be broadly representative of all sectors of society.

## Discussion

### Questions and comments

There are tensions between these principles and reality. Are there guidelines on how to make them operational? These principles will only be viable with democratic governance.

There is scarcity and a lack of basic skills in the military and this is a common feature of many African countries.

The African soldier is most of the time neglected and left to poor practices. African militaries are mostly tools for peacekeeping and nothing else. In other parts of the world they have multiple tasks. Creativity in defining the roles of the military should be a major consideration.

The size of an army is important in the democratization process. For instance Eritrea and Ethiopia during the Degue regime.

Limitations on the control and power of the military? There has to be some reasonable balance of power and authority between the military and civil society. Even in the representation and making up of the military, a wide range of society has to be represented without discriminating factors. The army should stand out as different from the rest of the bodies.

## Group III: Defence and Security Reviews

**Chair: Len le Roux; Rapporteur: David Pulkol**

This report began by asking: Why do we do reviews? What are the driving factors? What are the issues that should be reviewed? What are the processes? The issues to be reviewed include governance; posture, roles and functions; force structure and capabilities; internal management processes

and efficiency improvements, among others. For example, in South Africa, representivity was the most important issue in order to achieve credibility. It was further stated that in doing defence reviews, issues of ownership, leadership, transparency and participation were important for success and credibility.

The format of the session was to gather inputs towards developing a programme that addresses SSR in the Horn. Each member of the group was asked to answer the question of entry points for SSR in their respective countries. The identified entry points are:

- Kenya: This is a functioning democracy, with good political realignment. The military is largely divorced from politics, and although there is corruption in the security forces, the defence sector is well aligned with the principles of democratic CMR. There is however a need for reviewing the rule of law and the criminal justice system. The identified entry points are:
  - Parliament.
  - Working with different political parties.
  - Civil society, which is strong.
  - Military, which is open.
- Uganda: This country has moved far with this process and has done a defence review. Reform of the intelligence sector still needs to be addressed. Entry points include:
  - Parliament, which is open.
  - Civil society/NGOs.
  - The press enjoys freedom and so it is possible to engage in the debate there.
- Ethiopia: Defence and security is a closed debate. The defence force is controlled by the ruling party, with little parliamentary oversight. There is thus little capacity in Parliament for these matters. Reviews would be difficult. Possible entry points are:
  - Parliament. Although there is a general lack of capacity it might be possible to engage with Parliament.
  - Media would be difficult to utilize as a point of entry.
  - Best hope is therefore universities and academics including CPRD and donors.
- Southern Sudan: 40% of national budget goes to the army. Issues are totally in terms of SSR. Entry points:
  - Parliament.
  - The peace process itself (this was highlighted as the most important entry point, where there is still an opportunity to ensure that SSR is taken up).
- Northern Sudan: quite a closed environment. Possible entry points are through DDR processes.
- Somaliland. There is a national reconciliation conference (like that of South Africa). 30% of the budget goes to the army and this should be the subject of review. Entry points:
  - This is an open society and engagement with government is a real possibility.
- Somalia:
  - Given the political and security situation, Somalia is currently a 'no go area', and there is not much to be done right now regarding SSR.

- Djibouti. Entry points:
  - The presence of the Americans and the French seems the most suitable entry point for engagement.
- Eritrea. Entry points:
  - There are none internally. Civil society/academic community in the Diaspora might be the only entry point.

It was noted that, overall, IGAD and other organizations were also considered as entry points. In some regions, there are parliamentary forums, although the Horn doesn't have one. It was further asked: How can we use the Pan-African Parliament to engage with the parliamentarians of the Horn, and encourage parliamentarians here to form a regional forum? Finally, it was suggested that we publish and use the media to circulate these ideas.

## Discussion

### *Questions and comment*

In Ethiopia it's possible to have a debate on national security strategy, because one already exists (for two years). We might also be able to use the media, as there are at least some private outlets.

At a regional level, strategy development in IGAD incorporates national security strategy, which might be an entry point. IGAD's parliamentary union exists, but it is non-functioning. Still, it might be an important entry point and should be considered.

In Somalia, there are opportunities to engage at regional level with its complex issues. A peace plan for Somalia exists in the US office. Somalia is also talking to the AU about a security plan, and these might be entry points.

Regarding parliamentary capacity building, the SSR programme should establish a group of experts to assist at national and regional level.

It is also important for military officers to be represented in parliament so they can serve as liaison officers.

There are three possible entry points for Somalia:

- The interim government still wants an African peacekeeping force and this could be used to advance SSR.
- The DDR programme within the peacekeeping programme at the Kenyan conference. This exists, and we have yet to see what it will offer.
- The Islamic Courts that are talking to governments might present another entry point.

We must engage governments when we talk about SSR.

Ethiopian entry points:

- In Ethiopia, there is a publicly floated national security reform paper, which might be an important entry point.
- The Inter Africa Group, in Khartoum held a conference about 8 months previously about the importance of national security reform in the Horn. This process itself will have an impact, and might be another entry point.

Northern Sudan is an open society. Parliament represents all political parties, including the SPLA. Thus it can be seen as an entry point.

Additionally, the IAG seminar was welcomed in Sudan by the Government of Sudan.

The fate of Northern Sudan depends on future agreements.

Even though these country-specific entry points are meaningful, we need to focus on regional models and perspectives.

Northern Sudan has a representative Parliament, which is an entry point.

Somalia's peace process was discussed and agreed upon as an entry point.

Capacity building should be seen as sustainable; with parliamentarians it requires access and follow-up activities.

In strengthening parliamentary oversight, there needs to be emphasis on policy and planning processes and not only on budgeting and expenditure control, currently there is a lot of emphasis on budget, and not enough on plan (a budget is the financial expression of a plan after all).



# 3. Conclusion

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## 3.1 CONCLUDING REMARKS

### *General Tsadkan G/Tensae*

The security situation in the Horn cannot be generalised, as it is very diverse. Security is at the heart of political situations. Thus, SSR can't be pushed forward without the involvement of governments. The final owners of the issue are, after all, governments. We as civil society or interested parties (who are pushing SSR forward) can only assist, support, and influence the activity of governments in transforming the security apparatus.

It is important to engage in national security debates. It will give predictability and certainty, and will be a source of legitimacy. NGOs and civil society can be a source of information and support for specific constituencies, and might help create regional security arrangements. This might not happen right away, but starting the process, for example by informing and engaging the public, can begin now.

IGAD should be engaged in the development of a regional security strategy and support to national security evolution. This is one way to propel the regional security process.

Another important element is the substantive issue of DDR. Three such processes have occurred in Ethiopia. These must be subject to review. There is a DDR process in Sudan, one in Somalia and potentially one in Eritrea.

The question is how we are going to influence governments/states to engage in SSR. Some possible points of departure are: literacy programmes (education and training), workshops and seminars for different sectors, advocacy programmes, networks, broadening the debate into society and raising the level of informed debate on relevant issues. The focus will be on the main pillars of justice, law enforcement, intelligence, prisons, and defence institutions. We must also create a loosely organized network to take the process forward so that we might exchange information and experiences, and coordinate efforts.

## 3.2 WAY FORWARD (HORN OF AFRICA NETWORK)

The key is to build a loose network and to involve a variety of stakeholders and interest groups (parliamentarians, civil society, practitioners, academics, etc.). This should be done within the African Security Sector Network, which supports the formation of sub-regional groupings. Various networks exist in West Africa and Southern Africa, and this should be extended to the Horn.

The main objectives would be information sharing, education and training, capacity building, research and raising awareness. The question to be answered is how to go forward creating this network and what its regional scope should be. The leadership of this network would have to lie in Horn countries itself.

Professor Eboe Hutchful, the convenor of the Steering Committee of the African Security Sector Network, advised that the ASSN could provide a supportive framework to the SSR programme in the Horn. The advantages of this existing network are as follows:

- There is an open door membership.
- It is a multidisciplinary network and includes important security practitioners.
- In this grouping, internal cross-fertilization has been extremely useful.
- In terms of networking, capacity is moved around, as African capacity is unevenly distributed.

### Discussion

Such networks are also useful for starting debate within a country. One reason is that national dialogue is facilitated by outsiders, who are Africans, with vested interests in regional peace and security. The network itself has the advantage that it is flexible and one has the opportunity to represent oneself or work within the network.

While there was a representative from Djibouti who, for political reasons, was unable to participate in the session, we need to make sure that we find a way to get that nation involved in this network.

Sub-regional networks were at the heart of the ASSN. Such sub-regional networks were well established in West and South Africa.

There is a structure in place within SADC that this network can work with. This is the Southern African Defence and Security Management Network, which links universities in SADC countries in presenting academic training in this field. The regional coordinator for this network is Brig General Macarique. A sub-regional SSR strategy is a matter of priority for the Horn, a most challenging terrain. A Great Lakes sub-regional strategy is also necessary.

Within this network, all participants must agree on the Charter. This will have to be an iterative process and flexible to allow for change and the inclusion of new actors.



# Appendix A

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## MINUTES OF A MEETING TO ESTABLISH A HORN OF AFRICAN SSR NETWORK (CHAPTER)

*Chair Medhane Tadesse, CPRD, Ethiopia*

### Participants

- Sudan: Ambassador Osman Elsayed, Hon. Bol Gatkouth, Gen. Majak D'Agoot, Arop Deng Kuol
- Somaliland: Hon. Ibrahim Jama, Ali M. Yosuf, Adam Musa Jibril
- Eritrea: Adhanom G/Mariam, Hiruy T. Bairu
- Uganda: David Pulkol

Also present were: Prof. Eboe Hutchful, Chair of ASSN and Prof. Robin Luckham, Chair of Advisory Group to GFN-SSR

### Discussion

The Chair, Medhane Tadesse talked about the need to establish a network of SSR activities in the Horn of Africa region similar to those operating in Western and Southern

Africa as part of the broader African Security Sector Network (ASSN). The objectives of such a network would be :

- To share information and knowledge.
- To coordinate research on SSR.
- To initiate grass-roots sensitization and mobilization in support of SSR in the sub-region.

Prof Hutchful and Prof Luckham also stressed the need to establish the network as a loose grouping but with a very crucial role to play in a region where SSR is seriously needed.

Finally all the participants agreed to be part of the established network and suggested that Medhane Tadesse from the CPRD continue to chair the process of formation and consolidation.

In the meantime it was acknowledged that the Charter of the network (a document similar to the ASSN Charter) should be prepared and circulated to all the members for comments and clarification.



# Appendix B

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## **PRESS RELEASE**

The Center for Policy Research and Dialogue (CPRD) from Ethiopia and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) from South Africa jointly organized a regional workshop on, “Promoting Security Sector Reform in the Horn of Africa” which was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia at the Africa Union conference hall, on the 13th and 14th of July 2006.

The objectives of the workshop were:

- To determine an agenda for support to the longer-term Security Sector Reform work in the Horn of Africa; and
- To initiate the formation of a network of the Security Sector Reform constituency in the Horn.

The workshop was opened by a keynote speech delivered by the Director, Peace and Security of the Africa Union Commission, Mr. Geoffrey Mugumya, on behalf of the Commissioner of Peace and Security Amb. Said Djinnit. Even though most of the participants were from the IGAD countries (Ethiopia, the Sudan – North and South, Eritrea, Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti and Somaliland), there were also participants from Southern and Western Africa.

On the first day, conceptual papers on Security Sector Governance and Transformation were presented, including an overview of security sector reform in Africa. Experiences were shared from certain sub-regions (West and Southern Africa specifically) as well as country-specific case studies. The situation of SSR in the Horn of Africa and its challenges were explored.

On the second day, three working groups were formed to address the thematic issues of (1) Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) and post-conflict stability, (2) Civil-Military Relations and Security Sector Governance, and (3) Defence and Security Reviews.

In conclusion, a network made up of individuals and civil society organisations was formed, and from the deliberations of the plenary and working groups, a way forward was formulated for promoting and supporting the SSR agenda in the Horn of Africa.

15 July 2006



# Appendix C

## REGISTRATION OF PARTICIPANTS

SER	NAME	COUNTRY	ORGANIZATION	CONTACT	
				TEL	E-MAIL
1.	Maj-Gen. Len le Roux	South Africa	ISS	+27836405243	lroux@issafrica.org
2.	Dr. Martin Rupiya	Zimbabwe	ISS	+27123469517	mrupiya@issafrica.org
3.	Prof. Robin Luckham	UK	IDS	+441273477448	R.Luckham@ids.ac.uk
4.	Prof. Eboe Hutchful	Ghana	ASDR	+2483554014	Eboehutchf@aol.com
5.	Mr. David Pulkol	Uganda	AFLI	+256782013080	mzeedpb@yahoo.com
6.	Mrs. Edith Mwanje	Uganda	MoD	+256772505472	ensajja@yahoo.com
7.	Maj-Gen. Ishola Williams	Nigeria	Panafstrag	+2348032193910	isholawilliams03@hotmail.com
8.	Hon. Thandi Modise	South Africa	NWPL	+27183927014	tmodise@nwpl.org.za
9.	Mr. Tsepe Motumi	South Africa	MoD	+27828012101	tsepemotumi@webmail.co.za
10.	Ms. Ciru Mwauba	UK	DFID	+44207023461	C-Mwaura@dfid.gov.uk
11.	Mr. Kerneleos Osman	Ethiopia		0911386211	matiselema2000@yahoo.com
12.	Hon. Col. Bol Gatkouth	Sudan	South Sudan Parliament	0918042135	bd-kol@hotmail.com
13.	H.E. Dr. Attalla Bashir	Djibouti	IGAD	091254151	igad@intnet.dj
14.	Gen. Majak D'Agoot	Sudan	University of London	+249911130807	mdagoot@yahoo.com
15.	Brig-Gen. Gordon Hughes	UK	Cranfield University	+4401793 785020	g.hughes@cranfield.ac.uk
16.	Mr. El Tayeb Ali	Sudan	Sudan Embassy	0911200262	eltayeb53@yahoo.com
17.	Mr. Ibrahim Jama	Somaliland	Parliament	4415851	raitejama@yahoo.com
18.	Mr. Ali M. Yusuf	Somaliland	NDC	+25224409928	caliluduf@yahoo.com
19.	Mr. Salih M. Ali	Sudan	Slam Center	0912303085	Salih0367@yahoo.com
20.	Mr. Osman Gbla	Sierra Leone	University of Sierra Leone	0232766008000	osmangbla@yahoo.com
21.	Ambassador Mohamed	Ethiopia	Parliament	0911822367	
22.	Mr. Bereded Anemute	Ethiopia	Parliament	0911822368	
23.	Mr. Adam Muise Jibril	Somaliland	Somaliland Ecological Society	+252 2426175	adamjibril@hotmail.com

## Regional workshop on 'Promoting SSR in the Horn of Africa'

SER	NAME	COUNTRY	ORGANIZATION	CONTACT	
				TEL	E-MAIL
24.	H.E.Ougoure Kifleu	Djibouti	MoD	0911650362	
25.	Mr. Kenedio M. Hadi	Djibouti	Counselor	0911650362	kenediol@ethionet.et
26.	Mr. Aphan M.	South Africa	Counselor	0911228866	aphanem@foreign.gov.za
27.	Mr. Sreihane Gomperhz	France	French Embassy	011140000	Sreihane.gomperhz@diplomate.gour.fr
28.	Brig.-Gen. Paulino Macarique	Mozambique	CDSM	+27836300606	macariquep@yahoo.com
29.	Mr. Ingo Wiederi	Ethiopia	World Bank	0911227712	lwiederhofer@worldbank.org
30.	Mr. Mette Knudsen	Denmark	Embassy of Denmark	0113711377	metknu@umgade.dk
31.	Mr. Idris Ahmed Mohamed	Sudan	MASC	+249912397245	ldrisadam5@hotmail.com
32.	Mr. Herui T. Bairu	Eritrea	Research	+4686950313	hirui.bairu@helin.com
33.	Amb. Adhanom G/Mariam	Eritrea	EPM	0911174864	hagos20@yahoo.com
34.	Mr. Djama Meidal	Djibouti	Presidency	+253811530	dameidal@intgact.dj
35.	Mr. Francis R. Wairagu	Kenya	SRIC	+25424448903	fkwairagu@yahoo.com
36.	Mr. Arop Deng Kuol	Sudan	Goss		ardekuo@yahoo.com
37.	Amb. Osman Elsayed	Sudan	Mase	+2499123975113	idrisadam5@hotmail.com
38.	Mr. Nashwa Kamel	Egypt	AU		
39.	Mr. Bernard Harbrone	UK	World Bank	+442024738899	bharborne@worldbank.org
40.	Dr. Tony Kambo	Ethiopia	UPEACE		tkarbo@upeace.org
41.	Mr. Rod Evans	UK	DFID Ethiopia		rod-evans@dfid.gov.uk
42.	Mr. Aberu Hailemariam	Ethiopia	UECSA	0116625717	uecso@ethionet.et
43.	Dr. Butera Jean	Ethiopia	UPEACE	0911681080	jbbutera@upeace.org
44.	Col. Bamous Kupeal	Mozambique	Mozambique Embassy	0911 500598	mossypela@yahoo.com
45.	Dr. Kassahun Berhanu	Ethiopia	AAU/CPRD	0111231067	Kassahun@psir.aau.edu.et
46.	Gen. G/Tsadikan G/Tensea	Ethiopia	CPRD	0911228952	cprd@ethionet.et
47.	Mr. Medhane Tadesse	Ethiopia	CPRD	0911210149	cprd@ethionet.et
48.	Mr. Yemane Kidane	Ethiopia	CPRD	0911248967	cprd@ethionet.et
49.	Mr. Wondwosen Michay	Ethiopia	Ethiopia International Institute for Peace & Development	0911452102	wondpr@yahoo.com
50.	Mr. Biruk Fikru	Ethiopia		0911762154	Bruck.fikru@fas.harvard.edu
51.	Ms. Meron Hadero	ET/USA		0911602672	meron.hadero@yale.edu
52.	Ms. Selamawit Deneke	Ethiopia		0911145358	