ACCORD PEACEBUILDING HANDBOOK

ACCORD

THE AFRICAN CENTRE FOR THE CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES

ACCORD PEACEBUILDING HANDBOOK

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ACCORD

The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) is a non-governmental organisation working throughout Africa to bring creative solutions to the challenges posed by conflict on the continent. ACCORD's primary aim is to influence political developments by bringing conflict resolution, dialogue and institutional development to the forefront as alternatives to armed violence and protracted conflict.

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

Preface

Peacebuilding in Africa, as is the case globally, is constantly evolving. Practitioners in this field are regularly faced with challenging dynamics that shape the approaches needed to enhance peacebuilding. Over the past two decades, the environments and situations traditionally known to host conflict have evolved. Through studies, practitioners have found that opposing actors and their interests have greatly influenced conflict trajectories. These developments have further impacted the strategies generally used to maintain and enhance sustainable peace. These are but a few of the challenges peacebuilding practitioners, actors and entities face in the course of their interventions. Due to the unstable nature of conflict, peacebuilding has had to progress to adapt to today's conflict dynamics. Due to the constant need to keep up with existing and evolving challenges, constant re-examination of the approaches and normative frameworks that target peacebuilding interventions is needed.

Peacebuilding is crucial for social transformation; it is needed by those who choose to use violence as well as those who elect a more passive approach as a means of resolving their disputes. Peacebuilding contributes to longer-term stability, and eliminates acts of violence. For peace to be sustained, it is crucial that peacebuilding practitioners, actors and entities formulate and implement strategies that lay solid foundations for economic recovery and development in fragile countries. This involves the building of solid institutions that can support transformational journeys, as well as developing infrastructures to shepherd communities and people together towards resolving disputes through dialogue and mediation. Ultimately, peacebuilding is important. Not only is it indispensable in dealing with legacies that cultivate intractability, but it further recognises and addresses the root causes of conflict.

For more than 20 years, ACCORD has been engaged in capacity-building initiatives that increase the individual and collective knowledge and skills of key peacebuilding stakeholders. The aim of these enterprises has always been to help peacebuilders to better understand the environment and contexts in which they work and the processes through which they can support local and national actors to lead their own countries' or communities' own peacebuilding processes. To this end this handbook, amongst others, underscores the central role of local and national ownership in securing sustainable peace.

This handbook is the cumulation of an organisational learning process that ACCORD has undergone since inception. Our aim is to strengthen capacities for sustainable peacebuilding in Africa and beyond. The African Peacebuilding Coordination Programme (APCP), funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, has since 2008 been an integral part of this process. The programme has grounded its work around

the peacebuilding processes of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, Sudan and South Sudan. The training materials – including this handbook – and related knowledge developed during the programme, have emerged as a result of engagement with local and national peacebuilders in these and other countries, as well as those within the ambit of the African Union's Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) framework, and the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture (UN PBA).



ACCORD hopes that practitioners, actors, stakeholders and entities engaged in peacebuilding will find this handbook useful. As is the case of the ever-evolving peacebuilding environment, the approaches enunciated in this handbook are not static; they are constantly evolving. We at ACCORD look forward to engaging with you more in the future in relation to further strengthening this handbook. The end result, we hope, would be our collective solid contribution to moving our societies beyond intractability.

John Ahere
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ACCORD

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Acronyms and abbreviations

ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ASI	African Solidarity Initiative
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
AU PCRD	African Union Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development
BDPFA	Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CAR	Central African Republic
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CSA	Conflict Sensitive Approach
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDDRC	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Capacity Programme
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration
DfID	Department for International Development
DPC	District Peace Committee
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
GBV	Gender-based Violence
GIZ	*Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit*
GOPA	*Gesellschaft für Organisation, Planung und Ausbildung*

HRBA	Human-rights Based Approach
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFI	International Financial Institution
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-governmental Organisation
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MONUSCO	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
NAP	National Action Plan
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
New Deal	New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States
NCDDR	National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NSC	National Steering Committee on Conflict Management and Peacebuilding
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
RBM	Results-based Management
RPP	Reflecting on Peace Practices
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PBA	Peacebuilding Architecture
PCS	Peace Consolidation Strategy
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
REC	Regional Economic Community
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SADPA	South African Development Partnership Agency
SATRC	South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SSR	Security Sector Reform
STAREC	Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas
TfP	Training for Peace
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Organization for Education, Science and Culture
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UN PBF	United Nations Peacebuilding Fund
UN PBSO	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UN Women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

Chapter One:
Peacebuilding and conflict in the African context

What will this chapter do?

- It examines different aspects of peacebuilding, highlighting progress and development in this area in the African context.
- It discusses both characteristics of and emerging approaches to peacebuilding.

Why is it important?

- It aims to assist readers to better understand what peace-building is, and how it can be rolled out.
- It attempts to support the reader to achieve greater contextual and conceptual clarity on peacebuilding in Africa.

What should you learn?

- By the end of this chapter, the reader should be able to identify elements of peacebuilding, understand what peacebuilding means conceptually, and identify the various value-driven peacebuilding needs.

1.1 Introduction

Conceptually, peacebuilding is complex and continuously evolving. It is often understood as having several key characteristics, including the long-term nature of the peacebuilding process, interdependence of actors, multidimensional nature of the process, and its concern with the consolidation of peace. In the post-Cold War era, discussions about what constitutes peacebuilding became important as countries emerging from conflict made efforts to attain sustainable peace. In this chapter, the historic context within which the concept of peacebuilding has evolved is traced, and some emerging characteristics discussed, with particular focus on how they relate to peacebuilding efforts in Africa.

According to Boutros-Ghali (1992:5), the broad nature of peacebuilding invokes action to 'identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict'. Peacebuilding involves actions focused on conflict prevention, management and transformation, all of which must be implemented comprehensively to address the tensions that persist in post-conflict societies. It should also aim to transform the conflict system as a whole, 'to prevent

violent conflict from occurring in the future. Peacebuilding, therefore, is a long-term process that, by its very nature, is neither linear nor static (Ettang et al. 2011).

Since Boutros-Ghali's (1992) definitive description, peacebuilding in practice has been evolving and gaining prominence. The establishment of the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) in 2005 underscores this incremental gain in prominence. The 2015 review of the PBA looked at peacebuilding in the wider UN system. Furthermore, the 2015 report by the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) on the review of the PBA postulates that peacebuilding needs to be the common thread running between peacemaking and peacekeeping, noting that peacemaking and peacekeeping are supposed to ensure that there is no lapse or relapse into violence.

This chapter aims to equip those working to build peace with a functional understanding of the key concepts, terms, and approaches to peacebuilding. As such, it focuses on the definition of peacebuilding, showing that, while peacebuilding is broad in nature, it is also possible to narrow it down to an idea that is practically viable. The section presents a brief historical overview, inclusive of a discussion of the development of peacebuilding in the African context. This is followed by an analysis of emerging characteristics of peacebuilding. Finally, the chapter advances two ways in which peacebuilding can be determined, namely in the context of specific programmes or as an overall systemic approach.

1.2 Understanding peacebuilding

Although the term peacebuilding was coined by Johan Galtung in the 1970s, the concept only became widely used as part of contemporary conflict management vocabulary when then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali used it as one of the major elements of his 1992 report titled An agenda for peace: preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping.[1] In this volume, peacebuilding was described as 'action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid relapse into conflict (Boutros-Ghali 1992:5). It was posited as the counterpart of preventive diplomacy, where the latter was seen as action aimed at avoiding crisis, while peacebuilding aims to prevent the recurrence of conflict. In the 1992 report, conflict prevention and peacebuilding were thus positioned at opposite ends of the conflict management spectrum, with preventive diplomacy representing the first or opening stage of an intervention and peacebuilding the last or closing stage (de Coning 2010). However, there has since been an expansion beyond this

1 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. Available from: <http://www.unrol.org/files/A_47_277.pdf>. [Accessed 12 October 2015].

understanding of peacebuilding as simply the post-peacekeeping phase, or as narrowly focused on avoiding relapse into war.

Peacebuilding is now understood to do more than just react to conflict dynamics in order to prevent the resurgence of violence, creating what Galtung (1985) termed 'negative peace', described as a situation in which there is an absence of violence. Instead, peacebuilding actors now actively work to strengthen the development of local social institutions so that societies develop the self-sustainable and local resilience needed to manage their own tensions as well as external influences and shocks. This is what Galtung (1970) terms 'positive peace' – the causes of conflict have been removed and resilient social institutions have emerged, with the result that violent conflicts, as well as the threat of the same, are absent. In essence, when peacebuilding is channelled towards securing positive peace, it aims to address the problem of structural violence. Here, peacebuilding consists of programmes that:

- empower marginalised groups
- encourage inclusive access to resources and institutions
- redistribute land ownership and income
- end discrimination against any group of people (Curtis 2012).

Nonetheless, the core focus of avoiding a lapse into violent conflict (also referred to as 'peace consolidation') remains one of the aims of peacebuilding.

PEACEBUILDING AIMS TO GENERATE A RANGE OF MEASURES THAT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO 'POSITIVE PEACE', WITH A VIEW TO AVOIDING A LAPSE, OR RELAPSE INTO VIOLENT CONFLICT, AND TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE EMERGENCE OF RESILIENT LOCAL SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

Case Study 1:
Practical reflections on positive and negative peace:
The spectrum of peace in the African context

The age-old concepts of positive and negative peace, coined by Galtung (1985), may seem outdated and irrelevant in modern peacebuilding contexts. When looking at contemporary African contexts, however, the terms are still very applicable and should be seen as essential in understanding why conflicts re-emerge.

The terms positive and negative peace refer to different spectrums in the peace consolidation timeline. Negative peace is the absence of violence, especially after a ceasefire is enacted. It further implies that a society is peaceful because there is an

absence of violence, in the absence of a resolution of the issues that fuelled the conflict in the first place. Galtung argues that only positive peace is sustainable. Positive peace refers to a situation in which there is an absence of actual or threatened violence and instability because the root causes of the original violence have been dealt with (Galtung 1996). Furley and Roy (2006), in discussing Africa's security environment, observe that most countries on the continent are located between the end points of a peace–war continuum. Further, they note that peace in the African context does not automatically imply an absence of violence. They believe that most African states are in a condition of 'negative peace' which, they argue, is unsustainable.

Northern Uganda, for example, has been relatively calm in recent times, with a reduction in violent attacks by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) following the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in 2006, which allowed for peace talks in Juba, South Sudan. Taking this agreement into consideration, there are those who argue that the conflict in the north has ended because an overwhelming majority of the 1.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), who lived in the camps at the height of the crisis have returned to their areas of origin or have resettled in new locations (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2012. Attempts to finalise a peace settlement failed in December 2008 when, following negotiations in Juba, LRA leader Joseph Kony refused to sign the peace accord after government forces had attacked an LRA base in Garamba, Uganda. Since the end of the talks, the conflict has spread into neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Central African Republic (CAR). There has been no effort to reopen the peace process by either the Government of Uganda or the international community (Hendrickson and Tumutegyereize 2012).

Despite these and other positive attempts and developments geared towards establishing normalcy in the north, the failed peace agreement is a major reason for concern for many northerners who live in considerable fear of LRA attacks. Such a situation is characteristic of what would be referred to as negative peace: there is an absence of violence but a continued threat of violence still exists (Furley and Roy 2006). This state of affairs logically supports the argument that unless the root causes of violence are addressed, perceived inequalities dealt with, and talks about peace are more elusive, what is typically branded as peace will in reality be only negative peace, and that such a situation could easily degenerate into war.

The contributor, Lesley Connolly, is an independent researcher



1.2.1 Peacebuilding in the African context

The early nineteenth century saw the western European countries divide Africa and its resources into political partitions at the Berlin Conference of 1884–85. Most African countries fought fiercely to end the 75 or more years of colonialism they had to endure. Since the end of the colonial era, violence and conflicts in Africa have continued to be largely internal and have resulted in substantial casualties (Jeng 2012). According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2002 Human Development Report, approximately 3.6 million people had been killed in internal conflict since the 1990s, compared to an estimated 220 000 deaths in interstate wars. Since then, African governments, regional institutions and civil society have been faced with the daunting task of managing and resolving violent conflicts, as well as their direct and indirect impacts on socioeconomic development (ibid).

In response, the African Union (AU) developed the AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) framework, which was adopted it in Banjul, Gambia in July 2006. This framework, which aims to consolidate peace and prevent relapses of violence, help address the root causes of conflict, encourage and fast-track planning and implementation of reconstruction activities, and enhance complementarities and coordination between and among diverse actors engaged in PCRD processes (African Union 2006), has become the guide to peacebuilding efforts on the continent.

The Framework is based on the core principles of:

- African leadership
- national and local ownership
- inclusiveness, equity and non-discrimination
- cooperation and coherence
- capacity-building for sustainability.

The goals of this document are to: ensure the prevalence of peace, law and order; create a stable humanitarian position, most importantly by meeting basic human needs; assist the vulnerable in society; establish political institutions and mechanisms; promote sustainable development; and ensure human rights and access to justice. The AU PCRD promotes collaboration with member states and regional economic communities, as well as with civil society organisations. Its aim is to increase the capacity of African civil society to address post-conflict issues (African Union 2006).

It is believed that advancing peace in Africa can be achieved through the successful implementation of the tenets of this framework. Thus civil society organisations and other actors involved in peacebuilding efforts are encouraged to be guided by these guidelines in ensuring that they are the focus of discussions about peacebuilding and training of practitioners. Furthermore, the framework, with its combined focus on

building a strong foundation for peace, and ensuring that the root causes of conflict are addressed, is broad enough to provide guidance across the multiplicity of roles and actors involved in peacebuilding (African Union 2012).

In the context of the implementation of the PCRD, the AU also launched the African Solidarity Initiative (ASI) in July 2012 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The inauguration also formed part follow-up events to the AU Assembly 'Decision on the report of the Peace and Security Council on its activities and the state of peace and security in Africa', adopted at its 18th ordinary summit, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in January 2012. This resolution stressed the need for renewed efforts towards post-conflict reconstruction and development to consolidate peace (African Union 2012). The ASI is seen as a tool for mobilising African countries' support for post-conflict reconstruction, and consolidating and expanding intra-African cooperation and mutual self-reliance.

The ASI aims to provide opportunities to mobilise additional commitments and contributions to support post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts in African countries that are emerging from war. The initiative is intended to encourage, motivate, and empower African states to begin to offer assistance to one another in a systematic manner, supplementing support from development partners. It seeks to promote African solidarity commitments and support as part of an agenda to address the range of challenges experienced by concerned countries in their reconstruction, peace consolidation, recovery, and development efforts (African Union 2012).

This raises one of the key characteristics of successful peacebuilding in the African context – local ownership. Broadly, local ownership is understood as consulting and involving local actors[2] in the implementation of externally designed processes, i.e. where a problem has been diagnosed by external experts, and solutions found from international experiences elsewhere, local ownership is about fitting external models to indigenous contexts (Hughes et al. 2015). However, over the years it has become clear that local ownership must find its own home-grown or bottom-up solutions in each society. For peace to be self-sustaining, residents must generate their own social institutions and make their own choices about their futures (de Coning 2013b).

Peacebuilding actors in Africa should target a society's institutional capacities, at both national and community levels, so as to stimulate the development of human capacities, and collective social institutions, processes and mechanisms, so that communities develop their own capacities to manage social change. The more resilient a society is in the face of transformation, the more able it will be to prevent relapse into violent conflict and to establish the foundations for durable and self-sustaining peace (de Carvalho et al. 2014). The term 'resilience' means the ability of social institutions to absorb and adapt to the internal and external shocks and setbacks they are likely to face (de Coning 2013a).

2 The term local in this handbook refers to indigenous persons, individuals who will benefit from peacebuilding initiatives and development.

UN Photo/JC McIlwaine

A woman holds up a banner during International Day of Peace celebrations on the theme 'Partnerships for peace: Dignity for all' in Juba, South Sudan (21 September 2015) .

1.2.2 Emerging characteristics

As noted above, there is not yet one common and widely accepted definition, approach or model for peacebuilding, but some common characteristics that have emerged over the last decade and a half in practice can begin to be identified. The following diagram lists five emerging peacebuilding characteristics.

Figure 1: Characteristics of peacebuilding



Peacebuilding is primarily concerned with peace consolidation

The first characteristic is that peacebuilding is primarily concerned with consolidating peace, in order to prevent a lapse, or relapse, into violent conflict. This is done by addressing those conflict factors that may, in the short- to medium-term, lead to relapse, as well as addressing the root causes of conflict that may pose a threat to peace in the long-term (de Coning 2013).

Case Study 2: Sierra Leone's peacebuilding initiatives

After the 11-year-long civil war ended in Sierra Leone in 2002, the government made peacebuilding commitments, which involved ensuring: consolidation of democracy and good governance; justice and security sector reform (SSR); attention to youth employment and empowerment; implementation of capacity-building activities; development of the energy sector; and sub-regional peacekeeping (involving presidential and ministerial summits of the Manu River Union's leaders).

This is distinct from the government's development commitments, which involve the development of infrastructure, productive sectors and human development. While this development agenda will have positive effects on Sierra Leone's stability and peace, it is distinct from the peacebuilding agenda in that the latter is primarily concerned with peace consolidation and long-term development in the country.

Source: United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. 2008.



Peacebuilding is multidimensional

Peacebuilding is a multidimensional or system-wide undertaking that has several forms. There are models or approaches that range from differentiating between three core dimensions to the more elaborate approaches listing six to eight different considerations.

The UN Secretary-General's 2001 report entitled 'No exit without strategy'[3] argues that peacebuilding should be understood as fostering the capacity to resolve future conflicts by:

3 United Nations 2001.

- consolidating security
- strengthening political institutions
- promoting economic and social reconstruction.

Other UN policy documents, for instance the Secretary-General's Note on the integrated approach (2006), proffer a more elaborate list that includes political, developmental, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social reconciliation and security dimensions. The AU's PCRD framework, discussed above, comprises six similar constitutive elements, but adds gender as a stand-alone consideration.

Humanitarian assistance as an issue is treated differently across various models. A number of peacebuilding frameworks, such as the UN's Integrated Approach and the African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework (2004), conceptualised by the New Partnership for Africa's Development's (NEPAD's) Peace and Security Programme, in conjunction with the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), include charitable dimensions. However, some argue that humanitarian assistance should not be considered part of peacebuilding because it needs to be recognised as independent, neutral and impartial. In other words, while peacebuilding is inherently political, humanitarian assistance is at pains to remain above the politics of the day (Bloomfield et al. 2003). Nevertheless some models, including the UN's integrated approach, do include aid within their peacebuilding frameworks, arguing that the humanitarian dimension needs to be factored into overall peacebuilding planning and coordination mechanisms. However, they explicitly recognise that the humanitarian dimension has a special status and that it needs to be treated as an independent, but parallel, peacebuilding component (Seybolt 2008).

The interdependence of peacebuilding actors

The emergence of peacebuilding should be understood in the context of an increasingly complex and interdependent conflict management system (de Coning 2008), involving a wide array of actors with diverse, and at times conflicting values, interests, purposes, organisational forms and methods of action. The actors involved in any peacebuilding system can be distinguished on various levels, from local to international. They may include states, multilateral institutions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), local communities and corporations (Culbertson and Pouligny 2007).

The work of these actors spans all dimensions of life – the political, security, development, governance, economics and sociocultural. In each specific case the full panorama of local actors, including governments, political parties, traditional leaders, civil society and others, is engaged in the peacebuilding process. It is in the relationships and links among local actors, and between international actors, local

and international actors, and the structures of hierarchy and self-organisation that characterise each actor that the complexity of peacebuilding systems is generated (de Coning 2008).

There is continual tension between the independence and interdependence of peacebuilding actors and peace processes tend to sharpen these and increase the divergence of interests between international, regional and local actors. The various peacebuilding actors exist as independent agents with their own mandates, interests, programmes and resources, yet they are dependent on each other to achieve their respective objectives and those of the overall peacebuilding undertaking (de Coning 2008). Therefore, proper mechanisms need to be established to ensure that international and local actors work within a coherent strategy that establishes priorities and mobilises the necessary resources. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1645 (2005) emphasises 'the primary responsibility of national and transitional governments and authorities of countries emerging from conflict or at risk of relapsing into conflict, where they are established, in identifying their priorities and strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding, with a view to ensuring national ownership'. However, policy makers have drawn attention to the dangers of making national ownership an unquestioned principle because it can lead to donors privileging the formal institutions of the state without sufficient attention to the informal sector (Tschirgi 2006).

Peacebuilding is a long-term process driven by short-term realities

The fourth aspect is the time perspective, with broad consensus existing among peacebuilding practitioners on two time-related issues (Tschirgi 2004). Firstly, humanitarian intervention in post-conflict settings has been criticised for its short-term focus and absence of links to long-term planning. At policy level, post-conflict

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes

According to Sanz (2008), approximately US$1 599 billion was spent on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes in 2007, an average of US$1 434 spent per demobilised combatant. In the same year, nine of the 19 countries undergoing DDR were among the lowest ranked countries in terms of human development. The number of actors involved in receiving funds for and executing DDR programmes has increased substantially. The AU reinforced the importance of peace and security in Africa by launching the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Capacity Programme (DDRCP) in 2013, with the main aim of identifying gaps and challenges in

DDR processes on the continent and responding to them by providing timely political, technical and/or resources.

Since the launch of the DDRCP, the African Union Commission (AUC) has been able to carry out DDR assessment missions and provide support to South Sudan, CAR and Comoros. In addition, the AU has recently engaged in discussions with Sudan on how to implement DDR activities (African Union Peace and Security 2015).

peacebuilding is a long-term process requiring enduring commitment from both the international and local community. This was acknowledged and recognised by the United Nations World Summit in 2005, leading to the establishment of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) (United Nations 2004).

Peacebuilding is a process that assumes progress and advancement, but it can also be subject to periods of regression. Failure to sustain international engagement in countries like Haiti, Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s was seen as an important factor in the serial relapses into violent conflict experienced in these countries a decade later (de Coning 2012). The international community, therefore, needs to recognise a causal link between sustained international attention, combined with active inclusion of local communities, and longer-lasting peace processes. Furthermore, the gap between the time period that the UN, World Bank and international donors plan for and commit to, which rarely exceeds three years, needs to be recognised, while also recognising that these transformative processes take a long time – two to three decades – to take hold (ibid).

Moreover, there is recognition that even peacebuilding processes require long-term commitment; immediate and short-term gains are essential to solidify concord, build confidence in the peace process and stimulate visions of a better future (de Coning 2012). This has led to practices such as the now standard inclusion of funds for quick impact projects in UN peacekeeping budgets, and an acceptance that some aspects of DDR, rule of law and SSR should be funded out of UN-assessed contribution operations budgets for peacekeeping. This area still leaves room for significant debate, and the peacekeeping-peacebuilding nexus discussion in the UN system raises the question of where the limits should be drawn when it comes to using the assessed contribution budget, and how UN peacekeeping can be best employed as an early peacebuilding drive in in post-conflict situations (de Coning 2008).

Existence of multiple peacebuilding and state-building instruments

Post-conflict countries are frequently engaged developing several frameworks and initiatives geared at dealing with peacebuilding and state-building challenges. Some of these initiatives are led nationally, while others are managed by external

actors. Internationally, there are many examples, among them: initiatives at AU level, including the AU PCRD framework; the UN's larger peacebuilding framework, which includes work done by the UN PBC, UNDP and many others; the work and practice of the World Bank; and the development of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (New Deal) and the g7+, among others. Some of these initiatives and frameworks will be explained later within this handbook. Nationally, in each peacebuilding context and country, several different initiatives can be referenced as instruments utilised to address peacebuilding. These include peacebuilding strategies, poverty reduction mechanisms, and peacebuilding and development compacts, among many other national frameworks (African Union 2006).

With the development of a number of instruments that aim to structure and support peacebuilding processes, there are increasing opportunities for convergence between several of these platforms and frameworks. However, lack of convergence between processes frequently creates confusion between local stakeholders and international actors, and challenges for identifying the priorities of engagement and action. This has the potential to create a number of serious risks, such as the engagement of actors in certain processes due to their funding potential, rather than belief in the relevance of the activities themselves (Curtis 2012).

Greater coherence between policies and frameworks is required at both the national and international levels. Nationally, the design of complementary frameworks would benefit community, national and international actors, providing opportunities to engage constructively in peacebuilding processes. Internationally, actors could certainly provide better coordination in terms of how policies may channel responses effectively towards peacebuilding (Curtis 2012).

1.3 Approaches to peacebuilding

Several approaches to the operationalisation of peacebuilding can be identified. Peacebuilding refers to direct work that intentionally focuses on addressing the factors driving or mitigating conflict. It encompasses strategies that are coordinated at multiple levels and across sectors, including ensuring that there is funding and proper communication and coordination mechanisms between humanitarian assistance, development, governance, security and justice. Peacebuilding is a process but it is also an approach that supports peace. Table 1 highlights two broad characteristics of approaches to peacebuilding – programmatic peacebuilding and systemic peacebuilding (de Coning 2012).

Table 1: Characteristics of peacebuilding approaches

Characteristics	Programmatic peacebuilding	Systemic peacebuilding
Timeframe	Short- or medium-term	Long-term
Funding	Funding is generally project- specific and so each venture is individually funded	Often fragmented, with finances received from various funders
Approach	Problem-specific	Holistic
Focus	Immediate threats	Conflict as a whole, approached through a broad strategy

Programmatic peacebuilding

Programmatic peacebuilding refers to specific activities aimed at addressing urgent or imminent risks to a peace process. The points below summarise some of the fundamental aspects of programmatic peacebuilding:

- risk refers to the assessment that a certain situation or condition may contribute to the increased likelihood of lapse or relapse into violent conflict
- it focuses on conflict factors that may have a potentially negative impact on peace processes, and that can be addressed through specific targeted programme responses
- this can also be thought of as preventative peacebuilding or instrumental peacebuilding in that it refers to specific programming that is meant to prevent a lapse or relapse into conflict
- the timeframe for programmatic peacebuilding is necessarily short- to medium-term, because it is focused on countering immediate or imminent threats to the peace process.

Bringing together the main pillars of peacebuilding – peace, security, human rights and development – is very difficult, but the end results are rewarding. In a post-conflict context there is a need for security, development and stability, hence some donors can be expected to have funds specifically earmarked for peacebuilding, and those funds will most likely be used to fund specific programmes in this category (Sriram et al. 2013). Activities supported by the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (UN PBF) or the AU typically fall into this category and are aimed at addressing specific peace consolidation needs that have either remained unfunded, are under-funded, or have newly emerged. funding for their own programmes. These activities are

not necessarily identified, or funded, as peacebuilding activities at the programme level, although some of the programmes discussed in the previous section on programmatic peacebuilding can be included here. Instead, they are considered and funded as peacekeeping, development, human rights, job creation, or rule of law activities. It is when these activities are considered together over time, in the context of their combined and cumulative peace consolidation effect, which their systemic peacebuilding identity emerges.

Programmatic peacebuilding Initiatives

Examples of these types of peacebuilding programmes include conflict resolution training and capacity building, the development of institutional capabilities needed for conflict prevention (such as the South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission or the Ituri Pacification Commission in the DRC), support for civil society or women's groups to participate in peacemaking initiatives, and backing for national reconciliation initiatives, including considering aspects of transitional justice.



Furthermore, donors also include support for specific programme activities that form part of, or support, DDR, rule of law and SSR in this peacebuilding category (Sriram et al. 2013). Donors usually encourage the use of conflict-sensitive approaches to development when working in conflict-affected countries because development that is not sensitive to conflict can strengthen conflict drivers and increase the risk of violence breaking out. Conflict-sensitive programmes typically have a developmental objective, for example, poverty reduction, but are considerate of the conflict environments within which they operate, in that specific steps are taken in the design and management of programme to avoid further aggravating situations. In some cases, the programme design can also be intended to support conflict prevention efforts proactively, and such activities are almost indistinguishable from targeted peacebuilding ones. Conflict-sensitive approaches to development will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter Six.

Forms of risk analysis need to be undertaken as part of the process leading up to the design of appropriate and targeted peacebuilding programmes. These analyses are

AN IMPORTANT PRE-REQUISITE FOR EFFECTIVE PROGRAMMATIC PEACEBUILDING IS AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE RISKS TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE CONFLICT FACTORS THAT CHARACTERISE THE CONFLICT SYSTEM.

meant to assist the peacebuilding agent and leading stakeholders to work towards a common understanding of what the conflict factors in a particular context are, from the earliest planning stages and continuously through the life cycle of the peacebuilding system. Funding for, and capacity-building towards, effective participation in an appropriate analysis approach could also be regarded as a programmatic peacebuilding activity because it makes the peacebuilding activities context-specific and, therefore, more likely to succeed (Maynard 2002).

Systemic peacebuilding

In contrast to programmatic peacebuilding, systemic peacebuilding emerges out of the total combined effort of the activities undertaken under the various peacebuilding dimensions, and thus exists in the form of a system-wide or holistic process.

Systemic peacebuilding is not about imposing change, but suggesting interventions and providing a reasonable set of criteria. These initiatives or suggestions may be anchored in a strategy or vision, for example an integrated strategic framework such as the Lift Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) or the Afghan Compact in Afghanistan. There may be specific processes and structures that facilitate the development, management and monitoring of such peacebuilding frameworks and these may be specifically funded (de Coning 2010).

In general, however, support for systemic peacebuilding occurs in a highly fragmented manner in that the various agents participating in and contributing to one overall process each independently design, manage, monitor and evaluate, and secure funding for their own programmes. These activities are not necessarily identified or funded as peacebuilding activities at programme level, although some of the interventions discussed in the previous section on programmatic peacebuilding could be included here. Instead, they are considered and funded as peacekeeping, development, human rights, job creation or rule of law activities. It is when these undertakings are considered together, over time, in the context of their combined and cumulative peace consolidation effect, that their systemic peacebuilding identity emerges (de Coning 2012).

A strategic or integrated framework that supports an overall vision for a systemic peacebuilding process, such as a conflict-sensitive PRS, maps out the overall priorities and objectives of the systemic peacebuilding strategy for a particular

country or region. Examples include the Results-Focused Transitional Framework, interim Integrated Regional Support Programme (IRSP) and Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) in Liberia, the Peace Consolidation Strategy (PCS) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in Sierra Leone, as well as the integrated peacebuilding frameworks of Burundi and CAR. Individual programmes become part of the systemic peacebuilding process as they contribute towards, and come to be considered part of, the overall efforts aimed at achieving objectives set out in strategic vision documents (de Coning 2010).

In some cases, the individual agencies may be conscious of their role in the overall framework but, in many cases, this link is drawn only at the systemic level, for instance in strategic evaluations or in annual PRS reports. This does not imply that the connections are artificial, but rather that those at the programme level are not always aware of the degree to which their individual activities contribute to an overall systemic peacebuilding framework.

There is uncertainty about the extent to which a development activity, for example a programme aimed at poverty reduction or infrastructure development, can be regarded as having a peace consolidation effect and thus be considered part of a peacebuilding system. The confusion is due to perspective and context. An individual donor or implementing agent may not think of or categorise the funding for building a road as a peacebuilding effort from a programme level or budget-line perspective. However, from a systemic perspective, in the context of an integrated peacebuilding framework, building a road may be regarded as an important element of a larger systemic peacebuilding framework (de Coning 2010). According to de Coning (2010), this may create work for ex-combatants, stimulate local economies and improve livelihoods by providing access to markets. In summary, in such a context building a road can have important peacebuilding effects, as it contributes to an environment conducive to a successful peace process and, by so doing, helps to prevent relapse into conflict.

Therefore, as the construction of the road example demonstrates, developmental and other inputs that have a positive impact on the consolidation of peace can be regarded as being part of the larger peacebuilding system.

UN Photo/JC McIlwaine

UNDP, in collaboration with its implementing partner, Nile Hope, handed over 48 trader stalls in Mingkaman's Internally Displaced Persons Camp in South Sudan in March 2015.

1.4 Conclusion

As well as briefly delving into the historical context of peacebuilding, and highlighting what peacebuilding means in the African context, this chapter explained two distinct ways in which peacebuilding tends to be approached. Some see peacebuilding in the context of specific programmes that aim to contribute to peace consolidation, whilst others consider peacebuilding as an overall or system-wide effort, in other words, from a holistic perspective. The first approach is focused on what can be done, whilst the latter is attentive to understanding how and why peacebuilding works in the way that it does. These two approaches are related; for programmatic peacebuilding to be meaningful and sustainable, it needs to be part of a peacebuilding system that is actively pursuing a strategic direction.

This chapter also examined a number of emerging characteristics that, taken together, may assist with increasing understanding of the concept of peacebuilding. The major characteristics – peace consolidation, the multidimensional nature of peacebuilding, the interdependence of peacebuilding actors, the longer-term vs. shorter-term approaches to peacebuilding, the existence of multiple frameworks for peacebuilding, and the linkage with the development of peace agreements – have all been discussed.

Chapter Two:
Understanding and analysing conflict

What will this chapter do?

- It will introduce information on the nature of conflict as well as the objectives and tools of conflict analysis.

Why is it important?

- Better understanding the nature, context and dynamics of a (given) conflict enables practitioners working in the development/humanitarian/peacebuilding field to understand their role in the conflict environment and the most appropriate action to take at each stage of their intervention, while preventing further harm from being done.

What should you learn?

- By the end of this chapter, the reader should have a deeper understanding of conflict and some of the tools available to interpret and analyse it where it occurs.

2.1 Introduction

Each conflict is different, having a unique combination of characteristics that define it; among them its history, root causes and effects, as well as the actors involved. It is important to identify the conflict drivers in particular contexts, and to adapt peacebuilding strategies to ensure that they are relevant for application in a particular country and to the possible changes that may occur within that specific environment. If the overall analysis and interpretation of a local conflict's dynamics is inaccurate or removed from the realities on the ground, the overarching peacebuilding strategy employed there is likely to be misdirected and ineffective.

This chapter aims to provide information to improve readers' understanding of the nature, common characteristics and different levels of conflict. It also provides insight into the objectives, principles, and a few common tools of conflict analysis.

2.2 Defining conflict

Conflict is a natural part of life and, when constructively addressed, it can bring about positive changes (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs et al. 2014). Conflict has been defined as 'a confrontation between one or more parties aspiring towards incompatible or competitive means of ends' (Miller 2005:22). It can also be defined as a 'perceived divergence of interest, or a belief that the parties'

current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously' (Prutt and Rubin 1996:4), and can take place at different levels (see Toolkit 1 below).

Henderson and de Coning explain that conflict:

- involves people: it is a state of human interaction that takes place between two or more parties (or it can involve even two or more parts of ourselves)
- is a state of human interaction where there is disharmony
- emerges when parties compete over actual or perceived values, goals or interests
- takes place when parties confront each other with competing actions and counter-actions
- is a sign that something is changing, has changed or is needing to change (2008: 38).

As we observe life, it is apparent that conflicts are often painful and uncomfortable, but also necessary; they have the potential to transform situations and bring about positive growth, if handled appropriately (see Case Study 1 on page 11). Therefore, conflicts should not be suppressed, but channelled and worked with. They can be considered an inevitable part of human life that can create opportunities for positive change through:

- creating opportunities for balancing the power within relationships or wider society, and for reconciling people's legitimate interests
- leading to greater understanding and self-awareness, as well as awareness of differences and diversity between people, organisations and societies
- leading to personal, organisational and even systemic development and growth
- acting as a valuable medium for openly expressing and solving problems
- allowing for dissimilar interests to be reconciled
- cultivating unity within groups (Henderson and de Coning 2008:46).

There is evidence from situations around the world that conflicts can have a devastating impact if they are left unrestrained and unmanaged (Henderson and de Coning 2008). It is therefore crucial to find the means to manage conflicts peacefully, while harnessing their positive contributions to necessary change and growth.

Toolkit 1: Levels of conflict



Inner conflict is the result of challenges we face daily over difficult decisions, anger, anxiety and frustration at the world not being as we wish it to be.

Interpersonal conflict occurs in a team or office environment and is, for example, a common feature of diverse international teams that work together in a peace mission environment.

Intergroup conflict can occur between aid organisations, the police, military, and civilian components of a peace operation, or between groups in a community.

Intrastate conflict occurs between different parties that attempt to gain control of part or all of a country.

Interstate conflict takes place between countries, or may include several countries in a region. A peace mission in one country may discover that a number of neighbouring states are playing a role in the conflict by providing support to one or more factions (Henderson and de Coning 2008).

2.3 Conflict analysis

Conflict analysis is an important instrument for practitioners working in the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding fields (Africa Peace Forum et al. 2004). It helps practitioners to gain a nuanced understanding of the context in which they work and their role in that context; it enables them to understand the effectiveness of their intervention in a conflict, 'prevent further harm from being done, help determine priorities for programme development and lead to understanding better the consequences of any actions or policies' (United States Peace Institute 2015). Conflict analysis as a process thus also acts as the foundation for ensuring conflict sensitivity, an approach that will be examined further in Chapter Six.

Conflict analysis can help practitioners to identify the most appropriate actions to take at each stage of the project/programme cycle – planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation. At the planning stage, conflict analysis helps practitioners to define new interventions and to apply a conflict-sensitive lens to new and pre-defined interventions (e.g. for beneficiaries, and in the selection of areas of operation, partners, staff and timeframe). In the implementation stage, it helps to monitor the interaction between the intervention and the context, and to inform project set-up and day-to-day decision making. In the monitoring and evaluation stage, it helps to measure the interaction of the interventions and the conflict dynamics within which they are situated (Africa Peace Forum et.al. 2004).

It is important to note that conflict analysis can also be carried out at various levels (e.g. community, national, regional and international) (see Figure 2). Identifying the appropriate focus for the conflict analysis is crucial as issues and dynamics present at national level may be different from those at the grassroots. While linking the depth of conflict analysis to the level of intervention is vital, it is also important to identify critical backwards and forwards linkages with other interrelated levels of conflict dynamics.

Figure 2: Interrelated levels of conflict analysis



Source: Africa Peace Forum et al. 2004:2.

Conflict analysis can thus be carried out at different levels and at different stages of the programme/project cycle. The purpose of the analysis and the importance it is awarded will determine which conflict analysis tool or methodology is the most appropriate. Furthermore, each conflict analysis tool/framework has different strengths and weaknesses, and provides different, yet complementary information on the context and dynamics of the conflict. It is important for practitioners to identify the most suitable frameworks or tools to use, and possibly to adapt these if necessary (see Toolkit 2 on page 30).

Conflict analysis should not be conducted in isolation. Practitioners need to engage in ongoing multi-stakeholder dialogue about conflict analysis to ensure that maintenance, review and validation take place collaboratively and on a regular basis (Garred et al. 2015). It is also important ensure that participatory methods are used and that a range of perspectives are collected to inform analyses, as this helps create an awareness of people's individual experiences and perspectives and broaden understanding of the context (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium 2012). In particular, the engagement of local civil society in conflict analysis is crucial, as at the heart of conflict and development lies the question of power and who is able to shape policies and actions at the national and international levels. A participatory process that gathers local knowledge has the potential to not only develop the

quality of analysis by challenging assumptions and establishing balance, but also to enable ownership of the analysis by those affected by the turmoil of conflict and to strengthen the resilience and capacity for collaboration by local civil society. A participatory approach has the potential to transform conflict analysis into a robust and grounded process that can empower locals (Garred et al. 2015). The methods frequently used for conflict analysis include desk research, expert interviews, surveys, community consultations and workshops with relevant actors (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium 2012).

Toolkit 2: Checklist for selecting a conflict analysis tool

1. Purpose



- Does the tool provide the information you need for your work?
- Is the conflict analysis process suitable for your aims?

2. Assumptions

- Do you share the tool's understanding of conflict?
- Is this perspective compatible with your organisation's values and mandate?
- How long does it take to gain results?

3. Methodology

- Does the methodology match the purpose of the analysis?
- Does the proposed methodology agree with the values and approaches of your organisation?
- How long does it take to gain information?

4. Resource implications

- What are the resource connotations of the tool (e.g. travel required, staff time)?
- Is your organisation able to allocate the required resources?

5. Availability

- Is the tool available at a time and cost that suits you?
- Can full documentation be accessed?

(Africa Peace Forum et al. 2004:12).

Case Study 3:
Assisting with nationwide conflict mapping exercise in post-Ebola Liberia

The consolidation of peacebuilding in Liberia has remained a major concern, particularly in the post-Ebola context. Consequently, the Liberia Peacebuilding Office planned to conduct a comprehensive nation-wide assessment at the end of 2015 that would assess potential conflict indicators, and the impact Liberian peacebuilding actors, frameworks and programmes have had in the country. The mapping exercise is hoped to support the National Reconciliation Roadmap and also build the practical capacities of Liberians to better understand issues affecting peace consolidation in the country. Due to high demand and relevance of the mapping exercise to the Liberian peace process, personnel tasked with conducting the nation-wide mapping, and also those who will be interpreting the data from the mapping exercise, would benefit immensely from training on conflict analysis. ACCORD responded to this need by providing training in conflict analysis in October 2015 for Liberian conflict mappers and analysts. With an emphasis on the engagement of civil society and the use of participatory methods, the training aimed to build participants' capacities (skills and knowledge) in conflict analysis and the gathering of reliable evidence-based data during the comprehensive nation-wide conflict assessment or mapping exercise in Liberia.



The main value of the tools lies in guiding the systematic search for information and providing a framework for analysing it, in the process raising critical questions and offering new perspectives. There are a number of conflict analysis tools that seek to provide information on different features and characteristics of conflict, including its nature, actors, causes and dynamics (Africa Peace Forum et al. 2004). The next sections discuss five tools of conflict analysis – conflict profile, conflict timeline, conflict mapping, conflict tree, conflict stages – that can be used to assess the different characteristics of conflict in a structured manner.

2.3.1 Conflict profile

The conflict profile provides a quick overview of the extent, causes and evolution of the conflict. It is, therefore, a good tool to use at the start of a detailed conflict analysis

process. This mechanism enables practitioners to structure the information available on the conflict systematically, and to edit it into a more manageable set of problems and questions that would need to be asked when starting conflict analysis process. Table 2 below highlights some central issue areas that are useful in drawing up a conflict profile.

Table 2: List of possible central questions on conflict characteristics

Conflict characteristics	Examples of entral questions
Type	• Is it an international/regional/local conflict? • Is the main cause of the conflict economic/social, or is it over identity and values?
Phase	• What phase is the conflict in? • Is it escalating? • Has a peace agreement been signed, and is there space for reconstruction efforts?
Extent	• What is the geographical spread of the conflict? • What are the economic and human costs? • What is the extent of armed group involvement?
Constellations	• Who are the actors and what are the alliances in the conflict? • What kind of patterns exist in the level of conflict and violence?
Trends and risks	• What are the national and regional repercussions of the conflict? • What are the probable impacts of victory or defeat for the parties?
Causes	• What are the economic, political and social causes to the conflict?
Settlements and peace processes	• What are the ongoing peacebuilding processes in the country?

Source: German Technical Corporation 2011:52–53.

2.3.2 Conflict timeline

The timeline (see Figure 3 below) is a simple conflict analysis tool that lists the key events (e.g. violent confrontations or peace initiatives) of a conflict in chronological order, thereby creating a simple tool to document the local history of the conflict and thereby identify its important events. The line mirrors the subjective perception of the actor or group being questioned on how the conflict has evolved over time. Thus, it allows users to distinguish between the different viewpoints that actors have on the development of the conflict. These may include the position of the major ruling party as opposed to the opposition party, or the different perspectives of individual parties to the conflict. It is common that different groups recall different events, and 'that they have different explanations for particular developments such as the escalation of the conflict or the conclusion of a peace accord' (German Technical Corporation 2011: 56). The method of drawing up a conflict timeline is simple: one must decide on a suitable year (i.e. a year that marks the beginning of events that are relevant for the analysis) to start the timeline, after which each group's/actors' (perception of) the most important events of the conflict are recorded on the time axis (ibid).

Figure 3: Conflict timeline – example from Uganda

Events as viewed by people of Teso	Year	Events as viewed by Ugandan government
Retreating soldiers loot Teso	1986	
National Resistance Army (NRA) disarms Teso local militia Karamojong raid cattle	1987	NRA takes Kampala, sets up new government NRA encounters armed militia in Teso
Former army officers in Teso form rebel army	1988	NRA continues fighting opposition in the north
People move to towns or leave area, to avoid fighting	1989	Government sends army to Teso to stop rebellion
Government soldiers herd people into concentration camps • inadequate food and water • people forced to inform on rebels	1990	Government ministers try to mediate and are kidnapped by rebels (one killed)
Elders of Teso contact their 'sons' in rebel army to try to stop the fighting	1991	Church leaders try to mediate between government and rebels
Rebels stop fighting for the good of their people	1992	Rebels surrender

Source: Fischer 2005:21.

2.3.3 Conflict mapping

Conflict mapping is one of the most common conflict analysis tools and is used to identify the main actors in a conflict. Specifically, this method entails producing a graphical presentation that enables practitioners to clarify the:

- main conflict theme and issues
- actors and their influence or power over the conflict
- relationship between the actors (Centre for Security Studies 2005).

The analysis should not only take into consideration the actors directly affected by conflict, but also those who are indirectly impacted, or are allied with or have influence over one of the parties. This helps in identifying the alliances between the factions, as well patterns of power, neutral third parties, potential alliances for cooperation and possible entry points for intervention. It is also vital when conducting such an analysis to consider the analyst's personal relationships with the various actors on the map, because the person/organisation conducting the analysis is also implicated in the situation. It is also important to remember that the dynamics of conflict, and therefore the relationships between the actors, change over time.

In order to focus conflict mapping on a particular problem area it is essential to define:

- what precisely the map is intended to show
- the point in time to which the analysis should relate
- from whose perspective the mapping is being carried out.

A graphical representation of conflict mapping is shown in Figure 4, while Figure 5 outlines a number of conventions that can be used in conflict mapping to describe the types of relationships the parties have with one another and the issue. The process includes identifying relevant actors to the conflict, and representing them individually as 'circles', with the size of the circle representing the relative influence they have in the conflict. Partners in alliances should be drawn close to one another. The linkages between the actors should be described using the conventions displayed in Figure 4. Finally, the conflict issue and the practitioners' own organisation need to be included in the drawing. This exercise allows experts to discuss and examine the allocation of roles between different peace actors, entry points for their own organisation and the formation of alliances and synergies (German Technical Corporation 2011).

Figure 4: Conflict mapping



Source: Fischer 2005:23.

Figure 5: Conflict mapping conventions

- Indicates parties involved in the situation (relative size = power with regards to the issue)
- Indicates links, i.e. fairly close relationships
- Indicates an alliance
- Indicates informal or intermittent links
- Indicates the predominant direction of influence
- Indicates discord, conflict
- Indicates a broken relationship
- Indicates issues or things other than people

Source: Fischer 2005:23.

2.3.4 Conflict tree

A conflict tree is a useful graphical tool used to explore the core problem(s) of a conflict by identifying it's root causes and effects. The starting point before drawing a conflict tree is to agree on the core problem of the conflict to be addressed (e.g. ethnic tension). Then next task it to draw a picture of a tree (see Figure 6 below), including its branches, trunk and roots. The core problem to be addressed is written on the trunk. Subsequently, the root causes and effects of the problem can be identified, with the causes placed at the roots of the tree and the effects in the branches of the tree. By visually identifying the root causes and effects of a particular problem, the tree enables practitioners to identify potential points where intervention in a conflict might be more successful, and whether such interventions can be expected to tackle particular effect(s) or root cause(s) of the identified problem. In other words, practitioners can consider which point of intervention would be most effective for their organisation to tackle – given their mandate, area of speciality and capacities (Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict and Norwegian Church Aid 2012).

Figure 6: Conflict tree



Source: Henderson and de Coning 2008:60

Using the conflict tree in Karamoja, Uganda

In northwest Uganda, at Losilang, beneficiaries referred to signs/symptoms of conflict (branches) such as loss, grief, death, gender-based violence, rape, human rights abuses, fear, trauma, violence and theft. When referring to the problem (trunk), raiding and the arms trade were emphasised. Coming to the 'roots' of the problem, factors mentioned included loss of authority by elders, unemployment, insufficient livelihood strategies and opportunities, little or no income, and lack of water.

This tool was useful in reflecting collectively on the root causes of conflict, the associated problems and the impact these have in their communities. It also helped to facilitate dialogue and participation, generating possible solutions to address the root causes of disharmony. Conducting this exercise with a number of communities can assist in identifying commonalities and differences, as well as the different strategies implemented by communities to address problems (Trocaire 2011).

2.3.5 Conflict stages

Conflicts evolve over time, passing through different stages of tension, intensity, activity and violence. Conflict stages is a graphical aid that helps practitioners to recognise the different stages of a conflict, and to use this information, together with other tools, to analyse the events and dynamics that relate to each stage of the conflict (see timeline example (Figure 3) and Figure 7). In particular, this tool enables practitioners to identify the stages and cycles of escalation and de-escalation of the conflict, to examine the current situation of the conflict, to try to prevent future patterns of conflict escalation by predicting them beforehand and, finally, 'to identify a period of time to be analysed later using other tools' (Fischer 2005:19). Thus, this tool can be employed early in the conflict analysis process to identify patterns in the struggle, as well as later to help in building an intervention strategy. The basic analysis involves five stages, which theoretically occur in the order outlined below (ibid). However, variations occur regularly and this model should be understood as a linear analytical tool, while real world experience is non-linear and highly dynamic (de Coning 2012). The five stages are discussed below.

i. **Pre-conflict** – a stage of conflict that is marked by incompatibilities between the goals of two or more parties, which could possibly result in open conflict. The conflict is generally still hidden from the general public, although the parties themselves might be aware of the possibility of confrontation. The relationships between the parties may be strained and/or they might intentionally try to avoid contact with each other.

ii. **Confrontation** – at this stage the conflict appears more visible. If only one side to the conflict considers that there is a problem, its supporters may begin to protest or display other types of confrontational behaviour. Sporadic fighting or other low levels of violence may occur between the different parties to the conflict. Each side may be drawing together its resources and possibly finding allies, in anticipation of increasing levels of confrontation and violence. Relationships between the different sides become exceedingly strained, which leads to polarisation between each side's supporters.

iii. **Crisis** – a this juncture, the conflict is at its peak, and tensions and/or violence are at their most intense. In a large-scale conflict, this stage denotes a period of war, when people on all sides to the conflict are being killed. Typical communication between the different sides has possibly ceased. Public statements tend to take the form of allegations made against the other side(s).

iv. **Outcome** – at this stage of the conflict, the crisis has led to an outcome. This can take place due to one side having defeated the other(s), or perhaps due to the calling of ceasefire (in the case of war). One party might give in or surrender to the claims of the other party. The parties may agree to engage in dialogue, either with the assistance of a mediator of by entering into direct negotiations. An authority or another more powerful third party may compel an end to fighting. Nevertheless, at this stage, confrontation and violence decrease to some extent as a settlement seems possible.

v. **Post-conflict** – 'Finally, the situation is resolved in a way that leads to the ending of any violent confrontation, to a decrease in tensions and to more normal relationships between the parties. However, if the issues and problems arising from their incompatible goals have not been addressed adequately, this stage could eventually lead back into another pre-conflict situation' (Fischer 2005: 19).

Figure 7: Conflict stages – example from Uganda



Source: Fischer 2005:20

Case Study 4:
Applying the conflict stages tool in Uganda

The case study of Uganda provides an example of how the conflict stages tool was used to analyse conflicts in western and central Uganda, and conflicts taking place in the Teso region of northeast Uganda during the same period. The analysis demonstrates that the conflict was most intense (and considered as such) in western and central Uganda between 1984 and 1986, whereas the confrontation and crisis took place later (1988–92) in the Teso region. Therefore, while one part of the country was perceived as relatively peaceful, another region was in the midst of violent conflict and extreme insecurity, and vice versa. This highlights the need to analyse both time periods in order to comprehend the conflict from the perspectives of parties in both parts of the country (Fischer 2005).



2.4 Conclusion

This chapter provided background aimed at helping the reader to understand the nature and types of conflict. It covered information on objectives, guiding principles, steps and tools of conflict analysis, and the ways in which this aid can support practitioners in the development/humanitarian/peacebuilding fields to develop appropriate, context-specific responses to conflict. In particular, conflict analysis enables practitioners to understand their role in a (given) conflict environment, and identify possible partners for their interventions and the appropriate action to undertake at each stage of their intervention, while preventing further harm from being done. This chapter has highlighted that conflict analysis should not be conducted in isolation. The analysis needs to be socially inclusive and it is important to engage in ongoing multi-stakeholder dialogue about conflict analysis to ensure that maintenance, review and validation take place collaboratively and on a regular basis.

Chapter Three: Peacebuilding phases and dimensions

What will this chapter do?

- It will provide insights into the phases and dimensions of peacebuilding.

Why is it important?

- By explaining peacebuilding phases and dimensions, this chapter aims to support readers to better understand the meaning behind the timing, objectives and content of peacebuilding processes and efforts.

What should you learn?

- The three identifiable, yet context-specific, phases of peacebuilding.
- Basics of the objectives and content of peacebuilding dimensions, and their context-specific timing and execution.
- The interdependence of different peacebuilding considerations, noting that only a holistic, multi-dimensional approach can lay the foundation for sustainable peace.

3.1 Introduction

Chapter One of this handbook examined the emerging characteristics of and approaches to peacebuilding, with focus on the African context. This chapter aims to deepen readers' understanding of peacebuilding by looking at the three identifiable phases that peacebuilding processes go through in the transition from violent conflict to sustainable peace. It also aims to provide insight into the five dimensions of peacebuilding, as well as the processes that need to be considered and possibly executed to prevent relapses into violent conflict, and to consolidate peace. It is worth noting that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to peacebuilding and each context necessitates a unique response to its challenges (Connolly 2015). Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that the different peacebuilding dimensions are interlinked and interdependent, and thereby no single dimension can achieve sustainable peace on its own (de Coning 2005).

3.2 Peacebuilding phases

Peacebuilding has traditionally been considered something that starts when hostilities end; that is, as a post-conflict activity. Peacebuilding in this understanding, therefore, was expected to be preceded by a ceasefire or peace agreement. However, the contemporary view is that peacebuilding is relevant at all stages of the

conflict-to-peace transition. One way of thinking about this transition is to divide it into three stages: stabilisation, transitional and consolidation. The phases should not be considered linear and time-bound, nor should they have absolute boundaries. Overlap in the transition between phases, as well as regression, should be anticipated, as a specific case may require moving back and forth between phases to accommodate the situation at any given time (United Nations 2004). The dynamics of the phases inform peacebuilding stakeholders of what actions and/or processes to undertake. Table 3 below outlines a broad overview of these phases.

Table 3: Peacebuilding phases

Stabilisation phase	Transitional phase	Consolidation phase
• disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation • humanitarian emergency • priority for the locals is survival • strong visibility and involement of external	• recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction • building local capacities • creating legitimate state institutions • developing rule of law	• reconciliation • security sector reform • handover of greater responsibility to locals • priority to local ownership • increasing human rights • trauma healing

3.2.1 Stabilisation phase

The stabilisation phase has a dual focus: firstly, establishing a safe and secure environment and, secondly, managing the immediate consequences of the conflict through the implementation of emergency humanitarian assistance programmes. The stabilisation phase is synonymous with what is referred to as the humanitarian emergency phase. During the middle and late parts of the stabilisation phase, preparations are underway for medium-term rehabilitation and longer-term reconstruction and development actions, and it is thus likely that various needs assessments will be undertaken, often culminating in an international donor conference. During this phase internal actors are typically preoccupied with basic survival and the reorganisation of their social and political systems (de Coning 2007). External stakeholders often play a prominent role during the stabilisation phase, but it is emphasised that they should seek every opportunity to involve and consult with local actors.

3.2.2 Transitional phase

The transitional phase typically starts with the appointment of a transitional government. This may be followed by an election process to select an interim government, a constituent assembly or an equivalent body responsible for writing a new constitution or otherwise laying the foundation for a future political dispensation. This process takes place in line with provisions of the interim constitution, following which a new, fully independent and legitimately elected government comes to power. This phase is focused on establishing a different, legitimate and sustainable socio-political order, underpinned by a functioning administration, rule of law and a sustainable socioeconomic system. The humanitarian focus shifts from emergency relief to recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction. The relationship between internal and external players should reflect a growing partnership and a gradual handover of increasingly greater responsibility to local institutions.

3.2.3 Consolidation phase

The consolidation phase seeks to support the newly elected government and non-state actors with a broad range of programmes aimed at fostering reconciliation and nation-building, boosting socioeconomic reconstruction, consolidating rule of law and SSR, as well as sustaining development programmes across the political, security, socioeconomic and reconciliation dimensions of peacebuilding. Peace operations led by the UN, with focus on their military components, are likely to draw down and eventually withdraw during the early or middle stages of the consolidation phase. Responsibilities will be transferred from the relevant UN peacekeeping operation to a UN peacebuilding mission, the UN country team and internal actors. The consolidation phase thus aims to ensure that internal actors develop their capacity to take full responsibility for the peacebuilding process, and that the role of external actors is progressively reduced to that of providing technical assistance and support (de Coning 2007).

3.3 Peacebuilding dimensions

Although the specific configuration of peacebuilding efforts will be unique in each context, it is possible to identify a broad peacebuidling framework consisting of five dimensions (see Figure 8) that will each be explored in turn.

Figure 8: Peacebuilding dimensions



Source: de Coning 2005: 94

3.3.1 Human security

The AU defines human security as,

> …the security of the individual with respect to the satisfaction of the basic needs of life; it also encompasses the creation of the social, political, economic, military, environmental and cultural conditions necessary for the survival, livelihood, and dignity of the individual, including the protection of fundamental freedoms, the respect for human rights, good governance, access to education, health care, and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his/her own potential (African Union 2005).

The fulfilment of the human security dimension, therefore, entails putting in place a wide range of measures. In the stabilisation phase, one of the most urgent points to focus on is minimising the possibilities for spoilers, unlawful actors and opportunists who seek to benefit from near-chaotic situations. A key peacebuilding process in this phase is DDR of former combatants, which usually continues during the transitional and consolidation phases (Douglas et al. 2004). In the transitional and consolidation phases, emphasis may also gradually shift to SSR, aimed at ensuring the development of suitable, professional and credible internal defence services and a police force (de Coning 2005). Next we examine two key components in the maintenance of security: DDR and SSR.

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration

Programmes for the DDR of former combatants are an essential component of peacekeeping missions and post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. Ensuring the success of DDR programmes is critical to sustainable peace and development. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration processes strive to transform agents of war into representatives of peace by not only disarming and discharging former perpetrators, but also reintegrating them into society (see Case Study 5 below). A successful DDR process requires that the wide range of organisations (e.g. national demobilisation commissions and peacekeeping missions) involved are consistent in their planning, implementation and financing of such efforts.

Disarmament involves the relinquishing of arms by former fighter, as well as in many cases, civilians. Disarmament is essential as a confidence-building measure in society aimed 'at increasing stability in a very tense, uncertain environment with nervous participants and a wary population' (Douglas et al. 2004:29). Its goal is to ensure that societies return to normal situations in which people will favour non-violent means of conflict resolution. It strives to reduce the number of guns that remain in circulation among populations, and the possibility of weapons being used in the future (ibid). Demobilisation has been defined as the 'formal, usually controlled discharge of active soldiers from the armed forces or from an armed group' (ibid). The phase involves ensuring that combatants are counted, registered and monitored, and prepared for discharge with identification documents, while ensuring that they obtain the necessary information to be able to integrate back into society. Reintegration involves supporting former fighters to acquire civilian status, and supporting them to reintegrate socially and economically into civilian life. These processes aim to create a smooth transition of returnees from the war to civilian life and ensure that they are able to earn a livelihood through peaceful means. Reconciliation should take place during the reintegration phase so that communities welcome former combatants and are able to assist them in their reintegration. Reintegration goes further, in providing the resources, both financial and in-kind, for former combatants to settle back into their communities (ibid).

UN Photo/Martine Perret

Weapons being burnt during the official launch of the disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) process in Muramvya, Burundi in December 2014. Burundian military signed up voluntarily to be disarmed under the auspices of UN peacekeepers and observers (2 December 2014).

Case Study 5:
Sierra Leone – building trust between former combatants and communities

The Lomé Peace Agreement of 1999 incorporated the development of a DDR programme targeting all belligerent parties, including Armed Forces of Sierra Leone (later renamed Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force), the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), Civil Defence Forces (CDF) and other groups. The DDR programme was carried out in three phases between September 1998 and January 2002. It initially faced serious setbacks, but the third time was successful, mainly because both the government and the RUF had realised that victory through military means would not possible.

Nonetheless, local social reintegration was not easy. Ex-combatants feared they would be targeted and ostracised, while civilians dreaded a return to violence, or resented the crimes that ex-combatants were frequently alleged to have committed. To reduce tensions and facilitate the reintegration of former fighters into communities, the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR) set up social reconciliation programmes in areas of critical tension – the south, east and northern parts of Sierra Leone. The NCDDR provided pre-discharge counselling to ex-combatants. Pre-demobilisation activities included

community sensitisation exercises and media and radio campaigns. Traditional reconciliation mechanisms were also employed. In potentially serious cases, where war crimes were alleged to have been committed, the NCDDR acted as a facilitator with traditional leaders to enable and pave the way for the return of former combatants. In a further bid to strengthen reconciliation, the NCDDR encouraged returning fighter to undertake tasks that could be beneficial to their communities. It also supported adult education programmes, civic and peace education, music, sports groups and other projects that contribute to rebuilding social capital (Ginifer 2003).



Security sector reform

While recognising that security sector components vary according to each country's context and situation, the African Union's view is that, in Africa, the security sector comprises 'individuals, groups and institutions that are responsible for the provision, management and oversight of security for people and the state' (African Union 2013:5). The AU defines SSR as a 'process by which countries formulate or re-orient the policies, structures, and capacities of institutions and groups engaged in the security sector, in order to make them more effective, efficient, and responsive to democratic control, and to the security and justice needs of the people' (African Union 2013:6). In Africa, SSR is increasingly being acknowledged as one of the most important contributors to development and peace on the continent (Bryden 2015). In post-conflict settings, SSR is an essential contributor to sustainable peace and development. Reforming the security sector can contribute to making people feel safe and secure and to rebuilding confidence between the state and citizens (United Nations 2015). Lessons from diverse African transition processes have contributed much to the evolution of the SSR discourse since it first emerged in the face of more complex security situations at the end of the Cold War (African Security Network 2015 and Bryden 2015). Although SSR has become the dominant theme, a number of related concepts, such as security sector development, management, reconstruction and – particularly among African scholars – transformation, have emerged to emphasise a particular type of context or approach (ibid).

Security sector reform is integrated as a prominent part of wider post-conflict peacebuilding frameworks and efforts in Africa. Processes can entail extremely sensitive procedures, both within states and externally, particularly in cases where national-level reforms are supported by the international community, as this can raise inherent tension around local ownership of interventions. To avoid the range of potential sensitivities raised by SSR, it is important to acknowledge that SSR not only comprises technical activities, but may change the national security discourse and become an integral part of wider political transitions. The reality is that SSR creates winners and losers, and this (which is inherently a context-specific consideration) must be taken into account in every reform effort. It is therefore vital to accommodate SSR support in a way that is mindful of national, political, security and socioeconomic realities. There are no one-size-fits-all SSR solutions for addressing the sensitive and complex conflicts in Africa (Bryden 2015).

African Union definition of actors involved in SSR processes

Primary security institutions – including police, armed forces and other law enforcement agencies, border management, immigration and customs authorities, presidential guards, anti-terrorist units, office/directorate of the state department, and other services set up by an AU member state.

Specialised intelligence and security institutions – involving those in charge of finding and using intelligence to preserve state sovereignty, state security and to defend vital national interests. These organisations may be involved in security activities such as counter-espionage, counter-terrorism and the fight against all forms of organised crime.

Public oversight and management bodies – among them the executive, justice ministries, the legislature, national security advisory bodies, parliamentary sub-committees, anti-corruption collectives, customary authorities, the Pan-African Parliament, and regional parliamentary bodies.

Justice and rule of law institutions – such as the judiciary, prisons and other correctional facilities, office of the attorney general, office of the public prosecutor, ombudspersons, traditional and transitional justice systems, human rights commissions, tribunals and courts.

Civil emergence units – for example search and rescue services, fire-fighting, riot control, natural disaster management and natural resource protection divisions.

Non-state security bodies – such as private security companies, informal, traditional and customary authorities and others, as may be decided by each Member State' (African Union 2013: 5–6).

3.3.2 Political transition, governance and democratisation

The political transition, governance and democratisation dimension entails support for evolution and representative participatory processes, development of governmental institutions that are effective and legitimate, and reforming or establishing the bureaucracy in all sections of the administration (de Coning 2005 and Zartman 1995). Political transition can include providing support for the formation of an interim government, and the constitutional and electoral process, as well as capacity-building for civil society and political parties. The governance process entails strengthening management in the public sector, revival of local governance, reformation of the civil service, widening civil society participation in decision-making practises, and facilitating the development of enabling policy frameworks and legislation. Usually it is necessary to place particular emphasis on establishing rule of law and reforming the criminal justice system (de Coning 2005).

Experience has shown that, in the early phases of a process of transition from conflict to peace, poor democratic culture, absence of good governance and destroyed institutions may contribute to the fragility of the peace process and increase the risk of a resumption of violence (African Union 2014). Similarly, in post-conflict situations, leaders may feel threatened by an election loss, creating situations tainted with electoral violence, fraud and manipulation (Search for Common Ground 2012). Political participation and governance constitutes one of the indicative elements of the AU PCRD. The component's core value is the promotion of good democratic governance, which includes 'political participation, transparency, accountability, separation of powers, creation of a (public) civil service, the rule of law and independent civil oversight' (African Union 2006). In addition, the AU's PCRD framework states that key elements related to consensus-building, decentralisation of governance and human resource and policy development should make the building blocks for good governance structures. Good leadership in societies emerging from conflict is recognised as a key enabling factor in helping to determine strategies for the equitable distribution of power, the establishment of good governance structures, and 'consolidation of peace and facilitation of transition from the emergency to the development phases of its reconstruction' (ibid 2006).

3.3.3 The socioeconomic development dimension

The socioeconomic development dimension entails the relief, recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction of basic economic and social services, and the return, resettlement, and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees. The processes involved in this dimension need to be implemented through an approach that takes into account the dynamic linkages between measures related to providing emergency

humanitarian assistance and the longer-term actions for poverty reduction, economic recovery and sustained growth. Efforts in this dimension entail rehabilitation and/or reconstruction of infrastructure, emergency humanitarian assistance, provision of social services (e.g. health, social welfare and education), and inducing economic development and growth through trade, investment, employment creation and regulatory and legal reform (de Coning 2005).

The AU's PCRD framework includes socioeconomic development as a focus area, which is defined as 'a multidimensional process that contributes to improved living conditions, improved ability to meet basic needs (such as health, education, and food), the reduction of poverty and inequality and enhanced capacity of human beings to realise their potential' (African Union 2006:5). The strategy's section on socioeconomic reconstruction and development outlines a number of objectives, including:

- 'addressing the gap between relief and development in order to ensure that a country does not revert to a war economy
- formulating policies that address social inequity, during the transition, reconstruction and development phases
- undertaking comprehensive institution-building to enhance good economic governance – this should guarantee that war economy actors are discouraged from reverting to previous corruptive [*sic*] behaviour
- building human resource capacity at local and national levels for policy development needs: assessment, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programmes and activities. This is especially important because it will create a system that can be actively monitored and government officials can be held accountable for the country's progress (or lack of progress)
- building a technology base to support reconstruction and development and developing physical infrastructure, including transport, communication, energy, water, health and sanitation' (Broodryk and Solomon 2010:18).

The framework also includes a commitment to promote national and local ownership, and to address the root causes of conflict (Broodryk and Solomon 2010). One of the most overlooked socioeconomic dimensions is environmental peacebuilding, or work to arrest the depletion of natural resources. Natural resources are one of a country's most critical assets for peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery. Land, forests, minerals, oil, water and other resources are the foundation on which livelihoods and national economies are rebuilt. The structural dimension of peacebuilding tends to focus on the social conditions that foster violent conflict but many note that stable peace must be built on social, economic and political foundations that serve the needs of the population. In many cases, crises arising as a result of systemic root causes are typically complex, but include skewed land distribution, environmental degradation

and unequal political representation as factors. When these social problems are not addressed, lasting peace is not guaranteed (African Union 2006). To focus more closely on addressing linkages between environmental factors and conflict, the subsections below explore environmental peacebuilding as a socioeconomic dimension to building lasting peace, and discuss approaches to environmental cooperation and peacebuilding.

Environmental peacebuilding

According to London International Model United Nations (2015:5), 'environmental peacebuilding examines and advocates ecological protection and cooperation as a factor in peaceful relations.' Peacebuilding is both the theory and practice of identifying the conditions that can lead to sustainable peace between those who have previously been adversaries, and assisting opponents to move towards sustainable peace (Carius 2006). At the most basic level, the environment can be affected in two ways: firstly, war often devastates the ecosystem and, as a consequence, the lives of those who depend on natural resources for their livelihoods; and secondly, the anarchy that accompanies conflict at times leads to the uncontrolled and destructive exploitation of natural resources. Environmental concerns may be opportunities for peacebuilding, but they may also draw attention to differences and reinforce conflict (de Coning and Capistrano 2007). Environmental challenges are also usually complexly interconnected with economic and governance problems (Carius 2006).

Post-conflict countries face the challenge of utilising their natural resources in ways that generate revenue, sustain livelihoods and contribute to economic recovery and reconciliation, without creating new forms of conflict, corruption or major environmental degradation (Carius 2006). However, many fragile recovering nations lack sufficient capacity to manage their natural resources effectively, making them more vulnerable to resource-fuelled clashes. In many cases, countries emerging from conflict, particularly those rich in natural resources, experience less effective governance, lower economic growth and stability, and more inequitable development outcomes than countries that are not as reliant on natural resources – a phenomenon known as the 'resource curse' (ibid).

Approaches to environmental peacebuilding

- **Initiatives to prevent conflicts that are directly related to the environment**

Preventing conflicts that are directly related to the environment, as an approach, looks at ways of reducing pressure on natural resources and institutional mechanisms. Most research that establishes a link between environmental degradation and violent conflict focuses on two solutions: reducing the pressure on assets on which people

are dependent economically; and strengthening institutional capacities to respond to environmental challenges (Carius 2006).

- **Efforts to initiate and sustain dialogue on transboundary environmental cooperation between parties to a conflict**

The second approach initiates discussions and establishes cooperation on shared environmental challenges. Apart from international or transboundary work, environmental peacebuilding usually includes cross-ethnic or cross-identity group initiatives implemented at subnational level. Such activities attempt to create peace by bringing conflicting parties together to agree on cooperative solutions to common environmental challenges. Opponents may decide to enter into dialogue on shared environmental issues when other political and diplomatic approaches have failed (Carius and Dabelko 2004).

- **Initiatives that seek lasting peace by promoting conditions for sustainable development**

The third approach looks at reaching long-term sustainable solutions and management regimes. This method is based on the premise that long-term and comprehensive sustainability is a prerequisite for lasting peace. The joint management of shared resources cannot be only a way of keeping both parties talking, but also the key to negotiating a resolution (Carius 2006). For example, even if the Jonglei Canal project or disagreements over who controls the oil are not the causes of the conflict in South Sudan, a solution for resuming this project or sharing oil resources is necessary for a peaceful resolution. These issues need to be discussed and addressed during the drafting of peace agreements, irrespective of the underlying cause of conflict, to ensure lasting peace.

Controversy between Sudan and South Sudan over oil revenue from the Abyei Area

After decades of civil war that left two and a half million people dead, the devastated and vastly underdeveloped southern part of Sudan achieved independence in 2011. South Sudan came into existence amid great challenges. The breakaway from Sudan marked a major breakthrough and a fresh opportunity for the South Sudanese. But this breakaway also highlighted massive state-corroding corruption, political instability within the ruling party and persistent tensions with Sudan over the sharing of oil revenue. All of these factors left South Sudan deeply vulnerable to renewed conflict.

South Sudan gained independence as one of the most fragile and underdeveloped countries in the world. The path to lasting peace will require addressing not just the immediate challenges presented by the current conflict, but those that existed long before independence was achieved. These include corruption, political party reform, intercommunal violence and tensions over sharing of oil revenue with Sudan. The persisting strains between the country and Sudan over cash flow, as well as the status of the contested Abyei Area also present ongoing challenges to peace and security.

The Abyei Area covers approximately 4 000 square miles of farmland, desert and oilfields located along the nebulous boarder between Sudan and South Sudan. Abyei's rich oil reserves make the region economically desirable for both countries, and this has led to ethnic and cultural conflict over it. To ensure peace between the two countries, it is essential for Sudan and South Sudan to clearly define borders.

To end the second civil war, the northern and southern Sudan signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, which included the Abyei Protocol, that planned to place Abyei under a new special administration. This management was to remain until the final referendum – asking residents to elect whether they wanted to remain part of Sudan or to join South Sudan – was signed. However, the Abyei Area Referendum, scheduled for 2011, never took place (Enough! 2013).

Why use the environment to build peace?

Solutions to environmental problems that ignore political borders require a long-term perspective. They should encourage participation by local organisations and NGOs, help build administrative, economic and social capacities for action and assist in the forging of common bonds that transcend economic polarisation. Addressing environmental problems frequently requires taking long-term preventive measures. Such actions must also be flexible enough to respond to unexpected, abrupt and critical changes. Institutions devoted to environmental cooperation can provide decision-makers with a lasting framework for action in which future benefits are given greater priority than short-term interests (United Nations Environment Programme 2009).

While natural resources are integral to peacebuilding efforts, they can also trigger, fuel and sustain armed conflict, undermining peace and sustainable development. Grievances over management of natural resources and revenues from them can contribute to the emergence of conflict. It is also important to keep in mind that natural resources are often said to finance conflict. It is also the case that combatants frequently target natural resources and the environment. Environmental peacebuilding

and cooperation is a socioeconomic development dimension that can be used as an instrument of transformation and resolution of political conflict in building peace.

3.3.4 The human rights, justice and reconciliation dimension

Peacebuilding efforts in this dimension include monitoring human rights, establishing the rule of law and justice sector reform, and promoting national dialogue and reconciliation processes, such as truth and reconciliation commissions (de Coning 2005). Peacebuilding programmes in this dimension should also help to create an environment conducive to peace, justice and reconciliation, facilitate the payment of reparations and increase the involvement of all politically marginalised groups in participatory processes (Bloomfield et al. 2003). There is a need to rebuild cross-cutting social relationships and trust that span ethnic, religious, class, geographic and generational cleavages in post-conflict societies. This builds the social capital that enables societies to mediate day-to-day conflicts before they turn violent. In addition, it builds state-citizen relationships that advance social cohesion (de Coning 2005).

The measures to deal with past human rights violations, serve justice and achieve reconciliation are concepts that fall under the umbrella of transitional justice, that is, 'the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society's attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation' (United Nations 2010:2). Transitional justice is a process that follows a period of violence and mass human rights violations, often leaving a society divided and with many victims of abuse still suffering. It seeks to introduce a comprehensive set of strategies that both deal with the events of the past and also look to the future to prevent a recurrence of conflict and abuse (Bickford 2005). Within the field of transitional justice there is a choice of approaches countries can choose to employ: retributive justice, restorative justice, or a combination of the two (Kent 2012).

Retributive justice emphasises the importance of ensuring that there is individual responsibility for human rights violations and that those accountable for these abuses are brought to legal account. Advocates of retributive justice assert that criminal punishment is a moral obligation that is indebted to victims, and that the public acknowledgment and punishment of the perpetrator who committed the wrong against them can contribute to the victims' healing process (Kent 2012). They also argue that prosecutions are beneficial to the wider society because they strengthen public confidence in the rule of law, deter criminality and prevent a repetition of human rights violations in the future.

Rather than focusing on individual guilt or punishment, restorative justice views problems as belonging to the whole society, and is interested in rebuilding broken relationships and restoring 'community' (Kent 2012). Restorative justice involves a process that aims to identify and address the issues and harms of the past in a collective manner, while simultaneously identifying the needs and obligations of the people and the state in order for a society to move forward. According to Zehr (2002), restorative justice reflects three basic assumptions: that crime is a violation of people and relationships, that violations create obligations, and that the central obligation is to put right the wrongs. An increasingly popular type of restorative justice is found in the form of truth commissions (see Case Study 6 below). Truth commissions are often tasked with integrating many perspectives and experiences to come up with what may be regarded as an official truth regarding what happened during a conflict. Truth commissions can also provide recommendations regarding legal, administrative and institutional measures that should be taken to prevent the recurrence of human rights abuse by the governments of the countries involved, while seeking to promote reconciliation in post-conflict societies (Hayner 1995).

Since the early 1990s, some African countries have implemented a range of new transitional justice policies to seek fairness and truth, address impunity and allow for reconciliation in fractured societies. Although achievement of these efforts has been diverse and uneven, African experiences have contributed to developing a plethora of international and domestic transitional justice initiatives. Approaches in Africa have ranged from judicial mechanisms, such as hybrid courts, through international tribunals, and domestic trials, to non-judicial mechanisms such as reparations, truth commissions and traditional or community-based processes.

Case Study 6:
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission

The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SATRC) was the first commission to attempt to rectify the balance between truth and reconciliation. The TRC added some unique features to the transitional justice process by drawing on past experiences from Latin America and elsewhere, and adding the new element of a conditional or earned amnesty process. The Amnesty Committee, one of three established by the SATRC, was the most unique feature of the new model, and introduced the notion of conditional amnesty into the transitional justice process. It was operationalised to adjudicate and facilitate the granting of amnesty to persons who, in the committee's opinion, fulfilled the criteria laid down in the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act

34 of 1995, which was also established by the SATRC. These criteria included the stipulation that individuals must themselves apply for amnesty for acts which they had committed; group applications were not permitted. In their applications, individuals had to make full disclosures about their role in acts for which they were applying for pardon. They also had to demonstrate that their action was politically motivated, meaning it had to be associated with the objectives of a recognised political party or organisation, or liberation movement of which they were members or supporters. For instance, if the applicants were previously members of the security forces, they had to show that they had received orders from a legitimate superior officer to commit the action for which absolution was being sought. Finally, even if these criteria were met, applicants could be denied amnesty if the committee felt that the act was disproportionate to the objective pursued (Connolly 2012).

Source: United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. 2008.



As the embodiment of Africa's determination for peace, justice and reconciliation, the AU is developing a policy framework on transitional justice that seeks to elaborate holistically on the entire range of measures required to demonstrate commitment to achieving justice, peace and reconciliation in post-conflict contexts. This arises from the AU's recognition that achieving peace, resolution and fairness in the aftermath of mass atrocities is a complex issue which necessitates extraordinary measures, and that no single measure of retributive or restorative justice is sufficient in addressing the vast justice demands of post-conflict societies. Thus, transitional justice measures must be applied as a holistic strategy. The framework will also outline 'a model that is adaptable to specific country situations, and because of its appeal to an African sense of justice, needs and aspirations, it will empower and encourage affected countries to take the lead in designing appropriate transitional justice mechanisms' (African Union Panel of the Wise 2013:77). This is founded on the understanding that no one package or approach can be passed on from one situation to another and be expected to achieve the same results. Each country experience will provide opportunities for lessons to be learnt, but it is important to make sure that each transitional 'justice process is locally owned and based on public consultations with all interested actors'

(ibid:15). In addition, this signifies that the framework will also recognise the existence and benefits of using traditional justice and reconciliation mechanisms, as long as they adhere to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. These mechanisms may avoid some of the pitfalls that can be imposed from above (particularly in terms of lack of local ownership and insufficient public consultation) and shift focus from state- to community-level accountability. In addition, the use of instruments such as *Gacaca* courts in Rwanda has been useful in complementing criminal prosecutions launched for certain crime categories. Yet, in most instances these mechanisms work well when they are pursued as part of a holistic strategy of transitional justice (ibid).

UN Photo/JC McIlwaine

Members of a church march in support of peace and reconciliation in Rumbek, South Sudan (21 August 2014).

3.3.5 The coordination, management and resource mobilisation dimension

Coordination, management and resource mobilisation are cross-cutting functions that are vital in successfully and coherently tackling the aforementioned peacebuilding considerations. All the dimensions are linked to and dependent on each other. No aspect on its own can holistically achieve the goal of peacebuilding, address the causes and effects of conflict, and do the groundwork for sustainable peace and social justice. Each factor makes a unique contribution to achieving the goal of peacebuilding, but its implementation cannot be said to be worthwhile if it is not carried out within the framework of a holistic, combined approach to peacebuilding that includes all the needed dimensions to achieve sustainable peace in a given context. Coordination

is concerned with planning, determining objectives, building strategies, sharing information, division of roles and responsibilities, and resource mobilisation. It focuses on synchronising the mandates, roles and activities of the different stakeholders and actors involved in the peacebuilding system in a given context, and makes this happen through joint efforts by stakeholders to prioritise, sequence and harmonise their programmes in order to achieve common objectives. Thus, coordination is a process that seeks to ensure that each individual programme sees that it is part of a larger peacebuilding system that it strives to complement, and without which it cannot succeed (de Coning 2005). The different aspects of the fifth dimension of peacebuilding – coordination, management and resource mobilisation – are examined further in chapters Seven and Eight of this handbook.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter has provided insight into the various phases and dimensions of peacebuilding, which aid practitioners in taking appropriate forms of action in a given post-conflict context. Although they should not be understood as being linear and time-bound, or as having absolute boundaries, peacebuilding phases can generally be identified as the stabilisation, transitional and consolidation phases. There can be overlap in the transition between phases, and regression should be anticipated, as a specific case may require some movement back and forth between stages to accommodate the situation at a given time. Although the specific configuration of peacebuilding efforts will be unique in each context, it is also possible to identify a broad peacebuilding framework consisting of five dimensions:

- human security
- socioeconomic development
- political transition, governance and democratisation
- human rights, justice and reconciliation
- coordination, management and resource mobilisation.

This chapter illustrated that there is no single dimension of peacebuilding that can achieve sustainable peace on its own, and each context is different; that is, there is no one-size-fits-all solution for appropriate peacebuilding systems. It is the context of the conflict that determines what type of multidimensional response needs to be undertaken and defines the optimal timing of the response.

Chapter Four: Peacebuilding actors and local ownership

What will this chapter do?

- It outlines the roles of both local and external actors, explains what is meant by local ownership and why it is so vital for peacebuilding.

Why is it important?

- It supports building knowledge about different actors involved in peacebuilding.
- Understanding of local ownership is important because without the consideration and integration of indigenous counterparts, achieving sustainable peace would not be possible. Thus, it is essential to understand how and when to incorporate aspects of local ownership within peacebuilding initiatives.

What should you learn?

- By the end of this chapter, the reader should better understand peacebuilding actors, appreciate what local ownership is, and why it is important for peacebuilding.

3.1 Introduction

When considering the range of actors engaged in peacebuilding, a distinction between local and external stakeholders can be made. Local actors are the primary architects, owners and long-term stakeholders in a peace process (Rupesinghe 1995). They are visible at three levels of society: top, middle and grassroots. Local actors at the top level include the military and police, government officials representing various structures of a state, and high-profile religious leaders. Local actors in the middle include academics and intellectuals, representatives of NGOs, the media, the private sector, traditional leaders (i.e. paramount chiefs and section chiefs), labour unions, lawyers' associations and other civil society organisations (CSOs). A CSO in this context refers to a sphere of society in which voluntary mobilisation and organisation takes place outside the realms of the family and the state (White 1994 and Lederach 1995). At grassroots level, local actors are mostly health officials, refugee camp leaders, community police, and representatives of women's groups and youth groups, traditional healers, market women's associations, paramount chiefs and village headmen (Lederach 1997). Often, indigenous stakeholders in conflict settings are recipients or beneficiaries in their interactions with external actors. Nevertheless, they represent the foundation for the success of external actors in contributing to the reconstruction of a war-torn society.

On the other hand, the presence of external actors is important in driving the peace process and ensuring consolidation and sustainability. Who then are these external actors? They are often international entities from neighbouring states, international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), representatives of international private sector organisations and the UN system. More recently, emerging powers such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), and the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) have come to the fore.

One way to think about the distinction between local and external actors is that the former are recipients of capacity-building that is aimed at helping them to manage and change crises, while the latter are providers of such support to community or national stakeholders. Local actors have lived through the conflict and their future will be shaped by its legacy and the transformative power of the peace process. They have become peacebuilders by necessity. They own the space and should control the process, because they will either suffer or benefit from its consequences – hence the relevance of local ownership in peacebuilding. Residents also have the greatest cultural, regional and national understanding of the conflict context, placing them in a key position to contribute appropriately to the peacebuilding process. Unless conflict-affected communities develop the ability to manage their own crises, the desired outcome for sustained national capacity for peace will not succeed (Guehenno 2011). External contributors can influence the process, but they cannot make peace on behalf of locals. Their role, although influential, is limited (de Coning 2013b).

An important principle that is emphasised throughout this handbook is that external actors need to be conflict-sensitive in all programme planning and implementation activities. This encourages all external actors to adjust development, humanitarian, peacebuilding and other activities to avoid or minimise negative impacts and promote positive outcomes on the conflict context, and also to design initiatives to address the causes of conflict. Non-adherence to this would lead to unnecessary delays in building local ownership, in the process causing unintended harm to the overall peacebuilding process. External actors have to provide a broad secure space within which local actors can find a safe grip to regain their role as primary peacebuilders. This has been quite challenging for many external actors (Machold Rhys and Donias Timothy 2011). Many external actors try to direct and control the conflict systems in which they are engaged, perhaps because it remains unclear either how local ownership should be put into practice, or how to address situations in which national ownership conflicts with the international norms of external actors. Adoption of certain norms – among them democracy, human rights and the rule of law – by local actors is one aspect of the peacebuilding process, but the continuation of these standards and the will of local actors to provide the socioeconomic support for them to become established is by no means guaranteed (ibid). A major theme in the second generation approach to

peacebuilding, therefore, is to find the optimal balance between the roles of external and local actors in which the latter can eventually take ownership of all relevant peacebuilding process.

The art of peacebuilding lies in pursuing the appropriate balance between international support and home-grown, context-specific solutions through local ownership (de Coning 2013b). Local ownership is a key concept and principle in peacebuilding settings, which emphasises that the future direction of a particular country should be in the hands of the people of that country. In other words, transitions should be country-led and owned. In many cases, the challenge has been that programmes and agendas of external actors do not address the real, prioritised needs of the people. This can cause harm unintentionally and render positive peace difficult to achieve. In the DRC for instance, a handful of local NGOs implemented most of the local peacebuilding programmes in the eastern provinces. They also most actively contested the dominant narratives concerning the causes of violence and the role of international actors (Autesserre 2010).

4.2 Peacebuilding actors

External actors

In many post-conflict situations, international peace and security actors such as the UN, the AU or sub-regional organisations, among them the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), have deployed peace operations to stabilise situations and monitor and support peace processes. The efforts and resources of peace operations are focused on ensuring a safe and secure environment for peacebuilding to occur, and for peace to be consolidated.

PEACE OPERATIONS USUALLY DEPLOY AT THE START OF THE STABILISATION PHASE, AND THEY PLAY A MAJOR ROLE DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PHASE. PEACE OPERATIONS MOSTLY WITHDRAW DURING THE CONSOLIDATION PHASE, WHEN THE RISK OF LAPSING INTO VIOLENT CONFLICT IS NO LONGER DEEMED TO BE A SERIOUS SHORT- TO MEDIUM-TERM LIKELIHOOD.

The collective of agencies of the UN system in a given country are referred to as the UN Country Team (UNCT). The UNCT is headed by a resident representative (RR), who is typically also the resident coordinator (RC), and usually also the humanitarian coordinator (HC). Members of the UNCT may include UNDP, the World Bank, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organisation

(WHO), United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and others. These agencies and funds have their own mandates, budgets and programmes and the RC/HC's function is to ensure that the UNCT develops a coherent overall programme in support of the country in which it is based.

Members of the UNCT and the government of the country in which they are operating usually agree on a common strategic framework, called the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), which specifies how the UN system will support the administration over a given timeframe (typically three to five years). The UNDAF is typically aligned with an even broader strategic framework, which encompasses the government and all external actors, including the UN; international financial institutions (IFIs), like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF); and donor countries (United Nations Development Programme 2010). In some cases there will also be a specific peacebuilding strategy, or premeditated framework, sometimes facilitated by the engagement of the UN PBC, the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (UNPBSO) and UN PBF.

International NGOs include a broad range of independent non-profit organisations that work in the humanitarian assistance and development spheres. Most INGOs have developed a specific field of specialisation and are primarily relief, advocacy or developmental agencies that are most active in the stabilisation phase of conflict. They are typically active in the recovery and rehabilitation of post-conflict societies.

The international private sector also plays an important role by investing in various sectors of the economies of post-conflict societies, which generates revenue for the state, creates employment and stimulates economic activity and growth. However, they can also be a destructive influence when they try to influence local politics to their benefit, or when their activities are perceived to benefit one of the parties to the conflict over others. The private sector is thus an important peacebuilding partner and their early engagement has the potential to address economic factors that can create peace dividends for local populations (Specker 2009).

Another important group of external actors is the donor community. Traditional donors include multilateral funding agencies such as the European Union (EU), and bilateral donor agencies such as the Japan International Cooperation Agency, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department for International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom, the German *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (GIZ), the Norwegian Agency for Development Coordination (NORAD), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and GOAL of Ireland.

Usually, most of these partners have a presence at country level, but do not execute programmes themselves. Instead, they provide resources for the UN system and NGOs that do the work on the ground. Many UN agencies also subcontract work to NGOs so that approximately 80 per cent of all programme activities in the field are carried out by NGOs.

New emerging actors need to be taken into account as they establish mechanisms like the BRICS new development bank. They may have different approaches, motives and methodologies, and not wish to follow the guidance of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). They often prefer infrastructure development partnerships and the exchange of technical expertise. They may not use peacebuilding concepts but have a long-term theory of change, arguing that stability and development will contribute to sustainable peace over time (United States Institute of Peace 2012).

UN Photo/Stuart Price

Nicholas Kay (centre), UN envoy for Somalia, speaks with health workers on the roof of a hospital in Hargeisa, Somaliland (13 June 2013).

Local actors

Local actors and organisations are directly affected by the conflict and have the biggest stake in and influence over peacebuilding processes. They have the most to gain or lose from peace, or relapse into violent conflict. From an external vantage point, local actors are those whose choices will determine whether peace is sustainable. Most external

initiatives, therefore, aim to influence the behaviour of local actors. This group is made up of a wide variety of stakeholders, representing every element and level of society.

EXAMPLES OF LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS INCLUDE: THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DAY, PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT, LOCAL PRIVATE SECTOR AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN ALL ITS FORMS. LOCAL ACTORS REPRESENT ALL ELEMENTS OF SOCIETY – POLITICAL PARTIES, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, TRADITIONAL LEADERS, RELIGIOUS ORGANISATIONS, THE PRIVATE SECTOR, PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS, YOUTH AND WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS, TRADE UNIONS, NGOS, UNIVERSITIES AND RESEARCH INSTITUTES, FAMILIES, FARMERS, SCHOOLS, THE JUDICIARY AND THE MEDIA.

Residents must be involved, from the outset, in shaping programming by participating in needs assessments, conflict analysis, planning, coordination and monitoring. Their involvement will result in more effective and relevant project design because the strategy has incorporated local knowledge (United States Institute of Peace 2012) and its implementation will benefit from their participation and ownership.

At the same time, it is necessary to recognise that local actors are not a homogenous group. Not all local actors are automatically peacebuilders. Some may prefer violence to achieve their aims and others may benefit from weak governance to carry out criminal activities. Additionally, not all those who are for peace will necessarily agree on how best it can be achieved. Local social institutions are likely to be weakened during the conflict and remain fragile for some time into the post-conflict period. Local actors are central to sustainable peace but may also be weakened, fragile and fragmented as a result of the conflict. It is important, therefore, that they be supported with sensitivity and care so that they can regain the capacity to manage their own affairs.

Civil society roles in peacebuilding

Civil society can play many roles in peacebuilding. The list below, while not exhaustive, outlines a few of these:

- protection of citizens against marginalisation from all parties
- monitoring of human rights violations and implementation of peace agreements, among others
- advocacy for peace and human rights
- socialisation to values of peace and democracy as well development of the in-group identities of marginalised groups
- inter-group social cohesion, established by bringing members of adversarial groups together

- facilitation of dialogue, at local and national level, between multiple stakeholders
- service delivery, assisting the state to provide food, healthcare and accessible labour to vulnerable people in post-conflict societies.

Local actor's roles in peacebuilding as a whole include:

- improving security
- encouraging the private sector to operate, expand and recover domestic markets
- promoting economic stability and job creation
- fostering peacebuilding processes through justice, dialogue and reconciliation
- creating a peace dividend for the local population
- maintaining the supply of social amenities
- building and maintaining relationships with other actors.

4.3 Local ownership

Local ownership refers to the degree of control that domestic actors wield over national political processes in post-conflict contexts; the notion conveys the common sense wisdom that any peace process that is not embraced by those who have to live with it is likely to fail (Donias 2012).

UN Photo/Albert González Farran

Ibrahim Gambari (standing), former joint special representative for the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, meets with local Sudanese sheiks at Mornei Internally Displaced Persons Camp in El Geneina, West Darfur (22 August 2010}.

Indigenous ownership is now widely accepted as a guiding principle of peacebuilding, yet the questions around how it should be achieved, and what it implies for the ideal local-external actor relationship are still hotly debated. However, it is commonly understood that the two main areas in which local ownership should be generated are in national capacities for peace, including among civil society, and in the restoration of core government functions (Guehenno 2011). The UN emphasises the vital link between local capacity and ownership in peacebuilding processes, arguing that ownership will remain theoretical if national actors do not have the capacity to fully engage in all phases of planning and implementation.

To improve the sustainability of ownership, enhanced coherence is needed in three critical areas – local ownership, local context and local capabilities. These are evident in the experiences of ACCORD's work in Burundi, Liberia and Sierra Leone (Leonardsson and Rudd 2015). In Burundi, ACCORD facilitated national institutional capacity-building of the executive office of the government by setting up a national office for security to support government coordination with external actors, and manage crises in the country. The organisation also worked with UNHCR to establish a dispute resolution process for the resettlement of refugees returning to their homeland. In Liberia, ACCORD's peacebuilding programme supported coherence and coordination in peacebuilding contexts by enhancing the skills of local peacebuilding stakeholders. This comprised training in the use of new evidence-based knowledge and innovative responses to peacebuilding challenges, and in designing, planning and implementing peacebuilding activities.

4.3.1 Local ownership and peacebuilding

Local actors need to make their own decisions, but they also have to recognise that their local system is embedded within a larger international arrangement. This implies a broader international culture, with norms, structures and expected forms of behaviour, which acts as a constraint, and which will determine the parameters within which local actors can make decisions about their future (Richmond 2011).

However, even if it is acknowledged that being part of the international system places some limits on the range of choices that they can make, states still have ample room to manoeuvre when it comes to deciding on the shape and future direction of their local political, economic, security and sociocultural systems. Countries in transition have a unique opportunity to reconsider how they wish to organise their own structures. Most established countries have made these choices at some point in the past, and are now locked in a process of slow evolution and adaptation, but countries in transition have the opportunity to make bold changes. A locally-owned peacebuilding process needs the identification of local actors who are willing to exercise ownership to build peace,

although this is not always easy as locals may initially find themselves in extremely weak positions (Shinoda 2008).

The damaging impact of not creating space for locals to own peacebuilding processes is illustrated in Autesserre's analysis of the DRC. She argues that the failure of the massive peacebuilding efforts implemented in the DRC stems from 'internationals' regarding local conflict resolution as an 'unimportant, unfamiliar, and unmanageable' task (Autesserre 2010:11).

Four key principles of local ownership

1. Externally driven peacebuilding processes are unsustainable
2. Peacebuilding should be needs-based, and the priorities, sequencing and pace of delivery should be informed by the dynamics of the conflict system, through local ownership and meaningful local-external coordination
3. The rate of delivery should be synchronised with the degree of absorption
4. A bottom-up peacebuilding strategy puts people in control of the design and implementation of peacebuilding initiatives.

The local ownership principle states that choices should be made by the people who will have to live with the consequences (MacGinty 2011).

The central principle is the ownership and participation of communities. Change needs to be determined and controlled by the people themselves. Participation of affected peoples on all levels of intervention is the key element of restoring dignity and developing trust in transformation (Giessmann, Körppen and Ropers 2011:251).

While the principle of local ownership is now widely accepted, including at the highest policy levels (Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development 2011b), so much is at stake in post-conflict situations that it has often not been honoured in practice.

It should also be noted that a model that works well in one context cannot simply be transferred to another setting and be expected to work equally well there. This is because each model has a history that is specific to the circumstance within which it emerged. Once it is divorced from that history, it loses its purpose and meaning (de Coning 2012). It is therefore vital that local actors be involved in designing and implementing the system used in every setting. A broadly accepted theory of change is that a period of social upheaval and renewal in a country should result in a new social contract among the people, which addresses the shortcomings of the past and articulates the people's common understanding of the roles of the state and the relationship among the different communities that make up societies (Call and Wyeth 2008).

4.3.2 Local ownership and state-building

In most peacebuilding experiences, focus has been on state-building – rather than on state formation – which is defined as an agreement between the people and the state (Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development 2008). The difference is that the former is focused on the executive branch or technical apparatus of the state, for instance on reforming security services, while the latter aims to facilitate the social contract between the people and the state, addressing the way in which a state is formed and how it relates to the people.

State-building is too often narrowly focused on the arms of government – legislative, executive and Judiciary. Most importantly, the activities of external actors in this regard help to strengthen these arms, and, therefore, are often welcomed by the government in power. The result is that external actors invest in building institutions, instead of developing the relationship between citizens and the institutions that are meant to serve them (de Coning 2012). This typically leaves existing and incoming governments in a position where they are not kept in check adequately by the legislative and judicial branches or other independent bodies of the state (Call and Wyeth 2008). Peacebuilding that focuses only on the executive branch of a county does not ensure a sustainable peace process, and may actually sow the seeds of future discontent (Mills 2009).

An approach that aims for longer-term sustainable peace should refocus the local ownership debate around state formation, rather than state-building; it should also find innovative ways of facilitating the development of new social contracts between people and the state (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2012). In this context, peacebuilding systems need to encourage processes that make the leadership accountable to the people, rather than to the international community (Caplan 2005). This will require investing in facilitating national dialogue, and the development or reform of constitutional frameworks. It also implies a renewed focus on aspects such as strengthening the overall socio-political structure, for instance the division of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, and the consolidation of civil society and social capital in the form of a free press, a unrestricted and independent judiciary, and human rights, electoral and other independent commissions that perform a critical role in the functioning of the overall framework.

4.3.3 Local context and external legitimacy

Local context means that peacebuilding needs to be informed by local rather than international, needs, priorities and circumstances (Baranyi 2008). This is an obvious principle that few will challenge but, in reality, it is difficult to operationalise and there

are very few cases in which it has actually been achieved. There are two forces that work against this principle. The first is that local actors are in disarray in the immediate aftermath of conflict and their ability to articulate a coherent set of needs and priorities remains weak. The second is that external stakeholders have a well-resourced and internationally legitimised system that thinks it is acting on local needs when, in fact, it is overly influenced by previous experiences and internationally generated models and theories of change (Sending 2009). International actors need to be trained in conflict sensitivity at policy and operational levels to understand and counter their own tendency to replicate their last experience elsewhere, and to overwhelm or drown out local voices (Berdal 2009 and Call and Wyeth 2008). They need to be trained in how best to facilitate and encourage local voices and capacities without undermining them. Local actors also need to be trained in identifying and articulating national and community needs and priorities, facilitating dialogue and discussions to identify these, and applying techniques for reaching out to and empowering all the voices in society, including those that may not normally be heard in official discussions (de Coning 2012).

Toolkit 3: Considerations for putting local ownership into practice



While the approach will vary depending on the specific context and activity, there are some general good practices that can be applied:

- adopt a participatory approach and engage local actors at the earliest possible stage through liaison, coordination and consultation, gathering information about needs and perceptions, and engaging local stakeholders in planning processes
- channel information from the local level about constituencies and marginalised populations' needs, concerns and priorities, and support the articulation of local grievances, interests and needs to inform national processes
- tailor the approach to the specific context and activity by looking at local systems, structures, strengths, weaknesses and dynamics. Conduct regular analysis of the micro-level socio-political, economic and cultural context and calibrate the approach accordingly
- value and make use of local or insider knowledge and expertise, including that of local counterparts
- avoid undermining local capacity by 'doing' or replacing rather than enabling. Identify and build on existing processes and structures, both informal and formal
- guard against bringing preconceived ideas or assumptions about what the problems or solutions are, by conducting joint assessments with local counterparts, and by asking resident stakeholders what they consider their needs or capacity gaps to be, or what they believe are the root causes of and solutions to the conflict.

Benefits of locally owned peacebuilding processes

- increasing sustainability
- smoother external support transition
- minimising or preventing dependency
- contextual and cultural appropriateness
- improved links between local and national peace efforts
- fostering resilience.

Promoting norms that are high on the priority list of those in the donor community may not necessarily be the emergency for locals, and the international community may not have the technical expertise or systems to provide support for local priorities. What takes precedence for locals might also need to be implemented according to different timeframes than those the international community is used to. For instance, indigenous leaders may seek an upfront investment in capacity-building prior to the implementation of various medium- and long-term governance and development initiatives, so that these initiatives can be managed by local managers, while the international community may be under pressure to launch such programmes early in the process.

4.3.4 Local capacities and internal challenges

The issue of capacity can be referred to as a core missing link in most post-conflict countries. Where capacity and institutions are not strengthened in post-conflict countries, the development of sustainable processes will be widely undermined. A key approach to this issue recognises the importance of strengthening national capacities and supporting core state-building and peacebuilding functions. The challenges raised by insufficient capacity, combined with existing peacebuilding and state-building frameworks, have often led to what some refer to as an impatient approach, in which immediate results are expected but not enough time or effort is invested in building capacities to sustain peaceful processes in the longer term. In this context, it is important that new approaches to peacebuilding are able to define new ways of providing support and strengthening the capacities of post-conflict countries to achieve lasting peace.

The local ownership principle is partly a normative position that makes claims as to who rightfully should have responsibility for the problem and the solution and, therefore, the legitimacy to take decisions that will determine the future course of events (Duffield 2001). It is now officially recognised that internal actors clearly own the problem and also have the right to oversee the solution. As they will have to live with the consequences, they should have the right to make the decisions that will determine their future (Call and Wyeth 2008).

Toolkit 4: Questions to ask to ensure locally owned peacebuilding processes

- Post-conflict spaces are often characterised by an environment of diversity and division
  - ✪ *Who speaks on behalf of the local people?*
- An all-inclusive approach can delay the process and damage confidence
  - ✪ *Is the process inclusive enough?*
- Local actors may seem to lack capacity and/or willingness
  - ✪ *Where are the capacity gaps in terms of taking full ownership?*

In the absence of an internationally recognised elected government – such elections are typically only held three to five years into a transition process – it is unclear which voices truly articulate the needs and preferences of the people, and there is much room for interpretation and manipulation during this period (Paris 2011). Crucial decisions are taken about the structure and policy direction of new institutions, such as the security forces and key ministries. In the absence of an elected government, most of these decisions are informed and influenced by those international actors that choose to engage in a given sector or project. These international actors typically attempt to consult and elicit input from CSOs, being aware of their own official policies on local ownership, and they are often able to explain the steps they have taken to consult and otherwise ensure that decisions have been endorsed by the transitional government, or otherwise have some claim to local legitimacy.

Nevertheless, local ownership is still elusive, despite the fact that the principle is in place and widely accepted. One reason for this is that the choice of who is considered a local actor and who should take the lead during the transition period is often influenced by international actors, at least until the first internationally recognised elections have been held. Even at the point of the people electing a government, so many aspects of the new state have already been decided that the freshly elected government typically has only limited policy space and largely has to continue to implement the policies and work with the institutions established during the transition period.

As well as being normative, local ownership is also a functional argument in that it is a prerequisite for sustainability (Eriksen 2009). Lederach (1997) argues that, for solutions to be sustainable they have to be home-grown, and emerge out of locally owned processes of reconciliation and social transformation. Regan (2010) stresses that 'sustainable public sector reform does not occur unless there is a domestic demand for it … there will be little chance of sustainable reform … unless the local populations are committed to and taking a leading role in the design and implementation of reform'(Regan 2010:25–50).

Toolkit 5: Towards a 'do no harm' approach to external peacebuilders

- Peacebuilders need to understand how their work interacts with existing power relationships, customs, values, systems and institutions
- Conflict sensitivity, based on regular conflict analysis, should be mainstreamed in planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of activities.



4.3.5 Civilian capacities and local ownership

The June 2009 report of the UN secretary-general on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict provides a useful summary of the core tasks that the UN is called upon to undertake in post-conflict peace processes, including:

- supporting basic safety and security – including mine action; protection of civilians; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; strengthening the rule of law; and initiating SSR
- supporting political processes – including electoral reform; promoting inclusive dialogue and reconciliation; and developing conflict-management capacity at the national and subnational levels
- supporting the provision of basic services – such as water and sanitation, health and primary education; and backing the safe and sustainable return and reintegration of IDPs and refugees
- supporting the restoration of core government functions – in particular basic public administration and public finance, at national and subnational levels
- supporting economic revitalisation – including employment creation and livelihoods support (in agriculture and public works), particularly for youth and demobilised former combatants, as well as the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure.

More innovative ways need to be explored by the UN and others to identify, work with and tap into local expertise, while at the same time supporting relevant local institutions through the employment of international civilian experts. In this way, local capacity will principally remain a local asset. The UN has underscored the importance of civilian capacities in the immediate aftermath of conflict in the independent report of the Senior Advisory Group of 2011. It also recognises the need to maintain and strengthen local civilian capacities, including the institutions employing and organising this capacity, in order to achieve self-sustaining peace. Importantly, civilian expertise that is locally employed and embedded is much better positioned to serve both the needs of international actors and those of credible local counterparts.

When international partners resist hiring local expertise, they harm the system's ability to become self-sustaining and, by doing so, they undermine the very goals peacebuilding is meant to achieve. Means of compensating local institutions for providing knowledge to international stakeholders should be explored to ensure that local experts remain local. This principle against local-to-international brain drain should become a standard part of local-international compacts for peacebuilding cooperation.

4.4 Conclusion

At a minimum, peacebuilding coordination should ensure that the host community participates in all decisions that affect them, and that there is a process in place to support them to develop capacity so they can play their rightful role. The African Peacebuilding Coordination Programme (APCP), in the context of which this handbook has been developed, particularly aims to support and contribute to enhancing the capacities of local actors to engage in coordination processes, so that they are better able to influence the outcome and direction of the peacebuilding plan.

As the peacebuilding process develops, local actors should play an increasingly important role. The stabilisation phase is focused on regaining the security and basic needs of the local society. The transitional stage hosts the commencement of the process of regaining political, social and economic control, while the consolidation phase represents the establishment and maintenance of local control over the politics, economy and security of the society in question.

Peacebuilding, state formation and institution-building have to be self-generated processes, driven by local contexts that produce indigenous and locally owned bottom-up institutions. This is the only sustainable way in which societies, institutions and states can be formed; it is the way in which all sustainable states and institutions have been formed elsewhere, including in the West.

This also implies that local actors have to do it for themselves. The role of external actors needs to be limited to creating a conducive arena within which this self-development can take place, and to providing the minimum support necessary. Anything beyond that can undermine the peacebuilding process. The most important transformation in the second generation of peacebuilding is the changing of attitudes and policies among external actors who have had to formulate and adopt new principles and approaches that challenge their own deep-rooted identity, self-image and roles. They need to learn to exert self-discipline, to take a much longer-term and more patient approach, and to limit themselves to their external role so that local actors can play an active role and take ownership of the peacebuilding process.

International peacebuilding interventions should provide security guarantees and maintain the outer parameters of acceptable state behaviour in the international system, and they should stimulate, facilitate and create the necessary space for the emergence of robust and resilient self-organised systems. International peacebuilding programmes should not interfere in local social processes with the goal of engineering specific outcomes, such as endeavouring to produce a neoliberal state. Attempting to control the outcome produces the opposite of what peacebuilding aims to achieve; it generates ongoing instability and dependence, and undermines self-sustainability.

Chapter Five:
Gender and peacebuilding

What will this chapter do?

- It outlines the various gender issues which should be considered while designing, planning, implementing and evaluating peacebuilding programmes and interventions.

Why is it important?

- Integrating gender in all peacebuilding programmes is essential for ensuring that the needs of all people are responded to, and guarantees that peacebuilding processes are inclusive.
- A gender-sensitive peacebuilding framework, project or programme will have a greater likelihood of success if it is more inclusive of all sectors of a society, and responsive to the interests, concerns and fears of all those affected by conflict.

What should you learn?

- By the end of this chapter, the reader should better understand why gender is an important aspect of peacebuilding and have gained knowledge of how to mainstream gender into all peacebuilding programmes and interventions.

5.1 Introduction

Ensuring the successful implementation of peacebuilding programmes and interventions calls for an inclusive process, with all actors playing a role in providing solutions. Violent conflicts affect women, men, girls, boys, those with special needs, the young, the old and those from particular ethnic or religious groups in different ways. Gender, age and culture may influence the type of risk someone is vulnerable to, as well as their role in the conflict. These factors may also affect the coping mechanisms they adopt, their specific needs during post-conflict recovery and the roles they take on in building peace (de Coning et al. 2012). This chapter deals specifically with issues of gender. Peacebuilding efforts have a better chance of being effective if they consider gender as an issue. The ultimate goal of all peace efforts is a lasting, sustainable peace, and taking gender into consideration is a means to achieve this end.

Both women and men have an important role to play in supporting peacebuilding efforts in their countries. In Africa, countries such as Rwanda, Sierra Leone and South Africa have demonstrated that including women in conflict resolution processes creates the necessary conditions for the achievement of more sustainable and lasting peace. They have also shown that including women in conflict resolution practices,

which are normally male-dominated, supports their socio-political and economic progress in the post-conflict state. Indeed, it has been found that greater gender equality leads to faster economic growth, democratic inclusiveness and better human recovery (Klot 2007). To rebuild the country, the post-genocide government of national unity in Rwanda made conscious efforts to treat women as catalysts for peacebuilding, and not only as victims of a tragedy. Structural changes grounded in legal and political decisions paved the way for women's advancement in politics and at other decision-making levels in the country (Brown and Uwineza 2011).

WHILE GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN PEACEBUILDING CAN BE VIEWED AS A STRATEGIC CHOICE THAT GENERATES MORE STABLE AND SUSTAINABLE PEACE, IT SHOULD NOT BE FORGOTTEN THAT EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF ONE'S GENDER IS ALSO A HUMAN RIGHT.

The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) defines gender mainstreaming as follows:

> Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in any area and at all levels. It is a strategy for making the concerns and experiences of women as well as of men an integral part of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres, so that women and men benefit equally, and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal of mainstreaming is to achieve gender equality (United Nations no date).

Structural vulnerabilities – arising from such factors as gender, ethnicity and intergroup inequality – interact with lifecycle dynamics to place certain groups of children, youth, working people and older adults at greater risk of being unable to cope with setbacks in times of crisis (United Nations Development Programme 2015). Thus, a gender relational approach to analysis for peacebuilding implies a broadly based description of how gender roles and relations work in each particular context, including how gender differences intersect with other identities (Myrttinen et al. 2014).

This chapter interrogates why gender considerations are important when designing, planning, implementing and evaluating peacebuilding programmes and interventions. Conflict affects women, men, girls and boys in different ways. Women and girls are often victims of acts of sexual violence during conflicts, and are disproportionately more affected by this phenomenon than men and boys (North

et al. 2006). This chapter also seeks to highlight the importance of reflecting these and other issues in peacebuilding programmes. It outlines the gender perspectives in peacebuilding and discusses how and why attention or inattention to gender has the potential to impact on the success of peacebuilding interventions in conflict and post-conflict countries. It also considers the challenges of gender mainstreaming in peacebuilding, and highlights some best practices in integrating gender into programmes and interventions.

5.2 Women, men and gender

The term *gender* is used to define the social roles of men and women, and how masculinities and femininities are constructed (Zarkov 2008). Judith Butler's (1988) seminal work argues that gender is a performance, constituting of several acts over a lifetime, prescribed for that particular gender. Gender as a concept is not reducible to women, or to specific femininities and masculinities (ibid). Gender relations differ during different ages, and among various social classes and cultures. Their expression also vary during times of conflict and peacetimes. Taking into account the centrality of gender to social systems, an examination of gendered discourses and practices within both conflict and post-conflict settings is necessary if we are to understand and address the complexities of particular contexts as well as individuals' lived and embodied experiences of these.

To be able to include women in the peace process (and therefore achieve greater gender equality in peacebuilding), practitioners have to be aware that the gender ideologies that prohibit women's participation are social constructions that can, and should, be disrupted. Women's involvement in negotiations and other peace processes is not just an issue for women, it affects men too. The point is to improve life for *all* people. Towards that end, men have to see the direct benefit of including women in peace talks, something for which the partnership of male leaders is critical in helping to explain and achieve. Furthermore, conflict often has a profound effect on gendered relations as traditional social structures are thrown into disarray and both women and men find themselves unable to fulfill their traditional gendered roles. Figure 9 highlights some of these complexities, linkages and effects.

Figure 9: Gender linkages and effects



Source: El-Bushra 2004.

Violent conflict often changes the livelihoods opportunities available to women, and impacts on the vulnerabilities and challenges that women and men face. In the post-conflict period, these spaces and dynamics need to be renegotiated, understood and taken into account in policies and programming focusing on economic recovery (Myrttinen et al. 2014). Conflict leads to the perpetration of violence and abuse against children, including young boys, who are subjected to involuntary recruitment into armies or militia forces, forced labour, human trafficking and sexual violence (North et al. 2006). These experiences should be incorporated into peacebuilding processes. The association of women and girls with vulnerability has negative consequences for men too, since the notion of *male* susceptibility becomes unimaginable, together with any physical and mental consequences for men who suffer abuse, as well as for their families (International Alert 2013). Furthermore, the issue of masculinities has seldom been addressed in peacebuilding, nor have issues of male vulnerability or women's agency in perpetrating violence. Men's relationships to different forms of violence, both as perpetrators and victims, therefore, need to be analysed.

Based on the realities of men and women in situations of conflict, it is clear that it is not possible to develop a truly gendered approach to understanding conflict and peace without bringing men's perspectives into analyses and, in particular, without holding

a view about men's relationships to violence (Myrttinen et al. 2014). The latest UNSCR, 2242, on women, peace and security, adopted in October 2015, reiterates the importance of engaging men and boys as partners in promoting women's participation in the prevention and resolution of armed conflict, peacebuilding and post-conflict situations (North et. al.2015). An increasingly popular approach to reducing violence, especially between men and women, is to focus on men as change agents; based on the idea that men susceptible to committing violence against women can change if they are helped to understand the causes and consequences of their predatory and risk-seeking behaviour. Projects focusing on male agency mainly operate at the level of individuals, with the goal of achieving broader societal transformation as other men are encouraged to follow the example of these role model men (Myrttinen et al. 2014).

As highlighted, gender plays a central role in peacebuilding since women, men, girls and boys face different risks and are affected and victimised in different ways during conflict. For women, this victimisation targets their sexuality. There is therefore need for increased appreciation of how men, women, and sexual and gender minorities exhibit different roles, experiences and vulnerabilities during conflict. This needs to be translated into peacebuilding actions, where practitioners need to pay deeper attention to the particular needs and opportunities of all genders in conflict and post-conflict situations. From a peacebuilding perspective, it is vital to address gender-based violence (GBV) against both women and men. Gender-based violence against men takes many forms: sexual violence, forced recruitment into armed groups and sex-selective killings are common during armed conflict (Carpenter 2006). If not addressed, these issues can disrupt or derail peacebuilding interventions.

UN Photo/Andi Gitow

Liberian women sit in a *peace hut*, women-run community court serving to resolve domestic disputes and dispense informal justice (6 March 2010).

5.3 Understanding the nexus between gender and peacebuilding

Building inclusive, sustainable, positive peace in societies affected by violent conflict requires analysing and addressing gendered power dynamics as well as gender roles and expectations (Myrttinen et al. 2014). A broader understanding of gender considerations and the different needs of women, men and gender or sexual minorities is, therefore, essential to peacebuilding. Conflicts disrupt relations and weaken relationships and community structures, it disrupts traditional gender roles and contributes to the disintegration of families and the social fabric of a community. It also increases vulnerability, particularly for those women and men who are victims and survivors of war. In conflict resolution, it is crucial to include women to work alongside men in peacebuilding and thus promote more inclusive and representative peace processes.

A project, organisation or activity should take into account the different roles, needs and interests of women and men when designing, implementing and assessing programmes. That being said, women often form new social networks and communities, and even surrogate families during conflicts. They initiate and participate in a number of social and activist projects to replace the social systems and resources lost as a result of conflict. It is from such structures and initiatives that capable women can be selected to participate in peacebuilding processes. Rwanda is a good example. Following the 1994 genocide, the already thriving women's CSOs present in the country led the reconstruction efforts (Newbury et al. 2000). Women are often an under-utilised resource in peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts; it is important to employ this supply, ensuring that they are not relegated to traditional gender roles like cooking and other domestic chores. Women need to be included in all sectors of peacebuilding and reconstruction.

The UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security (adopted in October 2000) acknowledges the disproportionate impact that violent conflict has on women, and recognises the critical role that women should and can play in the peacebuilding and conflict prevention; including in peace talks, conflict mediation, and all aspects of post-conflict reconstruction. The AU's PCRD framework places gender at the centre of discussions on issues of post-conflict reconstruction. Increasingly, the value that women have added to peacebuilding processes is visible, from their ability to form coalitions across conflict lines, as demonstrated in Liberia when Christian and Muslim women united to stop the out-of-control violence of former President Charles Taylor and his armed gangs in 2003 (during the second Liberian Civil War that took place from 2000–03). Dressing in white to express their unity despite being of different religious faiths, the women exerted pressure on the warring parties at the negotiating table and pushed them to sign a peace agreement (the Accra Peace Accord of 2003). Overcoming

countless obstacles, they helped bring Liberia to the start of a process of building peace (PeaceWomen no date).

Highlights: Gendered peacebuilding

Women and men respond differently to conflict: In resisting violence, surviving and supporting their dependents, women and men act differently.

Power dynamics change during and after conflict: Effective peacebuilding interventions must not only consider the different needs and capacities of women and men. Equally important are the power relations that affect their respective abilities to obtain and maintain support. Women often take on new roles, or step into the vacuum left by men during times of conflict and into the peacebuilding phase.

Women and men bring different issues to the table: When analysing a situation, who one consults has implications not only for what one hears and understands, but also for what one's response options are likely to be. (Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2006).

5.4 Role of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions in gender-responsive peacebuilding

In 2000 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security. The adoption – an outcome of advocacy by NGOs – was ground-breaking, marking the first time that the UNSC recognised the experiences and needs of women in conflict-affected areas, as well as their contributions to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Since 2000, the Security Council has also adopted the following women, peace and security resolutions: UNSCR 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013) and, most recently, 2242 (2015) (UN Women 2015). These resolutions together make up the women peace and security international policy framework. Several other frameworks exist to support and complement these resolutions, with the role of women in peacebuilding and post-conflict resolution serving as one of the core issues of discussion. These are also reflected in the four pillars of UNSCR 1325, which directly and indirectly influence peacebuilding programmes and interventions (see Table 4 below).

Table 4: The four pillars of UNSCR 1325

Pillar	Impact
Prevention	Hindrance of relapse into conflict and all forms of structural and physical violence against women and girls, including sexual and GBV
Participation	Inclusion of women and women's interests in decision-making processes related to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts
Protection	Women and girls' safety, physical and mental health, and economic security are assured and their human rights respected
Relief and Recovery	Women and girls' specific needs are met in conflict and post-conflict situations

While there are many provisions for gender mainstreaming in Africa's peace processes, these have mostly remained as strategies on paper, lacking the requisite political will and financial support for them to be translated into action for impact. To date, according to the International Knowledge Network of Women in Politics, 43 countries globally have launched national action plans (NAPs); twelve of these being by African countries (International Knowledge Network of Women in Politics no date). Several other nations have committed themselves to developing NAPs; which seek to strengthen the implementation of UNSCR 1325 at national level. However, those developed and launched so far have been impacted by funding and coordination challenges, factors that have impeded their effective implementation significantly. Furthermore, there are over 2 500 indicators on women, peace and security collated by UN Women into 400 groupings and categorised according to the four pillars of UNSCR 1325 (UN Women 2011). With this many indicators, it is challenging to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the various resolutions and frameworks, particularly in Africa where there are many competing interventions and actors working on issues to do with women, peace and security. Furthermore, the reach and impact of gender-related initiatives are not well documented.

A global study on UNSCR 1325 brings renewed attention to aspects of post-conflict peacebuilding and examines how attention to a gender perspective in these areas contributes to lasting and meaningful peace and security (United Nations 2015). The eighth resolution on women, peace and security to date, UNSCR 2242 (2015), posits the women, peace and security agenda as a central component of efforts to

address challenges unique to the current global context, including rising violent extremism, climate change and unprecedented numbers of displaced persons (United Nations Women 2015). All these factors have an impact on peacebuilding processes, rendering a gendered approach even more important. The resolutions have provided a framework within which peacebuilding practitioners can engage women and men alike in processes. The emphasis on the importance of increased women's engagement in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction seeks to address gender roles in a patriarchal structure where women are perceived as victims and rarely as agents of peace.

5.5 The African Union's approach: Policy to practice

The AU adopted the PCRD Policy (African Union 2014) in 2006 in Banjul, Gambia during the AU summit. This strategy serves as a guide for the development of comprehensive policies and strategies that elaborate measures that seek to consolidate peace, promote sustainable development and pave the way for growth and regeneration in countries and regions emerging from conflict. Among the principles of the policy are inclusiveness, equity and non-discrimination, which place emphasis on participation and addressing the needs of vulnerable groups, including women and girls in PCRD activities.

This framework has six indicative self-standing and cross-cutting elements, which represent the pillars upon which PCRD efforts should be developed and sustained. One of these is on women and gender. While this element is specific to women, other pillars in the policy also reflect the needs of women in peacebuilding. For instance, the focus on security calls for integrated approaches to repatriation, resettlement, reintegration and rehabilitation of refugees, IDPs, former combatants and their families, paying particular attention to women victims and survivors of violence. It also calls for the specific security concerns of women and girls, including their demands for protection against those who may have committed acts of sexual and other violence against them, to be addressed, since the reintegration of perpetrators into society can threaten them. This pillar also ensures that the process of transformation of the security sector recognises and acknowledges the role of, and addresses the specific needs and challenges that confront, women and child soldiers. In addition, it calls for the formulation of policies that address the specific security needs of vulnerable groups, including women, girls and child soldiers. Most AU member states have incorporated the provisions of these pillars into their planning on peacebuilding.

African heads of state adopt a gender parity principle

Over the years, many global policy frameworks, and those from Africa in particular, have reflected a critical normative shift towards greater gender parity in peace processes. In July 2002, at the AU summit hosted in Durban, South Africa, African heads of state unanimously adopted a gender parity principle which brought the 50-50 policy into the statutes of the AU. The parity principle has ensured a gender balance of five male and five female commissioners in the AUC (African Union 2014), an institution responsible for maintaining peace and security in Africa.

Furthermore, the AU has partnered with many like-minded organisations to achieve gendered peacebuilding. An example of this partnership is the AU-UN framework agreement signed in 2014, which is a joint collaboration framework between the two bodies on preventing and responding to conflict related sexual violence. This framework supports the prevention and protection pillar under the gender, peace and security programme (African Union 2014). Experiences of survivors of conflict-related sexual violence indicate that complete healing is a prerequisite to peacebuilding; without the healing of the body, mind and soul, they cannot engage fully in building sustainable peace in their communities.

In 2009, the AUC declared 2010–20 as the African Women's Decade. The goal of the decade is to accelerate the implementation of commitments on gender equality and women's empowerment from the local, national, regional and continental levels. This complements Agenda 2063, efforts, particularly on the role of women in Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance. The AU has demonstrated strong commitment to this vision, by highlighting the importance of transforming the status of women from that of always being victims of conflict, and to advance their agency and participation in peace processes (African Union no date). This has been reflected in the peacebuilding efforts of the AU, AU member state and CSOs working to empower women in conflict and post-conflict countries.

5.6 Conflict-related sexual violence and exploitation: A peacebuilding perspective

The conditions of inequality that exist in a society prior to outbreaks of violence are aggravated during situations of armed conflict. Levels of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) often rise in crisis and conflict settings, where systems of protection, security and justice break down and women and girls are left particularly vulnerable. In war and conflict situations, sexual violence is a uniquely destructive act and method of war which poses a grave threat to international peace and security (United Kingdom

Government 2014). Sexual violence is now recognised as a weapon of war and a human rights crime by the international community and International Criminal Court (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2015).

On the other hand, women are not always victims of conflict and conflict-related sexual violence; they also play other roles, including advocating for change in the status quo on women's engagement in peace processes.

The need to mainstream gender into peacebuilding is now widely recognised, with particular focus on the importance of tackling SGBV in conflict-affected settings (Environment House 2014). Sexual and GBV have devastating, long-term effects on the lives of victims and survivors, their families and communities, and they also impede development progress. These issues must therefore be considered in all mediation efforts and in the implementation of ceasefire and peace agreements. By expanding understandings of gender in peacebuilding – and bringing men's perspectives into the analysis – we can begin to better understand men's relationship to violence as both victims and perpetrators. For instance, the phenomenon of sexual violence against men in conflict is rarely explored, and often misunderstood. Support groups for women who have experienced sexual violence are extremely limited in post-conflict settings, and the even greater lack of equivalent groups for male victims significantly hinders recovery and rehabilitation (Environment House 2014).

Furthermore, SGBV and exploitation present a foundational constraint on women's capacities to exercise their citizenship rights and their leadership roles, and to fully contribute to reconciliation. This affects not only their mobility and health, but also the way they are perceived (as legitimate participants) in post-conflict decision-making. Responses to SGBV and exploitation, however, have been very narrowly defined, under-resourced and addressed inconsistently throughout peacebuilding frameworks and priority plans. In part, this is because very little exists in the way of evidence-based approaches to SGBV prevention, protection, physical and psychosocial recovery (United Nations no date).

Sierra Leone's Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework specifies the need to increase women's access to the courts, help ensure property rights and, most crucially, provide alternatives to the customary court system. This framework is committed to increasing support to family support units of the national police to address SGBV and other crimes, with focus on women. This particular SSR reform initiative sets an important precedent that should be assessed for potential replication (United Nations no date). To achieve enhanced and more productive engagement of survivors of conflict in peacebuilding activities, healing of the mind and body needs to be prioritised and pursued. The availability of such frameworks provides a platform for holistic healing and strengthens citizen's confidence in peacebuilding interventions.

Additionally, the United Nations Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in the Central African Republic, adopted in 2014, includes important commitments for the prevention of SGBV, including the provision of human rights training for security forces, as well as identification and support for victims of violence (United Nations 2010). Sexual and GBV is neither inevitable nor acceptable. The UNDP supports national efforts to tackle SGBV by:

- increasing women's political participation and leadership in sectors such as justice and security, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and economic recovery
- building the capacities of police investigators, prosecutors and judges working on sexual and gender-based violence cases
- supporting the development of policy and legal frameworks that are inclusive and protective of women, and women's rights
- improving access to justice and security service delivery
- providing amenities for survivors, including medical, psycho-social, family, legal and economic assistance, such as through one-stop clinics
- tackling impunity for sexual and gender-based violence
- establishing victims' rights to reparations to help them rebuild their lives
- engaging at community level in awareness-raising and prevention activities
- mobilising men to advocate against and tackle the prevalence of sexual and gender-based violence (United Nations Development Programme 2015).

5.7 Importance of gender in peacebuilding programming

Significant gaps remain in the effective implementation of international mechanisms and in the provision of support and services to those most vulnerable in conflict, including women. To overcome gender constraints in peacebuilding, an integrated framework for action is required. Gender mainstreaming practices should address both the institutional and structural barriers faced by different groups of women and men in conflict settings.

Gender analysis should therefore inform all gender mainstreaming actions and other interventions in peace and security. Some of the reasons for strengthening gender sensitivity in peacebuilding project programming are that it:

- allows for understanding the situation more accurately
- enables practitioners to meet the priorities and needs of the population in more targeted manner, based on how women, girls, men and boys are affected by crises
- ensures that all people impacted by a crisis are acknowledged and that all their vulnerabilities and needs are taken into account
- facilitates the design of more effective and appropriate responses (Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2006:2)

Deliberately incorporating women's needs and interests into peacebuilding is crucial and should take into consideration the fact that pre-conflict gender relations do not remain the same following conflict.

There are various aspects of peacebuilding that often neglect to account for gender. Some of these are listed below in an attempt to recognise the important role they should play in ensuring that peacebuilding processes are gender-sensitive and take into account particular vulnerabilities.

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration often fails to consider the specific needs and realities of former female combatants (many of whom have small dependent children), which makes it difficult for them to adjust in post-war societies (Delgado 2010). Based on the conditionality that a weapon should be surrendered in exchange for financial/material support, a great number of women lose out, having played crucial roles during conflict that did not necessarily involve owning weapons. Even in cases where these women do not have a weapon to surrender, they should still be eligible for DDR programmes, which would to enable them to secure new livelihoods.

Gender is an important factor in determining the possibilities for economic reintegration of former combatants and returning populations. Taking a relational approach to gendered economic empowerment projects can help to reduce suspicions or potentially violent backlash by those who feel excluded (e.g. husbands of women receiving support) (Environment House 2014). The DDR process responds to the needs of female ex-combatants by providing them with skills training. However, women and girls who were associated with armed groups encounter challenges during the DDR process since the community perceives them as perpetrators; restricting the level of engagement they assume in peacebuilding activities. Peacebuilding practitioners should consider realities such as these in programme design, planning and implementation.

During conflict, most girl soldiers, while occasionally being allowed to fight, are also continually expected to perform sexual services for commanders and are frequently raped, not only by opposition forces but also by their compatriots (Maulden 2011). To respond to these security needs UNSCR 2242, adopted in October 2015, urges states to strengthen access to justice for women, including through the prompt investigation, prosecution and punishment of perpetrators of SGBV, and to provision of reparations (United Nations Press 2015 and United Nations 2015).

Women in society also play key roles in DDR processes, either individually or as part of an institution, mostly working for NGOs. This exercise of their agency should be facilitated and strengthened.

In Sierra Leone, a survey asked predominantly male ex-combatants to identify those who played a significant role in helping them reintegrate; 55 per cent named women in the community (United Nations Women no date).

Economic recovery programmes

Deliberate efforts should be made to ensure that women are involved in programmes that will improve their livelihoods. This has been emphasised by frameworks like the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BDPfA) and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Sometimes, women are left out because, in terms of established gender roles, men are considered the 'breadwinners'. However, violent conflict often changes this, and due to shifts in gender roles, women frequently end up heading households. This dynamic must be taken into account in all post-conflict settings (Farr 2002). Almost ten years after the genocide, Rwanda's 2002 census noted that females were heading 34 per cent of households, which highlights not only the civil war's impact on demographics, but also the shift in women's societal roles (Brown and Uwineza 2011).

Changing gender roles

Women heading households are often unable to obtain services because there is no help with childcare, or support to collect water or firewood. Single male-headed households often have specific needs as the household heads may not have the skills to cook, care for young children or do household chores (Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2006).

Deliberate efforts should be made to allocate resources to women-specific projects, but with the same overarching objectives of inclusiveness and ownership from the decision-making to implementation phases. It should not be assumed that because a project is women-focused, all women that should benefit from it will do so, hence the need for targeted programming for measurable impacts. Evidence supports the claim that focusing on gender equality fast-forwards achievement of other development objectives (United Nations Development Project 2014). In the long-term, it is important to include women in ensuring adherence to equality goals in post-conflict reconstruction, noting that gender inequality can influence long-term prospects for peace and development. Societies that have high levels of inequality, including gender inequality, are more susceptible to conflict (North et al. 2006). However, post-conflict programmes rarely recognise the impacts that resource allocations can have on gender. Many post-conflict countries face severe resource scarcities that require choices and

the removal of gender barriers in setting priorities and ensuring that the distribution of funding reflects the interests and needs of all people as this may affect development outcomes significantly.

The need to enhance women's skills during and after conflict so they can take up new roles in the economic sphere, to enhance their productivity, should be considered.

UN Photo/Evan Schneider

UN Police Advisers Briefing on Increasing Female Police in Peacekeeping (7 August 2009).

Political participation

As a process geared to long-term sustainability, peacebuilding is political in nature. In post-conflict contexts, it involves making decisions that shape all aspects of a country's future. While women often become more engaged in the public sphere during times of conflict, when it comes to the peacebuilding process, they are often excluded (Klot 2007). Women should be actively involved at mediation/negotiation tables to give them opportunities to articulate their needs and ensure that there is adequate focus on key priorities and translating them into gains for the benefit of all in their societies (United Nations Development Fund for Women 2009).

Factors that enable this fair and substantive representation and participation should be considered priorities and should be allocated sufficient budgets (even while other reconstruction efforts are occurring). Examples of prioritisation include: the provision of maternal and specialised healthcare, mechanisms to address the effects of GBV, education, security available, and access to justice systems and social services.

The inclusion of women in the peacemaking phase should ensure that they are also involved at the policy-making level and contribute to state machineries.

In addition to allocating sufficient resources to women's immediate practical interests, it is important to ensure that their long-term strategic interests are met. In Africa especially, strong women's movements and women's active participation in conflict resolution have resulted in increased representation of women in politics. Countries such as South Africa and Rwanda present examples of sharp increases in women's post-conflict representation in parliament, with Rwanda specifically boasting the highest percentage of women in a national parliament's lower house in the world (Inter-Parliamentary Union no date). Such representation is considered a measure of democratic inclusivity. If a large section of the population is not politically represented, can the state be a truly inclusive democracy? There is a strong link between democracy and development, but this connection is challenged and weakened by gender inequalities in societies.

Women's political representation is a question of human rights. If women constitute approximately half of society, they deserve to be represented at a similar level. This is a basic question of having interest groups appropriately represented in functioning democracies. Numerous international and national instruments have been developed to advocate for increasing women's political participation. These include the BDPfA, 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), as well as the 1997 Southern African Development Community Declaration on Gender and Development at the sub-regional level (Southern African Development Community 2012) to name just a few. In some cases, national constitutions enshrine various women's rights and gender equality, thereby strengthening women's participation in political processes.

Security sector reform

In some countries in the aftermath of violent conflict, positions and job opportunities in the security sector tend to be given to members of disbanded armed groups and government soldiers, who are often men. This can leave women vulnerable as it may threaten their level of access to justice mechanisms and leave them afraid to report abuses committed against them, at times by the same people who are supposed to be protecting them. In peacebuilding, the approach to security must be holistic, looked at from a humanistic angle and based on a human rights approach.

An enabling environment for peacebuilding depends on the level of perceived security at individual or societal level. During conflict and sometimes in post-conflict settings,

the armed groups attack women's sexuality, instilling fear and sense of insecurity which translates into limited engagement of women in peacebuilding activities.

Security is not about the presence of security personnel, but about:

- an individual's state of mind – do they feel secure?
- who is involved in the provision of security and who is benefiting from it
- how security is defined, what it entails and how it is meted out
- what security organs and structures are in place and what their level of effectiveness is
- how security forces handle specific gender-related crimes, such as domestic abuse, sexual violence and trafficking in human beings?

Police services in many countries recognise that crime and violence affect women, men, girls and boys differently, and continually challenge themselves to provide better services to all (Bastick 2014). To respond to the challenge, SSR must be gender-sensitive throughout the planning, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases. It must also include the reform of recruitment processes and improvement in the delivery of security services to address and prevent SGBV (ibid). The inclusion of women in the security sector is crucial because it enhances community responsibility and local ownership in the provision and maintenance of security, being representative of the communities it serves. Thus, ensuring the balanced representation of female and male personnel is essential to enable police services to effectively prevent, detect and investigate crimes against women and men (ibid).

Furthermore, good policies are key building blocks for achieving gender-responsive policing. Every policy should take into account the different needs of women, men, girls and boys, whether as victims of crime, perpetrators, detainees or police staff, and there should be policies in place to address specific gender-related issues (Bastick 2014). To facilitate the monitoring of issues, each policy should set out what sex disaggregated data is to be collected and how it is to be reported, and it should identify relevant indicators.

In addition to deliberate efforts to include women in the security sector, it is important to remember that security needs differ and that this should be taken into account when designing security policies. A comprehensive re-envisioning of a gender-responsive security sector is needed without delay. Across the security sector, urgent attention must be paid to: establishing accountability systems; ensuring gender-sensitive recruitment, selection and retention policies; specific procedures for registering crimes against women and protecting victims; and gender-responsive police structures, deployment, risk assessment, research, and crime and injury data and information collection systems. The relationship between security forces and

peacebuilding practitioners should be strengthened, in the process consolidating response mechanisms on the security needs of all people, and enabling both these players to benefit from the exchange of information.

Transitional justice

Numerous countries in Africa have implemented some form of post-conflict transitional justice mechanism. These include Algeria, Burundi, DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and South Africa. These processes have had mixed results and reviews. In post-conflict scenarios, transitional justice is often approached in a top-down manner, so that retributive justice tends to benefit perpetrators rather than victims or survivors, because perpetrators often end up in positions of political power.

Women's access to justice is hampered by lack of access to education and/or knowledge of the existence of opportunities for redress. There are other reasons suggested as well. For example, in South Africa, the TRC held special hearings for women, but only after coming under pressure from women's interest groups to address human rights violations against women during the apartheid era. In addition, the women's hearings were not well advertised and women who could have testified about their experiences were not aware that the special hearings were taking place. Nevertheless, numerous women worked for and contributed to the Commission itself (Graybill 2001). In other words, women should not only be included in the system of transitional justice, but it is also important to ensure that there are sufficient spaces for their voices to be heard and for them to receive justice. Without this justice, victims and survivors of conflict remain distant from peacebuilding interventions.

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE MECHANISMS NEED TO BE DESIGNED TO ENSURE WOMEN'S SOCIETAL POSITIONING IS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AND THEIR GRIEVANCES ADDRESSED. 'WHOSE JUSTICE?' IS A QUESTION THAT CALLS FOR CONTINUOUS REFLECTION.

Trauma healing

When trauma is not dealt with, survivors bear the brunt of its consequences because strain begets violence, and this has more pronounced impacts on women than men. Sometimes the oppressed become oppressors and former armed combatants may resort to both physical and sexual violence as a way of dealing with their own trauma (Reimann 2001). It is essential for peacebuilders to be aware of possible cycles of abuse and their influence in perpetuating conflict. It is also worth noting here that sexual violence against men (for example, when a man is raped in an attempt to undermine his gendered identity) can also feed into this cycle.

In the aftermath of conflict, weak justice systems and socioeconomic and cultural factors deter women from reporting abuses and promote a culture of impunity. In Rwanda after the genocide, for example, widowed or abandoned women were left traumatized as a result of experiencing physical violence, rape and sexual enslavement during years of protracted conflict (Brown and Uwineza 2011). However, this should not be considered a women's issue and provision of trauma healing for all members of society is necessary because, if trauma is not addressed in relation to both women and men, then cycles of violence may continue. This ultimately affects reconciliation and peacebuilding programming.

5.8 Strengthening research in gender and peacebuilding

Understanding the causes of war and finding remedies to its seemingly constant recurrence is a central theme in peace research (Wallensteen 2011). Such research seeks conclusions on policies and interventions to prevent this recurrence, point to routes that should be avoided and possibly suggest constructive peacebuilding actions. It is essential to understand the dynamic impact of gender roles in conflict and post-conflict settings by developing knowledge and harnessing evidence on these. Women's diverse experiences during war can often be a significant point of strength in a peacebuilding initiative (Kulp 2009) and this highlights the need for research into women's roles and experiences.

The establishment of a Regional Research and Documentation Centre for Women, Gender and Peacebuilding in the Great Lakes Region is one of the major activities of UNESCO's gender equality programme. The creation of the centre is part of UNESCO's programme promoting the human rights and status of women living in the Great Lakes region through the pursuit of policy-oriented research, consultations, networking and capacity-building for sustainable peace in this region (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation no date). There are numerous other research initiatives focusing on gender issues and these should be strengthened to support evidence and the highest quality research for effective peacebuilding programming.

Over the past two decades, interest in the relationship between gender, peace and security has increased dramatically, as manifested in new research agendas, policy debates and development programmes in conflict-affected countries. Cutting edge policy research, innovative new ideas and robust evidence are significant means of organisations generating knowledge on gender equality and peacebuilding. Through research, monitoring and evaluation of programmes should be repeated periodically so that the impact of new measures can be assessed. Furthermore, conducting gender self-assessments or gender audits as a form of research can be an excellent first step in identifying which policies and actions are in place and which need developing.

5.9 Organisational commitment to mainstreaming gender

Ensuring inclusivity in peacebuilding programmes calls for gender-responsive environments. Over the years, there has been rising awareness of and substantial increase in commitments to gender mainstreaming in peace and security. The past 20 years have seen a significant increase in global and national commitments to gender mainstreaming and there is now greater recognition of the centrality of gender equality and women's empowerment to sustainable development and post-conflict reconstruction. In addition, trends indicate that both national governments and the international community are increasingly institutionalising gender mainstreaming.

Today we are at a pivotal juncture. Gender mainstreaming is no longer optional. Priority should be given to its implementation as global discussions take place on accelerating progress to achieve the MDGs (and the Post-2015 Development Agenda after the MDGs expire), the 20-year legacy of the BDPfA, UNSCR 1325 and the AU gender policy. Gender mainstreaming seeks to integrate gender equality components into national public and private organisations, in central or local policies, and in services and sectoral programmes. In the longer run, it aims to transform discriminatory social institutions, recognising that discrimination can be embedded in laws, cultural norms and community practices. Such progressive changes rely on access to data, gender expertise, sound analysis, supportive cultures, budgets and the mobilisation of social forces. Mainstreaming gender and being gender-responsive calls for meaningful transformation and tangible shifts within institutions and in the processes that guide peace and security work. The institutional environment has to be gender-sensitive and gender responsive. For inclusive, holistic and sustainable peace, peacebuilding interventions should address the security needs of all people, regardless of gender, in conflict situations.

Strategies to internalise attention to gender and gender equality throughout the institutions working on peacebuilding should be clearly outlined. They included strengthening the capacities of senior management in leadership and advocacy around gender equality, enhancing communication and knowledge management strategies and tactics on gender mainstreaming, deepening human resource capacity to mainstream gender, elaborating a clear accountability and reporting framework to track gender equality results, committing dedicated core and project resources at the administrative and operational levels, and developing a clear monitoring and evaluation framework (United Nations Development Programme 2008). Figure 10 illustrates the elements of gender mainstreaming at organisational level.

Figure 10: Gender mainstreaming in peacebuilding: Organisational commitment



Source: Gender and Development Network 2015

5.10 Integrating gender into peacebuilding processes: How to

The question of how to integrate gender issues into peacebuilding processes is fundamental. Peacebuilders should identify entry points and platforms from which they can incorporate gender into their work. Some openings and strategies are explained in Toolkit 6.

Toolkit 6: Strategies for incorporating gender and including women in peacebuilding

Advocacy and awareness creation

Enhancing women's participation in peacebuilding is a process. It requires addressing deep-rooted cultural and structural aspects that have the potential to change relations between women and men within a given society. Linkages should be formed connecting women and men at the decision-making level to enhance communication between them.

Accountability
Actors in peacebuilding should have a gendered lens that ensures women's inclusion in ways that can be monitored.

Compromise and cooperation
Peacebuilding frameworks should not be rigid and there must be opportunities to readjust and include women in more significant roles. Both women and men should be empowered to work together and appreciate the unique strengths that each sex brings to peacebuilding processes.

Inclusivity
Women's involvement in peacebuilding is a right because they are an essential constituency of any peacebuilding context. Inclusivity also assists in fostering their human rights by enabling them to be involved from decision-making right through to implementation.

Disaggregation of beneficiaries
Interventions should consider who the direct and indirect beneficiaries will be and how they will benefit as well as the impact of the location identified and timelines set, particularly when it comes to women's participation (United Nations Development Fund for Women 2002).

Determination of actors
How and where are women involved? Are they relegated to 'secretarial' roles or are they involved in the making of decisions throughout the design, implementation and review phases? If women are included, is it at the top, mid or grassroots level and is it only elite/educated women?

Design of interventions
A peacebuilding intervention that does not take women into consideration right from the start is not likely to succeed (Delgado 2010). However, interventions aimed at benefiting women should never be homogenous. They must be context-specific and take into account women's varying needs and priorities.



Resources
Prioritisation of women's capacity-building and training needs will ensure that their inclusion is enhanced. Women-focused interventions are often poorly funded and short-term; long-term financial commitment should be made.

Women's participation is made more dynamic during violent conflict as they often take up roles that were traditionally the preserve of men. With this in mind, it is thus crucial that in the post-conflict phase momentum achieved, and the deliberate construction of new gender relations, be concretised. For peacebuilding to be locally owned and to achieve peace, it is imperative that women are involved. The addition of women

should not only be done at the policy level, but also at the operational stage, so that it becomes part of societal structures and systems, the norm rather than the exception.

5.11 Challenges of integrating gender into peacebuilding programmes

While various efforts are made to ensure that peace and conflict interventions pay more attention to gender, women and others excluded from power continue to be left out of official peace efforts. This leads to their contributions to peace and their experiences of conflict being ignored. Furthermore, there is still limited understanding of the links between gender, violence and peace. Some challenges that affect the implementation of peacebuilding programmes include: coordination challenges between different actors working on gender issues; weak gender analysis that affects project planning and implementation; feeble gendered monitoring and evaluation resulting and the resultant failure to formulate recommendations that could see gender being incorporated into future phases of the programme or in similar programmes; weak gender reporting; limited gender-sensitive conflict analysis; lack of gender-sensitive approaches to conflict; insufficient political will to support gender initiatives in peacebuilding; and conflict analysis tools that are not gender-responsive, noting that strong analysis is central to effective peacebuilding.

Furthermore, at the local and community levels, better and more creative outreach and educational strategies to highlight instances in which women have played roles as problem solvers, entrepreneurs and leaders are needed. Peacebuilding also needs avenues, beyond newspapers, policy briefs or academic studies to illustrate the roles women have played to bring peace to their communities, regions and/or countries. While women often take on greater and more extensive roles and responsibilities during times of conflict, patriarchal structures tend to be reinstated in post-conflict settings. Unfortunately, it seems that changes in gender roles do not necessarily lead to changes in gender ideologies (El-Bushra 2004).

5.12 Best practice in integrating gender into peacebuilding programmes

Current international practice emphasises the primacy of high-level conflict resolution. This, coupled with unique African experiences, provides an opportunity for increased inclusivity in peacebuilding processes. A gender perspective highlights the different roles and needs of women and men during and after conflict, offering a more accurate and comprehensive basis for analysis and intervention. Failure to integrate a gender perspective results in a distorted and simplified picture of the complex processes of

building peace, and increases the likelihood of ineffective or even harmful programmes being implemented (El-Bushra 2004).

Framework for gender equality programming

- analyse gender differences
- design services to meet the needs of all
- ensure access for women, girls, boys and men
- encourage equal participation
- train women and men equally
- address GBV in sector programmes
- collect, analyse and report sex-disaggregated and age-disaggregated data
- target actions based on information from gender analysis
- coordinate actions with all partners
- Adapt and act collectively to ensure gender equality! (Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2006:1).

Some of the best practices and lessons that have worked and can be considered include:

- regular analysis of how peacebuilding programmes affect human rights, with particular focus on the rights of women and children
- integrating gender objectives into existing strategic planning processes
- using and applying inclusive language into peace negotiations
- setting up a pool or databases of experts on gender, conflict, mediation and negotiation who are readily available to provide support
- conducting baseline studies on the gender specific dimensions of a particular conflict and the gender-specific activities undertaken at the time of the study
- map women's organisations and networks, and their experiences, needs and interests, from the very beginning of the intervention to provide a platform for tapping into existing expertise and resources
- support local women's organisations or individual female activists who have strong backing at grassroots level and in the wider population, offering opportunities to increase the capacities of these groups or individuals to reach out to a wider target population on peacebuilding initiatives
- ensure specific resources for individual activists and women's organisations, for capacity-building in leadership, conflict analysis, negotiation and communication skills
- support peace forums and negotiations led by women, to strengthen their response to the security needs of residents, including using the leverage of international organisations to link women's forums to official, Track 1 negotiations

- identify and support local women, who often serve as agents for peace and have grassroots links, as negotiators and mediators
- support local actors to find a common agenda and the different interests of women and men that must be included in negotiations
- encourage mediators to put gender issues on the schedule of a negotiation if gender-sensitive women are not present at the table, and establish guidelines to help them implement this demand
- provide gender mainstreaming training for influential and strategically placed men so that they can advance the gender agenda.

Toolkit 7: Mainstreaming gender in the national peace architecture and in peacebuilding programmes, Kenya

Gender is not an add-on, but should be an integral part of projects and daily work. By knowing more about the needs of target groups and the different impacts that projects can have on women or men (or both), it is possible to raise the efficiency of a project and its output. Including the views and needs of women, who represent over 50 per cent of the population, fulfils the needs and interests of the wider population. By doing so, institutions and processes of peacebuilding and peace operations become more inclusive and effective. In the absence of a gender mainstreaming, peacebuilding processes are weakened and often their sustainability may be jeopardised.

Kenya's approach to engendering peacebuilding programmes reflects the importance of an inclusive process where the community is involved. The community is central to the functioning of District Peace Committees (DPCs) in the country; encouragingly, one of the selection criteria for the committee is fair representation of women and men. In 2013 UN Women, in collaboration with the Kenyan Ministry of Coordination of National Government under the National Steering Committee on Conflict Management and Peacebuilding (NSC), implemented a programme that strengthened the gender dimension in the NSC's peacebuilding programming, including capacity-building for the DPCs and peace field monitors. Further, the programme also strengthened the early warning and early response systems in the country through recruitment and deployment of gender data analysts in each of the 47 counties. These specialists deployed several months before the 2013 elections, provided information to the NSC for analysis and linkage to early response on women's security issues before, during and after the elections. Further, the DPCs appointed gender focal points to support responses to gender issues in the work of the committee. Gender focal points within the committees aim to improve understanding of the roles that women and men can and should adopt in peace processes, and how masculinities/femininities relate to violence, vulnerabilities and peacebuilding in their contexts. This has led to inclusivity in the work of the committees and stronger responses to gender issues in their communities.



The contributor, Irene Limo, is Senior Programme Officer in the Peacekeeping Unit at ACCORD.

5.13 Conclusion

Gender plays a key role in the power dynamics of societies and an understanding of gender is, therefore, vital to successful peacebuilding. Women and men perceive difficulties differently and, as a result, have different approaches to problem solving, which are constituent to ensuring holistic and strengthened peacebuilding. Gender inequalities and socially constructed expectations of gender roles mean that men and boys, and girls and women, are exposed to the harmful consequences of armed violence in different ways, and stand to gain differently from peacebuilding efforts.

Integrating gender into peacebuilding programmes and interventions is everyone's agenda. The presence and roles of gender advisers should not be confused with this key obligation of integrating gender which each peacebuilder should undertake. Gender advisers can provide advice and guidance to other technical experts, as well as pointing to gaps in information and data. They can also help to think, plan and design assessments and interventions so that gender dimensions are not lost, but this is done collaboratively with peacebuilding practitioners and experts. To be effective as peacebuilders, it is crucial to be aware of the diversity of gender norms and privileges and how these are experienced by men, women and gender minorities of all ages at different times, and to respond to the power dynamics and norms that influence peace and violent conflict. Failing to recognise these can lead to missed opportunities and have a negative impact on efforts to deliver lasting peace.

For men and boys, women and girls, violent conflict creates both new spaces and novel vulnerabilities. In particular, the Post-2015 Development Agenda includes, but also goes beyond, a focus on women's empowerment. It offers opportunities to treat gender inequality not only as a women's issue, but a matter requiring both men and women to change the way they think about their roles and identities, prioritise inclusive decision-making, and to challenge social norms and values (Environment House 2014).

How can peace be sustained without women helping to craft it in the first place? Women comprise more than half of the world population so, whether they are combatants or survivors, peacebuilders or bystanders, they must be awarded opportunities take up roles in the transition from war to peaceful development. This is not just a moral issue or a question of equality; it is an efficiency issue. At this rate, peacebuilding and other processes lose half of the world's potential by not including women in all aspects of global problem-solving. Moving forward globally in an effective and efficient manner, women will need to play a pivotal role in security and peacebuilding in this century.

Chapter Six: Peacebuilding programme and project management

What will this chapter do?

- It introduces results-oriented project and programme management strategy; results-based management (RBM) and conflict sensitive approaches (CSA) to projects and programmes.

Why is it important?

- Without effective project or programme management processes, peacebuilding interventions can become ineffective or unsustainable, and may fail to meet their goals. It is of value to the reader to learn about RBM as it is one of the most effective and widely used project and programme management tactics in the field, with a focus on achieving expected results.
- A CSA enables practitioners to understand the unintended consequences of their interventions; minimise negative impacts and maximising positive ones. It enables them to better integrate the specific context in which their initiative is evolving into the design, planning and implementation of the project or programme.



What you should learn?

- By the end of this chapter, the reader should better understand the benefits and use of RBM as a project/ programme management strategy, and have a basic understanding of the objectives and means of integrating a CSA into project or programme cycles.

6.1 Introduction

Programme management involves coordinating several different projects that may not be closely related, and determining priorities and assigning resources such as contracted services and budgets. A programme is an organised set of activities, projects, processes or services that is oriented toward the attainment of specific objectives (Kuster et al. 2011). As outlined in Chapter 2, a programme follows a cycle that runs from initial planning, through implementation, monitoring and evaluation and exit strategies, and each of these steps requires proper management.

In this chapter, we will focus on one of the most common types of programme and project management strategies used by a range of actors involved in peacebuilding (e.g. NGOs, CSOs and the UN), that is, RBM. Subsequently, it examines conflict sensitivity, an approach to project and programme management that guides practitioners in

taking into account both the positive and negative impacts of interventions in regard to conflict or peace dynamics.

6.2 Results-based management

RBM has been the most common project/programme management strategy among international development, humanitarian and peacebuilding organisations since it was first highlighted in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. With its introduction, the declaration recommended that partner countries and donors jointly commit to 'a participatory approach to strengthen country capacities and to promote accountability of all major stakeholders in the pursuit of results' (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2005:18). RBM was re-confirmed as international best practice in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation of 2011 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2011).

RBM is founded on the principles of accountability, national ownership and inclusiveness (United Nations Development Group 2011). The UN refers to RBM as 'a management strategy by which all the actors, contributing directly or indirectly to achieving a set of results, ensure that their processes, products and services contribute to the achievement of desired results (outputs, outcomes and higher level goals or impact' (ibid:2). Actors subsequently use evidence and information on the actual results to inform their decision-making during the programme cycle, as well as for reporting and ensuring accountability (ibid). Donor agencies, in particular, use the information gained from RBM systems to generate performance information for accountability reporting to external stakeholders as well as for internal management learning and decision-making (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2000).

The RBM approach is compatible with and complementary to the Human-Rights Based Approach (HRBA) (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2015), a widely used conceptual framework for the process of human development that is normatively based on international human rights standards and operationally directed to promoting and protecting human rights (United Nations Children's Fund 2012). The HRBA approach examines the inequalities that lie at the heart of development problems and seeks to redress the unjust distributions of power and discriminatory practices that hamper development progress. The complementarity and compatibility of RBM and HRBA arises from their respective functions: 'RBM is a management tool that helps to achieve desired results and report on them, while the HRBA is a framework that assists in defining the result objectives, i.e. its content and the process through which the results are achieved' (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2015:7).

As illustrated in Figure 11, RMB follows a life-cycle approach, which starts with planning, including setting the vision for the programme, and defining the terms of conduct and RBM framework for. This is followed by the implementation of the programme, with provision for it to be monitored, through appropriate data collection and adequate reporting, to ensure that set objectives are achieved at every stage of the programme. The monitoring and evaluation component provides the evidence that guides decision-making on current and future interventions (United Nations Development Group 2011). Ensuring adequate stakeholder participation is considered a top priority during every programme or project phase.

Figure 11: The results-based management life cycle



Source: United Nations Development Group 2011:2.

There are some differences in the RBM approaches and tools used by different donor organisations and other actors, but they also share some commonalities. In this chapter we focus on two of the most commonly used tools: the results framework (also known as the results matrix) and the risk mitigation strategy.

6.2.1 Results framework

A results framework is a graphic demonstration (for example, a matrix, a display or summary) used in RBM to demonstrate the different chains or levels of results expected from a particular programme or project. The results can be either positive or negative, unintended or intended, and they signify the changes 'in a state or condition that derive from a cause-and-effect relationship' (United Nations Development Group 2011:7). Designing a results framework necessitates understanding the causal linkages between an intervention and its results. The causal sequence to achieve a specific result can be visually shown in the form of a results chain (see Figure 12) of inputs ➔ activities ➔ outputs ➔ outcomes ➔ goal ➔ impact, with the assumption that actions taken at one level will lead to a result at the next level, and in this sense, the results chain stipulates the sequence of actions taken to achieve a particular result (ibid). A results chain should clearly show the change to be achieved through the cause-and-effect relationship between implementation (inputs and activities) and the results (outputs, outcomes and the goals or impact). Outputs and outcomes signify the results to be achieved in the medium term, whereas the goal or impact refers to the results to be achieved in the long-term.

Figure 12: The results chain

Source: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2015: 6.

The development of a sound results framework necessitates clarity in terms of the theory of change to be employed, that is, the reasons that the project, programme or strategy is expected to lead to the desired outputs, why those results are likely to lead to the immediate or intermediate outcomes, and how those outcomes are linked to longer-term effects or impact (World Bank 2012). Theory of change also requires being able to know or estimate the time it will take to finish each stage of the programme and the extent to which the outcomes will have been achieved at each stage (United Nations Development Group 2011). It is necessary to identify and analyse assumptions about the operational context and related risk issues carefully. The theory of change can then be built into a results framework, which depicts these causal linkages, from inputs to impact, in visual form.

Theories of change explained

'Theories of change is a simple, powerful concept which can improve design, monitoring and evaluation of programmes in conflict-afflicted environments. In general, a theory of change states what expected (changed) result will follow from a particular set of actions. A simple example would be, "if I add more fuel to the fire, then it will burn hotter". The concept is analogous to a "development hypothesis". As applied to the conflict field, theories of change refer to the assumed connections between various actions and the result of reducing conflict or building peace. For example, one of the most popular conflict mitigation strategies entails bringing representatives of belligerent groups together to interact in a safe space. The expectation is that the interactions will put a human face on the "other" foster trust, and eventually lead to reductions in tensions. This strategy relies on a theory of change known as the contact hypothesis that can be stated as: "If key actors from belligerent groups are given the opportunity to interact, then they will better understand and appreciate one another, be better able to work with one another, and prefer to resolve conflicts peacefully."

To give another example, we may have a theory that developing more inclusive democratic structures will lead to more satisfaction with governance and societal conflict management systems. An expanded consideration of this theory may suggest that increased satisfaction with social conflict management systems will lead to lower likelihood of violent conflict occurring. By making the theory explicit, it is possible to consciously shape programme planning and implementation to correspond to it. Clarity on the theory of change to be applied allows practitioners to critically examine it, refine it and, if necessary, dismiss it when evidence suggests it is misguided.

However, theories of change are more useful to the extent that, having identified the changes we expect from an intervention, we can "know it when we see it". What does less likelihood of violent conflict look like there? Are there indicators of these changes that might be relevant in multiple contexts, or flexibly adapted for particular cultures? Articulating our intervention's theory of change allows us to develop and monitor meaningful change indicators and enables the evaluation of programmes' (United States Agency for International Development 2010:1–2).

The type of results frameworks used may differ between different donor agencies and actors, but they all follow a similar logic. As shown in Table 5, the results framework used by UN development agencies entails vertical columns for indicators, means of verification, risks and assumptions and (indicative) resources, and horizontal rows for outcomes and outputs. It is also important to make the outcomes SMART, that is specific (S), measurable (M), achievable (A), relevant (R) and time-Bound (T) (see Table 6).

Table 5: Results matrix

	Indicators (baseline, target)	Means of verification	Risks and assumptions	Role of partners	Indicative resources
Outcome 1					
Output 1.1					
Outcome 2					
Output 2.1					
Output 2.2					

Source: United Nations Development Group 2011:16.

Terms explained

Assumptions: 'Variables or factors that need to be in place for the results to be achieved, whereas risks naturally describe the possible (controllable or uncontrollable) challenges that may have a (negative) impact on the achievement of results.' (United Nations Development Group 2011:21)

Indicative resources: 'An estimate of the resources required – financial, human, technical assistance and knowledge – for a given programme or project.' (ibid: 22)

Means of verification: Sources of information (e.g. persons, organisations and beneficiaries) from whom data will be gathered to inform initial baselines and to measure progress made in the achievement of results (ibid).

Output: 'The products, capital goods and services which result from a development intervention; may also include changes resulting from the intervention which are relevant to the achievement of outcomes.' (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 2002:28)

Outcome: 'The likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs' (ibid:28).

Performance Indicator: 'A variable that allows the verification of changes in the development intervention or shows results relative to what was planned' (ibid:29).

Role of partners: The support given by project/programme partners for the achievement of a given outcome or output (ibid).

Baseline: 'Information gathered at the beginning of a project or programme against which variations that occur in the project or programme are measured' (ibid:8).

Target: Specifies a particular value that an indicator should reach by a specific date in the future. For example, 'total literacy rate to reach 85 per cent among groups X and Y by the year 2010' (ibid).

SMART outcomes

S	**Specific:** Impacts and outcomes and outputs must use change language – they must describe a specific future condition
M	**Measurable:** Results, whether quantitative or qualitative, must have measurable indicators, making it possible to assess whether they are achieved or not
A	**Achievable:** Results must be within the capacity of the partners to achieve
R	**Relevant:** Results must make a contribution to selected priorities of the national development framework
T	**Time-bound:** Results are never open-ended – there is an expected date of accomplishment

(United Nations Development Programme 2009:58)

The results matrix can help practitioners to stay focused on the expected achievements of a programme or project. It also helps to build consensus among donors, beneficiaries and other stakeholders on the implementation approach and content of a project or programme (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2015). The matrix can be used throughout the programme/project cycle – from planning to implementation to monitoring and evaluation.

As a key strategic document, summarising in a nutshell what a programme or project intends to achieve, the results matrix can also act as the centrepiece of project/programme proposals. As a monitoring and evaluation tool, it allows practitioners to ascertain whether a project or programme's expected results are being achieved,

and acts as a guide on 'parameters for which results to measure and to account for with useful targets, baselines and means of verification' (United Nations Development Group 2011:29). The matrix also supports projects and programmes to remain aligned and relevant to an overall strategy. It can act as a reference point for reporting project/ programme progress to donors and other relevant stakeholders, and for making management decisions if changes need to be made to the programme or project (ibid).

The matrix should be accompanied by a monitoring and evaluation plan that outlines exactly how data will be collected systematically prior to, during and after project/ programme implementation and how progress towards achieving expected results will be assessed and demonstrated. The plan highlights the modalities or mechanisms to be used to monitor the achievement of outputs, as well as the frequency of monitoring and who is responsible for it. It can incorporate some elements of the results matrix, such as baseline targets, indicators and means of verification. The methods for gathering the information required for monitoring and evaluation vary depending on the time and resources available and the depth required to complete the monitoring or evaluation of the programme or project adequately. The systems to collect information can include: focus groups, semi-structured interviews, testimonials surveys and questionnaires, workshops and roundtables (United Nations Development Group 2011).

6.2.2 Risk mitigation

Programmes and projects are expected to develop strategies for managing and mitigating the possible risks that could affect the achievement of expected results, and risk management is a crucial part of developing an RBM strategy. Risks correspond to potential future happenings that are partially or fully beyond our control, and that may (negatively) impact the achievement of objectives (United Nations Development Group 2011). There are different categories of risk (see Figure 13 below) that may have an impact on the achievement of results. Contextual risks refer to possible events taking place in the operating environments (e.g. humanitarian crises, state failure or return to conflict) that may have a negative impact on the achievement of results, and over which external actors would have limited control. Institutional risks (also called political risks) 'include "internal" risk from the perspective of the donor or implementing partners' (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2015:14). It encompasses the number of ways in which an organisation, as well its staff or stakeholders, may experience negative impacts from a planned intervention. Institutional risk will often be related to reputational or operational security risk issues (ibid). Together, the contextual and institutional risks make up the two-fold programmatic risks: firstly, the potential for a project or programme to fail to achieve its objectives and results targets and, secondly, the possibility that the programme will harm the operating environment (ibid).

Figure 13: Types of risks



Source: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2015:13.

Risk assessments should widely consider what possible risks an intervention could have, whether it may be financial, operational, strategic, environmental, political, regulatory or organisational. The use of a risk matrix (see Table 6) allows for systematic prioritisation and listing of the possible dangers identified. The risk matrix allows for threats to be ranked in terms of the likelihood of them taking place – low (L), medium (M) or high (H) – and their severity if they were to take place. The matrix also includes a section for defining a strategy for the mitigation of each risk (United Nations Development Group 2011). This approach needs to include a plan for how and when risk issues are to be monitored. In addition, it needs to define clear mitigation measures. These include prevention, reduction, transference, contingency planning and acceptance. The United Nations Development Group (2011) defines these measures as:

- prevention – avoid the risk from materialising or prevent it from having an impact on objectives
- reduction – decrease the likelihood of the risk developing or limiting the impact in case it materialises
- transference – pass the impact of the risk to a third party (e.g. via an insurance policy)
- contingency plan – prepare actions to implement should the risk occur
- acceptance – based on a cost/benefit analysis, accept the possibility that the risk may occur and go ahead without further measures to address it.

Table 6: Risk matrix

Risk	Likelihood of risk (L, M, H)	Impact of risk (L, M, H)	Risk mitigation strategy
Result:			
Risk 1			
Risk 2			

Source: United Nations Development Group 2011: 22.

6.3 Conflict sensitivity in project and programme management

Actors in conflict-affected areas increasingly recognise that their interventions are likely to have unintended impacts on the contexts in which they are working and the people they are meant to assist (Aoi et al. 2007). In influencing a complex system, it is not possible to achieve only one intended effect because the system will respond in a variety of ways that cannot all be foreseen (de Coning 2012). On the other hand, they have also begun to recognise opportunities for building peace that their interventions potentially miss (Swisspeace 2012 and Kenya Conflict Sensitivity Consortium 2010). In other words, actors working in conflict-affected situations are increasingly realising that they need to make a conscious effort to avoid or minimise the negative impacts of their interventions and equally to maximize the positive impacts that can be gained from strengthening social cohesion and peace (Swisspeace 2012). Conflict sensitivity can be defined as 'different efforts, methods and tools for working in a context with the objective of at least avoiding destructive, negative, harmful, unintended effects and if possible contributing to peacebuilding through positive effects' (Kenya Conflict Sensitivity Consortium 2010:7). A number of principles guide the application of conflict sensitivity (see Figure 14).

Results-based management can also generate unintended consequences. The most common danger is that those responsible for managing the project, programme or activity only focus on generating measurable outputs that will, from the perspective of the indicators, create the impression that the desired results are being achieved. In the larger context, these outputs may detract from the achievement of the goals and objectives of the project, or undermine key aspects, among them stakeholder involvement. Another danger is that the focus on results and their indicators may end in attention being paid only to the intended results; this may render actors blind to the side-effects their actions are causing, or to the opportunities they are missing.

Figure 14: Principles for conflict sensitivity



Source: United Nations Development Group 2011.

The objectives of applying a CSA to actions and programming are threefold; Swisspeace (2011) describes the components as enabling an organisation to:

I. understand the context in which it is operating, in particular to comprehend intergroup tensions, the 'divisive' issues with potential for conflict, and the connecting issues with the possibility to mitigate conflict and strengthen social cohesion
II. understand the interaction between its intervention and that context
III. act upon that understanding, to avoid unintentionally feeding into further division, and to maximise potential contributions to strengthen social cohesion and peace.

There are a number of tools, approaches and handbooks which focus on how to apply and integrate conflict sensitivity into the actions, projects and programmes of an organisation. Three common approaches or tools are, the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA), Do No Harm framework, and Reflecting on Peace Practices (RPP). The PCIA is a means of evaluating and anticipating (as far as possible) the impacts of proposed and completed development projects on the 'structures and processes which strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence or continuation of violent conflict, and the processes and structures that increase the likelihood that conflict will be dealt with through violent means' (Kenya Conflict Sensitivity Consortium 2011:23).

The Do No Harm framework was developed based on the programming experience of many aid assistance workers. It provides a tool for mapping the interactions of conflict and humanitarian assistance, and it can be used to plan, monitor and evaluate both development and assistance programmes. The framework is a descriptive tool which:

I. 'identifies the categories of information that have been found through experience to be important for understanding how assistance affects conflict
II. organises these categories in a visual lay-out that highlights their actual and potential relationships
III. helps practitioners predict the impacts of different programming decisions' (Collaborative for Development Actions 2004:3).

Case Study 8:
Applying conflict-sensitive analysis to GOPA's food and nutrition project in the West Nile, Uganda

With the support of GTZ, *Gesellschaft für Organisation, Planung und Ausbildung* (GOPA), a private independent consultancy company, implemented a food and nutrition security project in the West Nile, Uganda, 'in which they integrated specific peacebuilding aims. At the beginning of their project, GOPA, with support from the Ugandan NGO Centre for Conflict Resolution, undertook conflict analysis to identify the existing conflicts associated with resource utilisation, access and ownership. The exercise revealed that 80 per cent of resource-based conflicts in the region were associated with access, or lack of access, to water points. The analysis highlighted that this related particularly to the fact that agencies such as UNHCR were supplying water points to refugee settlements, but with limited or no services made available to host communities. Furthermore, host communities were refused access to certain water sources, as they were prioritised for use by refugee populations. In retaliation, refugees were subjected to inflated prices for food and other essential items in local markets.

More localised conflict analyses around existing borehole sites provided detailed information, which in turn informed joint community dialogue meetings between refugee and host communities to identify possible ways forward. It was agreed that additional boreholes would be sunk to address the inequitable distribution, and to relieve tension and conflicts.

In a similar exercise, GOPA identified a number of conflicts that erupted seasonally, as pastoralists moved their cattle to the nearest water sources during the dry season. To address these water conflicts, the NGO erected valley tanks with the capacity to retain water for up to three months during the dry season. This reduced the volume of livestock being moved during the dry season, and significantly reduced the prevalence of conflicts in these areas.

By adopting a CSA and employing conflict analysis to inform the way they designed their interventions, GOPA learnt that:

- refugee service delivery programmes needed to include management of the relationship with host communities
- joint programme strategies that work with refugees and host communities are the most effective, creating opportunities to incorporate peacebuilding activities

- poor relations, anti-social behaviour, negative attitudes towards certain groups, verbal abuse and denial of access to services are often the visible ways individuals and groups have of expressing underlying hidden needs, desires and perceived (or real) social injustices.

Using tools such as conflict analysis helped GOPA to better understand the dynamics that determine social behaviours and enabled GOPA to predict, and take action, to mitigate against the escalation of violence and potential conflict. These tools helped them to remain flexible and continually review their programme design, which could be amended based on changing circumstances. In contrast, GOPA withdrew from implementing a different project that was pre-designed without implementing a conflict-sensitive approach, and where unknown and unresolved conflicts within beneficiary communities were undermining its intended objectives (Saferworld 2008:23).



Conflict sensitivity should inform all levels of interventions (local, regional and international) and all stages of a programming cycle (Governance and Social Development Resource Centre 2015). Previously mentioned CSA tools, such as the RPP and PCIA are excellent ways to integrate CSA into projects and programmes. Yet the starting point and foundation of conflict sensitivity at project or programme level is a structured and thorough conflict analysis (introduced in Chapter 2) that is regularly updated throughout the project/programme cycle so that it informs the way interventions are defined, planned, and evaluated and monitored in a conflict-sensitive manner (Kenya Conflict Sensitivity Consortium 2010).

Reflecting on peace practices looks at how peacebuilding work could be made more effective, through practice and reflection. It looks into what can be learnt from experiences; and how these compare with those of other practitioners. General lessons can then be shared. It is experience-based learning processes, in particular, that provide peace workers with the necessary tools to mitigate or prevent violent conflicts, and the strategies for peace work and monitoring and evaluation of peace initiatives (Kenya Conflict Sensitivity Consortium 2011).

Generally, however, operational guidance for conflict sensitivity should not come in the form of a correct, one-size-fits-all tool, but rather as a menu of options and guidance which can be adapted, localised, and developed as the context and purpose demands (Barbolet et al. 2005). In fact, the terms and concepts of conflict sensitivity

and conflict-sensitive approaches should not be understood as entailing only one tool or a set of tools. The word approach denotes something broader, referring to an entire ethos on how organisations could strategise, design, implement and evaluate their efforts (ibid).

Conflict sensitivity should be also be applied at organisational level, ensuring that human resources, procurement and overall organisational policies adhere to conflict sensitivity. Similarly, donor organisations and governments should follow conflict sensitive policies and practice, for example by increasing the capacity of their own staff and aid recipients in conflict sensitivity, while implementing accountability measures to ensure that CSA is applied in the initiatives and interventions they support. This need arises from the fact that there is high interdependence between different organisational sectors, meaning that failure to apply CSA at one level affects the success of its practice at another. Conflict analysis lies also at the core of following conflict sensitivity in organisations, as it helps to define and guide organisational policies and practices to be conflict-sensitive (Kenya Conflict Sensitivity Consortium 2011).

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter briefly outlined the basic features and principles behind a results-oriented strategy for project and programme management, that is, RBM. It introduced information on the use and logic behind two key RBM tools, the results framework, and risk mitigation matrix. The chapter presented information on the objectives and guiding principles behind conflict sensitivity, and discussed the importance of, and means to, integrating conflict sensitivity into all stages of a programme cycle, and at organisational, donor and government levels.

Chapter Seven:
Coherence and coordination

What will this chapter do?

- This chapter explains what coordination and coherence entail and why they are significant.

Why is it important?

- Uncoordinated and incoherent peacebuilding processes contribute to inefficient and ineffective peacebuilding.
- A CSA enables practitioners to understand the unintended consequences of their interventions; minimise negative impacts and maximising positive ones. It enables them to better integrate the specific context in which their initiative is evolving into the design, planning and implementation of the project or programme.

What you should learn?

- By the end of this chapter, the reader should understand why coordination and coherence are needed and how to pursue them.

7.1 Introduction

Coordination and coherence contribute to successful peacebuilding. When they are lacking, the various initiatives and programmes that are meant to contribute to an overall peacebuilding outcome are likely to overlap and duplicate each other. It is also unlikely that prioritisation or sequencing will be adequate. Most, if not all, actors and agencies involved in peacebuilding will agree that coordination and coherence are necessary. However, in practice, they are directed by their own interests and goals, and limited by their own rules and procedures and, as a result, the incentives for pursuing individual goals and objectives are often more immediate and influential than those inherent in pursing more coherent processes. This chapter explains what coordination and coherence entail and why they are important, as well as considering what can be done to pursue them despite challenges that may exist.

7.2 Coordination

The best place to start is by looking at some definitions. The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2011) explains that coordination means, Making things, people and parts function together efficiently and in an organised way. The Collins English Dictionary

(2013) provides insight into coordination that is even more relevant for peacebuilding. It defines coordination as, the organisation of the activities of two or more groups in such a way that each may work more efficiently and be aware of what the other group(s) are doing.

These definitions suggest that there are multiple actors or agents involved in a shared undertaking, and that their actions need to be coordinated so as to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness. In the peacebuilding context, coordination may involve:

- developing a shared understanding of what the various actors want to achieve, for instance in the form of a strategic framework
- developing a shared plan for how that can be achieved
- gathering and sharing information
- mobilising resources
- agreeing on a division of tasks
- providing overall leadership of the process (Minear and Chelliah 1992:3).

Coordination is achieved by creating opportunities for the various actors involved in a peacebuilding process to communicate with each other so that they become aware of each other and their place in the overall undertaking. When this is achieved, the individual actors will adjust their own actions to avoid duplicating what others are doing, and they will synchronise their plans with the overall goals and timetable, so that their separate actions contribute to achieving the common objective.

Coordination differs from management, or command and control, because the aim is not to create one organisation or institution, but to make several independent organisations work towards achieving a shared objective. The role of a coordinator differs from that of a manager or commander, in that a coordinator does not have the authority to lead or instruct peacebuilding actors. As peacebuilding actors are independent, and as their participation in the shared undertaking is voluntary, the role of the coordinator is to manage the process, not the actors. The coordinator thus has to rely on a different form of leadership which entails persuasion, negotiation, diplomacy and process management (de Coning 2010).

Elements of coordination

- developing and maintaining a shared strategic framework
- strategic planning
- gathering, managing and sharing information
- mobilising resources and ensuring accountability and transparency
- agreeing on a division of labour
- providing leadership.

7.3 Coherence

Coherence is achieved when a number of actors are pursuing a shared goal in a coordinated effort. It implies that they have a shared analysis of the situation and an agreed plan for how to achieve their common goals and objectives.

In this handbook coherence is understood as the effort to pursue a shared strategic direction among a set of peacebuilding actors and across the various dimensions of peacebuilding.

Coherence, therefore, refers to the effort to pursue a common objective, while coordination refers to the activities needed to ensure that such a common objective is achieved. In other words, coherence denotes the strategic efforts needed to align a set of actors to a common objective and coordination refers to the operational and tactical actions necessary to synchronise the activities of the various stakeholders.

The need for, and benefits of, improved coherence are widely accepted. There is now broad consensus that inconsistent policies and fragmented programmes entail a higher risk of duplication, inefficient spending, lower quality of service, difficulty in meeting goals and, ultimately, reduced capacity for delivery and, therefore, impact (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2003). As a result of this consensus, there is also a widely shared understanding that pursuing a more coherent approach will result in more relevant, effective, efficient and sustainable impacts on any given peacebuilding process (de Coning and Friis 2011).

While the need for coherence is widely recognised and accepted, achieving it in practice has proven very difficult. A large number of evaluation reports and research studies that have analysed the record of peacebuilding efforts have found that most have had significant problems with coherence and coordination, and that this shortcoming has contributed to the poor rate of sustainability of these operations to date. For instance, the *Utstein* study found that most peacebuilding programmes lack a clearly articulated overall strategy (Smith 2004).

Strategic direction

The Joint *Utstein* Study of peacebuilding, which analysed 336 peacebuilding projects implemented by Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom over a decade, identified lack of coherence at strategic level, what it terms a 'strategic deficit', as the most significant obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding. The *Utstein* study found that more than 55 per cent of the programmes it evaluated did not show any link to a larger country strategy. It also uncovered that, for programmatic peacebuilding to be meaningful and sustainable, it needs to be part of a larger peacebuilding effort that is actively pursuing a shared strategic direction (Smith 2004).

7.4 Actors and coordinators

All local, national and international actors involved in peacebuilding should be involved in some form of coordination. That is, coordination is not something that happens only at the highest levels or only among international actors. When local community organisations or NGOs meet to plan a joint initiative they are coordinating. When donors meet with the representative of a host state to discuss how best to support a specific action plan, for instance the 2013 Strategic Roadmap for National Healing, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation in Liberia, they are coordinating. Coordination is a shared responsibility, and every actor synchronises whenever they are communicating with others with a view to harmonising their actions with those of the other parties. Coordination, therefore, is a form of self-organisation in which the actions of each actor, in response to the activities of the others, result in the overall behaviour of the system (de Coning 2014a).

In some cases the peacebuilding actors may choose to appoint one among them to lead the coordinating role and facilitate the process. The peacebuilding actors are still self-organising in the sense that they remain independent and make their own decisions, but the coordinator is mandated to help the process along by providing leadership, assisting actors to share information, supporting them to plan together and assisting them to agree on a division of tasks.

The UN's Integrated Approach is an example of how the UN system is trying to ensure coherence and achieve coordination among the many different departments, agencies, funds and programmes engaged in peacebuilding. The *Integrated Approach* refers to a set of processes, mechanisms and structures that are meant to generate and sustain a common strategic objective, as well as a comprehensive operational approach, among the political, security, development, human rights and, where appropriate,

humanitarian and UN actors at country level. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan described the concept as follows:

An integrated mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the UN system seeks to maximise its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner (United Nations 2006:4).

In the peacebuilding context it is important that local and national actors lead, or where circumstances require co-lead, those coordination processes that will have a significant impact on their lives (see Case Study 9 below). A significant development in this regard is the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. This initiative seeks to transform the way international assistance is managed by placing the recipient countries themselves in the driving seat when it comes to determining what causes their fragility, setting their own priorities, planning their own paths to resilience and managing the relationship with their international partners. The New Deal was agreed in 2011 in Busan, Korea – at the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness – by donors and self-identifying fragile countries that have organised themselves into a grouping called the g7+. The donors and g7+ countries come together in the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding is a mutual pact. The g7+ countries take the lead in carrying out their own fragility assessments and, based on these, develop their own peacebuilding and statebuilding goals (PSGs) and indicators. In turn, donors align their support to the agreed PSGs and offer improved predictability and transparency in the assistance they provide. Together, they enter into a Compact that serves as a strategic framework for the government and its international partners.

The most distinctive feature of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding is that it recognises that peacebuilding essentially has to be local (de Coning 2013). However, for the New Deal to move from an aspiration to reality there would have to be a significant shift in agency from the international to the local level. Achieving this will require nothing less than a paradigm shift in the way so-called fragile states, international organisations and international development partners understand their respective roles and responsibilities in striving for peacebuilding coherence and coordination (de Coning 2014b).

Case Study 9: Coherence and national ownership in Somalia

The government and people of Somalia are faced with an overwhelmingly complex set of challenges. The legitimacy of the government is challenged and its capacity to deliver is weak. At the same time, the current process represents the best chance the people of Somalia have had in decades to benefit from some level of stability, rule of law and provision of basic services. If it is to succeed, the government will have to go beyond defeating Al-Shabaab with the help of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It will need to deliver order, justice and livelihood opportunities that out-perform those offered by Al-Shabaab. In a country that is clan-based, governance needs to be hyper-local. Physical security may be imposed, but sustainable stability has to emerge and be maintained by local communities, supported by the federal government. Consequently, a strong federal-local partnership needs to be forged.

At the same time, the international community has to overcome its own coherence demons. Despite efforts at fostering coherence and aligning international support behind government owned plans, dozens of international partners and organisations are still by and large each pursuing their own national or organisational interests. The result is predictably self-destructive: an international community that, despite its stated principles, is unwilling to give its local partners the space they need to take full ownership of their own project. In the process the international community ends up contributing to the very fragility it was meant to address. These challenges are not new and the consequences are not unknown, but they have proven to be more structural, inherent and resilient than our theories of change assumed (de Coning 2014b).



7.5 Limits of coordination and coherence

It is important to recognise that the highly dynamic and non-linear nature of complex structures, among them social systems, implies that coherence can never be fully attained. It is possible, however to distinguish between processes where there is less, or more, coherence. Pursuing coherence should thus be understood as an aspiration that can be measured only in degree, not in terms of end states (de Coning and Friis 2011).

Coherence also needs to be appreciated in the context of the inherent tensions and contradictions that exist between various peacebuilding dimensions and among different peacebuilding actors. As a result, agencies responsible for programmes and campaigns will often have to settle for 'partially coherent' or 'good enough' solutions in order to manage these tensions, while establishing a workable foundation for cooperation.

There are many factors that frustrate coordination and coherence in the peacebuilding context, including the sheer number of international and local actors involved in processes, and the wide-ranging scope of activities undertaken by these actors. Both the interactions among these many actors, and the interplay between multiple dimensions, contribute to the complexity of peacebuilding.

There is often an assumption that if a specific approach to coherence and coordination has worked well in one context – for instance the way the stability plan for eastern DRC was jointly coordinated by the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) and the national government's Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC) – that applying it to another context should produce similar results. However, one of the most important indicators of the degree to which meaningful coherence can be achieved in any given context is the level of conflict and hostility within the conflict system. The more tense or violent the conflict, the less conducive it is to coherence among peacebuilding agents (de Coning and Friis 2011). This is because the differences between the various actors are more likely to be pronounced under pressure. It is neither the coherence and coordination model, nor the intensity of the efforts invested in coordination and coherence, that primarily determine the degree to which coherence can be achieved in a given situation. Rather, it is context that determines the extent to which a given situation is conducive, or not, to achieving coherence. Context is, however, not a stable or given state; it is continuously changing and, as such, so is the scope for coordination and coherence. This does not imply that it is meaningless to pursue coherence and coordination amidst ongoing conflict, but recognising these limitations helps to avoid unrealistic assumptions about the degree of coherence and coordination that actors should aim to achieve, and provides more awareness of the specific context within which actors operate.

As the examples in the Table 7 below illustrate, the inherent contradictions and tensions among the principles, mandates and approaches of various peacebuilding actors can limit the scope for coherence and coordination. These examples show that even where peacebuilding actors have common goals and objectives, they may disagree on the prioritisation and sequencing of actions.

Table 7: Examples of challenging coherence and coordination situations

Challenge	Example
Differences in approach to prioritisation and sequencing	In Afghanistan, some of the political and security actors argued for focusing on stabilising the security situation before dealing with corruption, narcotics and human rights. Those specialising in organised crime, narcotics and human rights argued, however, that dealing earlier with those responsible for human rights violations, corruption and drug trafficking would have resulted in more sustainable stability.
Conflicting mandates	In Darfur, those with a justice mandate have argued that efforts to identify and bring war criminals to justice should take priority, while those with a peace mandate have argued that peace should be achieved before pursuing justice. Those who favour peace before justice argue that the threat of international prosecution has resulted in the prolongation of the conflict, and this has resulted in more deaths and suffering than would have been the case if justice were to be pursued after peace had been consolidated.
Short-term versus long-term goals	In Liberia (2004-06), practitioners responsible for organising the first post-conflict election wanted to encourage IDPs in Monrovia to return to their original communities so that they could be registered there to vote. However, humanitarian actors disagreed with the return timetable because their assessment was that the conditions were not yet ripe to provide alternative sustainable livelihoods for the returnees in their home locations.

ACCORD's experience with the Training for Peace programme

The Training for Peace (TfP) programme benefitted from a management structure that ensured strategic coherence, whilst allowing for programmatic flexibility. Over 20 years of implementation, the TfP programme evolved through four phases, but its core identity and focus remained coherently centred on helping to build the capacity of the civilian and police dimensions of African peace operations through research, policy development and training. This is due to the consistent application of the core principles governing the TfP partnership, a clear strategic management approach and the stability of the partnership and its members.

The principles that govern the TfP programme are African ownership, decentralisation and relevance. The intervention is guided by the needs of the AU, regional organisations, African member states and the UN.

The management structure of the TfP programme is highly decentralised in that the partners are responsible for their own programme design and implementation. Their programming has to be in line with the overall strategic direction provided by the donor, the International Advisory Board and the partners in a cooperative strategic guidance process. The annual meetings and periodic independent evaluations further help to generate feedback and stimulate adaptation. This approach enabled the TfP programme to stay strategically coherent, whilst at the same time being highly relevant, innovative and adaptive to the changing needs of the AU, regional organisations, African member states and the UN (de Coning 2015).

7.7 Conclusion

A key characteristic of the peacebuilding process is that all of its dimensions are interlinked and interdependent. Therefore, in relation to the various programmes and activities, and the agencies that carry them out, no single programme can achieve the goal of the peacebuilding operation – addressing the consequences and causes of the conflict and laying the foundation for social justice and sustainable peace – on its own. It is only through combined and sustained efforts that peacebuilding can prove successful in the long-term, and that the investment made by each individual programme can be said to be truly worthwhile. It is thus the total collective and cumulative effect of all the programmes undertaken in these different dimensions that slowly builds positive momentum towards sustainable peace.

Chapter Eight: Resource mobilisation and funder relations

What will this chapter do?

- This chapter discusses resource mobilisation, with the focus on its relevance for the peacebuilding context.

Why is it important?

- The implementation and sustainability of peacebuilding programmes are closely linked to both tangible and intangible resources that can be mobilised. Among others, these are: human, financial, technical and in-kind resources.
- The key challenge for peacebuilders and peacebuilding organisations is to mobilise resources for peacebuilding programmes in a sustainable manner.

What should you learn?

- By the end of this chapter, the reader should have an understanding of what resource mobilisation is, what it entails, why it is important and how a peacebuilding programming can benefit from it.

- While there are several resource mobilisation strategies to consider and choose from, in this chapter we explore resource mobilisation from donor organisations. Hence, the chapter will also discuss how donor relations can be developed, strengthened and sustained for peacebuilding initiatives.

8.1 Introduction

Resource mobilisation is a critical element that affects the success or failure of peacebuilding efforts. Resources can be tangible (including funding and human resources), or intangible (e.g. volunteerism or-in kind support (International Development Research Centre 2010). Essentially, resource mobilisation is about raising the different types of support that a peacebuilding programme or organisation will need to meet its vision and objectives. Therefore it is important for those working in peacebuilding to have an understanding of what resource mobilisation is and what it entails (International Development Research Centre 2010).

Hence, in this chapter we first share theoretical information on the concept of resource mobilisation and its importance, and some of the fundamentals that guide resource mobilisation. Second, it explores the steps involved in developing a resource mobilisation strategy and, finally, it turns to donor funding and offers guidelines from practice on donor relationship management for the success of peacebuilding programmes.

8.2 Basic conceptual understanding of resource mobilisation

Resource mobilisation is a process that an organisation, or programme, engages in to obtain the financial, human, administrative and logistical support it needs to achieve its mission and objectives. Resource mobilisation can also be defined as a management process of identifying people who share the values of the organisation and taking steps to manage this relationship (International Development Research Centre 2010).

Very often resource mobilisation is mistakenly viewed as meaning fundraising, but this is only one of the options available. More broadly, it involves developing the capacity to understand what resources you require, identifying and deciding on the strategies to find these resources, and having the capability to manage the resources and account for them (International Development Research Centre 2010).

Resources can be monetary or non-monetary, as well as tangible or intangible. Monetary resources include financial support, human resources, buildings, motor vehicles, office equipment and so on, while non-monetary ones refer to volunteerism or in-kind support (Jumuiya Ya Afrika Mashariki 2013).

Resource mobilisation illustrated simply revolves around three main elements: determining the resources required, knowing the resource providers, and choosing from the strategies available to mobilise the required resources.

Figure 15: Elements of resource mobilisation



For the mission and objectives of peacebuilding organisations to be achieved, resource mobilisation is a fundamental requirement for peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction, and the prevention of conflict re-emerging, which is of particular relevance and importance for Africa. As the number of conflicts being successfully resolved on the African continents grows, so does the need for effective understanding and implementation of resource mobilisation for effective peacebuilding (Asia Pacific Fundraisers' Network 2013).

8.3 Stages in resource mobilisation

Mobilising resources for peacebuilding initiatives entails several steps. Some form the preparatory stages towards the development of a resource mobilisation strategy and plan. Preparatory tasks will include:

- an assessment of resource needs
- an valuation of the resources available
- an understanding of the resource mobilisation process and capacity needs
- identification and assessment of opportunities for resource mobilisation
- identification of challenges to resource mobilisation

8.3.1 An assessment of resource needs

Before embarking on a resource mobilisation process, it is necessary to thoroughly assess all the resources that the peacebuilding initiative will need to meet its mission and objectives. If this is a programme within an existing organisation, then the resource needs assessment will take into consideration existing organisational infrastructure and resources that can support the programme. Alternatively, the costs of the programme's fit into the organisation will be assessed. If it is a stand-alone peacebuilding initiative, it is important to ensure that the resources required and any hidden costs are assessed thoroughly for resource mobilisation efforts to be optimally targeted and effective. Both monetary and non-monetary resource needs should be assessed and identified. This important preparatory step informs the rest of the process and strategy development. Hence it is worthwhile spending time on this and enlisting the capacity required to complete the assessment successfully. A skilled finance person is useful to assist in identifying any hidden costs; it would also be helpful to assess similar programmes to better understand the resource needs to run activities or events similar to the proposed programme.

8.3.2 Assessment of resource providers

After identifying the resources required, the scanning of the peacebuilding environment in terms of resource providers and their strategies, policies and

commitments to peacebuilding is critical. Through this step it is possible to identify potential partners and appropriate resource providers, be they governmental donors (USAID, the United Kingdom's DfID, and Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) etc.), foundations (e.g. the Clinton Foundation and Berghof Foundation), multilateral organisations such as the UN or the EU, and financial institutions such as the IMF or the World Bank, to provide loans or funding towards development. The African Development Bank (AfDB) is an Africa-wide institution geared towards providing assistance for the economic development and social progress of African countries. This scanning exercise assists in matching the scope and interest of the peacebuilding initiative to that of resource providers, which can only be done if a thorough donor analysis has been conducted to assess funding partner priorities in the field of peacebuilding.

In the peacebuilding context, it is important to note that several global and regional policy developments have a direct bearing on the way in which resource providers determine how their resources will be spent for peacebuilding. Therefore, an understanding of these global and continental developments and the link to particular peacebuilding initiatives is important. A few developments in the peacebuilding field do have a direct bearing on resource mobilisation; these are discussed below briefly to underscore the importance of having a thorough assessment of these developments and their relevance to resource mobilisation.

- The African Solidarity Initiative (ASI) – at continental level, noting the importance of the principal of ownership of the African development agenda and programmes, there are efforts to mobilise resources from within the continent. The ASI was launched by the AU and seeks to mobilise support from within the continent for countries emerging from conflict, which is in line with the AU Policy on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (African Union 2014). This Initiative essentially promotes solidarity and collaboration among member states, regional economic communities (RECs), key African institutions and the countries concerned to roll out a full implementation plan, and to mobilise in-kind, capacity building, as well as financial contributions, to support post-conflict reconstruction activities and efforts in the African countries concerned (African Union 2014). While the ASI outlines the specific objectives and results it hopes to achieve, it also indicates the coordination mechanisms; namely the responsibilities within AU departments, as well as the monitoring and evaluation requirements that need to be met. For resource mobilisation for peacebuilding, this is an important initiative to link fundraising strategies to. Of course the important task for the peacebuilding initiative seeking resources is to thoroughly understand this initiative and where the opportunities lie to link these to ongoing resource mobilisation efforts.

- The g7+ – at global level, the g7+ initiative is an intergovernmental grouping made up of countries that are, or have been, affected by conflict and that are now in transition to the next stages of development. These include Burundi, CAR, Chad, the DRC, Sierra Leone, Somalia and South Sudan. The core ethos of the g7+ is that 'countries must prioritise peacebuilding and state-building to provide foundations that allow the Millennium Development Goals to be successfully tackled, and that peacebuilding and state-building should be part of the Post-2015 Development Agenda framework'. A strategic plan – the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States – has been developed to facilitate the achievement of this requirement. The New Deal focuses on five main areas: legitimate and inclusive politics; security; justice; economic foundations; and avenues and services. As part of the commitment to achieve results, member states have vowed to ensure that there is transparency, risk-sharing, and to use and strengthen country systems, strengthen capacities, and ensure timely and predictable aid (g7+ 2011). The pledging and acquisition of funds is an ongoing exercise for such initiatives, but it can be stated that as this initiative has characteristics sought by funders, it attracts investment.
- South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) – at country level South Africa provides development support, through its SADPA, to other African nations. Some of the government departments that provide assistance include defence, through peacekeeping operations, and education, through providing scholarships and subsidies to students from the rest of Africa. Other departments include the police service, mineral resources, energy, trade and industry, agriculture, public enterprise, science and technology, justice and constitutional development, and public works (Besharati 2013).

The importance of researching and understanding how global, continental, regional and national initiatives like those mentioned above fit into the peacebuilding agenda, and in particular towards developing an understanding of where the resources are available, cannot be underestimated. This is also important for the strategy development process, which is discussed later, used to map who potential partners are, as well as during the stages of matching the strategic plan to potential resource mobilisation avenues.

8.3.3 Understanding the resource mobilisation process and capacity needs

The mobilisation of resources for a peacebuilding initiative requires a carefully developed strategy. The overall objective of crafting a strategy is to ensure that there is a clear, systematic, reliable and well organised method of searching, acquiring, utilising and managing resources. It also informs ways of effectively managing existing

donor relations. Before engaging in the actual process of mobilising resources, it is vital for any organisation to formulate a clear goal and objective (United States Agency for International Development 2010). It has to be in alignment with the overall organisational mission, vision and values, with a clear plan for how resources will be utilised, whether it is for implementing a specific project or programme, or for overall running of the organisation (International Development Research Centre 2010).

Any strategy should aim to mobilise adequate resources and put in place mechanisms for a conducive environment for fundraising efforts to run smoothly. It should provide a framework for gauging existing resources and assessing organisational needs for new funding to meet its objective. The strategy also needs to assess and identify sources of funding for the organisation or programme, with a clear set of plans for how resources will be acquired. Formulating binding principles for resource mobilisation in line with the values and rules of the organisation is also vital (International Development Research Centre 2010).

8.3.4 Identifying and assessing approaches to resource mobilisation

The types of potential funding partners identified will determine strategic considerations and the approach to be used to mobilise resources.

Options for resource mobilisation could entail the following:

- periodical fundraising events, inviting local communities, private sector and like-minded organisations
- establishing a profit-making section in an organisation either to sell products or services
- partnering with international donors to raise financial support through responding to tenders, requests for application, requests for proposals, unsolicited proposal submission (where the donor organisation has not made announcements), and solicited submission (where a donor makes a targeted call to a specific organisation) (International Development Research Centre 2010 and Achamkulangare 2014).

An important consideration here is the way the proposed programme is presented to a potential funder. Writing proposals is a skill and most donors or resource providers have specific templates they prefer that any organisation applying for funding (whether solicited or unsolicited) uses (Achamkulangare 2014). As a rule of thumb, these are the elements that most proposals should include to assist in securing resources:

- context analysis
- overall objective, proposed outputs and results

- organisational experience and capacity (capability statement)
- monitoring and evaluation plan
- programme management and risk assessment
- cross-cutting issues
- budget estimate.

8.3.5 Challenges to resource mobilisation

Depending on the type of funding partner from whom funding is secured, there are challenges that may be encountered. This section discusses a few that may affect peacebuilding programmes:

Clashes between peacebuilding guiding principles and those of donors

In complex post-conflict situations, peacebuilding is guided by the principles of local ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability, aimed at ensuring the suitability of peacebuilding initiatives. Thus it is important that resource mobilisation, in particular for peacebuilding initiatives, be guided by these values (International Development Research Centre 2010). Clashes between the principles of a peacebuilding initiative and those of the institution from which the resources are raised can result in unintended consequences. This will ultimately impact the peacebuilding programme and its objectives. This risk should be identified at the preparation phase, and plans developed to mitigate it. Research and thoroughly understanding the priorities, values and objectives of the funder should assist in mitigating this risk (Oxford Policy Management and the IDL Group 2008).

Risk management in resource mobilisation

Risk management has emerged as a critical area in resource mobilisation, as organisations have to deal with increased risks associated with securing resources from non-state entities. Due diligence processes and procedures for dealing with potential fraud, misconduct, misappropriations and financial wrongdoing are high on the agenda of both organisations and their funders. While donors would like organisations to absorb all the costs of mitigating the extra risks, the latter would like to pass on to the donors at least part of those costs (Achamkulangare 2014).

Importance of coordination in resource mobilisation

Coordination in peacebuilding initiatives is central to facilitating resource mobilisation. Coordination in resource mobilisation examines the key factors for: ensuring successful coordination mechanisms which help unblock resource flows; lessons to be learned from past coordination mechanisms that have been successful or unsuccessful; and

the way in which the nature of funders helped in overcoming some of the challenges (Jumuiya Ya Afrika Mashariki 2013).

Development donors are among the dominant resource providers in the prevailing peacebuilding context. In the next section we discuss in detail the mobilisation of resources through development donors (International Development Research Centre 2010).

8.4 Mobilising resources from donors

As indicated previously in this chapter, the type of potential resource providers determines the approach taken to mobilising resources. There are a number of considerations that need to be taken into account when mobilising resources from donors. These are discussed below.

8.4.1 The relevance of donors' interests/motivation in resource mobilisation

Donors are bombarded with a number of requests for funding. Making a choice of which programmes, initiatives and projects to support is often difficult and is determined by a number of factors. The importance of a return on investment is an important consideration in the choices donors make about which initiatives to fund (International Development Research Centre 2013).

In the donor environment there is often reference to the 4P's of: policies, priorities, procedures and psychology that inform decisions to provide resources. In most cases these are the crux of what determines successful resource mobilisation from donors (International Development Research Centre 2013).

- Policies – national interest, together with prevailing development priorities, define the foreign policies of resource providers such as multilateral institutions, governments and development partners. These guidelines govern how resources in general, and development resources in particular, are allocated (International Development Research Centre 2013).
- Priorities – donor priorities are very much an internal decision based on the external development environment as well as national interests. Pre-determined priorities determine the areas in which action will be taken (ibid).
- Procedures – they determine the rules of engagement and set out the requirements and guidelines that govern relationships. Processes are affected by international structures like the OECD DAC institutions and often there is consensus on a number of areas, including procedures governing giving, reporting, and monitoring and evaluation (ibid).

- Psychology – This speaks to the human factor in resource mobilisation and the importance of the relationship with those working in the resource providing institutions and their roles in managing the return of investment from the donor's perspective (ibid).

8.4.2 Understanding donor relations

Upon identifying a potential funder, and with the aim of forging long-term and closer ties, it is important to get to know and understand the funder better. In other words, it is imperative to possess an accurate and up-to-date understanding of the funder's requirements and interests and how these align with those of your organisation. This continuous monitoring of donor's policy and interests might help to uncover opportunities to be negotiated, including long-term partner relationships, funding arrangements and identification of other opportunities (Association of Donor Relations Professionals no date).

The ability to develop a positive donor relationship has an implication on an organisation's ability to influence continuation of core funding or specific project support. It is important to note that this is not done overnight. Organisations must establish and sustain positive organisational credibility and reputation consistently over time. This is accomplished through two main conscious efforts. First is the ability to meet all donor requirements (in terms of quality implementation of projects, standard financial management and overall system and procedures followed) and second, developing a human relationship with representatives based at the donor agencies. As alliances and relationships deepen, chances that the funder will bestow support on the organisation increases over time, thereby intensifying the commitment and opening doors for potential investments (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Leed Forum 2006).

8.4.3 Donor expectations

Meeting donor requirements

Donor requirements vary based on the policy and interest of each funding country or organisation. Solid donor relations are said to be concretised by three major characteristics that an organisation needs to have in order to attract support. These are legitimacy, transparency, and accountability. Table 8 below explicitly outlines what donors expect.

Table 8: Donor requirements

	Details
Legitimacy	• different countries have different terms and requirements for recognising the legal existence of organisations • however diverse these requirements are across the region, each state still exercises a degree of control over the incorporation of non-profit organisations • only those that have been established according to their country's civil laws and traditions are considered legitimate • such organisations are more likely to gain donor support because they have achieved some level of compliance with government standards, and are less likely to be suspected of being fronts for underground political movements or fly-by-night operations
Transparency	• this refers to open communication with internal and external stakeholders regarding an organisations' financial and management status, and is a characteristic of institutions that disclose information about their programmes, activities and even financial transactions and investments, to stakeholders and anyone who wishes to know more about them • it is a criterion that is highly regarded by prospective donors and partners, as transparency assures them of an organisation's trustworthiness and commitment to its constituents
Accountability	• this refers to an entity's ability to stand up for its mission, and to be guided by sound management and financial principles • an accountable organisation is one that services its community responsibly, manages its resources properly, and is able to report back to donors on the use of donated funds • such organisations are also likely to gain public support, as quite a number of donors now expect to be updated on how their funds have been used beneficiary organisations

Source: Adapted from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2006 (pg. 8, 24, 30, 61–64, 70, 75 and 90).

Financial management

Financial management is one of the areas donors examine to determine the competency of a potential grantee (recipient of a fund). Credible financial management entails that a clear set of rules, procedures and systems be in place to ensure that funds are utilised for the intended objective or agreed project activities. Depending on each donor's requirements, financial reporting and auditing is one way of showing the organisation's transparency and accountability. Adherence to internationally accepted financial and auditing procedures is very important in order to gain credibility and trust in the eyes of the donor (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2015).

Visibility

This element assimilates the opportunities and mechanisms for meaningful donor recognition, taking into consideration the funder's preferences on how to do it. Providing visibility for the funding organisation could be achieved by including their logo on your publications, training materials or brochures, and generally acknowledging their support in the implementation of the programme (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2015).

Reporting

Accurate and timely narrative and financial reporting creates opportunities for future partnerships. This approach provides the funding partner with opportunities to review the relevance, timeliness and quality of outcomes while solidifying transparency and building trust between themselves and the organisation, thereby promoting sustained relations over time (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2015).

Monitoring and evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is the most common approach used by development partners to assess the effectiveness of aid. It has the ultimate objective of providing evidence-based information about a particular project or programme which is gained through various data collection methods to assess performance, progress towards results and impact within a specific timeframe (Jumuiya Ya Afrika Mashariki 2013).

Developing human relations

It is imperative to understand ways to handle the human aspect of managing relationships with donor. Funding agencies are not cash machines that operate robotically; human beings control and direct the system according to policies

and structures in place. Therefore, as projects are being implemented and formal communication established, personal relationships need to also be developed. The organisation's core function should then be to initiate new relations, sustain existing ones, and build on an ever-expanding network of committed partnerships as an ongoing activity (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2015).

8.4.4 Other important considerations

The establishment of a partnership culture is an area in which an NGO may take a good lesson from the private sector, especially in adopting a client-oriented mentality. Managing funder relations from a client-oriented viewpoint fosters client satisfaction, which in turn allows the organisation to maximise partnership opportunities (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Leed Forum 2006).

For this approach to be sustainable, the organisation must consider integrating systemic mechanisms and plans for long-term engagement with the funder by conducting periodic assessments of funder needs and priorities (ibid):

Build strong personal relationships with actors in the field that the organisation specialises in. These should include the funder, government officials, key local development players in civil society and the private sector, prominent figures, intellectuals, academics and community leaders (ibid: 39).

This is an inclusive approach, ensuring that the organisation stays abreast of the most pressing peacebuilding needs and interventions, which in turn is a valuable input to the organisation's ongoing development efforts. Furthermore, using different platforms to share information with prospective or current partners is crucial in affirming that the organisation is keeping up with the current context in peacebuilding initiatives and is actively producing knowledge in the field. These relations and partnerships should create opportunities that are strategically beneficial to the organisation (ibid).

USE COMMUNICATION OPPORTUNITIES THAT SUPPORT INNOVATIVE IDEAS. THE MEDIA AND PUBLIC OPINION CAN BE VERY POWERFUL PLATFORMS TO TRANSFORM PILOT INITIATIVES INTO NATIONAL PROJECTS.

8.5 Conclusion

There are practical financial and non-financial considerations for every peacebuilding project or effort, and having adequate resources to implement a proposed peacebuilding process is vital in ensuring its success. Resource mobilisation should be one of the key considerations in the planning phase of a peacebuilding initiative and should be an important element throughout the

project cycle. Identifying the resources required and potential providers of funding is important at the beginning of a programme. However, as peacebuilding initiatives take place in a very dynamic and fluid environment (by the very nature of peacebuilding), it is important that there be an on-going assessment of resources required or additional resources needed, or a re-direction of resources if the programme needs to be adjusted to meet changing peacebuilding needs on the ground. This is where a stable and positive relationship and open communication with the funder is vital, so that, in a partnership approach, the programme can develop and be adjusted if necessary as the funder is made aware of changing circumstances. If a donor or funder feels part of the process and is included at every stage of the project cycle, opportunities for sustained funding grow and more flexibility is possible in implementing a successful peacebuilding initiative.

Conclusion to the handbook

Since the first edition of the peacebuilding handbook was published in 2013, the contexts and dynamics of violent conflicts in Africa changed, calling for the adoption of suitable strategies for effective and efficient peacebuilding. Ever since Boutros-Ghali's (1992) definitive description of peacebuilding as an 'action to determine and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict', practices have also been evolving and gaining prominence. The establishment of PBA in 2005 underscores this incremental gain in prominence. The 2015 report by the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the PBA postulates that peacebuilding needs to be the common thread that runs between peacemaking and peacekeeping, while peacemaking and peacekeeping are supposed to ensure that there is no lapse or relapse into violence. It is within this paradigm that this handbook locates itself, examining Africa's shifting conflict dynamics and contexts in light of the many sustainable and effective peacebuilding responses being implemented.

The handbook identifies the different dimensions and phases of peacebuilding that enable practitioners to determine the content, and suitable timing for and objectives of their peacebuilding processes and efforts. Amid these phases and dimensions, it is important for entities and practitioners to contextualise their efforts, to make them relevant to the prevailing situation at any given time. To support better understanding of this context, this handbook delved into the different tools that can be employed to analyse conflicts. The availability of these tools notwithstanding, it is important to emphasise that the purpose of the analysis and the level at which it is carried out will determine which conflict analysis tool and methodologies will be the most appropriate to use.

In every context, there are actors and stakeholders who influence and are influenced by conflict(s). Central to the debate on the role of different level actors is the issue of local ownership of peacebuilding interventions. Sustainable peace can rarely manifest if there is little or no local ownership. On the other end of this, it must be acknowledged that external actors crucial to the success of programmes and projects on the continent, given the technical capacities and resources (financial and otherwise) that they are able to contribute to improving situations and lives in conflict or post-conflict settings. To prevent the fallout that can result from competing interests between demands for local ownership and those of external actors, it is important to strike a pragmatic balance that places conflict transformation as the unifying and desired end for all actors. This can be best achieved through ensuring coherence and coordination of the efforts of relevant actors working in a specific conflict arena. Without coherence and coordination of efforts, the journey towards conflict transformation will be impeded

by, among others, interventions that are likely to be insensitive to prevailing conflict dynamics, and ineffective as a result of unsound design and disjointed implementation.

Gender issues are integral to peacebuilding. Embedding gender considerations in peacebuilding fosters inclusivity which is invaluable for the success of any peacebuilding effort. It is important to note, as has been inferred in this handbook, that women in contemporary Africa are most disadvantaged during conflicts. They often bear the brunt of violence and yet tend to be the least involved in the resolution of the same conflicts. Kray and Babcock (2006) emphasise that peace agreements and reconstruction are more sustainable and effective when women are involved in peacebuilding processes.

This handbook also examines the principles and objectives of RBM, an established project and programme management strategy used by donor agencies and implementing organisations alike. Built on the principles of accountability, national ownership and inclusiveness, the aim of this strategy aim is to ensure that all actors contributing directly or indirectly ensure that their processes, products and services add to the achievement of desired results. Programme implementers are, therefore, required to measure and document results to ensure that their projects and programmes are contributing to the desired positive social change envisioned during the design stages. At the same time, practitioners need to be sure that their interventions remain conflict-sensitive, avoiding or minimising negative impacts and maximising positive ones on the conflict dynamics. This handbook provides ideas on how projects and programmes can be managed in a results-based and conflict-sensitive manner.

Ultimately, it would be a *faux pas* for practitioners not to consider the indispensable matter of the resources needed to successfully undertake peacebuilding; which needs both significant and modest resources, depending on the conflict arena. This handbook unpacks 'resources' and classifies them into useful categories *vis-à-vis* financial, human, technical and in-kind. For peacebuilding practitioners, it is important to not only raise the aforementioned resources for interventions, but to also sustain strong collaborative relations with providers. As resources have been shrinking in recent times, it is crucial that practitioners become strategic in how they continuously raise funds for peacebuilding projects, bearing in mind that peacebuilding is a long-term endeavour.

It is ACCORD's hope that this handbook will be useful in empowering practitioners, stakeholders and other relevant actors to confidently design, plan and implement peacebuilding projects and programmes in a coherent and coordinated manner and, by extension, to contribute to conflict transformation.

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Conclusion

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ACCORD PEACEBUILDING HANDBOOK

This handbook is the cumulation of an organisational learning process that ACCORD has undergone since inception. Our aim is to strengthen capacities for sustainable peacebuilding in Africa and beyond. The African Peacebuilding Coordination Programme (APCP), funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, has since 2008 been an integral part of this process. The programme has grounded its work around the peacebuilding processes of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, Sudan and South Sudan. The training materials – including this handbook – and related knowledge developed during the programme, have emerged as a result of engagement with local and national peacebuilders in these and other countries, as well as those within the ambit of the African Union's Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) framework, and the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture (UN PBA).

It is ACCORD's hope that this handbook will be useful in empowering practitioners, stakeholders and other relevant actors to confidently design, plan and implement peacebuilding projects and programmes in a coherent and coordinated manner and, by extension, to contribute to conflict transformation.

ACCORD
THE AFRICAN CENTRE FOR THE CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES