



Institute for Security Studies

# POLICY BRIEF

## RECOMMENDATIONS

- South Africa should identify and capitalise on its points of leverage obtained by virtue of its regional position and its contributions to peacemaking and peacekeeping.
- South Africa should utilise its contextual knowledge and experience to develop fresh responses to the vexing problems of post-conflict development and peacebuilding.
- South Africa should develop a coherent national post-conflict and peacebuilding strategy and ensure adequate resources for its implementation.
- There should be improved coordination among the state and non-state stakeholders to achieve maximum impact.
- The credibility, impact and effectiveness of engagement will be enhanced by targeting and deepening South Africa's footprint (interventions), rather than repeating demand driven dispersed engagements.
- A pool of specialists in post-conflict development and peacebuilding should be built to boost South Africa's human resource capacity for effective delivery on its engagements.
- Prepare for sustained intervention if South Africa is to be acknowledged, respected and recognised for its work.
- Constant monitoring, evaluation and reflection are necessary to realise aims and objectives.
- Effective knowledge management is essential for mitigating the effects of a lack of continuity caused, for example, by rapid staff turnover.
- South Africa has not sufficiently promoted gender mainstreaming in its post-conflict development and peacebuilding endeavours. This is an area where it has vast experience and where it should be playing a leading role on the continent.

## SA's post-conflict development and peacebuilding experiences in the DRC

### Lessons learnt

Cheryl Hendricks and Amanda Lucey

## SUMMARY

This policy brief analyses South Africa's post-conflict development and peacebuilding engagements in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It identifies lessons learnt that could inform the policy and programming development of the envisaged South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA). South Africa has engaged substantively in peacemaking and peacekeeping, activities that are well documented. However, its post-conflict development and peacebuilding activities have yet to be systematically mapped and analysed. This analysis of the DRC highlights the need for better strategic planning, coherency and sustainability to increase impact and effectiveness.

## INTRODUCTION

Post-conflict development and peacebuilding are broad concepts that address the security, economic, political and social challenges occurring in the aftermath of conflict with the aim of creating sustainable peace. South Africa is a key player in the conceptualisation and implementation of continental and regional peace, security and development architectures. It has assisted many African countries with conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction, through bilateral, multilateral and trilateral arrangements. These interventions have often been financed through the African Renaissance Fund.

South Africa now seeks to broaden and deepen its engagement as a development partner, and is establishing the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) as the co-ordinating vehicle. SADPA seeks to 'develop partnerships that drive innovation around development cooperation in Africa and developing countries to create self-sufficient societies ... [through] co-crafting the policy focus; sharpening the delivery mechanisms and broadening the instruments for development cooperation'.<sup>1</sup>

In part, SADPA's success will depend upon constant reflection, appropriate realignment, innovation and flexibility in its approach to post-conflict development and peacebuilding. It is therefore important that South Africa

begins by reflecting on lessons learnt from its engagement to date on these issues. However, there is little substantive knowledge available on South Africa's interventions in this area.<sup>2</sup>

South Africa, despite challenges, remains strategically placed to effectively contribute to post-conflict development and peacebuilding on the continent. It continues to enjoy the legitimacy and moral authority to assist with conflict management and peacebuilding. This provides South Africa with access to post-conflict countries, but it also places an enormous responsibility on its shoulders. The expectation is that it will not be just another donor, but an empathetic, appropriately knowledgeable partner with a vested interest in the future development of the continent. This requires South Africa continually to refine its vision, strategy and delivery so that it is innovative and implements programmes that will have a sustained socio-political and developmental impact.

This policy brief identifies the lessons emerging from the DRC. It examines the type of initiatives implemented, determines their strengths and challenges, and extracts broader lessons for South Africa's post-conflict development and peacebuilding programming on the continent.

The data for this research was collated through desktop and field research and presented to stakeholders in South Africa for feedback. The framework for South Africa's engagement with the DRC is the annual Bi-National Commission (BNC). The agreements reached in these commissions guided the identification of respondents in the DRC. Some 20 interviews were conducted with state and non-state actors in March 2013.<sup>3</sup>

## DRC: BRIEF CONFLICT HISTORY

The causes of the conflict in the DRC are manifold and the cast of actors ever-expanding. Exploitative patterns of resource extraction, colonial and postcolonial authoritarian forms of governance, post-Cold War decline in the resources to sustain patronage politics, external pressure for good governance, and regional instability (genocide in Rwanda and marauding Ugandan rebel movements) all contributed to the many wars that have engulfed this country. Conflict has been a part of the DRC's existence from the time of independence. President Joseph Mobutu ascended to the presidency through a coup in 1965. In 1997, Laurent Kabila (with the backing of Rwanda and Uganda) assumed power through a bloody civil war. His reign was short-lived and the country was again immersed in a civil war. After Kabila was assassinated in 2001 his son, Joseph Kabila, became president.

A Global and All-Inclusive Peace Accord was signed in Pretoria, South Africa on 17 December 2002 and endorsed at Sun City on 2 April 2003. South Africa was a key actor in the DRC's peacemaking endeavours. The agreement called for an end to conflict, an inter-Congolese dialogue, the withdrawal of foreign military personnel and the disarmament of rebels. It also put in place a transitional

power-sharing authority. The United Nations (UN) had formed the Peacekeeping Mission in the Congo (MONUC) after the Lusaka Agreement of 1999. Following the Sun City Agreement, and as conditions in the east deteriorated, the number of MONUC peacekeepers increased substantially and the mission was renamed in 2010, becoming the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), to reflect a new mandate focused on the protection of civilians.<sup>4</sup> More than 30 countries have contributed to the peacekeeping contingent.

South Africa has been a key contributor to UN peace missions in general and to MONUC/MONUSCO in particular. MONUSCO was authorised to have a force component of 22 019 uniformed personnel. Its current strength is 20 519.<sup>5</sup> South Africa currently contributes some 2 100 peacekeepers to UN missions; of these, 1 250 are deployed in the DRC.<sup>6</sup>

The emergence of yet another rebel group<sup>7</sup>, M23 (formed in April 2012), in the eastern DRC led to the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2098 (2013), which allowed for a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) 'with the responsibility of neutralising armed groups'.<sup>8</sup> The FIB consists of 3 battalions of with approximately 850 soldiers each from South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania. These are in addition to the peacekeepers who were previously deployed.

---

## The expectation is that SA will not be just another donor, but a partner with a vested interest in the development of the continent

---

The continued presence of peacekeepers in the DRC and the deployment of the FIB indicate that while the elections, held in 2006 and 2011, may have ushered in an elected democratic government, they failed to bring about an end to the conflict. In 2006 the international community largely managed the elections. The *Commission Electorale Nationale Independante* (CENI) was, however, able to run the 2011 elections,<sup>9</sup> in which President Joseph Kabila was re-elected despite tensions over the results. Elections are viewed as part of the package of peacebuilding measures, but they can equally deepen existing fissures, as appears to have been the case in the DRC.

Kabila's government has found it difficult to establish its authority throughout the country, particularly in the Kivus, where a succession of rebel groups that were not successfully integrated into the national armed forces – *Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo* (FARDC) – render the area unstable. For example,

the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), previously led by General Laurent Nkunda, signed a peace agreement in March 2009. Disgruntled former CNDP elements regrouped to form M23 in 2012, which has become the latest threat in a series of waxing and waning rebel groups which continue to carry out atrocities among the general populace.

There is, however, a renewed consensus on the need for a comprehensive approach to addressing the conflict in the DRC. Leaders of 11 African countries signed an agreement on 24 February 2013 for the development of a regional oversight mechanism known as the '11+4' or the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC.<sup>10</sup> The UN, African Union (AU), International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) act as guarantors to the agreement. In addition, the presidents of South Africa, the DRC and Angola signed a tripartite Joint Cooperation Mechanism to ensure the efficient implementation of the 11+4 framework.<sup>11</sup>

Armed conflict in the DRC has never completely ceased, making the task of post-conflict development and peacebuilding extremely difficult. It remains a fragile country where threats to state authority are coupled with socio-economic challenges, including unemployment, lack of basic services, illicit economic activity and incomplete security sector reform (SSR) programmes. Despite all the programmes and billions of dollars in assistance, the DRC still ranked last (number 186) in the 2012 UN Human Development Index. This is the historical and current context in which South Africa has been assisting the DRC with post-conflict development and peacebuilding.

## SOUTH AFRICA'S ENGAGEMENT IN THE DRC

South Africa's approach to post-conflict development and peacebuilding is shaped by its foreign policy, and by its formative engagement in the UN, AU and SADC. When South Africa (re)entered the international arena in 1994 it immediately assumed a leadership role, and thus had to simultaneously learn while doing. Its successful democratic transition, quest for democracy and human rights, and its model of conflict resolution, coupled with a then iconic president, Nelson Mandela, provided the country with symbolic power on the global stage that few African states have hitherto enjoyed. That it possessed the largest economy on the continent and had a strong defence capability added to its regional and global positioning. This positioning, however, also implies a responsibility to assist with advancing peace, security and development in Africa. South Africa constructs its own identity and development as intrinsically linked to the prosperity and security of the continent.<sup>12</sup>

South Africa viewed its engagement in post-conflict reconstruction as that of 'technical cooperation and development', focussing on the promotion of democracy,

good governance, prevention and resolution of conflict, socio-economic development and integration, humanitarian assistance and human resource development.<sup>13</sup>

---

## SA has been a key contributor to UN peace missions in general and to MONUC/MONUSCO in particular

---

The country has worked with the DRC in relation to post-conflict development and peacebuilding since 2002, when the Peace Accord was brokered. In 2004 South Africa and the DRC signed a General Cooperation Agreement and formalised and institutionalised bilateral relations through the BNC, which has a strong focus on post-conflict restructuring and development (PCRD).<sup>14</sup> The two countries signed approximately 32 memorandums of understanding (MoUs) between 2004 and 2005. South Africa has broadly clustered its assistance to the DRC into three key areas, namely (i) SSR, (ii) institutional capacity building and (iii) economic development.<sup>15</sup> This policy brief clusters the activities into seven areas: governance, human resource development, implementation support, economic development, infrastructure development, information sharing and humanitarian assistance. Table 1 provides an example of the type of activities per cluster that South Africa has engaged in.

These activities have been delivered by a diverse range of government and non-government actors, such as the SA Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), SA National Defence Force (SANDF), SA Police Service (SAPS), Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy (PALAMA), Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA), Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and Department of Home Affairs (DHA); companies such as Vodacom and Shoprite; and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as IDASA, ACCORD, SAWID, etc.

In general, the response by DRC stakeholders interviewed on South Africa's engagement was positive and appreciative. They saw South Africa as being 'neutral' and 'African' and therefore implicitly understanding their circumstances, and as presenting an alternative in terms of both funding and programme design. However, it is questionable how far South Africa lives up to this portrayal. South Africa appears to respond primarily to requests from the DRC, which explains the varied nature of the activities in which it has engaged. If South Africa is to form partnerships, it has to respond to requests for assistance, but it also needs to develop an overarching post-conflict development strategy that will define where it can have impact and how the different actors and programmes will cohere to bring

Table 1 Examples of SA's post-conflict development and peacebuilding activities in the DRC

<b>Governance</b>	Assistance with the development of a master plan for the reform of the armed forces
	Needs assessment for the army, navy, air force & military health (proposed)
	SA Police Services (SAPS) development of a 5-year plan (not fully implemented)
	Interpol (SA representative stationed at National Congolese Police (PNC) to assist with planning)
	Development of an organic law for decentralisation of government and public administration, and vision & strategy document for the public service
	Anti-corruption legislative & institutional framework
	Establishment of the diplomatic academy
	Supporting the legislative drafting and development of a legal & constitutional framework
	Trade policy formulation; quality control; competition policy; intellectual property; micro-finance
	Deployment of election observers
<b>Human Resource Development</b>	Training of army (three battalions; rapid reaction force; new recruits)
	Training of PNC to police elections; VIP protection training; professionalisation of PNC; office administration training/ human resource and project management for police; arms control proliferation training
	Training of civil society for engagement in community policing forums and SSR
	Training of prosecutors, investigators, auditors, civil society & business to develop and implement integrity initiatives
	Training of immigration officials
	Training of senior DRC public servants & public management
	Training of diplomats; foreign language training
	Training on conflict resolution & negotiation, SA foreign policy, management and leadership & mission administration; training on anti-corruption
	Training of DRC magistrates
	Building capacity for infrastructure development (i.e. job inspection, licensing of civil construction agents, setting up of information systems, financing, infrastructure development)
	Administrative assistance for CENI
	Training of DRC revenue authorities
<b>Infrastructure Development</b>	Rehabilitation of the Mura base; rehabilitation of Maluku police training centre; renovation of ENA (school of public administration); refurbishment of foreign ministry building to set up diplomatic academy
	Bas Congo Corridor (deep-water port at Banana, rehabilitation of Matadi Port, rehabilitation of the railway line, Matadi to Kinshasa); Zambia copper belt spatial initiative
	ACSA undertook financial needs assessment (airport construction)
<b>Implementation Support</b>	DDR; identification & registration of FARDC personnel; destroyed illegal and redundant weapons and ammunition
	Security patrols
	Transportation of ballot papers for elections; air support for elections; deployment of SAPS members for elections; donation of 4x4 vehicles & communication equipment & desks, tents and computers
	Institutional development of national ministries, provincial legislature & municipal local councils
	Census of public service personnel; pilot project – asset register for immovable assets in relation to infrastructure sector
	Feasibility study for Bas Congo Corridor and Zambia Copper Belt; technical expertise by Telkom to Congolese telecoms network; Eskom feasibility study for electrification of Kimbanseke area; financial needs assessment of state-owned enterprises
	Preparation of funding applications; organising investor conferences to raise funds for PCRD projects
<b>Economic Development and Trade</b>	Support for the development of trade and industry in DRC
	Mining of bauxite, aluminium smelter, hydro-electricity (as part of the Bas Congo Corridor)
	SAA flights, retail sector (Shoprite), telecommunications (MTN, Vodacom), Western Power Corridor Project; Standard Bank
<b>Information Sharing</b>	Workshops by e.g. IDASA (democratisation and establishment of sustainable policing in the DRC); SAWID (gender mainstreaming); ACCORD (workshops on peacebuilding); IGD (dialogue on PCRD & elections); ISS (gender mainstreaming in the security sector); IJR (information sharing on transitional justice)
	Information sharing between provincial & local councils in SA & DRC
<b>Humanitarian</b>	Gift of the Givers – humanitarian assistance

about sustainable change. South Africa's funding is limited and many of its projects have been conducted through trilateral funding arrangements. In a field with very resourceful donors, and in a context where post-conflict development and peacebuilding are difficult to implement and sustain, South Africa has to be more strategic in order to be effective. To date the majority of its interventions can be characterised as short-term and uncoordinated programmes that have lacked sustainable impact. There is also little evidence of follow-up or of monitoring and evaluation to [re]address issues as they arise.

Despite its interventions in SSR – for example assisting with the development of a master plan for the defence forces,<sup>16</sup> the integration of ex-combatants into FARDC, and their identification and registration (Operation Teutonic), as well as training both PNC and FARDC personnel – South Africa is no longer viewed as a key player in SSR in the DRC. A FARDC representative interviewed noted that 'we do not feel its leadership in the region', while the EU Police Mission (EUPOL) representative indicated that South Africa was not engaged with police reform.

Interestingly, civil society representatives working with the police noted that South Africa had been the first to train them on SSR and lamented that South Africa had deserted them. There was one South African person working for INTERPOL located within the PNC. Admirable as her work is, this is a far too limited capacity/insufficient presence to follow through on the SSR policing initiatives first started by South Africa (SAPS and IDASA primarily) – EUPOL has 50 officers working in the DRC. South Africa was viewed as having had (in the past) excellent trainers when it came to police and defence training, but they were largely considered to be working in isolation from the other donors. It also seemed that South Africa paid little attention to the building of oversight bodies for, and to mainstreaming gender in, the security sector – areas in which it has a distinct advantage. South Africans, in turn, noted the lack of infrastructure in the DRC and the lack of funding to implement projects.<sup>17</sup>

SSR is the first element in post-conflict development and peacebuilding, and if this aspect is not carried out properly it is unlikely that there will be sustainable peace. It therefore remains imperative that South Africa participates in SSR. However, South Africa must identify its strengths and distinctive contributions and produce novel approaches if it is to be a key actor in SSR. South Africa constructed and successfully implemented its own SSR programme and therefore has many valid experiences to share. From the list of activities above it is clear that there was substantive engagement on SSR (governance, capacity building, implementation support and information sharing), but when asked what South Africa's contribution to SSR was, one of the respondents stated, 'they just gave us old computers', indicating that, on the whole, traction was limited.

The assistance given by DIRCO in terms of the establishment of the Diplomatic Academy, the refurbishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs building and

the training of diplomats and other officials is one of the few interventions where South Africa's footprint still looms large. There is a building with a plaque dedicated to Nelson Mandela, and the staff of the academy spoke highly of the calibre of the training. They were trained in conflict resolution, negotiation skills, South African foreign policy, management and leadership, and mission administration, as well as being taught their own history and foreign policy by Congolese trainers.<sup>18</sup>

South Africa has also trained a number of diplomats in English, information technology and protocol training. This training has, however, been discontinued. There appeared to be concern on the South African side that the diplomats who received training were not posted, while the Congolese viewed the funding as 'too little and always late'. The respondent at the Academy noted that although there were other funders, South Africa was a key partner, and it should assist further with the training of another 360 diplomats and the school administrators. This definitely remains an area where South Africa has both access and experience, and where it can make a meaningful contribution, beyond simply training diplomats, to the shaping of ideas that will assist with building regional and continental consensus in international relations.

---

## **If SA is to form partnerships, it must not only respond to requests for assistance, but also develop a post-conflict development strategy that defines where it can have impact**

---

The assistance given by the DPSA, primarily through PALAMA, aimed at decentralising and reforming the DRC's public service, appears fraught with challenges. South Africa assisted with the development of legal and policy frameworks (e.g. the Organic Law, approved in 2009, and an anti-corruption framework) for the public service. It also assisted with human resource management (a census database for the public service and the training of public servants), the establishment of the school for public administration and the refurbishment of its premises. However, the refurbishment of the building is incomplete and it is falling apart, the collation of the census data was halted before it was completed (funding appeared to be a problem), and the DRC respondents in the public service had misgivings about the relevance of the training.

It appears as though bad planning and a lack of understanding of the context may have produced tensions, while inadequate funding (or insufficient management

thereof) could have resulted in incomplete projects. The DRC's Department of Public Administration remains under-capacitated and non-computerised with ramshackle infrastructure, which is a sad reflection on the state of development in the country as a whole.

The 120 people who were trained to undertake the public service census are now apparently unemployed. At the 2012 BNC an action plan was drafted which identified corrective measures (e.g. moving the census files to the reserve bank, fixing the leaking roof, completing the census), but by March 2013 this had not been done. It is on undertakings such as these that South Africa stands to lose its credibility. The anti-corruption project – a noble exercise in a country steeped in corruption – is trying to make an impact with few human and financial resources. South Africa assisted with the printing of booklets (it printed 250 000, although the request was for 1 million). However, approximately 20 000 of the booklets are still piled in the office. It is doubtful whether this is an area in which South Africa has sufficient experience to make a sustained impact. Indeed, the programme director noted that there were few South Africans with the requisite knowledge to assist them.

---

## SA is working in a variety of sectors without the requisite human and financial capacity

---

South Africa was able to provide wide-ranging electoral assistance, e.g. with the deployment of observers and SAPS personnel, training of DRC police for assistance with elections, providing police with communication equipment, printing and transporting ballots, and the training of, and sharing of experiences with, CENI. There should be continued support to electoral bodies, especially in the periods between elections, so that they are able to exist and function as credible bodies. South Africa's IEC is respected throughout the continent and can therefore leverage this moral authority to begin to establish the legitimate, effective and efficient electoral governing institutions that are necessary for democratic consolidation.

South African companies such as Vodacom, MTN, Standard Bank and Shoprite are all visible in the DRC. In 2012 the DTI led a delegation of 75 business executives to the DRC under the Initial Trade and Investment initiative. Defenceweb noted, 'Two-way trade between South Africa and the DRC was R7,8 billion in 2011, up from R6,2 billion in 2010 and R4,8 billion in 2009.'<sup>19</sup> South Africa accounts for 21 per cent of the DRC's total imports.<sup>20</sup> It has also been investing in development corridors (Bas Congo), hydropower facilities (Inga Dam) and mining in the DRC.

It has done less in infrastructure development such as roads, buildings and airports.

The Inga Dam project (treaty signed in March 2013) is seen as the litmus test for how South Africa will engage in the DRC in future. Distrust around the project abound, so vigilance, openness and honesty are key to shaping future development activities. There are a lot of opportunities for South African businesses in post-conflict African countries, which should be encouraged. However, there should be prescribed ethics for the conduct of business and South Africa must be wary not to project the image that it engages in post-conflict development and peacebuilding for profit motives.

There are a number of other areas in which South Africa has signed MoUs to provide assistance, but in which it has not done much by way of implementation, for example agriculture, education, health and human settlements. Humanitarian intervention is limited and there is a need to reflect on South Africa's capacity to expand in this arena given the growth of Gift of the Givers.

South Africa is working in a variety of sectors without the requisite human and financial capacity. This frustrates both implementers and beneficiaries. There is a need to streamline engagements and to ensure that together these form part of a coherent post-conflict development and peacebuilding vision that is cognisant of local sustainable agendas, practices and processes. South Africa also needs to invest in training and equipping its own cadre of people to become post-conflict development specialists and peacebuilders.



## ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Cheryl Hendricks is a professor in the Politics Department at the University of Johannesburg. She is also the lead of the ISS project 'Enhancing South Africa's Postconflict Development and Peacebuilding Engagement in Africa'. Amanda Lucey is a researcher in the Conflict Management and Peacebuilding division at ISS Pretoria. The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of Mr P Cunta, Mr B Maluka, Ms N Masiko and Mr T Tjemolane in the collation of data for this project.

## NOTES

1. S Casoo, The South African Development Partnership Agency, Presentation to ODI Cape Conference 14–15 November, London, 2012, [www.odi.org.uk](http://www.odi.org.uk)
2. There is a plethora of information on South Africa's engagement in peacemaking and peacekeeping but less so on its development and peacebuilding agenda. There is a comprehensive Masters thesis on *South Africa's post-conflict and transitional diplomatic efforts in the DRC Lessons Learnt: 1990–2009* by Maud Dlomo (2010), which has proved useful for supplementing the information that was garnered through field work. There is also an overarching review by SAIIA on 'Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance: The South African Case', (ed) W. Braude, P Thandrayan and E Sidropolous, 2008.
3. These were with, among others, the Police, Defence, Public Administration, Diplomatic Academy, Department of Agriculture, CENI, the Disarmament Commission, South African embassy officials, etc.
4. H. Menondji, Problematic Peacekeeping in the DRC: From MONUC to MONUSCO, 2013, <http://thinkafricapress.com/drc/problematic-peacekeeping-drc-monuc-monusco>
5. See <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/facts.shtml> (accessed 29 August 2013).
6. See UN Missions Summary Reports detailed by country for December 2012.
7. See "DRC: Who's among the armed groups in the east," available from <http://www.irinnews.org/report/89494/drc-who-s-who-among-armed-groups-in-the-east> Accessed 29 August 2013
8. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2098 (2013), available from [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_res\\_2098.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2098.pdf) (accessed 15 April 2013).
9. CENI had support from the UN peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO and other donors including logistical support from SA.
10. Special Report of the Secretary-General on the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Great Lakes Region, 27 February 2013, available from [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_2013\\_119.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_119.pdf) (accessed 15 April 2013).
11. Angola Press, Congo-Kinshasa: Leaders for the Creation of a Tripartite Mechanism for DRC, 13 March 2013, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201303140845.html> (accessed 17 April 2013).
12. We state this mindful of the fact that South Africa is not homogenous and that there are many different views on how it should engage, a point of which Dr Siphamandla Zondi has reminded us.
13. DIRCO, Establishment of the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund, 2004, <http://dfa.gov.za> (accessed 6 May 2013).
14. See <http://www.dfa.gov.za/kinshasa/bilateral.html> (accessed 6 May 2013).

This policy brief was made possible through the support of the Department for International Development (DFID). The ISS is also grateful for the support of the following core partners: the governments of Norway, Sweden, Australia and Denmark.

### ISS Pretoria

Block C, Brooklyn Court,  
361 Veale Street,  
New Muckleneuk,  
Pretoria, South Africa  
Tel: +27 12 346 9500  
Fax: +27 12 460 0998  
Email: [pretoria@issafrica.org](mailto:pretoria@issafrica.org)

### ISS Addis Ababa

5th Floor, Get House Building,  
Africa Avenue, Addis Ababa,  
Ethiopia  
Tel: +251 11 515 6320  
Fax: +251 11 515 6449  
Email: [addisababa@issafrica.org](mailto:addisababa@issafrica.org)

### ISS Dakar

4th Floor, Immeuble Atryum,  
Route de Ouakam,  
Dakar, Senegal  
Tel: +221 33 860 3304/42  
Fax: +221 33 860 3343  
Email: [dakar@issafrica.org](mailto:dakar@issafrica.org)

### ISS Nairobi

Braeside Gardens,  
off Muthangari Road,  
Lavington, Nairobi,  
Kenya  
Tel: +254 20 266 7208  
Fax: +254 20 266 7198  
Email: [nairobi@issafrica.org](mailto:nairobi@issafrica.org)