



POLICY BRIEF

Power and influence: identifying champions of change in SADC

Liesl Louw-Vaudran

This policy brief explores the notion of power in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It examines which countries have excelled in areas prioritised in SADC's common agenda, which is shaped by the revised Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). Recommendations are made about how South Africa might partner with key SADC countries to drive growth and development in the region.

Key findings

- ▶ There is consensus in Southern Africa that greater regional integration and cooperation are key to the development of all SADC's member states and would contribute to the organisation's success.
- ▶ In order to deal with some of its regional imbalances, SADC has attempted to foster processes that capitalise on the complementarity and proximity of countries in the region.
- ▶ Over the years SADC has built up considerable technical expertise in supporting economic development as well as peace and security. The challenge is to ensure implementation.
- ▶ From a South African perspective, decentralising power and encouraging partner states to play a greater role will be a major challenge.
- ▶ South Africa has a great deal to gain if regional champions successfully drive change in SADC, since that will ensure greater decentralisation of responsibilities and reduce the burden of regional hegemony borne by South Africa.
- ▶ The key would be to manage this process carefully to prevent divisions within SADC.
- ▶ By developing clear criteria, shared by all member states, that will help determine 'champions' in the region, South Africa can drive the SADC agenda forward.

Recommendations

For South Africa:

- ▶ Promote a more equitable distribution of roles in SADC by supporting the concept of regional drivers.
- ▶ Introduce the notion of 'champions' at SADC summits, in consultation with the SADC chairperson and the countries in question.
- ▶ Create strategic hubs with the leading countries in key sectors prioritised by SADC and promote capacity building in those countries.
- ▶ Look at future growth paths in key sectors to determine strategic partnerships.

For SADC:

- ▶ SADC summits could be used to offer heads of state and government a platform on

which to report back on their specific areas of responsibility.

- ▶ Investigate the comparative advantages of each of the 16 member states.
- ▶ As it draws up its next five-year plan when the current RISDP expires in 2020, SADC should consider identifying regional champions to take charge of key priorities in the new strategic plan.
- ▶ Investigate the possible reform of the Double Troika arrangement, changing it from a rotational arrangement between states into a more permanent structure.
- ▶ Promote self-financing and ownership by SADC member states of the region's various programmes by allocating responsibilities to key member states.

Introduction

South Africa continues to play a central role in the 16-member Southern African Development Community (SADC), but its dominant position results in a dual challenge. Firstly, as a result of its position the country is often accused of being a ‘bully’ or ‘arrogant’. Secondly, South Africa is sometimes accused of not making a great enough contribution and not showing sufficient leadership.

SADC and regional champions

South Africa has by far the largest economy of the 16 countries in SADC – three times larger than that of Angola and almost seven times larger than that of Tanzania, which are the second- and third-largest economies in the region. Technologically it is the most advanced economy in the region and has the third-largest population (56 million) after the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with 79 million, and Tanzania, with 59 million.

In addition, South Africa has the greatest potential to exercise its power, not only because of the size of its economy, its population and its military might but also because of its diplomatic reach and technological advancement.

However, in recent years the country’s potential has declined in relation to that of other states in the region, many of which have outstripped South Africa’s growth and its rate of industrialisation (a key priority).

In order to deal with some of its regional imbalances SADC has attempted to foster processes that capitalise on the complementarity and proximity of its member countries. A vision has emerged of regional ‘champions’ or ‘locomotives’ as a means of driving specific issues and ensuring a more effective, equitable and mutually beneficial redistribution of roles.

According to this vision, a core group of countries (some believe this should be limited to the major contributors to SADC’s budget) could be given a formal role in the organisation. Currently, the rotational leadership in SADC is based on the so-called Double Troika system.

The current chairperson, the previous chairperson and the upcoming chair form the main Troika, while the chairperson of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security leads the Organ Troika, together with his predecessor and successor in this role. Together

these form the Double Troika. Some believe that this rather complicated and top-heavy structure needs to be reformed. The double troika could, for example, be turned into a more permanent structure made up of the six lead states in the region.

Such ideas are not unique to SADC – they have increasingly been identified at a continental level, with the African Union (AU) identifying ‘champions’ to deal with reform (Rwanda’s Paul Kagame), corruption (Nigeria’s Muhammadu Buhari) and intra-African trade (Niger’s Mahamadou Issoufou).

The African Union has identified ‘champions’ to deal with reform, corruption and intra-African trade

There is also nothing new in the allocation of country-specific responsibilities, the concept of which was first introduced by SADC’s predecessor, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).

SADCC was created in 1980 by the nine ‘Frontline’ states in response to the apartheid regime’s destabilisation of the region in its war against the liberation movements. Countries were allocated sectoral responsibilities, with Angola responsible for energy, Mozambique transport, Zimbabwe agriculture and Swaziland (now Eswatini) human resource development.

Identifying possible regional locomotives or drivers is methodologically challenging because of the interplay between the capacity to undertake a certain role and the political will to do so. It is also challenging as a country’s power projection may change fairly rapidly.

Negative governance trends in Zambia and Tanzania,¹ once considered stable and well-governed post-independence African states, are examples of such a change.

This study has determined possible locomotives by examining traditional notions of power, analysing the track record of key states in championing certain issues prioritised by SADC and looking at future possibilities.

The following section sets out some of the key issues, pitfalls and opportunities that SADC and South Africa might want to consider in identifying sectoral champions.

Power and influence


Research based on the International Futures (IFs)² modelling platform shows South Africa’s historical (and likely future) degree of dominance within the SADC region, as conceptualised by traditional notions of power determined by the relative size of the economy, the total population, the country’s military capacity, its diplomatic reach and its technological advancement.³ Influence, in the context of this brief, is defined as the capacity of a country to project its power through, for example, visionary leadership, its role in peacekeeping and its diplomatic networks.

Figure 1 shows the nine most powerful countries in the SADC region. The only country that is likely to approach

South Africa’s level of power in 2040 is Angola. However, defined by this index, in 2040 South Africa will still have about 35% more power than Angola. Towards the end of the period the gap between Tanzania and South Africa will begin to narrow.


Figure 2 approaches the distribution of power from a different point of view, looking at the total influence exerted on SADC members. This is measured by examining the total influence on the SADC region of all countries – including big global powers – and then selecting the SADC countries from this list. The figure thus shows the proportion of total influence exerted on countries in the SADC region (as a share of total global influence exerted on the region) and, again, reveals South Africa’s disproportionate weight in Southern Africa.

Figure 1: Distribution of power in SADC countries



Source: IFs 7.33

Figure 2: Level of influence on the region of leading SADC countries (1994-2040)



Source: IFs 7.33

In assessing the above figures it emerges that while Angola is most likely to assume a leadership role in terms of the traditional metrics of power, as seen in Figure 1, the country has far less influence in the region than would be expected based on its macro fundamentals, as seen in Figure 2. In the past it has punched below its weight, particularly because of its limited diplomatic and multilateral role.

In fact, Angola ranks in ninth place (behind Mauritius) in terms of its influence on the region, but there are indications that this could be changing, with President Joao Lourenco playing a stronger regional role.

In analysing figures 1 and 2 it appears that Zambia exerts the second-greatest amount of influence in the region, as Zimbabwe's influence has steadily eroded over time. The role of the DRC climbed aggressively between 2000, when it was the country with the least amount of regional influence, and 2015, when it was


positioned in fifth place, behind Zambia, Namibia and Botswana. However, as indicated above, fragile countries such as the DRC might lose their influential role quickly as instability and poor governance take their toll.

Future economic growth

According to 2017 statistics from the International Monetary Fund,⁴ South Africa's is the largest economy in SADC (\$349.3 billion gross domestic product, the second- largest in Africa), followed by Angola (\$124.2 billion, fifth-largest) and Tanzania (\$51.7 billion, tenth).

Growth trends will, however, change the picture as GDP growth among member states differ quite substantially. According to the IFs, by 2040 the South African economy is projected to grow by nearly 60% over 2015 levels and will remain the economic engine of SADC.

Figure 3: SADC's biggest economies



Source: IFs V. 7.36 initialised from IMF data

However, in the next few decades Tanzania is expected to have the fastest-growing economy in SADC, with its GDP expected to increase by 500% from US\$43.3 billion⁵ in 2015 to US\$265 billion by 2040. Mozambique, the sixth-smallest SADC economy in 2015, is also expected to grow dramatically – from US\$5.9 billion in 2015 to just under US\$90 billion by 2040 – a 400% increase.⁶ The growth in these countries by 2040 will be followed by that in Zambia, Madagascar, Botswana, the DRC and Angola.

Linking champions and SADC priorities

SADC's current key priorities are set out in the RISDP, 2015-2020. Overall, the intention of the RISDP is to 'deepen the integration agenda of SADC with a view to accelerating poverty eradication and the attainment of other economic and non-economic development goals'. The revised plan builds on the original 15-year plan, from 2005, and emphasises industrialisation 'to fast-track the socio-economic goals of the region'.

SADC has identified strategic and specific objectives for each of the above-mentioned priority areas, as well as the

interventions needed to fulfil these goals. While South Africa has led in some of these areas, several other countries have excelled in promoting the agenda of the RISDP. The following sub-sections will reflect on each of them.

Industrial development and market integration

Industrialisation has been a key theme of SADC in the four years since it was introduced as the region's theme of the year in 2015.

Which countries have excelled in industrialisation and manufacturing?

South Africa's manufacturing sector has been by far the most dominant, having contributed more than \$100 billion to GDP in 2015. IFs projects that value added⁷ in manufacturing in Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania will experience rapid absolute growth in the next few decades.

Figure 4 depicts the top eight SADC countries with the largest value added in manufacturing in terms of absolute size. It excludes South Africa, by far the most dominant

Box 1: Key priority areas identified in SADC's revised RISDP


- Industrial development and market integration
- Infrastructure in support of regional integration
- Peace and security cooperation
- Special programmes of a regional dimension, including human development, health, gender and labour

economy, and also excludes smaller economies such as those of Malawi and Lesotho, which do not make a strong impact on the overall industrial production of the region.

Figure 5 shows value added in manufacturing in US\$ billions and as a percentage of GDP for Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania, the three SADC countries, excluding South Africa, with the largest manufacturing sectors in absolute size and as a percent of GDP.


The figure shows that Tanzania, in addition to having the fastest-growing GDP in SADC, has the fastest-growing manufacturing sector in absolute terms. In 2015 manufacturing contributed US\$3.2 billion to Tanzania's GDP. IFs projects this figure will grow nearly nine-fold, to US\$32 billion, by 2040 (shown by the solid orange line in Figure 5). Moreover, manufacturing in Tanzania contributed less than 8% of GDP in 2015 (a lower share than in any other SADC country), but is expected to contribute 12% by 2040 (shown by the dashed orange line).

Figure 4: Value added of manufacturing, US\$ billions, excluding South Africa



Source: IFs v 7.36 initialised from World Bank data

Figure 5: Value added of manufacturing as % of GDP and in US\$ billions, excluding South Africa



Source: IFs v 7.36 initialised from World Bank data

It is important to ask which countries in SADC have been particularly active in championing industrialisation within the regional organisation.

- Zimbabwe, which has been one of the worst economic performers in Africa in this decade (with negative growth rates and a score of 37.2% for sustainable economic opportunities in the 2018 Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance), has championed the idea of industrialisation in SADC since 2014. It is largely due to Zimbabwe's efforts that this has been the main theme of SADC summits ever since, resulting in it being emphasised in the revised RISDP and during the annual SADC Industrialisation Week, organised with the private sector. Zimbabwe's economic decline, however, calls into question its role as a champion of industrialisation.
- Mauritius, meanwhile, has excelled when it comes to promoting regional economic integration and improved involvement of the private sector, one of the objectives of the RISDP. An example is the fact that in 2017 it hosted the launch of the Africa Economic Platform, a major AU initiative to promote intra-African trade and cooperation with the private sector.⁸

Infrastructure in support of regional integration

According to the revised RISDP, key sectors are energy, transport, tourism, information and communications technology (ICT), meteorology and water.

- Four SADC countries feature among the top ten in the African Development Bank (AfDB)'s Africa infrastructure index for 2018. They are Seychelles (1), South Africa (4), Mauritius (6) and Botswana (9).
- When it comes to key issues such as electricity generation, the AfDB's figures show that Seychelles (2), South Africa (3), Mauritius (4) and Botswana (9) are among Africa's top 10 per capita electricity producers.⁹

As with the first priority area, it is important to look at which countries within SADC have shown commitment to driving this agenda.

- Namibia, which is chairing SADC in 2018/2019, has made infrastructure development the central theme of its tenure. National projects such as the multi-million dollar upgrade of Namibia's Walvis Bay port form a key element of the SADC RISDP. The port is destined to serve four important development corridors – to Luanda in the north, Zambia and the Copperbelt in the north-east, Harare in the east and Johannesburg and Upington in the south.
- Despite its economic challenges, Zimbabwe, which hosts the Southern African Power Pool, is still well informed on issues of power. With SADC due to launch the new regional gas mechanism that was discussed at the August 2018 summit in Windhoek, the lead country in this strategy might be Mozambique, which has large gas reserves, although¹⁰ Angola, Namibia and Tanzania also have considerable reserves. Scholars have warned, however, that the hopes of creating a sustainable energy grid to serve the entire region have not been matched by the required coordination and political will.¹¹



4 SADC COUNTRIES IN
TOP 10 ELECTRICITY
PRODUCERS IN AFRICA

Peace and security cooperation and mediation

The RISDP outlines as its objectives the enhancement of regional peacebuilding; conflict prevention, resolution and management; disaster risk management; regional collective defence; regional early warning; cross border security; training in peace support operations and migration and refugee management.

Drivers in this sector might be ascertained by asking:

- *Which countries in SADC have the biggest armies?*

South Africa has the greatest military power, according to the Global Firepower Index,¹² second in Africa only to that of Egypt. It is followed by Angola (fourth in Africa), the DRC (10th), Zimbabwe (11th) and Zambia (12th).

- *Which countries participate in international peacekeeping?*

Tanzania, South Africa, Zambia and Malawi are the only SADC countries that rank among the top 25 countries contributing troops to UN peacekeeping operations. Tanzania is in tenth place, with 2 510 troops; South Africa 17th, with 1 246; Zambia 21st, with 1 037 and Malawi 23rd, with 939.¹³

In terms of participation in SADC peacekeeping initiatives it should be noted that:

- South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi have played a significant role in the UN Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the DRC;
- Zimbabwe houses the Regional Peace Training Centre of the SADC Standby Force and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation;
- Angola has played a key role in the SADC mission in Lesotho and Madagascar; and
- Botswana has contributed to the civilian component of the SADC protection mission in Lesotho.

Special programmes with a regional dimension

The task of determining champions for this broad strategic issue, the objective of which is to improve human capacity for socioeconomic development, is complex and would necessitate a comparative analysis of all 16 member states. Some issues that should be considered are:

- When it comes to work in SADC, Namibia,¹⁴ for example, champions issues such as gender mainstreaming and works well with the SADC secretariat to foreground the gender protocol. Namibia also performs well when it comes to gender equality.¹⁵
- Zambia has been selected by the AU as champion for its campaign against child marriage and has hosted a number of continental meetings on the subject. Although Zambia still has a high proportion (up to 30%) of girls marrying before the age of 18, it has been very active in trying to eradicate child marriage. In 2016 SADC developed a model law against child marriage that was adopted by the SADC parliamentary forum.¹⁶

Selecting champions

If SADC is to foster an approach of identifying regional 'champions' it is important to consider how it will go about doing so and what the advantages of such a strategy would be.

The main aim of selecting 'champions' is to ensure greater buy-in by member states to SADC's programmes and priorities. Allocating responsibilities to leaders and countries in the region is likely to improve implementation of decisions. Success in championing certain key issues could be a source of pride to those countries that implement it.

Allocating responsibilities to leaders and countries could improve implementation of SADC decisions

The current Double Troika system, as stated above, provides that a minimum of six member states must be involved in driving decisionmaking in SADC at any given time. However, there is a need to allocate responsibilities beyond the two troikas.

One way of doing so might be to emulate the AU, which, in its efforts to ensure greater buy-in by member states to its projects, nominates certain heads of state and countries as 'champions' to drive key issues.

The criteria for the selection of these champions are, however, not entirely clear and appear to be relatively ad hoc, depending on the abilities and willingness of a specific leader rather than a country.

In the UN Security Council the notion of ‘penholders’ relates to countries that occupy a semi-formal position taking the lead in drafting resolutions on specific topics. In recent years African countries like South Africa have advocated joint ‘penholdership’, together with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the United States, Britain, France, China and Russia), when it comes to African issues.

SADC could use the same strategy as the AU but, given the strong democratisation in the region and the relatively frequent turnover of leaders, it would be advisable to link the role to countries rather than to individuals.

Champions would then be countries that have done well and are expected to do well in certain areas, although some might be selected because of a particular historical focus.

SADC’s selection of champions should not be open ended. A three-year deadline should give a country enough time to make an impact.

The role of non-state actors

While SADC is essentially a member-state-driven organisation, efforts have been made to ensure greater people-centred regional integration and to mobilise non-state actors in this effort.

For example, plans have been afoot for some time to revive the SADC business council – a difficult process given the unequal distribution of business organisations in member states. The annual SADC Industrialisation Week has been a useful forum for mobilising the private sector.

The key is to avoid resentment of lead states and carefully manage the redistribution of roles

There is a long tradition of cooperation among non-state actors such as trade unions and civil society organisations in SADC and this cooperation has been used for some time to mobilise around political and economic development issues.

South Africa has played a dominant role in this regard, with several civil society organisations using the country’s

relatively free political space to mobilise and run political campaigns. A regional strategy based on selecting key drivers and champions of change should also include such non-state actors.

Conclusion

Given South Africa’s dominance in the region it is clear that decentralising power in SADC and nurturing partner states in the organisation to play a greater role will be a major challenge. In an organisation based on consensus, where the stronger powers are often reluctant to be seen to take a strong lead, out of fear of being accused of bullying, such allocation of roles could be a sensitive issue.

However, there is consensus that greater regional integration and cooperation is key to the development of all SADC’s members if it is to succeed as an organisation. South Africa has a great deal to gain if regional champions succeed in driving change, ensuring greater decentralisation of responsibilities and reducing the country’s regional hegemony.

By developing clear criteria, shared by all member states, to determine ‘champions’ in the region, South Africa can drive this agenda forward.

University of the Witwatersrand Professor Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, an expert on SADC,¹⁷ believes a ‘twinning’ arrangement could also be considered whereby a bigger state ‘adopts’ a smaller state to ensure the implementation of the regional development goals.

Experience has shown that in some cases there are ‘active’ and ‘passive’ followers, for example, when peacekeepers are deployed it is customary for a dominant state to take the lead, with others joining, said Van Nieuwkerk. This was the case with the FIB in the eastern DRC, where South Africa took the lead, with Malawi and Tanzania appearing to play the role of ‘passive’ followers.

The key would be to avoid resentment of lead states and to manage carefully the redistribution of roles.

As noted above, research shows that Angola and Tanzania are likely to remain the second- and third-largest economies in the region, after South Africa. When it comes to industrialisation and the value add of manufacturing, Mozambique is also expected to grow

rapidly, thanks to its vast gas reserves, and is expected to increase its capacity, while South Africa, Angola and Tanzania still lead in this regard. This means that Angola and Tanzania should be considered powerful states in decision-making in SADC.

In addition from the size and growth of countries' GDP figures it is important to take other considerations into account. Smaller countries such as Mauritius excel when it comes to good economic governance and making it easier to do business. Both Mauritius and Botswana have succeeded in improving infrastructure. Namibia, for its part, has proved its ability to provide certain crucial social services and promote gender equality.

While Zimbabwe may not be one of the big contributors to UN peacekeeping operations (it ranks 70th in the world, with only 89 peacekeepers deployed), it hosts the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre and has historically shown a willingness to lead the region in this regard. The economic implosion of the last few years, has, however, made a considerable impact on the capacity of its military to play a role in the region.

Botswana, despite hosting the SADC secretariat, has not been proactive in supporting capacity building within the organisation, despite the fact that its position as host could be a source of influence and job creation.

The SADC region faces huge challenges. While it is, historically, relatively stable, economic growth in most of its member states has not translated into higher living standards for the majority of its citizens. Drought and low agricultural production has also led to a drop in food security¹⁸ and the industrial capacity of many countries has been eroded by cheap imports from China and elsewhere.

However, progress in creating new infrastructure to link SADC states, as well as the potential of wealth thanks to the gas finds in countries such as Mozambique, may change the region's fortunes for the better.

Over the years SADC has built up vast technical expertise when it comes to supporting economic development as well as peace and security in the region. The challenge now is to ensure that its plans are implemented. A critical look by SADC's member states at their abilities and strengths could help drive the region even further towards achieving its development goals.

Notes

- 1 Author's interview with a senior AU official, 2015.
- 2 IFs is a free, open-source model used to aid critical thinking about development futures. It was created by Professor Barry B Hughes and is hosted and developed by the Frederick S Pardee Center for International Futures at the University of Denver: <http://pardee.du.edu/understand-interconnected-world>
- 3 The Hillebrand-Herman Moyer Index, used by the IFs system, includes drivers of national power such as demographics, diplomacy, economics, military capacity and technology.
- 4 The GDP data as set out in the IMF World Economic Outlook for 2018: www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2018/07/02/world-economic-outlook-update-july-2018
- 5 Values in 2011 constant dollars unless otherwise specified.
- 6 This will largely be due to the discovery in the country of one of the largest reserves of natural gas in the world. Export of liquefied natural gas is expected to start in 2021. For more on Mozambique's growth see the ISS African Futures and Innovation study: 'Can natural gas improve Mozambique's development?', *Southern Africa Report* 10, September 2017: <https://issafrica.org/research/southern-africa-report/can-natural-gas-improve-mozambiques-development>
- 7 'Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources ... Classification of manufacturing industries accords with the United Nations International Standard Industrial Classification revision 3.' See full definition at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.CD?year_low_desc=true
- 8 https://au.int/sites/default/files/newsevents/conceptnotes/31884-cn-concept_note_african_economic_platform_march_20-22_2017_mauritius.pdf
- 9 According to the African Development Bank figures for 2018: www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/AfDB_Statistics_Pocketbook_2018.pdf
- 10 Serious governance issues pointed out in the above-mentioned ISS report on Mozambique would arguably preclude this country from being chosen in the short term to 'champion' the gas mechanism.
- 11 M Muller, 'How the systemic failure of energy cooperation in SADC has undermined regional integration'. In Trudi Hartzenberg, Gerhard Erasmus, Paul Kalenga and Talkmore Chidede (eds), *Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook 2017/18* (Stellenbosch: TRALAC, 2018).
- 12 This index takes into account hardware, manpower and technological advances, among other factors: www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp
- 13 Statistics from the UN from 30 September 2018, available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>
- 14 Interview with senior SADC official, Gaborone, June 2018.
- 15 This is according to the gender equality index of the UN Development Programme: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/GDI>
- 16 For more on the SADC model law see: www.girlsnotbrides.org/sadc-model-law-child-marriage/
- 17 Interview, 30 December 2018.
- 18 The final communiqué of the 38th SADC summit, held in Windhoek, Namibia, on 18 August 2018, noted, among other things, an overall decline in food production in the SADC region.

About the author

Liesl Louw-Vaudran is a Senior Research Consultant at the ISS. She coordinates the ISS' research on the southern Africa region and also edits and contributes to the ISS' PSC Report. Liesl is a former foreign correspondent and Africa editor of Media24 in South Africa, and has over 20 years' experience working in various African countries. Her latest book *South Africa in Africa: Superpower or Neocolonialist* examines South Africa's role in Africa after the end of apartheid. Liesl is completing a Master's degree in international relations at the University of Pretoria, South Africa.

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Acknowledgements



This publication was funded by UK aid from the UK government; however the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government's official policies. The ISS is grateful for support from the following members of the ISS Partnership Forum: the Hanns Seidel Foundation, the European Union and the governments of Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the USA.

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