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REPERCUSSIONS: ZAMBIA, RHODESIA
AND SOUTH WEST AFRICA

by

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JOHANNESBURG

November 7th, 1966

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It has been said that "happy is the country which has no history." If the converse is true, the speed with which history has been making in Southern Africa in the course of the past few weeks must, I fear, ensure that most of the countries within the area will be in for an unhappy future. Every single day seems to have witnessed some event which has dragged one or more of them into the forefront of the contemporary scene. With this plethora of material - I cannot bring myself to say riches - I propose this evening to try to deal with the countries in question in reverse order to what appears to be, at the moment, the seriousness of the events which have affected them.

I. ZAMBIA

To begin with Zambia, there is, as yet, no sign of an end to the steady deterioration which began last November, and was suddenly accelerated by Zambia's decision to move, in May last, into the forefront of the battle against Rhodesia. I mentioned, a month ago, the surrender of the Zambian Government to the demands of the African miners of the Copperbelt that a sum of £6,581,000 standing to their credit in the mines' pension fund should be handed over to them before they were obliged to contribute to a new national provident fund which the Government had devised. It appears that the way in which the Government plans to implement this agreement is that a first payment of £800,000 will be made to the 40,000 members of the fund, as soon as the necessary legal formalities have been completed, and that the balance will be paid out over an undisclosed period. The effect of this procedure has, of course, been to create considerable disappointment among the African miners, who expected the full £6½ million to be paid to them almost immediately. They were further disappointed by the award, a joint decision by the Government and the Copper Mines Companies, of an increase of 22% in African wages, as against the 100% increase sought by them. The dissatisfaction was reflected in the slowness with which a number of miners went back to work; 11,000 were still out on the 19th day of the strike, and on the 22nd day, only 40% of the underground workers at Mufulira, the centre of the strike and the richest mine, had returned. The continued unrest resulting from these differences was given as one of the reasons for the extension of the special security regulations, and the introduction of additional ones, and it was reported that 36 Africans had been placed under restriction during the period of the unofficial strikes. The discontent is unlikely to be reduced by the possibility that short-time working, resulting from the reduction in production in the course of the next three months which I shall mention later, will, over that period, more than cancel out the 22% increase of wages.

One unintended but useful effect of the strike was to

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enable the mines to clear most of the stockpile resulting from the interruption of the export of copper via the Rhodesia Railways in June and July, but the decision of the Rhodesian Government to insist on a truck-for-truck transfer of rolling stock at Victoria Falls has reduced coal imports from Rhodesia by about a half. This has reduced the supply to the copper mines by 25%, and the mining companies had, in October, to reduce activity at the smelters by 25%, and this weekend by a further 9%. Reduced output from the smelters will reduce work at the refineries. The companies will be put to considerable expense in stockpiling 25% of their normal output half-way through the production stage. The 25% reduction in October was expected to involve an end reduction of 500 tons of copper a day, worth almost £250,000 at current price, and presumably the additional 9% cut will increase these losses by one-third. It is unlikely that normal production will be attained again until the end of this year, which would appear to involve a loss to the companies of over £20,000,000 in sales, after the earlier loss of £30,000,000 due to failure to export between May and September. The cost to the companies of the 22% wage increase to African miners is calculated at £6 million, and the mining companies will soon be as discontented as the miners.

The limitation of traffic over the Rhodesia Railways has forced the Zambian Government to revert to its earlier efforts to develop alternative routes for imports and exports, and the need has been increased by the shut-down, at the end of October, of the British airlift from Dar-es-Salaam. 450 heavy Fiat trucks were bought from Italy for immediate delivery and use on the road route to and from Dar-es-Salaam, and it has been reported that 3.4 million gallons of oil entered through Tanzania in September, the highest amount in any one month so far. These trucks are, however, experiencing considerable difficulty in traversing the rough roads, and although most of them have contrived to complete their journeys during the dry season the wastage has been one a day and serious delays are forecast when the rains start. It has been stated that, in spite of the road lift, Zambia now has only about 15 days' stock of petroleum products, as against Rhodesia's six months'. It was this which made the explosion of a large fuel tank at Kitwe, with the loss of 300,000 gallons, so serious. Talks with the Congolese Prime Minister in Lusaka in October about the possibility of increasing the freight carried by the Congo rail and river route, are said to have left Zambian officials with the feeling that to depend on the Congo is to walk on a quicksand, and they were unlikely to have changed their views when the Prime Minister was immediately demoted to Defence Minister on his return to Kinshasha. The Benguela railway is carrying more than 1,000 tons of petroleum products monthly to Zambia, and about 9,000 of general cargo, mainly coal, but these amounts are relatively small. Attempts to expand traffic by road to Malawi, and thence by rail to Beira, have been more promising, and traffic by this route shows signs of doubling, but it has involved Malawi in ordering £1 million of diesel-electric locomotives and the cost of these and other improvements is likely to be reflected in an increase of freight charges which will involve Zambia in further expenditure. The total amount carried by this route is again fairly small. The grant of a loan of £6.3 million by the World Bank for improving roads within Zambia (a project which

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was originally forecast to take until 1970) will not help very much; it was first announced six months ago and the presumption is that nothing has yet been done.

The Zambian Government meanwhile goes ahead with its development plans which bear less and less relation to reality. It has accepted an Italian tender of between £17 and £18 million for an 8 inch oil pipe-line between the Italian-owned oil refinery at Dar-es-Salaam (which can process 600,000 tons of oil a year) and Zambia; planned a new power station on the Kafue River, which is expected to cost more than £50 million, and announced that Central African Airways are to be divided, with the result that the profitable Rhodesian section will no longer subsidise the Zambian section, which will, therefore, have to be subsidised by the Government. And today a £429 million, four-year, prosperity plan has been announced. It is stated that Mr. Kaunda still hopes to obtain the funds for the Kafue dam from the United States, but the decision of Congress to limit U.S. expenditure on aid to Africa this year to \$500 million, casts considerable doubt on any such sum being forthcoming from U.S. Government sources.

With the economic and financial situation worsening it has become all the more important to Mr. Kaunda and his Government to see Mr. Smith's Government overthrown at the earliest possible moment, and it is their exasperation with what they consider the dilatory tactics of the United Kingdom which has led to the personal attacks on Mr. Wilson, and to Zambia's demands at the United Nations and the Organisation for African Unity, for immediate military action against Rhodesia. Yet Zambia's dependence on Rhodesia is such that the Government has also felt obliged to reject Mr. Wilson's offer to contribute £14 million, provided they would cut off all remaining Zambian trade with Rhodesia, even though this offer was topped up by other Commonwealth countries at their recent meeting in London, to a total of £22 million, the bulk of the increase to have been provided by Canada. Zambia's present and prospective losses have been estimated by Mr. Wina, the Finance Minister, at over £30 million, and Zambia is in no position to sustain further immediate losses without the certainty of recovering all of them. But whether or not Zambia takes further steps to reduce trade with Rhodesia, the Zambian economy is now bound to be under steadily increasing pressure, inflation and unemployment will progressively increase, exasperation with Britain, as the ultimate cause, by reason of its Rhodesian policy, of most of Zambia's troubles, will increase in parallel, and the Zambian Government may soon decide to withdraw the country's reserves of £80 million from London. Mr. Wina, the Finance Minister, has so far said only that he has no present intention of doing so, and that the British Government could expect to be informed if and when the Zambian Government changed its mind. It is unnecessary to emphasise the serious effect which such a withdrawal, following the withdrawal of Burma's £40 million, could have in causing further lack of confidence in sterling. And any repercussions on sterling will add a further element of uncertainty in Zambia.

Relations between Zambians and Europeans resident in Zambia are already deteriorating as the latter are the available scapegoats for whatever goes wrong. President Kaunda recently denounced Europeans for disloyalty, and declared that a number of them would find themselves deported, within the immediate future, at 24 hours' notice. He added that what might happen to their property and the transfer of their pay was a matter for other ministers, and not for him. Those deported would not be allowed any extension of stay to deal with such matters. These threats, in turn, encouraged African agitation against the expatriates, and murders occurred. The trouble at Kitwe has already led to 150 miners giving notice. I have previously drawn attention to the resignation of European railway men and its effect on the efficient working of the Railways. Further withdrawal of European mine workers would further reduce output, sales and the sums available to the Government from mining taxation, and once this cycle develops the danger is that it may lead rapidly to demands for nationalisation of the mines so that all revenue can be used by the Government.

It would be surprising if, in such circumstances, the political situation in Zambia had not also been deteriorating. Steps have been taken to deprive any members of the United Nationalist Independence Party who hold seats in Parliament, and may resign from the Party, from continuing to hold their seats until the next election. This, in effect, prevents the development of a stronger opposition within Parliament, which prevents, in turn, Parliament from providing a safety valve as frustrations mount. The only way in which discontent can then express itself is within the party, and not by open opposition but by secret plotting.

Externally the Government have been no more successful. There are few signs of collapse in Rhodesia and Mr. Smith's Government has easily survived the assault of the Commonwealth Conference, which had been stimulated by Zambia into taking the action which it did, and criticised by Zambia for refusing to go further. At New York Zambia's complaint about an alleged Portuguese violation of her western frontier was countered by Portuguese denials and Portuguese complaints that African infiltrators had crossed the Angolan border from Zambia. Zambia obtained little satisfaction from a non-committal Security Council resolution of the Israeli-Arab type. And the O.A.U., in spite of a Zambian contribution of R150,000 (double Zambia's contribution to the U.N.) has bogged down over the Ghana-Guinea dispute to the extent that 14 heads of state have announced that they will not attend the current summit meeting.

How long President Kaunda's Government can outlive the threats to his internal policy of expansion, the failure of his external policy of opposition to Rhodesia, discontent among the best-organised African workers, and the internal unrest which all three have caused, is doubtful: African precedents would suggest that its expectation of life can only be short.

II. RHODESIA

I propose to deal next with Rhodesia because the deadline for Britain's reference of the independence question to the United Nations is the end of November, whereas the Committee of 14 on South West Africa is not due to report until April 1967.

During the past month the Rhodesian Government has been considering carefully the British proposals, which Sir Morrice James brought out, and which represented the so-called "last word" offer prepared in London after Mr. Bowden, the Commonwealth Secretary, had reported to the Cabinet on his visit to Salisbury. Mr. Smith took an early opportunity to explain to the people of Rhodesia that his reference in September to the end being in sight meant only that as the British Government was apparently committed to a time-table through to November 30th, then one way or another the end was in sight! The phrase did not necessarily mean that he felt that the end would be a settlement, but that he thought that the talks were reaching a climax. This cleared the decks so far as the September talks had been concerned.

Mr. Smith then went on to explain that it was not in Rhodesia's interest to end the present discussions, that the Rhodesian Government had already met the British Government on the latter's six principles, and that what was in dispute was a matter of degree. So far as the shape of the Constitution was concerned, he believed that Britain and Rhodesia were far closer to agreement than many people in Rhodesia and Britain realised. At the same time Mr. Smith stressed that Mr. Wilson's so-called final offer had never been presented as a final offer: "I have a feeling," he said, "that the British Government know what would have happened to it if it had been presented as such." Although Sir Morrice had returned to London Mr. Smith did not rule out further visits from British officials. But, swinging back again, "... if, come the end of November, we are not getting any further and it looks as though Britain is going to do what she says she is going to do, then I think I will have no option but to set up a very high-powered commission of top people to look into this whole question of our future constitution, because things like a senate come into the picture, the entrenched clauses and the question of a republic."

Mr. Smith's reference to a senate confirmed suggestions in some reports of the earlier discussions that increased African representation might be provided by means of the creation of a senate in which the chiefs would have special representation. The reference to the entrenched clauses probably linked to an earlier report that while the Rhodesian Constitution of 1961 envisaged an African majority within a period of 15-20 years, Mr. Wilson has been envisaging that majority within a period of from 12-15 years, and Mr. Smith would like to be able to defer it, if necessary, for as long as 50. This may be only a question of degree, as Mr. Smith says, but it is difficult to argue that it is not fundamental. Mr. Smith himself subsequently elaborated his reference to a republic: Rhodesia would automatically

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become a republic if the Rhodesian issue were to be handed over by Britain to the United Nations, because this would be tantamount to ejection from the Commonwealth and "if we are not in the Commonwealth, we must automatically assume the status of a republic, whether we like it or not." According to unconfirmed reports Mr. Smith also insisted that any face-saving return of power by his Government to Sir Humphrey Gibbs, prior to his being asked to form a new government, should not exceed the absolute minimum necessary for such an arrangement to be made, that is, a matter of hours at most: Mr. Wilson is said to have been envisaging something much nearer a period of genuine government by Sir Humphrey, but a compromise here might still be possible. Mr. Smith has, however, emphasised that he is not prepared to agree even to a nominal transfer of power, and for the briefest possible period, unless all the subsequent steps had previously been negotiated. Mr. Wilson would appear to be still insisting that the negotiations can only take place with the new legal government formed by Sir Humphrey Gibbs after the transfer of power to him.

In spite of complaints from London that time was being wasted, Mr. Smith refused to be hurried and his reply to the proposals brought by Sir Morrice James was not finally sent until last Friday evening, the 4th November. It was emphasised in Salisbury that it represented the result of several meetings of the Rhodesian Cabinet. Mr. Smith has in this way avoided any suggestion that he might be making proposals with the backing of only some of his ministers or that there were divisions in the Cabinet. According to reports from Salisbury the reply contained concessions by the Rhodesian Government and it was stated that if Britain made concessions in the same spirit of cooperation, the gap between the two Governments could be bridged. The report today that the British Cabinet will be considering the Rhodesian reply later this week could mean either that the first impression is that it does afford such a possibility for further negotiation, or simply that the British Government believes that there are advantages in waiting until the O.A.U. has concluded its present meeting at Addis Ababa.

Until there is some more definite reaction from London, it is impossible to be optimistic about the outcome of further negotiations. It has, for example, been reported that the Rhodesian Cabinet has been devoting more time to a survey of the possible effects of additional mandatory sanctions than to drafting the reply to London, and that this has covered agriculture, mining and industry. The survey has brought out that the most prosperous branch of farming has been the raising of beef cattle for export, that at present over 1,000 a week (i.e. 52,000 a year) are being exported to South Africa, and that prices have been maintained at a high level. Wheat production has increased substantially and "present indications are that the national crop volume will reach a spectacular level;" even so, Rhodesia is unlikely to be self-sufficient within a decade, for most of the 900,000 bags of wheat consumed have hitherto been imported from the U.S.A., Canada and Australia, at a cost of about £2 million a year, and Rhodesia's own production, a year ago, was barely sufficient to feed the population for four days. The sugar crop has been a good one but the price is low and the prospect of finding external markets slender. So far as tobacco, the main cash crop, is concerned,

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although growers are on the average making less this year than in recent years, they appear to be reasonably satisfied with their returns, and it is believed that the total returns will amount to about £23 million as against £33 million last year. Large quantities of the crop are said still to be stored in every available building in Salisbury. Of the total of 200 million lbs., the lowest local estimate of export sales is about 80 million lbs., of which about one half is said to have been bought and paid for by South African firms, while the balance may have gone secretly to Holland, Belgium, Portugal, West Germany, Nationalist China and Japan. Although three-fifths may thus remain unsold, the British forecast that several hundred growers would not be able to grow a crop in the coming season has been proved inaccurate; the number of registered growers for the coming season is almost the same as last. Indeed, a warning has had to be given that farmers should not plant tobacco this season to an extent likely to produce a larger yield than the total of 200 million lbs., which the Rhodesian Government Corporation will purchase. So far as base minerals are concerned, no figures have been given for exports of chrome, asbestos and manganese, but Mr. Garfield Todd, the former prime minister, who has no reason to love the Smith regime, pointed out, in his first statement after the order confining him to his farm had been relaxed, that: "we have only to use our eyes as the trains go by to guess that our mineral production must be high, and we see that it is being exported." Gold is being produced to maximum capacity because of its special importance in financing purchases overseas of essential imports. Rhodesian production of copper is small, but Zambian copper is now passing through Rhodesia at the rate of about 1,200 tons a day, sufficient to keep the Rhodesia Railways operating in the black. Indeed, 10 new diesel locomotives have had to be obtained from the United States, bringing the total now in service to 79, in order to enable the Railways to deal with the heavy freight traffic. The 10 locomotives cost Rhodesia Railways £1½ million, and they have taken an option to buy a further 20 at a cost of £3½ million. The Railways have also contributed to the inflow of 343,000 visitors who spent £5.8 million, making tourism the fourth largest foreign exchange earner. The Government has just raised a further internal loan of £5 million, making a total of £20 million this year, and this has enabled even development plans to be financed. It is no wonder, therefore, that Mr. Smith commented on a recent statement, by Mr. Wilson, that Britain had been sheltering Rhodesia, that "we are able to carry our own can," and commiserated with Zambia for having been misled "by the British Government (which) has led them into their present predicament. These poor and inarticulate people, who cannot run a railway, a post office or a petrol rationing scheme decently, have now been given a whole country to run." Mr. Garfield Todd himself summed up the situation by saying: "I think that Mr. Wilson has done awfully badly during the past 12 months."

The failure of the economic sanctions is indeed so generally admitted that even in Britain it has now been suggested that, if further mandatory sanctions are to be imposed by the United Nations, they must, in addition to closing the gaps in

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the present boycott of Rhodesia's exports, ensure that oil is no longer carried by rail through Mozambique or by road across Beit Bridge. In view of the unlikelihood of Portugal agreeing to the former, or South Africa to the latter - Mr. Vorster has emphasised that he has no intention of changing Dr. Verwoerd's policy of free trade with Rhodesia - it is difficult to see how such sanctions could be made effective except by using force. The Liberal Party Conference in England accordingly recommended that consideration should be given to bombing the two points of entry at Beit Bridge and Malvernia, and the London Times took this suggestion sufficiently seriously to point out that, while such bombing was within the capacity of the Royal Air Force, success could not be guaranteed in a single strike, and that the Rhodesian Air Force would be able to oppose effectively everything except a surprise first attack. Moreover, the attack would have to be mounted from either Zambia or Botswana, in order to fly over the minimum amount of South African or Rhodesian territory. The Times said nothing about the likelihood that the South Africa Air Force would take action to oppose any threat to communications via Beit Bridge, or that the Portuguese would protect their rail connections with Rhodesia, or that both would object to overflying by aircraft with hostile intent.

The Liberal Party was nonetheless correct in its estimate that sanctions only make sense if they are backed by the use of force, and force is what the leaders of the African States, now meeting at Addis Ababa in the Organisation for African Unity, want used against Rhodesia. The latest resolution of the U.N. Assembly calls on Britain to use force if the present negotiations do not end in the submission of Rhodesia. Although both the Labour and Conservative parties, with a greater sense of responsibility than the Liberal Party, are opposed to the use of force by the U.K., the Assembly of the United Nations is likely, within the next few months, to recommend that the Security Council take the necessary steps to use force to make sanctions effective and to topple Mr. Smith's Government. Security considerations have, as Lord Graham, the Minister of External Affairs, has said, prevented any discussion in Rhodesia of the potential threat from military sanctions and of the possible counter-action which the Rhodesian Forces might take.

Since there is likely to be a flurry of discussion, and possibly further visits by Ministers and officials, British or Rhodesian, before 30th November, it may be December before the prospects become clearer. If Mr. Smith can secure sufficient concessions from Britain, over independence, and the date of majority rule, both sides would heave a sigh of relief. If he does not secure them, but can prolong discussions into December, he may at least drive a further wedge between Britain and the African States, and provoke the latter into provocative action which could leave Britain in a position to refuse to propose mandatory sanctions to the United Nations. But I have a feeling that we are now watching shadow-boxing, and that the negotiations between Britain and Rhodesia do not really matter very much any more.

It already seemed possible last week that the United Nations Assembly might decide to impose mandatory sanctions in the course of November, without waiting for Britain to make a request for them,

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and indeed in direct opposition to Britain's wishes. Such action could have led other members of the Commonwealth to support Britain in opposition, since it would have been a deliberate rebuff to the Commonwealth by the Assembly. But the African States, in their latest resolution, seem to have seen the risks of this procedure, and to have decided that they would be wiser to limit themselves, for the moment, to calling upon Britain herself to take action now, so that they may, in December, argue that Britain, having failed to do so, the U.N. must immediately take such steps, however drastic, as may be necessary to compel Rhodesia's submission, whether or not Britain has asked for them. There would be only three months between the end of December and the April date by which the Committee of 14 on South West Africa must report to the Assembly and if Rhodesia could be shown by April to be in danger of collapse, the threat of sanctions to compel South Africa to fall in with the Assembly's recommendations for the future administration of South West Africa would have more weight than it would seem likely to have at the present time.

There is, of course, the remote possibility that Mr. Vorster might inform Mr. Smith that, if he should fail to reach agreement with the United Kingdom, and if the Security Council were then to order further mandatory sanctions, South Africa might be unable to continue to support Rhodesia. The reason for such a change in South African policy could, it has been suggested in London, be a promise by Britain to veto in the Security Council any proposals for action against South Africa in the event of a South African refusal to transfer South West Africa to the United Nations. Apart from the inherent improbability of the South African Government making any such agreement, this would be the biggest doublecross since Hitler and Stalin made their infamous agreement in August 1939.

Few, a year ago, can have expected that the anniversary of U.D.I. would find Rhodesia resisting successfully all Britain's efforts to compel her to surrender, still less that she would have been able to do so in spite of the reinforcement of those efforts by the Commonwealth, and the imposition of mandatory sanctions by the United Nations. When the members of the Rhodesian Front Party drink to U.D.I. at the celebration ball in Salisbury (double tickets, including supper and champagne, £5) they should also remember the genius, whoever he was, who was responsible for the brilliant idea of using three sledgehammers simultaneously to drive in a tintack.

III. SOUTH WEST AFRICA

South West Africa has undoubtedly loomed most important in South African minds during the past month.

It was on the the 17th August that Dr. Donges announced that while South Africa's loans to South West Africa would be reduced by R7 million during the current year, developments in the territory would not be slowed, and that "on the contrary the authorities will press ahead with development in accordance with the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission." South Africa, at the same time, objected to the terms of an American statement made on the 27th July which "sought to minimise the effect of the (World Court's) judgement favourable to South Africa." To this complaint the United States Ambassador at the United Nations reacted, on the 23rd August, by informing a press conference that the judgement on South West Africa had gone in favour of South Africa on a technicality, "in an age where technical decisions no longer seemed appropriate. The substance of the problem has to be dealt with and this problem is sure to be high on the agenda of the forthcoming General Assembly." Less than a week later it was announced that there had been a gun-battle in Ovamboland between South African Police and a group of armed infiltrators, who have subsequently been said to have been dropped by parachute from an aircraft operating, in all probability, from Zambia.

More ominously, the Swedish Foreign Minister suggested a United Nations decision to annul South Africa's mandatory powers over South West Africa, "as a new way to influence the racial policy in South Africa." The African countries requested the Assembly to give priority to discussion of South West Africa when it met, and a sub-committee of the Assembly's Committee of 24 on Colonialism proposed, on the 9th September, that the United Nations should take over control of South West Africa, by force if necessary, and the full committee of 24 endorsed the proposal, on the 15th September. Mr. Ernest Gross, the legal representative for Ethiopia and Liberia at the International Court, suggested that judges of the Court should, in future, be assessed not only on independence, character and legal qualifications, but also on outlook - which amounted to a suggestion that they should be selected in future for political reasons. On the 25th it was reported that the western countries would prefer the Assembly to seek a clear ruling from the Court on the legality of revocation of the mandate, and on whether South Africa had violated its League of Nations trust. Mr. de Villiers argued in the Assembly, on the 26th, that the United Nations had on the contrary no right to interfere in the affairs of South West Africa. South Africa had even succeeded before the Court in convincing the complainants - Liberia and Ethiopia - that their charges of militarisation of the territory had been unfounded, and the latter had then omitted all charges of oppression from their complaint. Their actions, he suggested, were "of even greater importance than if the Court had made such a finding." No attention was, however, paid to his arguments, and the Colombian and Indian Foreign Ministers recommended that the United Nations should itself take over the administration of South West Africa, in spite of a suggestion, which - it should be noted - came from the Secretary of State of Liberia, that an ad hoc

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commission should be appointed to report on the best way to proceed. The representative of Guinea argued that South West Africa should be taken over "by peaceful means, if possible, but by force if necessary" and alleged that since the World Court's judgement, 750 million dollars had been invested in South Africa, including a £20 million loan from the Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 58 other states supported Guinea's demand that the General Assembly should take over the administration of the territory. It was realised that South Africa would certainly resist and that the outcome would depend on the attitude of South Africa's trading partners, and Denmark pointed out that "countries which had advocated economic sanctions against South Africa must be prepared to bear their share of the burdens such actions would place on the principal trading nations." One African delegate protested against mere resolutions at the present stage, on the ground that 75 had been passed on South West Africa without effect. The Foreign Minister of Zambia said that the "issue is moral, humanitarian and political. The 500,000 people of South West Africa had no other home 'quite unlike the imported racists in South Africa.'" Brazil suggested that the U.N. should ask the World Court whether the world organisation had the legal authority to revoke the mandate, and to take over the administration of the territory, but the suggestion received little support. The Irish Foreign Minister proposed, instead, a Commission of 10 to recommend to the Assembly the most effective means of terminating the mandate and bringing South West Africa to independence. "South Africa," he said, "had not only repudiated the mandate but had openly proceeded to govern the territory as part of itself." The lady delegate of Guinea called Mr. Matthys Botha "an impostor" who "spoke for the 'odious minority of apartheid.'"

By the beginning of October it had become clear that the Assembly was likely to take drastic action. Mr. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, who in past years had strongly supported South Africa's administration against Communist and Asian criticisms fell into line stating that "we believe that South Africa has forfeited its right to administer the mandate." Not even U Thant's report that he was in no position to furnish any reasonable estimate of the costs which would have to be met by the United Nations in taking over South West Africa, was able to hold up the debate, although it was pointed out by the South African Foreign Minister that the cost of administering South West Africa (£70 million in the present budget) was nearly double the budget of the United Nations itself, estimated at £47 million. It was also pointed out that France had refused to pay £6 million for the peace keeping costs of the Congo, and the Soviet Union £21½ million for peace keeping costs in the Congo and the Middle East. Scandinavian delegations backtracked to the extent of recommending the establishment of a special committee to examine the question of the legality of revoking the mandate, and Latin American delegates spoke in favour of obtaining a prior ruling from the World Court, but the Afro-Asians were determined to push ahead. Only Malawi dissented and announced "that it cannot

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and will not support any proposals, however idealistic in their aim, which are prima facie incapable of practical implementation."

Dr. Muller again tried to indicate to the Assembly how complicated was the problem with which they were trying to deal. "Do delegates know how the budget for administering the territory compares with the whole budget of this organisation? Have they any idea of the extent of visible and invisible contributions made by South Africa? Have they ever considered the problem of running a railway system for a huge territory with a population of only half a million people, if it were not linked with and integrated into a South African system? Have they considered the same problem concerning postal services and telecommunications, and do they know that the only proper harbour is Walvis Bay, which is South African territory? Do they know that the population of South West Africa is not and has never been a homogeneous one and that under the policy of the South African Government provision is made as far as possible for a separate area for the exclusive use of each group?" How little this had affected his audience became clear on the 12th October when Mr. Goldberg informed the Assembly that "the people of South West Africa, like all peoples, had the right to determine their own future. South Africa's right to administer the territory arose solely from the mandate and it incurred certain obligations which it has not fulfilled. Other obligations included reporting annually which it had refused to do. South Africa thus has disavowed the mandate and forfeited her right to administer South West Africa."

At this point Dr. Muller warned the Assembly that South Africa would "resist with all the power at its disposal any attempts which endanger the safety of our country or of the peoples committed to our care. And my Government will have the support of peoples equally determined to resist"- meaning thereby, most certainly, not only the White people - "there can be only one answer, firm and determined resistance to attempts from outside at imposing a dangerous and unwanted system." In the course of the debate the Israeli representative agreed that the General Assembly was entitled to terminate the mandate, the New Zealand representative that South Africa had forfeited any moral right to administer the territory, and the French representative that South Africa had failed to carry out its duty of improving the moral well-being of the population. The only crumb of comfort, and indeed it is only a crumb, was to be found in the Australian Foreign Minister's statement that "the fact that South Africa has in effect disavowed all international obligations, provides justification for action by the United Nations, but the action should be fitted to the purpose. We should not smash a continent in order to mend a part of it." The Soviet Union stated that it would prefer the Organisation for African Unity to take over South West Africa, and not the United Nations, but the Afro-Asian countries had already admitted that the O.A.U. could not take over the administration of the territory because "it lacks both the funds and the administrative skills." On the 19th October the United Kingdom representative, Lord Caradon, agreed that South Africa had forfeited the right to administer South West Africa, but cautioned the United Nations against overreaching itself in trying to free the territory: "the limitations on coercive action through economic

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sanctions and other means provided by the United Nations Charter are no less now than they were a year ago when Britain opposed such measures." The United States, however, decided to support the Afro-Asians in their demand for the termination of the South West Africa mandate.

Dr. Muller had already warned the Assembly on the 12th October: "I sincerely hope that nothing will happen in this session to make it impossible for my Government to keep up a dialogue with this organisation." And on the 25th October Mr Vorster endorsed Dr. Muller's statement saying that: "unless attacks on South Africa cease, if legal principles count for nothing any longer, if South Africa's honour continues to be violated, the South African Government would have to review South Africa's position more fully on Dr. Muller's return."

A resolution was nevertheless adopted by the Assembly on the 27th October, stating that South Africa had forfeited its mandate to administer South West Africa, that the Assembly revoked it, and that the territory should become the responsibility of the United Nations. To this end a Committee of 14 was to be established to report back, not later than April 1967, as to the procedure which should be followed. Britain and France have subsequently let it be known that they will not serve on the Committee. The U.S. has agreed to do so but only if the Committee is so constituted that it will not inevitably produce a report to endorse the most extreme, and probably the least practical, proposals made to it. For this reason the U.S. delegation to the U.N. is said to have opposed the suggestion of the Afghan President of the Assembly that the Committee should consist of 4 Africans, 3 Asians, 2 Latin Americans, 1 West European, 1 East European, 1 Scandinavian and the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., which would have almost certainly meant that the Afro-Asians and the 2 Communist members would have been able to carry all their proposals by at least 9 votes to at most 5. The U.S. delegation has therefore proposed that the Committee should consist of 3 Africans, 2 Asians, and the rest selected on a basis which would not produce the same result in another way. Even so it is difficult to see the President agreeing, or the U.S. being able to insist on the Afro-Asians plus the Communists having fewer than 7 members which would ensure that they could prevent the adoption of any recommendation which they disliked and carry any for which they could get the support of even one additional member of the Committee.

So ends an experiment in international organisation which in South West Africa lasted 46 years. The other African mandated countries - Togoland, the Camerouns, Tanganyika, Ruandi-Burundi - ceased after World War II to be mandated territories, became trust territories, were - so far as the first two were concerned - reunited after more than 30 years of divided administration by France and Britain, were granted independence in the course of the last seven years and became members of the U.N. From the point of view of most other members of the U.N., some at least of them could scarcely be argued to have been more fitted for independence, on political, economic, or educational

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grounds, than South West Africa, and it is understandable that those who voted for their independence have been reluctant to oppose the universal demand of the African member countries, other than South Africa, that the mandate for South West Africa should also be ended, whether or not the mandatory agrees, and particularly as that mandatory had itself declared, almost since World War II, that the mandate had lapsed with the demise of the League of Nations in 1946. The judgement of the International Court, in connection with the appeal of Ethiopia and Liberia, had moreover left the United Nations with no hope of securing a legal decision in favour of ending the mandate, which the Security Council might, in the event of opposition by South Africa, have been asked to enforce. If, indeed, the Assembly had not taken action now, it is difficult to see how any action could have been taken later.

The cart has, of course, been put before the horse. The mandate is declared to have been terminated before any consideration has been given to the form of government which might succeed it. The only U.N. precedents are trusteeship and independence, but in only one area - Western New Guinea - has a trusteeship agreement been made with a state other than the former administering country. The administration of Western New Guinea was entrusted by the United Nations to Indonesia, which had been mainly responsible for forcing the Netherlands to surrender the territory to the United Nations, had claimed it as a part of Indonesia, and speedily announced, in spite of the provision of the trusteeship agreement for a plebiscite after seven years, to determine the territory's future, that it was the destiny of Western New Guinea to be united in perpetuity with Indonesia. Part of the other half of the island is administered under a trusteeship agreement by Australia, which almost simultaneously with the U.N. decision about Western New Guinea, promised the Papuans independence within 20 years, of which 5 have now elapsed. Whether the new Indonesian Government will permit a genuine plebiscite in Western New Guinea in 1969, or accept the result of the voting, if adverse to incorporation in Indonesia, is doubtful, but it is unlikely that the Afro-Asian countries will take any serious steps to prevent Indonesia flouting either the trusteeship agreement or the result of the plebiscite. It may well be that the Papuans of North East New Guinea and of the Australian colony of Papua will themselves have the task, after they get their independence, of liberating their fellow-Papuans in Western New Guinea from Indonesian colonialism. Since this would be a dispute between non-whites, it is possible that the United Nations, if it still existed, would then take a less biased view than it would in, say, 1969, of an Australian effort to argue the case of the Papuans against any proposal to hand them over in perpetuity to Indonesia.

There is, however, no member of the United Nations with similar claims to administer South West Africa to those of Indonesia in Western New Guinea. To entrust the territory to any of the nearer African countries would be to complicate the problem further. Zambia has at least a common frontier with about a third of the Caprivi Zipfel; it has the resources of the Copperbelt and is searching desperately for its own route to the sea. Botswana would also welcome a possible route to the sea, but, without resources

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itself and with a population as primitive as the Bantu tribes of South West Africa, would scarcely fulfil the requirement of providing the quickest possible progress to independence. On the other hand Botswana might well object to the claims of Zambia or any other African state being preferred to her own. The Congo is unable to control its own provinces and Tanzania is in a similar situation with Zanzibar: both are remote. Nigeria, which might have seemed the most likely choice, has almost removed itself by failing to end either its civil war or its constitutional crisis. Ghana is not, in vote-power at New York, what Ghana was under Dr. Nkrumah. Of the Asian states the only ones remotely capable of undertaking the responsibility would seem to be India or Japan. The Indian Government might be tempted by the thought of using the administration of South West Africa as a means of securing concessions for the Indians of South Africa, or even of overthrowing the existing Government in South Africa, but India is desperately poor, threatened with famine, and compelled to pay prior attention to the threats to her own security from Pakistan and Communist China. Japan could administer South West Africa, but South West Africa is not in South East Asia, and it is difficult to see what Japan could be offered in compensation for the expense and trouble involved. Brazil is the nearest state of real size and resources and might be ready to act, but is probably ruled out, in the eyes of the Afro-Asians, by being Portuguese-speaking. The possibility, moreover, that a Brazilian-administered South West Africa would prove a powerful attraction to Angola might lead Portugal to seek to dissuade Brazil. A combined Brazilian-administered South West Africa and Angola might, however, provide a possible solution for the problems of both territories. There remains a state chosen from the northern hemisphere. The U.S.A. would probably veto Russia and Russia the U.S.A., although the latter, as one of the three remaining Principal Allied and Associated Powers of World War I, would appear to have a considerable interest still in the territory. (Italy renounced her interest in the mandate system by the peace treaty of 1947, and Japan likewise by the peace treaty of 1951). Britain, France (and Italy) would almost certainly rule themselves out (they have got - or almost got - out of Africa and the last thing they want to do is to get in again), and it is difficult to see how the return of Germany to her former colony could be regarded by the United Nations as a course acceptable to the Hereros! There remains, as the most likely, Sweden (or a consortium of the Scandinavian countries), Yugoslavia or Canada. The U.S. would probably object to Yugoslavia and prefer Canada, but Russia might insist on the Scandinavians who have, with her agreement, already provided two Secretaries-General of the United Nations.

My guess is that the most likely course to be recommended by the Committee of 14 is a direct U.N. trusteeship - there was one in Western New Guinea to cover the period of the immediate transfer of responsibility from the Netherlands to Indonesia - and that it may be suggested that the territory should be administered by a U.N. Commissioner, on the model of the League of Nations High Commissioner for Dantzig. The best candidate

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I can think of is the present Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. Lester Pearson, who may then already have been ruled out by becoming the next Secretary-General of the U.N., but who might otherwise be offered the position, at least if he has indicated his intention of resigning in Canada. Again I am guessing but I doubt if he would consider accepting it unless assured in advance that he would be given the full assistance of the Government of South Africa in the peaceful transfer of the territory. A possible alternative choice would be Dr. Ralph Bunch, the Senior Under-Secretary at the U.N., who succeeded Count Bernadotte as U.N. Representative in Palestine. As a negro he would find his task at Windhoek far more difficult, but, since he is on the point of retirement, he might be available.

For almost every reason one can think of, not least the cost of administering the territory to which Dr. Muller drew the attention of the Assembly in New York, the United Nations would probably wish the period of transition to self-government to be minimal. It may be cynical to reflect that, once South West Africa were independent, the restraint of a United Nations presence there, on agitation against South Africa, for what it would be worth, would also disappear, and every attempt by the South African Government to control radio and other propoganda against itself, to prevent subversion by infiltration, sabotage and agitation, and to resist even deliberately provocative action, would be greeted as aggression and serve as a pretext for further demands against South Africa. But it is as unnecessary as it is discouraging to speculate further on these lines.

IV. SOUTH AFRICA

There remains the problem of South Africa's reaction to the decision of the Assembly to terminate the mandate. As we all know, the Prime Minister's reply was "we shall do nothing."

South Africa will therefore not leave the United Nations, at least not until the Committee of 14 has reported to the Assembly in April. She will be able to question the basis of the report, to comment on any proposals the Committee may make, and to indicate, if she wishes, what action she may have decided to take to maintain her own administration of the territory: for Mr. Vorster has also said that what we have we hold and that the Government will be supported by all South Africa's peoples.

It is difficult to see what steps the United Nations can take to transfer the administration of South West Africa to the native people or to another administering country, or to itself, other than to impose some form of sanctions on South Africa if she should oppose the transfer. These could be either economic, a boycott of South African exports, a refusal to supply her import needs, and a ban on capital investment, or a naval and air blockade, or both. And one or more countries could be asked to supply forces to counter any South African efforts to defeat these sanctions. If the use of force for this purpose should lead, as it would be bound to do, to incidents, the Security Council could decide to take the necessary military action to immobilise the South African forces, that is, to call on some country or countries with the necessary military, naval and air strength to do so on its behalf.

That the Government take this threat seriously is clear from the announcements of stockpiling already undertaken, from the appeals to those industries of strategic importance to stockpile goods or material needed, and for all business men to consider whether they should not now increase their volume of such imports as they might need to keep their factories or workshops operating. The necessary import licences will, it is said, be obtainable because the reserves have increased to a record level, which makes this relaxation of import controls possible. Meanwhile, the search for oil continues, almost regardless of cost, a new SASOL is promised, and a third ISCOR.

What is the likelihood of the United Nations being able to compel members of the United Nations to apply economic sanctions to South Africa? Britain and France have already refused to serve on the Committee of 14, and Britain has stated that any steps recommended must be practicable. To expect Britain to interrupt her trade with South Africa would be to expect her to carry on the sterling area without South Africa's gold, to balance her imports and exports without one of her biggest markets, and to sacrifice an investment of £1,200 million. But if South Africa's biggest trading partners were to be exempted, could other countries, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Japan, be expected to accept their lesser losses from participation? The United States could stand the losses

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but would the advantage of independent African goodwill and its effect on the racial situation in the United States really compensate for creating chaos in an area of stability, particularly while the United States is still engaged in a war in Vietnam, which is costing \$40,000 million in a year, and 1,000 American casualties a week? Before this point was reached Mr. Goldberg might find himself translated to another sphere.

Rhodesia has been extraordinarily helpful to South Africa in providing a trial run for sanctions, and evidence of their ineffectiveness against one of the smallest and most landlocked of peoples. South Africa is in a much stronger position. The only commodity suspension of the export of which to South Africa would cause problems of replacement is oil, and it is said that the recent completion of additional storage has increased the reserves to a level sufficient to meet the country's needs for 2 years. If oil should meanwhile be discovered, although it would not be in production for some years, the few existing hopes which might be pinned on economic sanctions would be greatly diminished.

The impracticability of economic and financial sanctions is perhaps the most serious aspect of them. Because, if they would be very costly, if they would upset some countries' balance of payments, if they would cause the devaluation of one of the world's two reserve currencies, and still be likely to fail, the question will inevitably be asked whether it would not be wiser to proceed at once to the use of military sanctions. These, it might be argued, would not only be speedier and cheaper, but would achieve not only the United Nations' objective in South West Africa, but the ultimate objective of the overthrow of the South African Government and its policy of segregation, without which even success in South West Africa might well prove temporary.

I have outlined on a previous occasion the forces considered by the Institute of Strategic Studies in London to be necessary for an effective blockade of South Africa, and it is enough to say here that they would in fact be so large that it is almost inconceivable that any countries would willingly agree to supply them, and that to fail in the use of military sanctions against a small country would be to destroy the peace keeping potential of the United Nations.

It will be necessary to examine all these possibilities in detail later. Tonight I wish only to draw your attention to the fact that within five months the future of South Africa, as at present organised, will be at issue. So, inevitably, will the future of the United Nations. And both may ultimately depend on the continuance and escalation of the Vietnam war. But, subject to what happens in Vietnam, South Africa may be well advised at present to pursue the Rhodesian tactic of letting the other fellow make the mistakes.