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The Rise of the South African Security Establishment

An Essay on the Changing Locus
of State Power

Kenneth W. Grundy

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The Rise of the South African Security Establishment

An Essay on the Changing Locus of State Power

I. Introduction

In June 1982 South African Foreign Minister R.F. "Pik" Botha turned up at a press conference in the operational area wearing the uniform of an honorary colonel in the South African Air Force. The *Sunday Times*' "Hogarth" playfully pondered that since "the doves of Mr Botha's Foreign Affairs Ministry have long waged a losing battle with the military hawks over matters Namibian and other diplomatic diversions," perhaps the Foreign Minister was signalling that if you can't beat 'em, join 'em.¹ "Tantalus" of the *Sunday Express* was equally cheeky, suggesting that since Pik Botha has been good at predicting the future, his uniform must demonstrate that in his view the government sees its future in military terms.²

In their own sarcastic ways, these columnists are telling us what many have long suspected, indeed what some have openly expressed, that the armed forces or more accurately the security establishment has positioned itself at the centre of power. The SADF is no longer simply an instrument for policy implementation. It is an active participant in policy making. Not merely in military matters, but in wider security issues, both domestic and external, and even in matters concerning the homelands, and economic and foreign policy, those associated with a military perspective have gained the ascendancy. Various components of the security establishment are prepared to provide intelligence, analysis and policy advice in order to enable South Africa to counter what they perceive to be a "total onslaught". Indeed, the very concepts of "total onslaught" and "total strategy" are creatures of the military mind. That the agenda of government can be dictated by such a perspective itself attests to the extent of insecurity in South Africa.

Over the past dozen years or so we have witnessed the rise of what might accurately be described as a security establishment in South Africa.

Diverse public and private institutions and agencies concerned about security, strategy and defence have grown in size and importance in national life. Although they may compete with one another for favour and budgetary largesse, together they constitute a concerted force proclaiming a parallel if not always identical perspective on state policy. But what is more, because of the pervasive combative mentality that has come to see so many issues of public affairs as bound up in the defence and security of the South African regime, security institutions increasingly have demanded a greater voice and role in policy issues not normally associated with defence and security. By so doing, various segments of the defence establishment have positioned themselves to be drawn into the highest policy councils. In short, the defence establishment has grown in power and has expanded the range of policy concerns beyond the defensive and strategic.

Of course, this primacy has not always been so. When geographer Edwin Munger wrote his *Notes on the Formation of South African Foreign Policy* over seventeen years ago, he was led to conclude:

If one were to list the most important people making foreign policy, the names might well run: 1. Dr Verwoerd. 2. Dr Verwoerd. 3. Dr Verwoerd. 4. Foreign Minister Muller. 5. The Cabinet, and 6. Secretary G.P. Jooste, Brand Fourie, Donald Sole, and one or two other professionals.³

In that instance, not a single name was listed from the security forces or the civilian defence establishment. Something significant has happened in these intervening years that has enabled a changing configuration of power to be entrenched in top policy-making councils. It is the purpose of this monograph to explore these power realignments and to discuss and analyze changing diverse regional strategic perspectives of government and other agencies

close to power in the light of the rise of the security establishment.

First, however, it becomes necessary to define what is meant by the security establishment in this context. This establishment includes all those individuals and institutions, whether a formal part of the governmental and administrative apparatus of the state or attached to private and parastatal organizations, that are concerned with the maintenance of the South African state primarily by developing and employing the coercive instruments of the state or by weakening by various means the coercive arms of hostile states. It is a definition that is consciously inclusive in order to discuss the full extent of security concerns.

First and most obviously the security establishment includes the South African Defence Force (SADF), the Department of Defence, and the South African Police (SAP), particularly its paramilitary units. Incorporated, as well, are the various branches of the intelligence community (the National Intelligence Service, the Division of Military Intelligence, and the Security Branch of the Police). Some governmental parastatal corporations, particularly Armscor, are defence oriented, as are the dozens of private firms that do work on subcontract from Armscor. The official vehicle for co-ordinating and expressing the views of these components has been, of late, the State Security Council and especially its Secretariat. The latter is heavily indebted to the SADF for key personnel. Part of the intellectual community, involving private and quasi-official think tanks have also been recruited into this constellation of groups. All are deeply engaged in the debate over defence and strategic policy, and, moreover, most have contributed to a widening delimitation as to what might be properly regarded as strategic cum regime maintenance affairs.

Background

During the inter-war period and virtually until the eve of South Africa's entry into World War II, the Union Defence Forces had been politically insignificant and, as a result, militarily weak. At the time of South Africa's 1939 decision to ally with Great Britain, the Union Defence Forces (UDF) consisted of only 313 Permanent Force officers and 3 040 other ranks (it had been authorized to number 5 385), plus around 14 631 Citizen Force men. There were another 1 900 in the Air Force and 432 in the Navy.⁴ Equipment and supplies were inadequate,

obsolete, and badly maintained. The Minister of Defence during the 1930s, Oswald Pirow, had displayed little aptitude for modernizing his forces and less interest in the assignment. South Africa was, after all, thousands of miles remote from potentially hostile forces. Its immediate neighbours posed little threat to the Union. Small wonder that the armed forces had been regarded as more important ceremonially than operationally and had been allowed to atrophy.

The growth of the Defence Force in World War II was but a temporary aberration in policy. This was confirmed by the demobilization after the war and a further postwar de-emphasis on military preparedness. The electoral defeat of the Government of General J.C. Smuts in 1948 brought to a close an era in South African politics. Although General Smuts was in many ways the embodiment of the UDF, the Defence Force had played virtually no role in domestic politics. And because the UDF had been identified as an institution very much dominated by English-speakers and moulded along British lines, it fared no better during the first years of the National Party Government.

That government first concentrated on the systematic construction of the apartheid state. Then, having set in motion their race policies, government turned to the UDF and the SAP to eradicate the vestiges of the imperial mentality and English-speaking dominance. All governmental institutions were converted into apartheid institutions to strengthen the party's hold on the state apparatus, and in the process loyal Afrikaners were favoured. Many British-trained, English-speaking officers were pushed into premature retirement. A defence amendment act required fluency in both languages for all UDF officers and NCOs and for all men seeking enlistment in the Permanent Force. Innocuous enough on the surface, this measure effectively discouraged the recruitment of English-speakers, by and large less inclined then to be bilingual. Replacements in the officer corps were largely Afrikaners with little or no combat experience. Regiments with long and proud traditions, colonial designations, uniforms and insignia, and invariably identified with segments of the English-speaking community, lost their historic identity. New uniforms and insignia were introduced. Afrikaners became more deeply entrenched in positions of authority throughout the defence forces, the police, and the ancillary organizations associated with security. The decision taken in the October 1960

referendum to establish a Republic and its subsequent implementation on 31 May 1961, were the symbolic capstones to this policy.

Yet a large number of Afrikaners positively supported the war effort at the risk of being ostracized as "traitors" to their "nation". The division of white South Africa was as much a division within Afrikanerdom as it was between Afrikaners and English-speakers. The war was the emotional trip-hammer that brought into the open the latent social cleavages among whites that had temporarily been suppressed or glossed over.

For the decade of the 1950s, the defence forces were not involved deeply in policy consideration or implementation, and not at all in policy making. Even into the 1960s, as the prospect of domestic civil unrest and external military threat on the "border" (expansively defined) grew, the defence forces maintained a low profile. After all, there were guerrilla wars smouldering in Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola and Namibia, and the SADF was entangled in one fashion or another in each. Nonetheless, the situational variable characterized by black dissatisfaction and international rejection meant that state security would play an ever more prominent role in governmental thought.⁵

Despite the growing perceived need for larger and more efficient coercive arms, there was never total agreement on how best to deal with the challenge. This contributed, for example, to competition between various intelligence branches. They engaged in running jurisdictional disputes as well as institutional jockeying for position. Likewise, there was no clear agreement on the division of labour and the mode of deployment of the various armed forces. Considering South Africa's commitment to military defence, it is surprising how little systematic strategic planning took or takes place. Other than low-level planning regarding budgeting, manpower, and weapons' procurement that began in the late 1960s, it was not until 1977 that a Strategic Planning Section of the SADF was created. Nonetheless, given P.W. Botha's reputation as a planner, long-range strategic thinking was late in coming to the SADF. Nowadays, strategic planning functions take place principally in the State Security Council. Increasingly, however, the spokesmen for various security groups sought a greater voice in policy determination, first with regard to their own strategic bailiwick, and later in related policy areas such as foreign affairs, domestic security, the economy, and eventually practically every facet of state

concern. It is this pattern we seek to chronicle and analyze.

The gathering influence of the defence establishment has not gone unnoticed. Although considerable effort is taken to shield the process from the public, it has not been a conspiracy and probably cannot be attributed to a conscious scheme on the part of individuals or institutions to take over government or inflate their power in order to strengthen the security establishment or parts thereof. Much information on these changes at all levels is a matter of public record. But it is necessary, if one wishes to understand the process, that interested observers ferret out the information and that they engage in logical and additive procedures and that they analyze the data soberly, even if it leads to conclusions they may not wish to admit.

II. The Ideological Context

Central to an understanding of the rise of the security establishment is an appreciation that South Africa's governmental officials live in a world that they perceive to be fundamentally and increasingly hostile to South Africa, a world whose attitude toward white South Africa can be encapsulated under the rubric "total onslaught".

It would be helpful at this point to define what is meant by "total onslaught" since that term forms the basis for so much of state policy in South Africa. Fundamentally, "total onslaught" can be viewed from at least two angles. On the one hand, there is the perceptual or subjective conception of a total onslaught. This contributes to the ideological and political context in which decisions are taken. On the other hand, "total onslaught" might be examined in objective terms. Is there a total onslaught upon the Republic? Or better, to what extent do the perceptions of governmental policy makers coincide with reality with respect to "total onslaught"? An objective assessment of the phenomenon would help in evaluating the extent to which policy predicated on this doctrine is likely to succeed. Not that policy based on a false reading of empirical reality always fails. In cases of asymmetric distributions of power and wealth, policy ill-founded may successfully blunder or muddle through, in spite of misperceptions.

United States foreign policy, when it brought inordinate force to bear on problems sometimes succeeded. So, too, did some features of British naval policy in the nineteenth century, early Hitlerian

military strategy, and some aspects of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. Because they were costly "victories" one might argue that they were not successful according to cost/benefit criteria or in terms of larger social standards of success. To caricature the issue — why mobilize 50 per cent of the available manpower into the defence force to the neglect of other social needs? Defence spokesmen may argue that this mobilization "succeeded" in deterring invasion and the territorial integrity of the state was maintained. But at what cost, if the same end could have been accomplished with far less manpower?

Since South African policy makers have taken such care to spell out their own views of the total onslaught, it seems hardly necessary to elaborate. The "total onslaught", General Malan says, "is an ideologically motivated struggle and the aim is the implacable and unconditional imposition of the aggressor's will on the target state".⁶ The enemy uses all means at its disposal. The onslaught is not just military; it is political, diplomatic, religious, psychological, cultural and social. General Malan again: "South Africa is today . . . involved in total war. The war is not only an area for the soldier. Everyone is involved and has a role to play."⁷

In a nutshell, the Soviet Union is regarded as the root cause of discontent and instability in the region. They are diabolically using newly independent black states for their expansionist designs. "The ultimate aim of the Soviet Union and its allies," reads the government's *White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply, 1982*:

is to overthrow the present body politic in the RSA and to replace it with a Marxist-orientated form of government to further the objectives of the USSR, therefore all possible methods and means are used to attain this objective. This includes instigating social and labour unrest, civilian resistance, terrorist attacks against the infrastructure of the RSA and the intimidation of Black leaders and members of the Security Forces. This onslaught is supported by a worldwide propaganda campaign and the involvement of various front organizations, such as trade unions and even certain church organizations and leaders.⁸

In a censure debate in 1978, P.W. Botha as Minister of Defence told the House of Assembly:

. . . South Africa is experiencing unprecedented intervention on the part of the superpowers. . . . The Republic of South Africa is experiencing the full onslaught of Marxism and it must not be

doubted that the Republic of South Africa enjoys a high priority in the onslaught by Moscow. All the authorities on strategy agree on this point. However, South Africa is also experiencing double standards on the part of certain Western bodies in their behaviour towards her. They are doing this in an attempt to pay a ransom to the bear whose hunger must be satisfied.⁹

Since the Western world is calling for major changes in racial policies in South Africa, the West is itself viewed as part of the problem rather than part of the solution. South Africa stands alone. Insofar as opposition parties attack the government "they do not care that their complaints sometimes play into the hands of those powers that are bringing pressure to bear on South Africa".¹⁰

Virtually every facet of public life, and many facets of private life, therefore, can be seen as part of the total onslaught. Since the onslaught directed at South Africa is "communist inspired", then South Africa must be regarded as a keystone in the defence of "the whole free Western world". The West, by refusing to appreciate the centrality of South Africa's strategic location, mineral wealth, and highly developed economy and polity, is practically collaborating in its own demise.¹¹

There is little point discussing the objective conditions that led to the rise of this defensive, some would say siege, mentality amongst those charged with state security. The growing isolation of South Africa and the mounting threat of violence in the region and the country have been widely recognized and analyzed.

While there is an undeniable threat to the South African regime, one might take issue with Pretoria's diagnosis of regional and global affairs at this time. To be sure, South Africa is the target of virtually universal criticism and condemnation of its domestic racial order. But criticism and condemnation hardly constitute onslaught, least of all *total* onslaught. It is stylish and politically advantageous to "attack" (an unfortunate word for verbal actions) South Africa. Moreover, there are genuine moral and philosophical misgivings about South Africa's system. For many people and governments, their judgements are well founded and they sincerely want apartheid ended. But for most of them, they are not prepared to participate in a crusade or even in economic activities to undermine the Republic. To accuse such people and governments of joining in a Marxist-directed total onslaught is simply wrong-headed.

One might also question, in light of the above, the extent to which the onslaught is directed from Moscow, or is a series of ad hoc and sometimes co-ordinated responses to the same phenomenon. Agreed, the Soviet Union would be overjoyed to see political instability in South Africa or, better in their eyes, a socialist government in South Africa. But for the Soviet Union it is a matter of priorities. The USSR has other more pressing concerns in world affairs — Poland and its own East European satellites, the global nuclear balance, China, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and the Soviet economy itself. Why should the Kremlin assume greater risks and costs for a nice enough bonus, South Africa, that would not add all that much to Moscow's global power?

In South Africa, thousands of white people and millions of black loathe the apartheid system. Are they agents or tools of the Kremlin? Not today. But they will be if they are continually harassed by the authorities and accused of complicity in a foreign-based violent revolution. The effect of domestic security policy based on a perception of total onslaught is to alienate still further well-meaning non-violent critics who wish to reform what even some members of the Government recognize as an antiquated system that needs to be changed.

In sum, it would appear that the total onslaught is not total. If it were, South Africa would be more completely isolated, its trade with the rest of the world more difficult, its citizens constrained more significantly in their movements around the world, and the levels of violence against the country from domestic as well as external sources would multiply many times over. Is the threat real? Definitely. But it is not total, and labelling it as such, at this stage, may appear at first glance to be sharp politics, but in the longer run detracts from the credibility of policy makers in Pretoria, and will make it virtually impossible to increase the dosage of motivation and mobilization later.

Crucial to the maintenance of the South African regime is the necessity to devise a co-ordinated, holistic, counter-revolutionary strategy. It is the mark of the present government, although it by no means stems directly from the time when P.W. Botha replaced B.J. Vorster as Prime Minister, that "a more conscious, concerted, and systematic effort is being made to integrate various mechanisms of white control to produce a counter-revolutionary package more rationalized and efficient than at any time before".¹² P.W. Botha and his most trusted associates,

particularly General Magnus Malan, had sought to fashion such a strategy during Botha's tenure as Minister of Defence in the Vorster Government. However, other political forces and personalities pursued different, though not necessarily conflicting, agendas. Since achieving leadership of the National Party and the Prime Ministership, however, P.W. Botha has been well positioned to formulate and implement his programme.

In practically every respect the current fascination with a co-ordinated "total national strategy" and consequently with the deepening involvement of the defence establishment in multi-faceted aspects of civilian life, as well as defence concerns, grows quite logically from the strategic thinking now identified with top-level SADF personnel, and is increasingly popular in the National Party and its voting constituents.¹³

It is not our responsibility to analyze empirically the concept of "total onslaught" and the worldview that emanates therefrom.¹⁴ Suffice it to say that the acceptance of such a view tends to emphasize a dependence on those instruments most identified with physical resistance and coercion, notably the armed forces and their support institutions, and leads to a pervasive atmosphere that is suspicious of dissent, and even alternative proposals and hard-hitting criticism. In this apprehensive atmosphere a confusion develops (and is consciously fostered) between white survival and the maintenance of the apartheid system. To lose control is to surrender, and if apartheid means anything, it means control. That the South African state can actually be saved by restructuring the state in ways quite different from those suggested or entertained by its present leadership is to think the unthinkable. This does not mean that change is beyond the National Party regime. In fact, one vital aspect of the counter-revolutionary strategy is to introduce proposals for modulated change, to blur the lines between formal segregation and integration, to experiment, to disarm critics by revising the trappings of apartheid without tampering with the essentials. This process still enables those in charge to control the pace and nature of change: or so it would seem. Whether it will unleash unexpected forces moving in surprising directions (as the Conservative Party contends) is another matter and is hotly debated in various segments of South African society.

The encirclement of the Republic, brought on in large part by the Republic's own domestic racial order, requires that when one thinks of a "total

national strategy" one conceives of it in at least regional terms. What happens in neighbouring states, in ostensibly independent homelands, and in self-governing homelands in various stages of domination, becomes a part of the total strategy. Their stability or instability, their economic achievements and frustrations, their evaluations of Pretoria's regime, become important data to be analyzed and influenced by the Republic. In short, in a state confronted by a "total onslaught", virtually everything foreign and domestic becomes a fitting subject for state policy and guidance.

Rise of the Defence Forces and the South African Police

The growth in the force levels, budgets, quality of material and equipment, and the professional skills of the various coercive arms of the state is a matter of public record. From a budget of R44 million in 1960 to R3 068 million in 1982, the SADF reflects government's commitment to strength and military excellence. Likewise, the South African Police (SAP) has seen its budgetary vote expand from R29 million to R482 million in those same years. In politics money talks. In regard to these governmental subventions, money reflects the product of institutions well placed and appreciated by those in positions to distribute funds. Even accounting for inflation, these are significant patterns of growth, and they have taken their toll on the economy and on taxpayers' resolution. Yet expansion of the security budget must follow inevitably from the panorama perceived from Pretoria.

The size and composition of the forces also reflect a commitment to build a formidable security force that can intimidate and deter potential aggressors and dissidents as well as be operationally effective when ordered into the field. In 1960 the SADF numbered 11 500 Permanent Force and 56 500 part-time men (plus 10 000 national servicemen). This resulted in a standing operational force of 21 500 men. By 1982, those figures had been raised to 28 300 Permanent Force, 157 000 part-timers, and 53 100 national servicemen. The standing operational force by this time had reached 81 400. The SAP, because of recruitment and wastage problems, number 37 126 members today, up only 31 per cent since 1962.

Numbers alone do not tell the entire story. The changing racial composition of the armed forces signifies a realisation that the security situation is serious, though not desperate. It had often been

stated by high-level National Party leaders, until early into the 1960s, that blacks must never be armed or required to serve in combat assignments in the SADF. As late as 1970 the Minister of Defence had stated that black Africans would be employed by his department only as common labourers. Their deployment would be solely in "traditional roles", menial positions as cooks, batmen, orderlies, labourers, drivers, and so forth. Despite their expressed aversion to arming blacks, in 1963 the SADF was authorized to re-establish the Coloured Corps. Ten years later a black African unit was created (currently the 21 Battalion), and later still, in 1979, a number of ethnic cum regional formations were established to be attached to various regional commands.

By early 1983 the SADF had an estimated 9 500 black (Coloured, Indian, and black African) members. This figure does not include the various armies and national guards now attached to the "national states" or homelands, the black elements of the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF) (a not insignificant proportion of that force), or the blacks in paramilitary formations of the SAP. But the black forces in the SADF itself constitute around a third of the Army and Navy Permanent Force. Seen in this context, the black contribution to the career Defence Force is noteworthy, especially the changeover in the past few years. But by including Air Force Permanent Force numbers, the black proportion falls to 22 per cent of the Permanent Force. Dilution is far greater when one adds in white national servicemen and still further Citizen Force and Commando units. Black units, however, have been actively involved in border patrols, cross-border operations, and combat duties in the operational areas. If blacks in the Namibian forces and blacks in military and paramilitary formations deployed in the operational area are also considered, one can see that blacks bear a disproportionate burden of combat (compared to their number in the SADF itself). The 32 Battalion (made up mostly of Portuguese-speaking blacks from Angola and chiefly involved in cross-border strikes), the SAP Counter Insurgency (COIN) Units (mostly Ovambo) noted for their tracking tenacity within Namibia, and the various San units alone, if press releases are to be believed, must account for an extremely high proportion of contacts with SWAPO.¹⁵ In this sense, blacks can be regarded as a form of "cannon fodder" as alleged by the African National Congress.¹⁶ In that

they are largely volunteer and specialist units that argument may lose some of its effect. So far, most of the published reports on blacks in the SADF indicate that these men have been most effective in their assigned tasks.

But the overall view of government is unmistakable, and it is probably based on an undeniable reality (though their time frame may be exaggerated). Their view, predicated as it is on the twin concepts of "total onslaught" and "total national strategy", is that the next five years will be decisive, and that "if we want to survive" the Defence Force must be enlarged and strengthened.¹⁷ Since the source of white manpower has already been "over-extended", a further increase of the full-time force can only be brought about by involving larger numbers of other population groups.¹⁸ This view, of course, is not shared officially by the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) and the Conservative Party (CP). Dr Ferdie Hartzenberg, former Cabinet Minister and now chairman of the C.P.'s executive committee, calls for a return to apartheid in all walks of life. This includes separate defence forces with separate uniforms for each "nation" in South Africa.¹⁹ Greater involvement of all race groups in the SADF has been, however, long and strongly endorsed by the Progressive Federal Party (PFP).²⁰

The importance of domestic order

Other aspects of strategic thought have recently emerged. General Constand Viljoen himself talks of "total victory" in five years, and he is referring not just to a military victory. This will come, in his view, through efforts to reach political settlements in both South Africa and Namibia. Yet one might add that it is the SADF that seems to be a factor delaying settlement in Namibia. But in five years Africans "will eventually see through the intentions of Russia".²¹ Why official SADF sources have fastened on a five-year span in what clearly is a protracted political-military war of attrition is not clear. It almost invites second-guessing, since in the past SADF leaders have not been noted for an overly optimistic or naïve perspective.

These views reflect, as well, a kind of juggling act being done by South Africa's strategic thinkers. To be sure, the regional strategic picture is not neglected, and much of this revolves around an outcome in Namibia that politically would not undermine the Botha Government and its dual white constituency in the Republic and Namibia and would not, in the view of SADF headquarters,

leave the Republic militarily exposed. If not friendly, at least not actively hostile governments must be in place, and it is hoped firmly so in the "national states"/homelands and among the Republic's immediate neighbours. For geopolitical reasons, measured criticism and even hostility can be tolerated more in some states than in others. Such matters and strategic co-operation and co-ordination will be discussed later.

But what strikes the Pretoria watcher so graphically is the recent interest by the SADF, as well as by the government, in a more systematic attention to domestic or internal security concerns. This can be seen in the emphases of the Defence Department in its latest strategic "line" and in its legislative proposals. Not that the SADF and government have abandoned the international aspects of security and border defence. Rather, these ideas are now supplemented by a re-emphasis on preventing and combatting internal unrest. Domestic internal security has long been a theme of successive South African Governments. But generally it had been a concern of departments normally identified with domestic issues — Justice, Police, Bantu Affairs, Internal Affairs, and so forth. It is significant that the Department of Defence and the SADF as its operational arm have now taken up the matter. Of course, internal security has always been an important matter for the SADF, from the time of the "Rebellion" of 1914 and the 1922 miners' strike. According to the Defence Act of 1957 as amended, the second function of the SADF is to be employed "on service in the prevention or suppression of internal disorder in the Republic".²² But it had generally been assumed that this was clearly a secondary function. This still may be so, but recent utterances and points of emphasis at least indicate that the SADF is increasingly aware that when the security of the state is at stake, defensive and domestic security considerations overlap.

In at least three ways, changes in strategic thinking point up a new concentration on domestic stability. First is a renewed attention to urban unrest. Jonathan Kapstein, a close observer of South Africa, indicates that South African military strategists use as "their bible" the writings of French Legionnaire officer, Roger Trinquier. From his Algerian experience, Trinquier argues that it is possible to control urban opposition from a technical and tactical viewpoint.²³ Aware that it would be expensive if not impossible to fight both an external and an internal war at the same time, SADF thinkers

have urged domestic political, economic, and social reforms to defuse a polarized and tense situation. On the basis of the British experience in Malaysia and the French example in Algeria, some military spokesmen believe that managed social change can be an instrument to disarm or reduce the appeal of those forces calling for social revolution. The carrot and the stick are to be used in tandem. The classic 20 per cent military — 80 per cent political solution comes to mind. To these ends increasingly, SADF personnel can be found deployed within South Africa, far from the Republic's borders: everything from Civic Action schoolteachers in Soweto and medical teams in the homelands to SADF units involved in cordoning off townships during SAP swoops, or SADF troops manning roadblocks. The formerly low domestic profile of the SADF domestically has been raised and activated.

The concept of "area defence"

Second are recent references to what is called a "second front". General Malan in 1982 interpreted a series of bomb attacks in Cape Town, the eastern Transvaal, Natal and Soweto as a "second front".²⁴ By this he means a pre-conventional warfare strategy that includes an increase of sabotage strikes against selected, largely symbolic targets. The impression is that such unrest is growing with 12 incidents reported in 1979, 19 in 1980, and 55 in 1981. Although the number of incidents in 1982 fell to 32, many were designed for maximum propaganda impact.²⁵ That pattern of political violence continued into 1983 with the Bloemfontein and Pretoria bombings. Yet the number of incidents alone is not nearly as significant as the psychological impact they have. Moreover, ANC operatives have demonstrated greater efficiency and competence. Thus South Africa had best be prepared for both sorts of warfare — conventional assaults when conventional defences are lowered, revolutionary assaults for propaganda, psychological, and political effect behind the "lines". The second front far from Namibia and inside the Republic's borders also serves to spread the Republic's forces thin. In order to undermine a reformist "political solution" revolutionaries will step up sabotage and subversion. According to General Viljoen, ANC politicization of the black community has not gone far enough to support revolutionary action. He thinks the ANC operates without popular support, and therefore their isolated strikes seek "to create an atmosphere of instability while endeavouring to get maximum

publicity from the least activity".²⁶

Government's response has been to coin the concept of "area defence" and to fashion call-up policy to satisfy such needs. Unlike SWAPO, the enemy fighting South Africa itself does not plan a "border war" but rather an "area war". To contend with this, "people living in an area must be organized to defend themselves". They are the first line of defence. The full-time SADF then becomes a "reaction force". The armed citizenry, or large segments of it, now are expected to bear the primary responsibility for containing localized outbreaks of violence.

Thus the Defence Department sought to have the Defence Act amended during the 1982 session of Parliament, to be able to call upon a large reservoir of auxiliary manpower "so that no area in SA will be vulnerable to attack".²⁷ The Act does not foreshadow "total mobilization", but rather is designed as a contingency measure. The object of the Defence Amendment Act of 1982 is not to call up all eligible men up to the age of 55 since that would be impossible and impractical anyway, but rather to be legislatively empowered to do so in selected areas that are under attack or infiltration. Area defence, if it means anything, necessitates the SADF taking advantage of a specialized knowledge of the terrain and the people of a locality. Local farmers, in particular, seem well suited to provide such intelligence and field skills. Thus it would appear that the Defence Amendment Act is not fashioned to swell the ranks of the Defence Forces across the board, but to call upon eligible men in particular locales or with particular skills when the need arises.²⁸ There is the further possibility that the SADF might use the compulsory service provisions of the Defence Amendment Act to provide staff for civil (as opposed to military) service departments with staff shortages.²⁹

Other recent legislation seems to focus on domestic security questions. One might cite a battery of laws passed to inhibit publication or dissemination of information regarding the activities of the police and other security forces. Between 1977 and 1981 more than twelve statutes were enacted to this end.³⁰

More directly, the National Key Points Act gives the Minister of Defence extensive powers to declare any premises a National Key Point. Thus, "any place or area (that) is so important that its loss, damage, disruption or immobilization may prejudice the Republic" may be so designated, thereby

obliging the owners to undertake security precautions, such as storing weapons and communications equipment, and organizing and training a defence unit to secure the Key Point against "terroristic [sic] activities, sabotage, espionage or subversion".³¹

In border areas of South Africa the abandonment of farms is growing, and isolated rural communities are vulnerable to sabotage and violence. Recent efforts to improve security there likewise point up a concern with the psychological as well as military dimensions of the problem. Both the Departments of Agriculture and of Defence are anxious to avoid white depopulation of the platteland. Yet of the 1 908 Transvaal farms along the border from Mozambique to Botswana, 761 no longer have white resident farmers. Most of those remaining are heavily armed and are digging in behind security fencing. Many are leaving, not for security reasons, but because the economic future for them is unsure. Drought, high costs, labour shortages and poor infrastructure are the key reasons. Almost all feel that terrorism will increase. Agricultural subsidies are costly and do not necessarily keep farmers on unproductive land. Ideas to purchase abandoned farms have been bruited about among the Defence planners, and resettling demobilized national servicemen on such farms has been suggested.³² The proposal of a "ring of steel" around the borders to provide protection for outlying areas is popular in Defence circles. The plan was suggested to establish a series of fortified strong points linked into a radio network. Cactus fences topped by barbed wire, and razor wire fences, are being erected, too.

Such schemes themselves are a reflection of the times — of South Africa's shrinking hinterland, of the southward movement of the defence perimeter of the Republic from the Equator, to the Zambezi, to the Cunene, to the Limpopo and the Orange. It is not yet a counsel of last resort. Foreign policy and expansive security plans still are central to the defence of the order. It reflects, however, an awareness of the need for a complete and holistic security system. There is in South Africa a confluence of interests between today's NP politicians in government, the SADF and the various intelligence services. They see and believe that the communist menace is not only real, but the most profound challenge to their system and their rule. Since the immediate communist challenge is perceived to be military and to be largely based beyond South Africa's borders and those of Namibia, then the immediate response is military and offensively

oriented. Thus General Viljoen can say that he believes in "offensive defence". "You have to be aggressive, as this demonstrates your determination."³³ For the Defence Force it is an interventionist defence of non-intervention. A baffling bit of Orwellian newspeak appears in the 1982 Defence White Paper where it is written that if circumstances demand it, the SADF will engage in "offensive pro-active action".³⁴

Likewise, defence schemes include the encouragement of a constellation of southern African states and collaboration among neighbouring "national states" in preventing Marxist incursions. Physical and material policies also demonstrate that these foreign factors will not be neglected. But of late there has been a shift in the stresses of security rhetoric, themselves an outgrowth of perceived menace. These are additional themes joined to an already immense commitment to regional defence. Yet regional defence does not necessarily represent a commitment to regional stability. Many of these ideas will be dealt with later in this essay.

III. Institutional Changes

Apparent to all who study South Africa have been certain shifts in the institutional centre of gravity and in the institutional setting for high-level policy making. In each of these shifts, it would appear that the security establishment, and especially the defence services, have gained power and influence at the expense of other bodies. Before trying to describe the nature of these changes, it might be helpful to place them in the narrower context of the idiosyncratic variables. In other words, the personalities and experiences of the key actors involved have shaped the trends that are reflected in the institution and roles involved. To many, what will be written here is conventional wisdom, but scholars have an innate capacity for neglecting the obvious in their analyses.

P.W. Botha has been responsible for so many of the changes that we point up. His leadership style is considerably different from that of his predecessor. That, plus his principal governmental experience as Minister of Defence, accounts for the phenomena we shall describe. To begin with, P.W. Botha is a manager, an organizational virtuoso, a leader who places great stock in expert advice, planning, preparation, structure, and follow-through. He is, as one academic put it, a "forceful managing director". This contrasts with Vorster's "chairman of the board" style.³⁵ Where John Vorster's lead was

slack, Botha's is firm. With consummate political and administrative skill Botha took over the reins of government. His moves have not gone unchallenged. He has, from time to time, been forced to slow the pace of executive consolidation, to modify his policies, and even to retreat in the face of vocal and concerted opposition. But the trend is unmistakable — government is being enlarged, centralized and streamlined. Efficiency and performance matter, and it is increasingly difficult for independent centres of power to become entrenched.

Reflective of the overall process has been what is called the "rationalization" of the government and the public service. This involves, *inter alia*, the centralization of power at three levels, much different from the ad hoc approach to government characterized by Vorster and H.F. Verwoerd. Disclosures stemming from the Information Scandal from 1974 to 1978 reveal much about Vorster's style. The scandal itself grew out of a slovenly administrative and decision-making style marked by departmental autonomy and debilitating inter-departmental political competition. Revelations of illegal or suspect practices hit close to Vorster. His direction of government was, at best, loose. Vorster's tenure as Prime Minister, in retrospect, was an organizational and administrative nightmare in more ways than one.

To correct this, Botha has simultaneously reorganized the Cabinet, developed an interlocking system of cabinet committees to devise policy and co-ordinate its implementation, engaged and broadened the scope of the Office of the Prime Minister, and launched a President's Council charged with the task of advising government on constitutional development and racial relations. The organizational changes began in earnest in September 1979 when the Prime Minister combined a score of established cabinet committees, some of which existed only on paper and many of which met sporadically and whose charges were fuzzy, into five key committees. He gave them clear assignments, saw to it that they met periodically, and co-ordinated and regularized their procedures.³⁶ Each of these layers has loosely parallel structures. But several conclusions are self-evident. Decision-making at the top has been tightened and centralized. P.W. Botha is indispensable to the process. The security establishment exercises an enlarged role, and decisions arrived at are more likely to be enforced and implemented than in the past with interdepartmental co-ordination the norm rather than the exception. The managerial revolution has arrived in Pretoria, and

the vanguard of that revolution has been P.W. and the SADF.

To a large extent these tendencies reflect P.W.'s own personality. His career has been as an organization man, a manager.³⁷ He rose to prominence as a party careerist, identified for years with the cadre of the Cape branch of the National Party where he gained a reputation as a brilliant organizer and administrator. In April 1966 he was appointed Minister of Defence, a post he held until 1980. Although it is hard to say who influenced whom, it is apparent that Botha presided over the modernization and expansion of the SADF. The professional military technocrats he promoted and admired in the SADF, in turn, taught Botha some lessons about managerial efficiency, planning, professionalism, and hierarchical structures. The cross-fertilization process has been salutary for both the armed forces and for Botha's evolution as an executive. A not insignificant part of the explanation for the rise of the defence establishment in governmental circles is the fact that during his tenure as Minister, Botha was able to identify and promote officers of intellectual and administrative promise. Most significant, of course, was his association with General Malan. In rapid succession Botha appointed Malan, the youngest ever Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of the Army, and Chief of the SADF. There is a special trust between the two men, and the Prime Minister clearly relies upon the General for advice on strategic matters, as well as on a number of domestic political concerns. Malan has not, as yet, proven to be particularly adept at parliamentary or intraparty politics. Botha's long association with the SADF has also enabled him to identify gifted administrators and thinkers in "his" ministry. Thus, it was only natural that on becoming Prime Minister he should turn to individuals whose skills he had already observed at first hand, or whose perspectives he shares.

Running throughout this account of civil-military relations are references to the close personal and professional bonds between the Prime Minister and particular SADF officers. It is equally understandable that as Botha becomes preoccupied with the detailed affairs of other departments, he will begin to recognize individual talents outside the SADF (as he has already within the Party) and move these individuals into responsible positions in his government, thereby effectively diluting SADF influence. So it is no accident and no apparent conspiracy that catapulted high-ranking SADF men into political

and advisory positions close to the Prime Minister. There, SADF personnel have an advantage in the definition of social issues and the establishment of the agenda of state. The challenge of "total onslaught" is, on the surface, a military problem. Those who share that view quite comfortably turn to the military for guidance. In effect, the SADF are experts in control and the exercise of coercion, but not normally experts on political matters. Botha has ideas of his own. The SADF are specialists in the planning process and the execution of policy. As such they have been drawn into affairs of state outside of their normal portfolio. By demonstrating certain technical/managerial skills, the SADF is involved at high levels. Much like the computer programmer or the systems analyst who, by virtue of his technical expertise, may take up work for an economic planner while knowing little about economics, the military planner may find himself recruited to help with the political process in education or homelands consolidation or industrial decentralization, among other things.

Botha has been a leader anxious to have expert input into decision and policy execution. This has led to an enlarged role, not just for the military elite, but for top-level civil servants and public officials and even to involvement for specialists in private industry, the universities, and the independent think tanks. To the chagrin of politicians outside the inner circle and others with narrow regional bases, it has become in many ways government by professionals.

Finding experts to provide counsel understandably has been resisted by the rank-and-file career administrative cadre who have not always promptly and dutifully carried out decisions taken by Botha and his associates, especially when they involve the downgrading of a particular office or function or changing already familiar routines. The traditional maxim, "the expert should be on tap, not on top", still applies, but in some fields, such as the economy, domestic security and defence, the authorities have permitted specialists to determine the agenda and to formulate the alternatives. Because the co-opted experts have demonstrated their loyalty to Botha or because they already share the perspectives of important political leaders, they have been able to make themselves indispensable.

This centralization of executive power in the Cabinet and particularly in a few departments, an inner circle, or inner Cabinet as it has been called, grows out of a personal hierarchical approach to

management, as opposed to a representative mode marked by delay, compromise, and consensus. Personalized though it may be in its South African garb, it is a phenomenon occurring in many Western democracies. The rise of "the Executive State", in turn has meant the decline of two institutions representative of the exclusive white community — the National Party and Parliament. Government from above, especially when it seeks to fashion policies likely to be unpopular with one's narrow and privileged constituency, has led to a paternalistic, centralist regime, a departure from the casual "democracy for the Herrenvolk" as once described by Pierre van den Berghe.³⁸ In right-wing Afrikaner circles Botha is accused of erecting, especially with the new President's Council proposal for an executive President, a *verligte* dictatorship. There are, of course, other institutions that have gained or lost power and influence in the movement toward the executive state, some within the executive branch. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Information (as it is now called) seems to have fallen on hard times. The Information Department has been downgraded (to the extent of inclusion in the above Department), as has what once had been called Bantu Affairs (now the Department of Co-operation and Development) and the intelligence organ formerly known as BOSS and DONS and which is now called the National Intelligence Service (NIS). Institutions so sloppily managed that autonomy and individuality led to embarrassment or worse, organizations with less than cost-effective procedures have been marked for reorganization, reduction, or dismantlement.

IV. The Security Establishment

It should be helpful to outline in more detail what is meant by the term, the security establishment. This fortuitous aggregation of institutions and groups can be divided into six components, although there is some overlap. First and most obvious is the SADF and the Department of Defence, and principally those Permanent Force officers charged with shaping overall defence strategy and especially with applying it in Namibia. We have already referred to the growing force levels of the SADF in most of its formations. Particularly important to the present discussion are those elements of the SADF charged with tasks with more political overtones. Here we include the various service academies and specialized advanced training institutions, the planning and especially strategic planning groups, Civic Ac-

tion arms, intelligence and, as will become apparent shortly, those segments of the SADF that liaise regularly with governmental, political and business elites in agencies such as the State Security Council and the Defence Advisory Board.

Second is the intelligence community, presently consisting of the Department of Military Intelligence, the NIS, successor to the Bureau for State Security (BOSS), and the Security Police. Their relationships among one another and with other governmental and political bodies have been marked by continual flux.³⁹ Under Vorster, internal state security and a considerable range of foreign policy decisions and advice were preferred by Vorster's closest lieutenant, General Hendrik van den Bergh, the then chief of BOSS.

In the early 1960s, South African authorities were alarmed by the threat posed by banned organizations such as ANC, PAC, Poqo, Umkonto we Sizwe, the Communist Party and other resistance movements. John Vorster, as Minister of Justice, and his Commissioner of Police felt the need for a sophisticated intelligence organization that could gather and evaluate information and thereby relieve the burden that was borne by the Security Police. Republican Intelligence (known as RI) was founded as a clandestine extension of the Security Police. Its members were hand-picked and included the former Commissioner of Police and the present Commissioner formerly head of the Security Police. Their leader was then the head of the Security Police, Colonel Hendrik van den Bergh, a Vorster nominee approved by Prime Minister Verwoerd. The Colonel saw RI as his personal vehicle to greater power. As RI grew, it modelled itself on America's CIA. But the CIA is involved largely with foreign espionage and operations. RI was also engaged in domestic spying, and so it also borrowed from the FBI and from MI6, the British counterpart of the CIA.

General van den Bergh's reputation flourished as RI's grew, and his close personal ties to Vorster (they had been interned together during World War II) enhanced his influence. This friendship was later to shape the nature of BOSS in the Vorster years. In 1969 the Bureau for State Security (BOSS) was created as a Department of State, thereby bringing the wholly secret RI into the open by making it an agency with a formal, high-profile identity. But there were also smouldering resentments in security and government circles. From within BOSS came criticisms of favouritism and Broederbond domina-

tion. From the Security Police came resentment over BOSS intrusion into the Police's function and areas of operation and over BOSS recruitment of Security Police personnel. Military Intelligence (DMI) suspected that van den Bergh and Vorster were plotting to have BOSS assume control of military intelligence (BOSS did have a division responsible for military evaluation). Effectively this appeared to have happened when, in 1968, General van den Bergh was appointed Security Adviser to the Prime Minister (in addition to his control of RI), and at the time this was regarded as a move to end competition between the three branches of the intelligence community. It did not. DMI bypassed van den Bergh and reported directly to Botha, as Minister of Defence, and P.W., in turn, reported to the National Security Council. This led to intense rivalry between DMI and BOSS and to fierce clashes in the NSC between Botha and Van den Bergh.

Rumours circulated of intra-intelligence spying, or various intelligence agencies withholding information from the others and from the Security Adviser, of BOSS's partisan political activities against legitimate as well as illegal political parties, and even against National Party politicians critical of Van den Bergh and Vorster. Claims as well of BOSS's dirty tricks abroad were legion, but these were hard to substantiate. Recent disclosures by Arthur McGivern and Gordon Winter have refuelled speculation.⁴⁰

The fact remains that BOSS went from 500 to over 1 000 full-time employees in the decade of its existence. Van den Bergh's domination of BOSS and his symbiotic attachment to Vorster made the principal intelligence agency of state vulnerable to governmental changes at the top. The Information Scandal provided just the sort of predicament to lead to the demise of BOSS. Like a rogue elephant BOSS had to be brought down, and when the personalities that dominated it fell from grace, BOSS lost its flimsy supports.

Even before Vorster resigned as Prime Minister in October 1978, "the second most powerful man in the country", General Van den Bergh, stepped down in a barrage of criticism. During his tenure he had built BOSS into a formidable and feared institution. In retrospect, however, it was a house of cards. He had also become the confidant of the Prime Minister and had provided the impetus for a vigorous South African policy of *détente* in the region and throughout Africa. That, too, was still-

born. And Van den Bergh was central to many schemes of the Department of Information, an edifice that fell on top of him and his patron. Finally, he had done battle with the man who was to become the next Prime Minister, on matters of intelligence, defence policy and foreign policy.

Meanwhile, however, DMI saw its star rise as Botha took command and pulled along with him various defence agencies. A major review of the intelligence service, undertaken by a former director of DMI, concluded that DMI should be central to the total enterprise. Botha consolidated his own control of the intelligence services by naming Kobie Coetsee as Deputy Minister of Defence and of National Security and by asking Coetsee to examine the roles of the security forces. Without Van den Bergh DONS (the re-named BOSS) lost its special place in the intelligence hierarchy. Van den Bergh's tenure as head of State Security had not erased friction between intelligence branches. DMI had been weakened but not destroyed. The Security Police resisted BOSS domination, too.

To this day, competition is intense. DONS, re-named again the NIS, with a new leader, Dr Lukas Daniel "Niel" Barnard, has an unclear mission. It has been re-established as an intelligence evaluation centre, a think tank rather than a gatherer of intelligence. But operatives accustomed to a more active policy role seldom are contented as passive analysts. DMI seems to have taken over external intelligence gathering. The Security Branch handles domestic intelligence. Covert operations are anyone's guess. Top-level policy advice seems to come from a number of SADF offices and officers. "The day of the generals is at hand", one Foreign Affairs official put it. The Security Police, however, have not been overshadowed, indeed, their chief officer was recently promoted to Commissioner of Police, thereby affording him a direct presence on the State Security Council. It is clear that NIS has been downgraded in importance in relation to the other intelligence agencies. No apparent logical division of intelligence labour exists, and that leaves the field open for competition and claims to authority and responsibility. Each agency tries to enlarge its own turf at the expense of its rivals. Now it would appear (and it must be emphasized that this is conjectural) that DMI is on top, with NIS at the bottom. Both, however, have been tarnished by their alleged implication in the abortive Seychelles coup, or conversely, by their inability to see it being planned, when South Africans and even some of

their ex-agents were involved.⁴¹ In either case, the operation does not reflect well on DMI and NIS and as a result, the Security Branch by default seems to have emerged relatively unscathed from the Seychelles debacle.

The third component of the security establishment is that segment of the intellectual community that serves parts of the security establishment on an ad hoc contractual basis. There are, for example, various centres of strategic studies. Perhaps the most active is the Institute for Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria. The centre at the Rand Afrikaans University is headed by a former Director of Military Intelligence, and that at UNISA is led by a Citizen Force officer. Faculty and researchers from these centres participate in discussion groups, planning sessions and advisory bodies and regularly address various classes in diverse military and police training programmes. They also do contract work for the SADF and other security bodies.

Likewise, private independent firms are engaged increasingly in research and policy advice on security and strategy. Among these groups would be the Terrorism Research Centre in Cape Town, Ron Reid-Daly's team of security technicians in Johannesburg, and other private firms advising private industry and parastatal corporations on improving their security to comply with the National Key Points Act of 1980 and to protect their executives from terrorist attacks and kidnappings.

Individual academics interested in strategy and security are also drawn into the policy process, usually remotely, occasionally directly. They testify before governmental commissions, undertake contracted research, help train security and government personnel, and in general make their expert advice available to the authorities.

The armaments and related industries are involved in the security establishment, too. Most prominent are the parastatal corporations directly a part of the security enterprise. The Armaments Corporation of South Africa (Armcor) exists solely to improve the material defence capabilities of the state. Like the SADF itself, Armcor comes directly under the authority of the Minister of Defence. It is one of the biggest industrial undertakings in South Africa, with assets greater than R1 200 million, 500 per cent greater than its holdings of R200 million in 1974. This places Armcor among South Africa's top twenty companies. Armcor directly employs around 29 000 and provides work for nearly 100 000 people through its

subsidiaries and its 3 000 private subcontractors.⁴²

The result of this growth and size is that Armscor is now the world's tenth-largest arms manufacturer. Where ten years ago about 70 per cent of the defence budget went to material imports, today military imports represent only about 15 per cent of the defence budget. Armscor, which was created partially in response to a UN arms embargo, is today in a position to export weapons. For political reasons it is not easy to find customers.

Through its subsidiaries, Armscor has deep links with private-sector firms and research companies. Up to 60 per cent of Armscor's production is contracted out to the private sector. This partnership with private enterprise goes back to the time when P.W. Botha was Minister of Defence. He gathered around him advisers from private firms, and that closeness persists today. Armscor tenders touch practically every sector of modern industry. Some of the country's top industrialists and managers serve on various group boards. Barlow Rand seconded John Maree to Armscor for three years, and he reorganized the corporation to make better use of the private sector. The main Armscor board includes the Chief of the SADF, General Constand Viljoen, as an *ex officio* member and the Director General of Finance. Armscor does not make public the names of its other Directors. But the concept of private-state co-operation for state security is well advanced by Armscor and is regarded by some planners as a model to be applied elsewhere.

Other parastatal corporations, Sasol and Iscor for example, also have defence and security links through planning bodies and through sales to security forces and other state organs. Moreover, the terms of legislation such as the Atomic Energy Act as amended in 1979, the National Supplies Procurement Act of 1970 as amended in 1979, and the Petroleum Products Amendment Act of 1979, require that firms do not disclose certain data about their operations. These laws, for their part, commit the private sector to what could justifiably be regarded as a military-industrial complex.

It is not only Armscor and the other parastatals that are the conduit through which the private business sector has been engaged in the security of the state. The Carlton and Good Hope meetings at which the Prime Minister sought to explain and discuss with private business leaders the thrust of his plans, to elicit from them ideas and reactions to his government's proposals, and to involve them more closely in his future visions. These meetings among

other things serve to punctuate a linkage that P.W. Botha seeks to develop. As in all political regimes that purport to be representative, various social groupings seek to expand their access to and role in government. In South Africa, the corporate world likewise seeks to improve its access to public decision-making bodies while also wishing to maintain its political distance. But the idea of total national strategy propounded by Botha and the Defence Force has been identified as a form of managerial modernization. This may well enhance the private sector's confidence in government. Business leaders, after all, admire managerial efficiency and effectiveness.⁴³ The 13-man Defence Advisory Board, whose membership is an elite of big business, is one medium for this involvement of the private sector in the total strategy for state defence and security, but it has not proven altogether satisfactory from the government's standpoint, and it has been relatively inactive since its formation.

A fifth component of the security establishment is the South African Police (SAP). There is no need to detail the role of the SAP in maintaining state security.⁴⁴ Perhaps less public are the paramilitary formations that patrol the borders, that are used to put down internal unrest, and that have been deployed in the operational areas of Namibia and Rhodesia. In all of these activities and others, there is a high level of interaction and co-operation between the SAP and the SADF. Although the SADF has sought to avoid the stigma of repressing the civil population, the fact is that the SADF has widened its range of domestic deployment and in the process finds its popular image more closely identified with the apartheid policies of the government and hence of the National Party.

Many of these organizations and their functions are brought together in the workings of the sixth element of the security establishment — the State Security Council (SSC). The SSC has become the central organization through which security policy is determined and its implementation co-ordinated. It also serves as the most important cabinet committee in a variety of other issue areas, including foreign policy, many economic decisions, some issues of justice, and even key apartheid and constitutional questions. Technically the SSC is but one among the five pivotal cabinet committees. In fact, it is *primus inter pares*. In the first place, it is chaired by the Prime Minister himself. Secondly, it is the only cabinet committee established by law with a fixed membership, and although this, in

itself, was not enough to make the SSC so vital in the Vorster regime, it adds to the impact of the body when coupled with other factors. Thirdly, it is apparent that the SSC's range of interests has been wider than other cabinet committees largely because its members subscribe to and propagate the necessity of a "total national strategy" to combat a "total onslaught" aimed at South Africa. Seen from this vantage point, practically no facet of state policy can be excluded from some aspect of security affairs.

Although the full membership of the SSC has never been publicly disclosed, it includes at least the following: the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Police, Justice, and the most senior Cabinet Minister.⁴⁵ The SSC also includes the top-ranking civil servants/career professionals in each of those key departments. Thus the Directors General of Foreign Affairs and Justice, the Director General of the Department of the Prime Minister, the Chief of the SADF, the Commissioner of Police, and the Head of NIS participate. A number of important people *not* directly responsible to Parliament participate in the decision-making process at the highest levels. The ministers who chair each of the other four cabinet committees are also co-opted attendees. Others in government and in private life may be invited to attend individual meetings, depending on the subject at hand and the nature of the expertise they might be expected to apply. If, for example, weapons development is on the agenda, the Director of Armscor may be asked to attend. If the topic is regional economic growth or transport planning as it impacts on foreign policy, the General Manager of the South-African Transport Services (SATS) may be co-opted. The SSC is a body composed of political heavyweights supplemented by the highest-ranking political and governmental experts in security and strategy. When they recommend policy, Cabinet is not likely to deny them. It is the prestige and influence associated with the individuals and their offices that assure that the SSC continues at the hub of governmental decision-making in so many areas of state policy.

Backing the SSC is a Working Committee and behind it a Secretariat, poised to shape agendas, develop position papers, formulate alternatives, take and circulate minutes, and, once the SSC and then the Cabinet has acted, to see to it that each operational department and bureau knows what is expected of it, that decisions are circulated to rel-

evant officials, and that co-operation and co-ordination are assured. There are also around fifteen interdepartmental working committees organized along functional lines. They consist mostly of heads of departments or their senior deputies, plus a heavy SADF component. In the past these have been associated with the Office of the Prime Minister. More recently, however, individual Cabinet members have tried to stake out "claims" to particular working committees. J.C. Heunis, Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, has been particularly adept in laying claim to the cabinet committee for Internal Affairs, the branch of the Office of the Prime Minister responsible for Constitutional Planning, and the Constitutional Committee of the President's Council. His influence ramifies from these bases to various interdepartmental working committees in related fields. The Secretariat for the SSC is headed by Lieutenant General A.J. van Deventer. He attends SSC meetings and, as a personal confidant of the Prime Minister, is in a position to influence policy extensively. As many as 70 per cent of the initial complement of Secretariat personnel came from the SADF; only 20 per cent from the NIS and around 10 per cent from the DFAI. In short, the Secretariat represents the triumph of the SADF in its ongoing battle with BOSS/DONS/NIS, the SAP, and of course the DFAI. How long it can retain that ascendancy is probably a function of the political staying power of the Prime Minister himself.

The State Security Council was established by the Security Intelligence and State Security Act of 1972. Its function was initially to advise the government with regard to the formulation of national policy and strategy and to determine intelligence priorities. It was, at that time, just one of twenty different cabinet committees. It met sporadically, as did the other cabinet committees. There was little co-ordination of committee actions.⁴⁶ The SSC was clearly subordinate to the Cabinet, politically as well as legally.

When P.W. Botha became Prime Minister he engineered a transformation in the SSC. The changes were largely structural rather than in the personnel. To begin with, he reduced the number of cabinet committees from twenty to five permanent committees. He introduced regular (fortnightly) meetings and rearranged their timing, so that SSC meetings precede Cabinet meetings. The appearance of the SSC presenting Cabinet with *fait accompli* decisions has been noted.⁴⁷ In addition, the SSC holds meet-

ings when Parliament is in recess and when the Cabinet is inactive. The SSC again would seem to provide executive continuity, particularly on matters of security, even though in formal terms the Cabinet is paramount.

Although the institutional roles of the SSC have remained largely unchanged in the past ten years, the perceptions of the individuals occupying these positions seem to have been changed. Under Vorster, the SSC was composed of a collection of strong-willed individuals with bases in the Party and keen on maintaining their departmental strengths. In this interlocking directorate they perceived the Cabinet and the Party as their primary power base of operations and not the peripatetic SSC. In contrast, under P.W., as the SSC was elevated in prominence, so its members began to identify with it as an institution. More key leaders began to see it as an inner Cabinet and to regard the full Cabinet as less central to the decision-making process. A parallel ironically exists in politics in the Soviet Union where there is an interlocking directorate at the top. Key individuals hold positions in both government and in the Politburo of the Communist Party. But without question they regard their standing in the Politburo as more important than their position in the Council of Ministers — one is clearly the decision-making locus, the other is a rubber-stamp and policy-coordinating body. Party prevails over government. Those who misjudge the situation, as did Georgi Malenkov, find their political careers side-tracked or shortened. Although it is clearly premature to regard this as a pattern that applies in South Africa — after all, it involves just one government, that of P.W. Botha — the parallel cannot be ignored since it does represent a possible formula for imposing marginal (though symbolically significant) reforms on a constituency that resists. To be sure, not all top Cabinet officers share an identity with the SSC in preference to a political base in the department or in the provincial party apparatus. Most would prefer to keep all political options open in an as yet fluid situation. South African politicians are too individualistic, too pragmatic to conform to some analytical model developed to explain political patterns. Nonetheless, in the aggregate, this tendency to identify with the SSC as an institution (particularly as one on the rise) ought not to be ignored.

By the nature of governmental and administrative reorganization, the SSC has the advantage of being the principal originating and co-ordinating

organ for the total national strategy, “the focal point of all national decision-making and governmental power”, as one analyst, perhaps with a bit of overstatement, put it.⁴⁸ The SSC’s agenda has widened as awareness of “total onslaught” has grown and as commitment to “total national strategy” broadly constructed has taken root. It is an atmosphere where, if one does not believe in “total onslaught” one, *ipso facto*, contributes unwittingly to that onslaught. It is an inherently polarizing outlook.

Other changes in executive organization have, by default, given the SSC and its ancillary Secretariat further advantages. The number of government departments has been reduced. The Office of the Prime Minister has been expanded and organized in a fashion that parallels the structure of cabinet committees. In 1982, the Security Planning section of the Prime Minister’s Office was moved organizationally out of the Prime Minister’s Office into the NIS. But rather than this representing an enhancement of NIS power⁴⁹ it is more likely a convenience move to enable Lieutenant General Van Deventer, the Secretariat’s head, to report directly to the SSC and the Prime Minister without having to work through the Director General of the Office of the Prime Minister, Dr J.E. du Plessis. In other words, the Secretariat is now even more independent. The decision-making process has been centralized, and placed firmly at the hub of the process is the Prime Minister, the SSC, and its Secretariat.

To add to the importance of the military establishment, SADF officers are prominent in many high-level interdepartmental committees, and they have had a direct input into diverse governmental commissions and investigatory bodies through petition, testimony, submission of evidence, and deputation. Often representatives of the SSC (and therefore not always military persons) sit on these panels. Just a few examples should suffice to demonstrate that they cast their net wide. The SSC has a spokesman on KEOSSA (the Afrikaans acronym for the Committee for Economic and Development Co-operation in Southern Africa) even though the enterprise is largely associated with agricultural development, finance, and foreign affairs in the “national states”. Similarly, the SADF has limited representation (General Malan himself) on the Central Consolidation Committee of the Commission for Co-operation and Development (the Van der Walt Commission) and is actively involved in its Defence and Strategy sub-committee. The SADF

has supplied researchers to the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) to study press reporting for its report to the Steyn Commission. Although there is nothing inherently pernicious about these linkages, they do illustrate the ubiquity of such security ties and their potential for influence. They also exemplify a salient departure from past practices.

As the Prime Minister institutes these organizational changes one cannot help but think that there is, indeed, purpose and design to his steps. To be sure, there is a good deal of rationalization in these measures and efficiency has its own rewards. But underlying these changes is a widely held belief that the Prime Minister is clearing the decks for action — not merely for fighting a war with violent opponents of the regime, but for fashioning significant political changes in order to outflank those opponents. Ironically, the nature and extent of these changes depend as much on those not at all represented on these bodies or in the latest constitutional schemes — black South Africans — and to a lesser extent upon the Coloured and Indian communities and their leaders who are inclined to resist being drafted into an order that still does not give them fully equal status and that excludes and is not even envisioned to include their black brothers.

In the remainder of this essay some issues in which the hand of the defence establishment is marking the outcome will be examined. These concerns do not represent a complete picture of defence involvement in matters not entirely defensive or strategic in nature. Rather, they are used to illustrate some of the broad observations and generalizations noted in the preceding sections and to suggest an evolving pattern for future political alignments and contests.

V. The Militarization of White Society

To an outsider who returns to South Africa periodically it is possible to discern a rising visibility of things martial creeping into what had heretofore been regarded as exclusively civilian life. Few in South Africa would like to admit it, especially in that it develops imperceptibly. Obviously these tendencies predate P.W. Botha's ascension to power. As this process has evolved, there has been a conscious creation of a social atmosphere that makes military service appear attractive, military responses to policy issues sensible, and greater military strength and expenditure acceptable — a mood which generally prepares the population for

conditions of sacrifice under situations perceived to be isolation, siege, or even war.

Particularly noteworthy has been the deepening *militarization of the white educational process*. Cadet detachments have been set up in white boys' secondary schools. There, some 150 000 to 200 000 boys are provided paramilitary drill and training, and are psychologically prepared for national service. They are encouraged to enlist in the Permanent Force upon graduation. While in some schools cadet detachments have been disbanded, in others the cadet units have been affiliated with Permanent Force and Citizen Force regiments. Officers and NCOs regularly visit schools in connection with youth preparedness, career guidance, information with respect to national service, the selection of boys in Special Schools for national service, and activities regarding the training of school cadets. Some students attend two-week camps during holidays. There, school teachers who also serve as officers subject them to a regimen of activities resembling what they can expect in the SADF.⁵⁰ Even before senior high school, youngsters in the Transvaal are urged to attend "voluntary" week-long veld schools ostensibly for the purpose of environmental education and outdoor survival techniques. What is also included is a heady dose of political, and some would say partisan, indoctrination and paramilitary discipline.⁵¹

Press relations

In addition, the news and entertainment media, particularly the state-owned and operated radio and television networks and the Publications Control Board, contribute to a largely one-sided atmosphere that tends to glorify, but not romanticize, military service. Yet there appear to be limits as to how willing the media are to be used. At one point, SABC production personnel refused to be associated with a sabre-rattling and propagandistic "documentary" on the SADF. A private company had to be hired to film the show.⁵² The press can be pressured by, for example, the establishment of the Steyn Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media. The SADF made submissions to that Commission and seconded researchers to the HSRC to study press coverage of the security forces for the Commission. Self-censorship in response to tightened secrecy and imposed journalistic restraints account for a situation where the security establishment is seldom mentioned except in a favourable light. The recent situation involving reporters who sought to

dig deeply into DMI and other SADF involvement in the Seychelles coup attempt and cover-up is a case in point.⁵³

Part of the positive image of the SADF is attributable to outright intimidation, part to self-restraint, part to conscious public relations, and, of course, part grows out of a genuine admiration for the effectiveness and professionalism of the SADF. The press liaison and public relations sections of the SADF have been steadily enlarged and professionalized over the years. Efforts have been made to engage large segments of the civilian population in support programmes to assist national servicemen before, during and after their service, and to help SADF members adjust to their lives and sacrifices.

The Civic Action arms of the SADF contribute to an overall affirmation of military virtue. The government and the SADF often refer to a "winning hearts and minds" (WHAM) philosophy with regard to the black population. Here the emphasis is on painting the SADF in a favourable light in order to deny the insurgents the psychological advantage of being more popular than the defence forces. The rationale is that by providing the people with needed services and assistance, perhaps the people will be less supportive of the insurgents and positively helpful to the SADF and the governmental officials. As part of the practical and propaganda strategies undergirding WHAM, the SADF in January 1978 established a subsection of Burgersake or Civic Action. Prior to 1978 similar assignments were performed by an organization operating in Namibia which, since 1974, had been a part of the SA Army. In time the activities of the Civic Action programme were expanded and the functions were divided, the subsection Civic Action concentrating on policy and co-ordination and the executive functions remaining with the branches of the service, mainly the army. Burgersake was headed by a former commander of the Transkeian Defence Force and Secretary of Defence to the Transkeian Government, Major General Phil Pretorius, a specialist in psychological warfare.

Civic Action provides national servicemen who perform mostly as teachers, agricultural specialists, medical doctors, engineers, and administrators. They work throughout South Africa and Namibia, in the homelands and in various other black venues, largely to improve relations with the black residents, and in the process to gather intelligence that may be politically and militarily useful to the regime. Some have been employed in schools in

urban townships, in which case the propaganda message may become heavy and may damage inter-group relations. Most national servicemen in these situations serve in full uniform, including holstered revolvers. Complaints regarding these activities have taken various forms, although in other instances coloured and black principals have applauded the teaching efforts and skills of national servicemen. On at least one occasion, however, the SADF teachers distributed copies of a SADF magazine, *The Warrior*, in which it is claimed that there is freedom in South Africa and that the true leaders of the black people are not "convicts" like Nelson Mandela but Community Council officers such as David Thebehali. In protest against this "gun toting battalion" some students boycotted classes.⁵⁴ When the idea of national service teachers was first suggested for Soweto, prominent black spokespersons objected.⁵⁵ Chief Gatsha Buthelezi stated that although he favoured Civic Action presence in his territory, he opposed the SADF insistence on military uniforms. In this context, it appeared to be a propaganda ploy rather than "a genuine wish to help, for humanitarian considerations."⁵⁶

When Civic Action was first conceived, it was regarded as very much the professional, modern way to combat civil unrest. The psychological weapon was to be one of the most powerful arrows in the SADF quiver. General Malan had stressed time and again the need to gain the "trust and faith" of local populations in order to foil insurgency.⁵⁷

On paper Civic Action made a great deal of sense. Some departments of government have difficulty persuading young, urbanized civil servants to take up assignments in rural areas. Under the guise of military discipline such services can be supplied. The idea of the social welfare services being provided by compulsory service formations also has been advanced by PFP MPs. Ray Swart, for example, has suggested that a multiracial, volunteer "peace corps" type organization be established and linked to the SADF (perhaps as a form of alternative service).⁵⁸

But psychological operations and Civic Action fool few blacks. The problems are not so much the personality or methods of those leading Civic Action but the fact that the programme is, in essence, a part of the government's "total national strategy" designed at heart to maintain control of the majority peoples and to perpetuate racial subordination. Civic Action involves the deployment of national servicemen doing their obligatory military service.

Although they may be happily furnishing a “non-military” service, their activities have a basic security purpose. Defence Headquarters and strategic planners clearly see Civic Action in its overall strategic and security contexts. In short, although Civic Action may have positive ramifications on the lives of some of the inhabitants in terms of the social services it provides, it is at heart an instrument of control. It involves virtually no black input in deciding which programmes to undertake or how to manage them in the interests of the subject peoples. Civic Action constitutes another field in which the SADF has insinuated itself where the political and social overtones amount to the militarization of South African society.

Involvement of the SADF in partisan politics

It was Major General Phil Pretorius, the very Director General of Civic Action, who caused the Prime Minister and the SADF some embarrassment in 1980. On 23 March 1980 the *Sunday Times* published a story about an SADF document headed “Psychological Action Plan: Defence Budget Debate” and dated 12 February 1980. That document detailed secret steps to manipulate the news media in order to nullify the opposition’s criticisms of the Prime Minister. It was signed on behalf of the Chief of the SADF, General Malan, by Major General Pretorius. Such direct dabbling in Parliamentary affairs and with it in partisan politics shocked some observers. The SADF, after all, had carefully cultivated its professional, non-partisan image. The Deputy Minister of Defence has said that the policy of his department, since 1966, had been to involve all parties in Parliament in the defence process through Parliamentary briefings, visits and consultations. The Defence Force is, we have been told repeatedly, a “peoples’ army”, and an army of all the people of South Africa. Apparently, some people matter more than others. Since a general approval of the SADF as an institution had characterized all legitimate political parties’ positions in the preceding years, many opposition politicians felt betrayed by this report. Regularly, the UP, NRP, and PFP had supported larger budgets and a general encouragement for the *verligtheid* of the SADF leaders. Now the SADF had apparently been caught trying to undermine those who criticized the National Party on other issues.

The Prime Minister, clearly compromised by the disclosure, nonetheless characteristically took the offensive, attacking the press and the opposition

parties for their efforts to secure full divulgence and explication of the matter. P.W. Botha tried to pass the matter off as a minor error of judgement. PFP leader Dr Frederick van Zyl Slabbert argued that “if an image is created that the Defence Force is simply the National Party in uniform, this country will split from top to bottom”.⁵⁹ Revelation Ntoula of *Voice* tartly jibed Dr Slabbert: “You see”, he wrote, “we Blackies fully perceive the role of the army, but without sounding too nasty to most Black members of the army, it is indeed synonymous with the Nationalist Party”.⁶⁰

Almost all who criticized the Action Plan attacked the efforts to shape opinion in the House of Assembly. Other features of the Plan went unscathed. By their silence most white politicians implied that SADF dabbling in domestic affairs was acceptable. To seek to channel public opinion and to create a positive image for the SADF is understandable to most politicians. But to turn that propaganda covertly on members of Parliament aroused a howl (among Opposition MPs) that the very basis of “democracy” was tottering.⁶¹

The Prime Minister rejected the Opposition’s call for a Parliamentary Select Committee to investigate the SADF’s secret Action Plan to “nullify” the Opposition during the budget debate on the Defence Vote. Instead, the Prime Minister appointed an SADF board of inquiry headed by the former Chief of the Defence Force, Admiral Hugo Biermann. This in-house investigation, as expected, exonerated the SADF and found no willfulness or negligence by anyone concerned in drawing up, authorizing, handling, or distributing the document. The farthest the report would go was to admit that “serious errors of judgement” had been made. No disciplinary steps were recommended, although shortly before the story broke, the subsection Civic Action was officially disbanded, and Major General Pretorius was relieved of this command. He has since been named Chief Director of Manpower Development.

Despite this flap, within months another SADF pamphlet, entitled *The Reason Why*, was printed, propagating the policies of the National Party and attacking the Opposition. General Malan repudiated this document, as well, and promised action against those responsible, who had been in violation of an SADF directive requiring all materials affecting party politics to be cleared by the Chief of the SADF. Again the internal mechanisms of the Defence Force, at the highest levels, were able to

whitewash the embarrassing yet ever more apparent partisan meddling of the SADF in the country's political life.

Within the military itself, the training of black and white troops involves some political indoctrination, as is perfectly understandable.⁶² But the message contains a strong, perhaps inadvertent, measure of pro-National Party publicity, too, and an unflinching defence of racial separation. The orientation manual for national servicemen was revised upon the protest of Opposition MPs, and in another instance the Opposition criticized an SADF handbook used for civic guidance programmes. The handbook in question was used to help officers and NCOs prepare lectures to servicemen on "civic guidance". "Civic guidance" is an integral part of personnel training in which recruits are subjected to lectures and discussions about, inter alia, political ideologies, world affairs, and domestic political and social affairs. The Minister of Defence, a few days after the protests, released a brief part of the document in question, but defended his Department and the handbook.⁶³

The Action Plan was a covert scheme to undermine opposition critics in Parliament. The handbook more openly shaped the political thinking of young servicemen. But in other ways the military is accused of participating in internal political manipulation. Within DMI is purported to be a group that specializes in disinformation. The DMI has also been accused of distributing literature to men eligible for national service to make it appear that the literature was from a group supposedly seeking to discourage national service. The pamphlet in question sought to associate this group with enemies of the state. In another instance, in a Cape Town labour dispute, the armed forces were charged with forging a Cape Housing Action Committee flyer in order to undercut that group. When the Minister was asked if the SADF was involved, he denied knowledge and declined to make a statement.⁶⁴ Such suspicions and rumours are commonplace as the "tentacles" of the SADF are seen and imagined "everywhere".

Throughout it all, the Defence Force stoutly denies partisan preferences or pressures. The Minister said that in 1971 he ruled against a suggestion that the General Regulations for the SADF and the Reserve be amended to permit members of the Permanent Force to become members of political parties.

On his recommendation, the regulations were revised in 1971 to permit Permanent Force members nothing more than attendance at public political meetings while dressed in civilian clothes, and the exercise of their voting franchise. Such members may not take part in any activities "for the furtherance of the interests of a political party or of a candidate for partisan election". His policy, simply put, is "to keep party politics out of the Defence Force". Moreover, "political indoctrination is not practised in the South African Defence Force. Our soldiers are, however, motivated against subversion and communism. This is done in an unbiased manner . . ."⁶⁵

Such assertions may be of little consolation to PFP, HNP or CP leaders who feel that the full panoply of the state, including the SADF, is engaged not only in maintaining the regime, but in furthering National Party policy and partisan ends. In the recent words of Koos van der Merwe, CP defence spokesman, "The Minister of Defence, typical of so many other National Party politicians, is now using the total onslaught against South Africa as a weapon against the NP's political opponents in an attempt to win cheap political points."⁶⁶ Seen from such a vantage point, little can be done to set his mind at ease. Ironically, government gets criticized by the PFP for using the SADF to resist significant social change and by the HNP and the CP for jeopardizing the security of the state by changing the system too rapidly. Such flack from both positions need not, however, serve to exonerate the government from either criticism or from both.

The nub of this issue would show most overtly with regard to the matter of constitutional change and reform. Although it stands to reason that SADF thinkers, as individuals and even as a group, would have a preferred constitutional order which they would feel more comfortable furthering and defending, there is no evidence of direct SADF input in the deliberations of the Constitutional Committee of the President's Council. It has been suggested to this researcher by someone close to the National Party centre that, indeed, the SADF contributed to, if not imposed, the decision not to turn District Six in Cape Town back into a coloured group area. One can see how such a decision might affect the provision of civil order and internal security. This influence was allegedly "entirely behind the scenes", but it has not been possible to confirm the story.

Economic issues

Self-sufficiency in weaponry and military material quite obviously is the proper concern of the security apparatus of the state. It is, as well, related to the strength and co-ordination of the national economy and infrastructure, and its relationship to the machinery of the state. Because of these imperatives it is likely that the regime will also feel compelled to achieve greater economic self-sufficiency, even at the cost of paying a high economic price in the short run. After all, if outright warfare is contemplated, why should not sub-violent hostile acts such as sanctions and embargoes not also be within the realm of possibility? Some industries are undeniably related to the military defence of the system. Steel, energy, transport, automotive, chemical, food and related industries come to mind. Likewise, manpower and even educational matters have direct economic and security consequences. Small wonder that the SSC, the SADF, and other parts of the security establishment should seek to become involved in decisions in these fields, and even beyond. We have already discussed Armscor and other links between the economy and the state.

A good deal of the effort to acquire or develop nuclear technologies and capacities has an obvious military and foreign policy application. The same might be said of the expansion of Sasol facilities in order to enhance the country's self-sufficiency in petrol energies. Most of the other economic efforts are more remote, temporally, from a direct military or defensive utility.

Nonetheless, this does not deter security policy makers from being alert to the long-range necessity of developing a self-reliant economy. During debate and discussion of the local-content programme in the automotive industry, for example, the fear of sanctions and an awareness of military linkages were frequently expressed.⁶⁷

In addition, the military helped to persuade government that South Africa needed its own diesel capacity. In 1978, government decided to let out bids for a diesel industry for South Africa. The Atlantis site north of Cape Town was chosen. But since diesel manufacturing is a high-technology precision-machinery industry requiring high tolerances, the result has been that South Africa now produces inferior diesel engines at around one-third greater cost than imported models. Many industrialists and economists predicted this outcome. Simon Brand, Chief Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister, resisted the decision. Higher costs, obsolete designs

that are less fuel efficient, and total South African financing have led to a situation where the country is really not self-sufficient since licensing is still required. It was apparent, however, that through the preparations for this decision, the SADF and the strategic planners would not be satisfied with anything less than 100 per cent South African diesels — even if it could have been demonstrated that there was, say, a 90 per cent chance of South Africa being able to continue to import diesel engines. The government later admitted that the decision had been 80 per cent strategic and 20 per cent economic. Lou Wilking, Managing Director of General Motors (SA), wryly quipped: "It looks more to me like it is 111 per cent strategic and minus 20 per cent economic." Others criticized it as well.⁶⁸

In those fields where total self-sufficiency is not attainable, the government has co-opted many foreign firms into security collaboration. The National Key Points Act of 1980, the Atomic Energy Act as amended, the National Supplies Procurement Act as amended, and the Petroleum Products Amendment Act, among other pieces of legislation, implicate private firms in a secrecy about their production levels, sources of supply, trading partners and so forth that contribute to the siege mentality. They also compromise branch subsidiaries of transnational firms with their corporate headquarters outside of South Africa. One suspects, however, that few foreign firms resist such strictures provided the costs are kept tolerable and total corporate operations are not too adversely affected.⁶⁹ One could also surmise that in this atmosphere there is a good deal of planning and implementation of secret stockpiles, strategic reserves and contingency plans entangling the private sector and the strategic planners.

In one other policy area there appears to be an uncanny confluence of strategic and economic thinking. That is in the matter of regional economic planning and strategic/territorial planning. The various industrial development plans, physical development plans, decentralization schemes, long-range homeland and national state consolidation plans and regional military command boundaries virtually overlap at every turn, as though they could not have been delimited without close and high-level co-ordination. Again, there is nothing notably wrong or perverse about this. Indeed, it is rather far-sighted to be able to show such purpose and organization. But it is further evidence of an order that values politico-strategic conformity and collab-

oration, and one that is structured to bring it about, a not insignificant achievement.

VI. A Constellation of States and South African Policy Toward the Homelands

There is no question that the territorial and administrative subdivision of what had been the RSA prior to the "independence" of the Transkei has important military ramifications. If one perceives the hiving off of the homelands into "national states" with their dozens of parcels of territory as a problem of territorial and border defence, one can appreciate the apprehension, if not alarm, that must face military planners. The independence of the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei alone have added 4 930 kilometers to South Africa's land borders.⁷⁰ Not that the national states or potential national states pose any immediate military threat to the Republic. Rather the multiplication of "international boundaries" and the prospects for governmental and social instabilities in these lands add to the potential problems that must be considered in strategic arrangements. To be sure the SADF has been responsible for training and equipping homeland defence forces. It is also true that these regimes are economically dependent on the Republic, and that their present governments will, for a long time to come, look to Pretoria for economic and military assistance, and even political maintenance. But a future not entirely or directly in Pretoria's control adds to defence and foreign policy problems. An NRP MP put it most caustically when he condemned the homelands scheme as a "nightmare" for South Africa's military commanders. "Surely even a moron can see that this map is the most illogical and stupid plan ever devised by man."⁷¹ But the SADF alone is not patrolling borders. The SAP is responsible for "internal" borders and the SADF for "external" borders, and the SAP has its own highly regarded COIN units.

The debate, of course, goes back much earlier as UP Parliamentarians resisted the unfolding policy of homelands in the 1960s. Their catalogue of defence-related horrors bears repeating, as their leader, Sir de Villiers Graaff, asserted that the homelands policy showed "a total disregard for considerations of defence".⁷² It was noted that:

- (1) eight separate armies in eight separate homelands would open a Pandora's box of problems;
- (2) communist states might be involved in sup-

plying arms and training to homelands armies;

- (3) terror gangs might operate from the homelands, thereby making the homelands "a festering sore on our borders in ten or twenty or thirty years time",⁷³ much as Cuba became a threat to the United States;
- (4) revolutionary forces might seek to remove compliant pro-Pretoria regimes in the homelands and thus use their territories as "liberated areas";
- (5) to grant independence to homelands would be to surrender South Africa's "entire defence perimeter" along all but the southern frontier to blacks who were years away from establishing "any adequate defence".⁷⁴ Transkei thus is seen as South Africa's "soft underbelly".

One could not be sure whether the defence of South Africa would be threatened by homeland independence because the homelands would be too weak or because they might be too strong or too independent.

Government countered in those days with expressions of confidence and assurance that the new black states would be so grateful for having been granted independence that a commonwealth would "arise". If South Africa were ever attacked, Verwoerd had said, the "common sense of the Bantu", and South Africa's "friendship" and "assistance" would lead the homelands to stand with South Africa.⁷⁵ Current government thinkers and strategic planners seem less inclined to leave the matter to chance and more determined to develop policies to offset any potential threat.

The extent to which SADF thinkers agree with government on the question of homeland policy is difficult to determine and in many respects is not that important. Certainly, they would probably subscribe to the necessity of keeping rural blacks separate from urban blacks in order to avoid the future need for simultaneous COIN operations in both sectors. Whether they concur that the present model of homeland self-government and eventual independence facilitates that end is not clear. One must surmise that it would be difficult for them to be pleased with the current conceptualization of homelands in all its particulars.

Defence of the homelands, in other words, is contingent on the pursuit of a homelands policy the precise parameters of which are still unclear. Ef-

forts to provide some greater assurance in strategic terms have taken a number of routes, each of which might be pursued independently, but together might form a consistent package that would expedite state security for the RSA and for the particular homeland governments in question.

There are, of course, multiple components of strategic policy in this realm. To begin with, the SADF is committed to creating, training, and maintaining in matériel the national defence forces for each homeland as it acquires "independence".⁷⁶ As each homeland follows "the road of independence to its end" it will develop its own "military unit in one form or another". If one accepts the basic premise that these non-contiguous territorial patches are to become sovereign and fully independent states, then it would have to follow that their governments would be free to pursue defence policies and foreign policies in their own interests as they perceive them.

The homeland defence forces, in turn, are regarded as an integral part of a larger regional defence scheme, though it is difficult for an outsider to grasp the configuration of that scheme as contemplated. Government spokesmen have repeatedly referred to regional defence. Although homelands have gained what Pretoria calls independence, the homelands still occupy a position within "the military milieu of the Republic of South Africa and not outside the military milieu of the Republic of South Africa".⁷⁷ Just how an independent state is to be made to have its defence policy conform to that of the Republic is not publicly specified, but politically and economically it is more than possible — it is likely. These sorts of issues were raised anew when the government of the Transkei severed diplomatic and military relations with South Africa in 1978 — at the time a theatrical, but practically inconsequential act. Despite the problems this entailed, Pretoria continues to regard homeland armies as part of the southern African defence system arrayed against the "onslaught of marxism and communist imperialism". With the government's resurrection of the idea of a regional constellation or confederation of states, the SADF again is called upon to design and promote a means for joint defence of the region. SADF personnel on secondment or ex-SADF men continue to play high-level roles in the forces of all the homelands except Transkei.

The establishment of regional-cum-ethnic units attached to various SADF regional commands helps

flesh out a complex picture of organizational diversity toward a single end. Initially four such "battalions"/companies were started in 1979. It was over a year later before official announcement of their existence was made (May 1980). In fact, the first four regional units have not fared as well as was hoped. It would appear that the ambitious plans to establish up to eighteen such formations have been set aside. Originally, these regional formations were seen as embryonic homeland armies, to be attached to each new "national state" upon its independence. But, in fact, the SADF established both a Venda National Force as well as a distinct 112 Battalion for Venda volunteers. And many Venda members of the 21 (non- or multi-ethnic) black battalion and of the 112 Battalion were not pleased by the prospect of leaving the SADF for a career in the VNF. It was not until September 1982 that the Venda Government took charge of the 112 Battalion.

Similarly, the KwaZulu Government will have nothing officially to do with the 121 (Zulu) battalion, and it would appear that the force levels of the battalion have dropped dramatically recently. The status of the 113 (Shangaan) and 11 (Swazi) battalions is unclear, especially in light of the kaNgwane-Ingawavuma land swap issues.

A NATO-type alliance is unattainable. More likely some version of a Brezhnev or Monroe doctrine may be on the cards, one that correctly accounts for the military asymmetries that prevail and which may be brought into force unilaterally. The SADF would like to exercise a "right of access" and joint command arrangement in times of crisis or emergency — not that any such formalities would be necessary as demonstrated by current pre-emptive cross-border policies on the Republic's northern frontiers.

Certainly, joint security planning is the lowest common denominator to be expected. By and large most planning efforts involving the Republic and the homelands deal with issues other than strategy. There are bilateral joint defence management councils or committees and quite probably a multilateral working committee for security, although the Ciskei-Transkei animosity would complicate that. One suspects that discussions tend to deal with limited functional or housekeeping chores, such as training, weapons standardization and supply, security intelligence exchange, and so forth. Insofar as there is strategic planning with regard to joint homeland/Republic questions, it is to all intents and

purposes the exclusive purview of the SADF, sovereignty and independence notwithstanding. Under P.W. Botha's leadership at Defence, the SADF was trusted and assigned principal responsibility for negotiating with the homeland governments on defence collaboration. Details were not the concern of Foreign Affairs and Information, for example. This has been a basic attitude that Botha has displayed throughout his tenure. In his view, the upper echelon of the SADF is trustworthy as well as sensitive to political and diplomatic concerns.

The heart of the problem is perceived by many to be territorial or spatial. Thus a good many strategic problems could be prevented if only the non-self-governing homelands were more compact and contiguous, thereby rendering fewer and shorter boundaries for the security forces to "defend". As early as 1974, Brigadier C.L. Viljoen, then Director of Operations for the Army (and today Chief of the SADF), suggested that the consolidation of the homelands would be beneficial from a security standpoint. In his view, the existing fragmentation was militarily unacceptable.⁷⁸ The Van der Walt Commission dealing with homeland consolidation is likewise made to appreciate that decisions regarding parcels of land can affect military matters, as logistical problems are compounded by the reassignment of roads, bridges, and other transport infrastructure. Consolidation of land might weaken the air radar network, and the proximity of homelands to cities might be viewed critically by the police and other security arms. For these reasons, among others, the SADF has sought to make the Commission aware of the possible dangers and opportunities of particular consolidation measures.

In other ways, border adjustments and territorial swaps with neighbouring states might also be seen as having a strategic dimension. As one surveys a map of South Africa, it becomes apparent that the homelands occupy strategic territory on or near the borders.⁷⁹ They form a semi-circle around the industrial and mining heartland of the Republic. Moreover, these territories are generally peopled by ethnic elements that also live in independent neighbouring states. Such a situation is a two-edged sword, as the histories of the non-Russian minorities of the Soviet Union indicate. It poses problems, but it also widens foreign policy and strategic options.

Historical claims based on ethnic occupation were at the base of the Transkei's justification for its severance of diplomatic relations with South

Africa in 1978 and its abrogation of the non-aggression pact and military training and co-operation arrangements. Obviously there were other reasons for their actions, but when international recognition and support were not forthcoming and the Transkei's abject dependence on South Africa became apparent and awkward to deny, the Transkei ended its foray into confrontational politics and diplomatic relations were resumed with Pretoria. Interestingly, the Transkei justified its retreat by fastening on South Africa's expressed willingness to negotiate the Transkei's demands that South Africa transfer East Griqualand to the Transkei.⁸⁰

One way of looking at these relationships is to see them as a series of concentric circles.⁸¹ The inner circle or core consists of the so-called white parts of South Africa. Here the central government is singularly responsible for security and defence. The innermost ring would then consist of those homelands that have not gained or even sought independence. Here would be included, for example, KwaZulu, QwaQwa, Lebowa, and Gazankulu. The "boundaries" in these instances are porous and, in fact, when it comes to security, the Pretoria Government is legally as well as politically responsible for defence and the maintenance of law and order in these units. The second ring, more remote from the inner core, are those homelands that have opted for and been granted "independence". Here the security links are diverse, especially before but also since the act of independence. For a variety of economic and political reasons the Republic sees these territories as a part of the larger regional security system. It is not an association of equals by any means.

It would appear that the South African Government would ideally like to transform the homelands, as each gains its independence, into an "inner ring of buffer states" to replace what had been a defence in depth prior to the fall of the Portuguese holdings in Africa and the Zimbabwe resolution. As a first and rather ineffectual line of defence against insurgents, the bantustan armies do little more than pose token resistance. Still they are important. They are the triphammer that sets into motion emergency plans in which the homeland governments invite in the SADF. The security of the two regimes, Pretoria's and the homelands', are inextricably interwoven, as successive Republic governments have structured the situation.

Unfortunately, this policy is not altogether clear in every case. Pretoria's policies have been inconsis-

tent and most baffling in some cases. Not that consistency is either necessarily wise or important. In some instances, homelands gained their independence with territory flush against a border with a neighbouring state. In another instance a narrow strip of territory was excised and retained by the Republic. In still other instances attempts were made to transfer the territory of an entire homeland or a part of one to an independent neighbouring state. In short, if there is a method to this madness, it is cryptic at the least. If homelands are to constitute a kind of *cordon sanitaire*, why did Pretoria with the consent of the Venda authorities push for a five-kilometre-wide strip of land between Venda and the Limpopo River? By removing Venda from direct contact with the Zimbabwe border, the buffer principle falls away. Factually, this has always been the case. But the homelands on the international borders have been dealt with differently.

Another set of aspirations based on traditional or historical experience, or so it has been argued, had been the dream of Swaziland's late King Sobuza II to unite all Swazis under a single government, namely his Swaziland. To accommodate the King, we have been told, and most probably for a variety of other reasons, Pretoria was prepared to cede Swaziland all of the kaNgwane (Swazi) homeland and the Ingwavuma region of KwaZulu. Although the outcome, details, and larger questions need not concern us here, Pretoria knows full well that boundary disputes and unfulfilled irredenta are lingering sources of friction, even between unequal parties. Transkeian and Ciskeian land claims, vast Lesotho claims, including the QwaQwa homeland, and other malcontents might be seen as amenable to territorial exchanges and transfers. Decisions, especially controversial ones, like the border adjustment schemes involving Swaziland, are not taken lightly or without considerable domestic political bloodletting. The idea of giving large pieces of South African territory to a neighbouring country does not go down easily with a committed nationalist (small n or capital). The manner in which the land cession was decided (unilaterally and in camera) and announced (ambiguously and disingenuously) added to a distrustful sense that there must be another, secret agenda that Pretoria and Mbabane are not publicizing. Strong opposition from other quarters, foreign and domestic, white and black, government supporters and those hostile to the government, mounted. Hence, it was assumed, a substantial *quid pro quo* must have been expected

to offset the likely political costs.

The geostrategic issues, though not widely regarded as particularly crucial to the decision, might have been considered, but the *prima facie* evidence seems loaded against it. Swaziland stability and economic progress might be set back by the addition of some 800 000 more inhabitants, not all of whom are Swazi and large numbers of whom do not want to lose their South African citizenship or become citizens of Swaziland. Given the King's age at the time, a succession struggle combined with the unwieldy integration of peoples who would then constitute over 60 per cent of the country's total population might simply be indigestible. Until recently the bulk of ANC infiltrators into the Republic passed through Swaziland. So ceding more territory to Swaziland (some one million hectares) hardly augurs well for border region security. White farmers in northern Natal and the Lowveld have made such fears known to Pretoria. The thinly populated Ingwavuma region would not be easily policed either.

Another strategic dimension would involve providing Swaziland with its own outlet to the sea and with the opportunity to develop a port at Kosi Bay. Rumours circulating held that the United States, anxious to counter Soviet naval power in the Indian Ocean, and for political reasons unwilling to utilize South African ports or to develop naval facilities in a homeland, thereby tacitly associating with the policy of separate development, might be willing to invest heavily at Kosi Bay if it were a part of Swaziland. Pained denials of this line of reasoning have been firm.

There is no need to speculate further as to why the scheme was hatched. Politically it has been costly for those identified with it. Pik Botha in Foreign Affairs and Dr Piet Koornhof, Minister of Co-operation and Development, were burnt, in partisan terms. In contrast to the speed with which it was announced in June 1982, one gets the impression that it was not such a spur of the moment idea. It is revealing that the Physical Development Plan map for the Republic and surrounding lands clearly places Ingwavuma and kaNgwane *outside* of the Republic's borders and makes them a part of Swaziland. The proposed Industrial Development Plan, in contrast, depicts them as part of South Africa.

According to one account, the scheme originated with the Secretariat of the SSC. In order to try to attract Swaziland's co-operation with constellation/

confederation and to encourage Swaziland to serve as a link between the SADCC and any embryonic constellation involving the Republic, it was proposed that kaNgwane be offered to Swaziland. Ingwavuma was allegedly not a part of the original design. This proposal was then supposedly turned over to the appropriate cabinet committee where both the Foreign Minister and the Minister for Co-operation and Development could better co-ordinate their efforts. At this level Ingwavuma was added to the package. The strategic planners proposed — the politicians disposed in a fashion not at all to the liking of the military thinkers at the SSC Secretariat. If this account is accurate, and confirmation is virtually impossible, then indeed the security establishment has a central role in foreign affairs and in other issues outside of strictly strategic matters. But it does not always carry the day. The DFAI, which would normally handle relations with Swaziland, and the Department of Co-operation and Development, the instrument for homeland affairs, have been embarrassed and upstaged in a policy area that has eluded their principal direction.

Partly as an international as well as a regional public relations effort, partly in order to establish the legal and ideological bases for greater military co-operation, and partly to facilitate cordial relations with neighbouring states and territories, the Republic has offered to negotiate non-aggression pacts with regional states. Only the former homelands, however, have entered into such agreements, most likely as nearly compulsory terms for their own achievement of independence. South Africa has concluded a series of bilateral pacts with each of the four independent homelands. Originally, when the idea was first advanced by J.B. Vorster in 1970, he had hoped to involve independent black states that were members of the OAU. This was, of course, a pipe dream. Equally prominent in the rhetoric have been South African threats to retaliate should neighbouring states harbour insurgents against South Africa. It is the latter message the world chooses to hear, and it is a message repeatedly reinforced by South Africa's military incursions. Black Africa's sense of reality, it would appear, is more attuned to regional experience than professions of non-aggressive desires emanating from the DFAI.

No truly independent states would entertain the prospect, at least publicly, of a co-operative military association or non-aggression pact with South Africa. Any open political link with the Republic is

regarded as a stigma too damaging to contemplate, and what is more, a military treaty implies the acceptance of the political status quo.

The non-aggression pacts between Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Venda and South Africa are fairly simple documents in which each party pledges not to resort to the use of armed force against the territorial sovereignty or political independence of the other. Article 2 is a bit more portentous in that it states that neither party shall allow its territory or airspace to be used as a base or thoroughfare by any state, government, organization or person for military, subversive or hostile actions or activities against the other party. This commits each signatory to a more positive act of preventing such activity. Should a homeland find itself unable to enforce its undertaking as per Article 2, that might provide an excuse and legal basis for South African intervention, or it might prompt an invitation to South African forces by a government in fear of its control. These pacts do not oblige the parties to come to one another's defence when the security of one is threatened. A non-aggression pact, as innocuous as it may at first appear, can be a useful tool in the hands of an activist government.⁸²

If the homelands, as they gain their formal independence, are to be successful as buffers protecting the Republic militarily, some device or plan must be developed by which the Republic can rationalize its own dominant regional role and its own right to intervene in neighbouring territories when it perceives it is useful to do so. Although it may superficially appear to be anathema for NP leaders to think along such lines, some version of a Brezhnev or a Monroe doctrine may be evolved involving the Republic and its homelands. Apparently, General J.C. Smuts advocated a Monroe doctrine in 1918 as a protection for Africa against European, and chiefly German, militarism.⁸³ More recently, such ideas have been broached to apply to perceived threats from the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic and are more limited regionally or even only to security links with the homelands.

Hence the Brezhnev doctrine comes more to mind with its concepts of limited sovereignty and intervention to maintain in power compatible socio-political systems. When the Brezhnev doctrine was propounded, it was an *ex post facto* rationalization for the Soviet-cum-Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. In that crisis involving a regional grouping of independent states, the USSR

asserted that a member of the group possessed only limited sovereignty, thereby enabling fraternal allies to intervene when that partner's class solidarity was endangered. The group, acting co-operatively and "by way of self-defence", had the right to use force to assure fraternal socialist unity and to prevent the possible collapse or overthrow of a member state's government. Insofar as there already is a serious question about the sovereignty of the homeland governments, and in that group solidarity has not, as yet, been institutionalized or formalized *à la* the Warsaw Pact, such a doctrine might more easily be applied toward a homeland government than, say, in a situation where there is no challenge to the juridical independence of the state. Clearly, Pretoria feels that it must have the right to intervene preventatively, "pre-emptive intervention" they call it, if necessary, in any part of its former territories if its interests should be threatened. The task is to devise an instrument and saleable rationale for the expression of that right.⁸⁴

The idea of a confederation of southern African states such as proposed by the Botha Government could expedite such a desire, yet so far the constellation/confederation idea has been most openly applied to economic and functional interaction, not to military/security links. Although it may be Pretoria's policy to regard the homeland security forces as part of the regional defence system to fight together against the marxist onslaught, their anticipated role may be little more than the canary in the coal mine — to signal to the SADF that larger-scale action must be taken to stem the tide of opposition to a homeland government and to the larger apartheid system. Since so far no homeland has gained any form of international recognition outside of South Africa, intervention, on invitation or without it, would be relatively easy. It would also confirm the rest of the world's scepticism of the homeland experiment.

In one respect the idea of constellation/confederation is the brainchild of Foreign Affairs and Information and the South African economic establishment. If the neighbouring states can become enmeshed in an economic network, expanded to include functional and even diplomatic ties, then military operations become less likely and less necessary. Structural control is superior to coercive control — and cheaper. The specifics of various constellation/confederation plans are not that important to this discussion.⁸⁵ What is clear is that total strategy includes the creation of some form of

confederation, at minimum involving independent and non-independent homelands, and maximally including regional neighbours that belong to the OAU. If carried to its logical conclusion, co-operation and interaction today might lead in a stage-like progression to a re-integration into a confederation and eventually to a federation of diverse national states. In this way, the ultimate dream might be to join together what the Verwoerdian paradigm sought to tear asunder. White South Africa is still dominant. Confederation becomes a "second prize" of sorts for South Africa's blacks understandably disheartened by their exclusion from the body politic and from the proposals of the President's Council and the Prime Minister for a new dispensation. Bear in mind that the political, ideological and economic conflicts of interest and the asymmetries cannot be wished away by the assumption that shared economic realities can heal all breaches. Black southern Africa is more realistic than Republican spokesmen care to admit.

The wider constellation is "dead", or so it would seem. Constellation has been a concept long connected with Pik Botha. When the design for the Constellation of Southern African States was announced, even before the Zimbabwean elections, it seemed a scheme to strengthen the Muzorewa forces in the voting ahead. But Pik was also pushing to steal the march on the military and their hawkish views on foreign policy. He seemed to be thinking that if successful it might strengthen his hand in Cabinet and in the SSC. He was, as one analyst put it, "prepared to barter the future in order to secure the Zimbabwe he wanted". He failed. His announcement of a constellation was premature, and Mugabe's victory led to Pik being outmaneuvered in domestic party politics.

Confederation concentrating on the new "independent national states" carved out of the pre-1976 Republic seems about all that can be expected, and even much of that progresses *sub rosa* and with difficulty. At each stage through the years, South Africa has been forced to scale down its image of regional co-operation. This narrow construction represents a blow to Pik Botha, the DFAI and the economic regionalists keen on spinning an economic spiderweb of constraints based on what they erroneously see as mutual self-interest. A defeat for Foreign Affairs can be translated into a victory for Defence in the hierarchy of Pretoria's politics. To be sure, the main thrust of confederal dreams is still economic. But there are hopes, one

suspects, to parlay the bilateral non-aggression pacts into a more positive and assertive multi-lateral arrangement, perhaps even an outright alliance. That would be the signal for Defence assuming an even greater role in the realm of foreign affairs.

VII. Foreign Policy

What has emerged, in part, from the preceding discussion has been a picture of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information being eclipsed by other governmental institutions and agencies, even on decisions directly touching upon foreign policy. This process began back in the Vorster years with the rise of BOSS and the Information Department and the personalities associated with them. The DFAI was outmaneuvered and later the defence establishment outflanked the DFAI still further.

It is hard to imagine that any decision as important and as controversial as South Africa's decision to intervene in Angola before and immediately after that country's independence in November 1975 would not be hotly debated and cause controversy in high places. The Angolan decision was no exception.⁸⁶

Prior to the decision to intervene, General Van den Bergh had provided much of the impetus for Vorster's efforts at détente and for his reluctant willingness to meet with leaders of OAU member-states.⁸⁷ Hilgard Muller had proved to be a lacklustre Foreign Minister and certainly not influential in the Party or the Government. He was not a *strong and effective advocate of departmental policy* and growth in NP councils, certainly not in comparison to Van den Bergh, P.W. Botha or Connie Mulder, each in his way headstrong and manipulative.

It came as no surprise, then, that when Government was faced with some very difficult decisions regarding policy in the unfolding Angolan civil war leading to independence, Muller would take a back seat and more forceful personalities would contest the wheel. Insofar as the policy dispute can be characterized as one between hawks and doves, it was Defence arrayed against BOSS and Foreign Affairs (particularly Secretary Brand Fourie and Ambassador Pik Botha), and Information playing a supportive role. It is apparent that as conditions shifted in the field the coalition of voices for or against deeper involvement or withdrawal shifted. In this instance, field conditions refer not only to the military situation in Angola itself, but also to

the global diplomatic picture, and particularly the indecisive American position (especially among diverse US branches and organs of government), the appeals of black states in Africa, the ebb and flow of independence movement support, OAU activities, and other foreign military and diplomatic dabblings.

South Africa did not appear to know what it wanted to do largely because the same South Africans were not involved, to the same degree, in every stage of the decision-making, and when they did contend for power, their domestic bases for support rested on shifting foundations. It is not appropriate to argue here the whys and wherefores of the issue. Suffice it to note the effects of the decision-making nexus during this period.

To begin with, although Defence and the SADF, were steadily identified with a hawkish orientation, they were somewhat restrained in their policy advocacy. Perhaps they were too inclined to believe their intelligence about MPLA weaknesses and UNITA-FNLA strengths. Perhaps they overestimated American commitment and underestimated Soviet aims. For whatever reasons, they did advocate deeper involvement and more direct and unambiguous orders. But in the context of a military invasion, they were temperate. Their initial large-scale strike, Operation Zulu, demonstrated restraint in the number of South African troops deployed and the composition of the forces, consisting of a Bushman (San) battalion, a black FNLA battalion, and just a dozen or two SADF officers and NCOs. *Perhaps this reflected the compromise character of the decision and the conduct of the intervention, by which hawks could gain the decision provided the doves were mollified by a less intensive and extensive SADF deployment.* The later operations, "Foxbat", "X-ray", and "Orange", for example, were more overtly South African exercises in terms of personnel. Through that period, however, there were few if any doves among the South African military strategists. But at least they appreciated that little could be gained by sending in more South African troops without more tangible Western support. And when they came to appreciate that Western support would not be forthcoming, and that what had been a free-wheeling bush war had become more like a conventional war with long logistical lines, larger troop concentrations, rapidly deployed vehicle columns with heavier artillery and projectiles, and when the SADF thinkers realized that their Angolan allies and clients,

UNITA and FNLA, were ill-prepared for that kind of protracted struggle, they were willing, perhaps reluctantly, to pull back to more defensible (militarily and diplomatically) positions.

The decision to retreat was taken over the Christmas holiday during which the Cabinet was unable to meet. The military hierarchy wanted to continue their support for FNLA and UNITA. The doves in BOSS and the DFA argued that this military intervention was being used against South Africa and alienating many African and Western states that had not been particularly sympathetic to the MPLA or a Cuban presence in Africa. Curiously, it was P.W. Botha who signalled a shift in government thinking when he stated, in effect, that South Africa would almost certainly reconsider its involvement in Angola if its interests in southern Angola were guaranteed and attacks into Namibia were terminated.⁸⁸

Throughout the intervention, top military men felt tethered to a foreign policy that made their jobs awkward and difficult. During the crisis it was BOSS, not the DFA, that kept communications open with black governments in Africa and it was BOSS that was able to elicit discreet appeals from these governments to intervene and to stay in Angola.⁸⁹ It was BOSS, as well, that argued for withdrawal and eventually they got their way. Dr Eschel Rhoodie of Information was sent off to Washington in January 1976 to meet with Americans (neither President Ford nor Dr Kissinger would see him). In all these dealings it was the DFA, and especially the Minister of Foreign Affairs, that was conspicuously silent or absent. By this time the DFA had lost its grip on foreign policy, and out of the crisis emerged BOSS and Information as Prime Minister Vorster's "second Department of Foreign Affairs".

Interestingly, it was the Angolan issue with Defence arrayed against BOSS and the DFA that probably led P.W. Botha to want to reorganize the entire foreign policy decision-making apparatus. When the information scandal broke and BOSS and Vorster plummeted from power, P.W. Botha was able to establish his new, more rationalized policy machinery.

There are stories of other major confrontations between P.W. Botha and Van den Bergh in foreign affairs that contribute to this atmosphere of competition at the centre.⁹⁰ When the Frelimo Government assumed power in Mozambique, Prime Minister Vorster took a conciliatory line (in contrast to his posture in the Angolan civil war). According to

Dr Rhoodie, P.W. Botha, as Minister of Defence, sought to support counter-revolutionary guerrillas trying to unseat President Machel. At the same time that Vorster had arranged to assist with the repair of Mozambique's railways and harbours, Botha secretly ordered the DMI to supply extensive quantities of arms and ammunition to guerrillas operating from a base near Komatipoort. When General Van den Bergh learned of this he sent men to Nelspuit and Komatipoort to immobilise the equipment being transported to Mozambique.

On another occasion immediately after the withdrawal of SAP units from Rhodesia, Rhoodie has maintained that Botha arranged for 500 troops to be airlifted from Waterkloof Air Force Base to Rhodesia to help Ian Smith combat the Patriotic Front forces. This coincided precisely with Vorster's assurances that South Africa was no longer directly involved in the Rhodesian war. Again, at the eleventh hour, General Van den Bergh told Vorster about Botha's designs and foiled Botha's plans.

The Namibian war adds to the authoritative role of the SADF in foreign policy. In effect, vast regions of Namibia are "governed" by the SADF, and the SADF possesses a virtual veto over any settlement proposal. In fact, top SADF voices participate directly in the negotiation process. Major-General Charles Lloyd (Chief of the SWATF) and Lieutenant-General Jannie Geldenhuys (Chief of the Army) have been members of various negotiation delegations. The DMI also participates. Although they would appear to support different positions (Lloyd and the DMI the hawks, and Geldenhuys the doves), they do bring a common professional military perspective into the proceedings. Various members of government and those close to government maintain that government wants a settlement on Namibia, but a quick agreement involving major South African concessions is not likely. Those in a position to shape the practical outcome in Namibia, the military men, would appear to favour the view that the Republic can best be defended from forward positions. When General Constand Viljoen talks of pushing SWAPO forces as far back as possible, his allusions are to spatial and territorial considerations far beyond the boundaries of Namibia.⁹¹ Although he has stressed that it is for government, not the SADF, to decide, General Viljoen insists that South Africa should not "rush into a settlement within the next year" (1983). "We are capable of maintaining the military situation

for a long time", Viljoen stated. The government should, he went on, take the time to reach a long-lasting solution. Hidden in these vague terms is a hard-line view that the military still has the key role to play in Namibia, strategically and politically, and that SADF thinkers are extremely sceptical of any concessions to other negotiating actors. It is apparent that the military is confident that it has the combat situation in the field well in hand. This being the case, SADF leaders are portentously signalling the politicians that they had better not do anything impetuous or irresolute. Viljoen has implied that even should a negotiated settlement be reached, if it failed to meet the SADF's demands, the SADF might have "to go back in" when Namibia was "again burning". From this vantage point, the SADF would seem to want to delay, as much as practical, a settlement that might lead to a SWAPO government in Windhoek. From an SADF viewpoint, independence for its own sake is worthless and does not necessarily bring peace. Look at Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, Viljoen pointed out. Just as importantly, the SADF is in the position to engage in cross-border strikes, to undermine a cease-fire should an agreement be reached, or to undermine the transitional process to independence. Initiative, it would seem, lies with Defence Headquarters, not with the DFAI.

Most disturbing of all in shaping the Republic's overall regional foreign policy posture are the apparent efforts to destabilize the domestic order in neighbouring states. To be sure, one cannot document or declare with assurance a conscious decision by government or agencies thereof to destabilize the region. Rather, one can arrive at such an assertion by assessing the sum total of a number of policy decisions and their cumulative impact on regional affairs. Although governmental rhetoric fastens on a desire for peaceful co-existence, constellations, and non-intervention as hallmarks of South African regional policy, actual policy also consists of a growing dossier of reports of large and small-scale open and clandestine raids into nearby states, the effects of which have been to heighten insecurities in areas near the international borders with the Republic. From close up it may appear to be a series of unrelated, ad hoc responses to diverse stimuli. But from afar what emerges is an unmistakable pattern of coercive hostility toward governments already inclined to be hostile to Pretoria, insecure and even skittish about incursions from the remaining white regime in Africa.

It is pointless detailing the various operations, charges, and denials in order to arrive at an empirical statement about conscious policy. Suffice it to say that the list is long and damning. SADF forces on numerous occasions have struck into Angola, not just in hot pursuit, but in large-scale, planned, coded operations that could only have been launched with the approval of government at the highest levels. Moreover, SADF forces have occupied vast stretches of Angolan territory for considerable periods of time, ostensibly to destroy and disperse large SWAPO concentrations of fighters and material, but also to terrorize Namibian refugees and local Angolan peoples and to demolish the economic infrastructure of the region nearest the border with Namibia.⁹² No manner of denial can efface the facts of these destructive results. This has been going on since the 1975-1976 invasion and has been most actively pursued since 1980.

Controversy has surrounded the extent of official SADF and DMI involvement in the abortive attempted coup in the Seychelles. Ex-SADF and ex-NIS personnel participated, and in their defence they have tried to implicate high officers of the SADF, DMI, and the South African Government. The full story did not emerge from the Pietermaritzburg trial of the airplane hijackers or from the captured mercenaries in the Seychelles. In fact, the South African authorities have sought to draw a curtain of silence, insofar as the law allows, over these issues. The Minister of Defence sought a clamp on certain evidence at the trial by invoking the General Law Amendment Act of 1969, section 29 of which provides that no person can be forced to give information if a Minister of State signs an affidavit saying the release of the information would affect the security of state.⁹³ Later in the year police confiscated reporters' notebooks and documents about NIS links to Martin Dolincheck, who was awaiting trial in the Seychelles on treason charges for his role in the coup attempt. A complaint from the Director General of the NIS invoked the Official Secrets Act. Even though the South African court determined that this was not an SADF operation, evidence clearly showed that somebody in the Defence Force took a sympathetic view of the attempt, and it appeared to some of the accused that the imprimatur of SADF approval was put on the arrangements. SADF weapons were somehow made available to the mercenaries involved. Perhaps what is most disturbing is that SADF officers could act without the knowledge or approval of

government or of their military superiors. Either the SADF staged the operation or else it was not an official SADF enterprise, in which case the SADF was negligent in not controlling its own people.

The inept January 1981 raid into Mozambique, ostensibly a surgical strike against ANC operatives in Matola, outside of Maputo, left thirty-one dead and others wounded. More recently, in August 1982, three South African soldiers were killed in Zimbabwe. According to General Viljoen, they, along with fourteen black soldiers, had been on an "unauthorized" mission. But this leads one to speculate on this mission's purpose, on how many undetected "unauthorized" missions have been into Zimbabwe, and on why the SADF command was unable to control and prevent such a mission.

In December 1982, according to an SADF spokesman, thirty-seven ANC "terrorists" and civilians died in an SADF raid into Maseru, Lesotho. This is an attack openly admitted by the SADF. Despite the fact that these two admitted raids have ostensibly been aimed at opponents of the South African regime, they effectively sow the seeds of fear and insecurity in the region.

Persistent accusations and reports of border incursions, military over-flight violations, and even short-term territorial occupation against the territorial integrity of Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe by South African military units, raids not always aimed at opponents of South Africa harboured in that state, constitute a pattern of hostility and aggression difficult to deny. If this were not enough, one might add unproven accusations of assassination attempts, sabotage, and intelligence "dirty tricks", and the destabilizing activities of counter-revolutionary movements targetting leftist and even some moderate black governments in the region. These include support and assistance for diverse dissident movements, including UNITA and FNL in Angola, the Mozambique National Resistance Movement, the Mushalala gang in Zambia, dissident Matabele elements in Zimbabwe, and the Lesotho Liberation Army guerrillas, possibly harboured in the Free State. The evidence of South Africa's encouragement, sanctuary, training, equipping, financing, logistical and diplomatic support contributes to a widespread atmosphere of animosity in the region. One might add that in some respects it is a mirror image of Soviet policy in southern Africa. That is because both South Africa and the Soviet Union share a similar policy style for opposite ends: they

work through proxies to destabilize the region. After all, an opponent's weakness is one's own strength.

Resort to such activities demonstrates the extent of Pretoria's diplomatic and political isolation. Policy by coercion and proxy is the measure of a pariah state caught in a deteriorating regional political balance.⁹⁴ The military trump card is a deceptive indicator of policy — superficially reflecting strength and purpose, but in reality a counsel of desperation rather than one of confidence and patience.

South Africa, it would seem, has come to accede to a superficially quite revolutionary doctrine of regional intervention. Increasingly, they have found it useful to employ or to encourage dissident factions from neighbouring states to intervene against their home countries. Since the rules of international law apply only through the intermediary of the state, there would appear to be little inhibiting the use of such forces against former homelands whose sovereignty and independence is universally challenged. In fact, however, since no one but South Africa recognizes such governments, South Africa might directly intervene even without an "invitation" to do so and argue that no sovereignty is violated since no one recognizes bantustan sovereignty. Without sovereignty the doctrine of non-intervention falls away. This is the virtue, if there is one, of a Brezhnev-like doctrine predicated on the concept of limited sovereignty.

When it comes to intervention further afield one might seek to justify intervention as the exercise of the traditional right of self-defence.⁹⁵ Alternatively, it might be rationalized as a form of counter-intervention, i.e., intervention to redress a balance of force that has been disrupted by another's outside intervention. In this case, the Angola interventions might so qualify, but only in a contorted fashion, since the Cubans have the blessing, indeed have been invited by the Luanda Government. The doctrine of hot pursuit is well established in international law and on occasion might be helpful, too. But South Africa would be hard-pressed to adopt that line in most of these cases, since the cross-border code-named operations are not in straight-away hot pursuit, but are operations necessitating considerable planning and logistical support. Some take the form of punitive raids in retaliation for guerrilla raids staged earlier by revolutionary forces believed to be based in a neighbouring target state. In those few cases where hot pursuit is indeed taking place, there is an immediacy and spontaneity

that is undeniable. What is more, even in legitimate cases of hot pursuit, how deep and for how long may the pursuer penetrate after contact has been broken off before "hot pursuit" no longer applies?

More likely there is emerging in the world a doctrine of pre-emptive intervention based rather on a rationale rooted in an arrogance of relative power. Usually the objectives have been precise and limited. Pre-emptive intervention is exemplified by Israel's strikes into Lebanon and its destruction of the nuclear reactor in Iraq as it is in Rhodesia's raids on Lusaka and United States bombing raids on Viet Cong concentrations in Cambodia. This is a form of anticipatory defence that, depending on the context and situation, may be more or less defensible.

Sometimes intervention involves direct (although usually covert) state acts; more often it employs proxies indigenous to the target state. According to this emerging new political doctrine of pre-emptive intervention, the inherent right of self-help or self-defence warrants the use of pre-emptive intervention if: (1) a neighbouring government is hostile to the intervening regime; or (2) if it is not especially hostile or directly abetting those exiles in arms against the intervening government but still is unwilling or unable to curb their activities; or even more minimally (3) if that host government may at some future time either aid or be unable to control announced enemies of the intervening regime. This is not a widely accepted doctrine of law — indeed, few if any governments would publicly acknowledge their adherence to this norm. Rather it arises because it seems to be practiced by a variety of states today. A government may presumably do what its leaders perceive it must do to survive, sweepingly defined.

It is argued that the security of the intervening state is jeopardized if it fails to act. The legal meaning of such acts is rather ambiguous. But insofar as unilateral acts of pre-emptive intervention have no collective basis or approval, the determination of their legitimacy often rests with some international body such as the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations. In these instances, situational and political criteria are applied. To the intervening government, legitimacy is usually not the crucial issue. A unilateral act of pre-emptive intervention derives what justification and legitimacy it claims because the state's leaders perceive a condition of encirclement or embattlement. In their eyes, intervention is unquestionably an act of self-defence.

One might see this as the international functional equivalent of what in American constitutional law is known as the "bad tendency test", whereby government may limit in part one's constitutional first-amendment rights of free speech if, at some future time, there is a likelihood that such speech might lead to substantive evils that disrupt the good order of the state, thereby demonstrating a "bad tendency". Some elements in South African governing circles, it would appear, subscribe to such a view, international law and practice notwithstanding. The very revolutionary, socialist nature of some regimes, or their willingness to harbour opponents of apartheid, or their instability *per se*, may be seen as ominous in the long run, crying out for preventative action.

It is ironic that P.W. Botha would, at the same time that he subscribes to a hard line in foreign policy, try to push a more liberal (only in relative terms) line domestically. By being so enamoured of the views and advice from those of a military orientation, P.W. may well be a prisoner of a narrow and inaccurate reading of regional political realities which takes on the quality of a self-fulfilling prophecy. There is something badly wrong, practically self-deluding, in the Defence view which regards Zambia, for example, as a "Marxist satellite" in the same sense as Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.* Undeniably committed to Marxism, one might also argue whether even the last three governments can fairly be called "satellites". Moreover, this very statement was published just weeks before the Prime Minister was scheduled to meet with President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. Senior military decision-makers have proven uncanny in their capacity to misinterpret the intentions of their counterparts abroad. What South Africa lacks, as US Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker has written, is "the capacity for sophisticated threat assessment and political analysis",⁹⁷ particularly when it comes to politics in black African states. This includes everything from their inability to appreciate the popularity of Robert Mugabe prior to the Zimbabwean elections, to their misunderstanding of United States politics in their initial invasion of Angola in 1975. American executive branch officials, no matter how highly placed, simply were not in a position to commit the Government (and certainly not Congress) to assist in military operations abroad. Had South African officials really understood American politics, they would have known this from the start.

As a result, the DFAI has been forced to conduct a responsive foreign policy, to extinguish brush fires of rage, incredulity, and criticism brought on by frequent SADF and badly disguised proxy thrusts at South Africa's neighbours. SADF top brass repeatedly plead that in the long run no military solution is possible, yet their actions make political solutions more and more remote.

VIII. Conclusions

It has been increasingly apparent to anyone who cares to observe the political realities of South Africa that the security establishment has gained prominence in policy-making activity. This rise in importance itself grows out of a commitment to resist the "total onslaught" by mounting a "total national strategy". It is justified by many as a survival response in a militantly hostile world. Early in the regime of P.W. Botha it became apparent that the defence élite had achieved greater status and power, especially in comparison to its place in the Vorster scheme. One journalist exaggeratedly wrote that the governmental setup was "popularly known as 'General Botha's Junta'", a term, it might be added never otherwise encountered when trying to research the phenomenon.⁹⁸

A situational analysis demands that the power shifts described in these pages not be divorced from their political context. P.W. Botha is determined to see South Africa through its present malaise. His governmental experience lies with the defence forces, which he has come to respect and admire. His would appear to be a sort of De Gaulle strategy by which essential, yet manageable or controlled, change would be devised and implemented with the concurrent force of the state and its instruments of coercion. Government will be flexible and pragmatic in creating a domestic and foreign policy order, but absolutely firm in dealing with real challenges to its stability and authority. What are the genuine threats to the system and who is to make that determination? How much change is necessary to defuse an embryonic revolutionary situation? It has been claimed, for example by Dr John Seiler, that members of the SADF general staff sent a memorandum to P.W. Botha, then Minister of Defence, after the Soweto uprising, "implying that some form of military takeover might be necessary to bring about socio-political changes". As a reaction to the inability or unwillingness of the Vorster Government to respond creatively to the Soweto challenges, the SADF leadership felt that it was

necessary to inform their civilian superior of their views. No doubt they merely confirmed P.W. Botha's predilections.⁹⁹ It is to be a changed order in which the essence of the system will be unchanged. Those who rule will continue to rule largely because they have discarded the excess ideological baggage of the past and because they have streamlined the governmental machinery and instruments of control as never before. Mr. Botha would seem to be building his machine for the long haul, and with the approval of the military men.

The youth of the top military brass is striking. General Malan was 46 when he took over as Commanding Officer of the SADF and 50 when he became Minister of Defence. General Viljoen was only 42 when he took over command of the Army, and Lieutenant-General Jack Dutton became Chief of Staff of the SADF at the age of 47. There is, as well, a certain homogeneity among the men who achieve high rank in the armed services. At the top, political reliability matters. Most of the senior officers rose to authority before P.W. became Prime Minister. It is now decreed that all who aspire to leadership earn a B. Mil. at the Military Academy at Saldanha Bay. While there, a certain conformity of thought can be instilled into degree candidates. In that fashion, candidates for entry into the senior circle can be "tested" and the uncommitted and potential critics can be sifted out. In a way, one might sense an "informal master plan" emerging and, characteristic of the military mind, *verlig* but still very committed to the continuation of the white dominant society. There are, of course, personality differences and personal divisions among ambitious men. These might easily be translated into different policy preferences from time to time. But compared to intra-armed forces competition elsewhere, these differences are tractable.

Throughout this essay the emphasis has been on discussing and, to a lesser extent, documenting this undeniable trend of a greater reliance and involvement of the security establishment in decision-making and its output. The problem for a social scientist is all too evident. By setting out to study a particular phenomenon, one may inadvertently fasten on confirmatory data to the neglect of evidence or events that do not corroborate the basic hypothesis being examined.

In this respect it is vital to point out that the findings are not all one-sided. The "defence family", if it can be called that, does not always get its own way, and its influence is not uniformly high on all

issues. There is a deep-rooted Boer resistance to a standing professional army, and a reticence to give that force too much authority independent of the elected government. Such an outlook stems from the same colonial experience and mentality that led American colonists to press for constitutional provisions that assured civilian supremacy over the military, the right of all citizens to bear arms (in order to form their own militia), Congressional control over the budget, and protection against the quartering of soldiers in private houses without permission of the owners. The British colonial authorities, after all, made excessive demands on the American colonists. When the colonists opposed or threatened to revolt against what they regarded as exploitative British policy, the authorities sought to impose their wills upon the recalcitrant colonists. That usually entailed the imposition of force, involving both British and occasionally mercenary forces from the continent. This led eventually to the war for independence. Once having achieved independence the Founding Fathers vowed to establish their opposition to a parasitic armed force in the Constitution.¹⁰⁰ In its South African construct, the concept of *volksleer* is deeply engrained, and this value has yet to be reconciled fully with a professionalized career armed force.

There are, as well, other individuals and institutions who also question P.W. Botha's reliance on the security forces. In the Party and in the Cabinet are powerful forces with a slightly different agenda for government, or at least slightly different priorities. Although individual political fortunes shift regularly, it would appear that particular leaders have been able to accumulate power, among them J.C. Heunis, Minister of Constitutional Development and Chairman of the Cabinet Committee for Internal Affairs and other key committees in the Office of the Prime Minister, and F.W. de Klerk, leader of the National Party in the Transvaal and Minister of Internal Affairs. Heunis is now charged with the task of supervising constitutional revision, and de Klerk is widely regarded as the political strategist entrusted with dealing with the right wing inside and out of the NP and a possible successor to P.W. Botha as leader of the Party. Both men gained considerable leverage in the 1982 Party struggle culminating in a July Cabinet shuffle.

These men are not especially close to the security establishment although, unlike the DFAI, they are not in direct competition with it either. It is worth noting that General Malan has not immediately as-

sumed a place of great importance in Party councils and in Parliament as some had predicted when he was first named to Cabinet.¹⁰¹ Although his role has not been weakened since October 1980, it does appear that he has been subject to intensive on-the-job political and partisan training. General Malan is an outsider in partisan politics. Although he is popular nationally, he has no provincial base in the Party. Party loyalists have long been reluctant to reward co-opted leaders too rapidly. Hence, individuals such as Pik Botha (Foreign Affairs), Dr Gerrit Viljoen (Education), Dr Owen Horwood (Finance), and General Malan, as examples, are expected to pay their partisan dues, so to speak, before gaining the topmost ranks in the Party. A case might be made that the defence establishment had been better represented when P.W. Botha was Minister of Defence and General Malan was Chief of the SADF.

Likewise, elements in Cabinet concerned with the economic well-being of the country are wary of committing too many resources to military expenditure and are keenly aware of the disorder that arises from expanded national service and Citizen Force obligations for economically active men. Of course, other elements of the economic community, in government and in the private sector, argue that their efforts, especially at regional investment, trade and general economic co-operation, are made more burdensome by an aggressive military posture toward neighbouring states. Economic instruments of foreign policy gain in effectiveness by a patient buildup of links and trusted relationships — they can be swiftly undermined by threats and open or clandestine military strikes into states with which, ostensibly, correct relations are sought.

In another sense, although the SSC has been regarded as a sounding board for SADF views, in a way it is also a check on the SADF. It reinforces a reliance on the principle of civilian supremacy over the military and to political paramountcy in the decision-making process. The military voice is clear and, as we have explained, well placed, but in the end it, too, must come to accept that this is an elected government answerable to an exclusive electorate, but nonetheless answerable.

Since P.W. Botha became Prime Minister he has reorganized the executive branch. This has entailed a heavy emphasis on planning, administrative reorganization and co-ordination, and a far greater reliance on professional advice, even if that entails going beyond the normal state machinery. The

SADF has gladly made its superior organizational skills available to P.W. Botha, and in the process has seen its role grow in power and stature. All aspects of government planning are now undertaken with strategy and security in mind. "Regional planning, economic planning, manpower planning, constitutional planning—the whole gamut is influenced by security and internal stability considerations."¹⁰² Executive government demands decisive, efficient, and far-sighted leadership. The managerial revolution in South Africa has been itself prompted by the military with its distinctive leadership style, and the military, in turn, benefits from a government that effectively accepts its framework of analysis and its strategic-ideological mind set.

Make no mistake, the military alone does not possess these skills and viewpoints. And it alone does not have access to power brokers in government. P.W. Botha has been open to ideas from all "acceptable" and knowledgeable quarters. This heightens governmental dependence on civil servants rather than upon elected partisan officials of limited experience. In the SSC, for example, there are some working groups empowered to take decisions on their own, thereby giving civil servants power unencumbered by the need to secure immediate political approval in Parliament.

Part of the explanation for the rise of the security establishment in central decision-making organs is that both P.W. Botha and his closest NP associates on the one hand, and the military-industrial axis on the other, appreciate the need for change in South Africa. The issue of political-governmental reorganization is not an apolitical desire for efficiency or rationalization. It is very much linked to the leaders' tolerance of and awareness of the need for change, a controlled change to be sure, that seeks better to defend the essence of the South African status quo. In this regard the best form of conservatism is a modulated liberalism. Magnus Malan and most ranking officers in the SADF believe that South Africa's future solutions must be principally political, but within the context of a secure and stable order.

According to this view, the struggle for South Africa is mainly a political and social contest. The military dimension is chiefly concerned with providing the politicians with the time and secure environment to bring about the needed changes. "It is at the most a twenty per cent military struggle as opposed to an eighty per cent political, economic and

social struggle", Brigadier Ben Roos, then Director of Army Operations, has stated.¹⁰³ General Malan has often expressed similar views. The axiomatic 80:20 ratio is shared by the former PFP spokesman on defence, Harry Schwarz; the NRP leader, W. Vause Raw; journalists, commentators, and ordinary citizens.¹⁰⁴ General Malan confidently asserts: "Militarily we can win the war. We can win it tomorrow. But this is the type of battle you never win on the military field. You win it in the political field."¹⁰⁵ It might be asked in all seriousness, what are the politicians doing to assure that military pressures will eventually be relieved? Will the new constitutional design which neglects in its essentials the black seventy per cent of the population, satisfy the black leaders and citizenry? The answer is an emphatic "no". The military arm is therefore indispensable. This perspective the military shares with the key partisan leaders and hence military influence, based on shared values and analytical modes, grows.

The Republic of South Africa finds itself in a state of "pre-semi-war", a situation that it has largely brought on itself. The principal opposition to the regime, the ANC, is in the process of trying to build political support and to organize within the country. There is no question that the ANC and its imprisoned leaders are popular among the urban blacks. And it is also clear that ANC operatives infiltrating into the Republic are more effective and better trained than their colleagues of the past. But the ANC is not in the position to achieve more than a propaganda victory here and there. They hope, no doubt, that well publicized acts of violence will demonstrate the regime's inability to maintain order, and will force the government to lash back viciously, thereby weakening the regime further among black South Africans and in the eyes of the outside world. In this sense, the May 1983 bombings near Maputo were the reaction the ANC expected and wanted as retaliation for the Pretoria car bombing outside Air Force Headquarters. But the ANC is by no means able to launch more than a series of isolated sabotage attacks and hope that their impact ramifies domestically and internationally.

Yet in this smouldering conflict, the rise of the security establishment has been almost inevitable. The problem for the South African Government is that it is faced with a virtually insoluble dilemma. It feels that it must alert the people to the danger and threat posed by a total onslaught and must prepare

itself for the expanding conflict, at the same time that it must try to reassure the electorate that panic and desperate or extreme measures are not called for. To reconcile these opposing aims may be

asking too much of any government, least of all one whose popular base is, by choice and design, narrowly defined and exclusive.

Notes

1. *Sunday Times*, 20 June 1982, p. 34.
2. *Sunday Express*, 20 June 1982, p. 22.
3. Edwin S. Munger, *Notes on the Formation of South African Foreign Policy* (Pasadena, California: Grant Dahlstrom/The Castle Press, 1965), p. 85.
4. See J.S.M. Simpson, *South Africa Fights* (London: Hodder & Houghton, 1941), pp. 94–101; and Deon Fourie, "South African Forces in World War II", *New Nation*, vol. 2, no. 12 (July 1969), p. 19.
5. See Deon Geldenhuys, *South Africa's Search for Security Since the Second World War* (Braamfontein: South African Institute of International Affairs [SAIIA] September 1978); Robert S. Jaster, *South Africa's Narrowing Security Options*, Adelphi Paper No. 159 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980); and Deon Geldenhuys, *What Do We Think? A Survey of White Opinion on Foreign Policy Issues* (Braamfontein: SAIIA, 1982).
6. As quoted in Geldenhuys, *Some Foreign Policy Implications of South Africa's "Total National Strategy"*, with particular reference to the "12-point plan" (Braamfontein: SAIIA, March 1981), p. 3.
7. As quoted in *The Star*, 10 September 1977.
8. Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply, 1982* (Cape Town: South African Navy Printing and Photographic Unit, 1982), p. 2.
9. Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly, *Debates* (Hansard), 31 January 1978, cols. 103–104. Hereinafter cited as *Assembly Debates*.
10. *Ibid.*, col. 105.
11. See: P.W. Botha in *Assembly Debates*, 8 March 1979, col. 2067; and 21 March 1980, cols. 3317–3319.
12. Philip Frankel, "Race and Counter-Revolution: South Africa's 'Total Strategy'" *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, vol. 18, no. 3 (October, 1980), p. 273.
13. First mention of a similar idea, although applied only to the military goals of the white community and advocating a commando structure as part of COIN activities, appeared in: Neil Orpen, *Total Defence* (Cape Town: Nasionale Boekhandel, 1967).
14. See: Geldenhuys, *Some Foreign Policy Implications*; and Frankel, "Race and Counter-Revolution", pp. 272–292. Some of this author's views are very briefly outlined in: "The Truth About Total Onslaught", *Sunday Times*, 15 August 1982.
15. *Sunday Express*, 24 May 1981; and 30 May 1982; *Sunday Tribune*, 24 May 1981; *Rand Daily Mail and The Star*, 29 May 1982.
16. "Army and Politics", part 3, *Sechaba* (June 1980), p. 11.
17. Brig. C.C. van der Westhuizen quoted in *The Star*, Weekly Air Edition (WAE), 30 October 1982, p. 3. See also the excellent series on the current situation on defence by Andrew Walker in *The Star*, 1–5 June 1982.
18. Brig. C.C. van der Westhuizen in *The Star*, WAE, 30 October 1982, p. 3.
19. *The Star*, WAE, 2 October 1982, p. 3.
20. See Kenneth W. Grundy, *Soldiers Without Politics: Blacks in the South African Armed Forces* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 118–133 et pass.
21. *The Star*, 1 June 1982, p. 12.
22. Statutes of the Republic of South Africa, Defence Act of 1957, Sec. 3 (2)a.
23. Jonathan Kapstein, "Armed Confrontation Builds in South Africa", *Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute*, vol. 107, no. 12 (December 1981), pp. 37–38.
24. *Rand Daily Mail*, 5 June 1982, p. 5.
25. *Los Angeles Times*, 18 March 1982, Pt. I–C, p. 6; and *The Star*, 5 January 1983. See also: Tom Lodge, "The African National Congress in South Africa, 1976–1982; Guerilla War and Armed Propaganda", a paper presented at the African Studies Association Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., October 1982.
26. "Changing defence strategy", *Financial Mail*, vol. 82, no. 3 (15 January 1982), pp. 190–191.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 191.
28. *The Star*, 13 July 1982, p. 19; and *Rand Daily Mail*, 13 July 1982, p. 1. See also *Assembly Debates*, 7 June 1982, cols. 8411–8571; and 11 June 1982, cols. 9416–9450; and especially Gen. Malan's explanation in "'Total Mobilization' Biggest Misconception", *Paratus*, vol. 33, no. 7 (July 1982), pp. 34–35, 81.
29. *Financial Mail*, vol. 85, no. 4 (23 July 1982), p. 403.
30. *The Star*, WAE, 19 October 1982, p. 4.

31. Statutes of the Republic of South Africa, Defence, National Key Points Act, No. 102, of 1980, pp. 971-977. Even before passage of this Act, there had been a high degree of co-operation. See, for example: "GM's Contingency Plans for South Africa 'Unrest'", *Southern Africa*, vol. 11, no. 5 (June/July 1978), pp. 2-7; and *New York Times*, 19 May 1978, pp. D1 and D11.
32. See: "Border Warders", *Financial Mail*, vol. 71, no. 10 (9 March 1979); *Sunday Tribune*, 21 May 1978; *Rand Daily Mail*, 3 March 1979, p. 5; 5 February 1982; and 24 May 1982, p. 2.
33. *Financial Mail*, vol. 82, no. 3 (15 January 1982), p. 191.
34. Department of Defence, *White Paper on Defence, 1982*, p. 28.
35. Herman Giliomee, *The Parting of the Ways: South African Politics, 1976-82* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1982), p. 11.
36. Ken Owen and Neil Hooper in *Sunday Times*, 14 October 1979; and Ivor Wilkins in *Sunday Times*, 28 September 1980, p. 31.
37. See: Giliomee, "Governing in the Managerial Style", *Parting of the Ways*, pp. 34-42.
38. South Africa: A Study in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 86.
39. This account is dependent on a series of articles by Mervyn Rees that appeared in: *Rand Daily Mail*, 1 and 2 February 1980; and also *The Star*, 14 January 1980, p. 2; and 23 April 1982, p. 10; *Sunday Express*, 13 December 1981; *Sunday Times*, 22 October 1978, p. 15; and Chris Vermaak, "The BOSS Man Speaks", *Scope*, 29 June 1979, pp. 16-23. Also *BOSS: The First 5 Years* (London: International Defence and Aid, 1974); and Republic of South Africa, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Matters Relating to the Security of the State* (Abridged) [Potgieter Report] (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1971).
40. See, for example, Gordon Winter, *Inside Boss: South Africa's Secret Police* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981).
41. *Sunday Express*, 13 December 1981.
42. "The business of defence", *Financial Mail*, vol. 62, no. 9 (26 November 1976), pp. 797-98; "Armscor: behind the secrecy shroud", *Financial Mail*, vol. 81, no. 11 (11 September 1981), pp. 1240-1241; *Sunday Times*, 11 July 1982, p. 25; Department of Defence, *White Paper on Defence, 1982*, pp. 25-28; and "Krygkor/Armscor", supplement to *Paratus*, vol. 33, no. 11 (November, 1982).
43. Frankel, "Race and Counter-Revolution", pp. 277-279.
44. Frankel, "South Africa: The Politics of Police Control", *Comparative Politics*, vol. 12 (July, 1980), pp. 481-499.
45. See: Ivor Wilkins, "The Way P.W. got it all sewn up", *Sunday Times*, 28 September 1980, p. 31. See also the Security Intelligence and State Security Act No. 64 of 1972, which provides that the Prime Minister must be chairman and membership must include the senior Minister of the Republic, the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Police, and any other Ministers whom the Prime Minister asks to attend. In "Reaching into government", *Financial Mail*, vol. 86, no. 2 (8 October 1982), p. 145; it was reported also to include the Ministers of Finance, Co-operation and Development, Internal Affairs, and Constitutional Affairs.
46. See: P.W. Botha in *Assembly Debates*, 6 February 1980, col. 324.
47. *Cape Times*, 23 January 1982.
48. Frankel, "Race and Counter-Revolution", p. 277.
49. See the portrait of Barnard in: *Financial Mail*, vol. 84, no. 10 (4 June 1982), p. 1131.
50. See, for example, *The Citizen*, 20 July 1982, p. 14.
51. See: *Rand Daily Mail*, 3 June 1982, pp. 1 and 6; *The Star*, 3 June 1982, p. 11; and *Sunday Express*, 13 June 1982, p. 13.
52. *Sunday Express*, 30 March 1980, pp. 1-2.
53. See also the agreement between the Newspaper Press Union and the Deputy Minister of Defence, of March 1979, described in the *Daily News*, 27 March 1979.
54. *The Post*, 31 January 1980; *Sunday Post*, 2 September 1979.
55. *Sunday Post*, 10 February 1980.
56. *Rand Daily Mail*, 21 February 1980. The programme in KwaZulu began in February 1980. See also *Financial Mail*, vol. 73, no. 7 (17 August 1979), p. 634.
57. For example, *Rand Daily Mail*, 13 June 1979.
58. *Assembly Debates*, 17 April 1978, cols. 4919-4923, among others.
59. *Assembly Debates*, 25 March 1980, cols. 3502-3515 (Prime Minister) and 3477-3482 (Dr Slabbert).
60. *Voice*, vol. 4, no. 13 (April 1980), p. 2. See also student criticism of Dr Slabbert's naivete in the pamphlet *Army News* (Johannesburg: Milcom, Student Representative Council, Witwatersrand University, 1980), p. 2.
61. On this episode see: *Sunday Times*, 23 March 1980, p. 1; and 30 March 1980, p. 20; *Rand Daily Mail*, 24 March 1980, pp. 1-2; 25 March 1980, p. 12; 26 March 1980, pp. 1-2, 4; and 31 March 1980, p. 7; *Sunday Express*, 30 March 1980, pp. 1-2, 8-9; and *Assembly Debates*, 24 March 1980, col. 3325; and 25 March 1980, cols. 3477-3515.
62. For comparative materials, see: Morris Janowitz and Stephen D. Westbrook (eds.), *The Political Education of Soldiers*, Sage Research Series on War, Revolution, and Peacekeeping, vol. 11 (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1983).
63. *Assembly Debates*, 22 April 1975, cols. 4569-4574; *Rand Daily Mail*, 25 April 1975, p. 2.
64. *Assembly Debates*, 19 May 1982, Q.col. 861.

65. *Assembly Debates*, 6 May 1975, Q. cols. 886–887.
66. *Cape Times*, 6 August 1982, p. 3.
67. See, for example, J.S. Pansegrow (N.P.) in *Assembly Debates*, 13 June 1975, cols. 9307–9308.
68. “South Africa: Countering the Threat of Sanctions”, *Business Week*, 20 November 1978; and “South Africa Driving a Perilous Road to Diesel Self-Reliance”, *Business Week*, 16 June 1980.
69. See Kenneth W. Grundy, “On Domesticating Transnational Corporations : South Africa and the Automotive Industry”, *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, vol. 19, no. 2 (July 1981), pp. 157–173.
70. See: Deon Geldenhuys, *South Africa's Black Homelands: Past Objectives, Present Realities and Future Developments* (Johannesburg: SAIIA, 1981), pp. 40–41.
71. *Assembly Debates*, 5 April 1978, col. 3955.
72. *Assembly Debates*, 6 March 1963, col. 2265.
73. *Assembly Debates*, 1 March 1963, col. 2356.
74. *Assembly Debates*, 26 January 1963, col. 271.
75. *Assembly Debates*, 20 May 1959, col. 6227; 29 March 1962, col. 3458.
76. See: Grundy, *Soldiers Without Politics*, pp. 231–241.
77. P.W. Botha in *Assembly Debates*, 22 April 1975, col. 4584.
78. *Rand Daily Mail*, 3 August 1974.
79. See: Patrick Laurence, *The Transkei: South Africa's Politics of Partition* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1976), p. 131.
80. See: South African Institute of Race Relations, *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1980* (Johannesburg: [SAIRR], 1981), p. 422.
81. This idea is borrowed, with licence, from Francis Wilson's paper, “Towards Economic Justice in South Africa”, prepared for the 50th anniversary conference of the South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 4 July 1979, particularly pp. 23–30. Prof. Wilson is applying a similar model to the issue of labour linkages between the RSA and its neighbours.
82. The agreement with Transkei is in: RSA, *Government Gazette*, vol. 136, no. 5320, 22 October 1976, p. 26; with Bophuthatswana, in *Government Gazette*, vol. 150, no. 5923, 6 December 1977, pp. 34–35; and with Venda, it is reprinted in “*Homeland*” *Tragedy: function and farce* (Johannesburg: SARS/DAG Information Publication 6 August 1982), p. 21. The agreement with Ciskei is in: *Government Gazette*, vol. 203, no. 8204, 14 May 1982, pp. 1–7.
83. See: Gail-Maryse Cockram, *South West African Mandate* (Cape Town: Juta, 1976), p. 40.
84. See the arguments advanced in C.E.J. Stephan and H. Booysen, “The Angolan Conflict: Its Relevance for South Africa in her Relations with Future Independent Bantustans and the Need for a Monroe Doctrine”, *South African Yearbook of International Law*, 1975, vol. 1 (Pretoria: University of South Africa, 1976), pp. 103–114.
85. See: Deon Geldenhuys, *South Africa's Black Homelands*, pp. 51–78, for a discussion of alternatives.
86. Robin Hallett, “The South African Intervention in Angola, 1975–76”, *African Affairs*, vol. 77, no. 308 (July 1978), pp. 347–386.
87. See: Chris Vermaak, “The BOSS Man Speaks: General Hendrick van den Bergh”, *Scope*, 29 June 1979, pp. 16–23, especially pp. 21–22.
88. *The Times* (London), 30 December 1975.
89. Hallett, “Intervention in Angola”, p. 370; quoting Robert Moss of the *Sunday Telegraph* (London).
90. See: *Guardian* (London), 8 August 1979, p. 6.
91. *International Herald Tribune*, 28 December 1982; *Citizen*, 27 December 1982; and *Rand Daily Mail*, 27 December 1982.
92. On SADF destruction of civilian targets in Angola see: *Guardian*, 29 January and 2 February 1981.
93. See: *The Star*, 16 June 1982, pp. 1 and 3.
94. See: Peter Vale, “South Africa as a Pariah International State”, *International Affairs Bulletin*, vol. 1, no. 3.
95. See: Derek W. Bowett, “The Interrelation of Theories of Intervention and Self-Defense”, in John Norton Moore (ed.), *Law and Civil War in the Modern World* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), pp. 38–50.
96. S.A. Department of Defence, *White Paper on Defence, 1982*, p. 28.
97. Chester A. Crocker, “South Africa's Defense Posture: Coping and Vulnerability”, *The Washington Papers*, vol. 9, no. 84 (Beverly Hills, California, and London: Sage Publications, 1981), p. 85.
98. Caryle Murphy in *International Herald Tribune*, 31 May–1 June 1980, p. 3.
99. This was disclosed by Dr Seiler in testimony before the United States House of Representatives Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade in Africa and on International Organizations; U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *U.S. Policy Toward South Africa*, 96th Congress, 2nd session, 1980, p. 46. Dr Seiler later said that this information had been confirmed by at least three different people; *The Star*, 7 May 1980, p. 1.
100. Constitution of the United States of America: Article I, Section VIII, Clauses 11, 12, 14, 15, and 17; Section X, Clause 3; Article II, Section II, Clause 1; and Amendments II and III.
101. See, for example, *Financial Mail*, vol. 77, no. 10 (5 September 1980), pp. 1084–1085.
102. Harry Schwarz as quoted in *Financial Mail*, vol. 86, no. 2 (8 October 1982), p. 144.
103. *Sunday Times*, 13 July 1976.
104. See: *The Citizen*, 23 April 1982 (Schwarz); *Assembly Debates*, 17 April 1978, col. 4835 (Raw); *Rand Daily*

Mail, 11 November 1978 (editorial); *Sunday Times*, 8 July 1979, p. 16 (editorial); and M. Hough, "Strategiese Aspekte van die Witskrif oor Verdediging en

Krygstuigvoorsiening 1979", *ISSUP Strategiese Oorsig* (September, 1979), p. 6.
105. Quoted in the *New York Times*, 7 September 1971.