


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## *SOUTH AFRICA IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD*

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It seeks also to educate, inform and facilitate contact between people concerned with South Africa's place in an interdependent world, and to contribute to the public debate on foreign policy.

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# **SOUTH AFRICA IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD**

James Barber

## **PART 1: INTRODUCTION**

As Bradlow Fellow at the South African Institute of International Affairs I set myself the task of examining South Africa's position in the post-Cold War world. This involved looking at the nature and impact of recent changes in international affairs, and how they have affected South Africa. My first step was to try to understand the changes by identifying scholarly interpretations of the post-Cold War international scene. I concentrated on Western scholars because they were more accessible to me, and also, in my view, more influential in shaping current international thinking. I eventually grouped their ideas into four broad interpretations or 'paradigms': using paradigm to mean a set of assumptions which establish a framework of understanding. Then, as a second step, I turned to study the implications of the global changes on South Africa, in particular to see how far the attitudes and behaviour of the South African Government interlock with the scholarly paradigms.

In such a two-phase approach the focus of attention shifts. First it is on the scholarly interpretations of global changes; then it moves to examine how South African government ministers and officials perceive and respond to the changes. An obvious question arises: 'Is there any connection between the scholarly interpretations and the government's behaviour?' My answer is 'Yes', but the link is not necessarily a direct one and the paradigm can be used in different if overlapping ways. Here I have employed them in three ways. First, to help understand the government's view of the world: how it perceives and interprets the international scene. Second, to identify ways in which the international setting presents opportunities but also places constraints on the government. Third, to help point out discrepancies between the government's perception and the way in which it behaves, or is obliged to behave.

In creating paradigms scholars are selecting what they regard as 'important' and 'significant'. In doing so they have to simplify reality, and they realise that no one paradigm can or is intended to cover the whole range of international behaviour. However, although the paradigms are only partial explanations, and although the scholars who advance them realise this, they all believe that 'history is on their side' - that time will show that their interpretation is the most relevant to today's developing international scene. Yet we know that attempts at explanation and prediction are flawed. Who ten years ago anticipated the imminent collapse of the USSR? Who foresaw Nelson Mandela as the President of South Africa? Such failures would have come as no surprise

to Leo Tolstoy. He dismissed as folly attempts to explain and predict the course of events. When, in his mighty novel *War and Peace*, Tolstoy discussed Napoleon's defeat in Russia, he concluded: 'We are forced to fall back on fatalism to explain the irrational events of history ... The more we strive to account for such events rationally, the more irrational and incomprehensible do they become to us'.

Despite such a salutary warning, there is purpose and relevance in examining the way in which the world is interpreted by both scholars and governments. We are all 'planning animals', even if, in our more realistic moments, we realise that plans seldom turn out as we anticipate. As individuals and groups we plan our daily lives based on our view of the world about us. Equally decision-makers in governments develop policies predicated on their perceptions of the present and the future. These perceptions are shaped by a combination of experience, prevailing values and intellectual influences. If, therefore, we want to understand the attitudes and actions of governments we have to identify the assumptions that inform their views. As Maynard Keynes, the great economist, wrote: 'The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist'. There is therefore purpose in trying to understand the linkage between prevailing interpretations of the post-Cold War world and the attitudes and perceptions of the South African Government.

## **PART 2: INTERPRETING THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD**

The end of the Cold War has brought great changes to international relations. All are agreed on that. There is, however, little agreement about anything else: about the nature of the change; or whether it is a good or a bad thing; or where future events are leading. At the time of the Gulf War President George Bush enthused about a 'New World Order'. he envisaged a globe free from threats, in which states would live in harmony under the rule of law, and in which free trade and a dynamic private sector would pave the way for economic expansion. He spoke of 'a world of open borders, open trade and, most importantly, open minds'.<sup>1</sup> Such hopes were quickly dashed. New conflicts arose, a clear global structure failed to emerge, and international efforts at peace-making and peace-keeping ran into the sand. Douglas Hurd, then British Foreign Secretary, spoke of a 'new world disorder'.<sup>2</sup>

During the long years of the Cold War two paradigms dominated interpretations of international affairs. The first was of a bipolar world in which East and West

confronted each other across an ideological and security divide. The second was of a globe classified into First, Second and Third Worlds on the basis of different economic policies and performances. Neither of these paradigms (separately or combined) fully explained the complexities of international relations, but they were very influential. They were the prisms through which the world was viewed. No longer is that the case. Self evidently the bipolar world of East and West has disappeared with the collapse of the communist bloc. Nor does the threefold economic division of the globe stand up to close examination. The Second World - of centralised, socialist, command economies - has disintegrated, and the Third World has fragmented. There are those who claim that the Third world image still has relevance.<sup>3</sup> If so, it is of very limited scope. The Third World was never a tight entity, and it has now split apart, leaving at one end vigorous, expanding economies (like those of the Asian Tigers) and at the other the wretched poverty of some African states. General Obasanjo of Nigeria, speaking of East Asia, said: 'Contrasting all this with what is taking place in Africa, it is difficult to believe that we inhabit the same historical time'.<sup>4</sup>

The combination of great change and the inappropriateness of the old paradigms has left both scholars and decision-makers floundering. New paradigms have emerged, but how helpful are they? Do they provide a way forward or do they simply add to the confusion? The uncertainty that characterises the post-Cold War period is reflected in the number of contending interpretations that have emerged in Western literature. None has yet established itself firmly, and nobody can be confident that any of them will. I have selected four paradigms to convey the main streams of Western thought. All have attracted criticism. However, the intention here is not to examine the criticism (other than in the sense that alternative approaches challenge each other) but rather to outline the main assumptions of each paradigm and then illustrate them through the writings of leading proponents. In doing this it becomes clear that within each broad paradigm there are differences of emphasis, but, in my view, they fall within the same set of broad assumptions. I have labelled the four paradigms: Western Triumphalism; Resurgent Realism; Institutionalism and Interdependence; Human Development and Human Rights.

## **2.1 Western Triumphalism**

President Bush's vision of a new world order was based on the belief that the West had triumphed in the Cold War; that the ideas and ideals of 'the free world' had prevailed over those of 'the evil empire'. More generally the Western Triumphalist approach is based on the following assumptions:

- (a) The main determinant of international behaviour is the internal nature of



the states which make up the system;

- (b) Within states liberal democracy has proved itself superior to other forms of government; and has successfully overcome the challenge of authoritarian regimes (fascism and communism);
- (c) Liberal democracy is built on economic, social, political and cultural foundations which offer the individual and the whole community greater freedom, security and prosperity;
- (d) Liberal democracies compete but do not fight each other. They form a pacific union, because they realise that more is gained by co-operation than conflict;
- (e) Internal barriers hold back some states and societies from embracing liberal democracy;
- (f) Although liberal democracies are not aggressive they have to defend their interests against other types of states.

Among the scholars who have advanced such views is Francis Fukuyama. Writing shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall Fukuyama claimed that the triumph of Western liberal democracy represented 'the end of history'.<sup>5</sup> By that he did not mean an end of events, but rather the end of history when 'understood as a single, coherent evolutionary process'.<sup>6</sup> For Fukuyama the outcome of the Cold War was more than the conclusion of a power struggle between East and West; it was the triumph of an ideology. He wrote: 'The twin crises of authoritarianism and socialist central planning, have left only one competitor standing in the ring as an ideology of potential universal validity: liberal democracy'.<sup>7</sup> It is the final achievement in the progression of human activities.

Pointing to the close relationship between political and economic progress, Fukuyama claimed that liberal democracy (based on the free market and capitalism) has outperformed all other systems. Modern economies need speed of response, flexibility, ingenuity and logical thinking, and these are achieved by accepting the judgements of the market and giving people choice. In contrast central planning stifles initiative. As a result liberal democracies are rich, and rich states are liberal democracies. However, the triumph of liberal democracy is not based solely on the market place. According to Fukuyama it also satisfies the need of individuals for recognition, dignity and self-respect. As people prosper they want more than wealth; they demand recognition. That requires a culture which encourages individual rights, progress, efficiency and the logic of natural science. Because some societies erect barriers against these, future

progress may be determined more by culture than ideology.

Fukuyama's liberal democratic state, therefore, rests on the twin pillars of economic progress and individual recognition; and is driven forward by a combination of the scientific method, individual initiative and a supportive culture. Further, he advanced the view that liberal democracies do not fight each other and form a natural pacific union. Inevitably disputes arise but democracies are accustomed to reaching agreement by negotiation and compromise. Yet, while they can settle their own differences peacefully, they may clash with states that are still 'in history' and willing to use force. Conflict may arise over such matters as scarce resources, the movement of people, and the control of arms. *Therefore liberal democracies must retain the ability to defend themselves and their interests. They still need to group together in such structures as G7, NATO and the EU. However, provided war with others can be avoided, future international relations will radiate around peaceful economic and social competition among liberal democracies. They and the groupings they create (regional and otherwise) will form the main building blocks of the international system.*

If liberal democracy offers such advantages why do many states resist it? Fukuyama offered a number of explanations. First, the 'correspondence between the people and states' may be incomplete because states are political creations which may fail to match people's needs. Second, liberal democracy cannot flourish if governments are corrupt or seriously inefficient. Third, for democracy to function people must develop a pride in the system and its values. Fourth, liberal democracy needs social underpinning, but some cultures work against it, including those based on fundamentalist religious beliefs or exclusive nationalism. Finally, the advantages of liberal democracy may be misunderstood or misinterpreted. On this last point Fukuyama wrote: 'The logic of progressive modern natural science predisposes human society towards capitalism only to the extent that men can see their own economic self-interest clearly. Mercantilism, dependency theory, and a host of other intellectual mirages have prevented people from achieving this clarity of vision'.<sup>8</sup>

Fukuyama also recognised that the liberal democratic achievement could all go wrong because of developments within the West itself: present values might be abandoned, or people become bored with their own success, or seek another form of socio-political organisation. Yet, despite the external obstacles and the potential inner doubts Fukuyama remained confident. We are witnessing, he concluded, 'the end of history as such: that is the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of government'.<sup>9</sup>

Although Fukuyama's position is distinctive and a few would fully embrace his

'end of history' thesis, other scholars and political leaders have advanced similar views. Many, for example, have endorsed the view that liberal democracies do not fight each other, and will form pacific regional groups.<sup>10</sup> On a broader front, Professor David Welsh, of Cape Town, stated that it is not necessary to accept Fukuyama entirely to recognise that currently liberal democracy has no serious ideological challengers. 'Henceforth', wrote Welsh, 'the debates will be mostly second order ones over the form that institutional embodiments of liberal democratic principles should take ... and what restraints should be placed on market forces, how comprehensive welfare systems should be and so on'.<sup>11</sup> In similar vein Strobe Talbott, an adviser to President Clinton, claimed that an unprecedented consensus has emerged on 'how we should organise ourselves within as well as among states ... As a general proposition democracy helps to bring prosperity to its peoples and peace to his neighbours', and he endorsed the view that liberal democracies are economically successful.<sup>12</sup> President Clinton himself has made similar claims. In May 1994 he said: 'Now the greatest opportunity for our security is to help enlarge the world's community of market economies; and to move towards a world in which the great powers govern by democratic plan'.<sup>13</sup>

## 2.2 Resurgent Realism

The confidence of Presidents Bush and Clinton in the superiority of Western democracy echoed that of their predecessor Woodrow Wilson, who, at the end of the First World War, called for a new world order of democratic states. Wilson distinguished between 'good' and 'bad' states: the good were democracies, the bad were governed autocratically. Wilson argued that 'the people' had an instinctive desire for peace, but were frustrated by undemocratic rulers. It was, he argued, the German rulers and not the German people who were responsible for the war. For the future he wanted statesmen to stand before the bar on public opinion, and to replace secret diplomacy with open agreements. To ensure this he called on the democracies to stand together. 'A steadfast concert for peace', he said, 'can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted ... It must be a league of honour, a partnership of opinion'.

Wilson's 'Idealism' was soon challenged by the advocates of 'Realism': including such scholars as E.H. Carr, who, in contrast with the idealists advanced a view of international politics based on power and the pursuit of national interests, in which order is maintained not by the opinion of free people but by a balance of power.<sup>14</sup> Realism persists as a major stream of thought about international relations. Among its chief assumptions are the following:

- (a) The main determinant of international behaviour is the system of states, not the type of states that make up the system.
- (b) The system is anarchic (i.e. there is no overriding authority) and so the first priority for each state is to ensure its security; and to that end each seeks to enhance its relative power within the system.
- (c) International morality is not based on justice or objective criteria, but is the product of power.
- (d) The doctrine of a harmony of interests is advanced by the strongest states, who seek to impose an order which suits them;
- (e) Security is achieved by balancing power within the system;
- (f) With the end of the Cold War the pattern of relationships between states has changed but not the principles on which the system rests. Security problems remain and it is necessary to readjust and gain new balances.

A year after Fukuyama first published his thesis John Mearsheimer wrote an article about the situation in Europe.<sup>15</sup> Although he concentrated on a single continent Mearsheimer's views are relevant to the whole international system. Unlike Fukuyama he argued that the end of the Cold War has not changed the fundamentals of international relations. These are still based on the established principles of Realism - whereby, within an anarchic system, each state has to look to its own security. It does so by seeking to increase its power relative to others. The result, wrote Mearsheimer, is that 'conflict is common among states because the international system creates power incentives for aggression'. As a consequence 'the distribution and character of military power become the root causes of war and peace'.

For Mearsheimer the end of the Cold War, far from removing the threat of war, has introduced new dangers. Like other Realists he focuses on the international state system, because peace is a function of 'the geometry of power in the international system'; and 'the keys to war and peace lie more in the structure of the international system than the nature of individual states'. He claimed that following the Second World War Europe had enjoyed 'the long peace', from 1945 to 1989. He gave three reasons for this. First, there was a bipolar balance of power between East and West, and, in his view, a bipolar balance is more stable, easier to manage and less prone to miscalculation than a multipolar situation. Second, during the Cold War there was broad equality of military power. 'Wars', he said, 'are more likely to occur when there is an inequality of power because there is more incentive for aggression'. Third, the presence of nuclear weapons on both sides helped to preserve peace. Deterrence

is effective when the costs of war are high, and nobody could underestimate the costs of nuclear war.

Mearsheimer challenged the view that liberal democracies will not fight each other, and that peace can be built on an liberal economic order in which states are increasingly interdependent. 'These views', he said, 'rest on the false premise that states pursue prosperity before security'. He pointed out that economic liberalism could not explain 'the long peace', because there was little economic exchange between East and West. That peace had been built on a balance of power. With that in mind Mearsheimer's gloomy conclusion was that: 'The demise of the Cold War order is likely to increase the chances that war and major crises will occur in Europe. Many observers suggest that a new age of peace is dawning; in fact the opposite is true'. With his belief that peace rests on a power balance and deterrence, he urged the US to encourage 'the limited and carefully managed proliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe'. In particular he advocated arming Germany with nuclear weapons. He dismissed those who suggest that Germans cannot be trusted because of their past history. 'If', he wrote, 'the Germans cause trouble in the new Europe it will not be a consequence of peculiar aggressive traits. The root cause of it will be Germany's exposed location in the centre of the continent and its non-nuclear status'.

Like Fukuyama, Mearsheimer's position is distinctive and few share all his views. Indeed, Bruce Russett described his thesis as 'pernicious and erroneous as well as pessimistic'.<sup>16</sup> Others, however, if not accepting every point of Mearsheimer's thesis, nevertheless embrace the principles of Realism. For them the post-Cold War uncertainty is not about fundamentals, but about new patterns of power. The rules of the game have not changed, but the players occupy different seats and have new cards in their hands.

Kenneth Waltz adopts this position.<sup>17</sup> He anticipates fresh power patterns emerging to replace old groupings like NATO, which he believes have lost their purpose. The end of the Cold War, argues Waltz, has left the US standing alone as a superpower, but, although American leaders claim that they will behave benignly, the record shows otherwise, that whenever the US had enjoyed hegemony it has imposed its will. Other states will therefore naturally be suspicious and reluctant to accept the US as the constable of the world. In Waltz's view: 'An inference drawn from the balance of power theory is that overwhelming power does not attract, rather it repels'.

He went on to identify a number of contenders as great powers of the future. The US is in the forefront, but Russia cannot be dismissed, because it retains the capacity to be a great defensive power. At the same time, while Japan and Germany have been reluctant to match their economic strength with political

and military activity, that is changing. Japan sits on top of a hierarchical division of labour in South East Asia. Inevitably political involvement will follow. To the question: 'Will Japan stand back while China grows stronger and stronger?' Waltz replied: 'More and more Japanese statements indicate that its leaders view Japan's emerging as a great power merely as a matter of time'. Germany is in a similar position. Either alone or as leader of the European Community it will emerge as a great power. Another contender is China, with its huge resources and rapid economic growth. Waltz concluded: 'Assuming Russia recovers and China hold itself together, we can expect, as in the old days, to have five or so great powers'. Yet he shared Mearsheimer's views that multi-polar structures are difficult to manage, and that in that situation nuclear weapons are a stabilising factor, because they deter aggression.

Another variant of the Realist position has been advanced by Samuel Huntington.<sup>18</sup> He foresees the source of future conflict not in ideology, but in culture and civilisations. ('Civilisation' defined as the 'highest cultural grouping and the broadest level of cultural identity'.) Huntington identified seven major civilisations: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slav-Orthodox, and Latin American: with 'African civilisation' as a possible eighth. Although he accepts that states remain the major international actors he sees them increasingly divided into their different cultures. 'The fault lines between civilisations', wrote Huntington, 'will be the fault lines of the future'. The potential for conflict exists at both micro and macro levels: the micro when different groups live side by side; the macro when states from different civilisations compete for power. The divisions are fundamental: history, language, religion and values: and because they are so basic and raise such strong emotions, they are more difficult to resolve than political and economic disagreements, which can be settled by compromise and shared outcomes. Nor, argued Huntington, does economic advance necessarily bring cultures together, because differences in rewards can breed resentment and a rejection of material values by the less successful.

Huntington recognised that because the West now enjoys a dominant position there is a tension between it and 'the Rest'. The Rest have three choices: jumping on the Western bandwagon; trying to build up counter-power; or opting out. Yet although the West is now at its peak, Huntington foresaw a steady deterioration in its relative position. He advised the West to retain its strength, but at the same time avoid confrontation with others. He recommended co-operation in the Western ranks; the incorporation of those with similar civilisations (Eastern Europe and Latin America); and as much understanding with other civilisations as possible.

### 2.3 Institutionalism and Interdependence

In his vision of the post-World War II order, President Woodrow Wilson not only emphasised the importance of internal democracy, he also stressed the need for 'good' states to work together in international institutions. A similar emphasis on co-operation and institutions is found in the post-Cold War world among those who stress Institutionalism and Interdependence. The main assumptions of this approach include the following:

- (a) Global activity increasingly crosses state boundaries, and goals can be achieved only through co-operation.
- (b) States remain prominent in international affairs, but share the stage with other organisations and groups, and are not always the most important actors.
- (c) All international actors are increasingly interdependent. Because of this international organisations and institutions are growing in prominence and range of their activities.
- (d) Members of international organisations pursue not only their own interests but those of the organisations *per se*.
- (e) International organisations establish 'regimes', i.e. agreed rules and processes of behaviour.
- (f) Interdependence is not confined to economic activities. There are multiple *international agendas*, including security.
- (g) With the end of the Cold War, co-operation rather than deterrence offers the most effective means of gaining security.

In 1993 Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye and Stanley Hoffman edited *After the Cold War* in which they called their approach to international relations 'Institutionalism'.<sup>19</sup> Like Mearsheimer they concentrated on Europe, but again their study has wider implications. Their theme was the increasing role of international institutions in global affairs. They recognised that the picture is patchy; that while in some sectors and some regions institutions are well developed, in others they are not. However, they argued that institutions are already important and will be increasingly so in future. The editors' concern was neither with 'the structure of the international system, emphasised by realism; nor on the interaction between domestic politics and international politics on which liberalism focuses'. Their focus was on 'international political processes'.<sup>20</sup> From that position they argued that institutionalism is consistent

both with Western liberalism (because it recognises the internal values and structures of states); and with realism (because states remain major actors and have different power capabilities).

Institutionalism is closely related to 'Interdependence': an approach to international relations which Keohane and Nye advanced in the 1970s. Then they argued that it is erroneous to believe that states can act independently because all international actors are increasingly dependent on each other.<sup>21</sup> Although states remain important, they operate alongside other actors; such as multinational institutions, business companies and non-government organisations (NGOs). These actors operate across multiple agendas, and because they are obliged to co-operate in handling these agendas institutions become more important. The institutions establish 'regimes' (agreed rules and procedures) which act as norms of behaviour. Conscious of the link between Institutionalism and Interdependence, Keohane, Nye and Hoffman stressed that all international actors work within regional and global webs of co-operation. However, while the West has already developed successful institutions and so has become a 'zone of peace', the Eastern bloc has not and is a 'zone of conflict'.

The three editors claimed that the end of the Cold War has created conditions favourable to the emergence of stronger and more active institutions. They are increasingly significant not because they control states, but because governments come to recognise their value. Successful institutions are built on the pillars of mutual interests, long-term commitments and reciprocity. Because they rely on agreement rather than enforced rules, institutions encourage pacific relations. They specify obligations; they can be used to manage conflict and reconcile interests; and are arenas for bargaining, conflict resolution and stability. Once institutions are established they develop their own dynamic. Not only do members pursue their separate interests within them, but the progress of the institutions becomes important in its own right, redefining members' interests and opening up new horizons. In contrast, in situations where institutions are weak or non-existent, there is chronic competition rather than co-operation.

A similar 'Institutional' approach was adopted by a group at the Brookings Institute in Washington, which investigated international security.<sup>22</sup> Unlike the Realists, the group concluded that the end of the Cold War had released powerful spontaneous forces, which, even if not fully understood, 'are revising the axioms of international politics'.<sup>23</sup> The pressure of events makes co-operation imperative. The group pointed to 'the internationalisation of the global economy [which] is by far the most obvious driving force helping to break down national and ideological barriers'.<sup>24</sup> At the same time the nature of international security has been transformed. Previously expansionist ambitions were the main threat to peace. Now political weakness and government disintegration have become major sources of violence and insecurity. For



example, the Russian economy has declined disastrously, creating political instability which the government may not be able to control. Equally sub-state violence is a major danger; as in the old Yugoslavia, where political leaders cannot deliver, even if they want to. In such cases only international co-operation and action can be effective.

The Brookings group concluded that past strategies founded on military strength are now inappropriate. In place of the deterrence and containment of the Cold War, it called for preventive management, through 'co-operative security'. The group argued that security is no exception to the need for co-operation; indeed co-operative security 'has become the new strategic imperative', offering reassurance by anticipating threats and making aggression difficult.<sup>25</sup> It differs from traditional approaches as 'preventive medicine differs from acute care'. The aim is to contain disputes within agreed norms and procedures short of conflict, because the globe faces threats which 'cannot be addressed by assertion of unilaterally superior force or readiness'. These threats create 'a transformed agenda for the international system', in which interdependence is a deepening reality and armed aggression is 'as futile as self destruction'.<sup>26</sup> War is not inevitable.

The group further claimed that the end of the Cold War has created favourable conditions for confidence-building and arms control. The opportunity exists to make co-operative security an overriding objective, by arrangements such as START and CFE.<sup>27</sup> It is not enough to sit back and hope. Positive security measures based on international institutions are needed, with arms control as a centre piece. With reference to nuclear arms the group concluded that concern has now shifted from deterrence to control of existing weapons and a reduction in their numbers. To implement such agreements transparency, monitoring and shared intelligence are necessary; but they must be backed by sanctions, including a capability to organise multinational force to defeat aggression.

The group recognised the central role of the United Nations. James Chear wrote a separate section on it in which he presented a mixed picture. On the positive side he noted that the end of the Cold War had strengthened some UN functions related to co-operative security (for example as an area for rule-making, conflict resolution and legitimising multilateral responses to threats); but it has obvious limitations, including its arms negotiating agenda which is mainly confined to three issues: international domains (eg. outer space); the control of methods of mass destruction (eg. chemical weapons); and the regulation of 'inhuman' weapons.<sup>28</sup> Yet despite these limitations Institutionalists are encouraged by a marked increase in UN activities. Marrack Goulding, a senior UN official, has noted the increased activity in the Security Council, following the end of the Cold War stalemate.<sup>29</sup> During 1992, for example, there was a fivefold increase in peacekeeping operations, with 52,000 troops deployed by the end of the year.

Goulding underlined the UN's wide range of tasks: from preventing hostilities to implementing agreed stalemates. He recognised that problems inevitably arise - administrative and financial, as well as 'political', such as enforcing ceasefires, or setting up an administration when a state has collapsed. Yet, despite the difficulties Goulding anticipated further expansion.

## **2.4 Human Development and Human Rights**

The Human Development and Human Rights paradigm brings together a number of disparate elements which make it a large and rather untidy package. However, the approach has coherence in that it falls within a broad 'Kantian' tradition. According to Hedley Bull this sees international relations essentially in 'the transnational social bonds that link individual human beings'. The dominant theme is 'the relationship among all men in the community of mankind', based on a set of moral imperatives. Within that community 'the interests of all men are one and the same'. These interests override those of states, and 'the rules that sustain co-existence ... among states should be ignored if the imperatives of the higher morality require it'.<sup>30</sup>

Among the broad assumptions of this paradigm are:

- (a) Attention is concentrated on people rather than states, systems or institutions.
- (b) International relations is based on moral imperatives as well as interests. If necessary these imperatives should override the claims of states and organisations.
- (c) Human development implies both material progress and political and social rights, and is especially important for the poor and disadvantaged. The issues at stake include the environment, and the allocation of resources between people.
- (d) The importance of 'the poor' may lie in their weakness: in their ability to destabilise the globe through environmental damage, the flow of refugees, increased crime and the spread of diseases and drugs.
- (e) The scope of individual rights includes democratic liberty, freedom of speech and belief and equality before the law.
- (f) Although Human Development has many threads they combine to make a composite agenda, which presents challenges that may be beyond the ability of existing structures to manage.

In 1993 Paul Kennedy published *Preparing for the Twenty First Century* in which his main concerns were people and resources.<sup>31</sup> He recognised that states have still to look to their traditional concerns, but his message was that we now face a radically new situation. 'Governments and people', he wrote, 'need to reconsider their old definitions of what constitutes a threat to national and international security. Regardless of whether the Cold War is over ... there now exist non-military threats to the safety of the people of this planet'.<sup>32</sup> Kennedy identified three major concerns: the growth of world population; environmental damage; and the impact of new technology. 'Governments', he wrote, 'face both new and traditional security agendas, in which the new is likely to prove the more formidable and may be beyond their capacity to resolve'. Global forces of change 'are moving beyond traditional guidelines into a remarkable new set of circumstances - one in which human social organisations may be unequal to the challenges posed by population, environmental damage and technology-driven revolutions'.<sup>33</sup>

Kennedy focused first on population expansion. He referred back to the fears of Thomas Malthus in the late 18th Century about the population running ahead of the resources to maintain it. Although those fears had proved unfounded, Kennedy argued that current problems are quantitatively and qualitatively much greater. The scale of population growth is unprecedented. In 1825 the world's population was one billion; a century later it had doubled; by 1975 it had doubled again; and had reached 5.3 billion by 1990. The main increase is in undeveloped countries, whereas the population in advanced states is either stable or in slow decline. The result is a major shift in population patterns. For example, in 1950 Europe had twice as many people as Africa; by 1985 the populations were level, and it is estimated that by 2025 Africa will have three times as many people as Europe.

Kennedy noted that some people believe that the challenge can be met by technological advance, and even argue that development requires an expanding population. He has no faith in such views. They assume dramatic changes in values and life styles; whereas 'the overall consensus is that the projected growth in the world's population cannot be sustained with our current patterns and levels of consumption'.<sup>34</sup> 'The results', said Kennedy, 'are probably increasing political and social instability, a widening gap between rich and poor, and major migration from poor to richer countries'. Attempts to control migration 'seem unlikely to succeed in the face of the momentous tilt in the global demographic balances'.<sup>35</sup> More generally the population changes may undermine the West's dominance. By 2025 only two Western states (US and Japan) will be among the world's twenty most populous countries, and as a consequence Western influence will be reduced, and liberal values (human rights, religious tolerance, multiparty democracy and rational scientific advance) lose their strength.

Kennedy argued that environmental damage is a by-product of increased global numbers and rising standards of living in advanced states. Human beings 'destroy forests, burn fossil fuels, drain wetlands, pollute rivers and oceans and ransack the earth for ores, oil and other raw materials'.<sup>36</sup> Again the scale of the problem is overwhelming. 'Since 1950', wrote Kennedy, '1/5th of the world's top soil and 1/5th of tropical forests have been lost. The assault comes from many directions: from peasant cultivators wanting land, private companies seeking profit, and governments searching for revenue or places to settle people. Advanced states soak up most of the world's riches, and individuals in these states use many times over the resources consumed by people in poorer states. If environmental protection is to be effective it must start among the wealthy'. However, poverty and sheer numbers also create problems. Kennedy quoted Rajiv Gandhi, who said: 'Mass poverty was forcing the poor to degrade the environment on which they depend for sheer survival'.<sup>37</sup> 'Nor', concluded Kennedy, 'does the market economy help to resolve these problems'. By its very nature 'the rational market ... is not concerned with social justice and fairness'.<sup>38</sup>

Such is the scale of the challenge that Kennedy thought the state might be the 'wrong sort' of organisation to deal with it and was losing control and integrity. There are cultural, political and economic factors which constrain the ability of governments to handle new problems. 'Cultural obstacles to change', he wrote, 'are common in all societies, for the obvious reason that an impending transformation threatens existing habits, ways of belief and social prejudices'. Within the rich democracies demands for improved living standards undermine politics designed to protect the environment and preserve resources. Elsewhere culture imposes restrictions, as in some Muslim states which 'stand in angry resentment of global forces of change instead of [as in East Asia] selectively responding to such change'.<sup>39</sup> Many governments seem unable to break old shackles. Kennedy cited India and China with their vast populations. 'They appear', he wrote, 'to be in a blind alley whichever way they turn'. Continued population growth will undermine agricultural gains and endanger social order; and if they achieve rapid economic growth it can only come at the expense of the environment. Both governments wrongly appear to anticipate a 'world of the future ... very much like the world of the past'.<sup>40</sup>

Similar concerns to those of Kennedy were addressed in the 1994 United Nations *Human Development* report.<sup>41</sup> However, the report's authors were more positive and optimistic about finding solutions. They saw the end of the Cold War as an opportunity for a radical rethink of international relations, based on new priorities and principles. 'The focus of attention must', they said, 'move from states to people'. They dismissed the conventional view of state-centred security as too narrow and too concerned with such issues as territorial aggression, nuclear war and the military balance. 'Today', stated the report,

'security is more concerned with daily worries than cataclysmic events. The world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives'.<sup>42</sup> Human security cannot be contained by state boundaries. There is no hiding place from pollution, famines and disease. Threats arising from population growth and disparities between rich and the poor lead to famines, violence, migrations, land degradation and trade in drugs and arms. The scale of the problem is immense. The value of the international drug trade now exceeds that of oil and is second only to the arms trade. It is therefore essential to move from a view of security based on weapons to one based on 'human security'. 'The idea of human security', said the report, 'though simple, is likely to revolutionise the 21st Century'. It is indivisible, universal and people-centred. It has two main aims: first, to counter common threats such as hunger, disease and repression; and second, to offer safety from the severe disruptions of daily life which create insecurity and intolerance. The report advocated setting aims to ensure basic incomes, access to food, good health and freedom from violence.

'Although security is important', said the report, 'human development is more than that'. The common heritage of mankind has been treated as a free resource and abused, especially by the rich, while at the same time poverty had led to eroded land, polluted water and deforestation. Remove fear and new opportunities arise, especially for the underprivileged. The central concern of development must therefore be people and not simply economic growth. 'In the final analysis sustainable human development is pro people, pro jobs and pro nature. It gives the highest priority to poverty-reduction, productive employment, social integration and environmental regeneration'.<sup>43</sup> If these are to be achieved new relationships must be forged, based not on the charity of the rich but on a shared development agenda which encourages trade, investment and technical co-operation. A new culture is required, embracing the redistribution of resources and encouraging sustainable development and environmental protection. It 'requires no less than a new global ethic ... [and] policies for a more equitable world order, based on fundamental global reform'.<sup>44</sup> Such a change would serve the interests of all, not least the rich who have most to lose. To that end the report recognised that the reforms imply global funding based on the channelling of resources from rich to poor states. (It estimated that a 5% transfer of GDP from rich to poor is required to establish basic standards and essential services.

In advocating such developments the report endorsed the Institutionalists' view that international organisations must be reinforced. It advocated a powerful World Central Bank, to stabilise the global economy, a wider role for the IMF to encourage supply side growth, and a new UN Economic Security Council concentrating on development and human security (while the present Security Council continues to handle conventional security issues). Alongside the

institutions the report recognised that responsibility also rests with states, groups and individuals. 'No amount of external assistance', it said, 'can ever substitute for the fundamental reforms needed in their [undeveloped countries] economies'. That could be achieved by a combination of self-help and international support: investment, trade, aid and the abolition of debts.

Yet, while the report advocated more powerful international institutions, most of these institutions are made up of state representatives, who are more concerned with advancing state interests than individual development and rights. Individual justice and a state-based global order do not sit easily together, and state-dominated bodies have grave limitations as vehicles for the advancement of human values. Doubts about the ability of existing structures to meet the challenges of Human Development are mirrored in allied, but distinctive concerns about 'Human Rights'. Human Rights are variously interpreted. Sometimes attention is confined to political and legal rights, such as freedom of speech and equality before the law; but there is a broader view which embraces such social and economic concerns as freedom from hunger and the right to education. Both these aspects predate the end of the Cold War, but they have become more prominent in the new international situation, and their advocates more active in promoting their values.

Adam Roberts addressed these issues in discussing the apparently contradictory concept of 'humanitarian war'. This involves the international community using military intervention in pursuit of human rights: for example, punishing a state for unjust behaviour, and overriding claims to sovereignty by seeking to impose universal standards. Roberts noted that the concept has gained ground since the end of the Cold War.<sup>45</sup> He quoted Perez de Cuellar, who, as UN Secretary-General, stated: 'We are clearly witnessing what is probably the irresistible shift in public attitudes towards the belief that the defence of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents'. In a similar vein the G7 argued at its 1991 London Summit that 'the international community cannot stand idly by in cases where human suffering from famine, war, oppression, refugee flows, disease or flood reach urgent and overwhelming proportions'.

Roberts gave a number of explanations for the shift in attitudes. These include a break down in order in some states, which had released the four horsemen of the apocalypse (war, pestilence, famine and death); increased Western awareness of suffering through television; vigorous advocacy by pressure groups; and greater confidence at the UN in its ability to act. 'In the past', said Roberts, 'humanitarian attention had concentrated on oppressive governments; now there was equal concern about lack of government and about deeply divided societies'. In these cases the balance of international opinion had shifted from preserving state sovereignty to an assertion of universal human rights. Yet

Roberts was ambivalent about the merits of change; not because of its aims, but the processes involved. The old respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs was concerned with order rather than justice, but it had a moral base in that it set limits on the use of force, respected different forms of society and reduced the dangers of armed clashes. What Roberts described as 'crusading' has a doubtful pedigree. he queried whether there is consensus on rights; he was sceptical about the humanitarian motives of the great powers who led the crusades; and he doubted if intervention could ever be impartial. He sympathised with increased attention to human rights but advocated a patient approach steadily building up a global consensus.

Roberts' final theme was taken up in a more radical way by Ken Booth in 1995.<sup>46</sup> He claimed that the major concern of the 21st Century will be ethics. He urged scholars to pay less attention to interstate relations and instead concentrate on global ethics. 'The present international system', he said, 'does little for the poor of the earth'. Although there are different cultural concepts of what constitutes basic rights, Booth claimed that it is possible to build a new consensus based on shared ethical ideas. To achieve that he urged a cosmopolitan, non-religious approach, in part to counter the danger of dominant Western values (such as possessive individualism, consumer democracy, a capitalist world economy, and unconstrained science and technology). Although concern about ethics is in its infancy Booth stated it will grow rapidly to challenge the existing state system. He argued that 'the enemy of cosmopolitanism is statism', and that the present international state system is a failure. It legitimises all sorts of *quasi* states and tyrants, offers only limited reciprocal justice and provides little for the common good. Most governments, including the powerful, have poor human rights records. Booth concluded: 'the true naivety at the end of the twentieth century is to believe that human society can continue to live indefinitely in the way it is'.

## 2.5 An Uncertain World

Each of the paradigms we have examined is distinctive in the assumptions it makes about what is 'important' in post-Cold War international relations. 'Western Triumphalism' looks inside the state, to focus on internal structures and values, in the belief that liberal democracy and capitalism are superior to other forms of political and social order and produce peace and prosperity at home and abroad. 'Resurgent Realism' concentrates on the interaction between states: the system rather than internal structures. It assumes an anarchic system in which states have to look to their security based on relative power. In contrast 'Institutionalists' are concerned with interdependence and the role of the organisations. They identify a variety of international agendas, and believe that progress, whether in terms of security or development, can only be

achieved through co-operation. Finally, advocates of 'Human Development' concentrate less on structures and institutions than people: their needs and rights. They cover a wide field from such broad issues as population growth, environmental concerns and the redistribution of resources from rich to poor, to individual rights and duties. With these different sets of assumptions in mind we can turn to South Africa.

### PART 3: THE SOUTH AFRICAN SCENE

How does South Africa fit into the post-Cold War world? As already noted there are three ways in which the paradigms may contribute to answering that question. First, by helping to identify the perceptions and aspirations of the new government (so far as can be gained from the public statements of ministers and officials). Second, by offering insights into the global context in which South Africa operates. Finally, they can point towards discrepancies between government statements and its behaviour, not necessarily because it is seeking to mislead but because of mismatches between its perception and the environment in which it has to operate. Yet, although the paradigms help, no definitive answers can be given because of the fluidity of the current global situation and because the new South African Government is still feeling its way. Both the international setting and the attitudes of the government are in transition. We are therefore searching for trends, and in doing so this section will start by making some general points about the new South Africa, and then explore in more depth three issues: the influence of international developments on the domestic scene; South Africa's position in Africa and especially the Southern African region; and finally, its position in the global economy.

#### 3.1 The New South Africa

Paradoxically the South African Government is both feeling its way cautiously in international affairs and at the same time keenly embracing a new role. The caution is not surprising because of the uncertainty which now characterises the changing global scene. The new South Africa is itself part of the change; a product of the post-Cold War world. It is still establishing itself and other governments and institutions are still adjusting to its presence. However, along with the realignment there is a freshness about the 'new' South Africa: a combination of idealism and energy, based on the remarkable achievement of overthrowing apartheid and forming a democratic government with relatively little bloodshed.

So far the new government's main attention has been on domestic affairs. In particular it has committed itself to the Reconstruction and Development



Programme (RDP), which, in President Mandela's words, is intended 'to change all aspects of our lives for the better - in education, health, housing, water, land and electricity'. Yet, while accepting the centrality of domestic concerns and the limited public debate about international affairs, the government recognises the strong links between foreign and domestic politics and is eager to play an active external role. At its best this positive external role was captured in the bridge-building achieved at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review in 1995, when all 175 participants accepted South Africa's compromise proposals. According to Foreign Minister, Alfred Nzo, the decisive factors in bringing this about were 'the stature, goodwill to and trust in South Africa'.

The government's approach to both domestic and foreign affairs is affected by the different backgrounds from which it is drawn. A Government of National Unity (GNU) is one of the central features of the interim constitution under which South Africa is now governed. The GNU is a compound of three parties: The African National Congress (ANC), which holds a clear majority and is the dominant element in government; the National Party (NP), the second largest party; and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). The origins of the parties are very different. The NP was the old White (Afrikaner-led) party of apartheid. It saw South Africa as a European outpost in Africa, and claimed that it was fighting a communist threat to the whole continent. The leading edge of that threat was the ANC: a liberation movement waging war against the apartheid state. It had wide international support, including that from communist states, and developed strong socialist leanings. These two old opponents (ANC and NP) plus the IFP (a traditional Zulu party whose main concern is autonomy for KwaZulu) have co-operated in the GNU. It is a remarkable example of political tolerance, and both the main parties have modified their positions because of the changed political circumstances and so that they can work together. However, inevitably the differences sometimes show through and there are political strains and uncertainty.

Further uncertainty surrounds South Africa's international economic and social status. It lies at a cross roads. The World Bank categorised it as a 'Small/Medium' economy, alongside Malaysia, Thailand, Turkey and Greece. It has also been designated as the sole African representative in fourteen newly Industrialised Countries (NICs), which lie between the 'advanced' North and the 'undeveloped' South. Not only is it in a mid-position internationally, but internally there are stark differences. On one hand there is an advanced 'North' segment which includes large private companies, a sophisticated banking and insurance system, a stock market, a well-developed infrastructure and a high standard of living for the wealthy. On the other hand there is a 'South' segment: of shanty towns, rapid population growth, environmental degradation, minimal services and grinding poverty. In economic/social terms South Africa

is a chameleon, with dual identity as both a developed and undeveloped country.<sup>47</sup> This dual identity impinges upon political and social structures, and is found in the different support bases for the political parties. The ANC draws its main support from the Black majority, most of whom live in the 'South' segment; whereas the NP looks to the more prosperous minority races (Whites, Coloureds and Asians) for most of its supporters (see Table 1).

The differences in origins and support is reflected in political views. These include attitudes to basic human rights. Many in the ANC favour enshrining social and economic rights in the final constitution. Are not, they ask, the right to be housed and have a job as basic as the right to free speech? Yet even some ANC members pause before giving a definitive answer; doubting whether it was wise to include as rights services which the state cannot yet deliver. The NP shares these doubts and further questions whether the state should be so intrusive to offer such rights and diminish individual responsibility. Differences are also found in attitudes towards some disputes. When President Mandela was questioned about the ANC's reluctance to accept international mediation in the dispute with the IFP over the future of KwaZulu, he responded by saying that what was important to one section of the population may be unimportant to another. 'Our people' (and presumably he meant the black majority) are not concerned with international mediation but want the government to stop the conflict and killing on the ground, and to promote development rather than funding a provincial government that is acting unlawfully. 'What is important to whites', said Mandela, 'is not important to our people .. Our people are not worried about international mediation'. They want resources to address basic human needs.<sup>48</sup>

**Table 1: Population of South Africa 1965-1995 by Race**  
(nearest million)

Year	Africans	Whites	Coloureds	Asians	Total
1965	12	3	2	0.5	18
1975	18	4	2	0.7	25
1985	22	4	3	0.8	32
1995	31	5	4	1.0	42

Returning to the international scene, the new government has a limited diplomatic inheritance from the past. Because the apartheid state was an international pariah its formal links were few. The ANC in exile had wider *quasi* diplomatic contacts, but many of those disappeared with the disintegration of the communist bloc. Yet what is lacking from the past is more than

compensated by the enthusiasm of the present. Unlike its predecessor the new government has enormous international prestige and is welcomed with open arms. There is general rejoicing at the prodigal that has returned, the sinner that has repented. As the fall of the Berlin Wall symbolised the end of totalitarian communism, so the overthrow of apartheid symbolised victory in an international crusade against racism. Governments and international bodies are eager to associate themselves with the new state and celebrate its achievement. At the UN's 50th Anniversary Boutros-Boutros Ghali declared: 'Let us take up the challenge of the next fifty years. The experience of South Africa has shown what can be achieved, when a determined people, supported by a united international community, work to realise the goals of the UN Charter'.

There is a high moral tone to the government's approach to international affairs. 'We are', Mandela told the Senate, 'committed to promoting world peace, human rights, democracy, development and equitable interstate relations'.<sup>49</sup> Yet the government realises that it is working in a changed and changing global scene. Aziz Pahad, the Deputy Foreign Minister, identified its three main characteristics: the collapse of socialism and the end of the Cold War; a universal tendency towards political systems with multiparty democracy, respect for human rights; and a more open market economy with the emergence of powerful economic blocs, such as the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). These characteristics would be recognised and endorsed by the proponents of Western Triumphalism. However, in seeking to play a role in this global context the new government naturally distances itself from the old apartheid regime, and emphasises the idealism of liberation. It preaches the doctrine of Human Development and Institutionalism. It identifies with 'the South', it stresses the importance of working through international organisation, it supports the principle of 'universality', and underlines its African identity. Alfred Nzo, the Foreign Minister, stated the government's foreign policy principles to a meeting of senior diplomats in September 1995. 'They are', said Nzo:

- \* a commitment to the promotion of human rights;
- \* a commitment to the promotion of democracy;
- \* a commitment to justice and international law in the conduct of relations between nations;
- \* a commitment to international peace, and to internationally agree mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts;
- \* a commitment to the interests of Africa in world affairs;

\* a commitment to economic development through regional and international co-operation in an interdependent world'.<sup>50</sup>

In those principles there is little reference to the assumptions of Western Triumphalism or Realism. However, as Aziz Pahad noted, the assumption of those paradigms can be found in the global setting. Tension can therefore arise between the government's stated aims and the setting in which it has to operate. This is illustrated in a dialogue between the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee about the department's priorities and resources. In May 1995 the committee claimed that there are 'significant disparities between stated policy priorities and the allocation of resources'. It noted that the government's stated aims are to emphasise Africa and South/South relations, to promote worldwide peace and democracy, human rights, sustainable development, protection of environment and improved living standards. Yet, said the committee, these are not reflected in the budget or the network of diplomatic missions. It accused the department of concentrating on established American and European contacts, at the expense of those in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. In response the department stated that new openings can only be developed if additional resources become available, 'regardless of the priority these new opportunities might command in terms of declared policy'. Aziz Pahad stated: 'Although we believe our future is closely linked to the South-South concept, there are certain realities we dare not ignore'. Those 'realities' were the strength and wealth of the West.<sup>51</sup>

Another dilemma concerns implementation of the government's principle of 'universality' or 'de-ideologizing' foreign policy so that it 'can establish relations with all countries without implying support for their internal or external policies'.<sup>52</sup> Using that criterion diplomatic ties have been established with almost all UN members. Aziz Pahad told parliament that 'while we will strive to consolidate and even expand our links with Europe and North America, we are also seeking to explore new opportunities in Asia, Africa and Latin America'.<sup>53</sup> However, a universal policy is not without its problems. It can ensnare South Africa in existing disputes. This has already happened in the case of the People's Republic of China (Beijing) and the Republic of China (Taiwan). The new government inherited from the white regime substantial trade and aid links with Taiwan (a fellow pariah state), and it is eager to retain them because of their economic importance. However, mainland China is determined to isolate Taiwan and eventually reclaim it. South Africa is, therefore, attempting to tread the delicate path of dual recognition. This is acceptable to Taiwan but not Beijing. The government's 'universalism' has also created tension with the US. Examples of this include South Africa's decision to establish formal relations with Iran (and to grant her oil storage facilities), and a conference of solidarity with Cuba in resistance to the American trade blockade which was held in South Africa in October 1995. At that conference

Mr. Tokyo Sexwale announced the twinning of Gauteng Province with Havana.

A final, pointed example of tension between stated principles and behaviour within the foreign policy environment arose in relations with Nigeria during 1995. In its policy towards Nigeria several of the government's stated aims can be detected: respect for human rights, universality, influence in Africa, and a commitment to work through international bodies. However, the context proved hostile to the achievement of these aims. That only became clear in retrospect. Although Pretoria realised that Nigeria was an authoritarian, military state with an appalling record of abuse of human rights, it was also a state that had stood firmly against apartheid (even if under a different regime). With that in mind, and in its attempts to play an African role, Pretoria practised 'quiet diplomacy'. Thabo Mbeki and Aziz Pahad visited Nigeria, as did Archbishop Tutu as Mandela's personal envoy. In September 1995 Chief Tom Ikimi, the Nigerian Foreign Minister, came to South Africa at the government's invitation. During the visit Nigeria's human rights record was not publicly challenged. Greg Mills commented: 'South Africa is in a quandary. It realises that Nigeria people supported the anti-apartheid struggle, and that the human rights issues of those days are the same sort of issues that apply in the case of Nigeria today. It feels it should caution Nigeria but is not sure how to do it'. In response to press criticism, Alfred Nzo replied: 'Nigeria is a country to which South Africa is deeply indebted. What is difficult for us at this stage is to stand on the roof top and hurl stones'.<sup>54</sup>

Assuming that quiet diplomacy would be effective South Africa did not stand on the roof top: an approach which may have satisfied the universality principle and the emphasis on an African identity, but it achieved nothing in terms of democracy and human rights. That became all too clear during the Commonwealth Conference at Auckland in November 1995, when the Nigerian authorities went ahead with the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other dissidents despite South Africa's pleas. There was an explosion of outrage - outrage at the Nigerians, and outrage in South Africa at the government's naivety. Quiet diplomacy was compared with 'constructive engagement', which had been employed by the US and Britain in apartheid days and despised by the ANC. Equally wounding to South Africa's pride, Kole Omotoso, a Nigerian writer, stated: 'You cannot blame Mandela. The South African government is extremely inexperienced in foreign affairs, especially as it refers to Africa'. He noted how South Africans are shocked to discover that Western values do not operate in Nigeria or other parts of Africa.<sup>55</sup> In their anger and humiliation the South Africans called on international organisations to act. That led to the Commonwealth suspending Nigeria's membership, but it did not lead to UN economic sanctions as South Africa had hoped. To achieve that a Security Council resolution would have been required, which in turn implied China supporting sanctions against a state because it infringes human rights. There

was no chance of that, for the context was one in which 'Realism' was more prominent than 'Human Development'.

### 3.2 Domestic and International Interaction

The relationship between domestic and international affairs affects all states, but it has been especially marked in South Africa's case. In the past apartheid was recognised as a matter of international concern and led to the imposition of economic and diplomatic sanctions. At the same time the liberation struggle had powerful international support, and the Southern African region became caught up in proxy wars of the power blocs. The interaction between external and domestic affairs was further underlined by the abandonment of apartheid. Three factors determined President de Klerk's decision in 1990 to change the country's political map. First was the continuing internal disorder (backed by the external ANC) which the government had faced since the mid-1980s. De Klerk stated that the alternative to a negotiated settlement was 'growing violence, tension and conflict'.<sup>56</sup> Second was the international pressure (including sanctions) which produced economic stagnation and could only be remedied by internal change. Third, de Klerk recognised the end of the Cold War as a turning point in world history. He said that: 'The dynamic developments in international politics have created new opportunities for South Africa'. They had removed white fears of a 'total onslaught', and, because the Eastern bloc was no longer able or inclined to support a liberation struggle, the government calculated that the ANC would be ready to negotiate a compromise settlement. The collapse 'of the Marxist economic system in Eastern Europe', added de Klerk, 'serves as a warning to those who insist on persisting with it in Africa'.<sup>57</sup>

At the same time, while the ANC realised that it could continue the struggle, it had little prospect of an early victory. Mandela, who from imprisonment had been in contact with the government over some years, stated: 'We have not defeated the regime. Consequently we see negotiations as a continuation of the struggle leading to our central objective: the transfer of power to the people'.<sup>58</sup> Joe Slovo, a leading communist member of the ANC, claimed that the liberation struggle could continue and in the end would be won, but it might leave a devastated country. 'We could', he said, 'have won the war, but we might have lost the revolution'.<sup>59</sup> Both parties therefore realised that because of domestic and international developments, and in particular the new circumstances flowing from the end of the Cold War, they were more likely to gain a better deal by negotiation than continued struggle.

### (a) Negotiating a Constitution

The constitutional negotiations which followed de Klerk's policy change and the release of Mandela stretched over four years. External factors played their part, not least the triumph of the West in the Cold War. Although in the changed situation the NP government had gained more breathing space, Western pressure persisted partly at the ANC's request, including economic and diplomatic sanctions. Despite its claims to be part of the West, the white government was neither liberal nor democratic, and Western states persistently urged it to abandon apartheid and settle by negotiation. During these negotiations the NP and Whites in general were increasingly exposed to Western liberal ideas as a challenge to their past racist, authoritarian behaviour. At the same time the demise of socialism removed the external backers of the liberation struggle, left the ANC without a socialist model on which to base its future policies and seriously damaged belief in command economies and one party states. The ANC became more pragmatic - more concerned with seeking a transfer of power than a socialist structure of government, and it too was exposed to Western liberal ideas.

As David Welsh noted, 'the negotiations revealed that liberalism had won the day and was ahead of the pack'. The debates were mainly about the institutional form that liberalism should take.<sup>60</sup> The outcome was a five year Interim Constitution and a set of principles, both of which carry the hallmarks of Western liberalism. The principles are already built into the interim constitution, and they bind the Constitutional Assembly (Parliament in another guise) in drawing up the final constitution. They include separation of the legislature, executive and judiciary; guarantees of multiparty democracy and free elections; commitment to individual human rights; and guidelines for the distribution of power between the centre and the provinces. When disputes arise they are to be settled by a Constitutional Court, which is to act on the basis of the principles.

Although the constitutional arrangements bear the stamp of Western liberalism it is too early to say whether political behaviour within that framework will reflect similar values. David Welsh rightly warned that while Western liberalism and pluralism may have won a war it has yet to secure the peace. In South Africa different voices are heard. President Mandela leads the way in appealing for reconciliation and tolerance. At his inauguration he called for old wounds to be healed, and entered into a covenant 'to build a society in which all South Africans, both black and white, will be able to walk tall, without any fear in their hearts, assured of the inalienable right to human dignity - a rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world'.<sup>61</sup> Liberalism and plurality are further reinforced by South Africa's vigorous civil society, whereby, in contrast with many African states, politicians share power and status with businessmen,

civic leaders and professionals. Yet uncertainty remains. South Africa's past is peppered with authoritarianism and intolerance. The white government ruthlessly and systematically imposed its control, denying rights to the black majority and suppressing dissent. In turn some sections of the liberation movements have treated opponents mercilessly. Nor has the end of apartheid seen the end of intimidation and intolerance. The struggle between the ANC and IFP has been characterised by cruelty and bigotry. It is therefore too early to say whether liberal values and Mandela's call for tolerance and reconciliation will take root in a country still haunted by a past of racial and tribal divisions, and in which a single party (ANC) has a dominant position in the political system. Hermann Giliomee has warned: 'The last thing South Africa can afford is self-congratulation. We lack the most crucial characteristic of a viable democracy, namely strong and coherent opposition parties which have undoubted capacity to become the future government'.<sup>62</sup> The conclusion must be that the constitutional arrangements have the imprint of Western liberalism, but South Africa's new political culture is still being shaped.

#### **(b) The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)**

The RDP is the centre-piece of the new government's domestic policy. Its objectives fall squarely within the Human Development paradigm. It does not set out detailed policies, but offers a set of benchmarks for socio-economic development, with targets in such fields as employment, housing and services. Jay Naidoo, the Minister with responsibility for the programme, stated that it is 'our response to the serious social and economic problems of South Africa: mass poverty, gross inequality, a stagnant economy and enormous backlogs'.<sup>63</sup> As Naidoo made clear the RDP aims at both economic growth and a major redistribution of rewards and resources.

That has prompted a debate in which assumptions are found from both the 'Human Development' and the 'Western Triumphalism' paradigms. The two sides are agreed that both growth and redistribution are desirable, but differ in how to achieve them. In broad terms those who emphasise growth urge a free market cum capitalist approach. They believe that the best way forward is to ensure that the economy develops as rapidly as possible via the market, thereby strengthening the country's overall position and generating further economic activity. This, so the argument goes, will benefit most people, and ensure redistribution by the trickle-down factor. The government's role in this scenario is to ensure order, protect property, create favourable conditions for investment and put its trust in the market. In contrast the strongest advocates of redistribution believe that the government must intervene actively to ensure a more equal pattern of economic rewards. They believe that only the government can remedy the injustices of apartheid, reduce unemployment, extend and



improve social services, and invest in education for all. In their view leaving the economy to market forces and foreign investors will benefit only those who already have wealth and privileges. They do not ignore growth, but are convinced that it is best achieved by the government mobilising the efforts of the majority and investing in people.

A few people are at the extremes in this debate, and most see virtue in a mixture of the 'growth' and 'redistribution' approaches. It would therefore be a mistake to see ANC members and leaders standing in one corner opposed to white businessmen in another. That became clear in the wide-ranging consultation undertaken in the adoption of the RDP. It began life as an ANC document with the first draft reading like a socialist blueprint, but, after wide consultation, including business interests and other parties, subsequent drafts moved away from that. As Nelson Mandela pointed out, the final version makes no mention of nationalisation or has a single slogan connecting it with Marxist ideology. Instead it advocates a mixed economy.

As finally agreed the RDP is a government-led initiative concerned with Human Rights and concerned with Human Developments issues (such as land reform, improved health and education services, the provision of water and electricity), but which, influenced by Western ideas, recognises that co-operation is required between government and private enterprise. Afar from being a rigidly centralised programme, Naidoo has stressed that the RDP is based on a partnership of government, the private sector, mass institutions and NGOs. The challenge, he wrote, is 'to tackle poverty not merely through handouts, but with a programme that builds the country's wealth'. The overall objective is to 'achieve sustainable economic growth while simultaneously meeting the basic needs of our people'. He stressed that the RDP is not an 'add on' to the existing government programme, but is the core of the government's efforts and will be achieved by readjusting resources through the budget. When Derek Keys, then Finance Minister, introduced the government's first budget, he claimed that it combined social justice with aggressive growth - 'the best of both worlds'.<sup>64</sup>

#### **PART 4: AFRICA AND THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION**

In sub-Saharan Africa great changes have followed the end of the Cold War. Gone are the global divisions, which fuelled major conflicts in such places as Angola, Ethiopia and Somalia; and gone are the apartheid battle lines. However, conflict continues to plague the continent, because of internal instability. Within this continental context South Africa's position is radically altered. In the apartheid days Pretoria had few contacts, and was excluded from international bodies. Now new horizons have opened up. As noted earlier with regard to Nigeria, South Africa expects and is expected to play a prominent

continental role: both as an economic motor to drive on the rest, and a force for peace and reconciliation. L.H. (Rusty) Evans, Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs, stated that the most important challenge for the new South Africa is 'the role which it will be able to play within the African context'. South Africa must act 'from the premise that it is first and foremost an African country'.<sup>65</sup> By early 1995 the government had established relations with 46 institutions, including the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), where it was appointed to the Central Organ for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.

Within the African context the government sees its new role mainly in terms of Institutionalism and Human Development. Membership of organisations provide a 'certain protection', said Aziz Pahad, 'but it also gives us an opportunity to exercise our role as a responsible global citizen by fulfilling certain responsibilities required of us'. He spoke of a common challenge to achieve an African Renaissance, which requires peace, stability and 'people security'. In seeking these South Africa is eager to help with conflict resolution, as witnessed by its membership of the OAU delegation which sought to prevent tensions erupting into civil war in Burundi. In fulfilling such a role the government has stressed that stability can only be secured in the broader context of Human Development. 'Peace', said Pahad, 'can only be built on economic progress and "people security"'. In setting out to achieve that, he recognised that South Africa has derived a moral authority from its national reconciliation, but he insisted that it 'should not act - or be perceived to act - as the superpower of the continent. We are therefore committed to approaching all issues relating to conflict prevention and resolution within established multilateral frameworks'.<sup>66</sup>

Yet a 'leadership' if not necessarily a 'superpower' role is what many outside the continent envisage for South Africa, and because of its relative wealth, strength and prestige it will be difficult to counter that perception. Such a role presents many difficulties. Africa is the poorest and least stable of the continents, with a rapidly expanding population (sub-Saharan Africa had 300 million people in 1970; by 1995 that had risen to 600 million and is projected to reach 940 million by 2010). It is no longer a cockpit for the great powers, but has many conflicts, and with its poor economic performance it is becoming marginalised. It remains a major recipient of aid, but even that raises doubts. 'Unlike investment', wrote Greg Mills, 'aid seldom creates capacity and skills in the recipient nation, instead creating a "culture of dependence"'.<sup>67</sup> A 1995 International Labour Organisation report pointed out that sub-Saharan Africa now received one third of all global aid, accounting for almost 10% of the continent's GDP. It is the only part of the world where aid is central in total economic activity, and while elsewhere direct private investment has grown steadily it has decreased in Africa. The report claimed that policies pursued by African states often undermine development. What is needed, said the report,

is policy reform, improved skills, consistency and stability.<sup>68</sup> Within this context South Africa is being encouraged to take the lead because outside powers are turning their backs on Africa.

#### 4.1 The Southern African Region

Pretoria's most immediate concern is with the Southern African region. In the past the apartheid government's relationship with its neighbours was one of contrasts. There were close economic and infrastructure links (because the neighbours were dependent on South Africa), whereas political and security relations were hostile. The hostility disappeared with the demise of apartheid, and the new government has set out to reshape regional relations based on co-operation and friendship. Its regional aims are similar to those for the whole continent but they are more immediate and pressing in the region. Even before assuming office Nelson Mandela wrote that South Africa wanted equality with, not ascendancy over, neighbours. It was, he wrote, the colonial economy which had entrenched South Africa's regional dominance and subordinated neighbours to act as labour reserves and client markets. The new South Africa would avoid domination and 'resist any pressure or temptation to pursue its own interest at the expense of Southern Africa'. Reconstruction of the region must, he wrote, 'be a collective enterprise' in which South Africa will shoulder responsibility 'not in the spirit of paternalism or dominance but with mutual co-operation and respect'.<sup>69</sup> Mandela has repeated these views in government. After receiving the Africa Peace Prize in March 1995 he said: 'Never again shall South Africa be the fountainhead of conflict in the region or further afield'. Instead it would work with neighbours through organisations like the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and OAU.<sup>70</sup> Later, after visiting Tanzania, he told the Senate the trip had underlined 'the centrality of Southern Africa and Africa in the foreign policy of our new democracy. This we intend to carry out on the basis of equality and mutual respect'.

The new government has already been active in regional conflict resolution and preventive diplomacy. During 1994/95 it played a leading part in reconciling disputes in Lesotho and Mozambique. However, it was careful to act with Zimbabwe and Botswana under the wing of SADC. As Rusty Evans confirmed 'South Africa has no intention of getting involved in conflict resolution on its own'. He reiterated the point that security must be seen in a broad Human Development context. 'The notion of peace', he said, 'should not simply be defined as an absence of war and conflict. War and conflict are symptoms of a greater malaise: perhaps at the core of which is a lack of democracy ... accompanied by socio-economic inequality, poverty, social injustice, disregard for human rights and oppression'.<sup>71</sup>

There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Pretoria in wanting to co-operate with its neighbours, to treat them as equals, and act on Human Development principles. However, the approach is based on questionable assumptions. While it may be possible to respect neighbours and treat them formally as equals, South Africa cannot escape the consequences of its own relative strength. Although it is a small/medium power in world terms, it is a giant in Southern Africa. The region is poor and vulnerable; it contains some of the world's most impoverished states; it has suffered from wars, famines and instability. This setting exaggerates South Africa's strength. However in regional terms it sweeps the board: in trade, transport, education, industrial development, military force and technological development (see Table 2).

Country	Population ('000)	GNP (US\$m)	GNP per capita (US\$m)
South Africa	39,763	106,019	2,670
Angola	9,732	6,000	620
Botswana	1,360	3,797	2,790
Lesotho	1,860	1,090	590
Malawi	9,058	1,896	210
Mozambique	16,565	1,034	60
Namibia	1,529	2,502	1,610
Swaziland	860	930	1,080
Tanzania	25,965	2,561	110
Zambia	8,589	2,580	290
Zimbabwe	10,352	5,896	570

The figures speak for themselves. South Africa's economy accounts for 79% of the region's GDP. In 1992 it exported R16 bn. to its neighbours and imported only R4 bn; it consumed 150,000 kWh of electricity while the rest combined consumed 24,000 kWh; it had 21,000 km. of the region's 36,000 km. of rail, and 58,000 km. of its 86,000 km. of paved road; and South African ports handled 111 bn. tons of goods, while only 7 bn. tons passed through the rest.<sup>72</sup> The question is not therefore whether it will dominate but how. South Africa is so much richer and stronger than its neighbours that, try as it may, it cannot avoid being the dominant power.

South Africa faces further regional dilemmas. One concerns the attitudes of organisations and states from outside the region. They expect Pretoria to accept responsibility as the region's leader; to use its strength to prompt economic development, and follow up its own political 'miracle' by acting as a political stabilising force. Such hopes overlap with South Africa's own eagerness to be active, but the emphasis is different. The outsiders want South Africa to lead, whereas the South Africans say that they want to co-operate as equals. Nzo states that 'we will contribute through mutual benefit and interdependence to regional co-operation and interdependence and not through "power politics"'.<sup>73</sup>

Yet the outside concentration on South Africa may well be at the expense of other parts of the region. This is understandable because it is easier to do business and direct regional support through the most powerful state. The result may be that external resources for the region (whether they be from private business, other governments, or international organisations) will increasingly be routed to South Africa. Pretoria cannot reject this situation because it needs *external support for its own development*. The dilemma was captured by Rusty evans when he said that the gap between the North and South segments of South African society and the rate of population expansion 'have dictated that one of the Department's principal priorities has become the active encouragement of large scale foreign investment in South Africa'. Then he quickly added, that there was no intention of diverting investment away from the rest of the region.<sup>74</sup>

The new government is learning that, despite its commitment to co-operation, interests do not always coincide, especially when there is such an imbalance of power. The end of apartheid removed a major source of conflict, but not necessarily differences of interest in such matters as trade, tariffs, the protection of local industries, transport and the movement of people.<sup>75</sup> For example, South Africa has long benefited from immigrant labour, but, with its own rapidly increasing population and serious unemployment at home, attitudes have changed. The government has steadily reduced the number of foreign workers legally admitted into the country. That policy will continue, with serious consequences for such neighbours as Lesotho and Mozambique (which supplied 88,000 and 44,000 miners respectively in 1992). A further problem is created by illegal immigrants. The number is unknown, and estimates vary widely from 2 million to 8 million. South Africa is 'a honey pot', attracting immigrants/refugees to its relative order and prosperity. Despite Pretoria's good intentions, immigration (whether legal or illegal) is difficult to handle justly, because people at home are under pressure for jobs and resources, and because it raises emotional questions about culture, nationality and individual rights.

Therefore in its relations with its neighbours, whether it be immigration or other matters, the new government cannot ignore domestic interests and

pressures. To retain support at home it has regularly to preach a 'South Africa first' message. However, as far as the region is concerned, there is a saving grace. The government recognises that South Africa's interests are best served by a stable, flourishing region. That may not always be obvious in particular cases and the government may have difficulty in persuading the public to this view, but it realises that South Africa cannot prosper unless the region prospers. President Mandela stated: 'Our concern for national sovereignty and national interest need not prevent us from planning seriously for regional growth and development - indeed they dictate that we move in that direction, because our fortunes are so interdependent. None of us can achieve sustainable growth and development, or peace and stability, in isolation'.<sup>76</sup> Alfred Nzo put it in a nutshell when he said: 'We cannot be an island of prosperity, surrounded by a sea of poverty'.<sup>77</sup>

The recognition of regional interdependence is based on both positive and negative factors. On the positive side there are opportunities in a stable region to extend economic activities including trade, investment, tourism, transport and the provision of power. Almost 90% of South Africa's continental trade is with the region, and further opportunities could be opened up. Equally, if the demands of an expanding population at home and the RDP targets are to be met, regional co-operation is required to harness basic resources such as water and power. Looking to the future South Africa has now made agreements with its neighbours for a Southern African Power Pool and Shared Watercourse Systems. One well-advanced scheme is the Highlands Water Project in the Lesotho mountains, which diverts the headwaters of the Orange River to meet the demands of Gauteng Province, the most populous and developed part of South Africa, and at the same time provides power for Lesotho and surrounding parts of South Africa. It is a huge project backed by Western capital, and underlines what can be achieved through regional and international co-operation. The same lesson can be drawn in reverse; from what so far has been a failure. This is the experience of the Cahora Bassa Dam, on the Zambezi in Mozambique, which was also backed by international capital. It is a remarkable piece of engineering, and designed to supply power to South Africa and create a major local irrigation scheme. However, because of wars and instability in Mozambique it has so far failed to provide either power or irrigation.

In negative terms if the region slides into disorder and increasing poverty, South Africa itself will be in danger of being dragged down with it. As well as the immigration/refugee problem, there is a threat that the Republic's borders will be penetrated by dissidents, cattle thieves, refugees, diseases, drug and gun runners. South Africa hopes for the support of its neighbours to counter such dangers. Yet, even with stable governments on the other side of the borders, it will be difficult to maintain control, but if there is a breakdown of order among the neighbours there will be no effective external authority to help.

There are two main ways for South Africa to approach this. One that has already been mentioned is by encouraging economic/human progress so that there is broad-based regional development. The other is to see it as a military task. In November 1993, when General Meiring outlined future roles for the armed forces, he said that a conventional external attack was very unlikely, but he stressed the importance of border control to prevent the flow of arms, drugs and illegal immigrants. 'This danger', he said, 'could best be countered with co-operation from neighbouring states, and so South Africa should work with them and enhance their defence capabilities'. However (although Meiring did not say so), if this were not possible the alternative would be to take a Realist view and give national security top priority by manning the borders against external threats. It would be extraordinary if the government behaved in any other way if it perceived a major threat developing to its own security.

## 4.2 Regional Institutions

Regional co-operation requires a structure in which to operate. One option is to establish a network of bilateral relations on single issues. Some are already in place, such as a trade agreement with Zimbabwe and a border control agreement with Mozambique. Such bilateral agreements will continue to be made, and they are attractive for Pretoria in that they are geared to specific needs and South Africa can often dictate the terms because it is the stronger partner. If regional institutions fail to develop this may be the way forward. However, the government is eager to demonstrate its commitment to co-operation and interdependence by working through multilateral institutions. It favours the institutional road because it wants good relations with its neighbours, because it feels a debt of obligation to those who helped in the liberation struggle, and because it shares with 'Institutionalists' the belief that this is the most effective way of achieving stability and development.

However, the region does not start with a blank sheet in terms of institutions. Its old organisations can be divided into two broad groups - one of which South Africa dominated; the other which excluded South Africa. In the first are the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Rand Monetary Area, which were built early in the century around South Africa's economic strength and have worked reasonably effectively within their limited sphere. However, they are confined in geographical scope to the Republic and her immediate neighbours. In contrast, the second group of institutions, which excluded South Africa, was much wider in its range of activities and its geographical scope. It consisted of three main bodies:

- (a) The Front Line States (FLS), whose purpose was to support the liberation struggle against white regimes;

- (b) The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), which was formed in 1979 and consisted of all South Africa's immediate neighbours, plus Angola, Zambia and Tanzania. Its aim was to reduce dependence on South Africa by fostering co-operation among its members, and securing international co-operation for 'economic liberation';
- (c) The Preferential Trade Area (PTA) which was designed to encourage inter-continental trade, and was even wider than SADCC in geographical scope, stretching as far as Ethiopia.

The two institutional groups no longer match the needs of the post-apartheid region. The first is too narrow; the second designed for a situation which no longer exists. Ideally it might be best to start afresh and seek answers to three basic questions. First, what functions are regional institutions designed to achieve: trade, aid, security, economic and political integration, or all of these? Second, is there a long-term goal in mind: a Common Market or even a Federation of States? Third, what immediate structures are required to undertake the functions and/or build towards the long-term goal? In facing such questions all Southern African states can recognise the advantages of co-operation: a single voice in negotiating international trade and aid deals; mutual support in technical matters; border security; common efforts to develop the region's economy and deal with environmental issues; sharing of infrastructure development; and more generally the advantages which combined action gives in dealing with common problems.

Yet it is easier to state the general advantages of co-operation than to identify the likely outcomes or the structures required to achieve them. Because of the tenacity of established interests combined with the current climate of uncertainty, there is likely to be a period of readjustment during which the smaller states will seek to balance the advantages of co-operation against the threat of domination. There is a real danger that they will see South Africa not as a partner but a threat. At the same time South Africa may be hesitant to use its strong position, either because it might be accused of dominating others, or alternatively becoming snared in others' problems.

So far SADC (which is a reconstituted SADCC) appears to be emerging as the most powerful and favoured institution. Not only has South Africa joined and been given responsibility for the financial and investment sector, but an offshoot of SADC has been proposed as a successor to the FLS. This is the Association of Southern African States (ASAS) which may be given a political *cum* security role, covering such tasks as the results of a breakdown of order; mediating in inter-state and intra-state disputes and conflicts; and promoting peacemaking and peacekeeping. The acceptance of a regional body for political and security



issues may prove to be a crucial factor. South Africa has already demonstrated its willingness to co-operate in achieving regional stability by acting with Zimbabwe and Botswana in Lesotho and contributing to peacemaking in Mozambique. If, as a result, there is reasonable stability across the region international co-operation will have a sound base on which to grow. Equally important the private sector will have an environment in which trade, investment and co-operation can develop. In contrast, if there is instability, Pretoria's regional relations may be characterised not by the development of vigorous regional institutions, but by a series of bilateral arrangements, and the erection of barriers: against migrants, drugs, cattle raiding, arms smuggling and even trade.

Future development is still uncertain. The SADC meeting in August 1995 (the first to be staged in South Africa) was a disappointment for those who favoured rapid regional integration. Dr. Erich Leistner noted South Africa's 'self-effacing attitude' at the meeting, resulting in frustration for those who wanted Pretoria to take a positive lead. There was progress on 'functional co-operation' in such matters as water and power resources, but not in other fields - including economic integration, relations with other regions, air transport co-ordination, and even the ASAS proposal was referred back for further consideration. Among the reasons Leistner identified for the slow progress were 'lack of political will', 'petty politicking' about who should have a leadership role (Presidents Mugabe or Mandela) and concern among other states about South African dominance. Yet Leistner argued that the expectations had been too high, that time was needed to absorb the new situation, and not least in South Africa. He saw the best hope in establishing a regional framework in which private enterprise could develop. He concluded: 'South Africa cannot afford to play a passive role in SADC for long. In its own interests it must insist on realistic objectives'.<sup>78</sup>

## PART 5: GLOBAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS

The triumph of the West and its importance to South Africa is most clearly demonstrated in global economic relations. The new government is eager to spread its economic links as widely as possible but it cannot escape the reality of the West's global economic dominance. Professor Willie Breytenbach sees 'South Africa's future [as] a regional leader and middle power within a US-driven global dispensation'. But he also recognises the dilemma of 'how best to relate to the dominant institutions of the multilateral financial world, without falling into [a] dependency trap'.<sup>79</sup> If South Africa wants major international economic support it will have to sing from a Western hymn sheet. South Africa depends heavily for its economic health on trade, and in this the pre-eminent role of the West is clear from Table 3.

**Table 3: South Africa's Foreign Trade (1992)**  
(US\$ million)

Region/Country	Imports	Exports
European Community	6,861	7,603
North America (US/Canada)	2,510	1,743
Asia (ex Japan)	1,892	2,753
Japan	1,728	1,735
Africa	589	2,007
South America	322	291
Australasia	241	120
West Europe (ex EC)	99	150
East Europe	40	50

The government cannot fail to recognise the importance of Western contacts. In May 1995, Aziz Pahad stated: 'South Africa is critically dependent on its business and economic relations with the outside world, particularly the industrialised world, to meet the growing demands of our people for a better life'. 'If', Pahad continued, 'RDP targets are to be met the country needs sustained growth which can only be achieved with international support'. He picked out for special mention first the US - the greatest economic and political power in the world - and second the European Union, which is even more economically important for South Africa. 'The reality', he said, 'is that the European Union is currently our predominant trading and investment partner'. He claimed that the livelihood of three out of every ten South Africans depended on economic relations with the EU and concluded: 'Our European policy is essentially an outward projection of South Africa's domestic imperatives - economic and social development'.<sup>30</sup>

Western economic contacts come in various forms and agencies. Governments provide aid, grants and loans; Western-dominated international organisations (like the World Bank and the IMF) provide development programmes and finance; private business companies offer trade and investment; and aid packages come through Western NGOs. In finding its way through this maze and maximising its advantages, South Africa's chameleon nature comes into play as the government tries to gain advantage from both its 'South' and 'North' faces. With its 'North' face it seeks to attract trade and investment; with its 'South' it looks for aid. The message is naturally fashioned for the

audience. Franklin Sonn, the Ambassador to Washington, speaking to American businessman, said that South Africa is committed to financial discipline, and determined to avoid populist measures which lead to over-expenditure, or to featherbedding as was done previously for whites. The new government, he pointed out, had not rushed into a World Bank loan; it had accepted trade liberalisation; it had promised to reduce expenditure; and to bring down its deficit from 6.6% to 4.5% of GDP. Sonn stated that communist influence on economic policy is minimal, and concluded that South Africa had recently achieved a high international credit rating 'because we know if we want to play the game we must play it according to the rules of the international market'.<sup>81</sup>

The other South African face was presented by Jay Naidoo at the UN Social Development Conference at Copenhagen in March 1995. Naidoo tabled a government report with statistics that reinforced the 'south' image: a population growth of 2.26% per year; 37% of the population under 15 years of age; 12.5 million illiterates; and 2.3 million undernourished. He said that South Africa was not asking for charity, and will not go cap in hand. He pointed to the RDP as an attempt 'to pull ourselves up by our own bootstraps'. Yet the main message was the need for coherent and co-ordinated support. The industrialised world, he said, has an obligation to help.<sup>82</sup> However, the 'South' claim has not gone unchallenged. In 1992 an application to be reclassified as a 'developing' state within the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) was refused on the grounds that South Africa was the world's 30th largest trading state. Instead it was designated as 'an economy in transition', similar to many Eastern European states.<sup>83</sup>

## 5.1 The European Union (EU)

A debate about South Africa's status has also arisen in relations with the EU. Pretoria has applied for membership of the Lomé Convention, by which the EU gives improved trade terms to less-developed states. However, South Africa does not fit neatly into the established framework. This is partly because of the distortions created by the past attempts to counter sanctions. Pretoria has requested special arrangements so that it can move slowly towards free trade. Neil van Heerden, then South African Ambassador to the EU, explained that a quick move could jeopardise South Africa's efforts to restructure uncompetitive industries and develop an integrated regional trade regime. Yet in the longer term Pretoria wants access to the EU on Lomé terms. Thabo Mbeki, the Deputy President, confirmed that 'the principal question for South Africa is market access. If we can get a relationship between the EU and South Africa which is the same as the Lomé Convention countries have, it's fine. We want free access for our apples, cars, coal, iron and steel and we need aggressive marketing to sell them'.<sup>84</sup> Within the EU there has been a mixed

response. Some members are sympathetic, others see South Africa as a potential agricultural rival and say it is too wealthy to fall within the Convention. Pretoria disputes that, and stresses its 'South' identity. 'The government is acting', said Rusty Evans, 'from the premise that it is first and foremost an African country, whose relations with the EU should take into consideration its relations with Africa and the ACP countries of the Lomé Convention'.

In June 1995 twin-track negotiations started with the EU. The first concerned Lomé membership; the second a separate bilateral agreement to cover matters outside the Convention. At the opening meeting, Trevor Manuel, the Minister of Trade and Industry, stated that South Africa wanted to negotiate a comprehensive 15-year co-operation and trade agreement.<sup>86</sup> He pointed out that already, by liberating tariffs and encouraging growth, South Africa had incurred a deficit largely due to EU imports. South Africa wanted to improve standards of living and job opportunities based on fair trade, and the promotion of *reconstruction and democratisation*. While he recognised that 'no agreement is possible without political goodwill', and that some EU states are concerned about giving market access to South Africa, he claimed that such access would have only a tiny impact on the EU's overall trade. He offered four reasons why South Africa should be granted special treatment. First, despite the radical changes at home, traces of the old international sanctions persist and result in adverse trade discrimination. Second, EU members have given enthusiastic support to democratic change, but 'political stability will have to be underpinned by economic growth and development'. Third, the EU gives aid to all Southern Africa, but the region's future rests on the economic reconstruction of South Africa. Finally, he appealed to EU self-interest, saying that South Africa offers great opportunities for trade and investment.

## 5.2 The United States (US)

The new government recognises the US as the world's most powerful state, with an economy more than twice the size of Japan's, its nearest rival. As with the EU, relations with the US also point up the dual nature of the South African economy. In recognition of the 'South' element the US provides aid. In February 1995 there was much American resentment when President Mandela, in an off-the-cuff remark, described US aid as 'peanuts' (meaning it was small in relation to US wealth). The Americans pointed out that although Africa is no longer of strategic importance to the US, South Africa is the fourth largest recipient of US foreign assistance (following Israel, Egypt and Russia), that US aid to South Africa which was USA\$80m. in 1993 had risen to US\$212m. in 1994, and there was a commitment to a further US\$500m. over a four-year period. Further this is at a time when the efficacy of aid in general is under challenge in the US Congress.<sup>87</sup>

Howard Reed, a presidential adviser, explained that while America is eager to help there are obstacles, including mounting international debt, which has led Congress to target foreign aid programmes. Reed said that the prevailing attitude 'is to let the private sector and the markets provide the necessary and needed capital for developing countries'.<sup>88</sup> The same theme was adopted by Ronald Brown, the US Secretary of Commerce, who stated that: 'Helping make South Africa a more productive, consumer-orientated, competitive society may be the best thing America can do to get South Africa moving ahead ... The single most productive way the US can help South Africa is to encourage growth and stability through increased commercial aid opportunities'.<sup>89</sup>

The development aspect of the US/South Africa relationship has been formalised in a Binational Commission, inaugurated in April 1994 by Vice-President Al Gore and Deputy President Thabo Mbeki. The main Commission is to meet every six months, with *more regular meetings for sub-committees* covering finance, investment, markets, education, environment and sustained development. Al Gore confirmed that the US wants to do all it can 'to lift up this new non-racial democracy we admire so much', and pointed out that the only similar Commission is with Russia. Again, however, the emphasis was on private enterprise and free markets. Millard Arnold, of the US Commerce department, stated that the US 'has been and will remain committed to assisting South Africa through redevelopment and beyond. It's been the policy of consecutive administrations to support the political, economic and social transformation of South Africa. The view of this administration is that our particular strength lies in private sector development'. He claimed that about 500 US companies were active in South Africa compared with 184 three years before.<sup>90</sup>

### 5.3 The Economic Debate

Many South Africans recognise the need to attract private capital. President Mandela himself, conscious of the importance of external investment for the RDP, told a US television audience: 'Forget the past and come to South Africa to make money. All of you will and should make your investment decisions based upon the *real opportunities you seek and find in South Africa*'.<sup>91</sup> Greg Mills, made a parallel point in drawing a distinction between aid and investment, and questioning whether aid creates capacity and skill or rather a culture of dependence. He stated that 'the central objective of South Africa's foreign economic policy will have to be the attraction of foreign savings', and he recognised that 'a fundamental pre-requisite for this concerns the state of the domestic politico-economic system'.<sup>92</sup>

One of the clearest changes of attitude has been the shift among many ANC

leaders from socialism to an acceptance of a mixed economy: what may be termed 'social democracy', based on the need to gain Western trade, aid and investment. Recognising South Africa's 'North' and 'South' faces, Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki speak the languages both of Human Development and of Western capitalism. When President Mandela welcomed delegates to a Southern African Investment Conference in September 1995, he spoke not only of 'the challenge of economic growth and development' and the need for sustained improvement in the quality of life, but also that this must be done 'within the framework of fiscal and financial discipline'. He spoke of abandoning 'the insular economy', and beginning 'the process of phased trade liberalisation, accompanied by measures to enhance the competitiveness of our economy'.<sup>93</sup>

Yet the picture is far from clear cut. Many ANC members remain sceptical about Western ideas and others are bitter opponents of capitalism and the free market. There is still a strong element of anti-capitalism within trade unions which have a powerful position within the ANC alliance. When Pepsi Cola built a new plant, which Thabo Mbeki described as a model for foreign investment, the union responded by saying that foreigners must adhere to the rules of the democratic South Africa, and give the unemployed a say in who is recruited. The criticism has found its most dramatic voice in 'the populists' led by Winnie Mandela. She believes that the government has sold out to the West. Even when still a Deputy Minister she declared that the government has betrayed the poor. 'This is not the South Africa for which I ruined my life'. 'Nothing', she told her followers, 'has changed. In fact your struggle seems much worse than it was before when the fight was against the Boers'.<sup>94</sup> When the government leaders dismissed the populists they were accused of witch hunting. 'So distant', wrote Mondli Makahanya, 'has the ANC leadership grown from its base that it does not realise that what the so-called populists are saying is merely an echo of the feelings of millions who formed meandering queues to vote last year'.<sup>95</sup>

Other critics within the ANC alliance, especially members of the South African Communist Party (SACP), have directed their criticisms against major institutions, which they see as agents of the West. They regard them as part of an 'imperialist conspiracy serving Washington's interests', in which the IMF is the North's debt collector, the World Bank an instrument of US policy, and the G7 a 'self-appointed directorate, meeting once a year to shower blame and praise on the rest of the world'.<sup>96</sup> Ben Turok, of the SACP, wrote: 'A new democratic South Africa will need to defend its interests against the predatory actions of international capital and institutions like the IMF, the World Bank and the Big Powers. He accused them of wanting 'to install democracy, compradorism and transnational power in a new world order which recolonises the Third World'. He warned against the IMF targeting South Africa and undermining its sovereignty. He called on the new government to stand firm,

to recognise that the South African economy was dominated by a small elite, and the majority of people had not (nor would not) benefit from 'the skyscraper economy'.<sup>97</sup> Raymond Suttner (another SACP member and now chairman of the Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee) was equally adamant. After praising Eastern Europe for its past support in the liberation struggle he regretted the present lack of counterweight to the imperialist West. 'UN agencies', he wrote, 'have been turned into adjuncts of imperialist institutions'. These include the IMF, which is able to impose its own conception of economic development, denying fundamental social transformation. It is critical', he wrote, 'that the new South African state throws its weight behind those forces committed to struggling against the so-called new world order'.<sup>98</sup>

These radical criticisms are not only found among ANC members but more generally in Africa. Sadiq Rasheed commenting on Africa's economic situation saw the immediate problems as sheer survival and basic order. 'What is required', he wrote, 'is human development and economic growth'. Yet the West's prescription - the IMF's structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) - have failed to achieve these. 'Evidence abounds', he wrote, 'that SAPs have been detrimental to human development in Africa'.<sup>99</sup> 'Further, it is unrealistic', he argued, 'to expect inflows of private capital because of Africa's plight'. Western aid is required for the most basic of needs, and it is in the West's interests to continue to offer it on terms acceptable to Africans, to reduce tensions, avoid environmental damage, counter the flow of refugees, and remove ethnic conflict. A new global order in which Africa slides into abject poverty will be neither secure nor morally defensible. 'There must be', he argued, 'less reliance on the market and more on government long-term planning'. The retreat of the state from responsibility is unwarranted. It should ensure that financial and economic resources are directed into human development. 'Market forces alone cannot promote growth, let alone human development and transformation in Africa'.<sup>100</sup>

The economic debate will continue. In the West there are mixed views about South Africa's prospects. In global terms it is a relatively small economy, and while there has been much rejoicing about the political changes, the socio-political future is uncertain. When Patrick McGowan examined future economic prospects in 1993 he reached gloomy conclusions. He placed South Africa among 'semi-peripheral' states (a middle group between the rich 'core' economies and the poor 'peripheral'); but feared it was slipping into the periphery. He pointed out that while between 1965 and 1990 the average per capita growth rate of the semi-peripheral group had been 2.8% South Africa's had been 1.3%. He concluded that 'the performance of the South African economy since the 1970s has been terrible'. Growth rates had contracted from 4% in 1970-75 to 0.89% in 1990-93; while the population increased by almost 4% per annum. McGowan gave a number of explanations for the decline:

- (a) The impact of apartheid, which frustrated human development, bred a large bureaucracy and resulted in international sanctions;
- (b) High government expenditure, which grew from 20.5% to 33% of GDP between 1980 and 1990;
- (c) Trade barriers erected to counter sanctions;
- (d) Poor management and inefficient use of labour; and
- (e) Trade unions gaining increased wages without greater efficiency.<sup>101</sup>

In 1993 and 1994 before the new government was in place McGowan's gloom seem well-founded. While foreign politicians enthused about the great political achievements, businessmen (who have to take the risks) were more circumspect. The president of an American company stated that 'investment in South Africa is a hugely postponable event. Businessmen are not heroes and they will wait to see how things develop'.<sup>102</sup> There were similar signals in Germany. In 1994 Rudolf Gruber noted that enthusiasm for the new South Africa among the political elite (parties, media, churches and universities) had led to increased aid, but he recognised that South Africa was low on the political agenda, and the business community was hesitant. South Africa is a small and declining market. In 1975 it represented 1.45% of West Germany's external trade, but by 1993 it had dropped to 0.7%. Businessmen were holding back, waiting to see how matters developed. They were asking whether South Africa will follow the same path as Black Africa; will labour relations go well; will violence erupt; what will happen when Mandela goes.<sup>103</sup>

Since the emergence of the new government there are signs that the gloom may be unfounded and the hesitation overcome. Some industries are booming (such as tourism and wine), some foreign companies (especially those with past South African links) have expanded and/or renewed their activities, and there has been a tidal wave of trade missions (although they may have been attracted as much by South Africa's beauty and weather as the economic prospects). In contrast with McGowan, Tim Read (of the London firm Smith New Court) presented a much more optimistic picture in October 1995. Read noted that after the period of stagnation the economy had returned to a growth path, with a current annual 3% increase in GDP; inflation was down to a twenty-two year low of 7.5%; South Africa was fully integrated into the international financial community; the Central Bank had started the progressive dismantling of exchange controls; and the GNU's first annual budget had shown great financial responsibility. Read's analysis underlined the new South Africa's advantages, which, if employed effectively, can lead to steady economic progress. Not only can it gain the economic benefit of its political transformation, it has basic economic strengths.



They include major mineral resources; an experienced business community with a Western business culture; technical skills in specific industries; a good payment record; relatively low debts; a stronger infrastructure and education system than most 'South' states; and a post-apartheid dividend, which includes the lifting of sanctions, reduced defence expenditure and international goodwill. Read concluded that overall the 'economic climate is generally good and investor-friendly'. Yet, despite this early progress, he was conscious that there was much to do, and many problems to solve including the under-delivery of the RDP, the rapid increase in crime, an overblown bureaucracy and the unresolved KwaZulu dispute.<sup>104</sup> The overall conclusion therefore must be that measured by Western standards, the jury is still out making its decision about the South African economy and is likely to be out for a considerable time to come.

## PART 6: CONCLUSIONS

Can any general conclusions be drawn about South Africa's position in the post-Cold War world? If do so the paradigms help to clarify and explain the situation? The answer to both those questions is a qualified 'yes'. The qualification is there on two counts. First, as had been said repeatedly, the situation is changing so rapidly, and there is such a high degree of uncertainty both in South Africa and globally, that a conclusion drawn today may appear naive two years hence. Second, the paradigms are built on general assumptions which never quite match behaviour. That said, the broad answer to the questions is that the South African Government's perception of the world about it and its stated aims are strongly influenced by the assumptions and ideals of the Human Development and to a lesser extent the Institutionalism paradigms. However, in seeking these aims the government finds itself operating in an international setting which is heavily influenced, although not fully shaped, by the characteristics of Western Triumphalism, and to a lesser extent Realism. The result is that some gaps have already appeared between the South African Government's aims and its ability to achieve those aims.

If the position outlined above is accepted, it becomes clear that no one paradigm alone adequately explains South Africa's situation. Each covers a wide range of concerns, addresses a set of major issues and helps to clarify the situation in so far as it is relevant to the particular circumstances, but the situation is more complex than any one paradigm covers. An alternative approach, therefore, is to accept that all four paradigms can be seen to be operating. This compound approach may be less heroic and clear cut than concentrating on a single paradigm, but it offers a better mode of explanation.

With that in mind it becomes clear from their public statements that many ANC

government leaders have pushed socialism into the background, but they have not lost the idealism which motivated the liberation struggle. The new government, with its ANC majority, is no world-weary regime which has 'seen it all before', but a young, enthusiastic administration eager to display its talents and promote its ideals. Policy is presented in high moral tones, in the phrases of the pulpit and the ideals of Human Development and Institutionalism. The government preaches the virtues of interdependence, co-operation and human values. Aziz Pahad sees South Africa's destiny as assisting in 'the furtherance worldwide of peace, of democracy, of human rights, of sustainable development, of protection from the environment, of disarmament, and of making our world a more agreeable and friendly place to live in'.<sup>105</sup> The government emphasises the need to work through international institutions (whether that be in Africa or globally), it associates itself with the 'South', and places particular emphasis on working in harmony with neighbours. In the region it says that it has no intention of dominating, but will operate on the basis of equality and in recognition that it cannot flourish unless its neighbours also flourish. The methods as well as the aims are stated in terms of co-operation and persuasion. As Alfred Nzo stated: 'Our foreign policy should rely more on political and moral persuasion rather than economic and military means in the pursuit of national objectives'.<sup>106</sup>

However, in seeking these ideals the South African Government finds itself operating in a global setting in which the dominant values and material strength rest with the major Western states and Western-dominated institutions. This is a situation which the NP element of the government finds relatively easy to accept, whereas within the ANC there is more ambivalence, although most government leaders are coming to terms with the situation. The influence of Western Triumphalism can be traced both within South Africa itself, where the constitutional structure (if not necessarily the political culture) reflects the values of Western liberalism. It can also be traced in the international setting in which the government recognises the importance of Western links if it is to achieve economic development and international influence. Alongside the recognition of Western strength there is also a hint of Realism. This is found in the government's recognition of states as the building blocks of the international system, and its emphasis on sovereign rights and national interests. That has emerged even in the region, where South Africa has so far failed to commit itself on major issues, including a free trade area, but has reached a number of bilateral agreements and has recognised that it must defend its borders.

The central challenge for the new government is therefore whether it can implement its Human Development and Institutionalism aims in a global context in which Western Triumphalism is in the ascendancy and elements of Realism persist.

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