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Editor/Redakteur

Andre du Pisani

Assistant Editor/Assistent-Redakteur

Alan Begg

Editorial Assistant/Redaksionele-Assistent

Gypsy Chomse

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Die Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut van Internasionale Aangeleentehede word deur sy Konstitusie daarvan weerhou om 'n mening oor enige aspek van internasionale aangeleentehede uit te spreek. Dit is daarom nie verantwoordelik vir enige sienswyse wat in hierdie publikasie weergegee word nie.

Smuts House Notes

South Africa emerged from the Second World War a proud, indeed respected, member of an international community in which its leading statesmen — notably Jan Smuts — figured prominently.

The demise of Nazi Germany, however, heralded a new era of enlightened thinking, and an African continent which had once been little more than an imperial plundering ground began to claim its freedom and assert itself on the world stage. South Africa's domestic policies became the salient feature of its relationship with the international community. Apartheid was to permeate not only domestic political life after 1948 but South Africa's foreign relations as well.

The international community reacted with little more than mild interest when coloured voters were removed from the common role in the 1950s, but from 21 March 1960, South Africa's domestic situation was to become forever and inexorably linked to its foreign relations.

The attention of the world — more notably its media — was dramatically focused on events in the dusty 'native location' of Sharpeville, a few kilometres outside Vereeniging in the Vaal Triangle. The concept of 'apartheid' had not been hitherto entirely unknown to the international community, but following the shootings at Sharpeville, it became a symbol of moral repugnance and a catalyst for unprecedented hostility. Increasingly, its practitioners came to inherit the contumely previously bestowed upon earlier authoritarian regimes.

Apparently safe behind a line of friendly buffer states in Angola, Rhodesia and Mozambique, South African Prime Ministers spoke defiantly of 'granite faces and unbending wills' and displayed a remarkable degree of resolve in brushing off international 'interference' in the country's domestic affairs.

Three events in the 1970s were to cause the first cracks in that 'granite face'. In the mid-1970s, the Portuguese empire in Africa disintegrated and South Africa became deeply embroiled in civil wars in both Angola and Mozambique. In 1976, widespread discontent inside South Africa's black townships found a focal point in opposition to the use of Afrikaans as a teaching medium in schools. The Soweto Uprising of 16 June 1976 spurred nationwide unrest that once again brought South Africa's domestic politics into sharp relief.

The final decisive event of the 1970s was the Lancaster House agreement in London which saw the end of Rhodesia and the birth of Zimbabwe. The last geopolitical and psychological buffer between South Africa and Black Africa had fallen.

Moving into the 1980s, South Africa found its international relations almost totally determined by its domestic policies, with the result that South Africa became increasingly isolated.

One early Spring day twenty-four years after the echoes of rifle fire had

died down in Sharpeville, thousands of people took to the streets in a massive popular protest against rent increases in the Vaal Triangle. Sometime during the course of the morning, a shot was fired or a stone was thrown and Sharpeville was once again left to bury its dead in a tragic repeat of history.

The Uprising spread across the country as township after township became engulfed in violence, under the full glare of international media attention. It was South Africa's first real exposure to the highly sophisticated international media and the satellite technology which transmitted events in the country across the globe. White South Africa living outside the townships did not witness these scenes. The word 'necklace' forever lost its connotations of feminine adornment, and the sheer brutality of the scenes flashing across the TV screens galvanised even moderate opinion into action.

South Africa's domestic policies became a burning international issue over which the government could no longer claim exclusive rights. Sanctions and disinvestment became the policy instruments whereby the international community exercised direct influence on South Africa's domestic scene. 'Intervention' in the economic rather than military sense became a fact and international bankers began to have as much say in South Africa's future as the domestic electorate. Debt rescheduling agreements became subject to conditions which must inevitably have a direct effect on the political direction of South Africa. New loans and new international investment will carry similar conditions. The international community is no longer merely interfering in South Africa's internal policies, it is helping to shape them.

The relationship between South Africa's domestic policies and its international position demands an understanding of the former in order to fully comprehend the generally abysmal state of the latter. No longer cushioned by the strength of the South African economy, the foundation on which its political leaders had leant in their defiance of world opinion, the decline of the economy in recent years has turned it into the 'Trojan Horse' of international pressure suddenly and ominously present in South Africa's domestic arena.

The South African government's cherished, prideful and occasionally bellicose domestic sovereignty, which had its origin in our white forbears' Trek of 150 years ago, today continues to pay the price of the events in Sharpeville in 1960 and 1984.

Gary van Staden
Senior Research Officer
November 1988

André du Pisani and Klaus von der Ropp

The Western/Namibian Initiatives: Past, Present — and Future?

Abstract

After more than a decade of diplomatic activity by various parties to bring about Namibia's independence, there seems at long last to be a glimmer of hope on the horizon. Africa's last remnant of colonial rule, the converging aims of Namibian independence and the termination of South African rule in Windhoek have taken on special symbolic import not only for Namibians but for the international community as well. Namibia has become a litmus test for the capacity of the international community to effect change in Southern Africa and to retain some influence over the vexed question of reform in South Africa itself.

Written to commemorate the tenth anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 435 (hereafter Res. 435), this paper sets out to explore the origins of the western diplomatic initiative on Namibia, to advance reasons for its failure, and to suggest some of the elements required for its revitalisation. Recent attempts to resolve the interlinked problems of Angola and Namibia are contrasted with earlier unsuccessful attempts to settle the Namibian conflict. While fundamental differences in style and substance between current and earlier attempts at mediation emerge, the conclusion is a cautious note of optimism.

... the way negotiations are carried out is almost as important as what is negotiated. The choreography of how one enters negotiations, what is settled first and in what manner, is inseparable from the substance of the issues.

Henry Kissinger (1969)

André du Pisani is Director of Research at the SAIIA. Dr. Klaus Freiherr von der Ropp runs the Bonn liaison office of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, a government-sponsored thinktank for the West German Parliament and Government.

Introduction

At the end of last year, at a conference of all West German ambassadors based in Africa, the West German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, announced a new attempt by the Bonn government to revitalise the Western/Namibian initiative. He reminded his audience of the ten years of fruitless diplomacy that had passed.

It was in March 1977, at a special UN Security Council debate on South Africa, that the five western members of the Council (the USA, the UK, France, the Federal Republic of Germany [FRG], and Canada) were confronted by the demands of the Third World and East European countries for the imposition of economic sanctions and other coercive measures to force South Africa to terminate its control of Namibia. The Western Five, in countering the pressure, started what later became known as the Western/Namibian initiative.

There followed intensive and often hectic diplomacy by both the Western Five and (after Zimbabwe's independence in April 1980) the six African Frontline States, assisted by Nigeria. These last played a particularly important role as mediators between the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) and the Western Five. Not surprisingly, their role was most demanding, as SWAPO found it difficult to trust the West. As far as newspaper coverage was concerned, in 1977 and 1978, Namibia was one of the key issues of international politics. The Western/Namibian initiative culminated in the September 1978 UN Security Council Res. 435, aimed at transforming South West Africa into the independent Republic of Namibia, an objective destined to remain unfulfilled. It was largely to the credit of African states that Res. 435 is still on the international agenda.

Africa seems convinced that there is conspiracy between the USA, the UK and the FRG, on the one hand, and South Africa on the other, to maintain the *status quo* in Windhoek (and, by extension, in Pretoria as well). Understandably, it is also desperation that causes African diplomats to adopt more aggressive language. For example, Theo-Ben Gurirab, SWAPO's 'Foreign Minister', shocked the West German delegate when he remarked during the Security Council debate on Namibia in April 1987:

I have a few specific and serious words to address to the Federal Republic of Germany: my people have very painful memories of the German colonial rule in our country. All of us bear the scars of the genocidal policies ... For some time we felt that progress was being made. The Bonn leadership, particularly in the Foreign Ministry, was forthcoming. Today, however, all is lost. The present Bonn policy is becoming more and more inimical to the interests of the Namibian people.¹

Gurirab reminded the West Germans and the other western delegates yet again of a situation that Africans find painful and difficult to understand. It is not, therefore, surprising that African states today call for intensified sanctions. Some are asking for more — for example, Peter D. Zuze, a

Zambian diplomat and the President of the UN Council for Namibia, probably articulated the feelings and anger of other African delegates when he remarked:

South Africa's arrogant attitude towards the United Nations is frustrating and should not be tolerated. The United Nations has intervened before in a military role ... What prevents the United Nations from removing the defiant thieves of Namibia?²

For the time being, it is highly improbable that western countries will adopt Zuze's view, regardless of President Kenneth Kaunda's recent restatement of his well-known opinion that white South Africans, and Afrikaners in particular, were the spiritual heirs of Adolf Hitler and his Nazi Party, and that the West should therefore declare war on them.³ Moreover, it is unlikely that more comprehensive sanctions will be imposed over the issue of Namibia. A more effective course of action would be the urgent revitalisation of the 1977 diplomatic initiative.

West German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, is especially committed to finding a solution to the Namibian and South African deadlock. Genscher was one of the chief initiators of the West's renewed focus on Namibia, along with Andrew Young and Don McHenry, successive US ambassadors to the UN. He is the only Foreign Minister involved in the original initiative who is still in office. As the USA and the FRG did not differentiate between the Namibian and South African conflicts, the British and French governments — not surprisingly, with their greater experience in Africa — were doubtful of success. Pretoria was also aware that the British and French did not always approve of the American and German approach, and skilfully took advantage of these divisions. From the outset, their cooperation was somewhat reluctant, the French being more openly sceptical than the British. Canada took a more 'progressive' line, but they played only a marginal role.

To revitalise the initiative, the reasons for the 1970s failure must be identified and understood, if repetition of the failure is to be avoided.

The origins of the Namibia initiative

Prior to the Lisbon Coup in April 1974, church organisations and Third World groups predominantly took an interest in Southern African developments. Politically, however, they were without influence.

The events that followed the flight of the Portuguese from Mozambique and Angola in 1975 caused western governments to fear that the policies of the remaining white minority governments might lead to the whole of Southern Africa falling under the influence and control of the USSR. At the same time, SWAPO's military wing, PLAN (People's Liberation Army of Namibia), extended its activities beyond Owambo (where the Namibian unrest had started in 1966) into white farming areas, posing a challenge to Pretoria's control over Namibia. UDI Rhodesia's days were numbered, and

in South Africa, the Soweto Uprising in June 1976, which led to nearly eighteen months of unrest, was a major cause for concern. The western powers feared that Pretoria's policies of *kragdadigheid* (force) and *koppigheid* (obstinacy) would drive the entire region — perhaps unintentionally — into the Soviet zone of influence.

In 1977, the United States, Germany and Canada led the initiative, considering a resolution of the Namibian problem as a prelude to solving that of South Africa. With the shift in emphasis in Soviet foreign policy some ten years later from military to politically negotiated conflict resolution since Gorbachev's accession to power, western concern had shifted to the fear that the South African government's domestic and foreign policies would lead to destructive and uncontrollable conflict within the Republic itself, as well as spilling over into the neighbouring states, creating a 'pandemonium of violence'. Both developments would be damaging for the West as South Africa is of considerable economic importance. This led in 1987 to both the US and Germany proposing the idea of a Camp David type summit on South Africa.⁴ This plan was abandoned, however, when the more perceptive British convinced their allies that the proposal was somewhat premature. Nonetheless, a successful resolution of the Namibian conflict is a *sine qua non* for any attempt to solve the South African question.

The substance of the UN Peace Plan

UN Security Council Res. 435 of September 1978 is based on UN Security Council Res. 385 of January 1976 and Res. 431 of July 1978. Res. 435 condemns, as did countless earlier UN resolutions, South Africa's policies in Namibia and requests that Pretoria allow free and internationally supervised elections to take place so that the inhabitants of the territory can exercise their right of self-determination. In Res. 435, the Security Council asks the UN Secretary General to appoint a special envoy for Namibia to prepare the groundwork for its transition to independence. Kurt Waldheim nominated the Finnish diplomat and Namibia specialist, Martti Ahtisaari, who spent two weeks in Namibia in August 1978 with a delegation of civil and military advisors. The information they gathered formed the basis of Waldheim's own report that, together with an 'explanatory declaration', became the core of Res. 435.

Res. 435 provides for the free and internationally supervised election of a Namibian constitutional assembly. A key element in the process will be the UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG), with members drawn from a number of as yet unspecified countries. UNTAG will be both military and civilian in composition. The military wing, as envisaged in the Secretary General's report, will supervise the cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of all but 1,500 SADF troops from Namibia, the patrolling of Namibia's international border and demobilisation of commando units and Namibian

forces. The existing civilian administration, headed by the Pretoria-nominated Administrator General, would remain for the transitional period. UNTAG's civilian wing will consist of some 360 police officers and more than 1,000 civil servants, whose main function will be to prepare for free and fair elections.

After the UN adopted Res. 435 at the end of September 1978, both the West and the UN were unable to implement it. Numerous attempts to lead Africa's last colony to independence were made, but all were doomed to failure because of South Africa's refusal to cooperate. Among these attempts were, most notably: (1) the Namibia Conference in October 1978 in Pretoria, initiated and led by West German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and which included the Foreign Ministers of the US, the UK, and Canada, and the Secretary of State in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; (2) an agreement that SWAPO's bases in Angola and Zambia be put under UNTAG control during the transitional period; (3) an unsuccessful attempt to create a demilitarised zone to the north and south of the Angolan-Namibian border, as suggested by the late Angolan President Agostinho Neto in mid-1979; (4) a pre-implementation meeting in Geneva in January 1981; and (5) three diplomatic efforts within the framework of Ronald Reagan's policy of constructive engagement: (a) the elaboration of western-style democratic principles into a constitution of an independent Namibia in October 1981, designed to amplify and strengthen Res. 435; (b) the Cuban linkage; and (c) the Namibia Conference in Lusaka in May 1984, where for the first time the 'internal' Namibian parties were allowed to participate at an international conference on an equal footing with SWAPO. It is difficult to explain why all these efforts failed — why the most powerful western countries seemed no match for Pretoria.

The reasons for the failure of the western initiative

Various analysts⁵ have advanced reasons for the seemingly intractable negotiations over Namibia's independence in terms of a formula agreed to ten years ago. While it is not our intention to examine the western powers' failure to bring about Namibia's independence in depth, a critical examination of the major reasons may prove instructive, not only to analysts but to the different parties as well.

On the question why the Western Five were unable to conclude their initiative successfully, three reasons are often advanced. First, the inability of the western representatives at the October 1978 Namibia Conference in Pretoria to agree on the imposition of sanctions. Secondly, no representative of the newly elected US President, Ronald Reagan, was present at the pre-implementation meeting in Geneva in January 1981; and finally, the idea of 'Cuban linkage' that was introduced by the US Administration in 1981. While accepting the contributory nature of the factors outlined above in the

breakdown of negotiations, far more important reasons are frequently overlooked. These include, among others, a lack of understanding as to the nature of the white South African psyche, particularly that of the Afrikaner, by both Washington and Bonn, who were the prime movers of the new policy in 1977. In brief, Pretoria assessed key western negotiators as 'diplomatic lightweights', and paid little attention to their suggestions.

No outsider would ever be able to say with certainty whether the Pretoria government was ever committed to the implementation of Res. 435, as this would inevitably have led to a landslide victory for SWAPO. Aspects of Pretoria's regional security policy - notably, attempts to coerce its neighbours, often by military means — and the consequences of a SWAPO takeover for the South African domestic scene militated against this possibility. The Western Five governments appreciated this and therefore, during the time preceding the October 1978 Namibia Conference in Pretoria, their representatives in New York, South Africa and elsewhere, created the impression that sanctions would be imposed if Pretoria proved uncooperative. Only the French correctly anticipated the failure of the October 1978 conference, yet Genscher remained hopeful and insisted on sanctions. Britain's David Owen, no doubt out of consideration for British economic interests in South Africa, and the United States' Cyrus Vance, made it clear that they would not follow Genscher.

Three years later, Chester Crocker, the able US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, was to use both the US' non-participation at the 1981 Geneva conference and Washington's introduction of the Cuban linkage issue in attempts to regain Pretoria's confidence. Nonetheless, conservatives had vainly hoped that in the meantime white South Africa would seize the unique opportunity provided by Washington's constructive engagement policy to settle the Namibian and South African conflicts.

With South Africa's adoption of the (as yet unspoken) inflammatory and pugnacious 'Do your damndest' as the motto for its diplomatic escutcheon, the failure to judge the South African character adequately meant that in 1977 and 1978, during the heyday of the Namibian initiative, the US and the FRG overestimated Pretoria's weakness following the Soweto Uprising in 1976/77 and in particular, consistently underestimated the staying power of Afrikanerdom. Their main thrust was directed at reducing the long-neglected SWAPO's suspicion of the West and creating a degree of trust without which the liberation movement, with its vast following in Namibia, would not collaborate in the search for a solution to the conflict. Their bid succeeded, but at the same time also alienated Pretoria considerably. It is arguable that it would actually have been possible to gain SWAPO's trust without forfeiting that of Pretoria. Ultimately, the West suffered a double defeat — it lost Pretoria's confidence for a considerable period and was unable to retain SWAPO's nascent trust.

Pretoria concluded — perhaps with reason — that the Western Five, realising that SWAPO was by far Namibia's strongest political movement, would no longer act as honest brokers but rather with a distinct bias towards SWAPO. A number of pointers seem to indicate this, although only a few can be discussed here. For instance, until the early 1980s, the Contact Group took virtually no notice of the 'internal' parties which, although weak (with the exception of the National Party of South West Africa), had Pretoria's backing and therefore were a factor in the overall equation. On his first visit to Bonn in October 1980, SWAPO's President, Sam Nujoma, was even received by the FRG Foreign Minister with the protocol due to a head of state.

All the member states of the Western Contact Group had approved in July 1978 a UN Security Council resolution that advocated the 'reintegration' of Walvis Bay into Namibia, even though, in terms of western international law, this South African enclave had never been legally a part of Namibia, despite SWAPO's legal interpretation to the contrary. During a tour of the Frontline States in January 1979, Martti Ahtisaari made demands that SWAPO also be granted military bases in northern Namibia for the duration of the transition period. The West took this into consideration, even though Res. 435 did not make such a provision.

South Africa, understandably, took objection to these moves, but even more disastrously, leading spokespersons for the Carter Administration as well as Genscher asserted time and again in the UN Security Council that what was to happen in Namibia (one-man one-vote in a unitary state) would be a model for South Africa (and of course Rhodesia/Zimbabwe).⁶

It should be noted that at the time the FRG's foreign policy met with broad approval among West Germany's governing coalition parties (the Social Democrats [SDP] and the Liberals [FDP]). It therefore came as a surprise when no less a formidable personage than the Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt (SPD), confronted US Vice President Walter Mondale in May 1977 and asked, although it was clear that the West must do everything in its power to force Pretoria to abolish apartheid, the real question was '... and replace it with what?'. The response of Genscher and the majority of West German politicians was to dismiss the question as 'obsolete'. No-one in South Africa or the FRG seemed to take into account that one of West Germany's most astute politicians, Egon Bahr (SPD) had answered Schmidt's question with his usual perceptiveness. He rejected such 'model solutions' as 'one-man one-vote in one state' and 'radical geographical partition', advocating instead 'a hitherto unknown model of coexistence with equal rights and special protection for minorities' for South Africa.⁷

Whatever the reasons, the views of such sober politicians did not prevail. Bonn demanded and still demands a transfer of power in both Windhoek and Pretoria. In short, the FRG wants white South Africans to capitulate before

the dictum 'Bite on the bullet of SWAPO power in Namibia, and then you will get what you fear most — an ANC government in Pretoria!'

Bonn, Washington and Ottawa so burdened their Namibian policies with a kind of 'South African mortgage' that they, from being the prime movers, became the gravediggers of their own initiative as early as the second half of the 1970s. If the Bonn government truly desired to contribute to resolving the Namibia dispute — and there is no doubt that this would be in the interest of all parties, including South Africa — then it would have to proclaim publicly, preferably before the UN Security Council, two cardinal truths: the solution found for Namibia on the basis of Res. 435 cannot automatically serve as a model for South Africa. On the contrary, Egon Bahr's maxim needs to be propounded: that the West must help *all* South Africans to find a solution *sui generis*. Leading representatives of the Reagan Administration have now taken this view, although it has always been that of the French and British governments.

Nevertheless, a number of the Christian Democratic Union's (CDU) members have recently published their answers to Schmidt's question, particularly Karl Heinz Hornhues, the leading authority on Southern Africa in the Bundestag, and Hans Hugo Klein, a Justice at the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe.⁸ Both look for a solution *sui generis*, as does Otto, Count Lambsdorff ('White security is the key to black liberation'⁹). It is perhaps ironic that it was a South African scholar, Deon Geldenhuys of the Rand Afrikaans University in Johannesburg, who drew attention in a perceptive article to the West German debate on South Africa's political options in the post-apartheid era.¹⁰

It seems clear that a reorientation of Bonn's policies, as outlined here, would facilitate the deliberations that are taking place between Angola, Cuba, South Africa, the United States and the USSR in an attempt to find solutions to the armed conflicts in Angola and Namibia.

Other major elements in the failure of the western initiative arose from the subjective approach of the Group's members. The Western Contact Group was wracked by internal division, but the entire western diplomatic initiative was ill-conceived in other important respects. To begin with, there was no clear definition of the problem. The US, the FRG, Canada and, to a lesser extent, France, attempted to use the Namibian initiative to enhance their own bargaining positions with regard to effecting change within South Africa itself. This not only undermined their efforts concerning Namibia but confirmed Pretoria's worst suspicions that South Africa was the real target — which resulted in a second weakness — an attempt to accommodate everyone's point of view even at the early diagnostic stage of negotiations. This was a serious flaw: not only did each party change its position as it saw fit — at times on a daily basis during talks — but the negotiations never generated a sufficient degree of trust to even move ahead.

The western intermediaries failed to understand that agreement between the protagonists was a vital precondition for the accommodation of the views of the secondary parties and that the problem lay in the relationships *between* the parties, not *within* each party. Therefore, the principals never managed to define the relationship either — for instance, South Africa/Angola and South Africa/Cuba never interacted during the initial stages of negotiation, although their cooperation was vital for an agreement with durable consequences. Peripheral goals such the reintegration of Walvis Bay (as mentioned earlier) were also given too much prominence. Another factor was the high profile given to major personalities involved, for instance, the acrimonious exchange between South African Prime Minister Mr John Vorster and US Vice President Walter Mondale in Vienna in May 1977, as well as various unhelpful outbursts between Vorster and SWAPO President Sam Nujoma.

The Contact Group's persistent lack of understanding concerning key aspects of the situation after almost ten years, embroiled the principal parties more deeply in a conflict which became progressively more costly and more internationalised. The Contact Group had to recognise that their attempts at building trust were undermined because negotiations failed to establish the *interdependence* of the principal parties — that all had something to gain and something to lose — nor could they offer any certainty of an early and mutually profitable return on the basic agreement for any of the principals.

Finally, Pretoria's regional designs militated against settlement, especially when the role of the South African military in neighbouring states increased in the form of transborder raids (*vide* Botswana and Mozambique), and a semi-permanent presence in the Angolan theatre.

All the above considerations must be viewed against the backdrop of Pretoria's Namibian strategy, for it provides clues towards understanding the daunting nature of the task confronting the western intermediaries in their attempts to resolve the interlinked conflicts of Angola and Namibia.¹¹

South Africa's Namibian strategy

From the outset, South Africa negotiated in terms of a two-track strategy. Externally, Pretoria accepted Res. 435 as a basis for settlement. Internally, it tried to exercise as much control as possible over the transition process. Informed by three core interests — regional security, the interface between Namibia and South Africa, and the nature and timing of political transition within Namibia — Pretoria has followed a policy of controlled change.¹²

This policy was given additional thrust with the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference (September 1975 to October 1977), which was designed to work out a constitution for an interim government. After 1977, Pretoria actively pursued a related political objective — the establishment of a moderate anti-SWAPO alliance, essentially dependent on South Africa for its security and economic livelihood, and subservient to South African interests. Since 1979,

the various interim governments, culminating in the present Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) established in June 1985, have all functioned more or less in accord with this objective.

After more than three years in office, however, the TGNU seems doomed to suffer much the same fate as its predecessors. It is heavily dependent on South Africa for finance and security, and has to function within a context largely determined by extraneous factors. The divisive and still continuing legacy of South Africa's policies of ethnic fragmentation has made it difficult for the TGNU to generate a legitimacy of its own. For a great many Namibians, the TGNU is seen as a Pretoria stratagem to externalise nationalist political organisations such as SWAPO, and to frustrate Namibian independence for as long as Pretoria wishes.¹³

The TGNU has also shown weakness in two other areas. First, it is unable to initiate dialogue between itself and opposition parties, such as the exiled SWAPO, the Damara Council or Peter Kalangula's Christian Democratic Action Party (CDA). In a very real sense, therefore, the TGNU contributes to the continued fragmentation of the Namibian body politic. Secondly, the TGNU has shown itself to be poorly institutionalised, with limited competence over constitutional matters. Forced to adhere to the South African government's dictates on the spurious issue of group and minority rights, its fragile credibility is further and humiliatingly undermined. Cynically, one could say that the TGNU has to fail because of its bastard parentage — South Africa sees it only as a delaying and spoiling mechanism with which to withstand SWAPO and world opinion, deliberately deprived of real authority; the Namibian parent on the other hand, sees it initially and perhaps naively as a modest springboard towards something indigenous and democratic — if flawed — but destined to remain in frustrated adolescence under the heavy hand of the Administrator-General.

The TGNU, therefore, having failed in crucial respects, and the South African government having realised that it had not worked, constituted a sound reason for Pretoria to revise its Namibian policy. Other reasons relate more to the Angolan equation and to changes in the style and substance of diplomatic intervention, no longer under the aegis of a divided Western Contact Group but under that of the superpowers — the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as among the principal parties themselves. We will consider the significance of these changes for the diplomatic process in the next section, and will reflect on what might be required to revitalise Res. 435 and to enhance its prospects for implementation, particularly in the light of the ever-increasing pressure for settlement of the Angolan issue.

Recent attempts to revitalise a resolution of the interlinked conflicts in Angola and Namibia

At the time of writing (September 1988), the United States and the Soviet Union are mediating a new attempt to resolve the continuing interlinked

conflicts in Angola and Namibia. To date, they have successfully negotiated an acceptance between the three principal parties South Africa, Angola and Cuba — of 'a set of essential principles to establish the basis for peace in the southwestern region of Africa'* on 20 July 1988. This agreement followed a series of many different meetings between the parties. Especially important were the meetings in London, Cairo, New York and Geneva, with US Assistant Secretary of State, Chester Crocker, acting as mediator and chairman. The earlier bilateral meeting at ministerial level between South Africa and Angola in Brazzaville on 12-13 May 1988 enabled South Africa to Africanise the diplomatic process, thus preventing the other parties, especially the superpowers, from claiming credit for a settlement over Pretoria's head.

The Moscow Summit, held between 29 May and 2 June 1988, signalled a new and different approach to that followed by the abortive Western Contact Group. Not only did the superpowers agree on a date for the implementation of Res. 435 — 29 September 1988 (its tenth anniversary), which also coincides with the IMF's consideration of the MPLA's loan application — but both powers cemented their roles as arbitrators. Coming in the wake of their painful and costly experiences in Afghanistan and Southern Africa, the new leadership in the Kremlin was aware of the dangers associated with 'regional overstretch', therefore, the incentive to work towards a political resolution of the linked conflict in Angola and Namibia became more compelling. In the context of the ongoing Angolan negotiations, the Soviet Union has learnt another important lesson — if it can demonstrate a genuine interest in trying to assist the other parties to reach their objectives, while at the same time retaining its own, yet making the two appear compatible, Soviet prestige would be considerably enhanced. More importantly, Moscow would be seen as essential for validating an eventual agreement. Unlike the fragmentation that characterised the Contact Group's earlier attempts, the two superpowers have opted for joint action, which in turn leaves less room for brinkmanship by the other parties.

The meetings in London and Brazzaville were about pre-negotiations to enable the parties to articulate their respective positions and to familiarise themselves with each other. The Cairo meeting was more diagnostic — opportunities and a framework for further talks were explored. Cairo put the possibility of negotiations on Angola and Namibia beyond doubt and further strengthened the superpowers' mediatory role.

Although Pretoria is willing to shed some of the burden of Namibia, it has failed to find credible black politicians to 'take up the right bits', as *The Economist* remarked recently. Having for so long administered Namibia against the edicts of the United Nations and much of the international

*See Southern Africa Record No. 51, 1988.

community, Pretoria is keen to rectify its legal status by giving Namibia political independence, while still retaining some control over the country's economic and geostrategic direction. Further, the South African government is increasingly frustrated by the very parties in Namibia they had chosen to support.

The crux of the political dilemma Pretoria faces is that after decades of involving itself in Namibia's politics, it is no closer to creating a credible alternative to SWAPO. The TGNU is weak and very divided. As mentioned earlier, although the TGNU is subordinated to a South African-appointed Administrator-General, some of the parties within it have recently come alive, refusing to play ethnic politics and insisting on non-ethnic second tier authorities, as well as a universal franchise. It seems doubtful, nevertheless, whether this will be enough to restore a semblance of legitimacy to the TGNU.

The significance of the agreement on 'essential principles' for the basis of a peaceful settlement between South Africa, Angola and Cuba in New York on 11-12 July 1988 stems from several considerations. It was the first such agreement that involved Cuba. The previous bilateral agreement between South Africa and Angola that had been mediated by Crocker in Lusaka in February 1984 fell apart almost as soon as it was signed. Given Pretoria's concern about the Cuban presence in Angola, Castro's commitment to total withdrawal introduces a new element, one that hinges on subjective perceptions and a willingness to take political risks. Secondly, although the principles focus primarily on Namibian independence in accordance with Res. 435, they also include South Africa's military disengagement from Namibia, as well as Cuban withdrawal from Angola. Although it is not explicitly stated, this implies that the Cuban and Angolan governments both recognise the linkage between the two issues, on which both Pretoria and Washington have insisted since 1981. Thirdly, this implied reciprocity gives support to the positions of both Pretoria and Havana. Pretoria can claim some justification for its insistence on Cuban withdrawal before implementing Namibian independence, and Havana can do likewise with regard to its refusal to withdraw unless Namibian independence follows the terms of an internationally validated formula.¹⁵

One must emphasise that unless these expressed intentions are translated into action so that agreement can be reached on the mechanisms of verification and a timetable for Cuban withdrawal, the window of opportunity that now exists may be lost. In this regard, the Agreement on Principles is of particular significance, because it underlines the interdependence of the different parties and thus reduces the chances of default.

On closer analysis, the four principles relating to security (D to G), included at Pretoria's insistence, are identical to the four clauses in the

Preamble to the Nkomati Accord signed with Mozambique in March 1984. Principle H (see Appendix) is also remarkably similar to a clause in the Nkomati Preamble. Unlike Nkomati, however, the principles are not formally binding on the signatories, but the inclusion of particular security concerns is consistent with Pretoria's attempts to conclude security or non-aggression pacts with its neighbours. If these principles are to be formalised in future agreements, they will have significant implications for the relationship between South Africa and UNITA, and between Angola and the ANC and SWAPO — an important change in both Pretoria's and Luanda's policies.

The vexed issue of verification and monitoring of compliance introduces another element into the diplomatic equation by involving the five permanent members of the Security Council as guarantors for their implementation. This implies recognition by the principal parties — South Africa, Angola and Cuba — of the legitimate interests not only of the three western powers but also of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. No provision was made for independent verification in the Nkomati Accord, so it would seem as though South Africa has learnt from previous experience.

Pretoria's acceptance of the role of the five permanent members of the Security Council is related to a careful re-evaluation of the role of the Soviet Union in regional conflicts and to the shift in Moscow's policy on the need for political rather than military settlement. This strengthens the United States' bargaining position and reduces the East/West rivalry that has complicated previous attempts to resolve conflict in this and other regions. For Pretoria, Moscow's changed attitude has undercut the local military and security establishment's hawkish perception that they were acting against Soviet expansionism in the region. The SADF therefore finds it harder to justify its presence in southern Angola and northern Namibia and ironically, strengthens Pretoria's diplomatic initiatives, despite some rumblings of dissent from the military.

In terms of revitalising Res. 435, some of the necessary elements are present in the current negotiations, but one must use considerable caution in any attempt to assess the prospects for peace in the immediate future. South African Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, has spoken of reaching only the foot of the mountain, with a long climb to the summit ahead. Chester Crocker has expressed the view that acceptance of the principles clears the way for 'hard bargaining' to begin. While negotiations continue there is hope, but it would be premature to talk of resolution at this stage. A great many difficult issues must still be tackled, some of which are outlined below.

* The position and behaviour of military forces — the South Africans in northern Namibia and the Cubans in southwestern Angola. Further military engagements will have to be avoided and tension reduced. From

their stronghold at Cuito Cuanavale, the Cubans may launch offensives against UNITA in an attempt to weaken Savimbi's forces.

- * Timetables for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and South African forces from Namibia will have to be synchronised and accepted by the principal parties. At present, there is a wide gulf between the two sets of proposals for withdrawal of the respective troops. The Cubans and Angolans have proposed a phased Cuban withdrawal over three years, while the SADF must withdraw within seven months in terms of Res. 435. This is a real obstacle, as both South Africa and the United States support more or less simultaneous withdrawals. Pretoria has suggested that the Cubans withdraw over twelve months, to be more consistent with Res. 435's requirements.
- * Political accommodation between UNITA and the MPLA, as well as direct communication between them, has not been on the agenda. For Pretoria, this remains central to its wider regional designs, and some attempts have been made to bring about a rapprochement between the rival movements, with the assistance of Cuban and African intermediaries. Nonetheless, the MPLA remain adamantly opposed to direct negotiations with Savimbi. If no conciliation between them is reached, it is likely that the SADF, the CIA and other foreign backers will continue to support UNITA, extending the civil war in Angola indefinitely and reversing any successes made at the diplomatic level now.
- * The agreement on principles reached in New York, augmented by the Geneva Accord, has to be cast in treaty form. There are some aspects, notably the presence of ANC bases in Angola and the monitoring of SWAPO activities, that could delay implementation and undermine trust.
- * Although the South African proposals and time schedules for SADF and Cuban withdrawals announced on 2 August 1988 indicate their willingness to begin implementing Res. 435, the mechanics for verification of this process must still be agreed to by all parties. South Africa's latest proposals show that Pretoria is at last willing to risk the possibility of a SWAPO government coming to power in Windhoek. Details of the proposals include: establishment of a monitoring commission by 9 August 1988; signature of a ceasefire by 10 August 1988; complete SADF withdrawal from Angola by 1 September 1988; implementation of Res. 435 beginning 1 November 1988, with independence for Namibia coupled to total Cuban withdrawal from Angola by 1 June 1989.
- * An outstanding issue of some import, especially to South Africa, relates to the cost of implementing Res. 435, calculated to be about R1,8 billion. Pretoria has suggested that the permanent members of the

Security Council share this burden. Related to this is economic assistance for Namibia after independence — a vital issue, given South Africa's own economic problems.

South Africa's recent proposals could be seen in two different yet related contexts. The first relates to the status of the negotiations themselves, which at the time of the announcement were poised on the brink of the 'process' stage. Pretoria tried to jump the gun in an attempt to regain the diplomatic initiative after the Cairo and New York talks. The announcement should not be seen as a calculated attempt to sink the talks, but rather as a stratagem to allow Pretoria to regain some control over the Namibian situation. Secondly, the proposals indicate Pretoria's relatively low pain threshold in Angola, its willingness to implement Res. 435 and to accept the implications of doing so — even at the risk of a SWAPO government in Windhoek. This latter explanation hinges on three related factors: the shift in the military balance in Angola and Pretoria's realisation that it is unlikely to be reversed; the effects of regional overstretch, especially in terms of escalating costs and risks to all parties; and the political malaise in Namibia, where South Africa's strategy of the past fifteen years has not yielded the anticipated results and now is even less likely to do so.

On reflection, both interpretations seem credible, especially if one considers that Pretoria was fully aware of the Cuban/Angolan proposals for Cuban withdrawal. Despite this, however, Pretoria went ahead and announced its own proposals publicly at a time when each party's representatives were involved in delicate negotiations in Geneva. Pretoria seems to have calculated that it had little to lose by doing so; on the contrary, it was perhaps an attempt to discredit the Cuban/Angolan proposals by offering something more attractive and constructive of its own, particularly in the area of phased withdrawal already mentioned. Pretoria violated one of the ground rules of negotiations — confidentiality — in the hope that it would win back the international spotlight and so show up the inadequacies of the Cuban/Angolan proposals. On balance, the tactic seems to have hit its mark in the international community.

An alternative approach could have been to pressure the Angolans and Cubans to reduce their withdrawal period by a year or so, the intention being to force a compromise of sorts. Luanda and Havana can hardly refuse such a 'compromise' in the face of Pretoria's more 'reasonable' proposals, and if they did, Pretoria could lengthen its own time schedule while retaining credibility. South Africa's strategy all along has been to make proposals — even premature and controversial ones — to keep the other parties engaged in the process. So far this strategy has worked, if only because the other parties must entertain the possibility that Pretoria is serious about negotiations. If this explanation is accepted, the next logical question is: what would bring Pretoria to go the 'whole hog' on Res. 435? Ironically, the United States has

used similar tactics with surprising success to ensure that Pretoria also remains involved in the process by moving events swiftly between Cairo, London and Geneva.

Conclusion

The Cuban/Angolan strategy has been remarkably successful in the Angolan conflict, although at great cost to Angola itself. South Africa's involvement in the Angolan theatre has become prohibitively expensive. Balanced against South Africa's own increasing economic and political problems, current prospects for a peaceful settlement of the interlinked conflict in Angola and Namibia must arguably be the best now than over the past decade.

It would nevertheless be premature to assume that agreement on the complex issue of Cuban withdrawal and its verification will necessarily result in a resolution of the conflict. Solutions at one level do not guarantee finding solutions at every level. It is therefore important to remember that Cuba plays an independent role in Angola, emphasising its 'internationalist' mission in Africa. Cuba has demonstrated this independence of action not only by increasing its military involvement in southwestern Angola — ostensibly at the personal behest of Fidel Castro — but has done so *despite* Soviet insistence on the urgency of a political settlement of the thirteen year old Angolan war.

Therefore, while considerable progress has been made since the meetings in Geneva on 22 August 1988 — the SADF withdrew from Angola by 1 September 1988 and a Joint Military Monitoring Commission, with representatives from the SADF, Cuba, Angola's FAPLA and the United States, has been established, which is functioning well — many issues remain unresolved. These include a timetable for the redeployment of Cuban forces to the north and their staged withdrawal from Angola; the issue of ANC bases in Angola, notably at Viana, Quibaxe, Pango, and the Quatro Rehabilitation Centre; effective political control over the actions of SWAPO; the long-standing question of UN impartiality; and the problem of UNITA's integration into the political life of Angola, complicated by the MPLA's particular objections to Jonas Savimbi's leadership. At the time of writing, an African initiative is being launched in an attempt to mediate between UNITA and the MPLA.

The most likely compromise at this stage would be a timetable for the redeployment of the Cuban forces to the north of Angola, rather than complete withdrawal before Res. 435 is implemented in Namibia. Pretoria is perturbed about the potential psychological impact the Cubans might have on elections in northern Namibia and by the assistance they might give SWAPO during elections. If the Cubans redeploy to the north, both concerns will be removed.

Finally, it is premature to assume that either the South African government, UNITA or the MPLA are coherent actors. All three are plagued, to a greater or lesser degree, by internal division and differences in perception.

Appendix

Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in Southwestern Africa

The Governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa have reached agreement on a set of essential principles to establish the basis for peace in the southwestern region of Africa. They recognise that each of these principles is indispensable to a comprehensive settlement.

- A. Implementation of Resolution 435/78 of the Security Council of the United Nations. The parties shall agree upon and recommend to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a date for the commencement of implementation of UNSCR 435/78.
- B. The Governments of the People's Republic of Angola and of the Republic of South Africa shall, in conformity with the dispositions of Resolution 435/78 of the Security Council of the United Nations, cooperate with the Secretary-General with a view towards ensuring the independence of Namibia through free and fair elections, abstaining from any action that could prevent the execution of said Resolution.
- C. Redeployment toward the North and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People's Republic of Angola on the basis of an agreement between the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba and the decision of both states to solicit the on-site verification of that withdrawal by the Security Council of the United Nations.
- D. Respect for the sovereignty, sovereign equality, and independence of states and for territorial integrity and inviolability of borders.
- E. Non-interference in the internal affairs of states.
- F. Abstention from the threat and utilisation of force against the territorial integrity and independence of states.
- G. The acceptance of the responsibility of states not to allow their territory to be used for acts of war, aggression, or violence against other states.
- H. Reaffirmation of the right of the peoples of the southwestern region of Africa to self-determination, independence, and equality of rights.
- I. Verification and monitoring of compliance with the obligations resulting from the agreements that may be established.
- J. Commitment to comply in good faith with the obligations undertaken in the agreements that may be established and to resolve the differences via negotiations.

- K. Recognition of the role of the Permanent Members of the Security Council of the United Nations as guarantors for the implementation of agreements that may be established.
- L. The right of each state to peace, development, and social progress.
- M. African and international cooperation for the settlement of the problems of the development of the southwestern region of Africa.
- N. Recognition of the mediating role of the Government of the United States of America.

Notes

1. United Nations Security Council, *S/PV 2740*, 6 April 1987, pp 24-47.
2. *ibid*, pp 18-23.
3. Andrew Meldrum, 'Interview with President Kenneth Kaunda', *Africa Report*, December 1987, pp 43-46. Kaunda was interviewed in his capacity as current chairman of the OAU, as 'spokesman for Africa'.
4. Klaus Freiherr von der Ropp, 'A "Political Initiative" for South Africa — A (West) German View', *Politikon*, No.1, 1987, pp 3-14.
5. Of the different studies, the following are particularly useful: Sue Cullinan, 'Military Policy and the Namibia Dispute', *South Africa Review*, No. 1, 1983, pp 33-41; Robert Jaster, *South Africa in Namibia: The Botha Strategy*, Lanham: University Press of America, 1985; André du Pisani, 'Namibia: On Brinkmanship, Conflict and Self-Interest — the Collapse of the UN Plan', Vol.8, No.1, June 1981, pp 1-16; *idem*, 'Beyond the Barracks: Reflections on the Role of the SADF in the Region', Occasional Paper, Johannesburg: SAIA, 1988.
6. See the interview with Andrew Young in *Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt* (Hamburg), 28 January 1979, p.8. See also the text of the press conference with Walter Mondale in May 1977 in Vienna, published in Colin Legum (ed), *Africa Contemporary Record, Annual Survey and Documents 1977-78*, New York & London, 1979, pp C27-31. Of the many speeches of Hans-Dietrich Genscher on these subjects, see for example his address to the UN Security Council on 27 July 1978 in *Bulletin* (Bonn), 1 August 1978, pp 797-798: 'Wir hoffen und wünschen, dass Namibia zu einem Modell des friedlichen Zusammenlebens und Zusammenwirkens aller Bevölkerungsteile und gruppierungen wird' (We hope and wish that Namibia will prove a model of peaceful coexistence and cooperation of all ethnic groupings); *idem*, address to the Security Council on 29 September 1978 in *Bulletin* 13 October 1978, pp 1084-1085: 'Wir wollen (Namibia) zu einem Modell des Friedens für das südliche Afrika machen ... Verhindern Sie einen Rassenkrieg' (We want (Namibia) to be a model of peace for the Southern African region ... You must prevent racial war). See also the address by the West German Ambassador to the UN, Rüdiger Baron von Wechmar, on 26 April 1978 in *Bulletin*, 29 April 1978, pp 385-388, in which he quotes Genscher: 'Namibia ein Modell sei, in dem Schwarze und Weiße friedlich und gleichberechtigt zusammenleben' ([that] Namibia might be a model in which Blacks and Whites will coexist in peace with equal rights).
7. Quoted in an interview with the *Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt*, 10 July 1977, p.10.
8. Karl Heinz Hornhues, 'Südafrika — Strategie für einen friedlichen Wandel', in Volker Rühle (ed), *Herausforderung Aussenpolitik* . . . , Herford, 1988, pp 143-160; Hans Hugo Klein, 'Über mögliche verfassungspolitische Optionen Südafrikas', in Walter Fürst *et al* (eds), *Festschrift für Wolfgang Zeidler*, Berlin & New York, 1987.
9. Robert von Lucius, 'Lambsdorff kritisiert die Südafrika-Politik der westlichen Länder. Teilung des Landes als letzter Ausweg? ...', in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Frankfurt, 8 August 1986, p.5.
10. 'German Views on South Africa's Future', in *Aussenpolitik*, No.1, 1985, pp 82-100.

11. This point is well argued in I.W. Zartman, *The Negotiation Process: Themes and Applications*, Beverley Hills, Ca: Sage Publications, 1978.
12. André du Pisani, 'Namibia: From Incorporation to Controlled Change', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1982, pp 281-305.
13. *idem*, 'South Africa in Namibia: Variations on a Theme', *International Affairs Bulletin*, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1986, pp 6-18.
14. See *Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in Southwestern Africa*, mimeo, 20 July 1988.
15. John Barratt, 'Angola/Namibia: Prospects for a Peaceful Settlement', Brief Report No. 69, SAIIA, August 1988, 3pp (with annexure).

Beyond the Bend: South Africa, Southern Africa and Namibian Independence

Thoughts of independence for Namibia have reawakened an interest in the potential ties between a new government in Windhoek and the states of Southern Africa. This paper's preoccupation is on the modalities of such a relationship.

The paper has a secondary concern: an exploration of some of the ideas and suggestions advanced by a new genre of Africanists which, for the sake of brevity, we will call 'neo-realists'. This group — it is premature to call those involved a school — asks some tough questions about what has already gone (and continues to go) wrong in Africa.¹ These are often unpalatable questions, but it is important to recognise that they are increasingly asked. The 1980 Lagos Plan of Action adopted by African leaders, for example, is an interesting example of a new pragmatism which gives the work of the neo-realists special saliency.²

The independence of Namibia, the only African state moving towards independence in more than a decade, provides an opportunity to begin again, learning from Africa's mistakes. While Namibia is *sui generis*, in many respects, broad brush strokes can be traced, and instructive generalisations drawn. Furthermore, the 'example effect' of an independent Namibia — which draws on the work of the neo-realists — as a model through which South Africa itself can be liberated, should not be underestimated. This paper is therefore strongly normative.

The argument proceeds on two levels: an exploration of the links between South Africa and the Southern African Frontline States, with particular discussion of the Namibian case. The second dimension positions Namibia's prospects within the work of the neo-realists. There is a third dimension, less explicit, but without which the discussion would be wooden. The exciting developments in East-West relations, if the early promise is fulfilled, will transform our world. Southern Africa will be profoundly affected by the

Peter Vale is Research Professor and Director, Institute for Social and Economic Research, Grahamstown, South Africa. This article has been revised from a paper delivered at the Symposium '435 and the Road Ahead', organised by the Namibia Peace Plan Study and Contact Group 435 (NPP), Windhoek, 9-11 September 1988.

redirection of the international system because there is wide consensus on the necessity for Namibian independence and the need to end apartheid in the most expeditious manner. Indeed, the recent discussion on some movement towards a peace in 'southwestern Africa' is partially the product of wider changes which have already taken place.

The Southern African condition³

The states of Southern Africa are joined by more than their geographic proximity. Extensive transport links, migrant labour, and industrial dependencies underpin an organic unity. Yet these states are divided by racism and colonialism. Apartheid rule and South Africa's refusal to accede to international demands for the independence of Namibia profoundly threaten the security of individual states in the region.

Southern Africa is caught in a structural paradox: deepening economic interdependence is accompanied by intensifying political conflict, frequently involving cross-border violence.

South Africa dominates the region. No other single state - or coalition of states — possesses either the economic, military, or technological power of the minority-ruled state. Partly in response to the growing threat of insurgency, South Africa's strategic planners — led by the South African Defence Force (SADF) — have energetically sought to destabilise its neighbours. South Africa's military action against these states has seen support for dissident armed factions in Mozambique, Angola and, it is rumoured, Zimbabwe, as well as periodic military raids into these and other countries.

This military action is one pillar of South Africa's destabilisation of its neighbours; the other is economic. For example, South Africa has been able to exert considerable pressure on the region's transport network. On several occasions, this has drastically disrupted the flow of trade to and from the majority-ruled states. Pretoria has also threatened to repatriate foreign workers whose remittances are important sources of revenue for their home economies. These activities underscore the dependence of other states on South Africa.

There have been several efforts to establish formal security arrangements in Southern Africa. One such grew out of the initiatives taken by Southern African states to assist in the elimination of white minority rule in what is now Zimbabwe. Following majority rule, this collaboration turned to the problem of reducing economic dependence on South Africa. In 1979, this was institutionalised with the development of the Southern African Coordination Conference (SADCC).⁴ SADCC's primary stated goal, to which we shall return, is defensive — to limit South Africa's capacity to inflict economic hardship on its neighbours. A more illusory goal is the promotion of equitable economic integration between member states.

South Africa's military incursions in the region have also generated some discussion among SADCC members on the possibility of closer military cooperation. At the September 1986 Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Zimbabwe, a security fund for Southern Africa was established. This represents the first joint military response to South Africa's regional policies. In addition, several outside powers — most notably Britain — have indicated a willingness to provide military assistance to Frontline States seeking to defend themselves against South African aggression.

South Africa has also pursued a route to regional stability, one which serves the interests of its white minority, as these are currently defined by Pretoria. This strategy relies on cooption: neighbouring states are promised South African economic largesse in return for the effective policing of the African National Congress (ANC) within their borders. This strategy has been partially successful. In March 1984, for instance, South Africa signed an accord with Mozambique which called on both parties to control dissident movements, and committed them to increased economic cooperation. It has since become clear that the SADF — or elements within it — never intended to abide by the arrangement and continued to supply military support and assistance to the insurgent Mozambique National Resistance (known as Renamo). As a result, the agreement is in tatters and the relationship between South Africa and Mozambique has sharply deteriorated. Although the South African and Mozambican Presidents agreed to resuscitate cooperation at their meeting in mid-September 1988, South Africa's credibility was seriously impaired as a result of the violation of the Nkomati Accord.

Pretoria continues, however, to try and persuade Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana to enter into similar non-aggression pacts. Parenthetically, it seems as if Angola recently resisted being wooed by a similar offer.

This 'Southern African condition', contingent as it is on the political preferences of those in power in Pretoria, militates against an easy road to Namibian independence, notwithstanding the recent talks and some apparent flexibility.⁵ Southern African politics is not the story of political (or, for that matter, economic) rationality. The protracted course of Namibia's quest for self-determination makes up a large part of the region's postwar history. A reading of the record suggests that each move forward is accompanied by pause, protraction, procrastination. South Africa's National Party remains the only permanent player in the game of Namibian independence. In Washington, London and Bonn, governments come and go; Pretoria alone remains constant.

Namibia within the Southern African condition

Despite the trappings of modernity, Southern Africa is an impoverished region. Greater anguish is added to an already bleak picture by the maldistribution of resources weighted heavily in favour of a single state —

South Africa. (Table 1 gives an idea of the region's resource distribution—see Appendix).

This lopsidedness creates problems for policy-makers seeking to influence the course of events in Southern Africa. Such problems lead to the question: can Southern Africa develop without South Africa? (An interesting variation on this theme, in the light of South Africa's destabilisation policy, was recently put by Anthony W. Gambino: 'Southern Africa: Can it Develop Despite South Africa?'.⁶ The answer to both questions is clearly: No.

The political economy of Southern Africa pivots around South Africa. This is made more desperate by the region's relative geographical isolation. Unless an external counterweight is introduced, Southern Africa's economic prosperity will be the captive of South Africa and, therefore, of the political goals of the government in Pretoria. There is no escaping this, and Namibia's independence and economic prosperity will be coloured thus also.

Namibia is more closely integrated with South Africa than any other state in the subcontinent and, despite some advantages, no new government in Windhoek will relish this situation. The exact magnitude of this integration is difficult to assess, but for every Rand spent in Namibia, approximately eighty cents derives from South Africa.⁷ Namibia's economic fortunes are therefore a reflection of South Africa's — a hazardous situation when South Africa's own prosperity is on the wane and further economic sanctions loom large.⁸

Furthermore, the nature of external economic involvement will pose specific problems for Namibia's independence. First, a conspicuously high proportion is militarily-biased. This will vanish with true independence, though a residue might persist for a short time. While this is so, the very intimacy of the SADF with Namibia creates huge security problems for a new government. After being there for seventy years, it must be assumed that the SADF knows the location of every lightswitch, every pane of glass. This makes Namibia far and away the most potentially vulnerable Southern African state, strategically speaking.

Secondly, external involvement is strongly located in the extractive sector. As a corollary, Namibia has a weak, underdeveloped industrial sector. Setting aside a narrow, ideological discussion about the dangers of the multinational corporations, the simple fact is that African states which have relied on the extractive industries alone have not been success stories. Deteriorating terms of trade have decimated the value of commodity exports. The Zambian experience is worth recalling, for example.⁹ In Zaire's case, graft and plain corruption ensured that the country's mineral wealth never bettered 'the lot of the ordinary people but ... [lined] ... the pockets of President Mobutu Sese Seko and his henchmen'.¹⁰

To summarise: Namibia's close economic relationship with South Africa is

based on malformation. It is subjected to the uncertain future of the South African economy, which in turn is the prisoner of its own politics. Equally important, external involvement in Namibia is concentrated in the extractive sector, one which has not been able to ensure substantial growth and development in post-colonial Africa.

As a result, economic growth in Namibia will be difficult to galvanise and almost impossible to sustain. In view of this, it is often argued that massive foreign aid will be forthcoming. Frankly, it is impossible to be optimistic about this: not only is aid — as will be discussed — a subject under much scrutiny, but Namibia's narrow population base and low priority in a world beset with more pressing problems means that the country will be left largely to its own economic devices.

Does it follow that the new country's economic interests are best served by the Frontline States or through SADCC? Here too the answer is negative. The region's other states are not only economic pygmies but 'most ... have stronger economic ties with South Africa than with each other'.¹¹ This is not surprising. The population of Southern Africa is 100 million, the GDP just under US\$100 billion (about the size of the Swiss or Swedish GDP, and about half of Brazil's¹²). South Africa's share of population is 32 million (roughly half that of SADCC's 70 million), its GDP is US\$75 billion, with an export capacity three times larger than SADCC's.

The economic base of SADCC members also varies from state to state. There is, for example, a considerable difference in size, population, GDP, and economic potential between, for instance, Lesotho and Zambia. These indicators are a measure of the individual relationship with South Africa (as Table 2 suggests) and they reflect the historical and geographic realities of Southern Africa.

SADCC is an incomplete and uncompleted international grouping. At the minimal level, there is little that is complementary between the economies of the countries involved and, on paper at least, little political congruency between governments. If apartheid did not exist, SADCC would not have been established. This trajectory suggests that the region would have been grouped economically¹³ (and indeed may still be) around South Africa. SADCC also fails a more general test which looks towards the end goals of economic groupings, the measure of which is found in the answer to the theoretical question of:

how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge and mix ... as to lose their factual attributes of sovereignty.¹⁴

In SADCC's case, the answer is not orthodox. The organisation was established to protect the individual sovereignty of each partner from a non-member: South Africa. Only on a limited scale was it suggested that SADCC

members should pool individual sovereignty towards a wider unity. Thus, as long as South Africa's political destiny remains unsettled, SADCC remains a 'conference', not a 'council' or 'common market'.

While there is a place at SADCC's table for an independent Namibia, the benefits are not to be measured by bread alone. In short, it makes very little real economic sense for Namibia to join SADCC, yet — and there is no underestimating this — the true benefit is political, symbolic. The growth of a SADCC personality will depend on the fostering of common Frontline positions on a range of issues from investment codes to opposition to apartheid.

Namibia can become a strong, decisive player in this search for a wider Southern African identity. Indeed, the Lagos Plan of Action strongly stresses intra-Africa cooperation, arguing that 'national self-sufficiency was to be fostered through African regional links'.¹⁵ Namibia can play an important role within SADCC by using areas of relative strength and expertise to the wider benefit of the Conference. Consider two examples: international awareness and education. African states have failed to assert themselves strongly in international fora. This itself flows from the lack of '(1) ... common positions on key issues; (2) ... analytical skills; and (3) ... negotiating skills'.¹⁶ The route to international assertiveness lies in increased political engagement. This is especially needed in SADCC because of the unique circumstances within which the grouping finds itself. In major western capitals, there is only a limited understanding of SADCC, its structural problems (i.e. the relationship to South Africa), and the profile of individual countries. It is simply silly to argue — as some are inclined — that western publics should 'know' about African developments. Politics is about winning the allegiance of people: lobbying in the United States, for example, is part of the political game. SADCC will have to learn this. Arguably, a country like Namibia, with unique international experience, can play an important role in bringing SACC and its problems to international attention.

A second area in which Namibia can contribute is by providing education and technical skills, particularly in agriculture. Whitaker notes:

In 1984, 26 percent of all professionals in agricultural research, extension and university education in the nine member countries of ... SADCC ... were expatriates.¹⁷

Although racially flawed, Namibia has a resilient and well-developed educational structure, which should weather a transformation of the society. Apart from the obvious case of Zimbabwe, no other Southern African state has come to independence with this strength. While the initial focus of energy will be towards vital domestic restructuring, the capacity of individual Namibians to contribute in the development of a wider Southern Africanism should not be underestimated.

Namibia and the neo-realists

Namibia's role in advancing SADC's goals will be complemented by a role as an agent for change within South Africa itself. One must not underestimate the 'example effect' of African history: the developments in one African state are taken to represent the norm, even the watertight case, of what happens elsewhere. This unfortunate tendency to transpose the specific to the general has done great damage to the course of liberation in Southern Africa. (As much damage, incidentally, as have crude Cold War arguments.) In disproving (or proving, as it happens) banal generalisations, independence and its aftermath in Namibia will be closely monitored. Greater cogency is added because Namibia so closely modelled on the political architecture of apartheid.

The lessons of recent African history and the thoughts of the neo-realists have particular importance to a conference dealing with the topic 'The Road Ahead', in Windhoek, Pretoria, or anywhere else in Africa.

Statism — the enshrinement of the state above all else — has been a major weakness in post-colonial Africa. Therefore,

[t]he African state ... [itself] ... not only became the 'principle industry', it also sought and succeeded in interfering in the most personal and private lives of its citizens. The African state developed fastest in setting up capabilities for repression and in systematically attempting to control and to organise society and individuals so as to gain their unquestioning allegiance ... It is because of these policies ... that the masses of African people have witnessed stagnation, mass starvation, wars, torture and other forms of repression. Many of these are traceable to the state by the internal and external policies it pursued or by its inaction where intervention was required.¹⁸

Any modern state has three discernible dimensions: sovereignty, accountability and delivery. In post-colonial Africa, the sovereignty of states has been besieged by debt and internecine war; the state has been set apart in its relationship to its citizens and has failed to deliver. There should be no turning away from recognising this: there can be no ideological justifications for untenable actions. If we shift paradigms, applying one set of rules to African states and another set to other states, we fail ourselves. Above all else, this is the message of the new Africanists.

What lessons can Namibians, as they grapple with the idea of independence, learn from recent African history?

To begin with economics: the severe economic crisis in African states has weaned African states away from the narrow socialist perspectives which have done so much damage. While not taking a hard free market line, African states have moved decisively towards the development of the private sector. Whitaker, in illustrating this, cites the following story told by an African economic planner:

We need two legs to walk — a strong state and a strong private sector; we are like a cripple I saw recently with no legs, pushing himself around on a crude board with wheels,

surviving only by begging and trying to look sympathetic to potential alms givers. Talking about privatization is one way to try and look sympathetic.¹⁹

Real action has gone further than the crude symbolism of this anecdote. For example, in 1986, ten African countries decontrolled agricultural prices; nine decontrolled consumer prices, including food. Eight countries reduced their fiscal deficits; twenty countries froze public sector hiring; thirteen opened up access to agricultural goods by eliminating marketing boards; nine transferred state corporations into private hands; eight shut down some state corporations; fourteen eliminated or cut subsidies on raw materials used by state corporations.²⁰

This speaks of a new economic pragmatism in Africa that will lead to a reduction in aid addiction. There is a growing realisation that, far from being the solution to Africa's economic woes, aid is now part of the problem; it weakens self-reliance and self-assuredness. On the other hand, by spreading the distribution of private and public ownership within African countries, a steady accumulation of investible surplus can occur that will enable the development of indigenous productive forces. In Namibia, the fragile industrial sector might be developed from this base. This should not be taken to mean that unbridled capitalism will be set loose; rather, the pattern might be mixed, maintaining the necessary balance between the understandable demands for social justice and economic prosperity. A recent statement by SWAPO suggest a recognition of this.²¹

This leads to politics. The single most important lesson from Africa is summed up in the proverb: 'The spirit is too great for one head'. Only through the encouragement of wider democratic practices can Africa prosper. In part, this will necessitate the development of 'features of a civil society, notably the right to form and operate associations whether religious, cultural or professional, with a view to participating in public affairs openly'.²² It will also mean a recognition — not a canonisation — of ethnicity. In Southern Africa, ethnicity has been abused, particularly by white minorities determined to survive. As a fact of political life in Africa, there is simply no denying ethnicity; nevertheless, it needs to be placed within the delicate balance between pluralism and nation-building. 'Greater respect for sub-nationalities and other minorities within each Africa[n] state should be scrupulously developed so that national unity ceases to be a pretext for prosecution of those who want to protect their rights.'²³

Minorities and dictatorships hide behind a plethora of laws that invariably favour themselves. As a result, Africa's enemies make much of the abuse of law on the continent. Particularly savage are the hardships that have been visited on government opponents, whose 'trials ... have usually made a mockery of law'.²⁴ The development within the structure of SWAPO of a strong legal tradition suggests that the course of an independent Namibia will

be charted by these considerations, particularly in two important areas: respect for life and property, and the rule of law.

There is also the important area in which economics and politics come together - policy, its formulation and implementation. The pursuance of single-track approaches is never successful and is singularly inapplicable in Africa, where underlying structures are so vulnerable to extreme remedies. The simple-minded belief that exact blueprints offer the panacea to each and every solution is giving way to greater flexibility. The opening up of the Mozambican economy, for example, provides an interesting illustration of flexibility.

The training, especially at the United Nations Institute for Namibia in Lusaka, of new administrative cadres, provides an opportunity to inculcate an open bureaucratic culture, free from the rigidity imposed by vested interests. The development of a spirit of exploration and innovation will not only be a major contribution to the well-being of all Namibia's people but, in important ways, set the wider Southern Africa free.

Conclusion

The new changes in the international community loom powerfully in the background. They have smoothed the way for African states to think and plan more clearly. Africa's post-colonial paralysis was deepened by East-West conflict. Indeed,

[t]he African post-colonial state was exposed to two contemporary international models — the Westminster parliamentary democracy and the Stalinist one-party absolutism — neither of which was particularly relevant to Africa and increasingly criticized even in their respective countries of origin.²⁵

The Cold War was a mindless, zero-sum world of absolute winners and total losers. Today, in contrast, there is broad agreement that economic development in the Third World has been retarded by East-West competition. Instead, as the Moscow Summit in June demonstrated, areas of common ground between the superpowers should be exploited to the benefit of the developing nations. South and Southern Africa have, therefore, been provided with the necessary space to discover a way forward, a way out of the current malaise.

* * *

The paper draws its title from V.S. Naipaul's novel, *Bend in the River*, which explores the post-colonial condition in a fictitious African state. Naipaul writes: 'When it comes to Africa, people don't want to know or they have their principles. Nobody cares a damn about the people who live in the place'. In the novel, Africa is portrayed as parched, barren, desolate, and

corrupt; an image which merges with much of the popular understanding of post-colonial Africa. This image has done great damage to Africa — to our people, our culture, our dreams. Nonetheless, approaches to Africa's condition are shifting. We Africans are taking our problems and our situation more seriously; we are looking 'beyond the bend' — beyond the set images of Africa as a basket case — to the real challenges.

Forty years ago, in another novel (*Cry the Beloved Country*) written about Africa, Alan Paton describes a part of Africa as a 'land of sun and beauty sheltered from the storms of the world'. South Africa, of which he was writing, stands today, ironically, at the centre of one of the great storms of our times. As a result of the South African condition, furthermore, the entire subcontinent stands in the same storm.

Without genuine independence, Namibia contributes to the turbulence wrought by the storm. Once independent, however, Namibia will have the potential to contribute to a genuinely more peaceful, storm-free Southern Africa. But 'the road ahead' will be arduous and stony for both the people of Namibia and their Southern African cousins.

Appendix

Table 1 Southern Africa: Country Differences

Country	Population ^a (millions)	GNP per capita ^b (\$)	Total Debt ^c (\$ billions)	Debt Export Ratio ^c	Life Expectancy ^a (years)	Infant Mortality ^d
Angola	7,7	840	3,2	na	42	200
Botswana	1,1	960	0,3	38,3	58	75
Lesotho	1,6	530	0,1	45,3	59	110
Malawi	7,2	180	0,9	343,0	47	160
Mozambique	14,2	360	2,6	1 518,6	45	200
Namibia	1,1	1,936 ^e	na	na	58	79 ^a
whites	0,1	na	—	—	na	57 ^e
coloureds	0,1	na	—	—	na	165 ^e
blacks	0,9	na	—	—	na	178 ^e
South Africa	33,5	2,340	24,0 ^a	na	60	78 ^e
whites	4,8	10,000 ^f	—	—	70 ^e	10 ^a
blacks ^g	28,7	940 ^f	—	—	57 ^e	na
Swaziland	0,7	790	0,2	75,6	50	125
Tanzania	22,7	210	3,4	743,3	50	110
Zaire	31,4	140	5,3	258,3	51	103 ^e
Zambia	7,0	470	4,2	464,0	54	85
Zimbabwe	9,0	760	2,4	164,3	59	75

^a1986

^b1984

^c1985

^dInfant deaths under age 1 per 1,000 live births; figures for 1984 unless otherwise noted.

^e1981

'Author's estimated based on Stephen R. Lewis, Jr, 'Some Economic Realities in Southern Africa', unpublished, prepared for the Overseas Development Council, September 1986.

'Blacks' as used here includes Blacks, Asians, and people of mixed race.

na = not available

Sources: IBRD, *World Development Report 1986*; IBRD, *World Debt Tables*, 1987; Stephen R. Lewis, 'Some Economic Realities in Southern Africa', *op. cit.*; OECD, *Development Cooperation*, 1986 Report, 1987; IMF, *International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1986*; UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1987*; UNICEF, 'Children on the Front Line', January 1987; USAID, *Congressional Presentation FY1988*, Annex I, Africa; USAID, 'Report to the Congress on Health Conditions in the "Homeland" Areas of South Africa'; Department of State, *A US Policy Toward South Africa*, The Report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa, January 1987; 'Should the IMF Withdraw from Africa?' ODC Policy Focus No. 1, 1987; Catholic Institute for International Relations, Profile: South Africa, Profile: Namibia, 1986.

From: Antony W. Cambino, 'Southern Africa: Can It Develop Despite South Africa?' in Overseas Development Council, (Policy Focus), March 1987.

Table 2 Some principal features of SADCC/South Africa links (per cent)

Item	Bot	Les	Mal	Moz	Swaz	Zam	Zim
Transport via SA	90	100	60	30	70	60	90
Imports	90	90	45	10	90	20	20
Petroleum	100	100	sig	neg	100	neg	neg
Electricity	40	100	—	60	80	—	neg
Customs revenues*	20	70			60		
Exports	8	40	6	4	40	1	20
Migrants ('000)	30	140	30	60	20	—	10

* Share of total government revenue.

From: Chandra Hardy, 'The Prospects for Growth and Structural Change in Southern Africa' in *Development Dialogue*, 1987: 2, p. 45.

Notes

1. See, for example, Jennifer Seymour Whitaker, *How Can Africa Survive?*, New York: Harper & Row, 1988; and *idem*, 'The State and the Crisis in Africa: In Search of a Second Liberation', *Development Dialogue*, 1987:2, pp 5-29.
2. For a South African audience, it is interesting to note that the recent constitutional proposals of the African National Congress (ANC) also appear to be informed by this thinking. See Tom Lodge, 'The Lusaka Amendments', *Leadership*, Vol.7, No.4, 1988, pp 17-20.
3. Elsewhere I have used the notion of 'The Southern African Condition'. See Peter Vale, 'Regional Policy: The Compulsion to Incorporate', in Desmond Blumenfeld, *South Africa in Crisis*, London: Croom Helm, 1987, p.179. The Southern African condition is 'distinguished by two features; geographic isolation from other centres of power and intrinsic cohesion. In Southern Africa this condition is weighted by the strength of South Africa, a country at odds with its neighbours.'
4. Comprising Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
5. See, for example, 'Peace in Southern Africa: Pretoria's aim: graceful exit from Angola', *Christian Science Monitor*, 10 August 1988.
6. Anthony W. Gambino, *Southern Africa: Can it Develop Despite South Africa?*, Policy Focus, Washington: Overseas Development Council, 1987, No.2, 11pp.
7. This is an estimate arrived at after discussion with some academic economists; nevertheless, I accept responsibility. It is drawn from a crude assessment of

- budgetary contributions, loans, subsidies and indirect contributions from, for instance, the South African military presence.
8. An appreciation of this is set out in Chandra Hardy, 'The Prospects for Growth and Structural Change in Southern Africa', *Development Dialogue*, 1987:2, pp 31-58. See also Stephen R. Lewis, 'Some Economic Realities in Southern Africa: One Hundred Million Futures', in Coralie Bryant (ed), *Poverty, Policy, and Food Security in Southern Africa*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988, pp 39-92.
 9. '... happy under a decade of benign rule by Prime Minister Kenneth Kaunda and the upward mobility guaranteed by its rich lode of copper for all those energetic enough to seize it, the steep drop in copper prices in 1974 tore the bottom out of the country's slow but seemingly steady progress. As copper went from a high of \$1.40 a pound in 1974 to less than half that for many of the years thereafter, the country tried to bridge the gap to better days by borrowing more than 44-billion from foreign banks and governments. When things failed to improve, Zambian belts had to be notched in —at first gradually, then sharply. Inflation caused the buying power of salaries to evaporate; livelihoods disappeared ... From 1980 to 1986 most people's incomes dropped by around 50 percent, and the country was visibly straining at the seams.' Whitaker, *op cit*, p.20.
 10. *ibid*, pp 33-34.
 11. Hardy, *op cit*, p.59.
 12. Lewis, *op cit*, p.41.
 13. Some states are already formally tied through the Southern African Customs Union and the Preferential Trade Agreement.
 14. E. B. Haas, 'The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing', *International Organization*, Vol. 24, 1970, p.610.
 15. Whitaker, *op cit*, p.200.
 16. 'The State and Crisis in Africa etc', *op cit*, p.20.
 17. Whitaker, *op cit*, p.182.
 18. 'The State and Crisis in Africa etc', *op cit*, p.17.
 19. Whitaker, *op cit*, p.201.
 20. *ibid*, pp 203-204.
 21. See 'Swapo's Nujoma speaks: No ANC bases in Namibia', *Weekly Mail*, Johannesburg, 19 August 1988.
 22. 'The State and Crisis in Africa etc', *op cit*, p.24.
 23. *ibid*, p.22.
 24. *ibid*, p.25.
 25. *ibid*, p.15.

Address given to the Namibia Peace Plan (NPP 435) Symposium held between 9-11 September 1988 in Windhoek, Namibia, on 9 September, by the former United States Ambassador to the United Nations.

Namibia: UN Resolution 435 and the Road Ahead

I am pleased to have this opportunity to be with you this evening. My association with this country covers a great many years.

As a graduate student, I and my generation studied South West Africa as students of international law and organisation. The South West Africa cases before the International Court of Justice were, and are, part of the effort of the international community to develop and apply the rule of law to international disputes.

As a young foreign service officer in the United States Department of State, I had the responsibility for coordinating the United States responses to the 1966 opinion of the International Court of Justice. Some of you may view the action of the Court as a frustration or even a victory. I am afraid that I fall in the category of the frustrated, though I support the principle of legal standing even if it means that a dispute will escape resolution.

As the American representative on the Western Contact Group on Namibia, I was deeply involved in the negotiations which led to United Nations Security Council Resolution 435, a resolution which many of us hoped would lead to a solution to the problems of this troubled country. The inability of the international community to implement 435 was again the source of enormous frustration. However, the effort has not been in vain. Resolution 435 remains the basis of a settlement even for those whose intention it is to deviate from its spirit.

More recently, my association with Namibia is that of an interested observer of events here, in South Africa, and in the region. I have no official status and in fact have the luxury of saying whatever I please.

Thus, my association with Namibia covers a great many years and I count many of you as old friends. I am reasonably familiar with the starts and stops, the hopes and disappointments, the optimism and cynicism, and the local, regional, and global factors which have been brought to bear on this small corner of the globe.

Don McHenry is a career diplomat of the US State Department and a former Ambassador to the United Nations. In the course of his career he has visited Southern Africa frequently.

My association with the search for peace in Namibia, or for that matter, in the volatile Middle East, has not always been a pleasant experience. Some of you are familiar with the efforts here and in South Africa to paint the endeavour of the Western Contact Group, and particularly my participation, in highly personal terms, even derogatory terms. It was a sometimes painful experience. As a diplomat, I was not a participant in the parochial politics of South Africa or of Namibia. I was not permitted to return rhetorical arrows in kind — though I confess I was sorely tempted to do so. Nor will I do so today. Then and in my remarks today, I have always tried to keep in mind the long-term objectives of the bulk of the world community for Namibia: a free people, equal in the sight of their Creator, striving to live in peace, to care for their common needs, and to govern themselves with the consent of the governed.

I am not naive about these objectives nor about the difficulty of their attainment. As goals they can stand as beacons of light, ever guiding their followers toward ideals, but always reminding them that the work of liberty is never done. Or, they can be the refuge of the tyrant and the oppressor who uses the admitted difficulty of attaining such lofty heights to circumscribe self-determination or, equally abhorrent, to deny basic rights to an ostensibly free people.

Nor am I naive about the effect which time and absence of responsibility may have on my objectivity. I have jokingly told the press that my experience with Namibia negotiations is such that I might not recognise a settlement if it dressed itself in sexy attire and took a seat next to me.

Perhaps at no time since the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435, almost ten years ago, have hopes for a Namibia settlement been higher. Having ridden the exhilarating roller coaster of expectations since the Contact Group negotiations, you know better than I of the depths to which hopes can plunge. It will come as no surprise to you that I have been and remain critical of the politics followed by the United States and South Africa over the last eight years. Even the successful conclusion of a settlement now does not vindicate those policies. The negotiations were needlessly complicated by East-West factors such as Cuban linkage and assistance to Savimbi. Time and lives have been lost. Conciliation and nation-building have been delayed and made more complicated.

Having expressed my position about the current approach, let me assure you, as an American Congressman did recently, I have no desire to be the skunk at the party of renewed expectations. I would welcome a settlement as much as anyone. Equally important, I have had the responsibility for juggling the many factors that affect negotiations. I am especially sensitive to the damage that was done to my own efforts in 1980 and 1981 by inappropriate remarks and attitudes by an incoming American administration. (On the other hand, perhaps I might energise the

negotiations by describing the policies which might be followed by a new American administration.)

My discussions with many of you reveal a skepticism about South Africa's intention to implement Resolution 435 in good faith, I understand your skepticism. It is born of experience. At the same time, you must not lose hope. Perhaps you might join me and become a hopeful skeptic.

It is not my intention to exhume the details of the failure to implement 435 ten years ago. It was clear to me in 1978, as it is clear to me now, that given the necessary political will, no legitimate obstacle stood or stands in the way of implementation of 435 and independence for Namibia on a basis acceptable to most Namibians and the international community in the absence of political will, the most absurd of excuses can and will be invoked and interminable delay can be imposed. Political will has remained elusive in the naive assumption that postponement of the inevitable is an acceptable policy goal.

In the ten years since 435, there have been no winners, only losers:

- thousands of lives have been lost in Namibia and Angola;
- badly needed infrastructure has been destroyed and funds for new infrastructure has been spent on the implements of war;
- new and extraneous factors have further complicated an already complicated issue;
- the important middle ground has become narrower as positions have polarised; and
- valuable time has been lost. It will be a poorer, more weary Namibia and Angola which must begin the difficult process of developing and nurturing their own institutions, the process of nation-building.

To speak of the current negotiations is like painting a moving train. Any comments may become irrelevant immediately. Nevertheless, it appears that the question today is again one of political will, though in 1988 the question is dressed in terms of Cuban withdrawal from Angola, just as in 1978 it was dressed in terms of United Nations impartiality, the composition of United Nations forces and other such excuses. Ominously, as progress on Cuban withdrawal draws near, there is renewed talk of the impartiality of the United Nations. Is the necessary political will present today? The answer is found in the responses to four critical questions.

1. Will South Africa proceed to implement 435 or will it take advantage of the legitimate security concerns of Angola and therefore rationalise continuation of its dominance of Namibia?
2. If the Cuban withdrawal issue is disposed of, will South Africa and Namibia proceed to implement both the letter and the spirit of 435 or will they use numerous procedural devices, administrative tactics and even legitimate but secondary grievances to make more difficult an already difficult process? Essentially, the question is: will all parties support free and fair elections?

3. If perchance we get to the election of a constituent assembly, will Namibians come together in good faith to work out that degree of consensus which provides the basis of government today? Or will Namibians of various factions, perhaps influenced by past and continuing South African attitudes and policies, take positions which they know can never be acceptable to the other and thus make consensus impossible?
4. Finally, can Namibians find and develop the necessary wisdom and patience to evolve a government appropriate to this country? Or will the new government follow policies which in their own way are as bankrupt and oppressive as those which rightly have been so harshly criticised? Will the government lurch into social, economic and political policies which are divisive and which have failed wherever they have been tried?

These, then, are the four crucial sets of questions before you at this moment of great expectations. Let me elaborate on each of them.

From all reports, the present negotiations have been deadlocked over a difference on a timetable for Cuban withdrawal from Angola, an issue which is not a part of 435 and which was not advanced as a reason for South Africa's initial refusal to implement the Resolution. I have always believed it possible to separate Namibia from most developments in Angola. Indeed, the policies followed over the last seven years of occupation of southern Angola by South Africa and continued strengthening of UNITA, have made the Angolan government more, not less, dependent on assistance from Cuba.

It will be argued that my own analysis is historical and beside the point now that the principle of linkage has been formally accepted. From the outset, Angola has justified the presence of Cuban forces on threats to Angolan security, initially from South Africa, and later from South Africa and Savimbi. In the present negotiations, Angola may indeed have accepted the concept of linkage, but its public suggestions of a Cuban withdrawal timetable indicates continued concern by Angola for its security. Governments are not known to willingly commit suicide. In the absence of an internal settlement, Angola must be concerned about a UNITA which is already strong, which continues to receive assistance from the United States, and if Nkomati is a guide, would continue to be assisted by South Africa, despite pledges to do otherwise.

Is there a way to separate legitimate Namibian security concerns from Angola? If South Africa needs some fig leaf to justify its recent withdrawal from Angola, to drop its demands for simultaneous withdrawal of Cuba and to grant Namibia independence, can such a fig leaf or political justification be developed? I hope so. It is partly in the acceptance of a realistic timetable in terms of Angolan security, perhaps twenty-four to thirty months, and recognition of the fact that peace in Namibia may be the only feasible means of forcing Angolan parties to recognise the necessity of coming to terms with

each other. Beyond that, it is possible to monitor the border, perhaps by an Angolan, Namibian and United Nations joint monitoring group; demilitarised zones could be established; the location of Cuban forces could be agreed upon; and there might be qualitative limits agreed upon. Finally, there might be pressure on both sides in the Angolan conflict to come to terms with the reality of the other's existence without external support. Even beyond these suggestions, of course, there is the political, military and economic reality that an independent Namibia would be forced in its own interest to distance itself from Angola and, for that matter, from developments in South Africa itself.

Implementation of 435

In the wake of optimistic reports of a settlement, some have asked whether it is necessary to go through the laborious process of 435. Surely the answer is obvious. Resolution 435 is the only agreed procedure for reasonably providing a minimum measure of fairness. At this stage, those who question the application of 435 raise grave questions about their seriousness. Similarly, intentions are questionable when old concerns about impartiality are raised, especially given previous statements by South Africa that the only obstacle was Cuban withdrawal. And, as much as I appreciate the concerns of many of you that agreements on the nature of a constitution must precede an election, I must regretfully disagree. Such a procedure is inconsistent with 435 and would threaten its implementation. Moreover, the objective of consensus-building can be met within the framework of 435.

I have always thought that the various Namibian parties hoped to obtain advantages in the implementation phase that they were unable to obtain in Resolution 435 itself. Indeed, it is clear that 435 or any other basis of settlement can be thwarted by any of the parties, particularly by South Africa, given its role in continuing to carry out administration. In the final analysis, the power of the United Nations is its ability to confer legitimacy on the electoral process. Impartiality, therefore, is a two-way street. It requires impartiality on the part of both the United Nations and South Africa. It requires an acceptance by Namibians of the participation of all parties on an equal footing. When is that footing equal and when have free and fair conditions been established? I venture to suggest that many of you have not read 435 for some time. I urge you to do so, for it requires conditions which some will object to and try to skirt. Let me simply conclude that 435 is not self-implementing. Differences on implementation are to be expected. In the final analysis, little will have been accomplished if any of the parties can legitimately point to an unfair process.

The constituent assembly and nation-building

I come now to the two most important questions, namely the work of the

constituent assembly and the nature of a Namibian government in a society unaccustomed, in a modern governmental sense, to democratic rule.

The duty of the constituent assembly is to work out an agreed-upon basis for government. Clearly, this could have been worked out in advance, as was largely done in Southern Rhodesia prior to Lancaster House. However, it is clear to those involved in drafting 435, that the necessary consensus did not exist and that multiple parties were then in a position to assert conditions far beyond their reasonable powers; thus, the idea of elections and the development of a structure of government by the people themselves.

Two points need to be made about the work of a constituent assembly. First, a system of government imposed by a majority over the vigorous, determined opposition of a minority will not guarantee peace. Nor will a system forced upon the majority by an insensitive and selfish minority. Either extreme will only guarantee immediate resentment and continued turmoil.

This does not mean that accommodation is impossible. History is replete with schemes that seek to guarantee fairness. The American constitution contained both temporary and permanent guarantees of this kind. Closer to you, so did the Zimbabwe constitution. The trick is to work out an accommodation in good faith, keeping in mind that ironclad guarantees are wishful thinking and impossible. It is more important to create an atmosphere of trust.

Secondly, it is important to note that while a constituent assembly is to produce a basic document, it must not be a static document. One would hope that the document which might be reached in the future would differ considerably from what might be agreed upon today. A document which entrenches privilege only guarantees future turmoil.

Finally, with regard to nation-building, I would urge you to recognise that it is a task which is never complete. In addition, Namibia must build a nation while much of the international community has already moved on to the even more difficult task of structuring interdependence.

You start with the heritage of a social and political system which is universally condemned. Your society has seen normal differences accentuated, leading to increased polarisation and years of turmoil. And, of course, while Namibia will be independent politically, economic ties with South Africa are a fact of life. In the words of Adlai Stevenson, you can, like a child, accept these adverse circumstances from your past and rationalise continued difficulty or you can move on. You can curse the darkness or you can light a candle. The decision belongs entirely to Namibians.

In this respect, there are lessons to be learned from your unhappy history. The fact and experience of turmoil should have taught lessons and instilled a desire for peace and cooperation. All Namibians, particularly those who have endured exile, know the depths to which a country can sink if it perpetuates

ethnic, religious, racial or other group advantage. Exiles have also seen the economic, social and political deterioration which result from the abrupt imposition of alien or proven disastrous economic and political structures.

Know that in your undertaking, Namibia is unique among nations. The international community has not had the power or even the will to right the situation here. But no nation in history has experienced a more constant guardianship than Namibia. That guardianship will continue in the implementation of 435 and, I believe, in assistance in good faith efforts to build a vibrant, peaceful and independent Namibia. but the international community can only assist. Only you can determine the difficult and winding road ahead.

South Africa's Foreign Policy Behaviour 1977-1987: An Event Analysis

Despite the large number of studies on South Africa's foreign policy, the majority tend to be methodologically unsophisticated. Generally traditional descriptive and historical methods are applied, while quantification is seldom used. In the latter case, only a handful of opinion surveys and a single events-analysis adorn the literature of foreign policy analysis (FPA) in South Africa.¹

Another shortcoming of FPA in South Africa is the uneven nature of its literature. In recent times, disproportionately many analyses focus on relations with Southern Africa and, to a lesser extent, with the West.² Macro-studies, which portray the working of foreign policy as a whole, as well as micro-studies of bilateral relations with ideological groupings other than the West and Frontline States, have been few and far apart. More contributions of the calibre of Olivier, Geldenhuys, Bissell, Barber, Du Pisani and Nolutshungu, are desperately needed.³

Foreign policy behaviour could be a useful approach in filling the gaps in FPA left by fragmentation and theoretical innocence. Foreign policy behaviour could be described as any observable activity where the government of a society interacts with other governments that are part of the society's external environment. In conceptual form, such activity is known as 'events'. Foreign policy events are gathered from newspaper reports and can be defined as simple declarative sentences on a state's activities, aimed at influencing the behaviour of the external recipient. 'Activity' can be described as official, non-routine, deliberate, overt actions of government representatives directed at external actors.⁴ In other words, 'events'-data are seen as important indicators of foreign policy behaviour. They serve to expand the scope and content of more traditional and familiar measures such as diplomatic history and capability or power analyses.

Events-data must be regarded as one of the major approaches to contemporary FPA. From a number of events-data projects a vast literature has sprung, focusing primarily on reports of empirical results and critical

Professor van Wyk is Director of the International Studies Unit, Rhodes University, Grahamstown.

evaluation of the events' movements. The most important events-data projects are World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS), Dimensionality of Nations Project (DON), Conflict and Cooperation in East-West Crises, Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), Middle East Cooperation and Conflict Analysis (MECCA), Middle East Project, AFRICA, Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON), Foreign Relations Indicator Project (FRIP), Situation Analysis Project (SAP), and Leng-Singer Events Data Typology.

A dataset called South African Foreign Events Data (SAFED) was compiled for the period 1977-1987. The collection and analysis of SAFED has one main and two secondary objectives. First, this data provides a quantitative overview of South Africa's foreign relations for an eleven-year period, indicating what South Africa was doing, with whom, and over which issues. Secondly, these events-data can be used either to support or to challenge orthodox assumptions, conventional wisdom, and generalisations based on more traditional modes of analysis, about the nature of South Africa's foreign relations. Thirdly, South African events-data may lead to the generation of both global and local events-data sources and so advance the debate over the validity, reliability, and drawbacks of this method of enquiry.⁶

As far as the first aim is concerned, three questions will be addressed. First, with which states (and non-state actors) does South Africa conduct its foreign relations, i.e. who are the targets of South Africa's external behaviour? Secondly, who are the main players — individual and organisational — in the foreign policy implementation process? At what levels in the executive arena — political as well as bureaucratic — do they operate? Thirdly, around which issues is South Africa's foreign policy executed? Each of these questions will be correlated with frequency and type of behaviour. 'Frequency' measures the volume of events in relation to a specific variable, and 'type' measures the nature of behaviour, i.e. cooperative or conflictive.

1. South African Foreign Events Data (SAFED)

The events of SAFED have been drawn from newspaper clippings on microfiches compiled by the Institute for Contemporary History (ICH) at the University of the Orange Free State. These microfiche are drawn from 105 South African newspapers and magazines. Events have been taken from only two of the many ICH topics, i.e. foreign affairs and Namibia. Due to the extensive media censorship in South Africa, events were also coded from *Keesings Contemporary Archives*, *African Diary*, and *African Contemporary Record*. The weak validity of McClelland's WEIS data, which uses only two newspapers, has been avoided by the multitude of sources utilised by SAFED. Also, Azar's findings that media sources based geographically close to the problem under investigation produce the most events, has served as a

guideline to enhance the reliability of SAFED's dataset.⁷ Special care has been taken to ensure the reliability of the data. Coders have been trained over a two month period in the application of SAFED's code book and Hermann's coding rules for events analysis, as adapted to the South African situation.⁸ For the three-year period in which the coding was done, a satisfactory degree of accuracy was achieved.⁹

The SAFED dataset includes events for an eleven-year period from 1 January 1977 to 31 December 1987. The sources used yielded 4463 events. For each event, fifteen variables have been coded, some of which will be analysed in this report. A description of the variables used will be helpful at this stage.

Target

A target can be defined as the recipient of South Africa's foreign policy behaviour. Events analysis is based on a simple communication process, i.e. a communicator (either as initiator or reactor) whose actions or behaviour are directed at a definite audience or entity — in this case, a state or non-state actor.

In operational form, 163 states and nineteen non-state actors have been identified as possible targets of South African external behaviour. The non-state actors are intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), and any analysis of South Africa's foreign policy will sacrifice much of its dynamics if non-state actors such as the national liberation movements are excluded.¹⁰

Decision-making

Frankel defines decision-making 'as an act of determining in one's own mind a course of action, following a more or less deliberate consideration of alternatives. By decision it is understood that which is thus determined. By action is understood a thing done, a deed, or the process of acting or doing'.¹¹ Events analysis cannot explain the processes whereby foreign policy decision-makers and institutions arrive at particular decisions. It can only assist our efforts in understanding the action or behavioural (output) part of decision-making as reported in the press.

Primary sources like minutes of the State Security Council (SSC) and the Cabinet are not accessible to researchers. Since the establishment of the State Security Management System by the Botha regime, foreign policy-making is increasingly cloaked in national security terms, and accountability to parliament and public opinion — already in a precarious state — has suffered even further.¹²

Another assumption of the study of foreign policy decision-making behaviour is that only the behaviour of the State in its *executive* function is analysed. It is almost an axiom of FPA that the role of the *legislature* and the

public in shaping foreign policy is limited. In the case of South Africa it is clear that the executive has virtually a monopoly on decision-making power in foreign relations.¹³ The executive includes politicians as well as bureaucrats. The political executive comprises the State President, cabinet ministers and deputy ministers. The bureaucratic executive refers to the upper echelon of officials involved in the making and execution of foreign policy, notably directors-general, chief directors, directors, ambassadors (civilian) and generals (military). Provision has also been made for instances where the representative is not an individual but an organisation (for example, the South African Defence Force [SADF] or the South African Police [SAP]). Apart from the identity of individual representatives, his or her departmental affiliation has also been coded. This method should illuminate the role of personalities, as well as departments (for example, the SADF and the Department of Foreign Affairs [DFA]) in decision-making behaviour.¹⁴

Issues

Keohane and Nye define issue areas as sets of problems regarded by policy-makers as closely interdependent and dealt with collectively. Rosenau regards an issue as differences over the allocation of value (in simple terms, the solution of a problem) between various actors (i.e. decision-makers, governments).¹⁵

The issue area used in this study is based on Rosenau's typology as adjusted by McGowan in his SASSED-based project, in turn derived from an events analysis of Southern Africa and therefore ideally suited for an analysis of South African foreign policy behaviour.¹⁶ Rosenau distinguishes four issue areas, i.e. status, territory, human and non-human resources, to which McGowan added security. McGowan's conceptualisation and operationalisation of these five issue areas is followed.¹⁷ Two other issue variables were used in SAFED, i.e. apartheid and Namibia. The persistence and negative influence of these two issue areas has become an axiom of South Africa's foreign relations for the past three decades.¹⁸ For this purpose, apartheid can be defined as: (a) the hierarchical ordering of the economic, political and social structures on the basis of race; (b) discrimination against Africans and, to a lesser extent, coloureds and Indians, excluded from many of the civil, political and economic rights enjoyed by whites; (c) segregation of the races in many spheres of life, both legislatively in the residential, transport and educational fields, and culturally by custom; and (d) the legalisation and institutionalisation of this hierarchical, discriminatory and segregated system, which was enshrined in law and enforced by the government.¹⁹ Although the prohibition on mixed marriages and inter-racial sexual relations has been scrapped, other legislation, i.e. Group Areas and the segregation of education on racial grounds, render non-racial marriage a practical impossibility.

In practice, apartheid-related issues refer to homeland citizenship, all racial legislation, issues arising from racial separation and discrimination, government action to justify and implement apartheid, apartheid institutions on national, regional and local levels, and ANC action against regime targets such as coopted black decision-makers and functionaries, buildings and infrastructure.²⁰

Despite the fact that all parties concerned agree in principle on Namibian independence as embodied in UN Resolution 435, the practicalities of implementation have, however, led to serious differences and conflict, particularly between South African and SWAPO. This issue has deteriorated over the past decade, as the Namibian and Angolan conflicts have become interrelated. South Africa favours the transfer of power to a client government. To achieve that goal, an *interim* government (the Transitional Government of National Unity) has been set up and the SADF has been pursuing the elimination of SWAPO. After almost two decades, SWAPO still continues a war of national liberation, and various interim governments have failed to mobilise internal and external legitimacy.²¹ In operational form, the Namibia issue refers to such matters as the war between South Africa and SWAPO inside and outside the territory; the various coopted government structures set up by South Africa in Windhoek and the homelands; international diplomatic initiatives to settle the issue (i.e. Resolution 435); the posturing of interested parties, domestic and international; and the status of Walvis Bay.²²

Cooperation and conflict

Although war is a daily occurrence in the international system, the economic forces of interdependence have increased cooperation even among hostile states. Even states without diplomatic relations carry on necessary exchanges through the good offices of a third party. Relations between allies are marked by routine cooperation, but this does not preclude conflict of interests. For instance, protectionism has increased tension between western trading partners and the desire for domestic reform has brought about conflict between the Soviet Union and various of its satellites. Conflict and cooperation cannot be viewed literally as opposite sides of the same coin because, short of war, relations between any two nations are usually a mixture of the two.²³

McClelland's WEIS categories for the measurement of foreign policy behaviour were reclassified to include conflict and cooperation. The following categories are regarded as cooperative behaviour: yield, comment, consult, approve, promise, grant, reward, agree, request, and propose. Under conflictive behaviour, the following categories have been placed: reject, accuse, protest, deny, demand, warn, threaten, demonstrate, reduce relations, expel, seize, and force.²⁴

2. Targets

The ideal would be to analyse South Africa's relations with individual states and other international actors. SAFED, however, produces an uneven pattern of bilateral relations. Toward certain states, e.g. the USA or Zimbabwe, the volume of events has been sufficient to warrant valid analysis. Unfortunately, South Africa's relations with many states have been intermittent and low in volume. Therefore, a macro rather than a micro analysis of the targets of South Africa's foreign policy behaviour seems more appropriate at this stage. Macro analysis in this context represents South Africa's relations with the various groupings of states operating in the present international system. In certain cases, frequency permitted, the nature of bilateral relations will also be analysed.

Since the rise of the nation-state, individual states have tended to form groupings among themselves based on geographic contiguity, mutual interests or other cohesive factors. In times of war or crisis, such alliances serve to bolster individual weaknesses and thus achieve a collective strength in the face of common threat or adversary. In times of peace, affiliations between states reflect the shifting patterns of ideological differences present in the international system at any one point in time.

The East-West power struggle has, in various forms, been a prominent feature of the post-World War II international system.²⁵ Since decolonisation, the Third World's Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) has challenged the East-West polarity.²⁶ It is important not to confuse the NAM and the Frontline States (FLS) because, although there are many links between them, for analytical purposes, they should be regarded as separate entities. This distinction is made to confirm the emphasis in South Africa's foreign relations on Southern Africa and therefore justifies separate analysis. The term 'Frontline States' identifies those actors in the region who share a desire to realise majority rule in South Africa and Namibia — the nine black states of Southern Africa and the two liberation movements, SWAPO and the ANC. Most of the rest of the Third World is classified under the NAM.

South Africa's relations with the United Nations will also be analysed. The UN is the international systems or global actor *par excellence* of the modern era. South Africa's domestic and foreign policies have been prominent on the agendas of the various UN organs for close to three decades.

Tables 1 and 2 will be considered jointly to illustrate the frequency and nature of South Africa's behavioural targeting in various international blocs.

South African foreign relations are primarily conducted with neighbouring states (45,37%) and the West (31,19%). Relations with the other four blocs account for only 23,44% of events. Earlier studies serves to confirm this.²⁷ The importance of the West is undeniable, particularly in trade links. Since Mozambique became independent in 1973, however, a change in

Table 1: Targets of South Africa's foreign policy behaviour

International Grouping	Frequency Percentage	Frequency (number of events)	Rank
West	31,19	1 392	2
East	2,73	122	6
Non-aligned	4,86	217	4
Frontline States	45,37	2 025	1
Pariah	4,46	199	5
United Nations	9,80	436	3

Table 2: Type of behaviour directed by South Africa at targets

International Grouping	Cooperation Percentage	Conflict Percentage
West	56,76	43,24
East	12,29	87,71
Non-aligned	47,01	52,99
Frontline States	32,69	67,31
Pariah	63,82	36,18
United Nations	37,40	62,60

Southern Africa's *status quo* came about which seriously challenged the very survival of the apartheid regime in Pretoria. The crises in Southern Africa have become a top priority for regional foreign policy-makers. Their agenda had been dominated by the demise of Rhodesia, the wars in Angola and Namibia, and the escalation of *Umkhonto we Sizwe* actions embroiled Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and Zimbabwe in the South African conflict.

It is therefore not surprising that two out of every three South African actions directed at the FLS have been conflictive (Table 2). A number of observations flow out of this finding. First, many studies point out that South Africa, as regional hegemon, has applied a dual strategy of reward and punishment in its relations with the neighbouring states.²⁸ The SAFED findings show clearly that South African efforts to establish friendly relations with its neighbours have largely failed, despite initiatives such as 'detente', 'the outward looking movement', 'constellation of states', and the 'Nkomati Accord'. Pretoria has exchanged ambassadors with only one African country (Malawi), and trade representatives with four others — Mozambique, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho. Furthermore, the FLS established the Southern African Development and Coordination Committee (SADCC) as a direct counter to the constellation idea.²⁹

Secondly, how does one explain the 67,31% hostile actions directed at the FLS? I agree with Davies and O'Meara that destabilisation does not provide a general explanation of South Africa's regional behaviour, but that a policy of intensified and selective destabilisation has been applied against those

countries that provide overt support to the ANC and/or SWAPO, particularly Mozambique, Angola, Lesotho, and Botswana, with the intention of discouraging Zimbabwe from following the same course.³⁰ The South African government's denial that they destabilise the region must also be rejected.³¹ Acts of destabilisation have been well documented.³² The SAFED data identified 246 events in which South Africa applied force against the FLS, but the greater proportion of hostile behaviour has been verbal rather than physical in content. Van Antwerpen found that negative comments and threats dominate South African behaviour towards the region.³³ According to the SAFED findings, 81,3% of South Africa's total foreign behaviour, regardless of bloc, was made up of verbal actions. It is understandable that the relations between states with incompatible value systems will be characterised by propaganda and verbal abuse.³⁴

Bilateral relations are also far from consistent, as Table 3 shows:

Table 3: South African bilateral relations in Southern Africa

Actor	Number of Events	Cooperation Percentage	Conflict Percentage
Angola	279	27,6	72,4
Mozambique	317	39,1	60,9
Zimbabwe	321	32,1	67,9
Tanzania	4	25,0	75,0
ANC	69	10,1	89,9
SWAPO	496	10,3	89,7
Zambia	64	50,0	50,0
Botswana	113	47,8	52,2
Lesotho	290	47,9	52,1
Swaziland	61	85,2	14,8
Malawi	26	84,6	15,4

First, relations with Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, the ANC, and SWAPO are predominantly hostile. Secondly, South Africa has maintained friendly relations with Malawi and Swaziland. Thirdly, relations with Lesotho, Botswana and Zimbabwe are characterised by their ambivalent nature. Space does not allow for a detailed discussion of each country. South Africa's relations with Zimbabwe are, if anything, worse than indicated in Table 3, as the SAFED data includes the last three years of South Africa's relations with the Smith and Muzorewa regimes in Rhodesia. Despite the brief euphoria of the Nkomati Accord and the Pretoria Declaration, on balance, relations with Mozambique have been predominantly hostile. In the period before the Nkomati Accord, they were particularly soured by a number of factors: (1) SADF support for RENAMO; (2) a reduction in numbers of South African exports through Maputo; (3) reduction of migrant labourers from Mozambique; (4) the unfettered support the ANC enjoyed in Mozambique; and (5) retaliatory

attacks by the SADF on targets in Mozambique. The Nkomati Accord failed for various reasons. With the escalation of conflict in South Africa and Mozambique, neither party believed that support for the ANC and RENAMO, respectively, had stopped.³⁵ For example, the disclosure of the 'Gorongosa diaries' destroyed all hope that South Africa was committed to the success of the Accord.³⁶

In the decade after Angolan independence, Pretoria's strategies regarding Angola fluctuated, but its objectives remained consistent, i.e. termination of Angolan support for SWAPO; military support for UNITA in its struggle against the MPLA government; and a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. South Africa also often intervened militarily on a large scale, occasionally clashing with FAPLA and Cuban forces, and occupying parts of southern Angola for lengthy periods.³⁷

The statistics in Table 3 show that the war against SWAPO has been a major South African preoccupation. Actions against the ANC display a similar behavioural pattern on a smaller scale. Extensive censorship and restrictions on the media have, however, had a detrimental effect on collecting events on the ANC. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (the BLS countries) have, on the other hand, been described as 'captives' of South Africa. While they are clearly opponents of apartheid and supporters of majority rule, their heavy economic dependence on South Africa makes them vulnerable to reprisals if they provide support to the ANC. South Africa has exploited the BLS countries' dependency to the hilt. BLS sanctuary for the ANC has been countered with acts of destabilisation, while actions against the ANC are rewarded with aid and business as usual.³⁷ Table 3 shows that even so South Africa has had only mixed success with its brinkmanship policy. Although Lesotho is economically more dependent on South Africa than Swaziland, the former's relations with South Africa has been more strained. Daniel attributes this to a fundamental difference between the Lesotho and Swazi societies.³⁸ Swaziland is more conservative, traditional and feudal, which accounts for its pro-western attitudes and diplomatic links, as well as its pragmatic view of apartheid. Relations with the ANC have always been ambivalent. Support for the ANC is acceptable as long as economic prosperity, heavily reliant on South African capital, is not jeopardised. Lesotho, on the other hand, has a more Third World orientation to international issues. It tilts toward the socialist bloc in diplomatic relations, and under populist domestic pressure, adopts a more confrontational attitude towards South Africa. The present military government in Lesotho is more cautious than the volatile Jonathan regime to avoid provoking Pretoria. The presence of the ANC in Maseru was reduced and the reward was quick in coming. Construction of the Highlands Water Scheme, so long delayed by South Africa, has got underway.³⁹ Further manipulation of the SAFED data,

by adjustment for time, is necessary to verify whether such a change in relations has in fact occurred.

South Africa's relations with Botswana can be described as ambivalent. After the conclusion of non-aggression pacts with Mozambique and Swaziland, South Africa had similar aims for Botswana. Botswana, however, kept Pretoria at arm's length. They regarded such a pact as another form of control that would virtually place Botswana on the same footing as the 'homelands'. The infiltration of ANC guerrillas through Botswana is a major cause of tension in relations. Botswana argues that despite its military might, South Africa cannot stop the ANC from reaching Johannesburg. Botswana does not overtly allow itself to be used as a springboard for guerrilla actions — to do so would jeopardise their dependence on South African transport and other services. South Africa has, nonetheless, often accused Botswana of providing open and tacit support to the ANC. The SADF has launched a number of attacks on allegedly ANC targets in Botswana. In return, Botswana has often accused South Africa of attacking refugee facilities.⁴⁰

The SAFED findings show that South African relations with the West have been on balance more friendly than hostile (see Table 2) — aptly described by Geldenhuys as a love-hate one.⁴¹ The deterioration in the relationship since the 1960s has been well documented.⁴² While SAFED data provides a general picture of relations for the period under investigation, the database has not yet been expanded to measure fluctuations in relations over time.

The introduction of various western sanctions packages against South Africa reflects a more dramatic deterioration in relations since 1986, although on the whole, mutual interests still have an edge over divisive forces in shaping South Africa's relations with the West. South Africa does not intend of its own volition to dismantle its strong economic ties with the West, notwithstanding the claim that the West underestimates South Africa's strategic importance and Pretoria's misgivings about the West's role in the Rhodesian and Namibian issues. Vale also argues convincingly that the West is still tilted towards Pretoria. The western viewpoint, particularly in the USA, had argued that a combination of domestic reform in South Africa and a South African regional policy that countered Soviet influence and broadened economic benefits (the Botha Doctrine) would secure western interests in the region.⁴³ Constructive engagement and the Botha Doctrine have not, however, succeeded. Whether the West will continue to shelter South Africa from the anger of the international community is uncertain.

SAFED shows that South African relations with the West are primarily with the United States (735 events) and with Britain (292 events). Relations with the USA have been 52% cooperative and 48% conflictive, as opposed to the UK with 58,6% and 41,4% respectively. The somewhat better relations

with Britain can be attributed to the Thatcher government's refusal to follow the example of the Reagan Administration's trade and investment sanctions against South Africa. The only other western countries with which South Africa has substantial interaction are France (75 events) and West Germany (64 events). Relations with both are decidedly friendly.⁴⁴ The remaining nineteen western actors contribute a total of only 242 events. South Africa's best relations are with fellow pariah states (see Table 2), although the low frequency of events (n=199) confirms Harkavy's conclusion that a bloc of international pariahs has little growth potential.⁴⁵ Small-state alliances have historically been of questionable value, and inter-pariah relations are fundamentally unstable. The introduction of Israeli sanctions against South Africa, under pressure from the USA, confirms the vulnerability of pariah links. They do serve, however, to assist South Africa in circumventing to some extent the UN mandatory arms embargo of 1977. It also serves a psychological need, i.e. a measure of symbolic international recognition such as the exchange of visits, medals, and expounding anti-communist rhetoric to an appreciative external audience.

South African behaviour to the UN has been clearly hostile (see Table 2) for some years, largely stemming from the active role the UN has played in the international campaign against South Africa. Heunis, an international lawyer in the DFA, accuses the UN of aiming to isolate South Africa 'as a prelude to bringing about the downfall of its government and its replacement by a regime acceptable to the majority of the members of the UN'.⁴⁶ Much of the relationship is composed of a war of words each feeding on the wrongdoings of the other party. A familiar pattern is the adoption of strongly worded resolutions, particularly by the UN General Assembly (as opposed to the Security Council), condemning excesses in South Africa's domestic and/or regional policies. South Africa has reacted in a similar fashion by sending protest notes that usually castigate the world body for its unfair and unconstitutional behaviour and hypocrisy.⁴⁷ On the other hand, South Africa cannot afford to disregard the decisions of the UN Security Council, which can apply extensive economic and military coercion, unless vetoed by the western members.⁴⁸

The pattern of South African relations with members of the NAM may seem somewhat surprising, considering the relatively high percentage figure for cooperative behaviour (see Table 2). South Africa is constantly seeking markets for its products in the Third World. It seems certain that a proportion of South Africa's arms exports go to Third World customers, but it would be rash to extrapolate from this a general burgeoning of South Africa-Third World trade. Analysis shows that South Africa's dealings with most individual non-aligned countries are of extremely low frequency. In most cases, less than five events have been recorded. South Africa has failed miserably in establishing formal diplomatic links with any significant

number of Third World nations. Not only is South Africa excluded from the activities of the NAM, but at its summit meetings, South Africa has been a frequent and obvious target of condemnation. The Declaration on Southern Africa adopted at the NAM Summit Meeting in Harare in August 1986 is a fair example of a recent and comprehensive denunciation of this country.⁴⁹

Relations with the communist bloc are predictably the worst of all (Table 2). The frequency of interaction is also the lowest (Table 1). Although the communist threat is central to the threat perception of the South African government, total onslaught rhetoric is often vague and meant for domestic consumption to reinforce existing white perceptions.

3. Issues

The two tables below illustrate the salience of various foreign policy issues and the way South Africa acted on them. The SAFED findings correlate closely with those of Van Antwerpen.

Table 4: Frequency of issues⁵⁰

Issue Area	Frequency	Number of Events	Rank
Security	51,2	2 287	1
Namibia	32,7	1 459	2
Status	32,6	1 457	3
Apartheid	17,8	795	4
Human resources	7,8	349	5
Non-human resources	4,6	206	6
Territorial	3,7	164	7

Table 5: Issues on type of behaviour

Issue Area	Cooperation Percentage	Conflict Percentage
Security	35,2	64,8
Namibia	35,8	64,2
Status	59,2	40,8
Apartheid	41,5	58,5
Human resources	59,3	40,7
Non-human resources	20,9	79,1
Territorial	43,3	56,7

Van Antwerpen identified the following behavioural pattern of issues: security 51%; Namibia 29,1%; territorial 3,7%; human resources 6,1%; and non-human resources 4%. Her findings on the apartheid and status issues differ, i.e. apartheid 1,9% and status 4,3%. The low frequency of apartheid issues is clearly due to her poor implementation of the concept,⁵¹ with the result that the link between apartheid and many events has been overlooked. The discrepancy regarding status issues is most probably related to the nature of South Africa's formal diplomatic links. The Van Antwerpen study focuses on Southern Africa, where links are limited, while SAFED covers relations

with the whole international system. In SAFED, most of the normal diplomatic exchanges can be classified under status issues. Matters where officials declined to comment, support or show opposition to other governments, ideological motivations, and talks on the Namibian issue, account for the high SAFED frequency for status issues.

The primacy of national security as a foreign policy goal applies to all states. In the contemporary international system, national security does not merely refer to the protection of sovereignty but also to the protection of core values such as a government system (regime), an economic system, as well as regional and world order interests.⁵² From the SAFED data, it can be deduced that South Africa has serious security problems and that excessive coercion is required to protect the government's interests. The South African government blames its security dilemma on a Soviet-inspired 'Total Onslaught' — the aim of which is to take control of South Africa's riches and strategic location and then to utilise it to undermine the West. The distortions of this perception have been exposed elsewhere and repetition is therefore unnecessary. Hanlon sums it up neatly: 'The concept of total onslaught equates the 'red peril' with the 'black peril', and defence of apartheid with defence of Western Christian values'.⁵³

South Africa's security crisis stems from its protection of minority governments against the tide of black political liberation that has rolled over Africa since the late 1950s. With the successful transfer of power to national liberation movements in Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia remain the only territories in Africa where black majorities do not rule. South Africa's main response to this predicament has been coercion. An all-out war has been launched against SWAPO and the ANC and neighbouring states that support the liberation struggle have been subjected to acts of destabilisation. A propaganda campaign has been introduced to discredit supporters of majority rule, and South African society has been militarised to counter this 'threat'.⁵⁴ Even so, the regime of 1988 is less secure than at any other time of its forty-year rule. The security issue is intrinsically linked to the Namibian issue. For the period under investigation, the Namibian issue has been seen by Pretoria in terms of the 'Total Onslaught'. Namibia is regarded as the next objective after Zimbabwe in the continuing march of international communism through Africa toward the ultimate target: South Africa. SWAPO is seen as the prime agent to promote this aim. Pretoria's security has thus taken precedence over the independence of Namibia. South Africa's priority has been to prevent SWAPO from taking over in Windhoek. Two strategies have been used unsuccessfully — one is to eliminate SWAPO militarily (Du Preez points out that, propaganda aside, after almost two decades, the two antagonists are still locked in a battle from which no clear victor can emerge).⁵⁵ Secondly, the introduction of coopted

government structures (first the Multi-Party Conference, and now the TGNU) has not gained support among the black masses, for the simple reason that SWAPO was not allowed to participate.⁵⁶

Since the SAFED investigation, the picture has changed dramatically. In one of the largest artillery battles in Africa since the Second World War, the SADF failed to dislodge the forces of FAPLA and Cuba at Cuito. South Africa has apparently also lost strategic control in the air. These shifts in the strategic balance have allowed FAPLA and Cuban forces to regain control of virtually all of southern Angola. The linkage of Cuban withdrawal from Angola to the implementation of Resolution 435 was accepted by Angola and Cuba, particularly due to the reduction of South Africa's military presence in Angola. After a series of negotiations between South Africa, Angola, Cuba, and the USA, agreement has been reached in principle on the withdrawal of troops and the implementation of Resolution 435. Failed diplomacy and a senseless war in northern Namibia and southern Angola has delayed Namibian independence by a decade. At the time of writing, Namibia's independence appears imminent, but some serious negotiations are still required before the implementation of Resolution 435 becomes a reality.

The discussion above shows that the crisis over minority government in South Africa has intensified. Criticism of apartheid has gone beyond symbolic action, typified by UN resolutions. The continued existence of the Pretoria regime is now seriously challenged. Apartheid and Namibia have become national security issues. Reaction to external criticism of apartheid varies. Historically, South Africa's response has been to seek refuge in the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs, as embodied in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. Detailed explanations and spirited defence of the South African situation are another approach.⁵⁷ Under the Vorster government, and even more so under Botha's, limited reforms were introduced, a process that has resulted in a degree of introspection. Decision-makers have admitted that apartheid has certain shortcomings that need adjustment, yet the dominant response has been to lash out at external critics of apartheid. With the more aggressive rhetorical style of President Botha and the South African delegation at the UN, all sorts of unsavoury motives have been attributed to the critics of apartheid.⁵⁸

Finally, economic issues (non-human resources) have been overshadowed by security and ideological issues. The strong cooperative patterns confirm South Africa's desire as a trading nation to strengthen its international economic ties.⁵⁹ The low frequency of economic issues is attributable to two factors. The first is that most international trade is handled by the private sector; the second that, due to South Africa's poor political status in the world (particularly in the Third World), foreign aid projects are often kept secret.⁶⁰

4. Decision outputs

The articulation of South African foreign policy is shared by three departments — the DFA the SADF, and the Office of the State President. They account for 71,8% of the total events (see Table 6).

Table 6: Frequency of departmental involvement in foreign policy

Department ^a	Percentage	Number of Events	Rank
State President ^b	17,1	765	3
Foreign Affairs	54,7	2 441	1
SADF	17,0	757	2
Law and Order	1,9	85	5
National Intelligence	0,3	24	8
Technical ^c	2,3	98	4
Finance	0,6	29	7
Home Affairs	1,4	61	6
Constitutional Development	0,1	4	11
Cooperation and Development	0,5	22	9
Justice	0,2	8	10

(a) Missing data accounts for 3,6 % of the cases.

(b) Until September 1984, The Office of the Prime Minister — since then, the Office of the State President.

(c) Departments related to transport, post and telecommunication, health, manpower, trade and industries, agricultural economy, mineral economy, the environment, as well as state corporations.

The statistics in Table 6 do not reveal the relative impact of departments on foreign policy, merely their involvement. Sheldon's conclusions on South African foreign policy-making seem reconcilable with the SAFED findings. Although President Botha is well qualified as a foreign policy-maker, he is unable to dominate because of his preoccupation with internal reform. South Africa's foreign policy record over the past number of years supports this conclusion, indicating that dominance of foreign policy has seesawed between the SADF and the DFA, with the result that President Botha has given his blessing to the most persuasive arguments.⁶¹ Although the role of the SADF in foreign policy-making has increased substantially in recent years, it has failed to take complete control. Even the workings of the State Security Council do not guarantee SADF dominance.

Many observers have argued that SADF dominance in the Secretariat, especially their control of the chairmanship, guarantees control over SSC foreign policy debates. The decisional structure, however, still allows the foreign minister, or other senior ministers, to present proposals in the SSC, by-passing the Secretariat and the Work Committee. Thus, a SADF majority in the Secretariat is more likely to produce interdepartmental antagonism and conflict than to ensure SADF control of foreign policy.⁶²

The sheer dominance of DFA involvement in foreign policy (54,7%) supports this argument. Also, not all foreign policy is necessarily formulated by the SSC. The SADF's involvement may be less (17%), but by its

predominantly coercive nature, it has had a more tangible and destructive impact than diplomacy on foreign policy (Table 7). This is particularly true for Southern Africa, as outlined in the analysis of security issues above.

The differences in departmental behaviour are sketched in Table 7. The State Presidential role is predominantly of a cooperative and symbolic nature.

Table 7: Nature of departmental foreign policy behaviour

Department	Cooperation	Conflict
State President	59,2	40,8
Foreign Affairs	52,8	47,2
SADF	14,3	85,7
Law and Order	25,9	74,1
National Intelligence	50,0	50,0
Technical	67,6	32,4
Finance	79,3	20,7
Home Affairs	42,6	57,4
Constitutional Development	25,0	75,0
Cooperation and Development	68,2	31,8
Justice	50,0	50,0

Comparison of the DFA and the SADF is a popular academic pursuit. The statistics in Table 7 suggest that a hawk-eagle dichotomy would be closer to the mark than the usual hawk-dove classification.⁶³ Sheldon describes the difference as follows:

This division, however, relates to means rather than ends. Both the SADF 'hawks' (military coercion) and the DFA 'doves' (economic coercion/diplomatic pressure) have similar, if not identical, foreign policy objectives. Therefore, if one insists on bird imagery it would be more accurate to describe the inhabitants of the competing foreign policy nests as eagles (military) and hawks (DFA) for the difference is one of degree rather than kind.⁶⁴

From a perceptual point of view, my own research on state elites has confirmed the eagle-hawk dichotomy.⁶⁵ That the focus is on different means to achieve the same ends must be emphasised. The ruling elites — political as well as bureaucratic — share the same values and ideology, which are rooted in apartheid. The factor common to all external pressure is the perceived challenge to the very survival of the apartheid regime. The state must therefore react with all the means available. Since the state is characterised by structural and functional differentiation, diplomacy or military force are utilised as appropriate. Such a duality of strategy, particularly in South Africa's regional policy, has been outlined earlier. With the establishment of the National Security Management System under President Botha, coordinating foreign policy is so much easier than under the *ad hoc* style of Mr John Vorster. President Botha will recall when he was Minister of Defence how the SADF intervened in Angola in 1975 without the knowledge of the full Cabinet or the SSC. It was only towards the end of South Africa's involvement in the Angolan war that the Foreign Ministry managed to exert

any significant influence over events.⁶⁶ This is not to say that interdepartmental rivalry does not occur. According to the Gorongozo documents, for example, the SADF's support for the MNR was in total opposition to the declared objectives of Foreign Affairs and violated the Nkomati Accord.⁶⁷

Some brief comments follow, on those departments that play a lesser role in South Africa's foreign policy-making process (Table 7). The hostile attitude of the Department of Law and Order stems obviously from its close involvement with the counter-insurgency strategy.⁶⁸ The predominantly cooperative behaviour of the financial and technical departments is largely due to South Africa's desperate need to maintain satisfactory international trade and economic relations. The last two years of the SAFED study demonstrate clearly South Africa's uphill battle against international ostracism through sanctions and financial isolation.⁶⁹ Some technical departments have also been involved in destabilisation, for example, the withdrawal of South African Transport Services railway trucks from neighbouring states.

A number of deductions can be made from the statistics in Table 8. First, that the political rather than the bureaucratic elite is still primarily responsible for the articulation of decisions. Collectively, the State President, cabinet ministers and deputy ministers are directly responsible for 64,1% of the actions. The hierarchy of decision-making is outlined in Tables 8 and 9.

Table 8: Frequency of role involvement in foreign policy

Articulator	Percentage	Number of Events	Rank
State President	16,3	728	2
Cabinet Minister	45,9	1 049	1
Deputy Minister	1,9	84	7
Director-General	5,3	235	5
Senior Officials	14,5	647	3
Dept Spokesperson	10,1	449	4
Organisation	6,1	271	6

Table 9: Nature of role behaviour in foreign policy

Articulator	Cooperation	Conflict
State President	60,3	39,7
Cabinet Minister	50,7	49,3
Deputy Minister	54,8	45,2
Director-General	42,1	57,9
Senior Officials	41,4	58,6
Dept Spokesperson	29,2	70,8
Organisation	29,1	70,9

Secondly, the State President is obviously powerful, and is responsible for 728 of the 765 events stemming from his office. The dominance of cabinet ministers, whether they serve in the Cabinet or the SSC, is manifest. One

suspects that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence are first among equals. Thirdly, the role of senior bureaucrats has increased. Included here are various Directors-General, the Chief of the Defence Force, the Commissioner of Police, and other senior functionaries. A number of factors may be responsible for this change, such as: (1) top officials being drawn into decision-making roles by the State Security Management System — this process and the dominance of security issues have increased the political influence of the SADF in particular; (2) external pressure has forced bureaucrats, particularly diplomats, to articulate South Africa's policies more often; and (3) as with the American State Department, the South African bureaucracy often uses departmental spokespersons and public relations officials to articulate policy. Such officials have been responsible for one out of every ten actions recorded by SAFED.

Role patterns of cooperation and conflict have been recorded in Table 9. The most striking finding is that conflictive behaviour increases as one goes down the decision-making hierarchy, and that cooperative behaviour has a slight edge among politicians while the bureaucrats clearly tilt toward conflict. In general, this difference in behaviour is probably related to the differing roles of politicians and bureaucrats. Politicians have nuanced perceptions, prefer to keep their options open, and are ultimately responsible for foreign policy. Bureaucrats, on the other hand, have only to implement it or, to put it crudely, have to do the dirty work. As one descends the bureaucratic ladder, implementation of policy becomes the primary function, usually in an impersonal way — for instance, in a conflictive manner such as military intervention, seizing arms caches, killing guerrillas, or reducing transport links. Between South Africa and its external environment, the incompatibility of apartheid therefore becomes more acute when one moves from the rhetorical to the implementational phases of foreign policy.

Conclusions

To summarise, this report is the first to be made from an events analysis of South Africa's foreign policy behaviour for the period 1977-87. The findings show that in South African foreign policy, relations with the Frontline States and the West predominate. Interactions with the FLS, the NAM, the communist bloc, and the UN are characterised by hostile actions. The only remaining friendly links are with fellow pariahs and, although relations with the West do still show some signs of friendship, apartheid has put these under tremendous strain.

The issues of security, Namibia and status pervade South Africa's foreign policy. War and conflict will persist in Southern Africa until majority rule has been established in Namibia and South Africa, although the latest negotiations between South Africa, Angola, Cuba and the United States have

been encouraging. Not only does Namibia's long-awaited independence seem closer to realisation, but common sense dictates that similar negotiations are the Botha regime's only viable strategy for resolving South Africa's domestic and global crisis of legitimacy.

Decision outputs show that the eagle-hawk dichotomy best describes the roles of the SADF and the DFA respectively. The DFA still dominates foreign policy articulation, but the influence of both the State President and the SADF is substantial.

Events data has proved to be an effective method to test propositions about South African foreign policy. The SAFED data provides evidence that supports, in general, the conventional wisdom about South Africa's foreign relations. South Africa has been at odds with most states over its domestic policies. In its coercive efforts to shape the Southern African region in an attempt to safeguard apartheid, South Africa has in fact exacerbated, not reduced, its international pariah status. Events data does not, however, provide a general theory for South Africa's foreign policy. The approach is too state-centred and vital dynamics of foreign relations are not captured; in particular, the interaction between (1) state and public and, (2) politics and economics. More non-state actors, for example, multinational companies, should be considered for inclusion as actors and target. At best, events data adds a new dimension to our understanding of South African foreign policy.

The existing SAFED data file does, however, offer many challenges for further research. First, events — not only of South Africa as an actor but also as a target — are necessary to appreciate the dynamics of interaction and reciprocity in foreign relations. The observer who only watches one of the boxers in a boxing match will have only a partial view of the proceedings. Foreign policy is after all not only initiatives but also reaction to stimuli from the external environment. This is particularly true of South Africa, as apartheid has been extremely externalised.

A second shortcoming of the study has been the lack of a time dimension. South Africa's relations with other actors has been based on an aggregate, and relations are subject to fluctuations. For example, have South Africa's relations with Lesotho changed since the *coup d'etat* in 1986? How did relations with Mozambique differ before the signing of the Nkomati Accord, and in the post-Nkomati period? Have relations with the USA worsened progressively?

Finally, further correlation of variables is needed for specific explanations. Two examples will suffice. In bilateral relations, the twenty-two types of behaviour on the WEIS scale, instead of the conflict-cooperation dichotomy, will provide a more nuanced picture. This approach will obviously require a high frequency of events. By correlating apartheid and Namibia with the other five issues, further proof of the pervasiveness of security in South Africa's foreign relations might be provided.

Notes

1. For a review of FPA literature in South Africa, see G.L. Rogaly, *South Africa's Foreign Relations 1961-84: A Set and Partially Annotated Bibliography*, Braamfontein: SAIIA, 1984. For empirical analysis, see Deon Geldenhuys, *What do we think? A Survey of White opinion on Foreign Policy Issues*, Vol. 1, 2 & 3, Braamfontein: SAIIA, 1982, 1984 & 1986 respectively; Johanna W. van Antwerpen, *Suid-Afrika se Eksterne Verhoudinge met Internasionale Akteurs in Suider-Afrika: 'n Gebeure-ontleding*, unpublished Masters dissertation, 1985; Mark Orkin, *Disinvestment The Struggle and the Future*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986; J.J. van Wyk, *Elitemenings rakende enkele aspekte van Suid-Afrika se Buitelandse Beleid*, unpublished D Phil dissertation, University of Pretoria, 1987; and Koos van Wyk, 'Elite Perceptions of South Africa's International Options', *International Affairs Bulletin* (hereafter IAB), Vol. 11, No. 3, 1987, pp 51-76.
2. Southern Africa and South Africa's foreign and regional relations are the top research priorities of International Relations scholars in South Africa. André du Pisani and Jacobus van Wyk, *A Restricted Palette: Reflections on the state of International Relations in South Africa*, paper prepared for the 3rd-World Assembly of International Studies, Williamsburg VA, 25-27 August 1988.
3. G.C. Olivier, *Suid-Afrika se Buitelandse Beleid*, Pretoria & Cape Town: Academica, 1977; Deon Geldenhuys, *The Diplomacy of Isolation South African Foreign Policy Making*, Johannesburg: SAIIA & Macmillan, 1984; James Barber, *South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970*, London: Oxford University Press, 1973; R.E. Bissell, *Apartheid and International Organizations*, Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1977; André du Pisani, *SWA/Namibia The Politics of Continuity and Change*, Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1986.
4. See Patrick J. McGowan, 'Meaningful Comparisons in the Study of Foreign Policy ...', in Charles W. Kegley *et al* (eds), *International Events and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy*, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1975, pp 52-54.
5. For initial exposure to the literature of foreign policy behaviour and events data, see E.E. Azar & J.D. Ben-Dak (eds), *Theory and Practice of Events Research*, New York: Gordon and Breach, 1974; P.M. Burgess & R.W. Lawton, *Indicators of International Behaviour: An Assessment of Events Data Research*, Beverley Hills: Sage, 1972; Maurice A. East *et al* (eds), *Why Nations Act*, Beverley Hills: Sage, 1978; Charles W. Kegley *et al*, *op cit*; Patrick J. McGowan, *Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies*, Vol. 3, Beverley Hills: Sage, 1975; Jonathan Wilkenfeld *et al*, *Foreign Policy Behaviour The Interstate Behaviour Analysis Model*, Beverley Hills: Sage, 1980.
6. These objectives are pursued by Shaw in his analysis of Zambia's foreign policy, and seems appropriate in the case of South Africa. Timothy M. Shaw, 'The Foreign Policy of Zambia An Events Analysis of a New State', *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 2, July 1978, p. 182.
7. E.E. Azar *et al*, 'The problem of source coverage in the use of international events data', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 16, September 1972, pp 373-388.
8. Charles F. Hermann, 'What is a Foreign Policy Event', in W.F. Hanrieder (ed), *Comparative Foreign Policy*, New York: David McKay, 1971.
9. Periodically the author coded events from a number of newspaper reports (N). This is called the criterion set (S). The coders (X, Y, etc) coded the same newspaper reports. An error measure (E) was constructed and was applied as follows to determine the reliability of each code (X, Y, etc) and the average of all coders.

$$E = \frac{a}{a + b + (c - b \text{ only if } c > b)}$$

where

a = number of cells identically coded in S and in the code sheets of coders X, Y, etc. for specific N (measurement agreement)

b = number of cells coded in S that are not identically coded by coders X, Y, etc. (measures errors of omission)

c = number of cells coded by coders X, Y, etc. for which S does not contain codes (measures errors of commission)

- The error measure varied between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating perfect intercodes agreement and 0 indicating complete disagreement. Philip M. Burgess & Raymond W. Layton, 'Evaluating Events Data: Problems of Conception, Reliability and Validity', in Kegley *et al*, *op cit*, p.110. Coding was done by the 1985-87 political methodology classes at the Rand Afrikaans University. The contributions of Lydia Basson, Anet Fouche, Gerhard Rossouw and Engela Schlemmer have been immense.
10. J.J. van Wyk, *Code book for South African Foreign Events Data*, unpublished mimeograph, 1987, pp 8-11.
 11. Joseph Frankel, *The Making of Foreign Policy*, London: Oxford University Press, 1968, p.1.
 12. See D. Geldenhuys & H. Kotze, 'Aspects of Political Decision-making in South Africa', *Politikon*, Vol.10, No.1, June 1983; Kenneth W. Grundy, *The Rise of the South African Security Establishment: An essay on the changing focus of State power*, Braamfontein: SAIIA, Bradlow Paper No.1, 1983.
 13. G.C. Olivier, 'Die publiek, die parlement, die burokrasie en buitelandse beleid met spesiale verwysing na Suid-Afrika', *Politikon*, Vol.3, No.1, June 1976, pp 2-21; Geldenhuys, *Diplomacy of Isolation*, *op cit*, Chapters 3, 4 & 5.
 14. Van Wyk, *Code Book*, *op cit*, pp 12-13.
 15. Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, Boston: Little Brown & Co, 1977, pp 64-65; James N. Rosenau, 'Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy', in R. Barry Farrel (ed), *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966, p.81.
 16. Rosenau, 1966, *op cit*, p.86.
 17. Patrick J. McGowan, *Southern African Subsystem Events Data 1973-1976 Codebook*, Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1978.
 18. These issues have plagued the whole period of Nationalist rule. See Olivier, 1977, *op cit*, pp 67-80.
 19. Merle Lipton, *Capitalism and Apartheid South Africa, 1910-1986*, Aldershot: Wildwood House, 1985, pp 14-15.
 20. Van Wyk, *Code Book*, *op cit*, p.27.
 21. See Du Pisani, 1986, *op cit*, Chapter 10.
 22. Van Wyk, *Code Book*, *op cit*, p.28.
 23. Robert D. Cantor, *Introduction to International Politics*, Itasca, IL: F.E. Peacock Publishers, 1976, p.17.
 24. Van Wyk, *Code Book*, *op cit*, p.21.
 25. Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, West Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, Italy, the United Kingdom, Japan, France, and the USA are classified by Wilkenfeld as western states. He also included Israel, Chile and South Africa, but for the purposes of this study, they are classified as pariahs. To this list I have added New Zealand, NATO, the European Community, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Norway. Jonathan Wilkenfeld *et al*, *Foreign Policy Behaviour: The Interstate Behaviour Analysis Model*, Beverley Hills & London: Sage, 1980, p.102. The eastern states include the USSR and its satellite states, the Warsaw Pact, the People's Republic of China, North Korea, and the South African Communist Party. Cuba is somewhat of a border case, but has been classified as part of NAM.
 26. See K.F. Cvicc, 'Non-aligned Summit in Havana', *World Today*, Vol.35, October 1979, pp 387-390.
 27. 'Uit hoofde van sy kulturele gebondenheid met die Weste en sy basiese anti-Kommunistiese houding het die Republiek homself onomwonde as 'n Westerse bondgenoot verklaar.', G.C. Olivier, *Suid-Afrika se Buitelandse Beleid*, Pretoria & Cape Town: Academica, 1977; 'South Africa's foreign relations are essentially relations with the West. The country's diplomatic, economic and military links have always been predominantly Western centred. In fact, the outstanding feature of South Africa's external relations has been its unambiguous Western orientation.', Deon Geldenhuys, 'South Africa and the West', in Robert Schrire (ed), *South African Public Policy Perspectives*, Cape Town: Juta, 1982, p.299.

28. See Henry Bienen, 'Economic interests and security issues in Southern Africa', *IAB*, Vol.8, No.1, 1984; Robert Davies & Dan O'Meara, 'Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African Regional Policy since 1978', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.11, No.2, April 1985, pp 183-211; M. Tamarkin, 'South Africa's regional options: Policy-making and conceptual environment', *IAB*, Vol.7, No.3, 1983; Joseph Hanlon, 'Introduction: Relations with Southern Africa', pp 332-340, and Robert Davies, 'South African Regional Policy Post-Nkomati: May 1985 — December 1986', pp 341-355, both in Glenn Moss & Ingrid Obery (eds), *South African Review 4*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987.
29. See R.F. Weisfelder, 'The Southern African Development Coordination Conference: A New Factor in the Liberation Process', in T.M. Callaghy (ed), *South Africa in Southern Africa: The Intensifying Vortex of Violence*, New York: Praeger, 1983; and Stanley Uys, 'The Short and Unhappy Life of Consas', *South Africa International*, Vol.18, No.4, April 1988, pp 243-248.
30. See David Martin & Phyllis Johnson, 'Zimbabwe: Apartheid's Dilemma', in *idem* (eds), *Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War*, Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986, pp 43-72.
31. A typical example of the warped logic of such a denial is President Botha, speaking at the opening the 1984 Parliamentary Session: 'Unrest in certain parts of Southern Africa also increased as a result of the inability of certain governments to maintain development and stability in their countries. In an attempt to hide the critical conditions prevailing in such countries and to obscure the designs of the Soviet Union in Southern Africa, the accusations is [sic] spread world-wide that South Africa undertakes actions aimed at destabilising her neighbours. The Republic of South Africa rejects this allegation.', Republic of South Africa, *House of Assembly Debates*, 27 January 1984, Col.6.
32. For details of South African acts of destabilisation, see Davies & O'Meara, 1985, *op cit*, pp 198-206; and Deon Geldenhuys, 'The Destabilisation Controversy: An Analysis of a High Risk Foreign Policy Option for South Africa', *Politikon*, Vol.9, No.2, December 1982. See also *Survival*, Jan-Feb 1988, pp 3-58.
33. Van Antwerpen, 1985, *op cit*, p.102.
34. The incompatibility of apartheid and African nationalism and the Pretoria government's inability to grasp that is outlined by Tamarkin, 1983, *op cit*, p.53 & pp 67-68.
35. See Jeremy Grest, 'Mozambique since the Nkomati Accord', in Moss & Obery (eds), *op cit*, pp 356-372; and Davies, 1987, *op cit*, pp 340-355.
36. See Martin & Johnson, 'Mozambique: To Nkomati and Beyond', in *idem* (eds), 1986, *op cit*, pp 1-41.
37. See Timothy M. Callaghy, 'Apartheid and Socialism: South Africa's Relations with Angolan and Mozambique', in *idem* (ed), 1983, *op cit*; and Van Antwerpen, 1985, *op cit*, pp 104-108.
38. John Daniel, 'A Comparative Analysis of Lesotho and Swaziland's Relations with South Africa', SARS, *South African Review II*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1984, pp 228-238.
39. For changes in the relations between South Africa and Lesotho since the coup, see Robert Edgar, 'The Lesotho Coup of 1986', in Moss & Obery (eds), 1987, *op cit*, pp 373-382.
40. See Dennis Austin, *South Africa 1984*, Chatham House Papers 26, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs & Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985, pp 55-56.
41. Geldenhuys in Schrire, 1982, *op cit*, pp 307-308.
42. See William Minter, *King Solomon's Mines Revisited Western Interests and the Burdened History of Southern Africa*, New York: Basic Books, 1986; J.E. Spence, 'Why is South Africa so unpopular abroad?', *IAB*, Vol.10, No.3, 1986, pp 19-31; and Hedley Bull, 'The West and South Africa', *IAB*, Vol.2, No.2, 1978, pp 1-10.
43. For perceptual differences, see Van Wyk, *Elitemenings ...*, *op cit*, 1987, pp 241-246. For a discussion of the Botha Doctrine, see Peter Vale, 'The Botha Doctrine:

- Apartheid, Southern Africa and the West', in Stephen Chan (ed), *Foreign Policies in Southern Africa*, London: Macmillan, 1989, forthcoming.
44. This finding confirms Sole's view that South Africa's western relations are largely confined to the USA, the UK, France and the FRG. Donald Sole, 'The goals of the West in Southern Africa: A South African view', *IAB*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1984, p.27.
 45. Robert E. Harkavy, 'Pariah States and Nuclear Proliferation', *International Organization*, Vol.35. No.1, Winter 1981, pp 155-158.
 46. Jan C. Heunis, *United Nations versus South Africa*, Johannesburg: Lex Patria, 1986, p.5.
 47. For a good example of such a negative view, see David Tothill, 'Forty Years On Reflections on the United Nations', *IAB*, Vol.9, No.3, 1985, pp 41-48. See also Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.
 48. John Barratt, 'South Africa and the UN. A brief survey of the relationship'. *IAB*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1985, pp 15-25. See also Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.
 49. Roger East (ed), *Keesing's Record of World Events*, Vol.33, London: Longman, 1987, Col. 34968-34970.
 50. The percentage total will exceed 100%, as the findings of three variables have been combined.
 51. Van Antwerpen, 1985, *op cit*, p.89.
 52. C.O. Lerche & A.A. Said, *Concepts of International Politics in Global Perspective*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1979, pp 31-39; F.S. Northedge, *The Foreign Policies of the Powers*, London: Faber & Faber, 1968, pp 10-20; Ray Ofoegbu, *Foundation Course in International Relations for African Universities*, London: Allen & Unwin, 1980, pp 59-60; and Frank N. Trager & Frank L. Simonie, 'An Introduction to the Study of National Security', in Frank N. Trager & Philip S. Kronenberg, *National Security and American Society*, Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 1973, pp 35-48.
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 55. Max du Preez, 'Namibia: A Future Displaced', in SARS, *South African Review III*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986, pp 347-360.
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 57. Geldenhuys, *The Diplomacy of Isolation*, 1984, *op cit*, p.211.
 58. See Department of Foreign Affairs, *South West Africa Basic Documents*, 30 January 1976 to 2 May 1979.
 59. Most foreign trade is, however, handled by private companies.
 60. This was dramatically illustrated by the Information Scandal. See Geldenhuys, 1984, *ibid*, pp 113-120.
 61. Garth L. Sheldon, 'Theoretical perspectives on South African foreign policy making', *Politikon*, Vol.13, No.1, June 1986, p.16. Please note that the period under investigation covers nine years and three months of the Botha government, and one year and three months of the Vorster government.
 62. *ibid*, p.7.
 63. For a discussion of the hawk-dove dichotomy, see Geldenhuys, 1984, *op cit*, pp 144-146.
 64. Sheldon, 1986, *op cit*, p.9.
 65. Van Wyk, 1987, *op cit*, pp 193-194.
 66. Geldenhuys, 1984, *op cit*, pp 82-83.
 67. Martin & Johnson, 'Mozambique: To Nkomati and Beyond', in *idem*, 1986, *op cit*,

- p.36. For further examples, see Grundy, 1983, *op cit*.
68. For statistics on the escalation of insurgency and sabotage in South Africa, see Tom Lodge, 'The African National Congress after the Kabwe Conference', in Moss & Obery (eds), 1987, *op cit*, pp 7-10.
 69. For details of the foreign debt crisis, see Jesmond Blumenfeld, 'Economy under Siege', in *idem* (ed), *South Africa in Crisis*, London: Croom Helm, 1987, pp 26-30.

Book Reviews

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: STATES, POWER AND CONFLICT SINCE 1945

G.R. Berridge

Sussex, Wheatsheaf Books, 1987, 288 pp, includes index, paperback, price not indicated.

This refreshing introductory, textbook on international relations surveys well-charted territory. The writing bears the hallmark of uncompromising realism — the work of a versatile neo-classicist, somewhat out of the mainstream. Most of the issues that are central for an understanding of international relations are crisply examined. For example the fragile state system of rules and institutions; the instruments of conflict (such as secret intelligence, economic sanctions, force and propaganda); international law; the balance of power; diplomacy; UN peacekeeping and the UN welfare network:

Informed by the understanding that 'the state remains the main agent in world politics', Berridge draws — with originality — on the work of other scholars, notably Bull, Carr, Hoffman, Waltz and Wight. A textbook of considerable stylistic mastery, it will no doubt be widely valued for general introductory courses on International Relations at undergraduate level.

Berridge's uncompromising realism restricts his theoretical palette, however, while he subscribes to the importance of international political theory within International Relations (p. 3), his own analysis does not do justice to this claim. For example, his understanding of international politics as 'the activity involved — peaceful or otherwise — in the working out of conflicts between states' (p. 36), would have benefitted from a consideration of theoretical insights emanating from peace and conflict research. Similarly, a mention of the new literature about the ethical aspects of international relations in general, and of foreign policy in particular, would have added an important dimension to the discussion of 'states, power and conflict since 1945'.

Nonetheless, the book succeeds admirably in introducing students to the subject rather than the *discipline* of International Relations. It provides a critical survey of the 'conventional wisdom' and points the reader in some new directions.

André du Pisani,
SAIIA,
Jan Smuts House,
Johannesburg.

Review Article: Inkatha — Truth in Diversity?

GATSHA BUTHELEZI: CHIEF WITH A DOUBLE AGENDA

Mzala

London and New Jersey, Zed Books, 1988, pp ix + 240

AN APPETITE FOR POWER: BUTHELEZI'S INKATHA AND THE POLITICS OF 'LOYAL RESISTANCE'

Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton

Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1987, 261 pp

USUTHU! CRY PEACE: INKATHA AND THE FIGHT FOR A JUST SOUTH AFRICA

Wessel de Kock

Cape Town, The Open Hand Press, 1986, 192 pp

These three books indicate the growing interest that Mangosuthu Buthelezi and the Inkatha movement in Natal has for analysts of South African politics. Inkatha raises a considerable number of issues about race, class and the mobilisation of ethnic symbols in an acutely polarised society. At the same time, the movement's conservative political position on international sanctions against South Africa indicates that there is an important external dimension to its study as well.

Mzala's book is written from an ANC perspective, as the author has for several years worked in the ANC's research department in Lusaka. While he does not use detailed local sources that explore in depth Buthelezi's local power base in Natal, this study contains a lot of useful information, marshalled behind a strong attack on the chief as an 'agent of apartheid'. Buthelezi's claims to royal ancestry are questioned, along with the assertion that Inkatha represents the continuation of much of the ANC's objectives before its banning in 1960. Mzala makes much of Buthelezi's being called to Pretoria in 1952 to be interviewed by Dr W. W. M. Eiselen, the Secretary of Native Affairs, after being expelled as a student from Fort Hare in 1950. Eiselen told Buthelezi that he had to 'wipe the slate clean' after the incident if he wanted to succeed to the chieftainship. Buthelezi's compliance in the following years, including his failure to oppose the introduction of the Bantu Authorities system in the 1950s, suggest to Mzala that the claim to be a continuation of the ANC cannot be taken seriously.

Mzala acknowledges that in the early 1970s, Buthelezi was a considerable thorn in the flesh of the South African government, in the wake of the proclamation in 1970 of the Zululand Territorial Authority. After being unanimously elected by 200 Zulu chiefs as Chief Executive Officer of the ZTA, Buthelezi was in a strong position to fill the political vacuum that existed in black South African politics in the post-Sharpeville period. During this time, a number of white liberals saw in Buthelezi the hope for some way

of undermining the apartheid system from within. Because of this, the chief was looked upon suspiciously by Pretoria until well into the late 1970s. Mzala's main charges against Buthelezi are that he has allowed Inkatha to become progressively drawn into the maintenance of the separate development system and of running the movement on an ethnic Zulu basis despite changes in Inkatha's constitution which opened it up to all black South Africans. Drawing on the work of Roger Southall, Mzala concludes that the extent of Inkatha's support within KwaZulu can be questioned, given that it forms the only administrative link between resettled communities and the KwaZulu administration and that the payment of membership fees is in many cases simply a tribal levy.

Mzala's study is a well-argued case against the politics of Inkatha and is generally free of jargon. Inkatha's attempts to establish a trade union rival to COSATU in 1986 in the form of the United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA) is portrayed as little more than the establishment of a company union whose president was also the personnel manager of the giant Tongaat-Hulett group. The author also has little time for the attempts by the Buthelezi Commission to achieve some form of power-sharing arrangement on the basis of consociational democracy, which, he argues, is simply an elaborate form of federalism. He repeats the ANC position that discussion on federal arrangements can only begin after the achievement of majority rule in South Africa.

The study by Maré and Hamilton broadly follows a similar argument to Mzala's, although it is easily the most fully researched of the three books under review. It employs a fairly liberal dosage of *marxisant* jargon, which leads to the portrayal of Inkatha as a creature of 'monopoly capital'. The book is an attack on the small group of journalists who sympathise with Inkatha, and is concerned to show in detail the degree to which Inkatha is locked into the working of the separate development system. It also draws on historical parallels with the 1920s, when King Solomon formed the first Inkatha movement in close collaboration with the sugar industry and the Native Affairs Department. Such a class alliance has been reformed in the course of the 1970s, with the main pressure now coming from multinational capital.

Following attempts to open up some form of dialogue with the ANC in exile in the 1970s and culminating in talks between Buthelezi and Oliver Tambo in London in 1979, Buthelezi has been forced to adopt an increasingly conservative position as his power base came under growing attack in the early 1980s from more radical forces organised around the UDF and later COSATU. The championing of a federal system would, in the authors' opinion, favour Inkatha's present political position 'and would probably provide the most likely route for Buthelezi's inclusion in national "reform" politics' (p.169). At the same time, there is a strong hint in their analysis that the central leadership does not always have complete control over the

movement at the local level, and that various local 'war lords' have effectively gained a power base. They cite the case of Thomas Mandla Shabalala, the 'war lord' of Lindelani outside Durban, who emerged as leader of the Inkatha suppression of the school boycotts in August 1985, and who was quickly coopted into Inkatha's central committee. Such war lords undermine, the authors conclude, Inkatha's formal commitment to non-violence. There will be pressure, however, in the event of any realistic hope for some form of regional power sharing, for Inkatha to disown the vigilant committees or *Amabutho*, although this may take the form of incorporating such groups into the KwaZulu police. Buthelezi dislikes the use of the term *impi* to describe groups of Zulu thugs, preferring the term 'armed men'.

Maré and Hamilton's book is likely to be established as the best text for teaching the politics of Inkatha in university courses and should help to debunk many of the myths propagated about the movement internationally. This is in marked contrast to the book by De Kock, which is much more supportive of Inkatha's position in the contemporary ideological struggle in South African politics. His book frequently exhibits some striking turns of phrase, which contain more than a whiff of bar talk. 'When Trotsky's political grinding of teeth is finally over', he remarks, 'and cigarette butts all that still smoulder at the negotiating table, South Africa will be a black ruled society in a unitary state' (p.21). Later we read that '[t]he belief that Mandela, giant as he is to fellow blacks, can neutralise the ANC's strategy of violence at will, a Pope Clement raising his hand against Attila the Hun at the Tiber, is naive' (p.126).

In sharp contrast to the two other works reviewed, De Kock supports the contention that Buthelezi represents a continuation of ANC strategy in the 1950s, especially in the figure of Chief Luthuli, though Mzala points out that, in contrast to Buthelezi's accommodation of the apartheid policy in the 1950s as represented by Bantu Authorities, Luthuli chose to stand firm and lose his chieftainship. De Kock is attracted to the tough image Buthelezi manages to portray abroad — he is 'no milksop pacifist and no less insistent on black rights than any black militant' (p.30).

The book contains a remarkable transcript of a discussion between Buthelezi and the Minister of Justice, Jimmy Kruger, in September 1977, shortly after the death in detention of Steve Biko. Kruger confesses to wanting to 'save' Buthelezi from Black Consciousness, which he sees as polarising South African politics. There is a strong echo of old style colonial trusteeship in Kruger's determination to 'uplift' Africans, while both he and Buthelezi tend to carry a heavy burden of the historical past. Kruger even claims that he is trying to do for Africans what Campbell Bannerman did for the Afrikaners in the wake of the Boer War. The small size of KwaZulu and its divided nature are not problems for Kruger, who tells Buthelezi he should model his state on that of Singapore.

De Kock's book provides little evidence of any democratic structure in Inkatha or for any significant non-Zulu support outside Natal. Like Maré and Hamilton, he is concerned about the press' portrayal of Inkatha, although this time it is radical journalists who are guilty of spreading one-sided distortions. There is an interesting portrait of the movement's Secretary-General, Oscar Dhlomo, whose father backed Jordan Ngubane's newspaper *Inkundla ya Bantu*. Dhlomo himself was a student at Adams College, even writing an MA thesis about the College.

None of the three books give detailed profiles of the main leaders of Inkatha and their backgrounds, which are generally labelled as 'petty bourgeois' in radical scholarship (such as that of Maré and Hamilton). It would be interesting to have more information on the reasons why some of these figures chose to join Inkatha and their vision of the political future. The movement remains in essence ethnically bound, although it is one that enjoys far more support than any other homeland movement in South Africa.

The appeal of ethnicity and historical tradition is clearly a vital factor, though none of these studies gets fully to grips with this phenomenon. At one level, it is easy to see ethnic symbolism as purely a top-down creation of the 'invention of tradition', to use a vogue term current in radical historiography. Yet, at another level, these symbols have a living vitality, even though they have been manipulated so successfully by the apartheid state and its ethnologists in such a cynical fashion. For radicals in South Africa, ethnicity remains a bogey term full of ideological pitfalls and one they are not really willing to confront beyond a rather petulant dismissal. Nonetheless, the existence of the Inkatha movement is perhaps itself a reminder that this attitude might in turn contain a number of very large pitfalls.

Paul B. Rich,
University of Bristol.

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