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Smuts House Notes

The articles in this edition of the *Bulletin* raise a number of interesting questions about some of today's most important issues. Gavin Maasdorp's thoughts on *perestroika*, the centrally planned economies and post-apartheid South Africa, may be of relevance for the rebuilding of Mozambique's economy, shattered as it is not only by the possibly injudicious application of the principles of the command economy but also by endemic civil war. Do they provide pointers of understanding Zimbabwe, where Mugabe insists that he will build a mixed economy within a fundamentally socialist framework? Most of all, can they contribute to the often heated debate on South Africa's economic future? Are the ideas of the Freedom Charter and of the ANC's more recent economic pronouncements necessarily incompatible with the free market ideals so freely canvassed in some South African circles today?

Dr Nelson's paper on the UN peacekeeping forces should help to place the triumphs and vicissitudes of Namibia UNTAG in a much-needed broader perspective. When UNTAG was about to arrive in Namibia, it became apparent that many South Africans, even those who should have known better, had little or no acquaintance with the UN's peacekeeping activities in other parts of the world, past and present. However negative the traditional South African view of the United Nations, it is interesting to see how many hopes are being pinned on UNTAG's ability to rid the Republic of what is now perceived as a burden which it has carried (some would say illegitimately) for nearly seventy years.

An article on the South African defence establishment is always welcome. Some years ago, Kenneth Grundy's important Bradlow Paper on the military-security establishment's role in Southern Africa raised many significant issues. Although the taxpayers finance the defence force's activities and white males are compelled to take part in them, information about decision-makers' perceptions and aims is notoriously hard to come by. Mr Pacheco's contribution is therefore more than usually pertinent.

When surveying world events during the first half of 1989, there are a number of striking features on which one could dwell. There has been the apparent reluctance of the Bush Administration to commit itself on foreign policy issues, at least until the President's recent visit to NATO and his European allies. Dominant figures have left the scene, notably the Ayatollah Khomeini and Emperor Hirohito. Both deaths have given rise to retrospective assessments of the rulers' historical significance and to speculation about the probable attitudes of their successors. When reading the European press, one is struck by an obsession with ecological issues. Even in Mrs Thatcher's Britain, the Greens are fielding numerous candidates in the European elections and are expecting wide support.

I should like, however, to consider briefly an interesting paradox which has unexpectedly materialised in the affairs of the two great people's republics of the East.

For the past ten years or so, the centrally planned state-controlled economy of the People's Republic of China has been gradually liberated by the government in Beijing. Free Economic Zones have been established on the coastline to attract foreign capital and expertise, and also, it is surmised, to facilitate the envisaged incorporation of Hong Kong in 1997. On the mainland, peasants have once more been encouraged to grow and market their own produce independently. In the towns, a class of small entrepreneurs has emerged and prospered. Standards of living have apparently been rising. Individuality began to reappear cautiously amongst a people who for long had been accustomed to a safe if monotonous uniformity in dress and behaviour.

For many people, it seemed that the logical next step after the partial liberation of the Chinese economy would be the at least partial liberation of the Chinese people from their ideological straitjacket. Much was made of *kaifeng*, the Chinese version of *glasnost*, and of the apparently blossoming pragmatism of Deng Zhaoping and his colleagues.

At the time of writing, these predictions appear to have collapsed in ruins. At the beginning of the year, rumours of economic problems and of open corruption were accompanied by the suppression of noted critics, such as Fang Lizhi, now in hiding in the US Embassy in Beijing. Increasingly authoritarian sounds were heard from the government. Hints of disunity among its members abounded. Then in April came the beginning of open student demands of democratic rights, followed in May by the hunger strike and demonstrations in Tienanmen Square. Workers began to strike in sympathy with the pro-democracy movement, which spread to other cities. Calls were made for the resignation of Deng and Li, now perceived as hardliners, and the giant portrait of Mao was defaced. Western journalists predicted that the demonstrators would prove irresistible, that their *demands would have to be met and that a new dawn of freedom was on the horizon*.

At this stage, Deng is supposed to have remarked: 'Better 200 000 deaths now and 20 years of stability', or even: 'What are a million deaths in a population of one billion?'. Senior members of the government sympathetic to the students were forced to resign or cowed into acquiescence. The People's Liberation Army, with apparent reluctance at first, moved in. Violence followed on both sides, but ultimately it was the pro-democracy movement which had to lose. The hardliners, still led by the apparently imperishable Deng, seem to be firmly in control as the inquisition starts and the so-called ringleaders are rounded up.

In the middle of all this excitement, President Gorbachev's visit to Beijing

passed almost unnoticed and was disrupted by the demonstrations. The visit had been hailed as a breakthrough after thirty years of Sino-Soviet freeze and much had been expected of it. What, must Gorbachev have pondered, were the lessons of China for his own country, where democratisation was far outstripping economic reform?

There has been violence in the USSR too this year, mainly the result of inter-ethnic tensions. There has been open controversy also, especially during the run-up to the elections for the new Congress of People's Deputies. Ever since Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) in March 1985, he has worked steadily towards the opening up of political debate (*glasnost*) in the USSR. He has neutralised his conservative opponents and appears also to have successfully harnessed his more radical ones, such as Boris Yeltsin, to serve his own programme. Although the extent of political reform in the Soviet Union should not be exaggerated or over-simplified (90 % of the new deputies, for instance, are members of the CPSU), the fact remains that for the first time since 1917, open elections have been held. Even the most controversial issues have been openly debated in the Soviet press and at public meetings, such as Stalin's role in Soviet history and the deplorable state of the Soviet economy (of which more later). In the context of Soviet history, this is little short of staggering. The Soviet satellites, especially Poland and Hungary, also appear to be progressing along unorthodox lines of their own, which have already taken them far further than Brezhnev was prepared to permit Czechoslovakia to travel in 1968.

If *glasnost* and democratisation have achieved extraordinary success, the same cannot be said for *perestroika*, which is an essential component of Gorbachev's vision for the future. A particularly serious problem is the continued failure of Soviet agriculture and of the transport and distributive mechanisms to get food and other commodities into the shops. Standards of living are still far below the average citizen's expectations. Tertius Myburgh heard a riddle during his recent visit to the USSR, typically black in its humour:

Q: What is 150 metres long and eats potatoes?

A: A Moscow meat queue.

There are other serious problems too, not the least being how to modernise Soviet industry and at the same time free it from the Stalinist command economy. Then there is the technology backlog, other perhaps than in the military sector.

The prognosis is far from rosy. A recent CIA analysis predicts that Gorbachev will be unable to set the Soviet economy to rights before the year 2000, which is what he undertook to do in the 1986 Plan. Consumer dissatisfaction and all the other problems are therefore unlikely to disappear and may well intensify.

In China, economic reforms did not lull the desire for political freedom, nor did they lead to the creation of liberal democratic structures as some people thought would almost inevitably be the case. They may, however, have raised expectations which the leaders were unwilling to fulfil. In the USSR, *undoubted strides have been made towards democracy* as westerners understand the term. Will its leaders be brought up short against their inability to reform the economy?

It is just possible that the Russians have unwittingly got their priorities right. Instead of full stomachs hungering for real political rights, as in China (certain other countries also come to mind), Gorbachev may find that he has his people behind him, even if they do express their dissatisfactions vociferously, as he struggles to establish a more open and efficient economy.

The next ten years will tell whether China or the Soviet Union makes the most progress towards a more open and prosperous society.

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Gavin Maasdorp

Perestroika and Post-apartheid — Lessons for South Africa from the Centrally Planned Economies*

Since 1986, a number of conferences have been held on 'post-apartheid' South Africa, usually defined as a country with boundaries as laid down in the Act of Union of 1910, under majority rule within a constitutional framework of non-racialism. This paper is concerned not with how that particular state of affairs might be achieved — it assumes (entirely realistically, one would argue) that we will get there someday — but rather with the future economic system which might prevail.

In broad terms, there are two types of economic system in the modern world — the market and the centrally planned economies — both of which have a number of variants. Adaptations made and specific economic policies followed by certain other countries with heterogeneous populations — for example, Malaysia, or, after the ousting of long-established authoritarian regimes, Spain and Portugal, or, at roughly similar levels of development, Mexico — might prove instructive in the South African case, but this paper is confined to the experience of the centrally planned economies (CPEs).

The reason for this is that the debate about the post-apartheid economy tends to have been conducted with little reference to the performance of countries which have attempted to implement Marxist principles of socialism. This is a serious *lacuna* in the literature, given the considerable attention that has been devoted to criticisms of the 'capitalist system'. Critics of the present system seldom posit any realistic alternatives and ignore almost totally the experience of the CPEs (the only known practical alternative to the market-based economy). This paper contends that it is not good enough merely to criticise; we must know what alternatives are suggested, how these will be implemented and with what degree of success (based on experience elsewhere) we might reasonably expect them to meet their stated goals, which presumably would include some reference to economic efficiency, social equity and the country's position in international trade.

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It is therefore important to inject the experience of the CPEs into the debate. In this sense, *perestroika* (restructuring) in the Soviet Union and economic reform in Hungary, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Poland and other CPEs could hardly have come at a more appropriate time.

This paper first explains the technique of central planning and the reasons for reform, discusses secondly current reforms and identifies three specific aspects which seem to be relevant for post-apartheid South Africa, thirdly examines some systemic options for post-apartheid South Africa, and finally, takes up some important issues for the future.

Central Planning

In the traditional Soviet-type model, which was initially copied by other centrally planned economies, the State owns the means of production, while economic decision-making is highly centralised, with a hierarchical system of planning operating from the top down.¹ Mandatory directives are handed down from planners to enterprises: the economy is controlled by the State and the Communist Party. This control is achieved mainly by setting targets for each enterprise and by quantifying outputs and inputs in physical units in as much detail as is feasible. Here, however, lies the rub: the data requirements of the model are such that the economy 'cannot effectively be steered by detailed administrative directives from the centre, not even with the help of computers'.²

The model attempts to balance supply and demand among all enterprises through the setting up of 'material balance sheets'. The model's statistical demands are tremendous: in the Soviet Union, twenty-four million different products are listed,³ but the State Plan is able to disaggregate only 2000 goods on the highest level. In smaller economies, similar problems are experienced: in Poland, for instance, it was found that, as production became more diversified and the economy more complicated, the central planners were unable to coordinate all the data required for the plan.⁴ Mathematical economists in the Soviet Union pinned their faith on input-output models and computers, but these have proved unable to cope with the tasks involved in detailed planning. Although detailed plans are produced, they are inconsistent and hence unachievable; indeed, making plans which in their totality are unrealisable is the 'planning paradox' of the centrally planned economy.⁵ The information is not available on the scale required and this technical problem is a more important defect than is that of lack of motivation, on which most critics of central planning concentrate their attention.⁶

In any case, even consistent plans cannot be fulfilled in their totality. Economic processes are stochastic, that is, not determinist in character, and are influenced by unexpected events and many other factors which cannot

be foreseen. The flexibility inherent in economic behaviour contrasts sharply with the element of compulsion inherent in the plan.⁷

In practice, the plans bear little relation to reality. Planners set the targets based on information supplied by enterprises, and managers of enterprises in turn are preoccupied with meeting production goals, since it is the fulfillment of plan targets which is the measure of enterprise success. In attempting to meet their targets, enterprises tend to disregard costs, with the result that they encounter financial difficulties. They are then bailed out by the State, the additional funds given to enterprises being at the expense of consumption. Kornai has dubbed this phenomenon of assistance to enterprises the 'soft budget constraint'.⁸ Because of their overriding concern for meeting output targets, enterprise managers tend to disregard quality, play down production capacity, hold excessive stocks of inputs as an insurance against inadequate and irregular supplies, and oppose innovation.

As a result of these problems of coordinating the (inadequate) information flows and the divergent aims of planners and managers, the command economy has had to be reformed. As a recent writer put it: 'The system breeds irresponsibility, inefficiency, and permanent deficits, while simultaneously tempting enterprises to hoard staggering amounts of materials. This system is hostile to innovation and quality; it has not prevented disproportions, but has demoralised the workforce and makes life very hard for the consumer.'⁹

The system has proved wasteful of capital, labour and natural resources, and has led to a mismatch of relative prices, a misallocation of resources and X-inefficiency.¹⁰ The basic problem is the absence of market-determined prices and market allocation of raw materials and equipment. Prices send misleading signals; while it might be possible for the prices of consumer goods to reflect relative scarcity (since consumers act independently of one another, transactions are voluntary and goods can be exchanged), it is not possible in the case of investment goods because all investment decisions are politicised. Allocative efficiency requires a link between the markets of consumer and investment goods and this in turn requires a capital market to ensure that investment decisions are made on economic grounds.¹¹ Kornai's 'shortage economy' is a consequence of these systemic deficiencies: the inefficient and inconsistent allocation of raw materials leads to delays throughout the chain of production and reinforces market imbalances.¹²

For CPEs generally, the 1970s and 1980s have been decades of falling economic growth rates and increased inefficiency, as well as a widening technological gap in relation to the West. Official growth rates are low but, because statistics in East European countries are doctored by both enterprise managers and central planners, Winiccki argues that 'stagnation of NMP [Net Material Product] and, consequently, falling consumption have become the norm, rather than the exception'.¹³ If these countries are to

*compete, they require modern technology, improved incentives and greater efficiency. They now realise that they cannot modernise from the centre. In the case of the Soviet Union, the impulse to reform derives from a dissatisfaction with slow growth, technical backwardness, stagnating (or near-stagnating) levels of household consumption, and a deteriorating social environment.*¹⁴ These points are also made in an important work by Aganbegyan, who connects technological backwardness with a 'flawed economic system'.¹⁵ Shmelyov identifies the built-in defects of the system as 'a producer's monopoly in conditions of universal shortages and enterprises' lack of interest in scientific and technical progress',¹⁶ while Winiecki argues that the causes of economic decline in the CPEs are endogenous to the system.¹⁷

Today, many economists in the CPEs recognise the need to change systemic structures and economic policy in order to incorporate the market, and to redefine property relations. They concede the superiority both of the market mechanism with regard to the allocation of resources and of a competitive private sector in ensuring efficiency, innovation and production. Thus, a senior Soviet economist recently wrote that, 'until our economy is run by the laws of the market ... all our efforts are doomed to failure or at least to half results'.¹⁸ Quaisser points out that in China (PRC), the Soviet model is 'deeply discredited',¹⁹ while Von Borcke argues that Soviet central planning has reached its 'historical limitations'²⁰ in the face of scarce capital, labour and natural resources. Nove refers to 'widespread agreement about the fact that, whether or not the centralised system conformed to the needs of the USSR fifty years ago, it has become obsolete, a fetter on the forces of production, to borrow a Marxist phrase'.²¹

For CPEs, radical reform is necessary if they are to cope with the needs of modern industrial society, and the current debate in the CPEs is not about *whether* they ought to reform but about *how* to reform. By 'reform' is meant an increase in the role of the market and a diminution of central control.

The Current Reforms

The CPEs today present considerable contrasts in the nature and degree of their economic reforms.²² Although the pace of reform has quickened in the 1980s and almost all CPEs are initiating some changes, this does not represent the first wave. Yugoslavia effectively jettisoned its command economy in 1950 by adopting a system of worker self-management, while other waves of reform were led by Hungary in the 1950s, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the 1960s, and China (PRC) in the 1970s. In Eastern Europe, reforms are proceeding most rapidly in Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union; Romania and Albania remain closest to the command economy model, although there are signs of

some relaxation in Albania; Czechoslovakia is introducing further reforms from 1989; and the GDR does not feel that it needs to follow the current wave. Among Third World CPEs, Vietnam is the leading reformer, and Mongolia and North Korea have now initiated some measures, but Cuba remains opposed to adopting market elements.²³

Kaser²⁴ attempts to locate eleven CPEs (excluding Yugoslavia and some of the Third World countries) on a scale of reform. This shows Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland to be most advanced in moving to a market system in industry; Poland, China, Hungary and Bulgaria in the decollectivisation of agriculture; and Hungary and China in direct foreign trade. Despite the high profile of its *perestroika*, the Soviet Union is only at the midpoint on the scale.

At the risk of oversimplification, the move is away from direct towards indirect central planning, that is, away from highly centralised decision-making and direct allocation of resources towards decentralised decision-making and a system of resource allocation containing market elements. In official philosophy, this represents not the abandonment of central planning but a reinterpretation of its role; for example, in Poland, planning is to be concerned primarily with long-term strategy and not with the determination of detailed output targets and the allocation of resources. Nor does it represent the abandonment of Communist Party control.

The basic unit of the economy is now seen as the self-financing, *independent enterprise with greater freedom to plan its investment, wages, output, quality, etc.* Direct intervention by the State is to be restricted to narrower activities as is normal in the West, such as the provision of public goods, while indirect influence on enterprises will be exerted through macroeconomic policies. Kaser refers to the 'dual track', that is, the obligation for enterprises to fulfil State orders while being free to apply their remaining capacity on the basis of market considerations.²⁵ The reform of wholesale and retail prices plays a key role in Soviet *perestroika*, excessive price stability now being recognised as a major cause of resource misallocation.²⁶ Hungary has gone furthest in developing a capital market, a stock exchange having recently opened in Budapest. Participation is limited but restrictions on share purchase and company listings are to be lifted from 1989.²⁷

As far as the post-apartheid South African economy is concerned, the main lessons from the CPE reforms seem to revolve around the issues of ownership and management, agricultural reforms, and equality, and it is to a discussion of these reforms that the remainder of this section is devoted.

Ownership and Management

In Marxian theory, capitalists are exploiters because they appropriate surplus value; to avert this, the means of production should be socially

owned. In CPEs, this was interpreted as State ownership, but many socialists have argued that this was incorrect: a country is not necessarily more socialist because it has more State ownership, and worker ownership in the form of cooperatives, for instance, is a more desirable type of social ownership.²⁸

Current reforms in most CPEs are seeing the modification of the system of State ownership and control: countries are endeavouring to enlarge the field of cooperative and private activity in industry and agriculture. In the Soviet Union, a draft law of 1988 considerably enlarges the scope for the operation of cooperatives, but the process is most advanced in Hungary, where there is a complex system of State, cooperative and private ownership with leases for small businesses and restaurants. In terms of the Soviet New Enterprise Law, which came into effect at the beginning of 1988, staff in large factories may form brigades or working groups which operate as sub-enterprises, renting the machinery and selling their output to the enterprise. They are also entitled to appoint their own managers at all levels. In several countries, joint ventures with foreign firms as well as wholly-owned foreign firms are allowed.

Most CPEs have at least some vestiges of a private sector. In the GDR, private property (in housing and equipment) has always remained, and the private sector accounts for 3.5 — 4 percent of value added in the economy. Agriculture is mainly in private hands in Poland and Yugoslavia. In the latter, remittances from those working abroad have played a significant role in financing the purchase of property, as indeed they have in Vietnam in setting up small firms (the household economy) in retailing and services. Most countries have set a limit to the number of workers a private firm may employ; in some, private activity is limited to family members only.

Among economists, the importance of ownership is a controversial issue. Some argue that the key question is not who owns but whether ownership is sufficiently separated from management. They do not see State ownership *per se* as a negative feature, and point to the satisfactory record of some State-owned firms in Western Europe. Rather, the critical aspect is whether management is free to make decisions according to market criteria or whether it is obliged to follow directives issued by the State or Party on non-economic, that is, political, grounds.

Others, however, argue that ownership is important.²⁹ Without investment autonomy, an enterprise cannot become either autonomous in current decision-making or competitive. Yet investment autonomy for enterprises is dependent upon the existence of a capital market because, without this, they will continue to rely on the State for funds. Experience in several CPEs, notably Hungary and China (PRC), suggests that private and cooperative enterprises have superior motivation to behave competitively than do those under State ownership. In Hungary, almost two decades of

reforms still have not made it easy for the State to implement bankruptcy legislation; losses are normal and are covered by State subsidy so that profitable enterprises in fact cross-subsidise the unprofitable, and the motivation of management to become efficient is reduced. The soft budget constraint still operates.³⁰

In some CPEs, however, there is a move towards the creation of a capital market. In both Hungary (as mentioned earlier) and China (PRC), stock exchanges have opened and equity shares have been issued. Both countries also have a bond market, which means that individuals may receive income from nonproductive activities — a feature of capitalism condemned by theoretical Marxism. But equity shares are generally restricted to the staff of the enterprise issuing the shares, and neither the bonds nor the shares can be widely traded.³¹ Social bonds are sold to workers in Romania and bear interest; this is one way in which the government there has been able to tap private funds.

A question arises from this argument: if the State wishes to simulate market conditions and have enterprises operating efficiently on market lines, why continue to own them? The relevant comparison should be: would State-owned or cooperative/private enterprises provide government with the largest revenue? In other words, would profits from (less efficient) State-owned enterprises exceed taxes paid by (more efficient) cooperatives and privately-owned ones?

A further word needs to be said about cooperatives, in particular about the Yugoslav concept of worker self-management. The labour-managed economy is not centrally planned. Membership of the cooperative is limited to staff, who have some say in electing the directors. In practice, however, directors must be Party members, with the result that political decisions override economic ones, the firms do not react with sufficient flexibility to price changes, losses are covered by subsidies, and there is no incentive to become efficient. An important theoretical deficiency, as shown by Lydall, is a tendency for labour-managed firms to be capital intensive rather than employment creating.³² This has obvious implications for the Third World and is one reason why interest in the Yugoslav model has declined.

As mentioned earlier, cooperatives are often held to be a superior form of social ownership than is State ownership. One reason for the attraction the Yugoslav model held was its democratic nature — all workers would contribute to managerial decisions. Experience, however, has shown that 'the notion that workers can somehow collectively manage in their spare time is nothing if not utopian'.³³ In practice, workers do not have the time, skills or inclination to participate in management, yet because managers are elected by workers, they are 'ill-placed to resist the latter's pressure for excessive wage increases'.³⁴ Workers do not take a long view, and prefer to

maximise wage increases rather than yields on capital or further investment in the enterprise.

Cooperatives in Western Europe, in contrast, are voluntary and are able to operate without bureaucratic interference and to respond more flexibly to market variations. The experience of different countries with cooperatives varies;³⁵ in many they have been disappointing but they appear to have been particularly successful in Italy, where they operate in industry, agriculture and banking, and constitute a large sector of the economy. Another well-managed cooperative movement is that of Mondragon in the Basque region of Spain. In West Germany, trade cooperatives have been more successful than producer ones, and in Africa, producer cooperatives have also had a disappointing record.

Agricultural Reform

In agriculture as well the trend is towards cooperative and private farming, the East European model of large State farms with high capital intensity and forced collectivisation of peasants having failed worldwide. In CPEs, reforms usually start with agriculture, as it is not difficult to reorganise this sector and grant increased freedom to individual peasants.

State farms exhibit two major weaknesses. The first is that their introduction requires substantial capital investment, but capital is the scarce factor of production. Secondly, it is difficult to motivate peasants in collectivised agriculture. Typically, therefore, yields remain low despite capital intensity, and farms are highly subsidised. Increased labour intensity associated with private farming has generally ensured that yields are higher on private plots than on State farms. For example, in Hungary, private cultivators (who may be either members of cooperatives or employees on State farms) account for less than five percent of the land but produce over one-third of the agricultural output.³⁶ The exceptions are Yugoslavia and Poland, in both of which the State discriminates against private agriculture in its investment policy, with the result that yields are higher on State farms despite the fact that most of the arable land is cultivated privately.

The model for privatising agriculture is commonly that of the family contract. Peasants on collective farms in the Soviet Union and Vietnam, for example, are given a certain amount of land for a specific period (15-20 years), the State provides inputs such as fertiliser and machinery, and the family then contracts to deliver a specific output to the State. In the Soviet Union, in addition, some output may be sold, but the problem is that there is no infrastructure for this exchange. In China, there has been a dramatic increase in food output since the breakup of the communes, and family leases have been extended to thirty years. This system of private peasants

generally seems more appropriate for Third World conditions than is that of State farms.

Equality

In Eastern Europe, disparities in wages between different occupations have been narrowed considerably. In fact, until 1987, in the Soviet Union, factory workers were paid more than certain professions such as teaching and engineering. Wages and bonuses of factory workers have been set irrespective of the performance of the factory, and blue collar workers have been regarded as a privileged class. This high degree of wage levelling, as it is now rather derogatorily called, has acted as a disincentive to individuals to undertake further studies or to accept positions of responsibility.

Indeed, the position has been reached where equality *per se* is no longer regarded as a positive factor, and all countries in Eastern Europe are trying to increase wage differentials so as to provide sufficient incentives to encourage efficiency and higher productivity. It is now accepted that the idea that socialism implied an equal distribution of income was a misinterpretation of Marxism; the true socialist principle of distribution is 'from each according to ability to each according to *work*', not needs. Aganbegyan refers to 'the former unjustifiable levelling out of salaries. Now salary levels are more closely linked to the quality and quantity of work'.³⁷ Thus, reforms include relating wages and bonuses to the performance of the enterprise.

Despite wage levelling, however, *income inequality* exists in the CPEs³⁸ and, in some countries such as Hungary and Poland, it is reported to be growing. Apart from official jobs, many people are engaged in the *expanding underground economy*, while private agricultural plots provide a further source of income (in Hungary, many families receive income from all three sources). Managers and directors usually have access to goods not available to the general public; so too do Party members and the top brass of the military, and it is their children who have better educational and career opportunities than those of the rank and file; bureaucrats and Party functionaries are a closed club of rent-suckers. The emergence of this new class is the subject of some press debate in the Soviet Union.³⁹ Some millionaires have emerged, especially in Hungary (although they are described as 'poor rich' in relation to their counterparts in the West).⁴⁰ There is some public criticism of the higher income groups, but such views are castigated by Shmelyov, who refers to 'proponents of equality in poverty'⁴¹ and 'aggressive envy toward those who enjoy high earnings — even in cases where the earnings are honestly come by'.⁴² The official view is that it does not matter if an individual receives a high income as long as it is earned and, in any case, high marginal tax rates do some equilibrating.⁴³

Another cause of inequalities is that, as in the West, social security in

Eastern Europe often tends to benefit the better off. This is because they are better able to take up their rights than are the poor. Some observers therefore argue that, unless special steps (possibly positive discrimination) are taken to help the poor, it is the 'bourgeoisie' who will maximise their benefits from the system. Yet — and this is a further cause of inequality — one of the poorer groups has been actively discriminated against: peasants in the Soviet Union were not included in pension schemes until 1964, while in most of Eastern Europe there has been an urban bias in health and educational services.

The overall picture of income distribution in Eastern Europe might not look substantially different from that in Western Europe. For example, in the case of the two Germanys, the shape of the Lorenz curve for worker households is almost identical,⁴⁴ although incomes in the West are of course much higher. The authors of a comparative study of Poland and Hungary state: 'It appears that if private ownership of the means of production is replaced by collective ownership, some types of inequality are eliminated, some others remain, and some new sorts of inequality emerge in social life.'⁴⁵ In other words, there is no system that can eliminate inequality.

Will Reform Succeed?

An examination of the factors favouring or militating against the success of economic reforms in CPEs is not a primary aim of this paper.⁴⁶ The issue is worth a brief examination, however, as it has some relevance for post-apartheid South Africa.

Writers on the subject agree that leaders such as Gorbachev may well fail in their efforts to reform their economies. There are many obstacles — political, social and economic — to be surmounted.

Political obstacles relate to the interests of what Winiecki calls 'the four pillars of the communist system of government':⁴⁷ the Party *apparatchiks*, bureaucrats, police and military. He argues that the police and military are less attached to central planning than are the *apparatchiks* and bureaucrats; they could do equally well (or better) under an authoritarian market economy. In contrast, the other two pillars rely heavily on political control of the economy to obtain a larger slice of the economic pie for themselves, and therefore have more to lose from reforms.⁴⁸ A recent official Soviet publication stated that: 'Perestroika is being attacked by its opponents primarily through bureaucracy, with the help of bureaucracy, and in the interests of bureaucracy.'⁴⁹ There are eighteen million bureaucrats in the Soviet Union and the aim of *perestroika* is to reduce this number by forty percent; thus, they have considerable vested interests in blocking the process. Moreover, ideological hardliners in the Party, although on the retreat in several CPEs, are still a presence, obsolete dogmas dying hard.

Social opposition arises from the fact that populations in CPEs have

become accustomed to being looked after by the State. Any system which entails risk and uncertainty, therefore, is bound to be regarded with suspicion, and this will be exacerbated by the short-term economic problems inherent in any reform programme. The current experience of, for example, the Soviet Union and Poland, shows that in the adjustment phase, output will decline, prices and unemployment will rise, and the standard of living will deteriorate. Economic reform is essentially long-term — problems such as obsolete plants, poor physical infrastructure and inappropriate education cannot be overcome in the space of a few years. But there is a trade-off between short-term economic hardship and long-term gains in social and political rights, as well as in a higher standard of living for the population, and it is on this point that reformers will have to play. A number of writers have stressed the need for political reform to accompany economic reform.⁵⁰ Hungary has given a lead in opening up the political system, but the Party in other CPEs may be less inclined to follow suit. How much political *glasnost* (openness) will be tolerated is an open question.

Other economic obstacles to reform include the reluctance of governments to accept the bankruptcies of some major enterprises, and lack of entrepreneurial drive among enterprise managers. The latter point, however, might be overstated by some writers, as there is a significant 'second economy' in CPEs, which shows that business flair is not entirely lacking. A final but critical issue is whether or not the political leaders have a clear vision of the sequence, timing and extent of measures necessary to transform the economy.

Should reform fail, the economic implications are clear. The CPEs will fall further and further behind the West technologically, become even less able to compete in international markets, and face deteriorating long-term standards of living. As an official Soviet document acknowledges: "The growing consumer requirements can only be met by proceeding with radical reform."⁵¹

Systemic Options for the Post-Apartheid Economy

Perhaps more important for the South African debate than the likelihood of these reforms succeeding is the mere fact that there is a general retreat from central planning. An economic system must prove itself capable of fulfilling the goals for which it was devised, and central planning has shown itself unable to increase either labour productivity or consumption, both of which were important objectives in Marxian terms. Concurrently with these reforms in the CPEs, there has been a growing appreciation in the West of the virtues of the market; indeed, '*perestroika* looks increasingly like Thatcherism with a socialist mask'.⁵²

With the experience of the CPEs clearly indicating the failure of central planning as a system, only a doctrinaire Stalinist would recommend its adoption in South Africa, especially since a highly open economy does not lend itself to planning. Indeed, a leading Soviet analyst on Southern Africa, Goncharov, recently stated that it would take 100 years for South Africa to become 'socialist',⁵³ while Slovo has acknowledged that post-apartheid South Africa would have a mixed economy.⁵⁴ Businessmen and liberal economists also talk of a mixed economy, so there appears to be some consensus on this score. There is no consensus, however, as to what the mix should be: the notion of seizing the 'commanding heights' (i.e. land and the alleged monopolies in mining, banking and industry), while allowing 'non-monopoly' and small firms to function, has its supporters, as does the belief in a minimal role (i.e. limited to macroeconomic management and the provision of public goods) for the State. Clearly, the State will play a crucial role in redressing the legacy of apartheid, but it is important to define what it ought to do in a mixed, post-apartheid economy: in the CPEs, it was thought that the State could do everything, but their experience has proved otherwise.

Common Characteristics of Economic Systems

There is no pure model of either central planning or a market economy anywhere: there are varying elements of private ownership in the CPEs and varying degrees of State ownership in the West. In all countries, the government has considerable power in steering the economy via its macroeconomic policies. There is a considerable degree of concentration of economic power in both systems — in the West through company mergers giving rise to large conglomerates and interlocking directorships, and in the CPEs through links between the Party and the bureaucracy. Some observers believe that there is a convergence between the market and centrally planned systems, while others argue that several different types of corporate organisation are emerging.

An important point not always recognised in the South African debate is that many of the features for which the western economy and society are criticised also show up in the CPEs. For example, much of the literature on South Africa (and Third World problems) refers to the 'crisis of capitalism'. *CPEs are in crisis too, and probably even more deeply so.*⁵⁵ Slow economic growth, rising unemployment and inflation, and growing indebtedness are characteristics of a number of these countries. In Romania and Poland, for instance, economic disintegration is giving rise to real hardship, with diminishing food supplies and shortages of heating in winter. Poverty and inequality have not been eliminated, and the nature of regional disparities is the same as in market economies, with industry concentrating in a few

traditional centres. Unemployment exists, but until now has been hidden rather than open.⁵⁶ Trade unions have less independence than in the West, and workers are equally alienated from the means of production.

Housing in Eastern Europe is in short supply and is often of a poor quality. It is not uncommon for families to share apartments. For example, in the Soviet Union, forty million apartments need to be built by the year 2000 if each family is to have its own. Trends in health in the Soviet Union are unfavourable, with infant mortality rates rising and life expectancy falling. In most East European CPEs, access to health care is free in theory only; in practice, individuals have to pay for treatment and hospitalisation. Corruption occurs not only in the medical field — it is widespread throughout society. Alcoholism and other social problems are also serious. Ecological problems are even more serious in Eastern than in Western Europe:⁵⁷ industrial plants are obsolete and, because of the importance of meeting output targets, enterprises cannot afford to close for the installation of anti-pollutant devices. Political problems in the form of ethnic tensions occur in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and discrimination on various grounds has not been eliminated.

The Mixed Economy

If central planning appears to be a defective model, what about the market economy? It is doubtful whether a libertarian model of a free enterprise system with minimal government would be a realistic expectation in a post-apartheid South Africa. Any government, for the sake of its own survival if for no other reason, would be compelled to play an interventionist role in economic affairs so as to remove the distortions which result from the country's racially-based past: for example, the gap in inter-racial welfare and wealth ownership, as well as the deplorable state of education, housing and other social services for the presently disadvantaged groups. This interventionist role would be greater than that envisaged by most free marketeers. This does not mean to say that markets need not have a vital role in the economy, but it does mean that explicit attention would be devoted to distributional issues.

In any case, no country conforms to a 'pure' libertarian model of a market economy. Contrary to a widely-held South African view, the success of the East Asian 'newly industrialised countries' is not due to their governments allowing the market mechanism virtually unfettered reign.⁵⁸ In all these countries, government intervention was of crucial importance in stimulating economic growth, the important point being that this intervention was restrained, sensible and competent. The aim was to encourage companies to become internationally competitive in the shortest possible time after an initial period of protection, and lame ducks were not tolerated.

The East Asian case is an important example for South Africa because it has an open economy and, if this is inefficient, the region's competitive ability in world markets will be impaired. Macroeconomic policies which have been shown to be successful in promoting economic growth and efficiency include realistic exchange rates, positive real interest rates, market determined prices, and direct as opposed to indirect subsidies.

Social democracies such as those in West Germany and Sweden offer another model for a mixed economy in post-apartheid South Africa. These countries combine an efficient private sector with a well-developed social welfare system. In Sweden, for example, the larger firms are highly competitive on international markets and there is less government interference with business than in most other West European countries. Revenue requirements for the social security system are extensive, and are met by high taxation rates.⁵⁹ But some West European countries are finding it increasingly difficult to maintain their social security systems at present levels as their population ages and the proportion of economically active persons (who sustain the system) declines correspondingly.

The successful functioning of a social democracy presupposes an efficient State apparatus, an integrated market, good flows of information, and a level of income sufficient to sustain the welfare system. In South Africa, the last of these conditions is absent and the others are defective: much of the population is imperfectly integrated into the market, the bureaucracy is bloated, and mean *per capita* incomes are not high. A cursory examination of the introduction of the 'social market economy' in the Federal Republic of Germany after World War II suggests that South Africa could perhaps move in the same direction. The economic reforms there in 1948 emphasised growth and capital accumulation, encouraged by low taxation rates, even if unemployment persisted. In the event, production was stimulated and jobs created. Thus, in West Germany, it was a case of 'grow first, redistribute later'. The lesson for South Africa is that high economic growth would be an essential precondition for any move to the West German-type model. The major obstacle, perhaps, is a political one, namely, that social democracy is a long-term goal and is unattractive to politicians in poor countries. For both economic and political reasons, therefore, the difficulties of introducing it in a country of high inequalities such as South Africa should not be underestimated.

Post-Apartheid Issues⁶⁰

Every country has its own special characteristics, and no model should be transplanted uncritically. The special feature of the South African case, which will set limits to what is feasible, is the strong feeling of political, social and economic injustice and deprivation among Blacks. Redistribution of incomes and wealth to rectify a historical legacy of extreme inequality

will be a major driving force in post-apartheid politics. It is for this reason that this section of the paper concentrates on issues raised by writers who would have the economic system move in the direction of greater State intervention rather than by those who favour a reduced role for the State. The latter group would advocate, for example, deregulation and privatisation, both of which measures have considerable attraction from a point of view of economic efficiency. The removal of regulations which have impeded economic activity, and especially the participation of Blacks in the economy, would have positive effects on income distribution. But the influence of privatisation on economic welfare and distribution is more problematic, and any moves which relieve the State of its historical duty of ensuring the provision of basic infrastructure and essential services for disadvantaged individuals, groups or regions, is bound to be regressive.

This section of the paper cannot hope to deal with all aspects of the post-apartheid economy debate. The main lessons for post-apartheid South Africa from the experience of the CPEs would appear to be related to distributional issues, namely ownership and management, agricultural reforms and wage equality, and it is to a discussion of these that we now turn.

Redistribution in General

An immediate question which arises refers to the country's capacity for redistribution. South Africa is a middle-income developing country and the amount of wealth available for redistribution is limited, the proportion of wealthy individuals in the population being small relative to the poor. Nor is there great scope for increasing personal and corporate taxation rates, which are already high by world standards. There are several reasons, however, why economic growth in post-apartheid South Africa of itself would facilitate redistribution, one being the volume of latent or suppressed talent and energy which would be released. Another, and major, reason is demographic and has, in fact, been operating since the late 1960s: the rapid growth of the white population (the most affluent group) is stagnating and this means that, in any period of rapid economic growth, Whites will become decreasingly able to provide the skilled and highly paid tasks required. Thus, Blacks will be thrust into such positions, their vertical occupational mobility will be facilitated, and with it a more equitable inter-racial distribution of income would emerge.

To illustrate these trends, figures show that the black share of personal income increased from approximately 20% in 1970 to 25% in 1975 and 29% in 1980; the white share of total disposable income declined from 66,7% in 1972 to 55,5% in 1985; the poorest 40% of the population increased their share of total income from 3,9% in 1970 to 7,6% in 1980; mean annual real earnings for Blacks increased from R410 to R763 between

1971-79, compared with a fall for Whites over this period; and Blacks' real *per capita* incomes rose from R64 in 1970 to R108 in 1980. More recent figures show that the personal disposable incomes of the three black groups increased far more rapidly in real terms than did that of Whites between 1972-85; in fact, in the 1980s, Whites' real incomes have fallen.⁶¹

It should be noted that these trends occurred during a period of slow economic growth and that they would be accelerated if the growth rate were to be increased. Indeed, Knight argues that, in principle, the share in national income of the poorest 40 % could be doubled by just two years of pre-1970 growth rates in *per capita* incomes.⁶²

The priority which ought to be attached to income redistribution *per se* is debatable. Although relative poverty must be tackled in the longer term, it is the eradication of the present high level of absolute poverty (based on some notion of a minimum subsistence level or similar measure) which surely should enjoy the highest priority. Continuous structural changes in socio-economic life are more important in promoting equality than are attempts at immediate redistribution; nationalisation of enterprises, in particular, does little to benefit the poor.

One attempt at tackling inequality worth examining is that of the Malaysian government, which set a target of thirty percent of indigenous Malay ownership of total assets to be reached over twenty years. This was to be achieved by the establishment of public enterprises in manufacturing and business, the restructuring of existing firms to ensure thirty percent Malay ownership and employment (including managerial positions), setting quotas for Malays in higher education and the civil service, and through low income housing policy. In effect, however, this attempt has been more successful in reducing inter-racial than interpersonal differentials, since the increased share of asset ownership has accrued to public enterprises rather than individuals, and inequality within the Malay population has widened.⁶³

State or Private Ownership?

There is little doubt that the question of ownership of enterprises and land will be a major issue in post-apartheid South Africa. The Freedom Charter of 1955 mentions the nationalisation of mines, banks and 'monopoly' industry, but no specific commitment to such action is contained in the recently published constitutional guidelines of the African National Congress. Nevertheless, State control of the so-called 'commanding heights of the economy' is often mentioned in the literature as a desirable goal, reference being made in particular to the largest half-dozen conglomerates which are alleged to represent 'monopoly capital'.

The veracity of such allegations requires careful consideration, since many of the operations of these conglomerates occur in highly competitive industrial sectors, for example, mining, automobiles, insurance, etc, and it

is, moreover, difficult to establish ownership patterns with any precision. It is well known that the largest conglomerates together account for an overwhelming proportion of shares on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, but the question is: who owns the conglomerates? Apart from large individual investors, shares are owned by public bodies, institutions (such as pension funds) and small investors. In the life assurance sector, companies are owned by millions of policyholders, the fastest growing market being among Blacks. Thus, the nature of and alternatives to nationalisation should be thoroughly investigated.

Nationalisation could be accomplished in various ways, ranging from minority shareholding by the State, to either majority shareholding or complete ownership without taking managerial control, to total ownership and management.⁶⁴ One alternative to nationalisation would be to enforce the provisions of the Maintenance and Promotion of Competition Act and break up any operations of the conglomerates which do, in fact, constitute monopolies. More importantly, the costs and benefits of State as opposed to private ownership require close examination. The main interest of the government in a post-apartheid economic system, given the long period of poor economic growth which is likely to precede substantial political change and the resultant 'daunting task'⁶⁵ it will face, should be to create a climate favourable for the efficient operation of enterprises, to ensure that enterprises are profitable and that they contribute to public coffers by way of corporate taxes. Judging by the record elsewhere,⁶⁶ nationalisation may not necessarily have beneficial effects on government revenue; indeed, it is likely that it could have a negative impact via adverse effects on efficiency, investor confidence and economic activity.

There are other good reasons why a post-apartheid government should proceed with caution in this sphere. First, in order to encourage economic growth and create jobs, it is essential that investment be maintained at a high level. Thus business confidence is crucial, and is easily lost if nationalisation features prominently in a political programme. It is especially important to retain the confidence of foreign investors; the experience of Zimbabwe is instructive, in that links severed during the time of UDI have not been resumed since independence. Many multinational corporations (MNCs) have already disinvested from South Africa and they will not consider returning unless they gauge the investment climate to be favourable. If business confidence is sacrificed on the altar of political rhetoric, the post-apartheid government would have great difficulty in maintaining political stability because of growing unemployment and poverty.

Secondly, the large conglomerates and MNCs have instituted considerable programmes of equal opportunity employment and social responsibility, investing funds in fields usually outside the scope of company activities, such as education, staff housing and community

projects. It could well be preferable for government to persuade such companies to step up these programmes rather than itself to take control.

Thirdly, government might find the existence of six large conglomerates, in which so much economic power is concentrated, to be convenient.⁶⁷ An alliance with them through, say, government representation on their boards, would enable the State to exercise enormous economic muscle in influencing capital accumulation and investment (over and above its macroeconomic policies). Moreover, taxes paid by efficient private sector conglomerates could well contribute more to government revenue than would profits under State ownership, which is bound to be less efficient, if the record in CPEs and Third World countries generally is anything to go by. For the post-apartheid State, there would seem to be more urgent priorities than to seek to secure the 'commanding heights'; participation in equity or on company boards, together with its macroeconomic policy instruments, would appear to provide government with sufficient power to influence investment decisions.

Finally, nationalisation could in fact operate against the weaker elements in society. It would, for example, have an adverse effect on the incomes of small investors and institutional investors such as pension funds, in which case, workers would be financially weakened.

From a redistribution point of view, workers might well gain more through having genuinely independent trade unions bargaining with the private sector than through State ownership. Another more beneficial system for workers would probably be through membership of producer cooperatives or participation in equity of companies. The cooperative movement, of course, is well entrenched in South Africa, especially in the field of agricultural marketing, and this is clearly a form of economic organisation which could play a larger role than it does today. Nonetheless, as alluded to earlier, the performance of cooperatives (at least at producer level) is patchy and they probably are less efficient than private firms. For workers, participation in company equity could be a more promising alternative. Several share-ownership schemes are already in operation in South Africa, and what is now known as the 'share economy' deserves further attention.

Land

In some countries which appear to have followed a redistribution-with-growth policy most successfully, substantial land reform played an important role. This was the case with both Taiwan and South Korea. The question of land ownership is an emotional issue in South Africa and will have to be addressed. Statistics on land use are poor, but it appears that about sixty percent of the country's total area is in the hands of private white owners. This state of affairs could be redressed in several ways without the

formation of State farms which, judging from their record in the CPEs, would be a serious error.

First, tax laws which encourage individuals to own several farms, and laws which restrict the breaking up of farms into smaller units, could be amended. Secondly, any farms offered for sale could be purchased by government at market prices and redistributed, or the government could in any case follow a programme (perhaps low-key) of land purchase. Thirdly, an element of compulsion could be applied, for example, white-owned farms where the owner is absent could be expropriated and redistributed, or the number of properties per individual owner could be restricted (in Yugoslavia it is three) and the land thus released could be distributed.

If redistribution is accompanied by falling levels of output, however, society will not gain. Agricultural output (especially food) must be maintained and expanded. This is an essential requirement for the future economic well-being of South Africa for reasons concerning the balance of payments. With shrinking ore reserves, gold mining cannot remain the prime earner of foreign exchange in the long-term. At the same time, demographers project that the population will grow to between 58-68 million by 2020, and any failure on the part of food supplies to feed these numbers would require imports. The combined effect on the balance of payments of declining gold exports and the necessity to import food would be severe, especially if manufacturing exports were not competitive on world markets. It is vital, therefore, that the land be farmed efficiently and productively, and that the experience of farms purchased for the homelands be avoided; hitherto productive land there has often deteriorated quickly.

The factors which together have made farming less financially attractive than it was thirty years ago would also require examination. Many white farmers today are not making profits, and incomes vary immensely depending on activity, market prices and climate. The climatic factor would have a significant bearing on land redistribution, the possibilities clearly being greater in intensive than in extensive farming areas. For example, the carrying capacity (in livestock units per hectare) of land in Gordonia is lower than in the Cape Midlands which, in turn, is lower than in the Natal Midlands. The potential for dividing farms in the more arid districts into smaller units clearly is less than in regions of higher rainfall.

Another important point is that the major demand by Blacks for land may well be in urban rather than rural areas, that is, for residential, not agricultural, purposes. The majority of Blacks will soon be urbanised and the proportion of households committed to serious, full-time, commercial farming could be lower than one might expect. Thus, the granting of freehold tenure in urban areas and the provision of normal mortgage bond financing would be key aspects of economic policy.

Rural policy, however, will have to play an extremely important role, not

only in ensuring continued food surpluses but in absorbing the labour force. Agriculture will remain a key sector, and a sound government policy would include the redirection of marketing, credit and other inputs, as well as extension services to small black farmers. The lack of these services at present constitutes a severe structural obstacle in the way of Blacks running their own farms successfully, and special financial institutions might have to be established to serve the small-scale farming and business sectors. The land tenure system in the present 'homeland' areas also constitutes a problem in the way of efficient commercial farming, and allocation should be changed to allow for the development of a market in land in these areas. On the periphery of the major metropolitan centres and larger towns, it might be possible to encourage the development of small private gardens (allotments or *kleinegarten*), as in Britain and West Germany; indeed, land near the airport in Durban has been made available to market gardeners.

Wage Policy

Continued economic growth would of itself reduce inter-racial income disparities since, as explained earlier, it would necessitate greater vertical mobility and hence higher income positions for Blacks. The skilled-unskilled wage gap, however, might be difficult to bridge. Skilled wages might well be artificially high because of the scarcity rent enjoyed by Whites as a result of past discrimination in employment and attainment of skills, but even in a post-apartheid economy, the question of international mobility for certain skills (especially in high technology fields) would remain.

On the unskilled market, supply greatly exceeds demand; this is not surprising, given the Third World demographic profile. Labour is the abundant factor in production, and labour intensive methods consequently are desirable. If the State sets minimum wages for unskilled labour above market-clearing levels, not only are firms encouraged to use capital intensive techniques, but international competitiveness might be reduced. If, however, unskilled wages are left only to market forces, they may well be below poverty levels. The role of minimum wage legislation would require careful consideration in the light of South Africa's position as a Third World-type economy; experience in such economies elsewhere has shown that high minimum wages lead to the creation of an elite of workers (usually urbanised) in paid employment, protected through unionisation from competition from the mass of outsiders (urban and rural unemployed) who would be prepared to sell their labour for lower wages but who are frozen out of the labour market.

It might be politically difficult for a post-apartheid government to resist worker demands for 'wage levelling', but the effects on the economy would have to be watched lest the negative factors operating in the CPEs manifest themselves.

Conclusion

The experience of the centrally planned economies appears to contain several important lessons for those engaged in the post-apartheid economy debate. One is that it is not a desirable model to emulate, for technical even if for no other reasons. Another is that to believe that State ownership of the means of production necessarily provides a better standard of living than does private ownership, is to believe in an illusion. Moreover, a highly planned, State-owned economy is difficult to reform once a ruling elite and bureaucracy are entrenched.

Given the movements towards reform in the centrally planned economies, it would be most inadvisable for a post-apartheid government to become preoccupied with issues such as nationalisation of enterprises and land. The government would inherit an economy which already has a considerable State sector by western standards — the public sector accounts for some forty percent of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) — and, together with the usual range of monetary, fiscal and other instruments available, this ensures an enormous degree of economic power in the hands of the State. How that power is used, then, is of crucial importance. The welfare goals of the new social contract which will be necessary in post-apartheid South Africa would be more effectively met if the State were to concern itself with black economic empowerment (to use a currently popular phrase), that is, to raise the share of the black majority in asset ownership and in managerial positions, as well as with guaranteeing equality of access in employment and social services. This can be achieved without throwing out the baby of private enterprise with the bathwater of apartheid; the market ought to be nurtured as the engine of growth in an efficient, mixed economy, which would prove a positive sum game for all income groups.

Notes

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- 1. This is well described by Kazimierz LASKI, *Marx-Sozialismus, Markt-Sozialismus und Wirtschaftsreformen des "real existierenden Sozialismus"*, 4 Forschungsberichte Nr.129, Vienna: Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies, 1987 (translated for this author by Ralph Clark).
- 2. Astrid VON BORCKE, *Gorbachev's Perestroika: Can the Soviet System be Reformed?*, BIOst Report No. 1-1988, Cologne: Federal Institute for East European and International Studies, 1988, p. 18.

3. *Ibid.*
4. Zdzislaw SADOWSKI, in a lecture on 'Polish Economic Reform: Problems and Prospects', Oxford University, 22 June 1988.
5. Laski, *op cit.*, p. 18.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.
8. See, *inter alia*, Janos KORNAL, *Economics of Shortage*, Amsterdam: North Holland Press, 1980.
9. Von Borcke, *op cit.*, p. 18.
10. Dwight H. PERKINS, 'Reforming China's Economic System', in *Journal of Economic Literature*, Vol. 26, No. 2, June 1988, p. 602, refers to the existence of allocative inefficiency and X-inefficiency 'on a grand scale' in China. 'X-inefficiency' refers to general managerial and technological inefficiency. When an input is not used effectively, the difference between the actual output and the maximum possible output attributable to that input is a measure of the degree of X-inefficiency.
11. Hartmut BECHTOLD and Andreas HELFER, 'Stagflation Problems in Socialist Economics', in Peter GEY, Jiri KOSTA & Wolfgang QUAISSER (eds), *Crisis and Reform in Socialist Economies*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1987, p. 29.
12. Peter GEY and Wolfgang QUAISSER, 'Planning System, Development Strategy and Economic Reform in Socialism', p. 10 (to be published in German in *Osteuropa Wirtschaft*, December 1988).
13. Jan WINIECKI, 'Are Soviet-type Economies Entering an Era of Long-term Decline?', in *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 3, July 1986, p. 345. NMP — net material product — is the measure in central planning equivalent to gross domestic product (GDP) in market economies.
14. Philip HANSON, 'Perestroika: Soviet Economic Policy under Gorbachev', paper presented at the Conference on Gorbachev and Perestroika, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, July 1988, pp. 1-3.
15. Abel AGANBEGYAN, *The Challenge: Economics of Perestroika*, London: Hutchinson, 1988, p. 96. Aganbegyan is the chief economic adviser to Mr Gorbachev.
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Dr C Nelson

The Initiation of UN Peacekeeping Forces: Problems and Reform Proposals

Abstract

In the wake of the unsuccessful efforts by the major powers at the end of the Second World War to reach agreement on the implementation of the collective security enforcement system embodied by the UN Charter, peacekeeping forces have been used on an *ad hoc* basis by the UN as an instrument for controlling several interstate and intrastate conflicts. Since the initiation of the first peacekeeping force in 1956, however, severe problems have been experienced in the initiation process. This article outlines the main problems experienced by the UN in creating peacekeeping forces. Particular attention is also given to those measures that can be employed by the UN and its member states to alleviate some of these problems.

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Organisation (UN) was established by the allied powers in 1945 with the primary aim of maintaining international peace and security, thus protecting future generations against the miseries and torment of war. Of all that institution's attempts at implementing this aim, its peacekeeping operations and peace observation missions have been the most prominent and important. Ironically, peacekeeping operations and truce missions were never visualised by the draftsmen of the UN's Charter as a means of managing international conflict. As a result, none of the Charter's 111 clauses makes specific provision for such an eventuality. At the most, only a few 'grey areas' exist, which can be interpreted in different ways.

The peace maintenance system designed by the Charter's architects, resulting directly from the lessons learnt during the time of the UN's

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predecessor, the League of Nations, was the collective security enforcement system. To give stature to this system, the Charter made provision for a Security Council which would not only be responsible primarily for the maintenance of international peace and security but would also be vested with the necessary enforcement authorisation to perform its imposed responsibility properly.¹

The Charter also stipulated that countries involved in conflict should apply all possible methods for its peaceful resolution. Only when such attempts did not succeed would the Security Council have the power to take the necessary steps, including the use of force, to re-establish the peace or to combat aggression.²

The practical implication of these stipulations was, therefore, that a permanent UN force or a UN standby force would have to be established under the control of the Security Council, in which the major powers would have a veto power. This veto was regarded as an essential element of the collective security system because none of the major powers would participate in enforcement actions if such actions should damage their interests. Furthermore, the Charter stipulated that a Military Staff Committee, consisting of representatives of the Security Council's five permanent members, would be responsible for the strategic management of this force.³

Within months after the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee began implementing the collective security system, it became clear that as planned the system could not be implemented owing to disagreement between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. It also became clear that the decolonisation process would create power vacuums in areas with a high potential for conflict. If these vacuums were filled by the competing superpowers, it would have an extremely bad effect on international peace and security. It was against this background that the UN was obliged to develop peacekeeping forces as 'a stopgap effort to manage international conflicts'.⁴

The first peacekeeping force established by the UN was the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) during the Suez crisis of 1956, which was withdrawn during May 1967. Over the years, another six forces were established to control international and intranational conflict. The *Organisation des Unies au Congo* (ONUC) was deployed in the Republic of the Congo (now Zaire) from July 1960 to June 1964. The United Nations Security Force (UNSF) operated in Western Irian (Timor), Indonesia, from September 1962 to April 1963, while the second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) functioned in the Sinai Peninsula from October 1973 to July 1979. Three forces still function: the United Nations Peacekeeping Force In Cyprus (UNFICYP), founded in March 1964; the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), which has been in the Golan

Heights since May 1974; and the United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL), founded in March 1978.⁵

On 29 September 1978, the establishment of an eighth peacekeeping force, to be deployed in the South West Africa/Namibia area, the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), was approved by the Security Council under Resolution 435.⁶ Owing to certain obstacles, however, the Resolution's provisions are only now being phased in.

Although the UN succeeded in elevating peacekeeping actions to an important instrument for the management of international conflict, its performance was hampered by several problems, of which the most important, specifically those regarding the formation of UN peacekeeping forces, will be briefly discussed. Measures to overcome them will also be considered.

PROBLEMS REGARDING THE INITIATION OF UN FORCES

Constitutional and Legal Problems

A factor hampering the formation of UN peacekeeping forces since the Fifties is that such operations, as already noted, are not expressly mentioned or provided for in the Charter. The problem is aggravated because several of the Charter's clauses can be interpreted as actually providing for such actions. The well-known jurist, Bowett,⁷ for example, came to the conclusion in his legal analysis of UN peacekeeping forces that there were several clauses which the Security Council or General Assembly could use to initiate such forces. The International Peace Academy also identified a number of clauses which could provide the necessary constitutional and legal basis for UN peacekeeping forces.⁸ Some jurists even went so far as to see a legal basis for UN peacekeeping forces in the Uniting for Peace Resolution, the inherent or implied powers of the Charter, and the approval of countries.⁹

The UN itself is markedly evasive regarding the matter because no one enabling resolution mentions the specific clause(s) establishing its legality — with one exception — a publication of the Office of the Secretary General in 1985. This mentioned that UN peacekeeping forces were formed under Section 40 of the Charter.¹⁰

Perceptual Problems

The absence of explicit stipulations in the Charter concerning UN peacekeeping forces not only gave rise to awkward constitutional and legal questions but was also responsible for the divergent opinions of the Security Council's members, especially the two superpowers, on their formation. During the early years, American opinion was characterised by an emphasis on the decision-making power of the General Assembly, although the USA

admitted that the Security Council was primarily responsible for maintaining international peace and security, but did not consider it an exclusive power. In contrast, the Soviet Union held exactly the opposite view.¹¹

During the Seventies, the superpowers came to sufficient agreement to enable the creation of three peacekeeping forces.¹² The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, and the subsequent deterioration of relations between the superpowers, eliminated the possibility of formal consensus. At present, it appears as if the normalisation of relations between the USSR and the USA, and particularly the new policy initiatives of the Soviet leaders, could result in a new consensus on peacekeeping. A peace observation mission has already been installed in the Persian Gulf to monitor the ceasefire between Iraq and Iran, while UNTAG will soon be deployed in Namibia.

Financial Problems

The lack of unanimity among UN member states concerning financing is probably the most important limitation of the UN's ability to create peacekeeping forces — a problem that had arisen with the first peacekeeping forces, UNEF I and ONUC. This problem grew to such dimensions in the early Sixties that a constitutional and political crisis developed. Apart from the General Assembly functioning without proceeding to the vote for an entire session, the crisis nearly resulted in the UN's collapse as an institution.¹³

Although the superpowers succeeded in averting the crisis, it was never completely smoothed over. Its latent nature is evident in the approximately seventy percent of the UN's total budget deficit due to amounts still outstanding in connection with earlier peacekeeping operations.¹⁴ The accumulated deficits on UNFICYP's and UNIFIL's Special Accounts amounted to US\$145 and \$270 million respectively at the beginning of 1987.¹⁵

Systemic Problems

Even if the UN could manage to smooth over the perceptual, financial, constitutional and legal problems, it could not guarantee that it would succeed in developing peacekeeping into a readily available instrument of managing conflict. Conditions present in the international system would inhibit such a development. The following can be considered the most important systemic obstacles:

- a. the creation of spheres of influence by some major powers and regional institutions¹⁶
- b. the internal nature of contemporary conflict¹⁷

- c. fear of the internationalisation of conflict in which the UN becomes involved¹⁸
- d. the prominence given by Third World countries to non-security questions in the UN¹⁹
- e. opposition from the major powers against too strong a role by the UN in the management of international conflict²⁰
- f. initiation of peacekeeping forces outside the UN framework²¹
- g. a general prejudice against international institutions²²
- h. the limiting influence of national sovereignty²³

REFORM MEASURES

Taking into account the many problems that hamper the smooth initiation of UN peacekeeping forces, the question arises as to which measures should be applied to eliminate these problems. The solution could lie in various steps which would not only contribute to the complete or partial elimination of the problems, but at the same time would assist the UN to perform the tasks envisaged by its founders. In the following section, attention will be given first to idealistic but impractical solutions; secondly, to informal changes to existing UN structures and procedures; and lastly, to specific action which can be taken by the UN *per se*, in addition to those by individual member countries.

IDEAL MEASURES

A. Implementing the Statutory Collective Peace Enforcement System

A measure ideally suited to the elimination of the problems associated with a peacekeeping force would be the implementation of the collective peace enforcement system, as contained in Chapter VII of the Charter. In this happy event, it would not only be possible to establish peacekeeping forces in terms of its clauses, it would also involve considerably fewer problems than has been the case to date.

The important question, however, is: can the collective peace enforcement system, as it is set out in the UN's Charter, be implemented? The immediate reply would be that the chances are remote. The mere fact that it has not been implemented by the Security Council after more than forty years is proof of this.

The inability to implement the UN's collective peace enforcement system in the contemporary era can be best illustrated by testing the system against the series of logical and theoretical requirements for a successful collective security system developed by Claude.²⁴ These requirements are:

- a. the existence of a universally acceptable definition of aggression

- b. the existence of an institution that can make authoritative decisions concerning disputes and identify aggressors
- c. a commitment to the maintenance of peace by states, even so far as to be prepared to neglect their own short-term interests so as to act against countries causing international conflict
- d. a willingness by member states to give up their right to the violent change of the *status quo* and to oppose violently those countries not showing such willingness
- e. the existence of an international system in which power is distributed evenly so that one or two powerful units cannot dominate the system.

When applied to the UN's collective peace enforcement system, it seems that not one of these theoretical requirements is met.

- 1) There is no existing definition of aggression in the UN which is accepted by all member states.
- 2) There is no over-arching institution in the contemporary international system with the competence or the ability to determine which country has to be acted against in a collective manner.
- 3) The political leaders of most of the member countries are only prepared to render lip-service to the maintenance of international peace and security.
- 4) The *status quo* is considered untenable by several of the UN's members, with the result that they are committed to its radical transformation.
- 5) The predominance of the USA and the Soviet Union since the Second World War has rendered them immune to intimidation from the UN, even if made in the name of collective security.²⁵

It is clear, therefore, that although a collective peace enforcement system would be an ideal solution to the problems of UN peacekeeping forces, it has little likelihood of broad support.

B. Statutory Provisions for Peacekeeping Operations

One of the biggest problems concerning the initiation of UN peacekeeping forces, as already mentioned, is that the Charter does not expressly provide for it. Claude rightly states that the Charter 'speaks much more decisively about the use of force by states than the use of force by the UN'.²⁶ The obvious solution to this problem, therefore, involves the amendment of the Charter to provide unambiguously for a peacekeeping force. The need to make such statutory provision becomes evident from the remark that peacekeeping action by the UN is approved in terms of 'Chapter six and a half' — obviously referring to action situated somewhere between the mediating procedures of Chapter VI and the collective peace enforcement measures of Chapter VII.²⁷

C. Replacing the Collective Peace Enforcement System with a Peacekeeping System

Another measure that could be applied to the elimination of peacekeeping problems would be to replace the outdated and impossible-to-implement collective peace enforcement system of Chapter VII of the Charter with a chapter specifically providing for peacekeeping actions. Such an amendment would have the dual advantage both of eliminating the major problems and of placing the Charter in tune with the political realities of today.

D. Establishment of a Permanent International Peacekeeping Force

A further alternative would be to amend the Charter to provide for a permanent international peacekeeping force, with the added advantage of eliminating some of the problems inherent in the establishment of an *ad hoc* force.

The idea of establishing a permanent peacekeeping force is not new. Suggestions have varied from a modest force of 1 000 men to an extensive force of 1 200 000 men.²⁸ A proposal for a permanent international peacekeeping force which has become especially famous because of its detailed nature, was made by Bowett in the early Sixties.²⁹ According to him, the peacekeeping forces in existence at that time were not appropriate to the status of the UN because 'each and every one of these military operations represented an exercise in improvisation',³⁰ and as such, unacceptable for an institution consisting of the majority of the states of the international community; moreover, loaded with the maintenance of international peace and security. Bowett also stated that although none of the UN's member states would be prepared to look after their *own* security in such a haphazard way, they still allowed the UN to perform its security task in that manner.³¹ After outlining the problems, he went on to say that 'none of these problems can be properly solved except by establishing a permanent United Nations Military Force' of at least 10 000 men,³² to be created by the Security Council, or the General Assembly, in case of deadlock in the Security Council. This was not intended to happen overnight but gradually over a whole decade. The main task of the force would be to perform peacekeeping operations. It could also be applied for peace enforcement purposes. In such cases, the Security Council would make the necessary decision and the force would be enlarged accordingly and issued with the necessary munitions.³³

E. Revision of the UN's Membership System

Another means of solving, or limiting, problems regarding the initiation of the UN's peacekeeping forces is the revision of the institution's membership system. The existing system by which states obtain membership of the UN is seen by some as frustrating, as it generates

more problems than it is capable of solving. Luard³⁴ as well as Kaufman,³⁵ for example, point out that the massive admittance of small and micro-states to the UN is not only undemocratic but also creates a situation where three micro-states — the Maldivé Islands, Malta and Madagascar — can force their will on the superpowers, and where the combined African states have more than forty times the voting power of the USA. The admittance of small and micro-states as fully fledged members of the UN has also resulted in the development of an enormous gap between voting power and financial responsibility. Plischke points out that, although the UN's small member states' contribution to the budget is only 1,68 percent, they nevertheless have a comfortable voting majority in the institution.³⁶

Revision of the UN's membership system, therefore, is of great importance if the institution wishes to improve its efficiency in general, specifically in relation to peacekeeping. The following amendments would put the membership system on a more rational basis:

- a. The limiting of membership to those states with a minimum population or with sufficient economic resources at their disposal.³⁷
- b. The establishment of an associated membership system for small and micro-states. Associated membership would have the advantage of allowing such states to enjoy the benefits of UN membership without being burdened by the financial responsibility.³⁸
- c. The awarding of observer status to small and micro-states.
- d. The reconstitution of the Security Council so that it would be more representative. This can be done by making the Council representative of the leading states or by creating a new category of semi-permanent members to serve on a rotation basis.³⁹
- e. Putting into operation a system of weighted votes.⁴⁰

F. Can the UN's Charter be amended?

Taking into account that most of the measures mentioned above presuppose the amendment of the UN's Charter, it becomes important to establish whether the Charter *can* be amended and, if so, what the procedure would be. It can be argued that it is possible to amend or revise the Charter; indeed, its draftsmen made sufficient provision for that. Section 109(3), for example, states clearly that it should be revised after ten years.⁴¹

Following on this provision, the General Assembly in 1955 established a committee, consisting of representatives of all member states, to decide on a suitable date for a general revision conference. No agreement could be reached but the General Assembly nevertheless decided that a committee would continue to exist and that any member state could ask the Secretary General at any time to convene such a conference.⁴²

Under the stipulations of Sections 108 and 109, amendments to the Charter can only be made if such a proposal is accepted by two-thirds of the

General Assembly's members and then ratified by two-thirds of the UN's member states, including the permanent members of the Security Council.⁴³ This therefore implies that amendment or revision is subject to the permanent members' right to veto.

Therefore, although it is technically possible to amend the Charter, it is doubtful whether the required two-thirds majority or agreement by the permanent members can be obtained in the present polarised and nationalistic system.⁴⁴ The Soviet Union has already implied its opposition to any revision of the Charter or even the convening of a revision conference.⁴⁵ The extent to which the Soviet Union would be prepared to change its point of view in the spirit of *perestroika* is not clear, but the Third World states would certainly not endanger their dominant position in the UN by amending the Charter. The United Nations Association of the USA is of the opinion that if the Charter were to be amended, despite the attitudes of certain states, as mentioned above, the result would be a weaker, not a stronger, United Nations.⁴⁶

REFORM MEASURES REGARDING EXISTING STRUCTURES AND PROCEDURES

Positive results could be achieved by introducing, on an informal basis, structural and procedural reforms with regard to the Secretariat, the General Assembly and the Security Council — a possibility for which there is already adequate precedent. For example, the regulation stipulating that if one of the permanent members abstains from voting, it would not be regarded as a veto vote, was accepted in the Security Council without formally amending the Charter. Other examples are the new developments with regard to the economic function of the UN and the many new committees established as subordinate bodies by the General Assembly.⁴⁷

When reflecting on informal structural and procedural reforms in connection with the UN's principal bodies, it is important to remember that such reforms could only be successfully implemented if both acceptable and to the benefit of member states, in particular to the superpowers. Any attempt by the present majority to resort to the tactics used by the western nations in the early years of the UN to carry through important changes merely on a majority of votes would inevitably be counterproductive. Member states will have to realise that adaption or reform with regard to the structures and procedures of the principal bodies will have to be strictly by means of negotiation and consensus. Luard expressed his views in his comment: 'It is by negotiation and persuasion that progress will be made, not by empty voting victories.'⁴⁸

A brief exposition follows of the structural and procedural reforms which can be made with regard to the General Assembly, the Secretariat and the Security Council to facilitate the initiation of peacekeeping operations. It

should be stressed, however, that some of the reforms that will be mentioned do not have a direct bearing on the peacekeeping practices but on an improvement in function of the major organs of the UN generally. This approach is not inappropriate since such improvement would also benefit the peacekeeping role.

A. The General Assembly

It should be remembered that the General Assembly's function is primarily that of a forum for international debate and discussion.⁴⁹ Although the Assembly, under the provisions of the Uniting for Peace Resolution, in 1950 appropriated the power to become directly involved with international security issues under certain circumstances and has done so in several cases, it is doubtful whether the permanent members, now or in the future, would allow the General Assembly to fulfil once again such a prominent function.

Bearing in mind, therefore, that the General Assembly's function in connection with international peace and security measures is largely restricted to discussions and recommendations, the question could be asked whether structural and procedural reforms would make any positive contribution whatsoever to the problems surrounding the initiation of peacekeeping operations. The answer would be that the General Assembly could create a beneficial political climate to enable the Security Council to initiate joint security action⁵⁰ because it is instrumental in codifying international standards of behaviour, can focus the international community's attention on peace and security issues, controls the funds allocated to peacekeeping operations, and can articulate the moral consensus of the majority of the member states. Key reforms would affect debating procedures and rationalisation of the committee and meeting system.

B. The Secretariat

When the UN's Charter was drawn up, most of the founder members accepted that the Secretary General's function should not be limited to that of a high-level administrative functionary only, but that he/she should be allowed to exercise wide discretion.⁵¹ As a direct consequence, Article 99 was passed, in terms of which the Secretary General was empowered to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which, in his or her opinion, might constitute a threat to international peace and security.⁵² Closely related to this right, the Secretary General also has, in terms of Article 98, the duty to carry out those instructions given to him/her by the principal organs.⁵³

Furthermore, Article 98 obliges the Secretary General to present to the General Assembly an annual report on the activities of the UN. Over the years, this report has evolved from a factual overview of the organisation's activities to the Secretary General's *own* evaluation of the preceding year's activities and the state of the international system, as well as the steps the

organisation and its members should take in order to realise effectively the UN's objectives. With these wide discretionary powers in addition to his/her administrative functions,⁵⁴ for the Secretary General to perform this new role, it is of vital importance that the Secretariat be provided with an effective information-gathering system.⁵⁵

C. The Security Council

As the Security Council, over the past four decades, has not succeeded in establishing itself as the 'ultimate arbiter and enforcer of the peace', the question arises as to what reforms should be instituted to enhance the Council's abilities to maintain peace and security in general, and international peacekeeping in particular. The following measures could make a positive contribution:

- a. renewal of the procedures relating to the handling of conflicts;
- b. upgrading of the membership by implementing Article 23(1); and
- c. convening of more private sessions to facilitate consultation and consensus.

Special Action by the UN and Individual Member States

In addition to the structural and procedural changes that can be introduced regarding the Secretariat, the General Assembly and the Security Council, the problems concerning the initiation of peacekeeping forces could be countered to some degree by special action on the part of the UN itself, as well as the member states. A summary of possible steps follows.

A. Action by the Principal Organs of the UN

- a. Adoption, by the Security Council and the General Assembly, of resolutions in terms of which appeals are made to all member states to train and maintain special forces for collective peacekeeping purposes.⁵⁶
- b. Acceptance, by the Security Council, of the practice in terms of which peacekeeping forces should be initiated before conflicts erupt and not afterwards.⁵⁷
- c. Acceptance, by the Security Council, of the principle that peacekeeping forces should only be established for a fixed period.⁵⁸
- d. Implementation, by the General Assembly, of Article 19 in respect of those member states who fail to settle their peacekeeping assessments.
- e. Convening, by the Security Council, of sessions outside the UN headquarters when considering measures for handling international conflict.
- f. A request, by the Security Council, to the International Court of Justice, to pronounce on the legality of *ad hoc* peacekeeping forces.

- g. Delivery, by the Secretary-General, to a session of the Security Council of an annual 'state of the international community' message, attended by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of member states.⁵⁹
- h. Drafting, by the Security Council or General Assembly, of a set of guidelines concerning the initiation of peacekeeping missions.⁶⁰
- i. Proclamation, by the General Assembly, of peacekeeping as a UN activity in a specific year.⁶¹

B. Special Action by Member States

Before identifying specific steps to be taken by member states, it is necessary to point out that cooperation between them, especially between the superpowers, is of the utmost importance.⁶² In view of this, most of the proposals put forward below will point out steps that these powers can take to bring about a greater degree of mutual cooperation.

- a. Consultation, by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the superpowers, before the annual session of the General Assembly, in an effort to find common ground on security issues.⁶³
- b. The attendance of the superpower Foreign Ministers as delegates to the Security Council at least once a year to hold multilateral talks on security issues.⁶⁴
- c. Attendance, by the heads of state of the big powers, of the opening of each General Assembly to clarify their positions on issues affecting peace and security.⁶⁵
- d. A formal declaration, by the superpowers, of their mutual commitment to strengthening the UN's efforts in the area of peace and security.⁶⁶
- e. Earmarking, by the permanent members, of *matériel* and personnel for UN peacekeeping purposes.⁶⁷

Steps that can be taken by the remaining members of the UN to eliminate some or all of the problems concerning the initiation of peacekeeping forces and missions, comprise the following:

- a. deliberate restraint to avoid abusing the open forums of the principal organs for propaganda purposes
- b. scrupulous fulfillment of financial obligations
- c. acceptance of the authority and responsibility of the Security Council concerning the maintenance of international peace and security
- d. provision to the UN of the *matériel* and personnel needed for peacekeeping operations
- e. recognition of the Secretary General as the most eligible coordinator of all efforts by the UN to handle international conflicts⁶⁸
- f. establishment of a Peace Fund, financed by voluntary contributions, so

that countries providing troops can be fully reimbursed for expenses incurred.⁶⁹

Concluding Remarks

Today it is generally accepted that as an instrument for managing international and intranational conflicts, UN peacekeeping has no equal. Besides the collective security enforcement system, which was never implemented, no other method exists at present in terms of which the international community can prevent the uncontrolled escalation of conflict. Indeed, the likelihood that the international community will come up with a workable alternative is extremely remote. For this very reason, it is of the utmost importance that those lesser factors which impede the initiation of UN peacekeeping operations be eliminated without delay. The proposals outlined in this paper could form the basis for an effective peacekeeping system.

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Orlando E Pacheco

Fundamental Character and Origins of South Africa's Defence Posture: Towards an Understanding of the Military-Political Mind

Our military posture primarily is defensive and not offensive and we have no intention of engaging in an arms race with any other state or states. We are, however, fully aware of the fact that passive defence alone is inadequate and we are therefore obliged to maintain a significant retaliatory and interdictory capability.¹

On the 20th of February 1988, eight Mirage F1s and five Impala aircraft struck separate SWAPO targets in Angola, including Ongiva, to avenge the previous day's bomb blast in the Oshakati (South West Africa/Namibia) branch of the First National Bank, which left, initially, eighteen people dead and thirty-one injured.² SWAPO denied it had been responsible for planting the twenty-five kilogram bomb. 'It was from here [Ongiva] that SWAPO had recently launched a number of attacks on the civilian population of SWA/Namibia.'³ Prior to this, South African retaliatory capabilities had been demonstrated in commando raids on the morning of Monday 19 May 1986 in the capital cities of Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zambia. They were allegedly in response to the refuge these countries provided to the African National Congress (ANC). In this instance, the attacks were a combined effort of helicopter-borne commandos and strike aircraft.

International reaction was swift, with condemnation from all quarters. Larry Speakes, the White House spokesman, spoke of the US 'sense of outrage', while British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, spoke in Parliament to deplore the South African attacks. Shridath Ramphal, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, asked, 'what more do Western governments need to disengage from South Africa and ostracise it from human society in both economic and political terms?'⁴

A few years earlier, the Commissioner of the South African Police, General P.J. Coetzee, had said that

any discussion of counter-measures against urban terrorism inevitably draws us into the international political arena, because, using South Africa's domestic policies as the excuse, the

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principle of territorial sovereignty and the related duty of neighbouring countries not to harbour terrorists, as well as the right of sovereign countries to carry out their domestic legal processes without interference, are thrown overboard by the international community when it comes to South Africa.⁵

It should be noted that the South African security forces, particularly the police, have studied the experiences in such counterinsurgency situations as Kenya, Malaya, Northern Ireland and Namibia, which have spotlighted the need for the distinction between police protection from ordinary criminal elements and the use of specialised and quasi-military units against insurrectionist forces.

In June 1983, the Chief of the South African Defence Force (SADF), General C.L. Viljoen, announced that:

Cross-border operations constitute legitimate hot-pursuit or pre-emptive strikes against the bases, training centres, logistic infrastructure and leadership groups of the terrorist movements dedicated to the violent overthrow of the SWA Administration and the SA Government. As has been stated repeatedly, our retribution is directed against those who have caused, or are about to cause, loss of life among our own population.⁶

In the same month, General Viljoen stated that

The government and the SADF would be guilty of a gross neglect if they surrendered the initiative to the terrorists and allowed them to expand their ranks, arm and attack at will ... If neighbouring countries ceased to supply, support and harbour our enemies, there would be no need for any offensive action by the RSA.⁷

Although not generally understood, and as described by Major-General Geldenhuys, a cross-border operation 'is much easier, much more cost-effective in terms of rands and cents as well as in terms of lives to destroy terrorists at their bases instead of allowing them to infiltrate and then trying to catch them'.⁸

From a diplomatic perspective, the raids had been conducted with the most inauspicious timing, as the Commonwealth's Eminent Persons Group (EPG) was in South Africa on the morning of the attacks. This was their third visit, in an effort to facilitate negotiations between the South African government and the ANC.

The degree to which international outrage was registered against Pretoria's disregard for diplomatic prudence in itself reveals a fundamental misconception among western analysts regarding South African comportment and *rationale*. This stance has been the subject of considerable interest on the part of western observers, who have debated South Africa's 'destabilisation' of the so-called Frontline States, as well as the rising preeminence of the South African military-industrial establishment.⁹ It is the express purpose of this paper to examine the fundamental character and origins of the South African defence posture and to provide some clarity on

its divergence from normative western perspectives and conduct. The paper's purpose is *not* to produce an apologia for the perspective of the South African military-industrial complex (although it may appear as such), but rather to avoid, in part, simplistic characterisations that tend to cloud one's understanding of the actual motivational and strategic factors surrounding the SADF's military initiatives. To this end, I would first attempt to pursue, as far as it is possible, a dispassionate analysis of the subject at hand; and, secondly, to move from the more emotive conclusions regarding the SADF towards an understanding of its professional ethos as seen through its fundamental strategic thought. The paper will therefore provide a corporate or cultural relativist view of the South African military in reaction to a shrinking inter-regional defence perimeter; its mode of what it perceives as preemptive- and counter-action, which is ordinarily labelled as 'destabilisation'; and its nonobservance/violation of international borders as barriers to strategic priorities (i.e. military incursions), most notably into Angola. This last item takes note of the American experience in Vietnam. From this platform, the sections on Basil H. Liddell Hart and André Beaufre attempt to crystallise the metamorphosis of strategy spanning a number of years. This strategic disposition therefore emerges not merely as a intellectual exercise but as what is seen as an eclectic synthesis of strategy geared to victory in a 'Low Intensity Conflict'; 'victory' being here defined more in terms of guaranteeing a measure of time and structure for the evolution of national policy rather than in the outright eradication of the opposition. General Coetzee describes it as follows: 'Our job in the security forces is to ensure that these processes continue, impeded to the minimum by violence, subversion and intimidation.'¹⁰

In the remaining sections, I will emphasise the heavy commitment to organisational and operational initiatives and their incorporation with formulated and adjustable strategy.

Partial Backdrop

With the fall of the Caetano regime in Portugal's 25 April 1974 *coup d'état*, both ally and buffer quickly evaporated for South Africa. Independence subsequently came to both Mozambique and Angola (25 June and 11 November 1975, respectively), and with it, two black states emerged, vindicating both the Mogadishu Declaration, adopted by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1971, which called for the intensification of the armed struggle, and the Accra Strategy of 1973, which focused on the liberation of the Portuguese colonies.¹¹ Further OAU strategy called 'for the advance of the freedom march further south with particular emphasis on the liberation of Zimbabwe and Namibia'.¹² At the time, South Africa was engaged in Prime Minister Vorster's *détente* initiative, which proved dramatic although ephemeral in South Africa's attempt to extend its

diplomatic ties with the rest of Africa. It was a time when discernible cleavages both in perspective and organisation existed between the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information, and the SADF — most particularly, the Army. The end of *détente* was primarily due to the collapse of the joint South African-Zambian settlement initiative for Rhodesia, and South Africa's intervention in the Angolan war in 1975-76.¹³

With these developments on its borders, a diplomatic downturn, and an increasing degree of isolation, South Africa embarked on a programme of unprecedented defence appropriations to address manpower, material and military technological needs, i.e. weapons development. Conscription and organisational initiatives were introduced. There was little doubt that South Africa was contending with a dramatic escalation of conflict both at home and across its borders. At this juncture, a distinctly military perspective and interpretation of the prevailing circumstances began to manifest itself in a most tangible way. This military ascendancy (which for all practical purposes can be viewed as the ascendancy of militarism as a whole) was underpinned by considerable theoretical premises. These would support the gradual foundation of, first, a 'total strategy', as pronounced in Cape Town in March 1975 by the then Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha, and then the well-known 'Total National Strategy', as described in the White Paper on Defence 1977.

As evinced in the body of White Papers on Defence, beginning with the one issued in 1973, there is a growing emphasis on organisational innovation and integration against a defined enemy. The effort would be managed and coordinated through a military perspective predicated on the works of military theorists to achieve the ends of both survival and confident projection of power, in keeping with the tenets of an integrated military strategy.

Before discussing this item, for the purpose of clarity, it would be instructive to distinguish between two perspectives when analysing behaviour, most conspicuously, in South Africa's cross-border policy.

Destabilisation and/or Military Pragmatism

Davies and O'Meara have reviewed opinions concerning South African regional policy and have categorised them as follows:

The first and most prevalent approach reduced the totality of South African regional policy to 'destabilisation'. This view tended to speak of a 'destabilisation strategy' ... The entire South African regional policy effort becomes collapsed into an attempt by Pretoria to inflict maximum material damage on the economies and social structures of regional states — a prelude to undermining their political systems and/or overthrowing their governments. A second and sometimes linked approach ... discusses Pretoria's regional policy in terms of the conflicts between the allegedly 'hawkish' military establishment on the one hand, and the allegedly more subtle 'diplomatic' tactics favoured by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹⁴

To see 'destabilisation' as the specific and singular strategy of the South African government is to deduce from its political effronteries and military incursions what under 'normal' circumstances would be proof positive of a reckless unleashing of armed might. Although seemingly plausible, it is nevertheless specious and more the product of current displeasure with Pretoria rather than the fruit of analysis incorporating military thought. The military-industrial complex of South Africa is thus viewed in the role of the brute with no brains. The proponents of destabilisation theory are apparently unaware that there exists no such theory in the annals of integrated strategic thought. This analysis prevails despite the fact that the ascendancy of the South African military is universally acknowledged. This ascendancy has brought in tow a highly seasoned professionalism and increasing sophistication which officers in other nations have readily recognised. Thus, military men are more inclined, by the nature of their training in the art of war and by temperament, to perceive the professionalism and strategic intents of their South African counterparts than men in other professions. Military men examine doctrine and the mechanics of military preparedness, while nonmilitary analysts are often more inclined to weigh nonmilitary factors and motivations. This dichotomy continues, by and large. Moreover, and in the specific context of rural insurgency and counter-measures, Major-General Geldenhuys stated that:

I find that scholars normally fail to grasp not the complexities of the subject, but the basic truths, i.e., the essence of what terrorism is all about ... Military-minded scholars, especially, are inclined to fail to grasp some of the basic elements of what terrorism is about.¹⁵

If indeed there is the acknowledgement of a demonstrable shift towards military leadership and perspective in the South African situation, it would appear reasonable for analysts to begin to think in military fashion to understand best the propellant of South African policies. Therefore, due caution is advised in separating too sharply the political-military perspective *interest of the South African leadership. This is once again a common tendency in analysing civil-military structures, especially in the West.*

Where one side has no coherent strategy, the opponent which does will prevail. As a threat mounts both internationally and on one's immediate borders, it is natural to turn to the pools of strategic expertise available. The military's business is largely exercising the mechanics and executing the directives of strategic thought.

Speaking of the State Security Council's secretariat, Simon Jenkins mentions that the high-calibre graduate officers are regarded as having a *comprehensive understanding of economic, social, military and foreign affairs superior to their counterparts in the civil service.* He writes:

These men are by no means hawks, though they are Afrikaans-speaking, the Afrikaner Broederbond has little influence over them. They are *military pragmatists*, guided by the central principle of Afrikaner survival: that no concession should be made to an enemy until absolutely necessary.¹⁶

Looking at the politico-military considerations of the SADF with regard to its border situation:

In the first instance, the departmental strategic policy of the Defence Force is aimed at preventing crises rather than seeking solutions after matters have come to a head. Prevention includes the deterrent element, preparedness, and presence in the threatened sphere.¹⁷

Thus, the enemy originating from beyond its borders will be pursued. As former Chief of the Defence Force, General Constand Viljoen, put it, with specific reference to nations aiding the ANC, it would mean 'hot pursuit and pre-emptive strikes against bases, training centres, logistics and leadership cadres of the terrorist movements'.¹⁸ Put succinctly, South African military policy would not stop at the border.

US Air Force General, T.R. Milton, is well-known among SADF officers, and his insights in the context of Southeast Asia have been well absorbed. He writes that in Southeast Asia

we were concentrating on a place called South Vietnam, and there were maps to prove its borders existed. In real life the borders did not exist and Ho Chi Minh ... knew it. He, unlike our intellectuals, did have a strategy, one designed to ... consolidate all of Indo-China — Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos — under Hanoi's rule. He must have had trouble believing his luck when we declared North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia out of bounds.¹⁹

The inferences for Southern Africa are all too obvious, as South Africa has made the decision to take the war north, if necessary. Another American wrote:

North Vietnam was the real opponent ... the army got caught up in ... search-and-destroy operations which cost the lives of many American soldiers ... and did not deal with the source of Communist strength ... The Communists controlled the tempo of the fighting.²⁰

The delimitation of strategic analysis therefore identifies an unconventional and moral opponent (in the sense that one recognises that an opponent's strategy is based on a different morality) who must be challenged in like manner. An attendant feature of this posture will be the violation of the conventional observance of territorial integrity. An enemy will be pursued regardless of international reaction. This proves perfectly logical if international opinion is seen as part of the problem and an element that militates against Afrikaner survival.

In conversations with SADF personnel, both high and low, it became

clear that in dealing with international issues where one's national interests are at stake, it is seen as legitimate to adopt a Machiavellian attitude, a common practice of interstate relations. This would allow for subterfuge and reneging, if necessary. This practice would be tempered by certain ethical norms derived from the moral foundations of the nation.

It is interesting to note that on 17 November 1987, Angola's Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Franca dos Santos, told the Mozambique News Agency that the Angolan army was preparing for heavy battles with SADF elements in the coming weeks.²¹ In fact, members of the 4th South African Infantry had already made contact with FAPLA infantry and at least two companies of T-55 tanks. This engagement occurred on 9 November, the day on which the SADF first acknowledged direct involvement in the Angolan civil war. In this instance, both sides had decided to employ a bit of information management.²²

Basil H. Liddell Hart and Grand Strategy

There has been little or no reference to the actual military seed from which South Africa's strategic formulation — the so-termed Total National Strategy — germinated. Though particular and appropriate acknowledgement has been made of the theoretical works of General André Beaufre (to be discussed below), Captain (Sir) Basil H. Liddell Hart is the original military theorist whose many works were absorbed by the SADF officer corps. His writings, which were widely read after World War II, became part of the officers' intellectual and strategic syllabus prior to the formulation and consolidation of total national strategy. Liddell Hart was a contemporary and personal friend of J.F.C. Fuller, who pioneered mechanised warfare. Though Liddell Hart's professional and academic interests had dealt initially with the training and tactics of the infantry, by the early 1920s, essentially through Fuller's compelling arguments, he had become a strong advocate of mechanisation as related to firepower and manoeuvre.

The extent of his interest included the examination of successful military minds throughout history, in an effort to discern consistent patterns of strategies. Though a eulogiser of the British officer corps during World War I, in the postwar era, he had experienced 'increasing disenchantment with the conduct of the First World War and a hardening conviction that the chief cause of the futile holocaust had been adherence to a false military doctrine'.²³ It must be remembered that the manpower-squandering nature of trench warfare had been but one of the results of attempts to fulfil universally accepted Clausewitzian²⁴ principles on war — the foremost being direct destruction of the enemy's armed forces.

In the later 1920s, Liddell Hart interwove the results of his historical studies with lessons derived from the misconduct of the First World War to

form his theory of the *strategy of the indirect approach*.²⁵ In contemporary parlance, it is known as *indirect strategy*. Further exposition of this approach came in *Great Captain Unveiled* (1927), his biography of the American Civil War General, W.T. Sherman, as well as in *The Decisive Wars of History* (1929), to name but two of his works, as the indirect approach or strategy would prove a ubiquitous theme. The indirect approach can be defined as 'any grand strategy that emphasizes political, economic, social, and psychological pressures instead of force; any military strategy that seeks to throw the enemy off balance before engaging his main forces'.²⁶ From within a clearly military strategic and theoretical framework, Liddell Hart began to consider the perspectives of theoretical masters such as Lenin and the significant similarities with Hitler's strategic pronouncements. For some time, Liddell Hart had recognised the import of 'moral' and 'psychological' elements in strategic thought. These were by no means minor considerations in the art of war.

Liddell Hart observed that it was Lenin who had enunciated the axiom that 'the soundest strategy in war is to postpone operations until the moral disintegration of the enemy renders the delivery of the mortal blow both possible and easy'. He compared this view with Hitler's saying that 'our real wars will in fact all be fought before military operations begin' and '[h]ow to achieve the moral breakdown of the enemy before the war has started — that is the problem that interests me'.²⁷ Interestingly enough, Sun Tsu had written in 490 BC:

In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact ... Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.²⁸

Simply stated, Sun Tsu asserted that '[t]he supreme act of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting'.²⁹ This morale-military interface would in turn afford Liddell Hart further strategic reflection:

As tactics is an application of strategy on a lower plane, so strategy is an application on a lower plane of '*grand strategy*'. While practically synonymous with the policy which guides the conduct of war, as distinct from the fundamental policy which should govern its object, the term '*grand strategy*' serves to bring out the sense of 'policy in execution'. For the role of grand strategy — higher strategy — is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war — the goal defined by fundamental policy.³⁰

Written in 1967, grand strategy was soon absorbed and taught to the SADF officer corps at the Defence College in Pretoria. Herein lies the origins from which Total National Strategy would emerge. The progression from grand strategy to total national strategy would have to await actual policy formation, reorganisation, and integration. From its inception, the fundamental character of grand strategy was clearly a

harbinger of the total national strategy that would emerge a dozen years later. An intermediate and highly significant step followed, in which the strategic ideas of General André Beaufre were incorporated, which gave much shape to the concept of total national strategy, but grand strategy and Liddell Hart's genetic imprint remained the foundation.

Liddell Hart continues:

Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and manpower of nations in order to sustain the fighting services ... Grand strategy, too, should regulate the distribution of power between ... *the services and industry*. Moreover, *fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy* — which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and, not least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponents' will. (*My emphasis*)

In addition to this, one may reflect on such items as the SADF/ARMSCOR linkages, most especially in logistics; the instances of South Africa's application of economic leverage with regard to its neighbours;³¹ 'transport diplomacy', as used under former Prime Minister B.J. Vorster;³² and civic action or 'hearts and minds' initiatives, of which the SADF has been an early and leading proponent, its relationship to counterinsurgency efforts being increasingly integral.

Liddell Hart concludes:

grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the various instruments, but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peace — for its security and prosperity. The sorry state of peace, for both sides, that has followed most wars can be traced to the fact that, unlike strategy, the realm of grand strategy is for the most part *terra incognita* — still awaiting exploration, and understanding.³³

To 'look beyond the war to the subsequent peace' presumes a 'conventional' adversary, and entails rather extensive policy formulation, dealing specifically with a 'post war' environment. At this time, it can be strongly argued that neither is the case in the South African situation.

John M. Collins defines grand strategy as:

The art and science of employing national power under all circumstances to exert desired types and degrees of control over the opposition by applying force, the threat of force, indirect pressures, diplomacy, subterfuge, and other imaginative means to attain national security objectives.³⁴

Liddell Hart's biographer and friend, Brian Bond, asserts that the distilled essence of grand strategy contained in Liddell Hart's short volume, *Paris, or the Future of War*, was that '[t]he function of grand strategy was to discover and exploit the Achilles' heel of the enemy nation ... in short, as a general rule one should strike *against the enemy's most vulnerable spot rather than his strongest bulwark*'.³⁵

Grand strategy must be examined in terms of Liddell Hart's short definition of strategy: 'the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy'. This definition links the subservience of military application/action to policy considerations, but in the more extended and integrated nature of national strength in relation to an actual or potential opponent, his strategic ideas were amplified. Thus what Liddell Hart anticipated and articulated was the movement in strategic thought from purely military lines of confrontation to an integrated reality which involved the full range of a nation's strengths.

It is worth mentioning that Liddell Hart's influence has been extensive. German Field Marshall Erwin Rommel had read one or more of Liddell Hart's books while commander of the 7th Armoured Division in France in 1940, and had expressed his admiration, though he never met Liddell Hart personally. He is not categorised as a disciple, as was his countryman, General Heinz Guderian, who had in 1939-1940 demonstrated the effectiveness of the theory of high-speed mechanised warfare (first in Poland, spearheading Kluge's 4th Army, and subsequently the armoured thrust across the Ardennes).

Yigael Yadin, the Israeli Defence Force Chief of Staff from 1949-1952, also acknowledged his influence, as did British Captain Orde Wingate, the mind behind the famous counter-guerrilla units known as the 'Special Night Squads', who emphasised the importance of Liddell Hart's theories in triggering off his own tactical and strategic observations. What we can observe, therefore, is the extended influence of Liddell Hart's works, as they were assimilated by military commanders and Allied policy formulators; an influence that by the Second World War ranged from mechanised warfare to all aspects of Allied strategic policy, even though he was an ardent critic of the Allied policy of strategic bombing and blockade on well articulated grounds.

General André Beaufre

Thus far, one can see that the progression from the indirect approach mentioned earlier to grand strategy is in part a matter of effective incorporation and integration of all categories of national resources and strengths. From this framework, in which fighting power was first perceived as only one instrument among many national resources, there nevertheless existed a need for greater delineation of the actual relationships among the instruments available. In particular, a greater depth of understanding would have to be reached regarding the use of military force as directed through and related to policy. This would entail a greater appreciation of the actual character and use of fighting power as well.

General André Beaufre was a contemporary and personal friend of Sir Basil Liddell Hart. In the preface to Beaufre's *An Introduction To Strategy*,

Liddell Hart writes: 'His book is, in fact, the most comprehensive and carefully formulated treatise on strategy, brought up to date, that has appeared in this generation — and in many respects surpasses any previous treatise.'³⁶ Beaufre defines strategy as the art of the dialectic of force, or more precisely, 'the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute'.³⁷ Admitting the highly abstract character of this definition, he nevertheless contends that it is on this level that one understands the related thought processes and rules that emerge from strategic reflection. He states further that:

In this dialectic of wills a decision is achieved when a certain psychological effect has been produced on the enemy: when he becomes convinced that it is useless to start or alternatively to continue the struggle.³⁸

The nature of conflict thus represents the strength of wills and their effect on one another.

Consistent with Liddell Hart's interpretation is Beaufre's concept of *total strategy*, which is to define the conduct of total war. Beaufre makes reference to Liddell Hart's use of grand strategy and considers his own term of total strategy a clearer one. The task of total strategy 'is to lay down the object for each specialized category of strategy and the manner in which all — political, economic, diplomatic and military — should be woven in together'.³⁹ On the same level of total strategy and closely associated are his five patterns of strategy:

1. *the direct threat*;
2. *indirect pressure*;
3. *successive actions*;
4. *a protracted struggle, but at a low level of military intensity (commonly known today as Low Intensity Conflict); and*
5. *violent conflict aiming at military victory.*

As with Liddell Hart, Beaufre sees military action as simply an arm to be used judiciously and in coordination with other strategic components. It is interesting that at the time of this writing — the early 1960s — Beaufre observed that, although the notion of an overall strategy existed in the military field, with which to allot tasks and coordinate various forms of activities, it did not exist in the political field. He states:

There is ... no such thing as overall strategy in the *political field* (e.g. co-ordination of general political policy, internal policy, external policy and propaganda) nor in the *economic field* (e.g. co-ordination of production, financial policy and overseas trade) nor in the *diplomatic field*. Yet in these activities strategy is employed almost daily — without anyone realizing it. Because people do not realize this, actions are not based on any concept, worked out through any orderly process of reasoning and many opportunities are therefore missed.⁴⁰

It is to this end of achieving an overall strategy involving each of these fields that South Africa's *total national strategy* subsequently emerged. Before we look at total national strategy, it is useful to consider Beaufre a little further.

General Beaufre contended that there has been an artificial distinction between the political and military fields and that, in his estimation, the conduct of policy should become a function of total strategy — in contrast to the position of some strategic thinkers, who had come to see technological and tactical developments as effectively altering strategy and thus in a sense subjugating strategy to these developments. Beaufre, while allowing for a certain influence, saw this analysis as deceptive, and dangerously so. The point here is that the nature of a comprehensive strategy would coordinate all avenues of national strength to include technological and tactical development and thus place these items in a supportive and subservient role in relation to total strategy.

As the distinction between the political and military fields diminishes through a clarification of the common meaning of such terms of policy, which Beaufre saw as 'an extraordinary junkheap of ideas and procedures',⁴¹ an enhanced appreciation of organisation and of integration in an overall coordination scheme/strategy emerges. Coupled to this is an increased understanding of the way in which the Marxist-Leninist system of thought draws no distinction between the political field and total strategy; that is, that the compartmentalisation of decision between policy ends and capable strategic means is eliminated through complete synthesis.

Beaufre also refers to indirect strategy, direct and indirect confrontation, and similarly to direct and indirect psychological action, all of which are coordinated by total strategy. He provides clarification on two important points. First, that traditional military strategy draws a distinction between the direct and indirect approaches and that their implications for total strategy are analogous. As mentioned previously, Beaufre defined strategy as 'the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute', and it is on this matter of force itself that he makes the second important clarification. He states that 'the word "force" refers not only to military force as used in war but also to possible utilization of the mere existence of this force — and therefore of its threat — together with the use of all nonmilitary methods of pressure'.⁴²

In my discussion with one SADF general, particular emphasis was placed on the need to know one's enemy and the nature of his immediate and long-term intents. The selective use of force would therefore be directed against the perceived patterns of enemy activity, be they military or otherwise. Sun Tsu's maxim would appear appropriate to this line of thought: 'Know your enemy, know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster.'⁴³ Accordingly, considerable effort is devoted to anticipating and

interdicting all lines of the enemy's approach, but not only by purely military means.

The military arsenal itself would be incorporated into the complementary concepts of deterrence and action. Beaufre goes on to explain:

When you wish to prevent something, that is deterrence; when you wish to achieve something, that is 'action' ... Action and deterrence, however, do not match each other completely: deterrence can be used without any action at all because it relies upon the existence of forces and the threat of action which they exert.⁴⁴

An example of this can be seen in the official pronouncements by the South African Foreign Minister, R.F. 'Pik' Botha, which were directed towards Zimbabwe in reaction to an attack on a farm in the northern Transvaal region of South Africa by unidentified elements originating from Zimbabwean territory. Both the Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs were quickly on the scene, speaking very much in accord and in military terms against an ideological adversary (Zimbabwe). Botha issued the statement: 'Zimbabwe stands warned that South Africa will not tolerate continued off-handedness on matters which profoundly affect its security.'⁴⁵ The 'off-handedness' referred to the implied indifference towards, if not actual, complicity of the Zimbabwean authorities with those crossing its borders to attack South Africa. It should be noted that approximately a week after this incident, the SADF did strike Angolan targets, as mentioned above, thus providing for the exercise of action on one front while theoretically enhancing deterrence on another, not to mention providing a stark disincentive for Zimbabwe.⁴⁶ Combining these two situations recalls Beaufre's postulate 'that any strategic undertaking involves a mixture of deterrence and action'.⁴⁷ He qualifies their use in the nomenclature of fencing, stating that:

deterrence is the shield which can only parry; action is the sword which can both strike and parry. Deterrence and action are two complementary strategic terms. If defined thus, the concept of action includes all forms of action from the most violent to the most insidious. It is a 'total' concept analogous to that of total strategy.⁴⁸

In considering Beaufre's fencing analogy, one is reminded of Liddell Hart's concept of 'hitting and guarding' in warfare. In these conceptualisations, the significant presence of the 'indirect approach' is actively at play. Expounding on the fencing analogy, I would mention that in fencing there is an overriding element of *deception* and as one presents one's blade for engagement — of which there are four single blade actions — only one is actually as it appears to be — the lunge — the other three are *indirect*, as are all compound attacks which by definition entail two or more feints. Therein lies the essence of the indirect approach, both in its military and nonmilitary

applications. The object is to catch one's opponent off guard. There are numerous instances of this approach in South Africa, one of which can be seen in the activation of the State of Emergency in conjunction with the detention of scores of political activists in an interdicting action against potential civil unrest surrounding the 16 June 1986 commemoration of the Soweto Uprising. It proved an extremely effective action, at least in military terms.

Special note must be taken of what Beaufre would term a 'specialized category of strategy', in this case *counterinsurgency*, and the considerable influence of Lieutenant-Colonel John J. McCuen on the thinking of counterinsurgency specialists within the SADF and the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF). What makes McCuen so influential is an effective working model of what he terms the four strategic phases of *organisation, terrorism, guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare*, which he posits as the basic phases of revolutionary war strategy.⁴⁹ The objective of counterinsurgency is therefore to meet the revolutionary war at a specific phase or stage of development and to 'roll it back' to a lower phase in inverse fashion. Although McCuen's ideas are not classified as a grand strategy, they are nevertheless extremely important for phasical operations, that is, identifying the actual revolutionary phase and applying comprehensive and strong countermeasures. Major-General Meiring and colleagues have valued McCuen because he provides a distillation of many sources, therefore nourishing the eclectic predilection of the security forces' leadership, and because his writings are considered more inclined toward practicality. Meiring has stated of McCuen's writings that 'they give you better ideas, but let you make your own decision within practical limits based on theory and on a good philosophical view of things.'⁵⁰ Conversely, as a counterinsurgency specialist, Meiring is critical of some of Beaufre's statements as being 'very vague at times. You could turn a wagon and a team of oxen around him'.⁵¹ The emphasis is clearly more on practicality than on inordinate theorisation. Perhaps here we see a pedagogical similarity between McCuen and Liddell Hart.

J.K. Cilliers, in his work *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, provides analysis of a number of counterinsurgency strategies (Chapters 3 to 8) which were employed in Rhodesia. With specific reference to the lessons learned from the Rhodesian Army's Civic Action Programme, Meiring states that the Rhodesian efforts illustrated how *not* to do things.⁵² Moreover, the implementation of such programmes were either untimely, inappropriate, or lacking sufficient commitment of men and *materiel*. The Rhodesian effort was at minimum a phase behind the revolutionary agenda, reacting to rather than initiating action, or, in American English, 'a day late and a dollar short'. Compounding this difficulty was the fact that even immediately after the election of Bishop Abel Muzorewa as Prime Minister on 24 April 1979

(in the failed internal settlement attempt), there was still no formal war strategy.⁵³ This occurred a little less than one year before the end of the war was brought about under the provisions of Lancaster House, which on 18 April 1980 saw Zimbabwe become independent, with Robert Gabriel Mugabe as Premier.

France's Indochina experience, for example, can compare with the Rhodesian efforts with regards to their slow reaction and the loss of initiative, eventually culminating in defeat.⁵⁴

Landward Defence

As we move towards the emergence of South Africa's total national strategy, it is important to remember that military doctrine — which is the bridge between strategic and tactical considerations — was undergoing a degree of transmutation. As if integration and coordination could be more easily achieved among the military services and the South African Police, the doctrine of *Landward Defence* was set forth. To the nonmilitary specialist, landward defence may not appear especially significant but it represents the locus from which organisational innovations and coordinating functions emerge and take shape, and it is reasonable to assume that effective implementation of military doctrine would serve as a sounding board for further institutional configurations.

Landward defence would also represent a military-political perspective that would in effect not only address issues of conventional warfare but also the realities of *Low Intensity Warfare* within its scope. From the 1973 White Paper on Defence and Armament Production:

Landward defence includes the preservation of internal order, the maintenance of the State's authority and the defence of our territorial integrity against any armed aggression. In this, the Army can and must make the greatest contribution; its aim therefore is to be prepared at all times to provide effective support to the South African Police in preserving internal order and to counter insurgency and conventional threats.⁵⁵

Landward defence was therefore established as a doctrine *vis-à-vis* landward battle. With the solidification of doctrinal development and definition, there were attendant organisational adjustments that would occur. These adjustments were in response to regional events as well as an overriding concern to enhance military preparedness and response.⁵⁶

Reorganisation

One of the consistent features of military organisations is the pressure to reorganise or adjust in response to changing mission directives and/or manpower constraints, especially on the inter-branch level and within highly specialised fields such as intelligence. By 1970, the South African military establishment had perceived a need for further adjustments in the

organisation of the Defence Force. Military budget estimates for the 1969-1970 period had been at R271,6 million, a relatively low level comparable to the figures from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s. Dramatic budgetary escalations would not appear until after 1975 (see Table A). Both organisational adjustment and military budgetary expenditures would increase in reaction to a perceived threat.

Source:

Phyllis Johnson & David Martin (eds), *Destructive Engagement*, and *The Star* (Johannesburg), 17 March 1988.

One of the results was an effort to reorganise the command and control structure of the SADF. In 1972, the Minister of Defence instituted a Defence Staff Council to replace the former Supreme Command.⁵⁷

Adjustments were effected after an intensive enquiry by streamlining the top structure of the Defence Force. The top structure of the Army, the Air Force and the Navy were also reorganized on a functional basis. In addition, the Director General Military Intelligence became directly responsible to the head of the Defence Force.⁵⁸

The Defence Advisory Council was also established as an advisory body to the Minister of Defence.

By 1975, further organisational adjustments had taken place. In fact, strategic policy, current events and organisation were seen as significantly interrelated. The 1975 White Paper on Defence and Armament Production put it as follows:

A further facet in the development and adaptation of the Defence Force's strategic policy in the light of events is the recent important organisational changes brought about in the command and control structure.⁵⁹

The White Paper goes on to record various organisational adjustments that are clearly intended to lessen purely administrative tasks for the echelon — a welcome relief against a perennial military foe — and to enhance military readiness and responsiveness.

Phased organisational adaptations had led to a more lateral command structure as well as a standard pattern in the staff structure intended for optimum control of the SADF. In accordance with these streamlining efforts, specific posts were abolished, as in the cases of the General Officer Commanding Joint Combat Forces and Commander Maritime Defence, with their executive responsibilities being transferred to the Chiefs of the three major services. 'In this way, an intermediary level of command was eliminated and the fighting services put under direct command of the Chief of the SADF.'⁶⁰ The elimination of an intermediary level of command is by no means an average event. The real effect on military responsiveness

quickly becomes evident. Further readjustments would place the Medical and Chaplains Services and the Quartermaster General in combat service support roles responsible to the Chief of the SADF.

Reorganisation would also support the need for an effective counterinsurgency effort. 'The structure of the S. A. Army was simplified to make provision, through its territorial command organisation, for the rapid local control of operations necessary to combat insurgency.'⁶¹ With reference to South Africa's counterinsurgency efforts, though technically not under military organisation, is the appearance of the Joint Management Centres or GBSs (*Gesamentlike Bestuurssentrums*). Although created in response to *A Report on the National Security Situation* by the Public Services Commission in September 1975, the GBSs would nevertheless operate as part of a national security management system at the local and regional levels in the main areas served by the SADF.⁶² The GBSs are essentially similar to the state and district war executive committees established and operated by the British-Malay forces which struggled against communist insurgency from 1948 to 1960.⁶³

The South African Army also opted for corps organisation.

The basic aims of this reorganisation are to establish short but effective vertical and horizontal channels of command and liaison so that operations can be controlled properly and support can be obtained where and when required.⁶⁴

The US Military Attaché in Pretoria observed in 1986 the impressive manner in which the combat service support, particularly logistics and communications, as well as command and control operated. In short, the system is highly tuned to supporting the Army in the field.

Total Strategy

By 1977, there was greater definition of military objectives and policies as well as strategic doctrines. Under the tutelage of the then Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha, specificity of military objectives were to include military and security arrangements with black homelands, which would be demonstrated dramatically on 11 February 1988, when South African security forces terminated an abortive coup in Mmabatho, Bophuthatswana, restoring President Mangope to power.⁶⁵

With greater organisational efficiency, military policy thus included a specific posture towards items such as arms self-sufficiency, counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts, police support, national intelligence services, regional intervention as laid down under the Defence Act, and force mobility and readiness. Strategic doctrines would dovetail military policy with emphasis on defence posture, deterrence, counterinsurgency and assistance to civil authorities.

With increased security pressures both internally and on the borders, and

after digesting the significance of Liddell Hart's and Beaufre's strategic analysis, 'it was seen to be necessary to generate a counter ideology to Marxism in the region'.⁶⁶ The nature of the threat was clearly seen as comprehensive, methodical and, above all, ideologically consistent with the operational *tenets of revolutionary warfare*. As these forces endeavoured to incorporate every means of leverage to obtain victory, such as township violence, political indoctrination, mobilisation and access to international forums and media, *inter alia*, the South African government would in turn present a comparable, if not superior, counter-strategy that would incorporate and integrate every manageable feature of national strength. The State Security Council, which was established by the Security Intelligence and State Security Council Act of 1972, would in time shape and direct this effort. By 1977, it had become known as *total strategy*, and by 1979 as *total national strategy*.

Consistent with both Liddell Hart and Beaufre, total strategy addressed political, economic, psychological, technological and military means in a mutually supporting structure of defensive and offensive capacity. True to the form of indirect strategy, and to Liddell Hart's *counteroffensive* predilection, the 1977 White Paper on Defence states:

Since strategy is normally directed towards the enemy's actions, it cannot be determined purely on the basis of one's own actions, but the reaction of the enemy must also be determined; this, in turn, demands a counter-reaction ... It is clear that in order to formulate and implement military strategy meaningfully, there is a need for a total national strategy.⁶⁷

The groundwork would therefore be laid both in military and government reorganisation and coordination. Under Defence Minister Botha, military reorganisational efforts had been initiated in advance. Total national strategy and subsequent governmental reorganisation would emerge under his premiership. With respect to Mr Botha's increasing influence, especially after 1974, Jack Spence explains that: 'Mr Botha was ... well placed to assert a military definition of his country's security needs against the more orthodox "diplomatic" style of the Foreign Affairs bureaucracy.'⁶⁸ Another author writes:

P.W. Botha's accession to prime minister in September 1978, after serving as defence minister for 12 years, heralded the growing ascendancy of the military ... in which decision-making and planning came to be dominated by security considerations ... He trimmed the bureaucracy, applying the management methods of the SADF to government. Military men became his key advisors, and Botha's takeover of the administration was referred to as a constitutional coup d'etat.⁶⁹

In counter-argument, Deon Geldenhuys states:

A ... popular notion is that the new structures are the vehicle for the military's involvement in policy formulation in both domestic and foreign affairs. Yet, while a

military input into policy making has now been formalised, so has that of other government institutions. To see the SSC — for example — as being dominated and dictated to by the military would be grossly unfair.⁷⁰

In an interview by Simon Baynham at SWATF Headquarters in Windhoek in May 1985 with Major-General Meiring, General Officer Commanding SWATF, the issue of military influence on national policy was recorded in the following exchange:

Simon Baynham: ... in conventional wars and counter-insurgency operations elsewhere the military invariably have a greater input in the political decision-making process. Surely, that applies to the situation here as well?

Maj-Gen Meiring: I think it acts both ways. Take our latest operation in Angola at the beginning of last year. That was a major political decision to stop at the time, so I think the input works both ways. You make a suggestion in the policy-making area and from there it depends on what type of input you deliver and also on what decisions have to be taken over what area. If of course you are in a major war, the opinions of the military will obviously have more weight. If on the other hand you are in a political situation, surely the military input would not carry as much weight as it would in other cases? But I think you cannot completely put the two political and diplomatic areas in one corner and the military in another corner. There is a great deal of interaction all along the line.⁷¹

The military man would immediately pick up on the significance of the 'kind of input one delivers' as being, in most instances, decisive in policy formulation and influence. This is especially so within a military structure, and the gist of life within military intelligence circles.

To take a rudimentary example, intelligence may reveal a concentration of opposing forces, i.e., a SWAPO staging centre preceding infiltration, which will warrant a high prioritisation of mission directives. A countermeasure can result which is a more visible military action, such as a cross-border strike. This event may be interpreted as undue military influence more so than would, for example, intercepting infiltrators on one's own side of the border. If the latter decision is taken, military influence is perceived as somewhat less in international terms.

With regard to the relative influence of the military on policy decisions, it has been noted among military observers that the current Chief of the SADF, General Jannie Geldenhuys, is not enthusiastic about having his troops patrolling the black townships. As a professional officer of considerable standing, however, he complies with his directives. This compliance provides further indications as to actual civil-military relations within South Africa.

The South African situation does not provide a convenient separation of distinctly military and civilian decision-making elites. Analysts may presume their existence while avoiding the assumption that a deepening intra-party synthesis is in fact developing. It would appear a logical result if the dialectical nature of strategy — and struggle — is indeed perceived as requiring a near-similar perspective of problem and solution. This synthesis

would be assisted if the natural channels of activity and influence for one party are eliminated. As in the case of South African-Zimbabwean relations, there are no diplomatic links. It can therefore be argued that the diplomatic corps is more likely to adopt a more uniform view, that is, the perspective of effective survival as seen by less restrained parties. What is more compelling is recognising the continuity of the reorganisational initiative, which would give the governmental organs a similar slant on coordination and integration of effort. Thus, one of the national objectives of the 1977 White Paper on Defence is:

planning total national strategy at government level for co-ordinated action between all government departments, government institutions and other authorities to counter the multi-dimensional *onslaught* against the RSA in the ideological, military, economic, social, psychological, cultural, political and diplomatic fields.⁷²

To this end, the interdependence of national policies and military strategy was cast.

Total National Strategy (TNS)

The 1977 White Paper on Defence defines total national strategy as

the comprehensive plan to utilize all the means available to a state according to an integrated pattern in order to achieve the national aims within the framework of the specific policies. A total national strategy is, therefore, not confined to a particular sphere, but is applicable at all levels and to all functions of the state structure.⁷³

Internationally, the United Nations' arms embargo against South Africa had taken definite shape in November 1977. This measure was clearly perceived as but one of the manifestations of a coordinated offensive against South Africa.

In 1978, Defence Minister P.W. Botha became Prime Minister. His organisational initiatives have reduced the twenty *ad hoc* committees under Vorster to five, then four, permanent Cabinet committees: National Security (known as the State Security Council [SSC]), Economic Affairs, Social Affairs, and Internal Affairs. The SSC is given preeminence as the primary council for security policy formulation and direction. National security involves both internal and external considerations so as to permeate practically all sectors of national activity. Though technically an advisory body to the Cabinet, the SSC, chaired by the Prime Minister, began the task of giving substance to the total national strategy. 'TNS is in fact officially presented as the Republic's counter-strategy.'⁷⁴

The 1979 White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply proceeded to discuss planning at national, interdepartmental and departmental levels, as well as addressing further developments in SADF command and control. Strategic management, planning and executive function were outlined as follows:

The Department of the Prime Minister is responsible for management at this level by issuing guidelines, total national strategy directives, and total national strategies concerning national security. The national strategic planning process is conducted by the SSC with its Work Committee and Secretariat and fifteen interdepartmental committees of the SSC, while co-ordination of the executive function is carried out by a National Joint Planning Centre.⁷⁵

As a strong indication of the supportive structure and nature of the organisational arrangement, as well as the 'all source' quality of interdepartmental cooperation, we read:

The SADF's strategies are determined according to the SSC's total national strategy directives and the total national strategies, an analysis of the threat as well as the SADF's capabilities.⁷⁶

With regard to the SADF's dependence on SSC formulations, threat analysis, and capabilities assessment, the above pronouncement is consistent with Liddell Hart's strategic reflections.

Furthermore, by 1977, more detail had emerged as to the roles and responsibilities of an integrated security network, which in effect comprises the 'Defence Family's' command and control structure. The Defence Command Council, the Defence Planning Committee, and the Defence Staff Council were established to facilitate such items as military policy formulation, procurement plans consistent with the pursuit of military policy, management and policy formulation that actually moved towards achieving prescribed aims and functions. This is particularly consistent with Liddell Hart's emphasis that all bodies of strategy must in their immediate and long-term implications directly or indirectly contribute towards obtaining strategic objectives which on the battle field may not necessarily translate into a geographically defined victory, that is, overtaking a pocket of resistance. Instead, Liddell Hart would consider a steady strategical pressure — in the operational field he refers to 'strategic net' — that presses specific advantages towards achieving decisive victory in various departments — economic, psychological, etc. It can therefore be argued that internal and external strategic play is in effect pursuing lines of 'least' resistance and the cultivation of actual and prospective advantages. The harmonisation of effort and analysis thus becomes paramount in pressing home one's advantages.

Turning to landward defence, additional features were emphasised, such as conventional training for formations up to divisional level through the SA Army Battle School (established in 1978). As with most armies, this thrust represented an attempt to incorporate lessons learned through combat, operational and institutional experience. With regard to a rapid deployment force, the Parachute Brigade was proposed 'in order to extend the operational capabilities of the SA Army in both conventional and semi-conventional actions'.⁷⁷

In his address to the National Party Congress in Durban on 15 August 1979, Prime Minister Botha announced the '12-point plan' as the policy content of total national strategy. Of the twelve points, the ninth and eleventh were directly related to maintaining a strong military posture. Further afield, speculative but nevertheless security-related, was the eighth point — a proposal for a 'constellation' of Southern African states, reflecting a somewhat less ambitious vision as compared to Vorster's constellation, which would have had much of Southern Africa join in mutual bonds of economic and military cooperation. In early 1988, State President Botha would offer to negotiate a regional security pact, unfortunately at a time when South Africa's relations with most of its neighbours were poor.⁷⁸

The eleventh point brought together the organisational and integrational notions of total national strategy by stating that

the maintenance of effective decision-making by the State ... which rests on a strong Defence Force to guarantee orderly government as well as efficient, clean administration. Clean administration is essential at all levels.⁷⁹

It should be kept in mind that the 12-point plan is a rather flexible, if not intentionally ambiguous, counter-policy to the perception of an actual 'total onslaught'. Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, in September 1980 defined total onslaught as follows:

The total onslaught is an ideologically motivated struggle and the aim is the implacable and unconditional imposition of the aggressor's will on the target state. The aim is therefore also total, not only in terms of the ideological, but also as regards the political, social, economic and technological areas.⁸⁰

The dialectic nature of South Africa's survival is again framed within the context of a hostile ideology, with all its attendant manifestations, countered by a national ideology. This dialectic is further defined in terms of a Marxist offensive countered by an anti-Marxist strategy. The perspective is stark and distinctly adversative but not altogether unrealistic in terms of the perceived intent of both opponents to undermine and eventually vanquish one another. The extent of polarisation between the South African government and the ANC was revealed, for example, when South African intellectuals met with ANC representatives in *Dakar, Senegal, in the summer of 1987*. The South African government was strongly opposed to this meeting but, perhaps more significantly, as related by at least two of the South African participants, the ANC spoke in no uncertain terms with regard to their inevitable role as the *sole* representative and governing body of the people.⁸¹ The avenues for any form of compromise are therefore essentially nonexistent, and the very nature of low intensity conflict highlighted.⁸² This is but one illustration of the perceived nature of the dialectic struggle, which is reinforced by one specific source of stimuli, namely, ANC pronouncements on a future South African leadership and representation.⁸³

The 1982 White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply continued to emphasise the struggle against the onslaught and the 'increasingly severe demands on the Defence Family'. Insurgency was seen up to this time as the primary manifestation of the threat against South Africa, although with increasing attention called to the possibility of conventional warfare — and a call for SADF readiness against any 'onslaught'.

Planning and force development were seen as *de rigueur* for the effective application of defence force capabilities. The organisational component was considered indispensable against an onslaught that saw, *inter alia*, Soviet military aid channelled to terrorists in both Angola and Mozambique. External support resulted in increased social and labour unrest, civilian resistance, and terrorist attacks against a variety of targets. The World Council of Churches was seen as giving assistance to churches which supported subversive activities. The tenor of the 1982 White Paper with regard to threat assessment was that of the variegated nature of the onslaught. Not only was there a potential *military onslaught* against South Africa but also an 'indirect action' in the form of a Soviet-influenced *revolutionary onslaught*.⁸⁴ With regard to landward defence, the 1979 White Paper spoke of the South African Army 'maintaining and employing a balanced and battle-ready land force to discourage or combat conventional, semi-conventional or *insurgency onslaught* against the Republic and SWA' (*My emphasis*).⁸⁵ The ANC was (and still is) seen, for all practical purposes, as being integrated with the South African Communist Party, acting as its military wing; this in pursuance of the Soviet objective of controlling the Republic of South Africa.

It is worth noting that despite the considerable effort that has gone into the implementation of total national strategy, there remains the question of conceptual coherency among the SADF officer corps. One author has stated that:

The total strategy of the South African military is actually far less coherent, less internally integrated and considerably less conspiratorial than at first appears to be the case. If many of the top officers experience difficulty in precisely identifying the features of their own total strategy apart from some loose and often caricatured concepts of the workings of domestic and international society, it is exactly because South Africa's total strategy is still basically viscerotonic, more of a mood composed of imperfectly linked semi-developed ideas than a sophisticated and carefully articulated formula for the direction of society.⁸⁶

The hope is that the assimilation of total national strategy is taking on greater form in the minds of the officer corps, but this cannot with certainty be said as having progressed. Of course one can and should discern a difference between conceptual coherency *cum* articulation and administrative-organisational adjustments reflecting the reality of total national strategy. In fact, one could argue strongly that conceptual

coherency in strategic thought among *all* actual adherents is not *de rigueur* if there in fact exist the few who are able to work out effectively a theoretical/strategic framework. If one observes the absorption of strategic reflection by, let us say, the German and British officer corps with regard to mechanised warfare between the world wars, other than the few who saw the potential of the new strategy, there was a point at which effectiveness was demonstrated and then general and invaluable acceptance in further strategic considerations followed. If indeed one is able to reflect on total national strategy in this fashion, one must first understand that it is not merely a military strategy, though firmly fixed in a low intensity conflict environment, entailing a protracted effort which, as in the Malayan experience, takes on an experimental and long-term character. The point here is that men like Sir Henry Gurney (the Malay High Commissioner) and Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Briggs (of 'Brigg's Plan' renown) would have been hard pressed to present anything other than, for example, four objectives, then to wait and see, as was the case with Sir Harold. Paradoxical as it may seem, immediate or near-immediate conceptual coherence is not a requirement for the majority of the officer corps: even at the 'field' and 'general' grade level, officers are not strategic thinkers so much as operational agents.

Most recent operational and organisational considerations

By the middle 1980s, the South African government had taken note of the buildup of conventional arms in the Frontline States. This buildup was in both quantitative and qualitative categories, to be met by the introduction of greater sophistication in the SADF arsenal.⁸⁷

Because of South Africa's extensive borders, the SADF operates in an area and not along a conventional front, which 'requires special attention to logistics, strategic and tactical mobility, the need for blanket cover, decentralisation of execution and a night-fighting capability'.⁸⁸

In view of a need to investigate 'the future planning of the SADF and related ARMSCOR [Armaments Corporation of South Africa] matters', the Minister of Defence appointed the Geldenhuys Committee on 30 March 1984. The Geldenhuys Committee proceeded to conduct a threat analysis as well as an analysis and evaluation of the SADF structure. Five work groups investigated the organisational models of nine other defence forces throughout the world for possible comparison. Three other groups were commissioned to examine the structure of the SADF on the basis of management principles formulated by the University of South Africa (UNISA).⁸⁹ During the course of its investigations, the Geldenhuys Committee concluded that it would be best to identify deficiencies and provide appropriate recommendations. The Committee remonstrated that

the 'large span of control', as it affected the Chief of the SADF and the Chiefs of the Arms of Service, was a potentially dangerous situation that could lead to coordination difficulties. The Committee stated that this situation was being rectified.

With regard to long-term planning, the Geldenhuys Committee, interestingly enough, discovered 'that it is usually difficult for individuals to switch their thinking patterns from "operational" to "long-term" planning and strategy'.⁹⁰ Therefore, in accordance with common organisational practice, the SADF would be introduced to the structural distinction between these two functions. In addition to the structural adjustments mentioned above, the Minister of Defence accepted the following:

- that a post of Chief of Defence force staff be instituted;
- that the Personnel, Intelligence, Logistics and Finance Staff Divisions become agencies; and
- that a long-term planning division and a management system division be created.⁹¹

Again we witness the organisational predilection *imperative in action*, which pursues a constant monitoring of organisational efficiency, responsiveness and flexibility to actual and potential dangers. In effect, organisational initiatives are increasingly geared to 'worst scenario' contingencies, as well as the effective management of total national strategy in a patently low intensity conflict environment.

This organisational imperative takes on a somewhat different form, though well within conventional business practices, of increasing privatisation in relation to advanced arms technology and production. The Geldenhuys Committee's motivation in supporting increased privatisation of ARMSCOR activity was to reduce the State's expenditure in this area. ARMSCOR, as the sole official procurement agent of armaments for the SADF, had been promoting privatisation, contracting out and industrial leasing, in an effort to encourage provisioning by the private sector. Furthermore, facilities would not be created if they already existed in the private sector.⁹² It should be remembered that, although ARMSCOR is a state corporation, it is run as a private enterprise, drawing its executive strength from the private sector. In addition, ARMSCOR's first priority in procurement policy is 'the maximum utilization of the private sector in the RSA and the utilization of ARMSCOR subsidiaries as main contractors who in turn subcontract the local private sector to a maximum degree'.⁹³ Therefore, the Geldenhuys Committee advocated the furtherance of 'company policy'. There is a mutual interest in the pursuance of privatisation towards the common goal of enhancing production and managerial efficiency.

Conclusion

In examining the conventional wisdom regarding the South African 'policy' of regional destabilisation, it has become evident that the emotive nature of this theme has perhaps obscured a deeper understanding of the underlying strategic and organisational motivations of the South African security posture. In considering the strategic reflections of Liddell Hart and Beaufre, one observes the theoretical framework in which subsequent national defence policy emerges. From Liddell Hart's proposition of Grand Strategy to Beaufre's Total Strategy, the theoretical conduct of effective warfare against foreign and domestic opponents is clearly delivered. This conceptual framework is derived and formed from a 'militarist' experience of both conventional and low intensity conflict outside Southern Africa. Nevertheless, the dialectic nature of the struggle *à la* Beaufre is seen by the South African government as a reality. The full implications of Liddell Hart's grand strategy are in turn, through modification and amplification, translated into organisational initiatives that were first incorporated into the SADF under the direction of the Minister of Defence and later in the organs of national government. The orchestration of national resources is indeed predicated on the organisational acumen of a leadership which perceives a total onslaught against the State and its survival. The dialectic nature of the assault calls for the response of a total national strategy. Anything less than this is seen as resulting in defeat. The organisational imperative therefore becomes the linchpin of the South African strategy — its trump card being its military prowess and periodic systems adjustment its lubricant.

What is perhaps not understood by the observer of Southern African affairs is that total national strategy was not conceived merely as a bulwark against anti-apartheid forces. Although it is convenient to perceive the South African regime as nefarious and intransigent, dealing in a somewhat predictable policy of destabilisation, this provides little understanding except to reinforce an already hackneyed characterisation. The South African government sees itself first in a struggle for survival against a determined Marxist opponent; upholding apartheid is *not* the primary security motivation. When survival is seen as the primary objective, the manner in which government offends what it perceives as a hostile and recklessly naive world dims in significance. If not for the volatile reaction that the South African situation tends to produce in many an observer, the range of strategic perception would perhaps be less likely to be dismissed. As indefensible as a government may be, it does not necessarily follow that its analysis of the nature of the opposition is simply the child of expedience.

One perception openly articulated is that South Africa and the free world are in an ultimate struggle for survival against the communist world. Although this kind of talk does not go down well and is easily dismissed as the rhetoric of a reactionary regime, the point stands in the absence of debate. On more than one occasion, the Minister of Defence, Magnus

Malan, has accused the West, particularly the United States, of relinquishing its leadership role in direct confrontation of communist ambition, especially in Southern Africa. Put simply and directly, the question is: has the West concluded in the course of formulating strategic policy, that cooperation and coordination among self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist states and adherents to various forms of scientific socialism, especially with regard to their support for liberation struggles and a class perspective on conflict, will ultimately be checked, if not eliminated, through a process of negotiation? For the South African government there is, in ultimate terms, no such perception; the battle lines and intentions are seen as clearly drawn and the struggle in Southern Africa is but a microcosm of the real world situation.⁹⁴ South African strategists would doubtless welcome a re-evaluation of the basic assumptions of western policy-makers in relation to Soviet objectives.⁹⁵

The exercise of military strength remains a salient feature of South Africa's total national strategy. A curious amalgam of military *cum* political analysis occurred as, for example, in the SADF's slow withdrawal turned indefinite stay in Angola. It was explained that 'it was necessary to ensure that strategic gains made by UNITA during the combined offensive against it should not be lost',⁹⁶ the rationale being that ground gained is to be kept if feasible and advantageous. Subsequently, troop withdrawal would be linked to the Cuban presence in Angola, thus stretching military gains into the realms of political activity.

The perspective of an irreconcilable global conflict, in ultimate terms, persists despite the regional agreement for a ceasefire along the Angolan/Namibian border reached on 1 September 1988. Furthermore, an agreement in principle turned accord in October, was obtained during negotiations in Brazzaville, Congo, which called for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola over a twenty-four to thirty month period.⁹⁷ This agreement was coupled with South Africa's own withdrawal and allowance for the implementation of United Nations Resolution 435 for the independence of Namibia over a one year period. The Accord of 9 October 1988 also ensures that some Cuban troops will remain in Angola after Namibian independence.

Reflecting on the State of Emergency, it has been seen by military personnel as an opportunity to restore order in certain sectors and to enhance the effectiveness of counterinsurgency efforts. The banning and restriction orders on organisations such as the United Democratic Front, the South African Youth Congress, and others, on 24 February 1988 is also seen through the lens of an effective counterinsurgency effort.⁹⁸ In the final analysis, the radical extent of manoeuvres, despite the outrage of the world, reflects the priorities of a South Africa at war. To the regime's leadership, this is the deciding factor.

Notes

1. BOTHA, P.W. (Minister of Defence), 'Preface', Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armaments Production*, March 1973, Pretoria: Department of Defence, WPM-1973, p.3.
2. *The Sunday Star* (Johannesburg), 21 February 1988. The death toll subsequently rose to twenty-two.
3. *Ibid.* Stated by General Jannie Geldenhuys, Chief of the South African Defence Force.
4. *West Africa*, 26 May 1986, p.1094.
5. COETZEE, P.J. (General), 'Urban Terror and Counter-Measures', in M. HOUGH (ed), *Revolutionary Warfare and Counter-Insurgency*, Pretoria: University of Pretoria Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984, p.36.
6. VILJOEN, C.L. (General), 'Revolutionary Warfare and Counter-Insurgency', in Hough (ed), *op cit*, p.5.
7. *Ibid.*, p.6.
8. GELDENHUYS, Jannie J. (Major-General), 'Rural Insurgency and Counter Measures', in Hough (ed), *op cit*, p.42.
9. Two works of note are Philip H. FRANKEL, *Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil-Military Relations in South Africa*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984; and Kenneth W. GRUNDY, *The Militarization of South African Politics*, London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1986.
10. Coetzee, *op cit*, p.37.
11. TRAINOR, L., *South African Foreign Policy: The Immediate Impact of the Portuguese Coup*, Wellington, New Zealand: Institute of International Affairs, 1975, p.3.
12. *Ibid.* Trainor cites OAU Council of Ministers ECM/St.15 (ix), Addis Ababa, 1975.
13. GELDENHUYS, Deon, *The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making*, Johannesburg: Macmillan South Africa, 1984, p.39.
14. DAVIES, Robert and Dan O'MEARA, 'Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African Regional Policy since 1978', in *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.11, No.2, April 1985, p.184.
15. Geldenhuys in Hough (ed), *op cit*, p.40.
16. JENKINS, Simon, 'Destabilisation in South Africa', in *The Economist*, 16 July 1983, p.16.
17. *White Paper on Defence*, 1973, p.5, para.9.
18. Cited by Simon Jenkins in *The Economist*, 16 July 1983, p.19.
19. MILTON, T.R., *Air Force* magazine, March 1983.
20. SUMMERS, Harry G. (Colonel), as quoted in Fox BUTTERFIELD, 'The New Vietnam Scholarship', in *New York Times Magazine*, 13 February 1983, p.52.
21. See *The Star* (Johannesburg), 17 November 1987.
22. In this engagement, FAPLA forces had sustained 67 killed, with 6 tanks destroyed and 1 captured. SADF forces had fought in conjunction with the 32nd Battalion (formerly FNLA) and UNITA. The clash had taken place 12 miles south-east of Cuito Cuanavale.
23. BOND, Brian, *Liddell Hart: A study of his Military Thought*, London: Cassell, 1977, p.37.
24. Karl Maria von CLAUSEWITZ (1780-1831). Joined the Prussian army and fought against the French on the Rhine in 1793-4. Served as an assistant to the Prussian general and military reformer Scharnhorst (1755-1813). Selected as military tutor to the Crown Prince (the future Wilhelm I). In 1812 he chose, like many other Prussian officers to defect to Russia rather than serve Napoleon in the enforced collaboration between his country and France. He served as a staff officer and observer with several Russian commands. He is best known for his work *Vom Kriege* (published in English in various translations as *On War*), which was published posthumously in 1832. One of his central tenets was that war is never conducted in isolation, but that one must take into account the political objectives of one's opponents and how these relate to one's own. See John KEEGAN &

- Andrew WHEATCROFT, *Who's Who in Military History*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1976, pp.73-74)
25. *Ibid.*, p.44. His first historical work, which was a biography of Scipio Africanus, *A Greater than Napoleon*, depicted the approach in 1926.
 26. COLLINS, John M., *Grand Strategy Principles and Practices*, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1973, p.270.
 27. LIDDELL HART, Basil H., *Strategy The Indirect Approach*, London: Faber & Faber Ltd, 1967, p.224.
 28. TSU, Sun, *The Art of War*, in James CLAVELL (ed), London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1981, p.23.
 29. *Ibid.*, p.7.
 30. Liddell Hart, *op cit*, pp.335-336.
 31. For two examples of a different sort involving Zimbabwe and Lesotho (both in 1981), see Robert M. PRINCE, 'Pretoria's Southern African Strategy', in *African Affairs*, Vol.83, No.330, January 1984, pp.23-24.
 32. For an interesting description of transport diplomacy in the case of South African-Zambian relations, see Deon Geldenhuys, *op cit*, p.153-154.
 33. Liddell Hart, *op cit*, p.336.
 34. Collins, *op cit*, p.269.
 35. Bond, *op cit*, p.39, citing Liddell Hart, *Paris, or the Future of War* (1925), pp.12-13, 20-27.
 36. BEAUFRE, André, *Introduction to Strategy*, London: Faber & Faber, 1965 (English translation). Preface by Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, March 1963, p.10.
 37. *Ibid.*, p.22.
 38. *Ibid.*, p.23.
 39. *Ibid.*, p.30.
 40. *Ibid.*, p.31.
 41. BEAUFRE, André, *Strategy of Action*, London: Faber & Faber 1967 (English translation), p.23.
 42. *Ibid.*, p.103.
 43. Tsu, *op cit*, p.8.
 44. Beaufre, *Strategy of Action*, p.27.
 45. *The Star* (Johannesburg), 15 February 1988, p.1.
 46. The situation is further complicated by the fact that official diplomatic relations do not exist between South Africa and Zimbabwe; notes are handed over by the South African Trade Representative to Harare to an official of the Ministry of Trade and Commerce.
 47. Beaufre, *Strategy of Action*, p.27.
 48. *Ibid.*, p.28.
 49. McCUEN, J.J., *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War*, London: Faber & Faber, 1966, p.40. Chapter II — 'The Problem — Revolutionary War Strategy', discusses the four phases and provides a selected bibliography on revolutionary war strategy. McCuen juxtaposes his four phases with those of Mao Tse-tung (two-stage strategy), Vo Nguyen Giap (three-stage model), and Trotsky (Five Phases of Revolution), all of which speak of the protracted nature of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary warfare, as well as the essence of self-preservation by the fluid use of phases and the gradual elimination of the enemy.
 50. BAYNHAM, Simon, interview with Major-General G.L. Meiring quoted in 'South Africa, Namibia and Angola', in *Southern Africa Record*, No.40, October 1985, p.7.
 51. *Ibid.*
 52. Among the items discussed by J.K. Cilliers are Protected and Consolidated Villages (Chapter 3), Internal Defence and Development: Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Population and Resource Control, Civic Action (Chapter 6), and Operation Favour: Security Force Auxiliaries (Chapter 8).
 53. Baynham, *op cit*, p.8.

54. CILLIERS, J.K., *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, London: Croom Helm, 1985, p.71.
55. *White Paper on Defence*, 1973, p.8, para.24.
56. See *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, 1975, p.10, para.37.
57. See *White Paper on Defence*, 1973, p.6, para.16, for the Defence Act reference and the constituted membership of the Council.
58. *Ibid.*
59. *White Paper on Defence*, 1975, p.5, para.8.
60. *Ibid.*, p.8.
61. *Ibid.*
62. For a description of the Joint Management Centres, see Grundy, *op cit*, pp.53-54; **and** Deon Geldenhuys, *op cit*, p.93; **and** Phyllis JOHNSON and David MARTIN (eds), *Destructive Engagement*, Southern African Research and Documentation Centre, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986, p.183.
63. For an interesting account of the counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya, see CHALLIS, Daniel S. (Major), 'Counterinsurgency Success in Malaya', in *Military Review*, February 1987, pp.57-69. Description of war executive committees on pp.64 & 66.
64. *White Paper on Defence*, 1975, p.8, para.24.
65. See *The Star* (Johannesburg), 11 February 1988, p.1.
66. Davies & O'Meara, *op cit*, p.189.
67. *White Paper on Defence*, 1977, p.5, paras 8 & 9.
68. SPENCE, Jack E., 'South Africa's Military Relations with its Neighbours', in BAYNHAM, Simon (ed), *Military Power and Politics in Black Africa*, London & Sydney: Croom Helm Ltd, 1986, pp.298-299.
69. MINTY, Abdul, 'South Africa's Military Build-up: The Region at War', in Johnson & Martin (eds), *op cit*, p.181. See Grundy, *op cit*, p.1, for a similar viewpoint.
70. Deon Geldenhuys, *op cit*, pp.93-94.
71. Baynham, *op cit*, pp.5-6.
72. *White Paper on Defence*, 1977, p.8, para.g.
73. *Ibid.*, p.5. Cited in GELDENHUYS, Deon, *Some Foreign Policy Implications of South Africa's 'Total National Strategy' with particular reference to the '12-point plan'*, Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1981, pp.8-9.
74. *Ibid.*, p.2
75. Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply*, 1979, Pretoria: Department of Defence, p.2, para.6.
76. *Ibid.*, para.10.1 (Force Design).
77. *Ibid.*, p.17, para.105.
78. See *The Star* (Johannesburg), 26 January 1988. Despite this nadir in South African regional relations, meetings which are more compelling to the Frontline States, due to economic considerations, continue between Mozambique and South Africa over the Cahora Bassa Dam. See also *The Star* (Johannesburg), 14 January 1988.
79. Deon Geldenhuys, *Some Foreign Policy Implications...*, *op cit*, pp.61-62.
80. *Ibid.*, p.3. Citing *Toespraak deur Generaal Magnus Malan voor die Instituut vir Strategiese Studies*, University of Pretoria, 3 September 1980, p.18.
81. Report on the Dakar Meeting, South African Institute of International Affairs, Jan Smuts House, Johannesburg, Thursday 6 August 1987.
82. See *The Star* (Johannesburg), 7 September 1987, for the ANC's five 'minimum' conditions for negotiations to begin.
83. One participant in the Dakar meeting mentioned that the ANC representatives regarded the issue of minority rights, i.e., the safeguarding of Afrikaner self-determination in a future black South Africa, as being an antiquated notion, bourgeois, and a vestige of the 19th century. In other words, the ANC has no ideological and/or legal provision for such a possibility. Less than a year later, however, at a meeting held in Frankfurt, West Germany, between ANC representatives and Wynand Malan and associates from the National Democratic

- Movement, the allowance for a multiparty, unitary state was assured by the ANC representatives.
84. The *White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply*, 1982, quotes Soviet President Brezhnev, speaking in 1977, which is seen as the Soviet intent for the region: 'Our aim is to gain control of the two great treasure houses on which the West depends — the energy treasure house of the Persian Gulf and the mineral treasure house of Central and Southern Africa.'
 85. *White Paper on Defence*, 1979, p. 17, para. 103.
 86. Frankel, *op cit*, p. 53.
 87. This upgrade in sophistication can be seen in examples ranging from the M-40 grenade launcher (first tested in combat during operations in Angola in the first half of November 1987) to the G-6 155mm self-propelled howitzer and its predecessor, the G-5, the 127mm Valkiri multiple rocket system, the XHA1 combat helicopter (prototype first shown 1 February 1986), the Cheetah fighter aircraft (ostensibly South Africa's counter to the MIG-21 and MIG-23), and most recently, the Rooikat 76mm 'armoured car', better designated as a tank destroyer and fire support vehicle, which was unveiled on 22 October 1988. It is very interesting to note that the Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, spoke of 'South Africa's tradition of mechanized warfare' in reference to the significance and continuity that the Rooikat represented to the SADF.
 88. Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply*, 1986, Pretoria: Department of Defence, p. 3, para. 17.
 89. *Ibid*, p. 7, para. 37.
 90. *Ibid*, p. 8, para. 40.
 91. *Ibid*, p. 10, para. 51.
 92. *Ibid*, p. 9, para. 47.
 93. Deon Geldenhuys, *Diplomacy of Isolation*, *op cit*, p. 142.
 94. With regard to Soviet intent and methods, especially in relation to the issue of international terrorism, Professor Y. Alexander, of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, states that 'peaceful co-existence has not been accompanied by a manifest weakening of the Soviet ambition to achieve regional and global hegemony, their exploitation of terrorism as tactical and strategic tools calls for a realistic Western strategy to meet this challenge'. See ALEXANDER, Y., 'International Terrorism and the Soviet Connection', in Hough (ed), *op cit*, p. 19.
 95. See GREGORY, Christopher, 'Soviet Foreign Policy: Ideology or Power Politics?', in *International Affairs Bulletin*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1987, pp. 44-61.
 96. *The Citizen* (Johannesburg), 23 February 1988.
 97. *Tribune* (London), 11 October 1988.
 98. For banning and restrictions, see *Business Day* (Johannesburg), 25 February 1988.

Book Reviews

DEMOCRATIC LIBERALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA

Jeffrey Butler, Richard Elphick and David Welsh (eds), Middletown, Conn: Wesleyan University Press, Cape Town & Johannesburg: David Philip, 1987.

Since at least the early 1970s, liberal ideas in South African debate have been on the defensive in the wake of an attack from a radical school of revisionist historians. This volume represents an attempt by a group of scholars resident both inside and outside South Africa to reassert liberal goals and values. Most of the contributions are based on papers originally presented at a conference on South African liberalism at Houw Hoek in the Cape from 29 June to 2 July 1986. The basic organising theme is not liberalism *per se* but *democratic* liberalism, which in the South African context means 'to insist unambiguously on a universal franchise, exercised in free and open elections for the country's rulers, and hence to insist on black preponderance in government'. This can be seen in part as a response to charges by radical critics that liberalism in South Africa has frequently been linked with a tradition of white missionary paternalism and even cultural racism which has been concerned to defuse, and as far as possible neutralise, more democratic forces seeking a major shift in access to political power for the black majority.

The contributions are quite idiosyncratic, though the editors probably feel that this reflects the *wide-ranging and eclectic nature of liberalism* in contrast to the more tightly organised schools and intellectual coteries of the marxist left. In many cases, the tone is intensely anti-marxist, reflecting bitter intellectual battles stretching back to the 1970s. The papers range, however, from quite strong support, as in Jane Hofmeyr's paper on education, for an alliance of liberals with more radical forces to a championing of more elitist models of consociationalism based upon the saliency of firm ethnic 'groups', as in Lawrence Schlemmer's chapter on the 'prospects for a liberal society in South Africa'. The volume in some sense reflects a political confusion within liberal circles on the kind of strategies to adopt at a period of acute political crisis. It is significant that there were notable omissions from the proceedings, including long-standing liberal activists like Peter Brown, Terence Beard and Helen Suzman, though Frederick van Zyl Slabbert contributed a final chapter on 'incremental change or revolution'. More seriously, there are no black contributions, nor is any effort made to analyse the political impact of liberal ideas on black politics or on organisations such as the UDF. For the most part, this is a group of social scientists and historians concerned to revive the somewhat battered academic pedigree of liberalism in South Africa. More cynical

observers, however, might perceive this as an example of the Owl of Minerva, Goddess of Wisdom, flying at dusk.

The volume is concerned with confirming, or reconfirming, an independent liberal intellectual contribution to South African historiography, the ethics of social justice in a post-apartheid society, and the contemporary debate on political and economic change. In addition, the chapter by Gerald Shaw seeks to defend the English-speaking press from radical charges that it is a creature of mining capital. Significantly, there is no paper on the role of liberalism in the churches, a lacuna that would have been unthinkable in any such discussion three or four decades ago.

The first two sections on history and historiography are in many ways the most important in the volume, for it is in this area that South African liberalism has suffered its worst defeat at the hands of the revisionists. Rodney Davenport, in his scholarly analysis of the Cape liberal tradition before 1910, points out that, in the debate on parliamentary representation, ethnicity or race never featured as an absolute criterion for admission to or exclusion from the franchise, indicating that the ahistorical discussion later in the volume by Johan Degenaar and Lawrence Schlemmer on the centrality of ethnic groups needs to be more firmly situated historically. Davenport also suggests that the economic explanations offered for the decline of Cape liberalism by Colin Bundy and Stanley Trapido need to be complemented by a more political explanation based on white demographic fears of being 'swamped' by a growing black electorate. An additional reason is the growth in white racial ideology linked to late nineteenth century British imperialism and the rise of social Darwinism. In many ways, the volume is weak in this regard, despite Richard Elphick's plea, in a stimulating chapter on historiography, for the importance of intellectual history in the South African context. Few contributions really get to grips with the shifting meanings of race and appeals to racial group solidarity, though Herman Giliomee contributes a useful chapter on the debate on liberalism, apartheid and *verligtheid* among Afrikaner intellectuals in the 1950s and 1960s in the wake of Van Wyk Low's important series of essays published in 1958: *Liberale Nasionalisme*.

The volume does not really answer the question asked by many critics of South African liberal historiography of why many mainstream historians failed to develop a more penetrating social and economic history before the 1970s. Chris Saunders's chapter on the period prior to World War II is part of a wider important study on the growth of South African historiography.¹ It shows how the marginalisation of two of the brightest historians of that period, W.M. Macmillan and C.W. de Kiewiet, had disastrous consequences for South African historical writing. The chapter on the post-1945 period, by Jeffrey Butler and Derek Schreuder, is extremely weak and appears to confirm the general suspicion that mainstream liberal

historiography in the 1950s and 1960s was both defensive and generally complacent, nostalgically looking back to the Cape liberal tradition and unwilling to investigate itself in any systematic manner. As Douglas Irvine admitted in his chapter on the Liberal Party between 1953 and 1968, 'The broad principles seemed clear enough, but there was little self-reflective analysis about the meaning of liberalism' (p. 120).

Three chapters in the volume seek to explore inter-war South African liberalism. Richard Elphick suggests, in an interesting chapter that is effectively part of a wider body of research in progress, that South African missionary liberalism should be seen as part of a wider *international* 'benevolent empire' of liberal and humanitarian concern, linking it to England, Scotland and the United States. The archival sources in this area are extensive, though still relatively underused, and there is a need for more study in archives of American foundations such as the Phelps Stokes Fund and the Carnegie Corporation, which helped fund the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) in 1929. We still need a detailed study showing the degree of American ideological impact on South African liberal thought, compared to its older British liberal mentor. Numbers of important liberals such as James Henderson, Edgar Brookes and W.M. Macmillan visited America in the 1920s and 1930s and had varying responses to its pattern of 'race relations'. American social science ideas began to play an important role in many liberals' thinking from the 1940s onwards and in many cases encouraged a rather benign faith in social evolutionary advance which tended to minimise the difficulties of achieving goals of 'inter-racial accommodation'.

The chapter by Jeffrey Butler discusses the role of welfare organisations in Cradock in the Eastern Cape, especially the local Joint Council which also involved the prominent black activist James Calata. By the middle 1930s, however, Butler points out, Calata had become disillusioned with such welfare activities, especially as groups like the Boy Scouts remained racially segregated. The liberals in the locality were by the outbreak of World War II an embattled minority 'trying to conserve what little liberalism existed' (p.97). Phyllis Lewsen's account of liberals in politics and administration tells a similar story, though she is anxious to try and play down any emphasis on internal divisions within the embattled liberal *laager*. The important point that needs to be recognised about the internal liberal divisions in the 1930s and 1940s is that they did have a significant effect on the way that they conceived of political activity and this is of historical importance. The differences were not just in the realm of personal likes and dislikes but crucial in terms of political ideology, especially when some groups in the Joint Councils became increasingly suspicious of the conservatism of those in the SAIRR. These divisions were fomented by contacts with black political leaders, and the weakness of Lewsen's analysis

is its tendency to see white liberal politics in isolation from wider forces in South African society. '[T]here is a strong left leaning among Native leaders', wrote J.D. Rheinallt Jones, the 'Advisor' to the SAIRR, to Jan Hofmeyr in April 1936, at the time of the debate over the 'Native Bills'. 'The joint council may become more left — indeed may well be advised to become more left in order to prevent the Communists leading the natives into grave trouble'.² The white liberals were in many cases striving for political influence with informed black opinion in more radical groups. This factor really fails to come through in these rather self-congratulatory accounts.

The question of links with the radical left became an increasingly important issue for liberals in the period of mounting opposition to apartheid in the 1950s. Douglas Irvine's chapter suggests that the Liberal Party failed to take part in the Congress of the People in 1955 leading to the proclamation of the Freedom Charter because the Party was essentially excluded from any effective participation in the planning stages, though some individual members of the Party did. The archival record suggests a rather different picture, for the Liberal Party was certainly invited by the sponsoring bodies of the Congress to help organise the proceedings, since it was believed that in doing so, other organisations would also be attracted. Though some Liberals such as Margaret Ballinger, Marion Friedman and Violane Junod were supportive of the idea, formal Liberal Party participation raised fundamental issues about its political identity.³ At a time when the parliamentary option still seemed open, a number of Liberals were worried that participation in a radical popular issue would tarnish its 'respectable image' in the eyes of the white electorate. In August 1954, for instance, Walter Stanford, then campaigning for election as a 'Natives Representative' for the Transkei in the House of Assembly, argued that the Liberal Party should only come in if it could take a 'decisive part' in the future direction of the Congress of the People. This appeared to be increasingly unlikely. There was also the problem of being searched by the police at the meetings. While 'this might impress some of the African voters', it looked 'bad to anyone else, especially the whites'.⁴ The evidence thus suggests that the Liberal Party was not yet sufficiently free from its attachment to Whig parliamentarism to consider attachment to a more radical mobilising strategy, especially when the latter was tarnished, in the period of the Cold War, with links to Communism through the left-leaning Congress of Democrats.

The treatment of the past is generally rather sketchy in the volume, and there is surprisingly no analysis of the role of liberalism in political debate in the wake of the demise of the Liberal Party in 1968. The absence of Peter Randall to discuss the work of SPRO-CAS in the early 1970s or of Beyers Naude of the Christian Institute indicates that the book has in many ways a

very narrow agenda. There is no discussion of liberal responses to the rise of Black Consciousness in the 1970s or for that matter of black liberals in general. Apart from Butler's reference to Calata, the work of Z.K. Matthews, D.D.T. Jabavu and Albert Luthuli goes effectively unnoticed, so reinforcing the stereotype that liberalism is essentially a 'white' political creed. There is a strong indication at certain points that this is in many ways an historical throwback, a collective exercise in nostalgia by a generation of post-war liberals from days when things were apparently less complicated than in the present, when radicals knew their place and mainstream white liberals could still make a strong claim to embody the moral conscience of all humanitarian and progressively-minded people.

This regressive quality in the volume also emerges in the chapters dealing with the sociological and economic analysis of South African society. David Welsh's chapter on 'Democratic Liberalism and Theories of Racial Stratification' resurrects the frontier thesis of Eric Walker and I.D. Macrone in a social science guise. Ideas of racial and ethnic difference were not caused by capitalist penetration into southern Africa, argues Welsh, for these were inherent within the racial stereotyping of the white settlers long before the establishment of a mature capitalist economy. Arguing on lines similar to Herbert Blumer's famous thesis of the mid-1960s, Welsh posits that capitalism in South Africa merely accommodated to a 'racial structure' that was already formed: 'it acquiesced, and adapted itself to a structure not of its own making and whose argument it was powerless to burst asunder' (p.198, emphasis added). This is a staggeringly simplistic statement made without any reference to any of the studies of the degree to which capital, especially mining capital, sought to influence in a variety of ways the direction of state policy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Its concept of a 'racial structure' is ahistorical and the analysis seems unaware of the increasing emphasis in a number of analyses (not all marxist) on the role of the state in sustaining and underpinning the operation of social and economic structures of racial domination in South African society. The chapter sits uneasily with David Yudelman's critique of Merle Lipton's analysis in *Capitalism and Apartheid* of the relationship of the state to mining capital after the 1922 Rand Strike. At a structural level, the mine owners managed to secure a favourable relationship by transferring the costs of the colour bar to other sectors of the economy. This is hardly the legacy of some previous pattern of racial structuring in South African society stretching back to the pre-industrial frontier, but the active manipulation of racial divisions to sustain a high rate of profitability on the mines.

Furthermore, Welsh's chapter can be seen as out of tune with Richard Elphick's imaginative essay, 'Historiography and the Future of Liberal Values in South Africa', which argues against the rather bland use of political economy which led some radical theorists to see South African

history as determined by the amorphous concept of 'capital accumulation'. A humanistic liberal historiography seeks to see the processes of racial and economic oppression in South Africa as in large measure made by real men and women and, just as this does not lead to an automatic indictment of capital collectively without a detailed analysis of the way in which individual capitalists and capitalist companies performed in South African economic history, neither does it collectively let them off the hook, as Welsh seems to imagine.

A similar sort of tendency appears in the chapter by Norman Bromberger and Kenneth Hughes on 'Capitalism and Underdevelopment in South Africa'. Here much is made of some evidence to show that there were some indigenous causes within African society to the operation of the migrant labour system which in some cases began, as with the Pedi in the Northern Transvaal, before colonial conquest in the nineteenth century. There was no particularly unilinear process of 'underdevelopment' in the reserves, as some of the radical analyses of the 1970s tended to assume under the influence of Latin American theories of underdevelopment, peripheralisation and dependency. The creation of backward reserve economies was not necessarily willfully made by the civil servants in the Native Affairs Department in the 1920s and 1930s, who appear in many cases to have been a reasonably benign group of paternalists. Policies can often have unintended consequences and the net long-run effect was the marginalisation of the reserve economies from the benefits of state support and this was to have a cumulative effect in enhancing the tendency towards migrancy.

The issue is clearly more complicated than many radicals assumed but are we to assume that there was no capitalist pressure for the preservation of the reserve economies? Bromberger and Hughes cite an article by Peter Wickens on the 1913 Natives Land Act to argue that there were a number of conflicting expectations behind this legislation. They seem unaware of the work of Tim Keegan on the operation of the Act in the Orange Free State and the Southern Transvaal Highveld and the clear manner in which the act was used by a class of white capitalist agriculturalists to bankrupt the black peasantry in that region.⁵ Nowhere is there any recognition of the possibilities of an alliance between sections of white capital and the apparatus of the state in making the goals of territorial segregation workable, though Bromberger and Hughes do stress what they see as a *settler state established through colonial conquest*. But what are we to deduce from such general typology? Not all settler states in Africa resorted to such measures and there is a need to specify more clearly the political pressures involved behind the operation of state policy. Within this context, the suggestion that 'in part the reserves were sustained by the desire of Africans to maintain a particular type of community' seems a good example of the

inability of the authors to understand the limited range of choices African peasants really had once the base of their economic livelihood had been destroyed.

Elsewhere in the volume there is some recognition of the power and importance of the state. David Yudelman's chapter is a distillation of ideas contained in an important longer study.⁶ Yudelman suggests that a strong symbiosis was forged between the two, though the state can be seen as acting as an independent political actor in its own right. This certainly weakens the appeal of general sociological theories of the plural society which fail to explain the pivotal role of the state. Yudelman significantly raises important questions on the limits of the state's ability to co-opt middle-class black leaders at a time when its political legitimacy is extremely weak among informed black elite opinion. There is also, Yudelman suggests, a problem for the state's ability to manage any effective transfer of resources to such an elite when its overall control over the economy is starting to decline through a drive for privatisation. He argues that one way out would be for a dispersal of economic power onto a regional level, though this still faces a long-term credibility problem as Blacks would argue that it is just another subtle device to perpetuate white rule. At the same time, it would be attacked by the white right-wing for weakening the power of the central state, upon which their privileges depend.

The state in South Africa thus faces a general crisis of political legitimacy and a number of chapters in the latter part of the volume deal with this issue. Two excellent contributions on human rights and the rule of law by John Dugard and A.S. Mathews show that some Afrikaner judicial thought has started to move in a liberal direction in the face of mounting international condemnation of human rights violations. Mathews, however, seeks more specifically to defend a conservative interpretation of the 'rule of law' from radical critics who have sought to impose on its additional social and economic objectives. Not only would this overload the justice system with a huge number of burdens but Mathews also argues that it was precisely the conservative definition of the rule of law which helped to maintain its legitimacy and claims to neutrality. Indeed, contrary to general problems regarding the legitimacy of the South African state, the notion of the rule of law commands widespread support among Blacks and might well be an important tool in the passage to majority rule. In essence, there appears to be some broad ground between liberals and radicals on this issue.

On industrial relations, Heribert Adam emphasises the growing importance of the black trade union movement and points out that, 'as long as business fails to back up its interests with tangible action in the work place that symbolises dramatically where it stands in the struggle, employers will be considered synonymous with the government' (p.329). He cites important evidence from notes made of the discussion between the ANC

and South African businessmen in Zambia in September 1985, when Gavin Relly of Anglo American asked the ANC to 'keep their fingers out of the Unions', and ANC spokesman, Mac Maharaj, retorted that they were already in. The question of the nature of the post-apartheid economy is beginning to emerge in serious political analysis and Sean Archer points out in an illuminating chapter on the Freedom Charter that it is considerably open-ended on the kind of economic system likely under a democratic government. Broadly speaking, the Charter can be seen as favouring a mixed economy with some nationalisation of big business ('monopoly capitalism') and land reform. There are many aspects to this which democratic liberals could see as forming the agenda for a broadly based discussion, though the current ANC leadership may be replaced by a younger generation far less conciliatory than those like Oliver Tambo.

Many liberals do therefore have a lot to contribute to South African political debate, especially in terms of reintroducing concepts of political morality that have in many cases been corrupted by the era of apartheid. Charles Simkins argues for an 'egalitarian liberalism' in the tradition of John Rawls's *Theory of Justice* and contrasts this with the more libertarian school of Robert Nozick. Simkins argues that a Rawlsian approach would imply a good measure of equality as well as mere equality of opportunity and a diversity of outcomes. Politically, this would mean a constitution guaranteeing individual rights and freedoms but also some recognition of different 'racial estates', though Simkins is suspicious of suggestions stretching back to R.F.A. Hoernle's *South African Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit* that these could be compatible with segregation. In essence, this appears to provide a moral basis for a model of political consociationalism in South Africa in which group as well as individual rights are protected under a new constitutional dispensation.

Consociational Democracy (DC) has come in for attack by a number of critics for its top-down quality and credibility problem. It is difficult to see how the parties to a DC bargain can necessarily deliver any significant political support.⁷ Lawrence Schlemmer's chapter in some senses represents a rather more pessimistic assessment of the prospects of DC compared with an enthusiasm for it in the early 1980s at the time of the debate on constitutional reform. Schlemmer significantly departs from one of the basic tenets held by many South African liberals, especially in the SAIRR throughout the 1950s and 1960s, that a pronounced process of westernisation was leading to the integration of black elites into a common society. 'Upwardly mobile black people in South Africa', Schlemmer writes, 'do not undergo the normal process of identification with middle class urban values and lifestyles' (p.389). It is difficult to understand exactly what this extraordinarily eurocentric statement means, for the 'normal processes' of middle-class identification are not spelt out. If it means that black elites do

not seek a material life-style and consumer values like South African whites then it is clearly wrong. If, on the other hand, it means attachment to non-capitalist values, then this may be due to the survival of intense forms of racial segregation which have still not led to the creation of a mature black business class. The process of identification with '*bourgeois*' values has been evident since at least the 1950s and the emergence of black consciousness and *other doctrines* has done little to change this. The inclusion of a black analyst in the volume may have gone a long way towards clarifying some of these points.

Schlemmer's chapter is ultimately pessimistic regarding the prospects of liberal values in South Africa short of the creation of an '*indigenous social theory of liberalism*'. Such a theory seems unlikely, given the generally isolated position that many liberal analysts find themselves in, and the final chapter by Van Zyl Slabbert fails to provide clear guidance on this either. While noting that '*incremental change*' and '*revolution*' can in some cases complement each other, Slabbert concludes that the 1983 constitutional referendum among white voters '*finally destroyed the possibility that fundamental change could occur constitutionally in any conventional sense of the word*' (p.402). Such a view fails to see how apparently intractable *constitutional settlements in Africa* were later renegotiated: the Central African Federation in the early 1960s being an especially good example. What is apparently non-negotiable at *one point of time* becomes negotiable at another — a week is a long time in politics, as Harold Wilson once said. Slabbert's analysis seems unduly burdened by the tight parameters of white politics and fails to look at the pressures from the popular level of the townships and the reserves. In general, however, the chapter pinpoints the fact that the volume as a whole can be seen as deriving from the failure of a particular set of negotiating strategies in the 1980s and the need for liberals to try and think through some alternative sense of ideological direction. This has occurred, furthermore, during a period of growing political polarisation in which, as Slabbert suggests, the society appears to be moving in the direction less of a '*non-racial democracy*' but of a '*multi-racial autocracy*'.

Is the volume really, in the final analysis, about *democratic liberalism*? In many ways, it has only a poor historical grasp of this term in the South African context and would have benefitted from *comparative analysis*, in the style of Barrington Moore, of the conditions and class alliances necessary to realise democratic liberalism. The choice of academic marxists as the main ideological target has driven the liberal contributors of this volume into a rather inward-looking debate in which the international dimensions have been ignored. A contribution from a scholar like Peter Vale would have enabled the volume to pinpoint the significance of South Africa's international linkages and external policy for the future of democratic liberalism. Further, what impact does the debate on sanctions and

disinvestment have on the position of liberals? Should we assume that it will automatically reinforce the position of the far right in white politics? The volume is silent on such issues. Likewise, it is silent on the general declining appeal of Afro-marxist regimes in the 1980s and the chances of a liberal agenda upstaging the rather tired looking marxist vocabulary which still defines much of the radical rhetoric in the townships. The resurgence of neo-liberalism in Britain and the US in the 1980s suggests that a transformation of values can occur in industrial societies quite rapidly. For such an upsurge, it is essential to have a clear understanding of the nature of popular forces. There is, however, little evidence of this in the present volume.

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APARTHEID: A HISTORY

Brian Lapping, London: Paladin, 1987, pp.241 plus book list and index. Illustrated. Four maps. R16,95.

This volume, by the producer of the Granada Television series *Apartheid*, seeks the answers to two questions: 'How did the peoples of one of the most richly endowed countries in the world come to adopt so inefficient a social arrangement, and why did they persist with it when the rest of the world could see that it was not working?' (p.13).

In his search for understanding, Lapping comes closer to the truth of the first issue than he does to the second. Nonetheless, the author's approach is a welcome one in a period of writing on South Africa close to being overwhelmed by 'committed analysis', and what a previous reviewer has termed 'an explicitly normative approach'.¹ Lapping aims at explanation,

rather than condemnation, and in the process demonstrates a feeling for human frailty not often found in current political writing on South Africa.

Lapping begins his account in the 1650s, with the establishment of a replenishing station by the Dutch East India Company at the Cape of Good Hope, and ends with the ten-year reform period 1977-1987. He covers considerable ground in between, including the growing clash of interests between the Dutch settlers and Britain; the Voortrekkers' attempts to escape imperial rule; the discovery of the country's mineral wealth and the impact thereof on politics at both the local and metropolitan levels; and the Boer War. The book focuses in greater detail, however, on the more recent events of this century: the emergence of nationalist groups, black and white; the election of 1948 and the subsequent codification and extension of apartheid; the attempts by successive prime ministers to implement the grand design in the face of growing political resistance and changing economic and social realities, culminating in the reform period of the late 1970s and the present decade. He ends on a pessimistic note with an interpretation of the results of the 1987 general election and sees the white electorate as steadily moving to the right.

Reading this book, I came to appreciate the veracity of David Hume's dictum: 'History is the discovering of the constant and eternal principles of human nature', for there are no saints and many sinners in the canvas Lapping paints. If any one group emerges from Lapping's scrutiny relatively unscathed, it is the black nationalists of the early 1900s, people who would most probably be labelled 'sellout' had they lived several decades later. (Sol Plaatjie, the first Secretary of the African National Congress, referred dismissively to those who made up the first black strike of any real size — which took place in 1918 — as 'these black Bolsheviks of Johannesburg'.) It is surely one of the profound ironies of South African political history that the reasonable demands of Plaatjie and his colleagues were ignored, opening the door wider to the radicalisation and ideologisation of black politics.

Lapping demonstrates with some success the limits to regarding apartheid as a phenomenon *sui generis*, arguing instead that the policy of racial discrimination codified, developed, and enforced by the National Party since 1948, is not so much an aberration as it is a continuation of a history of discrimination in South Africa. Moreover, much of that history is one of conflict between Afrikaner and Briton. Indeed, it is seldom appreciated by observers of South African politics that, as late as the 1930s, the terms 'racial conflict' and 'the two races' when used in South Africa did not mean black versus white. They referred to the 200-year-old conflict between Afrikaner and Briton.

The Afrikaners, Lapping asserts, are not uniquely evil or racist or authoritarian. Indeed, he suggests that, as the first people in Africa to attempt to throw off the colonial yoke, the Afrikaners were, in their demand

for absolute power in their own state, little different from the black nationalists who were to follow in the rest of the continent. While apartheid as an explicit policy can be linked with the accession to power of the National Party (NP) in 1948, the genealogy of apartheid as racial discrimination can be traced back through the previous 300 years of South African politics. It is rooted in the Afrikaners' own perception of foreign dominance and discrimination. The irony here is obvious. It is significant that the first actions of the newly-elected NP in 1948 were directed not at the black population groups as those unfamiliar with the history of apartheid tend to assume, but at the British. Malan's immediate objective appeared not to be the further subjugation of the black majority, but rather to secure Afrikaner supremacy over the English-speaking whites. To this end he promptly put a stop to Smuts' immigration policy, and extended the time qualification for citizenship from two to five years to ensure that recent British immigrants would not be able to vote in the next general election.

The history of apartheid as it unfolds within the pages of this slim volume is not black and white. Apartheid is not just an overweening concern with skin colour, it is discrimination in the service of group identity and security — with a dose of power politics thrown in for good measure. In 1934 Jan Hofmeyr said of Hertzog's disenfranchisement of Cape blacks: 'It starts out from fear and its underlying conception is the interests of the stronger'. Having presented apartheid in this way, Lapping fails to explore adequately the implications of this for the second issue he sets out to explore — namely, why apartheid endures.

Many public figures, both within and without South Africa, have bemoaned the foolishness, selfishness and shortsightedness of the (white) South African voter in not jettisoning apartheid. Few have offered a credible and realistic scenario for the future. Lapping joins the ranks of the many who threw up their hands in despair at what they saw as the outcome of the 1987 General Election: a shortsighted white electorate placing its government in a seemingly impossible dilemma. Ken Owen and Denis Beckett are amongst the few who evince a deeper understanding.² As Beckett has pointed out, whites 'need to know where they are going before they set out, not to find out where they have gone, and they need more than a constitutional guarantee, which they see as but a liberal autumn preceding a totalitarian winter'.³ Perhaps the biggest shortcoming of Lapping's book is the expectation implicit in the closing sections of his book: that those in a position of power in this country — no matter how unjust that dispensation may be — should give it up for an uncertain future.

Notwithstanding its shortcomings, *Apartheid: A History* is an interesting and eminently readable introduction to the complexity of South African politics, containing — for those wanting to pursue issues in greater detail — a useful and annotated bibliography. I would recommend this book to all who

are interested in South Africa's history and concerned about its future. For to contribute *meaningfully* to South Africa's future, it is surely important if not essential to study its past.

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Relations, University of the Witwatersrand)

Notes

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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICAN STUDENTS

Jacqueline Matthews

Johannesburg, Southern Book Publishers, 1987, 127 pp, includes index, appendices, bibliography, R27,99.

This study of international economic institutions and policies targets its market among university and technikon students. It is based on well-organised and carefully structured lecture notes, written by a university teacher of many years standing. It addresses an undergraduate audience which possesses a basic knowledge of economics. Its specifically South African viewpoint breaks new ground, a refreshing change from the more common American orientation of such course texts. The publication of this book comes at an apposite time as South Africans are forced to become increasingly and uncomfortably aware of the impact and influence of the international economy on our economic and political destiny in a hostile world which views disinvestment and economic sanctions as appropriate political weapons. It is as well to provide students with an outward-looking mentality and a knowledge of the nuts and bolts of international economic relations. This book is also likely to be of use to businessmen wishing to break into the export market.

The book surveys five specialist areas: international trade policies and institutions; the international monetary system, exchange rates and the balance of payments; regional economic integration and the European Economic Community and relations with Africa; the problems of developing countries and the problems arising from relations between developed and developing countries; and the characteristics and activities of multinational corporations — again with particular emphasis on Southern Africa. The chapter on the international monetary system was written by Dr

PDF Strydom of the Sanlam Investment Corporation and erstwhile respected professor of economics at the University of South Africa.

The book admirably fulfills its task of expounding on the basic concepts necessary for an understanding of international economic relations and highlights the problems that arise in such inter-country contacts. A smattering of economic theory is used in explaining the advantages of trade, but overall, the approach is strongly contemporary and empirical. A wealth of statistical data is used and pertains mainly to the period 1980 to 1985, but a historical dimension provides a post-Second World War context.

The clear numbering of topics and subheadings within chapters makes for easy reference, although this convention fragments the flow of argument and emphasises its textbook character. Graphs, maps, statistical tables, a helpful set of appendices, a detailed bibliography, a list of abbreviations, and a full index add to the book's ready reference appeal.

The highlighting of problems will stimulate debate in discussion groups, while at the same time, the student can assemble the evidence needed in argument. The 127 pages of text have been densely written and — at R27,99 — the local publisher is providing a viable alternative to an imported textbook of less relevance to the South African student.

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
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