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Contents/Inhoud

New Framework for Foreign Policy Analysis

This edition of the Bulletin has been dedicated almost entirely to the publication of a series of papers presented by distinguished South African and visiting scholars at a conference organised by Prof. Koos van Wyk of the International Studies Unit at Rhodes University in August 1989. It was felt important that in the light of the imminent radical changes in South African society, serious consideration needed to be given to the future role of foreign policy. This collection of papers endeavours to point the way.

Prof. Van Wyk has accordingly been invited to act as Guest Editor for this issue.

Smuts House Notes

The analysis of South African foreign policy has, in the past, been characterized by descriptive and historical approaches. In this mode contributions by Barber, Olivier, Barratt, Nolutshungu, Pienaar and others enriched our understanding of the subject. Unfortunately for scholars of South African foreign policy this intellectual tradition remained the dominant paradigm despite the tremendous impact since the 1960's of behaviouralism, post behaviouralism, and more specifically, comparative foreign policy (CFP), on political science communities elsewhere. This test emphasized a more 'scientific' examination of foreign policy. Belatedly, local political scientists have started to apply CFP theories to aspects of South African foreign policy, notably in decision-making, elite and mass opinion, the beliefs of leaders, and foreign policy behaviour.

On the whole, however, the theoretical and methodological underpinning of the analysis of South African foreign policy still leaves much to be desired.

In this volume of the *International Affairs Bulletin* the proceedings of a conference titled *New Frameworks For Foreign Policy Analysis* are published. Organized by the International Studies Unit, Rhodes University, the conference was held at Grahamstown in August 1989. The eight articles included address a wide variety of theoretical and practical applications of foreign policy analysis.

Hopefully these articles will inspire students of South African foreign policy to ascribe a very high priority to theory and methodology in their research.

A brief overview of the articles may be helpful. Charles Kegley explores the achievements and shortcomings of the Comparative Foreign Policy (CFP) paradigm. He suggests a number of ways in which this paradigm can regain momentum, i.e., a broader level of generality, departure from state-centric biases; an increase in policy-relevant research, expansion of existing data sources and the development of new ones, the construction of new theories not necessarily dependent upon quantification and greater sensitivity in the application of methodology. Pat. McGowan, in his typical style, challenges the reader to a fundamental rethink of foreign policy analysis (FPA). He argues convincingly that FPA cannot be divorced from International Relations theory. He demonstrates that FPA is primarily imbedded in neo-realist thinking. He points out that neo-realism and its predecessor, realism, have serious shortcomings as a general theory of International Relations, and urges the merits of World Systems Theory as an alternative and dynamic framework of FPA. World Systems Theory provides a powerful historical critique of the development of the

international political economy structure, which entrenched, generally speaking, the interests of the industrial world at the expense of the Third World.

The articles of Van Wyk and Radloff, and Van Nieuwkerk and Van Wyk are based on quantitive analysis. The first, using events data, investigates the symmetry (volume) and reciprocity (friendly and hostile actions) of foreign policy behaviour between South Africa and its external environment. The findings show that among other things, symmetry occurred over a two year cycle since 1984, and that reciprocity was particularly strong in the area of verbal co-operation and physical conflict. The second article, using content analysis, analyses former State President P.W. Botha's foreign policy beliefs. The findings show that Botha saw the world as dominated by a confrontational environment (realism) and that his beliefs were characterized by serious misperceptions such as total onslaught. As decision-maker, Botha's beliefs encouraged a foreign policy based on realism, which had many negative consequences for South Africa's relations domestically, as well as for the international community and the region.

In the next two articles two leading scholars present their thoughts so concisely that their contents are synonymous with future research agendas. Deon Geldenhuys identifies ten crises in South Africa's foreign relations. His core argument is that apartheid lies at the root of South Africa's woes. The crises relate to morality, legitimacy, credibility, giantism (regional hegemony), security, stability and survivability, prosperity, ostracism, foreign intervention, and manoeuvrability.

Peter Vale, provides a much needed review of scholarly work on South Africa's regional policies and regional perspectives on southern Africa He identifies three schools of thought: the 'Episodic School', the 'Expatriate Revisionists' and the 'Technical Experts'. After outlining the shortcomings and strengths of each approach, Vale postulates a number of questions which require serious scholarly attention, regardless of intellectual points of departure.

The two articles by Leonard Suransky and Kiru Naidoo demonstrate that scholarly investigation is not only about description and explanation, but that prediction is an essential intellectual tool for the social scientist. Suransky speculates in fine eclectic style about the foreign policy of a post-apartheid South Africa. He discusses the process of transition beyond apartheid, the effects of socio-political and economic orientation (capitalism or socialism) on a future foreign policy,. non-alignment as an option, and what the likely Western and Third World foreign policies towards the first black African nuclear power will be.

Naidoo addresses the position of a post-apartheid South Africa in the international political economy. He foresees that South Africa's movement away from its present capitalist stance towards a mixed economy, in line

with the philosophy of the Freedom Charter, as well as closer and friendlier economic co-operation between South Africa and its neighbours within an expanded SADCC. However, the dictates of South Africa's national interest will still be foremost.

Koos van Wyk
Guest Editor.

Charles W. Kegley, Jr.

The Development and Destiny of The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: Paradigm Lost?

To evaluate a field of study is a presumptuous exercise. It necessitates violation of a strong conviction that there are many paths to knowledge, and that intellectual progress is enhanced by paradigmatic heterodoxy rather than by paradigmatic chauvinism. And it requires entering a controversial area – the study of paradigms and of the factors promoting and inhibiting their growth. 'Brother, can you paradigm?', Inis Claude (1970: 47) once asked. Like the study of comparative foreign policy, the philosophical, historical and sociological study of paradigms is in its infancy (Merton, 1973). Neither philosophers nor historians nor sociologists of knowledge nor political scientists agree on the meaning, characteristics, and utility of paradigms; nor do they agree on the utility of discussions couched in terms of paradigms. Given these conditions, it is unclear whether it is possible 'to paradigm' meaningfully or successfully. Indeed, I am uncertain whether one should paradigm. Such musing can be counter-productive, arousing epistemological uncertainties and masochistic introspections; it may in fact divert and sap energies directed at furthering knowledge by the apparent intractability of the epistemological problems noted and the anxieties such intractability elicits.

Despite these misgivings, the temptation to scrutinize a paradigm which is itself committed to detached scrutiny and iconoclastic skepticism could not be resisted.

The *wissenssoziologie* that follows seeks neither paradigmatic panacea nor placebo. Its sole purpose is to provoke discussion. It will have succeeded if it encourages constructive communication about how accumulated imbalances in scope and method might be redressed. It will have failed if it stimulates still more cleavages, breeds intolerance of differences, and fosters new levels of exasperation.

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> 'the development of scientific knowledge must take account of the way science has actively been practiced'. – Thomas Kuhn
> 'Science searches the common experience of people; and it is made by people, and it has their style'. – Jacob Bronowski

If, as Thomas Kuhn (1962: 77) claims, '*the decision to reject one paradigm* is always simultaneously the decision to accept another,' then the goals advocated by those urging comparative studies of foreign policy in the 1960s might be classified as a paradigmatic departure revolutionary in intent. Those present at the creation of the comparative foreign policy (CFP) paradigm shared a cluster of assumptions that seemed to justify – indeed, demand – a declaration of independence from pre-existing approaches to the study of foreign policy. Certain convictions were held to be self evident: that all nations' foreign policy behaviours were comparable; that patterns in those behaviours were determined by certain factors (among these were size, wealth, and political accountability); that to uncover *nomothetic* statements about the relative potencies of these determinates, powerful comparative methodologies were available (deriving their just power from the paradigm that justified them.) The declaration accepted one set of epistemological prescriptions and rejected another. A convincing case against a case-study approach was voiced (Rosenau, Burgess, and Hermann, 1973). Antidotes for anecdotes were prescribed. Faith in a form of reasoning that was itself *sceptical of faith was expressed: to replace subjective belief* with verifiable knowledge; to reject intuition for testable evidence; to make claims to knowledge not on arguments from authority but from falsifiable hypotheses; to build theory not by the arbitrary selection of facts but rather by analysis of all available data – both supportive and non-supportive – collected systematically; to transcend the false solace of appeals to common sense, conventional wisdom, and uncertain truths; to introduce greater rigour and precision into analysis by moving from pre-operational, elastic lexical concepts to operationally defined, intersubjectively-transmissible ones; and to rest observations on reproducible evidence instead of opinion and educated guesses – these were the *presumptions and commitments* uppermost in the minds of advocates of comparative studies of foreign policy.

The roots of this paradigmatic departure must, of course, be traced to the so-called behavioural revolution that swept the study of international relations and to the scientific-neopositivistic tradition of inquiry in the social sciences that predated it (see Gunnel, 1975). The predominant ethos of the CFP paradigm was scarcely revolutionary, inasmuch as the call for transformations made in studies of foreign policy echoed analytic principles

called for earlier in cognate fields: greater sensitivity to the problems of correct inference from observable data; awareness of the requirements of scientific method and of statistical treatment of data; and consciousness of empirical procedures for the building of a body of theory from verified hypotheses which in turn becomes the basis of new hypotheses, to name but the most conspicuous categories. The call for focused research not only on idiographically-detailed descriptions of unique and peculiar international episodes, but on the search for generalizations bound by neither location nor time for their validity, of course, had been articulated before as well. Hence the CFP research orientation was part of a much larger intellectual movement, deriving stimulation at its incipience from these wider developments in the social sciences even while it served itself to accelerate catalytically this movement.

The quantitative and scientific contagion process evident throughout the social sciences made the prediction 'historians – your days are numbered' seemingly self-fulfilling, as the emergence of the interpolimetric and cliometric approaches in international relations (IR) and history, respectively, would suggest. Comparative studies of foreign policy comprised a part of this development.

Nevertheless, it can be posited that at its origins the CFP research movement possessed the major prerequisites that Thomas Kuhn (1962) identified as the central components of a paradigm. From the beginning, there was a self-conscious cognitive and professional identity. There existed a modicum of consensus about what central questions should be investigated, the framework(s) most useful in guiding research and theorizing, the sources from which those data could be 'made,' the categories by which those data could be collated, and acceptance of comparative methodologies by which those collected data could be analyzed. There existed also basic agreement about the rules governing the interpretation of emergent research results, including fundamental epistemological premises and criteria for assessing the cogency of knowledge-claims. Although diverse threads of analytic posturing render the mosaic difficult to characterize, nevertheless in the beginning sufficient coherence was extant to make a paradigmatic perspective a meaningful adjective for describing what was being created.

To label this emergent genre of research a 'paradigm' is now, as then, questionable. Philosophers and sociologists of knowledge do not agree intersubjectively on an operational definition of a paradigm (see Lakatos and Musgrave, 1978), so that we can know when we have an instance of one. Its meaning is unclear. Any application of the term is therefore guaranteed to invoke controversy. But the label, it is submitted, is appropriate for the CFP approach that was advocated initially. Sociologically, CFP acquired early in its history the character of a research community. A paradigm is a collective

intellectual enterprise, requiring for its formation prophets to articulate inadequacies in prevailing paradigms, to propose solutions to those deficiencies, to lead the revolt against the frameworks and research programs in existence. It requires disciples to carry the message to the unconverted. CFP had both in abundance at its birth. CFP research also created a new vocabulary (a slanguage?) for discussing foreign policy problems, with all the attendant rites, rituals, and commandments which tend to govern any collective *weltanschauung*. Thus what began as an 'invisible college' (Price, 1963: Crane, 1972) – a collection of scholars sharing conceptual premises, working informally and formally at the development of new research frontiers – became a highly visible research movement. It became, not a fad, not a fantasy, but a field (Rosenau, 1968, 1975). It successfully differentiated itself, over time, from antecedent, rival approaches. Its claim for intellectual and paradigmatic legitimacy was widely accepted. These attributes, it is submitted, met the minimal requirements of what might be termed a selfconsciously organized paradigmatic orientation.

The sources that gave rise to the legitimacy and prominence of the CFP paradigm were multifarious. Those writing a *wissenssoziologie* would certainly cite as factors promoting its rise the sense of exhilaration that derives from being in the *nouvelle vague* of research, and the paradigm's ability to confer identity and status on those adhering to its principles. Promotive, too, was the existence of a climate of opinion that made its attack on dogma, on political journalism as a substitute for policy analysis, and on the smug assurance of ideologues and polemicists fall on receptive ears. The demand of policymakers for knowledge that was more than merely heuristic in its value also facilitated the search for methodological innovations able to provide that knowledge, innovations that took the study of foreign policy beyond the limits imposed by existing approaches. Non-systematic and non-comparative approaches were perceived increasingly as inadequate and incapable of providing new answers or resolving old puzzles and anomalies.

Then too, the paradigm's growth was stimulated by forces that had little to do with the apostolic fervour of its proponents or the cogency of their preachings. The paradigm emerged partly in response to the creation of new communication networks, new journals and scholarly associations, new institutional pressures and new criteria governing academic rewards and advancement. New sources of research funding and the advent of the grants-economy also contributed to the paradigm's growth. This is not to suggest that a discipline thinks with its wallet (although some of it undeniably does). It is to remind us that the allocation of intellectual resources among different research orientations is often affected as much by extraneous socializing forces and the availability of research resources and

funds as by actual idea-cleavages or intellectual forces. The comparative study of foreign policy paradigm was not immune to these forces, and its emergence must be seen in light of the propensity for paradigm formation and paradigm rejection to be shaped by these kinds of processes and environmental climates.

Whatever the reasons for its ascendance, the comparative foreign policy paradigm clearly surfaced as a major departure in international relations, gathering momentum and converts as it grew. It transcended the traditional approaches that had preceded it for centuries, thereby differentiating itself from them and acquiring, in the process, an identity and sense of autonomy. Some of the salient indicators of this development and progression are worth recalling, listed in approximate chronological sequence:

★ the foundation laid by pre-theoretical efforts to provide the field with conceptual schema and analytic frameworks for comparing the external behaviour of nations (e.g., Snyder, Bruck, Sapin, 1962; Modelski, 1962; Thompson and Macridis, 1962; Rosenau, 1966; Hermann, 1968; Brecher et at., 1969; Wilkinson, 1969).

★ the advent of the event data research movement and the symbiotic relationship it has maintained with the development of comparative studies of foreign policy (see Azar and Ben-Dak, 1975; Kegley et al., 1975; or Munton, 1979, for reviews and examples).

★ convening of three major conferences in the late 1960s by Edward Azar at Michigan State University to consider event data research potentialities and comparative research prospects.

★ formation of the Inter-University Comparative Foreign Policy (ICFP) Project, with James N. Rosenau as co-ordinator, which culminated in a series of workshops and publications (Rosenau, Burgess, and Hermann, 1973; Rosenau, 1974 and 1976).

★ formation of the Foreign Policy/International Events (FP/IE) subsection of the International Studies Association renamed the Comparative Foreign Policy subsection, with associates numbering in excess of 500 members that publishes its own newsletter.

★ creation of The Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies publication series (e.g., Kegley and McGowan, Vol. 4, 1979) devoted exclusively to the publication of comparative studies of foreign policy.

★ creation of the periodical International Interactions by and under the editorship of Edward Azar for the dissemination of research in systematic studies of international behaviour.

★ publication by McGowan and Shapiro (1973) of a propositional inventory containing a staggering number of empirical, comparatively-tested findings about foreign policy behaviour found in the literature.

★ emergence of an impressive array of research project varietals from the seeds of the CFP orientation, whose acronyms comprise a substantial part of

the field's vocabulary; WESI, DON, COW, COPDAB, CREON, FRIP, IBA, SAP, AFRICA are but a small subset of the projects undertaken (see Burgess and Lawton, 1972).

★ acceptance and use of CFP frameworks, data-systems, and technologies by governmental agencies dispersed throughout the world, conspicuously prominent in the foreign affairs bureaucracies of not only the United States, but also Japan, Norway, Canada, the Soviet Union, Chile, to name but a few.

★ diffusion of the CFP research orientation throughout the foreign affairs think-tanks in the United States (e.g., DARPA, IPPRC, CACI, Mathematica, Decisions and Designs, Inc., Human Sciences Research, Inc., Center for Naval Analysis, etc.).

★ diffusion of the CFP mode of analysis throughout the discipline's scholarly literature, attaining a significant place in the way thinking about foreign policy was expressed in textbooks (e.g., Hanrieder, 1971; Letner, 1974; Vocke, 1976; Morgan, 1976; Sullivan, 1976; Kegley and Wittkopf, 1987, East Salmore, Hermann, 1979, Jensen, 1982).

These developments in the 1960s and 1970s reveal more than hyper-activity. Even as a mere portrait of its skeleton, they are symptomatic of paradigmatic achievement and accomplishment. They signify the creation of a productive paradigm with a progressive record of expansion and growth. They attest to the fact that a paradigmatic revolution had been completed, in the sense that the foundations were successfully laid for a research orientation that rapidly evolved and matured. It is difficult to identify another research movement in the IR field that has obtained as much identity, visibility, and level of co-ordinated activity as has the CFP paradigm.

Yet, however unmistakable are the indicators of the CFP paradigm's creation and growth (see McGowan, 1976) it is certainly clear that evolution has meant change. The characterizations that defined its advent do not define well its present state. It no longer fits its own caricature. It has evolved into something different from what it once was. Past success does not, moreover, guarantee future progress. Indeed, it can be asked if the label 'paradigm' remains an apt description of what the CFP genre of research has become.

Today voices of disillusionment are increasingly heard from within and from outside the CFP movement (e.g., Smith, 1987). The sense of excitement and crusading methodological sermonizing exhibited at the birth of the paradigm has dissipated. The evangelical joy that accompanied the propounding of a new approach has given way to the anguish that accompanies its execution. The cry of 'eureka!' is heard less frequently. Instead, challenges to the central premises of the paradigm are becoming more common and strident. If one listens to contemporary disciplinary

discourse, the impression is undeniable that the paradigm is troubled and troublesome, and that its sense of internal cohesion has diminished and perhaps begun to disappear.

What do these complaints and criticisms tell us? Are they symptoms of paradigmatic decay, fragmentation, stasis and atrophy, or intellectual senility? Is the CFP paradigm suffering from a terminal illness? Or is it merely that normal science is now the case under the paradigm? Some of the alleged symptoms deserve to be inspected more closely.

Paradigm Lost?

> 'The ego is indefatigable!...Especially when paradigms are lost'. – James N. Rosenau

Assertions of the CFP paradigm's malaise and demise abound. Witness a small sample of the opinion. One critic characterized the field thus:

> The comparative foreign policy area is (at least if taken as a whole) an example of a static or degenerating research nucleus. Once fairly well united by shared *commitments* to common research interests, this group has never exhibited any uniform, sustained selective cumulation...(Ashley, 1976: 155).

Others from inside the movement have observed:

> The past twenty years have not been without progress...but the entire enterprise is now as intellectually strong as is the most primitive stage in the path from theory building through verification to the question of *quo vidimus*. And, unfortunately, this foundation may be so rickety that all the skills of the computer programmer and the statistician cannot salvage the enterprise. (Harf, et al., 1976: 272).

Yet another comparativist asked 'Where did I go wrong?', and reported:

> A television ad for a dehydrated soup mix has a small child eagerly asking its mother: 'Is it soup yet?' If (CFP) investigators were mothers and our research the prospective soup, our children would have starved waiting for the lunch to be prepared. (Hermann, 1979).

Similarly, in a private communication, Jonathan Wilkenfeld reflected that:

> My research generation (if there is such a thing) was quite successfully indoctrinated on the notion that as social scientists, we are never going to get anywhere unless we rise above case studies and concentrate on conceptual schemes, cross-nationally operationalized variables, and models capable of universal application. All this was based on the assumption that similar states faced with similar circumstances will react similarly to the same stimuli. While I still believe this to be the case, I have become increasingly critical to the process.

These assessments convey the impression of a paradigm in disarray or decay. The important question is why these expressions are so prevalent. What problems contribute to the potential loss of this paradigm?

Criticism from those within the paradigm has been voiced often, and much of that self-evaluation has been constructive (e.g., Rosenau, 1974, 1975, 1976; Hermann, Kegley, and Rosenau, 1987). (This self-scrutiny itself

should, in my view, be taken as a sign of healthy ferment, for what we take the time to evaluate says something about the things we value.) Vexatious problems currently faced have been identified, and perversities and pathologies have been explored. The field has resisted the unforgivable temptation to forgive itself instantly for its sins of omission and commission.

This essay is not the place to review the issues and debate again the avenues for their solution (some will be considered subsequently). But if we listen to a small sample of opinion we can at least estimate the magnitude of the paradigm's deficiencies, and assess their implications for the future of the paradigm. A non-systematic reading of the views of systematicists reveals the following to be the major afflictions:

Conceptually, we are told, the field – uses deterministic logic for indeterminate phenomena; confuses correlation with cause; practices blind reductionism and/or holisticism; proliferates conceptual schema endlessly, with new ones embraced and old ones discarded without demonstrating either the deficiency of the old or the fecundity of the new; lets data-availability shape the definition of research problems; permits method to define subject rather than vice versa; hides behind 'as if' reasoning; theorizes ethnocentrically from a 'state-centric' posture; masks the multidimensional character of foreign policy phenomena; uses the protective *ceteris paribus* clause indiscriminately; overemphasizes national units of analysis; has been preoccupied with the internal development of itself as a discipline; focuses on a national attribute-foreign policy) actor – action) perspective, thereby missing factors affecting relations between actors; ignores cross-level linkages and the problem of tracing the connections between micro-behaviour and macro-consequences; is inattentive to macro-change.

Methodologically, the field is accused of being – meta-methodologically preoccupied; overly-reliant on particular types of data (i.e., event); causally inferential in the absence of causal research designs; inattentive to the problems of multicollinearity; addictively attached to additive linear models of curvilinearly-ordered phenomena; unappreciative of the dangers of ecological inference; mistaken in treating variables as independent that empirically are not (i.e., they co-vary); resistant to replication studies obsessed with overly-aggregated measures and data-reduction techniques (i.e., citing figures without giving facts); insensitive to the mathematical requirements of statistics employed; naively attracted to simple (single) indicators of multidimensional concepts; willing to transform data to fit techniques rather than enhancing validity; selective of variables in terms of their quantifiability (i.e., what is conventually measured is what is convenient to measure); stubbornly inductivist and empiricist (i.e., the picture is painted with numbers).

Substantively, findings are characterized as – trivial; ahistorical; afuturistic

(i.e., exclusively historical); obsolete (overturned by developments); inattentive to the impact of foreign policy and its evaluation; apolitical; ethically insensitive; policy-irrelevant; non-dynamic (i.e., static); non-processual; theoretically un-informed; descriptive but non-explanatory; predictively impotent.

Still others could be added to these over-lapping criticisms. Research outcomes in comparative studies are said to be divergent, ad hoc, unverified, and artifactual. Worshiping at the altar of parsimony and elegance, CFP theories are neither parsimonious nor elegant. Nor are they sufficiently multi-causal. Collectively, these attributes describe a paradigm that is said to be both primitively immature and maturely stagnate. It has made a Popperian spectacle of itself, proceeding tenaciously in a pedestrian trial-and-error fashion without producing spectacular results. *Instead of* generating (as a mature science is supposed to) novel auxiliary theories, CFP research has produced a welter of discrepancies, inconsistencies, and anomalies. The Kuhnian notion of a normal science becoming theoretically dogmatic (as Kuhn put it, 'All normal science rests on a foundation of dogma') or always 'preparadigmatic' is also pertinent to comparative studies of foreign policy, in the sense that progressive effort has confined, not liberated, the orientation from its central preconceptual tendencies. Frustration points, it would seem, to a paradigm lost, a paradigm nearing the end of a normal period waiting to be replaced by newer reconstructed logics.

If taken to their logical resting place, these complaints about perplexing difficulties invite only despair. The words of the Anglican confession of sin capture the prevailing mood: 'We have left undone those things which we ought to have done; and we have done those things which we ought not to have done; and there is no health in us'.

But is this sense of doom and gloom warranted? Do specific difficulties sum to paradigmatic failure? Is the CFP paradigm really lost? Is, indeed, the comparative approach to understanding foreign policy not a solution, but part of the problem?

This image may be inaccurate. Its general pessimistic and defeatist conclusion, it is contended, should be challenged. Some alternate ways of interpreting the meaning of the criticisms being voiced deserve consideration.

Paradigm Regained

> [S]cientific method [has] been subjected to a lot of self-criticism...We can all show weaknesses, it's easy to condemn, and still ...for me personally...it organizes thinking about how you know and whether you know. I don't think the criticisms that have been expressed...should be taken in summation as a condemnation of the underlying philosophical premises. – Thomas Volgy.

Picture, if you will, a (rectified) CFP paradigm resting on the psychoanalyst's couch, disclosing anxieties about itself and its self-worth, and asking for advice that can alleviate perceived discomfort. Is the paradigm real, or just a figment of one's imagination? Is there reason for hope? Is the future lost? A candid and competent analyst would have to begin a response to these queries by confessing that there currently exists little agreement about the criteria by which paradigmatic adequacy should be evaluated (Lakatos and Musgrave, 1978), and that therefore diagnosis about CFP research must depend on what is maintained about paradigms in general. The request for help raises anew Claude's (1970: 4) question: 'Brother, can you paradigm?' For what is diagnosed depends on what we look for, and how we look for it. Nevertheless, if caution is abandoned and some non-systematically generated impressions about systematics in foreign policy research are offered, they might include the following observations.

First, if (as Rosenau, 1968, recommends) CFP is looked on as a method, not a body of knowledge, then it is questionable to look askance at the future of comparative foreign policy research. Methodological commonalities define the boundaries of the field, not substantive pursuits (although CFP researchers share inclusion of the behaviour abroad of national units in their models, and every methodological approach carries with it epistemological and metaphysical assumptions). Comparative research strategies are diverse and flexible, and many questions can be addressed meaningfully by them (see McGowan, 1975). Indeed, some questions can only be probed comparatively. To answer, for instance, whether a country's foreign policy is changing over time – and how much – inter-temporal comparisons must be made. And to determine if poor nations are more warlike than rich ones, or if foreign aid recipients are more – rather than less – cooperative toward aid donors, cross-national comparisons must be made. Since questions of this sort are not about to go away, the need for comparative approaches will not disappear (as long, that is, as nation-states exist and formulate foreign policies to compare).

Second, comparativist logic is an inescapable component of any kind of inquiry, including foreign policy analysis. Although some philosophers of science and even advocates of CFP research (e.g., Powell and Knight, 1975) might disagree, others (e.g., Alfred North Whitehead) would assert that comparison is unavoidable. We are all comparativists. All thinking necessitates categorization, and all classifications require comparisons so objects can be grouped into categories. So, too, all statements about degrees of difference rest, necessarily, on perceived national similarities and differences. Hence, comparison is not something we can choose to do or not to do. It is a part of any interpretation of foreign policy behaviour. Unless we are willing to strike all 'either-or' and 'more-or-less' references from the vocabulary with which foreign policy is discussed, we cannot avoid being

comparative. In this context, challenge to comparative research masks the commonality and complementarity of all approaches to foreign policy. (What is challenged, of course, are methodological obstacles to making precise comparisons). An approach advocating consciousness about how comparative logic is utilized does not need to fear for its future, it could be said, for all knowledge claims will force those issues to be considered in one way or another. Despite frustrations, CFP researchers are not straining at the leash to escape the confines of a paradigm advocating systematic, controlled comparison. Because it provides a vehicle for thinking about foreign policy and for interpreting those thoughts, the paradigm's utility will encourage its persistence. It is unlikely for the field of foreign policy to return to reliance on common sense, with all its common limitations (Deutsch, 1959). Or can it? Those enumerating a number of now-familiar reasons why foreign policy should be studied without reference to numbers can still be heard from some quarters. Especially chastised is the paradigm's obsessive compulsion to measure anything but what is important ('if it can't be measured, it isn't worth knowing'). These broadsides display elements of perspicacity, as well as incomprehensible levels of incomprehension. It is mistaken, for instance, to assume that systematic comparison must be quantitative (Holt and Turner, 1970; Przeworski and Teune, 1970). And it is outnumbered. Extrapolated, such criticisms argue that the CFP paradigm be abandoned altogether. At the heart of this kind of complaint is not informed criticism, but paradigm-conflict. The tired debate between competing paradigms is not worth debating yet again. The CFP paradigm, therefore, is best advised, thirdly, to not let revanchist attacks (by those uninformed about the rules of interpretability the paradigm assigns itself) contribute to the loss of confidence.

But fourth, the paradigmatic disquiet exhibited is not best attributed to external attack. Nor is self-doubt best diagnosed as a reaction to the emergence of a rival paradigm promising to overcome more effectively than comparative approaches the obstacles to understanding foreign policy phenomena. No such paradigm is on the horizon. A kuhnian paradigmatic revolution is not evident. Instead, the CFP paradigm's penchant for self-disparagement might be responsible. CFP risks being labelled a cult of methodological flagellomaniacs.

Self-evaluation for the best of reasons can lead to the worst of effects. Obsequious attention to deficiencies can hide contributions and achievements. The latter have been painfully slow, but there has been much accomplished. Consider especially what has been learned, that was not known before, about the sources and consequences of crises, the dimensionality of national attributes and external behaviour, the domestic conflict-foreign conflict linkage, the relationship between alliance

aggregation and war, and the dynamics of arms races, to name but five areas of reward for past labors. En route to these advances, progress has been made as well in the methodological sophistication found in comparative analyses. These achievements alone partially vindicate the path taken, and should help to restore faith in the capacity of the paradigm to advance knowledge. Appreciation of research progress can be an antidote to a paradigmatic existential crisis.

Fifth, perhaps the mood of discontent derives as well from unrealistic paradigmatic ambitions. Some 'fantastic' claims were initially made about what the comparative approach could produce (see Rosenau, 1975). At its inception, CFP research was not inclined to settle for anything less than everything. This is a sure recipe for self-perceived failure. Asking too much of a paradigm risks making it a victim of overload, placing a burden on it that cannot be carried (explaining why there seem to be so many comparative approaches, but so few arrivals?). That progress has been uneven (advancing in some areas, faltering in others) suggests that some aspects of foreign policy are more resistant to systematic treatment than others. The paradigm won't be lost if limitations are acknowledged. To succeed partially is not to fail completely. The extraordinary contributions made are not diminished by the notable lack of accomplishment in some areas. The CFP paradigm can be regained if goals are downgraded the better to fit capacities.

Another (sixth) way of diagnosing paradigmatic dissatisfaction is to postulate that the paradigm is a victim of the prejudice of an age of instant gratification. Unrealistically, immediate success and constant progress have been expected. It would be foolish to require initial conceptions to be immaculate. CFP research has not even been around long enough to discover whether its methods have the self-correcting properties they have been assumed to have. It is probably more appropriate to expect paradigmatic progress to conform, not to a unilinear pattern, but to a logistic 'J' curve (similar to general learning curves), with growth incremental and uneven over time, rising dramatically at first but flattening at a reduced rate of growth as the field matures. This expectation tells us that defeat need not be accepted because the rate of growth begins to decline. Rather, satisfaction with winning more limited victories must be learned. Knowing more, less should be expected. Because progress has already been made, it is not as easy as it once was to reach the frontier. You have to go further now to get there, as a result of past explorations, and it is more difficult to advance it or go beyond it. So, too, must the loneliness of working at the frontier be accepted more gracefully. Recognition for subsequent explorations is unlikely to be as widely appreciated (history assigns special recognition to those arriving on unchartered territory first).

These realities should not contribute to the loss of the CFP paradigm, however. If progress cannot be continual, especially the farther we advance, it can be more meaningful.

If the above argument is reasonable, the mood of discontent would seem unjustified. But it is an empirical datum that the future of the paradigm is being questioned by devoted advocates. A final source for this discontent may be posited: that it derives from the mistaken assumption that paradigmatic factionalism and sectarianism constitute failure. However, another way of looking at the deteriorating paradigmatic cohesion recommends itself, namely, that sub-specialization of effort and internecine quarrelling are signs of healthy ferment, not decay nor hopeless confusion. It would be a curious reading of the history of the development of scientific knowledge to contend that the absence of disagreement represents paradigmatic progress. Agreement indicates instead intellectual stagnation and boredom (a sure sign of paradigmatic decay). No, the transition of a paradigm that in infancy was determined to pursue narrow objectives to one now accommodating a wide range of theoretical foci with a rich repertoire of comparative methodologies is evidence of a vibrant, expanding paradigm. To address many, not few, questions testifies to success, not failure. Profusion has produced many intellectual offspring. That they have wandered off, ungratefully not acknowledging the orientation that gave them birth, should not be taken as rejection – the paradigm's premises and revolutionary spirit have been carried ih hm. The incorporation of these progeny's efforts into the mainstream of the IR research community in general is not evidence of paradigm lost. It is example of a creative paradigm that has expanded its boundaries. Integrity is not compromised by interdenominationalism. A paradigm is invigorated by diversity and reformation efforts.

This set of diagnostic observations leads to the conclusion that the CFP paradigm is assured of its future. The paradigm would seem not to be lost.

It must be repeated, however, that this conclusion is not necessarily correct. It derives from the assumptions made about how a paradigm is best defined and assessed, because what a paradigm claims cannot be put to a direct test. How we choose to look at paradigmatic issues will shape opinion about whether a paradigm even exists. A paradigm can always be gained, regained, or lost by *employing criteria that tautologically produce that* conclusion. When different definitions are employed, different realities are discerned. Thus, the validity of our hypothetical diagnostician's characterization of CFP research as a paradigm is contingent upon the assumptions and observations made about paradigms in general. Before the patient is given a clean bill of health, some alternate ways of looking at the paradigmatic status of CFP research should be acknowledged.

It could be argued plausibly, for instance, that CFP research has never

satisfied the conditions for a paradigm, in the strictest sense of that term. Properly speaking, the identification of a comparative methodology with a paradigm is dubious. So, too, is the assumption that a paradigm can be an epistemology. Scientific comparison represents an orientation, a point of view, toward the study of foreign policy. An approach seeking higher levels of generalization by delineating similarities and differences in the foreign conduct of more than a single actor is not a 'paradigm,' it could be contended. Although many are inclined to speak of a paradigm in this sense, philosophers of science also note that it is possible for two or more paradigms to compete, both of which are 'scientific'. And comparison, which is inescapable regardless of paradigm, may therefore not be sufficient evidence of paradigm. From this perspective, the comparative approach to foreign policy is not a paradigm made, lost, or regained. It is only a somewhat sectarian outlook that challenged preexisting epistemological tendencies and methodological rituals regarding the study of a vaguely defined set of substantive phenomena.

Plausible too is the thesis that the CFP approach is a paradigmatic departure neither lost nor regained but in a 'preparadigmatic' state, having achieved neither self-acceptance nor self-definition. This interpretation would hold that any potential paradigm remaining preoccupied with meta-paradigmatic questions probably is not one. Attained paradigms, it should be recalled, do not talk endlessly about philosophical justifications for their approach – they practice it. It may be that if it is necessary for CFP research to talk so much about itself and its mission, this uncertainty is evidence of a paradigm not lost, but one embryonically not yet born.

But the most appropriate way of viewing contemporary CFP research, it is submitted, is to return to a conception of paradigms that claims the former as a legitimate instance of the latter. If CFP has achieved 'normal science' stature, then it is doing now what all mature paradigms are expected to do – they evolve, sifting in the data seen as important, the units interpreted as salient, and the questions and topics deemed relevant. It would be mistaken to define paradigm evolution as paradigm abandonment. Incremental shifts are not revolutions. Paradigm modification is not paradigm collapse. Hence the fact that CFP research is moving by a process of trial-and-error in new directions (different from those envisaged by its proponents) might be interpreted as signalling successful transformation, not disappearance. It has triumphed by expanding its agenda, improving the sophistication of its methods, and moving well beyond the narrow range of queries that originally dominated attention at its inception. Tension of allegiances within the movement is now tolerated, even encouraged. Signs of having reached an intellectual impasse are not displayed.

Then again, perhaps calling CFP a normal science is begging the question. Is it normal for a normal science to be such a distressed science? Perhaps it is.

It can be argued, paradoxically, that the achievements which make a science normal tend to produce disillusionment, especially when the 'mopping up' stage first commences. CFP may have entered this phase of development. An unanticipated consequence of past accomplishments is that they generate a virtual flood of puzzles for the paradigm to mop up. There is more – not less – to do as a result of what has already been done. As should have been anticipated, findings have not been consistent with each other or with conventional wisdom. What has been learned has enlarged awareness of how *little is still* known and how much there is to know. As knowledge increases, relative ignorance also increases (Tompkins, 1979). To be sure, the inundation produced has been overwhelming, and cannot be absorbed with a mere mop. The task-expansion created by research puzzles and new complexities may have exceeded tolerance for them. Discouragement and disillusionment are not unlikely reactions to this state of affairs.

If a normal science typically goes through such a phase, the stage need not necessarily be prolonged nor end in deterioration. The flood of puzzles can pique interest, stimulating intellectual curiosities and breeding excitement instead of apathy. Indeed, the questions provoked by CFP research perpetuate the need for additional comparative studies to resolve them. Subtleties and complexities heretofore unappreciated can now be considered. Greater awareness that there are no easy answers to research questions should *renew distrust of those with easy answers. If the* opportunities provided are seized, a new phase of energetic paradigmatic problem-solving activity can commence. The paths of research down which past research has lead us can also push us.

Although these reflections are no less arbitrary than alternate ways of thinking about the paradigmatic stature of the CFP genre of research, they may be the most commanding. To argue that CFP research comprises an established paradigm changing with age is to capture what seems to be unfolding, namely, the transformation of a fairly cohesive, small, and focused research movement into a relatively fragmented, large, and substantively dispersed research orientation. This view would hold that the loss of unity is not the loss of paradigm, and evolution is not decay. Perhaps CFP research is, ironically, a victim of its own accomplishment, and disenchantment is a response – not to paradigmatic failure – but to the new identity assumed and the new challenges past successes have created. A psychoanalyst might diagnose the discontent as a kind of paradigmatic mid-life crisis. Ageing can raise doubts about self-definition and identity. The realization with maturity that unrealistic goals will not be realized can elicit despair. The discovery that uninterrupted achievement cannot be sustained can provoke the frustration exhibited. To find that CFP scholars parented a paradigm that was not part of their original intent can lead to a false sense of alienation and rejection.

A psychoanalyst might instruct his patient not to try regaining youthful exhilaration by attempting to reassume the characteristics of youth. Like Humpty Dumpty, the pieces cannot be put back together again along the same lines they once assumed. The clock cannot be turned back. The excitement of youth cannot be regained by discarding the logic of verification that occupies learning in middle age, and returning to the logic of discovery that typifies youth. A paradigm has the capacity for self-renewal and regeneration. It can make a 'passage' into a new phase of growth by adhering confidently to fundamental (methodological) principles and basic (epistemological) ideals. It might effect recovery by retutoring its self-image, adjusting expectations to capacities and objectives to potentialities. A paradigm in tune with what it has become (not what it once was) can be a paradigm with confidence restored and commitment regained, productively rededicating itself to the conquest of challenges that it found unthinkable to address in adolescence.

Some concrete proposals for paradigmatic recovery also might be prescribed. Inasmuch as concrete suggestions refer to some redirections in progress, the CFP paradigm already may be embarked adaptively on passages that can take it toward its destination. Let us look at the future of comparative studies of foreign policy, by examining paradigmatic trends presently in motion and by offering some recommendations for new departures.

Paradigm Retracked: Some Prescriptions for the Future

'Criticism of a [paradigmatic] programme is a long and often frustrating process and one must treat budding programmes leniently'. Imre Lakatos

Need qualitative CFP research be a contradiction in terms? Must the CFP paradigm brace itself for a slowdown? Not necessarily. But to make a safe passage to a new phase of growth, some new departures may be required. Necessary, it would seem, is willingness to rethink research priorities, to confront the adequacy of research strategies (i.e., are we carrying the right intellectual baggage?), and to re-energize effort (even if we're on the right track we'll get run over if we just sit there, running out of steam). All of these are necessary; none alone is sufficient. Six central directions that the next decade of research might pursue productively are prescribed medicinally for consideration, as follows.

Departures in the Level of Generality

A paradigmatic crisis can have empirical causes. Organizing perceptions about reality in order to understand it is not without its problems. Confronted by comparative approaches to foreign policy analysis is an

empirical problem: does the frame of reference of cross-national models *order reality meaningfully?*

CFP findings themselves have a way of undermining the utility of the pictures produced. Patterns in foreign policy behaviour valid through time and across space have not been forthcoming. CFP data speak loudly and clearly: the world of foreign policy is more complicated and idiosyncratic than initially suspected (hoped). Looking for similarities, CFP research has (re)discovered differences; searching for cross-national commonalities, cross-national variations have been found. Generalized statements about foreign policy phenomena have not emerged. In fact, the history of CFP research is cluttered with disproved claims regarding universal features of foreign policy. Covering laws have not covered. The paradigmatic maxim 'seek simplicity, but distrust it' has been followed, but the search has been elusive. Nomological or 'law-like' statements have not been found. Instead, indeterminate, multiple, and relative ones have. Uncertainty and distrust of generalization have been the most important products of empirical research.

These findings showing that states respond differently to identical environmental stimuli raise serious questions about paradigmatic pursuits. It may be that painting a lucid portrait of a varied subject perceived as unvariated is impossible. Are there common denominators for comparing meaningfully all nations' foreign policies? If not, assumptions of regularity and recurrence are unwarranted. The central empirical question raised is whether the behaviours explored are similar enough to permit nomological comparisons. If differences between the objects classified (nations and their behaviour abroad) outweigh similarities, then the typological rule that categorizes empirically cluster characteristics according to the distribution of their attributes is violated. Those categories will fail to differentiate sufficiently (they will not minimize within-group variance and maximize between-group variance). When we try to categorize homogeneously objects that are heterogeneously varied, classes become distinctions without differences. Meaningful comparisons are precluded, as are valid generalizations about causal linkages.

Now, if empirical research itself demonstrates that the pursuit of higher-order and universally applicable generalizations about foreign policy is not productive, does this mean or imply that the paradigm itself is lost and the quest should be jettisoned? Such an implication is in my view altogether unwarranted. To discern differences adequately, similarities must be detected. For that, cross-national comparisons are needed. Moreover, for some kinds of questions comparisons of aggregates are mandatory. Just because you can never step into the same stream twice does not mean that it is any less important or less possible to know which way it is flowing. Or (to mix metaphors further), even though a walk through a forest can prove illuminating, getting close to the underbrush can prevent a clear view of the

forest from being obtained – if we don't want to get lost or lose our sense of direction, we will need to step away occasionally from the trees and survey the forest in its aggregate dimensions. Only comparative findings enable the general flow of the stream and shape of the forest to be detected, and patterns in aggregate behaviour to be discerned.

What is true, of course, is that cross-national comparisons of aggregated measures of foreign policy behaviour are limited in their capacity to capture details. This limitation has been aptly termed (Verba, 1967) a 'dilemma' in comparative research. That mode of research cannot master all types of inquiry. While it can address questions about what is general in the behaviour of all states, it cannot address questions about what is unique and individual in the behaviour of a particular state. This trade off (see Coplin and Kegley, 1975: 366) between richness and rigour, relevance and elegance, is insurmountable. The price must be paid for the choice made. Findings may be obtained at the idiographic pole of the continuum that are complete and complex but ungeneralizable and untestable; driven to their analytic extreme, they say more and more about less and less (...until they say everything about nothing?). At the opposite, nomothetic pole of the continuum are found conclusions like those presently produced by CFP research: partial and simple, but generalizable and testable; driven to their logical extreme, they say less and less about more and more (...until they say nothing about everything?). The dilemma posed for comparative studies of foreign policy is that we cannot have it both ways. We cannot maximize generality and reality at once. One must be sacrificed for the other.

Cognizance of this dilemma suggests the need for future research to pay increased attention to the range of variation around general patterns and to the exceptions that can become important. Sensitivity to dissimilarities (and treatment of outliers and residuals) can delineate boundaries. Probings of the sources for discerned clusterings can facilitate identification of more circumscribed – but valid – generalizations by specifying the empirical divisions operative between classes of cases. In short, an intermediate position between the extremes to the hermeneutic and nomological alternatives can be sought.

This prescribes reduction of the level of generality that is sought, so that more contextually-qualified, circumstantially-bounded, and temporally/spatially-specified propositions are tested. More of the peculiar, unique and particular can be captured at a reduced level of abstraction and generality.

Operating from the 'situational perspective' (Brady, 1974) can introduce greater validity and texture into research hypotheses. In short, to become more relevant, be less elegant; to be more realistic, be less parsimoniously rigid.

To depart from highly-macro, universal abstractions in CFP research carries with it several corollary recommendations that should be made

explicit. Implicit is the prescription to give up the search for a general-purpose framework for comparative investigation. General purpose approaches, hindsight suggests, do not serve general purposes well. It is indeed mistaken to debate the relative merits of alternative frameworks, typologies, and conceptual schema in the abstract. They serve some research goals better than others. They should not be proposed until it is determined what it is that we want to find out. This simple notion, with which few would disagree, has in truth been violated frequently. A plethora of taxonomics have been devised to structure theorizing and observations about foreign policy behaviour for comparative purposes. Most have failed. The lesson revealed by this experience is that pretheorizing may be appropriate (unavoidable!) in shaping the organizing of perceptions about a subject of inquiry. But efforts to pretheorize about the sources and consequences of foreign policy behaviour in general are more likely to confine than to liberate inquiry. It is instructive that so few general-purpose schema have gained popularity, withstood the test of time, and been utilized widely. More profitable, perhaps, would be efforts to construct pretheoretical typologies for specific types of foreign policy issue-areas specified contextually.

Indeed, the recommendation that less-aggregated aspects of foreign policy be studied calls for testing middle-range – and more importantly – problem-specified concepts of foreign policy behaviour. Instead of asking the generic question 'Why do nations act?' we should begin to ask 'Why do they emit X issues? 'Under what conditions?' This circumscribed kind of analysis would confront with data not theories of foreign policy behaviour, but theories of types of foreign policy behaviour. This might approach concept formation by asking 'How do central decision-makers (and counter-elites!) lump factors in their heads when they think about foreign policy issues?' Entailed would be accounting for cross-national variance in, say, military spending, foreign trade, or immigration policy – for the categories of foreign policy demands to which all governments respond – and for which bureaucratic agencies are routinely assigned to manage. Greater attention to the level of specification might free the paradigm from the triviality of findings (e.g., large nations are global actors, poor nations are dissatisfied, nationalistic societies wage war, etc.). It would take investigation away from efforts to account for cross-national differences in levels of foreign policy activity and in degrees of conflict, to which the field has been so addicted. These prescriptions, of course, are consistent with the pleas made for issue-area conceptions of foreign policy (e.g. Rosenau, 1971; Kattenburg, 1974; Coplin, Mills, and O'Leary, 1976). They conform as well to dyadic measures of relations between actors proposed previously (e.g., Rummel, 1966, 1968; Kegley and Skinner, 1976). But it urges also that inquiry be brought down to human proportions, introducing greater

sensitivity to cognitive processes and individual-level variables, including the role of human volition (in the mode that much of Holsti's work, 1976 has exhibited and as illustrated so well by the contribution to the present issue of this journal authored by Anthoni van Nieuwkerk and Koos van Wyk).

To repeat, however, this prescribed departure does not require sacrifice of comparative methodology. To study not only the central tendencies in foreign policy behaviour, but also the dominant deviations from these central tendencies, does not necessitate a return to in-depth case studies. Instead, the comparative case-study approach that is recently emerging is example of the kind of departure that is being recommended for investigation of contextually-bounded generalizations. So too, is reconsideration prescribed of how case-studies might be treated rigorously for middle-range hypothesis-testing (see Holt or Turner, 1970; Russett, 1970; Campbell, 1975). To pursue generalizations that are meaningful and falsifiable at this level requires that controlled comparisons be made.

Substantive Departures

The prescription that the level of generality in comparative foreign policy research be reduced stems, it was noted, from empirical factors. So, too, might three other empirical developments contribute to a CFP paradigmatic crisis. Each invites a substantive departure in research pursuits worthy of consideration.

First, as Chad Alger has demonstrated cogently for us, increasing proportions of the activity flowing across national boundaries emit from non-national units. The CFP focus on government-to-government interaction does not capture the behaviours of subnational and supranational actors, and so-called non-state nations of peoples without power and sovereignty which assuredly conduct foreign relations in an interdependent world. Those actors are increasingly important (as they always were, had we bothered to regard them as being as important as they always thought they were). The transnational perspective is a paradigm whose time has come. This does not render the CFP foci obsolete, however. It merely requires incorporating those kinds of actors into models and treating them as components of nation-states' external environments. Nation-states do not promise to wither away in the immediate future. But exclusive attention on national units – and the statecentric focus it entails – is clearly unwarranted in the interdependently linked transnational system. Acknowledgement of this reality is needed if comparative foreign policy research is to remain relevant to empirical realities.

Second, we live in a world of geometrically accelerating rates of global change, as any survey (e.g., Kegley and Wittkopf, 1989) will reveal. CFP research must begin to take greater account of global transformations and of

the time dimension if its paradigm is to retain pertinence. Therefore, working the dance of time and change into the equation is called for, including stochastic disruptions, discontinuities, and the kinds of instabilities and unique events endlessly recurrent in a rapidly changing world environment. Global transformations have the capacity to render previous findings obsolete. Indeed, as argued earlier, the continual revision of what we take to be confirmed hypotheses, of what we take to be 'knowledge' about foreign policy behaviour, must be recognized and accepted rather than taken as a sign of paradigmatic decay. Developments over time will always overturn research results. There are no eternal verities. Called for, therefore, is rejection of some bad analytic habits: over reliance on cross-sectional research designs (dynamic inferences cannot be safely made from static data), ignoring feedback effects (e.g., the effect of prior external behaviour on a country's subsequent attributes), reluctance to make inter-temporal comparisons, and refusal to model process in foreign policy making. All of these are correctable by restructuring how foreign policy research problems are defined, by taking cognizance of the need for continual revision of our knowledge, and by acknowledging the role of the contingent and the threat that role entails to deterministic logic.

Third, we live in a world of empirical uncertainty and moral confusion. In searching for answers to the former, has CFP research ignored the latter? At least since Hiroshima, but through eternity, all foreign policy questions must be regarded as moral questions. Comparative studies have overlooked the value-implications of inquiries, under the fallacious notion that value-concerns pollute objectivity. We should listen to critics' charges that CFP research ignores the normative assumptions implicit in its perspective, that many research tools inadvertently support the status quo, and (less *inadvertently) that research questions* have been formulated to enhance, not knowledge, but the interests of those entrenched in power. A paradigm cannot isolate itself from the pressing ethical issues of the day, silent on advice, detached from human desperation, and tolerant of all ideas including repugnant ones. Self-described policy experts are often disguised ideologues. Should not their influence be counterbalanced? Comparativists are not precluded from entering the debate. A contribution should be made by demonstrating – empirically – the inadequacy of simplistic policy prescriptions, simplistically arrived at. The danger of amoral policy recommendations needs to be demonstrated empirically. Such endeavours in the context of ethical thinking can stimulate theoretical insight (see Kegley, 1988). The CFP paradigm should re-enter the world it seeks to map, and attempt to contribute to the shape it will assume. A purely rational, empirical account of human misery is inhumane. Science is not distinct from politics ethics, and theology, as sometimes assumed. A more ethically-conscious mode of research is needed. Glenn Paige's (1977) critique of the

ethical implications of his own previous work serves as a useful reminder of the role of values in all empirical research. It should be required reading for all those professing knowledge.

Practical Departures

A paradigmatic crisis can be stimulated by indifference from those whose interest and welfare are affected by the conclusions it derives. A paradigm needs to matter to others, in the long run, to flourish. Comparative foreign policy research can justify its existence most effectively by providing solutions to real world problems, that is, by generating knowledge that can be used to make sound decisions, solve practical policy problems, and discover the means to alleviate conditions of conflict, repression, and the violation of basic human rights.

Few would argue that CFP research findings are policy-relevant or prescriptive. (That claim cannot be made more convincingly by many traditional students of foreign policy – streams of anecdotes and unsubstantiated opinions do not provide the first shred of policy-useful information, either.) Comparative foreign policy research is vulnerable to the charge of escaping the real world and its responsibilities. Undisciplined search for discipline has produced, has it not, a science better suited for describing the past, criticizing methodological shortcomings in others, and testing purely intellectual propositions, than for proposing remedies for problems? CFP studies point to difficulties with solutions, not solutions for difficulties. They may be characterized as conforming religiously to the rule of doctors: never diagnose a disease you can't treat. Some might argue that CFP research findings (based on patterns in historical data, and therefore dependent on things as they are presumed to be or to have been) imply policy prescriptions that exacerbate, not ameliorate. 'Whatever hospitals ought to do, they ought not to spread disease,' Florence Nightingale once reflected. Has the CFP research orientation overlooked the possibility implied by this aphorism?

To retract and revive comparative foreign policy studies, research needs to become policy-relevant. This is difficult. It means far more than merely being where the action is and studying what is trendy to study. Nevertheless, the difficulties of becoming more policy-orientated may be greatly exaggerated. Comparative methods are highly flexible, and can be adjusted readily to conduct empirical research in a more policy – and ethically – relevant fashion. Adoption of the orientation toward the definition of research problems and statement of hypotheses taken by our colleagues working in the evaluation research tradition is required to generate 'usable knowledge' (Lindblom and Cohen, 1979). The 'policy sciences' are called that because of the manner in which they address policy questions. Entailed is escape from the 'If X, then Y' syndrome of bivariate

logic correlating national attributes with foreign policy behaviour (e.g., regime type predicts to foreign policy conflict). Binary thinking in these terms binds thought. Needed is substitution of 'policy outcomes' for dependent variables, including shifts to factors subject to policy manipulation implied by that rhetoric. Evidence should be marshalled to structure judgment of value about a programme or policy, with a view to action. This asks us to be decision-orientated rather than orientating ourselves toward the production of generalizations about relations between macro indicators. It means refashioning research problems on designs oriented toward purely evaluative questions ('Is X better than Y?') or policy-impact analysis ('What are the consequences of policy action X or Y?').

To assume more of an evaluative posture toward foreign policy problems still requires the systematic collection of evidence as a central part of the research process (stating policy prescriptions loosely so no set of observations can negate them is *not* an aid to policy evaluation). Testable hypotheses require systematic comparisons and comparative logic. Experimental and quasi-experimental comparative research designs (see Cook and Campbell, 1979) are examples of this kind of policy-oriented research and illustrative of the kinds of payoffs that such strategies of inquiry can produce for the action-oriented social scientist. If future comparative research in foreign policy studies is cast more in this mode, the viability of the CFP paradigm might be enhanced considerably. Research findings would be met less by loud yawns from those working in policy environments, as well as those seeking to bring about fundamental changes in the human condition.

Departures in Data

A paradigmatic crisis can be rooted in the deficiencies inherent in the way the phenomena it attempts to explain are observed. Pictures of the world emerge from the observations that are made (and vice versa: paradigmatic filters shape observations). A paradigm can be no better than the accuracy of the vision it provides. If we look in different places, we find quite different realities. This epistemological principle informs us that a paradigm can become tied too tightly to the particular *weltanschauung* incorporated in a particular approach to systematic observation.

It is a truism that the emergence of the event data movement has contributed significantly to the growth and development of comparative studies of foreign policy. Elsewhere it has been argued (Kegley et al., 1975) that event research and CFP research have been related symbiotically: the former has assisted growth of the latter, and the latter has contributed to the development of the former. Event data have opened up whole new areas of

foreign policy investigation to comparative study. Those data have enlightened investigation considerably. By introducing new complexity and realism into conceptions about foreign policy, event data have justified the effort that has been invested in their collection. By sensitizing researchers to conceptual and methodological issues, the gathering of event data has been invested in their collection. By sensitizing researchers to conceptual and methodological issues, the gathering of event data also has enhanced considerably the sophistication of researchers.

Worth asking, however, is whether CFP studies have growth too dependent on this single source of information about what countries are doing to each other, as captured in what the world's press defines as newsworthy. If we base study almost exclusively on event data, we run the risk of missing much of the action. We only get the news that's print to fit. Event data tell us what behaviour is moving across borders eventfully, but they do not at all inform us well about the routine, peaceful kinds of (uneventful) transactions that dominate the system's usual mode of intercourse. Our picture is potentially very incomplete, therefore. The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. By permitting a single type of data source (i.e., the mass media) to determine what we see, observation is entrusted to a single institutional mechanism to assemble data on which studies are based. The judgement of the editor replaces the judgement of the social scientist. To the extent that CFP studies fail to expand source bases, the paradigm becomes vulnerable to the charge that it engages not in comparative studies of foreign policy, but in comparative journalism.

There are several solutions to this problem. Event data need not necessarily tie the field exclusively to a bounded cluster of foreign policy dimensions to be compared (i.e., activity/passivity, conflict/cooperation, etc). What we see may be what we get, but if we look for different things, we will get alternate pictures. Hence called for is conceptual innovation in how existing event data sources are treated, as exemplified by the CREON project's efforts (see Callahan?, Brady, and Hermann, 1980).

A second potential solution to the observational problems is to attempt to free the paradigm from reliance upon exclusively empirical approaches (if there is such a thing as pure induction). Part of our problem is that, in an effort to empirically-ground investigations, we study only what governments do. We miss entirely what they do not do. What people don't do and why may be as important as what is done. Moreover, are exclusively inductive inquiries that ignore what is not – or cannot – be perceived justified? Is a factor only a phenomenon when it is observed? This is to be doubted. Perhaps there is greater need for deductive and simulation studies in our systematic quest for systematics. The kind of imaginative approach to systematic foreign policy study that John Gillespie (1976) was teaching us

effectively is illustrative of what might be done in the future. If we ignore this advice, empirically-grounded theory may remain just that – grounded. It will not get off the ground.

A third data departure entails not departing from reliance on data-based investigation, but instead, expending further effort on future data-collection enterprises. (Even if we close our eyes that does not make foreign policy phenomena cease to exist.) Contextually-specified generalizations require inclusion and measurement of variables heretofore treated exogenously (i.e., as the N (the number of cases considered) diminishes, the V (the number of variables treated) should increase, at least according to J. David Singer's (1966) well-known 'N/V ratio' formulation. The kinds of conditions and factors crying most for measurement are ones conventionally ignored because they are difficult to tap. Included here are mental states of central decision makers, psychological and perceptual variables, and, yes, even the political processes that have been black-boxed so routinely (see Wittkopf, 1976). Such variables are measurable, as the work of Ole Holsti, Margaret Hermann, Alexander George and others have demonstrated, (as is illustrated again, by van Nieukerk and van Wyk's application in these pages).

But data generation for the study of beliefs and operational codes is very costly in time, money, and energy. Called for, therefore, is greater innovation in data generation techniques and the kinds of sources treated? for the derivation of data. One possible solution – if the diversity of a diverse world is to be captured – is to engage in what is called 'meta-analysis'. This approach (see Glass, 1976; Rosenthal, 1978) proposes content analyzing results of empirical research across various levels of analysis and for various aggregations of actors, and using the resultant quantitative indices as contextually-rich data for subsequent (re)analysis. Combining results of independent studies has its dangers. It forces work in a third- or fourth-order reality. But it has the pleasing attribute of providing a sufficiently sizable N and V for systematic comparisons. Surely other variants of more conventional approaches to measurement (e.g., coding of Associated Press cable traffic of the application of artificial intelligence techniques) can be pursued advantageously as well. Escape from the blinders imposed by the concentrated data-generation procedures presently employed is prescribed. Escape from conceptual filters might be facilitated as well as merging event data with other types of data; even if liberation from instrumentalist prisons is not achieved, combining data sources (e.g., Holsti and North, 1966) will at least reduce the artifactuality of indicators and therefore enhance the validity of the findings.

Theoretical Departures

A paradigmatic crisis can derive from its inability to account adequately for

the empirical patterns it describes. No paradigm that has as its primary products only empirical descriptions and a methodology for generating them has survived for long. It must move beyond simple description to explanation. It must, sooner or later, not just trace relationships among variables; it must show the conditions under which the relationships hold and, more importantly, explain why discerned relationships are to be expected. It also must demonstrate its capacity to utilize generated empirical materials to provide potent and reliable predictions (paradigms: prognosticate or perish!). For these, we need theory.

Previously, the paradigm's central concern has been how data could be collected and mined for cross-national comparisons. This preoccupation has led to a disregard for the act of theorizing (as Patrick J. McGowan argues so cogently in the pages of this journal). The data gathered are exerting enormous pressure for theory (just as, earlier, theories postulated in the realpolitik paradigm exerted pressure for data). It is now time for theory to catch up with data. And it is time to get over reluctance to declare that the Emperor has been without clothes. Although systematic studies are not atheoretical (see Zinnes, 1979: 436), theorizing often has been primitive and non-explicit. Macro indicators, for instance, have frequently been inter-correlated without theoretical interpretation. As Vladimir I. Grantman, Director of the USSR's Institute of World Economy and International Relations, correctly observed (in Moscow, August 13, 1979): 'Without theoretical interpretation...indicators are deaf and dumb. They give nothing'. Indicators that are not informed theoretically invite confusion instead of clarification; they are subject to misinterpretation. Many indicators – like GNP – live up to their name: they are gross. Especially gross is the tendency to employ macro indicators indiscriminately, that is, inattentively to what they purport to be measuring.

Symptomatic also of many CFP studies has been the assumption that a statistical account of a high and significant proportion of the variance is sufficient, in and of itself, without provision for an explanation of the causal mechanism through which the relationships uncovered are believed to obtain. CFP research must begin to show not merely statistical regularities in how nations act under certain conditions, but why they act as they do. So far, this has not very often been done adequately. McGowan (1976) is right in his conclusion that:

> Our field does not have a single middle range scientific theory, much less a general theory. At best, as in the work of Rosenau, we have a number of weakly related typologies of types of actors, types of actor attributes, and types of foreign policy behaviour. I am not aware of a single deductively derived general proposition that has been operationalized and validated by comparative empirical research with the possible exception of studies of Richardsonian arms race models.

Here, then, is an area crying for attention. For the paradigm to be

retained, some theoretical clothes must be tailored for the Emperor. Empirical findings – and anomalies – must be explained. Research must, if it is to be taken seriously, also take seriously the task of theory construction. In the absence of investigations grounded in a developed theory, the CFP paradigm will remain a place of confinement (see McGowan's essay in these pages).

In constructing theories that can illuminate patterns in cross-national and inter-temporal data, we fortunately do not have to start from scratch. The theoretical questions to be addressed should heighten further the already growing respect for classical theories and for the theorists who labour within those traditions. Transdisciplinary and interparadigmatic reconsolidation should not be resisted (Caporaso, Hermann, Kegley, Rosenau, and Zinnes, 1987). By working with others, the theorist and empiricist can advance faster. What should be overcome is the reluctance of comparativists to draw from non-conventional models outside the positivistic research tradition. Theoretical parochialism must be transcended. Is it not about time, for instance, that comparative foreign policy research began to take seriously a body of theory so considered in virtually all societies outside the United States, namely the varieties of marxist-inspired theory? Departing from paradigmatic chauvinism could have a cathartic, liberating effect, freeing the paradigm from the assumptions that confine its thinking and inhibit its growth. Eclecticism could stimulate the creation of a variety of auxiliary theoretical and empirical departures.

Departures from Methodological Perversities

Finally, a paradigmatic crisis can have methodological origins. Its mode of analysis may lead to faulty inference and specious truth claims by creating obstacles to convergent validation. Quantified ignorance, predictive weakness, and explanatory impotence may result. Eventually, methodological malfeasance can provide incentives to create an entirely new paradigm to replace the existing one. CFP researchers should not be strangers to that possibility, inasmuch as its paradigm attains its primary identity by treating comparison more as a verb than a noun. Attention to methodological problems with comparison-making is imperative for CFP research.

Methodological malfunctions are difficult to diagnose because deficiencies often fail to reveal themselves until after they have done their damage. CFP research has been guilty, in my opinion, of a number of methodological sins. Several of the more conspicuous include (1) the construction of linear models when evidence informs us that relationships are curvilinear and multiplicative (non-additive); (2) inattention to the dangers of ecological inference across alternate levels of analysis (i.e., disregard of the effects of

aggregation on relationships among variables, diminishing the validity of isomorphoric generalizations across levels); (3) overuse of data reduction techniques that risk aggregating variance out of existence, thereby invalidating conclusions; (4) denial of the temporal ordering of phenomena in research designs; (5) insensitivity to autocorrection effects and the problems associated with multicollinearity and data transformations; and (6) blind ignorance of the theoretical underpinnings and assumptions implicit in the coding rules employed to collect aggregate data, that is, of the premises contained in a data structure that affects the generalizability and validity of research results.

These are just some of the more vexatious problems and habits (recall the discussion above for other possibilities). The problems are not insurmountable, the habits not addictive. Called for is still greater sophistication. Also demanded is termination of the 'methodological myopia' that has been so pervasive – the use of a limited range of statistical techniques, with problems adjusted to techniques as contrasted to a problem determining the range of tools employed. Abraham Kaplan's (1964: 28-29) 'law of the instrument' has been operative: research problems often have been defined in a manner requiring techniques with which the analyst is skilled and familiar.

Data should not be analyzed in ways that conceal more than they reveal. CFP studies would benefit from less dysfunctional ritualistic research practices. Greater acceptance of newer methodological departures is needed.

For instance, catastrophe theory (Zeeman, 1976) might liberate research from its present inability to deal well with the infrequent and accidental in foreign policy phenomena. We need ways of tapping the unintended macro consequences that result from the aggregative effects of individual behaviour (Scott, 1979; Skinner, 1979). The enrichment process already underway through assimilation of the CFP orientation into the research cultures found in the policy-making environment needs to continue, for that cross-enculturation has stimulated the search for new methodological solutions to the real-world policy problems. Improvements in the exciting areas of threat analysis, early warning systems, scenario generation, Delphic-forecasting and artificial intelligence provide examples of the ways CFP approaches contribute to, and are contributed to by, research design innovations. New directions *are* feasible, which only a decade ago seemed hopelessly unrealistic (see the contributions in the Hermann, Kegley, and Rosenau [1987] anthology for a large number of suggestions and applications).

At the risk of eliciting a noisy groan, even more attention to the tedious, demanding, and often unexciting tasks that have preoccupied the attention of comparativists for two decades is prescribed. Referred to here are issues surrounding scaling procedures, typification, indicator construction, data

reliability, source coverage, measurement error, index validity, pretheorizing, the logic of comparative inquiry, conceptualization, data quality control, replication, and the like. These efforts need to continue. There is much room for improvement. Mastering these tasks is crucial to the quest that engages comparativists. That the patterns detected in observations will be no better than the instruments that guide perceptions of reality should never be forgotten. Understanding the impact of methodologies upon inferences is central to understanding.

To reaffirm the necessity for thinking methodologically (while recommending less ritualistic reduction of research practice to particular techniques through particular rules) is not to assert that methodological sophistication promises a panacea for epistemological difficulties. That would be naive. There are many paths to knowledge, and we should take as many as possible. Putting a little zen into the art of comparative foreign policy analysis would be helpful. Adding a dose of deduction and retroduction might help also. But what cannot be done is to attempt to effect an emancipation from research and empirical study. A retreat into a nostalgic use of unmeasured concepts and unauthenticated beliefs would not be enriching. A recidivistic return to imprecision and anecdotage will not return greater understanding (however fun and comforting cognitively the use of elastic concepts and the affirmation of the familiar may seem). No, understanding can be enriched only by critical awareness of the way our view of the world is shaped by the way we look at it and how we link observations to generalizations. No foreign policy analyst can escape the limitations to understanding imposed by the approach employed. Hence greater appreciation of methodological considerations and barriers will bridge the presumed gap between comparativists and non-comparativists. It will not divide it further. The 'two-cultures' are not really so divergent: the ability of both to differentiate sense from nonsense is dependent on the adequacy of the method for making and sorting observations. Too much attention cannot be given to the methods of thinking about and studying foreign policy employed.

These prescriptions for research priorities hardly scratch the surface of what needs to be done. They are hopelessly inadequate for curing us of our afflictions, inasmuch as they point to directions for potential progress but not certain promise. One constant in a world of rapid change is the inability of the obstacles to understanding to subside. Needed, therefore, are the kinds of theoretical and conceptual revolutions that can enable us to escape the confines of our paradigmatic blinders. Our field is still waiting for a Kepler (as Don Munton, 1974, noted some years ago).

Nevertheless, I hope that I have, however inadequately, provided in these few pages good reasons for denying claims to the effect that the CFP paradigm is lost. It is proceeding, even advancing, however haltingly and

non-self-assuredly. Its self-doubt is its greatest threat to its future advance, and to the loss of the impetus that has been painstakingly gained. 'Which way shall [we] fly,' John Milton once queried, 'Infinite wrath and infinite despair?" 'Can we not,' he also asked, 'possess a Paradi[gm] happier far, [by] hand in hand with wandering steps [take our] solitary way?'.

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Pat McGowan

State-Agents, International Structures, and Foreign Policy Behaviour:

Thinking seriously about Foreign Policy Analysis

Structures are not in any deeper sense prior to the human drama itself, as some structuralist theory would have us believe. Structures are not 'givens' (data), they are 'mades' (facts) – *made by collective human action and transformable by* collective human action. (Cox, 1987: 395).

Introduction

If we wish to think seriously about the foreign policy behaviour of states, we must accept what Dessler (1989: 443) has recently called 'two uncontentious truths about social life'. The first truth is that the events, outcomes and actions of the social world are the product of human agency – the observable, real undertakings and projects of individual men and women acting alone and in groups and organizations such as the state. The second truth is that human agency can only take place in concrete historical circumstances that 'condition the possibilities for action and influence its course' (Dessler, 1989: 443)

In international relations theory today this distinction between agency and circumstance is known as the agent-structure debate (see Klink, 1990 and Wendt, 1987). It is the major contention of this essay that one cannot think seriously about new and presumably better frame-works for the analysis of foreign policy until one has situated oneself in this ongoing debate. One must, I contend, adopt a general theory of international relations before one can do meaningful foreign policy analysis.

Theories of foreign policy are agential theories that focus on how decision-makers, bureaucratic organizations or states act to achieve their goals and interests in a world of conflict and co-operation. Given the nature of social life highlighted by Dessler, agential theory can never give a complete explanation of behaviour unless it is combined with a theory of the

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international structures that condition agency. General theories of international relations, if they are at all worthwhile, comprise a coherent and consistent fusion of *structural theory* (how circumstances arise; how they are changed and reproduced; and how they condition and influence action) and *agential theory* (who are the actors, their resources and their repertoires of action; how and why do they decide to act; what are the actors' goals and interests and whence do they arise).

Within international relations itself and more generally in the philosophy of science there exist a variety of proposed 'solutions' to the so-called agent-structure debate. The most sensible I have encountered is expounded by Dessler, what he calls 'scientific realism' (not to be confused with classical realism and contemporary neorealism in international theory). This position has been neatly stated by the philosopher, Roy Bhaskar (1979: 43):

> Thus consider *saying*, *making*, and *doing* as characteristic modalities of human agency. People cannot communicate except by utilizing existing media, produce except by applying themselves to materials which are already formed, or act save in some or other context. Speech requires language; making materials; actions conditions; agency resources; activity rules...[S]ociety is a necessary condition for any intentional human act at all.

From this perspective all activity by agents presupposes pre-existing social structures. Prior existence, however, is not determination of action. Consider the relationship between discourse (speech and writing) and language. On the one hand, as a set of rules, language makes discourse acts possible and constrains them into patterns that are either sensible or not. Language does not 'determine' what I say or write. On the other hand, the English languages spoken in South Africa and the United States are the products of discourse by millions of people for hundreds of years. As Dessler (1989: 452) remarks, 'all social action presupposes social structure, and vice versa'.

Scientific realism may be the 'new philosophy of science' (Manicas and Secord, 1983), but in its application to the analysis of social life it has been around a long time. An elegant statement of its premises was made over one hundred years ago by Karl Marx when he wrote that

> Men make their own history, but they don't make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past.

What Marx and Bhaskar are pointing to is the requirement that social scientific explanations do two things: first, all theoretical explanations must recognize and account for agents' actions, be these agents individuals, households, classes, parties, states or alliances; second, all theories must accept the 'causal relevance' of the conditions of action we call structural

factors (Dessler, 1989: 443). Because this is extremely difficult to do in practice, international relations is plagued by the agent-structure problem.

Contemporary Foreign Policy Analysis

The existence of this problem and its implications for new frameworks for foreign policy analysis does not seem to have been recognized by specialists in the field of foreign policy studies. At the present time there are at least three general theories of international relations that contain agential and structural features: the *classical realism* associated with such writers as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, John Herz, Martin Wight and, most recently, Hedley Bull; *neorealism* most associated with Kenneth Waltz, but also including Stephen Krasner, Robert Keohane, Robert Gilpin and others; and *world-systems* theory as found in the writings of Samir Amin, Andre Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein and others.

Unfortunately for the field of foreign policy analysis, it is usually the case that any general theory used is seldom referenced and related to the particular piece of foreign policy analysis that is being researched and written. The theory is implicit, and being largely implicit, its adequacy and appropriateness for the study at hand can never be determined. Indeed, with but slight exaggeration, I would assert that the major problem in foreign policy analysis is just this one – the failure of most analysts to relate their agential foreign policy theories and empirical studies to more general structural theories of international relations. This is why there is so little cumulation and research progression in the analysis of foreign policy behaviour.

Compare foreign policy studies to biology, for example. The variety of subjects studied by biologists is much more vast than the subjects we study. Their subjects range from the atomic and biochemical properties of cell components such as genes, through the ecology of populations with millions of members, to the history of life in all its forms on earth. Yet, without exception, every biologist does her research in the context of the neo-Darwinian synthesis involving Darwin's theory of evolution as modified by the mathematical study of population genetics in this century. Because it is undertaken with explicit reference to a general unifying theory, neo-Darwinianism, biological research has a coherence and progressively cumulative character that must make green with envy any social scientist who knows the least bit about some field of biology, such as ethology or animal behaviour.

Why, for example, did humans come to live in groups? As Richard Alexander (1979: 58–65) has forcefully argued, from a purely biological point of view it is not obvious that sociality is an advantage. Contrary to the long-standing belief that groups exist for the good of the species and

individuals for the good of the group, a moment of reflection indicates that group living has real costs for individuals, including increased competition for resources and mates and increased danger of disease and parasite transmission. 'Why' he asks 'be social, beyond what is required to mate and raise a family?' Neo-Darwinianism provides the biological answer, 'individuals living in groups reproduce more than individuals not living in groups' because as group members they can better exploit food resources that are clumped in one place like a fishing ground or that are large, dangerous and hard to catch. Most importantly, group living permits aggressive defence against predation by other species and other humans.

This 'explanation' of sociality only makes sense if one accepts the theory that widespread patterns of animal and human behaviour must be fitness enhancing; they increase the chances of passing one's genes on to subsequent generations, otherwise they have no biological basis. This theorem only makes sense in the context of neo-Darwinian notions of survival of the fittest based upon each species' potential for overpopulation; the general absence of overproduction in most species; variability among indiidual members of each species; and the resulting competition among individuals to reproduce successfully. As natural selection operates overtime, a species' gene pool changes, which is what evolution ultimately is all about. It is not my purpose to sell Alexander's ideas. Rather, it is to highlight the structure of his explanation of a certain type of human activity – sociality. Alexander assumes that humans are reasonably 'rational' and would not live in groups unless the advantages to them as individuals were greater than the individual costs of group living. They would most certainly not live in groups because groups are somehow 'good' for the species as a whole. The prime advantage is enhanced fitness, defined as individual reproductive success. Here human agency is supreme. But what conditions agency in this instance is the distribution and nature of food resources and predatory species in the environment. Thus, when it comes to the analysis and explanation of animal and human behaviour, modern biology practices scientific realism. Genetically selfish individuals act in larger environmental settings of physical, biological and cultural structures and their actions over long periods of time shape these structures. Theoretical completeness is achieved by treating equally agents (genetypically and phenotypically) and structures (ecologically).

Now, I am certainly not a Darwin, so this paper will not attempt to present a substantive theory of international relations that solves the agent-structure problem for our field. But, if the point is now taken that having such a theory and using it explicitly as the general framework within which research in foreign policy is undertaken has now been accepted, then I have already accomplished most of what I wanted to achieve in this essay. But perhaps my fundamental point is not yet accepted by my readers. Could

readers think that foreign policy studies today *are grounded explicitly* in more general theories. I believe otherwise and to establish my point I will refer to the recently published book, *Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach* edited by M. Clarke and B. White (1989).

The publishers claim that this book represents an 'up-to-date text-book' that provides 'a concise introduction to the study of foreign policy'. In fairness to the authors and editors, I would say that the book does this and does it well. The authors are leaders in the study of foreign policy in the United Kingdom and their various chapters and references indicate that they are familiar with the best work done in foreign policy analysis in North-America as well. The book can be read with profit by both undergraduate students and academic specialists. They will learn a lot from it, as I did, but they will not find any of the seven distinguished chapter authors ever indicating where they stand theoretically in the controversies that are currently raging among theorists of international relations around such issues as the agent-structure problem and between the contending schools of thought known as neorealism, world-systems theory and post-modern theory.

The chapter that is most likely to relate foreign policy analysis to the concerns of this essay is Christopher Farrands' on 'The Context of Foreign Policy Systems: Environment and Structure'. This chapter presents a sound overview of its topic and clearly shows Farrands' mastery of the relevant literature. But no general theory is presented as providing the analogue to neo-Darwinism for foreign policy studies.

Indeed, existing general international relations theories are rejected as 'deterministic'. Farrands correctly states (1989: 98) that policy analysts assume foreign policy decision-making involves human agency and choice, albeit often very constrained choice. On this basis he rejects classical realism as represented by F.S. Northedge because foreign policy is 'determined' by the balance of power. He rejects contemporary neorealism and liberal political- economy as represented by A.O. Hirschman because Farrands claims this approach reduces foreign policy and power relations to the 'dictates' of international economic structures. Finally, Farrands rejects dependency theory and world-systems theory as represented by Johan Ghaltung and Andre Gunder Frank because structures of dependence are 'deterministic' as regards foreign policy choices (1989: 96-98).

The general argument is that 'foreign policy analysis is simply incompatible with determinist theory' (Farrands, 1989: 98) and that all varieties of general theory which consider the causal relevance of international structures, whether these be realist, neorealist, or world-systems theories, are somehow deterministic and therefore downright harmful to the enterprise of foreign policy analysis.

What should be said in response to such nonsense? Surely even Farrands

would admit that the study of foreign policy is a key part of the more general study of international relations. How can the study of foreign policy be divorced from the study of international relations? Yet, if one rejects realism, neorealism and dependency/world-systems theories, what does one have left? It would seem that Farrands would have us do foreign policy analysis in a theoretical void. In effect, he is like a 'creation scientist' who would demand that we do biology without modern evolutionary theory because any theory that claims that environmental factors influence the course of individual behaviour is 'deterministic'. It is perhaps a good thing that Farrands is a social scientist and not a biologist.

More seriously, it seems to me that Farrands completely misrepresents the arguments of all three general traditions of international relations theory. I have neither the time nor the space to quote from the array of realists and neorealists from Thucydides to Krasner and Keohane in order to refute Farrands. The critical case, as I shall argue subsequently, is world-systems theory. For now it is sufficient to note that this theory's intellectual godfather is, of course, Marx. Theories in the Marxian tradition are often rejected because of their alleged economic determinism. But, I have already had reason to quote Marx on the issue of human agency – 'Men make their own history , but they don't make it just as they please ...'. I fail to find any determinism here. Indeed, this is a classic example of what Harold and Margaret Sprout once called 'environmental probabilism', – a theoretical position that the environment of international structures and processes makes certain kinds of foreign policy outcomes more likely than others. Foreign policy decision-makers do make their own history; they retain a considerable element of choice, but those choices are, like all choices, environmentally influenced ones. Are the decision-makers of Botswana as free to choose as those of Pretoria and are either as free as President Bush and Secretary of State Baker?

The Alliance Between Foreign Policy Analysis and Neorealism

The real theoretical problem for foreign policy analysis inherent in general theories of international relations that emphasize international structures is not their determinism. Rather, the problem is their possible methodological individualism. Analysts tend to treat decision-makers as free agents who rationally pursue their 'interests' (the rational-actor tradition), or as free bureaucrats who pursue rationally their 'bureaux interests' (the bureaucratic politics tradition, and note how really close it is to the rational-actor approach, except that the agents are bureaux instead of states), or as free information-processing machines who muddle through somehow (the psychological processes tradition). In every case these diverse traditions are based on a methodological individualism that privileges choice-taking

'individuals' that may be actual human decision-makers, or bureaucratic organizations, or states. They are all 'agents', not 'structures'.

Given these various traditions of foreign policy analysis, one would have thought that analysts would feel very comfortable with neorealist theory of international politics, in particular as espoused by Kenneth Waltz (1979). This is so because at the most fundamental level of epistemology, Waltz's neorealism and foreign policy analysis are versions of methodological individualism. For his part, Waltz is very explicit about his methodological individualism: 'International-political systems, like economic markets, are individualist in origin, spontaneously generated, and unintended' (1979: 91). International political structures are for Waltz the unintended consequence of the inter-action of competitive states, and their major features are just two – the organizing principle of anarchy and the distribution of power. Structure is created by the behaviour of individual actors. Its theoretically important features are the arrangement of the units into bipolar or multipolar power configurations. Once in place, 'the organization of units affects theory behaviour and their interactions' (1979: 39).

Theoretically, Waltz then claims that warfare is the consequence of international anarchy and that the absence of great power war since 1945 is the result of bipolarity. Thus,, it is true that neorealists like Waltz write a great deal about how international structures, be they the distribution of power or anarchy, contain state behaviour. But the structures themselves derive from the behaviour of the individual units, and within these resulting international constraints, the agents who act are more or less rational decision-makers seeking to maximize their wealth and power. This is exactly what foreign policy analysis has always argued as well!

In my view, then, most foreign policy analysts do have a general theory of international relations, but they either don't know it or they quite perversely deny it. That theory lies in the various versions of power politics that are today called neorealism. Besides the common commitment to methodological individualism that neorealism and foreign policy analysis share, there are many other shared commitments. Perhaps the most important is their Weberian commitment to the modern state as the key actor in international and domestic political life.

For neorealists and foreign policy specialists the modern state is a given empirical datum whose international or foreign policy behaviour it is their self-chosen job to explain. This is their 'state-centricism' and it takes many forms – which all, however, privilege the modern state in two generally unexamined ways. First, as a given, the nature of the state, its various forms and origins, is a non-problem. Totally abstracted away are the concrete historical political struggles among classes and state managers that produced the modern state, its powers, and its relations with civil society. The second

way that the state is privileged is that its international activities are put at the centre of theories of international relations and foreign policy analysis.

A South African example may illustrate the unfortunate consequences of state-centricism for the study of foreign policy and international relations. As a centre of political and economic power the Anglo-American Corporation is at least as important to the present and future of South Africa as is the South African state presently governed by State President de Klerk's National Party. Yet, how much has been written on the 'foreign policies' of Anglo? It is my understanding, for example, that its intelligence about political-economic trends in neighbouring African states is much superior to the intelligence produced by the South African government. Why do 'foreign policy' specialists not study the decision-making process of this giant? I will not accept as an answer that access to decision-makers and official records is harder with Anglo than it is with the government of South Africa. Much of the answer must be found in the state-centricism of scholarship by South Africans and outsiders who knowingly or unconsciously are working within the general neorealist conception of international structures and foreign policy behaviour.

A second communality between foreign policy analysis and neorealism is their decidedly Smithian vision of how wealth is produced in society and internationally. Following Adam Smith and David Ricardo, often without knowing it, foreign policy analysts are generally uninterested in the process of accumulation or they blindly accept classical economic doctrines to the effect that wealth is privately produced (its what business does, not government), and that international economic relations are governed by hidden hands with comparative advantage written on them.

If one asks any neorealist what the goals of state behaviour are, he or she will answer: the pursuit of wealth and power, which are interchangeable. When foreign policy analysts write of the goals of state behaviour, do they say something else? No, they don't. Either they agree or they say that the really interesting problems are found in how states organize themselves to make effective decisional choices in their endless quest for security. When asked what security is, the foreign policy analyst says wealth and power. What, then, is the difference? What is going on here is a shared perspective that economics and politics are separate spheres of social activity, where wealth is produced in the private sector while political life is entirely public. This is one reason for the common practice of neorealists and many foreign policy specialists (particularly in security studies) to turn to various versions of game theory for analytical leverage in their research. You can employ game theory if you view social reality as a distributional struggle for security, power and wealth among pre-existing and unexamined state-agents. It makes utterly no difference whether one views this struggle as zero-sum or positive-sum. That is not the point. Rather, if one views social

life as the historically contingent and circumstantially influenced product of struggles among and between all sorts of agents such as individuals, households, ethnic-nations, classes, state managers, firms and states themselves, then game theory has little appeal to one because by its very nature as a form of mathematics it is completely ahistorical.

A second South African example may clarify the point I am making. How many times have managers and spokespersons for business interests in the Republic said that what is wrong with unions such as COSATU is that they refuse to separate legitimate labour-management issues from 'politics', such as the struggle against racism and the apartheid system? Anyone who argues that politics and economics are separate, can be separated, or should be separate, is a nineteenth-century liberal living in 1989! Such a person is not living in South Africa or anywhere else in the world for that matter and it makes no difference whether the person advocating such positions works for Anglo-American or is an academic student of international relations and foreign policy. All are political liberals.

Thus, there is a third and final communality between neorealism and foreign policy analysis. All neorealists and almost all foreign policy specialists are political liberals and I believe that the theories they prefer to work with are selected for political reasons and not just because they are somehow 'better' than conservative (the classical realism of Hans Morgenthau) and radical (dependency and world-systems theory) alternatives. To deny this elementary truth about scholarship as it is practiced in South Africa, Great Britain and the United States is, itself, a very profound form of liberalism because only a liberal could argue that politics, economics and scholarship are or should be separate spheres of social life.

Now, I am in severe danger of being misunderstood if readers believe that I am making an argument against neorealism and its tacit alliance with foreign policy analysis. My points are simply that this alliance exists; that most foreign policy analysts are neorealists and political liberals whether they know it or not; and, third, that neorealism is in fact the dominant general theory of international politics and international political-economy in the English-speaking world today.

It is true that I do not find neorealism to be an acceptable theoretical paradigm because of its state-centricism, its economistic and individualistic conception of international structures, its focus on Western great powers, its political preference for the North as against the South, and its profoundly ahistorical character. But, if readers like these things or if they find appealing the apparent rigour and parsimony of neorealist discourse, all I am calling for is that they do two things. First, readers who are foreign policy analysts should make explicit how and why they are using a neorealist perspective in their research and writing. Second, readers should be aware of the powerful

criticisms of neorealism by my colleague at Arizona State University, Richard Ashley (1983, 1984), and by other competent scholars (Cox, 1983 and 1987; Wendt, 1987; Rupert, 1990). They should then have their answers ready when I and others ask why one would still work within this dubious, albeit hegemonic paradigm.

The World-Systems Alternative

Are there any alternatives to the theoretical vacuity of contemporary foreign policy analysis and the political liberalism of neorealism and the conservatism of classical realism? Are there alternatives to classical realism's preoccupation with power and its Augustinian view of human nature and neorealism's individualistic and state-centric view of the world? I believe that there are alternatives and, in my view, by far the most interesting is the world-systems perspective as expounded by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, 1979, 1984) and other scholars such as the African, Samir Amin, the American, Christopher Chase-Dunn, and the Swiss, Volker Bornschier. This approach to the study of international relations draws from several rich traditions, including Marxism and Latin American dependency theory as put forward by Andre Gunder Frank. It is explicitly historical, it does not privilege the modern state, and it refuses to separate the political and economic spheres of life.

Because world-systems theory is in the Marxian tradition, although it belongs to that tradition's non-dogmatic, neomarxist branch, it does share with classical Marxism a methodological collectivist understanding of social and political life. What capitalism and classes were for Marx, the world-system is for Wallerstein. This approach rests upon three paradigmatically significant claims (Klink, 1990). First, the world-system and its properties are assumed to be ontologically prior to any subsystems that may exist, such as households, ethnic nations or states that make foreign policy. It is asserted that the basic social reality of modern times is this world-system, which came into existence in the sixteenth century. The system's basic long-term structures are a network of long-distance trade in basic commodities, a mode of production for producing these commodities and for exchanging them that is called capitalism, and a plurality of cultures and political entities, that is, nations and states.

The second axiomatic feature of the world-system is that it is a structured hierarchy of inequality referred to in terms of a core, a semi-periphery, and a periphery. Core-like states and regions use advanced technologies and high-wage labour to produce and exchange commodities. The United States is a current example. It is the key core state and economy and the fact that its largest export sector by value is agriculture does not make the US a poor, peripheral third world state, although such states are also agricultural exporters.

Associated with the core-periphery structural hierarchy are the world-system processes of *uneven development*, so that the world is always divided between the rich and the poor; *dependency*, so that the periphery depends upon the core for capital, technology, and political support; and *formal and informal imperialism*, so that strong core states dominate the lives of the people of the periphery who have no states at all (colonies) or who have weak states (neocolonialism and spheres of influence).

The third claim is that the creation of the system and its continued reproduction obtain principally through the mechanisms of unequal exchange and core-state struggles for dominance of the system, known as hegemony. Unequal exchange operates because the system is one in which the weak have extensive economic relationships with the strong. Not only can the strong impose or bargain successfully for formally unequal trading relationships, such as those granted by the Ottoman Turks to the English, French and the Dutch known as the 'capitulation treaties', but the very nature of trade between technologically advanced, high-wage regions and technologically backward, low-wage regions is such that the wealth thereby generated flows mainly to the core, not to the periphery. As a result, world inequality grows because of international trade, it is not reduced, and the facts agree with world-systems theory in this respect.

Struggles among core states are very significant as well. Paul Kennedy has written about them in his new book, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (1987). These struggles which involve the stuff of diplomatic and military history affect the pace of accumulation and economic innovation in the core, the effects of which are felt throughout the entire world-system. These struggles, best seen in the great coalition wars of modern times, beginning with the wars of Charles V in the first half of the sixteenth-century and most recently seen in World War II and the Cold War, determine which power sits astride the system as its hegemon. As leaders of the system, hegemons create political and economic order that facilitate system functioning in its political and economic spheres.

The agents in world-systems theory range in scale from family households to international political and military alliances. Key agents are socio-economic classes, cultural communities or nations, firms and states. Among other activities, these agents produce, exchange, consume, negotiate and fight. In doing so they utilize available human and material resources and often, but not always, follow rules such as contract law and diplomatic immunity. International structures arise from the actions of these agents and are sometimes the unintended consequences of action, as in global inequality, and are sometimes created internationally, as in the network of world trade and in the degree of power concentration in the core-hegemonic dominance vs. balance of power. At any given point in time the existing structural configuration of the world-system represents

'circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past'. While such structures are open to transformation by collective human action, they are also a human-made set of conditions that constrain weak agents and provide opportunities for action by the strong. This paradoxical 'agency' of structural features of the world-system comes not from any capacity of structures to 'act', but rather from the fact that state-agents and others incorporate in their decision-making calculus the external circumstances they encounter.

Such a basic introduction to world-systems theory. How can it be related to foreign policy analysis? Should it be so related? This is a matter of great controversy right now in international studies circles in Canada, the US and the UK. Serious critics of the world-systems perspective say that it is a sophisticated form of Marxist functionalism that reduces state action and agency to the functionally determined 'needs' of the system (Brenner, 1977; Klink, 1990). In contrast to neorealists, who privilege the modern state, critics assert that Wallerstein privileges the world-system. Wallerstein's (1979:5) central theoretical concept is that of a social system, which he defines as

> We take the defining characteristic of a social system to be the existence within it of a division of labour, such that the various sectors or areas within are dependent upon economic exchange with others for the smooth and continuous provisioning of the needs of the area. Such economic exchange can clearly exist without a common political structure and even more obviously without sharing the same culture.

The concrete empirical manifestation of this social system is what Wallerstein calls the modern world-system, which began to take shape *sometime after 1500 and which still exists*. It is left to the contemporary international political economy to put the notion into good liberal neorealist terms.

Critics assert that because the capitalist world-system is the only self-contained social system in the world, all other social relations and agents such as households, ethnic nations, classes, firms, states and state managers are theoretically subordinate to the world-system. These entities and their actions are asserted to be secondary social relations, called into being if you will by the world-system. If this is true, then it can be asserted (Klink, 1990) that

> If the properties of the world-system are ontologically prior to the states embedded within that system and if state behaviour is a *function of systemic reproductive* imperatives, then it must be the case that states, or state decision-makers, are not goal directed entities. Rather than pursuing nationally-mandated goals subject to the constraints imposed by the international system (as in the neorealist formulation), the state foreign policy process must be viewed either as irrelevant or as a mechanism through which systemic imperatives are automatically translated into appropriate state behaviour.

If one agrees with this argument, then foreign policy analysis should have

nothing to do with world-systems theory and we had better all become open and enthusiastic realists or neorealists. But, I want to conclude this article by arguing that the critics of the world-system theory such as Klink (1990), Wendt (1987), and Ruppert (1990, forthcoming) are wrong about their claim that the theory denies agency to state actors. And, if states and state managers, the 'persons' foreign policy analysts call decision-makers, do have the capacity to act in pursuit of their interest, these interests not being identical to systemic 'needs', then of course world-systems theory is an appropriate general theory of international relations available for foreign policy analysis.

Unfortunately, Wallerstein has so far refused to respond to his critics, who are legion. But responses by others have been made, the three best in my view being Chase-Dunn's (1981) early explanation of what world-system theory really says, as opposed to what its critics vulgarize it as saying; an article by Denemark and Thomas (1988) on the Brenner-Wallerstein debate; and a spirited defence of Wallerstein's theory by Garst (1985). The thrust of Garst's response is that Wallerstein's critics focus on the first volume of his historical analysis of the modern world-system which appeared in 1974 and his now famous article on 'The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis', which also originally appeared in 1974. They have not read carefully the second volume of his history which appeared in 1980 and, of course, they certainly could not have read volume three, which only appeared this year (1989).

So, agreeing with Garst, I would say that before one dismisses the relevance of world-systems theory to the analysis of foreign policy behaviour, one should read Volume two of Wallerstein's three-volume analysis of the world-system. One should note carefully how Wallerstein describes and explains the Dutch rise to hegemonic status in the mid-seventeenth century and how they led the system at that time. One should also read his lengthy discussion of the struggles between Britain and France to replace the Dutch as hegemons and his explanation of why the British won and the French lost. Consider too Wallerstein's analysis of the rise of Brandenburg-Prussia and Sweden as European semi-peripheral powers before 1750. Once one has done this, one should then go back to the many criticisms of world-systems theory – as I have done – and see if they still make sense.

Properly understood, Wallerstein's concept of the modern world-system 'refers to an institutional structure that shapes the *interplay* between the political variables associated with the interstate system and the economic variables associated with the world-wide capitalist exchange network' (Garst, 1985: 470). This approach does not claim that all state behaviour is determined by system needs and it does not privilege the economic over the political. The strength of states within the world-system is determined not

by system needs and the state's position within the system's three-role hierarchy of core, semi-periphery and periphery, but by the character and results of political class struggle among members of the state's society.

A strong state with an active and influential foreign policy is associated with core-like productive processes (pre-existing structures do count) *and* with five highly political features: (1) *mercantilism*, the extent to which state policy directly aids its owner-producers to compete within the world market economy; (2) *military power*, the extent to which states can affect the capacity of other states to compete; (3) *public finance*, the ability of states to mobilize resources to perform these competitive and military tasks at costs that do not eat into profits of their owner-producers; (4) *state building*, the capacity of states to create and sustain administrative structures that permit the swift carrying out of tactical decisions; and (5) *a hegemonic bloc*, the degree to which the political rules reflect a balance of interests among owner-producers and state-managers such that a working alliance among them forms the stable political underpinnings of a state. Surely it must be admitted these five features of state strength are all types of intentional activity and that, therefore, states are agents within world-systems theory.

A state with such characteristics is a 'strong state' within the world system. It is not certain that existing or developing states will have some or all of these features. It is clear that actual states are the result of historical processes of state-building. Finally, it is stressed by Wallerstein that the key to the entire process is the last feature, the creation or the destruction of hegemonic blocs, and this is the result of what liberals call politics and what radicals call class struggle.

Conclusion

Returning to the topic of central concern, new frameworks for foreign policy analysis, what I have tried to do in this essay is to argue for the introduction of a new criterion for assessing the promise of such frameworks. To be useful such frameworks *must* take account of the causal relevance of structural factors in the process of foreign policy formulation and implementation. Otherwise, such frameworks can give us only an incomplete and therefore ultimately false description and explanation of foreign policy behaviour. Ideally, agential foreign policy frameworks should be presented as components of an integrated theory of state-agents and *international* structures. As regards world-systems theory, this would require further elaboration of its agential component, which is not as well developed as its structural side (see McGowan and Kegley, 1983, for an initial step in this direction).

At the very minimum, foreign policy frameworks such as systems analysis, bureaucratic politics, psychological processes and policy implementation are in need of much reworking so that they 'recognize and

make appropriate allowance for the workings of both agency and structure' (Dessler, 1989: 444). While it may be the case that in any specific foreign policy study the allowance for the causal role of structures remains unexploited, *the possibility of bringing structures back in must be present.* This can not happen until foreign policy analysis recognizes the causally important role of international structures and abandons its closet neorealism, whose conception of structures is individualistic in the extreme. While foreign policy frameworks ignore international structures altogether, neorealism misunderstands them. Structures are seen as settings or contexts of rational agent action, like an office building within which work is done. If we have a blueprint of the building, if we know its 'structure', we can then predict typical patterns of action, such as how workers move through the structure. Workers who avoid stairs, lifts and hallways and attempt to move about via air-conditioning ducts and upper floor windows will not survive, as they will be fired or die as a result of ignoring structural constraints.

Far more fruitful is to think of the world-system's structures as mediums or means to social action. In this view the building is not a structure that constrains behaviour, but rather an enabling structure equipped with walls, floors, lifts, stairs, office equipment and communications devices – the material resources used to do work. The building was, after all, built and equipped for a purpose and it changes over time as it is remodelled and suffers wear and tear (this analogy is taken from Dessler, 1989: 466-7).

When we evaluate a proposed framework for foreign policy analysis or an actual empirical study, we want to be able to answer to our satisfaction a series of theoretically vital questions: (1) What is the author's conception of the nature and causal role of international structures? (2) Does this framework for analysis explicitly incorporate structural features or does it only allow for their subsequent inclusion? (3) Is the foreign policy-making process treated as the site where decision-makers relate their goals and resources to nationally defined interest *and* to structurally generated international conditions, materials and rules? (4) Does the framework for analysis illuminate how both agents and structures are generated and transformed by state-agent activities? If the answers to these questions are satisfactory, then we have encountered serious foreign policy thinking.

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Koos van Wyk and Sarah Radloff

Symmetry and Reciprocity in South Africa's Foreign Relations

A perusal of the literature points to five major constraints facing the study of symmetry and reciprocity in foreign policy behaviour. First, these phenomena have been analysed at different levels. Secondly, foreign policy behaviour, particularly the concepts, co-operations and conflict, has been operationalised in many ways. Thirdly, different data sets have been utilised, i.e. WEIS, COPDAP, CREON and DON. Unfortunately the convergence of data sets measuring foreign policy behaviour has met with limited success.[1] Fourthly, a variety of statistical methods have been used.[2] Finally, the Comparative Foreign Policy movement is largely an American academic enterprise. The creation of data sets in the Third World will hopefully create a 'second generation' of quantifiers replicating experiments and challenging existing assumptions.

Symmetry and Reciprocity: Mixed rather than dominant patterns

Before dealing with the definitions of reciprocity and symmetry in a logical way, clarity about the 'level of analysis' problem is essential, the reason being that most studies operate on the dyadic level of analysis but given the structure of our data set and South African's position as an international pariah, generalisation on a level higher than dyads seems appropriate. Our data set, South African Foreign Events Data (SAFED) includes only those events where South Africa is either the actor or target. Reciprocity and symmetry will therefore be a correlation between the totals of South African behaviour sent and received regardless of other actors or targets. Philips adopted a similar approach in his study of the conflict environment of nations.[3] Although dyadic analysis has been the dominant approach in CFP, it is not devoid of flaws. The inclusion of active dyads and the exclusion of inactive dyads in a given time frame might produce distorted results.[4] A further disadvantage is that 'simplistic circularity' excludes the impact of intervening variables on dyadic relations.[5]

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The reason for our more systematic level of analysis is to investigate whether South Africa as an international pariah is so much at odds with the international community that generalisations about its foreign policy interaction are possible at a higher level than dyadic relations. If the results attest to the contrary, South Africa's dyadic relations will obviously merit future analysis. Unfortunately the spatial constraints of this article limit us to only one of these levels of analysis.

With the level of analysis problem addressed, the next step will be to clarify the crucial concepts of symmetry and reciprocity.

For the purpose of this study, symmetry can be described as a quantitative equivalence in the volume of actions initiated by and targeted at South Africa.[6]

Reciprocity means that change in an actor's level of output in a given dimension often produces a resulting change in the target's level of output in the same or another dimension. It also refers to the balance in the affective (i.e. friendly or hostile) content of the interaction between actor and target. The basic principle of reciprocity in international relations is to do unto others what they have recently done unto you. If the behaviour being responded to is a co-operative action, then a co-operative response would be appropriate because it would reward the sender of the co-operative action and thus increase the probability of future co-operative behaviour. If the behaviour to be responded to is conflictual it may very well be a challenge to some concrete national foreign policy objective. If this is so, the foreign policy makers can be expected to respond with conflictual behaviour in an effort to deter the other party from such a challenge.[7]

The question to be asked, deduced from the preceding definitions, is whether research findings have confirmed these hypotheses? Empirical findings provide only partial support for the notions that international relations are symmetric and reciprocal. Richardson, Kegley and Agnew found that strong correlations for symmetry were only evident in slightly more than half of the dyads included in their sample (16 out of 30). Moreover, a weak correlation between symmetry and reciprocity had been found for all except three of the cases.[8] One could argue that international relations are often asymmetrical, given the disparity between national capabilities and attributes in the international system. Skrein, in a study of sixty-nine countries, found not surprisingly, that size and development relate to total output of foreign policy behaviour, i.e. the output of larger countries is bigger than that of small countries.[9] Tomlin *et. al.*[10] argue strongly that relations between subordinate states and developed states are asymmetrical and in favour of the latter, e.g. the relations between former colonies and the former colonial suzerains. Rosenau and Hoggard [11] also found evidence of asymmetry. Small developed open societies (where they classify South Africa), rank lowest of their eight genotypic national societies

in the output of both conflictual and co-operative behaviour. *To sum up:* International relations display a mixture of symmetrical and asymmetrical interaction.

The findings of reciprocity have produced mixed results as well. Richardson, Kegley and Agnew found that of the dyads included in their sample, only 50% had strong reciprocity.[12] Philips' findings, executed on the same level of analysis as our study, have limited utility. They focus only on the reciprocity of conflict behaviour. Although Philips found ample evidence of reciprocity, the dimensions for conflict sent and received have not always been related to similar dimensions.[13]

Thompson and Rapkin found that strong reciprocity between members of the Western Bloc and the Soviet Union and intrabloc relations within the Western Bloc had only been evident for a minority of dyads.[14] Frei and Ruloff's analysis of East-West co-operation and conflict found far more weak than strong reciprocity even when adjusted for time, ratios of strategic nuclear systems to military expenditure, trade and domestic pressure.[15]

One of the problems comparing the above findings on reciprocity is that foreign policy behaviour has been operationalised in many ways. Philips and Crain [16] identified eight categories, McClelland and Hoggard [17] three categories, and Philips [18] six categories. These are the results of factor analysis on data sets with numerous categories. In mitigation one has to add that different data sets produced different factors. A contrasting approach followed by Ward is to reorganise the categories of a scale (WEIS in this case) by using logical reasoning rather than statistical methods.[19] In this study we have used a basic 2 x 2 matrix of foreign policy: verbal and physical behaviour by co-operative and conflictual behaviour. A matrix based on co-operation and conflict by verbal behaviour (deeds) and physical actions are the basics of international behaviour as represented by both traditional and behavioural schools of thought.[20] Since we are interested in broad correlations, these four categories of foreign policy behaviour have their attractions. Information was drawn from a data set called SAFED (South African Foreign Events Data). SAFED is based on a WEIS scale and consists of 15 179 events for the period 1977-1988.[21]

As mentioned above the 'simplistic circularity' of reciprocity has often been questioned. Many students have pointed out that intervening variables like uncertainty inertia, time lags and leads, and capability change have an impact on reciprocity.[22] Although we recognise the merits of all these variables, spatial constraints inhibit a full investigation. Our interest here is with the influence of *time* on reciprocity and symmetry in South Africa's external relations. Although time series have produced mixed results in terms of reciprocity, the South African case has been extraordinary.[23] The relations between South Africa and its external environment have progressively worsened over the last decade.

In the mid 1970s a crucial threshold was reached in this process of deterioration. The collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire in Africa started the erosion of the *cordon sanitaire* which protected white minority rule from black Africa. Within a few years the independent states of Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe came into being. Domestically, this transformation process had a profound effect on the black mood in South Africa. The Soweto riots erupted in 1976 and violent clashes between the state and young blacks spread country-wide. Although this revolt was harshly suppressed by the State, large scale violence erupted again and again in black townships, particularly in 1980, 1982 and the period 1984–1987.

South Africa has been ruled under a state of emergency since 1986.[24] These deteriorating relations fit Rosenau's description of convulsive change which '... arises out of a condition in which both internal and environmental change are high, it is so designated because with a great deal transpiring at home and abroad, the top leadership of governments must respond quickly to societal demands and external pressure that are often contradictory and that thus necessitate erratic unpredictable and agitated efforts to keep the interdependencies of the external environment in balance with the shifting structures of their societies'.[25] Consequently South Africa has applied a mixture of co-operative and hostile strategies to cope with its domestic and regional crises. The world community reacted in mixed fashion as well. South Africa was roundly condemned and even punished for its domestic and regional excesses but praised and rewarded for its efforts to promote domestic and regional peace.[26]

Our argument is that over the short term, on both the symmetric and reciprocal levels, South Africa's international relations have been fluctuating due to their inherently unstable nature. To speculate or even advance arguments to the effect that certain years are characterised by symmetry and reciprocity and others not, would be premature at this stage, when our confidence as positivists has flagged somewhat. It is inconceivable that dominant patterns of symmetry and reciprocity will be supported by our findings. Neither do we expect that asymmetry and weak reciprocity to be dominant patterns. At best we accept mixed results: Certain years will be characterised by strong positive correlations, while for others the tendencies will be weak, positive or even negative correlations.

The deduction from this analysis therefore, is that general propositions, rather than hypotheses, are advisable at this state.

STATISTICAL PROCEDURES

The behavioural experience of South Africa from 1977 through to 1988 was analysed by comparing the amount of behaviour initiated by South Africa with the amount of behaviour targeted toward South Africa. Taking

each year separately, a *behaviour sent* matrix and a *behaviour received* matrix were obtained by observing the frequencies of each of the four types of behaviour sent by South Africa per week and the frequencies of each of the four types of behaviour received by South Africa per week, respectively. Twelve canonical regressions were performed using the behaviour sent and behaviour received matrices, one for each year. The resulting paired canonical variates were used as an indication of reciprocity.

To estimate the extent of symmetry in the behavioural interactions of South Africa, the frequency counts of each of the four types of behaviour sent by South Africa each month and the frequency counts of each of the four types of the behaviour received by South Africa each month were used.

For each year separately, bivariate regression analyses were performed with frequency counts as dependent (Y) and independent variables (X). The coefficient of determination R^2, which gives a measure of the variablilty of Y explained by the regression of X was obtained for each year. R^2 was used as an indication of symmetry. The standardised regression coefficient, R, obtained from the bivraite regressions, was also used as a measurement of the extent of reciprocity in the behavioural interactions.[27]

Canonical correlation analysis examines the relationship between two sets of variables. Given two sets of variables X and Y, canonical correlation analysis attempts to find a linear combination, called a canonical variate, of the X variables that has a *maximum* correlation with a linear combination of the Y variable. The correlation between the two canonical variables is called the first canonical correlation. The first canonical variates can be expressed in the form:

$$\alpha_{11}X_1 + \alpha_{12}X_2 + \cdots + \alpha_{1p}X_p =$$
$$\beta_{11}X_1 + \beta_{12}X_2 + \cdots + \beta_{1q}X_q + e_1$$

where α_{ij} for $j = 1,2\cdots,p$ are the canonical coefficients of the first linear combination of the X variables. β_{ik} for $k = 1,2,\cdots,q$ are the coefficients of the first linear combination of the Y variables and e_1 is the least squares error term. The canonical correlation procedure continues by attempting to find a second set of canonical variates *uncorrelated* with the first pair that produces the second highest correlation coefficient.

The process of constructing canonical variates continues until the number of pairs of canonical variates equals the number of variables in the smaller set (X or Y).

Results

The volume of frequencies of SAFED, clearly indicated what to expect in terms of symmetry. South Africa, for the 12-year period under investigation, was the target of 10202 events emanating from its external

environment while her recorded actions totalled 4977 events, Table 1 illustrates that weak rather than strong symmetry characterise the interaction between South Africa and the world community.

Table 1: Symmetry for the four types of behaviour

Year	Verbal Conflict	Physical Conflict	Verbal Co-op.	Physical Co-op.
	R_2	R_2	R_2	R_2
1977	.48	.45	.47	.68
1978	.03	.03	.03	.16
1979	.15	.28	.01	.02
1980	.01	.56	.29	.04
1981	.29	.23	.56	.18
1982	.00	.81	.81	.37
1983	.12	.48	.05	.01
1984	.62	.26	.67	.57
1985	.45	.01	.30	.87
1986	.80	.49	.61	.89
1987	.17	.13	.06	.77
1988	.52	.91	.70	.80

Figure 1: Symmetry for co-operation and conflict



Co-operative behaviour has been more symmetric than conflictual behaviour. Strong positive symmetry for physical and verbal co-operation was evident for six and five years respectively. For verbal and physical conflict, such symmetry was only recorded for three years each. The small comfort we can gain from the above finding is that some element of positive symmetry characterises all types of behaviour for all years.

The findings outlined in Figure 1 confirm the patterns of symmetry in Table 1 but one new pattern is clearly in evidence. From 1984 symmetry occurred over a two year cycle. The years 1984, 1986 and 1988 were characterised not only by intense international attention to the South African issue but also by divergent, conflictual and co-operative actions and reactions. These contrasts were most probably influenced by the violence in black townships and the South African government's new constitution during 1984; the debate over the merits and disadvantages of economic sanctions in 1986; and the war and conflict resolution in Namibia/Angola during 1988.

The patterns for reciprocity are more pronounced than those of symmetry. Table 2 displays the results of the standardised regression coefficients.

Table 2: Reciprocity for the four types of behaviour

Year	Verbal Conflict	Physical Conflict	Verbal Co-op.	Physical Co-op.
	Std. Reg. Coeff.	Std. Reg. Coeff.	Std. Reg. Coeff.	Std. Reg. Coeff.
1977	.70	.67	.69	.83
1978	.17	.18	−.18	.39
1979	.38	.53	−.17	.14
1980	.09	.75	.54	.21
1981	.53	.48	.75	.43
1982	.06	.90	.90	.61
1983	−.35	.69	.21	−.08
1984	.79	.51	.82	.75
1985	.67	.10	.55	.93
1986	.89	.70	.78	.94
1987	.41	.36	.24	.88
1988	.72	.95	.84	.90

Verbal co-operation and physical conflict were strongly reciprocal for eight of the twelve years under scrutiny, and physical co-operation and verbal conflict for seven and six years respectively. Furthermore, for physical conflict, weak but positive reciprocity was also in evidence for the other years as well. Reducing the four categories to two produces much the same patterns of reciprocity.

Table 3: Reciprocity for Cooperation and Conflict

Year	Cooperation Std. Reg. Coeff.	Conflict Std. Reg. Coeff.
1977	.73	.64
1978	−.15	.13
1979	−.12	.39
1980	.50	.25
1981	.76	.53
1982	.90	.40
1983	.08	.45
1984	.81	.75
1985	.63	.71
1986	.81	.90
1987	.21	.59
1988	.85	.79

The measurement of reciprocity by means of canonical regression is summarised in Tables 4.1–4.12 in the appendix.

The results of the canonical regression show that strong measurements of reciprocity were found as follows with correlation greater than 0.4: verbal co-operation for six of the years, physical co-operation for five, verbal conflict for three and physical conflict for five years. Strong positive measurements of reciprocity in physical conflict were also evident in two additional years but the correlations between the canonical variates were weak. The most impressive result, flowing from the first canonical variates ,is that the mixture of behaviour (all 4 types) sent and received is strongly correlated for all but one of the years in question. The regressions nonetheless produced findings which stand in sharp contrast with Philips' findings that typify South Africa as one of those nations for which reciprocity is not well predicted.[28] The mixture of co-operative and conflictual reciprocity confirms our hunch that both South Africa and the international community utilised different strategies to protect and undermine apartheid respectively. For South Africa various departments had their specialised approaches, e.g. SADF by coercion, Foreign Affairs by diplomacy and propaganda, and technocratic-departments by aid and economic coercion. Externally, some actors like the national liberation movements concentrated on force while Western actors combined carrot and stick approaches. Reliance on force as a foreign policy instrument, particularly in the region, did not fulfill Pretoria's long term objective, i.e. to safeguard apartheid. The high levels of reciprocity in verbal co-operation show that the good intentions necessary for third party involvement in facilitating a negotiated settlement between the ANC and the NP are there to be tapped.

Conclusions

SAFED has provided a more comprehensive source for the analysis of South African foreign relations than other existing data sets, where South African related events are under represented.

The mixed results show that our basic proposition has been valid for symmetry and reciprocity in South Africa's international interactions. Co-operative symmetry has been characterised by an almost equal distribution of strong and weak positive correlation. For conflict behaviour significant symmetry only occurred in a minority of the years under analysis. Reciprocity for both conflictual and co-operative behaviour were in evidence for many of the years under investigation.

SAFED offers many opportunities for further analysis of symmetry and reciprocity. Comparing across nation genotypes or power-blocs could produce more definite patterns of symmetry, asymmetry and reciprocity. The dyadic level of analysis and a factor analysis of the WEIS categories might produce more significant correlations for symmetry and reciprocity in co-operative behaviour. The introduction of other intervening variables besides a time series is another avenue worth exploring.

Appendix

Table 4.1: Canonical Variate Loadings for 1977

Behaviour Sent	*Canonical Variates*			
	1	2	3	4
Verbal Cooperation	0.190	0.957	0.080	0.206
Physical Cooperation	0.855	0.293	−0.159	0.397
Verbal Conflict	0.808	−0.041	0.537	−0.238
Physical Conflict	0.598	0.063	−0.659	−0.452
Canonical regression	0.84	0.53	0.28	0.07
Behaviour Received	*Canonical Variates*			
	1	2	3	4
Verbal Cooperation	0.660	0.719	0.213	−0.034
Physical Cooperation	0.636	0.471	−0.370	0.487
Verbal Conflict	0.987	0.048	−0.033	−0.149
Physical Conflict	0.480	−0.554	−0.558	−0.389

Table 4.2: Canonical Variate Loadings for 1988

Behaviour Sent	*Canonical Variates*			
	1	2	3	4
Verbal Cooperation	0.385	0.069	0.473	0.790
Physical Cooperation	0.004	0.839	0.524	−0.145
Verbal Conflict	0.808	−0.291	0.372	−0.353
Physical Conflict	−0.160	−0.330	0.921	0.131
Canonical regression	0.65	0.62	0.42	0.13
Behaviour Received	*Canonical Variates*			
	1	2	3	4
Verbal Cooperation	−0.284	−0.078	−0.124	−0.948
Physical Cooperation	−0.184	0.848	0.453	−0.206
Verbal Conflict	0.846	−0.017	−0.145	−0.512
Physical Conflict	0.279	−0.345	0.862	−0.244

Table 4.3: Canonical Variate Loadings for 1979

Behaviour Sent	*Canonical Variates*			
	1	2	3	4
Verbal Cooperation	−0.217	0.399	0.543	0.706
Physical Cooperation	0.174	−0.347	−0.786	−0.481
Verbal Conflict	0.908	−0.054	−0.050	−0.413
Physical Conflict	0.147	0.828	−0.078	−0.535
Canonical regression	0.62	0.41	0.30	0.09
Behaviour Received	*Canonical Variates*			
	1	2	3	4
Verbal Cooperation	−0.190	−0.038	0.166	0.967
Physical Cooperation	0.854	−0.331	0.022	0.400
Verbal Conflict	0.141	−0.014	−0.800	0.584
Physical Conflict	0.418	0.870	0.086	−0.245

Table 4.4: Canonical Variate Loadings for 1980

Behaviour Sent	*Canonical Variates*			
	1	2	3	4
Verbal Cooperation	0.907	0.312	0.288	−0.077
Physical Cooperation	−0.172	0.891	−0.390	−0.158
Verbal Conflict	0.393	0.332	−0.050	0.856
Physical Conflict	−0.352	0.731	0.577	0.092
Canonical regression	0.63	0.50	0.39	0.23
Behaviour Received	*Canonical Variates*			
	1	2	3	4
Verbal Cooperation	0.735	0.187	0.375	0.533
Physical Cooperation	0.249	0.699	−0.355	−0.568
Verbal Conflict	0.131	0.307	−0.354	0.874
Physical Conflict	−0.257	0.741	0.492	0.377

Table 4.5: Canonical Variate Loadings for 1981

Behaviour Sent	*Canonical Variates*			
	1	2	3	4
Verbal Cooperation	0.658	−0.126	0.742	0.024
Physical Cooperation	0.121	0.189	0.041	0.974
Verbal Conflict	0.914	0.136	−0.381	−0.023
Physical Conflict	−0.169	0.937	0.209	−0.225
Canonical regression	0.56	0.30	0.22	0.04
Behaviour Received	*Canonical Variates*			
	1	2	3	4
Verbal Cooperation	0.702	−0.269	0.564	−0.343
Physical Cooperation	0.045	0.798	0.594	−0.091
Verbal Conflict	0.734	−0.027	0.234	0.637
Physical Conflict	0.494	0.660	−0.457	−0.335

Table 4.6: Canonical Variate Loadings for 1982

Behaviour Sent	*Canonical Variates*			
	1	2	3	4
Verbal Cooperation	0.756	−0.469	−0.398	0.225
Physical Cooperation	0.243	−0.213	0.716	0.619
Verbal Conflict	0.718	−0.081	0.529	−0.445
Physical Conflict	0.314	0.937	−0.017	0.149
Canonical regression	0.84	0.76	0.53	0.17
Behaviour Received	*Canonical Variates*			
	1	2	3	4
Verbal Cooperation	0.770	−0.482	−0.381	−0.172
Physical Cooperation	0.581	−0.031	0.705	0.406
Verbal Conflict	0.275	−0.050	0.380	−0.882
Physical Conflict	0.259	0.960	−0.097	0.048

Table 4.7: *Canonical Variate Loadings for 1983*

Behaviour Sent	*Canonical Variates*			
	1	2	3	4
Verbal Cooperation	0.393	0.917	−0.036	0.054
Physical Cooperation	0.523	0.115	0.158	0.829
Verbal Conflict	0.482	0.319	0.769	−0.273
Physical Conflict	0.870	−0.307	−0.226	−0.314
Canonical regression	0.76	0.53	0.41	0.20
Behaviour Received	*Canonical Variates*			
	1	*2*	*3*	*4*
Verbal Cooperation	0.588	0.733	0.149	0.306
Physical Cooperation	0.815	−0.332	0.032	0.475
Verbal Conflict	0.449	0.235	0.842	0.186
Physical Conflict	0.790	−0.131	0.049	−0.597

Table 4.8: Canonical Variate Loadings for 1984

Behaviour Sent	*Canonical Variates*			
	1	2	3	4
Verbal Cooperation	0.841	−0.348	−0.363	−0.198
Physical Cooperation	0.666	0.692	−0.265	0.087
Verbal Conflict	0.801	−0.055	0.515	−0.301
Physical Conflict	0.612	−0.201	0.495	0.583
Canonical regression	0.82	0.66	0.30	0.18
Behaviour Received	*Canonical Variates*			
	1	2	3	4
Verbal Cooperation	0.944	−0.325	−0.033	−0.054
Physical Cooperation	0.704	0.693	−0.061	0.142
Verbal Conflict	0.699	0.049	0.668	0.250
Physical Conflict	0.178	−0.062	−0.118	0.975

Table 4.9: Canonical Variate Loadings for 1985

Behaviour Sent	*Canonical Variates*			
	1	2	3	4
Verbal Cooperation	−0.088	0.637	0.765	−0.024
Physical Cooperation	0.972	0.171	−0.142	0.081
Verbal Conflict	−0.420	0.875	−0.241	0.000
Physical Conflict	−0.052	0.271	−0.012	0.961
Canonical regression	0.83	0.68	0.61	0.22
Behaviour Received	*Canonical Variates*			
	1	2	3	4
Verbal Cooperation	−0.199	0.750	0.629	−0.048
Physical Cooperation	0.932	0.354	0.045	0.068
Verbal Conflict	−0.153	0.799	−0.387	−0.435
Physical Conflict	0.181	0.647	−0.292	0.680

Table 4.10: Canonical Variate Loadings for 1986

Behaviour Sent	*Canonical Variates*			
	1	2	3	4
Verbal Cooperation	0.679	0.110	0.587	−0.427
Physical Cooperation	0.212	−0.650	0.155	0.713
Verbal Conflict	−0.625	−0.191	0.699	−0.289
Physical Conflict	−0.022	0.799	0.120	0.589
Canonical regression	0.45	0.25	0.14	0.05
Behaviour Received	*Canonical Variates*			
	1	2	3	4
Verbal Cooperation	−0.074	0.763	0.147	−0.626
Physical Cooperation	−0.571	0.216	−0.776	−0.162
Verbal Conflict	−0.684	0.563	0.243	0.395
Physical Conflict	−0.854	0.122	0.245	−0.443

Table 4.11: Canonical Variate Loadings for 1987

Behaviour Sent	*Canonical Variates*		
	1	2	3
Verbal Cooperation	−0.093	0.599	0.795
Verbal Conflict	−0.436	0.739	−0.513
Physical Conflict*	0.976	0.159	−0.146
Canonical regression	0.82	0.50	0.13
Behaviour Received		*Canonical Variates*	
	1	2	3
Verbal Cooperation	0.158	0.986	−0.044
Verbal Conflict	0.031	0.100	−0.995
Physical Conflict*	0.986	0.122	−0.115

*Note: No cases of physical cooperation were recorded in 1987

Table 4.12: Canonical Variate Loadings for 1988

Behaviour Sent		*Canonical Variates*		
	1	2	3	4
Verbal Cooperation	−0.399	0.880	−0.238	0.096
Physical Cooperation	0.121	0.276	0.932	0.201
Verbal Conflict	0.579	0.067	−0.227	0.780
Physical Conflict	0.943	0.322	−0.084	−0.032
Canonical regression	0.90	0.78	0.43	0.15
Behaviour Received		*Canonical Variates*		
	1	*2*	3	4
Verbal Cooperation	−0.478	0.875	0.050	0.064
Physical Cooperation	0.054	0.023	0.988	0.142
Verbal Conflict	0.285	−0.218	−0.055	0.932
Physical Conflict	0.921	0.381	0.083	0.017

Notes

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Anthoni van Nieuwkerk and Koos van Wyk.

The Operational Code of PW Botha: Apartheid, realism and misperception.

Introduction

For students of foreign policy, belief systems of leaders are a vital concern. The operational code as an approach has generated much of our knowledge of foreign policy beliefs and leaders. Since the theoretical debate on the operational code has reached a point of saturation, the focus has shifted to the utility of this approach. Up to now, operational code case studies have been necessary to establish an appropriate literature. Scholars are now faced with the exciting challenge to merge operational code insights with the study of belief systems in its wider context, particularly with concepts such as misperception. This should be seen as part of an encouraging trend investigating the correlation between foreign policy beliefs and other variables such as behaviour, psychological motivation and crises outcomes (Walker and Murphy, 1981/82; Stuart, 1980; Walker, 1977; Walker and Falkowski, 1984; Walker, 1983; Hoagland and Walker, 1979; Falkowski, 1979).

Our concern with this study is to show that a B-type belief system is compatible with a realist world view. If that is the case, B-type believers would also display those typical forms of misperception associated with the realist paradigm.

This study has been organised in three parts. Part one is primarily a conceptual analysis. The nature of the B-type belief system, the realist paradigm and their assumed compatibility will be outlined. Also, an understanding of the various types of misperception is essential to our analysis. Part two will briefly focus on two B-type believers, i.e. John Foster Dulles and Ronald Reagan. Part three, our essential focus, proposes that PW Botha displays a typical B-type foreign policy belief system and the skewed perceptions associated with such a world view. The consequences of realism for South Africa's foreign policy will also be outlined.

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I. Conceptual Analysis

The task of the student of foreign policy belief systems has been simplified since Holsti (1977) deduced a typology of six ideal types of belief systems from the large number of available case studies[1].

Holsti's typology of political belief systems is based upon the assumption that a leader's views on the nature of the world are 'master' beliefs and constrain the individual's other political beliefs. Holsti constructs a typology of six operational codes (Fig. 1) by classifying an individual's beliefs regarding two fundamental aspects of political life. At the heart of the first belief is a distinction between a view of the world as essentially conflictual versus the belief that it is basically harmonious. The second belief differentiates between three sources of conflict: human nature, or the attributes of states, or the international system (Holsti, 1977: 156–157).

Figure 1: Typology of political belief systems.

What are the fundamental sources of conflict?	What is the fundamental nature of the political universe? Harmonious (conflict is temporary)	Conflictual (conflict is permanent)
Human nature	A	D
Attributes of nations	B	E
International system	C	F

In this study we will argue that PW Botha's operational code resembles Holsti's B-Type. Before embarking on an analysis of Botha, a brief discussion of B-Type as well as some of its exponents will be in order. One of the encouraging conclusions of Holsti's study is that examples of the B-Type best fit the hypothesis flowing from his typology (Holsti, 1977: 267-269). The main characteristics of the B-type belief system are succintly summarized by Walker and Falkowski (1984: 259-260):

> In the political universe conflict is temporary; in a world of peaceful states there will be peace. The basic sources of conflict are war-like states. The conditions of peace lie in the containment, reform, or elimination of warlike states. The nature of conflict is zero-sum; issues tend to be closely linked. The role of conflict in historical development is very functional in some circumstances. The major danger of war is from miscalculation and appeasement. There is a high correlation between the opponent's foreign policy and the opponent's disposition and attributes, e.g., political or economic structures, or the nature of leadership. The opponent's actions result from careful planning, and its goals range from expansionist to destructionist. These goals arise from basic features of the opponent's regime. The opponent is likely to view conciliatory actions as a sign of weakness or lack of commitment and be encouraged to pursue expansion in the face of appeasement. Policies of firmness will deter the opponent's expansionist policies. The danger of an impulsive response by the opponent is minimal.

B-type beliefs, as outlined above, share many similarities with a realist world view. By 'realist view', we refer to the cynical proposition that the state has to acquire as much power as it can, because of the dangerous and anarchic world in which it has to survive (Taylor, 1978: 122). Some of the main similarities are: Conflict and war are often unavoidable in interstate relations and only those states who take appropriate measures, in particular, the accumulation of economic and military power, will survive; the use of power justifies the ends sought by the state. Ends and goals are defined in terms of 'national interest' which in effect means the accumulation and utilisation of power (Taylor, 1978: 128). In summary, the B-type perception is congruent with what Holsti and Rosenau aptly described as the Cold War Internationalist viewpoint (1984: chapter four).

John Foster Dulles and Ronald Reagan have already been identified as B-types. According to Dulles, international conflict was a zero-sum game and communist nations were the primary source of conflict. In the scope of conflict, issues were seen as inseparable; failure in one area was likely to result in further challenges elsewhere. From a historical point of view, conflict was ever-present and required constant vigilance and defence. Dulles set out two conditions of peace: avoid war that might arise out of the adversary's miscalculation of your intentions in the short term; and transformation of warlike nations in the long run.

Dulles viewed his adversaries, the communist nations, as highly organised and committed to furthering the international goals set out in Marxist-Leninist doctrines. Deterrence, rather than appeasement,was the most effective policy to counter communist expansionism[2].

Although Reagan's political belief system has not yet been rigorously analysed in terms of the operational code, existing literature strongly suggests that he can be categorised as a B-type. Reagan's master beliefs are clearly of the B-type, i.e. a Cold War, Manichean view of the world, supported by the belief that communism, in particular the Soviet Union, is the main threat to World peace.

Reagan views international politics as a struggle between democracy and totalitarianism, 'between right and wrong, good and evil' (Leng, 1984: 339; Johnson, 1988: 514). The Soviet Union, or 'the evil empire' in Reaganspeak, is the prime cause of international conflict. Reagan ... 'has painted Russia as almost black. The Soviets are the embodiment of evil, their goal is world domination.' He has said: 'We are faced with the most evil enemy mankind has known in his long climb from the swamp to the stars. Moreover, their surrogates all over the world are just like them.' (Glad, 1983: 44). Reagan's world view reflects elements of realism. He regards the role of power as central in the relations between competitive sovereign states. Just as realists assume that international politics are shaped primarily by considerations of power and self-interest, Reagan assumes that economic and military

strength are the crucial bases of American security and leadership (Anderson and Kernek, 1985: 391). Like all realists, for Reagan the ends justify the means in the struggle against communism. For example, the Reagan administration's obsession with countering the spread of communist influence, particularly in the Third World, has led to American support for a number of repressive regimes with appalling human rights records.

Given the tendency of B-Type belief systems adherents (and realists) to display rigidity in their view of the world and their adversaries, susceptibility to misperception seems inevitable. Following Stein's research agenda (1988: 263), our proposition is that B-Type belief systems strongly correlate with a tendency toward misperception. Misperception broadly means that images screen out important signals in some way – either ignoring them completely, interpreting them incorrectly, or changing the information to fit existing images (Russett and Starr, 1985: 306). Obviously, misperception includes both the underestimation and exaggeration of intentions. Stein (1988) presents four sets of factors which can contribute to misperception: cognitive, motivational, strategic and domestic.

Some common cognitive sources of misperception are the following: first, lack of empathy – that is the inability to understand others' perception of their world; their own conception of their role in that world; and their definition of their interest. An acute form is the 'mirror image' or 'Black-White Diabolical Enemy Image'. The self-image personifies all that is good and positive, but the image of the adversary is seen in starkly opposite terms (Russett and Starr, 1985: 306).

Secondly, the availability of a limited cognitive repertoire, i.e., the tendency to judge the intentions and plans of adversaries according to criteria governing your own policies. The selective assimilation of information to fit existing paradigms is a common occurrence in this regard.

Thirdly, the tendency to generalize and exaggerate the similarity between events. Conspiracy theories could be regarded as an extreme version of such 'representativeness'. Fourth, egocentric bias, that is overestimating one's importance as influence or target. Fifth, the proportionality bias – that is, leaders expect their adversary to expend efforts proportionate to the ends they seek. Consequently, they make inferences about the intentions of others from the costs and consequences of the actions they initiate. Sixth, the fundamental attribution error – one's own behaviour, for instance in defence spending, is justified as a necessity but similar action by an adversary is rejected as a threat to the peace. Seventh, the attribution of greater coherence and centralization whereby an adversary's control over their machinery of government is seen as centrally co-ordinated to such an extent that all actions and intentions form part of a coherent plan[3].

Motivation is the second source of misperception. Motivated biases such as subconscious needs, fears, expectations and emotional stress can also

colour leaders' perceptions. Two common manifestations are defence avoidance and wishful thinking. Defence avoidance is characterised by efforts to avoid, dismiss, and deny warnings that increase anxiety and fear. When desires instead of situational analysis, shape beliefs, a leader engages in wishful thinking.

The nature of the international strategic balance is a third source of misperception. The uncertainty and changing nature of the security dilemma often results in strategic assessments of an adversary, based on exaggeration and distortion. Leaders tend to overrate the advantages of the offensive, the magnitude of unfavourable powershifts, the hostility of their adversaries and their own sense of vulnerability.

The fourth source of misperception stems from governments utilizing foreign threats to boost domestic support. Two examples will suffice. First, civilian and military officials responsible for defence, either deliberately or unwittingly exaggerate threats to increase the size of budgetary allocations. Second, foreign threats are used to conceal domestic conflict and to promote national unity or even greater governmental control to suppress domestic opposition. Regimes lacking sufficient legitimacy often rely on such measures[4] (See also Scolnick, 1988). A variation of the latter type takes the form of projection, that is, domestic conflict in deeply divided societies is attributed to external sources.

II The Belief System of PW Botha

In 1978, Mr. P.W. Botha became Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa[5]. He brought to the office of Prime Minister that combination of experience and personality that personifies a typical B-Type belief system and the acute threat perception associated therewith. Botha epitomized the 'kragdadige' political leader whom the Afrikaner-based National Party has chosen since 1948. Like his predecessors Malan, Strijdom, Verwoerd, and Vorster, Botha thrived on a tough and uncompromising attitude towards a world that has increasingly rejected apartheid. The success of Botha's career has been ascribed not to his popularity or charisma, but rather to his organizational skills, perseverance, party loyalty, and ruthlessness. Botha was well known for his quick temper and has often deliberately ridden roughshod over his unnerved opponents to score political points. Respect for Botha was normally based on fear. Ironically, in recent years, Botha has often expressed a yearning for greater respect and acceptance.

PW Botha dropped out of University in 1936 when he took up an appointment as a National Party organizer. In this period, he excelled as party organiser and gained notoriety as a wrecker of opposition meetings. His obsession with a 'communist threat', which in later years formed the basis of his foreign policy beliefs, was already evident at a National Party Congress in 1937, when a motion of his against communism was accepted.

When the Nationalist Party won the whites-only election in 1948, Botha became a Member of Parliament. Botha's ascendancy to political power gained momentum when he was appointed by Verwoerd as Minister of Defence in 1966. His long incumbency in this office had a profound impact on his beliefs. His ideas of the communist threat combined with the strategic doctrine of the South African Defence Force (SADF)[6], as well as the deterioration of South Africa's regional security, resulted in broad principles of threat perception and how to counter it. With the aid of his military advisers, these ideas were spelled out in various Defence White Papers as the 'Total Onslaught' and the 'Total National Strategy'. In essence, all South Africa's problems, domestic and international, were blamed on a communist-inspired onslaught. The government should therefore coordinate all available resources to counter this threat. When Botha became Prime Minister, he restructured the government's decision-making machinery to accomodate the principles of the Total National Strategy. An elaborate National Security Management System (NSMS) was implemented. The State Security Council (SSC), a Cabinet committee comprising Ministers as well as top securocrats, under the chairmanship of PW Botha, became the locus of decisionmaking. The SSC was underpinned by a network of committees reaching right down to local government level to supervise the implementation of decisions. On the whole, in the Security Management System, security considerations came to dominate all decisionmaking.

Botha therefore not only became the kingpin of state executive power but the restructured State apparatus has become the embodiment of his 'realist' beliefs.

These beliefs were greatly strengthened by the deterioration in South Africa's regional and international position. In the 1970s the driving force behind black nationalism became a stark reality to the upholders of apartheid in South Africa. The collapse of the Portugese colonial empire meant that former guerrillas were now ruling in Angola and Mozambique. A similar transformation was underway in Zimbabwe where the Patriotic Front of Robert Mugabe was waging a revolutionary war against the Smith regime, resulting in black rule by 1980. The South African regime had numerous security problems as well. The SADF and the South African Police were engaged in fighting SWAPO guerrillas in Namibia and Angola and ANC insurgents in the border areas of South Africa. In 1976, large-scale violence erupted in South Africa's black townships due to frustration with apartheid. In 1984, black violence erupted once more in protest against the new constitution which still excluded Blacks from parliament. Western opposition to apartheid took a turn for the worse. Demands were growing that the West should introduce sanctions against South Africa. Botha's assessment of these events was that they formed part of a comprehensive

Soviet-inspired onslaught against South Africa. Botha rejected the notion that the desire for black emancipation was at the root of these occurrences. Instead, he insisted that Moscow and its agents were the real instigators. In this way, he branded the very broad spectrum of those opposing apartheid as either communist controlled or infiltrated. He reserved special scorn for 'misguided liberals' in South Africa and the West who, through their naiveté, promoted the communist cause.

The Pretoria government's response – in which Botha as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence played a major role – to changing circumstances and escalating threats, is reflected in the idea of a Total National Strategy (TNS). The TNS envisaged a three-pronged counter-revolutionary strategy to safeguard apartheid. First, tough security action aiming at eliminating domestic anti-apartheid activists and their organisations, was applied. This has meant a tighter application of security legislation and the declaration of four states of emergency since 1985. The large-scale use of the South African Defence Force against black opponents of apartheid signified the state's willingness to apply coercive strategies. Secondly, limited constitutional reform, aiming to co-opt black groups in apartheid structures, was introduced, of which the homelands and the three-chamber parliament have been the most prominent manifestation. Thirdly, a mixed strategy of 'carrot-and-stick' measures targetted at neighbouring countries with the aim of protecting the status quo, was deployed. Those states that support ANC and SWAPO guerillas have been subject to acts of military and economic coercion. Once neighbouring states close ANC military bases as a result of South African threats and pressure, economic rewards e.g. aid, trade and labour agreements are usually forthcoming. The Nkomati accord with Mozambique in 1984 could serve as an example of this kind of strategy.

Proceeding further with the analogy of P.W. Botha as Holsti's B-Type, Figures Two and Three clearly indicate the similarities between Botha's master beliefs and those of Holsti's B-Type[7]. These findings are briefly discussed below.

Figure 2: PW Botha: Beliefs about the nature of political life

Operational Code Questions	Type B Response	Judgement of Coder (Botha's beliefs)	Fit
1. What is the nature of the political universe?	Conflict is temporary; in a world of peaceful states there will be peace.	'I do not believe in an utopian future but war need not be our future'; 'In the long run, I believe that the Soviets will lose the fight in Southern Africa'; 'Communism cannot succeed'.	++
2. What are the basic sources of conflict?	Warlike states or classes of states.	'Russian expansionism and imperialism.'	++

Figure 2: PW Botha: Beliefs about the nature of political life (continued)

Operational Code Questions	*Type B* Response	*Judgement of Coder* (Botha's beliefs)	Fit
3. What are the conditions of peace?	Containment, reform or elimination of warlike actors.	'Counteract the communist forces by a total strategy'; 'Risk physical conflict to stop Marxism in Southern Africa'; 'Conclude non-aggression pacts with neighbouring states.'	++
4. What is the nature of the conflict?	Zero-sum	'Christianity vs. Godless Marxism'; 'Western civilisation versus Marxist expansionism'.	++
5. What is the scope of the conflict?	Issues tend to be closely linked.	'The total onslaught against the Free World'; 'Soviet Union strives toward imperial domination'; 'The domino theory'; 'The Soviets' global strategy'.	++
6. What is the role of conflict in historical development?	Very functional in some circumstances.	'We will fight for survival'; 'Oppose communism to achieve peace'.	++

Figure 3: PW Botha: Beliefs about the adversary

Operational Code Questions	*Type B* Response	*Judgement of Coder* (Botha's beliefs)	Fit
1. What is the nature of the adversary?	There is a high correlation between ideology and foreign policy.	'Disorderly, Godless Marxism'; 'Russia's goal of world domination'; 'Russian expansionism and imperialism'.	++
2. What are the goals of the adversary?	Range from expansionist to destructionist.	'The communists preach revolution'; 'It is the Soviets' aim to destroy the norms and value systems of the Free World and of Free Enterprise'.	++
3. How will the adversary respond to conciliatory actions?	Likely to view it as a sign of weakness.	Response uncertain.	0
4. How will the adversary respond to policies of firmness?	Adversary will be deterred.	'We were prepared to risk physical conflict to stop Marxism in Angola. We succeeded in halting chaos and a Cuban advance into South West Africa'; 'Neighbouring states who accommodate terrorists, do an injustice to themselves. We will retaliate against them'.	

Botha's master beliefs regarding the nature of international life are briefly summarized in six points below.

1 The nature of the political universe.

According to Holsti's B-Type, conflict is temporary and world peace is therefore obtainable. B-Types can in this regard be described as optimists. Botha, however, does not address this topic in great depth. Rather, his pronouncements centre on current international political issues. His beliefs are however marked by a religious dimension, and could be seen as forming the basis for his view of the nature of the political universe. According to Botha, the enemy – that is, communism – rejects God, and elevates the state and the material to the level of sanctity[8]. Since their violent *weltanschauung* cannot deal with human nature, they turn to revolution[9]. Christianity is the only force that can successfully oppose and conquer communism[10]. Botha regards himself as a 'realistic optimist'[11]. He believes that communism is still spreading rapidly across the globe, but that Christianity will eventually be victorious[12].

2 The basic sources of conflict

B-Types believe that conflict is caused by actions of warlike states or classes of states. For example, Dulles believed that 'communist nations' were the source of conflict in the world (Holsti, 1977: 164). Botha displays similar beliefs. He argued that 'There is no doubt in my mind that Russia is the dominating force in international affairs today'[13]. He further believes that '...the Republic [of South Africa] stands amidst a power struggle between Marxism and the Free World. In the onslaught against the Free World, South Africa is indeed a prime target of Soviet neo-colonialism'[14].

3 Conditions for peace

According to the B-Type, warlike actors must be contained, reformed or eliminated in order to achieve peace. Botha believes that in order to create conditions for peaceful coexistence, a policy of firmness must be followed. His references to a 'total strategy' which were designed to counter the 'total onslaught', must be seen in this context. For example, he remarked that South Africa will strengthen its security forces so that '...together with our peace-making efforts, communism can be opposed, also outside our borders'[15]. Botha has evidently embraced the realist notion expressed in the ancient dictum *'si vis pacem para bellum'* (if you want peace, prepare for war). South Africa's regional behaviour underlines this approach. After the proposed Constellation of Southern African States failed to get off the ground, military action against neighbouring countries who harboured ANC guerillas were seen as necessary in order to counter the 'communist

threat'. These actions gave rise to accusations of destabilisation, and will be discussed later.

4 Nature of the conflict

B-Type actors believe that the interests of competing parties – usually the West and the Soviet Union – are diametrically opposed. When these parties clash, therefore, gains to be made by one party inevitably result in an equal loss to the other. This zero-sum approach is also evident in Botha's beliefs. According to him, the international scene is characterized by a universal struggle between 'christian order' or 'chaotic communism and marxism'[16]. Furthermore, '...without South Africa, the Free World will lose the fight against marxism and tyranny'[17] and '...the West will collapse without a stable South Africa'[18].

5 Scope of the conflict

B-Types believe that issues tend to be closely linked. Typically, each issue is viewed as part of a larger or more fundamental conflict. The clearest indication of Botha's views in this regard is his constant reference to the 'total onslaught', which he believes is planned by the Soviet Union, executed by various henchmen, proxies and terrorists, and fought on all possible levels[19]. The ultimate goal of the communists, Botha believes, is the achievement of world domination. During an interview in 1979, Botha expressed this belief as follows: 'To a certain extent I would say the Russians moved into vacuums created by the weakness of the West. On the other hand, I think there is a grand design on the part of the Russians. They have a mission. If they could conquer Africa they can overthrow Europe...'[20].

6 The role of conflict in historical development.

B-Types believe that conflict can be very functional in some circumstances. According to Botha, the role of conflict in the defence of certain goals is sometimes unavoidable; in fact, at times even necessary. He believes that '...the extreme demands of the international community, such as one-man-one-vote and black majority government, must be resisted by force'[21]. Similarly, the omnipresent communist threat '...will be resisted by this [the Nationalist] government with all lawful means to its disposal'; the reason being that 'This government does not wish to see the communist flag flying in Southern Africa'[22].

Botha's second master belief deals with views on the nature of the adversary, and is divided into four categories:

(i) The nature of the adversary

B-Types maintain that there is a strong correlation between the

adversary's ideology and its foreign policy, and that their actions result from careful planning. This means that at least as far as the making of foreign policy is concerned the adversary is seen as a unitary actor. As previously indicated, Botha believes that the cause of global conflict has to do with ideological differences between states[23] and that the cold war has not yet ended[24]. In particular, he believes that the struggle is waged between 'the values of Western civilisation' and 'the doctrines of Marxist Soviet-imperialism'[25]. Botha's understanding of Soviet foreign policy decision-making seems to be severely limited. The content analysis of his speeches indicated that Botha displayed a serious lack of knowledge and understanding of the complexities of the Soviet Union's foreign policy decision-making process. He apparently completely overlooked the existence of parties, pressure groups and other factions that play an important role in this process and instead viewed the Soviet Union simply as a unitary actor.

(ii) Goals of the adversary.

In line with B-Type beliefs, Botha believes that the adversary's goals arise from the basic ideological features of the adversary's regime – '...a mixture of Marxist ideology and old-fashioned Russian imperialism'[26] – and therefore range from expansionist to destructionist – 'Conflict and polarisation is the basic prerequisite for communist expansionism'[27].

(iii) How will the adversary respond to conciliatory actions?

B-Types believe that a policy of reconciliation will be viewed as a sign of weakness or lack of commitment, and that the adversary will therefore be encouraged to pursue expansion. The logic of Botha's beliefs on the nature of the adversary as well as his zero-sum approach to conflict preclude him from even considering the implementation of conciliatory actions or policies. Instead, Botha believes that since South Africa is faced by a total, communist-inspired onslaught, the goal to strive for should be that of 'peaceful coexistence, achieved by means of non-aggression pacts'[28]. In the short-term, however, he insisted on the military taking strong action against the adversary and its allies.

(iv) The adversary's response to policies of firmness

By adopting firm policies, B-Types believe that the adversary will be deterred from pursuing expansionist policies. This seems to be Botha's view. His pronouncements on the question of Soviet goals in Southern Africa give an indication of his beliefs in this regard. In 1978, Botha declared that 'The first obvious intrusion by communist Russia into the affairs of southern Africa was of course in Angola. We in South Africa were prepared to risk physical conflict in order to stop a Marxist-oriented group from

seizing power in that country...We are thankful that in spite of the lack of promised support from the West, we succeeded in halting chaos and a Cuban advance into SWA'[29]. Botha furthermore announced that 'We want peace with our neighbours. Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Angola or Zambia does (sic) not have to fear us. We are prepared to conclude non-aggression pacts. But if they do not do that, if they let themselves be used by the communists, to undermine and sabotage us, we will retaliate like we did before and in future will' (sic)[30].

In conclusion, the above dissection clearly illustrates that the foreign policy beliefs of PW Botha are a vivid illustration of the B-type realism. Given this, the second part of our initial proposal suggests that Botha's world view will also be constrained by misperception.

III Botha's Misperceptions

As discussed above, B-Type belief system-supporters tend to display rigid world views and exaggerated threat perceptions. Botha, with his 'Cold War' world view and 'total onslaught' perception of the enemy, is guilty of most of the misperceptions outlined in Part One.

In the first place, some common cognitive sources of misperception in Botha's speeches and writings can be detected. An outstanding feature is Botha's lack of empathy, which results in black-white thinking. Botha regularly paints the enemy in stark, diabolical terms and the self as good and positive. Communism and socialism, for instance, are given as the reasons for '...misery and decay in Africa and large parts in the world'[31]. Furthermore, communists are described as '...the devil since they reject God'[32]. Botha regards '...the forces of chaos and anarchy, which are fed by the Kremlin, as a threat to our Christian lifestyle'[33]. By contrast, the Afrikaner people and the South African government are frequently described as 'orderly, civilized and Christian'[34].

Botha tends to generalize and exaggerate the similarity between issues of conflict. This tendency frequently takes the form of conspiracy theory. Witness, for example, Botha's references to the Soviet Union's 'grand design' for global domination[35], as well as the 'Third World War'. By this he means that 'The Soviet Union, ever since the end of the Second World War, has been conducting a well orchestrated and world wide offensive against the open societies of the West, impelled by a mixture of Marxist ideology and old-fashioned Russian imperialism'[36].

Botha also displays an egocentric bias, that is over-estimating one's importance as influence or target. He said that 'Without South Africa the Free World will lose the fight against Marxism and tyranny'[37] and 'Today the Republic stands amidst a power struggle between Marxism and the Free World. In the onslaught against the Free World, South Africa is indeed a prime target of Soviet neo-colonialism. The events in Angola, Somalia and

the rest of Africa, must be seen as attainment of intermediate goals in a quest for the main target on the continent – the RSA'[38]. Botha's insistence on South Africa's strategic importance to the West recapitulates his egocentric bias. He also argues that South Africa is a vital ally for the West in its struggle against communism. This belief is based on the assumption that the Cape sea route and South Africa's strategic minerals are indispensable for safeguarding Western security interests[39]. This belief is not shared by the West. Since the Cape sea route is as wide as the Indian ocean, interruption of Western routes by the Soviet Union is impractical and highly unlikely. Even the Iraq-Iran war did not prevent the flow of oil through the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. The predictions by prophets of doom, that such a crisis would trigger an East-West confrontation, have been proved to be unfounded. Although Western dependence on SA's strategic minerals is undeniable, any South African attempt to restrict supply is a high-risk strategy, due to the array of potential Western countermeasures. The feasibility of such an option is low, given South Africa's dependence on exports (Van Wyk & von Bülow, 1988: 159; Bowman, 1982: 159).

Another misperception derives from Botha's operational code and flows from what is known as 'the attribution of greater coherence and centralization'. This means that an adversary's control over their machinery of government is seen as centrally co-ordinated to such an extent that all actions and intentions form part of a coherent plan. As discussed previously, Botha tends to view the Soviet Union as a monolithic actor, relentlessly implementing a master plan for global domination.

Motivation, a second source of misperception, is commonly manifested in defence avoidance or wishful thinking. Although not prone to the former, Botha often engages in the latter, where desires, instead of situational analysis, shape his beliefs. This can have serious consequences for foreign policy. Two examples will suffice:

★ A belief that South Africa could form an anti-communist security alliance with the West[40]. Events in the 1970s, and in particular the disastrous South African invasion of Angola, brought the magnitude of Botha's illusions to the fore. Predictably, South Africa's calls for a NATO-type South Atlantic treaty met with a similar fate.

★ A belief that neighbouring countries in Southern Africa would join in a 'Constellation of Southern African States', under the guidance of South Africa, in order to fight communism and promote capitalism. This initiative was a totally misguided and naive assessment of the state of regional politics at that time. The CONSAS-initiative in fact misfired badly with the formation of the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC). It soon became abundantly clear that no African country was prepared to collaborate with South Africa in the search for '...a strong force, a bastion against Marxism in Africa'[41].

A third source of misperception lies in political leaders' assessment of the uncertain and changing nature of the international strategic balance. Because Botha holds a 'Cold War' view of international affairs, he tends to overrate the power and hostility of the adversary. Botha regarded the Soviet Union of the 1980s as being in the strongest military position in its history[42]. Botha furthermore argued that the reason for international insecurity had to do with 'Russian expansionism which is steadily taking hold on the lives of people through propaganda and terrorism'[43]. Because of the Soviet Union's 'remarkable' capacity to penetrate strategic regions all over the globe, Botha argued, the 'whole Western world today is on the defensive'[44].

The fourth source of misperception concerns the practice of (especially unpopular) governments utilizing foreign threats to boost domestic support, conceal internal conflict, promote national unity or even suppress domestic opposition. The Botha government's utilization of the 'total onslaught' rhetoric in order to conceal the failures and implications of their apartheid policies, is notorious. It is not uncommon for Botha to dismiss internal strife and opposition against apartheid, by branding all opposition as part of a communist plot to overthrow the state. Repression of anti-apartheid opposition is consequently undertaken in the name of anti-communist measures (Webster, 1987: 141).

IV Consequences for South Africa's Foreign Policy

Botha's adherence to realism has had a profound effect on South Africa's foreign policy since 1978. Historically, South Africa's prime ministers dominated foreign policy making. Botha, as Executive President, manipulated his unchallenged position to impose his world view on foreign policy making. He also surrounded himself with advisers, primarily from the security establishment, who not only shared his views, but were instrumental in restructuring the foreign policy making process. The creation of the National Security Management System (NSMS) led to a foreign policy embedded in realism. The Total National Strategy with its emphasis on 'national security', 'national interest', and 'the mobilisation of available resources' served as a pretext to utilise state power to protect apartheid and minority rule against domestic and external opponents. Foreign policy decision making under the NSMS was characterised by disturbing, totalitarian tendencies. The State Security Council – under the chairmanship of PW Botha – usurped much of the traditional power and responsibility of the Cabinet. The dictates of so-called national security became a handy excuse to avoid public accountability and, in sharp contrast to previous practice, justified the use of military coercion as an instrument of foreign policy (See Grundy, 1983).

The responsibility for decisions to use military options as an extension of foreign policy is not always identifiable. For example, who took the

decision to attack simultaneously alleged ANC bases in Harare, Lusaka and Gaberone, thereby effectively ruining the Eminent Persons Group's (EPG) mission in South Africa? Was it the State Security Council, the Cabinet, PW Botha, Magnus Malan or even SADF generals acting without the authority of the political executive or a consensus of all of them?

Under the Botha regime, the use of South Africa's military and economic might to create a regional environment conducive to the continued existence of apartheid, became the primary goal of foreign policy. The 'realist' design of this foreign policy was evident. Any threat to the apartheid regime was met by force while those states refraining from challenging the status quo in South Africa, were rewarded with development aid. In his New Year's message for 1984, PW Botha warned neighbouring states not to harbour 'terrorists'. He added that South Africa had a much wider array of coercive means available which could be utilised if such hostile acts were to continue. His advice to the neighbouring states was that it was therefore in their best interest to follow the route of cooperation rather than confrontation with South Africa.

The irony is that 'realism' did not provide the security for apartheid so much desired by Pretoria. Although South Africa inflicted severe damage on its neighbours, the ideal of a controlled regional environment left much to be desired. Examples include:

★ The failure to establish client governments in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, although the 1986 coup in Lesotho could be regarded as a success for Pretoria;

★ The establishment of SADCC, which explains the neighbouring states' distaste for the Constellation idea;

★ The SADF's failure in winning the war against Swapo in Namibia and Angola – they became instead embroiled in a protracted and expensive conflict in Angola;

★ The introduction of sophisticated fighter aircraft, artillary and radar systems which resulted in an unfavourable tilt in the regional strategic balance away from South Africa. One of the basic pillars of South Africa's regional foreign policy, i.e. military superiority, collapsed and forced them to seek a negotiated settlement for Namibia. Recent efforts by Zimbabwe to buy new fighter planes proves that the word is out about South Africa's military vulnerability;

★ International pressure, including sanctions against South Africa, increased, due to its domestic and regional excesses.

The misguided morality of a foreign policy based on 'realism' is evident in South Africa's regional foreign policy as practised by the Botha regime. Despite Pretoria's abhorrence of the guerilla and terrorist tactics of the ANC and Swapo, similar tactics were employed against the internal and regional

opponents of apartheid. By providing military assistance to Renamo and Unita, South Africa should take some of the blame for the atrocities committed by these rebel organisations. In general, South Africa's destabilisation of its neighbours exposed the realist assumption that the ends justified the means employed. Botha's chilling warning in 1980 subsequently became a brutal reality:

> When a country is threatened by an external enemy or internal instability and insurrection, politics cannot function normally. Therefore we should engage in military actions and where necessary in political warfare, which is part of a total strategy, to counteract the forces of chaos and Communist subversion directed against us[45].

Botha's realist foreign policy also affected the foreign policy 'mood' or 'political culture' in South Africa. Here one refers to white public opinion. A longitudinal survey of white opinion strongly emphasized the acute threat perception and support for a hawkish regional foreign policy (See Geldenhuys, 1986, Du Pisani, 1988). The sources of these realist views require further investigation. The role of state propaganda by means of the state-controlled television service and the co-opted Afrikaans newspapers has obviously been paramount (See Van Wyk, 1989; Geldenhuys, 1984: Ch. 6). In the Afrikaans community – where the bulk of the state's support is located – the major agents of socialisation (family, school, church, university and the SADF) support apartheid and policies to enhance it. The result is that the spectrum of beliefs intrinsic to the 'total onslaught' and the state's response to counter such threats (real and imaginary) are embraced by Afrikaner youth (See Booysen, 1988, 1989; and Gagiano, 1986).

Finally, the pursuit of 'realist' policies has been at the cost of human rights. As pointed out above, apartheid, rather than communism, lies at the root of the South African conflict. The linkage between domestic and external use of coercion by the South African state must be emphasized.

Whatever the means – destabilisation, anti-guerrilla strategies, the state of emergency, SADF operations in black townships – the goal is the same: safeguarding apartheid and minority rule. An alternative strategy should be sought by means of a negotiated settlement, which guarantees political and economic rights for all South Africans, regardless of colour.

In conclusion, Botha's 'Cold War' world view, combined with 'Total Onslaught' rhetoric, gave rise to a foreign policy based on realist assumptions, and conducted with vigour by the South African state. These assumptions include: strength produces peace, might yields influence, superior firepower can both deter and compel, power can be purchased, the capacity to destroy is the capacity to control, and political problems are susceptible to military solutions. The corollary of these assumptions, as pointed out by Kegley and Wittkopf (1982: 235), also holds true for South

Africa's foreign policy under Botha: superior firepower ensures victory in war, arms supplied to an ally will guarantee its abiding loyalty, the distribution of weapons promotes regional stability, and the price of military preparedness is never too high.

Notes

1. According to Holsti's typology of operational codes, A-Types locate the sources of conflict in certain aspects of human nature (ignorance, prejudice, ethnocentrism, etc.), but believe that those aspects are capable of being changed by education, institutional reform, etc. C-Types believe that because conflict is inevitable in an anarchical system, peace requires fundamental transformation of the system itself. According to D-Types, the roots of conflict are to be found in certain permanent features of man's nature: selfishness, greed, power-seeking, etc. It is utopian to believe that these human characteristics can be permanently altered. E-Types are sceptical about the perfectability of human institutions, including the nation-state, and believe that one should pursue some variant of balance-of-power politics. F-Types locate the roots of conflict in an anarchical environment, and are sceptical about the prospects for systematic reform to eradicate the sources of conflict.
2. For a brief summary of Dulles' belief system, see Holsti (1977: table 27).
3. To Stein's list of cognitive sources of misperception, cognitive dissonance could also be added (See Jervis, 1976: ch. 11). For the purposes of this study, cognitive dissonance has been excluded due to the fact that effect rather than rationality characterizes the beliefs of B-Types.
4. For the effect of weak government legitimacy on national security and threat perception, see Buzan (1983).
5. See Geldenhuys and Kotze (1988) for an overview of Botha's rise as political leader.
6. Frankel (1984) provides us with some useful insights into the structure and dynamics of the relationship between the civil and military in South Africa.
7. Findings were taken from Van Nieuwkerk (1988: Ch. 3).
8. Speech by PW Botha at a public meeting in Kuruman, 10 May 1980.
9. Speech by PW Botha at a student meeting in Pretoria, 5 August 1983.
10. Quoted in Scholtz (1988: 8).
11. Quoted in Scoltz (1988: 11).
12. Quoted in Scholtz (1988: 9).
13. Quoted in Starcke (1978: 57)
14. Speech by PW Botha to the SADF in Kimberley, 23 July 1982.
15. Speech by PW Botha at a public meeting in Worcester, 5 November 1979.
16. Speech by PW Botha at a public meeting in Rustenburg, 17 March 1981.
17. Speech by PW Botha at Waterkloof military airbase, 30 September 1978.
18. Hansard, column 9129, 13 June 1980.
19. Speech by PW Botha at a public meeting in Brakpan, 31 March 1981.
20. Interview with Der Spiegel, 17 August 1979.
21. Speech by PW Botha at a public meeting in Nelspruit, 24 June 1983.
22. Speech by PW Botha at a public meeting in Stellenbosch, 12 November 1982.
23. Speech by PW Botha at a public meeting in Stellenbosch, 10 April 1980.
24. Hansard, column 5350, 26 April 1984.
25. Hansard, column 4402, 19 April 1979.
26. Speech by PW Botha at a public meeting in Margate, 18 November 1978.
27. Speech by PW Botha at a public meeting in Johannesburg, 30 May 1980.
28. Speech by PW Botha at a public meeting in Bethal, 28 October 1982.
29. Address by PW Botha to the 'Western Five' Contact group, 16 October 1978.
30. Speech by PW Botha at a public meeting in Bethal, 28 October 1982.
31. Speech by PW Botha at a public meeting in Kuruman, 10 May 1980.
32. Speech by PW Botha at a public meeting in George, 8 November 1980.
33. Speech by PW Botha at a public meeting in Stellenbosch, 10 April 1980.

34. Speech by PW Botha at a public meeting in Epping, 6 October 1978.
35. Interview with Der Spiegel, 17 August 1979.
36. Speech by PW Botha at a public meeting in Margate, 18 November 1978.
37. Speech by PW Botha at Waterkloof military airbase, 30 September 1978.
38. Speech by PW Botha to the SADF in Kimberley, 23 July 1982.
39. Speech by PW Botha at a public meeting in Bethal, 28 October 1982.
40. Quoted in Scholtz (1988: 38).
41. Speech by PW Botha at a public meeting in Durban, 15 November 1979.
42. Hansard, column 9128, 13 June 1980.
43. Speech by PW Botha at a public meeting, Pietermaritzburg, 27 October 1983.
44. Speech by PW Botha at a public meeting in Durban, 21 April 1981.
45. Speech by PW Botha at a public meeting in Witbank, 16 September 1980.

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Deon Geldenhuys

Ten Crises in South Africa's External Relations

The dictum, 'no normal sport in an abnormal society' – used to devastating effect by the champions of South Africa's sports isolation – also has relevance for the Republic's foreign relations generally. The history of South Africa's post-war international relations shows quite clearly that no 'normal' foreign relations are possible for such an 'abnormal' society. South Africa finds itself in a state of chronic high tension with the international community because its domestic political order is universally rejected. What is more, the outside world is committed to remedying the perceived abnormality of apartheid, rooted as it is in racial discrimination and white domination. Apartheid has created a set of crises in South Africa's foreign relations, flowing from the uniquely hostile external environment confronting the country.

In the first instance, the country faces a crisis of *morality* in its external relations. Apartheid violates the post-war international morality with its 'enthronement of the rights of man',as Winston Churchill formulated it. This *Zeitgeist* has found formal expression in several international conventions, beginning with the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, followed by the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965, the two human rights conventions of 1966 and the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid of 1973. It is mainly through the United Nations that apartheid has been elevated to one of the principal moral issues of our time, one that unites the world community as few other issues can. In a ranking of current international offences, apartheid will be at or near the top of the list.

An emerging convergence between South African policies and practices and international morality has been evident in recent years. Pretoria has begun to dismantle elements of apartheid and has also declared itself in favour of some fundamental precepts of human rights. But there is still a

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long way to go before South Africa could sign the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and overcome the crisis of morality in its foreign relations.

The second crisis, flowing from the first, is that of *legitimacy*. Without a moral foundation, the South African government's lack of international legitimacy is, of course, an extension of its lack of domestic legitimacy in the eyes of the (black) majority of South Africans.

The UN General Assembly has for decades now been busy delegitimizing the South African government, culminating in the Assembly's rejection of the South African delegation's credentials in 1974. The reverse side of this process of delegitimation has been the Assembly's legitimation of the exiled liberation movements, notably the African National Congress (ANC). These organisations have in numerous resolutions been elevated to the status of sole legitimate representatives of the South African people, whereas the 'racist Pretoria regime' has been expressly condemned to illegitimacy. In the UN, the liberation movements in fact enjoy more rights than the South African government.

Despite this lack of international legitimacy, the South African government still participates in international relations as the ruler and representative of the country – and in the process deals, as equals, with some of its severest detractors. This has particularly been the case in the course of the Angola-Namibia peace negotiations: Pretoria conferred with the governments of Angola, Cuba and the Soviet Union among others, as well as with the UN. In future *de facto* recognition of the South African government – dictated by the realities of power – will still go hand in hand with attempts at undermining its international legitimacy.

The South African government has, in the third place, a perennial problem of *credibility* in its foreign relations. The issue of credibility arises when a gap develops between promise and performance: Pretoria fails to deliver on its promises or merely on the expectations it has aroused (or others have created). These promises and expectations can refer to changes (read: improvements) in the Government's conduct within the country or in Southern Africa.

The Nkomati Accord, signed by South Africa and Mozambique in 1984, provides a typical illustration. This agreement on non-aggression and good neighbourliness held out the promise of a new era of peace and amity in relations between South Africa and Mozambique. Pretoria, however, violated the Accord by continuing to support the Renamo rebels in Mozambique. This involvement in Mozambique was only part of the wider controversy surrounding South Africa's destabilisation of its neighbours – charges (and evidence) that undermined Pretoria's declarations of regional friendship and co-operation.

Another example is former President PW Botha's 'Rubicon' speech in August 1985: great expectations had been built up around the address, both

in South Africa and abroad. In the event, Botha failed to live up to any of them.

Unfulfilled promises and expectations help to explain why so many countries apply the 'bad faith' model in judging South Africa. They believe that the Government cannot be trusted to mend its ways either at home or in the region. In short, nothing good can come from Pretoria.

The South African government once again faces a critical test of credibility in Southern Africa. At issue is its adherence to the Namibia independence formula and also its treatment of the future sovereign state of Namibia. South Africa also has a new opportunity to demonstrate its *bona fides* toward Mozambique, now that the two countries have picked up the pieces of the Nkomati Accord. But the ultimate test of the South African government's credibility lies at home: will the new De Klerk Administration make good on its promises of major reform within the next five years?

South Africa's regional dominance gives rise to a fourth critical issue, namely, that of *giantism*. In the Southern African region, South Africa is a superpower. Its dominance over its neighbours is manifested in the size of its population (some 40% of the region's total population); its economic power (the Republic accounts for nearly 80% of total GNP of Southern Africa), an extensive transport system by road, rail, air and sea, vital to several landlocked neighbouring states; and its superior military capabilities (including a widely acknowledged nuclear potential).

Although regional dominance is not unique to South Africa (other Third World examples are Brazil, India and Nigeria), apartheid gives its pre-eminence a unique character. A white-ruled state dominates a black sub-continent and the dominator is ideologically seriously at odds with the dominated. In short, the problems of morality, legitimacy and credibility greatly exacerbate the difficulties flowing from the objective inequalities in power between South Africa and surrounding black states.

There are, as suggested, indications of the dawning of a new era of co-operation between South Africa and its neighbours. In the wake of the US-mediated peace settlement in South-western Africa, regional destabilisation – both by and against South Africa – may be giving way to collaboration as the countries seek peaceful instead of violent resolution of outstanding conflicts. There is evidently a growing realisation in Southern Africa that years of intra-state and inter-state strife have taken an unacceptably high toll in terms of human suffering and economic dislocation. This new approach, of course, also reflects the current state of superpower relations. South Africa may, therefore, be offered new opportunities to use its giantism to the benefit of the entire region.

An end to apartheid, it should be added, will not simply remove the tensions inherent in a situation of regional dominance. A successor black

government in South Africa (assuming it inherits a state in reasonable economic and military shape) will have to contend with many of the same suspicions on the part of its neighbours. So although the sting of apartheid will then have been removed from South Africa's regional relations, the 'big guy on the block' syndrome will remain.

One need not be a believer in conspiracy theory *a la* 'total onslaught', as Pretoria termed it, until recently, to realise that South Africa's ruling elite has long experienced a *security* crisis. This fifth issue has always had both internal and external dimensions. The domestic component consists mainly of the revolutionary struggle being waged by the ANC and its internal supporters. The external dimension refers to foreign support for the ANC's armed struggle and also to international sanctions against South Africa. Insofar as all these actions are designed to erode the power of the state, they undermine its security. Indeed, many advocates of sanctions calculate that these punitive measures will materially reduce the Republic's ability to resist external demands for fundamental political change.

White South Africans have tended to define such challenges in existential terms: to the vast majority, their physical survival was at stake. They, in other words, did not distinguish between a struggle against apartheid and an offensive against them as Whites. The result has been a deeply ingrained threat perception among white South Africans, with stark images of a hostile world ganging up with the ANC to seek their destruction. Security and survival then became the overriding concern of the ruling group – and provided a handy pretext for all kinds of authoritarian excesses.

Recent events in Southern Africa may ameliorate these perceptions of threat. The Cubans are departing and the Soviet Union is promoting the pacific settlement of regional conflicts. It is not an atmosphere favourable to the ANC's armed struggle. The ANC's ability to wage war has recently been constrained even more by the removal of its guerilla bases from Angola. If peace is indeed breaking out in the region, white South Africans will need to reassess their popular notions of threat. A lull in Western sanctions pressure on Pretoria may further help the development of a more pragmatic, less paranoid, South African view of the world.

Closely related to the issue of security are the twin crises of *stability and survivability*. South Africa has over the past thirty years experienced three major periods of instability that have called its very ability to survive into question. Survivability is here, of course, defined in terms of the existing political order. The three crisis periods co-incided with the Sharpeville shootings in 1960, the Soweto uprising in 1976 and the upheaval triggered by the introduction of a new constitution (still excluding Blacks from political participation) in 1984. Each phase was characterised by a combination of internal unrest and violence and a sharp escalation in external pressure on South Africa. Each time there were hopes on the one

side and fears on the other that the white power structure would collapse. Foreign confidence in the South African economy was always an early casualty during these periodic bouts of instability, as witness the flight of capital. Instability, moreover, undermined one of Pretoria's traditional 'selling points' in its foreign relations, namely, that South Africa was a paragon of stability in a volatile continent.

Despite the odds, the South African Government, in all three cases, managed to beat off the domestic and external challenges to its authority, restore a large degree of law and order, and renew some confidence in the economy. Perhaps more importantly, the Government could show its opponents, at home and abroad, that it would not easily submit to pressures for its own demise, and that it has both the will and the means to ensure its survival.

Insofar as domestic political changes are made, Pretoria insists it will dictate both the direction and pace and will not be prescribed to by extraneous forces. Recent developments in Southern Africa have no doubt strengthened the ruling white elite's confidence in its capacity to maintain itself in power and ensure domestic stability. Regional issues are likewise approached with renewed confidence: South Africa's position as the leviathan of Southern Africa has, if anything, been strengthened by the phased departure of foreign forces from the region.

The issues of stability and survivability contribute to what could be termed a crisis of *prosperity* – in seventh place. The crisis of prosperity occurs because of declining international participation in the South African economy. South Africa's has a particularly open economy with well over 50 percent of GDP dependent on external trade. It has traditionally also been a capital importing country; South Africa needs foreign capital to achieve an annual economic growth rate above 3.5 percent. With these economic links restricted by foreign countries, the South African economy is growing well below its potential and cannot produce the necessary wealth to sustain its rapidly increasing population. The result is a process of gradual impoverishment that is afflicting the population at large.

To overcome this crisis of prosperity, South Africa needs greater external involvement in its economy in terms of trade, investment, loans and technology transfer. There is, also, a domestic political price to be paid – an end to apartheid and white domination – before South Africa can be fully reintegrated into the international economic system.

The problem of prosperity is in large measure the result of South Africa's international economic isolation. *Ostracism* is then the eighth critical issue in South Africa's foreign relations. The extent of the Republic's enforced economic isolation is clearly reflected in the fact that up to 90 percent of its merchandise exports are subjected to sanctions of one kind or another, and that about 100 countries officially restrict trade with the Republic.

Widespread official restrictions have also been imposed on foreign investment in the provision of loans to South Africa, as well as numerous curbs on the transfer of technology.

There are other areas of isolation too. South Africa's diplomatic isolation is manifested in, among other things, its limited diplomatic network. It has formal diplomatic relations with only 25 states, that is, about 15 percent of UN member countries. This figure is obviously well below South Africa's wishes or capacity. Its military isolation is illustrated by the UN Security Council's mandatory arms embargo of 1977, the only one of its kind presently in operation. South Africa's socio-cultural isolation covers a broad spectrum, affecting international sport, foreign travel, art and entertainment, and academic exchanges.

There are many other indicators one could use to measure the extent of South Africa's isolation in the diplomatic, economic, military and socio-cultural spheres. A comprehensive survey will show that South Africa is today one of the most ostracised states in the world.

The ninth factor is that of foreign *intervention* in South Africa. By intervention is meant coercive external interference designed to force the South African government to change its behaviour, if not to abdicate. While South Africa has not been subjected to the extreme of direct military intervention by foreign powers, such action has long been advocated abroad, whether on humanitarian grounds or as a preventive measure. The proponents of humanitarian intervention argue that apartheid so offends the conscience of mankind that collective military action is justified to rid the world of this scourge of racism and all the suffering it entails. Preventive intervention is advocated on the grounds that foreign powers should step in to prevent a racial bloodbath in South Africa, a conflagration that would have profound consequences for the wider world.

Meanwhile, South Africa has for many years had to contend with indirect military intervention in the shape of foreign support for the ANC's armed struggle. Sanctions can also be regarded as a form of intervention, in that they are used to coerce the South African government into meeting external demands. Sanctions and the resultant isolation of South Africa are therefore not designed to free foreign states of the problem of apartheid, but are very much an attempt to shape the course of events in that country – against the will of the Government.

Even if intervention by force may lose favour in the new climate of superpower relations, intervention in South Africa by lesser means is bound to continue – even if at a (temporarily) reduced level of intensity – as long as apartheid exists.

Finally, South Africa is confronted with a crisis of *manoeuvrability* in its foreign relations. Given the other critical issues, the country is left with precious little freedom of movement or options in its international relations.

Although it has a traditional Western orientation, Western powers have long turned their backs on any formal alignment with South Africa; least of all do Western states want to become implicated in the defence of apartheid. Some South African politicians and commentators have toyed with the idea of taking the very opposite line, namely, seeking an alignment with communist powers. In view of the communists' historical hostility to white-ruled South Africa and the latter's deep-seated anti-communist sentiments, such a partnership is highly unlikely. Nor can South Africa hope to join the Non-aligned Movement, a body that has for decades been in the forefront of the international offensive against apartheid. Closer to home, South Africa has over the years tried to draw its neighbours into formal co-operative structures (variously styled as power bloc, economic community and constellation of states), but to no avail. The black states, ideologically far removed from South Africa, are unwilling to formalise their relations with (and dependence on) their white-ruled neighbour. Instead, they have chosen to form their own regional groupings that exclude South Africa: consider the Frontline States, the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADDC) and a Preferential Trade Area.

This leaves South Africa driven towards a fifth option, dictated by force of circumstance, namely, to strengthen ties with other so-called pariah states, notably Israel, Taiwan and Chile. Even this alternative is fraught with difficulties: Israel in 1987, under US pressure, also boarded the sanctions bandwagon against South Africa; and Chile is set to leave the league of outcasts after its return to civilian democratic rule in 1990.

Instead of establishing longer term formal partnerships with other states, South Africa is left to seek short term, *ad hoc* gains in the West, the communist bloc, Africa and elsewhere in the Third World. This gives South Africa's foreign relations not only a rather fluid, unstable character, but also a highly pragmatic flavour. A possible new era of peace in Southern Africa may, however, offer Pretoria new opportunities to form more stable and lasting relationships with countries in the region. Ultimately, only a 'normal' South Africa free of apartheid could hope to conduct 'normal' foreign relations with countries the world over.

Peter Vale

Pretoria and Southern Africa: A Pathological Report

Beware the under toad (John Irving)

Like many romantic novels, this paper begins with desolation and ends with hope. There is a strong link between international relations and romantic fiction; in both, misunderstanding follows the breakdown of communication with dark, ominous consequences but the promise of a better, more rosy life drives the narrative on towards the light.

Decades of conflict have left southern Africa with a near depleted capital base and falling growth potential. Against this, the regional population base (notwithstanding the chronic implications of AIDS) is increasing. Ill-advised economic policies – in both South Africa and elsewhere – have proved ruinous. Continuing regional structures – the Southern African Customs Union and the Preferential Trade Agreement, to mention only two – are inadequate to guarantee the region's long-term future. This all comes at a moment when southern Africa's international economic competitiveness has sharply declined.

From the outside southern Africa looks like a basket-case, especially when measured against the Pacific Rim and Europe which have not only found the formula to settle differences, but are called economic miracles.

Contemplation of the desolate and the despairing always concentrates the mind but here it underscores the importance of a neglected topic in foreign policy analysis. What has happened in southern Africa, where will it end? The paper addresses these central challenges.

Too few scholars with an interest in *apartheid* have given attention to the relationship between South Africa and its neighbours.[1] As a result the issue, is, analytically-speaking, enigmatic. This paper has the long-range goal of trying both to explain this neglect and to discover ways around it. Its sharp focus, when this occurs, is on the immediate, the accessible: the range of published work which has tried to explain the somewhat confusing and abstruse links the *apartheid* state has developed within its immediate vicinity.

Neglect, of course, is not a comfortable word in scholarly discourse and

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this is especially so in a subject like foreign policy analysis, where residual responsibilities are central to professionalism. The paper, therefore, has a strong normative dimension; it presses for the centrality of southern Africa in foreign policy analysis, believing that this will help to offset the crippling reversals which the region has come to know.

Deep probing – particularly drawing on comparative work from other regions – suggests that the normative reasons for studying the regional issues are compelling. The success of regional integration rests on many forces; counted amongst these is scholarship, which promoted (perhaps even elevated) the debate on a united Europe. It helped site theoretical markers and inculcated in a generation of Europeans, a sense of regionalism.

There are also negative reasons anchored around normative considerations. The procreation of a wide academic and public interest in regional affairs can prevent policy-makers from believing that regions are 'natural' arenas for the conduct of domestic policies. By a curious process of osmosis, failing policies at home are too often exported into the neighbourhood. This has been especially so in southern Africa where Pretoria's bullheaded approach to regional affairs has been so evidently destructive.

The following rhetorical question polishes the point: Had there been a strong southern African consciousness in South Africa could the South African Defence Force [SADF] have been lured into the region with such ease and would, subsequently, southern Africa resembled a corpse as it now does.

First, however, some thoughts on institutions under the assumption that, just perhaps, the explanation for the under-developed state of the literature and absence of a creative policy on southern Africa follows from the lack of systematic institutional locus.

Within South Africa those institutions charged with looking at international or African issues have been unable for financial or ideological reasons to get under the skin of the region. It is invidious to name names, but any intelligent reading of the literature suggests that South Africa's total contribution to an understanding of African problems (never mind their solution!) would probably not fill a damaged floppy disk! This is not to say that South. Africans have not advanced our understanding of South African issues, especially in foreign policy.[1]. When they look over the borders, however, the lights dim: Africa reverts to the dark continent. To be sure, part of the explanation is to be found in the inability of South Africans at large to visit Africa. In the instances where this has happened, some interesting insights have followed.[2].

Foreign institutions have not done much better on southern Africa. The potentially important Centre for Southern African Studies at York, for example, has focussed strongly on South Africa itself and on individual

neighbouring states. The regional links and dynamic however, have been sadly underplayed. The focus of Yale's Southern African Research Programme has been also been wide but the regional question has been missed. Other bits and pieces are to be found elsewhere, for example, the London-based Catholic Institute for International Affairs works fairly systematically on the region. Alone, the Centros Estudos Africanos at the Universidade Eduardo Mondlane has done work which, from a scholarly point of view, seems orderly.

Teaching departments in universities, in South Africa and abroad, have also not locked into the region with any enthusiasm. Even in the heyday of regional studies, southern Africa never seemed to feature in any serious deliberation.

The message of neglect is substantiated by looking at the press, both here and aboard. No South African journal has a 'Southern African Correspondent' or even a specialist writer on the subject. Foreign papers have journalists based here and often call these 'Southern African Correspondents'. In the main, however, they report almost exclusively on South Africa and, besides, the Kamoda Declaration formally prevents coverage of the Frontline from a South African base.

Let us reflect now on another neglected relationship, especially in South Africa: the link between the academic and the press. With few exceptions, South African analysts (in regional and other issues) seem disdainful of the media. The opposite, parenthetically, is also true. Free from outside contamination, South African scholarship replicates debate after debate over the gamut of foreign policy and regional issues which are, often, far removed from the immediate political exigencies, either on the government's side or on the side of those – of whatever hue – who seek to be the country's next government. An engagement between academics and the press can obviously have important consequences for foreign – especially regional – policy.

The story so far

The states of southern Africa are joined by more than their geographic proximity. Extensive transport links, migrant labour, and industrial interdependencies underpin an organic unity. Yet politics deeply divides these states. As a result, southern Africa is caught in a structural paradox: growing economic interdependence has been accompanied by intensifying partisan conflict, frequently involving cross-border violence.

How are these acute ambiguities to be understood, particularly when viewed against the light of the continued insistence both by South Africa and by its neighbours that some institutional arrangement for regional security and economic progress ought to be developed.

South Africa dominates the region. No other state alone – or coalition of

states – possesses either the economic, military or technological power associated with minority rule. Partly in response to the growing threat of insurgency, strategic planners – led by the SADF – have sought to destabilise neighbouring states. Military action against these states has included support for dissident armed factions in Mozambique, Angola and, it is rumoured, Zimbabwe, as well as periodic raids into these and other countries in the region.

If military action is one pillar of South Africa's efforts to destabilise its neighbours, another is economic pressure. Use of this lever has underscored the intrinsic dependence of its neighbours on South Africa's geographical setting, its financial status and technological resources. South Africa has been able to exert pressure on the region's transport network, for example. On several occasions this has had a major disruptive impact on the flow of trade to and from the majority-ruled states. Pretoria has also threatened to repatriate foreign workers, whose remittances are important sources of revenue for their home economies.

There have been several efforts to establish formal security arrangements in southern Africa. One grew out of the initiatives taken by southern African states to assist in the elimination of minority-rule in what is now Zimbabwe. Following the achievement of majority-rule in that country, this grouping turned to the problem of reducing their economic dependence on South Africa. In 1979, this effort was institutionalized with the establishment of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). The primary short-term goal of SADCC is defensive – to limit South Africa's capacity to inflict economic hardship on its neighbours. A longer-term aim is to promote equitable economic integration between member states. A decade after the creation of SADCC both these goals have proved illusory.

Individual SADCC countries have deepened their economic links with South Africa.

South Africa's continued military incursions in the region have generated some discussion among SADCC members on the possibility of military cooperation. At the September, 1986 summit meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, in Zimbabwe, a security fund for southern Africa was established. This represented the first formal military response to South Africa's regional policies. In addition, several major powers – including the United Kingdom – have indicated their willingness to provide military assistance to states seeking to defend themselves against South Africa.

South Africa has pursued an alternative route to regional stability, one which serves the interests of its supporters, as these interests are currently defined by Pretoria. This strategy relies on co-optation: neighbouring states are promised South African economic largesse in return for the effective policing of the African National Congress (ANC) within their borders.

The strategy has been partially successful. In March, 1984, South Africa signed an accord with Mozambique. The agreement called upon both parties to control dissident movements and committed them to increased economic cooperation. It has since become clear that the SADF (or factions within it) never intended to abide by this arrangement and continued to supply military assistance to the dissident Mozambique National Resistance. But while the formal agreement is in tatters, the relationship between South Africa and Mozambique has continued to warm as a result of economic and other forces which, ironically, spawned the Nkomati Accord.

The search for regional security in southern Africa, as in other regions, hinges upon a subtle interplay of economic, political, and military factors. In southern Africa, however, regional security – or the lack thereof – is intrinsically linked to the domestic politics of a single state, South Africa. The central threat to stability in the region arises from that state's particular regional policy objectives. But, as the recent Namibian experience has shown, these objectives are no longer static. They are influenced by domestic political shifts – including soaring defence costs – inside South Africa, changes in the regional balance of power – in Namibia's case, the withdrawal of the Cubans – and the changing relationship between the Superpowers.

The telling of the tale

Given the overall theme of neglect set out in the preceding pages, the claim that 'in the last five years many thousands of words have been written on South Africa's relations with its neighbours'[3] will seem weird: and so it is. With the exception of two normative approaches which have focussed on institutions which foster integration (or the opposite) in southern Africa, most of the words written on southern Africa have been descriptive. As a result, they offer little or no vision of what the region could, and ideally should, look like.

The two exceptions have been very influential in policy-making circles because both have stimulated areas of debate which have, over time, become processed into some form of policy. Put explicitly: policies have been forged around both positions with fairly serious implications. They, therefore, should be considered in some detail.

Both start from the same assumption – South Africa's preponderance of regional power – then proceed to disagree about everything else. The issues which divide them are the very thrust of their focus and the differences between them, therefore, are strongly political, even ideological. Ironically, they are mirror images of each other.

To label a school of thought or an approach to analytical issues is – like flattery – the last refuge of the scoundrel. Nevertheless, it provides a shorthand note from which some deductions can be drawn. In this spirit, we

will call the first of these groups, the emancipationists: the second faction will be called the subjugationists.

A word of explanation is important. Both agree that the region is dominated by the power of South Africa. All southern African institutions, therefore, have (or should have) some bearing on this dominant configuration. The central focus of the first group falls, essentially, on SADCC and the necessity for this grouping to free itself severally and individually from South Africa's strangehold, thereby contributing to the overall quest for a political solution in South Africa itself.[4]

The other faction begins and ends its exposition with South Africa's power and is, to be polite, fatalistic about SADCC's prospects.[5] It sees it as a concerted, externally-induced conspiracy in the region which drives them to self-destructive policies of which, for our purposes, regional destablisation is the most important.

In a curious way both these positions should be considered only as a sign of the times in which they appeared. SADCC was negatively viewed in South Africa and, not surprisingly, South Africa's opponents viewed that country in an equal and opposite light. The dressing up of political points as analysis is as old as political science itself and is, one might add, especially strong in international relations where the discipline's lexicon lends itself easily to abuse.[6].

The connection between theory and practice is an intriguing one in any political setting. In the South and southern Africa's case, however, intrigue and tragedy have been close bedfellows. The impulses, for example, which have fashioned South Africa's regional policy seem to flow mechanically from the application of a simple anti-communist litmus test. However closer scrutiny reveals that they are to be found in an abstruse conjuncture of social science, racial ideology and antiquated strategic logic. Some of the real undercurrents which have informed this kind of position have emerged in recent sociological work. [7] There seems to be only a short wire between work of this type and the world in which the country's security operates.

While largely in disagreement, the two factions have provided chimeral interpretations of regional establishment circumstances. The region has been portrayed as either the site for the liberation of the region's people from racial domination or, alternatively, the hand of externally-induced oppression. In such settings regional affairs have no independent axes, but instead are captured by powerful forces over which individual countries have no control. Undercurrents and eddies are the very stuff of international relations in southern Africa.

This lengthy deliberation on these differing approaches to analysis of South Africa has been intentional. It has shown, first, how narrow and ideologically driven perspectives can deeply distort policy choices, with catastrophic results. There can be few areas in the world, Central America

included, where the ill-advised foreign policy routines have so devastatingly wrecked the chances for peace and harmony than in southern Africa.

Secondly, their influence on policy options demonstrates, the cogency and power of normative work within regional studies, especially in southern Africa. The important lesson, thirdly, is to recognise that normative work needs to be based on a prudent understanding of the forces at work in political situations and that wise policy, itself, should be driven by what seems attainable.

There has been some sober work on southern Africa largely free of a normative dimension: to an assessment of this work we now turn.

There have been three mainstream schools engaged in conceptualising southern Africa: the 'Episodic School', the 'Expatriate Revisionists' and the 'Technical Experts'.[8]

The first has chronicled events or episodes in the changing pattern of southern African relations. With few exceptions, there has been little effort to develop strong analytical frameworks around these episodes. Deon Geldenhuys has been the most prolific student of this genre, but others, like John Barratt, have also written work of this kind.[9]

Their work rests within the comfortable assumptions of traditional international relations and has had little impact either on practical foreign policy outcomes or on the trade of the foreign policy analyst. In respect to the latter this may seem a curious claim to make since, Geldenhuys' work especially has become the central focus of attention in a wider policy-making and academic community.[10] The interest in this focus – apart from its apparent infectiousness – is the degree to which it reflects the lack of understanding of the policy-making process within South Africa. In fact, contrary to what Geldenhuys' opponents argue, there is very little direct policy-making contact between academics who write in this genre and those who make policy.

We might pause here to reflect on the flimsy ties between serious scholarship and policy-making in South Africa. This is a matter for grave concern, not because it is better in other countries – it really isn't – but because, as the southern African experience shows, unbridled policy-making without pause for reflection can be so utterly destructive. Might not this point also be reinforced by asking a rhetorical question similar to the earlier one? Had there been a strong exchange of views between practitioners and theoreticians in South Africa, could the SADF have been lured into the region with such ease and would, southern Africa subsequently have come to resemble a corpse?

The second school, as the name suggests, has written from outside South Africa's borders and has used a strong revisionist paradigm. Some of this work has been excellent, adding an exciting new dimension to our

understanding of some of the forces at work in the region.[11]

There are limitations to this category of analysis and it would be foolish to pretend otherwise. What, however, is clear is that their work has precipitated a two-fold reaction. First, it alerted an increasing number of academics to the devastating effect of South Africa's regional policy. Secondly, it compelled other writers to look more carefully at their own work, so sharpening all-round perceptions.

The 'Technical School' has done solid work on economic and technical issues, many of them writing only on SADCC.[12] Much of this work lacks a serious theoretical direction; this may be a strength in a world in which ideology and theory so easily conflate.

In addition to the three schools outlined above there are a number of new windows through which to view South Africa's relations with its neighbours. One has a constricted prism, seeing these relations as predicated upon the so-called independent homelands and the institutions which this association has engendered. While closely linking domestic and regional issues, this perspective has largely been ignored in the literature.[13]. A second window is the move by the Department of Foreign Affairs to enter, if not pre-empt the emergent debates.[14] The most interesting is, however, the third: a very rigorous and reasoned analysis of the regional economy in the *post-apartheid* era.[15]

Toward new ways of seeing southern Africa

To emphasise the cardinal point, therefore, this paper argues that foreign policy analysis should be strongly prescriptive. It suggests that responsible analysts ought – to borrow a poignant image from southern Africa – not only to mine the coal face but to suggest arrangements which might make this work safe.

In Southern Africa's case, scholarship should encourage those forces, institutions and structures which might help secure southern Africa's future. There should be no apology for this: there is an urgent need to nourish a serious public debate on this issue. Scholars should be the catalysts in this process.

In approaching the issue in this fashion, the many approaches which have been brought to bear on the topic should be carefully evaluated. In southern Africa a particular set of political and international circumstances are at work: how else does one account for the obdurate stand which minority rule and colonialism have made in this part of the world? It is simply insufficient to claim, with revisionists, that an exploitative alliance between South African business interests and apartheid has enabled this to happen. It is also careless to claim that white South Africa pursues national interests, like other states. In setting-out to understand old issues from a new perspective,

foreign policy analysis in southern Africa can – indeed, should – create an organic understanding that the region's destiny is inextricably bound together.

New work should delve into the ambiguities and contradictions which have followed the failure of regional accords, like Nkomati. What insecurities, for example, drive sectional interests, in both countries, towards, alternatively, congruence and division? What wider lessons for southern Africa can be drawn from the Nkomati experience? Are, for instance, formal bilateral arrangements doomed to disintegration? What are the prospects for multilateral arrangements in the region which might, conceivably, be underwritten by outside powers?

There needs to be the recognition that southern Africa is in the process of transition and that this will not be completed until the conflict over South Africa is resolved. However, innovative scholarship needs to question whether the regional circumstances might help secure the resolution of this, the principal issue.

Beyond South Africa as it is presently understood, southern Africa will remain a region with the same basic economic and technological contours. It will, however, face challenges of a different order. How – in this new world – southern Africa's peoples, as a whole, will find prosperity is the mountain toward which scholars need now to turn.

Notes

1. See Deon Geldenhuys *'The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy'*, Johannesburg. Macmillan for the South African Institute of International Affairs, 1983.
2. See, for example, Denis Venter. 'Van Nyasaland tot Malawi: Politieke ontwikkeling en verandering in 'n Koloniale semelewing, 1891-1964.' Unpublished D. Litt et Phil thesis, Unisa, 1985. 610p.
3. Peter Vale. 'Regional Strategy: The Compulsion to Incorporate', in Jesmond Blumenfeld (ed) *South Africa in Crisis*. London: Croom Helm (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs) (1987) pp. 176-194.
4. See, for example, M.R. Bhagavan. *The Energy Sector in SADCC countries: policies, priorities and options in the context of the African crisis*. Uppsala. Scandinavian Insitute of African Studies. 1985. (Research Report, No. 74), 41p. Reginald H. Green. 'Southern African development cooperation: from dependence and poverty towards economic liberation.' *Africa Contemporary Record*, Vol. 14, 1981/82. pp. A97-113.
5. For the perverse end of this, See, for example, D.A.S. Herbst. 'Paper projects and ambitions hamper SADCC'. *Southern African Forum, Position Paper*, Vol. 6, No. 14, 1983; D.A.S. Herbst. 'Thorny Path for nine Southern African states'. *Southern African Forum, Position Paper*, Vol. 5, No. 19, 1982.
6. Peter Vale. Whose World is it Anyway?: International Relations in South AFrica, in Hugh C. Dyer and Leon Mangasarian (eds), *International Relations: The State of the Art*. London: Macmillan in association with Millenium: Journal of International Studies, 1989 pp. 198-217.
7. See C.P. de Kock. 'Revolutionary violence in South Africa: 1 000 days after 3 September 1984' in D.J. van Vuuren et al (eds) *South Africa: The Challenge of Reform*. Pietermaritzburg. Owen Burgess Publishers, 1988. pp 343-399.
8. Peter Vale. 'Regional Strategy: The Compulsion to Incorporate...' etc., *op cit.*

9. For example, see Geldenhuys' 'Recrossing the Matola threshold: the 'terrorist factor' in South Africa's regional relations', *South Africa International*, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1983, p. 152-171; 'South Africa's regional policy' (i) *op cit*, p. 123-160, and other work cited in this chapter. See also John Barratt. Foreign Policy 1983-1985 – the regional context in D.J. van Vuuren (ed) *South Africa: a plural society in transition*. Durban, Butterworth, 1985. p. 414-478.; Peter Vale. 'South Africa's Regional Foreign Policy: a search for the status quo ante', *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. 7, No. 5, 1982, pp 15-18.
10. The 'expatriate revisionists' have made a series of almost personal attacks on Deon Geldenhuys whose work falls into 'the episodic school'. This is unfortunate and, in my opinion, the former have damaged the quality of their work considerably through these attacks. By claiming, as Joseph Hanlon does, that 'Geldenhuys is close to at least some of the National Party strategists and ideologists' is simply nonsense or mischief-making. To believe further that 'Geldenhuys may be seen as a future Henry Kissinger or Chester Crocker of South Africa – the academic who first studies government policy then graduates to create it' is simply to misunderstand the nature of the foreign policy-making machine which Geldenhuys was at pains to describe in his seminal book on the subject. (See Joseph Hanlon. *Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa*. London, Catholic Institute for International Relations in collaboration with James Currey, Indiana University Press, p. 309: and Deon Geldenhuys. *The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making*. Johannesburg, Macmillan for the South African Institute of International Affairs, 1984, 295pp.)
11. See, for example, Robert Davies and Dan O'Meara. 'Total Strategy in Southern Africa: an analysis of South African Regional Policy since 1978', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1985, p. 183-211; Robert Davis. *South African strategy Towards Mozambique in the post-Nkomati Period: a critical analysis of effects and implications*. Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. (Research Report No. 73), 71pp.: Hanlon, *op cit.*; and Phyllis Johnson and David Martin (eds). *Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War*. Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House for the Southern African Research and Documentation Centre, 1986. 378pp; Peter Vale. 'Some thoughts on the Political Economy of Control' in Willie Breytenbach (ed). *The Constellation of States: A consideration*. Johannesburg, The South African Foundation. 1980. pp. 27-30.
12. See, for example, Douglas G. Anglin. 'SADCC after Nkomati', *African Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 335, April 1985, p.163-181; Gavin Maasdorp. 'Squaring up to economic domination: regional patterns' in Robert I. Rotberg et al., *South Africa and its Neighbours: regional security and self-interest*. Lexington: Lexington Books. 1985. pp. 91-135. Elna Schoeman's comprehensive bibliography entitled, *'The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC): A select and annotated bibliography'*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, (Bibliographic Series, No. 14), 1986. 131p. An excellent introduction to the content of this work.
13. Marie Muller. 'Multilaterale samewerking in Suider-Afrika', *Politikon*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (June, 1988), pp. 90-104 is the best, most sane, exposition of this perspective.
14. See Gerrit Olivier. 'Recent developments in South African Foreign Policy', *Optima*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (December, 1988), pp. 196-203.
15. Simon Brand. *Economic Cooperation in Southern Africa: Continuity and Change*. Paper presented at the Lausanne Colloquium, 8-13 July, 1989, 31pp.

Dr. Leonard Suransky

New Places, New Faces, and New Tastes: The Foreign Policy of a Liberated South Africa

We are faced with two major paradoxes which will affect our attempt at futurology regarding a liberated South Africa's foreign policy, and the diverse responses of different sectors of the first, second and third worlds to a post-apartheid South Africa.

Methodology

Firstly though, in response to Professor Kegley's request that we lay our methodological cards on the table, a word about my approach.

The task of this paper is to cast some light on an as yet unrealised future, and there is a need to fall back on some relatively unscientific crutches, such as the much maligned faculty of "intuition" that almost unmentionable concept in behavioural science.

This does however reveal my preference for an eclectic approach to research, mixing what is best and most helpful from traditional realist and idealist perspectives, with that which is of utility from the more rigorous, quantitative approaches of behavioural science or dependency theory.

I remain convinced that the human psyche, domestic society, and certainly the interaction of nations, nationals and the whole array of non-governmental organisations (N.G.O.s) in the international system, are far too complex to comprehend or quantify in any conventional scientific sense. This has lead to the disappointment and disenchantment with the initially over-enthusiastic theory-building aspirations of comparative foreign policy analysts, that we discussed in Kegley's paper.

In a paper such as this, speculation, intuition and comparison with similar newly liberated states such as Zimbabwe, are a few of the limited tools at a researchers' disposal.

The Process of the Transition beyond Apartheid

The first paradox that faces us, is how change is going to come about, and how long it will take. Is the transition to full power-sharing going to involve

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violent conflict or will it be a mixture of violence and negotiation? If it is to be more on the violent end of the spectrum, what will the dimensions and proportions of this violent confrontation be, and then, how long will it last, what toll in lives and destruction of property and the infrastructure of South Africa will it take?

The second alternative on this issue relates more to South Africa as we know it today, and the remarkable change in its foreign policy over the past year, heralding a new mode and a new mood of negotiation, first in Angola, then in Namibia, and now even in South Africa, in the post-Mandela/Botha tea party era.[1]

This conciliatory *zeitgeist* is primarily a microcosm of the even more remarkable rapprochement between Reagan and Gorbachev. Even the level of domestic violence, i.e. urban bombings of shopping centres and police facilities, which had previously caused such fear and insecurity in the white and other communities, seems to be on the downswing. Likewise the appalling violence and indeed terror in the Greater Pietermaritzburg and Durban areas between rival black ideological groups vying for regional and national pre-eminence, seems to be lending itself to both domestic, and possibly overseas negotiation, with rumours of future meetings at the highest level between Buthelezi and the ANC leadership. This would be none to soon as these killings which have on average cost 100 lives a month, and have made analogies to Beirut and Belfast credible, earning the area the dubious name of the "Natal killing fields".

The South African destabilisation raids on neighbouring front-line states which were such an integral part of the day-to-day reality of the past decade, seem also to be receding into the past, and if Renamo and Unita come to terms with, or are "persuaded" to come to terms with their governments, this sordid chapter of Reaganesque Contra-like behaviour, may be happily relegated to the history books.

There are still external economic sanctions causing inflation and a stagnating economic environment, but some of the velocity seems to have left even this movement, at least in the USA, where it was most effective and damaging[2]. In August, the Commonwealth foreign ministers decided to encourage world banks not to roll over South African loans in June 1990, as a more finely tuned sanctionary pressure on the South African fiscal authorities. It is unlikely that Maggie Thatcher will allow this to go ahead if President de Klerk proceeds with his promised vigorous reform measures. The South African government's Angolan, Namibian and Mandela initiatives have gained a grudging, and initially disbelieving breather for South Africa. Foreign leaders and observers can hardly believe it is shedding its customary pariah, bad-boy, posture. With the September 1989 elections behind him, President F.W. de Klerk and his slimmer and trimmer Nationalist Party, has received an unmistakable domestic and international

message to fulfill his campaign promises to move to a more democratic, responsive government which will engage legitimate black leaders. Do we have a mixture of a "restructuring" Gorbachev, and a "kindlier, gentler" Bush reflected in this new Nationalist leader, or are we to see yet another, glossier, new mask for apartheid and white hegemony?

In order to explain this reversal we would have to look to a confluence of changes in the international, regional and domestic systems that impinge on South African foreign policy decision-making.

1) Mention has already been made of the paradigm shift in superpower interaction from confrontation and the cold war arms race, to a negotiating and dialogue stance, which I would consider to be the major pressure, but also an opportunity for South Africa's seeming about-turn.

2) Secondly there was the rising cost of the securocratic, militaristic option. This influenced the outcome of the bureaucratic power struggle between the hawks and the doves of South Africa's decision-making elite. We would suggest that similarly, the cost of the war or armaments race option versus domestic exigencies, the old guns versus butter dilemma, has been very influential in both Mr. Gorbachev's and Mr. Reagan's own rapprochement.

3) Thirdly, there have been pressures of incipient domestic rebellion, rather remarkably, in the very midst of a state of emergency! These have come from the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) and particularly trade unionists, students, political activists and church leaders and have taken their toll. It is instructive that Mr. Adriaan Vlok, uncharacteristically for a Nationalist Minister of Law and Order, released several hundred political prisoners in mid-1989. He seemed to be responding to the significant and internationally embarassing pressures of hundreds of imprisoned political prisoners, mounting country wide hunger strikes and hospital escapes. Later policewomen were used to restrain Archbishop Tutu, Reverend Boesak and supporters from marching on Parliament in late August, in an unusually imaginative use of coercion. However, some weeks later, on the very eve of the September 6 national elections, the government was no longer prepared to risk major disruptions of the elections, and dogs, sjamboks, teargas and eventually bullets were used, and over twenty youths were brutally killed while demonstrating non-violently at Mitchell's Plain against the elections.

The largely non-violent defiance campaigns of the MDM, a seeming return to the Gandhian strategies of the pre-1960's, have by and large *not* been crushed in the South African Police's traditional *kragdadige* way, something they certainly still have the will and the muscle to do.

However, such a reaction would have undermined the new, more reasonable, more sensitive image the South African government is attempting to project abroad.

4) There have even been significant shifts in white domestic opinion,

including dissatisfaction among businessmen who have been undermined by sanctions in an increasingly inflationary and wilting economy. This led them to consultations with the ANC external leadership in Lusaka and Dakar, to ascertain and even possibly to have made a contribution toward the fashioning of a post-apartheid economic dispensation.

Young army conscripts had become increasingly disenchanted with an unending and unwinnable war in Angola, (not unlike their Russian confreres in Afghanistan). To a small minority, their army duty against black fellow citizens in the townships, is even more repugnant. A brave handful of draftees have been prepared to sacrifice six precious years of their lives in prison to avoid this, but they are the tip of an iceberg below which lie some less courageous hundreds, a worrying phenomenon for the army. I would hazard a guess that a majority of these conscientious objectors come from the English-speaking community, given that community's more liberal foreign policy orientations.[3]

To some extent the rot has begun to spread to Afrikaner youth too. One must take note of the curious manifestation of anti-establishment Afrikaner rock groups touring and being welcomed around the country, and of the recent anti-discrimination protests at Afrikaner academia's respected mecca, The University of Stellenbosch. There, for the first time, the rectorate reversed an expulsion of an SRC demonstrator calling for the desegregation of residences, in the face of student protest and the threat of a law suit.

On the negative side it should be noted that lower and working class whites have moved to the right, apprehensive that their culture, language, school and residential exclusiveness might be negotiated away from under them. This sector of the white community has moved to support the Conservative Party, which believes it can turn the clock back to the heyday of Verwoerdian apartheid, with all the added isolation of South Africa that that would inevitably entail.

5) How important are individual actors in this process? Is the departure of ex-Minister of Defence and State President, P.W. Botha likely to bring the meaningful change' promised in the elections? He developed the total onslaught theory, and was the architect of South Africa's largely extra-parliamentary, unaccountable and therefore undemocratic security management system. Is his passing an indication of the end of the era of 'securitocracy' in South Africa? If so, what then will President F.W. de Klerk's *modus operandi* be? Will he complete his five year term, or will he be replaced by a president from the majority left of the spectrum under a new constitution?

In this post-tricameral election climate, is it likely that a major governmental initiative will be taken to engage in candid and open negotiations with the legitimate leadership of black South Africans? Will this be in a Lancaster House type format? Or is it more likely that such

negotiations will be U.S. led, and USSR supported, and mediated by the likes of a Herman Cohen of the US State Department, along the lines taken by Chester Crocker in the Angola/SWA/Namibia talks? Or will Maggie Thatcher, or a more representative European leadership group including her, play the role of go-between? The ANC gained widespread OAU endorsement for its guidelines for a future South Africa in Harare in August 1989, and it seems determined to be pushing for *direct, unmediated negotiations.*

Do we even have these options? In Zimbabwe it took seven years of fighting before the drained and exhausted parties consented to crawl exhausted and spent to Lancaster House i.e. war first and only then, negotiations. Can South Africans, of whatever background, learn from the Zimbabwean experience, or do we have to go through a similar debilitating cycle of prolonged violence and indeed war? Of course South Africa is no Rhodesia, and has a military capacity which would require a different kind of guerrilla war, maybe the likes of which the world has not yet seen. It is more likely to be an internal insurgency since the South African terrain does not lend itself to a guerrilla war such as that in Zimbabwe, the ANC fighting arm is now being pushed further away from South Africa's borders to Tanzania, and the SADF seems well able to defend the borders for the forseeable future.

We live in an era of mass revolutions which seem to neutralize and cripple government forces: for instance the impact in both Iran and the Philippines of *millions of people* flocking into the streets. In those two cases the armies were restrained from – or refused to shoot – their own people. More recently the ageing leaders of China did not allow the Peoples' Liberation Army to show similar restraint in Tiananamen Square, and thousands were killed. This will probably be to their eventual political detriment.

In South Africa a white army would, at its current level of consciousness and training, be unlikely to show restraint at the sight of mass protests by millions of Blacks, or to understand that shooting them is to shoot one's fellow *citizens*. They have not been trained to see things that way.

It is impossible to forsee accurately the form that such an uprising would take, just as the Israeli's never envisaged an intifadah' and seem far less able to contain it than several earlier and more conventional wars. We certainly must try and learn from these contemporary conflicts elsewhere in the world, but I do believe that our experience would be distinctly individual, because of South Africa's special logistics and resources. I have no doubt though that the frustration and anger of the repressed majority will find possibly more violent, but increasingly more ingenious, outlets the longer that negotiations for real power-sharing are delayed.

Socio-political and economic orientation: Capitalism or Socialism? The second paradox that I see is the puzzle as to what type of

post-apartheid society we can expect. This is the corner stone of what the emerging foreign policy of this country will be, and as importantly, what the reaction of the economically and socio-politically developed West, as well as the reaction of the less developed Second and Third Worlds to a post-apartheid South Africa, will be.

Foreign policy is both *purposeful* and *value laden*, and we need to attempt to envisage alternative domestic governmental scenarios which will inform the new order and its foreign policy posture and allegiances.

Some may envisage a post-apartheid foreign relations dispensation in *a **status quo ante** format, a return of South Africa to the Western fold*, fully accepted in political, economic, academic, sports and other circles, as soon as bad old apartheid has been abandoned. Such acceptance *may* be forthcoming, but the welcome is likely to be an even wider, more global one. We do however, have to consider how we might arrive at such a state, given the likely radical changes that a true democracy in South Africa will bring.

It appears that there exists a broad consensus among urban black South African to pursue a *socialist* post-apartheid system. Without making value judgements as to the wisdom or unwisdom of their position, it exists, and it will make a world of difference to South Africa's future foreign complexion, and its acceptability or unacceptability to a range of First, Second and Third World nations should this agenda prevail.

It is not surprising that capitalism in South Africa, which has been so inextricably linked to the repressive and exploitative policies of apartheid, should be so mistrusted, and in some circles despised by black South Africans. Therefore, if they have their democratic say, it is most unlikely that post-apartheid South Africa will resemble what South Africans have come to know and take for granted, and that we will witness a situation of returning to 'business as usual'.

Nor, on the other hand, need this mean that the present system will vanish overnight, or even over many years. Even a black majority government will have to survive and indeed prosper in an increasingly interdependent and largely capitalist-dominated international economy, if it is to fulfill the social and economic requirements for reconstruction that its supporters will demand. It can be convincingly argued that any South African government of whatever ethnic or ideological stripe will have to export platinum, vanadium , chrome, antimony, manganese, gold and diamonds to the West, and in particular to the USA, or wherever else the market may be, to survive economically. It cannot afford not to, nor is the USSR in a position financially to subsidise another Cuba, should South Africa choose to *boycott the West*. With the Soviet Union scrambling to invigorate its lagging economy through perestroika and an affiliation with Western Europe, as it becomes the European Community of 1992, the world may be on track to a *more mixed economy*'.

This view is reinforced by the reality of other African neighbours with diverse socio-political ideologies such as Angola, Zaire and Zambia selling their oil and copper where best they can, and increasingly casting off *doctrinaire* economic programmes.

A perhaps unlikely, but a rather intriguing scenario, given the ANC's and the SACP's fraternal ties with the Soviet Union, could be a USSR-RSA precious metals consortium along OPEC lines, in an attempt to raise the world prices of the abovementioned metals. White South Africa and the USSR have already achieved a modus vivendi for the marketing of their diamonds in London.

This whole dilemma presents white South Africa, which is fairly unanimously 'free enterprise' oriented, with a considerable challenge, first domestically and by extension in its foreign relationships. At the University of Durban-Westville it is a minute percentage of students who espouse a non-socialist orientation. The overwhelming majority of these future managers and indeed leaders of South Africa, are deeply interested in Third World socialist countries and experiments, such as Brazil, Tanzania, Cuba, Eastern Europe, China and so forth. It takes some doing to point out to them the impressive successes of the Newly Industrialized Countries (NIC's), the Tigers of South East Asia, such as Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and even Thailand, who have achieved remarkable growth via the capitalist road, with much help from their first world friends, and not a little exploitation of their factory workers.

Indeed young blacks envisage a post-apartheid South Africa as a third world, non-aligned country. Their perceptions are important in the imaging of a new political order.

The GNP statistical status of South Africa at US$2,010 per capita per annum is impressive, and gives some inkling of how rich some white South Africans must be. It is sobering to remember that blacks only own a miniscule 2% of South Africa's resources...but for my students Kwa Mashu and Phoenix, and even sadder, the violence torn townships of Pietermaritzburg such as Mpumalanga, are home, and are decidedly third world realities for them. They seem to live very much in a third world South Africa, they experience and therefore tend to see South Africa as such, and they must reflect some of the thinking of their internal and external leaders.

The closest analogy – Zimbabwe

Neighbouring Zimbabwe may give us some insights into a future liberated South Africa's foreign policy. Most importantly, Zimbabwe has made the core inspiration of its foreign policy posture and perception system its domestic ideological belief system.[4] President Mugabe has claimed that Marxist-Leninist principles are the principles we would want to guide us in

our socialist track',[5] and his first Foreign Minister Witness Mangwende asserted that Government's foreign policy direction is moulded around the very basic principles and beliefs upon which our liberation struggle was founded and won'.[6]

1) Most important to Zimbabwe was a determination to be respected as a *sovereign state aligned to and controlled by no other power'* Interestingly enough the shoulder which Mugabe's ZANU government seemed to be looking over in fear of outside interference, was to the far north, in the USSR, rather than to the Republic of South Africa in the south.

Since ZANU had been Mao- and China-oriented in its Marxism-Leninism during the liberation struggle, and since the USSR had defined Nkomo's ZAPU as the true representative of this struggle, and had excluded ZANU from many Soviet international fora, the new Zimbabwean government was initially both suspicious and wary of the USSR. They deferred accepting a Soviet ambassador for ten months after independence. This is surprising and informative, since the greatest threat to their sovereignty would seem to have come from their southern flank. This has been substantiated by South Africa's de-stabilisation strategy, including the constant breaching of its Beira corridor and Maputo railway fuel and trade links, and the more important incursion of Renamo into Zimbabwe's eastern highlands in mid-1987. Can we expect a black majority South African government to forcefully direct their foreign policy towards a more international arena, about which most South Africans across the race and class spectrum, know so very little?

2) The OAU injunction *against outside interference in a member state's internal affairs*, against the wishes of (the) broad masses, but also against interference from internal forces, is a prominent principle, as it has been for most South African governments.

3) A *positive non-alignment* which means an active posture to preserve an independent identity against superpower or colonial interference. This non-alignment was supposedly military, political, economic and diplomatic, but certainly not ideological. The goal is not to become a part of the sphere of influence of either of the superpowers. However, the USA was seen as the main danger. At the August-September 1986 Eighth Non-Aligned Summit in Harare, Mugabe, as Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), took a pro-Yugoslavian and Titoist position, refusing to align with either superpower bloc, in contrast to the Castroist attempts to force a clear *USSR-aligned* posture. Nevertheless, the NAM, under Mugabe's leadership, continued to soft-pedal criticism of Soviet excesses such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Soviet-supported Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, while showing no such quarter in virulently decrying the US invasion of Grenada and its destabilisation of Nicaragua. What would a liberated South Africa's position in the NAM be?

4) Zimbabwean foreign policy is strongly motivated by a commitment to a socialist ideology, for a redistribution of national wealth controlled by workers and peasants, and opposed to a capitalist, private enterprise system. This involves a strong alignment with fraternal socialist states, and in particular, in Zimbabwe's case, with Mozambique, with whom Samora Machel even talked of a union, and to whom Mugabe has committed 7 000 troops to fight Renamo.

Zimbabwe has had to make some concessions to the economic exigencies of a world based on an international capitalist economic order, and particularly to the semi-peripheral economic and military muscle of South Africa with which it conducts some 40% of its trade. In the latter respect it has led the struggle to lessen its dependency, and that of the Front Line States, on South Africa, through the formation of an alternative trading network, SADCC, a bold and defiant move. Trade with South Africa has not, however, prevented the new foreign image and posture, chosen by the leaders of a majority-ruled Zimbabwe, from being socialist, non-aligned and decidedly oriented to the developing world.

Westernism or Non-Alignment?

The issue of the future internal ideological and external political bloc orientation of South Africa is central. The debate needs to examine the viability, the accomplishments and failures of a wide variety of socialist and capitalist experiments in the developing world which we are a part of. It would indeed be unfortunate, if South Africa chose a particular international ideological and economic orientation, that it may later come to regret, for lack of sufficient, reliable and relatively objective research, informain and education.

It is important to monitor how the external ANC, SACP, PAC and BC leadership are reading the portents of glasnost' and perestroika' for themselves. Are they inclined to follow the flexible, multi-party, incentive-engined approaches of Hungary and Poland, and in Africa of Mozambique and Zimbabwe or are they going to remain in the verkrampte, dichard mode of Cuba and Albania? If Gorbachev fails to deliver the goods, and faces his own version of Tiananamen Square, or the wrath of his own frustrated and demoted bureaucracy, or his labour unions, or all of them together, and he is defeated...will this Prague Spring' continue? Will it go down in history as a brief and premature interlude, or as a revisionist, bourgeois plot along the lines of the propaganda the geriatric Chinese leadership are putting out about the events of their brave June uprising, calling for more basic democratic freedoms within China's socialist framework?

Western vs. Third World Foreign Policy towards South Africa.

A remarkable accomplishment of the movements of the unrepresented

masses of the people, is the way in which being excluded from participation in the foreign policy decision-making processes of South Africa, they have managed to project or *internalise* the apartheid question into the domestic politics of the USA and elsewhere.[7] It was news of the 1976 Soweto student uprising, and the subsequent brutal death of Steve Biko, which triggered a wave of revulsion in the USA and, in turn, the divestment reaction. What is remarkable in the annals of US foreign policy, is that over the next decade Apartheid in South Africa was gradually made (not exclusively) into a black American or Afro-american domestic issue, and under people like Randall Robinson of the black Transafrica lobby in Washington DC, it became an increasingly black-led campaign. It was the first time that this black constituency demanded a foreign policy role for itself.[8]

It is a mistake to judge this internalisation of apartheid within the Western political and foreign policy discourse as some sort of foul play or breaking of the rules of the sovereignty game. One would wish that atrocities and repressive practices that other governments impose on their people or subjects, would gain as much coverage and support by a foreign domestic constituency such as black Americans. Such an ability to internalise and understand the suffering of segments of a far off nation, and then to act on it and to bring about pressure for change, if it were more widespread, would introduce a powerful public opinion pressure on delinquent regimes.

In the future, in a new South Africa, it would be to that society's credit if such constituencies here were able to influence its foreign policy against excesses that they see elsewhere. *It is in fact the mark of a truly democratic country*. Though black Americans are small minority, their slow march to participation in their polity, indeed to a small level of grass roots driven power-sharing, has expressed itself by making South Africa the black constituency's foreign policy issue in the USA. It has managed to persuade a congressional majority to override a Presidential veto, to pass a sanctions package that has damaged South Africa and precipitated much soul-searching and debate here. There is currently an attempt to find ways to fine tune the sanctions weapon, so as to ensure that less blacks will be directly damaged by such sanctions. Will a South African white minority be able to play this kind of a foreign policy role in a post-apartheid South Africa? It will be a test of the level of such a democracy and will no doubt take time and will have to be hard fought for. It is clear that at present the views and desires of black South Africans hardly impact on South Africa's foreign policy. The Angolan/Namibian settlements have been followed with interest, some disbelief, and are perhaps the first policy in a long time which has majority support in this country. This is a laudable departure.

I suspect that as in the anti-apartheid movement, some states, such as the Dutch and the Scandinavians, will more readily and warmly support a social democracy in South Africa, or even a Marxist-Leninist state. England and

the USA may react more coolly, indeed they may even try to destabilise a majority ruled left-leaning South Africa, as they have done to new regimes which followed a different ideology to their own, starting with the Soviet Union in 1917, through Cuba, Vietnam to Chile, Nicaragua and Panama. So the new South Africa should not necessarily expect an unambiguously welcoming First World reaction.

For instance, South Africa will be the *first black African nuclear power.* How will the West and particularly the US respond to that? Will it be a racist reaction, suggesting that in black majority hands such power is unsafe?[9] Will they try and undermine South Africa, will there be a Nicaragua-like destabilization policy, and will there be conservative white South African Contras supporting such a policy of sabotage? Perhaps suddenly the US black lobby will become an ally rather than a foe.

What of the reaction of that other African regional power, the oil-endowed Nigeria? Will they see South Africa as an upstart newcomer on the block, and expect some respect and deference? Will it feel threatened by South African military prowess and nuclear capability? Will there be an inter-African confrontation between Western and Southern Africa? Will South Africa, as a regional superpower, rather be called upon to mediate African disputes, and then will this be through diplomatic or military means, or both?

The Third World is likely to respond to South African liberation with relief and great expectation. They have been involved in a long, hard fought battle to bring an end to apartheid, which most South Africans know little about. There are many exotic countries and movements in the world that have sheltered and nourished the anti-apartheid liberation movements. They will come to Pretoria, or wherever the new capital may be, to celebrate and to examine this much maligned and ostracized pariah land.

I envisage a blossoming of new faces, new tastes, new garbs, new music and culture in Pretoria which will challenge the beauty of the jacarandas in bloom. The whole world will suddenly be on South Africa's doorstep, and these are worlds that most South Africans know little about,...different ideologies, different religions and different cultures. In turn our envoys will go forth into uncharted territories for South African diplomacy, and will learn, interact and bring back the diplomatic messages, but also the cultural ways and tastes of new places. South Africa will become an accepted part of the world again, but it will be a second and third world as well as a first world. Through this process, white South Africans will make the much more important discovery of one another within the various culturally rich communities within South Africa, which have been so hermetically sealed off from each other. This will make for some friction, but also for considerable human and cultural rewards.

South Africa is most likely to join the OAU and the non-aligned movement (NAM) and to become an energetic, and significant actor in these forums, perhaps playing a transformative role. There is no doubt that the addition of South Africa to these forums as a political, military and economic giant of the third world will make an historical difference and will lend third world echelons real clout given its unusual strength. The NAM has not really been anywhere as neutral as its name suggests, and perhaps South Africa will swing it to a more truly neutral stance in our increasingly less bi-polar world. This trend began to emerge at the September 1989 NAM summit in Yugoslavia, with a move to rehabilitate and de-demonise relations with the West, at least with a view to conducting closer economic relations with them. South Africa could become a forceful proponent and advocate for changing the world's moribund and inequitable global structures, and a pressure point for re-distributing the world's resources more equitably.

What will the major theme of a liberated South Africa's emergence onto the international stage be? Perhaps for all its economic and military might, it may emerge as a moral force in international politics, a focal point for the dissemination of non-racism to a world that still reeks of that human sickness, an ironic and fitting twist to its for so long having been the focus and symbol of racism. However, in adverse circumstances of scarcity and fear, it could take the opposite turn and entrench racism and discrimination.

Perhaps its new political structures, needing as they do to accommodate so many peculiar insecurities, will through all the suffering and oppression that has led to liberation, offer the world new forms of government and democracy, new structures and ways of ordering society, that will be an inspiration and model to other nations.

Then, of course, perhaps South Africa, faced with a backlog of some of the worst socio-political and economic injustices in the world, and with an endless agenda of problems to set right domestically, will prefer to temporarily downplay its international role, and seek a transitional period of *isolationism*, if this is at all possible in a world of such growing interdependence and shrinking privacy. South Africa will find itself a competitor with other second and third world countries for the world's diminishing foreign aid and investment capital, forcing it into an adversarial role with some of its friends and allies.

Will there be a call for South Africa to receive immigrants of colour from some of the less advantaged, poverty- and hunger-stricken parts of the region, the continent or beyond? Will it react positively to such requests, or like most new countries, revolutionary or not, will it continue with its traditional foreign policy agenda, and pursue its own national interests first and foremost?

Conclusion

In summary, inevitably the kind of transition South Africa undergoes en route to its post-apartheid state will have a lot to do with the country's future, and its foreign policy.

I believe that the quicker we learn to know and understand each other as citizens of this country, to share and appreciate each other's cultures, foods, music and ideological eccentricities, on a wide scale, the more we begin to share the economic, social and political resources of South Africa, the better our ultimate dispensation will be. It will be more peaceful, less violent, and better received by the first, second and third worlds, and it will be very different from the South Africa most white South Africans know. It will not be without pain and fear, but a more just and democratic South Africa will soon bring down some of the international walls of denigration and rejection. Some old friends may reject us but that may change in time. New friends are likely to converge on us from all over the world, as I have already mentioned. Likewise our Foreign Affairs personnel will be visiting lands and countries which were banned to most South Africans, and will learn a great deal from such exposure.

This South Africa (Azania?) will be a happier, more cosmopolitan, more multicultural place, and many fears will dissolve amid the challenges of learning to live together for the first time. Waking up from decades of pariahdom, to get to know the once forbidden nations beyond our borders, their forbidden music, ideas and ways, both the good and the bad of it.

Notes

1. This was not just a storm in a teacup. Four senior government ministers have been meeting with Mandela for several years.
2. The much harsher Dellums amendment was put on hold prior to the US Presidential elections, and has remained on hold, awaiting the outcome of the South African elections, and more importantly the changes promised by De Klerk. If there is no movement on this front, the US congress does have the will to push through new sanctions, and President Bush would be inclined to go along with Congress, since he is operating a more consensus oriented, less veto-prone foreign policy than his predecessor, President Reagan.
3. Du Pisani, Andre, *What do we think? A survey of white opinion on foreign policy issues*, Occasional Paper No. 4, The South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 1988. For instance on the question: *'The government should negotiate directly with the African National Congress (ANC) to try to find a solution to South Africa's racial problems'*, 19% of the Afrikaans respondents versus 60,7% English-speakers agreed to the proposition in 1988 (p.31). On the question *'Blacks should serve with Whites, Coloureds and Indians in the same Parliament'*, 44,2% Afrikaans speakers vs. 84,5% English speakers agreed in 1988, and 60,3% Nationalist Party supporters vs. 96% Progressive Federal Party agreed.
4. I wish to give credit for Mr. Gregory's very stimulating study on the impact of Marxist-Leninist ideology on Zimbabwe's foreign policy, which has helped answer many questions I had in this sub-section, and which gives some foretaste of just one scenario of what we may expect in a new South Africa (see reference no. 5).

5. Gregory, Christopher Ivan, *The Impact of Ideology on Zimbabwe's Foreign Relations (1980-1987)*, Masters Dissertation, The University of The Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 1988, p.129, quoted from, Ngangura, M., *Zimbabwe: under ZANU's umbrella*, African Now', December 1984, p.26.
6. ibid. p.127.
7. Van Wyk, Koos, of the International Studies Unit, Rhodes University, Grahamstown. This is one of many interesting points Prof. van Wyk made in a week-long series on *South African Foreign Policy* at The University of Durban-Westville in May 1989.
8. (a) Transafrica's protests outside the South African embassy in Washington DC, which led to the daily arrest of many prominent Afro-american and other anti-apartheid people, dynamised this campaign.
   (b) Afro-americans found a precedent, and both direction and legitimacy for this foreign policy role in the traditionally exceptional influence that Jews in the USA have wielded over US policy towards Israel and the Middle East.
9. Mazrui, Ali, *The Africans*, a nine-part BBC/PBS TV series on three cultural strands that make up Africa, western colonialism, Islam and indigenous cultural ways and religion. 1988. A book of the same name exists.

Mr. Kiru Naidoo

New Faces, New Places, New Tastes – The Politics of the International Economic Relations of a Liberated South Africa

Whilst the seizure of state power is the central aim of any revolutionary movement, the crucial sphere of economic policy-making, be it on a national or international level has often been glossed over much to the detriment of a post-revolutionary government. The focus of this paper shall be the position of post-apartheid South Africa within the context of an international capitalist economy, with reference to economic and political transformations in the post-apartheid phase and its prospective role within the Third World. In addition it will propose a case for a new regional policy in Southern Africa in the interests of economic prosperity, taking cognisance of new international economic alignments notably that of the European Community for 1992. The nature of the political transformation and the inherited internal economic order which will definitely place an array of limitations and constraints on the foreign policy of a post-apartheid South Africa will also be looked into.

South Africa became integrated into the world economy in the latter half of the last century following the discovery of gold and diamonds. The subsequent trade in these minerals and other primary products in return for machinery and technology to facilitate its industrial development entwined South Africa in the international capitalist economy. The conclusion of the Second World War further enhanced this relationship with massive foreign investment taking advantage of the exceptional rates of return guaranteed by apartheid. This growing dependence made the South African economy susceptible to the rigours of international market forces, with limited power in the international market. These realities will present a post-apartheid government with an unenviable dilemma. Any argument for international political non-aligment and goe-political neutrality has therefore got to be mindful of the inheritance of an economy so tied to western capital. The internal dynamics of a post-apartheid state will demand some shedding of the umbilical cord to the Western economic sphere but as Payer (1974)

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asserts: 'the internal political evolution of a nation is intimately and structurally connected to its external situation'. Can a post-apartheid government afford severance from the international capitalist economy, considering its long association with it, or will strategies aimed at economic transformation force such a move?

Against this backdrop it is vital to consider one factor which has cleverly been able to hold in bondage just about every Afro-Asian or Latin American post-revolutinaygovernment. The International Monetary Fund has clearly been the agent of Western capital rather than a mechanism to remedy short term balance of payments. It has, as Padayachee (1988) asserts 'long held centre stage as the control and surveillance arm of international economic relations; it has reflected, imposed and maintained behind a cloak of neutrality the dominance of Western industrialist capitalist interests'. The economic bondage that plagues the developing world can't be best remedied by the displacement of the hegemony of the IMF as well as that of its offshoots, the World Bank and USAID. Western capital seeks notably through the IMF, to influence the events leading to liberation and the consolidation thereof in order that South Africa might not break with the international capitalist economy. Any offer of economic aid to a post-apartheid government must clearly be seen in this light. Ignorance of its implications will most certainly set a fledgling government off on a wrong foot.

There is great difficulty in writing about the nature of the transition to the post-apartheid phase as it is a dangerous arena in which to speculate. This is especially so since no amount of academic forays can predict authoritatively the possible outcome of mass mobilisation and struggles against the apartheid regime, the nature and intensity of which varies with the degree of state repression and new initiatives on the part of the masses. However the parameters of this paper do warrant consideration of a framework of at least two possible scenarios. The one of continued capitalist development is in line with the international economic realities facing South Africa and the other sketches the mixed economy option spelt out in the Freedom Charter and of late in the constitutional guidelines of the African National Congress. The latter option, it must be noted, has been presented for discussion and critique to the broad mass of the population and its reception would be an authoritative indicator of a post-apartheid economic policy.

The formal capitalist avenue would imply that the eradication of apartheid would be an evolutionary transition leaving intact the mechanisms of the present unevenly developed exploitative capitaist economy. Such a position would inevitably arise out of what is termed, in the prevailing rhetoric, a 'negotiated settlement'. This would undoubtedly be a victory for Western capital, which is clearly keener on cementing an alliance with perceived stable black nationalism as opposed to shaky racial hegemony. Black

nationalism, in this context, is suspected to imply the likes of the Buthelezis, Inyanda and NAFCOC. While benefitting foreign multi-nationals and the local black bourgeoisie, particularly, (in relation to other houses of national capital) this type of arrangement would be at the expense of toiling masses 'whose subjugation or co-option will be crucial to securing continued foreign loans" (Padayachee: 1988) and whose liberation from white exploitation will simply be nullified in the hands of their better off black brothers.

The capitalist path, with all its trappings, ignores the exploited Third world component in the South African economy. Millions are locked into poverty, with 50% of the population, as a whole, living below the subsistence level.

Wilson and Ramphele (1989) contend that 'Poverty in South Africa is a special case. The degree of inequality – the gulf between rich and poor – is greater in South Africa than in 57 other countries for which such data exists'. The study speaks further of a dire need to transform the economy in the direction of uprooting poverty. The classic capitalist avenue will not address this all consuming problem since true economic liberation is the elevation of the lot of those at the very bottom.

The mixed economy option of social democratic development encompassing measures of both capitalist liberties and socialist regulation is arguably the better option. This is in the context of a post-apartheid South Africa inheriting a populace riddled with poverty after centuries of subjugation and exploitation, as well as a depressed worker population. A strong role for the state can be identified in this option. Western capital,in perpetually seeking to subvert this process, will be overtly hostile and as non-co-operative as possible. To some measure this could be different for South Africa with its vast reserves of certain minerals, of which the only other available source is the Soviet Union. Noting this factor the West is likely to be more accommodating to a mixed economy in liberated South Africa. However, in any event, a socialist option would be perceived as being a challenge to Western economic and strategic interests locally and as such the West is likely to strive to squeeze the economy to a standstill through a variety of ways. The West's strategy will be to destabilize a post-apartheid South Africa politically in order that the whole economic system will be subverted. In the immediate post-apartheid phase the South African economy will need to stabilize its development in such a way that reliance on the international capitalist economy can be reduced to a minimum.

As my colleague has pointed out, the foreign policy of a post-apartheid government is likely to be non-aligned. In fact this is explicitly stated in clause 'Y' of the ANC's constitutional guidelines. What are the economic implications of this? At the outset, it must be pointed out that South Africa has,amongst other things, a diversified economy, a well developed

infrastructure and some degree of technological expertise, which is in sharp contrast to many of its prospective colleagues in the Third World bloc. This background is likely to enhance its respect and as such, South Africa is likely to become a leading member in the Non-aligned Movement. A rather ambitious prospect here would be the introduction of a south-south dialogue to offset vertical relations. A diversified economy and a dynamic leadership in post-apartheid South Africa can start the ball rolling towards such an end. However, the danger here is that South Africa could acquire a metropole status arising out of this relationship and hence make no difference to its colleagues in the Third World.

The proposal of a case for a new regional economy policy for southern Africa must be viewed in the context of certain arguments set out above. Much of Africa, and more so southern Africa, eagerly awaits the liberation of South Africa, in order that their own economies might be liberated. Africa's support for South African liberation movements is a marker that is likely to be called in and will need to be addressed. The apartheid regime's hegemony in the region puts an economic stranglehold on much of southern Africa. Southern Africa is heavily dependent on the communications and transport network of South Africa and as such its economies are regulated to great measure by South Africa's assertion and coercion. Arguably a friendly government in South Africa will lift many of the burdens facing our neighbours. However, one must be cognisant of the fact that very few, if any, examples of such friendliness between neighbours exist, as the rules of economics most often dictate that the national interest should take precedence.

A necessary point from which to argue this proposal is the fact that, save for artificial geographical boundaries created by colonialism and capitalism, Southern Africa is in fact an indivisible region. For a long time, Southern Africa was perceived as the natural hinterland of South Africa for labour, raw materials, etc. This perception can be used in the reverse to facilitate unity rather than exploitation. This contention might be viewed with a great deal of scepticism in certain quarters, noting the numerous attempts at and failures of regional co-operation in Africa and the Third World. While this might be so, it is clear that the scenario is now changing, with the prospect of the European Community merging into one in 1992. An economic powerhouse will be unleashed onto the world that will send sovereign nations scurrying for allies to hold their own against a united Europe. (The dropping of trade barriers between the US and Canada is probably an early example of this, as is Mr. Gorbachev's courting of the Western Group of Seven.) A balkanized Third World, particularly with reference to Africa, will sink further into dependency, unless a concerted and positive effort is made to reassess their economic alignments.

The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference

(SADCC) was originally formed to offset dependence on hegemonic South Africa. The development of a new regional strategy, with South Africa as a component of SADCC and in the role of equal partner, will facilitate a mutually beneficial arrangement. This arrangement might not make Southern Africa as powerful as Europe on the international stage, but it will most certainly contribute to a forced march out of dependency on Western technology and capital. The current allocation of responsibilities and initiatives within SADCC is as follows: Angola is responsible for energy conservation and development; Botswana for agricultural research and animal disease control; Lesotho for land utilization, soil and water conservation; Malawi for fisheries and forestry and wildlife; Mozambique for transportation and communications; Swaziland for manpower development; Tanzania for industrial development; Zambia for mining and Zimbabwe for food security. South Africa's diversified economy can play a fundamental role in enhancing all of these initiatives.

The regional co-operation lesson from Africa is not an enviable one. In any event Jalloh (1980) asserts, in terms of the motivating factor in regard to regional economic co-operation, Africa was 'particularly influenced by the creation and success of the ECC'. The paradox is that the European Community's plan for 1992 can force a revival and faith in economic unions in Africa. The picture is, however, not all that bleak, since a notable survivor has been the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which resembles the power dimensions of South Africa in Southern Africa, with Nigeria as the hegemonic partner surrounded by poor neighbours with faltering economics. ECOWAS can be used as an appropriate comparative model, since many of the pitfalls of an uneven partnership has already been experienced and remedies have been attempted. This avenue is an exciting option that is in need of much further research.

With the strong pressures from a variety of sources, more especially those from popular struggles within South Africa, and the international sympathy that is is able to garner, it is evident we are fast on the road to the post-apartheid phase. South African international economic relations could therefore experience a far reaching transformation, as the emphasis would necessarily have to be placed on using the benefits of economic prosperity more equitably than is currently the case. Careful consideration of the role that a liberated South Africa should play in the international capitalist economy would go a long way towards enhancing the popularity of that government. It is also of consequence that the ANC is encouraging debate around the future economic policy of this country, as it is crucial that the ideological orientation of the economy should be the will of the majority of the people. South Africa's post-liberation role in Southern Africa, notably, the prospective role in SADCC, ought to contribute to the economic upliftment of the region as a whole. The union of the European Community

in 1992 must be a crucial backdrop to South Africa's international economic relations as economic alliances will ensure that 'balkanized' regions of the world are not disadvantaged by the European powerhouse. The politics of the international economic relations of a post-apartheid South Africa would bring new faces, new places and new tastes to this part of the world and along with excitement of this, South Africa needs to weigh, with great care, the implications of this transformation, being constantly vigilant in the national interest.

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Book Review

SUDAN SINCE INDEPENDENCE: STUDIES OF THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1956
edited by Muddathir Abd Al-Rahim, Raphael Badal, Adlan Hardallo and Peter Woodward, Gower, Aldershot, England, 1986, xi, 181 p.

This book deals with the politics and government of the Sudan since gaining independence from the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in 1956 and emphasis is placed on the Numayri era, 1969-1985.

The book is of contemporary relevance as it covers the major issues facing the country such as the divide between the Muslin-Arab north and the Christian-African south, with the latter fearing an Islamic cultural, economic and political hegemony; the relationship between military and civilian rule and unstable coalition governments; problems of regional and economic development; national integration and the future of the south; and the country's relationship with neighbouring states and East-West conflict.

Its major strength lies in the fact that almost all of the contributors have been or are present members of the Department of Political Science, University of Khartoum: eleven of the articles have been written by northern and southern Sudanese familiar with the Sudan's political economy.

The book consists of 15 chapters divided into five parts or themes: 'Society and Politics', 'Institutionalised Politics', 'Administration', 'Regionalisation' and 'External Relations'. Some themes are developed more strongly than the others but this is compensated for by overlapping of subject matter. The 'Regionalisation' theme gives a comprehensive overview of southern regional and political issues whilst the part on 'Administration' is detailed and gives insights into the structure and functioning of the bureaucracy and its role in economic development.

Part 1, 'Society and Politics', consists of four chapters. In a brief first article, 'Islam and Politics', Peter Woodward outlines the party political role of the Khatmiyya turuq and the Mahdists movement that are associated with the traditional al-Mirghani and Mahdists families respectively. It also deals with the political involvement of the modern elite-based Muslim Brotherhood, and the Republican Brothers. The rivalry between them, attitudes to Shariah, the reasons for Numayri's implementation of Islamic Law and the southern response to this are factors which demonstrate strongly that any future government, whether military or civilian, will have to accommodate Islam and Islam's involvement in politics.

Fatma Babiker Mahmoud's chapter on 'Businessmen and Politics' illustrates the support the political parties received from the business classes

and the latters' alliance with international capital (Lonrho) in the crushing of the 19 July 1971 coup.

Ahmed Hassan El Jack and Chris Leggett in their 'Industrial relations and the political process', give a good overview of the trade union movement and industrial relations under both civilian and military rule, and its relationship with political elites that has been one of conflict and accommodation.

In chapter four, 'Numayri's fall: the economic base', Tim Niblock shows how poor economic planning, cutbacks on foreign investment, limited funding on development in the outlying and southern regions, and civil strife in the south, all contributed to economic decay and the political disintegration of the state and the eventual overthrow of Numayri by the military in April 1985.

Part II, 'Institutionalised Politics', consists of three chapters dealing with political forces such as the parties and the military, parliament and the problems of constitutional development. Ali Suliman Fadlalla in his 'The search for a constitution' (Chapter five) traces Sudan's constitutional development, the weakness of constitutional structures in the face of Numayri's strong executive and dictatorial powers, and the representation the military and 'modern forces' should be given in constitutional development. He also discusses whether there should be a presidential or parliamentary system of government and a secular or Muslim state. The problems and weaknesses of coalition governments; a feature accentuated by the instability of Sadek el-Mahdi's coalition government and its overthrow by the military on 30 June 1989 are also examined.

Chapter six, Peter Woodward's 'Parties and parliaments', illustrates the historical development of the major political parties since 1945. (Umma, PDP, NUP); their secular and sectarian leanings, rivalry and coalitions, as the need arose. It also discusses the relationship between the parties, the electoral process, constitutional development and parliament. The chapter also devotes space to the role of Numayri's Sudan Socialist Union (SSU) party as a national reconciliatory influence and its 'popular control over state organs'.

Chapter seven, Peter Woodward's 'Military-civilian relations', is an important study in its own right and makes an important contribution to the debate on a relationship almost endemic in many African and third world countries. He shows that there is no clear cut distinction between military and civilian rule. He illustrates this by the increasing involvement in the SSU of civilian technocrats, the incorporation of former rivals such as Sadiq al-Mahdi of the Umma Party and the Muslim Brothers in it, encouragement given to soldiers to venture into business enterprises, and the involvement of Islamic religious figures in the military and the consequent enhancing of Numayri's domination of the military and civilian apparatus.

Part III, 'Administration', consists of four chapters. In chapter eight, 'The civil service: principles and practice', Al-Agub Ahmed Al-Teraifi, outlines the rapid growth of the civil service especially during the Numayri era. Preference was given to educated people; age, sex and kinship influenced the recruitment and promotion of civil staff and loss of staff due to government purges, the brain drain and inefficiency.

Najmal Abdin elaborates in 'Administrative reform 1956-1981' (chapter nine) that in Numayri's hastening of administrative reform he failed to consider constraints such as the poor state of administrative machinery, low standards of the plans and programmes for development, brain drain, nepotism and corruption of his regime. Emphasis was placed on organisational and institutional changes in contrast to behavioural and attitudinal ones.

Chapter ten, Abd Al-Rahim Al Rayah Mahmoud's 'The machinery of economic management', shows how the limited powers of ministers in the Ministry of Finance, coupled with financial difficulties caused the country's economy to come under IMF and World Bank control. Foreign loans were not accounted for, nationalised banks had to compete with stronger private ones, rampant inflation, corruption, and only the few benefitting economically, contributed to Numayri's downfall.

In the next chapter, Ahmed Mustafa Al-Hussein, 'Bureaucracy and economic development: the Gunaid Sugar scheme', uses the Gunaid Sugar Scheme as an example of the bureaucracy's role in economic development, the integration of the local economy into the national one and the transfer of local economic surplus to the central government for its financial needs.

Part IV, 'Regionalisation', consists of three chapters. In the opening chapter, Chapter twelve, Mohammad Beshir Hamid's 'Devolution and national integration in the Southern Sudan', is one of the lengthier articles. It discusses the differing military and civilian approaches to integrating the south and the southerners' fear of northern Islamic domination in the quest for national integration. Exacerbating the situation, was the leadership division in the south, and its leaders excessive interest in regional rather than national issues.

'Oil and regional sentiment in the south' by Raphael K. Badal, (Chapter thirteen) discusses the Regional Assembly debates and southern students' responses to the 1980 boundary dispute whereby rich southern areas were to be annexed by the north. The central government's motive in siting the Chevron backed oil refinery at Kosti rather than oil rich Bentiu area in the south is also discussed.

In Chapter fourteen, Kunijwak Gwado-Ayoker's, 'Interpreting the South', utilises regional southern vocabulary to explain the country's poverty and underdevelopment. *Podhicol* (Southern region) is underdeveloped by *hukama* (state) for the benefit of *Buonyo* (riverine

northerners). This new vocabulary is indicative of differing perceptions of the country's problems and accentuates the divide between north and south.

Part V, 'External relations' consists of a single chapter by Muhammad Beshir Hamid entitled: 'Aspects of Sudanese foreign policy: "splendid isolation", radicalisation and "Finlandisation"'. He discusses Sudanese foreign policy under different military and civilian regimes and the 'Finlandisation' of the country's foreign policy with respect to Egypt under Numayri's rule. The writer states '...Sudanese-Egyptian relations assumed a pattern which ...strikingly resembled the relationship of Finland with the Soviet Union'.

He comments also on the influence of East-West conflict on foreign policy, examining developments in neighbouring states such as Congolese and Ethiopian support for the southern rebels and Numayri's dilemma vis-a-vis the Arabs and Egypt on the latter's signing of the Camp David Agreement with Israel in 1978.

In all an extremely useful reader for both the layman student of and specialist in the Sudan and a major contribution to the recent spate of books on Africa's largest country. A criticism is the extremely fine print that made reading difficult at times, and the lack of either a biographical note on the contributors or a bibliography to lend support to the chapter references.

Abdul Samed Bemath,

Johannesburg,

July 1989.



Diagram 1: A Typical Primary System

Diagram 2: Semantically Defined Ethnic Profile Deviation



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