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Smuts House Notes

In the world-wide upheavals of 1990 South Africa's transformation process may have played only a small part. But for those who live here — and for those returning from exile to live here again — it has been a traumatic year. From the post-2nd February euphoria we have "advanced" on a roller-coaster ride to a confused mood of uncertainty about the future. This includes an almost desperate hope that things will still work out, that negotiations will in the end succeed and that the prize of a viable and genuine democracy will be won.

This perhaps matches the mood in countries of East and Central Europe, where people are also facing the "coming down to earth" experience, after the euphoria of a year ago. But nowhere in that part of the world are they faced with the same depressing degree of violence between rival political movements, as in South Africa, a situation which President Babangida of Nigeria has recently called "the shame of Africa".

Of the fact that South Africa is in a process of transformation there is no doubt. There is no need to list the legislative and administrative steps being taken during 1990 to demolish many apartheid structures and to open up the political and economic debate. All this breaking down of a previously rigid system has proceeded at a pace more rapid than anyone could have imagined possible only a year or two ago. But this breaking down of the old untenable structures is only one part of the process of transformation. The other, even harder, part is the building of new viable structures for the future, and that has hardly begun.

So the big question remains: Transformation from apartheid to what? Democracy has a host of differing meanings to different people. After all, the builders of apartheid claimed they were creating democratic forms of government, and communist parties of the past even labelled their authoritarian systems "Peoples' Democracies". The longer South Africans have to wait for answers to the question of what the content of this concept of democracy will be in our case, the greater will be the uncertainty, confusion and even fear of the future.

Meanwhile the violence, physical and rhetorical, escalates, and political leaders on all sides concentrate on trying to strengthen their own bargaining positions and arguing about old issues, instead of projecting clearly a vision of the future and moving firmly towards it.

In these circumstances many people, looking to the decade of the nineties ahead, must feel as once Matthew Arnold did:

> "And we are here as on a darkling plain
> Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
> Where ignorant armies clash by night."

South Africans, black and white, on all parts of the political spectrum need

to be rescued from this mood of uncertainty and growing doubt. That is the role of leadership, and the world has recognised that we do have remarkable leaders — to mention only the foremost, De Klerk and Mandela. For the vast majority of South Africans the hope for the future, which is still alive, rests on them, and they will be tested to the full in 1991.

To use another image, we are still poised on a fragile bridge slung across the chasm between the sterile rocks of the past and the fertile but unexplored territory of a new South Africa. The safest way to cross is to move forward at a steady pace, with eyes fixed on the other side. Hesitation and a to and fro movement could cause this fragile, swinging bridge to collapse, and to look down into the chasm will only increase the temptation to turn back to the old struggles. If the leaders demonstrate the confidence to complete this difficult crossing, most of their supporters will follow, gaining in confidence as they go.

John Barratt
Director General, SAIIA

Authors of these Smuts House Notes in each issue of the *Bulletin* are invited to express briefly personal views on any subjects they may choose within the Institute's field of interest.

Simon Baynham

Defence and Security Issues in a Transitional South Africa*

Introduction

Defence and security policy is not produced in a vacuum but rather in the context of a set of circumstances — historical and contemporary, external and domestic — which influence decision makers and their advisers. Ideally, security policy is the outcome of a series of rational assessments concerning threats to the state, together with the multi-faceted (i.e. not merely military but including, *inter-alia*, economic, ideological, psychological and diplomatic) responses required to counter such threats. In practice, however, the environment in which decisions are made is much more complex. At the same time, the appropriate infrastructure, armaments and manpower demanded by defence planners must be reconciled with competing economic claims on the Treasury in a world of limited resources and infinite material needs. In short, and in Hobbesian terms, defence may be the most important functional prerequisite of the state, but it is not its only duty. It is within this wider context of opportunity cost (of, in this instance, 'guns versus butter') that future security policy — an issue of vital importance for any country in the process of transition — must be analysed.

Unfortunately, future requirements in the security sphere are extremely difficult to assess. For at a time when considerable expectations have been raised by President de Klerk's reforms, it is a reasonable assumption that a major political transformation in the Republic will not be postponed indefinitely. But at this stage of the game — and although the shift away from apartheid can be considered inexorable and irreversible — nobody

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* This article is a slightly revised version of a talk given at the Pretoria branch of the South African Institute of International Affairs on 14 August 1990. Some of the ideas presented here are derived from discussions with co-delegates at the IDASA/ANC Conference on the Future of Security and Defence in South Africa, Lusaka, 23-27 May 1990.

really knows what the constitutional landscape will resemble.[1] On top of all this, there are at least two other major unknowns.

First, what *resources* will be available to sustain the armed forces of the future? Whereas one may be reasonably certain, *ceteris paribus*, that more money spent on health services will improve the quality of life in a given area, it is less easy to demonstrate that higher cash allocations for defence will make a state more secure. Indeed, there may even be circumstances in which enhanced military capacity diminishes security by altering the balance of power between contesting countries. By the same token, too little spent on deterrence and defence may ultimately prove very costly. As an aside — and against a backdrop of an end to the Cold War, reduced regional tensions and the imperative for substantial expenditure on socio-economic upliftment — it is my view that the SADF will continue to be a target for financial cuts.

The second imponderable relates to the nature of the threat confronting a future South Africa. On this issue, an outright analytical distinction may be made between threats derived from the international environment and those that are generated internally. The principal factor from the external setting is the state or level of global tensions, together with the posture of potential aggressors. However, whereas it is comparatively simple to calibrate enemy military *capabilities* as measured in terms of troop strengths, nuclear warheads, tanks, aircraft, warships and so on, it is quite another matter to make crucial judgements as to enemy *intentions*.[2] The current crisis in the Gulf is merely the latest evidence of that!

Potential Threats

With the foregoing perspectives in mind, a wide spectrum of conventional and unconventional menaces threaten South Africa. *Inter alia*, and in no particular order of importance, these include:

(i) The sustained build-up, especially in qualitative terms, of high-tech (mainly Soviet) military hardware in nearby states. Although the rate of escalation has slowed (and the USSR has been demanding hard cash in advance for the past 18 months or so), the process remains unreversed. Deliveries of sophisticated jet fighters, linked to formidable air-defence networks on the ground, account for a substantial proportion of such armaments.

(ii) An arms embargo which, even if lifted, will almost certainly result in periods — perhaps prolonged — where specific categories of military equipment became obsolete. There can be no doubt, however, that the after-effects of the embargo will continue to cause procurement problems as the military establishment adjusts to new international markets. The escalating real costs of locally manufactured hardware

will continue to cause financial difficulties — unless, of course, Armscor was able to go for long production runs resulting from high overseas demand. Regarding Armscor's future, I imagine that the 'defence family' is unlikely to permit de-escalation of research and development (R & D) in a number of high-technology areas (intermediate-range missiles, electronics, perhaps even in the nuclear field) to the extent that Pretoria loses, perhaps irrevocably, valuable ground covered in recent years. In the event of a lifting of the mandatory arms embargo, the RSA would be free to purchase 'major ticket' items on the international markets — perhaps even Mig fighters and tanks from an increasingly demilitarised Eastern Europe/USSR. If this occurred, Armscor —which is also adapting to civilian sector needs — could concentrate on what it does best: manufacturing missiles, armoured vehicles, artillery, ammunition and infantry arms for both local defence and for export to lucrative (albeit shrinking) markets in Third World hot-spots.

(iii) Uninterrupted tensions and poor relations between the RSA and a number of its neighbours, specifically (for the time being at least) Zimbabwe.

(iv) Civil wars in Angola and Mozambique and the potential for increased political strife in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Zaire, Lesotho and other neighbouring states.

(v) Linked to my previous two points are the problems related to giantism — a regional perception and antipathy regarding the RSA's enduring economic and military hegemony in the sub-continent no matter what government was running this country.

(vi) Associated with the above are the social and economic problems that would (and, indeed, already do) spill over the borders into the Republic: rebel bands, refugees and the like. Just look at Malawi where one tenth of its inhabitants — 800 000 people — are escapees from the economically ravaged territory of Mozambique. Indeed, currently more than a million refugees have left their homeland and taken refuge in the neighbouring states of southern Africa.

(vii) The impact of famine and pandemic diseases — especially the devastating impact of AIDS — which threaten to overwhelm not just South Africa but the entire sub-continent. The social dislocation and chaos that could flow from disasters in these fields would have far-reaching social and security implications for the region.

(viii) Continuation of the armed struggle directed against current or future governments from hard-line extremists of the left and/or right. For there can be no doubt whatsoever that a negotiated settlement will leave substantial numbers of disillusioned citizens out in the cold. Whites who believe that the current administration has 'sold them

down the river', and blacks who consider that their leaders have compromised their ideals, will almost certainly constitute an enduring domestic threat to a post-apartheid polity.

(ix) The possibility of intensified ethnic and racial conflict, together with class antagonisms between workers and a growing *lumpenproletariat* of under- or unemployed. In short, and in regard to this last point, there is likely to be an enduring gap between the haves and the have-nots.

(x) This brings me to my tenth and final point, that is, to the fact that South Africa is sitting on a series of interlinked timebombs: demography, employment and urbanisation. Black unemployment is likely to hit 8 million by the year 2000. Heightened but unrealised job expectations, meshed with squalid living conditions, could inject new levels of militancy and endemic violence from the nothing-to-lose millions of dispossessed as traditional patterns of authority continue to fragment and collapse. The security implications are frightening.

With all these horrors on the horizon, one's immediate reaction might be to spend untold billions on security and defence. But paradoxically such action could also constitute a threat, namely, if the defence burden on the economy became too burdensome at the expense of social and welfare programmes. We need to keep in mind, therefore, Lord Salisbury's warning: 'If you believe the doctors, nothing is wholesome; if you believe the theologians, nothing is innocent; [and] if you believe the soldiers, nothing is safe!'

The Internal Balance of Power

Before looking at future security scenarios in more detail, however, I would like to make a few observations concerning the internal balance of power. For there can be no doubt that the current politico-military power equation is of some relevance at least to the question of military and police forces in the months and years to come.

My first point is that the South African state retains a near monopoly of military and policy power within the Republic's borders. As I have argued elsewhere[3], this dominance has been weakened — but not yet fundamentally threatened — by the mass action of the 1980s and early 1990s. Thus, while this virtual monopoly or organised force has been challenged by the supporters of the ANC and other parties inside South Africa, the Republic's military might has not been significantly eroded by the activities of the ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). Relative to Pretoria's powers, therefore, the ANC's capability in the military sphere is limited and its armed struggle has been confined, largely, to sporadic hit-and-run operations that can be regarded as merely pin-pricks in the wider military scheme of things.[4]

Secondly, I would also argue that the recent reductions and rationalisation

in the South African Defence Force (SADF) — which have been concentrated in the smaller fighting services (air force and navy) and which were made possible by the 22 December 1988 New York accords and the end of the war in Namibia/Angola — are in no sense inconsistent with a strengthening of Pretoria's security capabilities inside South Africa itself.

In the third place, and at first glance, this means that we are addressing a situation that is qualitatively different from the balance of power prevailing when a negotiated settlement occurred in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe eleven years ago. At that time, the opposition forces and their armed wings, Zanla and Zipra, had a physical and military presence in half the country. They also had sufficient internal bases, cover and weaponry to mount major attacks in the rest of Zimbabwe. In short, a military stalemate had been achieved; that *modus operandi* is patently not prevailing with regard to South Africa. Nor is there much prospect of such a deadlock coming into being in the immediate or foreseeable future. From the perspective of the SA security establishment, therefore, the conclusion is inescapable: the government and its armed forces are in a much stronger position to dictate terms about a future Defence Force than is the ANC and its military leadership.

On the other hand, it requires little insight or imagination to realise that Pretoria cannot sustain indefinitely the political/constitutional status quo on the basis of its armed might alone. For whilst it is clear that the administration is paramount militarily, it certainly wields no monopoly in political terms. Or as Professor Willie Breytenbach put it recently: "[the] .... weakness of the revolutionary forces in South Africa is counter-balanced somewhat by another ideological phenomenon: the relative weakness of the state and its governmental apparatus in legitimacy."[5] And it is in this respect — and not in the strictly military sense — that MK has been instrumental in fostering and fuelling a spirit of resistance against the *de jure* authority of the South African state. This is one reason, of course, why the process of negotiations has now begun. Crucial to the agenda, conduct and outcome of these talks will be the attitude and behaviour of the armed services during the period of transition.

Military Integration?

Although General Magnus Malan has stated, repeatedly, that the integration of Umkhonto we Sizwe with the established security forces is out of the question, privately he and his senior advisers must know that — sooner or later — integration of *some sort* is inevitable. If not integration *per se*, then the absorption of Umkhonto elements into the military and the police. What would be the mechanics for setting the machinery in motion? At the Lusaka IDASA/ANC conference in May 1990[6], I argued that the suspension (or renunciation) of the armed struggle on the part of the ANC, together with a simultaneous statement from the Government on political

prisoners, exiles and emergency/security legislation, would get the ball rolling. I also suggested — given Dr. Gerrit Viljoen's statement that responsibility for dealing with the Republic's endemic violence was not the responsibility of the Government alone — that the ANC, and possibly other opposition parties, could be appointed to work with the SAP/SADF in a peace-keeping capacity.

For the sceptical, this formula for a move forward is not as far-fetched as it might seem. Indeed, elements of this scenario have already been set in place. First, the armed struggle has been suspended — at least by the ANC — and President de Klerk's administration has made reciprocal concessions regarding the State of Emergency, political exiles and so on. (This is not to say that all is going smoothly. In fact as of late 1990, the Vula affair, the SA Communist Party's published plans for the creation of para-military township self-defence units and differences concerning the Pretoria Minute's interpretation, have all played a part in jeopardising the process of reconciliation). Secondly, in May 1990, the SAP and the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) announced that they had established liaison structures to handle complaints against the police. This type of co-operation and co-ordination appears to be on the increase, as witnessed by the subsequent August announcement that country-wide structures to facilitate communications between the police and local community leaders were in place. Third — and very significantly in my view — Umkhonto we Sizwe and the SAP's security branch are *already* working together via a joint steering committee; and combined security teams have been set up to protect ANC leaders inside the Republic. Together with General Malan's (qualified) invitation for the Umkhonto senior command to visit SADF facilities, these developments point to a process that is not just hypothetical but which has, in fact, already started.

Nonetheless, the business of establishing security services that are acceptable to the vast majority of South Africans — and let there be no doubt that this issue will be a central concern in the negotiating process — is littered with obstacles and problems.

There is, first of all, the contentious issue of manpower policy. In polities that are fragmented by primordial affiliations of race, religion and ethnicity, the make-up of the security forces is of utmost importance to the state and to its inhabitants. Minorities — and indeed majorities — who regard themselves as under-represented in the military and police frequently fear for their own political influence and security. But in addition to the social composition of such forces, the question of military manpower also refers to the mechanism by which armies are raised. In South Africa, these dual determinants are intimately connected since the system of recruitment (i.e. the selective conscription of only one racial group) results in a Defence Force that is dominated, both numerically and in terms of seniority, by whites.

The ANC has called for both the integration of MK into the SADF and for all-volunteer military forces. Compromise on this latter point might be reached, eventually, by phasing out national service and replacing it with (i) a permanent core of professional soldiers (the Permanent Force) supported by (ii) non-racial voluntary units serving for say three to five years. The short-term volunteers would thereafter go into a Citizen Force Reserve. If a new constitution acceptable to the majority of South Africans came into being, 'Africanisation' of the military and police would be accelerated. Indeed, in such a political scenario, some sort of MK integration into the SADF would be virtually inevitable. This is not to say that the process would be uncomplicated. In fact, the opposite holds true. A number of very concrete hurdles to integration exist, including: bitterness about the past and conflicting political affiliations; the fact that the SADF and MK represent quite different military traditions in terms of technological competence, training standards and operational role (in this regard, one must expect SADF objections to affirmative action programmes that might dilute professional standards); special problems in integrating the intelligence structures of the separate commands; and demands by parties other than the ANC (PAC, Inkatha, AWB etc) to be represented in a re-designed Defence Force.

The issue of manpower policy and recruitment also brings us to another theory issue, that is, to the question of the 'homeland' forces and to the ethnically-enlisted battalions of the SADF (111 Battalion, 113 Battalion, 117 Battalion etc.) Given the ANC's stated opposition to any form of institutionalised segregation on the basis of race and tribe, is the survival of the ethnic units on the cards? One way out of this dilemma might be to recruit on a *geographical* rather than on an ethnic basis, as occurs with considerable success in Switzerland and the UK.

Special difficulties surround the future of foreign units recruited into the SADF — specifically the Portuguese-speaking 32 ('Buffalo') Battalion, and former SWATF 'Bushmen' who have been re-located into the Republic as 31 Battalion. The ANC have been virtually unanimous in calling for the withdrawal and disbandment of such 'surrogate' forces; but Pretoria has a long-standing commitment to these battalions, many of whose units have been applauded for their non-partisan peace-keeping role in Natal.

Internal Security

This brings us to a third major concern, one which relates to the highly relevant issue of internal security. In South Africa, the traditional division of labour between the military's primary role of maintaining the country's territorial integrity and the SAP one of tackling crime and ensuring law and order has been heavily eroded — although it has to be stressed that there has always been some overlap here. In short, the diffused nature of the threat to

the state blurred the distinction between the military and police functions,[7] sucking the Defence Force into the domestic arena and focusing SAP time on operations against political dissidents. As a consequence, the police have devoted insufficient energy to fighting 'ordinary' crime. The latest carnage that has erupted in Natal and on the Reef is once again pulling troops into the townships, whilst taking police personnel away from their conventional line of duty to deal with anti-'unrest' activities instead.

In this latter respect, SAP actions in the townships are viewed by critics as overly harsh and provocative and there is scant evidence that the police have generally adhered to a key concept of counter-insurgency (COIN) operations, that is, to the principle of minimum force. Senior SAP officers claim that the incremental or phased escalation of police actions along West European lines in situations of disorder is next to impossible under local conditions due to the proportion of protestors to police, the nature of the township terrain, climatic conditions and the measure of aggression employed by hostile crowds. Whilst these arguments are open to serious debate, such perceptions and experiences lie at the heart of SAP security operations. One catastrophic result has been frequent over-reaction on the part of (very often) young, under-trained and frightened men who simply do not have the numbers, means or disposition to tackle demonstrators through the phased use of force.[8] In the face of a barrage of criticism, SAP morale has been additionally sapped by resentment and frustration among police personnel over conditions of service — especially the crippling workloads and unpaid overtime, often in hazardous conditions — and by indignation and confusion caused by the 2 February unbannings.

Elsewhere, I have suggested a number of specific proposals that I believe would help to address these critical issues so that the police service is sensitised and adapted to the requirements and rights of all South African citizens.[9] But for the moment at least, I cannot envisage either an early re-orientation in the role of the SAP or that the SADF will be released from the deployment of its forces as a military aid to the civil power (MACP) function in the foreseeable future. If this prognosis is accepted, then it would be remiss in my view not to focus on an alternative strategy for promoting peace and internal stability in the period of transition and thereafter. I refer to the possibility of establishing an entirely new paramilitary force for riot-control duties.

The existence of a separate 'Third Force', independent of both the military and the police, is common in Western Europe — for example, the French Compagnies républicaines de sécurité (CRS) and the German Bereitschaftspolizei (police alert units). The creation of a non-partisan body along these lines in South Africa would enable the regular police (and the Defence Force) to cultivate an image of serving the interest of all members of the community, thus divorcing them from those duties that have given the

SAP a stigma as enforcers of apartheid laws and internal order. It is true that such units tend to develop an aggressive character of their own; but European governments have found ways and means of tempering such instincts — as evidenced in the model developed by the London Metropolitan Police. In the South African situation, I believe that a Third Force would serve to depoliticise the SAP/SADF through the latters' *non*-involvement in riot-control operations. This would eventually permit the police to focus on its primary role: containing the escalating spiral of such 'ordinary' crimes as murders, armed robberies, rapes and serious assaults.

Conclusion

In the interim — and as the prospects for serious negotiations loom ever larger on the political horizon — let me end my talk by listing some specific additional recommendations regarding the current cycle of barbaric blood-letting:

* There is an urgent requirement for a rapid expansion of the police — especially black people — over and above the belated measures to expand the force and improve conditions of service announced by the Government in June. Years of political neglect have rendered the SAP undermanned, under-paid and grossly over-stretched. One litmus test of society's health is its policing; yet South Africa is severely under-policed with 2,2 personnel per 1000 citizens. This is less than half the ratio of police to population prevailing in Western Europe.
* Strict adherence to the principle of minimum force. (This should not be misunderstood to mean that maximum force should never be used.) To date, riot-control techniques have often been unnecessarily heavy-handed. The SAP must cultivate a new image as neutral protectors of the populace.
* Consideration might also be given to decentralising police authority so that local communities would have greater influence with regard to the SAP's composition and activities. Under a more devolved structure, the centralisation of detection work via a national investigative agency could take charge of the major criminal cases, leaving the divisions/districts to concentrate on policing their local areas. If some sort of federal polity emerged in a new South Africa, it is possible to conceive of a national police force being superseded by, perhaps, six to a dozen regional bodies backed up by specialist organisations along the American model.
* In the aftermath of the Goldstone Commission into the police, there have been fresh demands for an open enquiry into the SADF Sebokeng shooting. Unless this happens, the security forces will remain wide open to allegations regarding their behaviour and discipline. With open

investigations, the army's reputation for impartiality — which has been high in the townships — can best be preserved, together with the principle of public accountability and democratic political control.

* Also of crucial importance is the requirement to speed up the judicial process and to implement a witness protection programme, so that court cases are dealt with quickly, together with additional measures to address the material and educational grievances that lie behind so much of the turmoil. In both respects, the Government has already initiated a number of specific steps, but these will take time to percolate through the strata of bureaucratic red-tape to have any real impact.
* Penultimately, there is a pressing imperative for the ANC and Inkatha to co-operate in stemming the bloodshed. For this to happen, there must be a willingness on the part of all legitimate leaders to participate in a process of reconciliation, to stop blaming each other and to discipline their respective constituents. The catalyst for this must be a meeting between Mr. Mandela and Dr. Buthelezi — a meeting that must mark the end of provocative speeches by khaki-clad men (and women) of the radical right and left.
* Finally, these measures must be meshed with an acknowledgement across the political spectrum that responsibility for dealing with the violence does not only rest with the current administration. It must include those who in the past considered themselves justified in resorting to armed resistance. Peace and violence, as General Malan pointed out recently, cannot be practiced simultaneously. but that injunction must apply to *all* parties.

NOTES

1. For some scenarios on this — and their implications for South African security — see Simon Baynham and Geoffrey Wood, 'Political Implications of Alternative Security Policies', in Fanie Cloete, Lawrence Schlemmer and Daan van Vuuren (eds) *Policy Options for Political Change in South Africa*. Pretoria: HSRC, forthcoming 1991. The chapter is reproduced, with some amendments, as 'Security Strategies for a Future South Africa', in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.28, No.3, September 1990.
2. This argument is developed by John Garnett, 'National Security and Threat Perception', *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, Vol.XI, No.2, November 1989, pp.1-19.
3. Simon Baynham, 'Political violence and the security response', in Jesmond Blumenfeld (ed) *South Africa in Crisis*. London: Croom Helm (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1987, pp.107-125.
4. This point, and the next two observations, are made in my article, 'Towards a National Defence Force in South Africa: Problems and Prospects', in *Africa Insight*, Vol.20, No.2, 1990, pp.118-123. number of other points made in the *Africa Insight* piece are reiterated in an expanded and more comprehensive manner here.
5. 'South Africa within the African revolutionary context', in Al J. Venter (ed) *Challenge: Southern Africa within the African revolutionary context*. Gibraltar: Ashanti, 1989, p.85.

6. Some of the ideas presented here are derived from discussions with co-delegates at the IDASA/ANC Conference on the Future Security and Defence in South Africa, Lusaka, 23-27 May 1990.
7. Andrew Prior, 'The SAP and the State: First Line of Defence', *Indicator South Africa*, Vol.6, No.4, pp.53-57.
8. These points receive wider critical attention in Baynham 'Political violence...', *Op.Cit.*, pp.115-116.
9. 'Stemming the mayhem', *The Star*, (Johannesburg), 18 September 1990.

Larry Benjamin

The Third World and Its Security Dilemma

Introduction

Since 1945, East-West conflict has been the central issue in world politics. The critical events that have recently engulfed the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe suggest that the centrality of this conflict has begun and will continue to, diminish. The collapse of the Communist monolith, and the ideology that sustained it, adumbrates the inception of a new international system. This, in turn, has inspired questions as to which areas of the world will now move into the spotlight and what issues will preoccupy the global village. The problems of war and peace and major power rivalry, whilst still dominant, no longer monopolize the international agenda. Issues such as economic interdependence, the future of the environment, nuclear proliferation, population growth and international debt, once condemned to the periphery, have thrust themselves onto the centre stage of world politics.

Although the pre-eminent concerns of the embryonic new international order have only started to crystallize, it may be postulated that the new international configuration will be one in which greater consideration is given to issues associated with the Third World. To continue to relegate Third World concerns to a secondary grade of international importance, would be to ignore its significance over the long term for the world at large. The central purpose of this paper is to examine the evolving concept of 'Third World' and *selected* aspects of its 'security' at the dawn of a newly constructed international system.

The Notion of the Third World as an 'Entity' in World Politics

The conceptualization of the 'Third World' to identify a vast myriad of economic systems and levels of development has led many scholars to question the appropriateness and enduring validity of the term.[1]

This a modified version of a paper delivered at a conference on 'Security in the Third World' held at Bellagio, Italy — 15—20 July 1990. The conference was organised by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London) and The Arms Control Association (Washington). Mr. Larry Benjamin is an Honours Graduate in International Relations of the University of the Witwatersrand, as well as being a Lecturer in the Department.

Today the 'Third World' refers to those states that are underdeveloped and hence economically weaker and poorer than the industrialized OECD states[2] as well as those of the Eastern bloc.[3] The term 'First World' refers not only to the level of development of the OECD states but also to their particular economic regime, that of a relatively free market system. In addition, the political systems of First World states are predicated upon liberal democratic ideals and structures. The 'Second World' is, in turn, comprised of states who have followed a socialist, state-controlled path of development.[4] The 'Third World' thus constitutes the 'residue of the global state system'.[5]

Definitions of the First and Second World typically incorporate both economic and political criteria. The debate concerning the validity of the Third World as an entity seems to focus more on economic considerations. The process of prioritizing and categorizing the states of the Third World depends fundamentally on the variables, or combination to be used in making such a determination.

Some of the states that presently constitute the Third World are economically impoverished, experience negative growth rates and are heavily dependent on foreign aid. Others, in contrast, are experiencing sustained economic growth — growth that in certain instances is more impressive than that accomplished by some of the advanced states. Then there are those states of the Third World that are even able to provide foreign aid to the least of their less developed brothers. In reference to prevailing political systems and structures it is noticeable that whilst some Third World states are authoritarian, single party states, others are monarchies, democracies or totalitarian socialist states.

In the context of a transformed international system with a fundamentally modified political agenda it is imperative to recognize that to continue to approach the problems currently besetting certain Third World states without painstakingly calibrating the diversity that exists within the grouping would be myopic. An hierarchical reclassification of states comprising the international system is mandatory if one is to avoid the generalizations and inexactitudes evident in many approaches to Third World problems in the past.[6] This is not however to suggest that the problems confronting a particular Third World state should always be seen as *sui generis*.

In a restructured system, the states of the 'Third World' could be regrouped to comprise in the first instance those that had sufficiently developed infrastructures, resources (especially technical/technological) and skills to enable them to join the industrialized states in the medium-term. This group would include the Newly Industrializing Countries (NIC's) of the Far East and Latin America as well as some European countries like Portugal and Greece.

In these states wealth is generally more equitably distributed, allowing for economic growth to affect all strata of the population. Population growth has also, by and large, been kept below economic growth levels (see chart 1). This has facilitated a higher standard of living and the diversion of resources to manufacturing and technological sectors. Hence, these states do not rely on the export of raw materials (with all its attendant problems) for foreign exchange.

Chart 1:



The oil-exporting countries of the Third World might constitute a distinctive grouping which some may term the *'Fourth World'*. Notwithstanding the fact that many of these states have very high per capita incomes, these are not as a result of economic planning aimed at developing infrastructures and industrial and technology sectors.[7] Their economies are still dependent on their income derived from oil: their principal and sometimes only significant export. They have no meaningful alternative (and less volatile) source of income. The fact that their economies continue to depend on non-renewable (in some cases fast diminishing) raw materials, rather than on greater long-term investment of manufactured goods and technologies places them in a distinctly less advantageous position than the aforementioned political conglomerate. Some of the 'Fourth World' states do however have the requisite resources to develop infrastructures and industry.

The 'Fifth World' would comprise the large majority of states that presently constitute today's 'Third World'. These states are the least developed of the lesser developed or underdeveloped states. Their

economies depend considerably, if not entirely, on the export of raw materials. The price and hence the foreign exchange earnings of these raw materials are subject to sometimes wildly fluctuating demand on the part of the industrialized world. The intrinsic vulnerability of these economies are compounded by the fact that many of these states rely on only one or two exports for all their foreign exchange (see chart 2). These states have skeletal transport and communication infrastructures, low literacy levels and population growth that typically exceeds economic growth (see charts 3 and 4). Furthermore, the benefits accruing from economic growth are not distributed equitably. It is this group of countries that has an overwhelming proportion of their population living below the poverty line. Such states have little hope of economic development. The creation of a New International Economic order would do little, if anything, to ameliorate their plight.

Chart 2:



It would appear therefore that the existing Third World could justifiably be sub-divided further into groups such as those outlined that more accurately reflect the economic characteristics of the constituent states. On a subjective level however, the present Third World may form a coherent

Chart 3:



Adapted from Sewell,J and Tucker,SJ Growth Jobs and Exports in a Changing World Economy, Transaction Books 1988

Chart 4:



Source : World Bank Atlas 1988

psychological whole. These states feel that they belong in one grouping; that they are all victims of an unjust global order, and although some might have fared better than others the system and its inherent iniquities should be rectified, as many of these states did not even exist when the international system, with its institutions and procedures, was first drawn up.

Although a sweeping reclassification of the international system might be both appropriate and justified, it is simultaneously apparent that the existing conception of the 'Third World' as a group with a colonial past and in a disadvantaged position in the international economy, might be difficult to transcend.[8] Even though the very idea of 'Third World solidarity' might be more of a fiction than a reality, it is a powerful impediment standing in the way of any attempt to re-arrange the international pecking order in newly created divisions.[9]

Part II: The Concept of Security in the Third World Context

Every state in the international community is faced with a range of security dilemmas and has to contend with real or perceived vulnerabilities. A definition of security, without placing it in context, is however, meaningless. Security in the First World has distinct and different components to security in the Third World. This is because the environment and the threats that confront an advanced industrial state are dissimilar to those of an underdeveloped state, still struggling to establish an identity.[10]

Any conceptualization of 'security' in the Third World ought not to be appraised solely in politico-military terms. 'For most of the world's population, the term also embodies food security, job security, resource security and other associated aspects of the everyday life of human beings.'[11] These are all problems that the Third World state has to deal with. They form the most basic threats to the well-being of its population, to the state's subsequent stability and, due to the interdependence of the global system, to the stability and peace of the world at large.

An explanation of the causation and dynamics of conflict and instability in the Third World may proceed constructively by recognizing that the sources of conflict are both exogenous and indigenous. The external dimension can be further sub-divided into (a) threats originating from the Third World itself; these are primarily military in nature, like territorial or ethnic disputes; and (b) those that emanate from the First and Second World. Such threats have stemmed primarily from the East-West conflict, with both superpowers striving to gain adherents in the Third World. At the same time, the central component of this second category of threats to security are those questions integral to the North-South debate and the call by the Third World for a New International Economic Order (NIEO).[12]

Statehood and Security

Notwithstanding the growth of transnational and non-governmental actors in the international arena, the state continues to be the most competent unit to provide security of a military, economic and social nature. External organizations may attempt to ameliorate insecurity, especially that of a socio-economic nature. However, if there is reluctance on the part of the state to cooperate actively, success will be limited. Such disinclination on the part of some Third World governments is often predicated upon the belief that the sovereignty of the state is being compromised. Some states and their peoples believe that when such sovereignty is restricted (especially when this is involuntary), the security of the people and also of the state is threatened. Once that happens, the state and its institutions are no longer the only actors deciding on issues. The involvement of non-governmental institutions, like the IMF or the UN might play a role in the implementation of such security. On the other hand, external intervention, not only from inter-state organizations but also multinational corporations (for example the role played by the United Fruit Company in Guatemala in the 1940s and 1950s) and terrorist groups (Lebanon) undermine a state's efforts to fulfill its traditional role in respect of military, economic and social security.

In much of the Third World the very existence of the state as a guarantor of security has been called into question. The *de facto* fusion of government and state and the concomitant absence of non-executive state institutions, such as genuinely independent judiciaries, have undermined confidence in and allegiance towards the state in the Third World. Internal threats to the security of the Third World state originate from the lack of a national identity in most states, the difficulty of peaceful political succession and socio-economic and ethnic tensions.

Nation-Building: Precondition for Security

The considerable extent of its powers and institutional structures enables a state to abuse them, if it so chooses. However, rarely does the over-extension of state power enhance the internal security of the state.[13] Furthermore, power in all its dimensions, is often concentrated in the hands of a small ruling elite which invariably also constitutes an economic elite. Thus in an environment characterized by a scarcity of resources, individuals and elites invested with power and its ancillary privileges, maintain their domination by suppressing the rest of the population and denying them access to resources and the levers of power. Such division and abuse may be based on tribal, ethnic, economic or political discriminations. It is at this juncture that the state, as the protector of 'minorities', becomes a threat to the security and well-being of the population as a whole.[14]

Internal threats to the peaceful coexistence of the population and the economic development of the state cannot be overcome until a sense of common identity and national consciousness has evolved. The forging of national cohesion counteracts and reduces ethnic and tribal tensions and class conflicts. This, in turn, enables the state and the government to pursue socio-economic programmes more adequately.

Max Weber's definition that a state is a 'corporate group that has compulsory jurisdiction, exercises continuous organization, and claims a monopoly of force over a territory and its population, including all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction', highlights some of the factors that are absent in Third World states. In many instances the state does not have a monopoly of force within its territory or its population. The government may not be considered legitimate by certain sectors of the population and internal and trans-border conflicts indicate that it has little control of events within its boundaries. This all underscores the inchoate or nonexistent national consciousness within Third World states and contributes to instability and insecurity.

Discrimination, either overt or concealed, against groups and minorities within a state deprives such groups of the basic protections that the state should afford all its people. It decreases the productive capacity of the state and undermines its foundations. In much of the Third World the institutions of the state and the government need to make a concerted effort to unite their centrifugal heterogeneous societies. The eradication of corruption and arbitrariness by such institutions will promote confidence and legitimacy, which can ultimately deflect the focus of loyalty from tribal and other authority centres to the institution of the state.

Military Security: Internal Dynamics and External Intervention

Military threats constitute the most extreme peril that a state has to combat in order to survive. In the politically stable industrialized countries such threats emanate from external rather than domestic sources. In the Third World the situation is sometimes very different. The artificiality of the territorial entity of the state, the lack of legitimacy of the ruling elites and the weakness of administrative institutions all encourage the emergence of internal challenges to state and government. In many cases, but especially in Africa and Latin America, secessionists, irredentists and members of the military establishment have resorted to violence to overthrow the existing elite or to sever themselves from its rule. Such challenges from different sectors of the population explain the acquisition, by the ruling elite, of arms from any source.

There are also external challenges which have to be countered by military might. Such armed threats may originate from adjacent states or the major powers. Most states feel threatened by militarily preponderant neighbours

who make claims on parts of their territory or their population. Military power is therefore a vital instrument of the security of the state (which in the Third World usually means the security of the regime). Underdeveloped states do not have the technological resources to develop their own military industries. The compelling thesis that the greater the size of one's military arsenal, the greater the regime/state security, encourages huge expenditure of scarce foreign exchange to acquire weapons. The suppliers or arms merchants are, of course, the large powers and especially the two superpowers. This military dependence on the 'North', limits the state's military autonomy, as the great powers might wish to further their own interests in a particular conflict. A Third World state could be also subject to arms embargoes which may seriously undermine its defence posture.[15]

Although the involvement of major powers in regional conflicts is visibly apparent through arms sales and the presence of military advisers, not all Third World conflicts are susceptible to outside involvement. Indeed reductionist interpretations of many conflicts (through an East-West prism) have ignored the regional complexes, power systems and, in particular, internal dynamics. Bobrow and Chan believe that Third World 'countries that are faced with severe regional military challenges and unfavourable balance of forces have constantly to guard against the possibility of somehow being left in the cold and required to fend for themselves. They can less afford to take foreign support for granted'.[16] Consequently, Third World states have invariably sought to impress their significance on the superpowers or embark on the development of their own military industry. This does not however provide or even enhance absolute security, which is unachievable. Instead such policies may impoverish the country and decrease the legitimacy of state institutions further in the eyes of the people.

Superpower involvement whilst generally not the *causa causans* of conflict has certainly promoted conflict in or between Third World states. However, it would appear that the abatement of the Cold War prognosticates an end to, or at least a reduction of, existing support and new ventures. Indeed it may even be surmised that the superpowers may perform a salutary role in resolving protracted and seemingly intractable Third World conflicts.[17] However the Cold War never has been the only determinant of superpower intervention.[18] Indeed the erosion of U.S.-Soviet bipolarity could facilitate and even nurture the growth of existing or new conflicts in the Third World. The withdrawal of the superpowers from certain conflict theatres may embolden regional powers to become more assertive or to use military force in order to effectuate new regional political outcomes.[19]

A prominent feature of the newly evolving international system is the enthusiasm with which the superpowers are embarking on conventional and nuclear arms reductions on an unprecedented scale. Against the background of these developments, the continuation or prolongation of arms races in the

Third World may seem anachronistic. The fact that regional conflicts are normally not a consequence of the Cold War, but rather that the Cold War has taken advantage of them, suggests that the end of the Cold War does not portend the cessation of regional conflicts or political upheaval in the Third World. At the same time, protracted conflict is sometimes the result of outside military aid.[20] External channels of resource – supply allow underdeveloped states to continue fighting longer than reliance on internal resources would allow. Thus it may be asserted that if external sources of arms build-ups were reduced, Third World states might find it necessary to seek diplomatic-political solutions to their problems. This, in turn, would facilitate greater global and regional security.

Long-term stability cannot be achieved through military force either in the domestic environment or in the international arena. Greater state cohesion, an extension of democratic norms, power-sharing arrangements and compromise with neighbouring states, are all essential prerequisites which may attenuate the pressure for increased military expenditure and huge military arsenals with the concomitant climate of suspicion and insecurity.

Nuclear Weapons and Non-Proliferation

Whilst some signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) believe that global security is threatened by the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, many Third World states regard the NPT as a manifestation of imperialism, an attempt by the great powers to maintain an unequal global system. Some Third World academics advocate nuclear acquisition by the underdeveloped states on the grounds that it would help to eliminate the politics of dependency.[21] The removal of this form of dependency would also improve the position of the Third World as an independent force in world politics. The argument advanced is that although the major signatories to the NPT have tried to enforce non-proliferation, they have themselves not adhered to Article 6 of the treaty which stipulates that '...each of the parties to the treaty undertakes to pursue in good faith ..effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control'.[22] The 1990s however may well see a continuation of the progress already made in recent years by the superpowers on this front. On the other hand, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Third World states has increased and various states (most recently Iraq) have demonstrated their intentions to acquire nuclear weapons eventually. This in turn has profound implications for regional stability and clearly compounds the fears of states whose neighbours seek to become members of the nuclear club.[23]

The Trading System

Since the end of the Second World War and the subsequent adoption of a Liberal International Economic Order, Third World states have been trying to secure an equitable position in the international trading system. The failure of import substitution (by many Third World countries) in the 1950s and 1960s emphasized that there was no alternative to participation in the international economic system although on a more equal basis. However, because all of the states initially had very weak industrial foundations they felt that a system predicated upon free trade would not stimulate their economies.

According to the South, vulnerability and insecurity stem from the imbalance in the terms of trade. The prices of primary export commodities fluctuate unpredictably, which makes development planning extremely hazardous. In the longer term there is a fall in the prices of their primary commodity exports, whereas the prices of the manufactured products they have to import continue rising.[24]

One of the reasons for the deterioration in the terms of trade is that supply of primary commodities might be greater than demand. A solution to this is not easy, especially in the case of agricultural commodities. The poor countries cannot afford to regulate prices by holding on to their exports until prices rise.

Low reserves mean that any foreign exchange is welcome to maintain a cash-flow. Furthermore, apart from the huge multinationals, the other primary commodity producers in Third World states are small enterprises. In some sectors there is no monopoly which can control prices by withholding products. The lack of uniform policies by smallholders[25], as well as the lack of organized labour, provides the workers, small owners and the Third World state with little leverage in the world market.[26]

The unfavourable terms-of-trade pattern has propelled the Third World into articulating the need to alleviate the imbalances. The UN, UNCTAD and GATT have been the focus of much of this activity. In the long term they have called for a New International Economic Order. However, their immediate objective is price stabilization for their commodities and greater access to Northern markets.[27]

Monetary Security

The structure of the existing monetary system also has its origins in the immediate post-war era. The Third World states are convinced that continuation of this system can only perpetuate unequal terms of trade, balance-of-payment deficits and the debt problem. These, in their turn, aggravate other problems such as decreasing living standards,

unemployment, mass dissatisfaction, widespread poverty and malnutrition, all of which undermine the security and stability of the state.

The International Monetary Fund is considered an instrument of capitalist and Western domination which infringes upon the sovereignty of Third Word states.[28] The Third World's major objection is that the IMF, because of its attachment to a liberal economic philosophy, considers balance of payment problems as short-term occurrences rather than long-term development, structural problems. For the Third World, the disadvantages of the IMF lie in two areas: voting powers[29] and the conditionality that accompanies IMF loans.[30]

General apprehension about dealing with the IMF has led many Third World states to seek loans from private banks. This trend has created the current debt problem that is undermining the economic and social foundations of these states. For significant gains to be made in socio-economic development, states of the South have to stop living on credit. Indeed this credit is now beginning to dry up. It is imperative that a new monetary regime, reflecting the necessities of all states in the system, be negotiated. As with the trade regime, a guarantee of security does not only depend on the Third World states but on the international system at large. From the perspective of the Third World, a continuation of the status quo will only serve to increase domestic instability and will hinder any attempt at development.

Security in Food and Health

Security, at the most fundamental level, encompasses the creation of conditions within each state which allow the citizen to have adequate food, sanitation, immunization and shelter. In most of the Third World, governments simply lack the resources to underwrite a basic minimum living standard for the majority of the population. The ramifications of internal/external military instability, terms of trade inequalities and balance-of-payment deficits all impact upon the individual units of the state. All these 'insecurities' contribute to unemployment, low income, insufficient purchasing power for basic foodstuffs, the lack of sufficient foodstuffs because of decreasing productivity and foreign exchange reserves.

The problem of food is a man-made one.[31] According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN, 455 million people in the Third World were receiving less than minimum food intake in the early 1970s.[32] Malnutrition weakens the body's ability to fight disease and the lack of essential drugs, especially in the rural areas, exacerbates the situation. At another level a hungry man produces less because he has less energy reserves to draw from. In the rural areas a decline in productivity implies less income and hence less food. The poverty cycle repeats itself.

Causes of Lack of Access to Food

Global food production at present exceeds population growth. However many Third World states have experienced a decline in food production either because they have concentrated on export crops like coffee and groundnuts, or because the incentives for rural producers have been very low. Food could be imported to make up the shortfall, but the problems of scarce foreign exchange (much of which is diverted to the military) and inadequate distribution would still have to be overcome. Lack of access to food is the result of both domestic and international factors:

Domestic Factors:

Agrarian reforms and land redistribution have always been unpopular because in most Third World states the local land-owning elite has close ties with government. El Salvador, where 2% of the population own more than 60% of the land is a case in point. The large farms, on the most arable land, usually cultivate cash crops for export. Furthermore the land is frequently not cultivated to its full capacity. On the other hand, the rural labourers and peasants till small pieces of inhospitable land exhaustively in order to provide for their bare subsistence. Over time the soil becomes emaciated as do the peasants' sources of food. The lack of political stability, further aggravated by poverty, necessitates that the government maintain rather than antagonize its support base, the wealthy landowners.

A second domestic factor is that state's policy of protecting the upper echelons of society rather than the population as a whole. This is a direct cause and result of the political insecurity of the governing elite stemming from the failure of nation-building. In periods of acute shortage, favoured sectors of the population are provided for, while the others are permitted to starve.[33]

A third factor is related to the necessities of the international economic system. The importance of trade favours cash crop producers while food producers have to face declining prices for their products, and reduction in their land's productivity.

International Factors:

International causes of this problem derive from well-intentioned but often inappropriate attempts by international organizations like the World Bank to increase food productivity and efficiency in the Third World. Many of the strategies that have been implemented have been capital intensive and have led to greater mechanization in agriculture. This has, inter alia, led to increased rural unemployment. In any event increased food production will only alleviate poverty if it is distributed among the most needy.[34]

A solution to the poverty and hunger of the rural areas in particular is to

make the peasant self-sufficient in food production. Agribusinesses frustrate the problem. Other alternatives for greater food security have been discussed by D.G. Johnson, who contends that liberalization of barriers to trade in agricultural products would reduce grain reserves throughout the world to their appropriate size. Furthermore, with regard to grain and food reserves, insurance schemes for developing countries could incorporate a guarantee by the First World to developing countries that in any year in which grain production declined more than a given percentage, it would make up the difference. This would ensure domestic supply stability for developing states.[35]

Sufficient food intake has a direct bearing on the health of the population. At the same time, health insecurity is worsened by the government's inability or unwillingness to provide clean water and sanitation. The existence of easily accessible, vital drugs at cheap prices may benefit a greater number of people; however the most important long-term factor of health security is the elimination of malnutrition and deprivation.

Prospects for Third World Security in the 1990s

In the course of this analysis various issues centred on the composition of the Third World and its multifarious security dilemmas have been examined. The Third World is an intricate and complex entity, and although one can generalize about common security problems, one needs to be sensitive to the diversity and differences that do exist.

At the dawn of the 1990s, intra-Third World differentiations will continue to hamper united action on many issues. The term 'Third World' emerged at a time when the world was split into two ideological/military camps. In that sense of the word, the term no longer carries any meaning. As discussed previously, the introduction of terminology like Fourth and Fifth World is conceivable, although such 'worlds' will continue to be bound to the psychological notion of the Third World as an entity encompassing all the 'underprivileged' of the international system. The gradual eradication of the atmospherics, institutions and mechanisms of the Cold War is bound to shift the attention of the world, and especially of the North, to economic and social issues. A deeper understanding by the North of the limitations that the current international economic order imposes on Third World development, could be the first step towards greater security. The longer the international community takes in coming to terms with this problem, the deeper the morass that the least developed countries, in particular, will fall into.

It is axiomatic that the security dilemmas of the Third World cannot be solved by concerted indigenous effort alone, but rather by the cooperation of both rich and poor states. Indeed, it can be asserted that 'Third World security' is too parochial an interpretation of these problems. Military

instability, the debt crisis, poverty and underdevelopment, environmental destruction all affect the First and Second Worlds too. Although the Third World has blamed most of its problems on the external factors of capitalist exploitation, this is not entirely credible. A greater willingness to recognize that some problems are attributable to domestic mismanagement may go some way to resolving those problems.

It should be borne in mind that the Third World is still racked by regional conflict. However, as we move into a new and unprecedented era of arms control agreements between East and West, there will be increasing calls for the reduction of armed confrontation in Third World states. East-West nuclear weapons reduction will put pressure on the Third World not to seek horizontal proliferation. The capacity and scope for regional conflict in the 1990s might diminish if the sources of arms are cut, but it is difficult to imagine nationalist/secessionist struggles and traditional feuds simply disappearing from the political make-up of Third World states.

The 1990s will be characterized by 'security threats' of two kinds, (1) North-South confrontation and (2) confrontation between Third World states. If the Third World is to make any input into the North-South dialogue, the second issue has to be resolved. The industrialized states will in any case resist relinquishing their positions of privilege in various international economic institutions, although there will be greater emphasis on the humanitarian aspects of Third World dilemmas.

The most basic security concern, however, that must be addressed in the 1990s is that of food and health. A hungry and disease-ridden population cannot offer its full productive capacity to a state in dire need of it.

Notes

1. See Kegley, C and Witkopff, E: *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, MacMillan, London 1989. Also see Papp, D: *Contemporary International Relations: Frameworks for Understanding*, MacMillan, New York, 1988.
2. These states constitute the First World. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development includes the states of Western Europe, The United States, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Australia.
3. The 'Second World' comprises the centrally planned economies and socialist states of the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe.
4. The monumental events sweeping through the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have called into question the validity of the continued existence of a 'Second World'. Following the series of elections scheduled to take place in most East European states in the first half of 1990, it appears inevitable that the East European states will eschew the centrally-planned economic system and their socialist orientation. This in turn may necessitate a reclassification of those states previously considered to be members of the 'Second World'. If one were to use economic criteria only, one could find that states such as Czechoslovakia and Poland may then belong to the Third World (as I redefine it) whilst a state such as Rumania might be 'relegated' to the ranks of the Fourth World or even to that of Fifth World or least developed states.

5. Beloff, M: 'The Third World and the Conflict of Ideologies' in Thompson, W (Ed); *The Third World: Premises of US Policy*; Institute for Contemporary Studies, San Francisco, 1978, p.12.
6. Hitherto there have been various attempts to determine different categories within the 'Third World'. For example some scholars have sought to divide the countries comprising the Third World into low income, middle income and high income groups. This approach, which looks only at GNP per Capita is both reductionist and misleading. It takes no cognisance of the distribution of wealth, the structural diversity of the economy of a particular state,the relationship between population growth and real economic growth, the level of indigenous technology or, for that matter, literacy levels. Thus a reclassification of the hierarchy of states comprising the Third World must be as comprehensive as possible and predicated upon a wide range of criteria.
7. The distribution of wealth in the Oil Exporting Countries is inequitable. These societies typically have an extremely wealthy elite, an insignificant middle class and a huge lower class many of whom live below the poverty line. Indeed, it is evident that the existence or non-existence of a substantial middle class is an important criteria that ought to be considered in any regrouping of current Third World states.
8. Ethiopia and Thailand were never colonized. Ethiopia was subjected to a brief Italian occupation before and during the Second World war. Furthermore, the states of the Middle East formerly parts of the Ottoman Empire were (with the exception of Saudi Arabia and Yemen) given as League of Nations mandates to the European powers after World War I. The colonial experience was thus limited in these areas. For a discussion of the reshaping of colonies by the European powers and its relatively limited effects in the Middle East see Cammack, P et al: *Third World Politics: Comparative Introduction*, MacMillan Education, London, 1988.
9. The term 'Third World' has been criticized in some quarters as demeaning or patronizing. This, in turn, might strengthen the argument in favour of avoiding using terms that may be offensive or value laden. The use of the terms Fourth and Fifth Worlds in this paper are used merely to encourage a process of rethinking current terminology and categorizations. Furthermore the carving up of the present Third World into a fourth and fifth world may also be flawed and too generalizing. Perhaps one needs to break down the Third World into even more groupings in order to reflect the extent of the diversity that exists.
10. In referring to the military dimension of national security, Bobrow and Chan highlight the problems of equating security in the First and Third World: 'If one were to use the American concept of the last three decades as a framework, what would one in fact be doing? One would be treating national security as calling for levels of military and economic capability far beyond the Third World's financial capabilities. One would be focusing on threats that are overwhelmingly external and military in nature, and on policy instruments of a like kind. One would be defining sources of threat as primarily centered on Moscow. One would be analyzing military strategic themes that emphasize deterrence, alliance cohesion and nuclear weapons. And one would be assuming military institutions as reliably subordinate to civilian authorities and primarily concerned with external threats' in Azar, E and Chung-In Moon (eds): *National Security in the Third World*; Edward Elgar, Hants; 1988, p.45.
11. Jan Martenson, Under-Secretary General, Department for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations at the *Symposium on Global Security for the Twenty-First Century*, Dec, 1986, Florence, Italy.
12. From the Third World's perspective the central issue in the North-South debate is the inequitable distribution of the world's resources and the biased global system, favouring the North both politically and economically.
13. In Buzan, B: *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*; Wheatsheaf Books, Brighton, 1983, p.42.
14. Two general models of the state exist: minimalist and maximalist. The minimalist

model of the state emphasized the importance of the consent of the citizens in the government. The state should protect the individual rights above all. The maximalist model asserts that the state has interests of its own and hence its role is not only that of protection of individuals. In such a case the state stands above the individuals that comprise it and is more removed from them and their needs.

15. In 1967, during the Six Day War, France terminated arms supply to Israel. The move was particularly deleterious to Israel as France had been its major source of weapons until that point in time.
16. Bobrow, D and Chan, S in Azar, E and Chung-In Moon; op cit, p.59.
17. The joint settlement of regional conflicts by the superpowers has been a theme echoed repeatedly by both United States and Soviet foreign policy makers over the last three or four years. The denouement or at least lessening of conflict in Angola/Namibia, Afghanistan, Cambodia and Nicaragua, although not simply the result of superpower actions, could not have proceeded if Washington and/or Moscow had chosen to perpetuate those conflicts.
18. The recent United States invasion of Panama is an example of intervention that had nothing to do with East-west conflict.
19. India, Iraq and South Africa are possible examples of regional powers who may at some future point be inclined to assert political and military muscle.
20. The conflict between the Sandinistas and the Contras in Nicaragua was perhaps an example of a conflict that could not have been sustained indefinitely without military aid from outside powers.
21. In this regard, one of the most noted scholars is Ali Mazrui. See Thomas, C: *In Search of Security*, p.121 ff.
22. Goldblat, J. (ed): *Non Proliferation: The Why and Wherefore*, Taylor and Francis for SIPRI, London, 1985, Appendix 1 cited in Thomas C; op cit p.122.
23. India exploded a nuclear device in 1974. Israel, South Africa and Pakistan are generally considered to be 'threshold' states. Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan and South Korea are potential 'proliferators'. More recently Iraq and Libya seem to have made considerable advances in their respective quests to achieve nuclear weapons.
24. The economic historian Paul Bairoch has provided statistics which indicate that by 1970 a standard amount of a non-oil-developing country's exports could buy 11% fewer imports than in 1953. A standard amount of an industrialized country's exports could buy 11% more; in Harrison, P : *Inside the Third World*; Penguin Books, London, 1988, p.342.
25. For a detailed discussion of the problems that confront smallholders and the dead-end situation that they find themselves in see Harrison, P, ibid, pp.343-344.
26. The case of tea in Sri Lanka is illuminating. In the 1970s the price of tea began declining. The lack of coordination among tea producing states of the Third World meant that there was no effort to regulate supply. In Sri Lanka declining terms of trade led to lower incomes for the population and hence less income surplus which could be directed towards the buying of manufactured goods. Existing industries in Sri Lanka had to be closed or cut back, with a consequent increase in unemployment that further exacerbated the income problem. This led to a concomitant decrease in government revenue. Many social programmes that had been implemented were subsequently curtailed.
27. The success of the OPEC oil embargo in 1973 stimulated debate on the leverage that 'Southern' raw material producers might be able to exercise through cartels. The creation of a new commodity system which would provide greater stability for the producing countries became the topic of many discussions in the 1970s. At UNCTAD IV held in Nairobi in 1976, a proposal for an Integrated Programme for Commodities (IPC) was adopted. Among the recommendations made was the creation of a Common Fund which would provide buffer stock facilities for a number of commodities. After much negotiation and deliberation, agreement with the North was reached in 1979 whereby $400 million would be made available to international commodity agreements for maintaining buffer stocks; $350 million would be geared towards commodity marketing and product research. The aim of

the buffer stocks is to keep the prices within a predetermined range. When the prices drop, stocks are bought on the open market to support the price, when the price rises beyond its limits then buffer stocks are sold. However, this programme has had very limited success. International commodity agreements do not exist in all the commodities envisaged by the Fund; furthermore, only rubber and tropical timber have been concluded under the Integrated Programme.

The EEC has also created a compensatory financing scheme, STABEX, under the Lomé Agreement. This agreement provides the African, Caribbean and Pacific nations (ACP) with preferential trade access to the European market, without reciprocity. STABEX's objective is to stabilize the export earnings of the ACP states in certain agricultural commodities, e.g. bananas, groundnuts, coffee and cotton. STABEX operates a fund to pay ACP states compensation when the prices of commodities included in the agreement fall below a predetermined level. Insufficient funds are however a shortcoming of STABEX.

In 1979, Lomé II introduced a scheme aimed at stabilizing certain mineral exports.

28. The IMF was set up at Bretton Woods in order to regulate the monetary side of the International Liberal Economic Order. Its purpose was to provide short-term finance to states to assist them with their balance-of-payment deficits. The institution's philosophy was firmly based in liberal economics. As such it considered balance-of-payment difficulties as short-term problems. For states of the First World, this analysis was valid. Balance-of-payment deficits in the Third World however were more the result of underdevelopment than temporary market imbalances.
29. In the IMF, unlike other international institutions, the voting powers of each state depend on its perceived economic strength, which is translated into quotas. Quotas determine how many votes a state has, its financial contribution and its borrowing capacity. Such circumstances make it impossible for Third World states to have a significant voice in the IMF. Indeed 40.9% of the IMF votes are held by the U.S., U.K., West Germany, France and Japan. Decisions made by the IMF therefore reflect the interests of these countries and the regime that they advocate, viz. the free-market system. The validity of this regime is not important. Rather it is the fact that Third World states who might not wish to adopt such a system, must do so if they wish to borrow from the IMF.
30. One way of alleviating balance-of-payment deficits is to borrow money to rectify the imbalance. The IMF provides needy states with loans. Third World states are however increasingly averse to such aid from the IMF. The reason for this is the conditionality attached to the loans. Before a loan is made to a particular state, the IMF makes a number of recommendations which it believes may alleviate the balance-of-payment deficit in that country. The usual IMF solutions to a country's problems include devaluation of the currency which reduces imports and expands exports. Deflation is another measure aimed at reducing consumer spending which should therefore reduce a demand for imports. There are however side effects. Inflation as well as a reduction in investment do not only aggravate the balance-of-payment problem, but also socio-economic development of the country's human and other resources. The reason for this is the inapplicability of certain of these measures to the problems of Third World countries. The measures are harsh and the population may suffer tremendously if the state does not have a solid welfare system. Unlike First World countries, Third World countries do not have the resources. Their problems are not only domestic mismanagement.
31. Traditionally, it was believed that the hunger of many Third World populations originated in their high population growths, which were outstripping food production. However, if one were to compare total world food production with the estimated average consumption of the world population, this theory would be disproved. Sufficient food is being produced; it is not being distributed effectively, nor is it being consumed effectively. For further discussion see Kegley, C and Wittkopff, E, op. cit. p.247.

32. Harrison, P, op. cit. p.261.
33. For example, during the famine in Bangladesh in the mid 1970s, food aid went primarily to the military and the urban population because these groups were the most essential components of the government's support base.
34. The World Bank's support of the Green Revolution was aimed at boosting food production by using high-yield varieties of seed, chemical fertilizers, pesticides and mechanization. Food production was increased; however mechanization increased unemployment. The lower-income brackets in the rural areas did not benefit as they could not afford these products, nor did they have sufficient land in which to experiment with them. Ironically, most of the increased food production is exported, while the majority of the population lives below the breadline.
35. For an in depth analysis see Johnson, D: *The Politics of Food*; Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Chicago, 1980.

Gerhard Erasmus

Is There enough Consensus for Namibia's Constitution?

1. Consensus about what?

A constitution is the organic and fundamental law of a nation. It is basically a document or agreement on the rules on how to govern a country and is concerned with the exercise of power through the organs of the State. It must therefore address questions such as the composition and powers of the legislature, executive and judiciary. Control over the exercise of these powers is a fundamental constitutional issue. The relationship between the organs of the State on the one hand and the individual on the other is not one of equality. Control over the powers of the State is therefore essential for democratic government.

A constitution should also indicate the final authority or source of power within the State. From a liberal democratic perspective a constitution will typically be described as the 'charter of government deriving its whole authority from the governed.'[1] It is in this tradition that the first written, modern constitution starts with the following statement: 'We the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union....do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.'

Does the Namibian constitution reflect enough consensus about these matters? In order to answer this question a brief discussion of the content of the constitution will be necessary.

In the case of Namibia another and more fundamental consensus-related issue is also to be addressed. Its independence constitution is also the basic agreement in terms of which the people of that country have launched themselves on the road of statehood and nation-building. In order to determine the chances of success in this respect the basic characteristics of that society have to be identified and analysed. Only then will it be possible

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to decide whether the rules contained in the constitution reflect the necessary consensus for tackling past ailments and future expectations. What then is the state of the Namibian nation? About what is consensus to be reached?

The Namibian society (there is not really a Namibian nation yet) has actually concluded its own peace treaty with the adoption of its independence constitution on 9 February 1990. It has thus ended a 23 year old liberation war.[2] It is also a society struggling with the legacies of apartheid, colonialism, ethnic exploitation and poverty. These are largely the remnants of white minority rule and the obstacles on the road towards nation-building.

It is about these basic issues that agreement has to be reached and which will have to be reflected in the constitution. In order to discover if it does, and if so, what form it takes on, one can start by tracing back the road to 9 February. What happened during the drafting process preceding the adoption of the constitution?

2. How was the Namibian Constitution agreed upon?

The Namibian founding fathers and mothers started with an important advantage — they had a game plan. Namibia became independent through the active assistance and involvement of the international community. Resolution 435 (1978) contained an agreement by all relevant parties that Namibia had to become independent and that it should become so under the auspices and supervision of the United Nations.

Resolution 435 eventually grew into a wide-ranging package of deals covering various internal and regional aspects of the Namibian independence process. This included matters such as the powers of the interim administration of the South African chief official in Windhoek, the Administrator-General, and the withdrawal of Cuban soldiers from Angola. The package includes another very important document — the 1982 Constitutional Principles.

The governments of five Western States (Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States) prepared and put forward to the parties involved in the negotiations on Namibian independence 'Principles concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution for an independent Namibia.' All these parties accepted this proposal, as did the major political parties inside Namibia. There was thus agreement among the writers of the constitution about the basic principles to be included in it. This eventually proved to be of considerable value.

The 1982 Constitutional Principles[3] did not constitute a final constitution. Their terms were general enough in order to permit the detailed constitutional machinery to be determined by the Constituent Assembly. About the essentials for democratic government the picture was however clear. Namibia had to become a 'unitary, sovereign and democratic state'[4]

with the constitution the supreme law of the land. The legislature had to be elected by 'universal and equal suffrage'; independent courts had to interpret and apply the constitution and regular elections had to be held. Human rights had to be protected. A rather extensive list of such rights and freedoms was provided and the final product had to be consistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The courts had to enforce these rights. The 'balanced structuring of the public service' and local and/or regional government also had to be provided for.

It should be pointed out that these constitutional principles did not provide for any 'group rights' or for any form of 'own affairs' government. During the subsequent discussions and deliberations on the content of the constitution these principles gained in importance and were often applied as a yardstick or at least as guiding principles. They enjoyed a certain status and reflected the values on which the great majority of the participants agreed. This is also a reflection of the fact that the international community's involvement in the process of Namibian independence was a legitimate one. This was not a typical decolonisation exercise. South Africa was not in the role of a colonial power granting independence to its colony. To the contrary — its presence there was considered to be illegal. It could therefore not grant Namibia its independence. Namibia became a State through the efforts of its people and finally through the application of an international formula.

The final drafting of the Namibian constitution was the task of the Constituent Assembly, which was elected by the people of Namibia in secret and free and fair elections under the supervision of the United Nations.[5] The constitution had to be adopted as a whole by a two-thirds majority of the total membership of the Constituent Assembly.

The international involvement in the Namibian independence process had other practical advantages. During the interim period immediately preceding independence the South African Administrator-General was still responsible for the day to day administration of the territory. He had, in addition, to undertake specific tasks such as the repeal of all discriminatory legislation prior to the election campaign and the release of all political prisoners. These tasks had in general to be performed 'to the satisfaction' of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The effect of this was that the internal political parties were free to devote all their energy and time to the election campaign and thereafter to the drafting of the constitution. Someone else was responsible for the daily government and was also under an obligation to leave the country on the day of independence. All the parties were free to criticize the South African administration. They did not carry any responsibility for the national administration.

The elections for the Constituent Assembly were soon declared to be free

and fair. No party gained a two-thirds majority[6] and as a result a *modus operandi* was soon established which had a direct influence on the adoption of the constitution and on the atmosphere prevailing during the deliberations. No party could write the constitution unilaterally. Bargaining and compromises became necessary.

It was soon evident that such a large body as the 72 member Constituent Assembly was not the most suitable instrument for the purpose of finalising the constitution. A Standing Committee of 20 members, representing all the parties, was formed, and sat in camera. A very constructive and reconciliatory atmosphere developed here. There existed a clear desire to have the constitution adopted unanimously although the members were also under a lot of time pressure. The chairperson of this Committee[7] played an important role. His impartial and sympathetic handling inspired trust and co-operation and further contributed to a spirit of reconciliation and of 'give and take'.

Eventually the constitution was adopted unanimously.[8] How was this amazing result possible? All the parties realised that Namibia's independence had finally arrived and that a completely new dispensation was about to be created. After all, SWAPO was the clear winner at the polls. There was not really any effort to fight for the continuation of apartheid vestiges. The DTA's policy was opposed to any form of 'group rights'. It wanted to be part of the majority. They instead opted for constitutional devices that could serve as controls over the exercise of executive and legislative powers. Rights and interests had to be protected through democratic government, not through special devices such as minority vetoes or consociational structures. The national Party (through the ACN) did repeat some of its traditional desires (such as cultural association) but did not push it to the point of confrontation. Apparently they too could live with the final result and with the protection eventually provided for by the chapter on fundamental human rights and freedoms.

During these deliberations SWAPO also never behaved in a threatening manner. The fact that English was eventually adopted as the only official language is on the other hand an important sign of a new trend. In the end all parties could show some gains. Those who previously relied on the 'protection' provided for by Pretoria could do so no more and had to come to terms with the new reality. To some extent the interim government of the previous twelve years also contributed towards cleansing the system and getting rid of apartheid. Important apartheid laws were abolished since 1978 and although some remained until the very end,[9] those earlier steps did nevertheless contribute substantially to a degree of normalisation.

Other explanations for the smooth transition have to do with a prominent international presence in Namibia during the period of the implementation of Resolution 435 and with the scrutiny which came with that. The 1 April

1989 debacle (when PLAN launched an attack across the northern boundary) must have had a sobering effect. Dramatic changes were taking place in Eastern Europe and in South Africa itself things started to develop in the 'right' direction. It was generally realized that a future Namibia will be very much dependent on regional and international co-operation.

The first round, the adoption of the constitution, was completed in a very satisfactory manner. But what about the future? Does the constitution contain the necessary provisions to safeguard the consensus displayed during the drafting process.

3. Characteristics of the Constitution

Democracy is not only about the popular election of governments. Democratic government in practice very directly depends on the nature and scope of control over the exercise of governmental power. Does the rule of law apply? Is it a system based on constitutionalism? Some of these answers may be obtained by studying the constitutional devices defining and protecting the human rights and freedoms of the individual.

The third chapter of the Namibian constitution contains a rather impressive list of fundamental human rights and freedoms. Since the constitution is supreme law, all executive and legislative measures also have to respect the constitutional provisions on human rights in order to be valid. The ultimate threat to the individual's rights and freedoms comes from the power of the State. If this is properly circumscribed and controlled, a very important guarantee is provided. In the case of Namibia the courts are empowered to rule on the interpretation and application of the constitution. An aggrieved party is thus ensured of the protection of the courts of law.

Apart from the classical rights and freedoms (such as liberty, human dignity, equality, *habeus corpus*, privacy, speech, press, etc.) this chapter also guarantees the right to education, including the right to establish private schools. The practice and ideology of apartheid or racial discrimination is forbidden. Affirmative action is permissible, providing for 'the advancement of persons within Namibia who have been socially, economically or educationally disadvantaged by past discriminatory laws or practices.'[10]

This particular provision on affirmative action was thoroughly debated, often redrafted and eventually accepted. It is to be expected that when such affirmative action programmes are eventually launched, further in-depth debate will be necessary.[11] This is a complicated matter, as affirmative action programmes elsewhere have shown. It is however important for a SWAPO government to be in a position to address the socio-economic problems left by earlier apartheid policies. This is an area that could serve as an important test case for the commitment to translate past consensus into future action.

It should be mentioned that the right to own private property is also

protected by the constitution. Expropriation is only possible when it is in the public interest and subject to the payment of 'just compensation'.[12] This is very much the traditional formula followed by Western countries and is also in line with the 1982 Constitutional Principles.

It has been argued above that the approach adopted by the Namibian founding fathers and mothers was to create a governmental dispensation based on the rule of law, human rights and minority protection. (Although affirmative action is provided for). Many examples can be cited of provisions demonstrating this point. The power of judicial review is an important one. It is also important to bear in mind that the judges are appointed on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission, which is largely a professional body. Judges will enjoy security of tenure. In this regard it may be added that other important appointments in the civil service, police, army and prison service can also only take place on the recommendation of certain special commissions.

The Namibian constitution is further based on the concept of separation of powers, the accountability of the executive (including the President), regular elections and political freedom. The whole constitution is entrenched and the chapter on fundamental rights and freedoms may never be abrogated from. An office of an ombudsman has also been created to assist and protect the individual in complaints against the executive.

It might be asked whether the power and freedom of the central government to undertake socio-economic measures necessary to cope with the needs of society are sufficient. In principle these powers are available. (There is a chapter in the constitution containing 'Principles of State Policy' and which serves as a yardstick for future government programmes). It might turn out that the determining factor in this regard is not the availability of legal powers, but financial resources.

4. Future Economic Expectations

The picture up until now has shown a remarkable degree of reconciliation. But what about the future expectations and needs of the underprivileged majority? In many important areas such as land reform and economic and social development the constitution is silent or contains only rudimentary provisions.[13] It might be true that such matters cannot be dealt with properly in a constitution. On the other hand it is also true that they must be dealt with at some stage in the not too distant future. When the legislation and executive programmes required for this purpose will be decided, the new State will come before a fundamental test. Its ability to address the problems of poverty in a manner that will balance black expectations with white interests and with international economic conditions is unknown. The signs up until now indicate a pragmatic approach. Political stability, which is equally important for an attractive

economic climate however also depends on such other factors as the economic and social well-being and upliftment of the large black majority.

Many of the factors which will determine the success of future development programmes are largely beyond the control of the Namibian government. This includes climatic conditions such as the often occurring droughts, regional and international economic interdependence and even the legacies of apartheid. very substantial number of civil servants has been inherited[14] — none of them having been kicked out by the new government. Big deficits on its budget and foreign debt are other immediate economic concerns.

It is not the purpose of this article to address the prospects of economic development in Namibia. It is however important to recognise the close link between basic economic issues on the one hand and legal and constitutional considerations on the other, within the overall context of the political process. Failure in the economic arena is bound to affect detrimentally the solid achievements obtained in the constitutional and political arenas.

5. Tribal and Ethnic Divisions

Namibia has inherited a system of government which was based on racial and ethnic rule. The so-called AG8 structure was based on eleven ethnic second tier governments with wide-ranging powers. This is one of the reasons why white schools and hospitals were only opened at the beginning of the year. The election results also confirmed some ethnic loyalties.

The constitution very deliberately moves away from this approach and opts for unity and a single nation. In the Preamble the people of Namibia pledge themselves to 'strive to achieve national reconciliation and to foster peace, unity and a common loyalty to a single state.' Where structures of local government are provided for, it is explicitly stated that boundaries for such authorities 'shall be geographical only, without any reference to the race, colour or ethnic origin of the inhabitants of the area.'[15] The members of both the cabinet and the National Assembly are charged with the duty to, *inter alia*, ensure that apartheid and tribalism do not again manifest themselves in an independent Namibia.[16]

Again it may be concluded that future practice will have to show to what extent tribalism, ethnic tensions and racism will be eradicated. What the constitution does show is an awareness and a desire to address these problems. The success or lack of it will clearly not only depend on government programmes. To a large degree the eradication of, for example, tribalism and ethnic animosity will directly depend on the behaviour of local politicians and their decisions not to exploit ethnic and tribal loyalties, or the degree to which political parties can muster support across tribal lines. At the time of the adoption of the constitution this was not a very urgent problem. Experience in other countries has however shown that it may

never be ignored. The solidarity that prevails during a liberation struggle may evaporate when the scarce resources of the State have to be distributed.

6. The Role of Political Parties

In general all parties represented in the Constituent Assembly played constructive roles. The small parties made a contribution far bigger than the size of their delegations (often only one person) would suggest. To some extent they were more free to pursue certain ideals and to fight for their inclusion in the constitution. This usually had to do with some principle of democratic government. The personal dedication and reputation of individual members are quite important in this regard. The informal agreement to endeavour to prepare a draft enjoying unanimous support did of course increase the influence of these smaller parties.

It is also important to remember that all parties have participated in the elections for the Constituent Assembly. There was no boycott action. It may thus be claimed that the final result enjoys general legitimacy.

SWAPO was in a strong position but played a constructive role. It won 41 out of 72 seats and clearly enjoyed majority support. But it was not threatened from the left. There was no other party which could 'out-radicalize' it. When it therefore pledged itself to national reconciliation and to pragmatic economic policies, it did so out of a position of strength.

With its 21 members the DTA was the second largest party.[17] It has always adopted a clear anti-SWAPO line, although it has also been consistent in its opposition to apartheid. It has in its ranks a lot of experience of government and sees its future role as that of a constructive opposition. The DTA supported the implementation of Resolution 435 and of the 1982 Principles. It made a very important contribution in the final drafting of the constitution. The quality of its leadership was significant.

The Namibian exercise in constitution-making emphasizes the importance of political leadership. All these parties, even the small ones, operated from a position of strength.[18] This is an important requirement for this type of process where it is necessary to bargain and to compromise. Positions taken were as a rule supported by the rank and file of the parties. On fundamental issues such as the opposition to apartheid, the protection of human rights and democratic government no compromise was required. In the detail of the constitutional machinery it was however frequently necessary to compromise — especially on the choice between strong, centralized government on the one hand and constitutional control over such powers and structures.

7. CONCLUSION

The Namibian constitution had a very good start. Future practice will determine whether it will now grow into a living document with wide

respect and support amongst the governed. The extent to which their rights and freedoms are protected through the application of the constitution will be a determining factor in this regard. It is with respect to this particular dimension that the Namibian courts can play a very significant role.

A second determining factor will be the economic policies and performance of the new government. It has already been mentioned that it faces many difficult decisions on socio-economic developments. The desire for strong, centralized decision-making will also arise. It will however have to be brought into equilibrium with the clear curbs on governmental power provided for by the constitution. Respect for the constitution and for individual human rights and the need to address the serious development needs of the black majority will call for a fine balance.

The behaviour of the various political parties will be of more than ordinary significance. Those in opposition will have to fulfill their role in a constructive manner. Care should be taken not to use the constitution as a mere instrument of obstruction. The new SWAPO government will have to be assisted and inspired along the road to democratic government; which will include the 'loyal opposition'.

Hopefully the reconciliatory spirit of the Constituent Assembly will prevail. All the political parties will have to make a deliberate effort to achieve this. SWAPO has started by including a few members of other parties and from the private sector in its cabinet and in senior executive positions.

All the parties have a serious obligation to refrain from exploiting ethnic divisions. It will be to everyone's benefit if this is done. It is a necessity for national unity and reconciliation. In this manner the amazing degree of consensus displayed during the drafting of the constitution can hopefully be maintained.

FOOTNOTES

1. *Fairhope Single Tax Corporation v Mellville*, 193 Ala, 289, 96 SO. Quoted by *Black's Law Dictionary* 4th ed. 384.
2. The war started in 1966 when the International Court of Justice ruled, on a technical point, that Ethiopia and Liberia lacked legal interest in the matter. That, for some, brought an end to the efforts aimed at a peaceful settlement. South Africa had ignored 3 previous advisory opinions of the Court. For a discussion of the reaction to the 1966 ruling, see Dugard *The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute*, University of California Press, 1973, 377-378.
3. Contained in UN Doc S/15287 of 12 July 1982.
4. In the earlier and more detailed proposals of the five Western powers it was stated that 'the key to an internationally acceptable transition to independence is free elections for the whole of Namibia as one political entity...' UN Doc S/12636 of 10 April 1978.
5. In terms of a later agreement of 1985 these elections were conducted on the basis of proportional representation.

6. The composition of the Constituent Assembly was as follows: SWAPO 41, DTA 21, UDF 4, ACN 3, FCN 1, NNF 1, NPF 1.
7. Mr. Hage Geingob.
8. It was however agreed that parties could have their reservations recorded.
9. White schools and hospitals remained segregated until January 1990. This was possible because of the powers enjoyed by the second tier (own affairs) government established earlier by South Africa.
10. Article 23(2) of the constitution.
11. This will, for example, happen in the case of land reform, for which a national conference of all interested parties is planned.
12. Article 16(2) of the constitution.
13. Article 95 on the 'Promotion of the Welfare of the People' and Article 98 on the 'Principles of Economic Order' indicate the objectives of the government. These are however not directly binding and legally enforceable principles.
14. A figure of 40 000 (out of a population of about 1.6 million) or even more has been mentioned. This covers all levels of publicly employed people and includes blacks.
15. Article 102(2).
16. See Articles 40(1) and 63(2)(i).
17. Actually the DTA consists of a coalition of parties. The leader of the (white) Republican Party, Dirk Mudge, broke away from the National Party in the late 1970s and has since then established himself as a rather formidable politician within the DTA and in the country as a whole.
18. It must be mentioned that in the ACN, the two National Party leaders got involved in a leadership struggle which led to litigation and even a request to the SWAPO chairman to resolve the issue. (He adroitly refused.) Serious problems also plague the FCN. One of its leaders, Captain Diergaardt of Rehoboth opposed the constitution and wanted a federal system. The FCN member in the Constituent Assembly however voted in favour of the constitution.

Zélia Roelofse-Campbell

An Attempt to Restructure an Inequitable Society: Reform, Revolution and Nationalization in Peru, 1968-1989

Introduction

In their formative post-independence years (1850-1930), Latin American nations sought to restructure their economies towards growth, integration and, later, towards development and industrialization. In a region where a colonial tradition of strong centralization existed, along with the phenomenon of a paternalistic attitude from the governing élites towards the indigenous peoples and peasants, it was a self-evident phenomenon for the state to be all-powerful. State development programmes and state control of financial and industrial enterprises were the rule. Nationalization of certain foreign operations was not uncommon, in order to gain control of key assets in the production sector and avoid dependence on foreign decision makers.[1] After 1930, many Latin American countries developed into corporate states and a multitude of parastatals flourished.[2] This type of centralization was more than often connected to populist dictatorships.[3]

Background up to 1968/The Rise of the APRA

Peru could be cited as an example of an almost feudal society in the twentieth century: a small élite (of European origin) ruled over the majority Indian population which was impoverished. To make matters worse, 1% of landowners controlled 80% of the usable land.[4]

In this climate, it is understandable that a growing discontent festered among the ever dwindling middle classes and the intelligentsia. Resentment built up against foreign interests which dominated the mining sector; unreasonably low guano prices were dictated from outside, thus depriving the country of much needed foreign currency. Internally, many middle class families were bought out of their land, often by questionable means, by the sugar barons, as the country witnessed the uncontrolled growth of *latifundios*

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(large landed estates). An over-centralized government applied most of its revenue in developing its infrastructure and the city of Lima, thus grossly neglecting the rural areas. To channel the increasing discontent against the status quo, in 1924 a young north-coast intellectual — Victor Raul Haya de la Torre — founded the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), a movement based on a strong anti-imperialistic ideology.[5]

From inception, APRA advocated social and economic reforms in order to improve the lot of the lower classes, especially the Amerindians, as well as nationalization of foreign companies.[6] In time, APRA was to grow to become the largest party in Peruvian history, not only because of the growing discontent in the country, but also due to the organizational genius of Haya de la Torre. However, the widening spectrum of support for APRA became a threat to traditional upper-class rule in Peru and steps were taken to prevent its coming to power. The government declared that it suspected a 'communist conspiracy'. One of the factors in this 'discovery' was a letter sent in 1927 by Haya de la Torre to José Carlos Mariategui, the famous Peruvian Marxist visionary. The result was that APRA was outlawed and its leaders exiled. However, APRA remained a force to be reckoned with in Peruvian politics and was a key factor in the elections of President José Luis Bustamante (1945-1948), who was deposed by General Odria, who ruled until 1956. In that year, Manuel Prado was elected president, also with support from APRA. In return, APRA was legalized as a political party.[7]

Meanwhile, the military was increasingly becoming a middle class institution, and had in its ranks a share of APRA and non-APRA supporters. This was to be of great significance later.[8]

In 1963 Fernando Belaunde Terry, a well educated architect from Arequipa, was elected as Peru's new president.[9] He formed his own party, the Popular Action Party (PAP), which became APRA's most serious rival, in that it was also reformist in ideology. In fact, Fernando Belaunde Terry's administration was the most reformist Peru had ever encountered so far. He combined ideology with pragmatism, declaring that Peru did not have to choose between Communism and Capitalism, for it had the source of inspiration to develop a doctrine in its own soil:

> We have been able to instill in the people the profound conviction that the source of inspiration for a doctrine is in our own soil, making it unnecessary to import socio-political ideas into a country which, since the distant past, has distinguished itself by producing them.[10]

During Belaunde's tenure (1963-1968), there were important reforms carried out in Peru. However, these were considerably watered down, as the president failed to gain wholehearted support in the Congress.[11] Those reforms which were successfully implemented included: community

development projects, expansion of secondary and tertiary education, various new agricultural programmes, housing and rural health, road building to integrate remote areas into the economic network of the nation, financial reforms, including the creation of the Bank of the Nation, a major tax reform, and the reinstitution of municipal elections. An Agrarian Reform Law was passed but considerably watered down by Congress.[12]

The Crisis of 1968

In his inaugural address in July 1963, Fernando Belaunde promised to find a solution for a long standing dispute between the Peruvian authorities and the International Petroleum Company (IPC), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey, which was exempted from Peru's laws and thus a blatant example of US dominance. President Belaunde undertook to resolve the problem within ninety days. Five years later nothing had been achieved. Throughout this time the US government, to support IPC in its negotiations with Lima, held back Alliance for Progress funds, much needed for the implementation of some of Belaunde's programmes. Meanwhile, nationalist sentiment was building up in the country, and the President found himself under increasing pressure to negotiate an agreement that would be more advantageous for Peru. The military joined the chorus of disagreement and, in August 1968, Fernando Belaunde finally reached an agreement with the IPC.[13]

Beset by economic problems, viz. increasing inflation, devaluation, and a foreign debt of 800 million dollars by 1968, Belaunde found himself in the position that he could not fund his programmes through taxes and foreign aid.[14] To add to his problems, there were increasing accusations of corruption in government circles and the military. The corruption scandal, although not touching the President personally, was a source of public outcry.[15] There were problems on a deep-rooted social level as well, as land invasions by the landless Indians became a frequent phenomenon in a country where there were large unworked land areas. The situation became so serious that the military were called upon by the landowners to protect their rights. In an act of self-examination, allied to the pretexts that corruption had to be eradicated, and that the IPC agreement had been messy and to the United States' advantage, the Armed Forces deposed President Fernando Belaunde Terry on October 3, 1968 and connstituted themselves the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (GRFA).[16]

Today it is generally accepted that the Belaunde era was one of progress and reform. It has been denied that, during his presidency, Peru was still run by a few families. Although much of the reforms were announced by decree, thus by-passing Parliament, the fact remains that important and progressive changes did take place in the country during this period.[17]

The Velasco Years, 1968-1975

General Juan Velasco Alvarado, president of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, together with a group of reform minded colonels, initiated the so-called Peruvian Revolution of the Armed Forces, which resulted in the GRFA. The government was vested in a Military Junta of high ranking officers, headed by Velasco. All cabinet ministers were senior officers in the three branches of the Armed Forces. The main reform objective of the new government is best reflected in the *estatuto* of October 3, 1968 of the GRFA:

> To promote to superior living standards, compatible with human personal dignity, the least favoured sectors of the population, changing the economic, social and cultural structures of the country.[18]

One week after taking office, the GRFA nationalized the IPC oil wells, installations and refinery, in an act that enhanced its legitimacy.[19] In this way, the Armed Forces were institutionalized. Nevertheless, since the revolution came from above, it became clear that popular support had to be wooed. This resulted in the creation of organizations such as the National System for Support of Social Mobilization (SINAMOS). With popular support, the military sought further legitimacy to carry out their *Plan Inca*, thus explained by Raul Saba:

> ...to create a new social reality for Peru through the transformation of economic, social, political and cultural structures. The destruction of economic bases of the oligarchy and the assertion of sovereign control over national wealth (especially the nationalization of the IPC) served as an immediate rallying point of popular backing for the Velasco régime.[20]

Nationalization of foreign companies became a central issue of the *Plan Inca*. Many foreign and Peruvian firms which were involved in the extraction of natural resources, basic industry and the provision of services were nationalized. On a different front, one of the first steps taken by the military was the nationalization of the sugar *haciendas* of the north coast. Ironically, this issue had been one of the compelling problems leading to the founding of the APRA.[21] Velasco also followed Belaunde, when he declared the Peruvian Revolution of the Armed Forces to be neither Communist nor Capitalist, but nationalist and humanist and, above all, a Peruvian solution to Peruvian problems.[22]

On June 29, 1969 General Velasco declared an all-embracing Agrarian Reform Law: all holdings of more than 375 acres were expropriated. 72% (25 million acres) of the arable land was expropriated between 1969 and 1974. However, large but efficiently run estates, 65% of which belonged to U.S. companies (for example, some coastal sugar plantations) were not 'broken up' but were, instead, run by the workers as co-operatives. Still, the

problem remained that there was not enough usable land for landless Indians, and the government initiated large scale irrigation projects and began to open up the Amazon region for cultivation. However, the overall result of the latter two initiatives was disappointing, to say the least, as only a modest increase in production levels (1,6% annually) was registered.[23] Another motivation for this all-embracing Agrarian Reform was the Army's experience in dealing with the 1965 insurgency. This guerrilla experience made clear just how deep was the cleavage between rich and poor.[24]

Furthermore, the State controlled electrical utilities as well as telecommunications, and directed financial institutions. The military also nationalized most U.S. petroleum, copper and sugar companies. However, it did co-operate with foreign oil companies for the purposes of drilling operations and the extracting and marketing of Peruvian crude oil. At that stage, the Military dreamt of Peru becoming a major exporter of crude oil. This did not happen, as they clearly overestimated the country's reserves as well as export potential. The result is that large sums were invested in equipment, pipes, etc., which brought no returns whatsoever and this was a major contributing factor in steering the country towards bankrupcy.[25]

Commerce and industry still remained in private hands, but owners were compelled to share profits with workers and gradually give them stocks until the work force would control 50% of the company. In this way, industry was to become a joint enterprise between worker and management.[26]

In order to attain this 'national and social integration', the government was quite mindful of the need to foster cultural unity in a country where a large slice of the population does not understand Spanish. (See Note No 4). It became clear that the country urgently needed educational reform, which was advocated by the government as the tool to develop a true sense of *peruanidad* (the nationalistic feeling of being Peruvian). In addition, Velasco decided to nationalize the mass media in an obvious attempt to influence public opinion and to achieve its ultimate goal, viz. that the people should identify with the state. Internationally, Peru became a staunch supporter of Third World and Non-Aligned countries, in opposition to its previous pro-US stance.[27]

The Velasco Reforms — Brief Appraisal

President Velasco's reforms, also known as 'phase one of the revolution', although done in a climate of relative freedom, did not have popular support on a wide front. His 'military populism' really failed, in that it did not create a social support base among workers, peasants and poor urban dwellers. In fact, popular participation was so limited, that the government was discredited. On top of this, Velasco became ill with cancer. In consequence,

he was deposed by a bloodless coup and replaced by General Francisco Morales Bermudez Cerrutti on August 29, 1975. As head of the new government, Morales Bermudez set himself the task of erradicating corruption and introducing 'economic logic'. into the administration. An economic crisis seemed imminent in 1975, with a sharp decline in GDP and real wages. However, whilst Juan Velasco was a reformist, Morales Bermudez in fact eased out the reform-minded officers and his government could be likened to no more than a traditional Latin American military régime.[28]

On analysis, were the Velasco reforms a total failure? The answer to the above question must be 'no' because whilst in general terms they could be assessed as such, he did succeed in many aspects such as the promised participation, the return to constitutional government and the rooting out of corruption. He clearly diagnosed society's ills to be a result of the civilian political system, and advocated a depoliticization of society. Velasco also created a corporatist system which would represent 'the true interests of the people'. He succeeded in establishing a large state sector arising out of the nationalization of the means of production and the creation of state enterprises for the development of state capitalism. This role was dramatically augmented through the creation of some 150 state enterprises. The number of civil servants, some 300 000 in 1970, reached approximately 670 000 in 1977.[29] Important changes in the country's social and economic structures did take place, as explained by Julio Cotler:

> The landowning structure, the traditional agrarian and commercial bourgeoisie, and the foreign enclaves were excised from the productive system. The state, which had had a very limited participation in production by Latin American criteria, was transformed into a most significant economic factor: whereas in 1965 the state's share of total investment was 16%, ten years later, it reached 50%.[30]

Furthermore, the military revolution did instil some hope in the masses, at least for a while. The 16th century mestizo rebel leader Tupac Amaru was made into a symbol of the Agrarian Reform, and Quechua was declared an official national language, along with Spanish. The people began to believe in the future and a sense of national pride arose. At the same time, there was a new awareness for political realities, and a new confidence was awakened in the people, who began also actively criticizing the government. They soon realized that many of the promises had been empty, and demanded more tangible improvements on the economic front. However, a nationalist economic policy proved to have demands of its own, eating away into revenues which rhetorically had been promised to the poor. To give an example: an estimated 70% of all farmers in need of land did not receive any during the so-called Agrarian Reform; there just wasn't enough arable land to distribute. Indeed, it transpired that the reforms were insufficient to

spread to the bulk of the population, which happened to be poor and rural.[31] However, at the same time, the North American loan agencies decided on a blockade against Peru, which in turn sank deeper into debt.[32]

Furthermore, Peru engaged in heavy international borrowing from 1971. The reason was that the domestic private sector became reluctant to invest, in spite of the fact that there were generous government incentives. The result was that prices for some Peruvian exports declined, along with domestic production in certain sectors, and forecasts on oil exports proved to be misleading. The above greatly contributed towards the severe financial crisis of 1978 and 1979. Through lack of funds, many development projects had to be halted and general dissatisfaction ensued.[33] In order to abate the crisis, already in 1974, the government began increasing its borrowing from the Eurodollar market and entering into several loan accords with international banks. While these measures did not even cover half of that year's budget, the military also saw a need to frantically stock up on arms purchases, for fears of a war breaking out with neighbouring Chile.[34]

All in all, it is apparent that the Velasco reforms, whilst initiated and executed with the best of intentions, did not achieve their main objective, viz. to integrate Peruvian society into a more viable and socially acceptable polity. The GRFA's nationalization policy was, to say the least, shortsighted. In commenting on the general disillusionment of the government in regard to its failed economic policies, Rosemary Thorp comments that

> (...) the facile expectation that nationalization of a profitable foreign firm would give ready access to surplus proved false. It was discovered that many enterprises had been run down (if not decapitalized) and desperately needed funds.[35]

One of the main motivations behind the military revolution was the fact that the country found itself in an economic crisis in 1967-1968. However, should one compare the 1975-1978 crisis to the Belaunde government's one, it is clear that the earlier one pales in comparison.[36]

Return to Civilian Rule and the Rise of Terrorism

On completion of their *docenio* (twelve year rule), the military government re-instituted constitutional rule (a constituent Assembly was elected in 1978). At the presidential elections held in Peru in May 1980 Fernando Belaunde Terry was returned to power on the *Accion Popular* (PAP — Popular Action Party) banner, the centrist party he had founded back in 1956. Historians agree that Belaunde was a great democrat, but there is also consensus that his second term as president, from 1980 to 1985 was calamitous for Peru. On the one hand, the people had great expectations from the yearned-for return of democracy. On the other, Belaunde inherited a precarious economy from his predecessors, which in turn led to a drop in

real wages, and a rise in inflation, unemployment and the external debt.[37] For the first time, annual inflation reached 100% and the foreign debt rose to US $14 billion. Furthermore, there was widespread corruption within the administration. In fact, Belaunde had a reputation of being a visionary, detached from reality, which earned him the nickname of *nublonauta* (one who sails through the clouds).[38]

However, the real problem which began during Belaunde's second term was the appearance of a new guerrilla outbreak known as *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path), which raised its ugly head in 1980. The government did not take any steps until it was too late 39. Guerrilla activities had broken out already in June 1965 (during Belaunde's first term) in the Sierra departments of Junin, Cuzco and Ayacucho. These were break-away leftist Apristas and communist groups and were suppressed by January 1966.[40]

It must be understood, however, that a movement such as Sendero did not exactly rise out of a vacuum, but from a need to achieve 'social justice'. Peru is one of the most inequitable societies in the world, where the concentration of ownership of the national wealth is second only to Haiti in the whole of the Western Hemisphere. 'The poorest 60% of the population receives only 8,9% of the national income.'[41] To this must be added the presence of racial tension between the impoverished (mainly Indian) population and the White élites, specially from Lima. Whilst Sendero began as a movement which was deeply ensconced in the rural backlands, today it has spread to 22 of Peru's 24 departments. This is also due to a rapid increase in the rate of urbanization, which began to take on serious proportions during Belaunde's second presidency. Until recently, the country's population was predominantly rural, but today 68,2% of Peruvians live in cities. Lima has grown to six million people, two milllion of which live in abject poverty, in shanty towns which seem to sprout overnight. This is, of course, a breeding ground for violence and revolutionary activity.[42]

Whilst Sendero prides itself on being a purely Maoist-inspired movement, another guerrilla group of Castroite tendencies appeared in 1984: the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), backed by Cuba and Nicaragua. But Sendero poses by far the greatest threat to democratic institutions.[43] Indeed, it is ironic that such a steep escalation in terrorist and guerrilla activity took place following the return of democracy in 1980. Its very return has in fact engendered far more human rights abuses than throughout the entire period of military rule.[44]

At the Presidential elections of 1985, the people looked for a candidate who symbolized new hope. A young, charismatic Social Democrat — Alan Garcia Perez — was selected to lead the APRA in the April 14 elections. Garcia had a resounding victory and, at 36, became the youngest president ever to take office in Latin America. Fernando Belaunde Terry became the first Peruvian President since 1945 to transfer power to another elected officer.[45]

He soon made it clear that he was going to show a 'new commitment' to all Peruvians by taking a confrontational stance with foreign creditors. Garcia took over Peru's highest office burdened by the political memory that neither the military régime's statization, nor Belaunde's free market system had worked for his country.[46]

The Presidency of Alan Garcia

When Alan Garcia took office, the Peruvian economy was in the worst crisis of its history. Inflation had reached an annual high of 250%, the GNP had fallen 15% in the previous five years, and real wages had lost 40% of their value. In addition, external debt repayments had been in default for a year, as all of Peru's export earnings would be needed just to service the debt.[47] In his inaugural address on July 28, 1985, Garcia announced his '10% solution': he decided to limit foreign debt service payments to 10% of export earnings; at the same time, he vowed to ignore the IMF, declaring that Peru was capable of seeking debt relief from overseas creditors. In fact, he defaulted on the $800 million debt to the IMF in August of the following year. The short-term result of the above measures was that Peru's economy almost immediately revived and the country could boast one of the highest growth rates in the whole of Latin America.[48] On a wave of popularity, Garcia tried to reform the land tenure system in the war-ravaged Puno department, and increased development aid to the Indian communities of the high Sierra. The result was that APRA achieved a substantial victory in the highlands in the municipal elections of November 1986.[49]

There were also a number of positive economic measures which Garcia announced upon taking office: he introduced a number of incentives to the industrial and agricultural sectors, in order to increase production and real wages. The aim of this measure was to foster confidence in the economy. By the end of the third quarter of 1987, real wages had risen by 10% (above 1980 levels) and the economy had grown by 8,5% in 1986 and 6,7% in 1987. What was needed at that crucial time in Peru's economic development was obviously to maintain sufficient investor confidence in order to maintain economic growth.[50]

However, at the beginning of 1986, Garcia had nationalized Belco Petroleum Corporation, a US oil company which had refused to accept new conditions for investing its profits on exploration.[51] This created a wave of hesitancy in foreign investors. The major blow came, however when, the following year, the president announced sweeping nationalization plans. In his independence day address of July 28, 1987, Garcia proposed the nationalization of all banks, insurance companies and credit institutions. This would be accompanied by the closure of the country's 190 parallel exchange houses and all dollar sales would be handled exclusively by banks.[52] The announcement came as a total shock, especially in view of the

fact that, in a pre-election speech in 1985, Garcia had categorically declared that 'financial institutions would not be nationalized should APRA come to power.'[53] Financial institutions had in fact supported APRA on the grounds of Garcia's undertaking, but now had to swallow his explanation that 'nationalization is necessary because the country's financial system has discriminated against the rural poor, contributed to the flight of capital out of the country, and was used to 'launder' or disguise the proceeds of drug sales.'[54] This nationalization, which Garcia apparently announced without consulting with any of his financial advisers, marked the end of a chance of securing any further domestic investment. The result was that soon the economy began sliding downhill.[55]

The nationalization bill was approved with several amendments, by the National Congress on September 29, 1987. The new law gave the state a minimum 70% (and up to 100%) stake in national banks and a minimum of 51% (and up to 100%) in regional banks and insurance companies. However, there were many factors in the law which had not been clarified, namely the question of compensation, the position of foreign bank subsidiaries, which were not affected by the measure, and the unconstitutional declaration of a 'state of emergency' for the financial system which, at the same time, was declared a public utility.[56] A wave of protest ensued. This centered mainly around the famous Peruvian novelist Mario Vargas Llosa, who created a Freedom Movement and subsequently became a presidential candidate. In October, the government finally began to retreat on the implementation of the nationalization law on banks. The police had attempted to storm two banks and one private investment house, but banks had made contingency plans. For instance, Peru's largest private bank, Banco de Crdito, had sold 50,7% of its shares to its 5000 employees, who in turn applied for *habeas corpus*. The result was that this and all other nationalization disputes were taken to the courts.[57]

The struggle against the nationalization of private banks during the second half of 1987 and first half of 1988 was the direct cause of the emergence of a strong right wing movement, which became known as the 'new right'. The movement became consolidated after it became clear that Garcia had found no means of pursuing his bank nationalization project, firstly because it was amended by Parliament, and secondly because Garcia lacked real clout to put it into practice.[58]

Still, state control of financial institutions remains in force, up to a point where, today, 'new foreign investment is prohibited in banking and insurance, domestic transportation, media, advertising, telecommunications and utilities.'[59] Although the government is desperately trying to attract new foreign investments to the oil and mining sectors, investors are being kept away by political uncertainty and a remittance ban, a ban which has been extended to August 1990.[60] The true economic

consequences of President Garcia's policies are irreparable. Peru has lost all standing in international financial circles and GDP may have shrunk by as much as 10% in 1989.[61] In the last fourteen years, growth took place during only four years (1981-1982 and 1986-1987), whilst between 1949 and 1975 growth was uninterrupted.[62]

Conclusion

Peru is, to-day, one of the most beleaguered nations of the Western Hemisphere. The economy is in a slump and the government of Alan Garcia has lost practically all initiative. Annual inflation is almost 3 000%, external debt has reached 16 billion US dollars, and the index of underemployment is very high: an estimated 60% of the 21 million Peruvians work in the so-called informal economy (this includes coca, ie. cocaine, cultivation). Illegal sales of the leaves amount to US $1,2 billion annually — almost the same as the copper and crude oil exports combined. There is a popular saying in the country at the moment: 'Peru is still alive by a miracle and survives by coca'. However, this is not as easy as it seems: for the control of the cultivation areas is fiercely disputed by the Maoist guerrillas of Sendero Luminoso and by corrupt military, as both sides are anxious to partake in the profits of the millionaire narcotraffic business. To give an idea of the seriousness of the situation for the country's administration, it suffices to say that two-thirds of Peru's territory is permanently under martial law and, in the ten years since its appearance, the war between Sendero Luminoso and the Army has already claimed 17 000 lives.[63]

The Peruvian people, no doubt disillusioned with this and all governments in the most recent past, went to the polls this year in order to elect a new president. In the second (and final) round, there were two candidates, both without any past political experience whatsoever: the novelist Mario Vargas Llosa and a former university rector of Japanese descent, Alberto Fujimori. In a surprise result, Fujimori came out the winner. As a candidate, he had an obscure plan of government and on the eve of his inauguration on July 28, 1990, it is still unclear what his economic plan is, except that he 'is going to make Peru into a new Japan'. This is a clear indication that the electorate is tired of politics and politicians, and perhaps wary of possible austerity measures such as those inaugurated by Brazil's new President, Fernando Collor de Mello, which might have been implemented by Vargas Llosa.[64] What the future holds for the country, is anyone's guess at this stage.

In conclusion, it is apparent that the Peruvian attempt to use wholesale nationalization and state direction of the economy to bring about a redistribution of wealth and to develop the rural areas has proved a catastrophic failure. The dramatic increase in the state sector – and in consequence the state bureaucracy – did little or nothing in end result to

alleviate the lot of the rural poor in a period of more than twenty years. In fact, the more arbitrary the remedy, the worse the patient's condition became.

Notes

1. See William P. Glade, 'Economic Aspects of Latin America' in Jan Knippers Black (ed.), *Latin America — Its Problems and its Promise*, Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1984, p.136.
2. For an analysis of corporatism in the two largest South American countries, viz. Brazil and Argentina, see Ralph Lawrence, 'Comparing Patterns of Governance in Argentina, Brazil and South Africa' in *Unisa Latin American Report*, vol. 6, 1, 1990, pp.4-17. This is a particularly useful article, since the author draws pertinent comparisons with the Republic of South Africa.
3. E. Bradford Burns, *Latin America — A Concise Interpretive History*, Fourth Edition, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall Inc., 1986, p.310.
4. *id.*, p.320. The Republic of Peru, as the country is officially known, covers an area of 1 285 216 km^2. The latest estimate (1986) puts population figures at 21 256 000 inhabitants, of which 46% are Indian, 38% are mestizos, 12% are White (especially of Spanish descent) and 4% are Black, Japanese and Chinese. 30% of the population speak only Quechua, and 4% only Aymara. (Source : *Almanaque Abril*, Sao Paulo: Editora Abril, 1990, pp.631-632).
5. See José Z. Garcia, 'Peru and Bolivia' in Jan Knippers Black, *op. cit.*, p.407. For a more detailed explanation on the thought of Haya and others, see Raul P. Saba, *Continuity in Change and Crisis*, Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987.
6. *Almanaque Abril*, Sao Paulo: Editora Abril, 1989, p.559.
7. *id. ibid.*; José Z. Garcia,*op. cit.*, p. 407. See also Jos Carlos Mariategui, *Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality*, Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1971. It is clear that there were disagreements between Haya and Mariategui. The former found the latter far too narrow and dogmatic in his Marxist approach.
8. José Z. Garcia, *op. cit.* pp.407/408.
9. A military junta was in power from 1962 to 1963. So, when Belaunde took power, there were many expectations for a new, democratic Peru to emerge. See David Scott Palmer, 'Peru: The Authoritarian Legacy', in Howard J. Wiarda & Harvey F. Kline, *Latin American Politics and Development*, Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985.
10. Quoted in Raul P. Saba, op. cit, p.46.
11. APR formed an alliance with a former enemy — Odra -in order to attain a majority in Congress, and the combined forces could block or water down Belaunde's reforms. See David Scott Palmer, *op. cit.*, p.278.
12. *id.*, p.279; José Z. Garcia, *op. cit.*, pp.49-50.
13. Abraham F. Lowenthal, 'The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered' in Cynthia McClintock & Abraham F. Lowenthal, *The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983, p.420; Raul P. Saba, *op. cit.*, p.51.
14. *id. ibid.* By today's standards, Belaunde's foreign debt and inflation of 19% seem very low. Still, the perception at the time led to financial gloom (David Scott Palmer, *op. cit.*, p.287).
15. *id.*, p.56.
16. E. Bradford Burns, *op. cit.*, p.321.
17. Raul P. Saba, *op. cit.*, pp.51-53.
18. Quoted in Daniel M. Schydlowsky and Juan J. Wicht, 'The Anatomy of an Economic Failure', in Cynthia McClintock & Abraham F. Lowenthal, *op. cit.*, p.99.
19. Raul P. Saba, *op. cit.*, p.56; José Z. Carcia, *op. cit.*, p.411; Peter S. Cleaver & Henry Pease Cargia, 'State Autonomy and Policy Making', in Cynthia McClintock & Abraham F. Lowenthal, *op. cit.*, p.216.

20. Raul P. Saba, *op. cit.*, pp.56-58.
21. José Z. Garcia, *op. cit.*, p.408; Peter S. Cleaver & Henry Pease Garcia, *op. cit.*, p.216.
22. Raul P. Saba, *op. cit.*, p.46; see also Julio Cotler, 'Democracy and National Integration in Peru', in Cynthia McClintock & Abraham F. Lowenthal, *op. cit.*, p.20.
23. E. Bradford Burns, *op. cit.*, p.321.
24. James Anderson, *Sendero Luminoso — New Revolutionary Model?*, London: The Institute for the Study of Terrorism, 1987, p.15.
25. *id. ibid.*.
26. *id. ibid.*.
27. Raul P. Saba, *op. cit.*, p.63; Julio Cotler, *op. cit.*, p.22.
28. E. Bradford Burns, *op. cit.*, p.322; Francisco Durand, 'Mario Vargas Llosa o la Nueva Derecha Peruana', paper presented at the XV International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA), Miami: December 1989, p.10; Raul P. Saba, *op. cit.*, pp.57 and 66; James Anderson, *op. cit.*, p.16.
29. Raul P. Saba, *op. cit.*, pp.57-62; Julio Cotler, *op. cit.*, p.24.
30. Julio Cotler, *id.*, p.21; David Scott Palmer, *op. cit.*, p.287; for an account of state investment within Peru see Patricia A. Wilson & Carol Wise, 'The Regional Implications of Public Investment in Peru, 1968-1983':, *Latin American Research Review*, vol. XXI, No 2, 1986, pp.93-116.
31. Raul P. Saba, *op. cit.*, pp.63-64. The author makes mention of Velasco's 'political logic' when he attempted to explain his political ideas to the masses; after some time, however, the people demanded 'economic logic' as well; David Scott Palmer, *op. cit.*, p.287; Julio Cotler, *op. cit.*, p.24.
32. Julio Cotler, *id.*, p.23.
33. David Scott Palmer, *op. cit.*, p.287.
34. Julio Cotler, *op. cit.* pp.26-27.
35. Rosemary Thorp, 'Evolution of Peru's Economy', in Cynthia McClintock & Abraham F. Lowenthal, *op. cit.*, p.45.
36. Daniel M. Schydowsky & Juan Wicht, *op. cit.*, p.138.
37. James Anderson, *op. cit.*, p.16.
38. *id., ibid.* and p. 20; David Scott Palmer, 'Peru's Persistent Problems', *Current History*, January, 1990, p.6.
39. James Anderson, *op. cit.*, p.16.
40. Raul P. Saba, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.
41. James Anderson, *op. cit.*, p.19.
42. *id. ibid.*, and p. 20, *Almanaque Abril*, 1990, p.632.
43. Robert B. Davis, 'Sendero Luminoso and Peru's Struggle for Survival', *Military Review*, January, 1990, p.80.
44. Susan C. Bourque & Kay B. Warren, 'Democracy without Peace: The Cultural Politics of Terror in Peru', *Latin American Research Review*, Volume XXIV, Number 1, 1989, p.7. The article provides an excellent analysis of the interplay between democratic politics and violence in modern Peru.
45. *Latin American Monitor*, 'Andean Group', May — June 1985.
46. Susan C. Bourque & Kay B. Warren, *op. cit.*, p.11.
47. David P. Werlich, 'Peru: Garcia Loses His Charm', Current History, January, 1988, p.13.
48. *id.*, p.14; Robert B. Davis, *op. cit.*, p.79. Gross domestic product increased by a healthy 6,5% in the first nine months of 1986. This prompted Garcia to call on the private sector to reinvest profits within the country. (Latin American Monitor, 'Andean Group', December, 1986).
49. Robert B. Davis, *op. cit.*, p.79.
50. David Scott Palmer, *op. cit.*, 1990, p.6.
51. *Latin American Monitor*, 'Andean Group', January/February 1986.
52. *Latin American Monitor*, 'Andean Group', July/August 1987.
53. Maria Kielmas, 'Peru Delays Nationalization of Insurers', *Business Insurance*, vol.

21, August 17, 1987, pp.3 and 33.
54. *id. ibid.*
55. David Scott Palmer, *op. cit.*,1990, p.6.
56. *Latin American Monitor*, 'Andean Group', October, 1987.
57. *Latin American Monitor*, 'Andean Group', November, 1987.
58. Francisco Durand, *op. cit.*, pp.4-6.
59. *Business Latin America*, February 12, 1990, p.44.
60. *id. ibid.* and p.45.
61. Robert B. Davis, *op. cit.*, pp.79-80.
62. David Scott Palmer, *op. cit.*, 1990, p.5.
63. *VEJA*, 18 April 1990.
64. *VEJA*, 20 June 1990.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE DEVILS ARE AMONG US — THE WAR FOR NAMIBIA

Denis Herbstein & John Evenson (Eds.), 1989 Zed Books, London 202 pages (including Bibliography & Index)

This absorbing journalistic account of South Africa's curiously hidden war in the largely uncharted immensity of northern Namibia and neighbouring Angola, brings home forcefully the futility of war. Written from afar, this is the first account that draws on the haunting testimonies of local political, military and religious personae, ravaged by the war in northern Namibia. With a searching eye, the authors expose the brutality of South Africa's occupation of Namibia, notably the gratuitous violence perpetrated in the name of ideology by the notorious police counter-insurgency unit, Koevoet.

Herbstein and Evenson have trawled wide. With bold brushwork, we learn of the history of resistance dating back to German Colonial rule, the ambiguities of Western diplomacy in its attempts to secure Namibia's independence and of South Africa's duplicity — the travesty of equitable trusteeship and administration characterising its 75 years of colonial rule. While parts of the story are covered episodically, rather than definitively, the authors' have managed to infuse dramatic power into their account, especially in their graphic portrayal of 'Life in the War Zone'. This chapter shows how harmony, tolerance and humanity, were eroded (if not replaced entirely) by fear, hatred, violence, intolerance and brutality.

Chapter 3 deals with the wanton destruction by 'Koevoet' (The Crowbar) under 'Sterk' Hans Dreyer, while Chapter 4 uncovers the chronic anxiety that tormented the people of northern Namibia from 1966 to the middle of 1989. These two chapters alone make the book worthwhile. John Liebenberg's haunting pictures of life in the war zone add an added dimension to the powerful rendition.

While the authors provide compelling reasons for South Africa's disengagement from Namibia, the last chapter of the book is weak and somewhat less convincing — almost as if the authors were in a hurry to complete the book so as to capitalise on international interest with the country's accession to independence. Consequently, the legacies left by South African rule are poorly drawn.

Herbstein and Evenson have succeeded nevertheless in providing a useful background to Namibian independence — an uplifting event in the struggle for the liberation of Southern Africa.

André du Pisani
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SANCTIONS AND SOUTH AFRICA: HIDDEN AGENDA?

The Commonwealth Secretariat Racism in South Africa – 'The Commonwealth Stand. London 1989, 82pp.

United Nations South African Destabilisation – ' The Economic Cost of Frontline Resistance to Apartheid, 1989, 56pp.

S. Smith, Frontline Africa — The Right to a Future. An Oxfam Report on Conflict and Poverty in Southern Africa. Oxford, Oxfam 1990, 387pp.

Writing on contemporary South Africa is not noted for analytical clarity or moderation of tone but when the subject of the pariah state is combined with the subject of sanctions the result is a veritable frenzy of confusion that is surely unrivalled in current political debate.[a] Thus the books reviewed here, which might be expected at least to be clear about the purposes of sanctions, offer a bewildering multiplicity of objectives. The ECPG is in the business of 'salvation of the wayward' (p.1), a seemingly large project though simplified, it would appear, by the fact that all the wayward (some quirk of God's will perhaps?) are entirely confined within the borders of the Republic of South Africa. Slightly less exalted, though for the secular amongst us perhaps more manageable, is the project of 'peace with justice' in the southern African region (p.1). Elsewhere in this text however sanctions are about white minority rule, anti-racist activities, genuine negotiations, the transfer of power, democracy and the imposition on South Africa of a unitary state.[1] On behalf of the Commonwealth its Secretary-General informs us that sanctions are about the 'denial of human oneness', a fault which, on the assumption that it is comprehensible, also appears only to exist in South Africa.[2]

But perhaps this is unfair. Observers whose inspiration is less than divine will surely be less woolly-minded. They will have hard-headed answers to obvious questions. But a brief perusal of their writings shows this not to be the case. For the UN group sanctions are about the removal of apartheid and the creation of democracy. The Commonwealth sanctions report (hereafter Hanlon) talks of negotiations and non-racial and representative government. The Commonwealth Stand talks of 'dialogue towards democracy' and the removal of 'racism enshrined in law'. Oxfam, hitherto a charity designed to help people in need, demands adult suffrage in a unitary state and democracy. It is hard to avoid the conclusion, on this showing at least, that while as Mr. Ramphal suggests, 'apartheid stirs fierce passions', analytical ones are not amongst them.[3] And this is surely odd. One does not expect systematic treatises in political theory and some allowance can be made for the use of slogans for dramatic effect and even the clear need on the part of some of these authors to vent hatred rather than shed light. Yet even allowing for these factors, such depth of confusion allied with such intensity

of purpose is curious, as the issues that must be dealt with in any intellectually coherent discussion of sanctions are not hard to discern.

These issues include, at the least, the justification of sanctions, the form that sanctions are to take and some assessment of the effects they are likely to have. Since sanctions, in this context at least, are intentionally designed to interfere in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state, clarity on the desirability of sanctions requires clarity not only on what particular practices within that state are unacceptable but additionally on what would be acceptable alternatives. These two are analytically separable but clearly connected. If, for example, the international community were to place sanctions on state X to persuade its inhabitants to desist from (say) the practice of widow burning it would need to be clear whether their death by drowning would be an acceptable alternative and if not, why not. Secondly, there is the question of sanctions as instruments. Sanctions are clearly a strategy of denial but complications arise because both state and non-state agencies are involved at both ends of the relationship. In such circumstances there must be clarity about both the scope and purpose of specific sanctions instruments. One may, for example, wish to avoid complicity in something regarded as morally objectionable, one may seek limited changes or one may be trying to inflict maximum damage on the target state.[4] Finally there is the question of the effects of sanctions and here again there is much confusion. The assessment of the effects of sanctions clearly turns in part on the vulnerability of the target state. Since sanctions, as has been suggested, are a strategy of denial, it follows that the must be some assessment as to how far the target state can procure what is being denied and what effects such denial might have. To some extent these are objective matters. second set of factors, however, concerns the responsiveness of the target state, as it were the subjective factors. The response of a target state or group is at least in part independent of its vulnerability, and clearly depends on a range of factors such as political organisation, cultural characteristics and perceptions of threat.

The proposition that the sanctions lobby persistently fudges the issue of the justification of sanctions is hardly novel but it bears repeating. If sanctions should be applied against South Africa because racial discrimination in law is a special case, the charge is quite strong (though not, arguably, water tight). Two consequences however follow. First, the South African government has for some years been gradually withdrawing discriminatory legislation and would deserve approval for these actions. Secondly, and much more importantly, the repeal of legally buttressed discrimination would remove the justification for sanctions. However, the case for sanctions also appears in a quite different guise in which formal legalities are unimportant. In this second version the target is ethnic minority domination and the proposed alternative is usually given (as in all

these texts) by the formula of non-racial and democratic government. The trouble with this broadening of focus is that the special case argument is lost. Ethnic minority domination and non-democratic governments (in any of the senses of that protean word) exist all over the world — there are no *moral* grounds for singling out one rather than another.[5]

The solution to these difficulties (which are never *publicly* acknowledged or engaged) is also well known. There are two logical options whose form is partly constrained by the terms of the UN Charter which only authorises the use of sanctions against state on grounds that threaten peace. Either the argument is offered that apartheid *itself* is a threat to the peace or, and rather more plausibly, South Africa's regional policy is a threat to international peace which authorises a special case for sanctions — hence the sanctions lobby's concern with South Africa's destabilisation policy. This solution is however a purely presentational one and the difficulty simply replicates itself on a new terrain. For years the ANC has been sending guerillas across South Africa's borders to kill people and/or destroy their property (the morality of these actions is not pertinent here). While it may be reprehensible it is a fact of life that states will defend themselves when attacked. It is also a fact that states regard recognition by other states as an important part of their security. South Africa has arguably done no more than any other regionally powerful state determined to secure some recognition of its position and the denial of support to its political enemies. What is called destabilisation can only be presented as a special case because it is destabilisation on behalf of apartheid not because of the behaviour in itself.

These systematic ambiguities at the level of justification are bound to have effects in terms of the scope and purpose of sanctions and as these books show this is in fact the case. The sanctions lobby has been very successful in recent years and this has enabled it to move forward to a more clear cut position, at least in some senses. Occasionally the old ambiguities reveal themselves, particularly where sanctions are aimed at a mass public which for the sanctions lobby play a useful function in 'setting the moral tone'.[6] In sport for example the Commonwealth's experts state that, 'The Commonwealth's 1977 Gleaneagles Declaration was one of the first internationally agreed sanctions. It calls on members to take 'every practical step to discourage [sporting] contact or competition".[7] What the text actually says is, '.... by taking every practical step to discourage contact or competition by their nationals with sporting organisations, teams or sportsmen from South Africa or from any other country where sports are organised on the basis of race, colour or ethnic origin'.[8] The difference is visibly significant and reflects the progress the sanctions lobby has made. Sports sanctions were sold to a mass public as a way of securing changes in sport. At a politically convenient moment their scope could be changed to

something wholly different that no changes in sport could meet — indeed significantly enough none are demanded.

Greater honesty, however belated, is always welcome. Past niceties have been abandoned and the texts all concur in the view that the purpose of sanctions is not really to remove discriminatory legislation but to bring about 'negotiations'. There is of course a tactical consideration here. It is necessary to argue simultaneously that sanctions haven't 'worked' and that more systematic sanctions would 'work'. An important subsidiary function of sanctions is to fuel calls for more sanctions. Nor does the superficial clarity of 'negotiations' in fact clarify very much since these authors appear to know already the required outcome of these 'negotiations'. Are sanctions to bring about negotiations or to bring about a particular conclusion of such negotiations? It is the surreptitious installation of the latter which explains the curious emptiness of much of this literature even in its more empirical analysis. The Commonwealth Sanctions report for all its 273 pages of 'expertise' is actually reducible to the proposition that more hurtful measures will hurt people more — which is of course true. Sometimes the intention is to hurt whites generally, sometimes it is assumed the business community will bring the government to heel or that the state will bend to pressure. There are useful discussions about vulnerability in the narrow sense but no real interest in the political effects of sanctions short of coercing surrender.

And herein lies the final disappointment of these texts, that their empirical analysis is as impoverished and threadbare as their moral reasoning. These texts are not committed to a careful analysis of South Africa or the Southern African region — their project is to construct a devil. So many things that are controversial and problematic are presented as fact that it is only possible here to register some obvious scepticism. It is quite absurd to blame everything that happens in Southern Africa on the Republic of South Africa — for example — every case of looting and smuggling[9]; it is simply false to dismiss either UNITA or RENAMO as *nothing but* puppets of South Africa[10]; the accounts of what happened in Angola proposed here are either false or simple-minded.[11] And the final impression given by the analyses presented fundamentally underestimates the capacity and the achievements of the black states in the region. The simple fact is that the states of southern Africa need have suffered no 'destabilisation'. The alternative was always obvious: to recognise South Africa and not to provide a haven for the ANC. Only one country, Malawi, has taken this option and even on these accounts it has not been destabilised (there is no chapter on Malawi in the Destabilisation Report). The other states have taken a decision that they will refuse to recognise South Africa despite the costs. They have been helped in this by the enormous guilt that prevails in the Western world about South Africa (and fuels its aid) but the fact remains that they have accepted the

costs and have fought a campaign to withhold the symbolic approval that is so central to the existence of at least Western states in the modern world, a campaign in which they have been remarkably successful.[12]

It has been well said that, 'anything connected with apartheid can safely be condemned without worrying overmuch about consistency'[13] but the reasons for this remain analytically interesting and virtually unresearched. Careful consideration of these texts suggests that the tissue of ambiguities and inconsistencies is not entirely accidental nor as innocent as it appears and that there may be in fact a rather different political agenda from that which is presented to the general Western public. There is a fund of goodwill in the West towards South Africa that is based in part on guilt but also on optimism and hope. The sanctions lobby seeks to push this goodwill towards certain political ends. The usual rubric for this is some such formula as the 'authentic voice of the people'[14] or 'genuine negotiations' but in the Oxfam text these issues are confronted with exemplary directness. The British (and other) governments are called upon not merely to impose 'universal suffrage in a unitary state' but to 'engage publicly with the MDM/ANC alliance'.[15] Here surely lies the real purpose of sanctions. For these authors sanctions are not about careful pressure to induce considered socio-political change in very special circumstances. They are part of 'the struggle', a modern morality play in which the bad will be chastised and the good exalted.

Finally, it should be said that these authors do not mince their words nor fail to parade their enormous moral virtue and hold up for derision everyone else's moral infirmity. Anyone who disagrees with them is, of course, a racist.[16] Is it not time that critical commentary on such positions was, not least in the interests of clarity, similarly robust? Then let me suggest that these books are (almost) worthless and their analytical and political effect (almost) wholly pernicious. They have no claim to expertise other than relentless hostility towards South Africa and the diligent piling up of 'facts' whose utility is purely propagandistic. Their function appears to be to contribute to hatred of South Africa and to reinforce a (not so hidden) political agenda designed not to help South Africans devise political institutions that all can live with but to impose on that country arrangements that favour one of the participants in the political process. These texts are not part of the solution — they are part of the problem.

FOOTNOTES

a *South Africa: the Sanctions Report Prepared for the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on South Africa*. Penguin Books in association with James Currey, London, 1989. *Apartheid Terrorism: The Destabilisation Report*, by Phyllis Johnson and David Martin. The Commonwealth Secretariat in association with James Currey, London, 1989. *Banking on Apartheid: The Financial Sanctions Report*. The

Commonwealth Secretariat in Association with James Currey, London, 1989. *South Africa: The Sanctions Mission: Report of the Eminent Church Persons Group.* Prepared by Dr. James Mutambirwa, World Council of Churches, Geneva and Zed Books, London, 1989.

1. The general level of reasoning attained in this report may be sampled in the following quotations taken from the same page (p.117):
   (a) 'The imposition of sanctions is not punitive'.
   (b) 'The UN has declared apartheid a crime. Governments should not thus be neutral to this crime. They should not negotiate with criminals. They should punish them.'

   Occasionally in this text, as here, the sanctimonious pose adopted by these churchpersons slips, to reveal something a little more reminiscent of Calvin's Geneva and rather more in tune, one suspects, with their psychological proclivities.
2. At least I take that to be the implication of his remark that, 'the rights of man must fight and win their *final* victory against the denial of human oneness' (p.xiv my emphasis).
3. Hanlon p.xv.
4. The first of these is now rather old-fashioned in anti-apartheid circles but occasionally surfaces in these texts eg. ECPG p.114 and Oxfam p.322.
5. Unless of course the domination of some groups were more reprehensible than others. The sanctions literature often gives this impression but it is never formally argued. There are of course all sorts of non-moral grounds but the sanctions lobby appears entirely uninterested in them also.
6. Hanlon p.70.
7. Hanlon p.60.
8. The Commonwealth Stand p.58.
9. UN p.11.
10. On Renamo see for example M. Cahen Mozambique: *Analyse Politique de Conjoncture* (Inigo Publications, Paris, 1990).
11. All the accounts of the Angolan conflict in these texts ignore the fact that as part of the agreements the Cubans and the ANC will be withdrawn from Angolan soil, a major objective of South African regional policy. For a serious account see R.S. Jaster, *The 1988 Peace Accords and the Future of South-western Africa* (IISS: Adelphi Papers 253, 1990).
12. For a different approach to destabilisation see J. Imrie & T. Young, *South Africa and Botswana: Case of Destabilisation?* (International Affairs Bulletin 14(2)(1990) 4-21)
13. A. James *Sovereign statehood* (Allen and Unwin 1986) pp.160-1.
14. ECPG p.8.
15. Oxfam p.24 and p.321.
16. ECPG p.119.

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