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SMUTS HOUSE NOTES

THE CHANGING AND UNCHANGING AGENDA OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: THE END OF HISTORY OR HISTORY REVISITED?

Scholars of international relations commonly take the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) as marking the birth of the modern state system. The conclusion of the Thirty Years War is taken as introducing the idea that the nation state as a sovereign entity represented the basic building block of the international system. Relations between states were now to be regulated by balance of power strategies which would induce a degree of international security and stability premised on shifting but countervailing power. Regionalism figured in this design principally in the guise of imperial extensions, explicitly in the case of the major European powers and implicitly in the case of US activities in Central and South America behind the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. In other words, regionalism represented mainly an uneven and unequal extension of the control of particular dominant states. If regionalism was rooted in and defined by nationalism, so too then was globalism. To the extent that globalism existed at all, it was simply a reflection of the fact that certain national interests, promoted through regionalism (either through formal or informal empires), had become globalised in the sense that these empires stretched to all corners of the world.

US GLOBAL DESIGN AND THE AMERICAN CENTURY

With the publication of the Atlantic Charter on the eve of involvement in the Second World War, it is not surprising that the United States should contemplate not only a new design for world order which would establish a wide and permanent system of general security, but a design in which New World ideas would triumph over the seemingly bankrupt ideas of the Old World. For the Twentieth Century had been convulsed by two major wars which though European based, had become global through imperial extensions; the international gold standard had collapsed; and the 1930s had seen major contractions in the international economy brought on by tariff and interest rate wars. Largely unresponsible for this international design although already by the turn of the century holding the most impressive national economy, it is perhaps not surprising that US officials during the Second World War should begin to plan for a new world order and in the jargon of the time, for the 'American Century'.

The hallmark of the American Century was to be a major new

commitment to globalism. Not only was globalism to be the main pillar of the new order, but it was to be a globalism founded not in the extension of competing national interests but in a multilateral liberalism. The nation state was most assuredly, however, not to disappear (in fact national self-determination for colonial territories was to be a major objective of the new order) but states were to develop multilateral co-operation along broadly liberal lines replacing the destructive national and imperial competition and conflict of the old balance of power system. Admittedly with the United States playing a *primus inter pares* role, there was created then the multilateral framework of: the United Nations with its commitment to collective security, human rights and the pacific settlement of disputes; the Bretton Woods system with its commitment to free trade, convertible currencies and balance of payments support; and a series of specialized agencies of the UN to develop co-operation in 'functional' areas such as health and education.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM

This American Century proved in large measure to be an American Dream, principally as national, regional and global pressures developed in contrary fashion. A revolution of national self-determination did sweep the former colonial world but not in a way that ensured an orderly transition to peace loving democracies. The surrender of colonial rule was often forced: new states engaged in many serious clashes with their new neighbours; new governments were subject to or displayed: corruption, military coups, repression of opposition and on occasion civil wars every bit as brutal as some of the interstate conflicts.

Regionalism, never a critical element in the new design, reappeared albeit in a changed form. One variant of regionalism was a weaker version of the old regional imperialism in the form of spheres of influence or collective defence arrangements (led by NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but including also SEATO, CENTO and ANZUS). A second variant was partly influenced by a reaction to Cold War pressures but also by a desire to promote greater co-operation across contiguous states on the practical ground that contiguity was easier than universalism, viz. OAS, OAU, ASEAN, but above all, the EEC.

Globalism certainly endured but not in the simple extension of multilateral liberalism. Despite the acknowledgement that unlike the League of Nations the United Nations would have access to armed force through which to preserve peace, collective security in the UN never truly got off the ground and was supplanted by 'superpower arms' racing' and superpower deterrence. The multilateral Bretton Woods' system, designed to promote international monetary co-operation, instead excluded the communist bloc

and served to complement superpower rivalry. Many Third World states, already confronting horrendous domestic problems of economic development or of building a legitimate political order, found themselves caught up in a superpower struggle which simply complicated their existing problems.

RETURN TO THE AMERICAN CENTURY

With the collapse of the Soviet 'empire' and perhaps even of the Soviet Union itself, we are not confronting the end of history but we may be confronting a move closer to the aspirations of the American wartime planners.

The importance and salience of nationalism has certainly not vanished nor does it look like doing so in the near future. As events in Eastern Europe (particularly Yugoslavia), Iraq (Kurds) or Somalia or Ethiopia or Palestine/Israel demonstrate, groups have not fallen into consensual or enduring units. On the other hand, many conflicts over national identities have been solved. While substantial problems of domestic order are likely to continue to plague third world states, equally many are moving towards more popularly legitimated systems. Such is the case with the rout of military regimes in Latin America, for example. Nonetheless, the establishment of a stable domestic order, which increasingly looks as though it will be some form of a stable multi-party democracy, is going to be on an agenda for a long time yet and a major pre-occupation and priority of many states.

Regionalism of the collective defence strain is either dead (SEATO, CENTO, Warsaw Pact) or moving that way. Regionalism of the more benign 'it's easier to promote co-operation among contiguous like-minded states' is however very much alive. The EEC is progressing and new regional groupings such as the North American free-trade zone (including the US, Canada and Mexico) or a Pacific Rim or ASEAN or even a Southern Africa zone are either taking off or looking like doing so.

Globalism, though still far removed from the dream of multilateral liberalism, is probably more healthy now than at any time in the post-war period. The Bretton Woods system of the IMF, World Bank and GATT has survived and is now more flexible and more truly (though far from perfectly) multilateral than ever before. Trade has expanded consistently faster than world output. Meanwhile unanticipated developments in international investment and banking have created high levels of interdependence. We live in an age when labour skills and multinational companies regularly transgress international boundaries. New trans-ideological international issues straddle national concerns and differences. Environmental and green issues, health problems with AIDS, tuberculosis

and malaria, the refugee 'problem' and widespread famine are increasingly seen as requiring multilateral management. Improvement in mass communications has served, by fax, phone and satellite, to disseminate knowledge of these issues and to stigmatise the politics of pariah states. And partly under IMF and World Bank pressure but partly under their own conversion, an increasing number of third world states are accepting economic liberalisation.

RETURN TO HISTORY?

With the 'end of the Cold War' we do not stand at the 'end of history'. An international agenda still confronts not only a major number of problems but also a range of complex choices. In confronting these choices the push and pull of nationalism, regionalism and globalism are likely to continue to remain with us for quite some time. Furthermore, just as the form and patterns of interaction among these forces has changed over the past, it is likely to continue to change and develop in the future. Certainly one of these futures, and one which in our view is very likely, is one in which nationalism and regionalism, while not being subverted, will increasingly become less salient against a progressive strengthening of multilateral liberalism. In this respect we are then returning to history.

Dr. Greg Mills and Professor Robert McKinlay
Department of Political Studies
University of the Western Cape

Greg Mills is Lecturer in the Department of Political Studies at UWC. Bob McKinlay is Professor of International Studies at the University of Lancaster in the United Kingdom. He is presently a visiting lecturer at UWC.

Deon Geldenhuys

TOWARDS A NEW SOUTH AFRICA: THE FOREIGN POLICY DIMENSION

South Africa has paid a heavy international price for apartheid. The world community has punished South Africa for its pursuit of a universally rejected domestic policy by forcing the country into isolation. The objective behind the ostracism of South Africa was to coerce the Republic into abandoning apartheid. Now that South Africa has indeed embarked on a process of political change away from apartheid, there has been a corresponding move out of enforced isolation. In this manner, the international community is rewarding South Africa for mending its ways at home.

South Africa's international reintegration will take time, its pace determined largely by domestic political developments. As long as the internal process of change remains on course, South Africa's international rehabilitation will continue. If the former becomes irreversible, so will the latter.

The short-term challenge to South African foreign policy is to manage this reintegration effectively. It is a process that will only be concluded — and South Africa finally restored to full international participation — once a new domestic political order, enjoying both internal and external legitimacy, has been devised. At that point, obviously under a new government, South Africa will for the first time in decades enjoy sufficient freedom of action to make fundamental choices in its foreign policy.

There is a still small but growing body of scholarly literature on a post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy.[1] What seems to be neglected in this debate, though, is the conduct of South Africa's international relations in the period of transition between white rule and what will be a black-led government under a new constitution. This interim phase could, by most accounts, last well into 1994. Just as a process of constitutional negotiation would be designed to pave the way for a new domestic political order, foreign policy should in this time also lay the groundwork for a new

Deon Geldenhuys is Professor of Political Studies at Rand Afrikaans University, Johannesburg

international status and role for a post-apartheid South Africa.

This essay focuses on South Africa's external relations in the run-up to a new constitution being promulgated. Although the substance of a post-apartheid foreign policy falls beyond the scope of the present study, the suggestions made here have a bearing on a future foreign policy; the proposals involve both opportunities and constraints for South Africa's foreign policy makers of tomorrow.

Before considering the process of steering South Africa back into the community of nations, it is useful to recall the country's international standing in the very recent past. This will highlight the contrast between the severe restrictions South Africa faced in its foreign relations under apartheid and the new international openings resultin g from domestic reform. South Africa is, in short, already firmly on the road of international reintegration. This is essentially the process that should be managed over the next few years.

1. FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE ERA OF APARTHEID AND ISOLATION

By the end of Mr PW Botha's presidency in 1989, South Africa was undoubtedly one of the most isolated states in the world. Consider the following indicators of the country's ostracism at that stage[2]:

* Apartheid gave South Africa a pariah image second to none. Apartheid was one of the world's principal moral issues, uniting the international community as few other questions could.
* The South African government faced a crisis of legitimacy abroad (an extension of its lack of legitimacy among the majority of its own citizens); large sections of the world community rejected the Government's right to rule and represent the people of South Africa internationally. The UN General Assembly's rejection since 1974 of the credentials of the official South African delegation is a clear expression of Pretoria's international legitimacy problem.
* South Africa enjoyed full diplomatic relations with only 25 states, a figure much lower than that for two other supposedly isolated states, Israel and Chile (under military rule), not to mention 'respectable' countries such as Argentina, Colombia, Poland and Zaire (with populations roughly the same size as South Africa's).
* South Africa belonged to less than 30 inter-governmental organisations, a figure again much lower than that of any of the above-mentioned states.
* The low frequency of its international treaties, even compared with Israel, Chile and Taiwan, provide further evidence of South Africa's diplomatic isolation.

* South African heads of state or government were not sought after guests in foreign capitals, nor was South Africa a popular destination for foreign leaders.
* South Africa was for decades subjected to a flood of condemnatory resolutions by the UN and other international bodies, with very little support from member states for Pretoria's position.
* Except for Rhodesia, no other national economy in recent decades experienced such severe ostracist pressures as South Africa's. The flows of trade, capital (loans and investment) and technology to South Africa were restricted by foreign governments.
* The UN Security Council maintained a mandatory arms embargo imposed in 1977.
* In the socio-cultural realm, South Africa's ostracism was reflected in, among other things, the existence of only two official cultural agreements with other states; problems of access to other countries with a South African passport; bans on landing and overflying rights for South African aircraft; and the sports boycott. South Africa's socio-cultural isolation far exceeded that experienced by Israel, Chile or Taiwan.

The wide array of ostracist measures was designed, at a minimum, to punish the South African government for unacceptable behaviour and to pressurise it into abandoning its offensive policies. More ambitiously, isolation through sanctions was aimed at forcing the South African government to capitulate and transfer power to its black opponents. Ostracism was combined with various forms of external intervention to achieve these same objectives. One type of intervention was foreign support for the armed struggle of the ANC against the South African government.

Facing a combination of international isolation and intervention, South Africa had precious little room for manoeuvre in its foreign relations. There were very few states prepared to formally associate with South Africa in a diplomatic or economic coalition, not to mention a military alliance. South Africa's closest partners in the diplomatic and military arenas were widely believed to be fellow-outcast countries like Taiwan, Chile and Israel. Neighbouring states that entered into formal economic associations with South Africa typically presented such links as the unfortunate results of necessity rather than the products of free choice.

Neutrality, another basic foreign policy orientation, was not open to South Africa either. Neither legal neutrality nor the political status of non-alignment was a viable alternative. A declaration of neutrality would not have kept a hostile world at bay. Non-alignment would in turn only have made sense if South Africa could join the Non-aligned Movement — something the Movement would not consider at all.

Dissociation is a third general external orientation[3], meaning that a state

voluntarily withdraws — to a greater or lesser extent — from international relations. South Africa, however, faced involuntary exclusion from normal international interaction and it could not conceivably withdraw even further; that would have played directly into the hands of its isolators abroad.

Pretoria was forced onto the defensive in its foreign relations. The domestic base was perceived to be under threat from the dual external pressures of isolation and intervention, which were of course in many instances aligned with internal pressures for political change. South African foreign policy was therefore designed to counter the rising tide of isolation and the threat of more drastic forms of external intervention, thereby safeguarding the security and ensuring the survival of the state (read: white power).

Under these conditions, South African foreign policy displayed both reactive and opportunistic features. Pretoria responded to external challenges as they arose — the fire-fighter's approach — with little outward evidence of a comprehensive, considered foreign policy with defined ends and clear means. South Africa employed diplomatic, economic, military and propaganda means to meet perceived threats from abroad, often using them in a haphazard and hamfisted way. These external actions were typically an extension of what has been termed the domestic politics of security or survival. Harsh repressive measures at home were thus accompanied by militant behaviour abroad, particularly in the Southern African region. This is not surprising, since the Government saw a direct link between internal and external threats to the "security of the state'.

Foreign policy was opportunistic in the sense that South Africa seized opportunities as they (often unexpectedly) arose. Again, this was typical of a state that was in a sense a victim of the international community, left with little freedom of action in its foreign relations.

All this is not to say that South Africa pursued a purely pragmatic foreign policy. In fact, it displayed some of the characteristics of what is known in Latin America as a "praetorian-ideological' style of diplomacy. Associated with authoritarian right-wing regimes (such as Paraguay under President Alfredo Stroessner and General Augusto Pinochet's Chile), it has been described as a direct, no-option-open style that allows little room for negotiation and compromise; it is highly ideological in a Cold War sense; its tone is often accusatory, and it is associated with the military establishment rather than the foreign office.[4]

The military influence has been most evident in the notion of a total onslaught against South Africa and the need to counter it with a total national strategy. South Africa's coercive diplomacy in Southern Africa — commonly labelled destabilisation — also carried a distinct military imprint.

Other elements of the praetorian-ideological approach predated the

strong military influence on South African foreign policy-making during the 1970s and 1980s. One was the Cold War perspective: ever since the end of the Second World War, South Africa perceived a serious communist threat to its security, believing it to be part of a wider communist offensive against the Western world of which South Africa considered itself part. The accusatory tone — the outside world was prejudiced, malevolent, ill-informed etc. in dealing with South Africa — was another familiar feature. Viewing international politics as a life-and-death struggle between communist and Western nations, South Africa traditionally ruled out any idea of compromise with communist powers. In a more general sense, compromise had never been a popular notion for successive National Party governments. Defining both domestic and international politics in existential terms, compromise with either internal or external adversaries was synonymous with placing the survival of white South Africa in jeopardy. Clearly, then, the style of internal South African politics was carried over into the realm of foreign relations.

2. RESTORING INTERNATIONAL LINKS

President FW de Klerk's historic announcements of 2 February 1990 marked a watershed in South Africa's domestic politics and foreign relations alike. Internally, the political process has been unshackled by allowing previously banned political organisations to operate freely. This was an essential move to place South Africa on the road to constitutional negotiations that may eventually produce a generally acceptable new democratic political order. The Government's commitment to a negotiated settlement of South Africa's racial conflict heralds the end of a long era of apartheid and white domination.

The move away from apartheid has coincided with South Africa's gradual movement out of externally imposed isolation. Now that the Republic is entering into or restoring normal international relations with other parties, many South Africans are beginning to realise for the first time just how isolated the country had long been. International ostracism had become a fact of life for South Africans; more than one generation has only known a country facing constant international adversity. Now, at long last, South Africans are becoming aware that isolation is neither a natural nor an immutable state of affairs and that it has moreover been damaging to their interests.

Since February 1990, South Africa has been experiencing a process of gradual international reintegration, by which is simply meant the restoration of links severed as a result of ostracist pressures or the establishment of new ties where these had previously been impossible because of enforced isolation.

There is no need to chart South Africa's return to international

respectability and participation in great detail, as this has been done elsewhere.[5] It will suffice to list some indicators of the Republic's improving international fortunes in the general areas of diplomatic, economic and socio-cultural relations.

* South Africa has begun to shed elements of its pariah image, specifically perceptions of a regional ruffian (destabilising neighbouring states), a colonial power (controlling Namibia) and most importantly a racist oppressor (upholding apartheid). Following the independence of Namibia, the abolition of apartheid and the liberalisation of South Africa's domestic politics, a new cooperative relationship has been developing between the Republic and most of its neighbours.
* For the first time since the early 1970s, South Africa's official representation abroad has lately been expanding. Among the countries with which South Africa has exchanged or agreed to exchange diplomatic, consular or trade missions since the beginning of 1990, are Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Rumania, the Soviet Union (interests office), Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Togo and Turkey . There has also been an upgrading of South Africa's existing formal ties with Denmark, Sweden and Argentina.
* President De Klerk has travelled more widely abroad than any of his predecessors since 1948. Since his appointment as State President in September 1989, he has paid official visits to, among others, Namibia, France, Greece, Portugal, Belgium, Britain, West Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain, Italy, the Ivory Coast, Cape Verde, Madagascar, Morocco, Swaziland, Senegal, Kenya, the United States and Luxembourg.
* In the process of establishing or restoring formal ties with other countries, South Africa has lately concluded bilateral agreements dealing with trade, air and shipping links with, among others, Hungary and Madagascar.
* The customary denunciations of South Africa by particularly the UN General Assembly, the Organisation of African Unity and the Commonwealth have since February 1990 given way to far more moderate expressions of criticisms and even to unprecedented commendation of the De Klerk government's political reforms.
* Economic sanctions have been lifted or relaxed by scores of states. A major case in point is the European Community's decision in December 1990 to rescind its ban on new investments in South Africa, followed by an agreement in principle among EC member states (with the temporary exception of Denmark) to lift remaining economic sanctions as soon as all apartheid legislation has been scrapped. In another important breakthrough for the South African government, President

George Bush in July 1991 lifted the package of US economic restrictions imposed under the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. Switzerland and Israel decided to lift economic sanctions against South Africa in the wake of the American move.[6] Earlier, numerous other countries had through acts of omission or commission allowed a relaxation if not an abandonment of punitive measures against South Africa.

* Socio-cultural interaction between South Africa and the outside world has also become much easier. Examples are the greater freedom of movement for South African passport-holders abroad, the expansion of South African Airways' international routes and the (re)introduction of more foreign airlines on the South African route, and South African sports organisations' gradual return to world bodies and international competition.

While the overall trend is unmistakable, South Africa still has many hurdles to cross before its process of international rehabilitation has been completed and normal or full international ties restored. For one thing, the disappearance of sanctions has not been universally welcomed. The Organisation of African Unity is a leading champion of retaining sanctions[7] (even though most of its members knowingly violate the restrictions), while the Commonwealth has not yet decided to relax its sanctions against South Africa.[8] In the United States, the lifting of sanctions under the 1986 Act of Congress has not altered the position of 88 cities and 26 states that still retain their own restri)'ctive measures against South Africa.[9] Military sanctions, notably in the form of the UN's mandatory arms ban of 1977, remain essentially unaffected by the erosion of restrictions in other areas (although many states will continue to violate the ban on military dealings with South Africa).

The ANC, of course, still insists on the retention of at least economic and military sanctions. The fact that so many states have nonetheless begun resuming or expanding economic ties with South Africa clearly shows that the ANC's influence over other countries is strictly limited. Yet it should be acknowledged that the ANC still has some hold over foreign states on the issue of sanctions, especially member states of the OAU and the Commonwealth. They will probably take their cue from the ANC in eventually deciding to formally bring sanctions to an end. In short, the ANC can indeed still affect the pace of South Africa's return to international respectability.

3. THE FOREIGN POLICY OF INTERNAL TRANSITION

Any state's foreign policy is aimed at safeguarding a particular domestic value system. Thus, until recently, South Africa pursued what has been termed, "the foreign policy of apartheid". By the same token, the Soviet

Union followed the foreign policy of communism, (or, more recently, perestroika), Britain pursued the foreign policy of Thatcherism under the previous Prime Minister, and Zambia to this day conducts the foreign policy of humanism. Now that South Africa has entered a period of internal political transition — bridging the era of apartheid and a future non-racial democratic order — it is only to be expected that its foreign policy will be designed to protect this process and thereby promote a democratic outcome. This means guarding against disruptive influences from abroad and seeking external encouragement for a negotiated settlement in South Africa.

It must immediately be conceded that the identification of such positive and negative foreign influences is politically controversial. The two main actors, the ruling National Party and the ANC, presently hold divergent views on the role that the international community should play during the transitional phase. The major point in contention relates to sanctions and isolation. The ANC regards the maintenance of sanctions as a positive external contribution: they are a means of keeping pressure on the Government to heed the ANC's demands, thereby strengthening the organisation's bargaining position. Sanctions are therefore a lever used by the ANC for domestic political purposes. The Government, by contrast, is adamant that the original justification for sanctions — a white minority government refusing to concede political rights to the black majority — no longer exists and that the retention of punitive measures could only retard economic growth to the detriment of particularly the disadvantaged black population. For its part, the ANC urges foreign countries to retain sanctions (until the ANC decides that they may finally be abolished), whereas the Government seizes every opportunity to overcome them (consider, for example, President De Klerk's foreign visits and the establishment of formalties with East European countries).

True, the ANC has since its unbanning relented on its sanctions stand. This applies particularly to ostracist measures in the socio-cultural field, such as international sports links, the exchange of artists and entertainers and the academic boycott. It would seem that the ANC has also resigned itself to the erosion of South Africa's diplomatic isolation; the organisation has apparently not gone out of its way to prevent either President de Klerk's foreign visits or the expansion of South Africa's diplomatic network. The ANC has, however, been far less accommodating as far as the lifting of South Africa's economic isolation is concerned, despite the fact that many countries have relaxed or dropped economic sanctions.

Once the constitutional negotiations are firmly on track, the ANC will have little choice but to make further concessions on economic sanctions. The rationale behind sanctions will grow even weaker as the negotiations proceed. Since the 2nd February 1990, sanctions have in fact progressively

lost their value as a bargaining card for the ANC; scores of countries have chosen to ignore the ANC's (not to mention the PAC's) demands that economic sanctions be retained for at least the time being.

It is only with regard to the maintenance of military sanctions against South Africa — notably in the form of the UN's mandatory arms embargo — that the ANC still finds itself fully in step with international opinion. There is simply no realistic prospect of the arms ban being lifted before a new post-apartheid government has been installed in South Africa.

The formal renunciation of economic sanctions by the ANC will have important implications for South Africa's domestic politics. A highly divisive domestic political issue will have been removed. It will also serve as a further indication that the ANC and the National Party are dealing with one another as political opponents rather than as implacable enemies. Their political contest will be played out on the local stage; the ANC would no longer feel a need to call on foreign actors to strengthen its bargaining position *vis-à-vis* the National Party through coercive measures from abroad. This could in turn symbolise a new relationship of trust between the two parties. Alternatively, the ANC could feel that it is powerful enough (and its opponent weak enough) to forego the lever of pressure provided by economic sanctions. An entirely different motivation for the renunciation of sanctions by the ANC might simply be that the organisation acknowledges the reality that punitive economic measures have become an empty shell.

Be that as it may, an ANC decision to abandon economic sanctions will also herald a new era in South Africa's foreign relations. The removal of the sanctions factor could lead competing South African political parties to approach the international community with a new and unprecedented unity of purpose. One is thinking not only of an emerging bipartisan approach to foreign policy issues between the National Party and the ANC, but a much wider consensus involving most parties. The immediate issue, though, concerns the appropriate role that foreign nations should be persuaded to play so as to promote constitutional negotiations. Their role during the period of transition could indeed have a bearing on the eventual success in reaching and implementing a constitutional settlement.

It is certainly not beyond the bounds of the possible that most South African political parties could agree on the following guidelines for foreign involvement:

* No foreign country would support violence as a means to achieve political ends in South Africa and would therefore not consider any request by a local party for supporting armed action.
* Sanctions would be phased out.
* Foreign actors would not try to prescribe a constitutional settlement to

South Africans but would be free to assist any local party in the negotiating process — at its request —through the provision of technical expertise and funding.

* The international community would try to encourage South African parties to seek a negotiated settlement to their conflicts. Having invested so much time, energy and money in fighting apartheid, the outside world has at least a moral duty to support the search for an apartheid-free alternative through peaceful negotiations.

These, then, could be the basic tenets of what might be termed cooperative involvement from abroad during South Africa's process of internal transition.

South African diplomacy would need to encourage such foreign involvement — and discourage contradictory tendencies. By promoting a set of objectives supported by most political parties in the country, South African diplomats would at long last be seen – both here and abroad – as serving the interests of society as a whole. What will detract from the credibility of the message, though, will be a virtually all-white diplomatic corps carrying it into the world. South African diplomacy needs to reflect the changing political realities in the Republic not only in the messages conveyed to the international community, but also in the messengers used.

Keeping the outside world informed, interested and involved in South Africa during the transitional phase, would require Pretoria to abandon its familiar "lying low" posture. This was a natural response to international unpopularity and adversity: South African diplomats abroad adopted a low profile to avoid attracting negative attention. Now, however, South African representatives abroad need to make their presence felt to ensure an external environment conducive to the Republic's domestic process of democratisation. Cooperative involvement by other states will only come about if South Africa manages to counter any international tendency to forget about the Republic and leave it to its own devices now that apartheid is finally being abolished.

There are several other adaptations that established South African diplomacy needs to make in the current period of transition.

First, a world view premised on Cold War notions of irreconcilable ideological conflict between hostile blocs is wholly outdated. An anti-communist orientation has no selling power in a world witnessing the spectacular demise of the communist ideology, the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the spectre of the Soviet Union tearing itself apart. There is no room for a praetorian-ideological style of diplomacy in the 1990s. The speed with which South Africa has moved to capitalise — in diplomatic and economic terms — on developments in Eastern Europe, suggests that this adaptation has indeed been made in Pretoria.

While South African diplomacy is shedding its anti-communist

orientation in adjusting to the post-Cold War era in which communism is in retreat across the globe, the South African Communist Party (SACP) has evidently been given a new lease of life. It is more than a mere irony that a Communist Party seems to grow in this day and age — moreover in a country in which there had long been an officially sanctioned anti-communist crusade. The ostensible increase in SACP support is not likely to inspire Western confidence in the future of South Africa and it is on the West that the South African economy will remain critically dependent. More importantly, the SACP remains more than a mere ally of the ANC: the two organisations are so intertwined as to permit overlapping membership. (This is probably a rather unique relationship in the annals of political coalitions; it is perhaps the political equivalent of Siamese twins.) South Africa's government-in-waiting therefore displays a strong communist presence and presumably also influence. From this perspective, South African diplomacy in the phase of transition has to alert the world to the possibility that the first post-apartheid government may well include communists among its members. Again, this may not be a particularly appealing prospect to foreign nations with vested interests in South Africa.

(There are, to be fair, also other ways of looking at the ANC-SACP connection. By drawing the SACP into government, it could be argued, the party would by force of political circumstances become more moderate (read: less communist). Or to put it more crudely, cooptation is a proven route to moderation. It should also be conceded that the SACP has already abandoned many of its orthodox Marxist-Leninist beliefs and displays many social democratic features. Not to be discounted either, is the possiblility of the ANC and the SACP going their separate ways as two independent parties each with its identity and membership. Such a divorce during the period of political transition may make it easier for South African diplomats to "sell' the ANC abroad as the heir apparent.)

Second, South Africa needs to extend its gaze far wider than the traditional areas of interest. In the era of isolation, South Africa had few friends and fewer allies. Large parts of the world were effectively closed to the Republic. Now the diplomacy of isolation needs to be replaced by the diplomacy of participation. This not only requires greater manpower but also the development of knowledge and understanding of what were previously *terrae incognitae*. What might help in the situation, and also make the diplomatic service more representative of the general populace — and thus improve its credibility both at home and abroad — would be the timely merging of the diplomatic corps and the ANC's own "foreign service".

In the process of expanding its foreign relations, and as perceived external threats diminish, it may well be asked whether South Africa still needs certain "old friends" as much as before. Taiwan and Israel obviously come to mind. The important consideration is whether a state on the road back to

international respectability should still be seen in the close company of so-called pariah states. A state is after all supposed to have no permanent friends, only permanent interests.

But Pretoria should also be cautious in making new international commitments or restoring old ones, lest the impression be created that its foreign relations are still serving white interests only. It can then be asked whether the Government's highly *partisan* position on the war in the Persian Gulf was appropriate? True, Pretoria backed the winning side, but would it not have been better, given popular sentiments among black South Africans, to merely take a *principled* stand on the issues involved? By the same token, one should question President de Klerk's effusive praise for President Bush and the US during his visit to Washington last year. Apart from the unequivocal identification with the US, Mr de Klerk's public outpouring of pro-American sentiment — in President Bush's presence — tends to leave an impression of subordination on South Africa's part.

Third, South Africa's growing international involvement means that the Republic will increasingly be called upon to help address global issues of the day, such as the ecology, nuclear proliferation and population development. Previously, South Africa found itself involuntarily excluded from many areas of international functional cooperation. South Africa probably experiences a considerable lack of expertise regarding collective problem-solving at global level and will urgently have to address this deficiency.

Fourth, South Africa can aproach the world community with a new confidence born out of the knowledge that the government of the day's commitment to a process of democratisation conforms to the international *Zeitgeist*. No longer condemned to defending the indefensible, South African diplomacy is bound to acquire a new assertiveness. In the place of the old defensive, apologetic, turning-the-other-cheek approach to the world, South Africa can now afford to become somewhat bold and even demanding in dealing with other states. Instead of projecting the image of a delinquent state at the mercy of the international community, South Africa can be expected to assert itself now that it can defend its interests from a moral basis too.

Fifth, assertiveness should not be confused with aggressiveness. The latter was an outstanding feature of Foreign Minister Eric Louw's brand of diplomacy (although by no means exclusive to him). A more tangible form of aggressiveness was evident in the 1980s, the era of South Africa's coercive diplomacy in Southern Africa. Now that the season of violence in regional relations is over, South Africa would probably need to sharpen such standard diplomatic skills as persuasion and negotiation in dealing with its neighbours.

Sixth, South African diplomats should prepare the ground internationally for new political masters in Pretoria. This is by far the most difficult

adaptation, since it is not clear exactly who will govern the new South Africa (will it, for example, be the ANC alone or in a coalition with one of more other parties?), nor precisely what type of foreign policy the next government will follow. All that can be said with certainty is that the first government elected under a new constitution will be very different in racial composition and political complexion to any of its predecessors. It is also safe to assume that a new political order will be reflected in a new foreign policy (in terms of general orientation).

The prospective new rulers themselves also have an important role to play in this process of foreign policy adaptation. Foreign observers can be expected to read into their current conduct an intimation of things to come in future. The foreign policy of the ANC in opposition may thus serve as a guide to the foreign policy of the ANC in power. From this perspective, recent actions by ANC leader Nelson Mandela are bound to raise eyebrows if not hackles in several foreign capitals. His public expressions of solidarity with the likes of Presidents Fidel Castro and Muammar Ghaddafi and PLO leader Yassir Arafat are not exactly calculated to win respectable friends and positively influence important people abroad.

It is hard to believe that the ANC could have been unaware of the poor impression that Mr Mandela's identification with these leaders would make in many Western states. Why, then, did he do it? And does it have any significance for a post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy? On both counts, one can only speculate.

One possible explanation for the ANC's embrace of leaders widely loathed in the West, is that the organisation wanted to cock a snook at Western nations — perhaps in retaliation for the latter's support for the De Klerk government's reforms and their perceived desertion of the ANC. Alternatively, the ANC wanted to assert its independence in foreign relations, making clear that it would not be constrained by Western sensitivities. Identifying with these three leaders may also be part of a more general pattern of solidarity with the Third World, particularly those nations that seem to be "bullied' by the West. Another possibility is that the ANC leader was merely repaying old debts: Castro, Ghaddafi and Arafat have long supported the ANC. (Why then not the same expression of gratitude for the Soviet Union and China?) A final, perhaps more cynical, explanation is that the ANC realises that it would be politically inappropriate to associate too closely with Cuba, Libya and the PLO once it is in power. The ANC therefore has to pay its dues now, in the luxury of opposition where it is less exposed to foreign criticism.

Should the latter consideration apply, it follows that Mr Mandela's warm feelings toward foreign leaders of dubious repute have little bearing on a future ANC government's foreign policy. Should any of the other explanations be correct, the ANC's current behaviour may well be an

indication of its conduct once in power: its foreign policy may, at least in style, be characterised by a strong sense of independence and assertiveness in dealing with the West, coupled with a strong rhetorical identification with the Third World.

The ANC needs to be more sensitive to the fact that observers are already looking for pointers to an ANC government's foreign policy — and will try to find them in the organisation's conduct of foreign relations during the period of transition. In short, the ANC already has a major responsibility in helping to create a favourable external environment for a new South Africa.

Finally, South African diplomacy during the transitional phase should not merely serve short-term objectives but should lay the foundations for sound international relations in the post-apartheid era. Put differently, South Africa ought to manage its gradual international reintegration in a way that would ensure longer term benefits, instead of being guided by immediate considerations of prestige or party political gain.

One of the longer term dividends for South Africa of cooperative involvement from abroad in the current reform process, is that foreign states may in future feel a moral duty to help safeguard an eventual constitutional settlement. They would in a sense serve as the external guarantors of a new democratic constitutional order. States with a high moral profile in international politics, such as the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and Canada, may have a particular role to play in this regard. The liberation movements, having for so long solicited international support in their declared struggle for a democratic alternative to apartheid, could hardly object to such a watchdog role for foreign nations. The National Party and other smaller parties are likely to welcome this type of informal international safeguard against undemocratic tendencies in a new South Africa.

Apart from safeguarding an emerging democratic political order, South African foreign policy should in the interim period between the demise of white rule and the advent of a black-dominated government also promote the basic longer term objectives of security, prosperity and stability.

Here a critical factor is the encouragement of greater foreign participation in the South African economy. This involves not only trade, but also the importation of capital in the form of investment and loans, and the transfer of foreign technology to South Africa. Increased external economic penetration is vital for economic growth which, in turn, is a prerequisite for prosperity and stability and ultimately also security. A new political order that is not underpinned by a strong economy is likely to experience severe strains caused by unfulfilled material aspirations.

Sanctions have, of course, in both intent and effect restricted South Africa's international economic relations. The mere easing of economic sanctions will not, however, automatically restore or expand the Republic's

foreign economic ties. South Africa probably finds itself in a harsher world than before the drastic intensification of its economic isolation in the mid-1980s. Following the demise of communism, Eastern Europe has become the focal point of Western economic interest. This has certainly occurred at the expense of Africa as a whole, which (to use the overworked but telling term) runs the risk of becoming marginalised in the world economy. And then there is also the growing trend towards bloc formation and protectionism in the international economy, developments that could be particularly damaging to the Third World, South Africa included.

It would be a tragedy if South Africa moved out of enforced economic isolation only to be condemned to economic marginalisation along with the rest of Africa. This country's present and future rulers should realise that the major economic powers have immediate interests far removed from South Africa and Africa. The world does not owe South Africa a living. A major challenge to South African diplomacy in the transitional period would therefore be to market South Africa as a worthwhile economic partner for many years to come.

Apart from the economic, there are also other areas in which South Africa could seize opportunities for international reintegration after a lengthy period of ostracism. In the diplomatic area one example is involvement in at least international conferences (if not organisations) dealing with global issues affecting also South Africa. In the cultural realm, one thinks of moves to lift restrictions on the flow of people to and from South Africa. Insofar as the Government becomes involved in reintegration efforts at cultural level, it is essential that this be seen by South Africans generally as being to their advantage and not merely for the benefit of Whites. The ANC of course also has a vital role to play in forging or restoring cultural links between South Africa and the outside world: South Africa's ostracism in this field has in no small measure been due to the ANC's exertions.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The foreign policy of South Africa's internal transition has two key elements: promoting cooperative involvement by foreign countries in South Africa and furthering its return to the international fold. Through these dual initiatives, South Africa could help to ensure that one form of international exclusion (enforced isolation) will not simply be replaced by another (marginalisation). The isolation of a state caused by its perceived international irrelevance or by the indifference displayed by countries of consequence, could affect it as adversely as ostracism through punitive measures.

Now that apartheid is disappearing, there could be a growing international tendency to forget about South Africa. And once a post-apartheid government has actually been installed — and the South African

problem thus ostensibly resolved — this trend may become even stronger. The world community will not easily be convinced that it owes a new South Africa anything. Many countries would probably take the view that they had done their duty by somehow contributing to the struggle against apartheid; what follows thereafter, is none of their responsibility. As always, South Africa will need the world far more than the world needs South Africa.

Fortunately for South Africa, it is far better placed — in terms of both human and material resources — than most other African states to escape the bane of international economic and political marginalisation. But the mere possession of these assets does not guarantee a meaningful international role; it is the way in which the resources are utilised that matters. To be reckoned in the new post-Cold War world, South Africa would need to conduct its domestic affairs in a way that would set it apart from the abysmal performance of so many African states in the recent past. The appellation that a new South Africa can least afford, is that it is but another typical African state. South African diplomacy should use the current phase of transition to convince the world that a post-apartheid South Africa would not follow so many other African states down the road to disaster. The credibility of such a message would ultimately, of course, depend on the words and deeds of South Africa's aspirant rulers.

ENDNOTES

1. See, for example, the *South Africa International* special issue on South Africa's post-apartheid international relations, vol. 21(4), April 1991.
2. Deon Geldenhuys, *Isolated States: Comparative Analysis*, Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg, 1990.
3. The three orientations are based on KJ Holsti, *International Politics: Framework for Analysis*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1988, pp.92-110.
4. See Heraldo Munoz, *Las Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Militar Chileno*, Prospel-Cerc, Santiago, 1986.
5. Deon Geldenhuys, "South Africa: From international isolation to reintegration', *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, vol. 13(1), May 1991, pp.62-99.
6. *Beeld*, 12 & 15/7/1991.
7. *The Star*, 30/7/1991.
8. *Beeld*, 15/7/1991.
9. *Beeld*, 8/8/1991.

Anthony J Leysens

SOUTH AFRICA'S MILITARY-STRATEGIC LINK WITH LATIN AMERICA: PAST DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

INTRODUCTION

Recent developments in the international system as well as within South Africa have had a significant effect on the nature of the country's position in that system.[1] On the international front the collapse of the old order in Eastern Europe was cited by President de Klerk as one of the reasons which contributed towards his decision to unban the African National Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress and the South African Communist Party on 2 February 1990. Internally, the lifting of the state of emergency, the agreements with the ANC in the form of the Groote Schuur (4 May 1990) and Pretoria Minutes (6 August 1990), the imminent demise of the Group Areas and Population Registration Acts and the gradual release of political prisoners have led to major alterations in South Africa's previous isolation within the international community (*Southern Africa Record*, 1990:77-78).

While it is too early to conclude that South Africa's pariah status has been completely transformed, substantial gains towards ending isolation have been made. On the diplomatic level President de Klerk has been received by the leaders of the major industrialised states. Some form of representation has been established in various states of the former 'east bloc', the latest to be added to the list being the Soviet Union. The most important economic breakthrough came recently when the European Community decided to lift the economic sanctions imposed in 1986. Trade delegations have been received from two of the largest global economic actors viz. the European Community and Japan. Advances have also been made in sport and culture. The International Olympic Committee has indicated its conditional willingness to invite South Africa to the Barcelona games while a number of South African entertainers have returned from self imposed exile.

Naturally South African political and economic analysts are anxious to determine how these events will influence the country and what the strategies on the political and economic levels should be to make best use of

Anthony J. Leysens is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Stellenbosch.

these new opportunities. Within this context the UNISA Centre for Latin American Studies in co-operation with the South African Institute of International Affairs held a conference in 1990 with the theme 'The Nations of the South Atlantic: Co-Operation or Confrontation'. The aim was to determine the possibilities of regional political and economic integration between African and Latin American states. One of the contributors, Anton du Plessis, concluded that '...it is clear that the changed global setting has opened the door and has created opportunities for a renewed and revitalised attempt to enhance regional integration. However, the South Atlantic is not an integrated regional subsystem and it is doubtful whether it will become one in the near future' (Du Plessis, 1990:10).

Admittedly, a fully economic and politically integrated regional system for the South Atlantic seems a distant possibility. Such an integrative effort would have to surmount various obstacles (historical and contemporary). The structure of the global economy and the nature of the domestic economies of future participants is one example of a potential obstacle which would hinder economic integration. This article, however, has the more modest aim of looking at the linkages which have been established between South Africa and certain Latin American states in the military sphere. These linkages, it will be argued, were established initially due to South Africa's isolated status and her inability over a number of years to be formally included in alliances associated with the 'Western bloc'. The benefits which South Africa and the Latin American states involved derived from this association could act as a foundation for the maintenance or expansion of linkages (political and economic) in the future.

The article is based on the findings of a wider study which looked at South Africa's relations with Latin America[2](1966–1988) using indicators derived from Geldenhuys's (1985, 1990) work on South Africa's isolation in the international system, viz.: the diplomatic, economic, military and socio-cultural terrains. Each field has a number of sub-indicators to facilitate collection and categorisation of data. For the military terrain these are: military co-operation (technical, procurement and supplying of arms) and military alliances. The main method by which the data were collected, was through the utilisation of documentary sources. These include library materials (books and journals) and popular media articles.

A data bank, consisting of relevant articles in newspapers and periodicals, was constructed by using the extensive collection of the Institute for Contemporary History at the University of the Orange Free State (1978–1988) and the microfiche collection (started in 1968) of the South African Institute of International Affairs in Johannesburg.[3] Interviews were also conducted (during 1989) with representatives from the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, Latin American diplomats in South Africa and researchers and individuals who specialise in Latin American studies.

The interviews were conducted in an unstructured manner and respondents were encouraged to describe their own experiences and to emphasise issues which they regarded as important.[4]

An inductive method was followed in the interpretation and analysis of the data. As such the research aim is exploratory/descriptive. No attempt will be made to search for general patterns underlying the subject matter, nor will any lawlike generalisations be made. The phenomenon itself and the processes which form part of it, will be concentrated on. Contextually the article thus aims to contribute to the literature on South Africa's relations with Latin America. However, no generalisations will be made about South Africa's relations with other states (for example, Taiwan and Israel) which have possibly been necessitated by similar circumstances.

The first two sections of this article look at the strategic rationale which was advanced by military planners and politicians in South Africa and Latin America for closer military-strategic co-operation in the region. These arguments need to be placed within the context of a perceived bipolar (East versus West) international system and South Africa's attempts to be included in the western alliance. South African overtures were well received by geo-strategic pundits in the Latin American military. We look specifically at Argentina and Brazil in this regard. Converging ideas on the Soviet threat in the South Atlantic led to various attempts to launch a South Atlantic Treaty Organisation (SATO) and these are evaluated in the next section. Lastly, some specific military benefits of South Africa's relations with Chile and Paraguay are identified and described.

THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE: ASPECTS OF PAST STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

Considering the fact that the vast expanse of the Atlantic Ocean separates the American and African continents from one another, forming the main eastern boundary of Argentina and Brazil and the western boundary of South Africa (which is also flanked by the Indian Ocean), it follows that maritime strategy has always been (within given constraints) an important element of military planning in these states. South African strategists (who desperately wanted South Africa's military forces to form an integral part of the western defence system) have in the past perceived the fact that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO) southern boundary having been informally determined as the Tropic of Cancer, had resulted in the creation of a power vacuum in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans (Papp, 1984:54).

In the early seventies South African politicians and military planners were still thinking in terms of maintaining a deep-water defensive responsibility in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans centred on the strategic significance of the Cape of Good Hope sea route. Two contributions, one by Grobbelaar

(1970) and the other by Biermann (1973)[5], illustrate the military's strategic thinking during this period and indicate why South Africa was the foremost apologist in the southern hemisphere for the creation of a South Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Grobbelaar (1970:61-62) saw the threat facing South Africa as consisting in the international hostility against its domestic policies and the danger posed by communist forces, who were involved in a worldwide struggle and intent upon supporting (black) nationalism in order to 'destroy the white governments in Southern Africa'. Accordingly he concluded that this threat could result in a conventional attack by independent African states to the north, a UN task force, a combination of these two elements, or in unconventional operations which were illustrated by the ongoing activities of 'communist supported guerillas' in the region.

After discussing the intrusion of communist forces in Africa and the growing presence of the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean, Grobbelaar (1970:65-71) emphasises the importance of the Cape sea route for the West's shipping and also stressed the fact that the United States would need a 'well developed land base' in the area in the event of a crisis situation. He concludes that South Africa will have to extend its immediate spheres of interest and target areas to include, not only the states to the north of it, but also the important 'land masses to the west and east' — i.e. South America and Australasia. The area which according to Grobbelaar (1970:72), shares hemispheric interests with South Africa, lies between the 5th and 45th latitudes and forms a 'natural geographic-military-strategic belt' which he calls the 'Southern Cross Belt'.

Southern Africa, under the leadership of South Africa, was seen as forming the central complex of this belt and it is 'therefore logical that the initiative for the creation of an alliance (between the states in this region) should emanate from South Africa'. This initiative is seen by Grobbelaar as being a part of the outward movement[6] as an 'operational concept'. The foundation for the envisaged military alliance had to be laid by the strengthening of 'diplomatic-political, economic, cultural, scientific, sport and other relations'. The end result would be a 'Southern Cross Alliance' which would form an effective political-military front and seal the 'open flank' of the West's defence system. Subsequently the United States, which was already linked through treaties with Latin America (Rio Pact) and Australasia (ANZUS and SEATO) would fill the 'gap' which existed in southern Africa (Grobbelaar, 1970:72-74).

A similar version of this line of strategic reasoning is provided by Biermann (1973 and 1977). Central to both arguments was the perceived communist threat. In the case of Biermann (1977:71) this amounted to an '...increase in interest shown by Communist powers in the Southern Hemisphere, and more specifically in the regions of the Indian and Atlantic

Oceans'. Biermann (1973:11-12) contended that the reason for this focus on the southern hemisphere was to be found in the nuclear stalemate between East and West. Accordingly, this made any communist expansion in the Northern hemisphere without direct confrontation (resulting in nuclear war) impossible. This resulted in the 'surge towards the Southern Hemisphere, in order to involve the Third World and to encircle the West, and hence the increasing strategic importance of the RSA in the global conflict'. Biermann (1973:12-15) goes on to relate the gains made by communism internationally and attributes the increasing presence of the Soviet Navy in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans to the strategic goal of establishing a 'prior presence' in an area before confrontation is initiated.[7]

Biermann (1973:26-34) emphasised the fact that he considered the possibility of a full-scale maritime conflict in the region as being remote. The main aspect of the threat in the southern hemisphere according to him, was to be found in the 'expansion of communist influence to the detriment of Western interests'. The possibility of the use of limited force by the Soviets and the ensuing eradication of Western influence in the area could only be neutralised if the West was prepared to establish a token maritime presence in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Latin American states such as Brazil and Argentina as well as the maritime forces of Australia plus the 'landbase' facilities and infrastructure offered by South Africa could be co-ordinated to develop a coherent strategy for the southern hemisphere. Biermann realised, however, that the possibility of Western participation was '...to such an extent inhibited by the present political climate that they flinch from the very thought of involving the White governments in southern Africa in regional defence' (Biermann, 1973:34).

In conclusion Biermann (1973:36-38) states that strategy for the southern hemisphere needed to be considered on three levels. Domestically, each individual state had to ensure the sovereignty of its territory and maintain law and order. Regionally, co-operation between states in the area which shared similar interests was of the utmost importance and had to be upgraded to ensure congruence in areas such as maritime reconnaissance and intelligence. Nevertheless the formation of a regional alliance according to Biermann was an 'intermediate objective' which had to lead to the final goal which — on a global level — was the inclusion of a superpower in the strategy for the southern hemisphere. This inclusion had to lead to the extension of America's nuclear shield in the southern hemisphere: 'In the final analysis it is a prerequisite for the successful defence of the southern hemisphere that the deterrent strategy based on nuclear terror and fear of escalation should also be applicable in this region' (Biermann, 1973:38).

The idea of co-operation with other states in the southern hemisphere and the projected link-up with the West would resurface again later, specifically when, in the eyes of South Africa's foreign policy formulators, events

seemed favourably poised for its realisation.[8] This happened in 1976 immediately after the Portuguese revolution, which drastically altered the status quo in southern Africa and again in 1981, when the newly elected American president, Ronald Reagan, indicated that he was willing to deal with authoritarian anti-communist regimes. The basic rationale behind the strategy remained the same.

In 1981 the South African Foreign Minister felt confident enough to again broach the subject of alliances — on this occasion using the parlance of the North-South dichotomy. In a statement to Parliament Foreign Minister Botha speculated (with seemingly remarkable foresight!) that in time relations between the superpowers would thaw, providing opportunities for the formation of '...new political and economic centres in the North-South complex', 'Domestically the Soviet Union will face increasingly difficult problems of an economic and ethnic nature, as I have said, problems which will weaken its ability to compete with the United States'. Prominent states within the southern hemisphere would form new linkages due to 'continuing competition among northern global powers' (*Southern Africa Record*, December 1981:7).

ASPECTS OF PAST STRATEGIC DOCTRINE: ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL

The strategic outlook which has been outlined also had its adherents in Latin America, specifically among the military. It should come as no surprise therefore that the periods of closest military co-operation between South Africa and certain states in Latin America came about during the time when these states were under the authority of governments partially or totally dominated by the military. Focusing on Argentina and Brazil[9], we will look specifically at those aspects of strategic thinking in these states which have a bearing on their security interests in the South Atlantic and which can help us to understand the rationale behind the proposals which were in favour of closer military congruence with South Africa.

Brazilian military doctrine has customarily been more landwardly oriented due to the expansion of interior borders and the need to secure them. This approach changed in the late sixties when military/civilian technocrats[10] embarked on an outwardly directed development plan which was designed to put Brazil on the road to becoming a modern industrial society. The programme's components required the development of local industry, the influx of foreign capital and the creation of economic growth through an export economy which included the distribution of Brazilian manufactured and agricultural products in Third World markets. International stability was deemed essential to give Brazil the opportunity to develop.

The worldview of the military intellectuals who took power in 1964 was

essentially bipolar: security and economic development were seen to be irrevocably linked as national and foreign policy goals. The independent Third World foreign policy followed by Goulart and Quadros (1961) was dropped and an attempt was made to purge Itamaraty (Ministry of Foreign Relations) of those diplomats who were seeking closer alignment with Africa and Asia. Foreign policy became congruent with Western interests, while Portugal's activities in Africa were supported. Nevertheless, according to Parkinson (1974:441) Itamaraty was left relatively untouched by the events of 1964, and by the early seventies it had started to reassert its traditional influence in the making of Brazilian foreign policy (Forrest, 1982:4; Glasgow, 1974:6; New African, 1978:87; Parkinson, 1974:439-440 and Tambs, 1979:18).

Brazil's stated export goals in the Third World, however, required a more pragmatic ('pragmatismo responsavel'/'responsible pragmatism') foreign policy outlook. In the early seventies a noticeable realignment towards Africa began to take shape. This initiative was led by Foreign Minister Gibson Barbosa and the diplomats at Itamaraty, but was opposed by the Trade Ministry who were more in favour of extending Brazil's foreign trade within the Luso-Brazilian community (Portugal and her 'provinces' in Africa) and with South Africa. The latter view enjoyed the support of some of the geo-strategists among the military. (Fig, 1979:27).

The views of the diplomats prevailed and this in turn led to the growing importance of the South Atlantic, across which travelled 66% of Brazil's exports in 1977 and a major consignment of its oil imports, which came from the Middle East via the Cape. In this sense the eastern border and the West coast of Africa ('nossa fronteira africana'/'our African frontier'), of which Brazilian geo-politicians had always been aware, became particularly important to Brazilian strategists. One of Brazil's leading geo-politicians, General Carlos de Meira Mattos, suggested in 1977 that Brazil should develop a more assertive strategy in the South Atlantic. The military seemed particularly worried when Cuban troops intervened on behalf of the MPLA in Angola, and viewed this as an increase in the threat which could be levelled against Brazil (Forrest, 1982:4; Glasgow, 1974:7 and Hurrell, 1983:351-352).

Argentina has always been aware of the importance of maritime strategy because of its geographical position, which also forces it to conduct most of its international trade by sea. Argentina's aspirations towards bolstering its position in the region have also been concentrated on extending its influence within the southern South Atlantic. Its traditional rivals in the region in the past have been Brazil and Chile. Argentinian strategy in the region is based on its goals of controlling the major strategic points in the area to safeguard its claims in Antarctica and the South Atlantic Ocean. These geo-political premises are specifically enunciated by the Argentinian navy, whose high

command was willing to co-operate with other states in the region (Brazil, South Africa) to establish a joint defence of the South Atlantic against foreign intrusion. The army, on the other hand, has traditionally been more concerned with Brazilian landward and seaward expansion (Hurrell, 1983:348-349 and Morris, 1986:45).

The Argentinian navy's strategic thinking is dominated by the writings of Admiral Segundo R. Storni, who stresses the importance of keeping open Argentina's sea lines of communication with Europe, North America and Asia, since the country's imports and exports are dependent on unhindered access to the Atlantic Ocean. Accordingly, at the time of the Cuban intervention in Angola, the Argentinian Foreign Minister expressed concern that these events could lead to a change in the status quo in the South Atlantic which would in turn threaten the country's sea lines of communication.[11] To Argentina, an understanding on the defence of the South Atlantic which included Brazil and herself as the pivot would ensure stability in the region and secure recognition of Argentina's sphere of influence in the South Atlantic (Manning, 1977:7; Sohr, 1981:24 and Tambs, 1979:28-29).

SATO: THE ELUSIVE GOAL?

We will next look at the various events surrounding the SATO (South Atlantic Treaty Organisation) concept. The whole idea of a more formal defence arrangement between states in the southern hemisphere was not an initiative which was solely pioneered by the South Africans. Already in 1964, after the military take-over, President Castello Branco of Brazil and Prime Minister Salazar of Portugal discussed the possibility of an agreement regarding the joint defence of the Cape sea route. The Argentinian ambassador to South Africa during 1964-1966 reportedly played an instrumental role in convincing his government to enter into discussions with South Africa regarding the possibility of closer military relations. The military government of General Ongania in Argentina (1966-1970) proved to be quite receptive to the idea, as in fact the majority of the other ensuing military governments would prove to be.[12] Thus, in 1966, according to Hurrell (1983:347), an exchange programme for personnel of the Argentinian and South African navies was instituted[13] (Fig, 1979:23; Forrest, 1982:3; *Swiss Press Review and News Report*, August 1978a:5).

This was followed in 1967 by the visit of a South African naval contingent to Argentina which included joint exercises between the two navies. A decision was taken to appoint naval attachés to the respective missions of both states. Although this cannot be confirmed, it was also reported that the Brazilian navy had taken part in joint exercises with Portugal and South Africa during 1968-1969. The Brazilian navy training ship, 'Custodio de Mello', which was on a world cruise to visit friendly states, did however

visit Cape Town in 1968. Also in 1968, the then South African Minister of Defence (Mr P.W. Botha) announced in parliament that confidential talks, concerning possible co-operation in the defence of shipping lanes in the southern hemisphere, had taken place between South African service personnel and those of other states in the area.

Foreign Minister Muller's visit to Argentina and Brazil in March/April 1969 included talks with the Argentinian Minister of Defence. Muller's warning (which he repeated to the Brazilian Foreign Minister) in Buenos Aires, concerning the threat of the Soviet navy in the South Atlantic, was reiterated by Defence Minister Botha who emphasised the role South America and South Africa would have to play in this regard. Directly after Muller's return, the Chief of the Argentinian Navy, Admiral Pedro A. Gnavi, arrived in South Africa as a guest of the Defence Department. Notwithstanding these developments and the ideological views of the military who were in charge at the time, both the Argentinian and Brazilian foreign ministries issued formal statements in 1969 denying any alleged intention to enter into a South Atlantic Treaty with South Africa or other states in the region. Military planners in these states and in Uruguay continued, however, to openly favour the inclusion of South Africa in a South Atlantic defence system (De Beer, 1980:556-557; Fig, 1979:29; Hurrell, 1983:353; Manning, 1977:5; *Swiss Press Review and News Report*, August 1978b:5; *The Star*, 4 July 1969 and *The Star*, 1 December 1969).

The 'alliance' issue resurfaced in 1976, in the aftermath of the decolonisation of Angola and Mozambique. The reason for this was the large-scale projection of Cuban troops into Angola (brought on by the military intervention of South Africa on the side of UNITA and the FNLA against the MPLA) and the possibility of Angolan ports being made available to the Soviet Navy. A flurry of activity by the parties who were concerned about these events ensued. For South Africa an opportunity arose to drive home the necessity of a link-up by the friendly states in the South Atlantic to counter the now 'tangible' Soviet threat in the area. Although it was later made clear that such a formal move was still politically unacceptable to some of the parties concerned (particularly the USA and Brazil), a number of meetings did take place among high-ranking officers from the USA, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and South Africa. This, and the fact that conservative military planners and newspapers in Brazil and Argentina were openly supporting the idea of a South Atlantic Treaty Organisation, fuelled speculation on whether an agreement had in fact been reached.[14]

By December 1975 the Brazilian minister in charge of the navy, Admiral Azevedo Henning, expressed his concern during a speech at the ESG (Escola Superior de Guerra — Superior War College) about the changes in Angola and the increase in the activities of the Soviet navy in the South Atlantic.[15]

Another indication of the fact that events in Angola were looked at in a serious light was the meeting which took place in Buenos Aires during April 1976 between the outgoing commander of the the US navy in the South Atlantic, Admiral George Ellis, his replacement Admiral James Sagerholm, Admiral Azevedo Henning of Brazil and the Argentine naval commander, Admiral Emilio Massera. Officially the meeting was held to discuss South Atlantic security, better co-ordination between the navies of Brazil and Argentina, and to prepare for the joint naval exercises (UNITAS) between the navies of the US, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay and Venezuela later that year. Shortly afterwards a joint Argentine/Brazilian naval delegation reportedly visited the Simonstown naval base in South Africa, ostensibly to discuss the logistic implications of future naval co-operation in the South Atlantic.

In September of the same year (at the time of the annual UNITAS exercises), Vice-Admiral James Johnson (Chief of the South African Navy) visited Argentina (where he stopped over at the Puerto Belgrano naval base) and Brazil. During the visit, Rear-Admiral César Guzzetti (Argentinian Minister of Foreign Affairs) expressed himself in favour of a South Atlantic treaty which would involve South Africa. In Rio de Janeiro Johnson (quoted by Hurrell, 1983:348) stated that 'the Communists are turning the area into a Soviet lake...and there's nothing we can do'.[16] Although some reports would have it that the South African navy chief was in the area to 'participate' in the Operation Unitas exercises, it seems more likely that at the most he was invited as an observer.[17] Nevertheless, the fact that he was there at all can be regarded as significant in its own right. As far as formal co-operation goes, the existence or the attempt to form an alliance was officially denied at the time by American and Brazilian government officials[18] (*Africa*, July 1977:71; *Africa Confidential*, 1977:2; Schissel, 1976:1358; Manning, 1977:6-7).

During the late seventies Brazil's diplomatic and economic offensive in Africa was in full swing. Angola, a state with which Brazil has substantive economic[19] and cordial political relations, was one of the African states which were at pains to stress the fact that they were opposed to an alliance between states in the southern hemisphere which included South Africa.[20] A formal South Atlantic alliance thus remained out of the question for the Brazilians. For this reason, the proposal for such an alliance by Admiral Hugo Marquez, chief of the Uruguayan navy, in October 1977 was summarily rejected by Brazil. From the South African side, Foreign Minister Botha (during his visit to Paraguay to attend General Stroessner's sixth inauguration as head of state) reminded those in the region who were being cold-shouldered by President Carter that an alliance would increase the capacity of individual states to resist the 'common enemy whose objectives affect all of us'. In 1979 the Brazilian navy minister again rejected the notion[21] (*Die Burger*, 15 August 1978; Hurrell, 1983:353; *Swiss Press*

Review and News Report, 1978b:6 and Tambs, 1979:22).

The advent of the Reagan administration in 1981 led to renewed expectations that an alliance between America and key southern hemisphere states might still be realised. One of the first steps which the administration undertook was to normalise relations with undemocratic anti-communist states who could act as regional allies to America's stated policy of countering and preventing further Soviet/Cuban 'adventurism'. This was reflected by the spate of high-ranking American officers who visited Argentina in 1981 and in the statements made by government policy makers.[22] Simultaneously relations between Brazil and Argentina continued to improve. In 1980 President de Figueredo of Brazil visited Argentina. During the visit the Argentinian foreign minister emphasised the significance of the improvement of relations between the two states in terms of a foundation which was being laid for an 'alliance against world communism'. In this regard the possibility of a South Atlantic defence pact was specifically mentioned by the foreign minister (Hurrell, 1983:348-349,356; Roherty, 1983:331).

During March 1981 an article (which later turned out to have been wrongly translated by the South African press) in the Brazilian magazine *Veja* suggested that Reagan sympathisers who were close to the US government had mooted the idea that the US should promote the concept of a naval alliance between Argentina, Brazil, Chile and South Africa. The South African press's interpretation that the Reagan administration had made official overtures to Brazil in this regard was immediately denied by the Brazilian Chargé d'affaires.[23] Brazil's position on the matter was that any threat to Brazil's security in the South Atlantic would be sufficiently covered by the already existing Inter-American Defence Treaty. It was against this backdrop that the Council for Inter-American Security, a conservative American think-tank, in co-operation with two Argentinian organisations (the Carlos Pellegrini Foundation and the Ateneo de Occidente) organised a conference in Buenos Aires during May 1981 (*Evening Post*, 23 March 1981; Kannyo, 1982:57; *Pretoria News*, 27 March 1981; *The Cape Times*, 28 March 1981 and *The Star*, 28 March 1981).

The conference, to which academics and military strategists from America, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Israel, Uruguay and South Africa had reportedly been invited, was arranged to look at the feasibility of forming a South Atlantic defence pact in support of NATO.[24] The head of the Council, General Gordon Sumner (retired), at the time of the conference was also acting as the special adviser to the US Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, Thomas Enders. General Vernon Walters (former deputy director of the CIA, and in 1981 special adviser on Latin America to the Secretary of State, General Alexander Haig) reportedly decided against attending the conference because of the unfavourable publicity surrounding

the event in America. According to reports in the South African press, South Africa would be represented at the conference by Dr Dirk Kunert (Department of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand), Dr D.A.S. Herbst (international communications expert) and a senior executive official from SASOL (South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation) (*Die Transvaler*, 25 May 1981 and Sohr, 1981:23).

However, both the South African Minister of Defence, General Malan, and a spokesperson from the Department of Foreign Affairs denied that South Africa was officially involved or had been invited to the conference. Dr Herbst later criticised the reports emphasising that he would not be attending and that he knew nothing about the discussions about a naval alliance which were alleged to be the main topic of the conference. Nevertheless he confirmed that a similar study group had met two years earlier to exchange ideas. (*Die Transvaler*, 26 May 1981).

In New York reports about the meeting were considered substantive enough to warrant an official condemnation from the chairperson of the United Nations Committee against Apartheid, Mr Akporode Clark. This resulted in a statement on the matter by Argentina at the United Nations, which emphasised the government's opposition to any military agreement which included South Africa. Chile, however, remained openly enthusiastic about the possibility of such an alliance — no doubt seeing an opportunity to gain some influence in the South Atlantic Ocean at Argentina's expense. At a function in honour of the visiting South African Vice-Admiral M.A. Bekker, a high-ranking Chilean naval officer noted that: 'the quadrangle formed by Chile in Punta Arenas (southern Chile), the Beagle Channel and the Antarctic, by Britain in the Falkland Islands, by Brazil, and by South Africa must be the support base for the defence of the South Atlantic' (Sohr, 1981:23 and *The Cape Times*, 26 May 1981).

The conflict between Britain and Argentina over the disputed Falkland Islands between 2 April and 14 June 1982 led to allegations which seemed to be supportive of those who had argued that an 'arrangement' of sorts between Argentina and South Africa was in fact in existence and had been for some time. An early indication of South Africa's unwillingness to openly support either Britain or Argentina was Foreign Minister Botha's refusal to comment on the availability of the Simonstown naval base in the event of an approach by Britain to the South African government in this regard. The possibility of a covert alliance between Argentina and South Africa seemed to gain credibility when the Foreign Minister stated in parliament that an 'understanding' existed between the two states. Reports in the South African press alleging that South Africa was possibly supplying Argentina with missiles and spare parts for its Mirages forced the Minister of Defence to make an official statement denying that any such transfers had taken place before or during the Falklands crisis (*Financial Times*, 26 May 1982, *Rand*

Daily Mail, 6 April 1982 and *Sunday Express*, 25 April 1982).

The existence of a 10-year-old military pact between Argentina and South Africa (which also reportedly included Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Israel and Taiwan) was offered as the reason for South Africa's 'commitment' to provide Argentina with the material she needed. South Africa was also said to have given some Argentinian officers specialist military training[25] (junior and senior staff courses, intelligence courses and advanced training on the Mirage fighter/bomber — the last named officially denied by a SADF spokesman). *New African* (1982:34) claimed that the existence of the treaty was officially confirmed by the Argentinian chargé d'affaires in South Africa (Mr Alfredo Oliva Day) but this seems highly unlikely considering the sensitivity of the issue at the time[26] (Adams, 1984:103 and *New African*, 1982:34).

General Malan's statement that South Africa was not providing Argentina with Mirage spares or missiles failed to satisfy London, where the statement was interpreted as dealing with specific (missiles and Mirage parts) items only. Adams (1984:103) argues that MI6 (British intelligence), which had to ensure that all possible sources of arms for Argentina were blocked, discovered the fact that South Africa and Israel were covertly aiding Argentina. It was decided that the best way to deal with the problem was to 'leak' the information to the press, in the hope that the ensuing publicity would force both states to cease supplies[27] (*Beeld*, 1 June 1982; *Financial Times*, 26 May 1982 and *The Star*, 26 May 1982).

However, the existence of a treaty between South Africa and Argentina (inclusive of the previously mentioned other states) remains a debatable point. One could for instance argue that had such a treaty existed, the South African ambassador to Argentina (Mr F.D. Tothill) would have had no need to offer the use of Simonstown to 'one or more countries capable of exercising global responsibilities for the defence of the South Atlantic and the Cape sea route' while addressing a seminar at Belgrano University during 1984. On the other hand hints of something more than just an "informal arrangement" between the two states reappeared in 1988. At a time when South Africa had lost at least two supersonic Mirage fighters (reportedly F1's) in the skies over Angola (attributable to the increasing effectiveness of Angolan defensive and offensive aerial capabilities), reports in a London daily (*The Independent*) alleged that Argentina was selling Mirage III jet fighters to South Africa. The airframes were reportedly being shipped to South Africa in crates for reassembly and upgrading by Atlas Aircraft Corporation.

The newspaper quoted 'western diplomats' as the source of the report. Although the matter was vehemently denied by the Argentinian consulate in Pretoria, and seems unlikely, considering Argentina's attempts at reacceptance within the Third World fold, the possibility of a preventative

leak by British intelligence (bearing in mind South Africa's alleged arms transfers to Argentina during the Falklands crisis) should not be discounted. (*Die Burger*, 10 June 1988; *The Cape Times*, 16 July 1988 and *The Citizen*, 10 June 1988).[28]

CHILE AND PARAGUAY: CONCRETE BENEFITS

South Africa's military relations with Chile have been close and the subject of much speculation by analysts and members of the popular media.[29] This has been particularly frustrating for Chilean diplomats who were critical of the military's diplomatic style, which included a high-profile approach to Chile's relations with South Africa. Chilean representatives at the UN for instance, perceived the regular visits by members of the ruling junta to South Africa as an impediment in their dealings with delegates of the international community at the UN, and in the Council for Namibia of which Chile was a member. Both states have in the past appointed high-ranking staff officers as ambassadors to each other's capitals. Chile under General Pinochet had also consistently supported the idea of an alliance of 'anti-communist' states in the South Atlantic. This has been part and parcel of Chile's traditional aspirations to an Atlantic Ocean outlet[30] (Morris, 1986:46).

Military co-operation between South Africa and Chile has been evident in various areas. Chilean officers of various branches of the armed forces have attended staff courses in South Africa, while Chilean pilots and pupil pilots have allegedly undergone training at South African Air Force flying schools. number of high-ranking Chilean and South African officers (including most of the members of Chile's former military junta) have made reciprocal visits. General Fernando Matthei's (Chilean Chief of the Air Force and member of the former junta) statement during a visit to South Africa in 1981 indicates the beneficial nature of the military relations between the two states. Addressing General Malan, he said that the newly appointed South African Minister of Defence had been a driving force in the improvement of relations between Chile and South Africa, and that this had allowed Chile to 'improve and update the equipment of our defence force'. We look next at the tangible indications of this co-operative arrangement and its mutual benefits (*Beeld*, 12 September 1984; *Die Vaderland*, 12 September 1984 and *The Star*, 3 November 1987).

The first sign of the burgeoning military relations between the two states was the visit of the Chilean Navy training vessel, Esmeralda, in 1977. The ship, which had been used as an interrogation centre after the coup which toppled President Allende in 1973, again called on South Africa in 1981 to participate in the festivities commemorating the twentieth celebration of Republic Day. From the beginning there were allegations that South Africa's military co-operation with Chile amounted to more than merely

symbolic visits. From 1976 onwards reports appeared stating that Chilean troops had been sent to Namibia to assist the SADF in combating SWAPO. Assistance was reported to include active combat, the training of UNITA forces involved in a civil war with the MPLA government in Angola and the monitoring of Cuban radio communications inside Angola.

Official allegations to this effect were made by the Soviet Union and SWAPO at the UN in 1978. Although the substance of the claims was rejected *in toto* by the South African authorities, the allegations concerning Chilean military personnel who assisted the SADF in the interception and translation of Spanish Cuban radio messages from within Namibia are quite true and were confirmed to the writer by a reliable source.[31] This is an important finding, because it proves that the military ties between the two states included an apparent commitment or willingness by at least one of the parties to assist the other in a (albeit low-scale) military conflict by providing military personnel (in this case in a supportive role) on the ground (*Die Burger*, 20 January 1978; Fig, 1979:30, *Hoofstad*, 18 January 1978; Sohr, 1981:24; *The Star*, 3 February 1978 and *Die Vaderland*, 16 June 1980).

During 1981 South Africa (according to the authoritative *Military Balance, 1981-1982* published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies) sold Chile 12 cactus surface-to-air missiles similar to the French croatale system which is manufactured locally under license. One of Chile's major contributions to the South African military-industrial complex was without a doubt the opportunity it provided ARMSCOR to show its prowess to the world at the FID air show in Santiago, during a time when no other state (except perhaps Paraguay and Taiwan) would have been prepared to do so (ARMSCOR had participated in the Expo 82 arms show in Athens, but was forced to withdraw following international pressure on the Greek government and the organisers of the show).

Additionally Chile, which according to the Chilean newspaper *La Epoca* was ARMSCOR's main client in Latin America, also gave the South African arms manufacturer an outlet (acting as a go-between) to the Latin American market.[32] ARMSCOR's general manager, Mr Fred Bell, stated in 1988 (at the time of FID 88) that the company expected to increase its sales in the region from $20-25 million to $50 million over the next five years. This development has not been appreciated by Brazil, also a major arms exporter, and in direct competition with South Africa for Third World clients[33] (*Die Vaderland*, 2 March 1984; Fig, 1984:251; Kannyo, 1982:55-56; *The Daily News*, 16 March 1988 and *The Star*, 28 March 1988).

ARMSCOR's display during the 1988 FID arms fair was particularly high-profile and was combined with a visit by two South African Navy ships, the SAS Drakensberg (a newly built replenishment vessel which was used to transport ARMSCOR's exhibits) and the SAS *Frans Erasmus* (a 'Minister' class strike craft), as well as a visit by the Chief of the SA Navy,

Vice-Admiral Glen Syndercombe. The UN's Special Committee against Apartheid urged member states to withdraw from the show and put pressure on the Chilean government to withdraw its invitation to South Africa. Chilean diplomatic sources later acknowledged that they had been put under unnecessary pressure and that the visit by the South African navy ships should have been more of a low-key event. Brazil, as Latin America's chief arms producer and supplier to Chile, also reacted sharply in condemning the 'flagrant violation' of the UN arms embargo (*Beeld*, 9 March 1988; *Pretoria News*, 4 March 1988; *The Argus*, 28 March 1988; *The Citizen*, 7 March 1988; and *The Star*, 28 March 1988).

A hint of the workings of South Africa's own military-industrial complex was illustrated in 1984, when Sandock-Austral (affiliated to GENCOR and ARMSCOR) in a joint venture with ASMAR (a company owned by the Chilean Navy and responsible for repair and construction work) started work on the construction of a shipyard at Punta Arenas. The facilities were opened by the Chief of the Chilean Navy on 21 November 1986. Sandock-Austral and Asmar are co-owners of the new shipyard company Sociedad Astillero Estrecho de Magallanes (SAEM), and the directorate of the company's board is rotated every two years. The R14 million contract was backed by the Industrial Development Corporation and insured by the Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation of Africa. The contract was undoubtedly facilitated to a certain extent by Lieutenant-General Jack Dutton, in 1985 one of the executive directors of Sandock-Austral and former South African ambassador to Chile (1981-1984). Official Chilean diplomatic sources regard the project at Punta Arenas as 'non-military' (*Beeld*, 2 May 1984; *Financial Mail*, 20 March 1987; *Finansies & Tegniek*, 13 February 1987 and *The Sunday Star*, 27 July 1986).

Another example of a South African-Chilean military project was the report in 1989 that ARMSCOR and Industrias CARDOEN were jointly manufacturing the G5 155 mmm howitzer at Iquique in Chile. This would enable the G5 to be exported to markets usually denied to South Africa. Chilean reaction to the report was that the joint venture was undertaken within the bounds of private initiative in a 'free zone of export' without any involvement by the Chilean government. The free zones which operate in Iquique and Punta Arenas allow local assembly of imported materials, without these being subject to import duties. Some observers have noted that Chile does not only act as an outlet for ARMSCOR's products to Latin America, but also serves as a covert conduit for South Africa's weapons and weapon technology imports[34] (*Business Day*, 8 March 1989).

According to Department of Foreign Affairs sources, South Africa has a number of bilateral treaties with Paraguay which are classified secret, but none with Chile. The nature of these treaties can only be speculated about, but Paraguay has in the past been suspected of aiding South Africa in

circumnavigating the arms embargo. During 1986 four West German citizens (all senior management personnel of Rheinmetall, a large arms manufacturer) were given suspended prison sentences and fined for selling an ammunition manufacturing plant, capable of filling artillery shells and rocket warheads up to a calibre of 203 mm, to South Africa. In order to deliver the plant to South Africa, a front company was reportedly established in Paraguay. The sale of the plant took place in 1977—coinciding with the transfer, from a US-based arms manufacturer, of the hardware and technology which ARMSCOR required to produce the G5 howitzer locally (*Die Burger*, 28 May 1986 and *The Star*, 28 May 1986).

A more tangible indication of Paraguay's role in South Africa's attempts to obtain arms and technology came in 1988, when a Paraguayan diplomat in Paranagua (Brazil) was expelled for acting as a link between West German arms manufacturers and South African buyers. special agreement with Brazil enables Paraguay (a landlocked state) to use Paranagua as a free port of entry. According to Brazilian authorities the Paraguayan diplomat had been using bonded warehouses to transfer arms from West Germany to ships headed for South Africa. In an official reaction, the Paraguayan embassy in Brazil stated that the official had been acting on his own and for personal gain. Apart from regular visits by senior military officers from both states, Paraguayan officers regularly attend training courses in South Africa (*Die Transvaler*, 6 November 1979; *Iversen*, 1987:385-386; *Sunday Times*, 6 March 1988 and *The Cape Times*, 14 December 1984).

CONCLUSION

The issue of South Africa's isolation in the international system was seemingly the chief political rationale for the outward movement foreign policy and its Latin American component. Foreign policy formulators and military planners clearly saw the Latin American 'link' (through the envisaged South Atlantic Treaty Organisation) as an opportunity to be included in the western defence system. High profile visits and cordial relations with states such as Paraguay and Chile, however, brought direct military technological and procurement benefits to South Africa and not re-acceptance in the West. Attempts to woo the largest regional actors in the Southern Cone, viz. Brazil and Argentina, met with mixed results.

Changing military rulers, inter-branch rivalry[35] among the generals, political instability and the process of democratisation in the eighties resulted in relations which were highly volatile. Open military relations with South Africa have been spurned in the past by both states because of the difficulties this would have brought about in their relations with the developing world. Political and military relations between South Africa and the Latin American states which are mentioned in this article were closest during the time that these states were under military governments or

governments which were to all intents and purposes dominated by the military. The period of democratisation in the region between 1980 and 1988 (which saw democratically elected governments coming to power in Argentina and Brazil) was characterised by a hardening of attitudes toward South Africa.[36]

At the time of writing the perceived rationale for a military alliance in the region has all but disappeared following the events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union during 1989/1990. Depending on the progress which is made in the present negotiations and reforms in South Africa, the need for the covert acquisition of weapon technology by ARMSCOR might very well become unnecessary. Already ARMSCOR and the SADF have had to experience cutbacks in personnel and budget allocations. Although the scaling down of South Africa's high-profile military relations with Chile is on the cards now that the military have departed, it seems unlikely that the joint (Industrias Cardoen and ARMSCOR) production plant at Iquique for the G5 artillery system will suffer as a result.[37] ARMSCOR might find, however, that the global demand for its products has diminished. Brazil, one of the largest arms exporters in the world (including to Iraq during its war with Iran), has experienced an unwanted side-effect of the Gulf War. States in the region are expected to shop for American military hardware after witnessing the spectacular operational successes achieved in Operation Desert Storm (*Time*, 15 April 1991).

While established military links with states such as Chile will be maintained (as illustrated by the recent visit of the SAS Tafelberg to, amongst other objectives, 'renew old friendships with the Chilean Navy', *The Argus*, 4 April 1991) it seems that the present global environment will pose its most demanding challenges for South Africa in the economic sphere. To this effect SAFTO (South African Foreign Trade Organisation) have recently launched a new 'Latin' initiative. There are certain constraints, however, which could hamper the expansion of trade relations on a large scale with Latin America. The discussion of these constraints does not lie within the scope of this article but forms an important part of the 'strategic' challenges which face South Africa in the future. The division of the world into outwardly protectionist trade blocs (an enlarged EEC with Scandinavian and Eastern European states as associated members and the Asian region with Japan as the regional hegemon) will necessitate some fundamental choices by South Africa's current and future policy makers.

ENDNOTES

1. South Africa has been subjected in the past to a form of enforced isolation due to the internal policies of the government. Geldenhuys (1985:2), who has written various articles and has recently completed a book (Geldenhuys, 1990) on the international isolation of South Africa and other states, explicates the concept of isolation by referring to the Latin root *insula*, meaning island. In international

relations this means that an actor (state or non-state) is isolated to a greater or lesser extent from other actors in the international system.
For a detailed discussion of South Africa's isolation in the international system see Geldenhuys (1985, 1988 and 1990).

2. The twenty states which are traditionally regarded as constituting the Latin American region are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela in South America; Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama in Central America; Mexico in North America; and Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Haiti in the Caribbean Sea. Jamaica, Trinidad and Barbados are not included because their political activities have traditionally taken place within geo-political and cultural arenas that differ from the above-mentioned states. Cuba will also not be included within the context of this article. The reason for this is due to the military confrontational nature of South Africa's relations with Cuba. This article is specifically concerned with co-operative interactions (Silvert and Blachman, 1976:552; Needler, 1970:3-4; Wiarda and Kline, 1985:5-6 and Weatherby *et al*, 1987:105).
3. The names of the twenty Latin American republics were used as keywords for the INEG search. The SAIIA collection maintains a specific category on South Africa's international relations with Latin America.
4. For a more thorough overview of the unstructured interview technique see Nachmias and Nachmias (1981:190-194).
5. Commandant D.B.H. Grobbelaar presented a paper on 'The Military-Strategic Aspect of the Outward Movement' at a symposium on International Politics at the Potchefstroom University for C.H.E. in August 1969. The paper was later published by ('South Africa in Outward Movement') the Centre of International Politics at the same university during 1970. In 1972, Admiral H.H. Biermann (newly appointed Commandant-General of the South African Defence Force) presented a paper entitled 'The Republic of South Africa and the Southern Hemisphere' at a symposium of the above-mentioned centre called 'South Africa and the Southern Hemisphere'. The paper was published in 1973 by the centre, and re-appeared in a somewhat revised version in 1977 as part of a book edited by Patrick Wall (British Conservative Party MP) titled *The Southern Oceans and the Security of the Free World*.
6. The first reference to the term 'outward movement' was made by Prime Minister Vorster during a public broadcast on Republic Day in 1967. The main thrust of the outward movement in foreign policy was to be directed towards the southern African region and the rest of the continent. Yet, as the substance of the policy took shape it became clear that specific importance was attached to the southern hemisphere as a whole. See for instance Muller (1968) and Mulder (1970).
7. In 1977 (the version published in Wall's book) exactly the same examples are quoted as in the 1973 publication to 'illustrate the nature and rate of this expansion' (Biermann, 1977:75). This seems odd, considering the fact that events in Angola and Mozambique presented an 'opportunity' to heap some more fiery coals on the head of a reluctant West, and that at the time of the book's publication the southern alliance concept was still very much alive. The reason for the omission can possibly be attributed to a delay in the book's publication.
8. References to the fact that the outward movement and dialogue initiatives were expected to pay dividends in terms of Western approval abound. See for example Muller (1968), Muller (1976), Spence (1973), Geldenhuys (1978), Geldenhuys (1982), Spence (1975a), Spence (1975b), Spence (1983) and Jaster (1988).
9. The reasons for focusing on Argentina and Brazil are firstly because of the fact that these states, having the Atlantic Ocean as their eastern border, have a traditional security interest in the area; secondly, in the attempts to convince other states in the southern hemisphere of the necessity for closer military co-operation in the Atlantic Ocean, Argentina and Brazil have normally been singled out by South African strategists and policy makers.

10. It is important to note that Chile has made claims to an extended economic zone in the South Atlantic which encompasses the entire Drake Passage area (this includes the contentious Beagle Channel area and the Antarctic peninsula) and clashes with similar Argentine claims. Both states nearly went to war over the issue in 1979, open conflict being prevented by papal intervention. In 1984 a treaty was concluded which awarded Chile an eastward-extending small area around the disputed Beagle Channel islands, thus providing the Chileans with an outlet to the South Atlantic. Argentina was awarded the larger extended economic zone further to the east and southeast. The Argentinian claim that Cape Horn island is the dividing line between Chilean control in the Pacific and Argentinian control in the Atlantic Ocean was also recognised (Morris, 1986:51-52).
11. See for instance the following statement by Rear-Admiral Mario Lanzarini (1977:220): 'The Argentine Republic, because of its geographical position and its dependence on the sea waterways by which over 90 percent of its foreign trade moves, must attribute vital importance to the South Atlantic Ocean and is deeply concerned about the increasing Soviet naval presence there, supported by bases in western Africa'.
12. Hurrell (1983:350) notes that Edward Milenky has characterised Argentinian foreign policy as varying between 'statist- nationalist' and 'classic liberal'. The former is coupled to a non-aligned posture and views Argentina as a developing Latin American state. This foreign policy position is identified with the governments of Peron (1946-1955 and 1973-1974) and the military government of General Lanusse (1971-1973). The latter is associated with a staunchly pro-Western and anti-communist policy. The policies of the military government of General Ongania and the successive military regimes which followed after the 1976 military take-over are related to this foreign policy outlook (Blakemore, 1987:122-123).
13. Alfredo Astiz, former military attaché at the Argentinian mission in Pretoria, who was recalled after his involvement in the Naval Mechanics School ('Escuela') interrogation centre was made public, had reportedly attended a South African Navy training course (*The Daily News*, 26 February 1983).
14. The conservative Argentine newspaper, *La Nacion*, stated in an editorial (shortly after a conference to discuss strategy in the South Atlantic had been held in Argentina) that: 'Our relationship with South Africa must be reconsidered. South Africa is a bastion against Communist infiltration already present in the South Atlantic'. Still in reference to the conference *La Nacion* wrote: 'Only three countries, who by their culture and their tradition are part of the Western world, have a geographical situation which enables them to play an important role in the control and the protection of the southern Atlantic: Argentina, Brazil and South Africa' (*Africa*, 1977:71; Manning, 1977:6 and *The Citizen*, 1 November 1977).
In Brazil the conservative *O Estado de Sao Paulo* reported at the time of the annual Unitas exercises in 1976 that a number of Latin American states were considering the formation of a permanent inter-American naval force to ensure a Western presence in the South Atlantic. In a similar vein the Argentinian newspaper *Hoy* and the Chilean weekly *Que Pasa* published 'details' of the nature of the pact which was supposedly being considered, amongst other things alleging the involvement of Britain and South Africa. These reports were probably given to the press by elements of the military in Argentina and Brazil who wanted an agreement of sorts to be concluded (Manning, 1977:6).
15. An article published in the journal of the ESG in 1976 states that: '...the transformation of Angola into a communist country represents a very considerable increase in the aggressive power that can be levelled against South America in general and Brazil, because of its geographical position, in particular' (quoted by Hurrell, 1983:352).
16. Vice-Admiral Johnson was also quoted in the local *Jornal do Brasil*: 'Politics is politics, but our problem is more serious than that. I would like to collaborate with the Brazilians and have them collaborate with us. We cannot remain alone. We can't guard this side of the South Atlantic alone' (*The Star*, 13 November 1976).

17. Johnson himself was later quoted as having said that, 'he would give his right arm to take part in Operation Unitas' (*The Star*, 13 November 1976).
18. During September 1976 Antonio Azeredo Silveira (Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs) emphasised that: 'There is not the slightest possibility of establishing a collective security system in the South Atlantic, especially with the awkward and unwanted presence of South Africa'. This denial was repeated during 1977, when a senior Uruguayan naval officer expressed himself in favour of a South Atlantic defence pact. Also in 1977 the US Secretary of Defence, Mr. Harold Brown, stated that 'he knew of no plans to establish a 'link-up' between the navies of South Africa and certain Latin American states' (Fig, 1979:29–30; Hurrell, 1983:353; *The Star*, 12 October 1976; 8 January and 8 December 1977).
19. On the Brazilian side exports of food and manufactured goods (eg. vehicles), provision of technology, and contractual construction projects undertaken by Brazilian companies. The Angolans on their part export oil to Brazil (Forrest, 1982:15-16).
20. The Angolan Foreign Minister expressed his opposition to such a pact at the time of Angola's admission to the UN in 1977, stating that: '...it is in effect an offensive military pact against southern Africa and it constitutes a menace for world peace'. In 1979 the Angolan representative at the inauguration of General Joao Baptista de Figueredo wanted assurances from the new Brazilian head of state that Brazil would not enter into a South Atlantic defence pact with South Africa (*Africa*, 1977:71 and *Pretoria News*, 19 March 1979).
21. The substance of Brazil's foreign policy at the time is succinctly expressed by Barbieri (1977:93) viz.: (a) 'That from a pragmatic point of view alliances with losers are not feasible'. (b) 'That relationships with countries still under white control would make relationships with Black Africa extremely difficult'. (c) 'That the security of the South Atlantic area will be strengthened when countries under white control are taken over by non-Marxist black governments'.
22. During 1981 the following American officers visited Buenos Aires: General Vernon Walters (former deputy director of the CIA, special adviser on Latin American affairs to the Secretary of State, General Alexander Haig), General Edward Meyer (US Army Chief of Staff) and Admiral Harry Train (NATO's Supreme Allied commander Atlantic — SACLANT) (Hurrell, 1983:356 and Sohr, 1981:22-23).
    Statements by the US Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, Thomas Enders, left no doubt that a re-evaluation of former outcasts' role in regional security was taking place. Enders specifically stressed the importance of closer relations with states in South America for the defence of the South Atlantic (for example during his visit to Brazil during August 1981). A proposal to solve the problem of South Africa's involvement in the regional defence of the area was apparently suggested by Admiral Train in Montevideo in July 1981 when he stated that the need to ensure a South Atlantic defence 'must lead the nations concerned to develop a natural defence, even without a pact, treaty or formal agreement' (Hurrell, 1983:356, 358 and Sohr, 1981:24).
23. The Brazilian Foreign Minister, visiting Nigeria during April 1981, stated that Brazil would never form part of a military alliance which included South Africa (Sohr, 1981:22).
24. According to Kannyo (1982:57) a similar conference also took place in Washington during August 1979. Among the participants mentioned are General Ramon Diaz Bessone (retired) from Argentina, General Carlos de Meira Mattos from Brazil, Ray S. Cline from America (former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency), Dr. Dirk Kunert from South Africa (Department of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand) and Patrick Wall from Britain (Conservative Party Member of Parliament). The fact that this conference did take place was confirmed by Dr. D.A.S. Herbst in 1981, when he was asked whether he would be attending the Buenos Aires conference (*Die Transvaler*, 26 May 1981).
25. Chilean pilots and pupil pilots have in the past allegedly undergone training at

various South African Air Force flying schools (own source).

26. Mr. Alfredo Oliva Day was in fact asked about the treaty at the time. His reply: 'That is a very delicate matter. You will have to speak to the South Africans'. (*Sunday Times*, 11 April 1982).
27. According to Adams (1984:103) British intelligence maintained that both states continued to supply arms and spares to Argentina until after the conflict. These included: Gabriel missiles, Mirages spares, bombs and aircraft ammunition. Adams ventures that unofficial sources in South Africa have confirmed these assertations.
28. A final note; the military (read navy) 'connection' between Argentina and South Africa ostensibly remained in place even after the severing of diplomatic relations in 1986. The *Department of Foreign Affairs List* for 1988 showed that the vice-consul for 'maritime affairs' at the consulate in Buenos Aires was a South African navy officer.
29. The closeness of these relations has also been perceived by other Latin American states. In 1980 the Argentinian Navy stopped and searched a Greek freighter in the disputed Beagle Channel area on suspicion of transporting armaments from South Africa to Chile. The ship was on its way from Durban to Valparaiso via Punta Arenas (*Beeld*, 17 July 1980).
30. In 1981 a senior Chilean navy officer (probably Rear-Admiral Ghisolfo Araya, vice chief of staff of the Chilean Navy), at the time of Vice-Admiral Bekker's visit, emphasised the need for a defence alliance in the South Atlantic, but left out Argentina as one of the states which would form a part of such an alliance. This was an indication of the traditional rivalry between Chile and Argentina (concerning the Beagle Islands) and reportedly resulted in an official condemnation by the Argentinians which rejected Chile's 'pretensions' in the South Atlantic. The statement was later repudiated by President Pinochet of Chile (Kannyo, 1982:58 and Sohr, 1981:23).
31. As recently as 1988/1989 Chilean military personnel in civilian clothing were observed at the town of Grootfontein in Namibia, where the SADF maintained a major logistical support base during South Africa's war against SWAPO insurgents (own source).
32. A South African diplomatic source stated that ARMSCOR has no 'bilateral' links with any Latin American state. ARMSCOR does, however, have a Latin American section. Apart from Chile, other clients in Latin America reportedly include Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela (*Business Day*, 18 March 1988).
33. During 1970-1979 Brazil was ranked second to Israel as a Third World arms exporter. Libya and Chile alone were responsible for more than 45% of the purchases. Armoured vehicles (Engesa) and aircraft (Embraer) have also been sold to African states such as Gabon, Sudan, Togo and Upper Volta. In 1977 Brazil and Libya concluded a contract for the delivery of 4000 armoured cars. Brazil specialises in low technology, low priced armaments that can be used by inexperienced soldiers, as well as in the refurbishing and upgrading of equipment (Forrest, 1982:8 and *New African*, 1978:90).
34. The cluster bomb system which was displayed by ARMSCOR at FID 1986, had already been provided to Iraq by Chile's Industrias Cardoen in 1980. The question about who provided the technology required to develop the system to whom immediately arises (*Time*, 10 December 1990).
35. During periods of military rule, Brazilian and Argentinian navy chiefs have in the past been in favour of the alliance concept because it would increase their prestige and budget allocation — important benefits which could be utilised in their rivalry with the army and air force for the presidency.
36. Nevertheless, Argentina's attempts to regain its international status after the 'dirty war' and again after the Falkland/Malvinas islands crisis led to some heavy-handed political action against South Africa, notwithstanding the fact that the military were in power at the time of some of these events.

37. Carlos Cardoen, who became openly critical of Pinochet's government in the final years of its existence, has ensured his relations with the new government of President Patricio Aylwin by contributing $1 million to the presidential election campaign in 1989 as well as undisclosed sums of money to several notable congressional candidates (*Time*, 10 December 1990).

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Philip Nel

OLD AND NEW THINKING ON THE BANKS OF THE MOSKVA AND THE APIES: PERCEPTIONS, IMAGES, AND EGO DEFENCES IN SOVIET-SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS

Abstract: Significant conceptual changes have accompanied the warming of official Soviet-South African relations between 1987 and 1991. These conceptual changes are here systematised and explored by means of a theoretically developed strategy for inferring perceptions. The strategy is based on balance theory and utilises symbolic representations or images as empirical evidence from which perceptions can be inferred. It is concluded that official South African thinking about the Soviet Union has evolved from an *evil enemy image* before 1988 to a *weakened enemy* image by 1990. The latter was by 1990 being challenged by a *potential partner* image. Soviet thinking about South Africa used to be caught up in the *polarized society* stereotype. Since 1987 this has made way, somewhat ambiguously, for an image which depicts South Africa as a *redeemable adolescent*.

1. GETTING GRIP ON PERCEPTIONS

The contribution of the cognitive revolution in foreign policy studies does not lie in its ability to provide a comprehensive and ultimate explanation of foreign policy behaviour. It lies rather in drawing the analyst's attention to the fact that all explanations of foreign policy behaviour in one way or the other have to make assumptions about how policy makers perceive and evaluate their environment. And if it indeed is the case that we cannot escape the 'subjective side' of foreign policy, psychologically minded authors continue, then we might as well be as explicit as possible about it.

There is considerable evidence that cognitive variables played, and still continue to play, an important role in Soviet — South African relations. 'Cognitive variables' I take to refer to those aspects which constitute decision makers as *believers*, as *perceivers*, as *information processors*, as *strategists*, and as *learners* (Holsti 1976). Not much has been written which explicitly distinguishes and explores these various cognitive categories as far as they relate to Soviet-South African relations, but available evidence suggests that mutual *perceptions* were especially significant. It is common knowledge that South African decision makers entertained a well developed threat perception attributed to the Soviet Union. Perceptions of a Soviet threat and perceptions of existing opportunities to exploit Western mistrust of Soviet motives induced, supported, and/or legitimised much of South

African foreign and domestic policy in the era of P.W. Botha.

Similarly, Soviet policy towards South Africa could to a large degree be attributed to Soviet perceptions of the 'bounded opportunities' presented to it by the existence of a universally despised white minority government which, by accident of history, tended to be associated with the capitalist West. Soviet policy was, however, extremely careful, given Soviet fears about a possible Western retaliation and the uncertainty of Soviet decision makers about the relative strengths and weaknesses of its main allies on the South African scene. Perceptions of opportunity, and evaluations of the strength and weakness of rivals and allies, thus seem to have played a prominent role in Soviet policy.

Altered images of the nature of the South African 'problem', and a different set of perceptions about South Africa and the West have been notable features of Soviet policy towards South Africa since 1987 (see Kempton, 1990; Nel, 1990a; Friedman and Narsoo, 1989; Phillips, 1990). Commentators differ on the extent and implications of these cognitive changes, but there can be little doubt that a major shake-out of traditional stereotypes has taken place. In this respect Soviet policy towards South Africa has been part of a broader cognitive revolution, which is known as 'new thinking in Soviet foreign policy'. What we need is a systematisation and exploration of these changes in terms of concepts developed by students of cognitive processes and change. This applies equally to changes in South African official conceptions of the Soviet Union. Although these changes are less dramatic, less explicit, and often more ambiguous than changes in Soviet conceptions, they do constitute a basic cognitive reorientation (see Geldenhuys, 1988) which is equally in need of systematisation and conceptual exploration. *The primary aim of this paper is to provide an exploratory systematisation of available information about how Soviet decision makers viewed South Africa in the past and how this has changed in the Gorbachev era, and to do the same for South African views of the Soviet Union.* In order to do so, I use and develop the concept of perceptions as a device around which complex cognitive processes and change can be systematised.

Ever since Jervis's pioneering book on the subject (1976), many scholars have come to regard perceptions as a useful rubric under which to subsume cognitive variables. In the process they tend to follow Jervis's rather loose usage of the concept. 'Perception' is thus often used as a catch-all term. Fortunately, some scholars have recently come to accept that this will not do. To escape the trap of non-vacuous contrast, when a concept is defined so loosely and is made so widely applicable that it loses all meaning, they suggest that perceptions should be distinguished at least from beliefs, values, images, and attitudes (as some social psychologists have done all along). Slowly, a consensus is emerging amongst these conceptually sophisticated

scholars that 'perceptions' should be used in foreign policy analysis to refer preferably to the results of *evaluative, judgemental* activities by means of which meaning and importance are ascribed to events and behaviour.[1] Decision makers are called upon to make these evaluations continuously, but they are especially relevant in circumstances of uncertainty and when relatively high costs are involved. With this in mind, perceptions may be defined *as the results of evaluations we make about objects, persons, and state of affairs. These evaluations ascribe meaning, i.e. importance and significance to the information we receive.*[2] 'Judgement' is thus the primary operative word when we consider political perceptions.

One of the implications of this definition is that perceptions, *qua* judgements, can be inferred. This is not because perceptions reside somewhere in the hidden depths of our minds. 'Perception', as a meaning concept, refers to the way people use language and other symbolic tools to attach value and significance to other people, their values and intentions, and their behaviour. Perceptions in foreign policy analysis can be read off, as it were, from the ways in which decision makers use publicly observable language and from the rules governing the social practices which are reflected in their language use. Meaning is a function of the way in which people use language, and not an entity residing somewhere in the depths of our minds. Perceptions thus have an inescapable *social* dimension, and should be regarded as the result of social activities, not as units of mind.[3] We need to be reminded that the origin of the concept 'perception' is the Latin 'percipere' which means 'to lay hold of, seize, to collect, gather, harvest', with its derivation 'perceptio' meaning 'a receiving, grasping, gathering together'. All of these refer to rule-governed, social activities, and not operations of the mind. To have a perception, one might say, originally meant to partake in a *public activity*, not that you exercise some *mental faculty*.

The bulk of this paper is devoted to the application, with necessary modifications, of the 'strategy for inferring perceptions' suggested by Richard Herrmann (1984; 1985; 1986; 1988) to the mutual perceptions of South African and Soviet decision-makers. In addition, the usefulness of this strategy in explicating some of the hidden determinants of change in the prevailing perceptions will be explored. It will be argued that understanding the perceptual processes at play allows us to determine the relative extent to which important opinion formers of both countries have taken leave of past ingrained cognitive patterns or stereotypes, and why. This, it is hoped, will add a novel dimension to our understanding of the changing nature of relations between the two countries — a dimension which will be ignored if we focus only on the inducements and constraints faced by the two states on the macro-systemic level.

2. STRATEGY FOR INFERRING PERCEPTIONS AND EXPLAINING PERCEPTUAL CHANGE

When engaging in the multifarious activities of publicly justifying their decisions and behaviour, decision makers constantly invoke, create, and recreate public images of themselves and of others. *Images* are the symbolic representations we create of others and ourselves through our use of language. Note here that behavioural patterns are also symbolic in nature (Harré, 1979), and thus policy decisions and policy behaviour can be subsumed, together with linguistic justifications, under the rubric of symbolic actions which invoke, create or recreate public images. Such public images provide the clues from which evaluative judgements or perceptions can be inferred.

Cognitive balance or consistency theory stipulates that a subject's emotional sentiments (feelings) toward another person or object would be balanced with the images painted by the subject of that person or object. Hence, intense dislike would be reflected in the portrayal of negative attributes (Heider, 1958; Kiesler, Collins, and Millier, 1969). This portrayal of negative attributes tends to be consistent or balanced with the initial affect, since it is only by balancing acts of this nature that we release ourselves from motivational constraints in the form of value trade-offs. In short, by balancing our affect toward and cognitive representation of a person or object, we make it easier for ourselves to take actions against or concerning the other. If a person is vehemently disliked, our public symbolic representation of that person will be balanced with our dislike in order to justify our taking severe action against him or her. This process can be regarded as a specific instance of that class of cognitive short-cuts which constitute actors as cognitive misers.

The literature on the role of perceptions in international relations emphasises repeatedly that decision makers use simplified rule-of-thumb cognitive procedures to release them from the complexity of varied information and value inconsistencies (Jervis, 1968; Jervis, 1976; De Rivera, 1968; Stein, 1988a, 1988b). This I take to be a process akin to the process of affective-cognitive balance or consistency. Simplification, however, not only means smoothing out information to fit with affect and preconceived beliefs, but also 'managing' our images to conform to our judgmental assessments of threat (and opportunity), and complementarity of value/cultural systems. By establishing conformity between images and perceptions, decision makers are released from debilitating value trade-offs which impede decisive action.

For our purpose, perceptions can thus be regarded as analogous to the affective units identified by balance theory as the axes around which images of the other are balanced. This act of balancing perceptions and symbolic portrayals is thus taken to be similar to the simplification process identified

by balance theory, with the exception that affect is now replaced by perceptions, i.e. evaluations, particularly of threat and opportunity, and value compatibility. Since such perceptions, with their accompanying circumstances of relative high cost and uncertainty, are crucial predispositional, enabling variables, their effect on cognitive processing cannot but be significant. As a general rule, we can postulate that the more intense the perception of threat (or opportunity), the more simplified the imagery employed to describe the source of that threat. As is the case with interpersonal affect and its effect on the portrayal of attributes, the simplified imagery of the other in international relations, *evoked* by the perception of threat or opportunity, facilitates decision making by eliminating value trade-offs (Herrmann, 1988: 185). Perceptions of *threat* and *opportunity* can thus be regarded as the master perceptions which determine cognitive simplification. Yet another set of perceptions is also of importance, especially when one deals with an adversarial relationship which stretches over a long time period. These are the evaluative judgments that are formed about the other's basic values or culture, and the degree to which these are regarded as compatible or incompatible with one's own. While it is the perceptions of threat or opportunity which in particular instances of uncertainty and high cost would trigger the simplification process described above, an enduring perception of value incompatibility provides a base for the reinforcement of simplified symbolic representation of an adversary over a longer time period. It provides continuity, as it were, to the perceptions of threat or of opportunity.

Our perceptions can be said to be parasitical on our knowledge or beliefs about the adversary's intentions, capabilities, and decisional processes. Information/beliefs about these are the basic cognitive material with which the evaluative activities of determining opportunities and threats, and weighing up cultural/value differences are performed. In short, it provides the information on which perceptions are based.

For my purposes, the justificatory symbolic representation of the other's intentions, capabilities and decision processes, whether explicit or implicit, can be regarded as the basic symbolic data from which the contents of perceptions can be inferred. I take the portrayal of the other's *intentions, capabilities* and *decisional process* as the operationalised units of the concept of image. By generating data about these image units, we may be able to infer decision makers' perceptions of threat or opportunity, and evaluations of the compatibility of the other's culture/values with one's own.

Actors' symbolic representations or images of an adversary, so balance theory suggests, would be consistent with the perceptions formed in circumstances of uncertainty, decisional need, and when relatively high costs are involved. These images are more than post-hoc rationalisations but are linked to the perceptions underlying them. Herrmann suggests that we

should view these underlying perceptions as *causes* of the images used (1988). Perhaps 'cause' is too strong a word to use here, and one should rather opt for a notion of weak causality or *evocation* to portray the linkage between perceptions and images. Perceptions, I would argue, *evoke* images in two ways. First, certain types of perceptions, e.g. a strong threat perception would, all other factors being equal, induce decision makers to portray the source of this threat as 'evil intentioned'. Particular perceptions thus evoke particular images. More interesting, though, is the second possibility. If a set of integrated, mutually reinforcing perceptions are entertained, this set of perceptions may evoke a similarly integrated, mutually reinforcing pattern of images. Let us call such sets of integrated images, which are in balance with a 'gestalt' of perceptions, 'stereotypes'. Usually a term of opprobrium, 'stereotype' is here used rather as the opposite of 'complex'. Stereotypes are therefore simplified depictions of another nation's or state's attributes resulting from the cognitive-balance process summarised above.

Cognitive theory has suggested that the purpose of the act performed to balance attitudes and symbolic representations, and in our version of this theory, to balance perceptions and images, is the motivation to *defend* and *maintain* self-esteem. As Herrmann (1988:182) argues, some theorists wish to distinguish between two types of motivational factors: the motivation aimed at maintaining self-esteem on the one hand, and on the other the motivation to maintain self-schemata — that is, the maintenance of patterned attitudes and beliefs about the self. This distinction may be purely semantic, and he proposes that we simply use *ego defence* as a general category to subsume both. I accept this suggestion with the provision that one does not thereby imply that *ego defence* is the only causal factor which sets in motion the evocation link between attitudes and representation, or perceptions and images. Yet, the motivation of ego defence, one can argue, is a crucial variable in the development of a theory of perceptions. All other variables we call upon to develop an adequate analysis of perceptions in international relations presuppose ego-defence in one form or another.

Introducing this motivational aspect of ego defence allows for the completion of the chain of inference and evocation suggested above. As it stands, this chain comprises the inference of perceptions from symbolic representations or images, since certain perceptions would evoke certain representational images to ensure the enabling balance I spoke of earlier. The motivational factor of ego-defence is a dynamic key within this evocation process. Uncritical, high self-esteem would tend to factor into the perceptual process in such a way that a rigid, stereotyped symbolic representation of the other would be evoked. If A perceives a threat from B, for example, and if A entertains an uncritical, high self-esteem, it is probable that B would be represented by in stereotyped imagery. Note that I am

speaking only about a *probability* since other factors, perhaps of a domestic political nature, may influence the 'colour' variance between different simultaneous representations of state B by two different actors in state A. This variance may be accounted for by say, the bureaucratic interests or audiences of the two actors. In general, however, variant representations or images will be variations of a theme constituted by a mutually shared level of self-esteem and its combination with prevailing perceptions.[4]

Figure 1 is useful to summarise the argument developed in this section.

3. INFERRING SOVIET AND SOUTH AFRICAN PERCEPTIONS[5]

This section reports the empirical findings generated by an application of the theoretical research strategy discussed in Section 2. Given the vastness of the endeavour, some arbitrary but not indefensible filters were applied. Most important is the fact that I concerned myself predominantly with identifying the most salient general image patterns displayed by Soviet and South African officials. What I aimed at was generating justifiable conclusions about the *prevailing images and corresponding perceptions* in each period, and not the variations between the images and perceptions of individual or group decision makers.

My primary source material was obtained from published statements and writings by and direct interviews with senior officials and decision makers on both sides. In the case of the Soviet Union, governmental and semi-governmental statements on South Africa were also used. In addition, some writings by prominent Soviet journalists and academics, with known official status, were also considered. In the case of South Africa, I relied exclusively on statements and writings by senior governmental officials and cabinet ministers. In developing a comprehensive data base of South African statements about the Soviet Union, I partly relied on the work done by Botes (1985), Van Wyk and Van Nieuwkerk (1989), and Geldenhuys (1988). This was supplemented by a contents analysis of 141 South African statements on the Soviet Union issued between 1975 and 1987 (see Nel, 1991:60-61). Soviet statements on South Africa were collected as part of a larger project which is to lead to a comprehensive data base on Soviet publications and statements on South Africa. For the purposes of this study only official and semi-official statements were used.

All statements were selected and classified according to the operationalised image indicators identified above, and general conclusions drawn about the contents of the prevailing images. These conclusions were compared with records of the policy behaviour of both states to determine their (provisional) validity. Since these conclusions are based on an interpretive mode of analysis, they can hardly be more than approximations. They do allow us, however, to present systematically a few

FIGURE 1: A THEORY FOR INFERRING PERCEPTIONS



*** Dotted lines refer to process of reinforcement**

interesting things about Soviet-South African perceptions and images. The documentary evidence used to trace images and infer perceptions are presented in a larger research report (Nel, 1991).

3.1 South African images and perceptions of the Soviet Union before 1988: the 'evil enemy' image

In terms of the three operationalised indicators I have identified above as empirical referents of a stereotyped image, South African prevailing imagery of the Soviet Union up until 1988 can be summarised thus:

Since the late 1930s[6], but especially since 1970, South African decision makers had repeatedly pictured Soviet behaviour in Southern Africa as motivated by aggressive intentions directed at South Africa itself, but also against the 'Western world'. These intentions were depicted, as uniquely evil, stemming primarily from the desire of the 'godless communists' to universalise the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Since 1929, Nationalist politicians, and before then other white politicians as well, believed that Marxism-Leninism's internationalist ideology incited blacks against whites and so undermined the basis of white state power. In addition, Marxism-Leninism's emphasis on class as a mobilising principle threatened the unity of the white (Afrikaner) people. Being an Afrikaner Nationalist thus by definition meant that communism's and Soviet intentions were regarded as directed against the very soul of Afrikanerdom. This basic conviction increased in intensity throughout the period 1948-1988 and received repeated reinforcement as the SACP moved closer to the ANC, and when Soviet and Cuban involvement in Southern Africa put beyond all doubt what the 'real intentions' of communists were.

Although public statements dealing with Soviet capabilities are scarce, three themes were often emphasised. First, Soviet military power, infrastructural resources and political will were rated very highly. This did not preclude the South African government from risking direct confrontation with Soviet forces or Soviet backed forces, especially in Angola from 1981 onwards. Such action was, however, based on shrewd assessments of the likely reaction of the USSR to, say, the South African invasion of Southern Angola in 1981. Soviet force posture was not underestimated, but was rather depicted as being neutralised by greater American assertiveness in the early Reagan era. Second, Soviet military deliveries to Southern African states were portrayed as of a greater order than was justified by the security needs of the recipient countries. Third, Russians were in general regarded as prone to extreme violence and licentiousness. Horror stories about the persecution of believers in the USSR embedded this in the minds of white South Africans who by nature are inclined towards religious fundamentalism. Soviets could thus not be

trusted to keep to civilized standards of behaviour, or to the civilised rules of international law.

Soviet decision-making was presented as being highly coordinated, even monolithic, and each Soviet pronouncement on South Africa, real or imputed, was depicted as an expression of a unity of will, of a hierarchical command structure, and of a high degree of coordination between the political and military branches of government.

These three dimensions of the prevailing South African image represent a close approximation of the stereotype identified by Herrmann (1985:35-36) and Cottam (1977) for which the metaphor of the 'evil enemy' is appropriate. The 'evil enemy' image of the other (or opponent) can be regarded as a stereotype since it lies at the opposite end of the spectrum from the complex image. Entertaining such stereotypes, balance theory suggests, frees the actor from moral constraints. As Herrmann writes:

> Characterizing the 'enemy' as diabolically evil, a leader can suspend moral restrictions on his own nation's actions. He can then impose his nation's preferred values with coercive strategies and tactics of force that would normally appear reprehensible. The argument in its simplest form is that if people perceive a dire threat to their preferred values, they are inclined to hate the source of that threat. They are likely to see the source of threat in terms that allow them to forego moral restraints and use all the forces available to defeat the challenge and ensure their preferences. (1985:35)

While I cannot here go into the detail of how South African behaviour tended to comply with the pattern one would theoretically expect in the light of the above, two general characteristics of South African behaviour have to be mentioned. The first is that the imagery employed to describe Soviet intentions, capabilities and decision making were extensively used to justify the so-called 'total national strategy' to counter the perceived 'total onslaught'. As Seegers (1988) points out, the rhetoric of the total onslaught was the rhetoric of centralisation. The total national strategy included the restructuring of South African decision-making to make allowance for the dominance of: 'security issues', an aggressive 'forward' regional policy which led to the destabilisation of countries which were regarded as tools of Soviet machinations, and an increasing militarisation of the South African society as part of a state-authoritarian drive to gain advantages over domestic opponents. This included the banning of political organisations, incarceration of political opponents, and, as has become known recently, a wide array of dubious covert actions to destabilise or eliminate 'enemies of the state'.

The second general characteristic of South African behaviour in terms of its *evil enemy* image of the Soviet Union, was the emphasis that was placed on the expectation that if opposed resolutely, the enemy would back down. This was evident *inter alia* from the considerable risks the SADF took in 1981

to invade Southern Angola (Operation Protea).[7] At that stage, the South African authorities had only little evidence that such a move would be tacitly supported by the new conservative administration in Washington. In contrast, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the build-up of Soviet backed forces in Angola, indicated a Soviet willingness to extend itself considerably.

Despite the uncertainty about the likely Western and Soviet responses, the operation went ahead. In retrospect, this can be explained partly by the logic of the response pattern evoked by Pretoria's evil enemy image of the Soviet Union. As Herrmann (1985:36) indicates, enemy images generally contain a portrayal of the enemy's power and capabilities derived, amongst others, from the weakness of one's own state. If the enemy's actions are met by strong, decisive action, it will be exposed as a 'paper tiger'. I would like to suggest that a recognition of this aspect of the response pattern evoked by evil enemy stereotypes, provides a strong explanatory clue for South Africa's destabilisation strategy in Southern Africa. It also helps us to explain the origin of the repeatedly expressed South African frustration with the West for not standing up decisively enough to the Soviet Union in Southern Africa. This response pattern evoked by the prevailing official South African images of the Soviet Union before 1988, can be labelled that of the *uncompromising defender.*[8]

Having identified the prevailing imagery and its corresponding response pattern, we can now proceed to infer, in terms of our general theory, the perceptions which can be said to have guided the cognitive processes by means of which South African decision makers managed their beliefs about and attitudes towards the Soviet Union. As was shown in a previous section, perceptions are more than cognitive tools, since they relate directly to behaviour by acting as enabling and limiting devices — they determine what would count as reasonable and unreasonable behaviour in particular circumstances. For instance the following can be said to be the major South African perceptions up until 1988:

— As the communist state par excellence the Soviet Union was taken to embody values diametrically opposed to those of 'God-fearing, decent people (read: the Soviet Union represents values inimical to that of the South African state).
— A well-developed evaluation existed that the intentions of the Soviet Union posed an immediate and direct threat to the value preferences of the South African state.
— Western states were regarded as potential allies in the struggle against communism/the Soviet Union, but only if they stood up decisively against it. Hence, whenever key Western states were prepared to do so (e.g. during the first term of the Reagan administration), an *opportunity*

for the successful repulsion of the Soviet threat was perceived. When the West failed to do so, however, it was perceived to be an unconscious partner in the threat.

— Soviet capabilities were in general perceived to be significantly larger than those of the South African state, and deployment of such capabilities was perceived to be unjustifiably large and menacing. If opposed decisively, however, Soviet capabilities could be exposed as vulnerable.

Finally, these perceptions, the 'evil enemy' images evoked by them, and the response pattern of the uncompromising defender evoked in turn by these images, were all supported by a near total absence of critical introspection or self-doubt. As has been noted above, and by many studies of the P.W. Botha era, whatever was wrong with South Africa was attributed to the activities of forces which were misguided, indoctrinated and sometimes controlled by the evil forces of communism led by the Soviet Union. This we have elsewhere identified as the Othello-syndrome (van Deventer and Nel, 1990), i.e. the attribution of problems in a relationship to the machinations of an evil manipulator behind the scenes. The Othello analogy is especially relevant in the case of South Africa, since evil white men (such as Iago in Shakespeare's play) were often portrayed as the source of the aggressive behaviour of black South Africans. Moscow's white communists, and Mr. Joe Slovo as their local 'representative", fitted the bill nicely.

The complex of links between high self-esteem, perceptions of threat (and opportunity), the *evil enemy* stereotype, and the *uncompromising defender* response pattern is schematically portrayed in Figure 2. This schematic portrayal is based on the theoretical insights summarised in Figure 1.

3.2 South African images and perceptions of the Soviet Union since 1988: Moving away from the 'evil enemy' image.

Superficially, it may seem easier to trace recent official South African images and their corresponding perceptual bases. Not only have the number of references to the Soviet Union declined rapidly, but one can also detect a more open-hearted, 'glasnost-like' attitude amongst South African spokesmen on domestic and international affairs. Yet, appearances may deceive. South African statements on the Soviet Union have indeed recently become less stereotyped and more nuanced, but also more ambiguous than before. In addition, evidence exists that more than one image of the Soviet Union currently prevails amongst South African decision makers.

In some circles, especially those for which General Magnus Malan acts as spokesman, considerable mistrust towards the Soviet Union continued to exist throughout the current period under review. Doubts continue to be expressed about the intentions of the Soviet Union, and the communist

FIGURE 2: SOUTH AFRICAN PERCEPTIONS AND IMAGES OF THE SOVIET UNION UP UNTIL 1988



Legend: Unbroken lines indicate "trigger activity".
Double unbroken lines indicate "evocation".
Broken lines indicate "reinforcement".

values represented by the Soviet Union are still universally rejected as incompatible with those of the South African state. Yet, politicians and officials have, especially since 1989, come to emphasise the inherent weaknesses and vulnerability of the Soviet Union. Significantly, changing Soviet behaviour in Southern Africa, that is the willingness of the USSR to consider and engage in negotiated settlements for regional conflicts, has contributed predominantly to the incapacity of the Soviet Union to continue as in the past. Soviet moderation, hence, was at least initially, portrayed as a sign of weakness, not of changes in Soviet intentions.

These instances of prevailing mistrust and implicit doubt about Soviet intentions form part of a continuing enemy image of the Soviet Union, I would argue. Yet in one crucial respect this recent image differs from the 'evil enemy image' discussed above. The Soviet Union has now come to be described as a weak enemy, plagued by systemic crises and declining legitimacy. A useful way to capture the distinction between the enemy image of the past and that of more recently, is to refer to the latter as the 'weakened enemy' image. The salient features of this image are that Soviet intentions are still mistrusted, that Soviet behaviour is still regarded as opportunistic in the sense that Western action against apartheid provides opportunities to be exploited by the USSR and its local representatives (the SACP and ANC), but that Soviet capabilities have declined considerably. In addition, Soviet decision making is still portrayed as emanating from one, unified source. Although note is taken of changes in Soviet behaviour, these changes are attributed implicitly to the influence of one man only, Mr Gorbachev. No consideration seems to be given to the developing pluralism in Soviet decision making circles, but the 'autocratic' monopoly on power by the CPSU is rather emphasised. For all practical purposes, Soviet decision making continues to be viewed in a totalitarian mould, that is as emanating from one unified, monolithic structure which is dominated by a single leader.

These images correspond to a set of perceptions which can be summarised thus: Although the Soviet Union is perceived to be still representing values inimical to that of the South African state, its systemic weaknesses imply that the threat emanating from the Soviet Union has declined. Furthermore, the weaknesses of the Soviet Union have been exposed by the determination of the South African state to resist Soviet aggressiveness and communism in general. The combination of successful 'security actions' and declining Soviet will opens opportunities for South African diplomacy, particularly in the Southern African region, to engage in the settlement of conflicts which allow South Africa to extract itself honourably from debilitating and expensive engagements in Namibia and Angola. Opportunities for compromise are thus perceived, also as far as the domestic conflict in South Africa is concerned.

The imagery which provides clues to these perceptions also corresponds to a response pattern which can be called '*defence through compromise and co-optation*'. South Africa's intractable security problem no longer needs to be addressed by means of a centralised state authoritarian strategy in which moral concerns are suspended. Furthermore, given the domestic, economic and foreign costs of an amoral state-authoritarianism, new — albeit risky — responses had to be considered. In considering such risks, inter alia the unbanning of the ANC and SACP, and engaging in talks on Namibian independence, evaluations of Soviet/communist strength became crucial. Once communism was perceived to be terminally ill, as illustrated in the minds of South African decision makers by events in Eastern Europe in the second half of 1989, risk taking became a reasonable response. Here, I believe,lies one of the keys to Mr F W de Klerk's remarkable speech of 2 February 1990. This speech, and consequent actions by the South African authorities, did not imply that 'total onslaughtism' was completely buried, though. As I have argued elsewhere, attempts by the South African state in 1990 to co-opt the ANC through a series of pre-negotiations, notably those that led to the Groote Schuur and Pretoria minutes, were premised on one of the basic tenets of the total-onslaught scheme of thinking. In terms of this conceptual schema, the ANC and SACP were traditionally viewed as primarily an extension of an international phenomenon, world communism. The local strength of the ANC was explained away as the result of the support it received from the SACP and Moscow. Once this support was perceived to have been sufficiently weakened, the ANC was regarded as 'ready' for co-optation by the state in its renewed bid to gain local and international legitimacy.[9] Hence the choice of 'defence through compromise and co-optation' as a description of the response pattern recently followed by the South African authorities in its dealings with the communist/Soviet threat.

Figure 3 contains a schematic representation for this response pattern and its corresponding imagery and perceptions. Note that the ego evaluation which underlies this imagery is described as being 'qualified positive'. This implies that while South African decision makers did engage in some introspection on many points, such introspection on the part of the dominant proponents of the 'weakened enemy' image, was qualified. This took on different forms as far as different sections of the South African state were concerned. For General Malan and the Defence Force, introspection did not mean that the core of past strategy was rejected. In fact, past strategy was positively evaluated as a contributing factor in the opening up of new opportunities for diplomacy through compromise. While the idea of 'the new South and Southern Africa' was promoted, General Malan for instance has yet to denounce apartheid as Mr Pik Botha did in an interview with the Soviet weekly New Times ('We have crippled ourselves with apartheid',

FIGURE 3: CHANGING SOUTH AFRICAN IMAGES AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION I



New Times, No.29, 1990). Mr Pik Botha and Mr de Klerk have been remarkably frank in exposing the mistakes of the past (see Reshetnyak, 1989). Yet, such frankness has often been qualified by the implicit assumption that the demise of apartheid does not imply that the South African state has exhausted its arsenal of devices to maintain control via, inter alia, the co-optive strategy referred to above.

Co-existing somewhat uneasily with this 'weakened enemy' image of the Soviet Union, is another, as yet not fully developed, image. Some recent statements repeat the predominant image of the Soviet Union and communism in general as experiencing serious decline. Absent, however, is any reference to Soviet intentions which may be detrimental to the value preferences of the speakers. Instead, the Soviet Union is portrayed as a *possible partner* for the establishment of diplomatic and commercial relations. In addition, the possibility of cultural and intellectual commonalities between South Africa and the Soviet Union is acknowledged for the first time. While it may be too early to do so with utter conviction, these images can be summarized tentatively as constituting an image of '*a potential ally*'.[10]

On the perceptual level, this potential ally image translates into a more nuanced evaluation of the differences between communism on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other. Hitherto, these have been seen as synonymous. Now, South African spokespersons seem to argue that their continued abhorrence of communism does not mean that the Soviet Union as such should be rejected. As Mr Pik Botha suggested in his cited *New Times* interview, the Department of Foreign Affairs has taken note of the growing pluralisation underway in Soviet society. Ungenerous observers may argue that this implicit distinction between communism and the Soviet Union is being exploited in official propaganda aimed against the SACP, and in order to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and the SACP, as well as between the SACP and the ANC. This may indeed be the case.

Inter-bureaucratic rivalry in the South African state may have contributed, surprisingly, to the emergence of the 'potential ally' image and its underlying perceptions. Eager to regain international legitimacy, the Department of Foreign Affairs has taken bold steps throughout 1990 and 1991 to open a whole series of consular and interest offices in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. One gets the impression that this was done for reasons of political expediency, and less because of a solid assessment of what South Africa can gain commercially from the huge expense incurred. Yet, the speed with which this move into Eastern Europe and the USSR took place, can also be seen as a function of the rivalry between the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Trade and Industry. Under its previous minister (Kent Durr), the latter department from 1989 onwards unilaterally established commercial contacts with the USSR and Eastern European countries, and was involved in organising high-level

reciprocal visits of trade officials and commercial groups. In doing so, it not only encroached upon the terrain which the Department of Foreign Affairs regarded as its stamping ground, but it tended to outbid the Department of Foreign Affairs in the race to portray the Soviet Union as a potential ally. Although this rivalry seems to have abated somewhat after Mr Durr became South African ambassador to London in early 1991, this rivalry did result in a optimistic evaluation on the part of both departments about the opportunities for South African trade and diplomacy.

Corresponding to this 'potential partner' image, and its underlying perceptions of 'little threat, more opportunities', and the compatibility of values and interests, is a response/behaviour pattern we can perhaps best describe as that of 'exploratory initiative'. Those decision makers who today are explicitly or implicitly inclined to act according to this pattern also tend to have either firmly taken leave of the apartheid practices of the past, or have come to criticise apartheid more than have other state officials. Both of these indicators of an emerging self-critical introspective ego evaluation are related to the fact that its representatives are more exposed to international opinion than are other state officials. This ego evaluation and the perceptions, imagery and response pattern identified above, can be represented schematically as in Figure 4.

3.3 Soviet images and perceptions of South Africa up until 1987: THE 'POLARIZED SOCIETY' IMAGE

As I did with South African images and perceptions of the Soviet Union, it is possible to summarise the prevailing Soviet image of South Africa before 1987 by means of a particular image pattern, or stereotype. In identifying this stereotype, I rely on Herrmann (1985; 1988) who has determined that Soviet thinking about the Third World generally fits into what he calls an 'imperial' pattern. According to this conception, Soviet expansionist behaviour in the Third World was based on and facilitated by a portrayal of particular targets for expansionsm as being possibly 'useful in the subject's plans' (1988:188). In terms of the theory developed here, this would imply that the imagery used to portray the target has to be balanced with the perception of opportunity entertained by the subject. Once images have been balanced with perceptions, an action strategy becomes possible which allows the subject to make use of the perceived opportunity without compromising his benevolent self esteem.

In the case of the Third World, Soviet perceptions of opportunities have traditionally been determined by calculations of the strategic benefits it could gain in its rivalry with the West in general, and with the US in particular. Assessments of what the likely American response to particular actions would be, informed the ultimate perceptions of opportunities. When dealing with Soviet policy towards individual countries or regions of the

FIGURE 4: CHANGING SOUTH AFRICAN IMAGES AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION II



Third World, we thus have to consider both Soviet perceptions of opportunity and its assessments of how these opportunities relate to its adversarial, but occasionally mildly cooperative, as in the era of détente, relationship with the USA.

Once an opportunity for expansionist behaviour *vis-à-vis* the West is perceived, cognitive balance theory suggests that the portrayal of the target country would tend to be balanced with the perception, and would thus operate as an enabling cue for behaviour. This portrayal can have many variants, depending on the target at issue. In general, however, it can take the form of the portrayal of the target country as in need of help to save it from evil or oppressive domination. As Herrmann notes: 'This construction surely protects the benign image of our own desires...'(1988:189), and can be said to have informed not only Soviet policy, but all imperialist actions toward the Third World in history, including those by Western countries.

The general 'imperial' image can consist of a whole range of subschemata and scripts, and different applications of it will display different configurations of these subschemata and scripts. In its extreme form the local inhabitants are portrayed as inferior and in need of imperial tutelage. Such is the case with the 'white man's burden' construct widely used in justifying Western colonialism at the turn of the century. Such racist constructs are today not widely employed, but more subtle forms of notions of superiority remain. In the case of the Soviet Union, much of its activities in Africa between 1960 and 1985 were premised on the assumption that the Soviet-suggested 'non-capitalist path of development' or the path of 'socialist orientation' was superior to locally devised development programmes, and that Africa could only benefit from applying it. The implication was clear: the Soviet type development programme was practically, scientifically and morally superior to whatever the West and Africa itself could provide. Let us call the stereotyped imagery which resulted from this variant of the imperial pattern, the *'child' stereotype*.

Another variant of imperial thinking is evident from the portrayal of the domestic politics of particular Third World targets as characterised by a Manichean struggle between good and evil. In this dichotomised image, the potential allies are portrayed as the 'good guys': the true nationalists, true democrats, and real patriots. In contrast the opponents of the good forces are portrayed as 'the enemy', as totally evil, undemocratic, devoid of all patriotism, and as acting contrary to the 'true interests of the people'. This variant can be called the stereotype of the *'polarized society'*. As was the case with the 'child stereotype', picturing the target in this mode relieves the subject from trade-offs between competing values such as the appreciation of the model of society represented by that of the subject's own, and considerations such as respect for the sovereignty of other nations. Action,

even of an aggressive nature, is made reasonable, because the image of the other justifies taking such action.

As Soviet scholars are wont to acknowledge these days, stereotyped thinking about Africa dominated much of Soviet policy. Because of the rigid strictures of Marxist Leninist ideology, with its emphasis on dichotomised, class-cum-national liberation concepts, the polarized society image was much in vogue in cases where opportunities were perceived to foster strategic gains by means of, inter alia, support for national liberation movements. In turn, Soviet policy toward 'newly liberated countries' — as for instance Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and the Congo were called — was premised more on a variant of the 'child' stereotype. This does not imply that only Soviet policy was characterised thus (Cottam, 1977), only that Soviet policy prolonged it somewhat longer than did other major European powers.

It is suggested here that Soviet official and semi-official symbolic representations of South Africa used to correspond to the 'polarized society' stereotype (see also Nel 1990a; 1991). The predominant theme in these statements was that South Africa at bottom was a divided society where good forces were arrayed against evil ones. The good forces were led by progressive, modernising, patriotic, and democratic organisations which had the true interests of the people of South Africa at heart. In contrast, the South African government was portrayed as extremist, motivated by racist and hegemonic intentions aimed not only at their own people, but also at other countries in Southern Africa. In addition, the domestic and regional policies of the South African government were depicted as singularly guided by the 'evil of apartheid', which was 'justly' rejected by the international community.

In addition to these images of the nature of the opposing forces' intentions and goals, two sets of stereotyped images dealing with the respective capabilities of the opposing forces were evoked. While the Soviet government remained in doubt about the imminence of fundamental change which would have brought the 'good forces' to power and about the capabilities of the national liberation forces to effect this, these forces were portrayed as being on the 'winning side' in more than one sense. Their aims were depicted as being in accordance with the beliefs of 'all sensible people in the world' who rejected apartheid with justification. Furthermore, the 'historical transformation from capitalism to socialism on a global scale' (the basic tenet of Moscow's support for national liberation in the Third World), placed progressive, anti-capitalist forces on the side of history. Finally, the apartheid system was said to be in the grips of a systemic, continuously worsening crisis which, over the longer term would only improve the relative capabilities of the 'good forces'.

Conversely, the capabilities of the South African government were never underestimated, but official statements ascribed whatever resources the South African state had to two factors. First and foremost, the South African ability to postpone the final judgement day was ascribed to the machinations of Western states which propped it up militarily, economically, and by means of anti-Soviet, i.e. reactionary propaganda. If it was not for this support South Africa could not have acted with such impunity, and its fate would long ago have been sealed. In the second place, South African strengths were ascribed to the ruthlessness of government actions against its domestic and foreign opponents. The recognition of South African capabilities was thus qualified by the normative rejection of the means whereby these capabilities were secured. Since Soviet decision makers had no doubt about the historical destiny of their own values and beliefs, they tended to view the strengths of the South African state in a simplified normative-teleological perspective, not in a complex factual one. If there is room to speak about Soviet miscalculations about South Africa (as Davidson, 1972 suggests), its roots probably lies here.

Official statements depicting Soviet images of the decision-making process in the South African state are difficult to come by, although well placed authors have ventured to make pronouncements on this score.[11] What statements there are, suggest that Soviet imgages in this regard were the mirror image of those entertained by South African authorities about Soviet decision-making. The Soviet government implicitly portrayed South African decision-making as rationally unified and conspiratorial, cynically employing and co-ordinating all arms of the state to (and even non-state actors) achieve hegemonic goals. During the 1980s this co-ordinated process was seen to have fallen under the aegis of the South African military. In addition, as the theory of monopoly capitalism prescribes, business was portrayed as being part of and benefitting from, this co-ordinated decision making.

The prevailing official image of South Africa entertained by the Soviet government can thus in summary be said to contain the following:

Although Soviet scholars and leaders today emphasise that they never subscribed fully to the thesis that the South African situation resembled 'colonialism of a special type', they did represent South Africa as a highly polarized society, with a 'good force', represented mainly but not exclusively by the ANC and the SACP, locked in bitter struggle with a 'bad force', i.e. the 'racist regime'. The 'good force' was depicted as truly patriotic, moving towards democracy and hence a modernising factor, while their leaders were depicted as progressive and friends of the people. In contrast, the 'bad force' was depicted as racist, evil, xenophobic, puppets of

a great-power enemy, and as demagogues. If presented in terms of our three image dimensions, this polarized schema corresponds to:

— a presentation of South African policy motivated by a desire on the part of the evil force to maintain its power, aided by another great power, notably the USA;
— pictures of the evil force's capabilities which tend to emphasise its fragility, if it was not for the external aid it received from the USA; and
— descriptions of the evil force which emphasise the coordinated conspiratorial nature of decision making.

According to the theory developed in this report, these images are balanced with a set of perceptions which enable or support behavioural strategies to the extent that it would make certain actions reasonable and others not and would relieve the Soviet Union of the need to make debilitating value trade-offs. Such a set of perceptions can be inferred from the symbolic representations of South Africa contained in the statements and policies of Soviet decision makers.

Most notable from the preceding discussion of Soviet statements and of Soviet policy earlier is that Soviet decision makers throughout the period under review perceived an opportunity which was constituted by the polarization between good and evil forces. By aligning themselves with and cultivating the 'good forces', they could further the value preferences of the Soviet state. Since the evil forces were associated by accident of history with the main contenders for Soviet global influence, the victory of the 'good forces' would translate into a victory against these contenders. Given the fact that the domestic and foreign policies of the 'evil forces' were often an embarrassment to these contenders, a further opportunity to gain a propaganda advantage over the contenders was also perceived. As long as the Soviet Union made sure that it was uncontaminated by contacts with the 'evil forces', apartheid and Western capitalist hegemony could be portrayed as the joint factors prohibiting the modernisation and democratisation of South Africa.[12]

The saliency of these perceptions of opportunity was increased by the perceived systemic and moral weaknesses of the 'evil forces'. Yet, because the 'evil forces' were 'historical allies' of powerful international actors which morally unjustifiably supported them, the opportunities were perceived to be circumscribed. Soviet behaviour thus had to be circumspect and watchful of the reactions of these other international actors. In addition, perceptions of the national liberation forces' capabilities were ambiguous. History was deemed to be on their side, but doubts remained about their capability to overthrow the state. The perception of existing opportunities thus did not imply that all courses of action were open to the Soviet Union. Some were

reasonable in terms of these perceptions, some not. Providing low level material and moral support to the ANC for instance, was reasonable. Encouraging the ANC to start a civil war with Soviet support was not (Kempton, 1989).

Finally, two opposing perceptions of the compatibility between the 'values' of South Africa and that of the Soviet Union were formed. On the one hand the values represented by the South African state — apartheid and militaristic monopoly capitalism — were deemed to be diametrically opposed to those of the Soviet Union. Thus there existed no common ground between the USSR and South Africa and hence no basis for compromise or relations of any sort. If such relations did develop for whatever reason, this perception made it 'unreasonable' to acknowledge this in public. On the other hand, the values represented by the national liberation movement were identified with, and it was regarded as the 'natural ally' of the USSR (see Singleton, 1982).

These Soviet perceptions of South Africa were guided by an unqualified positive ego evaluation. While elements of mild introspection sometimes crept into academic treatises on South Africa, this was totally absent from journalistic writings and official statements. The possibility that Soviet thinking was misguided, or based on faulty or one-sided information was never considered, nor was the perception of the value divide between the USSR and the South African state ever reviewed. Whenever Soviet expectations and plans were dashed, such failure was projected onto the machinations of international capitalism which would not let history run its course, or on the evil conspiracies of the South African state. Unfulfilled expectations were cognitively 'reworked' to protect the positive ego evaluation — a striking example of cognitive balance motivated by ego defence.

On the other hand, these perceptions induced a behavioural response pattern which can perhaps best be summarised as *'cautiously competitive'*. Soviet policies towards South Africa, as we have seen, were based on the perception of bounded opportunities to further Soviet preferences in competition with the USA particularly. Yet, because of the bounded nature of these perceived opportunities, Soviet policy was cautious and reactive, rather than pro-active. Figure 4 schematically portrays the linkages between the official Soviet images, perceptions, ego-evaluation and response pattern:

3.4 Soviet images and perceptions of South Africa, 1987 onwards: THE 'REDEEMABLE ADOLESCENT' IMAGE.

Given the rivalry amongst different sections of the Soviet bureaucracy and among their intellectual supporters, and the resistance expressed by some Third World countries and some traditional allies of the Soviet Union in South Africa to some tenets of new political thinking, (See Nel, 1989b) it is

FIGURE 5: SOVIET OFFICIAL IMAGES AND PERCEPTIONS OF SOUTH AFRICA BEFORE 1987



Legend: See Figure 2

understandable that the Soviet policy towards South Africa between 1987 and 1990 remained ambiguous, perhaps deliberately so. This ambiguity was also necessitated by the nature of the new Soviet policy: an attempt to broaden Soviet official contacts with a wide array of South African interest groups had to be balanced with the continuation and further cultivation of ties with traditional 'natural allies' — the ANC and SACP in particular. Only by maintaining the old while developing new levers of influence could the Soviet Union fulfill its desire to play a constructive diplomatic role in settling the South African conflict, and thus on this level further improve the growing co-operation between the US and USSR.

This ambiguity, however, is not substantial enough to postulate the existence of two or more sets of new official images. In this respect, recent Soviet thinking about South Africa formally differs from South African official thinking in which I identified two sets of images co-existing uncomfortably. To accommodate both the ambiguities in Soviet official thinking, and the basic unity of the recent imagery used to portray South Africa, I wish to distinguish between image *schemata* and image *subschemata*. The image schemata employed by rivals in the Soviet decision-making apparatus display a significant degree of communality. However, on certain image details, at least two different sets of image subschemata can be identified. In terms of the theoretical perspective developed here, these differences may be explained by looking at variations in the ego-evaluations entertained by rival interest groups in the apparatus. One would expect that decision makers who concede, for whatever reasons, that past Soviet policy was misguided or flawed, would symbolically represent South African reality differently from those who are less inclined towards self-critical introspection. Before I discuss these differences, let us first summarise post-1987 Soviet images of South Africa in general.

Judging by the condemnatory terms used to describe it, the Soviet government has clearly not developed a more benign image of apartheid (although the excessive pejorative language of pre-1987 has largely disappeared). Yet in many respects the Soviet official image has become more complex.[13] Leave has been taken of the simplified 'polarized society' stereotype. In its place emphasis is put by all sectors of the official apparatus dealing with South Africa on the fact that all sections of the society are mutually dependent and that a negotiated settlement has to be reached. While the Soviet government has clearly not turned its back on the liberation movement, and some statements continued to portray this movement in very laudatory terms, the problem is no longer viewed as simply black (equals good) versus white (equals evil). Divisions within the white community are noted (even more so by journalists and academics). Originally (that is before the De Klerk era) these divisions were emphasised to highlight possibilities for exploiting them in an attempt to weaken the

South African state. More recently, the South African government came to be portrayed not only as 'part of the solution'[14], but was also credited for its reform moves. This presents a fundamental change from the past Soviet image. There is even a tendency amongst certain members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to focus almost exclusively on the positive changes in white politics, and not on the liberation movement. This is bitterly resented by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee people and members of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which still continues to influence Soviet policy making, but not as much as before. These latter organisations still maintain close links to the ANC and SACP, and their support for a negotiated solution stems from a belief that this will ensure a transfer of power to their allies (See Shubin, 1991). In contrast, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, with some exceptions, support a negotiated settlement as a value in itself, and as a means to promote closer East-West dialogue.[15]

Emphasis has also shifted away from the systemic crisis the South African state was in the past said to have experienced. In its place, the technological potential of South Africa as a whole is highlighted.[16] While the achievements of the liberation movement are acknowledged, the image of it as historically invincible has been dropped and replaced with carefully worded admonitions that dialogue and compromise should be pursued.[17]

In summary these images can be said to amount to a view of the South African situation as redeemable if certain conditions are met. Not only is the internal conflict in South Africa regarded as amenable to settlement by 'political means', i.e. negotiations, South Africa is presented as having taken the first steps to return to the international field. Such statements emanated from the Soviet establishment after the successful completion of the Namibia-Angola negotiations in late 1989, which gives a clue to the seriousness with which Moscow viewed this test of South African goodwill. It has, however, become more frequent as the De Klerk government abolished one pillar of apartheid after another.

What is also clear from these statements, however, is that Soviet officials regard the changes in South African policies as the result of international and local pressure. The role it sees for itself is also one of combining effectively both sticks and carrots to induce further change — hence the insistence that UN-sponsored sanctions must remain. How firmly the Soviet Union will stick to this depends on the world's reaction to the rescinding of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act by the USA. Yet it is clear that the Soviet Union sees a paternal role for itself, in conjunction with other international actors, in keeping South Africa in check. In this regard, Soviet thinking on South Africa has not taken leave of the paternal instincts it displayed to much of the Third World in the pre-Gorbachev era (see Herrmann, 1988; Nel, 1991). While this paternal instinct may have become

more benevolent from a Western point of view, change in the Third World is still viewed as a function primarily of East-West co-operation. In this regard, the Soviet Union has not completely rid itself of the 'child image' it, and some Western nations, for so long entertained about the Third World. Of course, Soviet imagery of South Africa is somewhat removed from the 'child' stereotype, given the acknowledgement that South Africa is a sophisticated technological power. It is therefore perhaps appropriate to categorise current Soviet portrayal of South Africa as corresponding to a 'redeemable adolescent' image. This 'redeemable adolescent' image corresponds to a perception of the eventual compatibility of the values of the Soviet Union with those developing in the South African official position. It is as if the Soviet spokespersons have come to accept South Africa as a long lost child whose growth to maturity they can help to nurture.

Like an adolescent going through the complexities of change, the current Soviet image also highlights the complexity of the forces at play in South Africa. South African decision making is no longer portrayed as unified and conspiratorial, but as susceptible to many influences and strains. Growing up, the Soviet image implies, is not an easy thing.

Apart from the perception of eventual value compatibility, perceptions of opportunities correspond very closely to this image. On the one hand, opportunities for Soviet diplomacy in Southern Africa were identified, especially in 1989 and 1990. Perceived opportunities included a more active role for the Soviet Union in bringing the ANC and the government closer to negotiations. With the successful completion of some preliminary negotiations between these two, and with the decline in stature of the Soviet Union as a global player due to its internal problems, this opportunity is perhaps today less clearly perceived. Yet as a recent statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicate (19.6.1991), 'Soviet diplomats still perceive an opportunity for the 'international public' — which presumably is taken to include the Soviet Union' — to join in the process of change in South Africa. Significantly, the UN is singled out as a vehicle through which such an opportunity may be pursued. (BBC SWB SU/1103, 20.6.1991)

More significant, though, has been the Soviet perception of an opportunity to improve its co-operation with the United States and other Western countries by means of promoting settlement processes in Southern Africa. As Mr Gorbachev already had indicated in 1987, the Soviet Union was well aware of apprehensions in the West about presumed or actual Soviet behaviour in Southern Africa. We have already seen that new political thinking was initially aimed at placating such apprehensions through the policy of promoting settlements for regional conflicts. Although South Africa was surely not the most important testing field for Soviet constraint, promoting peaceful change in South Africa was one of the

ways in which the central relationship between Moscow and Washington could be steered into less confrontational directions. Since the Gulf War of 1991, the Soviet establishment has become in turn more apprehensive about the role of the US as an 'international policeman'. The reference to the possible role of the UN in South Africa is thus not only a sop to the ANC which has recently called for international mediation to break the apparent deadlock in its negotiations with the government during the first half of 1991. It is also a reference to the fact that the Gorbachev team has become sensitive to impressions that it is colluding too closely with Washington.

The idea of settlement of regional conflicts through political means is, however, a divisive factor in Soviet thinking on South Africa. On the one hand Soviet diplomats, and originally Mr Gorbachev as well, portrayed the South African issue as similar to other regional conflicts. This elicited strong reaction from the SACP who rejected it in favour of its long-standing portrayal of South Africa as 'a colony of a special type'.[18] As was the case with colonialism in general, this special case of colonialism can only be removed by means of national liberation, the SACP believed. Too much talk about South Africa being an example of a regional conflict which has to be settled by political compromises, threatened to undermine the very conceptual basis of the SACP's existence. It therefore comes as no surprise that a representative of the International Department of the CPSU, V. Shubin, as late as 1991 rejected the idea of applying the regional conflict concept to South Africa (see Shubin, 1991:8). This debate is not simply an arcane semantic one, but reflects serious differences on strategy in the Soviet establishment.

Finally, this and other differences amongst the image subschemata entertained by some in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Asoyan, for instance) and by some in the International Department of the CPSU (Shubin, for instance) also implies that different subperceptions may be entertained. In the case of the former, opportunities for Soviet diplomacy per se may be more readily perceived. In the case of the latter, the perceived opportunities relate not only to the fact that negotiations would promote the ANC chances of coming to power, and hence vindicate the International Department's long-standing investment in that organisation. It also relates to the possibility that an ANC victory through negotiations would put the Soviet Union for once on the winning side, and vindicate its support for national liberation movements in the Third World. Such 'successes' resulting from the support for national liberation have indeed become very scarce.

The theory of affective-cognitive balance developed in this paper would suggest that the variations in image subschemata and subperceptions traced above are fundamentally linked to differences in the ego evaluations of the proponents of these different opinions. This assumption is corroborated by

the remarkable differences in ego-evaluation between, say Mr Shubin on the one hand and Mr Asoyan on the other. Asoyan, as we have seen, has been in the forefront of developing new images about South Africa. He has also been one of the consistent proponents of the idea that Soviet thinking in the past has been misguided and prone to stereotypes. In a seminal two-part article in 1989 (Asoyan 1989), he has extended this introspection to a very critical analysis of past Soviet domestic policy as well. According to Asoyan, apartheid and Stalinism had much in common, and both are equally despicable.

On the other hand Mr Shubin has been in the forefront of those who deny that past Soviet 'perceptions' have been misguided (Shubin, 1991:11). While Shubin concedes that South Africa is a complex society, and that Soviet observers have recently learnt much due to more varied contacts with South Africans, he still regards past Soviet assessments as 'principally correct'. Clearly, Shubin's and Asoyan's image subschemata and subperceptions also differ because they are respectively members of bureaucratic interest groups which are locked in a bitter struggle for prestige and scarce resources. On a psychological level, which interests us here predominantly, their differences relate to two different sets of ego-evaluation — the one self-critical and prone to deep introspection; the other only mildly introspective and devoid of self-criticism.

The image schemata and subschemata entertained by various sections of the Soviet establishment, and its corresponding perceptions and subperceptions, are schematically represented in Figure 6.

4. CONCLUSION: PERCEPTIONS AND THE EXPLANATORY POTENTIAL OF A COGNITIVE APPROACH.

'Perception' is both an overworked and under-utilised concept in foreign policy studies. Overworked, because many authors tend to employ it as a catch-all term to discuss the 'psychological environment in which decision makers operate. This will no longer do. The concept should be taken to refer primarily to the results of evaluative, judgmental activities through which importance and meaning are attributed to objects, persons, and events. The under-utilisation of the concept of perceptions in the literature can be explained partly by the failure to restrict its referential domain. This paper illustrates the fruitfulness of exploring perceptions and related concepts provided that one tries to distinguish as clearly as possible between perceptions and other variables such as beliefs, attitudes and values. These distinctions not only provide us with levers with which to empirically manipulate available sources on perceptions, but also allow for the tracing of possible linkages, causal and otherwise, between perceptions and attitudes, and/or perceptions and beliefs, for example. One does not have to accept the specific theory of affective-cognitive balance developed in this report to

FIGURE 6: SOVIET IMAGES AND PERCEPTIONS OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1987 ONWARDS



Legend: See Figure 2

appreciate the advantages of distinguishing between various cognitive and affective variables.

One of the strongest claims advanced in this paper is that the differences between the perceptions entertained South African decision makers before 1988 and after 1988 can be theoretically linked to the variance in the ego evaluations present in the various periods. An obvious counterclaim would be that this theoretical linkage is superfluous if it is advanced as an explanation of perceptual variance. A more parsimonious approach would be to simply explain perceptual variance by means of the changes in Soviet behaviour towards the South African authorities. Do we really need a cognitive theory, which is anyway of dubious experimental status, to explain what is so obvious: decision makers react differently, surely, when their adversaries stop posing a threat to them? Consequently, foreign policy analysts only need to record the behavioural patterns of other states if they want to explain the responses of their own.

A number of responses can be made to such arguments-from-parsimony. It is indeed a useful rule not to complicate an issue more than is called for. Yet parsimony can become misleading if it is based on naivety. We constantly have to be reminded that decision-makers act in a world or in worlds in which they themselves are always implicated. This implies, first, that what is reacted towards is not an objective self-contained universe of events, but a universe mediated by the subjects involved in the events. In our example South African decision-makers react not to a set of events that can be said to exist independently from their interpretation of such events. The only meaningful world for them, and for the analyst, is a mediated world in which the intentions of others may not be the same as the evaluations made of those intentions. Scholars who still believe that foreign policy behaviour is best explained in terms of a model in which discrete, objectively identifiable events act as external stimuli for 'subjective' responses, have learned nothing and forgotten nothing. Events can be seen as stimuli only because subjects constitute them as such. The less threatening nature of Soviet behaviour can be used as an explanatory variable only if we have information that it was perceived to be so by the South African authorities.

That only answers half of the counter-argument presented above, however. It is one thing to say that explanatory variables have to be viewed as mediated variables. It is another to say that explanatory weight should be given to ego-evaluations, as I do. It is not feasible to be as definitive in this regard as one justifiably can be with regard to the point that foreign policy analysis inescapably has to consider the psychologically mediated environment of decision-makers. A more conditional answer is possible, however.

The theory of affective-cognitive balance used here to good purpose can be said to be logically parasitical on the concept of ego-evaluation. Affect

towards someone or something by definition requires that a criterion is used to judge that someone or something by. The literature on affect, and notably Heider's theory that representations of the one would be balanced with the affective evaluation of the other, tend to give affect towards the considerable self explanatory weight. Strong negative affect towards something or someone would be accompanied by a positive, but not necessarily totally uncritical, ego-evaluation (Herrmann, 1988). Changes in the affect displayed towards the other would therefore tend to be accompanied by changes in the ego evaluation. Consequently, when changes are observed in one of these two related units, one has good reason to expect that the other had changed as well. Empirical investigation will enable one to determine whether the changes on both sides are of similar magnitude. If that is found to be the case, the hypothesised linkage can be further explored.

Establishing a conceptual and empirical link between ego evaluation and affect towards the other does, not imply however, that one has good reason to interpret this link as a causal one. It is a well-known precept of methodology that correlations in the variance of two variables do not necessarily mean that variance in one is caused by variance in the other. Both variances may be caused by a third — as yet unaccounted for — variable. Possible candidates for this role have to be systematically eliminated through a process of counterfactual argumentation (see Fearon, 1991).

In the applied version of balance theory used here, variance in symbolic representations of others were related to changing perceptions which were said to evoke certain image patterns. In addition, the contents of these perceptions were conceptually and empirically linked to variations in the ego evaluations of South African and Soviet decision makers. Following the logic of the argument developed here, this conceptual and empirical link should not be taken to constitute a causal link, at least not until all other possibilities to account for the correlations have been discounted. On this point the analysis in this paper needs to be supplemented by a systematic counterfactual procedure to do just that. While this presents a fruitful avenue for further research, note should be taken that one possible *third* variable, namely bureaucratic interests, was identified as being of potential relevance. In discussing the differences amongst the image subschemata and subperceptions of various sections of the Soviet establishment concerned with South Africa, I pointed out that these variations can be related to the institutional and personal rivalry prevalent in the Soviet establishment. The differences between, say, Asoyan and Shubin are crucially dependent on their institutional positions, not on their ego evaluations, although this line of argument does not take us very far. Once we start dismantling the concept of an 'institutional position', we soon find that part of what it means to occupy such a position is that actors normatively and evaluatively position themselves in relation to the goals and values represented by their

state or society. Institutional affiliation may be an intermediate variable inasmuch as it can channel such evaluations of the own in specific ways. Ultimately, however, the concept of an institutional position logically imply some type of ego evaluation. This would hold whether one regards balance theory as appropriate or not.

Thus, although some more work has to be done to determine the exact nature of the linkage between ego evaluation and alter perception, we can conclude that there are strong prima facie evidence which suggests a significant link between the two. This link need not be taken as a causal one for it to be used as an exploratory explanatory factor. Explanation does not have to be causal to count as such. The human sciences, as do the natural sciences, use many different types of explanatory devices (Nagel, 1971:20ff), some deductive-causal, some teleological-functional, and some probabilistic. The type of explanation employed in Sections 1.4 and 3 is a mixture of the last two types of explanation. Probabilistic, because a concurrence of two sets of variance over a number of instances is taken as a clue that variance in one set of variables is internally related to another and that this would hold for a statistically significant number of instances. Functional-teleological, because cognitive and affective processing are taken to represent a system or Gestalt which is internally structured towards a goal of equilibrium maintenance or balance. Specific variances in units of this balance-orientated whole can accordingly be explained by the function(s) such variance would perform for the system as a whole to achieve its balanced state. Changing ego evaluations are thus conditioned by the goal of the system in which it operates, but in turn can be said to determine the system outcome in so far as it contributes to the balanced nature of the system. Ego evaluations and perceptions are functionally related parts of a larger system, and their respective explanatory value does not reside in either being considered a discrete independent variable or causal factor in the normal sense of the term. The validity of this line of argument is not dependent on the prior acceptance of balance theory, but would hold for any theoretical perspective in which cognition is conceived of in terms of a structured whole or system. The current consensus is that this is a fruitful way of thinking about cognition (see Gardner, 1985).

ENDNOTES

1. For K.J. Holsti (1988:320) individuals' perception 'of an object, fact, or condition [is] their *evaluation* of that object, fact, or condition in terms of its goodness or badness, friendliness or hostility, or value; and the meaning ascribed to, or deduced from that object, fact, or condition.' (emphasis in original). The social psychologists Freedman, Sears, and Carlsmith concur in their Social psychology (1978) when they identify evaluation as 'by far the most important underlying dimensions of.....perception' (p.73). Jervis, although prone not to make a clear distinction between beliefs and perceptions, also sees *evaluative judgements* as the primary content of perceptions (1976:29). Drawing on some experimental results,

Joseph de rivera (1968:20) also identifies 'choice' and judgement as that which distinguishes perceptions from beliefs. Kum, when discussing threat perception, also argues that 'perception often involves a laborious process of intellectual *understanding, appraisal,* and *assessment* of the intentions, capabilities, and actions of others' (1990:449). Similarly Holsti, North and Brody describe perception as 'the process by which decision makers detect and *assign meaning* to inputs from their environment and formulate their own purposes or intents' (1989:86).

2. One school of cognitive psychology equated perceptions with 'sensory registering' (see Hamlyn, 1985). In political analysis, h owever, such a usage does not allow us to distinguish between beliefs and perceptions (see Nel, 1991).
3. Richard Little in his thoughtful chapter 'Belief systems in the social sciences' (1988), also comes to the conclusion that the study of cognitive variables embraces both psychological and social dimensions.
4. For general treatments of the importance of self-esteem, see Heider, 1958:210; Zajonc, 1980:154-157.
5. Lists of the sources used are available from author.
6. See van Deventer and Nel, 1990.
7. See Bridgland, 1986:337-341.
8. This is a variation of Herrmann's 'defensive pattern' (1985:35).
9. See my 'Expediency and irony rule as South African officials move into Eastern Europe'. *The Argus*, 24.6.1991.
10. In the absence of conclusively supporting evidence, I refrain from speculating on the images South African decision-makers have of Soviet decision-making procedures. They probably experience the same problems as do seasoned students of Soviet affairs in finding out exactly what is going on these days in Soviet decision-making circles. The emergence of alternative centres of power in somé of the constituent republics of the USSR, notably the Russian federation, compounds such problems.
11. See, for example, Urnov, 1982.
12. See Campbell, 1986.
13. For a discussion of the changing Soviet view see Kempton, 1990; Nel, 1990a; Rahr and Richmond, 1989.
14. See Makarov's interview with Phillips (Phillips, 1990:10), and Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement (18.6.1991) in BBC SWB SU/1103, 20.6.1991.
15. See Jordan (1990) for some insightful comments on the various opinion groups on South Africa in the Soviet establishment.
16. See for example interview with Boris Asoyan, currently Soviet ambassador to Botswana, on Radio Moscow, 27.7.1988 (FBIS-SOV, 4.8.1988).
17. See interview with Andrei Urnov, one time Head of the Africa section of the International Department of the CPSU, in Phillips, 1990:8.
18. See for example statement by SACP delegation to the 'Great October inter parties' Moscow meeting', 5 November 1987. Published in *Umsebenzi*, Vol.4, No.1, 1988.

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BOOK REVIEWS

STUDIES IN THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF SOUTHERN AFRICA: VOLUME 2 — SOUTH AFRICA, LESOTHO AND SWAZILAND,
Z.A. Konczacki, Jane L. Parpart and Timothy M. Shaw (eds), Frank Cass, 1991: xvii + 290 pages.

This book contains useful information. A number of chapters can be regarded as surveys which can be put on to history and economic history student reading lists for those starting to specialise in the relevant topics. I would particularly recommend Gavin Maasdorp's study of Swaziland and Timothy Keegan's chapter on the making of the South African rural economy. The latter could be read in conjunction with Francis Wilson's chapter in the old *Oxford History*. The contrast could be used to assess just what is is that has changed in the writing of South African history during the past quarter of a century. The question is more subtle than it might seem.

There are two main problems with the book as a whole. First, it is rather less comprehensive than an initial reading of the table of contents might suggest. On the rural side, there is a gap of more than a century between the Guelke and Keegan chapters. There is nothing on mining since the 1930s. The Bloch and Hirsch articles add up to rather less than a delineation of manufacturing from the 1950s to the present. Apart from a reference to F.A. Johnstone's *Class, Race and Gold* (1976), all the references in the Doxey article date from no later than 1964. There is nothing on the important issue of urbanization. And there are other gaps in a time span which stretches over more than three centuries.

Secondly, the methods used are very diverse. Orthodox Marxism and liberalism are present. So is social history, structuralism and anti-structuralism, macro and micro treatments, theoretical and anti-theoretical approaches. The editors recognise this in a very brief introduction and celebrate it as mirroring the richness and dynamism of the historiographical tradition of the 'new' schools. It would have been helpful if there had been an analysis of what is at stake between them. The most explicitly Marxist chapter is the one on foreign investment and disinvestment, which contains economic analysis one would have thought impossible after the work of Sraffa, Morishima and Steadman. rather more interesting application of Marxism is the study of regional relationships by Sejanamane and Shaw. But the current crisis of socialism and socialist analysis is not discussed seriously anywhere in the book.

These two features make it difficult to make sense of the book as a whole. One cannot regard it either as the sustaining of a single argument, or as a coherent set of approaches to different aspects of Southern African history. Readers will therefore find themselves picking out individual chapters on

the basis of their particular interests. This is often the case with collections of articles.

There is another frustration for the contemporary South African reader. This arises from one's sense that revisionist historiography is itself in a crisis. Nowhere in the introduction is this problem discussed. Perhaps this accounts for the feeling that the book belongs to an intellectual era which, if it has not already come to a close, is rapidly doing so.

The two main components of revisionist history had a definite 'progressive' purpose in the 1970s and the 1980s. Social history used hitherto disregarded written sources as well as oral sources in order to bring to light the hidden history of ordinary people, industrial workers, agricultural tenants and even the urban demi-monde. Marxist analysis, on the other hand, concentrated on the exploitation associated with economic growth and development within a racially-based political order. Both approaches could be deployed as a critique of the economic institutions and outcomes of capitalism with white domination through the formal political system. In this sense, they were part of the broad anti-apartheid struggle.

With the dismantling of apartheid, the historiographical task changes. Depending on the form of the new state, it will have a greater or fewer number of celebrators and detractors. New official histories will be required, generating new forms of criticism. In the process, central terms such as 'resistance' and 'struggle' may come to have a considerably different meaning, both on the left and the right of the political spectrum. All this is likely to be located primarily at the political level. But given the central developmental problem facing the new system — finding a non-racial and more consensual basis for further accumulation — an interesting task for economic historians becomes a kind of institutional archaeology, preferably with constructive intent. This at least permits economic history to become politically less polarized than it has been during the last two decades. (Whether this possibility will be realised or not will depend on the evolution of our political culture.) One can take an example from the book to illustrate the point.

In the last two sections of his article, Keegan discusses the major determinants of our present form of agriculture: the Land Act, the assault on tenancy, the retention of chiefly authority, the development of the migrant labour system, resettlement, state support of white commercial farming on farms of increasing size. Out of this (and some more recent developments such as diminishing state support of white farmers) has to be made a new rural system in a non-racial political system. Some parts of the system, such as racial controls on access to land simply cannot be sustained and the relevant legislation has already been repealed in that knowledge. Crucial now is the question of property rights and the state's handling of land claims. And that is a much harder question. Thinking about it really

involves thinking about a number of economic requirements as well as the political environment within which it will have to be resolved. The central issues are:

* maintaining, indeed substantially increasing, the marketed surplus in order to feed urban populations;
* the place of agricultural produce in our international trade, both with sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world;
* employment and income generation for rural households, well over half of whom live in poverty;
* the retention and augmentation of skills in the countryside;
* the political pressures within which policy decisions will have to be made.

Depending on the outcomes of policy making, there may or may not be scope for reconstruction of certain forms of tenancy.

If one approaches historical sources with issues of this sort — and the dilemmas they raise — in mind, one is likely to see that at least some of them have been wrestled with before, admittedly under different political and economic circumstances. The problem now is not just to replace a white supremacist framework with a developmental orientation. It is the more complex one of deciding which economic institutions cannot survive, which have some developmental content and are capable of transformation, and which need to be introduced. Knowledge of roots and of the interests historically at play are important, but so is a sense of alternatives, of battles fought and lost. What might have been is sometimes a key to what might be. A greater sense of contingency and of dilemma in the writing of our history might make the future seem less oppressively determined and our current debates more vital.

Charles Simkins
Johannesburg
November 1991

THE KGB, POLICE AND POLITICS IN THE SOVIET UNION
Amy W. Knight, Boston, Unwin Hyman, revised edition 1990.

Do we really need another book on the KGB? The Cold War is over, Dzerzhinskii's statue has been toppled from Lubianka Square, the KGB is being disbanded and its 700 000 staff and their millions of informers will soon be out of work. The KGB is history — or is it?

Seeing the book on my desk recently, a visitor from Moscow chuckled cynically, as only Russians can: 'There'll *always* be a KGB in my country!' Russian and Soviet life has been permeated by the secret police for centuries,

whether they were known as the Third Section, Okhrana or Vecheka, or by bewildering collections of initials like OGPU, NKVD, MGB, SMERSH (not a James Bond invention) or, since 1954, the KGB.

Amy Knight is a Senior Research Specialist in Soviet affairs at the US Library of Congress and her book fills a long-standing gap in western scholarship on the USSR, especially where the KGB's domestic role is concerned. Her aim is to provide western readers with a conceptual framework for understanding the KGB and by and large she succeeds. Many books have been written on the KGB in English, ranging from spy stories and the confessions of former operators such as Arkady Shevchenko (*Breaking with Moscow*, 1985) to quasi-academic studies like John Barron's *KGB Today: the Hidden Hand* (1983). However, the relative dearth of serious works on the KGB means that Ms Knight has relied heavily on Soviet publications and this makes her book all the more valuable.

The book is divided into three parts, covering the KGB's origins, its organisational structure and its functions, the last-named section being much the longest. The revised edition includes an epilogue which deals with the period 1987 to 1989. Of the five appendices, the first lists the various names under which the Soviet security police have been known since 1917, but I would have liked some graphs to illustrate the various organisations in the Soviet security establishment and the relationship between them. Other appendices explain the legal framework within which the KGB has operated and its most important office-holders at Union and republic level. There are some useful suggestions for further reading, mainly in English; each chapter has extensive end-notes and the book is on the whole easy to read and relatively free of jargon.

Ms Knight points out early in her book that although pre-revolutionary Russia was also a 'police state', Lenin's Bolsheviks made a much better job of it then their somewhat inefficient predecessors, even though they hoped it would not be needed for long. As it turned out, their utopianism was unfounded and the secret police became a permanent feature of the Soviet system, an elite organisation designed to protect the regime and its ideology. Soviet leaders, with the exception of Stalin, have therefore had to grapple with the conflict between 'the desire to reform and rationalize the system by creating a normative legal order and the necessity of relying on a strong political police to preserve their power' (p.xvii). There has thus been a 'continuous tension between the party's desire to reform and its need to retain tight political control' (p.183). Soviet history shows that with few exceptions the latter consideration has outweighed the former.

Knight believes that Khruschev was crucial to the KGB's modern development because he abandoned overt terror as a means of subduing dissent. However, although legal limitations were now placed on the KGB's activities, it still persecuted dissenters and in the conservative, almost neo-

Stalinist Brezhnev years, its power and prestige revived under Yurii Andropov, who was appointed KGB chairman in 1967. The KGB was glorified as a patriotic organisation, staffed by the sensitive, industrious and ever-vigilant guardians of the Soviet state and people, a vision which benefited not only the organisation but also Andropov himself, substantially contributing to his appointment as CPSU general secretary when Brezhnev died in 1982. Ms Knight covers the Andropov and Chernenko years well but is understandably more superficial where Gorbachev is concerned, since she completed the book in 1987. Although Knight's book was published before the full implications of *perestroika* became clear, we now know that the CPSU's abandonment of its monopoly of power in February 1990, also singed the KGB's death-warrant.

The book's second section describes the KGB's structures and functions and helps the reader to understand the overlapping activities of and rivalries between its six directorates and other security-related organisations.

Section three analyzes the KGB's functions in the mid-1980s which Knight describes as highly sophisticated when compared with the brutal tactics of the Stalin period. Interrogation, for instance, becomes 'a friendly chat' (p.195) which does not however, exclude the notorious psychiatric hospitals, a fair amount of covert violence and extensive propaganda and censorship. The chapter on the KGB's role in policing the USSR's 67 000 kilometre-long border is particularly helpful to the western reader. KGB border troops have been the USSR's first line of defence against foreign aggression and the significance of the Baltic States' take-over of these functions in 1990 is now much clearer. In Chapter eight Knight makes useful distinction between the Soviet military and the KGB which tend to get lumped together by westerners. Whereas the military's tasks are to protect the USSR from invasion and project its strength, the KGB must defend the system against enemies at home and abroad and, for that matter, within the military itself. There is a sad little tale on p.236 about a Soviet officer who was called in and chastised by the KGB after showing a cherished copy of *Playboy* to a few trusted 'friends' in his unit.

Although Ms Knight is primarily concerned with the KGB's *internal* role, Chapter nine discusses its First Directorate, which deals with foreign policy. Many of the USSR's brightest and best graduates competed for KGB recruitment in this field, taking up posts in Soviet embassies all over the world. I would have liked, however, to see a more extensive discussion of the KGB's activities in the Soviet satellite states, especially since Andropov was Soviet ambassador to Hungary in 1956 and was head of the KGB when Czechoslovakia was invaded in 1968.

Ms Knight's conclusion and epilogue are unavoidably speculative and things have moved further and faster than either she or any other Soviet expert in the West believed possible in the mid-1980s. Although she warns

that resistance from the KGB and other members of the Soviet security establishment might occur if Gorbachev seriously threatened their interests, she considers it more likely that, whatever the degree of economic liberalisation, Gorbachev would be forced increasingly to rely on the KGB to suppress popular discontent. This is what happened in the 1920s, when Lenin liberalised the Soviet economy but clamped down on political dissent. Who knows whether Mr. Gorbachev now wishes he had done likewise?

Sara Pienaar
Hon. Research Associate (USSR and Eastern Europe)
SAIIA

ANTI-ZIONISM: ANALYTICAL REFLECTIONS

R. Tekiner, S. Abed-Rabbo and N. Mezvinsky (eds). Amana Books: Brattlebro, VT, 1988.

This book is published as a *Festschrift* to honour Rabbi Elmer Berger. It commemorates 30 years of Berger's anti-Zionist writing and is published by EAFORD (The International Organisation for the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, based in Washington D.C.).

The work is a collection of ten essays by academics at American Universities. Within the broad classification of anti-Zionist writing, there are many categories and approaches. This book contains several of the important viewpoints, such as the strong differentiation which is made between Judaism and Zionism. It is claimed that the Jews are not a 'people' but a 'religion', and therefore there can be no 'legitimacy' to the claim that Zionism is the expression of Jewish Nationalism (Naseer Arurim 'Anti-Zionism: A Democratic Alternative', pp.52-53). This is in line with the earliest approach of the American Reform movement as set out in 1885 and altered successively in 1937 and 1976 (See notes 6, 7 and 8).

Also included is an essay by Benjamin Joseph entitled 'Separatism at the wrong time in History'. Joseph is the author of *Besieged Bedfellows: Israel and the Land of Apartheid* (1988). The essay (and the book) overplays the limited contact between Israel and South Africa in the mid-1980s during the sanctions era. It tries to suggest 'a symmetry in ideology and practice between Israel and [Apartheid] South Africa'[1].

In dealing with Zionism and its aspirations, we enter into an arena of heightened emotionalism. This is so both for those who support and for those who reject Zionism. There can, it seems, be very little chance of reconciliation and understanding between these two positions because of the extent of the polarization which has occurred. The recent Peace Conference in Madrid illustrates this clearly, in that neither side really *listened* to what the other was saying. Even so this was the first ever public non-military Middle Eastern Summit attended by most of the major parties to the conflict.

Although nothing practical seems to have emerged from the Conference, the fact that the meeting actually took place is positive in itself. Even though the parties would appear no nearer to any resolution of the problem, there seems to be some softening of the hard-line on both sides — the Arab world towards Israel, and Israel towards Palestinian groupings.

The introduction to the collection of essays states that the

> ...major premise (of the collection) is that the historical continuity of *classic* Zionist ideology is responsible for many of the serious socio-economic and political problems confronting Israel...(p.x). [my emphasis].

This 'classic Zionist ideology' is defined as being the ideas articulated by Herzl in his pamphlet *Der Judenstaat.* Of course Herzl did not invent Zionism. He merely committed to paper concepts that had been current in Central and Eastern Europe for just over fifty years prior to 1896[2]. Earlier writers were far more thorough in their research and far more erudite in the expression of their Zionist ideas. For example, Rabbis Alkalai and Kalischer, who in 1843 and 1862 respectively, wrote of the need for Jewish settlement in the Holy Land. They based their claims firmly on passages from the Talmud, that is on Jewish tradition[3]. Moses Hess also published *Rome and Jerusalem* in 1862. This was a searching intellectual study which dealt with the anomalous situation of the Jews in Europe[4], rising anti-semitism and the suggestion of the solution: the Jewish national home in Palestine. So Herzl was merely expressing a tendency which had emerged in the Jewish consciousness of 19th century Europe.

Elmer Berger's essay 'Zionist Ideology: Obstacle to Peace' opens the collection. Written in 1981, it was chosen because it seemed to the editors that it was particularly representative of his writing[5]. Rabbi Berger is a Rabbi in the American Reform tradition. This tradition began in the last century by rejecting Zionism. In this it followed the lead of the German Reform movement. The Pittsburgh Platform (1885), laid down a negative approach to Zionism and its aims[6]. The Columbus Platform (1937) softened the approach to Jewish settlement in Palestine, recognizing the development there of a 'Jewish Homeland'[7]. A small minority within the Reform Movement refused to endorse the 1937 statement on Palestine or its successor, more explicitly supportive of Israel, the San Francisco Platform of 1976[8]. Berger belongs to this group.

He uses the Pittsburgh Platform of 1885 to support the notion of anti-Zionism as a legitimate position in Judaism. But he conveniently fails to mention the 1937 and 1976 amendments by the Reform movement of America. Thus he bases his anti-Zionist stance on a position which has been democratically changed by the self-same movement which ordained him as a leader – as a Rabbi.

The ultra orthodox position on Zionism as expressed by the *Neturei Karta*

(Guardians of the Wall — not as he translates it — the City) is one of absolute rejection. They renounce secular/political Zionism because it is God *alone*, in their view, who has the power to ordain the time of the coming of the Messiah and the redemption. He (God) will send the Messiah in His own good time, and man must patiently await that time. The basis therefore of this ultra-orthodox rejection of Zionism is theological. Says Berger '...There were — and are — Jews who far from incorporating political Zionism as a part of their faith, have regarded it as a moral imperative to stand in opposition...' (p.4). He seems to lump all those Jews who oppose Zionism together in one group, Reform and ultra-orthodox alike.

Berger's position is at the other end of the theological spectrum from the *Neturei Karta*. He does not clarify the fact that anti-Zionism is the *only* issue on which they can agree. For the *Neturei Karta* do not regard the Reform movement as a legitimate expression of the Jewish religion. Berger does not acknowledge the shift that has occurred in the Reform Movement's thinking on the existence of the State of Israel. He also does not take cognizance of the existence of shades of legitimate Jewish opinion dissenting from both the ultra-orthodox and extreme Reform rejection of Zionism.

Naseer Aruri's article 'Anti-Zionism: Democratic Alternative' is problematic. The first paragraph is replete with loose statements that beg to be challenged. Zionism, he says, under the influence of 'nineteenth century nationalism and colonialism...attempted to establish a Jewish state by colonizing a *territory* (my emphasis) away from Europe'. Palestine or as Jews have called it for millennia *Eretz Israel* (Land of Israel), is not *any territory*, it is *the* territory. It is the territory which nurtured the basis of Jewish life and thought. It was here that the Mishnah, the Talmud Yerushalmi (Palestinian Talmud), the Midrash evolved. Zionism is thus hardly a colonial force in any way similar to the British, French, Italians, Belgians and Portuguese who 'scrambled' for Africa in the last century. In this article too, there is the despicable coupling of Zionism and terms applicable exclusively to Nazism. There is the undefined use of the term 'herrenvolk democracy', (p.33), referring it would seem to the political system within Israel. This meaningless juxtaposition of two ideologically 'loaded' words is sinister and offensive. How does Aruri understand 'Democracy'? Israel is the only state in the region where western democratic principles exist and are cherished — principles such as freedom of the press, free elections, freedom of expression and complete religious freedom. How will anti-Zionism offer a better 'democratic alternative'? Aruri does not elaborate.

One of the most interesting articles is the one which closes the collection. Written by Norton Mezvinsky, it is entitled 'Reform Judaism and Zionism: Early History and Change'. It traces the American Reform movement's changing attitude to Zionism from rejection in 1885 to support by the time of the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. He deals briefly but

comprehensively with the major personalities of the movement and the events which shaped their ideas. In the concluding paragraph Mezvinsky expresses his dissatisfaction with the rapprochement between the Reform Movement and support of Israel. Part of his objection to this change in attitude is the Orthodox exclusion of Reform in matters of Internal Affairs in Israel (i.e. Jewish marriages and divorces may only be concluded through the Rabbinate. Civil ceremonies do not exist). This leads him to his final remark, which could spark off serious debate within the Reform camp: '...The seemingly inescapable conclusion is that the Reform movement has thereby rejected the philosophical bases of Reform Judaism...' (p.335).

This collection of articles on the question of Anti-Zionism presents nothing new. All the arguments put forward have been presented before. The work is a statement of the Anti-Zionist position, and makes no attempt to acknowledge let alone engage in dialogue with the opposing view. The book deals with the realm of *opinion*, and not with scientific truth. There is therefore no justification for rejecting out of hand the Zionist point of view. Perhaps now, after the Madrid Conference, with the meeting for the first time of the opposing forces, the way to constructive debate may be possible.

NOTES

1. 'Camera Media Report' published by the *Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America*, Vol.2 — 2 June 1990, contains an article refuting the claim that Apartheid and the structure in Israel are in any way similar. 'Refuting the Lie: What is Apartheid?' (p.9).
2. The pamphlet *Der Judenstaat* was published in 1896 and not 1897 as stated. (see facsimile of the original frontispiece, published in the 1954 edition of the English translation of *The Jewish State*, issued to mark the 50th Anniversary of Herzl's death).
3. See A. Hertzberg, *The Zionist Idea*, Atheneum: New York, 1973, for extracts from the writings of Rabbi Yehudah Alkalai, pp.102-107 and Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Kalischer, pp.108-115.
4. See Moses Hess, *Rome and Jerusalem*. Bloch Publishing Company: New York, 1943 (tr. Meyer Waxman). (p.74) '...As long as the Jew endeavours to deny his nationality...as long as he is unwilling to acknowledge that he belongs to that unfortunate and persecuted people, his false position must daily become intolerable. Wherefore the illusion? The European nations have always considered the existence of the Jews in their midst as an anomaly. We shall always remain strangers among the nations. They may tolerate us and even grant us emancipation, but they will never *respect* us as long as we place the principle *ubi bene ibi patria* above our own great national memories...'.
5. Introduction to the present volume, p.xii.
6. See M.A. Meyer, *Response to Modernity: History of the Reform Movement in Judaism*, Oxford University Press: New York, 1988. Extract from the Pittsburgh Platform 1885: ...Fifth. We recognize in the modern era of universal culture of heart and intellect the approaching of the realization of Isreal's great Messianic hope for the establishment of the kingdom of truth, justice and peace among all men. We consider ourselves no longer a nation, but a religious community, and, therefore, expect neither a return to Palestine, nor a sacrificial worship under the sons of Aaron, nor the restoration of any of the laws concerning the Jewish State...
7. See *ibid* p.389, extract from the Columbus Platform 1937:

...5. *Israel*...In all lands where our people live, they assume and seek to share loyally the full duties and responsibilities of citizenship and to create seats of Jewish knowledge and religion. In the rehabilitation of Palestine, the land hallowed by memories and hopes, we behold the promise of renewed life for many of our brethren. We affirm the obligation of all Jewry to aid in its upbuilding as a Jewish homeland by endeavoring to make it not only a haven of refuge for the oppressed but also a centre of Jewish culture and spiritual life...

8. See *ibid*, p.393 extract from the San Francisco Platform 1976:

We are privileged to live in an extraordinary time, one in which a third Jewish commonwealth has been established in our people's ancient homeland. We are bound to that land and to the newly reborn State of Israel by innumerable religious and ethnic ties...We have both a stake and a responsibility in building the State of Israel, assuring its security and defining its Jewish character....

The extract continues by reaffirming the need to maintain strong communities in the Diaspora.

...The State of Israel and the Diaspora, in fruitful dialogue, can show how a people transcends nationalism even as it affirms it, thereby setting an example for humanity which remains largely concerned with dangerously parochial goals...

C.J. Ginsberg
Department of Hebrew and Religious Studies
University of the Witwatersrand

BOOK REVIEW ARTICLE

ETHNIC DISSIDENCE AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER: AN UNEASY FIT

Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective
, *(eds) Ralph R. Premdas, S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe and Alan B. Anderson, Pinter Publishers, London, 1990, 225pp.*

The jury is still out on the issue of whether Francis Fukuyama's controversial triumphalist article was a valid assessment of the significance of the watershed year of 1989 ('The End of History', *The National Interest*, Summer 1989). On the one hand, advocates of Western liberal-democratic, free-market principles may justifiably be allowed to conduct a victory parade on the ashes of the collapsed edifice of communism in Eastern Europe and its Third World variants. Ironically, it was clearly the contradictions of communism rather than capitalism that proved the stronger. There can be little doubt that the ideology has lost its appeal, and those scholars who continue to subscribe to the faith have been forced to retreat to defensive positions that are shored up by arguments based on the belief that *ceteris paribus*, it would have worked.

Yet two years down the road, one could make out a strong case for arguing that to have seen 1989 as the end of History in Hegelian terms, i.e. the end of the history of thought about first principles concerning political and social organisation, may well have been precipitate. For a start there was always fundamentalist Islam lurking in the wings, anti-Western and by the very nature of its theocratic underpinnings illiberal, and in whose lexicon the concept of democracy does not figure. Then there was the Gulf Crisis; the conflict was most aptly labelled, since it represented the latest in a series of violent encounters between two worlds separated by a gulf of misunderstanding, if not outright mutual incomprehension. Saddam Hussein's use of this powerful mobilisational ideology meant that the West's victory celebrations after the fall of the Wall in 1989 were more short-lived than one could reasonably have allowed oneself to believe. At the very least the groundswell of support throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds for the self-appointed new Saladin in his struggle against the latest wave of Frankish invaders, cast serious doubts on the purported universalist appeal of Western liberal-democratic ideals.

However, from our present vantage-point, maybe the most serious weakness in Fukuyama's argument was his assumption that the spread of liberal-democratic principles would take place within an international system as then constituted. The political map was a given, and the movement, upwards and outwards, of the triumphant ideology, would do

so within existing state boundaries. It was, if you like, Wilsonian liberalism minus the principle of national self-determination, which the American president had sought to apply to the terminally-ill Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires.

In the short period of two years, this assumption has been exploded by the forces of dissident nationalism which more than any other factor, have exposed the quicksands on which Bush's much-vaunted 'New World Order' was built. For example, no sooner had the 'mother of all wars' been won, than Washington found itself confronted by the awful dilemma of how to respond to the uprising of the Kurds in northern Iraq, a revolt the Americans were, at the very least, tangentially responsible for unleashing, and which in years to come we may discover they actively encouraged. Pandora's box, once opened, proved extremely difficult to close. But given the threat to wartime allies such as Turkey, who were next in line in terms of Kurdish demands for an independent Kurdistan, the Bush administration justified its passivity in the face of the Iraqi onslaught against the secessionists in terms of the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state — and this after having throughout the Gulf War called for a popular uprising against Saddam!

The aftermath of victory was a sobering affair for Washington, and pictures of the destitute Kurdish refugees certainly took the shine off the 'New World Order', and raised questions over any facile association between the end of the Cold War and the cessation of what, for successive Administrations, has often appeared to be an unfathomable quagmire of Third World conflicts.

Denied the Cold War categories which were so easy to superimpose on international affairs, the West has been forced to come to grips with new forces that are at work in the international system. The secession of the Baltic republics, soon to be followed by the disintegration of the rest of the Soviet Union into its constituent parts to the point where it is now a Union only in name, the establishment of an Eritrean state enjoying *de facto* if not *de jure* independence, the fracturing of Somalia into two distinct political entities, and more recently the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the ominously familiar rumblings of Katangese secessionism amidst the chaos in Zaire, all point to a New World Order in which peoples are falling back on older, more elementary certainties, and in which there is likely to be very little order.

And while it may be too early to judge, the evidence so far indicates that there are forces working at cross purposes in the international system. While on the one hand economic integration has gathered pace, with regional trading blocs all the vogue, this centripetalism has been countered by powerful centrifugal tendencies. It may be no exaggeration to argue that what we are witnessing is the third great wave of state-formation this

century. The first saw the rise of a multitude of states out of the ruins of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires after World War I and the second, the birth of the Third World contingent in the wake of European decolonisation in the 1960s. It is noteworthy that since the latter, with the notable exception of Bangladesh — until last year the single successful case of secession in the post-war era — the only new states to join the international system were those created as a result of the eradication of the last vestiges of the European empires. Portugal's granting of independence to its various pieces of real estate in Africa in 1975, France's withdrawal from Djibouti in 1977, the severing of Britain's ties with its motley collection of islands in the Pacific and Caribbean, and the special case of South African 'decolonisation' of Namibia, were all essentially part of a mopping-up operation.

These new states all acceded to membership of the family on the basis of the principle of national self-determination, enjoying the benefit of all the systemically-sanctioned rules of international life that were supposed to underpin their existence, such as that of internal sovereignty and territorial integrity. In one sense the Cold War served to freeze the political map. Despite the fact that throughout the post-war period, secessionist movements have fought for independent statehood, in some cases, such as the Kurds, since the 1920s, their record of success, until recently, made sobering reading. The post-war consensus dictated that diverse ethnic groups, despite all evidence to the contrary, were lumped together to form, at least putatively, nations, thus allowing the principle of national self-determination to be applied. For the purpose of participation in international life therefore, disparate groups gained independence within the straitjackets of a single state, on the basis of colonially-determined territorial boundaries.

This bargain, struck between the post-colonial elites and the departing European powers became a sacrosanct ordering principle of the international system, so much so that throughout the Cold War neither of the two superpowers wanted to be seen, despite the geo-strategic benefits which might accrue from so doing, to be rocking the boat and supporting secessionism. The stand-off between the rival power blocs on this issue thus helped to preserve the territorial status quo. And the Third World states, out of enlightened self-interest, sought to ensure that the rule stuck, as demonstrated by the almost unanimous repudiation on the part of African states of Biafra's bid for independence. The break-up of the European empires into post-colonial states was desirable, but the process was to go no further. The related norm: that you should not stir up ethnic dissidence in your neighbour's backyard carried weight due to recognition of one's own vulnerability. The old adage: 'People in glass houses...' became the order of the day.

In Eastern Europe, the homogenizing influence of Marxism-Leninism

had similar results, and helped to contain potential problems. The attenuation, if not elimination, of 'false consciousness', be it ethnic, linguistic or cultural, was an integral component of the political projects of all East European regimes. These aspirations were to be realized in, for example, the new Homo Sovieticus, cleansed of his primordial and pre-socialist hangovers.

One of the consequences of the end of the Cold War is that the apparently eternal verities are no longer available to act as restraints on ethnic dissidence. The process of democratization in Eastern Europe has lifted the lid on previously suppressed feelings of ethnic antagonism. The inevitable uncertainties that accompany any political transition make the temptation for societies to fall back onto more familiar and certain points of reference all the more attractive. And in the Third World, the end of the super-power confrontation — and arguably the end of the interest of both East and West in most of the Third World — has had similar results. It has meant that the 'natural' process of state-formation in the Third World — if by natural we mean the evolution of new states as a result of both fusion and fission as happened in Europe — that was interrupted as a result of the impact of colonialism in the 19th century and then held in check in the post-colonial period by the exigencies of the Cold War, has restarted. Two factors may account for this. Firstly, the shibboleth of national unity, a *sine qua non* often invoked by governments in the face of the dangers of Cold War related conflicts, and which was often used as justification for suppression of ethnic dissidence, no longer carries so much weight internally. Secondly, as far as external variables are concerned, both Eastern and Western patronage of Third World allies has greatly diminished, and this has therefore reduced the ability of Third regimes to contain centrifugal tendencies. Diminishing Soviet support to the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia, for example, certainly encouraged the Eritreans to make their finally successful bid for independence.

For international relationists, therefore, these developments increasingly suggest that we have to move away from our traditional concentration on inter-state relations, join hands with sociologists and anthropologists, and examine the internal composition of states, in particular their ethnic make-up. Gone are the days when we can allow ourselves to be precluded from so doing by the strictures imposed by Realism, which held that what went on inside the state was not our concern — since all states, irrespective of their internal political, ethnic or religious characteristics, all acted identically in the international arena in their search for security and quest for aggrandizement, a pattern of behaviour dictated by the anarchical nature of the system in which they operated. While this line of argument may still hold, it is also the case that in a fluid international situation, such as we are now experiencing, a state whose international behaviour we are analysing

one day, may well not be there in any recognisable form the next. Under such conditions, concepts such as the nation-state, so beloved of American international relations scholars, carrying within it assumptions of ethnic, cultural and religious homegeneity, have become of questionable analytical value.

The publication under review: *Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective*, a collection of case-studies on the rise of ethnicity and the growing problem of secessionism in the international system, points the way forward and helps to throw light on these increasingly salient features of international life. Published under the auspices of the International Centre for Ethnic Studies in Kandy, Sri Lanka, it brings the perspectives of sociologists, development economists, political scientists and historians to bear on the specific question of ethnic unrest in its most radical form, namely when it leads to attempts at secession.

Besides its multi-disciplinary approach, another merit of the book is that the net has been cast over a wide area. The studies range, in geographical terms, from an analysis of Quebeçois separation in Canada, to Moro aspirations for independence from the Phillipines. In addition, it deals not only with well-known cases of ethno-nationalism such as those of the Kurds in the Middle East, or of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, but also throws light of some of the more obscure manifestations of the phenomena of secessionism, such as that of the Hmong people in Laos, and the little-known case of the attempts by the inhabitants of the island of Bougainville to break away from Papua New Guinea.

The case studies are preceded by a discussion of the importance of the issue by Ralph R. Premdas, one of the editors of the collection, which brings home to social scientists the importance of granting it attention. As Premdas argues:

> Secession, like divorce, is an ultimate act of alienation... As an act of territorial and political assertion, a secessionist struggle is usually prolonged, punishing and prohibitively costly. Often badly beaten and savagely brutalised, rarely is it totally and finally annihilated...It comes and goes, ebbs and flows in a logic of its own. It dies hard, if ever (p.12)

The ubiquity and tenacity of the problem are sufficient grounds in themselves for granting secessionism the importance it merits. There are, however, humanitarian concerns which should also come into play as justification for grappling with the phenomena.

> Bloodshed, chaos and suffering tend to accompany the birth of a secessionist child. It is likely to be illegitimate, spawned in conspiracy and the result of rape...Prolonged struggle demoralises all sections in the conflict equally...creates a garrison mentality, cripples democratic institutions, breeds fanaticism and helplessly accepts a distorted existence as normal and inevitable. (pp.12–13).

Passions are roused in an attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable, namely the principle of state sovereignty on the one hand, and the right to national self-determination on the other. 'No state dismembers itself willingly; no separatist movement has been proffered victory on a platter' (p.13).

Premdas then goes on to discuss the theoretical issues involved in analysing the problem. His survey of existing analytical frameworks is extremely useful in demonstrating how the phenomena of secessionism have been refracted through the lenses of various disciplines; and the interpretations put forward by different schools. Modernisation theorists such as Deutsch and Huntington held that ethnic cleavages, 'Regarded as signs of under development...aberrations to be eradicated by industrialisation and urbanisation' (p.18), would disappear once the homogenising process of modernisation had been set in motion. In a similar vein Marxist political economists treat ethnicity as an epiphenomenon, manipulated by elites in order to achieve territorial autonomy, a pre-condition for the establishment of a system of capitalist exploitation of their respective working classes. What Premdas calls the phases-and-stages school, associated with scholars such as Donald Horowitz, Anthony Smith and John Woods, attempts to chart the development of secessionist movements through various stages, pinpointing key variables such as the question of relative deprivation as a precipitant of separatism, the movement's mobilisational capacity and the response of central governments. Yet Premdas argues that these frameworks have never been tested against an in-depth study of a single movement, its proponents instead eclectically drawing on selective data from an assortment of cases.

Premdas advances his own alternative framework, based on a division of the causes of secession into primordial and secondary factors. The former include variables such as language, race, religion and territory, 'primal features...the stuff of which 'nation' or 'tribe' is constituted' (p.22). Secondary factors are, in a sense, the external components, the product of the interaction of the group with the outside world and include perceptions of neglect, exploitation and discrimination, and objective intrusions such as forced annexation. These serve as 'the triggering mechanism of collective consciousness felt by a group as it proceeds to define its demands' (p.22).

The interplay between primordial and secondary factors is a complex one, varying across time and space and from movement to movement depending on the concrete situation they are facing, so that at any given moment they may choose to emphasise one or more of these factors as against the others. However, Premdas makes the essential point that the presence of both primordial and secondary factors is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the group in question to opt for secession as a solution to their problems. A catalyst is required, namely the development of a 'collective consciousness', whereby as a result of competition with another group, they

begin to see their primordial factors as being threatened by secondary factors, and start entertaining the exit option as a defence mechanism. Premdas also borrows from other schools, in particular the phases-and-stages approach, and points out the importance of studying other variables, such as the organisation and ideology of the movement, the role of leadership and intellectuals in articulating grievances, the way in which a governing regime reacts to the threat and the resources it can bring to bear on the problem, as well as the international dimension of secessionism.

The latter is dealt with in some depth by three of the case studies in particular, namely Samarasinghe's piece on Tamil separatism in Sri Lanka, Aguado's study of the Kurdish movement and Scott's contribution on Hmong aspiration for separate statehood in Laos. Building on the preceding study by de Silva on the rise of a sense of territorial separateness amongst Sri Lanka's Tamils, and the role of historically-based claims as a driving force in Tamil separatism, Samarasinghe concentrates on the secondary factors that triggered off the Sinhalese/Tamil conflict, and then proceeds to examine the process of internationalisation. Rooted in Tamil demands for a separate state, ('Eelam', in the north of the island), Indian involvement, began in 1987 and has turned the conflict into one of the bloodiest and most intractable secessionist wars in the Third World.

Delhi's decision to intervene in the conflict was the result of a complex mixture of domestic/political concerns dovetailing with regional/military ambitions. Throughout the period from 1977-87, it was widely known that the Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka had been receiving assistance of various kinds from their kin in the South Indian, Tamil-dominated state of Tamil Nadu, so much so that there were even reports that the separatists had established bases on the mainland. Tamil Nadu, in electoral terms, was of fundamental importance to the Congress Party. As a result it became important, at the very least, not to antagonize Indian Tamils by interfering in the supply routes, and even better to provide assistance to the Sri Lankan Tamils. In addition, given India's self-perception as a hegemon in South Asia, Delhi became increasingly concerned, as the conflict deepened, at the degree of external, particularly Western, military support to the government in Colombo. 'India strongly disapproved of such links...the Indian perception appeared to be that Sri Lanka's military force should.. be limited to a token 'ceremonial army' and that the Indian military umbrella would cover Sri Lanka's security needs, if any' (p.57).

In 1987, when Sri Lankan forces launched an offensive in the Jaffna peninsula, India intervened on behalf of the separatists by dropping supplies to the rebels and then warning Colombo that it would intervene militarily if the offensive continued. 'Thus, an ethnic dispute that started as a purely domestic quarrel was converted into an international dispute involving Sri Lanka's powerful neighbour' (p.60). However, while forced to intervene on

behalf of the Tamils, given existing sympathies at home, India was also careful not to assist the secessionists to any decisive degree: for reasons of self-interest, since this could in turn backfire by fuelling its own separatist problems in places like the Punjab and Kashmir. India then moved in to broker an accord between Colombo and the Tamil separatists, and a contingent of Indian troops was dispatched to oversee the truce and disarm the rebels. However, sucked into the vortex of the communal strife, the Indians then found themselves forced to conduct their own offensive in the Jaffna peninsula in order to bring a recalcitrant faction of the Tamil separatists movement (the Tamil Tigers) to heel, as well as under attack from the JVP, a militant Sinhalese nationalist group. They withdrew in March 1990, leaving the Sinhalese and Tamils to their own devices, but in the course of their stay, were responsible for stripping Serendipity of its last vestiges of communal harmony. As Samarasinghe's study shows, foreign powers tend to intervene in secessionist conflicts out of their own interest, rather than any concern for the right to self-determination of an ethnic group.

As Aguado argues, the Kurdish issue possesses strong inbuilt tendencies towards internationalisation. Straddling four different states in the Middle East, namely Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria, and occupying the strategic heartland of the Middle East, the Kurds, in their struggle for an independent Kurdistan have often been manipulated by the states in the region in their own national interests. One result of this has been to compound the fractionalism inherent in the traditional political organisation of the Kurds based on tribal loyalties, and led to the proliferation of political parties in Kurdistan, each competing for popular and international support, with some willing to settle for some form of regional autonomy within the respective states in which they find themselves, while others continue to struggle for a united Kurdistan, through joint secessions from the states in which they are entrapped. As a result, as part of the competition for supremacy between states in the region, the Kurds have often been used as a weapon to weaken rivals, as shown most recently by Iranian and Syrian sponsorship of Iraqi Kurds during the Iran-Iraq war. Yet while the governments of neighbouring states have often used Kurdish aspirations to promote their own interests, they have been careful to keep this assistance within strict limits, content to sustain a movement with some nuisance value, but not to make it strong enough to turn around and create problems at home.

Scott's study of the relatively unknown case of secessionist aspirations amongst the Hmong tribal people of Laos, also draws out the importance of the impact of external actors in the development of desires for separate statehood. Courted during the Indo-China war by both the Communist Pathet Lao and the Royalist forces, as well as by their respective foreign

backers, China and the U.S., the Hmong were led to believe by all parties that their alignment with one or the other side would be rewarded, come the peace settlement, with a separatist state. The Hmong, however, backed the wrong horse, and in the aftermath of the war found themselves the target of a policy of genocide, directed by the victorious communists in Vientiane, because of their support of the Royal Lao government and its U.S. allies.

Three of the studies, Raghovan's on the Southern Sudanese secessionist movement, Renard's on the Karen rebellion in Burma and Tan's on Moro separatism in the Phillipines, all highlight the role of European colonialism in both creating and/or reinforcing Premdas' primordial factors. As a result of British colonial policy in both the Sudan and Burma, premised on the philosophy of divide and rule, religion, an important primordial variable, became an additional source of division between the Black tribes who inhabited Southern Sudan and the Arabs of the North on the one hand, and the minority Karen and the Burman majority on the other. London made a point of separating the ethnic groups in both its colonies, allowing Christian missionary activity amongst the various Southern Sudanese tribes and preventing Islamic proselytising amongst those who chose to remain animist, and in the Burmese case, permitting Christian missionaries to not only convert the pagan Karen, but also to contribute to the strengthening of a Karen self-identity by developing a distinct Karen script. To the existing cleavages along ethnic, linguistic and regional lines — Southern Black Africans versus Northern Arabs, various tribal languages versus Arabic, Karen highlanders versus Burmese lowlanders — was added another source of division, namely Christianity/animism versus Islam and Buddhism.

In the case of the Moros on the southern islands of Mindanao and Sulu in the Phillipines, it was Spanish colonialism, and in particular the onslaught of Catholic missionary activity which successfully engulfed the rest of the archipelago, which contributed towards the development of a sense that they constituted a distinct people. Adherents of Islam since the end of the 13th century, the Moros had, by the 15th century, developed their own distinct political institutions in the form of sultanates. And it was around the defence of these religious/cultural institutions that the Moros put up their resistance to successive attempts by the Spanish, beginning in the 16th century and continuing right through to the second half of the 19th century, to subdue their autonomy and bring them within the fold of Filipino-Catholic national life. And despite numerous setbacks, resistance continues to this day under the aegis of various Moro secessionist movements.

If colonialism reinforced primordial factors, it was post-independence governments that were responsible for bringing secondary factors, such as perceptions of neglect and/or exploitation on the part of subordinate groups, into play. This point is made clear in the study on Bangladesh by Rashid and that on Bougainville by Premdas. In the case of the conflict

between East and West Pakistan, Rashid charts the development of feelings amongst the Bengalis of the Eastern wing of the country that they, despite a decisive contribution to the struggle for independence in 1947, had fallen under the domination of the Urdu-speaking minority from West Pakistan. Insensitive to the need of the Bengalis for a sense of full participation in the running of the country, the post-independence government, dominated by West Pakistanis, ensured not only that the seat of government but also all the key ministries, were located in the Western part. The problem was compounded by the dispatching of Westerners as administrators and soldiers to the East. West Pakistan businessmen moved in large numbers to the East, and came to dominate the jute trade — East Pakistan's principal economic activity — thus creating a sense of economic exploitation. In addition, despite the fact that Bengalis constituted a majority of the country's population, the government decreed that Urdu was to become the national language. The common bond of Islam proved too weak to prevent the rise of feelings on the part of Bengalis that they were being subjected to a process of internal colonialism and to convince themselves of the necessity of secession.

In his study of the problems of secessionism in Bougainville, Premdas shows how Australian colonial policy in Papua New Guinea created an administrative system in Papua New Guinea which was highly centralised, and which subsequently became a bone of contention between the capital and the multiplicity of outlying regions. Centralisation was continued by the first post-independence government, which saw it as an essential component of its proclaimed policy of nation-building. Although lip-service had been paid to the need to devolve power to provincial administrations, these were shelved just before Papua New Guinea gained independence in September 1975.

The island of Bougainville, with a small population but because of its rich copper resources a major contributor to the central coffers and therefore always resentful of the concentration of power in Port Moresby, opted for a UDI two weeks before independence, once it became apparent that the status quo was to be maintained. The new administration in Port Moresby sent in troops to quell the secessionist rebellion. Negotiations followed and a *modus vivendi* was reached through a partial devolution of powers to the regions. It remains the case, however, that feelings of economic exploitation by the centre on the part of the inhabitants of Bougainville still rumble beneath the surface, and that calls for secession are a regular feature of the politics of Papua New Guinea.

The book ends with three case-studies drawn from Europe and Canada. To those who subscribe to the view that secessionism is a problem limited to pre-modern societies, they are a salutary reminder that the developed West is far from immune to the disease. Anderson's contribution centres on the

question of linguistic nationalism, amongst such varied groups as the Basques, Catalans, Corsicans and Welsh in Europe, and amongst the Quebecois in Canada, and the manner in which this both feeds into and feeds off feelings of ethnic separatism, which in turn has in some cases led to demands for political autonomy and even complete independence. The specific case of Quebec is dealt with competently by Corbeil and Montambault, who usefully apply Premdas' separation of variables into primordial and secondary factors to an historical overview of Quebec's quest for self-determination. The final chapter, by Ray and Premdas, deals with another source of disunity in Canada, namely the periodic calls for separation emanating from the Western provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia, and that are rooted in perceptions of economic exploitation by the centre of the country's industrial and financial wealth, located in Ontario and Quebec.

Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective is thus a timely reminder of the pervasiveness, if not promiscuity, of the problem. And for those who believe in the irreversible victory of liberal-democracy in 1989, it is important to remember that the gratuitous brutality that often accompanies secessionist conflicts, be it on the part of the seceding or target state, is not exactly conducive to the implanting of liberal-democratic systems of government. If anything it throws up such unsavoury demagogic characters as Milosevic, and leads to vicious chauvinism, the quashing of any internal political dissent and not rarely genocide.

Mark Simpson
Department of International Relations
University of the Witwatersrand

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