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THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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International Affairs Bulletin

Volume 5, No. 2, 1981

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Smuts House Notes
SAIIA International Political Outlook Conference

On 31 August and 1 September 1981, the South African Institute of International Affairs held the first of a series of political outlook conferences.

On the suggestions of a number of participants at the conference, the Institute prepared an Executive Summary for its Corporate Members and this is reproduced below, together with a programme outline.

The wider global context

All speakers stressed the historical perspective. They also emphasised the rapidly changing nature of the international order, a specific aspect of which was the interdependence of nations and the impossibility of immunity on the part of individual states from the effects of changes beyond their borders.

An important theme of all the speakers was the question of the Soviet Union's capacity to project its power around the world. Some speakers felt the inherent threat of the Soviet Union lay in Soviet strength whilst others felt more danger lay in Soviet weakness.

Notwithstanding division on this issue, all agreed that the situation in South Africa presented a unique political opportunity for the Soviet Union to involve itself in the region, including the domestic politics of South Africa. Speakers also stressed that the resource and economic strength of South Africa encouraged international strategic concern and enhanced Soviet political interest in the region.

Speakers pointed to differing European and American perspectives on relations with the Soviet Union. The Reagan Administration believed, for example, that *détente* with the Soviet Union had produced little of substance either for the bilateral relationship or the alliance generally. Most Europeans, however, because of the political and economic advantages derived from the process by Europe, believed that *détente* was alive and should be maintained. In this sense a distinct difference between Europe and America had developed on how to deal with the East.

Another area, similarly endowed with politically sensitive strategic resources, was the Middle East and speakers emphasised Soviet capacity to project power into that region by exploiting the many opportunities provided by instability.

A further threatening international issue which one speaker referred to was the proliferation of nuclear capability in various regions of the globe, including Asia, Latin America and South Africa.

The requirement of external legitimacy was seen to be a salient point relating to Southern African issues. Such legitimacy was lent by the international community in its collective judgement, for example at the United Nations. What is of particular interest was the assertion that this phenomenon was not new. The acceptability of domestic and regional settlements had always inescapably been the subject of external adjudication as was, for example, the case in the Middle Ages in the relationship between the Pope and the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire.

Southern Africa

An important theme was that regional circumstances had been transformed in recent times and that these new circumstances affected South Africa's regional policy and had already affected South Africa's domestic political development. Speakers recognised South Africa's economic and military strength and its present dominance in the region, but suggested that this might be challenged in the future as a result of such developments as the founding of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), by nine neighbouring states. A prerequisite for a continued positive South Africa role in the region was the satisfactory solution of domestic conflict in South Africa.

Grave concern was expressed at perceived South African efforts to destabilise the region and several speakers referred to issues such as South Africa's withdrawal of locomotives from Zimbabwe. On the other hand, one speaker stressed pointedly that South Africa continued to play a positive role in the region and elsewhere in Africa. It was his belief that this contribution was not adequately appreciated in the international community. Moreover, he emphasised South Africa's determination to find a satisfactory solution to the Namibian impasse.

On Namibia, however, other speakers argued that Pretoria's reluctance to accept both the spirit and letter of Security Council Resolution 435 damaged South Africa's position in Africa and in the world. In other words, South Africa was blamed by many for the continued impasse.

With regard to South Africa's regional ambitions, speakers tended to feel that these could not be successful unless South Africa grounded them in a sincere understanding that domestic reform was essential. In other

words, the prospects for a successful Constellation of Southern African States would flounder on the apparent inability of South Africa to reform itself domestically.

Two Zimbabwean speakers argued that the major motivation behind the SADCC was the desire by those states involved to weaken their links with South Africa. They felt that Zimbabwe with its economic potential could play a pivotal role in the success of the SADCC.

On the economic outlook for Zimbabwe, it was admitted that major problems existed in the fields of transport, fuel, foreign exchange and skilled manpower. Moreover, the economy was overheated, inflation rates were rising and investor confidence and standards of national housekeeping had deteriorated. Nevertheless, these participants argued strongly that the overall economic outlook remained positive with, for example, record agricultural output leading the way. The Mugabe government, contrary to the belief of many, was pragmatic in its approach.

The issue of South Africa

There was an overwhelming belief amongst foreign speakers that South Africa's domestic policy provided both the greatest stumbling block to regional peace and, at the same time, the greatest incentive for Soviet involvement. Concomitantly, European and American elites recognising this fact were reluctant to embrace South Africa as long as Pretoria persisted with the existing political dispensation.

However, it was pointed out that the image of South Africa differed between and within major Western countries. For example, most young West Germans and West German intellectuals were highly critical of the South African Government and tended to support international proposals which were capable of bringing about rapid transformation of the existing status quo. But West German industrialists and bankers tended to appreciate the positive features of the South African economy and were envious of the apparent political peace.

Despite the pragmatism which traditionally governed Western relations with Pretoria, some European countries had distanced themselves from the recent American position, fearing that Pretoria would use the favourable circumstance to prevaricate on both domestic reform and on Namibia.

Participants granted South Africa's powerful position domestically and in the region, but argued that sheer economic and military power would not obviate the need for political solutions. Numerous speakers referred to the demography of South Africa, pointing out that the Whites were not in a position to withstand the numerical superiority of a Black majority.

Turning to 'the crisis of rising expectations' speakers stressed the role of

the middle class in spearheading revolutionary change. Furthermore, it was pointed out that notwithstanding sincere attempts at proposing political reform by competent people, such proposals would fall on fallow ground if the political circumstances in the country were not conducive to reform.

Programme outline

Monday, 31 August 1981	
Opening Address	Mr H.F. Oppenheimer National Chairman, South African Institute of International Affairs
Keynote Address The Changing World Around South Africa	The Rt Hon. Edward Heath MBE MP Former British Prime Minister and Leader of the Conservative Party from 1965–1976
The Global Outlook: an American perspective	Dr George H. Wittman Director, Defense Issues Programme, Hudson Institute, New York
South Africa's Position in the World: a European perspective	Marion Countess Doenhoff Publisher, *Die Zeit*, Hamburg
South Africa's Position in the World	Dr the Hon. Hilgard Muller Former South African Foreign Minister
Tuesday, 1 September 1981	
The Outlook for Southern Africa: a view from Europe	Prof. Thierry de Montbrial Director, French Institute of International Affairs
Zimbabwe and its Neighbours	Mr E.G. Cross General Manager, Dairy Marketing Board of Zimbabwe, and President of the Zimbabwean Institute of International Affairs, Salisbury
The Challenges Facing an Independent Namibia	Prof. Wolfgang Thomas Dept of Economics, University of Transkei, Umtata
Southern Africa in the World — an overview and review of the conference	Mr Peter J. Bottomley, MP Member of the British Conservative Party

Edward Heath

The changing world around South Africa

It is 27 years ago, in 1954, that I was last in South Africa and coming back now I can see the extent of the change and development which has taken place in this country industrially and in other ways. I can see where things would change and have changed in my judgment for the better, and also those spheres which are controversial, where one would feel that the institutionalization of some aspects of life have not helped the position of South Africa in the world outside. I am always wary about commenting on the internal problems of other countries. I recognize we have quite enough internal problems in the United Kingdom, of our own, to which we have to give attention. But where countries do have a common interest then I think we are justified in talking to each other about these problems, to see the extent to which they affect our attitudes in various spheres and also, if possible, to find ways by which we may in exchanging our experiences help each other in the solution of the difficulties which face everyone of us today.

Since 1945 we have seen extraordinary changes in the world. We have seen a period in which the super-powers ceased trying to outrun each other and decided that the basis of parity was the only way in which they could follow a constructive path of limiting nuclear weapons and, hopefully, conventional weapons. In this we have had some success with the first Test Ban Treaty and the treaties which followed it which have been observed by the super-powers. At the same time we have now passed into a period in which there is a fear that the super-powers are getting out of balance again and this holds great dangers for all of us in the free world. We have passed through a period of 30 years of unrivalled

The Rt. Hon. Edward Heath, MP, delivered the keynote address at the first international political outlook conference, "Southern Africa in the World", organized by the South African Institute of International Affairs, and held in Johannesburg on Monday, 31 August, and Tuesday 1 September, 1981. This article is the text of Mr Heath's address.

prosperity in the world as a whole. Whatever some monetary economists may now say about John Maynard Keynes, he did in fact help us from 1945 until 1974 to expand the world economy at a rate hitherto unknown, and to increase the prosperity of individual people in a way which had never been experienced before. It was the sudden onset of the OPEC 400 per cent increase in oil prices and the policy which has followed since, which has produced so many problems, not only for the industrial but also for the developing world. We have seen a world in which although some developing countries have made remarkable progress, taken overall the gap between the industrialized countries of the North and the developing countries of the South has become wider.

It was the examination of these problems to which the Brandt Commission, of which I was a member, devoted its time and for which we put forward solutions. I am glad to say that at the end of October there will be the mini-summit conference of 22 Heads of Government from both North and South, and I hope it will be possible for them to agree on certain very basic principles which will enable us to advance North and South together and to break the deadlock which has existed for so long; nearly 15 years in the discussions between the industrialized and the developing countries.

Of course the phrase North-South is a misnomer and I have discovered since I have been here that it is also open to misunderstanding in South Africa itself. The North, the industrialized developed world, does include Australasia in the southern hemisphere. It includes India and China, the two largest countries by population in the northern hemisphere. But the plain fact is that if you have East and West then if you want an alternative as far as the media are concerned it can only be North and South. They are not sailors, they do not recognize that there is quite a variety of points of the compass you could choose if you really wanted to be accurate and so having had East-West for the last 35 years, we now have North-South and this is something which we must accept.

The point I would like to make to you here is that we have also had to recognize that East and West and North and South are no longer separated, they are in fact intertwined, they cannot any longer be considered separately. The impact of the difference between North and South in the economic and social sphere is bound to affect the balance in East and West in the politico-military sphere. This can be vividly illustrated in the recent case of the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. Afghanistan was a non-aligned country. What did we do in order to show that we were friendly towards it, that we wanted to solve its problems and that it should look to us for a way of life? We made it the princely contribution of one million pounds. We cannot therefore be surprised if countries like Afghanistan, like Turkey, like Pakistan found no

good reason to look to the West for their sustenance. Of course when the crisis was upon us we changed our policy and went to them and said, "You are really our friends, we now want to make this clear, you are our brothers, you may be our Muslim brothers but you are our brothers, and we offer you large loans". By that time Turkey had a military dictatorship and President Zia in Pakistan said, "the Russians are now on my border. If I take this large loan I am quite plainly just a lackey of the West." And this has a very firm moral for us, that we cannot wait until a crisis of this kind is upon us. We have to formulate foreign policy which takes just as much account of the economic and social problems of the North and South as it does of the political and military problems of East and West.

That then is the situation, I think, at which the world has arrived, and to-day I would like to try to put into context some of the problems which I see of South Africa's position in the outside world. So I would like to discuss the situation of South Africa in relationship to East and West and North and South.

It has become a maxim of foreign policy in the West that no country can insulate itself completely from the powerful and complex forces which are sweeping our world today. These forces can endanger the internal political stability of almost any nation, just as they inevitably condition the options open to it in its external policy. Equally, experience has taught each country in the West that its internal conditions are a fundamental determinant of its options in the sphere of foreign policy.

Both these maxims are, I believe, directly relevant to South Africa's position in our changing world. There are in fact three features of the international environment which have a particularly profound impact on her domestic situation and on her options abroad. The interests of the West are vitally affected by all these features and by the capacity of South Africa to respond to them.

The first of these features is the relentless geopolitical onslaught of the Soviet Union. This is not just a military threat. Subversion by the Kremlin — through local communist parties or labour movements, through support for other radical forces, or through its ever more sophisticated techniques of propaganda — is in many cases far more dangerous and threatening than the Soviet military machine itself. In addition, the new tendency of Moscow to use proxy troops around the world enables the Soviet Union to gain direct military leverage over conflicts to which it would never dare to commit forces of its own.

No continent knows this better than Africa. Recent history shows that Soviet diplomacy has hardly been a triumph in Africa, but subversion and military intervention by proxy have reaped their dividends in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and across the Red Sea in South Yemen

Up to 20 000 Cuban troops and $2 billion in Soviet arms helped the

military rulers of Ethiopia in their repression of Eritrea and in consolidating a Marxist dictatorship in Addis Ababa; between 10 000 and 20 000 Cuban troops backed by Soviet arms and advisers helped the MPLA to power in Angola; and small numbers of Cuban proxies remain on duty in other African countries, such as Congo and Mozambique.

All this is underpinned by the increasing strength and geographical reach of the Soviet Union's own military power. Here, the most remarkable advances have been made by her navy. Before 1972 the Soviet navy had undertaken regular operations in the north-west area of the Indian Ocean and around the coast of West Africa, but it kept above the Equator. After 1975, on the other hand, its progression below the Equator began. Patrols and intelligence ships were stationed far down the east coast of Africa.

This was mirrored on the west coast of Africa by the movement of the Soviet navy into South Atlantic waters, supported by its newly acquired facilities in Marxist Angola.

South Africa and the West are both gravely endangered by this situation. It threatens them in three ways. The first is by contributing to a pincer-like strategy by which the Soviets hope to dominate the Gulf and the vital Straits of Hormuz. One arm of the pincer consists of gaining control over the Red Sea area through the influence of Moscow in Ethiopia and South Yemen, both of which are rapidly developing Soviet-style communist parties. The other arm is based on Moscow's takeover of Afghanistan and its very probable desire to gain control of the disaffected regions of Pakistan. Together, these advances by the Soviet Union have placed her in a powerful position to increase her leverage over the vital oil-producing states of the Gulf, by subversion and by intimidation.

The second way in which the Soviet Union's presence in Africa and in the waters surrounding it threatens the interests of the West and of South Africa is by the danger it poses to the Cape route. As a result of its leverage over Angola and Mozambique, and its naval facilities in both these countries, the Kremlin has created new opportunities for subverting South Africa, whatever the regime in Pretoria, and for putting pressure on the West in a crisis.

Third, these advances by the Soviet Union directly endanger the security of South Africa itself. This inevitably affects the interests of the West, if only because at present we are heavily dependent on a range of essential minerals which no other power sympathetic to the free world can adequately provide.

This is why for better or for worse the destinies of South Africa and the West are intimately intertwined.

The second feature of the international environment which is profoundly important for South Africa is the emergence of black rule in

Angola and Mozambique and, even more so, the birth of Zimbabwe. No international development in recent years will have done more to embolden the hearts and minds of black nationalists everywhere than the victory of the Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe. In addition, the emergence of a prosperous black-ruled nation on South Africa's doorstep has created a new economic pole in the region towards which South Africa's other black neighbours may increasingly gravitate. This, too, will give psychological reassurance to the black population throughout Southern Africa, even if the great economic power of Zimbabwe remains potential rather than actual for some time to come. The impact which that will have on the stability of South Africa and of the region is of great concern to the West. For additional instability will further threaten our markets and our supplies of raw materials in addition to providing fresh opportunities for Soviet advance.

There is a third feature of the international environment which, like the second, will inspire black people everywhere who feel downtrodden and depressed. It is the slow, but marked, progression towards more free and responsive government on the African continent. This is by no means confined to Zimbabwe. The last few years have seen the eclipse of three of the Continent's most bestial dictators: Amin of Uganda, Bokassa of the short-lived Central African Empire, and Francisco Macias Nguema of Equatorial Guinea. At the same time, Senegal and Tunisia have opened up their political systems; Ghana and Nigeria have abandoned military rule for constitutional democracy; and the Organization of African Unity has substantially increased its concern for human rights and its disapproval of their violation by some of its member governments.

These three features in the international environment all point inexorably to one common conclusion: this is the need eventually to grant full political rights to the non-white population in South Africa itself. That objective is not only essential to the survival of the white man as a relevant political factor in this country; it has also become more urgent than anyone would have anticipated only a few years ago.

Let me explain why this is the case in terms of the trends in international affairs to which I have just referred.

First, the fury and the frustration of the non-white population in South Africa, which are born of the system of apartheid and fanned by the emergence of black majority rule elsewhere in Africa, constitute one of the greatest opportunities for Soviet advance in the world today. The longer their bondage lasts, the more they will resort to the armed struggle which the Soviet Union is only waiting to sponsor, and the more they will seek comfort in the historically inevitable victory which is promised by Marxist ideology. That, more than anything else, would provide the Kremlin with the opportunity and the means which she needs for developing her

stranglehold on the region as a whole.

Let no-one imagine that repression of black militancy will deny the Soviets this opportunity for geopolitical advance in Southern Africa. At best, repression will serve only to push the focus of the conflict outside the borders of South Africa itself and thereby to suck its already vulnerable neighbours further into the conflagration. No-one in a country so alert to the danger of Soviet mischief as South Africa has always been will fail to understand the opportunities which this would give to the designs of the Kremlin.

Nor should anyone believe that the West would step in on behalf of South Africa in a moment of such national peril. Neither in peacetime nor in war would the West stand in strategic alliance with South Africa as long as she pursues a system which it considers to be profoundly insulting to the rights of the overwhelming majority of her population. The Angolan civil war provided clear evidence for this. The United States was unable at that time to join South Africa in the war against the Marxist MPLA and their Cuban supporters; and under no conceivable circumstances would she have done so even had the will of her people not been sapped by the crises of Vietnam and Watergate.

It is absolutely true that the West has co-operated and continues to co-operate closely with other governments which shamefully violate the rights of their citizens. But what makes South Africa so unique in the modern world is that the debasement of human rights has become institutionalised, enshrined in law, and even sanctified by religious doctrine. No Western country with a history of colonialism or with a multi-racial society could ever support such a system of legislative discrimination.

To do so would not only violate our most deeply held principles: it would also have unimaginable consequences for racial harmony at home. It would turn allies and friends throughout the world against the West. It would bitterly divide the Alliance at a time when unity has never been more important. And it would portray the Soviet Union as the friend of the oppressed in Southern Africa, and the West as their enemy. The result would be to facilitate, and even to legitimize, Soviet interference in Africa and in other conflicts or regions around the world in which the West is engaged.

Unless and until the dismantlement of apartheid is assured, it would be a grave mistake for South Africa to base her strategy on the assumption that when the chips are down the West will stand with her. The commanding irony of South Africa's present situation is that for these reasons it cannot even be in *her own* strategic interests to encourage the West into a political or military partnership against Soviet aggression. This is, I believe, a tragedy for both South Africa and the West. Without

the system of apartheid in South Africa, we would be natural partners, wedded in common cause against the communist onslaught in Southern Africa itself and around the world. Not only do we have very similar perceptions of the Soviet threat; but anything which endangers the security of one of us almost inevitably endangers the security of both. Moreover, South Africa's high technology industries, her economic efficiency, and her well-trained and well-equipped army provide her with everything which is needed in material terms to contribute to a common defence of freedom. The loss to our common security which results from the impossibility of consummating this potential partnership is inestimable.

This leads me to the second major feature of the international environment to which I referred earlier. This is the emergence of black majority rule in South Africa's three most important neighbours: Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. The birth of Zimbabwe is by far the most significant of the three for South Africa. Alone of these countries it has a constitutional democracy and a well-functioning economy. It could become, and indeed to some extent has become, a spiritual and economic magnet for the whole region. It is already taking the lead in creating an economic regrouping of nine black states in Southern Africa. It has every prospect of becoming a major exporter of agricultural produce, including grain. And in time it will also grow in importance as a producer of the manufactured goods which the region requires. This is inevitably going to undercut the economic dependence of the region as a whole on South Africa, and therefore the growing leverage of Pretoria over her neighbours. The result of this will be to erode further the prospects for the establishment of a "constellation of states" based on growing economic co-operation between South Africa and her neighbours. In fact, any plan of Pretoria to develop a more structured economic partnership in the region is doomed as long as she pursues a domestic policy of racial discrimination which black leaders find insulting to the dignity of their own kind.

This is an immense loss to both South Africa and her neighbours because they are natural economic partners. This is easily understood when we consider the high degree of complementarity which exists amongst their economies. Between them, they also possess practically every major raw material which is required by industrial society, including oil. In addition, they would have immense potential as political partners in strengthening the region against the mischievous designs of the Soviet Union and the other forces which constantly threaten to unsettle it. But just as a full partnership between South Africa and the West would be impossible until the dismantlement of apartheid is assured, so the great fruits of co-operation between South Africa and her neighbours will be

denied until that objective is finally in sight. This, too, is a matter for profound regret in the West, whose enduring interest in peace and stability in Southern Africa I have already mentioned.

But the greatest impact made by the recent movement towards black majority rule in Southern Africa will not be on Pretoria's options for *foreign* policy, but rather on the consciousness of blacks in the towns and heartland of South Africa itself as well as of Namibia. For the victory of the Patriotic Front parties has convinced them above all that militant nationalism can triumph against the heaviest odds, if it perseveres. It would be shortsighted not to acknowledge the inspiration which this will inevitably have given to those black South Africans who have hitherto sought peaceful change for their country.

Nor should we ignore the other lessons of Zimbabwe. Foremost amongst these is that guerrilla movements which profess a radical, or even Marxist, faith, can rapidly shed the more extreme elements of their ideological clothing once they are given responsibility in government. Such responsibility can give them a vested interest in moderation at home and abroad. Zimbabwe is not the first example of this, the experience of Kenya has also been testimony to this reality. But what these countries have also shown is that the longer freedom fighters are isolated and suppressed the more they will resort to violence, to extremist ideologies, and to the patronage of radical or anti-Western nations.

This is why it is essential that in bringing Namibia to independence, the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) be recognized by South Africa as a full and legitimate participant in elections, just as the outside world should recognize the full legitimacy of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA). Any idea that the DTA can successfully bring about the eclipse of SWAPO if that Organization is excluded from an election in Namibia is without foundation. The failure of the Internal Settlement in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia demolished whatever credibility an analogous scheme for Namibia might have had.

To be sure, it is essential that a way should be found for ensuring that whoever wins the election would respect the rights of all minorities in Namibia after independence. But to isolate SWAPO because it has links with Moscow is only to give it no alternative but to strengthen that relationship. The response of South Africa and the West to the menace of Soviet support for powerful liberation movements such as SWAPO, which are neither communist parties nor irretrievably anti-Western, must be to do all we can to lessen their dependence on Moscow, rather than to consolidate it.

The international environment in which South Africa finds herself today is therefore one of great complexity and often of paradoxical character. The many and varied currents of international change to which

I have referred, including the movement in the direction of open government in a number of African countries, will probably provide few opportunities and many obstacles for South Africa's foreign policy as long as she remains isolated in international affairs. But beyond that, there can be no doubt that they will add greatly to the already tremendous forces for political change within South Africa itself.

To an outsider it is increasingly clear that the quest for political change within South Africa is manifested in far more than just bitterness and resentment on the part of the non-white population.

In the first place, there appears to be a growing, even if reluctant, acceptance that an equitable political system will come about only through violence. This is particularly true amongst young black South Africans, whose alienation is deepening at an alarming pace. It is accompanied increasingly by the espousal of extreme ideologies. In such an environment is it not inevitable that Marxism with its emphasis on class warfare will become a guiding light for black nationalism? To ascribe its popularity entirely to subversion by the Soviet Union is to shut one's eyes to basic changes in black consciousness.

But militancy by itself does not lead to change. What makes it effective is organization; and here, too, profound changes are occurring amongst black South Africans. One of the most significant of these changes is the incipient growth of black trade unions. Today, only about 2 per cent of the African workforce is unionized, but the trend towards greater organization of labour in the future is clear. Already now, black workers are coming to see strikes as a weapon for achieving economic and social demands outside the shop floor, as well as on it.

Subsidiaries of foreign companies have shown that they can make a major contribution to an improvement in the conditions of black workers by pursuing fair employment practices, including more liberal standards of labour relations, in their South African operations. Although direct foreign investment accounts for only a small proportion of total black employment, it can have an impact far beyond the work places which it creates. For it sets an example which the less enlightened South African firms may find increasingly difficult not to follow and which government will find increasingly difficult to ignore. As the Wiehahn Commission, appointed by the government, wrote in 1979: "The presence of subsidiaries of multinational enterprises within a country's borders creates a conduit through which strong influences and pressure can be exerted on that country's policies and practices".

The increasing organization and political awareness of South African blacks is also nourished by a constant improvement in the education and skills of a growing number of their workers. There can have been no society in history in which such a development did not lead to the

emergence of an organized and influential middle class. Yet it would be a fatal mistake to believe that a new bourgeoisie will remain co-operative and quiescent if it feels itself and its kin to be effectively excluded from the political system of the nation.

One revolution after another in history has shown that it is the middle classes which spearhead revolutionary change, and which provide its philosophical and organizational basis. This was so in the Russian Revolution, in the Civil Rights movement in the United States, and in liberation movements throughout Asia and Africa. There is no compelling evidence that South Africa would be an exception to this rule.

Indeed, to the extent that it has been pursued in South Africa, a strategy of co-option does not appear to have paid dividends. The most favoured of the non-white racial groups, the Indians and the Coloureds, have generally refused to acquiesce in the role of a second-class ally of the white man, despite their relatively privileged status. On the contrary, they appear to have become very much more militant over precisely the period during which the most strenuous efforts have been made to woo them.

Underlying all these trends will be the inexorable growth in the proportion of blacks to whites in South African society. In 1980 blacks outnumbered whites by five to one. By most forecasts the ratio will be seven to one in the year 2 000, and nine to one by 2020. The Minister of Manpower (Fanie Botha) has put this into perspective by reminding us that even before the end of the century, of every additional seventy-three people who enter industry, seventy-two would be black or coloured and only one would be white. Even if jobs can be provided for all these people, will they be satisfied with the status of indefinite subjugation to a dwindling minority of whites? Could South Africa be defended effectively from external threats amidst the civil disorder which these demographic trends could help to bring about? Could the discipline of coloured and black recruits in the army be maintained under these conditions? And how would the Soviet Union's appetite for exacerbating and exploiting instability wherever it exists be curbed amidst the tempest of a race war? If ever an historical tide of change was determined by necessity, it is the move towards full political participation by blacks here in South Africa.

I believe that responsible whites in all walks of life — in industry, in the army, in universities, in parliament and in government — are coming to understand the need for change and the powerful social dynamics which underlie it. Viewed from abroad, Afrikanerdom appears to be in a ferment of change unparalleled in the history of the Republic, and this is not just at the level of attitudes and rhetoric. Very real, and welcome, decisions to reform the system of apartheid have been made. Black trade unions have been recognized. Statutory job reservation has been substantially removed. Progress has been made towards permitting anyone to establish

a commercial enterprise in an industrial area. Advances have been made in the removal of statutory provisions on the mobility of labour. And a number of regulations on "petty" apartheid have been abolished.

I am confident that this process will continue as a growing proportion of the Afrikaner population becomes urbanized. For participation in a complex industrial society creates both a greater stake in its effective functioning and heightened awareness of its fragility. For this reason, the prospect of living in a state of growing conflict with the majority of South Africa's labour force is likely to become less and less acceptable to the Afrikaner nation as a whole. In short, the prerequisites of economic and social stability will increasingly conflict with traditional concepts of Afrikaner nationalism.

There are those who say that the abandonment of some of the more peripheral aspects of apartheid by the present government of South Africa is merely an exercise in political window dressing; they deny that it has any real significance. I do not accept this view. Even modest reforms, such as those to which I have referred, represent a very considerable assault on the concept of total and absolute differentiation between the white and the black man. They therefore tamper with the psychology of apartheid in a manner which is replete with political significance.

But this does not mean that the reforms which have been made so far to the system of apartheid are even remotely adequate; nor does it mean that they will in any way defuse the growing forces for change to which I have referred. Very far from it. Not only are most of these reforms peripheral to the experience of a great proportion of the black population, but they offer no hope whatsoever that the *core* of apartheid will be removed. This is the denial to the black population of an equitable role in the central governance of South Africa. And there can be no doubt about what an equitable role will mean. It will mean giving equal political rights to all regardless of race. No formula for a constitution will successfully defuse the growing forces of unrest if it does not provide for a universal franchise at the national level. The franchise may be qualified or not; the state may be federal, confederal or unitary; blacks may live apart from whites; but the election of the central government must be by universal suffrage. It would be irresponsible and cowardly for any foreign politician to skirt around that point or to hide it in complicated constitutional argument. To be sure, this transition will not be without its problems. The political restructuring of a complex society can never be a process which is wholly tranquil.

But it will be as nothing compared with the tempest of a revolution, should it be allowed to occur. This, I believe, is increasingly understood by political and business leaders in the West. And there is a growing recognition amongst our public opinion that the economic stake in South

Africa of countries like the UK and the US is best preserved by political adaptation which will help to avoid the upheaval which would otherwise lie ahead. The notion that the West's economic interests in South Africa give us a stake in the *status quo* is therefore old fashioned and dangerously misleading.

It would, I believe be foolish for a foreigner to predict when the forces for change in South Africa will make the transition to an equitable political system the only way of avoiding revolution. However, the battle lines do not yet appear to have been finally drawn by any means. Profound changes appear to be underway in the attitudes of all races in South Africa, including the Afrikaners. The opportunity for dialogue and for political reform without revolution still exists. That this opportunity should be seized will remain the fervent hope of all those who realise the immense political, human and economic contribution which South Africa could make in shaping tomorrow's world. If it is seized, then at last it will be possible to construct the great and natural partnership between the Western World and South Africa which remains an objective of profound common interest.

David B. Abernethy

The major foreign policy positions of the Reagan Administration

Implications for United States-South African relations

To begin with I would like to raise, and then attempt to answer, four questions. First of all, how confident can I be that I know what I am talking about, in terms of an understanding of President Reagan's foreign policy less than six months after the start of the new regime? Second, to the extent that I can be confident that there is something meaningful to say, how can one describe the worldview, the general stance toward the peoples and countries beyond our borders, of policy-makers in the Reagan Administration? How does it compare to the worldview of President Carter; what are the elements of continuity and change in the approaches of the two American Presidents? Third, what are the implications of Reagan's worldview for American policy toward South Africa? Fourth — and I would emphasize this question more than the others — are there constraints or limits on the translation of Reagan's general worldview into specific policies toward South Africa which would make it difficult for the United States to "tilt" in a significant way toward the South African government?

My principal argument is that there are a number of these constraints, that they have, in my judgment, the fortunate effect of inhibiting a rapprochement with Pretoria even if some individuals in Washington might like to effect that rapprochement, and that it is important for South African policy-makers in calculating their own foreign and domestic policy choices to take into account the serious limits on American capacity

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and will to establish friendly relations with any South African government based on apartheid principles.

I

Taking the first question first: do I know what I am talking about? Indeed, can anyone, at this stage, speak confidently of the major foreign policy positions of the Reagan Administration? Let me give three reasons why the answer to this question may well be negative. To begin with, we are dealing with a new Administration, less than half a year in office. Some appointive positions on the foreign policy side are not yet filled; others are still occupied by Carter appointees who may expect in due course to be replaced. There is a changing of the guard not only in the White House but also in the Senate, which for the first time in twenty-five years is under Republican control. This means specifically that the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is a Republican (Senator Charles Percy) for the first time in years, and that Republican Senator Nancy Kassebaum is assuming new responsibilities as Chairman of that Committee's Subcommittee on Africa. So we are dealing with a new cast of characters in the executive branch and in one part of the legislative branch. And with the transition from any Administration to any other, we must cope with the byzantine complexities of bureaucratic politics. The larger and more powerful a country, one might argue, the larger and more complex and more internally competitive its bureaucracy is likely to be. Surely this is true of the United States. Many institutional actors help to frame and carry out American foreign policy — the State Department, the Defence Department, the Treasury, the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, and so on — and inevitably these institutions engage in power plays against each other. The American press has made much, for instance, of alleged differences between Secretary of State Haig and Secretary of Defence Weinberger over foreign policy matters. In the past, under Presidents Carter, Ford and Nixon, the National Security Council was a very important actor, assuming some of the policy-setting functions which the State Department felt to be its own. The role of the NSC seems to be reduced in the Reagan Administration relative to the power of the State Department. In any event it takes time for competing bureaucracies, headed by new officials interested in exerting power, to sort matters out sufficiently that one can know when to listen for the "authoritative word" amid a chorus of often cacophonous voices.

A second reason why I or other analysts may not yet know what we are talking about is that the Republican Party, like the federal bureaucracy, speaks with many different voices, and the party is undergoing a process of change whose outcome is by no means certain. Under Mr Reagan the Republicans have taken a turn to the right and

brought in new ideas that were not prominent before. And the party is striving to become a majority party, its immediate goal being to capture control of the House of Representatives in 1982. At present, more Americans identify themselves as Democrats than as Republicans. Presumably the Reaganites would like to change that. If the Republican Party is to move toward majority status, it must incorporate new groups and bring within itself the conflicts and contradictions that characterize American society as a whole. The more influential the party, in other words, the more difficult it may be for party leaders to adopt a single, clear and forthright stand on issues X, Y or Z.

Currently, Republicans are engaged in a debate over the unit of analysis on which to focus their energies. Should they concentrate on the world, on foreign policy, on the importance of defence spending and the relationship between our defence efforts and particular foreign policy goals? Or should they concentrate on the national government as the important unit? As I will try to show, President Reagan has set for himself an enormously ambitious domestic agenda involving significant changes in the character and scope of the federal system of government. This is by itself a tremendous task; should the Republicans spend most of their political capital on the domestic market, so to speak? Or should they focus on public policy relating to the individual and the community in which the individual lives? Much of what is called the "New Right" in American politics is focused on "micro-level" policy matters: the drive, for instance, to criminalize abortion, stop sex education in schools, end school bussing as a means of racial desegregation, reinstitute prayers in public schools, provide tax relief for the private educational system, undermine affirmative action efforts in job recruitment and promotion, etc. Many people in the "New Right" worry less about "macro-level", global or foreign policy questions than about the "micro-level" questions I have just mentioned. The relative importance of the world, the country, and the individual — this is an issue that Republicans are currently debating among themselves.

On foreign policy matters, the Republican Party encompasses moderate liberals — who belong to what one might term the Eastern corporate, internationalist establishment — and a much more hardline, right-wing group which sees the world in East-West terms, favours military responses to perceived external challenges, attacks foreign aid, and tends to favour protectionist over free trade policies. Interestingly, the American far right does not identify itself closely with the interests of American multinational corporations but rather regards them with some suspicion: MNCs are considered too international in scope to act in terms of the American national interest, too willing to make business deals with socialist and communist regimes, too wealthy and powerful and élitist to

understand the circumstances of ordinary, "down home" folks. The ideological tensions within the Republican Party on foreign policy are reflected in Senator Jesse Helms' testimony against Dr Chester Crocker, nominated by the President to serve as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Helms attacks the more liberal Crocker for belonging to the Council on Foreign Relations, an organization initially "funded by the Morgans, Carnegies, Rockefellers and others interested in international business operations". Dr Crocker, as a member of the Council, is likely to carry out "the same old foreign policy run for the benefit of businessmen and socialists" that has characterized the past few decades, alleges the indignant Senator.[1] Helms goes so far as to attack Cecil Rhodes, normally considered the archetypal capitalist, as "a confirmed socialist at heart" whose Rhodes Scholarships were designed "to educate (sic) native élite in the socialism being taught in England. . ."![2] One can see in the exchanges between Helms and Crocker an illustration of the considerable diversity of viewpoints within the Republican Party, a diversity that may become more pronounced as the party attempts to attract a majority of the voters to its fold.

The third reason why I may not be able to speak with confidence about President Reagan's foreign policy is the high priority the President has placed on domestic affairs during his initial months in office. The first six months have been devoted primarily to articulating, popularizing and translating into legislative language a set of ambitious and multifaceted domestic goals. Let me refer briefly to five of these goals:

1. A reduction in the size and impact of the federal government relative to the private sector. If the President's proposed budget- and tax-cutting proposals are enacted, and the rather optimistic economic assumptions of the Administration are borne out, "fiscal 1982 outlays will be cut from 23 per cent of the gross national product to 21.8 per cent, and receipts will be reduced from 22,1 per cent to 20,4 per cent. By 1984, outlays and receipts will be down to 19,3 per cent of the GNP and the budget will be balanced".[3] The role of the private (profit and non-profit) sector in making economic decisions is correspondingly expected to expand.

2. Within the public sector, a devolution of power from the federal government to state and local governments. The President proposes to consolidate a large number of grant-in-aid programmes, currently designated by Congress for specific purposes or target groups, into a small number of block grants which states and localities will have considerable leeway to spend as they wish. This devolution of responsibility is accompanied by a reduction — of about 20 per cent in real terms compared to Carter's proposed Fiscal Year 1982 budget — of federal funds available for state and local social services,[4] so the proposed change is not exactly an unmixed blessing from the perspective of state governors

and city mayors. The President's budget proposals may also increase somewhat the leverage of state over city authorities. This makes political sense for the Republicans, who tend to elect a higher proportion of governors than of big-city mayors. But the budget shifts may also increase the already serious financial problems of America's urban areas, whose elected leaders might prefer less control over more money to more control over less.

3. Reduction of the federal government's capacity to regulate the economy and the behaviour of individuals. Moves toward economic deregulation were started in the last years of the Carter Administration (on oil and gas prices, for instance), but a much more concerted and broad-gauged effort in this direction is being mounted by President Reagaan.

4. Stimulation of growth and greater productivity in the economy by pumping more money into those segments of the private sector that are most likely to save and invest their tax savings — that is, the already wealthy. For understandable political reasons, the new Administration is unwilling to admit that it proposes to shift the distribution of income in a regressive direction, but it seems clear to me that the major purpose of the proposed Kemp-Roth tax cuts, which the President supports, is to place a large portion of the tax savings in the hands of people earning $50 000 and over, on the assumption that these individuals will save and productively invest the extra income. This activity by the wealthy is supposed to increase the volume of goods and services and reduce levels of inflation and unemployment at the same time. Traditionally, Republicans have tempered their desire for a more regressive tax policy with fear of the inflationary effects of budget deficits which sizeable tax cuts would incur. The newly popular doctrine of supply-side economics, by accepting budget deficits in the short run as a reasonable price to pay for economic growth, which in turn is supposed to increase tax revenues and eventually balance the budget, enables the wealthy to have their cake and to feel patriotic while eating it too. The Administration is making a gamble — and the gamble is absolutely crucial to the political future of conservatism in America — that the short-run economic costs to the lower and middle class brought about by budget cuts will be more than compensated by the economic benefits to all from the trickle-down effects of tax cuts. I personally have ethical qualms about making such a gamble, and I doubt that in fact the wager will be won. But the gamble is being made, based in large measure on a conviction that previous liberal economic policies have failed to keep the so-called "misery index" (the inflation rate plus the unemployment rate) from rising rapidly in recent years.

5. A shift in federal spending priorities from social and welfare programs to defence — from butter to guns, if you will. Non-defence

spending for Fiscal Year 1982 is to be cut by $48,6 billion from the figure President Carter proposed for Fiscal Year 1982, while defence outlays are to rise $4,8 billion over Carter's figures, which themselves represented a substantial increase over Fiscal Year 1981. For the period 1981–86, Reagan is considering increasing total obligational authority for defence by $195 billion above the $1 085 billion estimated Carter projections for these years.[5] Greater defence spending, quite apart from its possible impact on the world beyond America's borders, could have a substantial inflationary impact domestically. It might also affect the geography of our economic development by funnelling defence contracts to the rapidly growing states of the "sun belt" stretching from the southeast across to California, where a very high proportion of defence industry prime contractors is located. Benefits to the economically more depressed states of the old industrial heartland, from Michigan to the mid-Atlantic states and New England, are less clearcut. The new Administration will need to take into account, if only for future electoral reasons, the differential territorial impact of a greater emphasis on defence spending.

Note that these objectives are multiple, that they are extraordinarily ambitious, that they are likely to have a variety of economic and political consequences — and that President Reagan will need all his skills as a communicator and politician to push his domestic programme through Congress and implement it through the bureaucracy. So far, I feel — and I think Americans generally feel — that Reagan has done a quite remarkable job of translating his general objectives into legislative programmes and of gaining needed Congressional support. He is, of course, a consummate television communicator; he is persuasive when relating at the personal level with other politicians. He takes Congress seriously and tries to work with it, unlike Carter who never seemed to overcome his initial suspicions of Congress, did not seriously attempt to co-operate with legislators when designing his programme, and as a result was not a particularly effective President. Reagan's success, toward the end of June, in pushing large — and largely unspecified — budget cuts through a Democratically controlled House of Representatives was an extraordinary victory for him, both as an individual and as Chief Executive. But to achieve a victory of this magnitude, the President must focus his attention on domestic matters, the important point for our purposes is that foreign affairs assume secondary importance and are delegated to other people. Reagan's three top advisers — Messrs Meese, Deaver and Baker — specialize on domestic affairs and have virtually no foreign policy expertise. Reagan was a State Governor; his career in public life lacks the exposure to foreign affairs that Representatives and Senators routinely receive. Most politicians, when running for President, will make the ritual trip to Israel or Ireland or Greece; Reagan, by contrast, has

shown limited interest in foreign travel. His primary interests, as I have indicated, concern changes in the nature of America's domestic political system.

II

Having more or less informed you why you should not listen to anything I am about to say on the Reagan Administration's foreign policy, I want to reverse course and indicate that something meaningful can still be said after all! The people now in power have said and written a great deal about foreign policy while they were still out of power, and we can analyze the assumptions and assertions in the speeches, articles and books which conservatives have produced. As a radio commentator, as a candidate for the Republican Presidential nomination and as a Presidential candidate, Mr Reagan insistently sounded the theme of the decline of American power worldwide and the need, as he saw it, for the US to develop a greater capacity and will to assert itself abroad. Dr Crocker, as an academic and a specialist on Africa — particularly Southern Africa — has produced a considerable volume of writing on developments within Africa and on US responses to those developments.[6]

There is, as well, an interesting recent phenomenon in American politics — the rise of the intellectual right. We tend to think of intellectuals as being rather consistently to the left of government, but recent years have seen the emergence of a number of conservative "think tanks" which are not simply producing critiques of liberalism — not to mention radicalism — but are also trying to come up with their own solutions to domestic and international problems, rather than simply saying "no" to what liberals and radicals propose. One thinks of the Hoover Institution, in Stanford, California, which has produced a widely-read volume, *The United States in the 1980s;* of the Heritage Foundation, in Washington DC, which produced *Mandate for Leadership: Policy Management in a Conservative Administration;*[7] of publications produced by the American Enterprise Institute, Freedom House and Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies (where Chester Crocker and several other individuals recruited into the Reagan Administration were located); of journals such as *Commentary, The National Review* and *Freedom at Issue,* which are generating conservative suggestions for American foreign policy. There is, in short, a body of material to read and analyze. It may not be a wholly reliable guide to policies actually implemented by the United States during the next few years; as I shall argue later, the responsibilities and constraints and the sheer learning experience that accompany the exercise of power inevitably alter the policy choices, if not indeed the policy preferences, which individuals of whatever ideological persuasion believe, while still out of power, they will make when in power. Still, it is possible — and possibly important — to speak of a

general approach toward foreign policy questions under President Reagan which stands in rather marked contrast to the general approach of President Carter. I will refer, perhaps in rather too schematic a fashion, to nine aspects of the Reagan worldview, paraphrasing in quotation marks what I understand to be the Reagan position and then comparing that position with the views expressed during the Carter years by Carter himself, Cyrus Vance, Andrew Young, Donald McHenry and others.

1. "The world is to be understood not as one entity but as a collection of entities; sovereign nation-states. States are impelled to act on the basis of economic and strategic interests that tend to put them in competition and at times, active conflict with each other. If anything, the rivalries among states are likely to increase in the future as scarcities of economically and strategically important resources become more marked. In general, it is more accurate to begin with the assumption that relations among states are zero-sum in nature (i.e. what one state gains is at the expense of another) than that all may benefit by transcending traditional notions of national self-interest".

This is quite different from the Carter position, as articulated with particular force during the first half of his Presidency. That position would stress both the desirability and the possibility of transcending nationalism, and the gradual evolution of a global perspective, genuine worldview, which could guide national leaders in developing non-zero-sum relations with each other. Under Reagan, planetarism or globalism is out; nationalism, the focus on the nation-state as the key unit of analysis, driven by self-interest, is in.

2. "Power in international relations should be defined in the traditional way as the capacity of states to knock each other around, if need be by the threat of use of military force. A state's wealth is also a component of its power. But once any one state decides to substitute military confrontation for economic competition, by a kind of Gresham's Law, force drives out wealth. Other states must employ their wealth to develop the military capacity to stop or deter aggression; they are free to employ their wealth primarily for economic development purposes only when the military threat is safely contained."

The primacy of force as a component of power stands in contrast to the more non-traditional emphasis, under Carter, of wealth and moral example as key components of power. To be sure, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a demonstration of the political Gresham's Law to which I have referred, and it pushed Carter closer to Reagan's overtly *realpolitik* understanding of power. None the less, Carter did emphasize the economic dimension of American power, in a world in which economic development for rich and poor countries alike has become a political imperative. Carter was more willing than Reagan to employ American

resources to stimulate economic development elsewhere, as an end in itself and as a means to deter intra-state violence and inter-state aggression. Carter wished, if you will, to turn Gresham on his head, to explore the conditions under which the productive and equitable use of wealth could drive out the resort to force in international relations.

3. "Of all the states in the world, the United States is, on virtually any count one could name, the best there is. Americans owe it to themselves to be unabashed patriots, for there is so much about our country to celebrate. We can sing "God Bless America" fervently and frequently, not because God *needs* to bless us but because the deity already *has* blessed us and continues to do so. Being the world's best country, the United States should also be its strongest. It should not allow itself to suffer military defeat (as in Vietnam) or diplomatic humiliation (as in Iran, with the fall of the Shah and the holding hostage of American citizens). Its virtues coupled with its strength, the United States should be in a position to influence other countries to adopt the pattern of private sector, capitalist development that is the source of its greatness."

One has here a self-confident, assertive moralism, with messianic overtones, that has characterized — and one should add, bedevilled — American attitudes toward the rest of the world through our history as a Republic. Carter, too, was patriotic and had a strong moralistic strain to his character and his rhetoric. But Carter's nationalistic pride was less effusive, less uncritical of all aspects of the American social and economic system, more willing to grant that God *needed* to bless America because our human rights agenda was far from completed. The pride was in what the country had done to recognize its problems — particularly in the arena of race relations — and to employ the political system to try and resolve them. Reagan glorifies the private sector's accomplishments in spite of the negative role played in American life by government; Carter took more pride in the role government has played in compensating for the negative results of profit-seeking socially discriminatory private sector activity. Patriotism and moralism are linked for both men, but the content of the patriotic message is somewhat different. And, as I have indicated, Carter was interested in moving beyond American nationalism toward a more global perspective. In this respect, he could accept with equanimity the limits on American power in a complex, interdependent world. Psychologically, it was not as important for Carter as it apparently is for Reagan to insist to a waiting world in loud tones that we are Number One.

4. "Americans should make moral and political judgments about other countries primarily on the basis of those countries' foreign policies, not their domestic policies. If the government of a country is friendly toward us and opposes Communism, this is of greater significance in determining

our relations with that government than the way it treats (or mistreats) its own citizens. If a government tries, directly through aggression or indirectly through support of terrorist organizations, to overthrow the government of another country, that is a more serious affront to the international order and to American interests than the violation by the same government of the basic human rights of people within the state's borders. This is why an emphasis on terrorism — which crosses national boundaries to threaten governments with which we may have friendly relations — should replace the Carter emphasis on human rights — which involve intra-state relations, between public officials and ordinary citizens."

The Carter human rights policy, by contrast, attempted to link our attitude toward another government to that government's respect for the rights of its citizens. The policy can be faulted for inconsistent application (strategic and economic considerations outweighed human rights factors when our relations with authoritarian regimes on the right such as the Philippines, Indonesia, South Korea, Brazil and South Africa, were concerned), for confusing realizable foreign policy goals with unrealizable humanitarian objectives, and for infringements on the sovereignty of other states. Paradoxically, however, Carter was concerned at the foreign policy level with the very problem Reagan had defined as the critical one in American domestic life: how to get the central government off of people's backs. Carter saw the good which government could do within the United States and yet stressed the evil things it could do to helpless citizens in other parts of the world; Reagan stresses the undesirable things which government can do within the United States and yet is relatively unconcerned over systematic, large-scale human rights violations by governments in other parts of the world. Carter tried to explore ways in which the political freedoms Americans enjoy, under a system of limited and divided political power, might be enjoyed elsewhere through the exercise of American leverage internationally. Reagan seems more concerned with the economic freedoms Americans enjoy at home and with the assurance that those freedoms be enjoyed abroad as well. If the best means of assuring American private sector access to foreign resources and markets is a foreign government exercising a high level of concentrated, centralized power to repress its population then the doctrine of "getting the government off of people's backs" can be as conveniently ignored in foreign policy as it is stressed (inconveniently for many Americans) in domestic affairs.

5. "One must unfortunately be rather pessimistic about the prospects for democracy, and respect for individual human rights, in most developing areas of the world and in those countries taken over by Communists. Most human beings, whether we like it or not, are

consigned to livingunder regimes which oppress them. The crucial foreign policy-relevant distinction is not, therefore, between repressive and non-repressive regimes but rather between different types of repressive regimes. Here there is an important difference between authoritarian (right-wing) and totalitarian (left-wing) governments. The former, quite apart from the fact that they side with the US against the Soviet Union, tend to be less restrictive of the economic and political rights of their citizens than the latter, because authoritarian regimes have roots in a traditional feudal system to which people have grown accustomed, do not attempt to suppress private sector economic activity and do not try to mobilize people into an unknown and very different future. Moreover, authoritarian regimes are sufficiently vulnerable to internal and external opposition forces that they can be overthrown (witness Syngman Rhee, Fulgencio Batista, Haile Selassie, the Shah of Iran, Ian Smith, Anastasio Somoza), whereas totalitarian regimes once established cannot be overturned. Totalitarian regimes being worse than authoritarian ones, Americans concerned over human rights violations should be particularly harsh in publicly condemning left-wing regimes. Right-wing governments, which are friendly to us in the East-West conflict, deserve less harsh criticism, and the manner of dispensing it should be quiet, through diplomatic channels, rather than through the public media in a way sure to embarrass and anger our friends".[8] Here I am paraphrasing the views of Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Reagan's Ambassador to the United Nations. She writes that "Traditional authoritarian governments are less repressive than revolutionary autocracies, that they are more susceptible of liberalization, and that they are more compatible with US interests . . . generally speaking, traditional autocrats tolerate social inequities, brutality and poverty while revolutionary autocracies create them".[9]

The Carter position on human rights was not premised on the fundamental distinction between regime types drawn by Ronald Reagan, Alexander Haig, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Michael Novak and Ernest Lefever. That regimes repressed their citizens was deemed more important than the position they occupied along the left-right ideological spectrum. Moreover Carter officials questioned the distinction itself. Communist regimes could move in a more liberal direction (Yugoslavia, Poland); Third World countries deemed pro-Soviet at one point could later move, in a pro-western direction (Indonesia, Ghana, Egypt, Somalia); and right-wing regimes could forcibly disrupt traditional patterns of life in order to mobilize labour for highly unequal patterns of economic development (South Africa). Carter officials criticized right-wing regimes; they also levelled harsh attacks on left-wing regimes, most notably the Soviet Union, for repression of internal dissidents. In my judgment, Carter's conservative critics incorrectly accuse his administration of practising a

double standard by only criticizing authoritarian governments; Carter's use of the Helsinki Accords to attack Soviet behaviour, for example, is there for all to see. If anything, the new Administration is in danger of practising a double standard by attacking only Communist regimes while remaining silent about any human violations committed by a pro-Western government.

6. "In formulating foreign policy, attention must be focused on what is happening now and is likely to happen in the near future. Today's threats to world peace and the American national interest must be countered now. It is not particularly useful in countering these threats to examine in great detail the historical context out of which contemporary conflicts arise, particularly if history indicates that injustices were committed by countries with which we are now allied. History is replete with injustice, but the mistakes of the past cannot become an excuse for inaction in the present when those mistakes are cleverly and cynically exploited by America's adversaries for strategic or tactical advantage. In the so-called Third World, it is true that people were once colonized by those who came from Western Europe, and that Western colonialism was rationalized by assertions of white cultural and racial superiority over people of colour. But those days are now gone, and it is counter-productive for new nations in Africa and Asia, or older nations in Latin America, to attack Western countries for sins of the past when the real danger threatening them now is from the Eastern Bloc. So-called Third World countries should not be misled by Communist exploitation of historical grievances; instead, these countries should unite with the United States to prevent even more insidious forms of colonial oppression, at Communist hands, in the not-so-distant future".

Under Carter, Young and McHenry, history counted for more than it does under a Reagan Administration that, while terming itself conservative, is ironically quite ahistorical in its approach to global problems. The Carter Administration placed more emphasis, in dealing with Third World countries, on trying to understand the economic, political, cultural and psychological legacies of Western imperialism and colonialism which help to explain the strong contemporary currents of anti-Western sentiment in many parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America. It was willing to grant that there are continuities in North-South relations, in the sense that the North still, as in the colonial past, benefits disproportionately from international flows of trade and investment. The Carter policies toward white minority regimes in Southern Africa were based on the view that such regimes were historical anachronisms, maintained by racist ideologies that were once an explicit part of white Western culture but that had now been just as explicitly rejected by the West. It was precisely the connection between the present policies of white

minority governments in Southern Africa and past policies and practices adopted elsewhere by the West (including patterns of legalized racial discrimination within the United States) that endowed the cause of majority rule there with such moral urgency. That moral urgency is much less pronounced in the Reagan Administration, in part because the historical background to the current struggle is considered to be of peripheral importance, if not a distraction from the task of determining a "realistic" future policy.

7. "In today's world of competing nation-states, there is one state that is far and away the greatest threat to all the others, and that is the Soviet Union. It specializes in aggression, both directly (Eastern Europe following World War II; more recently, Afghanistan) and indirectly through support of international terrorist organizations and of regimes (Cuba, Libya, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Angola) which act in their particular regions as Soviet surrogates. The expansion of Soviet strategic and conventional military capacity during the 1970s far exceeds a rational defensive response to Western military power and suggests, instead, that the Kremlin could be planning a first strike against the West while successfully countering our second strike efforts against the Soviet Union. Because the Soviet Union is the great threat to peace and stability, it follows that the United States, as the other great super-power, is the only country with the capacity to deter Soviet aggression. American nationalistic pride needs to be tempered with alarm, for the Russians are coming, and if we do not stop them, nobody will. It also follows that inter-state conflicts in any part of the world are to be seen essentially in East-West terms, either as an expression of US-Soviet rivalry or as having importance in so far as they affect that rivalry".

Following the invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter's worldview shifted closer to that of Mr Reagan. It is true, moreover, that his influential National Security Council adviser, Dr Brzezinski, held hawkish views of the USSR from the very start of his tenure in Washington. State Department, United Nations and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency officials, on the other hand, tended to be sceptical of such a Soviet-centred Russo-phobic view of the world. In their view, to the extent that the Soviets constituted a threat, Moscow might be induced to be less belligerent by a negotiated arms control agreement and by an expanded United States foreign aid programme designed to reduce the poverty and the domestic and international inequalities which make Communism attractive in the Third World. These officials saw the world in North-South as well as East-West terms; the compass boasted four cardinal points, not two. And conflicts within Third World countries, or among Third World countries, were seen as having causes quite separate from Soviet machinations. If the Russians were coming, it was because

they were taking advantage of conflicts and problems elsewhere, not because they were causing them.

8. "American commitment to economic development in the Third World should be judged by how well our national interests are served by that development. In this respect, bilateral aid programs, concentrated on friendly regimes, are preferable to multilateral programs — through the World Bank or the UN Development Program, for instance — over whose allocation procedures the US has much less control: Aid should reward our friends, not placate our critics. And economic assistance should not be considered an alternative to or substitute for the military assistance that we should be providing friendly governments to protect them from subversion. In all likelihood, the ratio of military to economic aid will rise in the future".

Under Carter, efforts were made to separate to some extent our economic development from our foreign policy objectives, by increasing the autonomy of the Agency for International Development within the State Department and by expanding considerably our commitments to multilateral agencies. There was less enthusiasm than there is now in Washington for concessional military sales to Third World countries.

9. "Insofar as we export our own model of development, we should stress the virtues and the vitality of the private profit sector. American private investment abroad is therefore to be preferred, where possible, to American public aid abroad; the former strengthens the host country's private sector, the latter its government. A government's attitude toward capitalism, whether indigenous or foreign-based, should be an important determinant of our attitude toward that government. International trade should be administered by private individuals and corporations; it should not be fettered by politically motivated restraints on trade such as boycotts of regimes we may happen to dislike."

The Carter position was, I think, somewhat less critical of the positive role which government-to-government aid could play, particularly in very poor countries where the prospects of attracting substantial American private investment are extremely small. It was not automatically assumed that all socialist governments were following the path to economic perdition. And there was a greater willingness to consider the imposition of official economic sanctions in special circumstances — as against the Soviet Union following the Afghanistan invasion and against Iran following the seizure of the American hostages in Teheran.

III

We have seen that there are a number of substantial differences between the worldviews of policy-makers in the Carter and Reagan Administrations. This brings me to my third question: what are the

implications of the Reagan worldview for United States policy toward South Africa? It does not require much intellectual acumen to see that on several counts there is a similarity between the stance toward the world of Ronald Reagan and the stance of the South African Government. White South Africa is assertively nationalistic, its assertiveness proud and self-confident and at the same time profoundly alarmed about the future. Power is defined in military and geopolitical terms, via elaborate and endlessly repeated arguments about defence of the Cape sea route, the value of the country's strategic minerals to Western military capabilities, and the government's ability to repel invasion or infiltration from whatever quarter. South Africa wants the United States to judge it by its foreign policy, defined as being pro-Western and anti-Communist, and not by the way blacks are treated within the country. Challenges to the legitimacy and power of the apartheid regime from the African National Congress (ANC), Pan Africanist Council (PAC), Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and other banned organizations are perceived as emanating from "terrorist" organizations. These are linked to Communism, defined so broadly as to include a range of views undreamt of by Karl Marx, and the organizations are perceived as surrogates for the Soviet Union, carrying out the Kremlin's evil plan for "total onslaught" on white-ruled South Africa. Pretoria stresses the current threat to itself from Moscow, ignoring the historically rooted injustices committed by whites against black Africans which are the starting point for comprehending South Africa's international isolation and the appeal in Southern Africa, such as it is, of the Soviet Union. From a right-wing American perspective, South Africa would qualify, at the worst, as an authoritarian regime, its political system based on "traditional" ethnic patterns; ignored are the ways in which the political system systematically undermines traditional family life and prevents the establishment of a viable, traditionally self-reliant livelihood in the rural so-called homelands. Over-emphasis on the traditional authoritarian aspects and under-emphasis of the modern, totalitarian aspects of apartheid policy and practice, enables the American right-winger to classify South Africa as a country which should not be publicly criticized — the more so as its government identifies itself as an outpost of Western interests.

These similarities and convergences in the Reagan worldview, the official South African worldview, and the ways in which the South African Government would like others to view it, suggest a United States policy more favourably disposed toward South Africa under President Reagan than under President Carter, or indeed Carter's Republican predecessors, Ford and Nixon. Clearly there are elements on the Republican right that favour a "tilt" toward South Africa as a desirable end in itself. Other elements, in the moderate middle of the party, favour

experimenting with a "tilt" as a tactic to induce South Africa to do what previous American criticism was apparently not able to do: bring about the decolonization of Namibia and a political as well as economic liberalization of the country's domestic racial policies. I would consider Dr Crocker's announced policy of "constructive engagement" to be an experimental, tactical move to induce change, not necessarily a strategic move toward long-term rapprochement. I could be mistaken in this interpretation, of course. In any event, underlying similarities in worldview would suggest a position in Washington less unsympathetic than in the past toward the official South African position.

IV

Given what I have said about the ideological similarities between Washington and Pretoria at this time, to what extent will a rapprochement actually take place? Are there domestic political and foreign policy considerations on the American side which constrain our government's capacity or will to move significantly closer to South Africa during the next four years? My answer is that there are many such constraints, that they are significant, and that consequently the South African Government should not expect a dramatic and long-lasting change from the policies of the past. I am doubtless influenced in my analysis by a personal belief that the US should not engage in a tactic, much less strategy, of "constructive engagement" until South Africa first makes significant moves to withdraw from Namibia and to institute domestic political change on the basis of common citizenship for all people within the traditional boundaries of the country. It is for others to decide whether my personal biases substantially distort my political judgments.

Twelve constraints are worth noting:

Domestic constraints

1. Although Mr Reagan's power base currently appears to be very solid, it might erode if his ambitious domestic programme fails to effect the economic improvements the President has led people to expect. That he has recently won important victories in Congress on his budget cuts is a sign of his present power, but it is also a sign of his potential future vulnerability, for if the budget and tax cuts fail to reduce levels of inflation and unemployment, the President will be unable to blame the Democrats for sabotaging his economic programme. Even if Reagan's personal popularity remains high, his party stands to lose in both the Senate and the House in 1982 if lower and middle class voters feel more harmed than helped by the net impact of the President's policies. The Democratic Party, whose liberal wing is quite critical of South Africa, would gain from this swing in voter sentiment.

2. It cannot be assumed that American multinational business and financial interests are in favour of a prolonged bout of "constructive engagement" with South Africa. The Republican right wing and multinational corporations approach each other with a certain degree of suspicion, as I have indicated. Multinationals have economic interests in black Africa which might be imperilled if black states attempted to retaliate against a pro-South Africa policy. Multinationals have been able to make mutually agreeable arrangements with Socialist governments in Africa — for instance, the FRIA consortium in Guinea, Gulf Oil in Angola, Union Carbide in Zimbabwe. They might not, therefore, regard the achievement of majority rule under Socialism in South Africa, or even the prospect of nationalized assets, as disasters to be prevented at all costs. As MNCs with South African subsidiaries experience productivity and sales losses from African strikes and boycotts that are largely political in character, some might consider becoming more vocal, active forces for genuine, power sharing among the country's racial groups.

My impression is that international business interests stand somewhat to the left of President Reagan and well to the left of the Republican right wing. The most obvious illustration of this point is Gulf Oil Company, which has virtually called for American recognition of the MPLA regime in Angola. If correct, my analysis suggests that a Marxist view, according to which public policy in a Capitalist state is a reflection of private corporate interests, is not accurate. Certainly on Angola it is Washington that adopts a hard anti-Communist line, not the more pragmatic capitalists of Wall Street. To the extent that international business does come to exert increased influence on America's South Africa policy (in line with the Marxist view), this may not be in the direction that Marxists would predict.

3. It may be that President Reagan has less public support on foreign policy than on domestic matters. A recent opinion poll indicates that a substantial majority of Americans is not happy about our military involvement in El Salvador. Preserving the junta currently running that country is not a cause that has exactly captured the enthusiastic support of our people, to put it mildly. The President's nomination of Ernest Lefever to the human rights position in the State Department was withdrawn in the face of virtually certain defeat on the Senate floor. The proposed sale of AWACS jets to Saudi Arabia is highly controversial and might be defeated. The President thus has a less successful record on his foreign policy initiatives — such as have been taken thus far — than he has on the domestic front. This suggests that even if he and his top advisers wished to tilt toward South Africa, it is not self-evident that he would succeed, at least in those areas of policy, personnel and budget requiring legislative approval.

4. Another constraint is the learning experience that often occurs when people move from the opposition into government posts and begin exercising power. Power can corrupt, as Lord Acton remind us, but it can also mature. It can produce a change in rhetoric, in style, and even in policy as one discovers that ideas developed in the relatively safe obscurity of opposition are not as appropriate or as realistic as expected when they are actually tried out in the "real world."

There is at least one sign that the initial tendency of the new Administration to define all foreign policy matters in East-West terms is being modified because it simply lacks credibility with other actors with whom we must deal. It is widely believed that Secretary Haig's first trip to the Middle East, with its insistent and persistent theme that the Russians are coming, was a diplomatic failure. Israelis and Arabs alike refused to define the critical Middle East problem as actual or potential Soviet aggression, choosing rather to view the problem in the context of the region's own complex politics. The Secretary of State must have been disappointed to learn that the people he was trying to convince found so little merit in his arguments and may have been not a little amused at his temerity in using them. Subsequently the President sent Mr Philip Habib to attempt to mediate a series of Middle East crises. Habib is a seasoned diplomat who knows the contending parties well, is tough and pragmatic, can listen as well as talk, and sees the region's problems as being deeply rooted in the region itself rather than caused primarily by Moscow's machinations. Employing the East-West paradigm in the Middle East did not work, so the Reagan Administration employed a less doctrinaire approach that granted the complex nature and multiple causation of regional conflicts.

The same kind of learning experience may be taking place in Southern Africa if one looks at the recently concluded visit to South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe of Secretary Haig's Deputy, Judge William Clark. In South Africa, Judge Clark spoke with government officials as well as with critics of the regime whom one could not define as Communists, in Namibia he met with leaders of various political parties, including SWAPO, and with church leaders who have strongly condemned South Africa's presence and policies in that territory. The views of Christian clerics who corroborate much of what SWAPO has been saying must reduce the credibility of the South African charge that SWAPO is a Communist organization and merely a front for Soviet imperialism.[10] While it is too early to discern the policy impact of Judge Clark's visit, one plausible interpretation is that he came away more sceptical than he might initially have been that the Namibian issue should be seen essentially in East-West terms, with South Africa representing the West and SWAPO the East. The credibility of South Africa's efforts to

define regional issues involving race, class, ethnicity and nationality in global Communist *vs* anti-Communist terms may possibly have been undercut by the Clark visit.

5. The pro-South African views of right-wing Senators such as Helms, Hayakawa and Tower are treated prominently by the pro-government South African media, in part because those views are at odds with traditional US policy and hence constitute "news", and in greater part because pro-government media, anxiously scanning the world scene for signs that South Africa might be able to escape its international pariah status, tend to emphasize remarks from outside which are consistent with or supportive of Pretoria's worldview. This tendency to seek approval in a hostile international environment is understandable. But the danger is that the media may systematically overstate the influence of the outsiders in question, and then proceed to equate their views with the policies of the American Government. To be quite specific, I think that the impact of Senator Helms on Reagan's Africa policy has been exaggerated in the South African press. Helms was able to slow down the processing of Chester Crocker's nomination; rules of Senatorial courtesy give individual Senators considerable delaying powers on such matters. But the confirmation vote in the Foreign Relations Committee was 16–0 (Helms did not show up), and only seven Senators voted against Crocker on the Senate floor. My impression from a week in Washington is that a number of prominent Republicans, including those of a quite conservative stripe, are fed up with Senator Helms' self-publicizing and obstructive tactics, and that we may see a further decline of his influence over foreign policy in the future.

Less well publicized in South Africa — and certainly less palatable to the South African government — are the views of a moderate Republican who may become increasingly influential in shaping American policy toward Africa. Writing in the *Washington Star,* Republican Senator Nancy Kassebaum, the new Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, asserted that "Pretoria offends everything conservatives stand for". American conservatives, in her view, believe in the integrity of the family, in minimal government regulation of individual behaviour, and in the value of private property. But the black majority in South Africa is subjected to influx control regulations and relocation policies which disrupt family life on a massive scale and with tragic effects; to hundreds of bureaucratic regulations inhibiting individual freedom; and to numerous restrictions on home and business ownership in the townships which deny to blacks the opportunity to practise private enterprise. Kassebaum concludes that American conservatism is very different from — in a sense the opposite of — the conservative position held by South Africa's whites. She adds:

> It is ironic that those in South Africa who sound the most like Republicans by demanding the right to private property, the right to be considered for jobs without regard to race, and freedom from government regulation and interference at home, in the schools and at work are described as "radical left" and even as Marxists.It is also ironic that there is more harmony between the 1980 Republican platform and the decision of the "Marxist" government in Zimbabwe to dismantle a comprehensive system of public housing for blacks and to substitute a system of widespread home ownership (on the basis that the public housing system was "racist") than there is with the South African system.
>
> Labels are always misleading, and they are especially misleading in South Africa.[11]

Because of Senator Kassebaum's formal position and because she has approached African issues with a great deal of openness and a lack of predetermined bias, this statement of her views should stand as a warning to South Africa not to expect automatic support from Americans who style themselves conservative, much less from all Americans who identify with the Republican Party.

6. In the House of Representatives the Democrats are still in charge. The Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee dealing with Africa is now chaired by Representative Howard Wolpe, who has considerable knowledge of African affairs and has written a book on urban politics in Nigeria. Mr Wolpe's view is that it is naïve for Dr Crocker to expect that "constructive engagement" will do anything but give the South African Government an opportunity to stall on both the Namibian and the domestic fronts. Through Congressional hearings on American policy toward South Africa, Angola and other countries, Representative Wolpe and like-minded critics of the Reagan policy are in position to publicize their views and to place Administration spokespersons publicly on the defensive.[12] The Democrats' "power of publicity" in the House would make it difficult for the Administration quietly to adopt new measures favourable to South Africa; at some point what was clandestine would become widely known in Congress and in the American media.

7. Another domestic constraint has to do with the role of black Americans in American politics and foreign policy-making. Clearly, blacks are more supportive of and influential in the Democratic than in the Republican Party, and in that sense the influence of the Congressional Black Caucus (some 20 out of 435 Representatives are black) declined when Carter was replaced by Reagan. No blacks in the current Administration play a foreign policy role remotely approaching the influence of Andrew Young and Donald McHenry during the Carter

years. It is, however, a mistake to regard the Republican Party as anti-black; after all, it was a Republican President, Abraham Lincoln, who was instrumental in freeing the slaves, and a Republican Chief Justice, Earl Warren, who presided when Supreme Court decisions in 1954 and thereafter undermined the basis for racially segregated schools and other public facilities. It is in fact the Democratic Party which has historically housed the most important racist elements in our society, in the political systems of the "White South" arising after Civil War reconstruction. Southern Democrats have long and consistently opposed civil rights for blacks, thereby putting the party's conservative and liberal wings at war with one another over this issue. To the extent that the Republican Party gains power in the South, it will find itself similarly split at the national level over civil rights issues. On the other hand, if it attempts to increase its power outside the South, it cannot afford altogether to ignore or alienate the black vote, which may hold the electoral balance in the large industrial states of the North which Republicans normally need to capture in order to retain the Presidency. A visibly pro-South African policy might not only reduce the Republican proportion of the black vote but also increase the level of electoral turnout by blacks. Both possibilities could hurt the Republicans in such states as New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois and Michigan.

An interesting and potentially significant recent development is the formation in 1977 of Transafrica, a Washington-based lobby funded, or organized and staffed by black Americans. Ably led by Mr Randall Robinson, Transafrica attempts to publicize within the black community the ways in which United States policy affects people of colour elsewhere in the world — most notably in Southern Africa — and to lobby for a foreign policy more favourable to the interests and the dignity of blacks.[13] In effect, Transafrica wishes to have an impact on our Africa policy similar to the American Jewish lobby's impact on our Middle East policy. It is too early to say how successful Transafrica will be; my point is that the organization exists and that with the expansion of the black American middle class, having money to support it and a growing concern for international issues, the influence of the black foreign policy lobby is likely to be felt regardless of which party is in power. Any Administration tilt toward South Africa will be sure to galvanize Transafrica and other black organizations to oppose such a move.

8. A continuing constraint is the ongoing debate within the US over the ethics of supplying bank loans and private investment capital to South Africa. It is true that the number and intensity of American student protests over the flow of private capital to South Africa has decreased since the period following the Soweto uprising in 1976. But the locus of the debate has changed. Primarily because student protests were successful

in institutionalizing concern over this issue, many universities, churches and foundations now have committees considering the moral dimension of their investment decisions and proxy votes, and South African issues figure prominently on those committee agendas.[14] Thus the concern on the part of many Americans over the propriety of financially assisting white-controlled private and parastatal bodies in South Africa continues, though the visible expression of that concern in the form of demonstrations and sit-ins has greatly diminished since 1976–77.

Moreover, as the volume of American bank loans to South African parastatals has grown, a counter-movement has developed to persuade state and local governments in the US to withdraw their accounts from banks involved in such loans and to deposit funds in banks not making them. Such efforts are occurring in many places throughout the country, encouraged by the American Committee on Africa. These efforts carry a certain amount of economic leverage because banks not loaning funds to South Africa are anxious to pick up accounts held by competing banks that are making such loans. And at a time when the United States needs massive infusions of capital to "reindustrialize" its faltering basic industries, the argument that bank funds should be recycled domestically and not sent abroad is quite consistent with American patriotism.

If American public policy were to become more favourable to South Africa, it is reasonable to suppose that pressures would grow to make our private sector foreign policy, in the form of capital flows, less favourable to her. One cannot say how successful these pressures would be in light of the considerable potential for private profit which South Africa under white rule represents. But the existence of sentiment for economic sanctions should not be discounted by South African policy makers, particularly if repressive actions on the order of Sharpeville or Soweto should occur in the future.

9. Another constraint is that super-powers think globally and must establish priorities for expanding or protecting their interests. This is an obvious point, but its implications are not equally obvious. White South Africans sometimes talk and act as if the Soviet Union placed a very high priority on taking over their country, as if a "total onslaught" were planned from Moscow to gain control of South Africa's strategic minerals and its alleged command of the Cape sea route.

This kind of talk, in my opinion, is tinged with paranoia and is not particularly plausible even if one grants that the Soviets would prefer South Africa in their orbit rather than the West's. The Soviet Union is likely to be primarily concerned, as it always has been, with real or imagined threats along its extensive borders and with opportunities to extend its influence on the Eurasian land mass. The Soviets are upset about signs of independence in their Eastern European client states

(Poland being the most obvious current example), testing options for expanding their power in Southwest Asia (the invasion of Afghanistan, and possible intervention in Iran), preparing for possible war with China, and working with smaller Asian allies (North Korea, Vietnam) that have expansionist designs.

The anti-Soviet thrust of Mr Reagan's foreign policy is therefore likely to place priority on defending Western Europe (through NATO and expanded theatre nuclear forces), ensuring American access to Persian Gulf oil (through some type of Rapid Deployment Force), and defending South Korea. Neither super-power, I would suggest, places the high priority on South Africa or on Southern Africa which Pretoria would like its own people and its would-be friends in the West to believe. South Africa is not so indispensable to the defence of the West as it supposes, for American stockpiles of strategic minerals and technologically feasible recycling techniques for some minerals mean that a cutoff in provision of South Africa's strategic minerals would not automatically cripple US military capacity. And it is difficult to take the "defence of the Cape sea route" argument very seriously when one appreciates that comparable arguments could apply at many points along the lengthy route from the Persian Gulf to the North Atlantic, that the most likely points of vulnerability are at the beginning and end of the route rather than at its mid-point, and that if the Soviets wish to start a world war they have far better military options than threatening or sinking a Very Large Crude Carrier on the high seas. The Pentagon must plan for first contingencies first, and for tertiary possibilities only later. Warsaw is primary, Windhoek is tertiary. Riyadh is more important to Western security than is Simonstown.

South Africa's ability to win friends in the West depends largely on the plausibility of its case for geostrategic indispensability. The less plausible that case, in light of the overall strategic concerns of the United States and other Western powers, the less likely that South Africa will be able to break out of the diplomatic isolation in which its racial policies have placed it.

10. Dr Crocker's policy of "constructive engagement" has thus far involved little in the way of substantive policy changes from the Carter years. But the new emphasis on a "constructive" relationship essentially free of public criticism from Washington, and the already considerable "engagement" in the sense of well-publicized discussions among the two countries' key foreign policy decision-makers, have aroused great hope in Pretoria that South Africa's views will be sympathetically heard in Washington as never before in the post-1948 era. How well justified is that hope? As I have indicated, two interpretations may be placed on the Crocker policy: (a) that it represents a shift of strategy in a more pro-

South African direction, regardless of what South Africa does; (b) that it represents a shift of tactics — from the stick to the carrot, if you will — to induce South Africa to liberalize its position on Namibia and domestic race relations. By the first interpretation, the United States is giving South Africa a mandate to stall, or even to adopt a more repressive stand on these matters, because no criticism — not to mention economic sanctions — will be forthcoming from the United States if hardline policies prevail in Pretoria. By the second interpretation, America's new "constructive" approach is conditional on constructive action by South Africa to terminate its rule of Namibia on the basis of Security Council resolution 435 and significantly to improve the political as well as economic and social status of South Africa's black majority. By this latter view, if South Africa does not respond constructively within a reasonably short period of time, then Washington may well adjudge its experiment in altered tactics a failure and would then be free to move to a more critical stance. Dr Crocker has indicated that he expects positive movement on South Africa's part in the near future and that "We will disengage from any process that, in our view, has become one of, if you will, a delaying tactic or a charade."[15]

One cannot yet tell which of these interpretations will prove to be the more accurate. But if the South Africans, betting on the first interpretation, choose to stall or become more repressive, and if the State Department is acting on the basis of the second interpretation, then South Africa will have lost a precious and perhaps unique opportunity to deal with the underlying sources of its diplomatic isolation. And the "laager mentality" argument that external criticism is an important contributing cause to South Africa's intransigence will be shown to be a rather transparent defence of the *status quo*, since soothing words from the leader of the West are no more effective than is criticism in effecting significant change. A "mandate to stall" interpretation thus carries with it the risk that South Africa's behaviour could cut short the very American experiment in more positive relations which Pretoria now welcomes.

11. "Constructive engagement" is a high-risk policy for the United States to follow in regard to its interests in Africa as a whole. One can argue that for Black African countries, South Africa serves a foreign policy function equivalent to the Soviet Union for the Reagan Administration: a country's attitude and policy toward South Africa determines to a large extent whether Black Africa regards that country as friend or foe. Whatever gains America registers in Pretoria for tilting toward South Africa will surely count as losses in so far as American relations with Black African countries are concerned. And even the slightest signs of a Washington-Pretoria rapprochement will if anything be given an enhanced significance in Black Africa. A double magnification

process is in fact at work here: (i) The South African media exaggerate the influence of those Americans, and of those aspects of the new policy, that seem favourable to South Africa. (ii) South Africa's critics, ever sensitive to Pretoria's interpretation of world events, further magnify the importance of trends as Pretoria sees them while reversing the moral sign placed, as it were, before the event. The African understanding of American policy is based on an interpretation of what white South Africans *say* that policy is. Indeed, the meaning of American policy in Black Africa may be less a function of what Americans say it is than of what white South Africans make of that policy.

Through this process of double magnification, as well as fears aroused by the willingness of the Reagan Administration to deal more favourably with right-wing authoritarian regimes elsewhere in the world, African states have reacted with increasingly sharp and outspoken criticisms of the "constructive engagement" policy. The risk for the United States is that it will alienate the vast majority of states belonging to the Organization of African Unity, on the one hand, while getting little or nothing from South Africa in return for having become more closely identified with Pretoria. The US also risks breaking ranks with its Western partners in the so-called "Contact Group", several of which are already showing covert signs of concern at the rightward direction of America's Southern African policy.

An important question is whether it is in the American national interest to pay the costs connected with alienating Black Africa on account of "constructive engagement". To be sure, Black African states are predominantly small, weak and terribly poor; not one of them, with the possible exception of Nigeria, can rival South Africa as a potential market for American exports, arena for private American investment, or source of strategic raw materials. Yet the leverage which African states, individually or collectively, can exert on the US should not be underestimated. With almost one-third of the UN General Assembly's votes, OAU members are in a position to raise, and to frame, Southern African issues in ways that can diplomatically isolate and embarrass the United States. The American effort to locate countries on or near the Horn of Africa willing to provide facilities for a Persian Gulf-orientated Rapid Deployment Force would well be jeopardized by an obvious US tilt toward the OAU's nemesis. Although the threat of a Nigerian oil boycott of the US is not very credible, particularly at a time of excess oil in the world market, the oil sales Nigeria has made to the US have generated a large balance of payments surplus; a conscious Nigerian choice not to "buy American" would hurt the American balance of payments position. Finally, if black Africans no longer consider America to be genuinely interested in fostering racial justice and human rights in Southern Africa, the chances for a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the region's problems

may well decline, and the likelihood of direct Eastern Bloc military involvement, on invitation from Africans, will be increased. In this respect, American policy would itself contribute, in a self-fulfilling prophecy, to the very outcome the Reagan Administration says it would like most to prevent.

In conclusion, I have argued that it is in many ways too early to discern what the foreign policy message out of Washington is, in part because new people are in power, in part because Republicans themselves are debating what ought to be done, when it ought to be done, and how it ought to be done. Beyond this, my principal argument is that although the Reagan and white South African worldviews have much in common, and although there are significant forces within the Administration for more or less unconditional rapprochement with South Africa on the basis on an East-West interpretation of events in the region, a number of significant factors on the domestic American front and in the international environment militate against lasting rapprochement as long as the policies which produced South Africa's pariah status in the first place remain essentially unchanged. It must not be forgotten that even the very powerful are not all-powerful. The United States, a mighty super-power, still faces internal and external constraints on its policy choices and must live with the consequences of its actions, consequences over which it hardly exercises full control. A proper awareness of these constraints cannot be encouraging to those who formulate South Africa's domestic and foreign policies.

Notes

1. "Nomination of Chester A Crocker: Report, Together with Additional Views", *US Senate, Executive Report No. 97–8,* May 1981, pp. 22–23.
2. Ibid., p. 22.
3. Joseph Pechman, ed., *Setting National Priorities: The 1982 Budget.* Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981, p. 1. This book compares in considerable detail the foreign and domestic spending assumptions and priorities of Presidents Carter and Reagan.
4. Ibid., pp. 7–8, 34–35.
5. Ibid., pp. 134–37.
6. Crocker's curriculum vitae and list of publications is contained in "Nomination of Chester A Crocker", loc. cit., pp. 4–10. Of particular note are *South Africa into the 1980's.* Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979, co-edited with Richard Bissell; and "South Africa: Strategy for Change", *Foreign Affairs,* December, 1980.

7. Peter Duignan and Alvin Rabushka, eds., *The United States in the 1980's*, Stanford, California: Hoover Institution, 1980. Charles L. Heatherly, ed., *Mandate for Leadership: Policy Management in a Conservative Administration*. Washington, DC.: The Heritage Foundation 1981.
8. See Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards", November 1979, *Commentary*, pp. 34–35.
9. Ibid, p. 44. See also Kirkpatrick, "US Security and Latin America", *Commentary*, January 1981, pp. 29–40.
10. As one American long-time observer of the region's affairs put it when we were discussing Namibia, "Everyone knows that SWAPO is more Lutheran than Marxist".
11. Nancy Kassebaum, "Pretoria Offends Everything Republicans Stand For", *Washington Star*, June 10, 1981.
12. See, for example, *United States Policy Toward Angola — Update*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, September 17 and 30, 1980; and the exchange between Representative Wolpe and Dr Crocker in a Subcommittee hearing on June 17, 1981.
13. See the interview with Mr Robinson in *Africa Report*, January–February 1980, pp. 9–15.
14. During the 1979 proxy season 27 shareholder resolutions on the corporate role in South Africa were presented, up from 22 in 1978 and 16 in 1977. South Africa accounted for over one-fourth of all the social responsibility resolutions submitted in 1979. Desaix Myers et al. *US Business in South Africa: The Economic, Political and Moral Issues*. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana: 1980, p. 287. The controversy over private investment and bank loans is summarized in Ibid., pp. 275–94, and actions taken by American colleges and universities are noted in Ibid., pp. 339–71. Publications of the Investor Responsibility Research Center, located in Washington, DC, inform interested institutional investors of labour and other developments within South Africa and of specific issues raised by different types of shareholder resolutions.
15. Chester Crocker, responding to a query from Representative Wolpe on Namibia, in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, June 17, 1981.

Simon Serfaty

The historical legacy of the Reagan Administration

Foreign policy has not been thus far a priority of the Reagan Administration. Its priority has been for matters of sheer political necessity, domestic issues, namely the state of the economy. In truth, the fate of the Administration depends on the performance of the economy. Not just the Reagan Administration, but the Republican Party itself, will fall or will succeed on the basis of that performance. Accordingly, it seems to me, it remains difficult to discuss at this time the specific foreign policies of the Reagan Administration. The fact is that at this time the Reagan Administration does not have a foreign policy. It has a view of the world, to be sure, together with various objectives which it means to fulfil in the future — but those objectives, those guidelines, have not been made operational yet. There is not at this point, for example, a regional policy in the Middle East, in Africa, in Europe. So that expectations, whatever these are, and whenever they are entertained, are — in my view — at best premature. We were told in a recent editorial in the South African press, for instance, of "a thin line of light that has appeared in the east which heralds the dawn of a new day" — speaking of US/South African relations. I agree with my colleague that such an assumption is — to repeat myself —highly premature. Considerable constraints stand in the way, and indeed it is much easier and much more realistic to predict — as Professor Abernathy just did — much continuity and little change in US/South Africa relations.

But it is of change that I want to speak, nevertheless, change in US foreign policy under the Reagan Administration within an evolving

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international setting. We were told earlier that we should think in histrorical terms: I would like to explain and to present the foreign policy of the Reagan Administration as it is likely to emerge over the next few months and over the next few years, within the framework of the past 10 or 12 years, and how we have reached the existing situation. I am assuming, as a start, that what made the US President right in 1981 did not make him right in 1971 at all. Instead, President Reagan became coincidentally relevant to the international circumstances of the late 1970s and early 1980s, as the ideas which he has advocated over the years, though possibly erroneous and wrong initially, came to be justified and justifiable in the light of the protracted decline of American power within an increasingly hostile international environment.

So I would like first to assess the nature of the changes which have fallen upon us within the international system over the past decade; second, attempt to assess the way in which two successive Administrations — the Nixon/Kissinger/Ford foreign policy administration and the Carter foreign policy administration — attempted to respond to those changes; third, analyze the nature and the causation of their failures; and fourth, therefore, examine the adjustments which we can now expect of the new Administration — one that was born less out of wisdom than out of the evidence of past failures.

First, with regard to the basic trends of the 1970s, it seems to me that three of those trends have been especially significant and especially dominant, when looking at the evolution of interstate relations. To begin with, there has been over the years a redistribution of power and influence. We have moved away from the past US/Soviet axis of power to move increasingly into a triangle of power which includes China — the third major power within the international system. The rise of China is based on its ability or potential to deter either the United States or the Soviet Union, or both acting jointly, from attacking it directly on the basis of minimal strategic resources (used very effectively, for example, *vis-à-vis* the United States) combined with maximal conventional forces (used no less effectively when dealing with the Soviet Union). It was in recognition of the emergence of the Chinese as the third major power (or the second-and-a-half power, as Brzezinski used to call it), that Henry Kissinger engaged in a pattern of triangular diplomacy in the early 1970s, which was of special advantage to the United States to the extent, of course, that we alone among the other players were able to balance our enmity against our amity *vis-à-vis* the two other states. This was the beginning of the China card that has been used in different manners over the past twelve years, and to which I may well come back.

But added to the emergence of a third power that helped create a triangle of power throughout the 1970s, there has been the emergence of a

variety of poles of economic and political influence, that is to say states that do not have the military ability to enforce their view of the world and of their regions, but which nevertheless have the resources — political, economic and otherwise — to influence the evolution of their region, and which can do so all the more effectively since there is no longer the diplomatic inflexibility that used to characterize the behaviour of the major and lesser states in the 1950s and 1960s. It is easy now for one of these poles of influence, for example, to move towards Washington and Moscow at one and the same time — or even, in some instances indeed, to move towards three of those poles at one and the same time, as we have seen them from time to time throughout the 1970s.

A second feature in the transformation of the international system in the 1970s, has been a dispersion of enmity which has somehow diluted the primacy of the East/West conflict as the only axis of confrontation within the international system. Indeed, at some point in the 1970s, we came to regret the simplicity of the 1950s and 1960s, when everything could be tied and confined to an assessment and an understanding of the East/West axis of conflict. Instead, by the mid-1970s, we were confronted with a variety of other conflicts — West/West and East/East, North/South, North/North, and South/South — that seemed to intersect in ways that were not always clear to us, observers and policy-makers alike. All the more so as initiatives taken along the North/South axis of conflict very often ended having repercussions over the West/West and West/East axis of conflict: thus, the manipulation of oil prices by the OPEC states along the lines of the North/South axis of conflict would influence the evolution of domestic circumstances in Europe, thereby permitting the rise of the left in such a way as to transform West/West relationships, leading to further complications in US/Soviet relations (as we saw, for example, in 1974/76 when "Eurocommunism" became a fashionable theme and a fashionable idea).

A third element in the transformation of the international system which meant an end to the past system of the years 1945/1971 which, as I will argue, is not about to return, has been the devaluation of American power. This may well have been the most significant feature of the past decade. I submit to you that there was a triple devaluation of American power in the late 1960s and early 1970s. First, in late March of 1968, there was a devaluation of American military power, as President Johnson in a sense
argued that such power could no longer "buy", so to speak, the desired settlement in South-East Asia, and announced therefore for the first time that we were in effect losing that war. This was the first time in the history of the post-war system that the vast surplus of American military power that we had enjoyed during the earlier years, was proving to be

insufficient. As a follow-up on that decision, of course, in the Fall of 1969, the United States abandoned the principle of nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, and endorsed that of parity and sufficiency, acknowledging therefore that it was no longer the dominant military state and that it could no longer recapture it under the existing domestic and international circumstances of the late 60s and early 70s.

Next, in August of 1971, there was a devaluation of American monetary power as there was an end to the convertibility of the dollar, in a situation that put an end to the convertibility of the dollar, in a situation that put an end to the hegemonial circumstances which had characterized the evolution of the Bretton Woods system after World War II. From then on, it became increasingly and painfully apparent — at least until the Reagan Administration — that the United States too had lost control of its economy, with interest rates, unemployment, inflation, and budget and trade imbalances setting new and higher postwar standards each year.

And third, there was in the Spring of 1973, the devaluation of American political power, as Watergate eroded the prerogatives of the Executive in the United States for the balance of the decade, soon forcing one President to resign and making it possible for the US congress to assert itself in the making of foreign policy in a way which was to hamper the behaviour of the policy-makers in Washington for the duration of the decade.

In such circumstances of devalued American power, the international system was bound to change. Vacuums were being created which would represent opportunities for regional and global states to move in, in order to enhance their influence in whatever ways they found convenient to do at the time. The 1960s, you will recall, had begun with John F. Kennedy's rousing pledge, and I quote, "to make people feel that in the year 1960, the American giant began to stir again, the great American boiler to fire again". The early seventies began with the study of the Brookings Institution suggesting a 12,5 billion dollar cut in the defence budget, which then amounted to 76,5 billion dollars. The *New York Times* called the plan insufficient, and indeed the *New York Times* had asserted in the early 1970s, at the time which it called "Cuban Missile Crisis Plus Ten", that the US military was the source of all international problems and that defence expenditures would have to be reduced by half to reintroduce an element of order and stability within the international system.

Now, such changes were perceived in the 1970s, with much optimism and great expectations as it was hoped that this new international system in the making would do away with the twin pillars of coercion and inequality as the basic principles upon which foreign policy is organized and indeed is implemented. We thought that we were going to enter into a brave new world that would eliminate the use and the relevance of

military force, and concurrently would bring about a new equality amongst states. Thus, the North/South negotiations were expected to show that military power alone would no longer be sufficient to enforce the passing inequalities that had prevailed within the past international systems.

Now as a response to such international constraints, US diplomacy went into two phases: first of all, the Nixon-Kissinger-Ford foreign policy administration attempted indeed to respond to the rising requests for avoiding future Vietnams, by organizing a retrenchment of whatever remained of American power, by reassessing the geo-political scope of American interests, and by delegating past American authority to a few viceroys that would in a sense play the imperial role which America had played in the past, within their own region. Iran for example, was to be such a viceroy in the Gulf, and Brazil was expected to become such a viceroy in Latin America. The second inaugural address of Mr Nixon in January of 1973, you will recall, spoke of the need to turn away from old policies that had failed. "We expected", the President said at the time, "that others too will do their share." And he concluded, and I am quoting, "The time has passed, in 1973, when America will make every other nation's conflict our own or make every other nation's future our responsibility, or presume to tell the people of other nations how to manage their own affairs." This was meant to end three of the features which had characterized the cold war outlook of the United States during the years 1945–1970.

First we would change our rhetoric, and do away with the Messianic perception of the American role in the world. We would present ourselves as a nation like any other, neither better nor worse. To this extent, Henry Kissinger, who had argued that the recently ended Vietnam war was the ultimate failure of the American philosophy on international relations, attempted to Europeanize, if you will, American foreign policy: to introduce a rhetoric that had just never been heard before, one that spoke of the balance of interests and self expansion and rejected notions of self abnegation while dismissing the *public* relevance of human rights to the making of foreign policy.

We had indeed a need, as Kissinger argued at the time, to do away with the old idealism and return to a form of pragmatism that would then enable us, secondly, to do away with an obsession that had made of ideology the moving force of American diplomacy. In the 1950s and the 1960s, you will recall, we had been apparently unable to make distinctions between nation states that embraced the same ideology, and we kept referring in the aftermath of the outbreak of the Korean War to a communist monolith directed by, on behalf of, and from, Moscow, leading therefore to the incompatibility between the United States and the

Peoples' Republic of China, for example. Kissinger now was dismissing the relevance of ideology as an end in itself in foreign policy, was rediscovering the primary of the nation state; and in so doing, he was looking for ways whereby there could be an accommodation of existing national interests in spite of ideological incompatibilities. There could not have been any detente with the Soviet Union or any detente with China, without the willingness to do away with the ideological obsession that had characterized American foreign policy in the 1950s and 1960s.

And third and related to this: Kissinger acknowleged the decline of American power under the domestic circumstances of the early 1970s. Indeed the SALT negotiations were initiated in the fall of 1969 under the assumption that it would be possible to stabilize the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, at a level that would be compatible to both sides insofar as the protection of their respective interests was concerned. In 1946, James V Forrestal, the First Secretary of Defence in the United States, had argued that there was nothing the Truman Administration or any subsequent Administration in Washington would accept short of 100 per cent security for the American people —and it is on that basis that we made of superiority the trademark of our actions in the fifties and the sixties.

President Nixon in 1970 was now indicating and arguing that there was nothing he or any subsequent Administration in Washington could provide for the American people better than 100 per cent insecurity. The search for security through a maximization of power on the basis of superiority over our adversaries and allies alike, had therefore led at best to a balance of insecurity between the two protagonists.

On paper the outline of this new look sounded well. It was however, hampered by three obstacles. First, Kissinger faced reluctant adversaries in attempting to implement that new look. In developing his policy of detente with the Soviet Union, Kissinger understood detente between the United States and the Soviet Union as the recognition of the *status quo* at the periphery of the international system, i.e. the Third World, while acknowledging the permissibility of change in Europe, through the kind of peaceful engagement that was written into Basket Three of the Helsinki Agreements. To the Soviets of course detente with the United States meant exactly the reverse: the acknowledgement of the *status quo* in Europe but the permissibility of change in the Third World. That power which the Soviets were now developing more and more openly and more and more rapidly was ultimately going to be used, even if it was granted that the Soviets had developed their military capabilities in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile crisis on defensive grounds. The problem is evident: power breeds ambitions, and while this had been true of the United States in the 1950s and the 1960s it would clearly be true of the Soviet Union as

well in the 1970s and 1980s.

So the Soviets refused to play the game the way Dr Kissinger had foreseen it, and so did the Chinese. What Peking wanted out of detente with the United States was to tear apart any remaining relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. It was not Taiwan that was an obstacle to the normalization between the US and China in 1974–76, it was the refusal on the part of the Kissinger foreign administration to go as far as China wanted them to go on the issue of the Soviets, as was shown during Teng's visit to America in January 1979. To the United States of course detente with the Chinese meant exactly the reverse again. Played with moderation, the Chinese card would make the Soviets fear their growing isolation *vis-à-vis* both Peking and Washington, and force them more and more irreversibly into this net, this web of commitments and understandings that were being negotiated during the years 1969–1975. You will remember that more than half of all US-Soviet agreements concluded since 1933 were signed between January 1969 and March 1975.

Thus, the adversaries did not play the game Kissinger hoped they would play; but neither did the Allies. To be sure, it was very helpful to have individual states at long last assume some of the responsibilities that had been assumed by Washington under circumstances of surplus American power. But there was now a shortage of American power. The Allies therefore had to play a more active role as well and, of course, they refused. The European states continued to expect that the United States would provide them with the measure of security to which they had become accustomed, without providing much in return. They continued to assume that the definition of teamwork was "European team and American work". If, therefore, there continued to be much reluctance on the part of the Allies to assume their share of the responsibility, those states who were willing to do so proved to be, of course, unreliable, (and there is no better example than that of Iran) because it was not possible to build the domestic structures that would enable those states to play the longterm role that had been defined for them at that particular moment.

And finally the new look failed in 1975–76 because Kissinger failed to build a domestic consensus for his policies. Somehow such Europeanization of American diplomacy did not go all that well with the American public. America, it was still felt, was born to mankind to do the world a service. Maybe we were not as strong as we used to be but we were still the best, and the wealthiest, even though we might no longer be the strongest. Already in the summer of 1976 the Vietnam War was beginning to be forgotten by the public that wanted the restoration of American power — without of course repeating the mistakes of the past. And thus President Carter was elected. And he led us in a sense to a fourth defeat in

Vietnam, if you assume that the first defeat took place in March 1968, the second in January 1973 and the third in April 1974, the fourth took place in January 1977 — we had never lost a war before, perhaps, but we came to enjoy the idea of losing one so we kept losing it several times.

The Carter Administration misunderstood the international system and the domestic constraints that it felt it faced. The Carter Administration therefore endorsed most of the new look as it related to the decline of the ideological obsession and the decline of the military obsession, but it sought to reintroduce a Wilsonian rhetoric into the making of American foreign policy. It would be Kissinger's policy, maybe, but it would be Kissinger's policy without the German accent. It seems to me that the foreign policy of the Carter Administration was a failure. Its few isolated successes notwithstanding, it failed for three major reasons.

First there was during the first three years of the first foreign policy of the Carter Administration up to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a marked predilection of the many "I's" over the collective "we". There was, if you will, a lack of consistency, based on an abundance of mini-Kissingers who were all anxious to define their perception of the world and their perception of the policy in a given place at a given time, but they were all defining it in a different manner. For example, the Cuban forces were at long last located in Africa and UN Ambassador Young found them to be generally stabilizing so far as Africa was concerned, and Brzezinski found them to be generally de-stabilizing and President Carter found them, well, about half and half, depending upon the circumstances at the time. And then there was the question of linkage: Secretary Vance did not want to link and Brzezinski did want to link and the President wanted to link — from time to time. And there was a wide variety of issues that separated the various proponents and policy makers of the Administration. Kissinger as the Lone Ranger was gone, if you will, but he had been replaced temporarily by a bunch of wild Indians that gave American foreign policy an inconsistency that brought about the decline of American credibility as we saw it in 1979–80.

To be sure, all Administrations have been divided on major foreign policy issues, and the Reagan Administration, too, is divided on such issues. But President Carter was not choosing between the two streams that were coming in his direction: that of Dr Brzezinski and that of Secretary Vance. He was attempting to merge them. He was attempting to adjust his preferences for his view of the world — as advocated by Secretary Vance — with Brzezinski's more relevant analysis of the realities of the world. Every January, you will recall, 1978,'79, '80, the President told us that he would look at the world as it is, a reflection of the inner turmoil that divided him in so far as the adjustment of his preferences were concerned.

Secondly, it seems to me, the foreign policy of the Carter Administration displayed a predilection for the desirable over the achievable. With the benefit of hindsight, there was nothing in the objectives of the Administration in 1977 that was not highly desirable and that could have suited the circumstances of the international system in 1977: a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East and the end of arms sales and the passage of the Panama Canal Treaty and the normalization of relations with Vietnam and China and the Soviet Union and the promotion of human rights worldwide: these indeed were desirable objectives. They were not made operational, however. No policy was devised, that might make it possible for most of those objectives to be satisfied within the time sequence that war being provided: a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East by the fall, a SALT II Agreement by the summer, a Panama Agreement by the spring and an end or a sharp decline of arms sales by the end of the year (1977), and so on and so forth.

No priority was given to any one of those objectives. It was a shopping basket, if you will, from which any and all of these objectives would be produced as soon as possible. And I think we all know that he could not, at one and the same time, seek normalization with North Vietnam and China, with China and the Soviet Union, with the Soviet regime and the Soviet dissidents. We could not at one and the same time zero in on human rights, thereby forcing upon the Soviet Union a reassessment of its domestic institutions, and also send Mr Vance to Moscow in order to force the Soviets into deep cuts in the area of strategic weaponry that would have forced them into a reassessment of their military force. There was a need to choose. And as each choice was made, there was immediately a price for each one of those decisions, and the identification of each area that was important to the Carter Administration.

And third, the Carter Administration in 1977–'79 failed in the end because of what seems to me its predilection for the juggler over the architect. As I said, issues were juggled around and no architecture was created, or else two architectures were created, and the President then attempted to blend them together in vain.

The initial Carter Grand Design — as stated at Notre Dame University in early 1977 — and the improvizations and the contradictions that characterized its implementation are well known. They were received at first with an indulgence that showed that the good intentions of the new President were well understood: a Year of Transition, it was said after the first twelve months: a Year of Adjustment, it was hoped the following year: a Year of Education, it was still thought as we entered what was to be a long election year. Yet, already in 1977 there was a confusion in style and an agitation in substance that invited setbacks and crises. Although it

is not unusual for a new President to want to assert an identity of his own in foreign policy, the attempt was made this time with a determination and a thoroughness that had not been seen since the Dulles years, at least, where the Nixon-Ford Administration had reluctantly accepted the constraints imposed by the Congress and a public opinion still traumatized by the Vietnam War, the Carter Administration appeared to welcome such constraints — constraints which several of its most influential members had helped initiate during their own years in the opposition. Everywhere, success was promised quickly: adopting a zero-budget approach to the making of foreign policy, Carter juggled with the relatively healthy agenda that had been inherited from the previous Administration. In January 1978, with failure thus written in this first year of transition — in spite, or because of the ratification of the Panama Treaty — the President was already promising to face "the world as it is".

Accordingly, the new year was to be the Year of Adjustment. In dealing with the Soviet Union, Notre Dame gave way first to Wake Forest, and next to Annapolis. Apparently dismissed earlier for being "not even a rival", Soviet military power was now acknowledged with a respect that invited empty threats: Zbigniew Brzezinski identified the new "marauders" and their proxies in Africa and elsewhere in a growing "arc of crisis" — but what to do if not to show ever more patience and moderation: no B-1s, no Tridents, no cruise missiles, no neutron bombs, no MXs. Unable to deal with more than one issue at a time, the Administration was pursuing commendable efforts in the Middle East but — Camp David notwithstanding — at the expense of the impending disaster in Iran; it was focusing at last on Southern Africa but it was neglecting the rising problems in North Africa and in the Horn.

The sand castle was swept away in 1979, the Year of Education. The rise of Khomeini and the fall of Somoza showed how difficult it is for the United States to be on the side of change without paying a price that might be or become excessive — a price that the Administration refused to pay in either case. A SALT II Treaty was finally signed, but with one protocol too many and two years too late: already in the summer of 1979 it was clear that the Senate would not ratify the treaty without a series of amendments that would be tantamount to a demand for re-negotiation. In January 1980, with the United States increasingly isolated and weaker in a world that was itself turning increasingly hostile and unstable, President Carter spoke once more of "the world as it is", a world that necessitated a doctrine which transformed his foreign policy into what the President had not wanted it to be.

Even the more pessimistic observers must have been surprised by the pace and the scope of the crises that accompanied Carter's last year. The revolution in Iran, followed by the takeover of American hostages and the

war with Iraq displayed the internal instability of a region obviously vital to US interests. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan demonstrated the growing external threat to whatever remains of past Western influence in the Gulf. The Polish labour crisis displayed the alarming potential of new challenges to the Soviet control of Eastern Europe; and the exceptionally bitter feuds with the European allies seemed to threaten the very survivability of the Atlantic Alliance.

Under different circumstances, such a deterioration of the international scene would have favoured the incumbent President, expecially as his rival exhibited in foreign policy a lack of experience and a language that were a source of concern to many. A romantic vision of what a second Carter Administration would be like might have been outlined and accepted. Undoubtedly, the President had accumulated much experience during his years at the White House, A man of details, he had studied fully all major foreign policy issues, always with patience and after with competence. In such cases as Panama, Camp David and Rhodesia, it was possible to admire his political courage and his diplomatic perseverance. But to the end, the President continued to be seemingly unable to organize these many details, and integrate his many ideas into a coherent vision of the world and of America's role and place in it. Dreaming of an international community that would be orderly and just, the President came to perceive too late and with too many false starts an international context that is tragic and unjust: increases in military spending, renewed interest in a rapid force of deployment, sudden conversion to the very defence systems that had been rejected earlier, elaboration of a network of air and naval facilities in the Gulf, introduction of some military presence in Saudi Arabia — in the fall Carter was adopting the Republican platform that had been drafted in Detroit the previous summer. In so doing, he was giving his challenger a legitimacy that could not be withdrawn next with abusive charges against the threats to world peace that were raised by Reagan's rhetoric. Indeed, the foreign policy of the Reagan Administration began under its predecessor in January 1980.

The objectives of such a policy are well known: to restore American leadership and reassert its influence in areas deemed to be vital to the interests of the West (first and foremost in the Gulf): reverse the military balance with the Soviet Union; and regain a measure of unity in the alliance with the states of Europe.

Shaping Reagan's vision of the past is an image of the Soviet Union as a country whose internal ineptitude masks an expansionist impulse motivated by an abhorrent ideology and fuelled by the steady accumulation of military power. That such power would not have been balanced, and the resulting expansion contained, by the United States since the latter years of the Vietnam War, and that a strategy of retreat

would have been devised instead — ironically enough under a Republican Administration at first is the source of the most immediate "present danger". Deceived by the Soviet Union, the United States abandoned the search for strategic superiority in favour of the ill-defined notion of parity, and then remained unable or unwilling to defend the terms of such parity, thereby permitting Moscow to achieve a growing military advantage which eased its penetration in the Third World and culminated with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Progressively confronted with such Soviet advances, the Carter Administration, Reagan has argued, persisted in seeking further accommodations that brought about a second SALT Treaty whose "fatal flaws" would have endangered the very security of the United States. At home, a US strategy of military retreat and political retrenchment confused the American public and misled it. Abroad, it permitted the fragmentation of an alliance system built under several Republican and Democratic Administrations while allowing additional instability in the Third World which, whether or not it was directed by Moscow, has brought about costly changes and intolerable humiliations. Thus, the rhetoric of the Reagan Administration and its massive and unprecedented military build-up aim at reversing such trends.

So endowed with the means and the will for leadership, the US can also restore its past commitment to the containment of Soviet advances.

To equate containment and cold war can serve no significant purpose. What is generally known as the cold war was a slice of history whose characteristics could not endure and can no longer be restored. In the end, not even the fiercest critics of the cold war fully escaped the imperative of containment. They merely sought to delay its application more or less indefinitely — "elsewhere, later" — while groping for new and elusive motivations — "to make the world safe for change", for instance. Emptied of their past rhetoric the great foreign policy debates of the last 35 years have raised the same questions, all inextricably tied to the modalities of containment: What and where are America's vital interests? Given such threats, what is the best, most effective way of defeating them? The irony of the most recent of these debates is that such questions would have been most neglected at the very time when they acquired a true urgency, based on a rise of Soviet power that has come together with the growing uncertainties raised by the Persian Gulf and the steady deterioration of the Atlantic Alliance.

If containment is America's "implacable challenge", the Gulf is bound to play — in the 1980 vintage of containment — the same role as that which was played by Europe after World War II: vital to the security of all protagonists, it is a region that remains weak and divided. As the European continent proved to be both the stake and the theatre of the conflict between the two super-powers, so is the Gulf now. Even the

resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict would not end such confrontation any more than the resolution of the Franco-German conflict terminated the clash between the United States and the Soviet Union in and over Europe. An America that would tolerate a Soviet control of the Gulf and accept its oil on Soviet terms — or an America that would merely want to avoid such terms by learning, at last, to live without that oil — would have abdicated any pretence at world power and sought refuge in a new isolationism whose future would remain uncertain and fragile. There is no region in the world today of greater importance to the United States and to the West than the Gulf.

It is such a situation that compelled the Carter Administration to outline a doctrine that might have had some significance if the President himself had enjoyed sufficient credibility. Thus the Truman doctrine had been "stated" long before the United States had the power required to enforce it — though admittedly at a time of relative Soviet weakness. Yet, coming in the midst of the hostage crisis, and immediately after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (where the prediction of a Soviet Vietnam was a meagre consolation), the credibility of the Carter Administration was at its lowest point. Under such circumstances, it might have been preferable to say less and do more. Instead, the rhetoric remained far ahead of the efforts that followed: the geopolitical outline of the new American presence in the Gulf was well drawn, but the predilection for naval and air facilities instead of bases was inadequate; the development of a rapid deployment force was long overdue, but even if it were to become a force, it would remain too slow so long as it is not based in the area. The effort was so "indirect as to remain generally insufficient — and so "subtle" as to go widely unnoticed. With the United States now running out of no-cost options in the Gulf, the Reagan Administration accepts the need for an increased visibility and presence of a further amount of American power in the region.

Finally, with regard to Europe, the Reagan Administration inherits an alliance that may well be in its worst shape since its inception in 1949. Even before the political theatrics of 1980, the Carter foreign policy had puzzled and antagonized Europe (including, most significantly, West Germany) to a point rarely achieved in the persistent history of Atlantic discord — and going through such landmarks as the heavy pressure on the sales of arms and nuclear reactors; the initial insistence on a locomotive strategy that would draw its strength from the German and the Japanese economies: the the cancellation of the B-1 bomber; the Turkish arms embargo; the wavering over the neutron bomb; the sharp fluctuation of the dollar; the delays over SALT II, and perhaps most of all, the revolution in Iran and its aftermath.

Whether an Administration that wants to be the symbol of a resurgent

America and that is determined to end the decline of American power can define an alliance policy that is sufficiently specific in its aims, effective in its application and broad in its vision, as to recapture the trust of states anxious to remain our allies and reluctant to part as our rivals, remains to be seen. In a sense the allies in Europe will have to be courted and ignored, and led and followed at one and the same time within the framework of a give-and-take relationship that avoids painful either-or choices (on arms control and sanctions for example), and cultivates helpful European contributions to the US effort (the French in the Gulf, the British in Southern Africa, and the Germans in Turkey, for instance). Instead of insisting too heavily on the illusion of unity, the Reagan Administration will hopefully let things loosen up if and where they must, showing quiet firmness on policies that are so important to us that we are willing to pursue them alone if need be, while showing public flexibility toward those European policies that are so vital to our allies that they are willing to implement them without us if they can. This in not a very dramatic suggestion, but the ability to take the drama out of the American relations with Europe, and restore instead a measure of ennui, may well prove to be the criterion of a successful alliance policy.

Coming after an historical parenthesis that delayed it for three years, a resurgence of American power is a much-needed counterweight to the drift toward a global crisis comparable in its magnitude and superior in its potential to that which preceded World War I. Without any doubt, such a resurgence presents a threatening side: pursued with excess it might accelerate the very conflicts it was meant to avoid. *Vis-à-vis* the adversaries, a return to a policy that aims at strategic "superiority" without arms control and containment without accommodation would risk a Soviet explosion: yesteryear's Moroccan crises can easily be anticipated for tomorrow. *Vis-à-vis* the allies, a return to a policy that insists on an overall leadership which, even if it were to become credible again, might still remain less than desirable in some areas of specific concern to Europe, would be tantamount to inviting the allies to a dangerous rupture: yesteryear's Fashodas too are easy to contemplate for tomorrow. And finally, to launch a new imperial offensive everywhere in the Third World in the name of vague and often self-defeating anti-communist interests would be to invite anti-American changes where they might have been avoided: yesteryear's Vietnams, too, are easy to fear for tomorrow.

History may well tell us that such excesses were inevitable. In the meanwhile, however, to put such excesses on trial at the very time when the new Administration is being inaugurated would hardly help it achieve the balance between power, interests and values that it may try to restore: strong but not bellicose, interventionist if and where needed but without

the abuse of the past, anxious to present to the allies a coherent and steady vision but without imposing it in its least details, and aware of human rights and of the need for change but not at the sacrifice of significant United States interests and commitments.

Winrich Kühne

France's Africa policy
Model or problem for the Western commitment in Africa

The following article was concluded in spring 1980. It analyzes some of the basic facts, concepts and problems of French policy towards Africa under President Giscard d'Estaing. Although later developments are not considered, its conclusions are quite topical in view of likely policy changes under the new French Government. The author maintains that these changes will be less dramatic than expected.

One reason is the bureaucratic inertia and even resistance against such changes in two traditionally important government institutions for French Africa policy — the senior African advisers at the Elysée and the "African network" in the secret intelligence service (Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionage — SDECE). New appointments are pushed through in both institutions. Fundamental economic interests, which are outlined in this article, are another barrier to far-reaching changes. In recent months French officials have assured African leaders that previous defence arrangements, economic co-operation and political relations will be maintained, and even reinforced.

However, new approaches are to be expected in the following areas:

- France's attitude towards the Botha Government in South Africa will become much cooler. The Mitterrand government will, in contrast to the government of Giscard, make increased efforts to ensure that companies and government institutions adhere to the United Nations arms embargo against South Africa. On the other hand, relations with the Frontline States and the liberation movements will improve;
- Political and military relations with certain reactionary or despotic regimes, such as the Mobutu regime in Zaïre, will become more detached and Mitterrand will be especially reluctant to engage in any

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kind of military intervention to uphold these regimes. Such a change in policy concurs with a fundamental conclusion of this article, which predicts that France will find it more and more difficult to secure its influence by direct military actions. Instead, the French Government will increase its efforts to break out of its francophone 'chasse gardée' and base its relations with African countries on a wider range of language and ideology. This trend was already apparent under Giscard d'Estaing.

The Africa policy of France is often regarded as the example of a clearly conceptualized foreign policy designed to counter Soviet and Cuban advances in Africa. The military aspects of the French policy in particular are considered to be a model for the successful defence of Western interests. Many Western observers feel that the swift and successful deployment of French paratroopers in the first and second Shaba crisis in March 1977 and May 1978 have earned France this reputation.

However, although France's special position in Africa remains uncontested, its Africa policy is in fact in trouble. It is becoming evident that France's traditional concepts and instruments, stemming mostly from the colonial era, while still forming the basis of her particular strength in Africa, are becoming increasingly inadequate for meeting the challenges of that continent.

Thus, when trying to establish a framework for a common Western approach to Africa, the particular motives, concepts and problems of French Africa policy have to be studied. The fact that France and other Western states proceed domestically and externally from quite different bases and interests, when designing and implementing their Africa policies, is all too easily forgotten. This may be illustrated by a comparison between the basic positions of France and the Federal Republic of Germany, which are currently, aside from the USA and Great Britain, the most important actors in any co-ordinated African policy of the West. Their concepts and instruments could conceivably compete with each other, to the disadvantage of either one. One must therefore differentiate between occasions when co-operation with France is necessary to counter certain threats in Africa, for example undesirable Soviet, or Cuban influence, and occasions when a certain reserve or even an openly critical attitude towards French Africa policy is necessary; for example when it jeopardizes concepts and interests of other Western states.

Different premises of French and German Africa policies

Contrary to the German Government, the French Government enjoys a relatively broad domestic latitude in the formulation of its Africa policy. In spite of the related costs, the majority of the French political public has

continued to endorse Giscard d'Estaing's military actions in Africa. It still considers Africa to be the last remaining symbol of France's global role. Thus both parliament and the political parties see little cause or possibility for fruitful domestic controversy over the French Africa policy. In this context, the last parliamentary debate on Africa in December 1977 showed an embarrassing lack of interest. The Socialist Party contents itself in general with some critical comments, and the Communist Party, although protesting more energetically, is not taken very seriously because of its alignment with the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union. It appears, however, that the question whether France may be overdoing its African commitment has gained ground in public debate and will continue to do so.

This domestic situation contrasts clearly with the domestic sensitivities of the German Government regarding its Africa policy, for example in connection with discussion about co-operation with Marxist states in Southern Africa (Mozambique, Angola), about their support for liberation movements in Namibia and Zimbabwe and concerning their policy towards South Africa. In Paris, ideological inclinations and human rights issues play a minor role, so that France is relatively free to conduct a foreign policy directly related to its own material and strategic interests.

Another basic difference is apparent in the question of military support for African states and their regimes, either by direct intervention or by training of troops and supply of armaments and equipment. In this field, the French Government has at its disposal a variety of possibilities largely denied to the Federal Republic of Germany.

In concrete terms, France's capability for military invention in inner-African crises is demonstrated by seven permanent bases with an overall manpower strength of between 14 000 and 15 000 troops: Djibouti 4 500, Mayotte and La Réunion 4 000, Senegal (Dakar) 1 500, Chad (N'djamena) 1 400, Ivory Coast (Port Bouet) 500, Gabon (Libreville) 500; and another 150 have recently been transferred to Mauritania. Although announced several times, it is not yet clear whether the troops stationed in N'djamena will be transferred back to France.* In Southern France and on Corsica, the French government has at its disposal a special intervention force ("force des actions extérieures") of about 4 000 men. It was speculated in July 1980 that half an armoured brigade was added to this force. As a consequence of the communication problems which adversely affected military operations during the Shaba II crisis, the French are now

* Since mid-1980, the time of writing, the situation in Chad has changed dramatically, as is well known. French troops left N'djamena and were transferred to an old French base (Bouar) in the Central African Republic (CAR). Today about 1 300 French troops are stationed in the CAR, 800 in Bouar and 500 in Bangui, the capital of the CAR.[1]

installing an airborne liaison centre in a Transall transport plane to chart troop movements in Africa.

Of special importance in West Africa is the port of Dakar, where French warships anchor at regular intervals, and the airport near Dakar (Cap-Vert), where more than a dozen French reconnaissance, combat and tank aircraft (Mirage IV, Jaguar, rebuilt Boeing 707's, etc) are permanently based. Air surveillance and sorties against the POLISARIO (Fronte Popular de Liberacion Sanguia-el-Hamra y Rio de Oro) in the West Sahara were launched from this base. The airbase at Port Bouet near Abidjan is maintained by a French unit to receive further combat aircraft in times of crisis. In the Indian Ocean, mainly in Djibouti and La Réunion, France has now permanently based a naval force of about 15 to 20 warships, including the aircraft carrier Clemenceau (Djibouti).

Since France succeeded during the 1960's in turning its colonial influence into a network of agreements on military aid, assistance and defence, it is in a position to employ this military potential in a relatively flexible and selective manner. Complete data as to the number and substance of these agreements vary as they have not yet been published. However, including the 1978 agreements with Djibouti, the Comores, and recently Mauritania, one can assume that France has concluded a total of eight genuine defence or assistance treaties (Ivory Coast, Gabon, Senegal, Togo, Central Africa) and 16 agreements on military aid.[2]

Domestically, flexible employment of these interventionist instruments is ensured by the fact that the French public, and thus the administration, respond with much less nervousness to African crises and conflicts than is the case in the Federal Republic of Germany. The French people are accustomed to such crises from the long colonial era. The French Government does, however, appear to be fully aware of certain domestic limitations. The use of French troops is relatively unproblematic only to the extent that it does not involve major costs and casualties, which would shock the public. But Paris knows that the rapid use of a few hundred or thousand well-equipped and well-trained troops may bring about a sudden change in the military and political situation in most African conflicts. The assault on Kolwezi during the Shaba II crisis was undertaken with 750 men; five men of the French troops were killed and twenty wounded. The risk of French casualties can, therefore, generally be kept very low.

A further fundamental difference lies in the economic basis of French and West German African policies. In this respect difficulties and weaknesses are more evident on the French side. The often inadequate competitiveness of the French export industry on the international markets *vis-à-vis* American, Japanese and German industries is well known. However, trade with the developing countries has been one of the essential

growth areas for French industry during the last few years. It is estimated that this trade created more than 100 000 new jobs in the period from 1970 to 1976. This figure is the more significant because the overall employment rate in French industry stagnated during the same period.[3] France expects its close political and military co-operation, in particular with the francophone regimes, to balance out its lack of competitiveness. The common currency zone based on the Franc (le Franc CFA) which France maintains with most of these countries has not only strengthened the economic and financial ties between them and their metropolis, but has also meant that in 1975 France sent 84 per cent of its bilateral public development aid into this zone.[4] Another indicator of Africa's unique importance to the French economy is the fact that about 66 per cent of French investments went to Africa in 1975 (by comparison, the Federal Republic's rate was approximately 10 per cent).[5]

This leads to the second major determinant of France's Africa policy, the securing of raw materials and energy supplies for French industry, of which Africa supplies 100 per cent uranium, 100 per cent cobalt, 75 per cent manganese, 55 per cent chrome, 33 per cent iron, 25 per cent lead, etc.[6] Cobalt from Zaïre comprises about 60 per cent of French supplies, manganese about 50 per cent and uranium from Niger will provide more than 40 per cent of France's supplies within a few years. Gabon also holds uranium reserves of about 20 000 tons, followed by Central Africa with approximately 16 000 tons. France imports 40 per cent of its phosphate from Morocco (here the Soviet Union is, exceptionally, its main competitor), 39 per cent from Senegal and Togo.[7]

Altogether, France's attempt to balance its trade, energy and commodity interests by means of close political and military co-operation with African regimes has become one of her basic concerns and, as will be outlined below, poses a fundamental dilemma for French Africa policy.

The discrepancy between objectives and possibilities

France's success during the 1960s in salvaging numerous administrative and economic structures from the colonial era and utilizing them in the building up and maintenance of the newly-emerged independent francophone states, laid the foundation for a policy of close bilateral co-operation and influence. Since the stability of most of these states is latently threatened in one way or another by ethnic and socio-economic conflicts, France, through its bilateral agreements, became to a certain extent a guarantor of these regimes. Naturally this role resulted in considerable potential for French intervention and control where the economic interests of French industry were directly concerned. France feels itself increasingly exposed to the threat of a domino effect in its sphere of influence.

It can hardly afford to drop any of the regimes which it has supported. Even if there are no genuine French interests involved in the continued support of certain regimes, given their obvious inadequacies, an overthrow would create a dangerous precedent for France's credibility. Other regimes, also shaky but more important to French interests, would be less inclined to continue close co-operation.

Even though this role of "gendarme d'Afrique" basically corresponds to the big-power ambitions of France and Giscard d'Estaing, it at the same time allows conservative regimes, like those of Senghor and Houphouët-Boigny, or neo-feudalist ones like those of Bongo and the recent one of Bokassa, to exert considerable pressure on Paris to keep them in power. This became evident, for example, during the Shaba crisis and from the subsequent very strong demands by Senghor and Houphouët-Boigny on France and other Western nations that they engage more vigorously for the security of African states and their regimes. The alleged Soviet and Cuban threat has become a very convenient instrument to manipulate Western global interests for the survival of these regimes. Equating the stability of certain regimes with "national" or even "Western" security has become a popular theme in some parts of Africa. This attitude corresponds to the narrow-minded views on security policy of some Western experts and politicians, concerning the Third World.

Although successful, the Shaba crisis, and even more so the events in Chad, show on close analysis that not only the economic, but also the military means at France's disposal may turn out to be insufficient to support the role of "gendarme d'Afrique". This was pointed out very clearly by General Guy Méry, chef d'état major des armées, when he said, "Nos capacités sont limitées et dans certaines domaines, nous approchons de cette limite."[8] (Our capacities are limited and in certain areas we are approaching this limit). The main difficulty in the military field lies not so much in the manpower strength of units which France can dispatch to Africa, but rather, apart from the costs of sustained military action, in the inadequate air transport capabilities and in their low range. The Transall, which was designed for European deployment purposes, has a range of no more than 1 350 to 1 600 miles with medium payloads (by comparison, the big US transporter Galaxy has a range of between 3 200 and 5 400 miles depending on the additional load).

In the Shaba crisis the United States provided assistance because of its perceived global interests. True, the French conducted the first step of their operation largely on their own, with four DC-8's chartered from a private airline, and one Boeing 707 to carry troops to Kinshasa, 5 Transalls to carry ammunition and equipment, and with several Zaïrean Hercules and 2 French Transalls to drop the first two waves of French paratroopers in Kolwezi.[9] But after that, the logistics and transportation of

French, Belgian and other troops were assumed by the US Air Force which made eighteen C-141 Starlifters available.

The low Transall range, incidentally, is a further unpleasant constraint on French Africa policy. In order to be able to reach the outer limits of its sphere of influence, Zaïre or the French island of La Réunion in the Indian Ocean for example, a chain of crisis-proof intermediate landing bases, as refuelling stops, had to be established across or around Africa. Thus, La Réunion and its military base can only be reached via intermediate stops in Egypt, Djibouti and the Comores. In order to ensure a secure military line of communication with La Réunion, not a single link of the chain may fail.

France has tried to avoid the costs associated with the stationing of French troops in Africa and the related logistic problems by supporting the build-up of indigenous armies, but the success of this effort seems to be limited.

It repeatedly became obvious that these troops were incapable of dealing with major domestic crises, as for example in both Chad and Zaïre. Therefore, during the last few years French troops have had to be employed to a greater extent. The reasons for the ineffectiveness of French military aid cannot be discussed here at length. One reason, however, seems to be that in a continuation of colonial tradition, the indigenous armed forces are recruited predominantly from forces close to the ruling regimes; that is, they are usually members of a group or groups having ethnic ties with the regime. As a consequence they tend to exacerbate rather than prevent those conflicts resulting from ethnic hostilities and the ensuing problems of territorial coherence and internal stability.

Present and future threats to French Africa policy — the trend towards destabilization

The growing disproportion between the conceptual expectations of French Africa policy and the actual military and economic capabilities of France is no novelty. But thanks to the relative stability of francophone Africa and great French diplomatic flexibility, it has been kept within bounds. However, due to a combination of several factors, there are increasing indications that the region is becoming destabilized, a development which will probably be directed against certain forms of French influence.

One of these factors in particular is the growth of the social-revolutionary, nationalist Islam (Algeria, Libya). According to sources in Paris, the number of Moslems in Africa has doubled during the last ten years. Strongly supporting this expansion are the petrodollars of some Arab oil-producing countries, especially Libya. The fact, however, that the Arab League saw fit to emphasize its good relations with Uganda and

its Chief of State, Idi Amin, a convert to Islam, during the Tanzanian-Ugandan conflict last March indicates that Libya is not the only state to welcome this spread. A few days prior to his downfall, Idi Amin was granted a four million dollar credit by the Islamic Development Bank while Libyan troops were involved in the military defence of Amin's regime. In addition to saving an Islamic regime, Libya's interests were probably also to salvage Libyan investments (insurance companies, banks and some of the remining Ugandan industries), as well as to keep Uganda as a basis for Palestinian activities.

In Paris there is little agreement on the importance of this trend for French interests. However, the Quai d'Orsay does speak of a "micro-imperialism" of North African states which is penetrating the South and is threatening to collide with France's post-colonial "imperialism" in West and Central Africa.

The developments likely to ensue from the advance of an Arab-financed Islam in the course of the next few years are very difficult to predict because factors such as religious ones (Christian or animistic versus Islam); social (social-revolutionary, socialist versus conservative-capitalist); ethnic (especially Arabs versus black Africans); territorial and economic conflicts (competition in the exploitation of commodities such as uranium, oil, phosphate etc.); are likely to overlap in different ways from country to country. It is not clear as to what extent Arab powers will either join forces or block each other in the process. Thus, there are indications that Egypt supported Tanzania in its conflict with Uganda in order to deal Ghadafi a blow. Probably for the same reason Sudan, together with Nigeria, supports a peaceful solution in Chad in order to prevent Libya from enforcing territorial claims in that area. But Nigeria is equally interested in limiting French influence.

Chad, which reflects all the above conflict constellations, has in a way become a touchstone for the question whether the territorial integrity and national stability of the states in this region can nevertheless be maintained. Chad's disintegration would constitute a direct threat to Niger's survival, which like Chad, has border difficulties with Libya. It could affect the supply of uranium to France from Northern Niger. A victory by the POLISARIO in the Western Sahara could aggravate the conflict between black Africans and Arabs in Mauritania which would undoubtedly affect Senegal's interests as a Black African nation. In April 1979, Mauritanian civil servants and officers established in Dakar an "armed front for the self-determination of Mauritania's black population".[10] On the other hand, the idea of fighting for a "United Islamic States of the Sahel" is coming up time and again, although it does not, right now seem to have very much backing.

Furthermore, it is entirely possible that — independent of the Islamic

issue — the stability of some francophone regimes of Black Africa will decrease rather than increase because of socio-economic difficulties. These countries for example the Ivory Coast, have been able to legitimize their capitalist-conservative approach to development and the dominance of major foreign — in particular French — capital, more or less successfully by means of high growth rates. But for various reasons, these growth rates appear to be becoming increasingly difficult to achieve. Thus, according to a World Bank report, the growth of Niger's Gross National Product declined from 20 per cent to 8 per cent in the period from 1976 to 1978.[11] In addition, the exclusive concentration on high growth rates has led to highly unbalanced developments in the social area. As a consequence, in the future problems are likely to spread. By the same token, there seems to be a growing resistance on the part of the younger generation to Western — and in particular French — control over its economic and cultural development. On the Ivory Coast, voices expressing these sentiments are becoming ever louder.

It is by no means clear how the younger generation and its élite, who have grown up under independence, will define relations with France once the "old men" who ruled during the first phase of their countries' independence step down. Although neither the possible advance of nationalist Islamic regimes nor the change of generations in the Black African states will put an end to the relatively intensified economic relationship with the industrialized states of the West, the traditional "neo-colonial" French type of co-operation could be jeopardized. The involvement of Paris in the rise and fall of "Emperor" Bokassa has made this "neo-colonial" style even more obvious for Africans.

In connection with these trends towards destabilization mention must also be made of the role played by the Eastern Bloc, i.e. the importance of the Soviet, Cuban and East German presence for France's Africa policy. There is a certain similarity in the ways in which these states and France secure their influence in Africa. In order to maintain its traditional influence in Africa, France has made itself the military guarantor of the territorial integrity and stability of the regimes of certain African states. Through similar guarantees and the related military commitments, the Soviet Union and Cuba have succeeded in gaining new influence in Africa, in particular in Angola and Ethiopia. The French administration does not attach much importance to the medium and long-term possibility that the Eastern Bloc could pose a threat to vital Western interests in Africa and this applies in particular to francophone Africa. The Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa are perceived as a threat only in the vague sense that they might latently encourage instabilities in this region as outlined above. The French determination to intervene in African conflicts, therefore, does not so much reveal an anti-Soviet attitude. Rather, it

represents a particular approach to inner-African instabilities and the related dangers to French interests.

Another matter, however, is the stationing of French troops and naval units in Djibouti. Here, France is not only interested in securing a traditional sphere of influence, but also in protecting the oil routes in the Gulf of Aden and the Persian Gulf. This concerns all Western states, but here again the increase of French forces in the Indian Ocean during the last few years was not primarily directed against the Soviet presence. Rather, it demonstrated France's resolve to counter the debate on decolonization within the Organization of African Unity (OAU) concerning La Réunion.

In that French activities in Africa are not prompted primarily by the Soviet and Cuban presence, the French policy of intervention is not in the first place an expression of a strategy concerning the global East-West conflict. Rather, it is a result of the special conditions that have developed in Franco-African relations in the course of history. Even in respect to the two Shaba crises Paris, Washington and Bonn agree that there is no convincing evidence of any direct involvement of the Soviet Union, Cuba or the GDR. Rather, it should be noted that the French Government's quick withdrawal of its accusation that the Soviet Union had participated in the second invasion of the Shaba province has generally been overlooked. Giscard d'Estaing did not want to strain unnecessarily the French-Soviet relationship by unproven statements. But, as will be shown, it is occasionally quite useful to French policy to dramatize the threat to Africa posed by the Socialist camp.

Giscard d'Estaing's new Africa policy — maintaining French domination through more flexibility and multilateralism

One should not understand the basic orientation of the French Africa policy outlined above as a dogmatic commitment. Despite its close co-operation with African regimes, Paris has always tried, and in most cases successfully, to retain a high degree of flexibility. This is most obvious in its military agreements, each of which has been individually negotiated and which allow France considerable manoeuverability in the employment of military means in inner-African conflicts.

Accordingly, the deepening contradiction between the far reaching objectives of French African policy and the possibilities open to it in practice, is not resolved by reducing the traditional claims to dominance. Rather, Paris is attempting to render this contradiction manageable by modifying and extending its Africa concept in three major directions: first, in pursuing the *maxime,* as outlined by Oliver Stern (State Secretary in the French Foreign Office) during a visit to Guinea-Bissau, according to which "neither *language* nor *political* or *ideological* factors should stand in the way of close and fruitful co-operation".[12] An example of efforts to

overcome language barriers is the fact that anglophone and Portuguese-speaking states dispatched observers to the Franco-African summit held in Ruanda in May 1979. Other states with which Paris desires closer co-operation are Sudan and Kenya. As far as ideological barriers are concerned, France's reconciliation with Marxist-oriented Guinea under Sekou Touré caused considerable attention.

Besides protection of specific economic interests (e.g. bauxite deposits in Guinea), France's primary goal in this extension is to modify its image as a post-colonial power interested primarily in supporting conservative-capitalist francophone regimes. This lessens France's obligation to offer support to conservative or reactionary regimes out of all proportion to their economic or military importance to her. Instead, Paris can demonstrate that it is both capable and worthy of co-operating with "progressive" ideologies whose representatives may one day seize power in one state or another. In view of the previously described tendency towards instability in francophone Africa, this must be seen as an important shift in emphasis in the French Africa policy. This shift will probably be accompanied by a more flexible conduct in military interventions.

The third thrust of France's Africa policy, in its attempt to narrow the gap between objectives and possibilities, is reflected in its endeavour during the first few years to get other Western powers, especially the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, to accept a greater share in the French commitments. It was suggested that they should assist in overcoming certain military weaknesses and economic costs (capital etc.), which are attendant upon French Africa policy. Moisi/Lellouche, in their above-cited article, use the term "multilateralization" when discussing this aspect of French Africa policy. It has manifested itself above all in a "rhetorical wave"and in several proposals by Giscard d'Estaing on European-African security and solidarity. In order to create an "Eurafrique", France suggested the establishment of a solidarity fund to support African states, a conference between Africa and Europe along the lines of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), as well as the build-up of a pan-African, but European-paid and trained, armed force of intervention; and Paris is also promoting a Europe-Arab-African dialogue.

Most African governments, as well as France's European partners, are very critical of these proposals. The Africans, including francophone groups, fear that they are merely designed to reinforce Western — mostly French-dominated — post-colonial influence in Africa. Some European partner states presume, and justly according to the above observations, that these proposals are primarily motivated by a multilateralization of French weaknesses and that they will be pulled into a policy which is not

necessarily compatible with their interests. They do not need and do not favour such close alignment with African regimes as is pursued by France, Keeping aloof from internal African problems may in the long run promise more stability. That does not rule out a defence against certain forms of Eastern military presence and influence. This defence however, need not be identical with a policy of more or less unconditional support for African regimes loudly declaring themselves to be anti-Soviet or pro-Western. Therefore, when considering the proposals emanating from Paris, one must differentiate between a multilateralization of the French Africa policy and a genuine European or Western multilateral policy towards Africa.

France in framework of the Africa policies of other European or Western states

The preceding discussion sought to demonstrate that, for certain historical and economic reasons, one has to be very careful when speaking of a common approach in the politics of France and other Western states in Africa. Such an assumption would merely be the uncritical counterpart of a no less undifferentiated assessment or overestimation of the Eastern threat to Africa which French policymakers themselves do not share. Nevertheless, in certain critical situations, France will continue to find it useful to emphasize such a threat even when it cannot be proved. In this way, France can best link its own regional interests to the global interests and fears of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany in particular, thus bringing about the multilateralization described above.

It will thus be necessary for the European or Western partners to determine on a case-to-case basis to what extent their own interests are being satisfied by a policy of military support and intervention resulting from the special French-African relationship. Seen from this perspective, the French presence in Djibouti takes on an importance completely different from that of the former French commitment to either Emperor Bokassa (Central African Empire) or to certain other regimes. It is, however, not only the East-West conflict which is apt to generate agreement with the French Africa policy; the West generally is interested in the maintenance of the territorial integrity of all African states. Any violation of this principle would create dangerous instabilities for any Africa-committed power because of the incalculable chain reaction. In this context, Western powers other than France find it much more desirable to have certain African powers like Nigeria and others uphold this principle rather than to have to intervene directly themselves. Other areas of common interest emerge of course within the framework of the European Political Co-operation (EPC) and the Lomé Agreement.

As is well known, the French attitude towards intervention during the

second Shaba crisis led to some misgivings in the Belgian capital. Contrary to Paris, Brussels did not necessarily want to link the protection of the white population and of the Belgian mining interests to a demonstration of political and military support for the Mobutu regime. It therefore initially pursued a strategy of "soft intervention", that is, the assignment of troops was to be accompanied by negotiations with the rebels and their political representatives on a peaceful settlement of the conflict. One specific purpose was presumably to render massive French intervention in Zaïre superfluous. Brussels had not forgotten that during a state visit Giscard d'Estaing had labelled Zaïre "the most important country after France itself", although other Western states had been much more active than France in the Zaïre mining business. No one really knows whether French intervention in the Shaba province helped to provoke the bloodbath or just in time helped to prevent an even greater one. But it is known that in an intense behind-the-scenes competition the French Government has gained majority control in the equity of the recently Shaba-based cobalt mining "Société Minière Tenke Fungurumè" (SMTF). This largely confirms the fears expressed by Belgian officials during the Shaba I and II operations, that Mobutu would grant special privileges to French capital at the expense of the Belgians.[13]

It must be questioned therefore, in view of Frence's insistence on dominating many parts of Africa as its *chasse gardée,* whether the shared European interests in Africa really permit a clearly co-ordinated policy.

Notes

1. For the details see also James O. Goldsborough, "Dateline Paris: Africa's Policeman", in *Foreign Policy,* No. 33 (1978), p. 174–190; and Jeune Afrique No. 986, 28 Nov. 1979, p. 77–78.
2. Cf. Dominique Moisi/Pierre Lellouche, "Frankreichs Politik unter Giscard d'Estaing — ein Kampf aus verlorenem Posten?" (French Policy under Giscard D'Estaing — doomed?) in: *Europa-Archiv* no. 2, 1979, p. 29–41. Somewhat different data are quoted in the *Military Balance 1978–1979,* London, 1978, p. 45 and *Sueddeutsche Zeitung,* October 25, 1979, p. 7.
3. *Le Monde,* January 23, 1979, p. 17–18.
4. Christian Uhlig, "Frankreich, die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die Nord-Süd-Bemühungen" (France, the Federal Republic of Germany and North-South Efforts), in: *Deutschland, Frankreich, Europa,* edited by Robert Picht and Alfred Grosser, München 1978, p. 200–239 (208).
5. *Ibid.* p. 215.
6. *Africa Report,* September–October 1979, p. 7.
7. Cf. e.g. *Le Monde Diplomatique,* February 19, 1979, p. 15 and *Africa,* No. 92, April 1979, p. 78.
8. Cf. *Le Monde,* June 6, 1978, p. 5.
9. Cf. *Le Monde,* May 21, 1978, p. 3.
10. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung,* April 11, 1979.
11. *Jeune Afrique,* No. 953, April 12, 1979, p. 45.
12. Cf. *Monitor-Dienst Africa,* December 13, 1978, p. 7.
13. Cf. *Africa Confidential,* Vol. 20, No. 18 (1979), p. 7.

Book Reviews

AMBASSADOR IN BLACK AND WHITE
Thirty Years of Changing Africa
David Scott
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 258 pp.
UK price £10,95.

A seasoned diplomat once remarked that the British made the most impressive members of any diplomatic community. Her Majesty's Government has served South Africa well with emissaries and this reviewer's expectations of a book written by a former British Ambassador to Pretoria were not disappointed.

The sub-title provides the key to the contents of the story and the title a clue to Sir David's conclusion. Yet, it is not a laborious analysis. Rather, it is, in the author's words, ". . . a personal story, dealing with family incidents and developments as well as with international events" (xii).

Nothing in this book has not the personal touch and it is characterised by an almost old world quaintness. For example, the map and line drawings by Michael Unwin — the author's eldest grandson — recall an earlier age in Africa which many will find charming.

However, while Sir David's book is imbued with this nostalgia, his work on the continent was very much concerned with the substance of a changing Africa.

David Scott arrived in Cape Town in January, 1951, by sea and departed from the same city in June, 1979, in the same fashion. Between these two dates Africa and perhaps even South Africa changed, and some of these changes are chronicled in the book. Four parts are set out: the 1950–1953 period in South Africa; the 1959–1960 phase in the Central African Federation; a Ugandan interlude, 1967–1970; and, finally, as Ambassador to Pretoria, 1976–1979.

Most South African readers will find parts one, two and four the most interesting, while those wishing to understand the present tragedy in Uganda might carefully read part three. This reviewer found the ten short chapters on the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland the most compelling; particularly an account of the course and, eventually, the report of, the Monckton Commission. Here, differing perspectives on

what is just, acceptable and, most important of all, workable in Africa — on the part of Black and White — became apparent. There is little of fundamental comfort in this analysis or the eventual outcome of the Commission for the Black/White problem in Africa, and the (South African) President's Council could do well to study the section carefully.

Many will be interested in the personalities which move in and out of the chronicle with almost the familiarity of family friends. Sir Roy Welensky, at times a political foe, was seen to be under the influence of Right-wing Tories. (There is a familiar ring in that, one fears.) However, Sir Roy, who allowed Sir David access to his private papers, emerges well in the book. The late Hans-Joachim Eich, the highly energetic and talented German Ambassador to Pretoria — who died tragically on our soil — was clearly a good friend and colleague. Other personalities include Henry Kissinger with his "very compelling charm", David Owen for whom the author appears to have considerable respect, Pik Botha who also emerges well as does Dr Dawie de Villiers and "his delightful wife Suzaan". In addition, of course, John Vorster, P.W. Botha, Ian Smith and a host of African leaders — Milton Obote, Idi Amin, Nathan Shamuyarira and Sir Seretse Khama and many others — are all part of the cast.

There is much in this book to enjoy and many lessons for all South Africans. Perhaps the most important is that relating to change. And Sir David cautions against:

> "two extremes between which an evolutionary policy has to steer if effective change is to take place peacefully. The first is that of immobilism — demonstrated in Algeria — in which the dam-wall of repression has to be built ever higher if the growing volume of discontent is to be contained. Eventually, the dam breaks, or is blown up; everyone except the revolutionaries suffers. The second is the slippery slope. The sluice gates are open voluntarily, but too wide or too suddenly; restraining influences are swept away, and the pace of evolution may quickly become indistinguishable from that of revolution." (p. 245)

This jewel of a book is highly recommended to both layman and scholar. Perhaps as a postscript this reviewer can be permitted to thank Sir David for his enthusiasm both for diplomatic life and our continent, and for the trouble he has taken in putting it down.

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ESSAYS IN FOREIGN POLICY
Olajide Aluko
George Allen & Unwin, Great Britain, 1981, 228 pp.
Approx. R12,00

Students of Nigerian politics will find little which is either innovative or likely to stimulate innovative thinking about Nigerian foreign policy in this book. The first reason for this is quite simply that all the essays here collected, save the last four, were published in various journals prior to 1976. While it is certainly a boon to the researcher to find all these essays under one cover, they could more profitably have been based as the starting point for an in-depth analysis of the rationale of Nigerian foreign policy, recalling the Lerche and Said dictum that the foreign policy of a state usually refers to the general principles by which a state governs its reactions to the international environment.

Herein lies the second reason for the uninspiring nature of this book; namely, that the essays are generally bland and lacking any speculative or innovative analysis. The book relies principally upon the recounting of specific Nigerian foreign policy actions (mostly pre-1976). What interpretation there is appears to be somewhat less than objective, since the author accepts without qualification the motivations and outcomes of Nigerian foreign policy undertakings and fails to point to any failures or breakdowns in Nigerian foreign policy at any time during the twenty years since independence.

The essays are divided into six parts, the first two of which respectively deal with Nigeria's role in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Organisation of African Unity. These two areas, certainly Nigeria's major foreign policy preoccupation, are dealt with in a scant thirty pages filled with platitudes unabashedly lauding the Nigerian leadership for every foreign policy stand considered and accepting every outcome as being "right" or certainly the most desirable. Nor does the author contribute anything to the need for up-to-date and academically reliable material on ECOWAS, an achievement for which Nigeria can justifiably claim the laurels, and to which students of African affairs look with great interest and hope.

Part Three deals with Nigeria's relations with "extra-African" powers and concentrates primarily on the fluctuations in the love-hate relationship between the United Kingdom and Nigeria since independence. An interesting but misplaced inclusion in this section is an essay on Nigerian-Israeli relations, which enjoys precedence over the essays which deal with Nigeria and the Super-powers. Perhaps the author was mindful of his potential Muslim critics and the OPEC constituency. Similarly in Part Four, which deals with the attitudes of various foreign states to the

Nigerian civil war in a fashion hostile to those who were pro-Biafra, the author selects an essay on the role of Ghana in the civil war, seemingly solely for the reason that the essay was available.

However, in reading Part Five one may be ready to forgive a great many of the inadequacies of this publication. This section (which is the most substantial of the six parts) considers the Nigerian foreign policy-making process. Besides giving a detailed account of the structure of the Nigerian foreign service, it acknowledges, for the first time, that there might in fact be a degree of domestic linkage in Nigerian foreign policy motivation, though it ignores the possible role of the legislature in the foreign policy formulation process. The realm of the contemporary is touched on with an essay on the dramatic Nigerian nationalisation of British Petroleum assets on the eve of the 1979 Lusaka Commonwealth Heads of State Conference, an act of courage and defiance having significance far beyond the issues pertaining at the time, the merits and demerits of which will probably always be a cause for debate. This particular essay provides most interesting insights into the rationalisation of this "watershed" by Nigerian decision-makers, and is additionally noteworthy for being one of the four new essays.

The other three "new" essays are included in Part Six under the heading of post-Gowon foreign policy. As the heading suggests, the first two essays in this section deal primarily with the Obasanjo phase in Nigerian foreign policy and place a degree of emphasis on the *entente* between Nigeria and the Carter Administration. However, considering the subsequent return to civilian-rule in Nigeria and the Africa policy of the Reagan Administration, these essays are now of little more than historical value. Nevertheless, Part Six is salvaged by the final essay which considers some options (albeit in a rather cursory fashion) for Nigerian foreign policy for the 1980s and for the first time the author ventures to speculate about alternative Nigerian foreign policy options and their outcomes.

Despite the reservations mentioned above, the reviewer will be glad to have this book on his shelf for purposes of quick reference. For this reason it is a good buy for any student of Africa and can be specifically recommended to those who have in recent times suggested the possibility of a rapprochement between Nigeria and South Africa. Nigeria is an important actor in international politics and those who seek to win her favour ought to seek a wider understanding of the motivations for Nigerian foreign policy; this book is probably as good a place to start as any.

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THE MARITIME DIMENSION
Eds. R.P. Barston & P. Birnie
George Allen & Unwin, London, 1980, 134 pp.
Approx. R13,30.

The eminent Israeli jurist Shabtai Rosenne has referred to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea as "one of the most complex instances of international negotiation of modern times, if not of all time". Few persons who have been involved in this marathon Conference would quarrel with his assessment.

The unique feature of this Convention, which is still not finalised after more than a decade of debate, is that it involves a re-negotiation of the rights and obligations of States *vis-à-vis* the uses of the seas and oceans which make up some four-fifths of the surface of our planet. Although the Convention, like any other multilateral treaty, will take the form of a legal instrument and involves reaching agreement on a whole range of legal issues, the Conference cannot occupy itself only, or even mainly, with legal questions. Essentially, it is a multi-disciplinary exercise, in which each and every member of the international community must take into account its political, economic, scientific and strategic interests, with all the ancillary problems which they involve, in order to arrive at a package deal.

The difficulties are immense, not only at the level of the Conference itself but even more so at the level of the participating governments. The delegates who are making the running at the Conference have been attending session after session through the years, and have a pretty shrewd idea of what is possible and what is not. Unfortunately this is not always the case with their governments who, when presented with the complexity of ideas and proposals incubated in a multi-disciplinary broth, are apt to shy off the implications of a package deal and to lapse into their old and more comfortable habit of thinking in compartments.

The international literature is full of books written from the specialised angle of the economist, the political scientist, the jurist, or the expert in mining, in shipping, in fishing or in naval strategy — to mention but a few. Rarely has any attempt been made to present a picture in which the diverse threads are gathered up and put together in a readable form. This book is a notable exception.

This fact alone would make *The Maritime Dimension* a book of more than usual interest. There can be few subjects which are more important, and less widely understood, than the changes which are taking place in the international régime which will govern man's uses of the sea.

If the topic is well-chosen and timely, the editors' approach can only be described as felicitous. Given the wide diversity of subjects involved, who

better placed to attempt a synthesis than a political scientist and an international jurist who has specialised in the law of the sea? Their choice of contributors includes experts on fisheries questions, on economic and political geography, on shipping and on strategic studies; and their own contributions serve to cement together and to illuminate the whole.

All in all, this is an excellent little volume which deserves to be read by all those in government and in the private sector whose interests are affected in any way by developments in the "maritime dimension" — developments which, without doubt, will come to be regarded as amongst the most important and far-reaching of our time.

CHARLES FINCHAM
Cape Director
South African Institute of International Affairs

Books received for review

THE ASIATIC MODE OF PRODUCTION: SCIENCE AND POLITICS
Bailey
Routledge and Kegan Paul. Approx. R18,90 pb.

ANGLO-AMERICAN DEFENCE RELATIONS 1939–1980
Baylis
Macmillan. Approx. R42,60 hc.

OUR FRAGMENTED WORLD
East
Macmillan. Approx. R10,30 pb.

THE TWO MARXISMS
Gouldner
Macmillan. Approx. R16,55 pb.

LIBERAL EQUALITY
Gutmann
Cambridge University Press. Approx. R13,85 pb.

EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST
Hourani
Macmillan. Approx. R32,00 hc.

IN SEARCH OF EUROCOMMUNISM
Kindersky
Macmillan. Approx. R12,00 pb.

THE PIECES OF POLITICS
Lucy
Macmillan (Australia). Approx. R34,60 pb.

COMMUNIST POWER IN EUROPE 1944–1949
McCauley
Macmillan. Approx. R23,00 hc.

SOUTH AND SOUTH EAST ASIA 1945–1979
Pardey
Macmillan. Approx. R12,00 pb.

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Symposium Proceedings

The United States and South Africa: continuity or change? (Joint SAIIA/USICA Symposium, July 1981) R10 excepting for delegates who attended the symposium.

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Bibliographical Series/Bibliografiesereeks

No. 8. *South Africa and the United Nations: a select and annotated bibliography.* Compiled by Elna Schoeman, 244 pp. R25,00.

This bibliography comprises over 1 000 annotated references to documentation and relevant literature pertaining to the United Nations, its specialized agencies and South Africa. The extensive indexing of all UN resolutions concerning South Africa is a noteworthy feature, together with a subject guide and author index. This is an essential reference work for all who are interested in the field of international organizations and South Africa's international relations.

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