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INTRODUCTORY NOTES

This is the first issue of what it is hoped will be a regular newsletter or review for Institute members. The form is still experimental and suggestions from members will be welcome. It is intended at this stage that there should be an issue at least quarterly, and that each issue will include the texts of some of the papers delivered at Institute meetings, with occasional other articles of special interest. Selected lists of new books in the Institute's libraries, with short reviews when possible, will also be included, as well as news of the activities of the Institute and of its various Branches.

An important project on which the Institute is at present working, is the Conference to be held in Johannesburg in June, 1970. Members were informed last year of the Institute's intentions in this regard, and a brief report is given in this issue on how the plans for the Conference are progressing.

It is appropriate that this first issue should contain the text of an address to the Witwatersrand Branch on 4th December, 1968, by the British Ambassador in South Africa, H.E. Sir John Nicholls. One of his predecessors, Sir John Maud, addressed the first meeting of the Institute to be held in the Oppenheimer Hall of Jan Smuts House in August, 1960. (His subject was "Britain as an International Affair".)

Sir Alan Watt, the Director of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, visited South Africa briefly in September, 1968, and he addressed meetings of the Witwatersrand and Pretoria Branches on "Australian Policy Towards South East Asia". A text of his talk was not available for distribution to members, but we are including herein the text of a lecture which he delivered in Sydney in November, 1967, on Australian Foreign Policy, which Sir Alan has kindly made available to us. Although this lecture is based on Australian policies only until the end of 1967, we feel that it will be of considerable interest to members, and it does contain many of the views which Sir Alan expressed in his talks in South Africa.

The article on South Africa's relations with the United Nations is based on talks given to the Cape Town, Eastern Province and Natal Branches in June, 1968, and to the Witwatersrand Branch in February, 1969. A separate information paper on questions affecting South Africa at the 23rd Session of the U.N. General Assembly (1968) is presently being prepared, and will be distributed to members. (A similar paper was distributed early last year on the 22nd Session of the General Assembly.)

/In 1967 ...

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In 1967 the Institute published five papers based on post-graduate theses prepared in the Department of International Relations of the University of the Witwatersrand. A further two papers will shortly be published, concerning the mercenaries in the Congo and the military potentials of African States, by S.J.G. Clarke and D.F.S. Fourie, respectively. Members will be informed as soon as these new publications are available.

THE DIRECTOR.

"DIPLOMACY - ART OR SCIENCE?"

By

H.E. Sir John Nicholls, K.C.M.G., O.B.E.

I have noticed that great men, at the height of their power or wealth, are very much inclined to attribute their success to the fact that some earlier great man had advised them in their youth "Never explain, never apologise". This has always seemed to me singularly bad advice, and I make no excuse for beginning my talk with both apologies and explanations.

My first apology is for my presumption in offering to talk on the particular subject I have chosen. Diplomacy is a very well worn subject, and its bibliography is immense. It is highly unlikely that I shall be able to add anything new (except perhaps an anecdote or two drawn from my own experience) to the published material on the subject. The first treatise on diplomacy of which I am aware was published by Ottaviano Maggi in 1596 under the title of *De Legato*. I only mention it because I cannot refrain from quoting his idea of the qualities to look for in an Ambassador. He should, says Maggi, be a trained theologian, well versed in Aristotle and Plato, and able, at a moment's notice, to solve the most abstruse problems in correct dialectical form. He should also be expert in mathematics, architecture, music, physics and civil and canon law. He should speak and write Latin fluently and must also be proficient in Greek, Spanish, French, German and Turkish. While being a trained classical scholar, a historian, a geographer and an expert in military science, he must also have a cultured taste for poetry. And above all, he must be of excellent family, rich and endowed with a fine physical presence. I myself, I should add, am a little weak on canon law.

Many other works on diplomacy have been published throughout the centuries, none of them, I think, more perceptive and instructive than Harold Nicholson's "Diplomacy", published just before the last war. Rereading this recently for the purposes of this talk, I realised my presumption in trying to cover the same sort of subject in the compass of one short lecture. You will have to forgive me if I quote from him liberally (as indeed I have already done) for he has said almost everything I wish to say and said it much better.

My second apology is for my title, which, the more I look at it, the more I find meaningless, though it sounded rather good when I first thought of it. I might just as well have chosen "Diplomacy - Fact or Fiction?" or "Diplomacy - True or False?" or indeed have used almost any other pair of antonyms. At the back of my mind, I think, was the wish to exclude from my topic tonight the actual mechanics of diplomacy - a subject which,

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incidentally, has been very well covered by a former colleague of mine, Douglas Busk, in a book called "The Craft of Diplomacy".

Now for the explanations. Diplomacy is one of those tiresome words which are used, and frequently misused, in a number of different senses. Harold Nicholson defines five of them - roughly as follows - first, as a synonym for foreign policy, second, as equivalent to negotiation, thirdly, the machinery by which negotiation is carried out, fourthly, as shorthand for a career in the diplomatic service and lastly as meaning the particular gifts and attributes supposed to be possessed, or at any rate, required, by diplomats. The only one of these senses which I regard as seriously misleading is the one which equates diplomacy with foreign policy; it is central to my theme tonight that diplomacy is the instrument of foreign policy, not the policy itself. You may have a good policy which fails because of bad diplomacy, just as you can apply good diplomacy to give effect to a bad policy. The distinction is important because the making of foreign policy is the task of governments; the diplomat contributes information and advice, but he does not make policy - his main role is to execute his government's policy decisions. So far as I can I will use the word diplomacy only in the sense given by the Oxford English Dictionary which is as follows:-

"Diplomacy is the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by Ambassadors and Envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist."

Though the aims of diplomacy may not have changed very much over the centuries, the thing itself, and the methods employed, have run through a number of different phases. Harold Nicholson traces its descent from the heralds of early Greek civilisation, whose chief qualifications, as he put it, were a retentive memory and a very loud voice. Next came the orator period, in which the Envoy's function was to persuade friendly or hostile states by sheer weight of eloquence to accept the views of his own state. It was not until the fifteenth century that the Ambassador or Envoy became something more than a loquacious messenger or royal marriage-broker, who returned home as soon as he had delivered his message and received a reply. The concept of a resident Ambassador, in the form of a trained observer and reporter as well as a negotiator, caught on very slowly, spreading from the Italian States to France and England at the beginning of the fifteenth century. Even then, there was no clear pattern; resident Ambassadors and Ambassadors on special missions existed side by side, and nothing like a professional diplomatic service developed until much later. It was not until the Congress of Vienna in 1815 that diplomacy was, so to say, systematized.

Until 1815 - and indeed for a considerable time thereafter - an Ambassador was literally the personal representative of his sovereign; and something of this special status still clings to diplomacy today. It was natural enough when foreign policy was essentially dynastic and personal, directed by the King himself,

with or without the advice of Ministers; it became anomalous as absolutism gave way to representative government. But most European monarchs maintained a proprietary attitude towards their Ambassadors long after the direction of foreign policy had passed from their own hands into those of their Ministers. The fact that Ambassadors are accredited by one Head of State to another, not by one Government to another, has today only symbolic significance and value; it emphasises that an Ambassador is not only an executive agent of his government but also the representative of his country as a whole.

I mention these historical developments by way of introduction to an examination of the changing face of modern diplomacy. That there has been a fundamental change in the last century or so, and more particularly in the last 50 years, is undeniable. Compare the role of an 18th Century diplomat, who took with him instructions for all eventualities and might have to wait three months for new instructions, with that of a modern Ambassador in direct radio or telegraphic contact with his own government and obviously deprived of all justification for bold personal initiatives. The central question to which I want to address myself is therefore whether diplomacy has so changed as a result of swifter communications that it has become an anachronism - or, to put it another way, whether the diplomat still has a necessary and constructive part to play now that Ministers and officials from the world's capitals can meet, discuss and settle (or not settle) their differences and be back at their own desks in a day or a week.

These are in a sense rhetorical questions, because you may be sure that I would not have spent 36 years of my life as a diplomat if I had not been convinced that I had a useful and even essential function to perform. But I think the questions are worth asking, and worth trying to answer, because there is obviously widespread uncertainty as regards both the potential scope and the limitations of diplomacy. To answer them I shall have to try to give you some account of the day to day activities of a diplomat.

To be as brief as possible, I will do this schematically under three rather arbitrary heads - representation, observation and reporting, and negotiation. Obviously the importance to be attached to each of these functions varies from country to country, so I shall have to describe them in the broadest possible way.

The representative role is almost self-explanatory. An Ambassador (or indeed any member of his staff) is sent abroad as a representative of his own government and country. If he is rude, bad tempered or arrogant, he will not advance his government's cause or give a very good impression of his country. If he dislikes entertaining and being entertained, and divides his time between paperwork in the office and playing backgammon with his wife, he will not make any impression at all. Assuming that he is neither a curmudgeon nor a stay-at-home, the more he travels, the more people he meets, and the more interest he shows in the country to which he is accredited, the more successful he is likely to be as a representative of his own country. It has been said that a good pair of legs (for interminable standing) and a good digestion

(for interminable eating and drinking) are of more value to an Ambassador than a good brain. This is, I hope, an exaggeration; but it is certainly true that a capacity for taking social punishment is in most countries a considerable asset. By the same token, a diplomat must not hide his light under a bushel; he must be ready to submit to the attentions of photographers with a good grace; he must be seen at the right public and private occasions; and, when he is recognised by strangers in the street, he is entitled to believe that he is making some progress. But, of all the qualities required by a diplomat, if he is to carry out his representational role successfully, I would mention two in particular. The first is to have the luck or skill to pick a pleasant, and preferably a well dressed and attractive wife who will back him in all his undertakings. The second is to have a genuine, and indeed consuming, interest in other people. There are countries in which an Ambassador has little to do outside his representational role. We must sympathise with such an Ambassador but we need not conclude that he is wasting his time. He may still enhance his country's reputation and, if he himself is recognised as an honest and likable man, he will be more likely to succeed when a real problem comes his way. So much for the representational side.

Next comes the diplomat's role as observer and reporter. I have said that it is not the diplomat's responsibility to make policy; but it is very much his responsibility to provide his government with the facts and analyses on which Ministers at home can formulate appropriate policies. To do this, he must not only be an accurate and objective observer of the local scene, but know how to report in such a way that his own government regards him as accurate and objective. And this is true even if, in the interests of truth, he has to report things which are unpalatable to his own government. This is one of many reasons why I am thankful to serve a democratic government rather than a totalitarian one; for the dictator, by and large, only wants his Ambassadors to confirm what he already believes. Undoubtedly von Ribbentrop's sycophantic reporting from London contributed just as much as his faulty judgement to Hitler's belief that Great Britain would not fight in 1939.

To say that an Ambassador must report accurately and objectively is in itself an over-simplification. There is more to this than accurately reporting or summarising a debate in Parliament or a Minister's public speeches. The Ambassador must know whose words are significant and whose are not. He must know what the words mean in the local context, and whether they are likely to be followed by actions or not. In short, he must try to find out where power and influence really lie, whom to believe and whom to disbelieve; and he is either a very conceited or an exceptionally talented Ambassador if, even after two or three years in a foreign country, he feels one hundred per cent sure that the information and impressions he is passing on to his own government will give them an exact and balanced picture of the local scene.

The third and last of the three main diplomatic functions is negotiation, which is the very essence of diplomacy. Now by

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negotiation, I do not mean exclusively or even mainly the negotiation of treaties or agreements, important though that may sometimes be. I use the word in a much wider sense to indicate the whole process of representing your own government's policy, intentions or desiderata to a foreign government in the way most likely to gain acceptance or at least understanding, and of dissuading a foreign government from acting in a way which will be unwelcome to your own government. This is obviously the crux of the whole matter; if an Ambassador cannot do this better than other people then the case for professional diplomacy is undermined and governments would all do better to rely on the press and news agencies for their information and on special emissaries for special tasks.

If I were to argue that the resident professional diplomat can always do the job better than a visiting Minister or official, it would get me into hot water at home. It would also be untrue. There are undoubtedly situations which can best be handled between Ministers, each knowing exactly the mind of his cabinet colleagues. There are Ministers whose authority and diplomatic talents are so great that they may outweigh the professional diplomat's advantage of expertise and local knowledge. There are times when the professionals have done their best but failed to break a deadlock and where the only hope lies in direct discussion between Ministers or even Prime Ministers. But I think myself that all these are exceptional cases and that as a general rule ministerial interventions in negotiation should be reserved for exceptional circumstances. My reason for saying this is that, quite apart from the many advantages which a resident Ambassador should derive from his position and his local knowledge, he is in a sense always an intermediary, even if he speaks with the full authority of his government. If he fails in his task, his government can still allow itself second thoughts; whereas if a foreign minister or prime minister fails, it is the government itself which has failed. In extremity, an Ambassador can be disowned or transferred, and the event will probably pass unnoticed except by his colleagues. Not so with Ministers; for if they intervene in negotiations or discussions, the full glare of publicity is turned on them; and, if they reach deadlock, the fact immediately becomes public property. All too often this makes the eventual resolution of the problem more difficult. To this I would only add that, even in the cases where it is right to entrust a diplomatic task to a Minister, it is highly desirable that adequate preparatory work should be done first through normal diplomatic channels, so that at least the issues in dispute can be narrowed and exactly defined. Finally - and this is perhaps a more personal note - I think it should be more widely recognised that to overdo the involvement of Ministers in negotiations or important discussions inevitably tends to depreciate the standing of the Ambassador vis-a-vis the other government involved. The Ambassador was there before the negotiation in question; he will be there when it is finished; and he will have to go on dealing with the Government of the country to which he is accredited on many important topics. It is surely not desirable for the foreign government to get the impression that, whenever something of real importance has to be

6/discussed...

discussed, the Ambassador takes second place to the visiting Minister. This can only raise doubts in their mind as to the amount of confidence in the Ambassador's abilities or the degree of trust his Government repose in him. To put the whole argument in a nutshell, an Ambassador's influence depends very largely on the extent to which his own government is seen to trust in his ability and experience. I must emphasize that these are reflections of general application and in no sense a criticism of the many British administrations under which I have served. Nor, of course, are they a criticism of ministerial visits as such - that is, visits for general discussions or exchanges of views - for these can be an invaluable aid to better understanding between countries, and in my experience are usually very welcome to the visiting Minister's Ambassador and his staff.

I have referred to the advantages which an Ambassador enjoys by virtue of his local knowledge. He is, or should be, familiar with local history, with the balance of political forces, with leading personalities in many fields - in short, with most of the factors that contribute to a country's national life and determine its policies. If he is, either by natural gifts or by long experience and training, sensitive and receptive to external impressions, he should be able to judge: - I almost said feel - how a country or its government will react to events or circumstances. He will know which arguments will persuade and which arguments will annoy: he will know what is attainable and what is not: and he will know when to press and when to yield. But none of this will take him very far in practice unless he can hold his own government's confidence and gain the confidence of the government to which he is accredited. And this, I think, can only be achieved by maintaining a standard of honesty very much higher than is commonly attributed to diplomats. Subtle and wily are, I suppose, the epithets most often applied to diplomats, often as if they were compliments: but the successful diplomats I have known were men of integrity and conspicuous honesty. Subtlety is, of course, a useful quality; but it should be used not to deceive others but to ensure that others do not deceive you.

I end as I began, with some apologies. First, I had hoped to be able to illustrate my thesis with some instructive or amusing examples from my own experience. I could have done this but I quickly realised that discretion - the bane of every diplomat's life - would have obliged me to emasculate and bowdlerize the anecdotes almost out of existence. And I must apologise too for the incompleteness of the picture I have painted. I have said nothing, for instance, of the growing (and on the whole regrettable) role which propaganda, public relations and information work play in modern diplomacy. The manipulation of public opinion - which Canning in 1826 called "the fatal artillery of popular excitation" - has become a major factor in international relations; but it would call for a lecture by itself. Nor have I mentioned the new art(or should it be science?) of commercial diplomacy, which likewise plays

an ever increasing part in the day to day work of Ambassadors and their staffs. Nor have I touched on the United Nations and the far-reaching effects which the existence of that and other international bodies has had on the practice of traditional diplomacy. If I have omitted these three subjects - and indeed many other important aspects of my topic this evening - it is because I do not want to strain your patience any longer.

Note:

The above address was originally given at a meeting of the Witwatersrand Branch of the Institute on 4th December, 1968, and extracts were subsequently published in Afrikaans in "Die Beeld" of 15th December, 1968.

AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY (1937-1967)
- RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

by

SIR ALAN WATT

(Director of the Australian Institute of
International Affairs)

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Australian Foreign Policy - Retrospect

Australian foreign policy between 1937 and 1967 can, for my purposes tonight, be divided into four periods, viz., (a) 1937 to October 1941, when Menzies and Fadden were in power as successive Prime Ministers; (b) from October 1941 to December 1949, when the Labour Party, under the leadership first of Curtin and subsequently of Chifley, held office; (c) from December 1949 to January 1966, during which Menzies led the Liberal-Country Party Coalition; and (d) since January 1966, when Menzies handed over the reins of government to Holt.

(a) 1937 to October 1941

During this period the Australian Government's attitude towards international problems, both as regards policy and method, is best viewed through the eyes of Menzies during the debate in the House of Representatives on the Munich Agreement. Menzies was then Attorney-General in the Lyons Government, its constitutional theoretician, and its most brilliant speaker. In his speech of October 5, 1938, he made the following points:

- (i) It would be 'suicidal' for a Dominion to formulate a foreign policy and to announce it, whether or not it was in line with Britain's;
- (ii) Australia should be consulted by Britain and, in reply, "say useful things at the right time" to the British Government;
- (iii) The Crown was indivisible: when Britain was at war, Australia was also at war. Australia could control only the extent and nature of its participation in such a war. (It should be noted that when the Second World War broke out, Menzies, as Prime Minister, did not take separate action for Australia to declare war against Germany; after Pearl Harbour, however, when the Labour Party was in power, Australia made an independent declaration of war against Japan).

Most Australians have forgotten that, at the time of Munich, Australia had no Diplomatic Mission in any foreign country. There was a High Commissioner in London, with a Senior External Affairs Officer to advise him; there was an Australian Counsellor on the staff of the British Ambassador in Washington; and there were

several Trade Commissioners in different parts of the world. It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that the attitude of the Australian Government towards the Sudeten German problem faithfully reflected that of the Chamberlain Government, from which the overwhelming bulk of confidential information based upon its own diplomatic resources and interpretation was received. At any time after the Balfour Declaration of 1926 Australia could have entered the field of diplomacy, as Canada and South Africa did. She did not choose to do so, partly because she was more or less satisfied with the existing system of consultation with Britain and partly because, unlike Canada and South Africa, she had no substantial minority in her population (French or Dutch) which needed to be placated by public signs of national independence of Britain.

It was not until Hitler's entry into Prague in March 1939, had opened the eyes of both Neville Chamberlain and Robert Menzies to the grave nature of the Nazi threat to world peace, that the Australian Government began to feel the need for independent information and advice from a developed Diplomatic Service of its own. In his first message to the Australian people as Prime Minister, broadcast on April 26 1939, Menzies made the following important statement:

"In the Pacific we have primary responsibilities and primary risks. Close as our consultation with Great Britain is, and must be, in relation to European affairs, it is still true to say that we must, to a large extent, be guided by her knowledge and affected by her decisions. The problems of the Pacific are different. What Great Britain calls the Far East is to us the near north. (Emphasis added). Little given as I am to encouraging the exaggerated ideas of Dominion independence and separatism which exist in some minds, I have become convinced that in the Pacific Australia must regard herself as a principal providing herself with her own information and maintaining her own diplomatic contacts with foreign powers ... This means increased diplomatic contact between ourselves and the United States, China and Japan, to say nothing of the Netherlands East Indies and other countries which fringe the Pacific."

In due course, Australian Legations were opened in Washington, Tokyo and Chungking, to which were posted, as Heads of Mission, R.G. Casey (now Governor-General), Sir John Latham (sometime Attorney-General, Minister for External Affairs and Chief Justice of the High Court) and Sir Frederic Eggleston.

Today, by way of contrast, Australia has no fewer than 56 overseas missions. Whereas by 1940 the total number of diplomatic officers in the Department was 29 - 14 in Canberra and 15 overseas, today the Department has 255 diplomatic officers - 90 in Canberra and 165 overseas, with a supporting non-diplomatic staff of 612 - 412 in Australia and 200 overseas, together with 817 locally-engaged employees at overseas missions.*

* Department of External Affairs Annual Report, 1 July 1966 - 30 June 1967 (Commonwealth Government Printer), p.1

(b) October 1941 to December 1949

The Labour Party came to power two months before Japan struck at Pearl Harbour. During the First World War, its leader, John Curtin, had been "an idealistic anti-conscriptionist, anti-militarist, anti-capitalist young man."* It is greatly to Curtin's credit that he met successfully the hard challenge of leading the nation in a war for survival - at a cost to health which resulted in his untimely death in 1945. His Minister for External Affairs was Dr. H.V. Evatt, a man with a brilliant academic record who was appointed a Judge of the High Court at the incredible age of 36, only to resign 10 years later to enter federal politics. An outstanding constitutional lawyer, he held the portfolios of Attorney-General and Minister for External Affairs for eight years, and made his mark on the world stage - particularly at the San Francisco Conference 1945, when the United Nations Charter was approved. Evatt's intellectual capacity would have taken him far in any of several walks of life; his burning ambition, however, and his aggressive style tended to antagonise others and he had few friends. Though he became President of the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, the Prime Ministership of Australia escaped his grasp.

For Australia the period from December 7 1941 to June 4 1942 was one of crisis and extreme emergency. For the first time in its history the physical security of her metropolitan territory was endangered and the Government therefore felt that its primary duty was to the Australian people. Australian Army Divisions were brought back from the Middle East; the strongest pressure was maintained, in Washington and London, to secure military supplies for the Pacific area (despite the decision by Churchill and Roosevelt to Beat-Hitler-First); while efforts were made to obtain an effective influence on the running of the war. Partly as a result of pressure by Evatt, the Pacific War Council was set up in Washington; while its meetings gave Australian representatives regular access to the President of the United States and others, the Council was advisory only and its deliberations did not substantially affect the military strategy adopted by Britain and America. Australian confidence in the eventual outcome of the war, however, was greatly strengthened by the Battle of the Coral Sea on May 8 1942; while after the Battle of Midway on June 4 1942 - described by Churchill as "the turning-point of the war in the Pacific"**- fear of actual invasion of Australia by Japanese forces was dissipated. Henceforth Dr. Evatt was able to concentrate substantially on problems of the post-war settlement.

Tonight there is time only to summarise briefly Australian foreign policy from mid-1942 to December 1949. Evatt sought to ensure that the views of Small and Medium Powers which had made a major contribution to the war effort should not be ignored by the Great Powers and, in particular, that the voice of the Australian

* The Government and the People 1939-1941, by Paul Hasluck, (Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1952), p.74.

** Second World War, by Winston Churchill (Cassell, London, 1951) Vol.IV, p.220.

Government should be heard at every stage when the future of the Pacific area was being decided. The Anzac Conference held in 1944 between Australia and New Zealand was, in effect, an assertion of the right of the two Dominions to be consulted regarding the post-war settlement in the Pacific. At the San Francisco Conference in 1945, through incredible exertions and his training as a constitutional lawyer, Evatt had an effect upon the U.N. Charter greatly exceeding the influence which Australia exercised in the international sphere at that time. He became the acknowledged leader of the Smaller Powers at that Conference; if he did not win friendship for Australia, other countries came to realise through the capacity of its representatives that Australian views had to be taken into account. The domestic jurisdiction clause of the Charter (Art.2,7) is practically an Australian draft; while Australian influence was substantial on the Articles dealing with the powers of the General Assembly, with trusteeship matters and provisions for non-self-governing territories and with the status of the Economic and Social Council and the treatment of 'full-employment' as an international objective.

So far as the Japanese settlement was concerned, Evatt fought successfully for separate Australian representation at the surrender ceremony, while Australians acted on the Allied Council for Japan for Britain, India and New Zealand as well as their own country. In addition, an Australian became President of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, while Australians were appointed successively to the position of Commander-in-Chief of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan.

At the end of the war, all Australian political parties wanted a 'tough' peace treaty with Japan designed to restrict her future military and economic capacity to make war. Post-war developments, however, made such a policy impracticable. The growth of the 'cold-war' in Europe while Stalin continued to rule the Soviet Union; the outbreak of Communist insurgency in Indonesia, in Malaya, in Burma and the Philippines; the victory of Mao Tse-Tung in mainland China; and the commencement of the Korean war in which Chinese Communist 'volunteers' eventually took part - all these things led the United States to regard Japan less as a defeated enemy than a possible ally against Communist encroachment. No Australian government could have succeeded in reversing the tide of international opinion in favour of a 'softer' peace with Japan. In the event, it fell to the Menzies government to seek a different form of guarantee against the conceivable revival of aggressive militarism in Japan - an alliance with the United States.

Before the change of government came about in 1949, however, the Labour Government had given political support for Indonesians seeking independence from the Dutch; had developed friendly relations with an independent India which had become a Republic within the Commonwealth of Nations; and, at Dr. Evatt's prompting, adopted a strongly pro-United Nations policy under which important world issues were to be referred to the world organisation for investigation and decision.

(c) From December 1949 to January 1966

In December 1949, the Liberal-Country Party Coalition, under the leadership of Menzies, was swept into power against a domestic background of, first, communist organised strikes on the coal-fields which had crippled industry and put hundreds of thousands of Australians out of work and, secondly, a declared Labour Party policy of nationalisation of the banks. In Europe, Berlin had been under economic siege and Czechoslovakia had gone Communist, while in Asia there had been the series of Communist revolts mentioned already. It is not surprising that the new government, which has remained in office for the unprecedented period of nearly 18 years, focussed attention for several years, so far as foreign policy was concerned, on problems of Defence.

The Menzies government had less confidence than its predecessor in the capacity of the United Nations to ensure international peace and security. It had noted the abuse by the Soviet Union of its veto power in the Security Council, and the failure of the world security system envisaged by Articles 43-47 of the Charter, which provided that Member countries should enter into special agreements with the Council making available armed forces and facilities to maintain international peace. This failure had led to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The Menzies government, which quickly reached the conclusion that Australian strategic involvement, in future, would not be in Europe or the Middle East - as in two world wars - but in South-east Asia, strove hard and successfully to negotiate a military alliance in the Pacific, with the United States as the most important participant. Thus the so-called ANZUS Treaty was negotiated, binding Australia, New Zealand and the United States to "act to meet the common danger" in accordance with their constitutional processes, in the event of "an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties" - including an armed attack not merely on metropolitan territories, but also on "island territories ... in the Pacific" under their jurisdiction or on their "armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific." When Sir Robert Menzies retired, he made it clear that he regarded the conclusion of the ANZUS Treaty as the most important single achievement of his government in the field of foreign policy. Under its terms the legal obligation to act applies not merely to cases of Communist attack, but also to attack of any other kind.

In June 1950, the Korean War broke out, and ended in a stalemate at the 38th parallel, as a consequence of the intervention of Chinese 'volunteers'. In 1954 France in effect accepted her defeat in Vietnam at the hands of the Vietminh, in the sense that, through the Geneva Agreements, she gave up the post-war attempt to retain the territories of Indo-China as a part of the French Union. Shortly afterwards the South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty was negotiated, binding Britain, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines to "act to meet the common danger", in the event of "aggression by means of armed attack" upon any of the Parties within a

defined Treaty area which excluded both Formosa and Hongkong. Under this Treaty, however, the obligation of the United States was specifically limited to cases of "Communist aggression."

While the Labour Party was still in power, the Australian Government had entered into informal (ANZAM) arrangements with Britain and New Zealand for the defence of the Malayan area. These arrangements were continued and expanded by the Menzies government. In 1955 it was announced that Australian ground forces would be stationed in Malaya as part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, and that these forces would be made available to aid in suppressing the Communist insurgency in that peninsula. When in 1963 President Sukarno made it clear that he proposed to 'crush' Malaysia - the newly-founded federation of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo or Sabah and Sarawak - Australia agreed to its troops helping Britain and Malaysia to resist Indonesian 'confrontation', although at the same time every effort was made to keep Indonesian-Australian differences at a low level of temperature, in the hope - which proved justified - that more friendly relations could be developed later.

In the same year Australia agreed to the establishment of an American Navy Communications Station at North West Cape, while in 1965 Menzies announced his Government's decision to commit a battalion of troops to South Vietnam, as "the most useful additional contribution which we can make to the defence of the region at this time."* This decision was taken in the face of bitter opposition from the Labour Party, which objected, in particular, to the despatch to Vietnam of conscripts under a national service scheme introduced by the Government in 1964.

So far I may appear to have over-emphasised the strictly military aspects of the Menzies government's foreign policy. To maintain proper perspective, it is also necessary to mention economic and diplomatic aspects.

The first Minister for External Affairs in the Menzies government which assumed office in December 1949, was Mr Percy Spender (now Sir Percy). One of his earliest acts was to promote acceptance of the Colombo Plan, under which capital aid and technical assistance was to be given to underdeveloped countries in South and Southeast Asia. In his first general review of the international scene in Parliament on March 9 1950, Spender not only stressed the need for a Pacific Pact, but also the need to alleviate poverty in Asia, if political stability there was to be achieved. By December 31 1965, Australia had contributed under the Colombo Plan by way of gift a total of \$A.122,396,800, consisting of \$85,674,000 for capital development and \$36,722,800 for technical training and equipment. As at present there are some 12,000 students from Asia in Australian educational establishments, though many of these are of course private students.

Special attention to the problems of Asia was also given by Mr

* Current Notes, Vol.XXXVI (1965), No.4, p.179

R.G. Casey (now Lord Casey) during his tenure of the portfolio of External Affairs from 1951 to January 1960. Shortly after assuming office he made a goodwill visit to Southeast Asia which convinced him that it was urgently necessary to strengthen and expand Australian diplomatic representation in that area. "It is essential," he said, "that we should have our own posts reporting quickly and directly to Australia so that we can follow developments and be in a position to take diplomatic and any other action which appears appropriate and practicable."* This was done, and Casey himself made frequent visits to the area.

The Menzies government also decided to improve relations with Japan, so far as Australian public opinion - which found it difficult to forget the mal-treatment of Australian prisoners of war - permitted. Visits were exchanged at the highest political level; Australia sponsored Japan for membership of the United Nations and the Colombo Plan; in 1957 a Trade Agreement was signed which facilitated two-way trade between the two countries to the point where Japan became Australia's best customer. When Menzies retired from office he left behind him an enviable record of political stability and economic growth, and a Party machine which was strong and confident.

(d) January 1966 -

Mr Harold Holt became Prime Minister in January 1966. It would have been extremely difficult for any man to follow in the footsteps of Sir Robert Menzies, whose gift for speech, capacity for repartee and long experience of office had built up a public image of a father figure with a particular political style. Holt took a number of early steps in an apparent attempt to make it clear that he would be no mere imitator of Menzies. He visited a series of countries in Asia, taking care to see Australian troops in Vietnam during the process, while he sponsored important changes in Australian immigration policy, designed to widen the categories of non-Europeans who could enter Australia for permanent residence and shorten the time for naturalisation of Asians already here. An Australian Embassy was opened in Formosa, although the Australian government had refrained from doing this for a period of 17 years, following withdrawal of the Australian Mission from Nanking in 1949, after Chiang Kai-shek's move from the mainland to Formosa. Holt strengthened substantially the Australian military forces in Vietnam, and gave the strongest public support to President Johnson's policy there, using the embarrassing phrase "All the way with L.B.J." Under his leadership, and that of his Minister for External Affairs, Mr Paul Hasluck, Australia has participated in meetings of ASPAC, the Asian and Pacific Council, whose other members are Japan, the Philippines, Nationalist China, South Korea, Thailand, South Vietnam, Malaysia and New Zealand, and whose functions are limited to economic, social and cultural co-operation, and the exchange of information. Australia is also a substantial contributor to

* Current Notes, Vol.XXII (1951), p.514

the recently-formed Asian Development Bank.

The increasing tempo of the war in Vietnam, however, together with the decision of the British Government gradually to reduce its military responsibilities East of Suez and the development by Communist China of atomic weapons have brought about a changed situation in Asia requiring a fundamental re-examination of Australian foreign and defence policy. It seems an appropriate moment, therefore, for Australians interested in international affairs to take a careful look at the future prospect and to make suggestions as to policies which Australia should follow or which it should avoid. I turn therefore to consider briefly the problems which have to be faced, and the criteria which should be followed in coming to decisions which can vitally affect the welfare and even the survival of this country in its existing form.

PROSPECT

This review of Australian foreign policy since 1937 has shown that, during a period of 30 years, Australia has built up an independent policy of its own, based upon a developed diplomatic service which supplies information and comments about most parts of the world which are of immediate importance to Australia. Current policy flows naturally from that announced by the Menzies government soon after it came to power in December 1949. In substance this still appears to be based upon the belief that there is a fundamental opposition in the world between 'aggressive Communism' and other countries; that Australia cannot afford the luxury of a policy of 'non-alignment' in this struggle; that her sphere of strategic involvement is inevitably Southeast Asia; but that in her relations with Asian countries she must do something to minimise the basic poverty of Asia through such activities as the Colombo Plan, contributions to the Indus Waters and Mekong Development schemes, participation in the Asian Development Bank and the activities of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; and that she should foster - perhaps participate in - Asian regional arrangements such as ASPAC, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and the like, designed to help Asian countries to help themselves. In following these policies she has depended upon 'great and powerful friends' rather than upon the United Nations to maintain international peace and her own security, developed her trade with countries in the Pacific and diversified her exports, and come to rely heavily upon the American presence in the Pacific.

Careful analysis shows that, during this period, Australia has limited its military commitments beyond her shores to cases where she had a Great Power partner - either a super-Power (the United States), or a power with significant forces (like Great Britain). Thus she refrained from supporting the Dutch presence in West New Guinea to the point of war with Indonesia, because neither the United States nor Britain was prepared to involve itself on this issue. On the other hand, Australia supported Malaysia against Indonesian confrontation, because Britain too was committed to Malaysia's defence; while she has sent significant forces to Vietnam, where the United States had committed itself heavily to the defence

of South Vietnam.

The war in Vietnam shows no present sign of ending, although Indonesian confrontation of Malaysia has been called off since President Sukarno has been shorn of his power. Yet the situation in Southeast Asia is still very unstable, and the announced British intention to withdraw from Malaysia at latest by the mid-1970's raises in acute form the problem whether Australia should enter into commitments in that area as and when Britain withdraws.

Before considering this problem, and trying to establish guidelines or criteria for Australian decisions, let us take a brief look at the changes which have taken place in the world since 1949. Technological development, especially in the nuclear and missile field, have underlined the fact that crushing power rests in the hands of two nations only - the United States and the Soviet Union. Each can destroy the other, but each knows that it can be destroyed by the other. So there is a balance of terror, and, since the second Cuban crisis, a degree of mutual restraint. It is difficult to believe that either country will launch a nuclear-attack against the other except in pursuit of what it conceives to be its own vital interests.

While Communism is still a world movement, it can no longer reasonably be regarded as 'monolithic.' The Sino-Soviet dispute has reached a peak of acrimony, and for this reason the Soviet Union at least, in aspiring to leadership of the Communist world, has been forced to make concessions to the views of smaller Communist powers which have given these latter some greater freedom of action. On the other hand, the Western Atlantic Alliance is in considerable disarray, as President de Gaulle pursues ends designed to limit the effects of American power and influence and to increase the power and influence of France. The diminution of British power, due largely to her economic difficulties, has forced her to accept the somewhat humiliating posture of a suppliant knocking on the door of the European Economic Community, while publicly denying the 'special relationship' with the United States in whose existence she once took pride! There have also been great changes within the group of non-aligned powers, despite occasional denials by some members that a change has occurred. Thus, Indonesia and Communist China are at loggerheads, while India - the originator of the policy of non-alignment - can scarcely be described as non-aligned in relation to China, although she still tries to maintain a balance as between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The United Nations organisation has changed radically during the period in question. Misuse of the veto in the Security Council by the Soviet Union greatly hampered the power of that body to maintain international peace, and led to a substantial transfer of security functions in practice - possibly unconstitutional - to the General Assembly, under the Uniting for Peace Resolution 1950. While the sending of a U.N. 'peace-keeping' force to the Suez area in 1956 helped to reduce tension there, a similar force sent to the Congo in 1960, under Security Council Resolutions endorsed by the General Assembly, had to engage in severe fighting which raised the important question whether its activities

had not infringed Charter provisions protecting the domestic jurisdiction of Member States. In any event, intervention in the Congo brought the world organisation to near-bankruptcy, the Soviet Union and France in particular refusing to recognise any liability to contribute to the costs, despite an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice to the contrary. In the circumstances it is doubtful whether such an operation can ever again be undertaken, unless the Permanent Members of the Security Council agree in advance. This means in effect that responsibility for international peace has tended to swing back again to the Security Council, where the Charter intended it to be, with all the limitations imposed on action by the veto power of the Permanent Members.

Since 1955 membership of the United Nations has gradually increased to the point where the Afro-Asian group, supported by Communist countries and some Latin American countries, can control the General Assembly. In practice Resolutions of the General Assembly have been passed, particularly those dealing with 'colonial' issues, which purport to reinterpret the meaning of the Charter without formal amendment (which could be vetoed by any one Permanent Member) and to create new law allegedly binding on all Member States. This attitude raises the most serious issues for countries like Australia too difficult to analyse fully tonight. It is perhaps sufficient to mention that such an interpretation of Assembly powers was challenged in the General Assembly by Mr Paul Hasluck in his address to the Assembly on October 14, 1967.

As far back as 1961 it was pointed out that a simple majority in the Assembly could be found among countries which together contributed less than 2.5% of the budget, while a two-thirds majority (required in theory for resolutions on 'important questions') could be obtained from countries who pay only 6.22% of the budget. Such a divorce between power and responsibility has led to a weakening of the authority of Assembly decisions, and to the growth of first, faint doubts as to whether limits should not be placed upon membership. Thus, the Secretary-General in his Report to the twenty-second Session of the Assembly, has suggested that "micro-States", i.e. "entities (like Nauru) which are exceptionally small in area, population and human and economic resources ..." should not in future be admitted to full membership, but might establish 'observer missions' in New York and participate only in the activities of relevant specialised agencies.* Such a suggestion deserves every support, and might conceivably be accepted by Afro-Asian countries - especially African countries - which are learning the hard way that political independence does not in itself solve economic and social problems, and that democratic governments established on the basis of a wide franchise in accordance with the principle of self-determination may soon be overthrown by military regimes.

Against this international background, what are the assumptions and criteria which Australia should adopt in judging what modifications, if any, she should make in her foreign policy? In my view they should be these:

1. Australia, like all other countries, should strive to protect

* Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organisation (16 June 1966 - 15 June 1967), Doc.A/6701/Add. 1, 15.9.'67, paras.163-7.

its own vital interests. These interests should, however, be enlightened, neither merely selfish nor short-term. They will almost certainly have to include recognition of the reasonable interests of relevant other countries.

2. Pending establishment of a world government, as distinct from a world organisation of independent States whose representatives carry out instructions based upon judgements of national self-interest, international problems are likely to be dealt with less in accordance with moral or legal precepts than with those of power. Australian resources - political, economic and military - are limited, and the ends she pursues must be related to the means at her disposal. This implies that, except in defence of her own territories, she should avoid becoming involved in a major war unless she is supported by a major ally.

3. The predominant guarantor of Australian security for the foreseeable future is the United States. Australia has committed substantial forces to Vietnam in support of the American commitment there; it is scarcely conceivable that these forces can now be withdrawn unless American forces are withdrawn. If the Australian Government comes to the conclusion that the war cannot be won, or that the price of continuance is greater than the price of withdrawal, she should exercise maximum influence privately upon the American Government designed to secure an American withdrawal, with whatever safeguards for the South Vietnamese which may still be procurable.

4. Australia cannot take the place of Britain in Malaysia and Singapore. She can, however, help both countries to build up their economic and military capacity, accord technical training both there and here, and maintain some kind of a limited military presence designed to foster internal stability, while avoiding involvement in possible communal disturbances or a revived Indonesian confrontation after British withdrawal. If, of course, the United States should be prepared to guarantee stability in this area, different considerations arise.

5. The economy of Papua and New Guinea must be strengthened and the local population prepared as far as possible for independence. This is a primary Australian responsibility, which must take precedence over economic aid to other countries. At the same time Australian bilateral and multilateral aid - especially to South and Southeast Asia - should be increased as far as possible within the limits of vital Australian developmental needs, and serious consideration should be given to Australian participation in regional associations, provided these do not involve commitments likely to entangle her in a major war without a major ally.

6. No country should follow an 'all-or-nothing' policy in one particular direction, rigid and unchanging whatever the circumstances. Thus Australia can neither be 'British to the bootstraps' nor go "all the way with L.B.J." In the last resort, we will have to depend upon our own efforts, though we should seek co-operation with allies and other friendly countries when this is available and effective. Towards Indonesia we should be friendly and help

ful, but still exercise a degree of caution - until such time as that country develops a stable economy and a government with adequate popular support with which even closer ties may be possible.

7. We would do well to foster any remaining British interest in the defence of Australia, in the defence of Malaysia and Singapore and the development of staging bases in the Indian Ocean. Britain is still important to us as a source of migrants, and as a trading customer, while the significance of the cultural links and ties of kinship tend to be under-estimated. If and when Britain enters the Common Market her links with Australia may weaken further, but there is no need to anticipate this except to the extent of seeking additional markets elsewhere and keeping a watchful eye upon the stability of sterling currency. So far as the rest of the Commonwealth is concerned, we should take more interest in India and Pakistan, Canada and New Zealand than we do.

8. Trade relations with Japan are now of vital importance for us, and political ties should be further developed at a stage when Japan is beginning to move from the 'low posture' she adopted after 1945. Not everything which Japan may wish us to do will suit our convenience, and we will need to develop a greater degree of adaptability than we have shown in the past, while standing firm when our basic interests are likely to be harmfully affected.

9. The Prime Minister, Mr Holt, has been unfairly criticised for warning us that we cannot continue to live in "lotus land." Many of us still seem to believe that we enjoy the special protection of Providence, that we are isolated from the effects of world competition, and that we can continue to enjoy a high standard of living while exerting less effort than that required of men and women in other countries. It is true that automation may bring greater leisure and greater prosperity at one and the same time; it is, however, an illusion to believe that these can be achieved in one or a few countries only, while much of the world remains at starvation level. If peace is indivisible; perhaps we will find in the long-term that prosperity, too, is indivisible.

10. Finally, we would do well to avoid succumbing to the infection of catch-cries such as "Yankee go home." Fundamentally, this is a Communist catch-cry, though many non-Communists use it. To the very young, it needs an effort of imagination to remember the days of "splendid isolation" in the United States. George Washington warned his fellow countrymen against European entanglements, while the Monroe doctrine telling European countries to keep out of the Western Hemisphere was balanced by great American disinclination to become involved on the battlefields of Europe. The United States did not enter the First World War until 1917, after Germany had entered upon an unrestricted submarine campaign. Unfortunately the United States Congress refused to support the Peace Settlement, including the establishment of the League of Nations, worked out at Versailles. The United States retreated into isolationism. The Second World War began with America still standing on the sidelines, from which she was rudely blasted by the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbour. After the end of this war, conscious of her status as a super-power with atomic weapons, the United States remained

involved in world affairs. She joined the United Nations, helped to revive Europe through the Marshall Plan, committed herself as a member of NATO to the objective of containing the Soviet Union, accepted innumerable other commitments elsewhere, especially in the Pacific and showed unparalleled generosity in the economic aid she made available to underdeveloped countries.

It would be wise for those who echo the phrase "Yankee go home" to ask themselves more precisely what they mean. Do they mean, at one extreme, "Withdraw into a new isolationism; forget us, politically, economically and militarily, and let us look after ourselves?" Few Australians who use the phrase mean this. Some of them mean rather "Withdraw from Vietnam so that we too can withdraw; but don't go too far away! Someday we might need your help in a closer emergency of our own. Come back again, with equal vigour, whenever and wherever we want you; but let us in the meantime avoid bloodshed and concentrate upon improving our own standard of living." Unfortunately, international obligations tend to be strongly reciprocal, and imply effort or suffering in both directions. Moreover, withdrawal is psychological and political as well as military. Richard M. Nixon is not the President of the United States, and perhaps never will be. He is, nevertheless, a man of importance in his own country, and we would do well to heed his recently-uttered words:

Weary with war, disheartened with allies, disillusioned with aid, dismayed at domestic crises, many Americans are heeding the call of the new isolationism.*

A similar note was sounded in a paper written by an Indian read recently at a conference held at the Australian National University:

The problems of Asia arise out of the inadequacy of the existing world political system. It is necessary to enumerate the reasons for concern in Asia. In the first place, some of the major European powers, with highly developed industrial and technological bases, have a degree of indifference towards Asia. It is possible to detect in the Gaullist view of Asia, for example, an outlook which regards this continent as an impossible burden for the rest of the world to carry. The problems in Asia are of such magnitude and the task of showing results so formidable that it may appear wise to many to leave this continent to stew in its own juice and evolve its own system, even if such a system is based on unconcealed domination of smaller states by the biggest one.

The Soviet Union is still largely concerned with Europe and West Asia ... its interest in Asia as a whole has been somewhat secondary. The United States as the dominant power in the Pacific is bound to remain greatly concerned with Asian events, but even there it is possible to foresee a degree of tiredness of American domestic opinion in regard to Asian affairs.

* Asia after Viet Nam, by Richard M. Nixon, Foreign Affairs, Vol.46, No.1 (October 1967), pp.123-4.

In brief, it is possible to advance the proposition that the three main pillars of the world political system - the United States, Western Europe and the Soviet Union - may not continue to have an abiding and persistent interest in Asia to the extent that is necessary in order that the system may be effective in ensuring stability in this continent.

European countries which are angered by what they tend to regard as an unacceptable risk of American escalation of the war in Vietnam, and who tacitly incline to support the slogan "Yankee go home," should reflect that isolationism, as well as peace and perhaps welfare, is quite possibly indivisible, and that the American commitment to Europe may be weakened by encouragement of American withdrawal from Asia and the Pacific.

It may, of course, be argued that withdrawal into neo-isolationism is illogical in this increasingly inter-dependent world, but, as William Morris Hughes reminded Australians, life does not consist wholly of logic. The irrational can and does happen in international affairs. The Australian role, I suggest, is to avoid undue apprehension, undue pessimism and undue optimism; to take a cool look at the world around us; to accept the responsibilities of adult nationhood, which imply readiness to work for a living and to depend upon ourselves rather than upon others; to contribute our fair share to the solution of international problems - political, economic and military - at some cost, effort and pain; to give judicious support to countries genuinely striving to maintain their sovereign independence and to increase the prosperity of their citizens; to build up an image of Australia as a reliable friend and ally worthy of being helped, in turn, in the day of our own emergency; and to justify by our actions the support of powerful friends, while maintaining our independence of judgement and of advice. Nothing we do can guarantee absolutely our own survival as a State with the traditions and prosperity we now enjoy; but if we fail - and, equally, failure is not pre-determined - we may at least leave behind us a record which can inspire others to seek to achieve ends which alone dignify the human race.

Note:

The above lecture was delivered to the All Nations Club in Sydney, Australia, on 3rd November, 1967, as the annual Sir Robert Garran Memorial Lecture.

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

by

JOHN BARRATT

(Director of the South African
Institute of International
Affairs)

The countless words and resolutions that pour out of United Nations bodies each year, condemning South Africa, are a reflection of the Republic's unfortunate reputation in that Organisation. At the same time the image of the United Nations in South Africa could hardly be worse. Many people consider the world body to be either a worn-out joke and waste of money, or a danger to the world, threatening rather than preserving peace. Yet South Africa remains a member of the United Nations, in spite of suggestions from various quarters that it should withdraw, and the Government has made it clear that South Africa will continue as a member, fulfilling its legitimate obligations, as long as it is in the country's interests to do so. For the time being the Government, while very critical of the United Nations, clearly regards continued membership to be in South Africa's interest, and in fact in recent times has participated more actively in U.N. proceedings.

When the U.N. Charter was adopted in San Francisco in 1945, General Smuts was a key figure. He was Chairman of one of the main Commissions, and he personally prepared the first draft of the Preamble of the Charter. His country, which had been a member of the League since its inception; which had made a significant contribution to the cause of the allies in the 1939-1945 war; and which was now one of the 52 founding members of the U.N., seemed destined to play a prominent role in the development of the new Organisation.

What happened to cause a steady deterioration of South Africa's relations with the United Nations and to bring these relations almost to a breaking point within about 20 years?

From the beginning South Africa found itself in the dock over one issue, namely South West Africa. General Smuts' request for the incorporation of South West Africa into South Africa was refused by the U.N. General Assembly which instead insisted, more and more vigorously as the years went past, that South West Africa should become a Trust territory, with its administration by South Africa subject to U.N. supervision. Successive South African Governments adamantly opposed any suggestion that they were accountable to the U.N. in regard to South West Africa, although they recognised the international character of South Africa's relationship with the Territory. They also refrained from incorporating it, and were willing to enter into negotiations with the aim of removing this point of friction from the U.N. agenda.

Discussion of the South West Africa issue in the early years did not involve the highly emotional attacks on South Africa which later became common, and it did not prevent South Africa from playing a fairly active part in U.N. activities. When the U.N. undertook in 1950 to repel the aggression by North Korea against South Korea, South Africa was one of the sixteen countries to contribute men to the U.N. force.

By then, however, another question had been added to the General Assembly's annual agenda - the treatment of persons of Indian origin in South Africa - and in 1952 the Assembly decided to discuss the question of apartheid. South Africa maintained in the case of both these items, which were later merged into one, that the U.N. was not competent to discuss them, in view of a Charter provision (Article 2, para. 7) which excluded matters within the domestic jurisdiction of a member state from United Nations intervention. South African delegations consistently refused, after stating their legal objections, to take part in debates on the substance of the items or even to reply to accusations, often incorrect or distorted. (South Africa had never claimed that South West Africa qualified as a domestic matter.)

Most Western powers at first agreed with South Africa's legal arguments about domestic jurisdiction, and in fact used them, too, when attacked over their colonies. So, while South Africa was in a minority on these questions, it was not alone, and its delegations continued to participate freely in other U.N. activities.

In 1957 and 1958 South Africa maintained only limited representation at the United Nations, as a form of protest against continued U.N. discussion of the country's domestic affairs. But towards the end of 1958 the Government decided to return to full participation in U.N. activities in the belief that the campaign against South Africa, which up to this point had been led mainly by India, was losing steam. This belief appeared to be borne out by the appointment at the 1958 session of the General Assembly of a Good Offices Committee on South West Africa, amidst talk of a "new approach" to this perennial question. South Africa also participated in negotiations for the setting up of the Economic Commission for Africa, and in 1959 Mr. Eric Louw was elected to a Vice-Presidency of the General Assembly, as the agreed Commonwealth candidate.

South Africa's position in 1959 seemed, therefore, to be improving considerably. But big changes in the make-up of the U.N. were by this time imminent. Membership had slowly been growing and a number of ex-colonial territories from Asia, with five from Africa, had joined the U.N. ranks. In 1960 the doors were thrown open, and 16 new states from Africa entered, followed by others in each succeeding year. African states soon comprised the largest bloc of members in the U.N. The total U.N. membership is now 126 (at the end of 1968), of which 40 are African States, not including South Africa.

24/ 1960 then was ...

1960 then was the great year of change in the U.N., and it was the year in which South Africa's fortunes in the Organisation went into a serious decline. It was the year of Sharpeville, when South Africa's internal policies were for the first time considered in the Security Council as a possible threat to world peace, and from that year the Western powers began to change their position on the U.N's right to discuss South Africa's internal policies. The anti-colonialism campaign reached its climax in 1960 and the General Assembly, on the initiative of the Soviet Union, adopted the Declaration against colonialism which has since been treated in the U.N. as having almost the same authority as the Charter. It was also the year when the Congo crisis erupted to enflame African passions probably more than any other issue has done, and to plunge the United Nations into severe financial and constitutional difficulties.

The colonial powers, whether compelled or acting freely, were now in full retreat from Africa. They were anxious to shed as soon as possible the stigma of colonialism. South Africa had been associated with these powers, both in Africa, where they had controlled most of the Continent, and by virtue of the ties of blood with Europe. But now the ex-colonial powers, those whom South Africa had considered to be its traditional friends, felt that their own interests would be best served by dissociating themselves as much as possible from South Africa. The U.N. forum provided the best place to do this. They were encouraged in this trend by the Communist countries who found South Africa a useful stick with which to beat the "imperialists". The United States likewise wished to make clear its disassociation from South Africa and its racial policies.

Since 1960 South Africa has, therefore, become increasingly isolated in the United Nations, and voting on South African issues in the General Assembly has become almost unnecessary. Time and time again extreme anti-South African resolutions have been passed with but one or perhaps two negative votes and a handful of abstentions. One might say, in other words, that it has become almost automatic to vote against South Africa, without worrying any longer to consider the real issues involved, the practicality of the steps recommended, or the prestige of the United Nations.

Let us look briefly now at what has occurred since 1960 in connection with the two main South African issues at the U.N. While I shall deal with the two issues separately, it will be realised, of course, that they are closely related within the U.N. context, as two aspects of the campaign against South Africa.

Apartheid Item since 1960

The shock of Sharpeville in March, 1960, caused a dramatic change in the direction which the "apartheid" item was taking. The emotion caused by that event was incredible, and the question of race conflict in South Africa moved for the first time really into the centre of the U.N. stage.

The General Assembly was not in session, and the fact that there was bloodshed made it possible for certain states to raise the cry of a threat to the peace and thus to bring the Security Council into the picture for the first time. When the Council met at the request of 29 Member States, in a highly charged atmosphere, the South African representative who had asked to be allowed to make a statement, presented the Government's objections to the item being included in the Council's agenda, as this would violate Article 2(7) of the Charter, and it would be the first time the Council had considered purely local disturbances. These legal objections were not accepted. The arguments against them were that (1) the General Assembly had already agreed to take up the question at eight sessions, rejecting the case that Article 2(7) applied; (2) the violations of human rights were so serious that the U.N. could not afford to ignore them; and (3) the doctrine of racial supremacy created a dangerous situation, affecting not only South Africa, but the peace of the Continent.

The only delegates to express reservations were those of France and the United Kingdom. There was, however, a distinction drawn by some other delegates between discussion of the question, with the adoption of recommendations, which they felt the Council could do, and actual intervention which they felt might be beyond the Council's competence on this issue. As a result, the resolution eventually adopted by the Council was relatively mild, compared at least with later resolutions. It deplored the loss of life, as well as the policies of the South African Government, and called on the Government to initiate measures aimed at bringing about racial harmony based on equality. It was adopted by 9 votes in favour, none against, with 2 abstentions (France and the United Kingdom).

This resolution, it should be noted, did not conclude that a threat to international peace was involved, but stated that, if the situation continued, it might endanger peace and security.

When the General Assembly met towards the end of 1960 the question of sanctions against South Africa was seriously introduced for the first time. The Conference of Independent African States had met at Addis Ababa in June, 1960, and had advocated extensive sanctions. These were proposed to the General Assembly for recommendation to all Member States, by the delegates of Ghana, Guinea, and others, but their proposal was not adopted. It received a majority of votes, but failed to gain the necessary two-thirds vote required for important questions. A milder, though condemnatory, resolution was adopted, with only 1 vote against (Portugal) and no abstentions. (South Africa did not participate.)

Although the African States had failed to have sanctions recommended, there had been a significant change for the worse in South Africa's position. At the previous session in 1959, before Sharpeville, many Western countries had expressed doubts about the Assembly's competence to consider the question. At the end of 1960, the arguments based on Article 2(7) were no longer supported by any country, except Portugal.

While 1960 was, therefore, a fateful year for South Africa, this was not the only important African issue before the United Nations that year. Another question burst upon the scene a few months after Sharpeville, which was to take the main spotlight off South Africa, divide African opinion and involve the United Nations in its most serious crisis. This was, of course, the Congo question. The trouble in the Congo and the U.N.'s involvement there for a number of years, which led to a financial crisis from which the United Nations has not yet fully recovered, gave South Africa a breathing space, or rather helped to avoid a faster deterioration in South Africa's position in the United Nations, which could otherwise have been expected after the developments in connection with the Apartheid question in 1960.

A significant event occurred at the beginning of 1961. On the invitation of the Government, the U.N. Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold, visited South Africa in January. On his return to New York he reported that, although his discussions with Dr. Verwoerd had not produced agreement, this was not conclusive and he wished to give the matter further consideration. The exchange of views, he said, had served a most useful purpose, and he hoped that the consultations would continue. For its part, the South African Government called the talks constructive and useful, and announced that Mr. Hammarskjold would be invited to visit South Africa again. He was in fact invited in August, 1961, for a visit in January, 1962. But in September, 1961, this promising dialogue was cut short by the tragic plane crash near Ndola.

In 1961 the Security Council did not take up the Apartheid question, mainly because it was in the hands of the Secretary-General, and at the General Assembly's 16th session that year, the African proposal for sanctions again failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority, although the number of votes in favour increased. The South African delegation, in the person of Mr. Eric Louw himself, participated for the first time in the discussions and in the voting. This was, I think, a recognition of the seriousness of the sanctions proposals which had now come to be the main aspect of the U.N.'s discussion of apartheid. In other words the rights and wrongs of the Government's race policies were no longer at issue. It was now simply a question of what the United Nations should do about them.

The following year - 1962 - saw the African proposal for the recommendation of sanctions against South Africa, finally achieve a clear two-thirds majority. The resolution (No. 1761), which was adopted by 67 votes to 16, with 23 abstentions, included a list of actions which it was recommended Member States should take against South Africa, including the breaking off of diplomatic relations, the closing of ports to South African vessels, the boycotting of all South African goods and an embargo on exports to South Africa, including all arms and ammunition. In addition, the Security Council was requested to take all appropriate measures, including sanctions, to secure South Africa's compliance with United Nations resolutions.

Another important provision of the resolution was the establishment of a special committee on Apartheid to review and report on South Africa between Assembly sessions. (I shall have more to say about this committee a little later.)

The adoption of this resolution was the result not only of the weakening of opposition to it on the part of Western and Latin American States, some of which now were content to abstain rather than vote against, but also by the increase in the number of African States in the United Nations. Those voting in favour of it included all the Communist countries, and all the Afro-Asians, except Japan and Thailand. The Western and Latin States, plus Japan and Thailand, were divided between the negative votes and the abstentions.

By the end of 1962, therefore, the idea of sanctions as the way of forcing compliance by South Africa, had become accepted by a majority of the United Nations. But, of course, the States which were of importance to South Africa's trade did not support the resolution, and they regarded it simply as a recommendation which they were not obliged to accept. As only the Security Council could order mandatory sanctions, the efforts of the African States were now directed at having the South African issue considered again by the Council where they hoped it could gradually be escalated until agreement was reached to take action against South Africa under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

Under Chapter VI the Security Council can consider issues which may lead to a threat to the peace. It was under this Chapter that the disturbances in South Africa were considered in 1960. Under this Chapter the Council in effect makes recommendations. Under Chapter VII, however, when the Council has determined that a threat to international peace actually exists, it can not only make recommendations, but also decide on measures, such as sanctions or even the use of force, which it can call on Members to apply.

In 1963, therefore, the next phase of the campaign began with the decision of the meeting of African Heads of State in May that four African countries (Tunisia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Madagascar) should present to the Security Council the African case that an explosive situation existed in the Republic of South Africa. The Council met to consider this question in August, 1963, and again in November/December of that year, and in June, 1964.

At the meeting in August, 1963, the Council failed to adopt a proposal to boycott all South African goods, but it did agree to call upon Member States to cease the sale of all arms and military equipment to the Republic. France and the United Kingdom abstained on this decision, and it was not in any case a mandatory decision under Chapter VII of the Charter, as the Council did not conclude that there was an actual threat to the peace.

It is not necessary now, nor is there time, to go into the various other developments during this series of meetings, except to recall that they included the appointment of a Group of Experts, followed in June, 1964, by the establishment of an Expert Committee of the Council to study "the feasibility, effectiveness and implications of measures" which could be taken against South Africa. In February, 1965, the Expert Committee's conclusions were submitted to the President of the Security Council. But the Council never met to consider these conclusions, not, in fact, has it since taken up again the South African racial question.

The African States did manage to have the issue escalated up to the point of having the recommendations of an arms embargo adopted, and an Expert Committee appointed to consider the feasibility and effectiveness of sanctions, but the results of that exercise made it clear that the Western powers were not prepared to impose sanctions on South Africa, and without their support it was obviously not possible to obtain an effective Security Council resolution. The African States had thus come up against a blank wall, and the position is still more or less the same today, as regards apartheid and the Security Council.

The campaign against South Africa has, therefore, had to be carried on in the General Assembly and in various subsidiary bodies of the Assembly. A constant theme of all debates on apartheid during the last few years has been the attacks on South Africa's trading partners for being unwilling to take any concrete action against the Republic.

While enforcement action through the Security Council has not proved possible, the campaign against South Africa has been considerably widened. The United Nations Secretariat and the Secretary-General have become more involved, with the publicity media of the Organisation being employed more effectively to serve the campaign.

At the centre of this campaign has been the Assembly's Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid (commonly known as the Apartheid Committee). This Committee's job is to keep the pot boiling and to employ all possible means of keeping the apartheid issue before Member States as a live issue. It submits reports to the Assembly and the Council, it grants hearings to opponents of the Government and it regularly holds sessions away from New York each year, in Europe and in Africa. It is not representative of the full U.N. membership, as Western States have never been willing to serve on it. As a result, it has no difficulty in adopting extreme recommendations. But in spite of all the noise it makes, it has not in fact achieved anything concrete against South Africa.

The position, therefore, has not changed fundamentally, as far as the apartheid issue is concerned, since 1965 when the Security Council's Expert Committee submitted its report. However, during these years the South West Africa question has been of more crucial importance, and we must now turn to consider what has happened on that question since 1960.

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South West Africa Since 1960

1960 was also a significant year in the development of the South West Africa issue, for in June, at the Conference of Independent African States, the Governments of Ethiopia and Liberia indicated their intention of instituting contentious proceedings against South Africa in the International Court of Justice. The proceedings were in fact instituted on November 4th, 1960.

I cannot now go into the history of these proceedings which were eventually concluded in July, 1966, with the well-known judgment that the Applicant States had no legal right or interest to question South Africa's performance of its obligations under the Mandate. But I would like to make a comment on the way the South African legal team tackled the case. It was a very competent team and it prepared the defence with a thoroughness and attention to detail which anyone who has seen the many volumes of written pleadings submitted to the Court, can only wonder at. The experience gained in preparing South Africa's case before the Court has had, I feel, a profound effect on the way in which the Government now reacts to the campaign against it overseas, including in the United Nations. For instance, for the past year or two the Government, through the Department of Foreign Affairs, has been replying in detail to charges about the various aspects of South Africa's policies, while previously these charges were simply denied or even ignored.

While the South West Africa cases were before the Court, the General Assembly continued to discuss the question and to hear petitioners, despite South Africa's objections that the question was sub-judice. But there was no fundamental change during this period. It will be recalled, however, that this period included, in 1962, the ill-fated visit to South Africa and South West Africa of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the U.N. Committee on South West Africa.

After the Court's judgment, South West Africa became a live issue again in the political arena. Many had confidently been expecting an eventual judgment against South Africa, and plans had been made to campaign for the implementation of the judgment, with the intention of obtaining mandatory Security Council action against South Africa. Consequently the actual judgment was bitterly resented by many, and there was an angry reaction from many of the African States. They pressed for an early debate on South West Africa in the General Assembly, and they succeeded in obtaining priority for such a debate in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly at its 21st session towards the end of 1966 -- as a matter of urgency.

Before the Assembly was a report of the Special Committee on Colonialism, which had earlier taken over responsibility for the S.W.A. question from the Committee on South West Africa. This report proposed in essence that South Africa's administration of the Territory should be terminated and handed over to the United Nations. As suggested grounds for this drastic action it

was said that South Africa was violating the Mandate, firstly, by refusing to report and account to the United Nations in respect of its administration of South West Africa and, secondly, by applying to the Territory policies which were inhuman, unjust and oppressive of the indigenous inhabitants, and which denied to them any progress towards self-determination. Thirdly, it was said that circumstances in the Territory constituted a threat to, or were likely to lead to a breach of, international peace and security.

South African representatives participated more fully in the debate than they had done in previous years, and appealed, *inter alia*, against the shutting of doors to further dialogue with the Government. At the same time they strongly warned that outside attempts at interference in the Territory would be firmly resisted.

The outcome of this debate was that a resolution was adopted, with only two voting against (Portugal and South Africa) and three abstentions (France, Malawi and the United Kingdom), which decided that the Mandate was terminated, that South Africa had no other right to administer the Territory and that henceforth South West Africa came under the direct responsibility of the United Nations. (Botswana and Lesotho were absent for the vote on this resolution.)

In a declaration made before the vote, South Africa stressed that not only was there no substantive justification for the action proposed to be taken by the Assembly, but that the resolution, in its very terms, would be *ultra vires* and invalid. This position has, of course, been maintained ever since in regard to all developments based on this resolution.

Portugal stated that the resolution went beyond the competence of the General Assembly, and both France and the United Kingdom stated objections and doubts of a legal and a practical nature.

The United States declared that in voting for the Resolution it had undertaken no commitments as to the action which it would consider appropriate in the Security Council, if the Council should later take up the question.

To say that this was a radical decision by the General Assembly is to put it mildly. It was, of course, also an extremely impractical decision, because the United Nations has neither the means nor the capability of administering the Territory - especially in the face of determined opposition from South Africa.

The first step in implementing this decision came at a special session of the General Assembly in April and May, 1967, when a resolution was adopted establishing a U.N. Council for South West Africa, consisting of 11 members, to administer the Territory until independence, on a date to be fixed in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, and requesting the Council,

to be based in the Territory, to enter immediately into contact with the South African authorities to lay down procedures for the transfer of the Territory. The resolution also provided for the appointment of a U.N. Commissioner for South West Africa, to whom the Council would entrust executive and administrative tasks. The U.N. administration would be financed from revenues collected in the Territory, while expenses directly related to the operation of the Council and the Office of the Commissioner would be met from the regular budget of the United Nations.

The Council was requested to proceed immediately to South West Africa to replace the South African administration, and the latter was called upon to facilitate the transfer of the Territory to the Council, which should do its utmost to enable independence to be attained by June, 1968. The Security Council was requested to take appropriate measures to enable the United Nations Council for South West Africa to discharge its functions.

To us sitting in South Africa this resolution seems even more unreal than the previous one. But at least on this occasion the voting was different, and a substantial group of 30 States abstained in the vote, including most Western States and, interestingly, the Communist group. The United States, which had voted for the previous decision to terminate the Mandate, reflected the opinion of Western countries when it stated, in explanation of its vote, that the decision to establish a Council to take over the Territory was not a practical move.

The Communist States rejected the proposal for the establishment of a U.N. administration which, they said, would be fraught with dangerous implications; many good decisions in the past had been distorted in the course of their implementation by the Western powers. (In other words, they did not want the United Nations involved in another Congo.) However, the Soviet Union subsequently stated that it would co-operate in any moves which would contribute towards independence for "Namibia", as it is now called in U.N. resolutions.

In August, 1967, the Council for South West Africa requested the South African Government to indicate how it proposed to facilitate the transfer of the Territory to the Council. Needless to say the South African Government replied that it regarded the relevant General Assembly resolutions as illegal and invalid. The Council for South West Africa was, therefore, unable to report any progress to the 22nd session of the General Assembly which began in September, 1967.

The Assembly, at the very end of its session in December, adopted a resolution which called upon South Africa to withdraw from the Territory; appealed to its trading partners and other Member States to ensure that withdrawal, and requested the Security Council to take all appropriate measures to enable the United Nations Council for South West Africa to discharge its functions.

The Assembly, therefore, was no further at the end of 1967, but it had by this time found an issue which gave considerable emotive force to the campaign on South West Africa, and this was the impending trial in South Africa of 37 terrorists captured in South West Africa. In a resolution adopted by 110 votes to 2 (South Africa and Portugal), with 1 abstention (Malawi) the Assembly condemned the "illegal arrest, deportation and trial" of the 37 South West Africans, under South Africa's Terrorism Act of 1967; called upon the Government to discontinue the trial; and appealed to all States and international organisations to use their influence to obtain compliance with the resolution.

This latter resolution prepared the ground for the Security Council to consider, for the first time ever, the question of South West Africa. 53 Afro-Asian countries, including Japan, requested the meeting of the Security Council, and in a resolution adopted unanimously on 25th January, 1968, when the trial was already in progress, the Council repeated the condemnations and demands of the General Assembly.

After the conclusion of the trial and the sentencing of the terrorists to various terms of imprisonment, the Security Council held another series of meetings in February and March, 1968, and finally adopted a further resolution, again unanimously, censuring the South African Government for its "flagrant" defiance of the earlier Security Council resolution, as well as of the authority of the United Nations. The Council demanded that South Africa forthwith release and repatriate the South West Africans recently tried and sentenced in Pretoria, and decided that, in the event South Africa did not comply with the resolution, the Council should meet immediately to determine effective steps or measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Charter.

When the Council met in January, before the end of the trial, it was apparently expected by most members that death sentences would be passed. That this did not happen, took a good deal of the steam out of the issue. If death sentences had been passed, I think a more serious crisis would have developed, because the feeling at the United Nations on this specific issue was apparently running very high. Also, certain aspects of the trial and the legislation on which it was based, caused grave misgivings among Western delegates, and greatly reduced any will they might have had to prevent extreme action.

Meanwhile the Council for S.W.A. decided to visit the Territory but, although it spent some time in Lusaka, it was unable to find a plane to undertake what some thought would be the rather hazardous journey to Windhoek. It reported back to the General Assembly in June, and the Assembly adopted a resolution recommending enforcement action by the Security Council to remove South Africa from "Namibia". However, a good number of Western States abstained in the vote, and some of them again indicated that they did not think enforcement action was called for.

The Security Council did not take up the S.W.A. question again in 1968, and the General Assembly, although it discussed the question at its recently concluded 23rd Session, did not take it any further. The Assembly's resolution, at the conclusion of the debate, simply reiterated previous condemnations and repeated the requests to the Security Council. It was adopted by 96 votes to 2, with 16 abstentions (Western States, plus Botswana and Malawi).

It is noteworthy that this resolution, like the previous one in June, 1968, does not refer specifically to Chapter VII of the Charter, but rather calls on the Council to take effective measures "in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter". According to reports, the Latin Americans would not agree to vote for the resolution, unless reference to Chapter VII was omitted.

The position now is that the Security Council is seized of the S.W.A. question (as the result mainly of the terrorism trial), which makes it much more of a problem for South Africa than when it was before the General Assembly only. On the South African side, the Government is pressing ahead with economic development and with certain administrative changes, linking the Territory more closely with South Africa, as well as with plans for granting some autonomy to the Ovambos and other smaller groups. This multi-national plan for S.W.A. has not so far made any converts among U.N. members, and it will no doubt encourage the African States to press harder for Council action. Whether they succeed, will depend once again on how far the few Western States in the Council are prepared to go. The U.S., U.K. and France seem, for the present, unwilling to allow the adoption of extreme measures, although the decision of France to vote in favour of the sanctions resolution on Rhodesia is a sign that the Government may not always be able to rely on a French abstention in the Security Council.

Widening of Campaign

I mentioned earlier that while enforcement action through the Security Council on the apartheid question had not proved possible, the campaign against South Africa had been considerably widened. The details of this campaign during recent years would fill several volumes, but let me illustrate what is now happening in various U.N. bodies responsible to the General Assembly, by listing some of the developments during the past year and a half:-

1. International Seminar on Colonialism and Apartheid in Southern Africa - Kitwe, July, 1967.

(This followed a Seminar in Brazil, 1966, as part of U.N. programme of seminars on human rights questions.)

2. Examination of prison conditions and treatment of prisoners in South Africa, by working group of experts of U.N. Human Rights Commission.

3. Examination of trade union laws in South Africa by working group appointed by Economic and Social Council.
4. U.N. Conference on Human Rights held in Teheran in May, 1968, the agenda for which was adopted by the General Assembly, with apartheid the main item.

At the General Assembly's last session (23rd), which ended a few days before Christmas, South Africa received special mention in 15 resolutions, apart from the main resolutions on apartheid and S.W.A. These resolutions concerned, inter alia, was crimes and crimes against humanity; capital punishment; measures to be taken against nazism and racial intolerance; the treatment of political prisoners; freedom of information; colonialism.

These cases, during the past year or two, of U.N. organised action against South Africa illustrate the efforts, chiefly of the Africans, to widen their campaign and to build up pressures against South Africa from various quarters. Whereas the criticism and condemnation of South Africa used to be confined mainly to the annual sessions of the General Assembly and the very occasional Security Council meetings, it now occurs in various subsidiary bodies and specially arranged seminars and conferences throughout the year. Meetings are held, too, in various parts of the world, and no longer just in New York.

They also show how use is being made of the bodies concerned with human rights in an attempt to build up the moral pressure and to influence world public opinion.

This has become an important aspect of South Africa's relations with the United Nations and it deserves more serious attention perhaps than it receives in South Africa. While one can criticize the abuse of United Nations procedures and meetings for political ends, and regret that the cause of human rights throughout the world is not being pursued more objectively, it would be a mistake for us to underestimate the campaign against South Africa in the human rights field. The aim is to isolate South Africa further, to build up the moral pressures and, if possible, to create internationally accepted rules under which South Africa would stand condemned.

Also, we must not forget that, while much of this is politically inspired and is backed by governments some of whom may have very little concern for human rights in their own countries, there are many who are genuinely concerned about human rights in South Africa. We cannot dismiss all those who speak of human rights as extremists or as hypocritical. Respect for human rights is an important tenet of the United Nations Charter which South Africa signed, and it is an issue of genuine concern to the world. South Africans must be prepared, I feel, to take this issue seriously and to engage in a dialogue with responsible persons and governments who are concerned about the infringements of basic human rights within South African society.

It is interesting in this connection that the Minister of Foreign Affairs devoted a speech at the University of the Orange Free State in March, 1968, mainly to the question of the U.N. and human rights. While he felt that the human rights issue was being used as a tactic in the international campaign against South Africa, without a real concern for human rights, he said that we must never allow a spirit of cynicism to influence us, and he stressed the importance of individual rights within the context of the separate development policy.

The Rhodesian Dispute

The resolutions of the General Assembly's recent session, which contained special mention of South Africa, included the resolutions on Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories. In the Rhodesian resolution South Africa is, of course, condemned for refusing to apply sanctions and for "the illegal intervention of South African forces". Further, the Security Council is called on to impose sanctions on South Africa and Portugal whose governments "have blatantly refused to carry out the mandatory decisions of the Security Council".

The Rhodesian dispute has unfortunately added an extra dimension to South Africa's struggles in the U.N., especially since the British Government withdrew its objections to U.N. intervention in the dispute. A sanctions resolution has been passed unanimously by the Security Council, under Chapter VII of the Charter, and South Africa, which has always maintained that it fulfils all its legitimate obligations under the Charter, is placed in the position of having to disregard what appears to be a legal, mandatory decision of the Council. There may be arguments which can be produced in an attempt to prove that this was not a legal decision in terms of the Charter. But such arguments will not convince many outside South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal, and will look too much like special pleading.

So the Rhodesian dispute has become a serious negative factor in our relations with the United Nations, just as it is standing in the way of improved relations with the rest of Africa.

South Africa's attitude towards Membership

In view of all the discussions of South African affairs in U.N. bodies and the flood of propaganda that the United Nations forum makes possible, it is not surprising that there is a fairly strong feeling in South Africa that we would be better off out of the Organisation and that the money spent on our annual contribution would be better spent elsewhere. But the Government does not appear to share this feeling. It has simply said in statements by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and other Ministers, that South Africa would remain a member as long as it was in the country's interests to do so. The Government has decided, however, to indicate its disapproval of certain actions by deducting from its annual contribution, its pro rata share of the costs of certain activities. But apart from this,

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there has been no indication of drastic actions. Mr. Schoeman, for instance, when he opened the Transvaal Congress of the National Party in 1967, said that South Africa retained its U.N. membership because it gave the country a platform from which to answer its critics and put forward its own point of view. This seems in fact to be the Government's main reason for continued membership at present.

Since about the beginning of 1967 the Government has been engaged in an intensive campaign, organised in the Department of Foreign Affairs, to explain fully and in depth aspects of its policies and to reply in the same way to criticisms. This information campaign has been part of the outward-looking foreign policy and it has not only been directed at the United Nations. But the U.N. figures very largely in it. In addition South African delegates now speak out more at the U.N. in reply to criticisms.

This has all involved a significant change in South Africa's attitude to U.N. discussion of South Africa's domestic policies. Previously the emphasis was on the illegality of any consideration of South Africa's internal affairs, and it was considered that to reply to criticisms would be to become a party to the illegal proceedings.

This changed policy is a realistic one, and it takes into account a factor in the country's security, which was pointed out by a distinguished French strategic expert, General André Beaufre, in April, 1968. He said that: "A South African policy which does not disarm this opposition, based on principle, by some well-conceived reforms and by a big information effort, risks allowing a hostile atmosphere to build up and harden." He said further: "..... it would be dangerous to rely on military strength, however efficient, to ensure the permanence of a policy which had failed to attract the understanding of a sizeable part of world opinion. That is an essential pre-condition." In this connection, I have no doubt the Government realises that, whatever the shortcomings of the U.N., it does provide an important platform and is a centre of world opinion.

In addition to the argument that the U.N. platform is useful, it has been recognised that the United Nations is an important centre for diplomatic contacts, including, for South Africa, contacts with other African States. Dr. Hilgard Muller has mentioned the importance for South Africa of this function of the United Nations several times. In October, 1967, for instance, he referred to the facilities provided for private and behind-the-scenes contacts between foreign ministers and other representatives of almost all the countries in the world. These contacts, he said, were more important than the public proceedings.

Then there is also the fact that South Africa is still a member of a number of the specialised technical agencies in the United Nations family, several of which are of considerable importance to South Africa, and which enable South Africa to make a fairly significant contribution to international co-operation in the various technical fields. Ending membership of the United

Nations might lead to a chain reaction in those agencies.

There was a concerted campaign to have South Africa expelled from the various technical agencies, and this had some initial successes a few years ago when the Government was more or less forced to withdraw from I.L.O. and F.A.O. (The withdrawal from UNESCO came at a much earlier stage.) But in the other agencies South Africa has stood her ground, and has received strong support from Western and other States for her constitutional rights. Even the Communist States are not keen to see a country expelled, when they are doing all they can to obtain recognition for East Germany in international bodies, on the grounds that membership should be universal.

However, if South Africa were to walk out of the U.N., many countries would probably drop their opposition to the expulsion of the Republic from the technical agencies. The argument has in fact often been used that, as South Africa is a member of the U.N., it has every right to be a member of the technical organisations related to the U.N.

A factor to be taken into account in considering the question of membership is the indication over the past year or two of a possible improvement of South Africa's international position, even within the U.N. Some Africans have begun to argue that the long and fruitless confrontation with South Africa has not benefited anyone concerned. They seek rather to end the isolation of South Africa in Africa by encouraging economic co-operation which may lead eventually to a dialogue in other fields. Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, which had strong economic ties with South Africa before independence and thus stood to lose a great deal if they joined the anti-South Africa campaign, are already advocating this new approach. But there are others, too, with whom South Africa is said to have some contacts, but who prefer not to take a public stand at this stage. The motives of these governments are the need to concentrate on the development of their own peoples and the good of Africa as a whole.

In this connection, it is significant that the executive head of the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa, Dr. Robert Gardiner of Ghana, has said several times recently that other countries of Africa would have to be realistic and do business with South Africa.

This new approach towards South Africa within Africa has not yet been reflected in U.N. proceedings, except to a small degree in the votes and statements of the Southern African States who have broken the solid anti-South African front of the African bloc. But this small change is a sign of a potential new trend under the surface of violent words.

The hopes of improvement in South Africa's position in the Organisation will thus depend on the extent to which contacts and co-operation with African States increase in the future, and on the willingness of other states to encourage this co-operation rather than frustrate it. At the same time, progress within South

Africa in implementing policies designed to remove White domination, is of fundamental importance, both to increased contacts with African States and to an improvement in relations with the United Nations.

A further factor which the Government has clearly indicated is of importance in determining its attitude to U.N. membership, is the position taken by Western States. For instance, during a debate on foreign affairs in the Senate in June, 1967, Dr. Hilgard Muller stated:

" The South African Government, in deciding its future attitude towards the United Nations, will always be greatly influenced by the attitude towards us - and towards irresponsible actions against us in the U.N. - of responsible members of the West and the Free World."

Dr. Muller made this statement immediately after he had commented that insults alone would not drive South Africa out of the U.N., but that the country's position in the Organisation had always to be considered vis-à-vis its sovereignty. "We are after all, a sovereign state and we can never forget that. We have a certain dignity, a certain self-respect which we must always bear in mind."

In this connection, the recent failure of the move to have South Africa suspended from UNCTAD (the Trade and Development body), largely as a result of determined Western opposition to the move, was a significant development, and served to justify South Africa's continued membership.

These various considerations are no doubt among those which have influenced the Government to maintain South Africa's membership of the U.N. As a further general consideration, the continued survival of the Organisation through twenty-three years of crises and many predictions of its imminent demise, is perhaps also of importance. The prestige of the U.N. throughout the world has clearly declined and the expectations of its founders have not been fulfilled. But it remains a factor in world politics. No countries have left the Organisation (Indonesia's withdrawal a few years ago did not last long), and countries outside have continued to seek admission (with the important exception now of Communist China, and of Switzerland which, however, is a special case). For South Africa to leave the U.N. under these circumstances would be a move towards isolation, and it would not be in line with the Government's outward policy. Moreover, such a move would not stop the anti-South African campaign within the U.N., but instead might even gain it more support.

As a final comment, I feel that a more sophisticated attitude towards the United Nations is needed among the public. The U.N. is not a monolithic organisation which speaks with a single voice. It is made up of various groups, with different interests and

priorities, and within each group each country has its own special concerns. The extensive political bargaining which results, particularly in the General Assembly, is often reflected in irrational and irresponsible actions or statements, as well as in the exercise of the "double standard". But South Africa is not the only subject involved in U.N. politics, and for many countries probably does not come very high in their order of priorities.

One tends to get a distorted picture from reading the reports from the U.N. in the South African press. Frequently, U.N. developments affecting South Africa, which are headlined in our papers because of their special interest to us, do not rate even a paragraph in papers in London and New York. There are occasions, of course, when South Africa receives special attention, and developments occur which can have important consequences, especially when the Security Council is involved. These occasions must be taken seriously. But it is worth remembering that there are many other important political issues which often take precedence, besides the many economic and social activities of U.N. bodies, which occupy the attention of members, but which seldom receive mention in the press anywhere.

It is necessary, therefore, to see U.N. activities in perspective, and to encourage a balanced attitude among South Africans, taking into account the realities of the world situation of which the U.N. is part. Such an attitude will make the formulation of a constructive South African policy towards the Organisation more feasible.

During a debate in the House of Assembly in February, 1968, on a motion concerning U.N. interference in South African affairs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs commented as follows:-

"Our relations with the U.N. are an important matter. The U.N. is an important institution. As a matter of fact, it is the most important world organisation. It is also very important to South Africa as a member and as a foundation member of the organisation, and as a country which is constantly receiving the attention of the organisation. I believe that the U.N. has a right to exist. I also believe that it is not perfect, and this is in fact the subject of this debate today."

The above article is based on talks given to the Cape Town, Eastern Province and Natal Branches of the Institute in June, 1968, and to the Witwatersrand Branch in February, 1969.

1970 CONFERENCE

On October 7th last year our National Chairman, Mr. Leif Egeland, publicly announced the Institute's plans for a Conference of international experts on the subject: "The Impact on International Relations of the Population Explosion". It is to be held in June, 1970.

Planning for this Conference - the first to be organised by the Institute - is in the hands of two committees: the Programme Committee, which is responsible for all the details of the Conference's programme and the form of the proceedings, as well as the issuing of invitations; and the Finance and Administration Committee, which is organising the appeal for funds, and is responsible for all the administrative arrangements. The membership of these committees is as follows:-

Programme Committee: Mr. Leif Egeland (Chairman),
Mr. Gideon Roos, Prof. K.H.C. McIntyre, Prof.
M.H.H. Louw, Prof. I.D. MacCrone, Prof. B. Cockram,
Prof. J.L. Sadie, Prof. O.J.M. Wagner, Prof. D.J.J.
Botha, Mr. W.T. Ferguson and Mr. John Barratt.

Finance and Administration Committee: Mr. Gideon
Roos (Chairman), Mr. J.C. Williams, Mr. D.E.G.
Vieler and Mr. John Barratt.

The following is the list of topics which it is at this stage intended by the Programme Committee should be considered by the experts at the Conference, in relation to the main theme:-

1. Contemporary World Demographic Trends.
 2. World Resources, their Distribution and Use.
 3. World Food Supplies.
 4. The Economics of the Population Explosion.
 5. The Social Aspects of Population and its Control.
 6. National Policies for Population Control, including
Family Planning.
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7. International Migration and Migratory Labour.
 8. International Economic and Financial Implications of
the Population Explosion.

9. Political Implications of the Population Explosion.
10. General Strategic Implications of the Population Explosion.
11. Population Factors in Regional Politics:
 - (a) (i) The Americas
 - (ii) Europe, including U.S.S.R.
 - (b) (i) Asia
 - (ii) Other problem areas.
12. International Action in connection with the Population Explosion.

Items one to six above will constitute the first half of the Conference, dealing in general with the problem at a national level. The remaining items, to be taken up during the second half of the Conference, relate to the international implications of the problems.

The Programme Committee is already in correspondence with a number of the experts who are likely to attend the Conference from overseas, and it is hoped that it will be possible in the near future to inform members of the names of those who have accepted invitations.

In the next Newsletter a list will be given of the companies and individuals in South Africa who have generously agreed to join in the sponsoring of the Conference. Without their financial support this undertaking by the Institute would not be possible.

However, the appeal for financial support has by no means ended. The minimum amount required to cover such substantial items as the transport and accommodation of visiting experts, the servicing of the Conference and the subsequent publication of the report, has not yet been achieved. The Finance Committee hopes that more companies will be willing to assist in sponsoring the Conference, and also that those individual members of the Institute who are able to, will respond generously to the letter which the National Chairman addressed to all members on 16th October, 1968. The response so far has been disappointing, and the Chairman plans to address a further letter to members in the near future.

LIBRARY

The following books are among those recently added to the Africa Library and the International Affairs Library at Jan Smuts House:

Africa Library

ANDRESKI, Stanislaw

The African predicament: a study in the pathology of modernisation. London, Michael Joseph, 1968.

BING, Geoffrey

Reap the whirlwind: an account of Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana from 1950 to 1966. London, Macgibbon & Kee, 1968.

The author was formerly Nkrumah's Attorney-General.

CALDWELL, John C. and Okonjo, Chukuka ed.

The population of tropical Africa. London, Longmans, 1968.

Papers presented at the first African Population Conference

held at the University of Ibadan in Ibadan, Nigeria, in 1966.

COLVIN, Ian

The rise and fall of Moise Tshombe: a biography. London, Leslie Frewin, 1968.

DOTSON, Floyd and Lillian O.

The Indian minority of Zambia, Rhodesia, and Malawi. New Haven and London, Yale university press, 1968.

EWING, A.F.

Industry in Africa. London, Oxford university press, 1968.

MINER, Horace ed.

The city in modern Africa. London Pall Mall press, 1967.

International Affairs Library

CONQUEST, Robert

The great terror: Stalin's purge of the thirties. London, Macmillan, 1968.

GITTINGS, John

Survey of the Sino-Soviet dispute: a commentary and extracts from the recent polemics, 1963-1967. Issued under the auspices of the Royal institute of international affairs. London, Oxford university press, 1968.

GRAY, Jack ed.

Modern China's search for a political form. Issued under the auspices of the Royal institute of international affairs. London, Oxford university press, 1969.

KULSKI, W.W.

De Gaulle and the world: the foreign policy of the fifth French Republic. Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse university press, 1966.

LONDON, Kurt ed.

Eastern Europe in transition. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins press, 1966.

SERVAN-SCHREIBER, J.J.

The American challenge. London, Hamish Hamilton, 1968.

An exposé of the American industrial and intellectual invasion of Europe.

SETON-WATSON, Christopher

Italy from liberalism to fascism, 1870-1925. London, Methuen, 1967.