


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REGIONAL CO-OPERATION: THE RECORD AND OUTLOOK

THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS



DIE SUIDAFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE

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REGIONAL CO-OPERATION : THE RECORD AND OUTLOOK

In 1984 the South African Institute of International Affairs celebrated its Golden Jubilee Anniversary. As part of the celebration, a conference was organised on the subject of regionalism, and was attended by the Directors and senior officers of some twenty-eight sister institutes from seventeen countries around the world.

This publication brings together the various papers delivered at the Conference, which was held in Cape Town on 6 and 7 March 1984. The views presented on the experience of international co-operation in various regions of the world and the prospects for the future were of particular interest given developments favourable to increased co-operation in Southern Africa which were already evident in early 1984.

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THE LIFE AND TIMES OF REGIONAL STUDIES

Peter Vale

Regionalism in international relations is a multi-faceted phenomenon; it derives a core energy from the desire by those involved in the regional endeavour to work for a common cause. In modern times, this joint endeavour is assumed to be for the good of all; however, history is littered with the ruins of regional enterprises whose architects harboured sinister intent.

The building of political communities - municipal, domestic or international - is a painstaking task. Moreover, in the treacherous realm of world politics, those involved in such an undertaking become entangled in a multiplicity of thickets whose roots are to be found in the domestic and international realm. This is sufficient reason to make the study of the building of such communities interesting to the scholar.

However, the scholar has had a more self-fulfilling interest in the regional issue. This interest derives from the notion that a central responsibility of the scholar is to seek means towards peace, and community-building is seen as a positive step in this search. Thus regional studies have a distinctly normative dimension to them. In addressing the complexities of the regional question, successive generations have been more prone to prescribe the contours which would shape a scheme for regional order than perhaps to understand its dynamic underpinning. Nowhere, as shall be demonstrated, has this been more prevalent than in Europe, which remains the central case study in regionalism.

Given this analytical and normative concern, it is therefore not surprising that the most overworked line of theoretical reasoning in international relations has been discourse on a trinity of linked concepts : inter-state community-building, integration between states and regionalism. By focussing on different aspects of these processes over a period and in differing circumstances, each has sought to : "... [explain] ... how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge and mix ... [so] as to lose their factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between themselves ..."¹

The central concern of this conference is, of course, with regionalism, but because of its close affinity with community-building and integration, constant reference will be made to the latter. It is highly unlikely that integration between states and community-building of the kind envisaged in this conference could take place between states of different geographical regions. True, close links can exist between states in different regions, but here we are considering something less than integration. It is, however, possible that regions can be built comprising states which normally

* The writing of this paper would not have been accomplished without the skills of Sonja Begg and Kathy Kovacevich. In addition, heavy reliance was placed on the advice of John Dugard and Bryan Bench. The author, however, remains responsible for the content of the work.

might not be thought to belong together. One such region is the so-called Atlantic Community. The fact that it is considered to exist in a regional form, serves to prove another point in the regional debate, viz. that states can, and do, belong to different regional groupings. So, the United States is a member of the Atlantic Community and at the same time a member of the Organisation of American States. Therefore regionalism, whilst a reality in international relations, often has its origins in a series of abstract notions and concepts.

A preliminary divide in the academic approach to these issues has coalesced around two powerful schools of thought - Federalist and Functionalist - and this paper will concern itself with examining both. First, however, some conceptual pruning seems necessary.

The earliest writings in international relations are European and demonstrate an obvious pre-occupation with matters of war and peace in Europe. Indeed, almost the earliest definitions in international relations are derived from the contemporary European realities. Here, the first oblique reference is made to regionalism; Pufendorf defines his De Systematibus Civitatum as "several states that are so connected as to seem to constitute one body but whose members retain sovereignty".²

This definition has an obvious ring of confederation³ about it and it is no surprise that the dynamic of regionalism has been used in close association with the integration of sovereign states as stated. The confederal or federal model is of obvious structural importance in the integration between states.

In Pufendorf's time, the scholarly interest in intermediary bodies was pursued in the hope that by an understanding of the mechanisms involved in this preliminary process, the means to build a permanent European peace might be realised. For Forsyth, these scholars :

... began to speculate about the nature of those intermediary bodies, such as the Swiss Confederation, the United Netherlands and, above all, the German Empire, which refused to conform to the model of the sovereign state and yet went beyond the normal league or alliance between such states.⁴

Thus, the tradition of European political thought is rich in the regional theme, perhaps not strictly-speaking regional, but concerned with developing the essential elements which might minimise the prospects for conflict in the European setting. So the recurring theme in regionalism is one of finding appropriate structures on which peace could be built. Writers such as Rousseau, Montesquieu, l'Abbé de Saint Pierre and Kant, concern themselves with the issues of confederalism and, like Pufendorf, they all focus on the European setting - the Swiss and Dutch Unions and the German Bund of 1815.

This 'ideal' of a United Europe, through a process of regional integration has two critical consequences which, arguably, still exist; both of these arose out of the practical application of the integration goal to political systems.

The first is that a host of activists - some worldly, some romantic - set about unifying communities to build nation-states. This is regional integration in a narrow setting, and Cavour, Garibaldi and Bismarck had in mind something distinctly less than a united Europe. On the contrary, their

ambitions were motivated by European nationalism, which was, in every sense, contrary to the progressive spirit of international regionalism. Nevertheless, their success in assuaging deep-rooted tension between those in close geographical proximity make them regional activists of a kind.

Today, this limited application of the regional process has found expression in the efforts of the Developing World to build nation-states out of different peoples and groups which, by inclination and tradition, feel that they do not belong one with another. The so-called "one party state", particularly in Africa, is a form of limited regionalism within the context of the long-term spirit of the regional endeavour. Indeed, it might well be argued that the quest for a one-party system in Africa has worked against the Pan-Africanist goal in general. This dichotomy between the continental ideal and the nation-state still plagues both the quest for African unity and the Organisation of African unity, the main vehicle for that goal.

The second consequence has also generated a species of regionalism which exists to this day : the notion of regionalism as imperialism. It has, as a distinctive characteristic, the imposition of a common authority over those involved in a regional or integration endeavour by the imposition of the administrative structures of one state. Such, for example, was Napoleon Bonaparte's vision of a united Europe which, quite plainly, was to serve his own ends. Recalling this vision in St Helena, the exiled Emperor noted :

One of my greatest ideas was to bring together and integrate the peoples united by geography, but divided and split apart by revolutions and politics. In Europe we thus find, even though in a condition of disunity, more than thirty million Frenchmen, fifteen million Spaniards, fifteen million Italians, and thirty million Germans. I would have liked to make each of these peoples into a single entity and a true nation. With such a retinue I would have appeared proudly before posterity, and I would have earned the blessing of ages. I would have felt worthy of this glory! ...

The unification of the thirty or forty million Frenchmen was already attained and perfected; that of the fifteen million Spaniards was on the verge of being achieved, too. The unification of the fifteen million Italians was already well under way; it only needed to grow further, and each day their unity of principles and legislation, of thought and feeling - that certain infallible cement of human aggregations - matured ... The unification of the Germans had to proceed at a slower pace; consequently I did not do more than reduce the monstrous complexity of their country.

... this unity will come about sooner or later by the force of circumstances. The impulse has been given, and I do not think that after my fall and the disappearance of my system, any other grand equilibrium will be possible in Europe except the aggregation and the confederation of the great nations. The first sovereign who, in the first major crisis, will espouse in good faith the cause of the peoples, will find himself at the head of all of Europe, and will be free to do whatever he wishes.⁵

A not unrelated vision of European unification emerges again and again in the speeches of Adolf Hitler, who too sought to put together what treaty and fiat had put asunder in continental Europe.

This notion of regionalism as an imperial force emerges powerfully in the writings of the Revisionist historians although starting from a different base. They have sought to argue that economics provide a vigorous, penetrative and cohesive force, which links not only regions but broader geographical conglomerations together in a wide network. In this view, capitalism is a glue which holds structures together and is overladen with degrees of militarization and repression. In this guise, goals of regional integration are a sinister force which seek geometrically to enrich the powerful and impoverish the weak.

This work has made a deep impression on scholarship in the southern African region. The power of the Republic, both military and economic, is seen to weaken and debilitate the chances of its neighbours to challenge the white state; this perpetuates a regional and domestic power divide of white wealth and black poverty.

There is a further sub-species of regionalism as imperialism which applies itself to another regional setting and a different political structure. Its particular focus is to explain the scope and dynamic of the relations between the Soviet Union and its neighbours and satellites. It portrays the Soviet Union as a relentless purveyor of power serving only its own insatiable ends. The Soviets, the argument goes, do this most successfully in their own back garden (i.e. Eastern Europe), but also have the capacity to do this elsewhere on the globe.

In essence, this position emerges as a clarion call to oppose this Soviet expansionism. It is an untenable argument from many points of view, for more often than not, the seeds of conclusions lie brashly in the question asked. Consider, for instance, the following poser given to students recently :

To what extent has the USSR succeeded in using the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) to further its own hegemonial ends?⁶

However, although the notion of regionalism as a path to nationalism and the notion of regionalism as imperialism have been the focus of some interest, both have been outside the orbit of those in international relations scholarship who have given attention to regionalism proper.

* * * * *

1. REGIONALISM : MAXIMUM APPROACHES

1.a Federal

Those who have sought to advance the integration of states by the federal model have stressed the advantages of a union in which diversity can be preserved and which offers security against the tyranny of the majority. By pursuing a federal solution, the end process of regionalism is to build a new and solid form of regional association. While the very compactness of its structures might vitiate against a consideration of federalism as 'regionalism', its universal appeal as an 'ideal' regional model means that we must include it here.

The intellectual roots of the federal tradition date back to the ancient Greek Leagues, through the Hanseatic League, the Swiss Federation and the

Dutch Federal Republic of 1579. It was, however, the impact of the experience in continental America which set the tone and scope of all approaches to regionalism through the federal process in subsequent years. Most writings on this topic, for example, take as their point of departure the American experience and that experience must detain us here.

It was, arguably, the growing controversy with England, after the defeat of the French, which emboldened the North American colonists to pursue some communal interests in their resistance to English authority. Like all efforts at integration it was painfully slow for, from time to time, the colonists seemed more aware of their differences than of the common purpose.⁷

In a sense, both the First (1774) and Second (1775) Continental Congresses were stopgap measures designed to deal with the exigencies of the war to which the colonies were increasingly committing themselves. It was also, however, these interim organisations which were to preside over the schism between the colonies and England. The American regionalist experiment was finally consummated by the Articles of Confederation adopted in 1781. Ogg and Ray isolated one characteristic of the Articles which is of obvious interest for scholars of international relations :

... [a] recognition of the practice under the Continental Congress of state sovereignty, expressly asserted in the documents second 'article'. The states, it is true, relinquished important powers to the new central establishment, but on the whole the union resembled a loose confederation or league. In this respect as in others it closely resembles the General Assembly of the United Nations.⁸

It is perhaps not surprising that these arrangements were found wanting, for the spirit of the integration process at work in, and between, the colonies went far beyond that envisaged by the Articles. Here the question of regional intent needs to be considered.

Regional integration often has an almost metaphysical dynamic which must be considered the "spirit" of the process. This frequently extends beyond the practical reality of what can or cannot be done on the ground. It is a centrifugal force binding the intent of what have been called "like-minded men" who are committed to the integration process. This factor arises again and again in the EEC experience and is, more often than not, way ahead of the realities. Pan-Africanism or Pan-Arabism are also good examples of this. Quite plainly, this is often in serious conflict with national chauvinism, and statesmen - like de Gaulle, for example - often have to choose between one and the other.

However, for the American colonies, a far more practical hurdle was the structural weakness whereby the Confederation was unable to meet its fiscal responsibilities, either at home or abroad. It is out of this inability (and the growing interstate conflict over commerce) that the impetus for reform of the Articles grew. The cry for economic order in the regional process, from this time on, is a singular feature of regional organisation and, ultimately, has hamstrung many subsequent regional efforts.

This cry for economic order has also surfaced in the modern European context. Here a trade-off is necessary between the success of the enlarged market and the failure of, for example, the Common Agricultural Policy.

Another feature of regional efforts, the tension between the parts of the process and the whole, surfaces in a continuum at the Philadelphia

Convention of 1787. Evidence of this appears in The Federalist Papers, which to this day stand as a seminal work on the problems of both nation-building and the integration process. In this, as in most matters of international relations, compromise was necessary. Forsyth writes of the outcome of the work thus :

... the authors of the Federalist papers considered that the American constitution which came into force in 1789 establishing a mixed 'federal' and 'national' system of government; the sovereignty of this system was concurrently exercised by the centre and the member state; and that the single most important change effected by the new system in comparison to the old was to strengthen the power of the central government to execute its own laws.⁹

Of greater significance to the overall theme of this paper is Forsyth's view on the regionalist dynamic of the process :

The new American union that came into existence in 1789 was in many ways remarkable. It was based on an agreement not between governments but between peoples. Its institutional super-structure was more developed and state-like and democratic than that of any previous federal union. Its powers stretched firmly across from defence and security to general welfare, and its capacity to implement and execute its legislative decisions were highly impressive. Yet it was still ... a union of states and not a state.¹⁰

Thus, at the centre of the American experience is a tension which has marred, and continues to mar, the regionalist experience, viz. the perennial conflict between the parts and the whole. Put more crudely and, perhaps, more correctly : how much sovereignty do the participating states surrender and, by deduction, does the central body have a life without the participating states?

Generally, the rule has been that a weak central body characterises a confederal structure and the opposite occurs in a federal system. However, such limitations are prone to founder under the impact of the waves of realism. As historical compromises emerge in the federating process, so the central structure gathers a life of its own and moves beyond the pristine designs of its architects.

The intent of the federation is captured in what can be called "articles of faith" which endorse the spirit of the process and provide, more often than not, the federation's security. Thus the Basic Law in West Germany and the U.S. Constitution provide both the amalgam of the federal enterprise, its regulator of growth, and its focus of adaptation. It is therefore crucial that the federation enjoys broad consensus on its legal being. Should the centre be challenged by one (or more) of the constituent parts the powerful legal structures provide the final arbiter in such conflicts.

The issue of legal compatibility amongst states involved in a regional enterprise is, obviously, of structural importance. The conflict of laws inside the EEC has only been partially settled by the European Court of Justice. Scholars of legal issues show a pre-occupation with the legal norms and conflicts in integration processes.

In the course of surrendering sovereignty, those involved in the federalizing process embark on a path of sharing from which there is only painful retreat. As history has shown, Federations will fight to survive,

to retain the central core of their being and, more often than not, the centre will prevail. The Civil War in the U.S. and the Civil War in Nigeria provide only two examples of the agony which the federal structure will inflict on itself in its bid for survival.

However, history has examples of Federations which have collapsed and, for Africans, the most instructive one is the Central African Federation. Lord Blake, in the preface to Dr. Wood's The Welensky Papers, has made a telling commentary on federalism and the seeds which lead to federal failure.

At this stage one is bound to wonder whether the conditions were not in themselves fatal for the success of the central African state. The inclusion of Nyasaland, a country with a tiny white population and one far better suited to direct 'colonial' rule than to responsible government, was a major disadvantage. African advancement there was sure to lead to a demand for secession, and, if there is one feature which is essential for the success of a federation, it is that the regions not only should not have the right to secede but also that they should not be perpetually clamouring for that right. Secession, more than slavery, was what the American civil war was about. When Western Australia petitioned the British Government to secede from the Australian Federation, the petition was rightly turned down flat, and there has been no trouble since. Much of the trouble in modern Canada stems from the quasi-secessionist attitude of an influential Party in Quebec. The European political establishment in Southern and Northern Rhodesia would in some ways have been only too glad to see the last of Nyasaland. It was the precedent that was so damaging, for if Nyasaland could secede, why not Northern Rhodesia? And this was of course what happened.

The other question is whether a federal system should have been adopted at all. It is interesting that not only were Huggins and Welensky against it, but also two of the leading contemporary constitutional lawyers, Sir Kenneth Wheare, who was an Oxonian Australian of the highest academic eminence, author of the standard work on federalism, and Sir Robert Tredgold, Chief Justice of Southern Rhodesia, later of the Federation. Wheare who was consulted in 1949 by Huggins's Minister of Justice, Sir Hugh Beadle, saw great difficulties in creating a federation out of territories at such different levels of constitutional development as Nyasaland at one end and Southern Rhodesia at the other. One could not easily elevate the former or depress the latter, but without some such movement he did not believe that federation would work. A unitary state would be a better answer.

Sir Robert Tredgold in 1951 was equally clear that this was a preferable alternative. In a memorandum which he showed to the Governor of Southern Rhodesia, after seeing the Report of the Conference of Officials he wrote :

'It took one of the bitterest civil wars in history to prove what should have been obvious from the beginning, that a problem, the concern of the whole union could not be settled in one way in one state and another way in other states.

This to my mind is the fatal defect in the proposals in the Report. They seek to avoid an issue which is unavoidable. They endeavour to postpone a decision which can only be made vastly more difficult by delay.'11

1.b Confederal

There is a point on the map of regional association which stops short of the unitary federal state; it is characterised by a weaker centre and the retention of real and consequential power by the participating states in the process. This is known as Confederation, and Forsyth has described it thus :

It is between these two worlds, the interstate and the intrastate, that the phenomenon we have called union or confederation exists. It is based on a treaty between states, that is to say, on the normal mode of interstate relations, but it is a treaty the content of which goes well beyond that of the normal treaty, even those which establish international organizations ... The 'personality' formed by union is an original capacity to act akin to that possessed by the states themselves. It is a 'real' personality.... it is a profound locking together of states themselves as regards the exercise of fundamental powers.

... a confederation manifests itself as a constituted unity capable of making laws for its members, however it is not the constituted unity of one people or nation, but a unity constituted by states ... [it is] a contract between equals to act henceforth as one ... A confederation ... is far more directly a contractual creature than the normal state and for this reason - it need hardly be said - far more fragile.¹²

In the regional context, the implications of the confederal structure on the integration process are sui generis. Indeed, the modern European experience, through the Economic Community, provides a potent lesson in the inherent tensions involved in this kind of regional exercise, particularly as regards conflict and co-operation between the parts and the whole.

If the member states of the European Community respond negatively to a variety of intra-European impulses - Wine Lakes, Butter Mountains and Enlargement - then the degree of sovereignty they have retained, imposes real limitations on fulfillment of the Europe envisaged by Monnet and the founding fathers of the EEC. Here the spirit of the European movement is in conflict with the demands of individual national interest.

Indeed, the failure of the so-called Fouchet plan of confederation in the EEC was a specific rejection of the notion that confederal approaches were suitable for aspects of the contemporary European experience. Some facets of the EEC experience remain, however, profoundly confederal; this is especially so in the economic realm.¹³

While recognising limited success in this regard, the confederal economic experience in Europe has suffered many reversals. More than a decade ago, Ralf Dahrendorf set four reasons for the limited state of progress inside the European Community. Today, despite the election of a European Parliament, and probably because of the Enlargement issue and the Common Agricultural Policy, things do not appear to have altered much. Dahrendorf wrote in 1971 :

1. Technically we have exhausted the possibilities of the treaties.
2. The contradiction between the political aims and the daily reality of the European Community has become all too apparent.

3. The supranational illusions of the European beginnings have constricted rather than spurred on genuine political co-operation.
4. Above all the illogical way towards Europe, which some have wanted to follow, has led us into a cul-de-sac : there is no material necessity (Sachgesetzlichkeit), which could force the nations of Europe to save a problematical agricultural policy through a currency union, or a problematical economic union by means of a comprehensive, concerted political approach.

... this nonsensical approach leads to the exclusion of a common political approach and the economic and currency union is already destroyed in its infancy ...¹⁴

Thus, while confederal approaches have an appeal in the search to find regional way-stations, in effect they can spur deep negative response should the integration process suffer fundamental reversal.

1.c Functional

There has been another broad approach to regional associations, which has been called functionalist. The roots of this approach are to be found in two intellectual traditions; the first, the Saint-Simonian tradition which asserts that technical co-operation - across national boundaries - opens a path to peace, and, secondly, the Eighteenth Century doctrine of the natural harmony of interests.

Functionalism begins with the notion of self-interest then seeks to destroy that notion in its quest for international harmony. This is set out in the following neat logic :

In functionalism the central idea was and remains a simple one; that political forms automatically follow self-interest behaviour in matters of co-operation first as in matters of conflict. If individuals and groups can make co-operative arrangements across nation-state borders for their mutual benefit, these arrangements will grow first into habits of behaviour and later into institutional structures.¹⁵

Like most regional theories, the functionalist one is utopian in its aim and it holds that the entire globe will be enmeshed in an intricate web of functional arrangements which will have supplanted the nation-state, per se.

It is clear that the functionalist position rests on the identification of a close association between the so-called welfare demands on the state and the state's capacity to meet these; this, it argues, can only come by widening the state's scope of action.

It is also clear that the functional theory rests on an optimism which is unusual in international relations practice. For example, in the 1930's, Normal Angell said of the long-term goals of functionalism that it sought to change not "human nature but ... changing human behavior".¹⁶

However, notwithstanding these shortcomings, functionalism is a theory of regional integration which has to be taken seriously because of the inroads it has made in the real world. Andrew Shonfield, in his Reith Lectures captured the essence of the functionalist spirit as applied to modern Europe when he wrote :

... the dramatic improvement in communications, the greatly increased mobility of people and money, and also the huge concentrations of corporate power in the hands of international businesses, taken together, demand the establishment of a new dimension of international public power. At the same time there is a parallel movement, less obvious but beginning to be significant, among associations of private and professional persons - farmers, trade unionists, certain scientists, even specialist professional civil servants - who find that the natural links for much of what they wish to accomplish are with their professional colleagues abroad, rather than with their own national governments. The transnational lobbies that are thus created look for some international political counterpart.¹⁷

Functionalist debate reached its apogee with the massive contribution of David Mitrany; for Mitrany, violence had its roots in the social and economic circumstances of people, and that if "we give them a moderate sufficiency of what they want and ought to have they will keep the peace".¹⁸

In its application to regional studies, functionalism has a seductive logic. In the post-War period, its appeal was strengthened by the influence of various other approaches to the discipline which sought to strip away the power of the nation-state, viz. the so-called transnational studies. All of these share a common concern with what was called non-governmental actors in international society and hold the hope that these actors may fundamentally alter the entire basis of government activity. Furthermore :

... such changes will constrain governments. They will be increasingly involved in each other's affairs, both directly and indirectly; it will become increasingly difficult to identify a distinctive base of national military power, or to harness it to the pursuit of national goals, except in periods of extreme crisis. Furthermore, this is to be a gradual process : though the sense of a strategy of international involvement and interpenetration is much weaker in trans-nationalism than it is in functionalism, there remains a strong implication of the possibility of moving from the small to the large, from issues of lesser complexity or lesser 'salience' to the more difficult or contentious problems of co-operation. There is also a concern with the limiting role of traditional concepts of international relations theory : the realist assumptions are thought to conceal more than they reveal about our present world.¹⁹

While the optimism of functionalism is clear, its limitations are inherent by this very nature. For functionalism to succeed in the regional setting, both national pride and other prejudices have to be stripped away and an entirely new dispensation sought. As shall be demonstrated, recent international developments have lent themselves to a more pessimistic interpretation of the world, with little hope of the long-term success of functional solutions. Nevertheless, functional solutions may provide short-term palliatives which could lead to broader regional structures. So, for example, in southern Africa the co-operation between states on drought and flood relief and the co-operation on, for example, the Cahora Bassa project may signal the beginnings of a search for a renewed functional dispensation in this particular region.

1.d Neo-Functional

In the Fifties and Sixties, inspired by the profound impact of the behavioural sciences on political studies, a group of American social scientists approached the question of regionalism from a new dynamic paradigm; this approach was to be called the neo-functionalist one.

It sought to understand regionalism by pursuing a line of argument which arose from an appreciation of the integration process itself. Given this point of departure, and its timing, the neo-functionalists gave attention to the integration process in what appeared to be the best laboratory in the world, viz. the EEC. Moreover, they confidently asserted that this 'model' could be exported elsewhere.

While hoping to rid themselves of the normative dimension of other work on regionalism, the neo-functionalists found themselves caught in the slipstream of the enthusiasm for the European experience at the time. In seeking to come to grips with an understanding of the process, they failed to bridge that ancient gap between theory and practice. As Harrison pointed out :

The weak link ... as it is visualised in the neo-functionalist chain, is that it is governments, and generally speaking the leaders of governments, who must, at least while unanimity procedures for community decision-making obtain, make the moves along the path to unity ...²⁰

Although the neo-functionalists had profound limitations, their innovative thought and the resulting technique went a great way towards an understanding of Europe. Ernest Haas, for example, turned away from the idea that sovereignty was a commodity which could be transferred; rather, he argued, sovereignty was changed in its scope and form during the integration process.

On the other hand, the provocative Haas-Schmitter paradigm for integration sought to stress that the factors which stimulate regionalism should be present prior to the process beginning; this was especially so with regard to functional and political factors. It went on to speculate on the probability that spillover could occur which deepened the integration process. This spillover could augment the community spirit. All in all, the theory aims at speculating on the need for political co-operation to be widened in the common purpose.

Joseph Nye developed the spillover feature a little further by arguing that a range of external factors could influence the integration process. This has an obvious appeal when one considers the importance of Superpower involvement in regional structures. His identification of 'high' and 'low' politics went a long way to helping in an understanding of how the integration process is seen by the layman involved.

The work of the neo-functionalists continues to visit the discussion of integration wherever this takes place; this alone is testimony to the profoundness of their impact. Perhaps the biggest single failure, as a group, was to hope that the science of politics could provide quick-fixes for such problems.

Looking back, it must be stated that theories on inter-state community-building have only managed to shed light on certain aspects of the complexities involved in the regional process. Like a flashlight in a dark room,

the scholar has illuminated only select features and moved on; the path to a real understanding lies, perhaps, in appreciating that, like life, the regional process is highly complex.

Arguably, three reasons account for the failure of the scholar to appreciate successfully the regional question. First, the various hypotheses, although carefully articulated and cogently argued, have failed to make provision for the inevitable setbacks involved in the regional process. Secondly, the normative impulse - which hamstrings the scholar and layman alike - has not succeeded in appreciating the tenacity of national interest to survive. Thirdly, the approaches so successfully used in one region have not been exportable to other regions; southern Africa is not an ASEAN, nor is the OAS comparable with the OAU.

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The approaches to regionalism which have thus far been considered represent a maximalist position which seeks an ideal of regional harmony. The roots of this appeal lie deep in the scholarship on international relations, although its impact has been less profound in its application to reality.

The maximalist theoreticians of regionalism have sought only to posit strategies towards the attainment of the goal of peace, which have been uppermost in the minds of scholars. So, William Olson sees this regionalist/universalist divide in the following fashion :

Less an argument about discipline than one of institutional viability, this debate manifests itself in a number of ways. The underlying difference appears to be the question as to whether it made more sense to develop, as a logical and achievable 'next step' toward eventual world organization, new institutions within a given region, such as Western Europe or the Western Hemisphere, or to concentrate immediately upon development of a global system. Regionalists argue that without a minimal degree of value consensus, governmental similarity, level of economic development, and military defensibility, no new conglomeration of states can effectively begin to merge their societies. Universalists contend that the quantum jump which has occurred in technology goes hand in hand with urgent problems of a global dimension, such as environmental pollution, hunger, disease, the possibility of a nuclear holocaust, and illiteracy, and that these can only be dealt with on a plane which involves all the nations of the earth. What has happened, ever since the issue emerged at the time the League Covenant was being forged, is that both regionalist and universalist perspectives persist in the work of scholars as well as in the institutional development of the inter-regional United Nations system itself. Scholarship reflects a dual reality.²¹

There is in the statement the familiar federalist/functionalist divide; although the functionalists would hold that the regional step was an interregnum in the quest for the universal goals.

It is true to say that the reality of regionalism was accorded a legitimacy in international law and diplomacy both by design and strategy. The Monroe Doctrine, for example, stands as the single most important

declaration of regional intent in modern diplomatic history and its translation into the Inter-American system was only the formalisation of a situation of tried and tested practice.

Given the desire for peace and tested regional structures, it was not surprising that the Covenant of the League of Nations sought to accommodate the reality of regionalism within its universalist goals. Article 21 set the guidelines for an uneasy truce between the necessity for the League's institutions to co-exist with regional structures like the Balkan entente, the Locarno agreements and the Briand proposal.

When the United Nations was formed, the desire for regional organisations had gained a new impetus and the scene was set where the arrangements for collective security in the Charter had also to co-exist with regional structures. Thus Article 52 (1) of the Charter seeks to avoid the conflict between the U.N. security system and such regional structures. It reads :

Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.²²

The tension between the universalist intent of the organisation and the arrangements made for regionalism has surfaced in two particular fields. Firstly, where issues of the pacific settlement of disputes are concerned, and secondly, the issue of enforcement under Article 53 of the Charter. In both cases, intra-American structures have provided test cases and, while the existing understandings do generate tension, the regional issue is not sufficient to provide a major disruptive force in the United Nations itself.

It is, however, important to note that American action in this regard has provided the cause for the tension which occurred. This raises, for the first time in this discussion, the issue of the collapse of the universalist ideal as a result of the Cold War and the resulting bi-polarity which came to characterise regional structures.

While the Roosevelt Administration favoured the universalist position as they prepared for the San Francisco Conference, it was not a unanimous one for all in that Administration. One strain, neatly personified in the Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Wells, eschewed the universalist position. Writing in 1944, he set out his views and simultaneously showed a sensitivity to intra-American diplomacy which bears repeating in the Eighties :

First ... must always come the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Western Hemisphere, and the continuous perfection of the existing inter-American system. These are the aims of the Monroe Doctrine. But this country has now wisely realized that they can be more readily secured through the multilateral approach provided for in present inter-American agreements (by which all the American republics are full partners in a joint enterprise) than through the unilateral approach maintained by the government of the United States for over a century. Our earlier insistence that we alone would interpret the Monroe Doctrine not only prevented the growth of any real inter-American community of interest, but aroused wholly legitimate suspicions and antagonisms among our American neighbours which greatly weakened our capacity to preserve the safety of the hemisphere.

The growth of the present inter-American system was continuous from the autumn of 1933 until the autumn of 1943. At this moment it has been arrested - only temporarily, I hope - by the shortsighted attempt of the Department of State to utilize inter-American machinery for the purpose of coercing the Argentine Republic. There is no room for the coercion on any American state by another in the present system of inter-American understanding. If this course is persisted in it will inevitably destroy all that has been accomplished during the preceding ten years. Further, the United States must continue wholeheartedly its present policy of economic co-operation with its American neighbours. Such bread cast upon the waters will come back to the citizens of this country a hundredfold. One of the most profitable opportunities for American investment and for American trade lies within the neighbouring republics of this hemisphere.²³

So it was that when the Cold War arose and regional organisations polarised, an attitude of mind based on experience existed which could adjust to a world in which the regionalist arrangement could be commandeered by the Cold War position not only of the United States, but also of the Soviet Union.

If the universalist position had prevailed, then the arrangements for Western security, particularly NATO, would have been brought under the aegis of the United Nations; an absurdity considering that it might then be subjected to the Soviet veto in the Security Council. The result was the establishment of regional arrangements which carry only an indirect link to the universalist ideal implicit in the Charter of the U.N. The hazards this poses for world peace are clear.

The fracturing of the world as a result of the Cold War, therefore, fundamentally ruptured the universalist ideal and put an unexpected ideological pressure on regional goals. Thus, for example, the EEC/NATO conglomerate is popularly seen to be a bulwark against the opposing Comecon/Warsaw Pact conglomerate. However obvious this may appear to be, it is the simplification which appeals to the common man, to whom, after all, these organisations turn for support and succour. In reality, therefore, regional organisations have been subject to an ideological pressure which has often strengthened the organisation's resolve to survive.

Regional arrangements in the developing world have not been free of this pressure and, as the Cold War deepened, were prone to seek a middle path which has enjoyed the epithet 'Non-Aligned'.

* * * * *

A litmus test of regional cohesion across a spectrum has been the ability of those involved to pursue a united foreign policy. Somehow, it has become accepted that foreign policy is considered the ultimate display of sovereignty, and its pooling has signalled the intention of a state's commitment to the common position.

All foreign policy is both political and economic. However, its exercise on the regional level may be distinctly political or economic and, on occasion, intertwined.

An understanding of the above raises the issue of the complexities involved in regionalism. In practice, the integration process has been a

continuous one of pursuing a mix of political and economic goals. When communities have flourished - and this has been at various stages in the duration of these organisations - the balance between politics and economics has been delicate. Moreover, as the interplay of these forces change, so regional structures can go through periods of disintegration; the initial impetus can falter and the process can be thrown into reverse. The EEC is an interesting example of this. By the time the British, Danish and Irish admission to the Community came about, the first European momentum was in reverse. At the present time, the process appears in reverse once again, despite attempts to refurbish the European zeal by the admission of new members; Greece, Spain and Portugal.

If, on the contrary, the regional organisation is to survive in the face of this fluidity, then it has to go through a continuous process of change and adaptation. At times it may be necessary to change the organisation's mechanism to suit the dynamic environment. This might also involve a realignment of the organisation's members. It is instructive in this regard to look at the Andean Pact where membership has changed; other Latin American examples are also instructive.

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2. REGIONALISM : MINIMUM APPROACHES

2.a Are there Optimum Levels of Regional Co-operation?

It is possible to begin to speculate on the probability that - over time and issues - optimum levels occur where particular circumstances generate the conditions for integration. A natural progression of this premise is that once the optimum level is passed, the drive towards regional co-operation falters.

In a pioneering work Edward English has sought to quantify the crucial notion of an "equilibrium level" of regional co-operation. This occurs when:

... [both] benefits and losses will incorporate both economic and non-economic elements ... [and that] economic factors will bias towards more integration, while non-economic forces may operate in either direction ...²⁴

This is obviously a key moment in the life of an organisation, for these "non-economic forces" may be profoundly influenced by a range of factors untouched by the joint endeavour.

The joint endeavour will therefore be supported by participants as long as they perceive that it matches the depth of their commitment to the arrangement. However, English points out that the nation-state is a "custodian of traditional centres and institutions" and that, therefore, "there will eventually be substantial non-economic costs in pursuing integration further".²⁵

The balance may be tipped if (and when) the economic costs of the joint endeavour - however these are measured - force the participating state also to reconsider its commitment to the community. So, as Bench has pointed out:

If the rise of the economic benefits is limited after a point, the non-economic costs of acquiring such benefits may not have to be at all substantial for a nation to willingly forego the gains of integration.²⁶

The economic payoffs from integration are, furthermore, obviously prone to weaken as the broader economic system is faced by scarce resources. This condition has characterised the international economy for more than a decade and as a result the desire for integration has also weakened. Europe is a good example here. Individual European states, facing immense domestic economic restraints, are less prone to pursue the common good offered inside the EEC. Mrs Thatcher's churlishness towards the Common Agricultural Policy (despite its local regional benefits) is in direct proportion to the efficiency of the British farmers who - generally speaking, of course - tend to be Tory supporters. This is a far more structural threat to the EEC than, for example, de Gaulle's chauvinism over the Hallstein affair. Even if de Gaulle withdrew from the political institutions of the Community, the benefits of the common market were plainly still working to the favour of France.

Four positions in a logical matrix may be identifiable, of which growing fracture during times of faltering economic performance is only one. In attempting to understand these four positions, cognisance should be taken of the issue of interest perception and articulation on the part of existing (or potential) member states of groupings. Furthermore, these may change over time and space.

A contrary situation can occur whereby states are drawn closer to integration during periods of waning economic performance. This happens because a growing market is necessary as individual states feel pressured by, say, rising mercantilist impulses elsewhere and because economies of scale can arguably be better achieved by the integration process. So, the tendency will be positive for a prescribed duration. ASEAN is a good example where states are increasing their levels of co-operation in spite of, or - as set out here - because of the difficult international economic conditions which prevail. The real test for ASEAN involves discovering whether the marginal incentives for adhering to the Association will continue if and when non-economic factors operate in an opposite direction. This provides the pivotal point in the test of a region's cohesion.

A new set of incentives/disincentives operates during times of economic prosperity when the need to integrate can be both positive and negative.

Perhaps the most familiar pattern of growing integration during times of economic prosperity is the early EEC model when the growing cohesion of the members achieved its greatest intensity during the economic boom of the Sixties. The widened market established prosperity in the member states of the Community and firmed the commitment to a broader integration. So salient was the seeming prosperity (read success) of the EEC that membership commitments to other regional associations were jeopardised. Here, the long-standing British commitment to EFTA is an interesting example of how a state's loyalties to one association can be shifted in favour of another. This experience in EFTA also offers an insight into vacillating membership loyalties of, and between, regional associations. Furthermore, it does appear that no clear pattern may be established of whether, or not, dualistic membership of two organisations can exist. In Latin America, for example, such dual membership does exist, as it does in southern Africa, for example, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland being members of both the Southern African

Customs Union and the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference.

The final matrix position involves disintegration in periods of economic prosperity. A stage can be envisaged at which the interest articulation has been satisfied and the margins for increased cohesion become narrower. At this point, economic and/or non-economic forces may indicate a tendency away from integration. An interesting example of this was Norway's curious preference not to join the EEC in the early Seventies. Whilst tightly wedded to select EEC states through NATO and uncompromising in its commitment to the western alliance, Oslo sought to turn away from the EEC primarily because of the windfall of North Sea Oil.

2.b Squaring the Triangle : Politics, Economics and Security

The realisation that non-economic forces play a powerful role in the regional process raises a perennial problem in our efforts to understand integration between states in any one region.

Increasingly, scholars of regionalism have been brought face to face with the realisation that the nation-state has tenaciously adapted itself to survive, despite the confident predictions that its demise was only a matter of time. Indeed, if there is one characteristic of our times it is the re-assertion of the notion of state sovereignty.

How and why this has come about has, of course, profoundly important implications for how one approaches the study of international relations and, by implication, how Institutes of International Affairs conduct their enquiries into the discipline over the coming decades. Hedley Bull has recently turned his mind to these issues and writes :

A decade ago it was widely held in the Western world that 'traditional military/political power' was giving place to 'civilian power', and especially to economic power. Along with the European Community, Japan was said to embody 'civilian power'; ... Alastair Buchan, who gave his Reith Lectures in the year following Andrew Shonfield ... argued that military power was of declining utility, taking as his theme Change Without War.

In the United States Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane produced elaborate explanations of the inadequacies of 'the states-centric paradigm', the declining role of force and the growing importance of economic interdependence. In Britain during the 1970s it came to be thought that it was economic experts who had most to say about international affairs : Andrew Shonfield became Director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Susan Strange Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Francois Duchêne ... Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

The experiences of the Western countries in the late 1960s and early 1970s appeared to confirm these views. In the springtime of détente between the super powers it seemed that at this level of world affairs the role of force would be less in the foreground. The defeat suffered by the United States in south east Asia confirmed the view that force was an ineffective instrument of policy for the Western powers in the Third World; in Britain (whose military interventions in south east Asia in the post-war period had, in fact, been victorious ones) the same theme was taken up to justify

withdrawal from east of Suez. In the relations of the Western countries with one another force apparently played no role, while economic issues were plainly central : trade policy, as Richard Cooper said, is foreign policy ...

The evidence of 'the decline of power politics' seemed to some in the 1970s to clear the way for visionary or progressivist interpretations of international relations ...

The views I have been describing are linked only very loosely together, but they all embody a return to the idealist progressivist interpretations of international relations of the 1920s, and may indeed be described as the neo-idealist or neo-progressivist fashion of the 1970s. From the perspective of 'the return to power politics' of the 1980s it is easier than it was for many at the time to see how weak the foundations are upon which some of these views were constructed (just as it was easier in the more overtly 'power political' world of the 1930s than it had been in the 1920s to perceive the shallowness of 'idealist' interpretations).

... The wars lost by the United States and its clients in the Third World were wars won by their adversaries, and in no way demonstrated the impotence of military power. The difficulties faced by Western countries in their military interventions in the affairs of weak Third World countries were not necessarily as serious for the Soviet Union, or for the growing number of Third World countries strong enough to undertake interventions of their own. The widening of the agenda of world politics to include greater attention to economic, social and cultural matters did not mean ... that 'transnational relations' were depriving the states system of its autonomy, but on the contrary that the states system was spreading its tentacles to bring areas of 'transnational relations' within its grip that had previously been left to the private sector. Rising concern about economic issues did not imply a decline in the importance of strategic issues if a neo-mercantilist doctrine was gaining adherents, asserting a necessary connection between the one and the other. Possession of scarce resources was a source of power to militarily weak states only for so long as militarily strong states chose not to use their force. More generally, the power or influence exerted by the European Community and other such civilian actors was conditional upon a strategic environment provided by the military power of states, which they did not control.²⁷

What does this mean for regional studies? It is probably to overstate the case to say that regional studies have lost their salience and that we will return to an age where the study of power politics dominates. Some regional structures are operative and make a great contribution to the building of understanding between peoples. Others, like the European Commission for Human Rights, serve as custodian for a set of values which are ultimately more important than the nation-state itself. These demonstrate that all of the broader idealism of the universalist movement has not waned. From this perspective, it remains vital that regionalism still offers a promise of a wider global harmony.

It is also true that the economists continue to give attention to issues of regional integration for a number of sound analytical and normative reasons. For them, the rise of neo-mercantilism is a grave departure from the liberal principles which underpinned the economic structures of the

post-World War II era. Their case is made infinitely more attractive by pointing out the undoubted benefits to prosperity of broadening and integrating economies.

However, for the political analyst the rediscovery of sovereignty has opened up a familiar debate which has sought to understand the world in the realm of force and restraints on force. It has re-asserted the role of strategic studies in international relations and has challenged us to think seriously about new mechanisms to preserve the peace. Regionalism can still be a means to this goal but we will have to find a new glue to hold regions together. A clue to an understanding of this lies in considering strategic questions, and two lessons are instructive.

In the first case, NATO has shown a resolve to strengthen its official cohesion in the face of anguishing pressure, most of it of a domestic political kind. The recent tensions between governments and populations have arisen because of differences of perception and opinion with regard to the primary strategic issues of our day. The Pershing and Cruise decision has put wider ideological pressure on the alliance and has, in time and space, increased the formal pressure between the partners. It has been an agonising moment and scarcely a journal today does not carry an article dealing with the trauma of the Western Alliance. So anxious has the process been that a host of other factors have been pulled in to buttress or rebut the importance of the Alliance to its members. The immediate focus will, however, remain military and strategic, and alliance tension - almost of a structural kind - will be political and less economic.

The second kind of arrangement, i.e. the need to explore means of catering for the security fears of regional protagonists, is the most important challenge facing the scholar. It proceeds from a realisation that security is far wider than military alone and may include issues of economic security. It will search to find the lowest common denominator in regions and explore ways of anchoring regions on this basic level. It will examine issues like confidence-building measures, regional arms control and the role of external forces in regional conflicts. It will, by limiting the latter, aim to increase the possibilities of enhancing the former two.

This is a far cry from the halycon notions of federation, confederations and the epoch-making cry for a world peace through the building blocs of regionalism.

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Those with a literary bent will notice that the title of this paper bears a close resemblance to John Coetzee's book "Life and Times of Michael K"; this is, of course, deliberate. The anarchical environment, so powerfully explored in Professor Coetzee's book, closely resembles our own world. The study of regionalism - like the life of Michael K - has been unable to change that world, but has had to bend with it and make what it can of the circumstances in which it operates. At times it has shown the capacity to challenge the world, but mostly it has been sufficient merely to survive.

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THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

Lee Chong Kai

In August 1967, the foreign ministers of Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand and the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia gathered in Bangkok to sign the ASEAN Declaration.

The creation of ASEAN was based on the premise that "co-operation among nations in the spirit of equality and partnership would bring mutual benefits and stimulate solidarity which can contribute to building the foundation for peace, stability and prosperity in the world community at large and in the ASEAN region in particular."

The aims and purposes of ASEAN were :

1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region...in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community ...
2. To promote regional peace and stability through respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries in the region ...
3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields.
4. To assist each other in training and research in the educational, professional, technical and administrative spheres.
5. To collaborate on agriculture and industries, expansion of trade, including the study of the problems of international commodity trade, the improvement of transportation and communication facilities and the raising of the living standards of their people.
6. To promote Southeast Asian studies.
7. To maintain close and beneficial co-operation with existing international and regional organisations ... and explore all avenues for even closer co-operation among themselves.

To carry out these aims and purposes, the following machinery was established :

1. An annual meeting of foreign ministers, referred to as the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting.
2. A standing committee chaired by the host country foreign minister with ambassadors of member countries as members.
3. Ad hoc committees and permanent committees.
4. A National Secretariat in each member country to carry out the ASEAN work on behalf of that country and to service the annual or special meetings.

The ASEAN Declaration also offered participation to all states in the Southeast region and bound its signatories "together in friendship and co-operation and, through joint efforts and sacrifices, secure for their peoples and for posterity, the blessings of peace, freedom and prosperity."

Although ASEAN's declared objectives are economic, social and cultural co-operation, political and security motives were contributing factors to its formation. An unstated but important underlying objective for ASEAN was the desire to establish a framework for peaceful intra-regional relation between member states, specifically to contain national differences, develop the practice of working together and mutual consultation over common problems. However, ASEAN leaders have resisted the formation of a military alliance. Towards ASEAN's declared objectives, in November 1971, at a special meeting in Kuala Lumpur, the foreign ministers declared Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality.

Apart from announcing their determination to resist outside (Communist) interference, the members pledged to "make concerted efforts to broaden the areas of co-operation which would contribute to their strength solidarity and closer relationship" (ZOPFAN Declaration). In this way, the members who are all geographical neighbours hope to avoid unnecessary conflicts that so often debilitate third world countries.

The birth of ASEAN was little noticed by the rest of the world. As if to support such scepticism, ASEAN limped along for most of a decade. The rhetoric sounded fine but it was not backed by deeds; internal disputes plagued the organisation and its members were unable to set aside narrow national interests for the broader regional benefit.

It was, therefore, not until the mid-1970s that serious attempts were made to pay more than lip service to regional co-operation. Uncertainties in the international economy as a result of the oil crisis (1973) and the rapid fall of the Indochina states to the Communists (Vietnam, Kampuchea) forced the members to take a fresh, hard look at their mutual interests and provided the impetus to increase the pace of economic co-operation, enhance political stability and to resist potential Communist subversion.

The turning point for ASEAN came at the first Summit of Heads of Governments in 1976 at Bali. Feeling a sense of urgency about events in the region, the ASEAN leaders set a new course toward economic co-operation and integration, which are embodied in the Declaration of ASEAN CONCORD.

The Bali Summit also established a Permanent Secretariat in Jakarta to be headed by a Secretary-General to be nominated by each member on a rotational basis for two years.

As momentum picked up, the five leaders met again in 1977 in Kuala Lumpur to review and ratify the steps taken by technocrats to devise and implement workable programmes within the spirit of the Bali Declarations.

Over the years it became increasingly apparent that ASEAN would count in the affairs of Southeast Asia.

Last month, some 16 years after the first meeting in Bangkok, the newly independent oil-rich state of Brunei became the sixth member of ASEAN.

Over the years, it has also developed an ASEAN tradition of consultation and consensus building and the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia recognised that "national resilience" is basic to the enhancement of regional resistance and stability.

Geographical, Cultural, Social, Economic Background

In terms of geography, the six ASEAN nations form a natural regional grouping.

Thailand is located in the middle of mainland Southeast Asia. Sometimes referred to as a 'frontline' state, it is directly exposed to the Communist non-ASEAN neighbours and their politics. To the south, it shares a border with Peninsular Malaysia.

Peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia are divided by the South China Sea. As for land neighbours, Malaysia has a border with Thailand to the north and with Indonesia and Brunei. The Indonesian island of Sumatra is separated from Peninsular Malaysia by the narrow but strategic waters of the Malacca Straits. Furthermore, the Sulu archipelago of the Philippines is sufficiently close to Sabah for Malaysia to be wary of its neighbour in the early days.

Although the only member without natural resources, Singapore is strategically located in the region for trade, shipping and communications.

The Republic of Indonesia consists of some 13 000 islands. It extends for more than 3 000 miles east to west, and almost 1 200 miles north to south. Both the Pacific and Indian oceans wash its shores. Through the Indonesian archipelago are important sea passageways which are used internationally (e.g. the Sunda Straits which deep draft tankers use for transit to Japan).

Brunei, the latest addition to ASEAN, is a small sultanate located on the north western part of Borneo.

The Philippines is located well off the shores of its Asian mainland neighbours. It is well separated from Communist Vietnam by the South China Sea. Its nearest neighbours to the north are Taiwan, Malaysia and Indonesia to the south. The location of the Philippines is unique because the distance from other nations provides a sense of detachment which is not found in countries on mainland Southeast Asia.

The total land area of the six ASEAN countries is more than 3 million sq. kilometres with a population of some 250 million. With the exception of Thailand, all the countries have a common historical experience of Western colonial rule, achieving political independence at various times after the Second World War. (Brunei achieved independence in January 1984). In spite of the geographical continuity, ASEAN countries are divided by a diversity of races, religions, languages and cultures.

The migratory flow of persons with different ethnic backgrounds from the Asiatic mainland formed the core of Southeast Asian population. People of Malay origin occupied large parts of Malaysia and Indonesia. The opening of sea trade to China by the Indians some 2 000 years ago brought Indian and Chinese influence to the region. The extent of their influence on the region is considerable. Their religious, cultural and business impact are still very much prevalent to this day. The ethnic, religious and cultural complexity of the region was further complicated by the arrival of Arab traders. With them came Islam, and it gradually spread to become one of the main religions in the area.

During the 16th century, European influence began to spread into Southeast Asia. The Portuguese were the first Europeans to enter the sphere of influence by capturing Malacca. They were eventually followed by the Spaniards who claimed the Philippines, and the Dutch colonised the Indonesian Islands.

In the 18th century the British and French appeared on the scene. The British annexed Malacca, Penang and Singapore, and established trading bases at Brunei. Thus by the 20th century, the colonial powers had consolidated their positions viz. The French in Indochina; the British in Malaya, Borneo and Burma; the Dutch in Indonesia; and the Americans in the Philippines. Only Thailand remained uncolonised. The long period of colonial occupation has greatly affected the socio-economic and political structure of each of these countries, and it contributed to the formation of a diverse and yet homogeneous society in this region today.

Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia are predominantly Muslim, Thailand is Buddhist, the Philippines Christian, although there is a significant group of Muslims in the South and Singapore is predominantly Chinese, observing a mixture of traditional teachings and practices, Buddhism and increasingly Christianity.

Although political traditions are also diverse, the ASEAN nations share a common position against Communism.

Events Preceding Formation of ASEAN

ASEAN has two direct antecedents - the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) from 1961 to 1967; and Maphilindo (Malaya, Philippines and Indonesia) in 1963.

The concept of a regional body to promote intra-regional economic co-operation among Southeast Asian nations is not new. It dates back to the early independent years. Although both ASA and Maphilindo were short-lived, the experience gained in regional co-operation has enabled the successor organisation, AAEAN, to be better prepared to avoid pitfalls and to progress at a greater pace.

The formation of ASA can be attributed to the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and the President of the Philippines, Carlos P Garcia. The Tunku had expressed great enthusiasm in promoting regionalism and was circulating a plan to establish a regional order in Southeast Asia. Response to the Tunku's plan was rather disappointing with

only Thailand having responded positively to the proposal. Eventually, on July 31, 1961, ASA was created comprising only Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand. In a simple declaration signed by the Tunku and the foreign ministers of Thailand and the Philippines, the ASA was declared as a free association of Southeast Asian countries aimed at promoting the well-being and progress in the economic, social, and cultural fields in the region through joint co-operation.

In 1963, two years after the formation of ASA, a dispute broke out between the Philippines and Malaya over the claim of North Borneo by the Philippines. Diplomatic relations between the two nations were suspended and it was not until 1966 when relations between the two nations finally improved. ASA was eventually phased out when ASEAN was formed in 1967.

Maphilindo, an organisation consisting of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines, was as good as stillborn when it was formed in 1963. The idea was to form a Malay Confederation comprising the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaya. President Macapagal of the Philippines was interested in developing a plan to block the planned federation of Malaysia and at the same time keeping open his claims to Sabah. However, in September, 1963, the Federation of Malaysia, including Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore was formed. In this respect, Maphilindo for all practical purposes was as good as finished. Diplomatic relations between Malaysia and Indonesia were broken and President Sukarno of Indonesia intensified his confrontation of Malaysia with a 'crush Malaysia' campaign.

These events reflect the regional political issues and the national animosity which existed in the pre-ASEAN period.

Structure of ASEAN (See Attachment 2)

For the first nine years, ASEAN's institutional machinery consisted of the annual meeting of foreign ministers and a sub-structure of standing, ad hoc and permanent committees. However, since the Bali Summit in 1976, considerable changes were made in the organisational structure of ASEAN with increased emphasis on economic co-operation. The economic ministers recommended that they should be answerable only to the Heads of Government, and that the standing committee should be abolished. The eventual decision taken by the ASEAN Heads of Government in August 1977 was a compromise. The foreign ministers remained the principal co-ordinators of overall ASEAN political policy in their annual Ministerial meetings. The economic ministers were given full autonomy on economic matters but the foreign ministers must be informed of their decisions through the Central Secretariat.

The ASEAN Secretariat was established and located at Jakarta after the Bali Summit in 1976. Its purpose was to service ministerial meetings, act as a link between all committees, co-ordinate all ASEAN activities, and initiate plans and programs for regional co-operation. The Secretary-General is appointed by the ASEAN foreign ministers on a rotational basis in alphabetical order, and the tenure is two years.

Reporting to the Standing Committee are the committees on Social Development, Culture and Information, Science and Technology and Budget. Working under the Economic Minister are committees on Trade and Tourism, Industry, Minerals and Energy, Finance and Banking, Food Agriculture and Forestry, and Transportation and Communications. These committees in turn spawn and oversee a host of sub-committees, working groups and ad hoc meetings which include participation by the private sector, e.g. the ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry. The ASEAN-CCI has working groups on Banking, Shipping, Tourism, Trade, Food and Agriculture and Industrial Complementation. Some of these working groups in turn organise industry and commodity clubs.

New and Potential Members

Brunei

The oil-rich British protectorate of Brunei became fully independent on January 1, 1984. On January 7, 1984, Negara Brunei Darussalam became a member of ASEAN. This was an historic occasion as Brunei is the first nation to join ASEAN since the regional grouping's inception 15 years ago.

Geographically and culturally, Brunei is a natural part of ASEAN. By joining ASEAN, Brunei, a small state like Singapore, will enjoy political and economic security within the grouping.

Other Interested Countries

In the past, several countries have indicated interest in becoming members of ASEAN. Sri Lanka, Burma and Papua New Guinea have all expressed interest in the grouping. However, candidates would need to satisfy two main criteria. Firstly, geographically the country should be situated in the Southeast Asian region. Secondly, the country must pledge to subscribe to or declare acceptance of what ASEAN stands for. This includes the 1967 ASEAN declaration in Bangkok; the ASEAN Concord and Treaty of Amity and Co-operation signed in Bali in 1976; and the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration signed in Kuala Lumpur in 1977.

Sri Lanka, situated in the Indian Ocean, does not meet the first criteria. Burma, although at one time rumoured to have indicated interest, has not taken any positive approach towards ASEAN. Papua New Guinea, which currently enjoys observer status within ASEAN, is more likely to be considered seriously.

Economic Co-operation

The ASEAN countries have a wealth of resources. It is a major supplier of tin, rubber, timber, petroleum, and many other primary commodities. The six nations are of different economic sizes and more importantly are at different stages of economic development and with the exception of Singapore and Brunei, produce similar products (see Table). The oil rich state of Brunei has the smallest population which enjoys the highest standard of living with per capita GNP of US \$ 20 000. The economy is wholly dependent on oil although timber and manufacturing are being developed.

Indonesia is the largest with a population of 150 million people and a land area of 1,9 million sq. kilometres. It is also dependent on oil and agriculture but because of its sheer size has the largest GDP but the lowest per capita income. It jealously guards its large market. Malaysia has been dependent on mining and agriculture especially rubber and palm oil with petroleum and natural gas increasing in importance.

Thailand and the Philippines are primarily agricultural countries. Singapore, the least endowed with natural resources except for its strategic position and deep harbour is dependent on manufacturing and services. It is also the most developed economy in ASEAN.

From the beginning, observers have been sceptical about ASEAN economic co-operation which is progressing at a steady, if slow, pace. Significant economic achievements include the formation of the ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASEAN-CCI); the agreement to provide an overall framework for liberalisation of trade through the Preferential Trade Agreements; the establishment of regular dialogues with external trading partners (e.g. USA, Australia, Japan, EEC, etc), the formation of the ASEAN Industrial Complementation Scheme (AICS), and the related plans for ASEAN Industrial Projects and ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures.

Although the number of items under the PTA have increased to 12 000 in 1983, the scheme benefits only an estimated 2% of intra-ASEAN trade which in turn is less than 15% of the group's total trade.

The ASEAN countries are basically protectionist - primarily concerned with nurturing its infant industries. Apart from Singapore, they produce similar primary and consumer products. And so each country has its long list of sensitive items for which it is not prepared to grant tariff cuts. However, there is agreement to continue to reduce these lists.

Another reason is that while the private sector is raring to go, the bureaucrats are often too timid and too slow. This is especially so in the case of Indonesia which is anxious to protect its huge domestic market.

In the case of the ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIP), progress has also been very slow. It was not until two years after the 1976 Bali Summit that a tentative Basic Agreement was approved.

The five projects which had been identified were : Ammonia-urea for Indonesia and Malaysia, phosphatic fertilizer for the Philippines, diesel engines for Singapore and rock-salt soda ash for Thailand. Only one of these projects has been realised, namely the Indonesia urea plant in Sumatra which came on stream this year. A similar plant in the East Malaysian state of Sarawak is under construction. However the projects for Thailand and the Philippines have not even passed the feasibility stage. Singapore recently identified the production of Hepatitis B vaccine as a replacement for diesel engines after Indonesian restrictions made the latter unfeasible.

Conclusion

ASEAN's achievements, though not spectacular, are nevertheless significant. It has succeeded in containing traditional rivalries

and disputes within the region. Today the ASEAN region is peaceful and unified in contrast to the wars that are raging in many other regions of the world. ASEAN's solidarity and ability to focus world attention on the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea is a measure of its success and recognition in international forums.

Political stability, and a general climate of confidence, together with liberal foreign investment policies and an abundance of natural resources have succeeded in attracting foreign investors. For instance, US investments in ASEAN rose from US \$ 1,5 million in 1966 to nearly US \$ 8 million in 1977. The most important industry was petroleum followed by manufacturing. Today, it is generally recognised that the ASEAN region is one of the most dynamic economic regions in the world and will continue to be so during the next decade. The ASEAN nations have individually weathered the recent and previous economic crises, some far better than many developed countries, as evidenced by their continuing high growth rates. Some of these achievements are not the results of collective effort but due to national efforts and resilience, which is a cornerstone of ASEAN.

Critics often contrast the limited progress in economic co-operation with the so-called political success of ASEAN. Given the incongruence of national interests arising out of the different stages of economic development in the ASEAN countries and the time-consuming nature of Mushawara or consultation and consensus, which is a characteristic of ASEAN, rapid progress is unlikely. The limited success of the ASEAN Industrial Projects is a further indication that economic co-operation could not simply be decreed into existence.

Dr. Chin Kin Wah in his paper "Regional Attempts at International Order : ASEAN"¹ holds the view that although ASEAN may be seen as an expression of regional order which adds to international order, it nevertheless contains elements of internal fragility which can become challenges to domestic and in turn, regional, order if not properly managed. These elements which are present in varying degrees in some member states, include economic under-development and neglected social injustices, political subversion and rural insurgencies, political strains to regime stability, problems of political succession, separatism and the threat of religious extremism. These are some of the "internal" factors which have led to assertions that the most serious threat to the region stemmed from internal instability.

The management of border security between Malaysia and Thailand and between Malaysia and the Philippines remains sensitive and complicated by Muslim separatism. In the latter case border security co-operation does not exist since the unresolved Sabah claim by the Philippines has left the Malaysia-Philippines border undefined. Other conflicting territorial claims over areas in the South China Sea also exist between Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia.


Indeed, the Sabah claim, although put in cold storage, continues to stand in the way of a third ASEAN Summit. No Malaysian Prime Minister has visited the Philippines since the claim was revived in the late sixties. And despite the existence of ASEAN machinery for mediation, inquiry or conciliation, Malaysia has been most wary lest the Sabah issue is re-introduced through a back door of ASEAN. Ultimately the preservation of

orderly relations depends on the exercise of political will based on calculated self interest. Where such will is present, machinery for conflict resolution loses its importance.


While much of the apparent intra-ASEAN harmony that does exist results from strong political will, it remains that "thinking ASEAN" is still essentially confined to the elites. The question arises whether the collective interests and consciousness of ASEAN will survive and transcend the uncertainties of elite change. And if ASEAN cohesion results mainly from the challenges posed by external stimuli, is the need to look inward for stronger functional under-pinnings being obscured?

Thus the ASEAN "Closet" like those of many a respectable family, is not without its proverbial skeletons. It would be naive to assume that behind ASEAN's common front there do not lurk rivalries, jealousies, suspicions and differences spawned by a diversity of experiences in the emergence of the new states within a region that is known historically for conflict rather than co-operation. What is noteworthy about the maturing of the ASEAN enterprise is that low level intra-mural conflicts are not allowed to rattle the harmony of "high politics". On balance, the preservation of such political harmony is the most successful indicator of the order that ASEAN represents.

¹. To be published in the April 1984 issue of Australian Outlook.



ASEAN Organizational Structure Since 1977



AUSTRALIA AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM

Philip McElligott

"The region of Southeast Asia and the surrounding Pacific and Indian Ocean waters comprise our environment. We are as well a part of the environment of the other nations in our region."

So declared former Australian Defence Minister (and later Prime Minister) Malcolm Fraser in March 1970, in emphasising a strong, regional role for Australia. The declaration was not so much novel as a timely reminder of the perception that had been voiced by successive Australian Prime and Foreign Ministers in the previous decade. Changes of government in Australia in 1972, 1975 and 1983 gave substance to the shadows of earlier expressed concerns and emphasised that the focus of Australian policies was to be on the Asian and Pacific regions. More recently the present Prime Minister, Mr. R.J. Hawke, in his statement in Washington on 15 June 1983, clearly indicated that Australia's priorities of relationships lay in the Asian and Pacific region, and with the major industrial countries with which Australia shared significant relationships, especially the United States and Japan.²

Recent overseas visits, to Asia in particular, by the Australian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, coupled with the recent South Pacific Forum Conference held in Canberra in August 1983, have led to numerous forthright and unambiguous statements from both Ministers indicating that Australia is indissolubly committed to the Asian/Pacific region and to the development of realistic and productive relationships within it. The frequency of these confirmatory statements of interest and intent are not to imply that in the past Australia had been negligent in its regional relationships. On the contrary, Australia has a long record of regional involvement which will withstand critical scrutiny but all relationships do, from time to time, especially after changes of government, need to be reaffirmed, and priorities need to be re-assessed if such relationships are to prosper, have substance, and to be constructively beneficial. Good relations and co-operation, after all, mean a good deal more than absence of friction.

It would be wrong nevertheless, not to admit that renewed and invigorated interest in the region has not been without ulterior motives on the part of the metropolitan powers, Australia, New Zealand, France, USA and Britain, all of whom have established strategic and economic interests and influences in the region. It was no coincidence, for example, that the emergence of the newly independent states in the South Pacific, beginning in the mid-70s, was also the occasion of marked interest by the USSR, China and Japan, which hitherto had little or no links with the area. Even Libya expressed more than polite interest. In most cases, the overtures sought to establish diplomatic ties, trade links and offered economic assistance, especially with fisheries, airport and port facilities. Such overtures were naturally matters to cause concern among the metropolitan powers. The quadrupling of Australian aid to the region in 1976, and similar favourable responses by its metropolitan colleagues, while appropriate and needed, could nonetheless not be viewed

with other than benevolent scepticism. For reasons which in themselves are sources of separate studies, issues such as : the impact of the 200-mile economic zones; in the South Pacific the need for new fishing grounds by USSR and Japan and the overtures briefly referred to above, have given the states of the South Pacific a status which their small size would not normally dictate, thereby making development in the region of prime concern to most Pacific rim countries, especially to Australia, New Zealand and the USA, who through the ANZUS Security Pact have developed a joint outlook on their strategic interests in the area.³

To set the Australian scene, geographically placed as it is on the Western rim of the Pacific, and being part of the Asian region, it has need to focus its relationships essentially in three directions - to its "near North" and thereby embracing Papua New Guinea and the nations of ASEAN; to the North-west and North, covering China, Indo-China, Korea, USSR and Japan and finally to its Eastern flank encompassing the Pacific, New Zealand and the United States, and thus with the latter two, forming the ANZUS linkage, the focal point and lynch-pin of Australia's security. This paper addresses itself in the main to the region of the South Pacific and regionalism within that vast area of concern to Australia.

Though the South Pacific region can be more precisely defined, it is, excluding Australia and New Zealand, generally accepted to include, taken on a West to East axis, the States and territories of the Melanesian, Polynesian and Micronesian islands. Within these three ethno-geographic and cultural groupings are nine independent Pacific Island states - Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Kiribati (formerly Gilbert Islands), Tuvalu (formerly Ellice Islands), Vanuatu (formerly New Hebrides), Fiji, Tonga, Nauru, and Western Samoa. In addition, there are Niue and Cook Islands; both are by choice self-governing entities in association with New Zealand, but their status does give them a degree of independence in the exercise of their external affairs. The region's decolonisation from Australian, British and New Zealand stewardships, has taken place over the past twenty years, in a process which, in comparison with other regions, has largely been orderly and free of great power rivalry. The first entity to gain independence was Western Samoa in 1962, followed by Nauru in 1968. Generally the major decolonising processes were an accelerative feature of the period between 1966 and 1980. The process continues. The "winds of change" have begun to blow hard on the U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (embracing Belau, the Northern Mariannas, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands) and French Polynesia. The Trust Territories have made moves towards self-government opting for varying degrees of association with the United States, while, within the French possessions, New Caledonia in particular, there are strong pressures by the indigenous population for independence.

The sheer size of the region, coupled with its unique demographic and geographical characteristics, bears a moment's reflection, a factor which is not unrelated to the overriding justification for regionalism in the South Pacific. To briefly put the area in perspective, its land mass consists of only 552 000 square kilometres, scattered across 35 million square kilometres of ocean, with a combined population of only 5,15 million, 62 percent of whom live in Papua New Guinea. With the exception of that country, which alone accounts for 85 percent of the region's land mass,⁵

the states of the region cannot be classified as other than "mini" or "micro" states. With few exceptions (Nauru and New Caledonia) they are characteristically deficient in resources, transport and communications. Consequently, these micro states, and entities, are dependent on the metropolitan powers (Australia, New Zealand, France, the USA and Britain) for development assistance even if they are aware that other eager donors are waiting in the wings, keen to co-operate, but at a price. This absence of alternative national development options for the South Pacific states has tended to reinforce the appeal of regionalism to the Islanders.

Some Reasons for Regionalism

Explanations abound on the good sense that regional associations make, but not all of these are appropriate to the South Pacific. For example, one of the oldest reasons for regional co-operation is military security. This justification has so far not underpinned regionalism in the South Pacific. The ANZUS agreement of 1951 was for many years assumed to confer some residual collective security on the region, but it did not and, even now, does not involve any South Pacific state other than Australia and New Zealand. Federation is another general rationale which has had little specific application to the South Pacific. Some may recall that between two World Wars some consideration was given to federating the British, Australian and New Zealand colonies, and again, briefly after 1945, it was fashionable to propose the political union of Melanesia. Nevertheless, these considerations were helpful to the subsequent thrust of South Pacific regionalism.

The rational explanations focus on economic and cultural influences. These two (augmented by administrative efficiency and historical ties) are the principal grounds upon which the present format of regional association has been built. For the European states which imposed the area's first experience of regional co-operation on the Islands, the more important of the two has always been economics. The metropolitan powers have tended to view the small, isolated and resource-poor countries of the South Pacific as economically suspect. To help create a more viable economic situation the Western states have advocated the achieving of economies of scale through supra-national co-operation.

The Island states have generally accepted the economic argument in principle although their perception of the need for regionalism took a different line. For them, the sense of commonality arising from cultural affinity figures much more prominently in their calculations of the value of regionalism.

Development of South Pacific Regionalism

Few of the institutions of South Pacific regionalism are entirely indigenous to the area. As one of the last regions to feel the "winds of change", initiatives for such matters were exercised in metropolitan capitals far removed from the South Pacific. Complicating the issue was the division of the area among the six metropolitan powers. In sum, the need for regional co-operation was first interpreted and expressed by the metropolitan powers to satisfy essentially their perceptions and requirements which ranged from administrative efficiency to imperial security; from racism to humanitarianism.

The current state of regional association in the South Pacific derives essentially from the decision by Australia and New Zealand in 1944 to establish a welfare commission for the area. The motives of the two Australasian governments in advancing their proposal were not totally selfless. The Australian foreign minister, Dr. H.V. Evatt, for example, was keen to unite all the islands on Australia's northern and eastern flanks in some military alliance and the proposed welfare agency was one step in this direction. Eventually, in 1947, a treaty (known as the Canberra Agreement) was signed by Australia, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United States to "encourage and strengthen advancement of the peoples of the non-self-governing territories in the South Pacific region administered by them." The organisation they created and named the South Pacific Commission (SPC), was a functional institution without any political powers, intended to discharge its responsibilities by providing expert advice to the administering authorities.

The Agreement, at least, defined the scope of the region. As originally set out in the Agreement, the boundaries of the region included all the islands westward of Pitcairn to West New Guinea and from Norfolk Island in the south to the Gilberts in the north. Two changes have occurred since 1947; Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands were added in 1951 and West New Guinea was deleted in 1962. Excluded from the area defined by the SPC were East Timor and Easter Island, being Portuguese and Chilean possessions.

Another significant development from the Canberra Agreement was the innovation of a regional council for South Pacific Islanders. The South Pacific Conference was intended to meet triennially as an advisory body to the Commission but it established the principle nonetheless that Islanders should meet periodically to discuss matters of mutual interest. It was this organ of the SPX which was to contribute so much to the development of a regional sentiment in the South Pacific. For the first time it gave the South Pacific Islanders an opportunity to gather together independently of European tutelage.

The mounting pressure for decolonisation within the various South Pacific dependencies from the late 1950's prompted a parallel demand to localise the SPC, the area's one inter-governmental association. The initial breakthrough came when Western Samoa was reluctantly allowed to accede to the Canberra Agreement - there were metropolitan power fears that its admittance would disturb the European domination of the Organisation. Consequently 1965 became a watershed in regional affairs. Island leaders, frustrated by the proscription of political debate and the scope of discussions generally within the Commission, mounted a concerted attack upon the Commission. Their protest, later referred to as a 'rebellion' was the reflection of a purely advisory relationship - it succeeded and signalled the end of the South Pacific Conference membership as a passive, peripheral appendage of the Commission. From then on there was a course of steady expansion by the Conference over the Commission until, in 1974, the Islanders' representative body became the governing body of the Commission.

This newly-won status did not satisfy all Islanders. They remained suspicious of any attempts by metropolitan powers to influence the operations of the Commission. It remained an organisation created by "outsiders" - indigenous control of a regional "home-grown", decision-making body continued to be the goal of most Island leaders. Their aspirations were

partially satisfied by the creation of a Pacific Island Producers' Association (PIPA) in 1965. A Fijian initiative which at least enabled the Islanders to exert control of regional primary produce programs, outside of colonial-power interests and reflected for them, an exercise in self-determination. This "home-grown" institution survived until 1973 when, by then, a third regional organisation had been created and which could productively absorb it - an organisation more suited to the 'Pacific way' of doing things - I refer to the South Pacific Forum.

The need to gain control of regional decision making, the pursuit of national objectives, and the Islanders' failure to politicise the South Pacific Conference, were the issues which made the creation of the South Pacific Forum in 1971 inevitable. The move to do so was an initiative of Fiji, Western Samoa, Tonga, Nauru and the Cook Islands. The metropolitan powers were excluded from this new body but not Australia or New Zealand, whose geographical and traditional links and the role they could play in regional development, were influential factors in their inclusion. The ambit of the Forum was restricted to the independent and self-governing states, and since then they have been joined by Niue, Papua New Guinea, Kirabati, Tuvalu, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and observer status has been granted to the Federated States of Micronesia. Unlike the Commission, and chastened by experience, no doubt, the Forum was created without a written constitution or international agreement. Since its inception it has functioned effectively (in defiance, as it were, of the Commission's Charter) without formal rules relating to its purpose, membership or the conduct of its meetings. Its decisions are reached by consensus and discussion as against the formal voting procedures exercised in the Commission. Its fourteen meetings to date have, invariably, been attended by Heads of Government which, of course, has given the Forum added status.

The need for a strengthened business arm within the Forum was seen at an early stage and in 1972 the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation (SPEC) was created, with secretariat and research functions, ostensibly to encourage and promote regional co-operation and consultation in trade and economic development, transport, tourism and related matters. Its budget was to be shared on the basis of a third-share each being met by Australia and New Zealand, with the remainder being met by the Island members. Its activities have been impressive, embracing such issues as EEC terms of Association, promotion of regional trade and the establishment of a Trade Commissioner Service, the co.ordination of long-term regional development of telecommunications, and fisheries development and control.

The Forum's broadening fields of interest has necessitated expansions in its institutional structures. It has developed Ministerial councils and officials' advisory boards. It has also been necessary to establish semi-autonomous regional organisations to manage those activities which call for detailed and co-operative integration - especially the Pacific Forum Shipping Line, the Telecommunications Training Centre, and the Forum Fisheries Agency, all of which have turned out to be areas of prime concern for the Forum. It has not been reticent in law-of-the-sea issues and has been, and is, most vocal in condemning French nuclear tests in the Pacific, and the lack of self-determination opportunities for the permanent residents of New Caledonia.

Whither Two Organisations?

Contrary to earlier expectations, the creation of the South Pacific Forum and its attendant bodies, did not bring about the demise of the South Pacific Commission, though it is commonly held within the region that its fate is virtually sealed - a single organisation will eventuate, but its emergence will not be immediate. Many complicated issues of a political, legal, constitutional and financial nature will need examination and clarification before such a development arises; this examination has already begun, and the results should be available in late 1984.

Despite the presence of two similar organisations within the South Pacific region, there is general consensus among the Islanders that both the Commission and the Forum have continuing, individual, useful functions to perform within their respective roles. Institutional jealousies do exist nevertheless. If for no other reason this implicit rivalry has served to sharpen the responses from either organisation. The potential for duplication has diminished, though demarcation disputes do arise from time to time. In the main, it can be said that the South Pacific Commission concentrates its efforts on grass-roots developments, and in this it can be said to have achieved some spectacular successes, most noticeably in the cultural sphere. The South Pacific Games, an indigenous initiative, has achieved a regional significance, equalled only by the Olympic Games. The South Pacific Arts Festival, a triennial event, is another regional success. But by far the greatest initiative, stemming from the dual responses of Commission and Forum, has been the development of the Fijian-based University of the South Pacific.

The South Pacific Forum on the other hand, while deriving its strength and authority from its political clout, is not as free to exercise its political muscle as my earlier comments might have inferred. It lacks that major advantage which the Commission possesses its geographic comprehensiveness. The Commission is the only inter-government association which embraces the entire area of the South Pacific. This territorial advantage has proved uncomfortable for the operations of the Forum at times, and has limited its effectiveness when issues concerning the entire South Pacific are concerned - this limitation was particularly evident in the negotiations leading to the development of the Forum Fisheries Agency. The Forum found it necessary to expand its convocation numbers to the extent that it resembled a meeting of the South Pacific Conference rather than that of a South Pacific Forum. Such occasions are rare, but it does highlight two facts; the limitations of the Forum in some issues, and that though the Commission seems to have lost its pride of place in South Pacific regionalism, it does serve as a form of insurance whereby complete regional contact is maintained.

The Forum nevertheless, in its relatively short existence, has placed some 'good runs on the board'. Most noticeable has been its contribution to regional co-operation because of its willingness to tackle the awkward problems which its sister organisation could not, or would not, pursue, such as French nuclear testing, the attainment of self-determination in New Caledonia, the proposed dumping of nuclear waste near Micronesia by Japan, the highly contentious concept of a nuclear-free zone in the region, and a commitment to advance the cause of general disarmament. Within the Forum's broad mandate, it directs its energies, in the main, to identifying the opportunities for the expansion of regional trade, and the scope for free trade among its members. In addition, the Forum continues to investigate

ways in which industrial and other developments can be rationalised under the aegis of regional enterprise and co-operation.

Inter-Island Relationships

Such a broad mandate has meant the generation of extensive activity by Pacific Island leaders committed to the concept of regionalism. Consequently, relations between the island-states are determined at the regional level rather than on a country-to-country basis. Forum meetings have therefore become the avenues of diplomacy for the micro-states, devoid as most of them are of a diplomatic service, and provides them with the vehicle for a fairly high profile in world affairs which is not normally theirs. The frequency of regional meetings has led to the emergence of a high degree of familiarity and rapport among the politicians and officials to an extent not seen in other regions. The relatively few leadership changes within island governments over the years also serves to strengthen this regional characteristic.

Such familiarity should not presuppose a continuity of harmony within the Forum. As most co-operation is sought on a wider and more complex range of subjects, so underlying conflicts do surface within the membership from time to time. These conflicts centre around issues such as the implementation of regional programs, the intrusion of Pacific Rim countries into regional affairs, in fisheries particularly, and the occasional surfacing of Melanesian/Polynesian rivalries. Discord over the implementation of regional programmes is, perhaps, understandable in a resource-poor environment - the cost and commitment of resources to a co-operative venture is invariably a recipe for tension, especially where compromise and some sacrifice may be involved: so also may the siting of a regional venture - clearly it is seen to benefit the host state in terms of the employment prospects and access, if not prestige. Other micro-states may view it in less favourable terms. The initial siting of several regional institutions in Fiji is a case in point. Resentment by the other Island states of what seemed favoured treatment for Fiji was a factor which led to regional states reverting to nationalistic rather than regional efforts on occasions, highlighted best perhaps in the case of the Forum's failure to achieve a regional air consortium for itself, and the development of the University of the South Pacific in Fiji.

What has emerged from the activity promoted by the Island states is what has been termed "an assertive strategy" - a conscious effort by the Island leaders to shape and fashion metropolitan power and influence in the region. Regional leaders are determined that the Island states will retain their supremacy in regional institutions and that Pacific Rim involvement is directly controlled by them. The states have redefined their relationships with the countries which have long-standing interests in the region, that is Britain, France, USA, Australia and New Zealand; but one would have to question how fundamental the nature of the change is in the relationships when the metropolitan countries contribute some 97 percent of the South Pacific Commission's budget, and Australia/New Zealand meets two-thirds of the South Pacific Economic Committee Budget. To be added is the extensive financial support given by Australia and New Zealand to the Forum Fisheries Agency and the Pacific Forum Shipping Line. Essentially the metropolitan powers are expected "to provide the purse but are not expected to pull the strings." Rather than develop into a

stand-off situation, the maintenance of this relationship, by both sides, is in itself a delicate exercise in the mixing of friendship, diplomacy and pragmatism in appropriate measures.

The Regional and Other Actors

Australia, New Zealand and the USA view their support for the regional forums as the most effective means of countering increased international interest in the region. The Pacific has generally been looked upon as an ANZUS Lake. The USA, it would seem, is satisfied to see Australia and New Zealand accepting leadership responsibilities in the South Pacific - this attitude is best reflected in the statement of the U.S. Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Richard Holbrook, which said, in effect, that the USA did not wish to usurp the leadership role that belongs to the Pacific Islands and to their near neighbours, Australia and New Zealand.

There has been renewed American interest of recent years in the region, the expansion of its aid programs and an interest in fisheries, while all economic in their objectives, give every reason to assume, nevertheless, that the security of South Pacific air and sea lanes, of importance particularly to the ANZUS partners, is not in doubt.

The ANZUS countries see their support for strong regionalism as effective means of displaying a favourable strategic posture in the light of the Chinese and Soviet approaches to countries in the region, and to the resource-poor micro-states in particular. The ANZUS partners also recognise that the relationship between security, co-operation and regional development is a pre-requisite to counteract any influences or developments which the Soviets or Chinese might seek to initiate. In sum, to create the climate in which assistance from the ANZUS partners in particular, will best stimulate regional determinism, while at the same time enabling the partners to exert some subtle influence on events.

Currently the USSR has little influence in the region; its attempts to develop them, even in the diplomatic sphere, have been rebuffed. Its attempts to develop diplomatic posts have not gone beyond a mission in Fiji. Its interest is essentially economic - particularly in the fishing grounds south of New Zealand, though there are indications that its tuna-fishing fleet is still active outside the declared national/regional fishing zones. Australia has a historic policy of keeping unfriendly powers out of the region, a view that is, fortunately, shared by the Island states.

China's interest in the region on the other hand, is viewed by Australia as a somewhat benign activity, having diplomatic rather than strategic objectives. It has opened relations with the independent countries of the region, and has missions in Fiji and Western Samoa where it has undertaken some rural aid programs, particularly vegetable seeding projects. It received some kudos for constructing a stadium in Apia for the 1982 South Pacific Games. Its most recent proposed undertaking has similar benign overtones - the P.R.C. has agreed to fund the construction of a Parliament House in Vanuatu. It would seem that its performance in the region has overtones of wishing to compete with the USSR, while seeking to downgrade Taiwan's influence in the region, especially in Tonga.

Japan remains the Pacific Rim country of most concern to Forum countries. Its major interest clearly is to obtain a share of the rich fishing resources of the region, and it has been very active in promoting this interest. It has established joint fishing ventures with Island governments, including training assistance and the provision of vessels; it has negotiated fishing agreements with various Island governments under which access is given to its distant-water fishing fleet, a facility which it has sought vigorously over the years. Australia has not been excluded from these approaches and, by agreement, Japan fishes in approved areas of Australia's fishing zone and Japan's large southern ocean fishing fleet has, for some years, enjoyed access to specific Australian ports.

The increasing Japanese involvement in regional fisheries is generally looked upon favourably by Island governments, while the fishing industry is high on the priority list of regional developments. This may not always obtain, of course.

While most countries of the region are of the view that the means should be found for increasing Japanese involvement in regional development, some regional goodwill towards Japan has been dissipated by Japanese proposals to dump nuclear wastes in the Pacific, a proposal now undergoing serious review.

On the other hand, South Korean and Taiwanese activity in the region is more of an irritant and nuisance value, in that it is concentrated on extractive fishing activities which are conducted by their fleets in a somewhat cavalier fashion.

It is of passing interest that Cuba has diplomatic representation in the region. It has established relations with Vanuatu, an event initially viewed with apprehension by Forum members - the incumbents, accredited from Tokyo, however, appear to have shown little interest in the post, following initial accreditation.

Problems and Prospects

Clearly the problems which, in the Forum's view, are the most pressing are decolonisation, nuclear testing and the oft-raised need for a single regional organisation. These issues were reflected on at length in the communique of the 14th Forum of August 1983. The decolonisation of New Caledonia figures prominently in the agenda for discussion, and the communique reflects the strongest protest the members can make against the French reluctance to nominate an independence calendar for New Caledonia. The issue can be counted on to produce a unifying effect within the membership. Decolonisation, together with French determination to continue nuclear tests in the South Pacific, can be expected to fester and will remain the major sources of conflict within the Pacific Forums. Recent statements reported to have been made by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that regional states are not concerned about the testing, will do little to assuage regional indignation.

The desirability of a single regional organisation continues to be the goal of Forum members, and Papua New Guinea in particular. There

are clearly wasted resources in the existing institutional arrangements. Though a Committee of Foreign Ministers has been appointed and directed to make recommendations to the next Forum on the issue, it can be expected to remain as a problem on the South Pacific Forum agenda for some time. What will eventuate is open to much speculation, and is dependent on the will and determination of regional leaders to broaden membership so that the Forum does not remain, as is claimed, a Commonwealth Club. The fact that the Forum retains an exclusively Commonwealth membership is not a factor of the Forum's own making. The main reason has been attributed to the failure of the French and American governments to create independent former colonies which would be technically eligible for membership. While some members felt a relaxation of entry procedures could be instituted, the majority at the 1978 Niue Forum felt that overly lax requirements would allow France and the USA a proxy membership of the Forum and an expectation to exert an undue exercise of power within it. The more likely future development in the region is that of an umbrella organisation perhaps, as has already been suggested, a Pacific Development Council, under which a variety of lesser organisations would function and through which would be maintained a creative pattern of reciprocal relationships common to the South Pacific. Metropolitan countries would not be excluded from the region, but would be expected to play a more constructive role in it. A more likely scenario, as suggested by Richard Herr, a specialist on Pacific issues, is that of a South Pacific General Assembly, not unlike the present South Pacific Conference, an Executive Council, one resembling a streamlined Forum, all supported by a Secretariat. The emergence of such a body could eventuate sooner than expected - much will depend on the consultations to be held this year between the Forum's Committee of Foreign Ministers, and the governments of France, USA, Britain, and their Pacific territories.

Leadership stresses within the Forum are not seen as a current problem. However, should there be an unexpected change of the present leadership within Papua New Guinea and Fiji, then a reversion to the strained relationships of 1980-1982 could re-emerge. Happily, the special relationship between the respective incumbent Prime Ministers allows for the two largest nations in the Forum to each seek higher profiles in the region without detriment to the Forum, or relationships.

Suggestions for the formation of a regional peace-keeping force have been mooted. It is unlikely that the proposal would gain the necessary support in the Forum; neither is there an evident need. The Santo Island (Vanuatu) rebellion in 1980 is cited as the catalyst for the need of such a force - most members, those devoid of a military presence especially, would see a bilateral arrangement as, say, between Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea an adequate precaution for emergencies. The introduction of a military alliance relationship is assessed as superfluous in that the probability of an unprovoked attack on an Island state by an external power is remote. The more likely probability is the threat from internal groups seeking to undermine national stability. The unrest in New Caledonia is a case in point, which no doubt future Forum meetings will closely monitor.

Economic issues continue to dominate regional considerations. The scarcity of skilled manpower, capital, and remoteness from markets are facets which make development in the majority of Forum countries a slow process. The region is one of striking inequalities between countries;

consequently the inescapable reality confronting the greater number of micro-states is, and will be, their continuing, economic dependence on the metropolitan powers. That this aid should or will decline is not in doubt, but there are indications that in the long run some hard decisions will need to be made by developing regional countries as to whether they choose in practice between permanent dependence on aid, or a substantial reduction in income, or encourage migration to better endowed countries in the region, if permitted.

The matter of the Forum joining in a wider proposed economic bloc such as the Pacific Basin is not an issue at this time but is exercising the minds of South Pacific Forum leaders. Developing the regional structures to a sound working level are sufficient unto the day.

As Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser said in his address to the Australian Chamber of Commerce in Sydney on 10 June 1982 :-

The objective of a stronger Pacific community and economy is one that we obviously all share and by pursuing it through a variety of avenues, it is possible to take account of all the factors involved, including the regional groupings which have become important in achieving economic development.

It is obviously a more difficult concept than that of the establishment of the European Community, because in the original establishment of that community there were countries more similar either in size or history or from the nature of the activities, the degree of industrialisation, the stage of their development, than you would find through the great diversity of countries in the Pacific. It is that very diversity, I believe, which poses the challenge and establishes some difficulty in determining what the true shape and form of the Pacific community as it one day will emerge and might ultimately be.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY : BEAUTY IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER?

Jerome L. Heldring

The outside world often marvels at the way in which the nations of post-war Western Europe have been able to build, and maintain, a structure of economic and political co-operation unparalleled in other regions of the world. More specifically, the European Community, based on the Rome Treaty of 1957, seems to have developed into a world power in its own right, on a par with the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan.¹

To be sure, compared to Europe's history of internecine warfare and compared to the law of the jungle which often still prevails among other nations (unless a strong power imposes some measure of discipline upon them), the European Community has been a model of international order. It has, moreover, the rudiments of a sovereign democratic state: a constitution (the Treaty of Rome), a government (the European Commission), and a parliament. More important, it seems to have greatly contributed to the economic growth and prosperity of its original member-states, eventually drawing other European states into its orbit. The fact that the Community is the world's largest trading partner is in itself a measure of its success and importance.

When appraising the relative success of Western European regional co-operation, it is essential to bear in mind the circumstances in which it evolved. World War II had reduced most nations of Western Europe to a state of impotence and poverty. Of the six original member-states of the Community, two (Western Germany and Italy) had been losers in the war against fascism and were, therefore, amenable to any form of co-operation that would restore their respectability. Three other states (Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg) had either never harboured or long since abandoned, any major-power ambition. Only France had some difficulty in forgetting its past as "la grande nation", but tried to recover its greatness in the leadership of Western Europe. And, indeed, the European Coal and Steel Community and the (stillborn) European Defence Community - precursors of the European Economic Community - were due to French initiatives. In short, the psychological climate for close co-operation between the European nations concerned, - even a co-operation which entailed some loss of national sovereignty - was extremely favourable. These nations had, each for its own reasons, come to the conclusion that they were "best able to pursue their national goals in close partnership with each other rather than separately."²

Two other factors encouraged the acceptance of close regional co-operation. First, American hegemony, still undisputed, freed the nations of Western Europe for a long time from worries about how to preserve their military security. Under the American nuclear umbrella, they could direct their main energies and resources to other objectives. Moreover, the United States was itself actively in favour of greater European unity. It put its diplomacy practically in the service of the cause of creating a strong power, possibly a competitor, at the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. This fact, almost without precedence in history, was also instrumental in achieving, within a relatively short period, more intimate forms of co-operation than Europe had ever known.

The other political factor which smoothed the path for Western European co-operation was the policy of the Soviet Union, which was perceived as aggressive. In face of this danger - whether real or imaginary - the nations of Western Europe were more ready to bury their mutual hatchets than they probably would have been otherwise. In any case, these circumstances made it easier for Germany's former victims to accept, as early as five years after the end of the war, Western Germany as an equal partner and ally. France even abandoned its traditional policy of counterbalancing Germany's potential might with a Russian alliance.

Finally, Western European co-operation, more specifically the European Economic Community, greatly benefited by the general economic upsurge in the West, whose beginning more or less coincided with the Treaty of Rome. It is difficult to judge how much of the Community's success is due to this general economic upsurge and how much to its own merits. After all, some non-members, such as the Scandinavian countries, Austria and Switzerland, didn't do too badly either during that period. There is no doubt, however, that both inside and outside Europe the working of the Community was deemed the decisive cause.

During the first ten to fifteen years of its existence, it was also largely plain sailing for the Community in that its main internal task then consisted of gradually demolishing the trade barriers that existed between the participating countries. In fact, the Community has been a triumph of laissez-faire policies, in essence a negative success. The much harder task of constructing new policies, such as an industrial or an energy policy, has been hardly tackled. Even twenty-five years after its inception, the Common Agricultural Policy remains its only positive, concrete achievement.

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In the course of time, the factors which, in combination, had created an environment in which Western European co-operation could blossom gradually changed. Internally, as the numbness caused by the horrors and humiliations of the war period wore away, and the light at the end of the tunnel of poverty and austerity became brighter, the nations resumed their old habits and ambitions. This was, first of all, true of France which, already in 1954, reneged its own brain-child, the European Defence Community. Too many Frenchmen deemed it incompatible with the nation's honour and sovereignty that French soldiers might have to fight under colours other than their own and, possibly, under foreign officers. After General de Gaulle's accession to power in 1958, this trend became official policy. National sovereignty, the shrinkage of which had been the essence of the Communitarian venture, became again the lodestar of the nation's policy, also in non-military matters. It is true that the General accepted the Community as a fact of life - which, incidentally, had been very beneficial to France's farmers - but he soon started to castrate it as a supranational entity or even as a policymaking body. In its stead, he pushed for a "Europe of the states", a concert between sovereign states based on close Franco-German co-operation. Eventually, the other member-states accepted - in practice, if not in principle - this concept, especially after the United Kingdom, which was not celebrated for its supranational enthusiasm, had joined the Community. European regional co-operation took the road toward confederation, rather than federation.

It would be hazardous, however, to assume that, were it not for General de Gaulle's doings, the European Community would have maintained its supranational momentum, encroaching more and more on the domains left to the control of the national governments, thus finally reaching, as its founding fathers had envisaged, the full status of a Europe united both economically and politically. Although nationalism may have been less deeply buried under the surface, or less apologetic, in France than in the other member-states, there is no reason to believe that their nationalisms, each in its own peculiar form, would not also ultimately have raised their heads. It is sometimes said that Dutch nationalism, for instance, expresses itself in a belief in internationalism³, more particularly in a belief that Holland should be the moral guide, the Joan of Arc, of the world.⁴ There was no lack of evidence of this sort of Dutch nationalism in the post-war era. Be that as it may, General de Gaulle has, by his policies, largely pre-empted similar eruptions of other European nations. Certainly, the Community has not succeeded in replacing, in any nation, the belief in the legitimacy of the nation-state by a new sense of European loyalty.

There are two other reasons to believe that the Community would, even without General de Gaulle's occurrence on the scene, not have been able to continue its original momentum. One is that, in contrast to what the propounders of the "spill-over" theory believed⁵, the gradually growing automatism in the process of economic integration did not necessarily exercise a favourable influence on relations between the member-states in other than economic fields. As the Common Market, that triumph of laissez-faire policies, approached its completion, those influences that, according to the theory, should have been pressing for further integration became satisfied and were losing their driving power. As early as 1966, a qualified observer noted : "The more disinterested the pressure groups become - and this will be the case when the central areas of integration will have been dealt with and only borderline areas of integration remain - the less they will insist on the continuation of integration. The nearer the economic union draws to its completion, the less relevant the economic and technical arguments to continue in areas beyond it become."⁶ In other words, each new step toward further integration would require a specific political decision by the member-states, each decision made with ever decreasing pressure from below. A former president of the European Commission even defended, after his experiences in Brussels, the thesis that "a venture such as the European Community seems actually to need a crisis in order to make progress"⁷, thereby admitting that there is no question of automatism.

Another reason for the stagnation of the integration process may be even more important. The birth of the European Community not only coincided with the beginning of the economic boom in the whole Western world but also with the emergence of the welfare state. Now, the welfare state is an international phenomenon, but one of its most revolutionary features has been that it has greatly strengthened the control of the national governments, or rather administrations, over their populations. Because of the all-embracing and intricate network of social and welfare benefits covering the country, the population of that country has become more dependent on the survival of its own administration than people ever were during the days of rampant nationalism, when they could only rely on their governments for the country's internal and external security.

Conversely, the governments of the welfare states have, despite their increase of control, become at the same time more dependent on their electorates to the extent that these leave them less room for making concessions for the sake of, say, greater European integration. Each move toward that goal is being jealously watched, lest it jeopardize the achievements of the national welfare state, in which the population of that state has acquired a vested interest. It is not to the European Commission, the executive of the European Community, that the peoples of Western Europe direct their expectations and grievances. It is still to their own national administrations that they do this, and since these expectations and grievances have enormously grown since the inception of the welfare state, these national administrations and governments have acquired an entirely new legitimacy. The task of breaking down national legitimacies has not become lighter but heavier.

So, instead of (in some occurrences, next to) the old, flag-waving, jingoistic nationalism, a new, less ideological and more materialistic nationalism has emerged, which may well prove to be a tougher nut to crack than its predecessor. This new, welfare-state nationalism seems to be even stronger among nations which think of themselves that they have forsworn nationalism forever. It is ironic, although not a coincidence, that the Social-Democrats, who traditionally pay allegiance to the ideal of internationalism but are, at the same time, the strongest advocates of the welfare state, find themselves in a particular quandary when having to decide between furthering the aims of European unity and the maintenance of the national welfare state.

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Externally, the conditions which had been so propitious for the European Community to develop and consolidate its model of regional co-operation also gradually changed. As the strategic equation between the United States and the Soviet Union shifted from American superiority toward parity, American hegemony became less readily accepted. Here again, France was the country which was the first to draw conclusions from this shift. Under General de Gaulle it pursued a policy still allied to, but less dependent on, and often even antagonistic to, the United States. It tried to persuade its European partners to go along with this course, but was not successful in this. The result was that the members of the Community continued to pursue their own, often diverging, foreign policies. Encouraged by the French example, the Federal Republic of Germany set out on its independent quest for an accommodation with its eastern neighbours, one result of which was to emancipate that country from the tutelage of the Western powers (among whom France). It was only after General de Gaulle's resignation that the members of the European Community decided to create an institution, not tied to the Community itself, for the purposes of consultation and co-ordination in matters of foreign policy. This so-called European Political Co-operation involves hundreds of civil servants of the countries concerned - meanwhile grown in numbers because of the entry of the United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland and Greece into the Community - and regular meetings of their foreign ministers (six times a year) and of their heads of state or government (three times a year). This impressive activity has contributed to the image of a strongly united Europe endowed with a foreign policy of its own. In reality, the EPC, although a useful instrument, has hardly infringed upon the freedom of movement, in matters of foreign policy, of the participating countries.

In fact, there may be less unity in foreign-policy conceptions among the Western Europeans than there was during the days when American strategic superiority was undisputed and American leadership unquestioned. At present, the doubts about them which General de Gaulle expressed twenty five years ago for the first time, often to the shocked embarrassment of his European partners, have become common currency among them. They lead, however, to different conclusions, depending on the country concerned, its historical background, its social structure, its geopolitical location and its size. These differences, sinking into insignificance at a time when the United States could seemingly be relied upon to take care of everybody's security, make it difficult for the Europeans, now that the belief in this guarantee has diminished, to unite on a European security policy. With the United States, there is no need for one; without the United States, intra-European differences prevent one from emerging.

The perception of the Soviet Union has also changed in the course of time. From an aggressive power, against which it was necessary to unite, it became more and more to be seen as an essentially defensive power, beset by a host of internal problems. Détente became the watchword at a time when the European Community was still in its scaffolds, and détente is a less convincing incentive for internal discipline than is fear of aggression. In that respect, regional co-operation in Western Europe has also suffered from the general sense of relaxation that started to settle over the Western world during the 'sixties. To the extent that unity between nations can only be forged against something - a common foe or threat - Europe lost, with détente, a mighty stimulus toward unity, unless it was prepared - which the French sometimes seemed to be - to substitute the United States for the Soviet Union as a bugaboo.

Interconnected with all this, are the changes in cultural climate that have occurred in Europe, partly as a result of the change of generation. The generation that had been responsible for the post-war reconstruction of Europe, a generation that was heavily marked by its prewar and war experiences, was succeeded, starting with the 'sixties, by a generation which had naturally no personal memories of that period and was, if only for that reason, inclined to look differently at the world. In fact, this new generation may have been more antagonistic toward the previous one, and toward all that it stood for, than has usually been the case in history. Anyway, among the tenets and assumptions that the new generation questioned, if not actively opposed, was that European unity was a good thing in itself. Along with the American alliance, another achievement of the post-war European "establishment", the cause of European unity lost its obviousness. This meant that regional co-operation in Europe was deprived of another stimulus.

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What has been achieved in the way of regional co-operation in Western Europe after 35 years is less than the founding fathers of a united Europe dreamed of, but more than states in other regions of the world - including the ones under Communist rule - have been able to attain. Indeed, the question can be asked whether the utopia of a united Europe⁸ was not an indispensable goad toward achieving something less than that.

If that is true, the better has, in this case, not been the enemy of the good but a necessary pre-condition to it.

What has been achieved is, at least, a concert of states, providing "an adaptable and flexible set of alliance bonds, (allowing) for differentiation of status among the members, for the participation of outsiders, for internal 'peace management' by consensus and acceptance of prerogatives (vetoes), and for the management of powerful outside influences."⁹ It has also created a space within which non-governmental forces have been able to grow and expand much more freely than they have ever been able to do in Europe. In how far this freedom is due to the European efforts or, rather, to the general pax americana prevailing over Western Europe is a debatable point.

It also remains to be seen whether this less utopian but still invaluable achievement has the strength to weather the adversities of a recession. The achievements of the European Community - the nearest fulfillments to utopia - are under very heavy pressure, and will be more so as the Community takes in new members, such as Spain and Portugal, countries with an entirely different outlook and economic structure than those of the original member-states. It could well be that here the idea of a united Europe, which in principle cannot exclude any democratic nation willing to adhere, will turn out to be its own undoing. The best that can be hoped for, in the case of Spain and Portugal joining the Community, is a "Europe of different speeds", allowing some countries a slower pace of integration than others. The European Monetary System, in which, for instance, the United Kingdom does not participate, is already an example of such differentiation.

As far as the "negative" achievements of the Community are concerned - the elimination of internal barriers, allowing for great freedom of movement of persons and goods - it should, however, be noted that the value which the national governments attach to the idea of a united Europe has, until now, been strong enough to make them withstand the voices that call for greater protectionism.

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It is questionable whether the measure of regional co-operation which the nations of Western Europe have attained can act as a model for other regions of the world. First, it should be borne in mind that Western European regional co-operation, on the one hand, embraces more than just the European Community and, on the other hand, is part of still wider arrangements. There is, to name a few, the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), consisting of more European countries than the European Community contains, plus the United States, Canada and Japan; there is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which the "Ten" (minus Ireland) prefer to any exclusively European arrangement when it comes to guaranteeing their security, thereby depriving a common European foreign policy of a major raison d'être; there is the Bank of International Settlements at Basle, where the central bankers of some Western European countries (including some non-members of the Community) regularly meet with their North American counterparts. This whole network of organizations covering Western Europe (but not exclusively

Western Europe) cannot easily be copied elsewhere.

Second, although the European Community, with its constitutional and institutional paraphernalia, is certainly the most impressive and most closely knit of these organizations, the exceptionality of the circumstances in which it was able to take off should be stressed again. The nations concerned were, right after a devastating war, in a psychological and material state to accept nearly anything that offered them hope. Moreover, they were under the protection of an outside power that not only exempted them, in a time of perceived danger, to a large extent from tending their own security, but also - and this is an exceptionality in itself - did not indulge in the traditional superpower's instinct of divide et impera.

There were other conditions that made regional co-operation in Western Europe the success it is, especially in the eyes of the outside world, but most of them are not easily repeatable elsewhere. Nor did they last very long in Europe.

- 1 In an interview in TIME Magazine (January 3, 1972), President Nixon said: "I think it will be a safer world and a better world if we have a strong, healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, Japan, each balancing the other, not playing one against the other, an even balance".
- 2 David P. Calleo, "The European Coalition in a Fragmenting World" (Foreign Affairs, 54 (1), October 1975, p. 100). Calleo's thesis is that "States have joined (the European Community) not to give up their sovereignty, but to protect it" (ibid., p. 98).
- 3 J.C. Boogman, "Enkele aspecten van het Nederlandse natie-besef in historisch perspectief" (Oos-West, March 1966, p. 80).
- 4 C. van Vollenhoven, "Roeping van Holland" (De Gids, 74 (1910), IV, p. 204).
- 5 E.B. Haas, Beyond the Nation State (Stanford, 1964), p. 48; id., "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process" (International Organization, XV (Autumn 1961), p. 72); Leon N. Lindberg, The political dynamics of European economic integration (Stanford, 1963).
- 6 R.J. van Schaik, "Once upon a Time: From Economic Integration to Power Politics" (Common Market, A Monthly Review of European Integration and Economic Development, VI, 6 (June 1966), p. 109).
- 7 S.L. Mansholt, "De verhouding Europa-Amerika en de actuele toestand van de Gemeenschap" (Internationale Spectator, XXV, 13 (July 8, 1971 , p. 1253).
- 8 cf. Horst Mendershausen, Western European Power: Mirage and Realities (The Southern California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar, 1972), pp. 9 - 10.
- 9 id, l.c. p. 47. Cf. also D.P. Calleo, l.c. p. 100: "A confederal structure, by its very looseness, allows numerous escapes and hence limits conflicts. In external policy, moreover, a confederal structure, if it lacks the unity of a national state, also permits a greater flexibility in approaching other powers and offers a less salient target for retaliation".

A FORM OF REGIONALISM AND ITS CHALLENGES :
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Philippe Moreau-Defarges

In the first years of its existence, the European Community (EC) has shown itself a model. The old Europe (or at least its Western part) which had torn itself apart over centuries, made peace with itself; and above all, this old Europe resolved its most serious problem through the creation of an economic unity with Germany's return (or rather the return of its Western part) to the Atlantic bloc and later to the International community. In addition, the European Community appears as a remarkable economic success combining a constantly growing interdependence of the economies of its member-states and one of the strongest growth rates. Finally, the commercial links seem destined to bloom into a political construction - a confederation.

Thirty years later, the lyrical illusion is gone. Nevertheless, the balance is far from being negative. An economic integration does exist. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Italy, France and the Benelux exchange about half of their foreign trade with their European partners. Great-Britain (UK), which joined the EC only in 1973, ships about 40% of its exports toward the member-states and also buys from them the equivalent of 40% of its imports. The commercial links with the Commonwealth have decreased a great deal. In the same way, the European Community (which had six members in 1970, nine in 1973, ten after the entry of Greece in 1981, and will soon have twelve members with Spain and Portugal), is setting up quite an effective policy of diplomatic consultation (for example the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)).

Now, why does the European Community seem to be only half-achieved? The European trade zone and the free floating exchange rates did not lead to an industrial integration, meaning rapprochements or merging of German, Italian, French companies, and also common policies (with respect to Energy, Research, High Technology...). In the same way, the political consultation did not lead to a common view of Europe's foreign policy, especially of its security.

The history of the European Community is finally a simple and even a basic warning to those who look from the outside at the European adventure and wonder whether there will be a chance of getting a similar global approach in other continents, especially in Africa. Economic relations might not bring political unity. The latter requires will and obstinacy. Sharing prosperity during a period of economic growth does not mean sharing scarcity and efforts in times of crisis. The present report has been written by an European who wants nothing other than to enlighten outsiders on the reasons of this half-failure (from the most general and the most materialistic ones to the most political).

First of all, the European construction as an historical work is the result of a specific time, the time of reconstruction, of reviving prosperity and especially of a mandatory Franco-German reconciliation (during cold war and as American protection was due to last for ever). The treaties organizing the European Community aim to develop exchanges between the member-states and also with third countries. (This is the

reason why trade agreements with other European and Mediterranean countries, and negotiations within the GATT were multiplied).

Now, the first shock for the European Community was the oil crisis in 1973. There, the European countries discovered their dependence and their vulnerability. They also rediscovered a feeling of anxiety in front of the growing tensions and the dangers of conflicts, especially in 1977 when the Soviets pointed against them a new series of missiles - the SS20. According to the historian Michael Howard, Europe is sheltered by a "complex of reassurance" and is built up outside or at least besides History. The European countries had a rude awakening in the mid-70's when they became aware of their industrial and demographic decline. But instead of providing reactions of unity and solidarity, it emphasized some national characters, which were illustrated by the misperceptions of the "Soviet issue" and the "Pacifism".

Furthermore, the failures of a tentative Common Market in some parts of the Third World have demonstrated how much the success of the Community requires a certain degree of complementary economics within the member-states, and consequently a relative homogeneity. The Six have this asset. There are obviously some disadvantaged regions (especially in South of Italy and to a lesser degree in South-West of France), but the Community remains a coherent bloc. In 1973, the Community welcomed two countries with a deep industrial decline - Great-Britain and Denmark - and a real poor one - Ireland. Finally, Greece and soon, Spain and Portugal, will make for a developing Europe by entering the Common Market. The European Community is now confronted with different types of economies in terms of growth and even modernization.

Such changes in the geographical and economical balance of the Community are challenging the general rules. The budgetary system, for example, was fixed in 1970. It was conceived as a financial instrument for common actions (justifying the allotment of 2/3 of the spending for the common agricultural policy, the only global one of the Community).

Great-Britain advocates another concept of European finances: The wealth of each member-state should be taken into consideration and the budget should be a channel for financial transfers from the "rich" countries (like FRG, France, and the Benelux) to the "disadvantaged" ones (UK, Ireland and Italy). This point of view can only be supported if Spain and Portugal will join the EC. Germany, on its side, complains of being the strongest contributor and requires some compensations (like specific programs in the area of Energy). There is no point here to discuss technical details. But the budgetary issue of the Community makes one aware of the importance - and the difficulty - in conceiving a common policy of solidarity. In addition to that, the economic crisis revives the demands and the oppositions.

The Community increased its membership twice - in 1973 and 1981 - and it will soon expand again with Spain and Portugal. The welcoming of new member-states upsets the existing relationship (for example through the multiplication of the languages and the breakdown of the European officials.....). But above all, each new member-state wants to transform the Community and to mould it to its own image.

The example of the Community and particularly of its enlargement provides some simple teaching that may affect Asia, as well as America and Africa. A common political view must back up every form of regional construction, even if the goals are commercial or economic ones. The organization must have a mutual understanding of its values, of its orientations, and particularly of its main objectives; and this mutual consent should become a contract, a treaty looking somewhat like a constitution, or a charter.

Beyond two elements - an historical situation which is today radically transformed and the changeover from a homogeneous block to an heterogeneous association - the Community is confronted with a new problem : The attrition and the cessation of the process of integration. The founders of the Community believed that the potential for European integration lay in the two following gambles : (a) economic interdependence would trigger political unity; (b) the political unity would breed a confederation, a sort of Super-state.

This supra-national ideal was also marked by an epoch. War appeared to have destroyed the nationalisms and especially to have confirmed their negative and dangerous role. Europe (or at least its Western part) would only revive if it got rid of the past. But the two gambles fell through. Politics asserted its specificity and its autonomy. This fact has been obviously revealed by the Gaullist phenomenon. Back in power in 1958, General de Gaulle recognized that an economical and commercial Europe would unconditionally be an instrument of modernization for French industry. But he always denied the idea of merging economics and politics. Each member-state within the EEC ought to be able to say "No" to every major issue. De Gaulle refused even a kind of supra-nationalism, and particularly the change-over from the unanimity rule to the majority rule. (This was the origin of the crisis of the empty chair and of the Luxembourg compromise, in 1965-66).

The Gaullist period reveals a challenge for every regional construction. In other words, the question is whether such an edifice will develop itself following its own dynamic, or whether it will be the result of the decision of the states. Thirty years of European construction suggest the following comments :

- No process of economico-political unification can succeed without a genuine project. This points out the need for an institution able to enlighten such a project. Such is the duty of the European Commission, the Guardian of the Treaties, in charge of making proposals, and therefore of giving a boost to the European build-up. However, the Commission is less and less fulfilling this mission. This attrition has multiple origins and reflects how inanimate the European enterprise is. What we should be reminded of here is how this institution which stems from the imagination is necessary but fragile, because it shatters when drawn into political rivalries.
- Every major progression in the European build-up is born from consultation and dialogue between the member-states, and often between two or three of them. The recent example of the European Monetary System, created in 1979, is significant. This system stemmed from high-level specialists (Mr. Barre, Mr. Triffin, etc.),

from informal talks between French, British and German experts, and finally from close relations between the German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt and the French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.

Therefore, does the dynamic of the Community appear to be the result of the conjunction of a European concept with the will of the member-states? But there is no new project. Since the setting up of the Customs Union and the Common Agricultural Policy in the sixties, no major and especially no coherent action has been undertaken. The European Monetary System is far from representing a common currency, and in a certain way the election of the European Parliament to the direct universal suffrage has been confiscated by the machinery of the political parties. As to the will of the states, it has principally expressed itself by interminable discussions. Thus, recourse to the unanimity rule became systematic, although General de Gaulle thought it should only intervene in some major decision-making.

In 1982 Great-Britain opposed the fixing of the agricultural prices, not because it disagreed with the price proposals, but only because it makes a habit of blocking any decision as long as its budgetary demands are not satisfied. In the end, the partners of Great-Britain overruled these objections, and the UK had to comply with their decision.

Finally, the fundamental European dilemma appears : The ten member-states know that they are condemned to live together, but they are not able to think about a common future, and particularly to accept its price. The Community is confronted with two simple challenges which are the key to its future : Those challenges are : first, the weakening of its industry and the urgency of reorganizing deeply some inadequate structures; and second, the need of creating a policy of security, a common defence.

In the industrial sector, the European project remains today a vague dream. The states have all completely different ideas. There is a widening gap between the French policy of interventionism and the German and British policy of liberalism. And above all, the British, German, French, Italian... firms have rather sided with the United States instead of trying to become closer to each other. A Europe of Enterprise is still to be created, combining technical efficiency and a certain political independence.

As to the security of Europe, this remains a major issue, although it has been forgotten since the failure of the project for a European Community of Defence in 1954. The security of Western Europe is based on three facts :

- the US nuclear umbrella
- the assurance of a certain status quo in Europe
- and the French autonomy of defence.

Any consideration about defence in Europe leads to think about the actual European order. The choices depend on the Atlantic relations or on the stakes of the East-West relations. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) appears once more to be in the heart of the debate. On one side, the United States and their nuclear umbrella continue to protect West Germany, and on the other side, Détente and Germany's Ost Politik confirm the rejection of nuclear weapons by this country (the adherence to the 1968 Non-Proliferation-Treaty (NPT) was one of the Soviet conditions). In

In those conditions, the dimension of European defence is rather thin and may focus on the cooperation of the conventional weapons system.

Every process of regional unification should be fascinated by the concept of "Nation-State", and should also be willing to acquire a similar cohesion and a similar permanency. The successes and weaknesses of the European build-up underline the link between the realities of an era and the attempts to go beyond it. The European Community was born under precise circumstances and chose its way - integration. Today and from now on, one should imagine another Europe, combining supranational aspects and inter-governmental cooperation, that will blend and balance out the European issues and some national concerns. But finally, the most serious weakness of the European structure is that it remains the business of a few officials and technocrats. "Europe" doesn't exist in the minds of its inhabitants. It is an abstract idea, without any image and symbols. In other words, Europe has got to make itself a face ...

NATO TODAY

Colonel Jonathan Alford

I do not intend to be facetious by saying that I think that NATO stands today pretty much where it always has : somewhat lacking in self-confidence; anxious about the role that nuclear weapons ought to play in the overall defence of the West; anxious about Soviet intentions and capabilities; unable wholly to reconcile all the conflicting national security priorities and domestic requirements of the sovereign states that make up the Western Alliance. Yet it is too facile simply to take the maximalist position and say that NATO has therefore failed to live up to its objectives and its ideals and should be written off. An alliance - any alliance - will always be substantially less than the sum of its constituent parts. Any alliance is bound to have great difficulty in reconciling diverse national interests. Any alliance not wholly dominated by one state - as is the Warsaw Pact, but then even the Soviet Union cannot altogether dictate policy to Eastern Europe - is bound to find it hard to co-ordinate industrial interests, is bound to face arguments about burden-sharing, about the division of labour, about free-riding or whatever other cliché happens to be in vogue. Anyone who doubts the truth of that proposition should look into the Duke of Marlborough's relations with the Dutch during the War of the Spanish Succession.

My instinct is to take the minimalist position which in essence argues that it is remarkable how well NATO has succeeded in reconciling conflicting objectives, that it is remarkable how much sixteen nations have been prepared to subsume their selfish desires in the pursuit of a larger goal and that it is remarkable how much military co-operation has taken and is taking place at all levels. Notice that I do not claim that NATO has for 30 years deterred the Soviet Union from attacking Western Europe because to make that case you would have to be sure that the Soviet Union would have attacked in the absence of a North Atlantic Collective security arrangement. However high the probability of such an attack, the case cannot be made. A different case can and should be made. NATO, by engaging the United States in the security of Western Europe, has largely prevented the Soviet Union from using its obvious and enduring military preponderance over Western Europe for essentially political purposes. It is sometimes argued that, in terms of gross aggregates of wealth and numbers, the Western European states could contain the Soviet Union. While the arithmetic may be correct, that has always seemed to miss the essential point that the Soviet Union is one great power adjacent to a number of much smaller powers. Only if those smaller powers could truly combine into a powerful political entity (and pool their resources) would it be in any sense possible to present that great European power, the USSR, with a morsel too big to swallow. I do not say that the Soviet Union would be tempted to pick off one by one the states nearest to it, but I have a very strong feeling, given the Soviet propensity for substantial demonstrations of military power, that the European states would quickly lose all ability to exercise an independent judgment in the absence of American patronage and power. Western Europeans may not like the idea of patronage - perhaps should

not like the idea of patronage - but the realities are that small countries tend rather rapidly to genuflect to proximate power unless they are confident of being able to invoke, if only in the last resort, some greater power than their own to counter the great power that they fear.

The Nuclear Dilemma for NATO

The other uncomfortable reality is that the Soviet Union is an extremely powerful nuclear state as well as one disposing of very substantial conventional forces. One has to face that reality at least to the extent of asking what ultimately protects any state from potential nuclear threats. One obvious answer is that the untrammelled possession of a modest number of nuclear weapons - of a relatively invulnerable kind - provides that kind of protection. "A nuclear state" as Herman Bondi once put it "is a state that no-one can afford to make desperate". But if it is politically or technically impossible for a state to provide itself with its own minimum nuclear deterrent, then it must seek that protection elsewhere by asking that some other state extends nuclear deterrence to cover it. This could be in the form of a simple declaratory statement but it is likely that the exposed state will seek more than simple assurances. It will tend to demand some tangible evidence that the protector cannot escape from whatever verbal commitment it may make. Let me be concrete. West Germany has denied itself the possibility of acquiring its own nuclear forces. Therefore it from time to time expresses nervousness in the fact of Soviet nuclear power and constantly seeks an American commitment expressed in physical terms - that is, a military presence - which will convey to the Soviet Union a clear impression that attacking West Germany means attacking a clear US vital interest and US forces deployed to symbolize that vital interest. As the Times recently noted : "It is the power of symbolism which is too often left out of rational calculations."

Of course that serves deterrence well enough but it carries with it the disturbing implications that, if deterrence were to fail (for whatever reason), West Germany at least would become a nuclear battle-ground. This has always been the disturbing feature of nuclear deterrence. So long as Soviet nuclear weapons exist, it will be necessary for NATO to deter their use by conveying a very clear impression in the mind of any would-be aggressor that any major conflict could bring about more pain than would be regarded as acceptable by military action of any kind, that any war in Europe would escape control. I do not think that it is in practice difficult for NATO to deter the first use of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union. The possession of quite small numbers of invulnerable retaliatory weapons can maintain a high risk of an aggressor having unacceptable pain inflicted upon him. What is much harder, is to work out what to do if deterrence failed. Does it make sense then to commit suicide? The answer must be "no". If deterrence fails, one must therefore try to do two things : first to keep the violence at as low a level as possible and to strive to terminate the war; second one must strive to prevent the aggressor from gaining whatever objectives he may have set himself. Both these objectives seem to demand substantial conventional forces. If one is not prepared to use nuclear weapons at once or at least very early in the face of any aggression - and clearly NATO is not prepared to do that for very obvious

reasons - NATO must have the conventional forces to deny the Soviet Union its objectives. How that can be done and how substantial those forces need to be is a proper subject for debate (and one to which I shall return) but I guess that NATO today does hold to a general belief that it is desirable to increase conventional forces to defeat a non-nuclear attack if that is possible but, if it is not, at least to give time for a war to be halted below the nuclear threshold.

Despite the urgings of many distinguished former Ministers of Defence and senior NATO Commanders, I do not think that NATO is likely to be interested in formal undertakings of "no-first-use" (of nuclear weapons) unless and until it is much more confident than it is now in its conventional denial option. It only makes sense in NATO's view - and in mine - to contemplate "no-first-use" after conventional forces have been improved to the point where there is no obvious need to substitute nuclear weapons for conventional inadequacy. As I do not regard that as attainable in the near term (primarily for reasons of cost), I think we shall continue to live in a twilight world in which NATO would greatly prefer not to use nuclear weapons first, in which we in NATO know perfectly well that it might in practice be extraordinarily difficult to make a decision to use nuclear weapons first, but in which statement of "no-first-use" as policy will not be agreed.

That is simply another way of saying that I see no real alternative to pursuit of the doctrine of flexible response in which NATO now undertakes to counter any Soviet attack "with an amount of military force and at a level of conflict deemed necessary to halt that aggression as well as to communicate NATO's capability and intent to escalate the level of destructiveness to whatever degree is finally necessary to dissuade the Soviet Union from pressing its initiative." That formulation contains an appropriate mix of proportionality and escalatory warning. It is worth remarking that there is no specific mention of nuclear weapons in that formulation. It is a doctrine quintessentially defensive and reactive. It might make a great deal of military sense to do other things in other ways but one has to recognize the limits to political feasibility for the Alliance.

I have to say that what naturally worries many people in Europe about this conclusion is that NATO is stuck with an armed and nuclear peace for as far as one can see ahead. I may lack the creative imagination to reach out to new concepts and new orders of stability in Europe attained by different means. It is a terrible commentary - "a satire on civilization", to quote a distinguished member of the British Liberal Party, Edward Grey - that the best we can do is to keep the peace by a tenuous balance of power and the prospect of appalling risk, all at considerable cost in terms of treasure and opportunities foregone. I have little doubt that NATO can keep the peace if it maintains cohesion, political will and mutual trust but it can only do it with the familiar instruments of military power used in familiar ways.

The Threat to Western Europe

I continue to state my belief that the Soviet Union does not see easy pickings in Europe. It sees only risks and dangers. It almost certainly has clear political objectives in Europe and even political

objectives facilitated by the distant and unspecific threat of the use of military power. We are all of us, in one way or another, affected by the aura of proximate Soviet military power and fear of that power is not absent when we make our political calculations. But war in Europe is not something to be undertaken lightly and it has been NATO's function for 30 years to convince the Soviet Union that the military option is a last resort only. There may be those in the USSR who might even think that they could win if it came to war - and I think that they might perhaps win if it came to war - but I do not see how, under current arrangements, they could be certain of keeping the nuclear genie in his bottle. The dangers of losing control continue to remain unacceptably high.

A Tentative Assessment

NATO - as NATO - is thus, from my minimalist viewpoint, in reasonable shape. There are few fundamental divisions between governments over what to do in NATO except, possibly, in the case of Greece. There are plenty of divisions between the European states themselves and between European states and the United States about other non-military issues and about what it is appropriate to do in the wider world outside the NATO area. I have no doubt that these extraneous issues could come to have a major impact upon the Alliance itself as narrowly defined if we do not handle them carefully but at the moment I see almost all the member governments of the Alliance pulling in the same direction, sharing very similar views about what has to be done, and quite determined to at least try to do what it is necessary to do to keep NATO in fair shape. I think we all want to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons, to increase defence expenditure in real terms to a modest degree and to the extent that it is politically feasible to do so - not always at 3% but generally above zero - and to devote most of that increase to conventional force improvements. What it makes sense to buy with the money available is something else that we can and should debate. Could we use the money we have more efficiently? more effectively? in different directions? May be so. I have yet to be convinced and it will be a long time coming.

NATO therefore stands pretty much where it did and is struggling hard to stay there. Moreover it is in practice extraordinarily difficult to move the Alliance away from its set course and orientation. That is not an excuse for not trying but a simple statement of fact. The inertia of an alliance like NATO is enormous. To get a consensus among sixteen nations to change direction in any radical way is something that is not easy and not to be undertaken lightly. Moreover it is worth remembering that in 15 years time we shall all of us be disposing of at least half of the same basic stock of military equipment that we have now. The investment is so large that it is not open to any country to scrap what it has and to start again. However bright the ideas and however radical the change that we might agree to, this is another fact we must live with. Whatever changes we might seek to introduce will have, in practice, to be incremental rather than radical.

Four Problems for NATO

Let me now touch on four specific problems that NATO faces in the short-to medium-term: nuclear modernization; the incorporation of new conventional weapons technology; manpower; and what are now called in the jargon "out-of-area" problems.

Nuclear Modernization

Most NATO governments believe - and with some justification - that the deployment of the first cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe on schedule represents a major political achievement. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the choice made by NATO in December 1979 to adopt the "Dual-track Decision", the important political fact is that, despite an unprecedented campaign by the Soviet Union to have that decision set aside, most NATO Governments have more or less stayed on course. NATO showed considerable political will both in deployment and in negotiation, and I have no difficulty in asserting that the Soviet Union has suffered a major political set-back and has no real idea what to do next : if they do not return to negotiate seriously, they face the clear prospect of NATO continuing, albeit slowly, to deploy the 464 cruise missiles and 108 Pershing II missiles that are in the programme. Uncharacteristically, the Soviet Union has left itself little negotiating flexibility and must either lose face or carry out its threats to intensify the arms competition which will damage its public stance, play into the hands of the American "hawks", lose support in Eastern Europe and cost more than they would like to pay. In my view the Soviet Union has played for very high stakes in Europe and has lost and they are now frustrated, angry and fearful. I do not say that the nuclear opposition in Europe has disappeared. Clearly it has not, but I think it is somewhat depressed and demoralized (and frustrated, angry and fearful also) at having lost the first and crucial round in the battle for public opinion.

At the same time, NATO governments must show their genuine willingness to re-open a dialogue and negotiations with the Soviet Union (on the basis of equal numerical rights) at any time and in any forum that the Soviet Union cares to put forward. The fundamental legitimacy of the Western position (and the basis for public support) must remain that we do want to limit (reduce) numbers of nuclear weapons and are to that end prepared to accept any figure between zero and 572 in intermediate-range missiles. In breaking off negotiations, the Soviet Union has stated as a precondition to any resumption of negotiations something which will continue to be totally unacceptable to the West, namely that all new US missiles must be withdrawn. In short, the USSR has overplayed its hand and does not know how to limit the long-term damage to Soviet interests in Western Europe.

Conventional Weapons and New Technology

How best to take advantage of developments in conventional weapons technology is the next big debate in the Western Alliance and this is very likely to develop into a fierce argument between the US and the Western Europeans. There is not much argument that NATO should improve in conventional capability as far as possible by incorporating the best of modern technology. The argument is about how to do it and whether NATO can afford it. I side with those who see a distinct advantage to the defence in the appropriate application of modern conventional technology but choices have to be made and the choice as presented tends to be between very long-range (500km +) or short-range applications. The Americans generally are pressing new long-range interdiction missions on the Alliance

(under the guise of "Deep Strike", "Air-Land Battle 2000", "The Rogers' Plan" and "Second-Echelon attack") in the belief that it is in the general area of the acquisition and destruction of distant, hard, mobile targets that the new technology offers the greatest promise. The Europeans, on the other hand, are obviously worried that this will, at best, be a very expensive and inherently fragile system; that it will come to look too "offensive"; that the Soviet Union may already be reducing both the vulnerability and operational importance of the second strategic echelon and enhancing the effectiveness of forces already deployed forward in East Germany; and that this will end with increasing European dependence on American technology. European interest tends to be focussed therefore on more direct means of defence (including air defence) and, especially in the German case, on the forward defence of the Federal Republic - and so on the application of new technology to direct-fire or artillery weapons with much shorter range amenable to development and production in Western Europe, perhaps co-operatively. It is safe to predict that Western European concern at the difficulty of selling into the American military market and of sharing equitably in military production will grow.

Money and Men

To an extent this is an argument about money. There will only be little (if any) more money for defence in real terms. Most Western European countries have not met their 3% pledges and do not look like doing so. Hence the 4% sustained growth that SACEUR is seeking looks wholly out of reach. Defence cost inflation will absorb almost all of such real growth as may be achieved. Thus hardly any great numbers of things (ships, aircraft, tanks, etc.) will be bought in the next decade. At best one-for-one replacement of obsolete equipment may be achieved. Yet the Third problem - manpower - looms larger and larger with every year that passes. Defence planners know now what manpower will be available and in the Protestant countries of Northern Europe and in the US it will be a lot less by about 1990 than it is now - up to 40% less in some cases. That will place a very great strain on those forces which rely largely on conscription, for the 18-year cohort will simply not sustain current establishments. For long-service manpower too recruitment will prove much harder. It will probably be necessary to pay relatively more in relation to alternative employment and to push up retention rates. All this will make it hard to maintain NATO manpower at its current levels. Whatever the purchasing policy with regard to weapon systems, it is safe to predict that any savings that technology may provide in the combat arms will be more than swallowed-up in logistics and maintenance. It is simply a myth that modern technology is easy to maintain. Some modern technology is easy to maintain and some modern technologies are less labour-intensive but with sophistication and very high rates of ammunition expenditure come major logistic penalties. Manpower demands may be shifting somewhat from front to rear but that is all. It therefore seems very likely that demands on reservists will increase quite dramatically if numbers on mobilization are to be kept at anything like current levels and keep reservists adequately trained and "in date" will present its own set of problems.

NATO and the Rest of the World

Finally, to return to a point made earlier, NATO needs to address itself seriously to "out-of-area" problems. I do not mean that NATO can or should address itself directly to political and military problems arising outside the area defined by the North Atlantic Treaty or that NATO can or should respond to military challenges outside the area of its competence. But the Western Europeans at least have to recognize, first, that there will be some problems outside NATO which will demand military responses and, second, that the US is currently in the mood to take up such challenges directly (and, if necessary, unilaterally) and will allocate increasing fractions of its military power to such contingencies.

The consequences for Western Europe are again twofold. First, policy differences of a more or less fundamental kind are likely to appear. Increasingly the Western European Governments and publics do not applaud unilateral American military action, whether in Grenada or the Lebanon or Nicaragua. While the criticism may sometimes be muted, the fact remains that much of Western Europe finds itself increasingly at odds with a renewal of American assertiveness. There is too a rather strong sense that it would both be imprudent to become too closely identified with an aggressive American policy in the Third World and that Western Europe is likely to suffer from the heightened US-Soviet tension that could arise from the forward policy of both superpowers. Secondly, the countries of NATO Europe are having to come to terms with the fact that the limited defence resources of the US are being increasingly earmarked for non-NATO contingencies with the growth of the Rapid Deployment Force. Furthermore, the military consequences of American military involvement outside the NATO area are likely to embroil NATO Europe willy-nilly as the US seeks to draw on US NATO stocks and manpower and to use European transit facilities for the deployment of US forces outside Europe. The Europeans naturally fear this substantial diversion of American interest and potential diversion of American forces. While there was never any guarantee that reinforcements in the Continental US earmarked for Europe would come to Europe, there was in the past a reasonable expectation that such would be the case. The creation of the RDF, while not excluding this possibility, has made it somewhat less likely that the best of American formations would arrive in Europe in a major crisis. Indeed Europeans are quick to point to the ease with which a Soviet Union, intent on an attack on Western Europe, could draw off American reserve formations by staging a diversion elsewhere, perhaps in the Persian Gulf. The curious paradox is that an enhanced US capability to intervene elsewhere has made it much easier for the Soviet Union to exploit their own internal strategic flexibility generally to distract the West and divert forces from the European theatre.

Western Europe has either to prepare to fill potential gaps in the NATO order of battle or, more likely, turn a blind eye to the consequences of potential diversion. Only if the US begins to withdraw the forces currently based in Western Europe will the alarm bells prove impossible any longer to ignore. A more pressing need is for the Alliance as a whole to find ways of consulting more diligently and in timely fashion about responses to crises arising in distant (or not so distant) areas. That, after all, was the main complaint about Grenada. The Europeans were not adequately consulted. However the Europeans must recognise that the US may not be willing to alter course simply because of Western European

disapproval however strongly expressed, may indeed be reluctant to expose itself to what it knows will be European censure. Consultation is certainly no guarantee of concerted action. The best that can be said is that it may prove possible with prior consultation to avoid the most obvious evidence of policy disarray; the worst that can be said is that it will simply make the West Europeans feel better and permit them to say that they took the opportunity to tell the US how unwise they considered their policies to be.

Conclusion

I make no apology for concentrating frequently in this Paper upon the US for it remains true that the US is still primus inter pares and when America sneezes, Western Europe is inclined to catch cold. However great an affront the considerable Western European dependence on the US for the security of Western Europe may be, Western Europe is in no condition to confront the USSR alone. I should however make an apology for using the shorthand term "Western Europe" when we all know perfectly well that it is only a geographical and not a political expression. Nevertheless it seems correct in a brief paper of this kind broadly to concentrate on those issues which find the Western Europeans more or less on one side of the question and the US on the other. What makes the US different is not simply its military (and especially its nuclear) power but the undeniable truth that it is divided from Europe by the Atlantic. Insofar as anything united Western Europe, it is that sense of unalterable distance from its protective superpower and concern that the United States, as a global power, will not always or even often accord European security a priority as high as the Europeans would like. Western Europeans understand quite well that "Fortress America" is an attractive idea for many Americans. Defending America is not difficult; defending America's interests is both difficult and it entails rather high risks. George Washington spoke of "our detached and distant situation" with a distinct air of self-satisfaction; it remains an easy trap for potential isolationists, forgetful of the consequences for world peace of an inward-turning USA.

All is not altogether well with the Alliance (all has never been altogether well) but things could be a great deal worse in NATO. One should not write it off. There are however incipient problems touched upon here which, if not handled sensitively, could become inflated to serious proportions. Some we can identify now and should begin to deal with now. Others are essentially contingent and we should set up the political mechanisms for handling them better (more expeditiously) when they arise. Those are tame conclusions but I see no real alternatives to the present structure with much the same agenda for NATO. To those who believe that European Political Co-operation (EPC) will lead (and should lead) inexorably to a resurrection of a European Defence Community (EDC), I answer that it will only come (can only come) if Western Europe is about to be deserted by the United States for only that traumatic shock could force the Western Europeans into a fundamental reassessment of their security arrangements. But it is by no means certain that such a shock would be beneficial; it would seem just as likely to have the effect of sending the Europeans scurrying one after the other to Moscow to make what terms they can get. It would seem preferable for Western Europe not to take that risk but to

try to muddle on as we have done for over 30 years. And the important thing is to persuade the United States that it is also in the American interest that Western Europe should remain independent and relatively free of Soviet influences. For an American, a world with Western Europe under Soviet domination would be an alien world. That will, in turn, imply that the Western Europeans should try to curb a distressing tendency to criticize the US at every available opportunity and demonstrate willingness to do at least some of what the American Administration regards as essential for the defence of the NATO area. The real dangers for the Western Alliance were neatly described by Stanley Hoffman when he spoke of "America's instinct for unilateralism disguised as leadership, Western Europe's inclination to abdicate, disguised as prudent criticism" (The Western Alliance : Drift or Harmony? International Security, Fall 1981, Volume 6 No. 2, p.119).

A CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF REGIONALISM IN LATIN-AMERICA

Roberto Escobar

There is a tendency to explain all parts of the world from the viewpoint of the European countries or the USA. For this reason, and due to its special geographic characteristics, what is known as "Latin-America" still remains fairly unknown.

A vast conglomerate of 21 countries and possessions of USA, Great Britain, France and Holland, covering more than 22.000.000 square kilometres with a population exceeding 400.000.000 people at this time; extends all the way from the South Pole to the northern frontier of Mexico, 32°N Lat., a distance of 16.000 kilometres.

Five European languages are spoken, at least ten major Amerindian languages, countless dialects and local tribal speech, evolved with contributions from African, Chinese and Polynesian languages.

It is a fact, though, that the North-American film image of the Latin seems to have generalized the idea that we are either villains or only guitar twanging lovers.

The problem of really understanding, knowing and defining my continent and its people has not yet been satisfactorily resolved. The idea of calling it "Latin" when there is no connection with the Roman Empire ignores that we are a Creole society formed by considerable cross-cultural relations for over 300 years between different kinds of Spaniards : Castilians, Andalusians, Basques and others with several kinds of Indians : Aztec, Maya, Caribes, Chibchas, Quechuas, Guaranies, Charruas, etc. and black Africans from the west coast, till massive European immigration begins in the 19th century bringing in Germans, Poles, Italians, Spaniards, English, Irish, as well as people from the Arab countries: Syrians, Lebanese, and a steady Trans-Pacific migration.

This process of cross-culturization took different forms in the different parts of the continent, forming cultural regions that have their own peculiar traditions and have achieved specific psychological profiles.

Due to these reasons it is difficult to analyse "regional co-operation" in Latin-America, without a clear picture of the natural way in which the regions are formed.

In this paper a Cultural Map will be briefly explained and may help to a greater understanding of national identity.

The limitations of time make it advisable to concentrate on only some of the issues, that I hope will be of interest to you.

Co-operation between Latin-Americans

It is fairly obvious that international and inter-regional co-operation means social interaction at three levels between government, business and the individual.

The areas in which this takes place, cover: defence, economic and legal affairs, trade, investment, technological transfer, education, tourism and emergency assistance.

Latin-American history shows that co-operation at government levels has not been successful, except for short periods of time. Political instability in some cases, and excessive political stability in others, breeds mistrust and promotes national isolation.

The number of treaties, agreements, protocols, charters and declarations signed by our governments are staggering - these documents fall into the general field of diplomacy rather than a mutual desire for true co-operation.

The Organization of American States, originally the Pan American Union, has never resolved any inter-country problems but has been successful in the fields of education and the arts. The OAS, as a co-ordinator between individuals is positive; as a meeting ground for the states, only nominal.

Other government agreements have operated mainly for reasons of defence, as was the intention of an ABC Treaty in 1915 between Argentina, Brazil and Chile. If that alliance had become official and evolved into a trade area and a strong channel for cultural exchange the whole history of our continent would have been different.

At a business level there are natural trade areas that have evolved through private enterprise and that operate successfully in competition with multi-national commerce.

The attempts at creating the Free Trade Areas by the United Nations Organization, are well conceived but have met with basic cultural differences that have rendered them inoperative.

The Free Trade Area, created in Central America in 1960 was an excellent idea that effectively increased business and profits but could not survive the competition from outside the area; consequently expired within ten years. In the meantime, nothing prevented Central America becoming the tragic scene of unnecessary warfare.

The Latin-American Free Trade Area, created by the agreement in Montevideo, never achieved a common understanding between countries with completely different economic policies, and different cultural systems for trade.

The Pacto Andino, however, co-ordinating the countries of the Pacific Coast for trade and transport has many possibilities since the countries involved belong to a form of cultural region.

On an individual level, co-operation is highly successful between countries that have common cultural bonds; major areas of individual co-operation appear in education, tourism and emergency aid.

A considerable number of Latin students attend Universities in other Latin countries, and many scholars lecture in other countries on a permanent basis.

Southern Peruvians and Western Bolivians cross the border into Chile to attend the Tarapaca University, close to the northern border of my country. Many prominent scholars from Peru and Bolivia have studied and/or lectured in Chilean Universities.

There are instances of mutual recognition of degrees between different countries, which do not exist between Universities on other continents.

An attempt was made to create an inter-American University, the Latin-American Faculties of Social Sciences: FLACSO, that opened schools in Mexico, Argentina and Chile, but the financing was restricted when its teaching moved visibly towards marxist ideologies. However it should be rescued and expanded, though it does not seem feasible to operate it on an all-embracing "Latin-American" level. International universities should and could operate within the cultural regions.

The Convenio Andres Bello, between Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Chile has the purpose of furthering educational exchange. For lack of adequate funding it has not advanced further than formal exchanges, but it could be the basis for an international Latin-American university of the Pacific Coast.

As regards tourism, the level of individual co-operation is excellent.

Latin-American countries have understood the advantages of the tourist trade and have developed through private and individual enterprise, the infrastructure that is required.

A recent example can illustrate this : during last month (February 1984), 200.000 West Argentinians crossed the border to spend their summer holidays on the Chilean Coast; during winter a similar number of Chileans cross into Argentina to relax and shop in the pleasant Argentinian cities.

Travel across the Andes is common and frequent, not only between Chile and Argentina, but also between Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia. Uruguay and Argentina operate in common in most things; migration and tourism in the Caribbean is an old, established habit; and many more instances could be given.

All this travel and sight-seeing does more for regional co-operation than the efforts of our governments.

Human life on our continent has existed for the past 10,000 to 12,000 years, according to archaeological studies. The various climates and soils, have defined certain possible patterns of life that recur, and only vary in their technological attainments.

Travel routes are today very much alike to those found in pre-hispanic times, so the organization of regional cultures in a proved fact that tends to be overlooked.

A form of co-operation with all of the sub-conscious solidarity in Latin-America is expressed after natural catastrophes. Earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, landslides, volcanoes and other suchlike phenomena are current and unavoidable on our continent. Whenever these occur international help is spontaneously organized and can be very effective. Political friction is set aside and true humanity is expressed.

As a general rule one could establish that in Latin countries the terms of mercy are more important than those of justice.

In an attempt to balance world power, the countries of Europe have grouped us as one "continent", expected to behave homogeneously, but already at the turn of the century, some Latin-American scholars and specialists in international law were insisting on more attention on the idea of regionalism.

One of the more remarkable contributions come from Prof. Alejandro Alvarez of Chile; born in 1864, he died shortly after World War II; he was responsible for developing the study of Comparative Law and the Code of International Law. He took part in the League of Nations and later in the Permanent Court of Justice at The Hague. Together with Lapradelle he founded the Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationaux in Paris. His publications add up to more than one hundred books and papers, all of which stress "regionalism" for Latin-America and develop the concept that the Latin-American countries need a different international order from that of Europe.

In Europe - he says - it is necessary to obtain Peace they do not have, while in Latin-America it is necessary to maintain Peace that is already there.

His philosophy of law stressed the fact that the study of legal norms is not sufficient and that the great principles of law rest of the "sentiment" and "psychology" of countries.

He was responsible for introducing the study of comparative law and sociology in the Universidad de Chile as early as 1896.

However, he knew that this was not sufficient. He continued to insist on the need to establish what he called the "sentiment" of a country and its "psychology".

Today I can add the conviction that irrational thinking and behaviour is more common than rationality, and that European culture is unique in the world inasmuch as it has rejected irrationality and has systemized rational thinking.

Curiously enough, the only continent that has been able to absorb European rationality and to combine it with its native irrationality has been Latin-America, where there have not been noticeable anti-European policies, as those that we can see in countries that have suffered European colonialism of the past century.

Latin-America has a distinctive "sentiment" and a "national psychology" that must be understood if international relations are to be successful.

At the IV International Lawyer's Conference, held in Santiago in October 1945, Prof. Alvarez proposed a "Fundamental Charter of the American Continent", ("Carta Fundamental del Continente Americano") with 41 articles. The first 15 deal with the International American Society.

A brief summary of this proposal :

- a) America is a "family of nations", whose element of union is born through a common historical and geographical heritage : "the

sentiment of solidarity".

- b) This "family" or international society has a specific "international" personality"
- c) Pan-American needs must develop all areas of mutual interest. These are as follows :
 - political area : reform of democracy to comply with the new conditions of social life after World War II.
 - economics : commercial and industrial development, this implies technological transfer.
 - social area : material and moral welfare must be improved. (Elsewhere Alvarez comments favourably on President Roosevelt's proposal of the Human Right of being safeguarded against material poverty).
 - cultural activities : the modernization and development of education, the renewal of the studies concerned with law, political and social sciences. The establishment of a Federation of American universities and an Inter-American University.
 - with regards to international and legal affairs, he suggests the modification of the great principles of international law and the acceptance of a Code of American International Law that he had suggested previously.

The question of solidarity, however is not as homogeneous as Prof. Alvarez suggests, but from the details of his proposal it becomes apparent that he knows complete agreement between countries of the continent is impossible, and so suggests methods of official consultation to achieve peaceful settlement of all disputes.

If we look at recent historical development over the past 40 years, we find that Latin-America seems more and more involved with international economics and less and less with developing regional co-operation.

Alvarez's Charter still seems to point the way.

The Cultural Regions of Latin-America

Let us look now at what the "sentiment" and "psychology" of our Latin countries provide as a basis for regional analysis.

At the time of Columbus' arrival, the continent was occupied by three major areas: Mezzo-America, with the old Aztec and Maya Empires, the Antilles comprising a sort of federation of Caribbean tribes, and the Andean Empire of the Incas.

The rest was made up of very primitive and isolated peoples of whom we still do not know very much.

The Pacific Coast developed a cross-cultural Creole society, with little immigration other than Spanish, African and Asiatic, mingling with the native Indians, all people with a high ability in craftsmanship and artistic

creativity. The Atlantic coast was sparsely peopled by Spaniards and Portuguese, the natives were isolated tribes and the real occupation of the territory began 200 years later than the Pacific, with black Africans first and in the 19th century, European immigration that reached the highest levels of the continent, including the USA.

The Caribbean was invaded and dismembered into colonies by England, France and Holland and received a high proportion of African slaves. The restricted agricultural possibilities of the area make any kind of economic independence an illusion, and oil resources have not helped social development so far.

Mexico presented a different cultural and social pattern. The strong Indian influence that still exists today, received the best intellectual help that Spain could provide. The first University was opened in 1523, and was served by a staff that spent six months in Mexico and six in Spain to be able to bring to America all of the latest developments.

Throughout its history, Mexico has always been closer to Spain than the other countries, and its high intellectual potential could be explained by this fact.

And so the continent acquired different cultural roots and different "rhythms" for development. The varieties of climate and soil are also responsible for substantial differences in the procedures for settling in the so called "new world" which is, in fact, older than the so called "old world".

Trade in the old pre-hispanic times, had established routes for exchange of goods stretching all the way from the Pacific coast into the Amazonian Jungle, and coastal salt was exchanged all the way into central Brazil for a variety of goods, including tropical bird's feathers, as one can easily see in the museums, today.

Later European immigrants have clung to the coast and developed a different kind of trade; Latin-America of today seems to turn its back on the central areas of South America and the coastal strip has been preferred. Only limited penetration up the rivers has opened up part of the region, that constitutes almost half of the continent and still remains to be developed.

Tracing the patterns of colonization, geographical characteristics, urban settlement and cultural pre-hispanic tradition makes it possible to distinguish seven Latin-American regions.

Understanding between countries, as a result of "common sentiment" seems to follow intra-regional relations, and many aspects of co-operation and non-operation could be explained by this cultural map.

The seven Regions that are delineated in MAP 1, (whose area and population are detailed in the following Tables) are as follows :

1. - NEO-AZTEC AMERICA
2. - ANDEAN AMERICA
3. - ATLANTIC AMERICA
4. - AMERICA INCOGNITA
5. - PATAGONIAN AMERICA
6. - AMERICA/ANTARTICA
7. - AMERICA DISPERSA

(SEE MAP)

These seven Regions can be grouped in three ways :

- a) Nuclear Regions : that concentrate population with intellectual and cultural potential. The NEO-AZTEC, ANDEAN, and ATLANTIC Regions combine 77% of the population in 41% of the territory.
- b) Dependent Regions : comprising the part of the continent that is still fairly unknown and depopulated and depend on the Nuclear Regions for development. These are : AMERICA INCOGNITA, PATAGONIAN AMERICA and AMERICA ANTARTICA, that add up to 53% of the territory with only 12% of the population.
- c) Non-Latin Regions : that include all of the countries, colonies and possessions that do not have a specific cultural profile and whose population is extra-continental and remains, for the better part, foreign to the rest of the continent. They have been grouped under : AMERICA DISPERSA and occupy 6% of the territory with 11% of the population.

The figures for area and population in 1970 and estimates for the year 2000 are found in the TABLES.

(Data on population from Sanchez-Albornoz: "La poblacion de America Latina" - Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1973.)

1. NEO-AZTEC AMERICA :

Comprises all the area "south of the border" from USA down to the middle of Honduras, covering the seat of the old pre-hispanic empires.

With 11% of the total territory it had 22% of the population in 1970 growing rapidly to 26% estimated for the year 2000 when its density of population will be the highest in Latin-America.

A strong Indian tradition coupled with high intellectuality and the advantage of having been the Spanish colony that remained closest to the mother country, give this Region a considerable element of self-assurance.

The fact that Mexico, Guatemala and El Salvador are countries that are completely included in one cultural region gives them a high political stability.

The fast growing population that will attain 73.0 inhabitants per square kilometre by the year 2000 makes this Region, culturally, the strongest in the continent.

National identity is very developed, especially as Mexico has to bear the competitive atmosphere of anglo-saxon USA.

2. ANDEAN AMERICA :

A very homogeneous Region formed with a highly developed Indian culture flourishing at the time of the conquest by Spain.

Comparatively, this territory is larger than the Neo-Aztec, covering 15% of the total with 22% of the population in 1970, declining to an expected 19%

in the year 2000.

With a high level of artistic capacity, the metallurgical and agricultural technology of the Inca Empire surpassed all of the Spaniards' crude mediaeval information. The cross-cultural approach between the two cultures was achieved with greater uniformity and mutual appreciation than elsewhere on the continent.

Indian cultures are alive and active today, but thrive to a greater extent in the Region known as America Incognita; the Creole society of this Region received little immigration from Europe other than the Spanish conquerors and colonists. However, about 30% of these came from Andalucia and brought with them the Moorish culture and style from the mediterranean; at a later time some Chinese and Polynesian groups arrived at the coast and a small number of black African slaves.

It seems that the countries of this Region show a greater tendency to Regional co-operation between themselves, than those of other Regions.

The general level of knowledge and education is higher in this region, than in the rest of the continent.

The first ideas of Independence originated in this area : Bolivar, Miranda, Rodriguez and Sucre from Venezuela, Egana, Carrera and O'Higgins from Chile. The universities of this Region are of good standing and repute and there is a better relationship between them than with the universities on the Atlantic Coast.

Economic development is slow, since the people of the Andean Region have a timeless psychology, but at the same time, 10,000 years of continued occupation of an area that comprises large deserts and very high plateaux, where life is extremely difficult, give the Andean people a potential strength that is deeply rooted in their geography and that will show little change.

3. ATLANTIC AMERICA :

Covering the coastal region of Brazil, from the Amazon's delta south, all of Uruguay, the eastern part of Paraguay, the Argentinian territory known as Entrerrios and the coast from Buenos Aires to Bahia Blanca, this Region comprises a similar territory to the Andean, 15% of the total but with a higher population, estimated at 33% in 1970 and declining to 32% by the year 2000.

The process of formation of the Atlantic society in South America has followed a completely different process from the two preceeding Regions.

The settlement of Spaniards and Portuguese was accomplished on a much more restricted level than in Mexico or the Andes. There was little mixing between the conquerors and the Indian groups, which did not coalesce into large societies like the Aztec, Maya and Inca Empires, but rather tended to form small and extremely isolated groups.

The population only began to grow visibly in the 17th and 18th Centuries when the greatest number of African slaves were brought onto the continent. During the 19th Century, after independence, a stream of European immigration : Germans, Poles, English, Italian, Irish and Spaniards, gave this Region its characteristics. It must be noted that European immigrants into

Brazil and Argentina surpassed in numbers those that settled in the USA.

Immigrant psychology is different from that of old countries firmly rooted in their traditions, like the Andean peoples. The immigrant leaves home seeking success and wealth which he is compelled to achieve in his new land. Once settled in he usually becomes fanatically nationalistic and aggressive in politics.

Both Brazil and Argentina show a national "sentiment" of superiority over others that contrast with the passive strength of the Andean Region and the cultural self-assurance of the Neo-Aztec.

In some ways, the Atlantic countries are a counterpart of those on the Pacific littoral.

80% of Brazil's population occupy this Region near the coast, and the remaining 20% are disseminated over the enormous Amazonic basin and the Matto Grosso, forming an effective barrier to cultural and commercial exchange with the countries on the Pacific.

50% of Argentina's population forms this Region, and 100% of Uruguay's.

In this way it can be seen that Argentina is subdivided into four regions and therefore has a more difficult political situation than Brazil and Uruguay.

One can see from this Map, we have two main Argentinas : the Atlantic, formed by late European immigration, and the Andean formed by the slow process of crosscultural relations between Spaniards and Indians. Both are separated by the Pampa, a large flat uninhabited area.

In this way one gathers that there is a measure of Regional co-operation developed within the boundaries of Brazil and Argentina, in which their federal organization gives the central government the responsibility for developing and financing the interior.

4. AMERICA INCOGNITA :

Occupying 41% of the total territory with only 11% of the population, this region remains quite unknown. The coastal Regions have penetrated into it up the main rivers: Amazon, Orinoco and Parana, and most of the population is found near them.

It appears as a centre of potential resources, of which very little has been utilized : wood, rubber and lately hydro-electric power at the Iguazu Falls.

The possible development of this Region depends on the countries involved : Venezuela and Colombia for the Llanos, Ecuador, and Peru on the West and Brazil on the East for the Amazon Basin, where Ecuador is at present drilling oil. Bolivia and Paraguay for the Chaco, Brazil for the Matto Grosso, and Argentina for the Pampa.

No doubt, a considerable amount of Regional co-operation will be required to develop this huge Region.

Only one important city is to be found : Brasilia, artificially located and a symbol of the progressive policy of Brazil.

The Argentinian Pampa is a sort of barrier between two parts of the same country, in much the same way as the Chaco is a barrier between Bolivia and Paraguay.

Border problems and friction originated all around this geographically difficult Region.

5. PATAGONIAN AMERICA :

This southern zone is also a Region with natural resource potential, both Chile and Argentina drill oil and have extensive cattle and sheep farming.

On the Pacific coast sea-food is plentiful and the natural beauty of this Region makes it specially adaptable to world tourism.

It occupies 4% of the total territory with very little population : only 1%.

There is a small university at Punta Arenas, in Chile, and a few small towns separated, again, by enormous distances.

The development of this Region rests with the central governments of Chile and Argentina who are particularly interested in it as an approach to Antarctica.

Culturally, the old Indian traditions have disappeared and the limited and low density of its population does not achieve a special psychological profile.

6. AMERICA ANTARTICA :

If there is one Region in the world open to Regional co-operation it is this one.

Of the total continent, the Latin-American part covers 2.000.000 square kilometres, and the only population is made up by the various scientific teams that work in the Region, all of them located on Chilean territory, that includes the only part of the continent that is north of the ice limit on the ocean.

An interesting experiment in Antarctic living has been started this year (1984) by Chilean families that have taken up residence on the continent and begun to organize social life.

The future of this Region is of world interest and may become the testing ground for the new international order that must come about.

7. AMERICA DISPERSA :

Last but not least, we find this non-Latin Region, where a cultural tradition is dispersed over nine different countries and numerous islands, mainland colonies and possessions of the UK, France, Holland and the USA.

A variety of languages and dialects are spoken here, with prominent contributions of African origin.

Discovered by Columbus and first occupied by Spain, its islands attracted gold miners first, and oilmen later. Agriculture is limited to sugar, tobacco and tropical fruit on the coast and coffee on the highlands, so all of the countries are stuck with monoproduction and therefore are easy prey for colonialism, either political, economic or both.

The Spanish colonization organized universities in Santo Domingo and La Habana, at an early date, followed by San Juan in Puerto Rico; these islands became literary and intellectual centres in America.

English, French and Dutch colonial efforts were less spiritual.

Large numbers of black slaves were shipped from Africa to work the cane fields and we find, today, a region in which there are such dramatic situations as the Soviet control of Cuba, the war in Nicaragua, the permanent migration of Spanish speaking peoples from the Caribbean to the USA, generally inadequate education and all the problems that attend tropical climates.

It occupies only 6% of the territory, with 11% of the population, pointing to a growing density that will make living conditions progressively worse, and since the educational level is low, possibilities of migration are limited to higher educated people, mainly in the Spanish speaking countries.

The diversity of governments, the complicated racial mix and the restricted resources will maintain this region as a depressed area, requiring continual external help.

Hopefully, the future strong development of the Neo-Aztec Region should balance this situation by incorporating the whole of Central America into a more coherent international system.

The islands, however, present specific problems for development, and the distance from the colonies to their European owners is not only geographical but also psychological.

The three nuclear regions of Latin America, that represent all the old tradition and "sentiment", coupled with the understanding of Europe as a friendly continent, confront the growing menace of the Caribbean and the central American states that make up the America Dispersa. With all the bitterness of colonial experience and the numerous racial problems, suffering from endemic poverty and low level education, it is not strange that Castro's policies can achieve rapid development.

The high level of migration towards the USA on the part of Spanish-speaking Caribbeans, accelerates the loss of intellectual potential, giving Cuba a leading role in the region.

In conclusion

Latin-America is a concept covering a diversity of cultures and traditions, that today can be understood as grouped in seven Regions, all made up by countries of portions of them, and presenting many problems of inter-regional co-operation.

The hispanic rule which gave the continent an undoubtedly similar profile, was built on the solidarity and cultural sentiment already achieved by the Indian societies.

Aztec, Maya and Inca political wisdom, had operated a psychology of co-operation to make living possible in a very complicated geography.

However, co-operation between Governments is scarce and only nominal, but business and personal co-operation is usual and operates successfully.

Some of the countries belong only in one cultural Region : Mexico, Uruguay, and Guatemala, tend to show considerable political stability. Others extend over two regions such as the Andean countries who are partly responsible for the interior of the continent, and these also show a tradition for political stability, since the Incognita Region has for the moment only unrealised potential.

However, countries like Argentina and Venezuela, which cut across several cultural Regions with differing characteristics, tend towards political instability, and make one think that national boundaries are artificial and often unjustified on this continent. If Latin-American countries were to find their way to agree a Charter for a new international order continent-wide, not dependent on the USA for support and approval, regional co-operation would advance considerably.

If these countries were to recognise the cultural areas presented to you in this paper, many local agreements could pave the way for such a Charter. With weak governments, the issues concerning inter-American problems, such as boundaries, trade, etc. become good excuses for political campaigns and smoke screens to cover national deficiencies.

Latin-America should look after Latin-America. The kind of technological help that operates between Chile and Ecuador, for instance, is a good example of the possibilities in this direction, but the bait of foreign financial help for new projects, keeps the doors of Latin-America open to present-day investors who produce changes in the cultural traits that make up national identity.

I am convinced that the future of the world lies in the southern hemisphere, and that the issues of Latin-American and African development and the social philosophy that this entails will become the basis for a new era of civilization in the world.

CULTURAL REGIONS OF LATIN-AMERICA (Escobar)

<u>Region</u>	<u>Area</u> (x 1.000 km ²)	<u>Population</u>		<u>inh./km²</u> <u>2000</u>
		<u>1970</u> (x 1.000.000)	<u>2000</u>	
Neo-Aztec America	2.171	60,7	161,5	73,0
Andean America	3.330	60,2	143,0	42,6
Atlantic America	3.358	91,8	201,7	60,0
<hr/>				
America Incognita	9.448	32,3	67,2	7,1
Patagonian America	772	4,0	6,0	7,7
America Antartica	2.000 approx.	-	-	?
<hr/>				
America Dispersa	1.454	30,6	66,9	46,1

DISTRIBUTION OF TERRITORY AND POPULATION IN THE CULTURAL REGIONS OF
LATIN-AMERICA

<u>Region</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Population</u>	
		<u>1970</u>	<u>2000</u>
I Nuclear Regions:			
NEO-AZTEC AMERICA	11%	22%	26%
ANDEAN AMERICA	15%	22%	19%
ATLANTIC AMERICA	15%	33%	32%
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Sub-total :	41%	77%	77%

II Dependent Regions:			
AMERICA INCOGNITA	40%	11%	11%
PATAGONIAN AMERICA	4%	1%	1%
AMERICA ANTARTICA	9%	-	-
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Sub-total :	53%	12%	12%

III Non-Latin Regions:

AMERICA DISPERSA	6%	11%	11%
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REGIONALISM - THE CARIBBEAN/LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

George Dhanny

It is paradoxical that at a time when co-operation among developing countries appears to be most critical, most of the integration arrangements in the third world are undergoing tension and crisis. Whether it is the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), the Central American Common Market (CACM), or the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA), which became the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in 1973, they are all beset with problems.

Historically, both regions have been penetrated and dominated by external powers to an extent which has resulted in serious economic and technological dependency. The states which are now Latin America and those which comprise the Caribbean, once formed part of empires with different cultures and methods of dominion. The Spanish discoverers decimated the natives on the islands and merged with those in the ruling class, forming half-caste populations that developed a culture of their own and an early feeling of nationality. The negroes on the islands became an overwhelming ethnical majority, segregated by the small minority of metropolitan origin. The Caribbean witnessed endless wars between the colonial empires; it became a battlefield and a ground favoured by pirates and adventurers. Hence there was little scope for a profitable interchange of merchandise or of ideas.

Several of the Latin American countries inherited the conflict fed during the anti-imperialist wars; Argentina's claim on the Malvinas/Falkland islands, Venezuela's on Guyana, Guatemala and Mexico on British Honduras. The former English colonies, on becoming independent, were thus faced with political and legal complications for reasons foreign to their acts or omissions.

To add to these problems, there are cultural differences, levels of development, the identity of agricultural economy and trade associations which make them dependents of different metropolises. As far as the Caribbean is concerned, not unlike Latin America, it has now become an integral part of the world economy with little choice for the region but to continue those traditional links. Some attempt doubtless has been made to diversify these international ties and deepen the national economies of the region. But notwithstanding the Caribbean preoccupation with the external world, this preoccupation has demonstrated little interest in the neighbouring states of Latin America. The historical reason for this lack of interest is the direct consequence of respective colonial policies of exclusive vertical relations with European states. It is only during the past twenty-five years or so that Caribbean states have sought to change progressively the constitutional nature of this metropolitan link. Even in Latin America, where the majority of states have been independent since the early decades of the 19th century, there is still considerable preoccupation with the excessive influence of external economic power on the economy and politics of the region today.

Economically, both the Caribbean and Latin/American regions remain structurally weak and dependent. But quite independently of each other,

the two groups of countries have sought the same framework for analysing problems and have proposed the same mechanism for advancing the process of economic development, i.e. economic integration. It is of interest to note that their respective attempts at economic integration have followed a similar pattern.

The Latin American experience preceded its Caribbean counterpart by a decade. This experience helps to explain some of the tensions and crises which inevitably arise when countries attempt to integrate their economies. The present crisis in CARICOM derives from fundamental economic, structural and political factors and external relationships characteristic of both the wider Latin American region and the Caribbean subregion.

The Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) embraced eleven countries of Latin America : Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela and Uruguay, comprising more than 90% of the territory, population and GDP of the wider region.

The Andean Pact among Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela was originally designed to accelerate the process of integration within those five countries in order to improve their positions in negotiations with the remaining members of LAFTA.

The Central American Common Market (CACM) includes five countries : Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica.

The idea of integration in Latin America during the 1960's was inspired by the success of the 1957 Treaty of Rome which established the European Common Market. Thus the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) was created in 1960, the Central American Common Market in 1962 and the Andean Group in 1969.

In the Caribbean, 1958 saw the establishment of the West Indies Federation. It was heralded at home and abroad with optimism and hope of new dignity for the region. Soon however, the experiment yielded to self-doubt, suspicion and fear of political union. Thus ended the ideal of regional co-operation at the political level; but at the economic level, the idea of co-operation was still alive.

The stimulus for a fresh attempt was provided by CARIFTA which added a new surge of enthusiasm for the idea of community, which in turn culminated in the establishment in 1973 of the Caribbean Community and Common Market as an acceptable compromise in the struggle to achieve regional co-operation. Even so, the constant threat of some alternative form of fragmentation or inconsequential world status still plagues attempts at integration.

In the Caribbean, as well as in Latin America, the idea of regional integration has been closely linked to the idea of economic development. Regional integration has been seen primarily as a means of accelerating the industrialization of these primary product societies and of achieving the desired goal of economic development.

In the immediate post-World War II period, when concern with economic development became the subject of new approaches geared specifically to conditions in Latin America, the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) provided the crucible for the new ideas of regional economists. The works of Raul Prebisch had a distinctive impact on current thought on economic development in the region and pointed directly in the direction of industrialization and regional economic integration as the formula which would provide larger markets for the region.

Subsequently, Caribbean scholars, with Arthur Lewis at the forefront, were also proposing the industrialization and diversification route to development. Operating from the same premise as the Latin American economists, namely the failure of traditional exports to generate sufficient employment and earnings, Caribbean economists were independently adopting the philosophy of industrialization for economic development.

The corollary of this philosophy was the need for markets wider than those provided by individual countries. Lewis' recommendations for industrial development for the Caribbean were based therefore on the premise of a customs union and a political framework for policy making.

Inspired by the experience of Puerto Rico, individual countries of the region embraced Lewis' industrialization recommendation, and each embarked on its own strategy of import substitution. But this policy was not extended into collective regional action, not even during the period of political federation from 1958 to 1962. The Federation was a political union which lacked the strength to deal with economic development on a regional basis. Consequently, the collapse of the political arrangements was not accompanied by the demise of the intellectual justification for regional integration as a means of accelerating the process of economic development.

During the period 1962 and 1968 no significant actions were taken on regional economic co-operation; but ideas of economists associated with the New World Group and the University of the West Indies flourished. Conferences of Heads of Government of Caribbean states were held at fairly regular intervals and various proposals were put forward, including : the formation of a Caribbean economic community; unitary statehood of Trinidad and Eastern Caribbean islands; and federation among the Eastern Caribbean islands themselves. The inspiration for these initiatives came from governmental rather than academic circles and still centred around the need for industrialization ("by invitation") to deal with the problem of development.

Concomitantly, this was the period of the achievement of political independence by several Caribbean countries and the dichotomy between political independence and the reality of economic dependence emerged.

Concern was now directed towards external dependency and the need for regional economic integration as a means of accelerating economic development and minimizing this dependency. A well-known economist, Alister McIntyre, provided an analysis of dependence as arising from the structure of the economy, i.e. "structural dependence" and a counter strategy of "resource combination" facilitated by a regional integration framework. The Latin American experience played an important part in the development

of Caribbean thinking on integration at this time. Furthermore, the common concern in both regions with the failure of the "industrialization by invitation" approach to development was bolstered by the Caribbean preoccupation with the small size of the economic units.

In his well-known work, the Economics of Development in Small Countries with Special Reference to the Caribbean, William Demas attributed a central place to regional integration in the economies of the development of the Caribbean. His approach differed from Lewis'. Basing his argument on the small size of the economies of the region, Demas showed that trade, specialization, economies of scale and particularly export of manufactures to world markets, were essential to the development and transformation of the economies. He further argued that the special problems in economic development created by small size made regional economic integration all the more vital for enlarging the size of the economic unit and for allowing for wider opportunities for structural transformation. His strong advocacy of regional integration is well illustrated by his work in piloting the idea through CARIFTA, CARICOM and the associated institution, the Caribbean Development Bank.

This was followed by a study undertaken by two Economists at the University of the West Indies at the behest of the Governments of the region. The study advised against the creation of a free trade area since, they argued, this would be an inadequate institution for dealing with the problems of development. Instead, they recommended the integrating of key sectors of production in the region. This would allow for the pooling of resources, particularly the natural resources of the region, thereby maximizing the benefits of these resources. An additional benefit of this approach, they suggested, was that the necessary planning and co-ordination for the use of resources would also force the governments of the region to tackle the issue of the presence and power of the multinational corporations in the field of natural resource exploitation.

By this time, the issue of the power of multinational corporations and their influence on the process of economic development and regional integration itself were becoming important in the thinking on integration, not only in the Caribbean, but even more so in Latin America. Such thinking led to an analysis of the origins and causes of underdevelopment and to provide basic analyses of how the region's economies functioned. This approach emphasized the role of domestic institutions and external relationships in explaining the process of economic development in this region of the world. Such analysis was directly influenced by the Latin American structuralist school which had in turn undertaken close examination of the multinational corporation as an institution and had offered significant theories regarding the relationship between development and underdevelopment.

In the decade of the 1960's, international agencies were themselves promoting the idea of regional integration as an instrument to accelerate the process of economic development and this further influenced Caribbean thought in this regard.

It is to be noted, as previously mentioned, McIntyre, in discussing the benefits of regional integration, had argued from the approach of the

"resource combination" that would be facilitated, while Thomas and Brewster in their study referred to before, had stressed the "regional programming of production" approach. These economists were very concerned about the possibilities of rationalizing production and trade in the region; and here the issue of the multinational corporation loomed large. Some economists argued that the method of operation of the large corporations, transcending national boundaries (i.e. corporate integration) could result in regional fragmentation, not only within a region such as the Caribbean, but also between regions, so as to form, for example, obstacles to Caribbean-Latin American integration.

And now an assessment of the integration experience in the wider region of Latin America and in the subregion of the Caribbean:

The decade of the 1960's when all the various integration movements came into being, also saw alternatives for economic growth and development in Latin America. It will be recalled that the decade up to the oil crisis was unprecedented prosperity. Latin American enjoyed the fruits of this increase in world trade by growing at 6 per cent annually between 1963 and 1973. The pursuit of integration therefore, was not as vigorous as it might have been if the world economic situation were different. While significant achievements occurred initially, it became evident that the various integration processes were not fulfilling the expectations of their promoters.

A study of the experience of the Andean Group is useful in illustrating the more general principles of the central theme; namely, the importance of differences in the level of industrial development in explaining conflicts between countries in regional integration; and further, the manner in which the different levels of development can generate interests which can be antagonistic to the process of integration itself. The study illustrates that conflict is intrinsic in the operation of the mechanisms of regional integration, so that, for example, in negotiations for a common external tariff, one of the most common mechanisms of economic integration, conflict arises between the most advanced countries in whose national interest it is to have lower tariff and lower costs for international competitiveness, and the relatively less industrialized countries who want the high tariff protection in order to build up their new industries.

The study points to the strength of nationalism in the constant pull between national and regional goals, and suggests that each country joins a regional integration movement seeking greater development for itself; so that the development of the integrated whole is never a national priority.

Consequently, the goals of integration expressed as balanced regional development and equity in distribution of benefits, inevitably become incompatible with the individual national pursuit of accelerated economic development or for that matter, political and diplomatic priorities. The study gives useful insights into the strength and weakness of regional experiments at a time when crisis and stalemate have beset most movements.

The early attempts at regional integration in Latin America have yielded limited success. Notwithstanding this, many Latin American

countries are convinced that integration is the major instrument that the region has for promoting economic growth and development over the medium and long-term. And so current debate appears to be shifting to the new groupings - the Latin American Integration Economic System (SELA) and ALADI - the Latin American Integration Association (1982) as well as more loosely knit forms of economic co-operation.

A look at the experience of CARICOM, in the context of the Latin American region, shows that progress has been made in similar areas of activity; tensions and adjustments have been similar; weakness and crisis in similar circumstances have been followed by queries about the usefulness of the concept of economic integration in addressing the problems which seem to be inherent in the nature of the development itself, which the movements are trying to address. In the contradictions which national and international policy bring to this process, one can have a brief look at the CARICOM subregion in its three fundamental areas of activity; (i) economic integration (free trade and integration of production); (ii) functional co-operation; (iii) co-ordination of foreign policies.

The CARICOM experience echoes that of the CACM where undoubted progress was made in trade, but not in the productive structure, and serious controversies arose over the distribution of benefits. Here the signal role of free trade was also identified and it was argued that the operation of trade was left to the mercy of market forces, since one of the few corrective mechanisms - the Regime for Integration industries - was hardly applied. As a result, new investments were channelled to countries with the largest markets and greater physical and human infrastructure. The Andean Group had a similar experience. What this experience demonstrates is the difficulties in implementing the integrated development approach necessary for economic integration.

In the areas of functional co-operation, the least controversial achievements have been registered in CARICOM. In shipping, health, higher education, technical assistance, etc., the cost of common services has been shared until the problems of balance of payments started to affect some of the member states. Obviously, these are stepping stones in regional co-operation and supporting services necessary for fully functioning economic integration.

The co-ordination of foreign policies is probably the most important aspect of the Caribbean Community. It represents a new departure in regional co-operation. It is to be noted that there is no similar experience in the Latin American integration movements.

One rationale for the policy of co-ordination for foreign policies has been a desire to alter the basis on which CARICOM countries participate in the world economy. It is seen as one way of altering the dependent nature of the relationship with the industrialized world.

Two broad aspects of the co-ordination of foreign policies within CARICOM can be identified. The first stems from the rationale of the Treaty and is mainly economic in consideration. The objective is to pool the bargaining power of the small states in order to gain maximum benefits in dealing with the large power blocs of the global economy. The second

aspect is the response to geo-political considerations which have grown stronger now that the region is once more faced with the prospect of becoming an area of international conflict.

Since its beginning ten years ago, CARICOM has witnessed the successful co-ordination of the policies of member states at forums such as the ACP, the UN and the OAS. In the field of foreign economic policy, there has been a tendency to seek bilateral solutions or special relationships with extra-regional states. This is obviously detrimental to regional integration. Such tendencies are exhibited most strongly when economic aid and foreign investment were involved.

The Caribbean Basin Initiative is a case in point. It was conceived as a programme to deal with the conflict in Central America based on US perception of that conflict as an ideological struggle. Like its predecessor, the Alliance for Progress, the CBI is to be superimposed on the development-orientated governments of the region and it has already become entangled in the debate on the nature and direction of the development process itself. The CBI has not so far received a visible co-ordinated foreign policy response of the Caribbean Community, although it purports to entail major developmental consequences for the whole region. The US-led invasion of Grenada is yet another instance when the CARICOM states failed to adopt a co-ordinated stand.

And now, some concluding observations. Integration movements in Latin America and the Caribbean, geared to achieving the goal of economic development of the countries of the region, have so far not been successful. *Regional functioning itself seemed to require some minimum of economic development at the national level as well as co-ordinated economic planning at the regional level, two processes which set in motion a series of conflicts which were themselves destructive of the co-operative ideal.*

The CARICOM experience over a decade demonstrates the predictable increase in intra-regional trade and the consequential conflicts between the weaker and stronger states over the distribution of benefits from such trade; the incapacity of the compensatory mechanisms to bring about equitable distribution and the consequent polarization of industrial development; the difficulties and non-implementation of the crucial areas of integration of production and the control of foreign investments in the region; the never-abating national versus regional pull; and the constant threat of bilateralism as countries are lured by the short run prospects of "going it alone" or of cultivating "special relationships" with major power. The current crisis in regional integration in both Latin America and the Caribbean probably indicates that the combination of economic, political and institutional resources, is not up to the task of dealing with these gigantic problems. And so, the search for new institutional forms continues while the process of regional co-operation continues.

Such search is necessary if only because there are no alternatives at present. The all-pervasive nature of the crisis in the international economy and the persistent nature of the dependent relationship with the world economy combine to keep the hopes of regional co-operation and integration alive. Indeed, it is still the only framework envisaged for dealing with the chronic problems of unemployment and poverty in the poorer nations in the face of the external problems generated when the industrial nations tackle their own problems of slow growth, energy and inflation.

ECOWAS AND OTHER REGIONAL BUILDING BLOCKS IN WEST AFRICA

Helen Kitchen

The Road to Lagos

For those of us who have monitored developments and trends throughout the African continent for several decades, a half dozen or so events since World War II warrant the designation "landmark" in the sense that they represent a basic change in the way African political entities relate to each other and the larger international community :

- President Franklin Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms" speech of 1941 was one such landmark, in that it and the Atlantic Charter that followed, accorded legitimacy to decolonization.

- The year 1948, when the National Party came to power in South Africa and made apartheid the law of the land, had the effect inter alia of providing all of Africa beyond your borders with one issue on which leaders could invariably find a unity of view when all else failed.

- 1951 belongs on any "watershed" list because the granting of independence to Libya that year marked the beginning of what would become over the next decade and a half a massive transformation of the political character of the continent's constituent parts.

- A landmark of another kind was recorded in 1958, when Sudan's Prime Minister Abdalla Khalil was removed from office in the continent's first military coup of the independence era. Today more than a third of Africa's states are led by men who came to power through military intervention.

- The founding of the Organization of African Unity in 1963 established the principle that the interests of all of the nations of North and sub-Saharan Africa would be better served by building a web of institutionalized relationships for "reasoning together" on a regularized basis than by fragmenting under the pressures of their diversity.

- 1969 has a special importance, because in that year 13 African governments drew up what was henceforth known as "the Lusaka Manifesto", subsequently endorsed by the OAU and submitted to the UN as a formal statement of the collective African attitude toward the white-ruled countries of southern Africa. As would be expected, this document rejects any government that adopts "a philosophy of deliberate and permanent discrimination between its citizens on grounds of racial origin." But it also accepts that "all the peoples who have made their homes in the countries of Southern Africa are Africans, regardless of the colour of their skins", and expresses a strong preference for peaceful solutions to the problems of the region : "If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible, if changed circumstances were to make it possible in the future, we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle, even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change."

South Africans might be inclined to add 1975 (the year of the final collapse of Portuguese colonial rule in southern Africa) and 1979 (the end of UDI in Rhodesia) as seminal years, but for most of Africa these were delayed but inevitable continuations of the sequence that began in Libya in 1951.

- Another landmark event, which brings us to the topic I have been asked to address, was the OAU's first extraordinary summit devoted exclusively to African economic problems and relationships - held in Lagos, Nigeria, in 1980. This meeting was extraordinary in fact as well as in name, because the participants : (1) largely eschewed the rhetoric of earlier years blaming Africa's mounting economic woes primarily on colonial rule; (2) spoke bluntly of the extent to which their own "incoherent policies", "divergent ideologies", and continuing tendencies to accept the notion of Africa as a collection of appendages of the developed world were imperilling the continent's economic survival; and (3) drew up a plan of action for creating an Africa-wide economic community. This document, known as the "Lagos Plan of Action", called for priority attention in the first 10-year stage to strengthening existing regional and functional economic groupings and creating new ones, with special emphasis on furthering "harmonization" in the crucial areas of food production, energy, industry, transport and communications.

Categories of Regional Organizations

Although plans for an East African Federation of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania - a logical and promising community that was on the drawing board as early as 1924 - foundered as the three countries moved on separate tracks into independence, the trend elsewhere in Africa has been toward a proliferation of the "building blocks" endorsed in the Lagos Plan of Action. The majority bring together a few countries in pursuit of specific shared goals, such as utilizing a river or lake (e.g. the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the River Niger Commission) or improving a particular field of agriculture (e.g. the African Groundnut Council and the West African Rice Development Association). Another category of organizations aims at the economic development of certain sectors or regions of member states, usually through the distribution of financial resources contributed to a common fund by members and particularly by outside donors - for example, the Conseil de l'Entente, the Organisation de Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal (OMVS), and the Comité Permanent Inter-états de Lutte Contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel (CILSS). Finally, there are a number of more ambitious organizations whose long-term aim is to promote economic integration among their members, notably the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), SADCC, the new 14-nation Preferential Trade Area (PTA) in eastern and southern Africa, and the institutions linking the francophone states.

ECOWAS in Context

Of the regional groupings that are concerned with economic integration, four in West Africa warrant our attention :

The Francophone Cluster

The currencies of 14 African countries, including eight in West Africa, are freely convertible into French francs at a fixed rate of exchange. These states hold their reserves mainly in francs in the French Treasury, carrying out exchanges on the Paris market. Except for Guinea and Mauritania, all of the countries that formerly made up French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa are in the "franc zone", as are Cameroon, Togo, the Comoros, and the former Spanish colony of Equatorial Guinea. The former French territories are grouped within the currency areas

that existed prior to independence, each group having its own currency (called the CFA franc, with the initials standing for Communauté Financière Africaine in West Africa and for Coopération Financière en Afrique Centrale in Central Africa) issued by a central bank. France's ties with these countries include not just monetary links but a wide range of financial and technical assistance as well as trade (African commerce accounted for 12 percent of France's total trade in the early 1980s). The discipline imposed by use of a "hard" currency is viewed as a significant factor in the relative prosperity of such countries as Congo and Ivory Coast.¹

Associated with this system are the Union Monétaire Ouest-Africaine (West African Monetary Union, UMOA) and the Union Douanière et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale (Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa, UDEAC). UDEAC - which includes Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, and (as of December 1983) Equatorial Guinea - encourages free trade among member states, has a common external tariff for imports from outside the group, and adheres to a common investment policy code.

The CEAO

The Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) came into effect in 1974 as a replacement for the moribund Union Douanière des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest. Members of the CEAO are Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta; Benin and Togo have "observer" status. All of these member and observer countries except Mauritania are in the CFA family. The objective of the CEAO is to establish a customs union, in which free trade in certain commodities, free movement of labor, a common external tariff, and a common fund to compensate member countries adversely affected by the new arrangements are envisaged. Considerable progress has been made toward these goals: a number of products are traded within the community free of tariffs; a "regional cooperation tax" has been introduced to replace country tariffs on certain industrial products; two community development funds have been established; and an agreement regarding free labor circulation and residence rights was signed by the six member states in 1978. In 1977, the CEAO countries plus Togo signed a Nonaggression and Defense Aid Agreement (ANAD).

ECOWAS

In 1967, ministerial-level delegations from 14 West African states met in Accra to agree on "articles of association" for the establishment of a "West African Economic Community"; at a 1968 follow-up meeting in Monrovia, leaders and senior officials from nine of these states signed a protocol incorporating the Accra articles and approving in principle the establishment of a West African Regional Group. This entity, however, never became an active force.

The next significant steps toward integration did not come until after the Nigerian civil war. In 1972, the leaders of Nigeria and Togo established an economic community that was intended "as an embryo" for an envisaged larger regional grouping. Negotiations toward that end began in 1973, and came to fruition in May 1975, when 15 heads of state gathered in Lagos to sign a treaty joining their countries in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Cape Verde entered the grouping in 1977.

In a very useful 1982 contribution to our briefing papers periodical: CSIS Africa Notes, Dr. Carol Lancaster argues that major motivations for Nigeria's efforts to make ECOWAS a reality were its interest in "strengthening (its') leadership in West Africa and, consequently, reducing French influence in the region." She also notes the irony that "ECOWAS and the CEAO owe a lot to each other. Nigerian efforts to create ECOWAS and efforts by key francophone states, supported by France, to create and strengthen the CEAO were mutually reinforcing. The more effort the one side made, the more effort was stimulated on the other side."²

ECOWAS includes all the CEAO member states plus Benin, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Togo. The land area covered by ECOWAS is some 2.4 million square miles (about one-fifth the area of Africa as a whole) and the combined population of the ECOWAS states is an estimated 135 million. The grouping is heterogeneous in terms of wealth and development, ranging from landlocked and resource-poor Upper Volta and Mali to Nigeria and industrially and agriculturally progressive Ivory Coast. Fourteen of the ECOWAS states have been affected by the Africa-wide drought of 1982-1984, and two (Ghana and Mauritania) are among the four African states most seriously stricken.

Broadly speaking, the goals of ECOWAS are similar to those of the CEAO: currency integration, free movement of persons among member countries, the replacement of tariff barriers to trade among group members by a common external tariff, and cooperation in agriculture and industry. The organization's Fund for Cooperation, Compensation, and Development is intended to compensate those member states suffering economic loss as a result of movement toward trade liberalization, and to finance regional development projects. The Fund's authorized capital is \$500 million (to be obtained through assessments on member states and through international loans); as of late 1982, its paid-up capital was only about \$50 million. The Fund made its first loan at the mid-1983 ECOWAS summit in Conakry, Guinea (\$3 million to Mali in support of a \$35 million regional telecommunications project).

While ECOWAS has made some progress since 1975 toward its objectives, the optimism that marked its launching no longer bubbles, and the organization's future is uncertain. The largest single constraint remains the love-hate relationship with its francophone "Siamese twin", the CEAO. ECOWAS members that are also affiliated with the francophone organization have been reluctant to forego the bird-in-hand benefits they receive from the existing CEAO arrangements for the uncertain rewards of participation in a larger economic union that remains partly on the drawing board. The implications of this impasse extend beyond West Africa, raising questions not answered in the Lagos Plan of Action. How does Africa get around the reality that success in establishing regional economic cooperation on a small or medium scale tends to impede movement toward more comprehensive (much less continental) integration? In this jockeying between intertwined entities that do not necessarily wish each other well, one can also find certain parallels with SADCC's situation vis-à-vis South Africa.

ECOWAS' founders, aware of the potential for tension between the region's anglophone and francophone groupings, attempted to finesse it by establishing the "side-payments" Fund mentioned above and by balancing the

staffing and locale of the organization's institutions. The executive secretary is a U.S - trained Ivorian, Dr. Aboubacar Diaby-Ouattara, while the executive secretariat headquarters are located in Lagos. The two successive managing directors of the Fund have been Liberians, while its headquarters are in Lomé, Togo. Soon after ECOWAS came into being, however, the executive secretary and the Fund's first managing director quarrelled over the extent of the former's authority over the latter. The squabble was not resolved until 1979, when the Fund director was dismissed and replaced; meanwhile, some of ECOWAS' planned activities languished.

One area in which the CEAO/ECOWAS dichotomy has had an especially serious impact is that of monetary unification efforts. The very success of the francophone cluster's monetary arrangements and the economic malaise that has afflicted many countries outside the franc zone, make the CEAO states apprehensive about flinging aside their CFA-franc life preserver -- exemplified by their rejection of a proposal to permit the issuance of ECOWAS gold coins that would have been legal tender throughout the grouping. Nor can the impasse be resolved by having the anglophone members of ECOWAS join UMOA, the francophone cluster's West African monetary union; few if any of the non-francophone countries would be willing to enter an arrangement marked by a strong and arguably "neocolonial" French presence. Moreover, West African banks have been slow to make substantial use of the West African Clearing House, an institution created in 1975 to enable the region's central banks to carry out their transactions with each other without having to work through extracontinental banks.

Steps toward freer trade among ECOWAS states also have lagged. Originally, it was intended that the organization's members would move toward full economic union in three states during the 15 years beginning in 1975: (1) in the first two years, there would be a freeze on import duties and a consolidation of customs duties; (2) in the course of the following eight years, members would eliminate import duties on goods produced within the group; (3) in the final five years, external tariffs aimed at non-ECOWAS countries would be unified. In fact, however, ECOWAS ministers did not undertake to freeze tariffs until 1979, and a revised May 1981 deadline for beginning the reduction of tariffs on ECOWAS goods was also missed. These delays were largely due to fears on the part of the weaker states of being economically dominated by the organization's stronger members. While some of the less industrially developed countries do rely heavily on customs income, the present low level of trade within ECOWAS would seem to indicate that economic "swamping" of one ECOWAS country by another is not a significant near-term risk. In 1981, only 2 per cent of ECOWAS exports (which totalled \$33 billion) were destined for countries within the region, while a little more than 3 per cent of total imports (\$27.5 billion) were of ECOWAS origin.³ Even these modest figures partly reflect the trans-shipment through neighbouring countries of goods originating outside the region. (These figures do not include "unrecorded trade" -- mainly smuggling -- which has been estimated at over \$1.8 billion a year.)⁴

A revised schedule for trade liberalization was agreed upon at Conakry in 1983. Under the new framework, ECOWAS members are classified into three groups according to their industrial development, dependence on customs revenue, and transport capabilities. The spectrum of industrial products has been split into (1) a priority group subject to accelerated tariff elimination because of their utility in connection with social needs

(e.g. food, housing, health) or economic needs (e.g. industrialization, job creation), and (2) a non-priority group. Tariffs are to be progressively eliminated on ECOWAS products over various periods of between 4 and 10 years, depending on the nature of the product and the economic status of the ECOWAS country in question.

Another area in which ECOWAS has fallen rather spectacularly short is that of free movement of persons within the community. As envisaged at its launching in 1975, the member countries were to eliminate visa requirements for ECOWAS-nation citizens in connection with residence or business activities. In this instance it was not the poorer countries but oil-rich Nigeria which expressed concern over the notion of free entry, because its relatively high wage levels seemed most likely to attract an unmanageable influx of foreign workers. In 1979, agreement was reached that member states need permit only 90-day visits by ECOWAS citizens without visas (and then only if they possessed a valid travel document and international health certificate, and entered the state through an official entry point). Moreover, a member state could refuse entry to any ECOWAS citizen who came within the category of inadmissible immigrants under that state's laws. Restrictions on intra-ECOWAS travel would be dropped over the following 15 years. Nigeria justified its drastic expulsion of some 2 million aliens in early 1983 in terms of these caveats in the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons and Goods, and declared its continued commitment to that Protocol.⁵

What are ECOWAS' prospects in the years ahead? At the organization's 1983 summit, ECOWAS heads of state appealed to the CEAO to merge its aims and aspirations with those of ECOWAS. The response was more encouraging than might have been anticipated. The final communique issued at the October 1983 CEAO summit in Niamey (Niger) stated that "the conference reaffirms the full and total membership of the CEAO in ECOWAS and their adherence to the ECOWAS principles, especially the establishment of a customs union and the free movement of goods and peoples of member states. It considers that the existence of the CEAO is not an obstacle to the implementation of the decisions of ECOWAS and stresses that the experience acquired by the CEAO in the field of subregional cooperation should be consolidated and placed at the disposal of ECOWAS to improve its services."

The fact remains, however, that ECOWAS is still hobbled by the reluctance of its members to gamble benefits in hand for the sake of a common market which does not yet and may never exist. And as 1984 dawned, the military coup in Nigeria, the ECOWAS linchpin, raised new uncertainties. Although the issues that moved the military to take power suggested that the new government would focus on the country's mounting domestic economic and social problems rather than regional affairs, the junta's public stand toward the ECOWAS connection has been generally positive. The organization was mentioned by name in the initial January 1 address to the nation by the Supreme Military Council's chairman, Major-General Mohammed Buhari, as one of the international organizations with which the new government would "maintain and strengthen existing diplomatic relations." On January 28 during a visit by Guinea's President Touré, Buhari said that "greater attention would be paid to the growth of ECOWAS". Discussion of specific ECOWAS-related issues reveals some ambivalence, however. In a January 5 press conference, Buhari implicitly endorsed the Shagari regime's controversial expulsion of aliens, and warned that, ECOWAS ties notwithstanding,

the laws regarding alien laborers would continue to be enforced. "It is going to be a case of Nigeria first", he concluded, "and then anybody else."⁶

Whatever the future holds, ECOWAS remains a unique ongoing experiment in large-scale cooperation.

The Mano River Union

The Mano River Union (MRU), which links Liberia, Sierre Leone, and Guinea (all ECOWAS members), is the smallest of the African regional organizations concerned with economic integration. The MRU has made considerable progress, at least in terms of legal structure if not yet of sizeable trade flow enhancement, in moving toward a customs and economic union. Founded in 1973, it instituted a common external tariff in 1977. Guinea joined the group in 1980. In 1981, the MRU countries began tariff-free trade in a wide variety of goods of local origin (although these remain subject to certain non-tariff barriers such as Sierry Leone's import/export licensing system).⁷ The MRU has also initiated a number of development projects, including a bridge over the Mano River and studies for a Monrovia-Freetown highway and a 180-megawatt hydroelectric project.

Some within ECOWAS view the MRU, like the CEA0, as something of a challenge to the larger group. T. Ernest Eastman, Liberia's foreign minister and the MRU's secretary-general, has sought to allay such concerns, saying that "We feel we have a continued, constructive role to play, rather like the Benelux within the EEC."

CEEAC

In a step that Gabon's President Omar Bongo hailed as being in accordance with the Lagos Plan of Action, Africa's youngest major regional economic grouping, the Communauté Economique des États de l'Afrique Centrale (Economic Community of the States of Central Africa) was launched at Libreville in October 1983. It is linked to developments in West Africa by shared participation in the francophone cluster's monetary arrangements and by its use of the ECOWAS model in developing its institutions. The CEEAC includes the five UDEAC countries (Cameroon, Gabon, Central African Republic, Congo, and Equatorial Guinea); the three Communauté Économique des Pays des Grands Lacs (Great Lakes Countries Economic Community) states of Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi; plus Chad and Sao Tomé and Principe. Angola sent Foreign Trade Minister Ismael Martins to the inaugural meeting. Although SADCC presumably has first priority in Angola's regional commitments, Martins told the Libreville participants that Angola was in total solidarity with the CEEAC countries, and would join the group at a convenient time.⁸

The goals of the group include the elimination of tariffs within the community and the establishment of a common external customs policy over a 12-year transitional period. The CEEAC may have better luck in achieving its objectives than some of the continent's other regional integration experiments because many of its members are present or potential oil producers and could become an attractive collective market.⁹

NOTES

1. Helen Kitchen, U.S. Interests in Africa (Washington, D.C. : Praeger, 1983), pp. 25-26.
2. Carol Lancaster, "ECOWAS: Problems and Prospects", CSIS Africa Notes, No. 4 (October 10, 1982). I am indebted to Dr. Lancaster for other significant contributions to this section and to the discussion of the francophone cluster.
3. Denis Herbstein, "Major Obstacles Slow Common Market Plans of 16-Nation Region", International Herald Tribune, June 27, 1983.
4. ECOWAS Background Notes, Vol. I, No. 1, Fall 1983.
5. See, for example, the advertisement placed in the June 27, 1983 edition of the International Herald Tribune by the External Publicity Division of Nigeria's Federal Department of Information.
6. Daniel G. Matthews, "Nigeria 1984: An Interim Report", CSIS Africa Notes, No. 29 (February 29, 1984).
7. Peter Robson, "The Mano River Union", The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. XX, No. 4 (1982).
8. "Central Africa Tries Again", Africa News, Vol XX1, No. 19 (November 7, 1983).
9. "Forgotten Grouping?" West Africa, November 14, 1983.



THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT CO-ORDINATION CONFERENCE

B V Mancama

The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference or SADCC or as it is pronounced "SADIC", has become an important focus of development efforts in the Southern African region. Its success has come as something of a surprise, even to those who originally conceived the idea and the degree of support the concept has already achieved marks it out as a possible example to others who are seeking some form of regional co-operative framework within which to undertake their development efforts.

The origins of SADCC can be traced back to a meeting in Lusaka in 1969 when the then groups of Front Line States committed themselves to collective action to seek the political liberation of Southern Africa. The focal point of the effort, at that time, was the liberation of the two former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mocambique and Rhodesia. United in the attainment of this objective, the front line states established a close working relationship within the region. This was further cemented in May 1979 when the Foreign Ministers of the front line states, by then including Angola and Mocambique, but excluding Zimbabwe, met in Gabarone, Botswana, in order to discuss the possibility of extending their co-operation action into the economic field. This was followed two months later in July 1979 by the inaugural meeting of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference at Arusha in Tanzania. This meeting led to the drafting of the declaration "Southern Africa : Towards Economic Liberation", which was eventually signed on 1st April, 1980, at a SADCC summit meeting held in Lusaka, Zambia.

This historic document was signed by the Presidents of Angola, Botswana, Mocambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho, as well as the Minister of Education in the Republic of Malawi. In this declaration, the Heads of State committed themselves to pursuing policies aimed at the economic liberation and integrated development of their national economies. The objectives were clearly enunciated in the document. They were :

- 1 The reduction of economic dependence, particularly but not only, on the Republic of South Africa;
- 2 The forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration;
- 3 The mobilisation of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional projects;
- 4 Concerted action to secure international co-operation within the framework of a strategy for economic liberation.

While it is generally understood that the primary purpose of SADCC was to reduce dependence on South Africa, the document is particularly clear on this issue. In it, it is stated "future development must aim at the reduction of economic dependence, not only on the Republic of South Africa, but also on any single external state or group of states". This objective, therefore, includes reducing dependence on overseas countries as well as avoiding the trap of excessive dependence on individual countries, such as Zimbabwe, which has a relatively sophisticated economy.

To give effect to the thrust, the declaration called for the establishment of a Southern African Transport and Communications Commission, whose objective was envisaged as : to co-ordinate the use of existing transport and communication systems and to develop additional regional facilities. The primary objective of the Commission was to improve the Mocambique ports, which would serve four of the states in the grouping, as well as to develop the ports and railways of both Tanzania and Angola. To achieve this, it was to mobilise finance and to direct and guide development on a co-ordinated basis throughout the region. The Commission was located in Maputo.

The declaration went on to call for increased trade within the region as well as improved co-ordination in a wide range of fields. This included mining, industry, energy and agriculture.

From its inception, it was envisaged that the SADCC would not support a significant bureaucracy. The secretariat was established on the basis of being simply a co-ordinating unit, operating out of Gabarone. Each participating country was required to take up part of the overall programme and to be fully responsible for it. The heart of the arrangement was an annual meeting of Heads of State. This was to be preceded by meetings of officials and Foreign Ministers with regional meetings of Ministers and officials with responsibility in specific areas being held on an as and when required basis. Individual countries to be responsible for convening such meetings.

SADCC was primarily the child of Sir Seretse Khama, President of the Republic of Botswana, who promoted the concept amongst his associates in the front line group of states. It was his vision which gave rise to the particular character of the co-operative arrangements and in many respects, he has continued to be the guiding spirit of SADCC after his death.

It was Sir Seretse who convened the meeting of Foreign Ministers of front line states in Botswana in early 1979. Aware that important political changes were imminent in Southern Africa, and in particular, that Zimbabwe would shortly be born, the Ministers agreed that it was time to give priority to increasing regional economic co-operation. It was agreed that the geographical nature of the region and the land-locked character of many of the countries in the grouping, meant that regional integration and co-operation was essential for the harmonious development of the countries involved.

The Foreign Ministers stressed at that meeting that regional co-operation should be approached in a pragmatic manner. Priority was given to concrete projects which emphasised mutual advantages to member States. The initiative represented no less than a new development strategy for Southern Africa. The objective being to improve the living and working conditions of the people of the countries concerned and to reduce their vulnerability to political and economic pressure from other countries.

It was no coincidence, therefore, that SADCC came into being shortly after the South African Prime Minister called for a constellation of Southern African States. The inaugural meetings of Foreign Ministers and Heads of State were quite clear on this. They saw the objective of the South African proposals as being to tie the countries of the region into an irreversible dependence on South Africa. This was clearly totally unacceptable to the countries concerned. However, it is wrong to believe that SADCC was brought into being simply as a counter to the South African proposal. SADCC was on the drawing boards several years before the Prime Minister of South Africa brought his proposals to the fore. From the very beginning, SADCC Heads of State have made it quite clear that they envisage that eventually both

Namibia and South Africa will be able to join the grouping, once their political status arising from necessary political changes are acceptable to the other countries of the region.

At the inaugural summit meeting of SADCC a comprehensive programme of action was adopted by the Heads of State. Each member state was allocated certain responsibilities as follows :

Angola	:	Energy conservation and security
Botswana	:	Crop research in semi-arid tropics and animal disease control
Lesotho	:	Soil conservation and land utilisation
Malawi	:	Fisheries, forestry and wildlife
Mocambique	:	Transport and communications
Swaziland	:	Manpower development and training
Tanzania	:	Industrial development
Zambia	:	Development Fund and Mining
Zimbabwe	:	Food security and security printing

A simple study of the geographical location and spread of the countries involved in SADCC will quickly show that they share a common regional identity and infrastructure. All countries of the region are closely connected both by history and recent development. To some extent it could be argued that Zaire should be included in the regional arrangement and this had been debated on several occasions during SADCC heads of State meetings. Clearly in the future, Namibia will become an active part of SADCC and eventually South Africa itself will join the grouping.

Even on the present basis, the SADCC group of States are a major economic force. The combined region covers an area of 5 million square kilometres of land and has a current population of approximately 65 million. The region has a combined gross domestic product of approximately US \$22 000 million. The combined foreign trade of the countries, including both imports and exports, reached US \$12 billion in 1982. The entire area is rich in raw materials and energy. In fact, it may not be generally known that the SADCC region as a whole is a net exporter of energy and will remain so through to the end of the century.

Within the region, there are proven resources of oil, coal, uranium as well as substantial reserves of iron ore, copper, nickel, cobalt, chrome, lead and zinc. The region is a significant producer of both gold and diamonds and has some of the most significant unexploited agricultural potential in Africa. The hydro-electric power potential of the countries involved is enormous and on top of this, the region already has a powerful and increasingly sophisticated infrastructure of railways, roads and harbours. Clearly, once the initial problems of management policy and politics have been overcome, the region has the potential to become an economic force. Even more so, when the countries of Namibia, South Africa and perhaps Zaire, are eventually invited to join the grouping. At that stage, it is not difficult to envisage that the SADCC group of countries will become one of the major economic groupings in the world.

Although the arrangements of SADCC are only four years old, the grouping can already point to a number of major achievements. All of the countries involved in the grouping, have now established their own SADCC secretariats and are well on the way to developing an integrated plan of action for their individual portfolio of responsibility. In particular, the Transport and Communications Commission in Maputo has been extremely active and a major

programme of development is under way which affects all countries in the region and which will have long term economic effects. The food security programme of Zimbabwe has been completed and adopted by Ministers and is now in the process of being implemented. The energy programme is in an advanced stage of study and will be placed before councils of ministers in the not too distant future. Tanzania has completed its initial study of industrial development needs and a programme was recently placed before potential investors in Harare.

The reaction of donors and investors to this programme of the group has been extremely encouraging. Altogether, projects calling for the investment of US \$3,4 billion have been identified and described. The main areas within which these projects have been put forward are as follows :

Roads	US \$ 615 million
Rail projects	592 million
Ports and Harbours	371 million
Airports	188 million
Communications	120 million
Industrial development	1 524 million

While the main thrust of the transport and communications projects has been to improve the infrastructure of the region, the primary focus of development as far as ports and harbours are concerned are the Mocambique ports. These are regarded as being crucial to the economic well being of the land-locked countries of the interior. In the industrial development field, the emphasis has been on improving the utilisation of existing capacity, as well as identifying bottle necks and shortages in capacity in fields where local raw material exist which can be processed. In addition, a number of projects have been put forward which will improve the supply of industrial products within the region.

On a less grand scale, but perhaps equally important, a number of minor projects of regional importance have taken root. This includes the excellent work being undertaken in Botswana on foot and mouth control and on the problem of agricultural development in semi-arid regions. The veterinary school at the University of Zimbabwe is now established and will shortly be producing its first graduates. In addition, efforts in the field of forestry conservation, research and agricultural development are all making significant progress.

However, this is not to say that there have not been difficulties. Clearly, within the group there are many divergent views. There is continuing fear that the SADCC group will be dominated by Zimbabwe. In the future, when South Africa joins the grouping, it will in turn face this problem. There have been the problems related to the continued destruction of infrastructure by South African backed rebel movements in Mocambique and Angola. The low intensity conflict in these countries has disrupted development and resulted in retarded progress. There have been conflicts with the Preferential Trade Area (PTA). The PTA grouping of 19 countries is very much more broadly based and founded on more conventional principles than the SADCC. The sponsors of the PTA are connected with the OAU and the Economic Commission for Africa and they see difficulties and contradictions in the SADCC arrangements. This view is not shared by the SADCC member states which see their membership of a sub-regional organisation as being complimentary to their membership of PTA and not in conflict. However, clearly, there will be a need for greater co-operation with the PTA in years to come.

In fact SADCC will have to withstand a number of strains and stresses from within and without before it is pronounced safe, secure and in good health.

These problems relate to political relationships in the region between member and non member states; the efficiency with which various member responsibilities are carried out; the need to demonstrate to every participant that benefits are being equitably shared and; the ability as well as the rate at which the necessary funds are attracted from donor countries.

Political relationships will, by and large, determine the pace at which progress is made by SADCC. Where there are internal political/security problems such as in Angola, Lesotho and Mocambique, for instance, the need will always be there to give priority to resolving such issues. Funds and effort will be directed at achieving political stability and security and this could be at the expense of SADCC's overall progress.

Given the varied nature of economic progress within the SADCC region, tremendous political will and statesmanship is necessary to provide the ingenuity that will assure the survival of SADCC as a meaningful economic entity.

The one immediate threat to SADCC emanates from South Africa as it tries to find solutions to its internal political problems and those of Namibia. South Africa has adopted a very aggressive posture towards a number of countries within SADCC. This has forced these countries to give priority to their security needs thus relegating their SADCC responsibilities further down the list of priorities.

The problem of efficiency in carrying out various responsibilities will have a bearing on the successes to be notched by SADCC. The one area which has proved problematical is the transport and communications network. While it is true that in the majority of cases, the causes of this problem are to be found in the lack of planning by former colonial masters, the reality on the ground today is one of very serious concern as the most obvious import/export routes are virtually non-functional. Besides the delays make these routes too costly at the best of times.

That there are common interests within SADCC members is in no doubt. These of course derive from their wish to promote economic development in the region and thus reduce their dependence on richer countries.

The problem of attracting funds will thus depend largely on factors of importance to would-be donors. On recent performance funds will be forthcoming earmarked for specific projects identified by SADCC.

The one area which may not be easy to resolve is that relating to the equitable distribution of benefits. As history now records, this was among the major reasons why the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland floundered and why the East African Community also folded.

For all of these problems, the SADCC group of States have achieved a great deal since they came together for the purpose of co-ordinating their development efforts. What has also given the concept a great deal of momentum, has been the support given to the concept by major western countries and the European Economic Community. The extent of this support and the enthusiasm which is exhibited in many western capitals for SADCC, has given rise to suspicion amongst certain SADCC observers that the organisation

might be a Trojan Horse for western economic and political interests. This is probably not true as it is more likely that the Western States are all too keen to see the success of a regional association which would make their development efforts in individual countries more effective. One thing that is beyond dispute, is that the welfare and future development of the SADCC group of States is seen as being critical to western interests in both the economic and political field.

Just as the desire for collective security and economic development led to the creation of the EEC after the second World War, it is the collective opposition of the front line states in the SADCC group to the political system in South Africa which provides the basis of cohesion within the region. Until there is significant change in South Africa, it is likely that this element in the SADCC situation will continue to exist. This will ensure that the countries of the region press home their efforts to harmonise and co-ordinate their development efforts. In a strange way, therefore, South Africa is contributing effectively, in a political sense, to the success of the grouping. There is no reason why South Africa should be fearful of such success. She is, and will remain, the most powerful economic entity within the region and it will be a while yet before development in the SADCC group offers a serious challenge to this position. On the contrary, South Africa stands to gain from the stability, development and prosperity of its SADCC neighbours.

SADCC provides a ready and powerful market for the South African manufacturers, finance houses and others able to identify opportunities in this grouping. There is technical know-how in South Africa which the SADCC countries are keen to acquire.

One thing South Africa cannot expect is political co-operation so long as it maintains its present internal political system. However, that is not to deny that economic co-operation may not be possible. There is little doubt that economic development and progress in the region would greatly benefit from South Africa's contribution if she were able to join the SADCC group. It is to be hoped that sooner, rather than later, the people of South Africa will present the world with a political dispensation which will make it possible for this tremendously wealthy country to be openly acceptable to the community of nations. Then, such will be the opportunities for the country to grasp and pursue that the effects will be felt, not only beyond the borders of the Republic of South Africa, but also beyond those of the SADCC countries and afar.

This Southern African region, and no doubt the continent of Africa in the process, will become the most exciting economic phenomenon ever experienced in recent times.

SOUTH AFRICA'S REGIONAL POLICY¹

Deon Geldenhuys

If one were to rank South Africa's present foreign policy concerns in order of priority, its relations with the black states of southern Africa would head the list. The emphasis on regional² relations is in fact not new and can be traced as far back as South Africa's pre-war foreign policy. The way in which South Africa has approached relations in the sub-continent has of course changed over time, as conditions and attitudes in South Africa, the region and the world generally have changed. Nonetheless, South Africa's basic objective has throughout remained constant, viz. to create an environment in southern Africa that would be conducive to what the country's rulers perceived as being in South Africa's political, economic and military/strategic interests. Put differently, South Africa has sought to ensure a regional context favourable to its security, prosperity and domestic political order. Flowing from this concern, Pretoria has tried to influence developments in the region in a direction that would promote these interests. Such, then, is the paradigm³ within which South Africa's regional policy has been shaped over the years.

The object of this paper is to examine, within this paradigm, the various shifts or changing orientations in South Africa's relations with the countries of southern Africa. Although the emphasis is on South Africa's regional relations, these of course cannot be considered without reference to its foreign relations generally and to domestic developments since they are all inextricably linked. Only the post-war period will be considered because the present foreign policy dilemmas facing South Africa are primarily the products of the peculiar post-war international political environment. The focus will be strictly on foreign relations at governmental level and the South African perceptions and actions examined are therefore those of the government of the day. This is not to say that these are the only relevant views and actions; there are indeed a host of others too that go to make up the totality of any state's foreign relations but in the particular context of this paper the authoritative and operative official perceptions and actions will suffice.

1. The traditional orientation : the Western/colonial family association

Modern South Africa's very origins as a colonial possession first of the Dutch and then of the British and the Western European descent of its white population, were clearly reflected in a foreign policy which, since its inception in the 1920s⁴, has been predominantly, at times virtually exclusively, Western oriented. The perception of a "family association"⁵ with Western countries was of direct relevance to South Africa's relations with African territories. South Africa hoped that its traditional ties with the Western colonial powers would place it in an advantageous position to influence their policies towards their African dependencies. In addition, South Africa also considered itself entitled to be heard on colonial matters by virtue of its status as an independent state, the most developed one in Africa and moreover one with a large permanent white population. In due course South Africa's interests in Africa proved irreconcilable with those of the colonial powers and their differences were such that it played a major role in undermining the family association.

In the early post-war years, General J.C. Smuts, then Prime Minister of the Union, suggested that a commission, composed of colonial powers and

others with economic and military interests in Africa (thus including South Africa) should be established to devise a common policy for the continent. Smuts entertained more specific ideas on southern Africa and introduced an important new theme by committing himself to the "knitting together" of the various territories of the region and he even advanced the notion of an organisation for regional co-operation on the lines of the Pan-American Union.

In essence, Smuts's was a design for inter-imperial co-operation involving also South Africa, which would obviously have been the dominant partner in any co-operative regional organisation. Smuts's proposed commission reflected a realisation on his part that developments in colonial Africa were bound to have an impact on South Africa and that the country should therefore try to get a hand in shaping the course of events in the dependent territories. The colonial powers however proved reluctant to draw South Africa into their scheme of things, and nothing came of Smuts's suggestions.

The new domestic order - apartheid - to which the National Party government of Dr. D.F. Malan (1948-54) committed itself, found expression also in its policy towards Africa. Malan's Africa Charter, first formulated in 1945 (when he was still in Opposition) and restated several times when in office, was perhaps not so much a statement of policy as an expression of a world view predicated on National Party ideology. The Charter declared that the development of Africa should be guided along the lines of "Western European Christian civilisation" and that the militarisation of the "native of Africa" should be prevented as it could endanger "our white civilisation". This anachronistic declaration in effect sought to consolidate the colonial order in Africa with a view to safeguarding South Africa's domestic order. For South Africa, in other words, the perpetuation of the colonial order became a condition for the maintenance of its domestic political order.

Flowing from its concern with creating an African environment favourable to its own interests, together with what South Africa saw as its rightful role as a part of overall Western defence against communist expansionism, the Union in the early 1950s participated in a series of discussions on the defence of Africa and the Middle East involving also the colonial powers, the Commonwealth and the United States. In addition, South Africa energetically canvassed the idea of an African Defence organisation for anti-communist states in Africa. South Africa's endeavours were, however, to no avail.

Despite the evident differences between South Africa and some of the colonial powers over political arrangements for blacks, Mr. J.G. Strijdom, Prime Minister (1954-58), made no secret of his conviction that apartheid was not merely exportable to the rest of Africa, but that it actually provided the only acceptable formula for relations between white and black. South Africa also remained keen to try to get a hand in the shaping of colonial policy and Mr. Eric Louw, Minister of External Affairs, accordingly suggested periodic ad hoc discussions on common interests between the colonial powers, South Africa and Rhodesia. South Africa further identified with the colonial order by cultivating, ever since the 1920s, close ties with white communities elsewhere in Africa.

In conclusion, it can be said that South Africa's family association with Western powers, despite its long history and consolidation through two world wars, started to wear thin around the edges in the first decade after the Second World War. The alienating factor was undoubtedly South Africa's domestic, and specifically racial, policies. This found expression in,

among other things, differences between South Africa and the colonial powers over colonial policies. South Africa could no longer base its approach to Africa on an assumption of a community of interests with the colonial powers; South Africa had to find a new orientation in its relations with Africa.

2. The "Grand Design" : domestic decolonisation and colonial liquidation

When Ghana became Britain's first black African colony to achieve independence in 1957, it demonstrated better than anything else the irrevocability of the process of decolonisation and gave new emphasis to South Africa's gradual if grudging acknowledgement that its fortunes in Africa no longer lay in a close and exclusive identification with the colonial powers. Realising this, Louw in March 1957 urged that South Africa must "accept its future role in Africa as a vocation and must in all respects play its full part as an African power". At the same time, however, South Africa could become a "permanent link between the Western nations on the one hand and the population of Africa south of the Sahara on the other". South Africa was, in other words, trying to bridge the gap between the disappearing and emerging orders in Africa by keeping one foot in each.

South Africa gave effect to its "role in Africa" by participating in the activities of the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara (CCTA) and its two main auxiliary bodies, the Scientific Council for Africa South of the Sahara (CSA) and the Inter-African Bureau of Soil Conservation and Land Utilisation (BIS), all established in 1950. Under the aegis of BIS four regional committees were formed, one of which is the familiar Southern African Regional Commission for the Conservation and Utilisation of the Soil (SARCCUS), headquartered in South Africa. Another well-known auxiliary organisation of the CCTA to which South Africa belonged was the Foundation for Mutual Assistance in Africa South of the Sahara. South Africa considered itself a leader in the field of providing African territories with aid and co-operation and in fact used its abilities to impress the Union's importance in Africa upon the colonial powers. In addition, South Africa also enjoyed trade and consular representation in a number of African territories, including the Belgian Congo, Kenya, Mauritius, Angola and Mozambique. The Department of External Affairs in 1955 re-organised its Africa section to improve contact with African territories and in 1959 a separate Africa division was established in the Department - the first geographically based division in a Department that had previously been functionally organised. The various links with Africa were essentially relationships between South Africa and the colonial powers controlling the dependencies.

South Africa's misgivings about decolonisation and its unwillingness to identify unequivocally with the emerging order in Africa were of course related to fears about the impact of these events on its domestic political status quo. It was this very status quo that was also at the heart of South Africa's steady decline into international unpopularity.

Against this backdrop, Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, Prime Minister (1958-1966), in 1959 announced a drastic new departure in his Government's apartheid policy. In expounding his so-called new vision, Verwoerd was at pains to associate the policy of separate development with trends in Africa. By providing for "Bantu homelands" which may ultimately become independent states, his was "a policy which does precisely what those countries of Africa which attack us desire to have themselves". He made particular reference to Basutoland where, he claimed, Britain was introducing a similar process. Far from denying blacks human rights and dignity, separate development "intended to

give them dignity and rights in the highest form, namely through self-government and self-determination". Verwoerd envisaged a commonwealth-type relationship eventually developing between South Africa and the states-to-be: they would be politically independent but economically interdependent.

The homelands formula formed the basis of Verwoerd's policy towards southern Africa. Initially, he wanted to draw the three British High Commission territories into the homelands design and lead them to independence under South African guardianship - and thereby prevent the adoption of policies in the territories which would run counter to separate development. Although Britain refused to entrust the territories to South Africa and instead chose to lead them to independence according to its own design, Verwoerd still saw a role for the territories, when independent, in his scheme for regional co-operation. In the political sphere, he again thought in terms of a commonwealth that would serve as a consultative body of independent states, while economic links could be formalised in a co-ordinating body along the lines of a common market. Although Verwoerd's plans for regional co-operation initially focused only on "white" South Africa, future independent homelands and the High Commission Territories, he in due course expanded the scope to a common market stretching as far north as the Congo (later Zaire).

Verwoerd, it can be argued, reformulated Smuts's ideas on regional co-operation to suit both external demands and domestic exigencies; externally, to correspond with colonial liquidation and domestically to fit in with South Africa's own brand of decolonisation. In addition, Verwoerd strongly believed in the primacy of economic interests over political considerations in South Africa's relations with black African countries. These ideas of Verwoerd, particularly those relating to the separate political and economic dimensions of relations with black Africa, have become basic tenets of South Africa's approach to regional relations. A related notion was that in view of the impediments to political and diplomatic relations between South Africa and black Africa, technical co-operation and the provision of aid represented an important channel for communication and might moreover pave the way to political and diplomatic ties. Thus the high premium Pretoria placed on involvement in organisations such as the CSA and CCTA.

In 1965 South Africa suffered a serious setback when the CCTA, CSA and BIS were either disbanded or absorbed into the Organisation of African Unity, from which the Republic was excluded. With the exception of SARCCUS, South Africa was in due course denied membership of virtually all the inter-African functional organisations in which it had so actively participated since the early 1950s.

On top of these political blows, South Africa's security concerns assumed an ever increasing salience with the tide of black liberation steadily moving southwards in the 1960s and domestic political violence reaching serious proportions in the early part of the decade.

Southern Rhodesia, with which South Africa had a long love-hate relationship, began strengthening ties with its southern neighbour upon the dissolution of the Federation in 1963. The divisive factors between the two countries - white Rhodesians' traditional anglophilic sentiments as against the Afrikaners' republican sympathies; Southern Rhodesia's entry into the Central African Federation and its pursuit of the racial policy of partnership, which was anathema to the supporters of apartheid or separate development - began to submit to what was being perceived by both countries as a new

identity of interests. Verwoerd lost no time in suggesting, in 1963, that if Southern Rhodesia could become an independent state, it could lead to a new closer relationship with the Republic of South Africa, whether "in some form of organised economic interdependence" as in the European Economic Community, or "for common political interests" on the lines of the Commonwealth. These suggestions however came to naught because it was politically inexpedient for South Africa to associate closely and formally with a country that had declared itself unilaterally independent and had thereby earned itself universal disapprobation. The Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique were, by and large, excluded from Verwoerd's regional designs.

By introducing the new homelands design, Verwoerd sought to provide a new model for resolving South Africa's racial problems in the first instance; a secondary consideration was to provide a new formula for regional relations in southern Africa; and a tertiary motive was to try to adjust the domestic base in a limited way to meet the exigencies of foreign policy. The new design however failed to realise its "external" - i.e. secondary and tertiary - objectives for the simple reason that it failed in its primary objective. Abroad, both the domestic and regional dimensions of separate development were seen as principally designed to safeguard white supremacy in South Africa. The unmistakable opposition of black South Africans to the new dispensation merely strengthened this perception.

Escalating domestic black resistance to the South African government's policies in the first half of the 1960s, coupled with the country's rapidly deteriorating international position, had a profound impact on both its domestic and foreign policies. Faced with widespread unrest and a sustained sabotage campaign, an upswing in emigration and a down-turn in the economy, the Verwoerd government resorted to the "politics of security".⁶ The Government was hardly in a position to launch any major foreign policy initiative; South Africa became locked in an introversive mood.

3. The outward movement : the search for a rapprochement with Africa

A major difference between the present and previous foreign policy orientations should be noted at the outset. The Verwoerdian grand design was, at least in part, an attempt to provide a domestic policy commensurate with the demands of foreign policy; the outward movement, by contrast, was essentially externally oriented and implicitly denied that foreign policy demanded a domestic corollary. The foreign policies generated by both orientations nonetheless shared a fundamental objective, viz. safeguarding the domestic base.

The fact that Mr. B.J. Vorster, who succeeded Verwoerd as Prime Minister in 1966, could have embarked on the so-called outward movement in 1967, is a measure of the success of Verwoerd's "politics of security". The tightening of security paid handsome dividends in terms of suppressing internal violence, restoring white confidence and steering the economy firmly towards growth. In short, South Africa could face the world with renewed confidence and approach Africa from a position of strength.

Although the outward movement was, as James Barber argued, a "broad based attempt by the South African government to improve its international status and position", its major thrust was unmistakably directed at Africa. This was deliberate, the hope being that a rapprochement with Africa would improve South Africa's foreign relations over a wide front. The key to arresting its growing alienation from its traditional Western allies, South Africa realised, lay in reaching an understanding with black Africa. At the

same time, however, South Africa was reappraising its traditional unquestioning Western orientation. Since the late 1960s, a new dualism began characterising the Republic's relations with the West. It became a love-hate relationship, with all the complexities, confusions and contradictions inherent in it.

Circumstances in the southern half of the African continent in the late 1960s seemed particularly propitious for South Africa to give effect to the Verwoerdian vision of a commonwealth-cum-common market arrangement. The independence of Botswana and Lesotho in 1966 and Swaziland in 1968 appeared to provide South Africa with an opportunity to formalise a new relationship with them and that this could moreover serve as a stepping stone to a rapprochement with African countries farther afield. In South Africa, the Government painstakingly prepared its followers to accept the "price" to be paid for a rapprochement, viz. the stationing of black diplomats in the Republic. Vorster's approach to black Africa was, however, cautious and he thought in much less grandiose terms about regional relations than his predecessor. Thus Vorster merely committed himself "to maintaining the closest economic and technological co-operation among all the countries of the region, for their mutual benefit and joint development". He insisted that each country involved should retain its political autonomy and therefore "the right freely to choose its own political, racial, cultural and economic systems". This was a restatement of South Africa's professed adherence to the principle of non-interference, the object of which was to protect the country's political status quo above all. Put differently, Vorster was in effect saying that regional co-operation had to be based on the existing political order in South and southern Africa. For South Africa, part of the given political order was the existence of black homelands which might ultimately become independent and then entitled to full participation in co-operative arrangements in the region. As such, Vorster's ideas on regional co-operation were firmly linked to the domestic policy of separate development.

In terms of formalising relations between South Africa and newly independent black states in the region, little was achieved. In 1967 South Africa established diplomatic relations with Malawi - to date the first and only such link with a black state (except independent former homelands) and in 1969 the Customs Union Agreement of 1909, involving South Africa and the three former High Commission Territories, was revised.*

* The new agreement, which is much more favourable to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS) than the original one, among other things provides for :

- unrestricted and duty-free interchange between the four parties of their domestic products and of goods imported from outside the customs area;
- common tariff and uniform trade regulations in respect of goods imported from outside the customs area;
- a common revenue pool including sales duties. The pool is divided according to a self-adjusting formula that contains a measure of fiscal compensation for the BLS states, to counter the disadvantages of being in a customs union with a partner that is both more developed and effectively controls the union;
- protection of the BLS countries' new and vital industries; and
- general and special consultations between the member states.⁷

Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland were also, together with South Africa, members of the Rand Monetary Area. (Botswana subsequently withdrew.) Outside of formal structures for co-operation, South Africa provided a considerable measure of aid to black neighbouring states. South Africa's was essentially a functionalist approach, relying on the so-called spill-over effect of non-political links.

South Africa and the other white-ruled territories in southern Africa drew closer together in the late 1960s. The growing cohesion was primarily due to security and economic considerations. "Communist-inspired terrorism" was being seen as a common threat facing Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, SWA/Namibia and South Africa itself. Although no formal defence agreement existed, evidence points to limited South African involvement in counter-insurgency operations in Angola and Mozambique, and the Republic also despatched police units to Rhodesia in 1967, ostensibly to intercept African National Congress (ANC) guerrillas en route to South Africa. In Namibia, the destruction of a SWAPO guerrilla training camp by South African security forces in August 1966 heralded the beginning of what developed into a protracted low-intensity war between South African troops and SWAPO guerrillas. In the Portuguese colonies, both South Africa's private and public sectors contributed financially to the construction of the Ruacana Falls and Cahora Bassa hydro-electric schemes in Angola and Mozambique respectively, and the Republic agreed to purchase power from them. Embattled Rhodesia, subjected to mandatory UN sanctions, depended for its very survival on the economic life-line provided by South Africa. South African businessmen, in turn, were not slow in seizing the opportunities presented by a captive market across the Limpopo.

The increasing importance of security considerations in South Africa's Africa policy was borne out in Vorster's statement that the Republic would not tolerate "terrorism" or "communist domination" in southern Africa and was determined to fight it even beyond the country's borders. Another way in which South Africa sought to combat the perceived communist threat was to offer non-aggression pacts to black states in 1970. Such pacts - for which there were no takers (except for independent former homelands several years later) - would of course have meant that the black countries involved would deny to insurgents facilities for operating against South Africa.

The outward movement was not primarily associated with southern Africa, but rather with South Africa's attempts at a rapprochement with black states farther north. It would indeed appear that Vorster was more interested in the "bigger stakes" offered by these other African states which carried greater political weight and which could not in any sense be considered "client states" of South Africa. The dialogue initiative - as the outward movement subsequently became known - produced some initial results in that a good number of black states indicated their willingness to enter into a dialogue with South Africa. The initiative however soon petered out. There was all along strong opposition in black Africa to any rapprochement with South Africa, and this inter alia found expression in the Lusaka Manifesto of April 1969 and the Mogadishu Declaration of October 1971. It became evident to both supporters and opponents of dialogue that South Africa and the black states had essentially conflicting objectives with the dialogue initiative: the latter saw it primarily as a means of persuading South Africa to abolish apartheid; the Republic's main objective was a rapprochement with black Africa and insofar as apartheid was to feature in the dialogue (and Vorster declared himself willing to discuss apartheid), it would merely be as an opportunity for South Africa to explain - and hopefully justify - the policy. The rapprochement orientation, as explained earlier,

thus denied the need for a domestic quid pro quo in support of a foreign policy (dialogue) initiative.

The failure of dialogue, together with the unresolved Rhodesian and SWA/Namibian issues, prompted South Africa to set its sights lower and to concentrate on consolidating its position in southern Africa and on finding regional solutions to the area's conflicts. This, however, did not spell the end of South Africa's attempts at establishing a rapprochement with black states outside the region. It was in fact in the aftermath of the dialogue era that Vorster scored two of his most spectacular diplomatic coups in Africa: in September 1974 he held talks with the Presidents of the Ivory Coast and Senegal in Yamoussoukrou and in February 1975 he met with the Liberian President in Monrovia. These breakthroughs however failed to produce any substantive and lasting political benefits for South Africa.

Meanwhile, on 5 October 1974, a new phase in South Africa's relations with black Africa - and more specifically southern Africa - was launched with the first in a series of meetings between South Africa and Zambia in an effort to resolve the Rhodesian issue. Vorster's famous Senate speech on 23 October 1974 in which he said "Southern Africa has come to the cross-roads" and had to choose between peace and escalating conflict; South African UN Ambassador Pik Botha's statement to the Security Council the following day that the Republic was committed to the elimination of racial discrimination; and Vorster's "give us six months" appeal in November 1974, were all designed to set the scene for the new era of détente. South Africa's détente moves however encountered strong opposition in black Africa. In April 1975 the OAU Council of Ministers adopted the Dar Es Salaam Declaration on Southern Africa which inter alia stated that "any talk of détente with the apartheid regime is such nonsense that it should be treated with the contempt it deserves".

Despite the obstacles, the Pretoria-Lusaka initiative went ahead and culminated in the Victoria Falls conference in August 1975 between the Rhodesian government and its black nationalist opponents. Also present at the historic meeting were Vorster and Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda.

The effects of détente were also to be seen in Namibia, where a South African-initiated constitutional conference got under way in September 1975. The Turnhalle Conference, as it became known, was representative of the various ethnic groups in the territory. It was this very ethnic composition together with SWAPO's absence that undermined the Turnhalle's credibility abroad. The Conference nonetheless represented a significant new departure in that all races were for the first time drawn into the process of political decision-making on Namibia's future.

The era of détente was short-lived, its demise caused primarily by the collapse of the joint Vorster-Kaunda settlement initiative for Rhodesia (which, in turn, was mainly the result of the Rhodesian government's intransigence) and South Africa's intervention in the Angolan war. The failure of détente was a severe setback for South Africa, which had entertained high hopes for the initiative. For South Africa, détente went beyond a mere Rhodesian settlement. Dr. Hilgard Muller, Minister of Foreign Affairs, had spoken hopefully of détente drawing the states of southern Africa together in a strong bloc which could present a united front against its common enemies. Vorster envisaged an "economic power bloc" and also coined a new expression: "a constellation of politically completely independent states" with close economic ties. In addition, South Africa was not oblivious of the wider foreign policy benefits which might accrue from a

breakthrough in southern Africa; it had by then become conventional foreign policy wisdom that the key to a general improvement in South Africa's foreign relations lay in normalising relations with black Africa.

South Africa's limited military intervention in Angola in 1975/6 should be seen against the background of the Republic's objectives with détente. By intervening on the side of the pro-Western UNITA and FNLA movements against the communist-backed MPLA, South Africa hoped to prove itself as a reliable ally of black states that supported détente and presumably opposed communist involvement in southern Africa. South Africa was, moreover, encouraged by some black states to send forces into Angola. By taking up arms against the MPLA and its Soviet and Cuban backers, South Africa also hoped to demonstrate its commitment to the West generally. The notion of serving Western interests - and also of deserving some reward for it - was of course strengthened by the United States' blessing of South Africa's intervention and Pretoria's belief (if not more) that Washington was committed to providing tangible support for the combined South African-UNITA-FNLA actions. Apart from all these considerations, South African intervention in Angola had two other important and immediate objectives, viz. to prevent SWAPO exploiting the chaos in Angola to step up attacks into Namibia, and to prevent a pro-Soviet regime being installed in Luanda.

South Africa's intervention failed to achieve the latter objectives and by March 1976 the bulk of its forces had been pulled out of Angola. Not least of the reasons for the withdrawal was the inability of Washington to provide the military support South Africa and its Angolan allies hoped for.

Despite the strain that the perceived let-down caused in US South African relations the two countries joined in a renewed effort to find solutions to the conflicts in white-ruled southern Africa. America's revived interest in the region was primarily in response to the Soviet success in Angola and a consequent fear that the Soviet Union might extend its direct involvement to other southern African conflict situations. The main focus of the American-led search for peace was on Rhodesia, where repeated British attempts at resolving the issue had failed. Although the Rhodesian initiative had passed from Britain to the United States, they co-operated closely to produce what became known as the Anglo-American plan. South Africa's involvement in the Rhodesian settlement initiative was primarily due to the crucial influence it could exercise over the Rhodesian government. Yet South Africa had a very real and direct interest in a Rhodesian settlement since the conflict might escalate to a point where the Soviet Union and/or Cuba and South Africa might get sucked into it on opposing sides.

Of secondary and less immediate concern to the United States, yet matters of great importance, were Namibia and the situation in South Africa itself. In Namibia the Turnhalle Conference failed to obtain any international recognition as a genuine national constitutional conference and SWAPO remained committed to the armed struggle. With Angola in MPLA hands, the fear was that the war in Namibia could escalate dangerously and provide new opportunities for the Soviet Union and its Cuban allies. In South Africa itself, massive unrest and violence in black townships all over the country began to erupt only days before the first high-level American-South African talks, thus vividly underlining the Republic's own serious political problems.

The collapse in late 1976 of the Anglo-American initiative on Rhodesia was a matter of serious concern to South Africa, for it carried potentially serious security and diplomatic implications. But worse was in store for

the Republic. The following year saw a quick succession of major events that had a profound impact on South Africa's international position. In the United States, the Carter administration took office in January 1977, bringing new strains to the already troubled relationship with South Africa. An early manifestation of the growing tension was Vorster's meeting with Vice-president Walter Mondale in Vienna in May 1977, where they took diametrically opposed stands on South Africa's political future. The Republic's foreign relations suffered heavily as a result of black consciousness leader Steve Biko's death in detention in September 1977, followed by the Vorster government's sweeping ban on a wide range of political organisations, newspapers and individuals a month later. The UN Security Council responded in November 1977 with a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. The country was forced onto the defensive more than ever before and domestically South Africa resorted to the politics of survival. The external corollary was a compound of introversion and dissociation, expressed in sporadic official suggestions that the Republic become "neutral" in the East-West conflict, "look East" or side with the "Fifth World". Regional relations also attained a new prominence and Muller reiterated the ideal of "a constellation of states ... which peacefully co-operate with one another". The regional option was in fact the only potentially feasible alternative among those mentioned; the others were more expressions of disillusionment, anger and anxiety than considered statements of policy.

4. The regional option: from constellation through destabilisation to moderation

What is new in South Africa's preoccupation with regional relations in the early years of Mr. P.W. Botha's premiership (1978 -), compared with its previous emphasis on closer regional ties, is the vastly changed environment in which it is set.

First, the domestic situation was more unsettled than at any time since the early 1960s. This was primarily caused by the pervasive racial tension and what was perceived as a mounting international "onslaught" against South Africa. To this can be added a crisis of confidence in the ruling elite following the so-called Information scandal. A reflection of the mood of the country was the upsurge in white emigration in the latter half of the 1970s.

Second, the collapse of the Portuguese empire had removed two vital links in South Africa's cordon sanitaire as Angola and Mozambique became independent under governments highly antagonistic towards South Africa. Communist powers had moreover established a military and political foothold in Angola. The MPLA regime in Luanda openly supported SWAPO in its war in Namibia, and Mozambique's FRELIMO government gave sanctuary and support to the ANC.

Third, the hopes for an internationally acceptable settlement in Rhodesia faded with the failure of the Anglo-American peace plan and the steady escalation of the war.

Fourth, South Africa's fortunes in Namibia fluctuated greatly. In April 1978 South Africa accepted Western proposals for a settlement of the conflict in the territory. The UN Security Council endorsed the proposals in July 1978 but repeated UN attempts failed to reach an agreement with SWAPO and South Africa on implementing a settlement. South Africa blamed the failures on Western duplicity, UN bias towards SWAPO, and SWAPO intransigence. In short, South Africa displayed little confidence in the other

parties involved and in the search for a settlement. The other parties in turn expressed serious doubts about South Africa's commitment to an international settlement in Namibia.

Fifth, South Africa's relations with the West deteriorated considerably after 1976/7 and the impasse over Namibia merely added to the strains.

Finally, South Africa itself contributed to changing the political complexion of southern Africa by creating what it regards as fully fledged new states through granting independence to black homelands (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei to date). This of course allowed for the implementation of the Verwoerdian design for regional co-operation.

On the whole, it is clear that these changes in South Africa's external environment were to its detriment and that they, together with the internal difficulties, have probably exposed the domestic base to greater pressure than ever. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the Republic resorted to a defensive strategy at home and regionally: South Africa was, as it were, forced to retreat behind the perimeters of southern Africa.

Although the notion of a constellation of southern African states was not new, Prime Minister Botha gave this inherited concept a substance previously lacking and indeed made it his first major foreign policy initiative. But since it was "revived" by the Botha government early in 1979, the concept of a constellation has been through different official definitions of its nature and scope as policy makers have tried to adjust it to changing circumstances.

Foreign Minister Pik Botha's address to the Swiss-South African Association in Zürich on 7 March 1979 ranks as one of the earliest authoritative statements on a constellation. As initially formulated, the regional option showed a set of clear assumptions :

- (i) A constellation offers an opportunity for finding regional "solutions" to regional problems. Given its stated disillusionment with Western peace initiatives in both Namibia and Rhodesia, South Africa presented a constellation as, at best, an alternative to Western settlement attempts and, at least, as a form of reinsurance or fall-back position in the event of these efforts failing. South Africa saw itself carrying a special responsibility towards the leaders of Namibia (i.e. the Turnhalle participants) and Rhodesia (i.e. the parties to the internal settlement of March 1978) : "if we let (them) down", Pik Botha said, "the whole of southern Africa is going to disintegrate".
- (ii) The "moderate" countries of southern Africa all face a common "Marxist threat" and cannot rely on the West for support. The security of black and white was perceived as indivisible and unless they joined forces, common enemies would, in Foreign Minister Botha's words, "shoot us off the branch like birds, one after the other". As an alternative to the grave and evil consequences flowing from a "Marxist order", the Prime Minister advocated "a regional order within which real freedom and material welfare can be maximised and the quality of life for all can be improved". Despite the pronounced anti-Marxist strain of his expostulation, P.W. Botha paradoxically left open the possibility of Marxist states being included in a constellation.

- (iii) Given a common threat, members of a constellation would engage in military co-operation. Thus Pik Botha suggested that the countries of southern Africa should "undertake joint responsibility for the security of the region". An element of the proposed military co-operation would be a non-aggression pact between constellation members - "an agreement which will involve the combating and destruction of terrorism ... and the mutual recognition of borders ... a joint decision to keep communism out of southern Africa", the Prime Minister explained.
- (iv) Apart from security considerations, the countries of southern Africa are bound by a host of other common interests in the areas of agriculture, commerce, transport, health, labour, power and energy, and scientific and technological development. P.W. Botha went so far as to suggest "the harmonisation of economic, fiscal, manpower and other policies". More nebulous was what South Africa saw as a shared interest in peace, stability, order, development and prosperity. Pik Botha drew the threads together with his suggestions that the countries in the region should develop "a common approach in the security field, the economic field and even the political field".
- (v) Co-operation in technical spheres would in time spill over to the political field. The spill-over factor was inherent in earlier statements on a constellation, thus giving the whole endeavour a distinct ring of determinism. Not only would co-operation extend into new areas but would also become increasingly institutionalised using existing co-operative structures such as the Southern African Customs Union and SARCCUS as a basis.
- (vi) Being a grouping of moderates, or "responsible leaders", a constellation would operate on the basis of the existing regional political order (and such domestic changes as South Africa considers appropriate). This of course implies acceptance of independent former homelands by other members of a constellation. In talking of his willingness "to seek a modus vivendi which does not involve sacrifice of principles or undermining our stability", the Prime Minister was probably conveying this very message. This condition, together with Pik Botha's statement that international recognition for Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Rhodesia (under internal settlement leaders) and Namibia (when independent - presumably under DTA leadership) was unlikely and his emphasis on their having to join forces with South Africa against "radical onslaughts", invariably creates the impression of a constellation as a defensive association of "pariahs". This impression is further strengthened by the link between a constellation and the Government's "total national strategy".
- (vii) Although a constellation might emphasize the links between international outcasts, its membership could also extend to recognised black states. In his Zürich speech, the Foreign Minister saw a constellation embracing seven to ten states representing 40 million people south of the Kunene and Zambezi rivers - a grouping thus including Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. It was hoped that Zambia too would join.
- (viii) Being based on the existing regional order, a constellation would reflect the "realities", as seen by the Government, of South African society. The most fundamental reality for South Africa is that of "multinationalism" and its concomitant notions of "vertical

differentiation" and "self-determination". The link between a constellation and South Africa's racial policies is further borne out in some of the definitions of membership of a constellation. The Prime Minister, for example, included independent former homelands, dependent homelands and even urban blacks among the components of a constellation. This had inevitably led to suggestions that a constellation is being propagated as a device to resolve certain dilemmas in the policy of separate development, notably the political future of non-independent homelands and urban blacks.

These premises suggest that the South African government considered a constellation as not merely desirable but indeed inevitable. Although the arrangement was seen as desirable from the point of view of South Africa's own interests in the first instance, the clear implication was that a constellation was also desirable from the perspective of the other prospective members. As regards the element of determinism, the implicit, and often explicit, assumption was that the centripetal forces at work in southern Africa - particularly economic but also political and security - were inexorably steering the countries in the region (or most of them at any rate) towards even closer and more formal relationships. The centrifugal elements, it was assumed, would in the end inevitably submit to the force and indeed the logic of those making for stronger regional ties.

Such notions were the result of a tendency to exaggerate the importance of economic ties in southern Africa and to underestimate the potency of divisive political and ideological factors. In typical Verwoerdian fashion, reliance was placed on the primacy of economic forces and the concomitant notion that co-operation in this field will, in line with functionalist thinking, spill over into the political and even military areas. Closely related to this brand of economic determinism was a tendency to assume shared perceptions among prospective constellation partners, particularly with regard to the nature of external (that is extra-regional) threats and the need for a common military-cum-political response. In addition to these features, the official expositions of a constellation have been characterised by a considerable measure of vagueness and contradiction, which indicates that the proposals had not been thought through.

Being based on the assumptions outlined, it is not surprising that the hoped-for constellation of seven to ten states did not emerge. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland were quick to give notice that they could not consider joining a constellation as long as South Africa adhered to its existing racial policies. An even more severe setback followed when Zimbabwe became independent under a ZANU-PF government. Prime Minister Robert Mugabe not only made it plain that Zimbabwe had no intention of playing the key role reserved for it in a constellation, but he also demonstrated his political distance from South Africa by joining forces with the Frontline states in their attempt to form an economic grouping aimed at lessening the black states' dependence on the South African economy and transport and communications networks. Lesotho and Swaziland likewise joined the new Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). It is highly ironical that Zimbabwe, which had a central role earmarked for it in the Pretoria constellation, assumed a leading role in this move away from South Africa's regional design.

These developments forced South Africa to amend some of its ideas on a constellation and to reduce an initially grandiose design to what is now essentially a device to restructure relations between present and former parts of the South African state. What remains can be designated an inner

constellation, with the outer or wider constellation rendered unfeasible by the prevailing political climate in southern Africa. This, however, is not to say that South Africa abandoned its long-held notion of creating an association of friendly, closely co-operating and interdependent states in the region. To establish such a favourable external environment remains a central objective of South Africa's foreign policy. South African spokesmen continued to argue that this desired state of affairs would in time emerge - and they based their assumptions on some of those upon which the constellation idea was originally formulated by the Botha government.

The inner constellation has since been formalised between South Africa, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei - the so-called SATBVC states. The process was set in motion with a summit meeting between the leaders of these countries (except Ciskei, then not yet independent) in Pretoria in July 1980. A second summit meeting between the five countries in November 1982 set the seal on the development of a comprehensive network of interstate structures for co-operation.⁸

At cabinet or policy level, the SATBVC countries are joined in the Multilateral Development Council of Ministers, whose function is to formulate policy guidelines for the entire network of multilateral bodies. The departmental and technical level is represented in the Multilateral Economic and Finance Committee and its seven Multilateral Technical Committees, their subcommittees and working groups. The seven Technical Committees are the following :

- Agriculture and Environment Affairs
- Industries, Commerce and Tourism
- Transport
- Posts and Telecommunications
- Health and Welfare
- Manpower and Education
- Financial Relations

Finally, there are six inter-state Regional Liaison Committees, concerned with the development of different regions; the regions are functionally defined, thus transcending political boundaries.

Last year, the five states involved in this grouping held 62 multilateral and 9 regional meetings. The SATBVC association has, as it were, taken to the road. The term, constellation, has meanwhile lost its earlier prominence in official South African statements. Instead, neutral expressions such as "multilateral co-operation" are used.

The TBVC countries are also formally linked with South Africa through customs agreements and the Rand Monetary Area. Although the terms of agreement applying to the TBVC countries are the same as for the BLS states, political considerations prevent the admission of the ex-homelands to the Customs Union alongside Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Reference should also be made to the Development Bank of Southern Africa which came into operation in 1983. Although an autonomous regional institution, the bank is at least at this stage virtually exclusively identified with the SATBVC countries.

Looking at the principles of multilateral co-operation between the five countries and at the established structures, it is evident that the emphasis is on economic and development co-operation. The SATBVC countries are however unlikely to restrict their co-operation to more or less technical

matters. At the 1980 summit meeting between South Africa, Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda, it had already been agreed to promote co-operation also in matters of security. By then, bilateral non-aggression pacts had been concluded between South Africa and each of the then independent former homelands. These agreements continue to exist independently of the multilateral structures for co-operation. As regards political co-operation with South Africa, it is fair to say that the four ex-homelands, given the international non-recognition of their independence and their heavy economic dependence on South Africa, have no effective freedom of action in international politics. Without any international standing, the TBVC countries' "foreign" political relations are almost exclusively with South Africa.

Although it has not happened yet, formal structures for co-operation in both security and political matters may in due course be set up as part of the wider network of multilateral structures between the SATBVC countries. In such an event, the bilateral non-aggression treaties might be converted into a multilateral defence pact. The case for a permanent forum for political co-operation would seem to become stronger if this grouping is formally developing into the confederation envisaged by Pretoria. Official talk of a confederation has inevitably led to speculation that such an arrangement would merely be an intermediate stage in a process of re-integrating the former homelands into the South African state through a federal structure.

With only former homelands joining, South Africa's regional design has obviously not produced the comprehensive pattern of inter-state relationships long cherished by South African policy makers. As a foreign policy objective, the constellation has failed; the inner constellation is in fact of limited relevance to South Africa's foreign relations. In a regional context, the SATBVC grouping will in no way ease South Africa's relations with black states since they have in any case never recognised the independence of Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana and Ciskei. If anything, the SATBVC association may complicate these relations by introducing a highly controversial element into an already difficult situation.

The refusal of the "real" black states of southern Africa to join Pretoria's constellation-cum-confederation, means that South Africa has to concern itself more with the non-members than the members of this grouping in creating a regional environment favourable to its own interests. In more ways than one, South Africa was forced to set its sights lower. First, the Republic realised that the black states were not going to join its proposed constellation; relations with them could thus not be improved and formalised through elaborate formal structures for inter-state co-operation. Second, the early 1980s saw mounting domestic and regional threats to South Africa's security; basic considerations of security took precedence over ambitious plans for regional co-operation.

The years 1980-83 will probably go down in history as a particularly turbulent period in South Africa's relations with its neighbouring states. These were years characterised by severe strains in relations between South Africa, on the one hand, and particularly Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Lesotho on the other. If an event has to be singled out as marking the beginning of this period, it was probably the ANC's sabotage of SASOL plants in June 1980. Numerous smaller acts of sabotage, armed attacks on police stations and even assassinations occurred over the next 3½ years. There were also two further major acts of violence perpetrated by the ANC: in December 1982, the Koeberg nuclear installation, still under construction, was sabotaged and May 1983 saw the car bomb carnage in central Pretoria.

South Africa perceived a direct link between these ANC activities and the organisation's presence in particularly Mozambique and Lesotho. The threat to South Africa from its immediate regional environment seemed more serious than ever before. Newly independent Zimbabwe, although denying ANC insurgents sanctuary, made no secret of its solidarity with the "liberation struggle" and with international moves to isolate and punish its southern neighbour.

These perceived threats from surrounding countries were the principal factor behind South Africa's resort to a "forward" or "offensive" regional strategy or, as critics commonly label it, "destabilisation". The most dramatic manifestations of this new strategy were military strikes against ANC targets in or near Maputo in January 1981 and again in May 1983 (although there is considerable doubt as to whether it was an ANC hide-out hit on the latter occasion) and in Maseru in December 1982. Such raids, whether pre-emptive or punitive, were nothing new for the South African Defence Force. They had frequently been undertaken against SWAPO targets inside Angola, a country that provides sanctuary to the guerrillas.

The extension of a hawkish strategy from Angola to some of South Africa's other neighbours, is therefore based on the premise that the ANC poses an immediate threat to the Republic's security and calls for tough counter-measures. The ANC cannot merely be fought on South African soil, Pretoria maintains, but should be attacked in its foreign bases. The ANC's hosts have, moreover, to be persuaded or forced to deny insurgents sanctuary - or made to pay a heavy penalty if they refuse to oblige.

In terms of the hawkish strategy, diplomatic means are either insufficient or inappropriate in dealing with surrounding states threatening South Africa's security (through their support for the ANC). Diplomacy has to be reinforced or even replaced by economic and military muscle. As the regional leviathan, South Africa is of course well placed to exert economic and military pressure against relatively weak and vulnerable black states. The means of economic pressure are varied, some highly visible and others barely noticeable: they range from the manipulation of exports to "target" states to cutting back on the importation of labour. Military pressure can likewise take various forms, for example sabotage of strategic or symbolic targets and material support for a rebel movement active in the target state.

These forms of intervention amount to destabilisation if they are deliberately intended to either create new or exacerbate existing instability in a target state. The object of destabilisation is then to promote (or force) profound political changes in the target state. These may or may not involve structural change - in effect toppling the regime in power and seeing it replaced by a "moderate" one - but would certainly involve a major change in the target state's behaviour. The latter in the first instance concerns the target's behaviour towards the destabiliser and the latter may wish to see anything from a fundamental (positive) reorientation in policy to a specific agreement not to endanger the destabiliser's security.

There has been considerable controversy over both the means and ends of the hawkish strategy that South Africa has pursued over the last few years. The charges of the aggrieved states - notably Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho and Zimbabwe - against South Africa have been met with denials and counter-charges.

There can be little doubt that Angola has had to pay a heavy price for its continued support for SWAPO: South Africa has over the years undoubtedly

given UNITA some measure of support and has on occasion perhaps directly attacked Angolan military and economic targets. As regards the ANC's hosts, they too have felt South Africa's wrath. South Africa's use of economic pressure against Lesotho over an ANC presence there, is well known. Similar pressure may well have been applied against Mozambique. And then there is the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO or MNR) which is widely believed to be backed by South Africa; of the latter's sympathy for RENAMO, there is no doubt. The Lesotho government too has to contend with a rebel movement, the Lesotho Liberation Army. Lesotho believes the movement enjoys South African support. In the case of Zimbabwe, there have been indications of South African complicity in sabotage raids and allegations of economic pressure. The disaffection in Matabeleland has also been blamed on South Africa by Harare, but this charge has a ring of unreality in view of the depth of the Nkomo-Mugabe divide.

If South Africa has then engaged in hawkish actions against neighbouring states, some of these operations may in effect if not also in intention have produced or aggravated domestic instability in the target states. Whether South Africa's hawkish strategy consists of a "master plan" for destabilisation in its ultimate form - removing regimes in power - is however an entirely different matter. (Such a contention sounds somewhat like a Southern African version of Moscow's "master plan for world domination".) Notwithstanding its power in the regional context, it is highly doubtful whether South Africa possesses the resources to dislodge several surrounding governments and sustain perhaps unpopular (puppet) successor regimes in the face of determined resistance. South Africa's long experience of African wars - in Angola, Rhodesia and Namibia - has probably made it keenly aware of the tremendous military, economic and diplomatic costs it would incur if its forces were to take on the role of "white Cubans" in southern Africa. Even if one accepts that there is no master plan, this is not to say that Pretoria has not toyed with the idea of getting one or two neighbouring governments replaced by movements sympathetic to South Africa.

As regards the lesser form of destabilisation - forcing changes in the target state's policy towards the destabiliser - this could in part be seen as a reactive strategy on Pretoria's part. Since South Africa sees most of the surrounding black states as committed to destabilising the Republic - through their support for the ANC, among other things - any South African resort to destabilisation would merely be a reaction in kind: meeting destabilisation with destabilisation. Alternatively, destabilisation could be a pre-emptive strategy: "let us (South Africa) destabilise them lest they really destabilise us".

Rather than continue the debate on destabilisation, it would at this juncture be more useful to consider the results of South Africa's hawkish strategy.

The year 1984 has already seen some remarkable developments in South Africa's relations with its neighbours. The course of events has taken many observers by surprise because it does not fit into the familiar pattern of relations and does not conform with the conventional apocalyptic scenarios for the region either. South Africa has disengaged its forces from conflict in southern Angola and a de facto ceasefire took effect between South African and SWAPO forces north of the Angola-Namibia border. South Africa, Angola and the United States met for tripartite talks in Lusaka, and Pretoria and Luanda set up a joint commission to supervise the ceasefire in southern Angola. Pretoria and Maputo have had two rounds of talks on a wide range of issues, including matters of security. Top South African and Mozambican

officials met in four working groups - one specifically concerned with mutual security - in January 1984 and they are set to meet again. The following month three South African cabinet ministers met President Samora Machel and also held talks with their Mozambican counterparts.

In the case of Lesotho, there is evidence that the country last year began clamping down on ANC followers in its midst, even expelling some of them. Swaziland has long been taking a tough stand against the ANC using the country as a springboard for attacks into South Africa. Zimbabwe has never permitted ANC insurgents the use of its territory as a base for operations across the Limpopo.

There have in recent weeks also been other indications of an improved political climate in the region. First, South Africa helped with the release of twelve Soviet citizens held captive by RENAMO. Of course, South Africa thereby proved that it was not without influence over the rebel movement. Second, South Africa publicly declared that it had no desire or intention to overthrow the Lesotho government - a statement made in response to allegations to the contrary. Third, Foreign Minister Botha recently spoke of an improvement in relations with Zimbabwe, and Harare confirmed that official contacts have been taking place with Pretoria. Finally, and farther afield - but with immediate regional significance - South Africa last year clamped down on conspirators reportedly plotting a coup d'etat in Seychelles and using the Republic as a base. Pretoria went further and conveyed to the Seychelles government its desire for improved relations on the basis of existing political "realities".⁹

On the face of it, South Africa's neighbours appear to be heeding its demands that they deny ANC insurgents sanctuary. The question now is whether these responses are related to South Africa's hawkish strategy?

In the cases of Angola, Mozambique and Lesotho, there can be little doubt that they have been influenced by South Africa's use of military and/or economic pressure. Perhaps there was some "demonstration effect" as far as Swaziland, Zimbabwe and even Botswana are concerned, but this is likely to have been a secondary consideration in their positions on the ANC. Even if South African punitive measures were the principal factor explaining the recent shifts in policy on the part of the first three countries, other considerations must also have weighed with them. Most important among these is American mediation. There are indications that the United States has also played a role in easing tensions between South Africa and Zimbabwe. Second, Portugal has emerged on the scene as an influential force for reconciliation between South Africa and Mozambique. Third, nature has helped to concentrate political minds in Maputo. With a crippling drought - and then disastrous floods - on top of all its economic problems, Mozambique was made acutely aware of the need for improved economic ties with South Africa. Lesotho may well be influenced by similar considerations. As regards Angola, it too has pressing economic reasons for wanting peace with South Africa.

To sum up, it can be said that South Africa's hawkish strategy, reinforced by a number of extraneous factors, has paved the way for a new round of South African diplomacy in southern Africa. Militancy seems to have given way to moderation. However, to speak of a new era in South Africa's regional relations would be highly premature at this stage. There are numerous imponderables that may yet upset the new climate of moderation. Among these are Soviet and Cuban influence over the MPLA; UNITA in Angola, RENAMO in Mozambique and the ANC in South Africa. These "rebel" or

"liberation movements" certainly do not relish the prospect of improved relations between South Africa and its neighbours and they might deliberately or inadvertently jeopardise the process of inter-state rapprochement. The protracted international negotiations over a Namibian settlement serves as a further reminder of the difficulties in resolving a regional conflict.

Conclusion

South Africa has since Verwoerd's time never been able to give effect to its ambitious designs for regional co-operation. This very failure is itself evidence that the Republic has not succeeded in creating exactly the kind of regional environment it desired. South Africa was consequently in recent years compelled to scale down its plans for regional co-operation; it was a case of reconciling the desirable with the possible. This has resulted in a much more modest and indeed more realistic conception of a favourable regional environment. The grandiose scheme for a regional constellation of states has given way to an overriding concern with security.

South Africa has, since the collapse of the constellation initiative, tried to establish a set of "rules of the game" in southern Africa. The first and most important rule is that South Africa and its neighbours should not allow insurgents to use their territories to commit subversion against one another. Second, material support for rebel or liberation movements should likewise cease. Should black states violate these rules, South Africa would respond with a variety of punitive measures. Should they however obey the rules, South Africa would be duty bound to do the same. A third rule, clearly secondary to the first two, is that political and ideological differences should not obstruct economic interaction. The black states' part of the deal would be to refrain from economic boycotts and South Africa in turn should likewise refrain from economic punishment or economic subversion. These rules are all based on the premise that the states involved would interact within the existing political order in southern Africa. Such a set of regional rules does not amount to a local version of the Brezhnev doctrine; for one thing, South Africa lacks the capability to "do a Czechoslovakia" and sustain a client regime in power.

The prospects for establishing these rules of the game have improved considerably over the last few weeks. Whether the new climate of moderation will last, remains to be seen. But even if South Africa's regional environment were to become more favourable (or less favourable) to its perceived interests than it had been for some years, this still would not solve the Republic's principal political and security problems. Only the creation of a domestic environment favourable to the interests of its people could do that.

- 1 This paper draws on material used in a number of published studies by the present author, in particular The Diplomacy of Isolation : South African Foreign Policy Making, Macmillan, Johannesburg, 1984; "South African regional policy", in Clough, M. (Ed.), Changing Realities in Southern Africa : Implications for American Policy, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkley, 1982, pp. 123 - 160, and The Constellation of Southern African States and the Southern African Development Co-ordination Council : Towards a New Regional Stalemate? SAIIA, Johannesburg, 1981. For this reason, the present paper will list only those sources not sited in any of the above publications.
- 2 The concept 'regional' is used here to apply to the southern African region. Admittedly, the designation 'southern Africa' is not a neat one since there are various views on its demarcation. Even official South African descriptions - which are of primary interest in the present study - vary considerably, as political circumstances change. Thus southern Africa has been variously identified as the area stretching as far north as Zaire; the area south of the Kunene and Zambezi; and South Africa and (some) adjacent countries. Rather than add yet another definition, this study will refer to the term in the context of the particular period in which it was used by South African policy-makers.
- 3 For the purposes of this study, it will suffice to consider a paradigm as a concise framework encompassing the major features (concepts, premises, procedures, propositions and problems) which are unique to the nature of a particular phenomenon. Used in this sense, a paradigm is akin to a model or ideal type. (Kotzé, H.J. en Van Wyk, J.J., Basiese Konsepte in die Politiek, McGraw Hill, Johannesburg, 1980, pp. 133 & 134.
- 4 The creation of the Department of External Affairs in 1927 can conveniently be taken as the beginning of an identifiable South African foreign policy.
- 5 The notion of a "family association" is taken from Modelski, G., A Theory of Foreign Policy, Pall Mall Press, London, 1962, pp. 76 & 77.
- 6 Stultz, N.M., "The Politics of Security : South Africa under Verwoerd, 1961 - 6", Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 7, no. 1, April 1969, pp. 3 - 20.
- 7 Ramolefe, A.M.R. & A.J.G.M. Sanders, "The structural pattern of African regionalism", The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa, vol. 6, no. 1, March 1973, pp. 88 & 89. The text of the 1969 Agreement is to be found in Republic of South Africa, Government Gazette, vol. 54, no. 2584, 12 December 1969.
- 8 Multilateral Co-operation in Southern Africa, 1983 : A Report issued by the Multilateral Development Council of Ministers, Publications Division, Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Information, Pretoria, 1983.
- 9 The Star, 25.1.1984.

