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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PORTUGAL AND ITS AFRICAN PROVINCES, WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO MOCAMBIQUE AND RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA

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Introduction

President Nixon recently said that the outlook for peace in the world was better than it had been for a long time. At about the same time Dr. Diederichs commented in a speech in South Africa that seldom had he seen a darker picture for the world than he saw at present. President Nixon was, of course, looking at the world from the point of view of one of the super powers, seeing the old threat of global and nuclear war receding in the current atmosphere of détente. He was apparently not thinking of the instability and conflicts which exist in various parts of the world, where the super powers are not directly involved. In the Middle East, which is the most serious area of conflict and instability and where the super powers are involved, partial agreements are being achieved, and the threat of confrontation there between the Soviet Union and the United States has almost disappeared.

But there are other regional and local conflicts which show no signs of abating. Ireland is one such area, and there are others which could erupt at any time. The rather common South African point of view, as expressed in this instance by Dr. Diederichs, is coloured by the consciousness that we live in a region where there is considerable uncertainty about the future; a region of dynamic change which involves political conflict and areas of instability, where there are threats of violence, and violence itself in some areas, in the form of terrorist and guerrilla activity.

It is difficult, therefore, for us to share President Nixon's rose-coloured view of the world. But at the same time I do not believe that we need to

fall in behind the prophets of doom who see only a very dark future in this part of the world. I say this because we in Southern Africa have great opportunities and great assets. But we must learn how to use them, and this challenge involves adaptation, accommodations, and change. As a result of recent developments, these may now have to take place more rapidly. There is now a need for a greater sense of urgency, but it must be a positive sense of urgency, which accepts the fact that change is both needed and inevitable. Uncertainty about the future can easily breed insecurity, and insecurity can lead to desperation. Such a trend could be fatal to our future in Africa - a future which, I believe has great potential, economically and politically, provided we are positive in our approach, open to accept constructive change and, above all, willing to become an integral part of Africa.

A leading Afrikaans academic, Professor B.J. Piek, said in an article published last week that White South Africans must realise that they are part of a Black continent and that their future will depend on their ability to fit into Black Africa. I heartily endorse this view, and I believe that it is in this context that we must look at the current developments in our neighbouring countries of Angola and Mocambique.

There is no doubt that the dramatic changes in Portugal have caused greater concern and apprehension among South African Whites than probably anything that has happened since the disturbances in South Africa of the early 60s. The immediate cause of this apprehension is, of course, the effect of the changes on Angola and especially Mocambique. Certainly these changes have been more sudden, more dramatic, than almost anyone could have expected. But we should have known that changes of this sort were coming; the signs were there - in Portugal and in Mocambique itself. It is therefore worth looking now at the course of events over the past few months to see how these dramatic changes have taken place and what the possible trends are for the future.

Policy before the Coup

In terms of Portuguese constitutional laws, which still apply, Portugal is a single, indivisible nation, composed of the metropole and eight provinces, all controlled ultimately by the central government of Portugal. These provinces are: Cape Verde, Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, Angola, Mocambique, Timor, Macau and Goa. (The last one was, of course, long ago lost to India.)

It was this concept of one nation that most of the world refused to accept, regarding the Portuguese Provinces instead as colonies, and it was this concept which Portugal fought so hard and for so long to defend.

In recent years, however, notable changes were taking place, and it was felt by many observers that Portugal was moving away slowly from the unqualified maintenance of this concept of one Portugal. In particular, new constitutional provisions were adopted in 1971 and 1972, which allowed greater autonomy for the overseas provinces, and it was obviously intended that this autonomy should gradually increase. Although ultimate control was firmly kept in Lisbon, local governments and their legislative assemblies were granted more powers, and more people were encouraged to participate in political life. One important symbolic change, for instance, was that Angola and Mocambique became known as "States", thus giving them new recognition as the two biggest and strongest provinces.

These constitutional changes were taking place under the direction of Prime Minister Caetano, and it is interesting to note that ten years previously (in 1962), while still Rector of the University of Lisbon, Dr. Caetano proposed to Prime Minister Salazar that a federal solution should be adopted, which would have amounted almost to a commonwealth system for the Portuguese Community, with considerable self-government for Angola and Mocambique. His proposal was, of course, not accepted then. But it was widely felt that, after he came to power, Dr. Caetano still had these ideas in mind, and that the 1971/72 constitutional changes were perhaps a step in the direction of an eventual loosening of the strong ties binding the overseas provinces to Lisbon.

Among those who had to apply these new provisions was General Antonio Spínola in Portuguese Guinea, where he was both Governor General and Commander in Chief of the armed forces. He attempted to apply the new laws liberally, in order to give the people of Guinea much more say in the running of their own affairs, and he went further in this direction than was the case in any of the other provinces. There is no doubt that General Spínola was affected by his period of duty in Guinea, and that he learnt much from his experience of the people there and also regarding the possibility of negotiating a settlement which would include the retention of some ties with Portugal. It was during this period that he met President Senghor of Senegal, who has played some role in bringing about the current peace negotiations over Guinea, and it is reported that he even met with some of the leaders of the PAIGC - all this while

he was waging a vigorous and effective war against the same movement.

The influence which this period had on General Spínola's views about Africa are illustrated in his recent book, where for instance he speaks about the importance of allowing the African to play a full part in his own country and of not considering him simply as an illiterate. He recalls the case of a certain Mandinga Chief who told him of his ten years of study of the Koran, of his perfect knowledge of the Arabic script and of his Mohammedan theological training. Yet, in spite of all this, he was officially regarded as illiterate, because he could not write or speak Portuguese. Such men, he writes, are fully capable of participating in government and should not continue to be excluded.

In Mocambique, too, changes were taking place. 1973 saw the election of a Black majority to the Assembly and some loosening of both the political and economic links with Lisbon. Increasing resources were being put into the education and economic development of the Black people, and special emphasis was placed on the idea of non-racialism. (This applied throughout the Portuguese provinces.) In the army more effort was being put into the winning of the hearts and minds of the people, and it was fully realised that, without the support of the local people, the military campaign against the guerrilla and terrorist forces could never be effectively pursued.

Furthermore, the Portuguese government was very conscious of the growing international pressure, and its gradual reforms in the overseas provinces were intended as part of the means to counter this pressure, particularly in the Western world, but also in Africa where it was continuously seeking contacts and improved relations. There were, for instance, special efforts to improve relations with Zambia, and relations with Rhodesia were becoming cooler. The requirements of this diplomatic campaign and the emphasis on non-racialism meant that Portugal was always very careful to dissociate itself from South African internal policies, and there is no doubt that this tendency would have become stronger, even under the previous Portuguese government.

In spite of all these gradual measures for reform and to counter criticism, the pressures, internal and external, continued to build up. Internationally Portugal's position grew weaker, and the liberation movements - especially in Guinea and Mocambique - were becoming better trained and armed. But it was probably the internal pressures within Portugal itself that were finally the most crucial. In addition to the actual budgetary cost of the African wars and the neglect of the economic development of metropolitan Portugal itself,

was the related fact that thousands of young Portuguese were emigrating to other parts of Europe. Portugal was being drained of its best people who were becoming alienated, physically and spiritually, from their own country. Then, most important, opinions in the army were changing. This was not simply a question of morale, after thirteen years of fighting in Africa, but a growing realisation that these were wars which could never be won in a military sense. This factor is of special importance, because the army had become the main support of the Portuguese system and government.

There is no doubt that Prime Minister Caetano was well aware of all these developments, and of the changes taking place which had to be accommodated. But he also knew that ⁱⁿ his position as leader he was dependent on a hard-line faction in the government set-up and in Portuguese society generally, which was suspicious of any loosening of the ties between Portugal and its overseas provinces. Perhaps, however, he did not appreciate the growing strength in government and outside ^{of those} who supported his own views and who wished to see a faster evolution of Portuguese policy.

The extent to which the approach of the Prime Minister coincided with that of General Spínola is shown in the treatment of the General after his return from Guinea. He was awarded the country's highest military decoration by Dr. Caetano (an award not given, by the way, to General Kaulza d'Arriaga who returned from Mocambique at about the same time), and the special post of Deputy Chief of Staff was created for him at the end of 1973.

The feeling at the beginning of 1974, therefore, was that significant changes in Portuguese policy were in the making, and that General Spínola would play an important role. But there could not have been many people who anticipated the chain of events which would be set off by the publication of General Spínola's book on 22 February, 1974.

General Spínola's approach to Portugal's problems

It was certainly not General Spínola's views alone, which led to the change of government on 25 April, but the open expression of these views in his book, "Portugal and the Future", served to encourage many others who were thinking along the same lines, and also some who were thinking of much more radical solutions. It also made possible more open discussion of these questions than had been possible before in the rather closed and strictly controlled Portuguese society. The fact that the book was allowed to be published indicates that Prime Minister Caetano knew of its contents and he was prepared to permit General Spínola's ideas to be debated. General Spínola made it

clear that it was in order to start a debate about the future of Portugal that he had produced the book. But there was a stronger reaction from the right than Dr. Caetano had apparently expected, and he was forced, under pressure from President Thomaz and others, to dismiss General Spínola from his post, together with the Chief of Staff (General Gomes) who shared responsibility for the book's publication.

This dismissal of the two Generals, and the indication it gave of the inflexible nature of the government, was the final determining factor which led directly to the army's action against the government on 25 April. Although it seems clear now that General Spínola was not directly involved in the planning for this coup, his ideas, together with his popularity as a hero in the army, served to ^{spark} it off. The coup was engineered by middle ranking officers who had no obvious leader. It was natural that they should turn to General Spínola, once their coup was so easily and so quickly accomplished. But it was in fact from Prime Minister Caetano that the call to General Spínola came, because it was only to him that Dr. Caetano was willing to hand over power.

Because of the central position of General Spínola in the events leading to the coup of 25 April and because of the fact that he is now President of Portugal, it is worth looking at his general approach, as reflected in his book, before turning to consider the policies at present being pursued by the new government, which in some respects go much further than anything proposed previously by General Spínola.

It is not possible to do justice here to General Spínola's profound thinking about the future of his country and its relations with Africa. We can only highlight a few points of importance and relevance to subsequent developments. In his book he attempted to examine Portugal's position realistically, and to propose changes which would take into account the facts of the situation. One must appreciate that he was writing this book as a servant of the previous government at a time when there was no thought of a radical change of government. He was proposing policies, therefore, which he hoped could be put into effect by a gradual adaptation of the old system.

In the first place, General Spínola recognised that Portugal could not continue to bear the cost of the unending wars in Africa, a factor which I have already referred to. In any case, he recognised the fact that an exclusively military victory was not possible. He said, for instance, " To want to win in a war of subversion by means of a military solution is to accept defeat in advance,

unless one possesses unlimited capacity to prolong the war indefinitely .. Is that our case? Obviously not." This realisation was not an original discovery of General Spínola. General Sir Gerald Templer had commented, when he arrived in Malaya in 1952: "The solution lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people." The previous Portuguese government, knew this, too, as did Frelimo and the other liberation movements.

Secondly, he maintained that Portugal could not continue in an isolated position, and that there was a need for Portugal's policies to be accepted in the world - particularly the Western world. In this connection, he touched a responsive cord in many Portuguese businessmen who were trying to establish closer economic links with the rest of Europe, but who were inhibited by the political barriers of Portugal's unpopularity as a result of its African policies.

Thirdly, General Spínola recognised that the African peoples of the Portuguese provinces had legitimate demands for freedom of expression and self-determination. He said, for instance: "Any overseas policy which is not governed by the honest and declared respect for the right of the people to regulate their own lives, and by the recognition of the capacity of the overseas populations to take on the role which is theirs in the guiding of their destiny, will be condemned, sooner or later, as being incompatible with the morality prevalent in the world today and with the sentiment of our own people."

Fourthly, while General Spínola recognised this right to self-determination, he did not propose a breaking up of the Portuguese community, or an abandonment of the Portuguese people overseas. In fact, he proposed very strongly the formation of a Portuguese world-wide community, but a community which would be based on the free acceptance ^{of it} /by all the peoples concerned. In this regard, he argued that, if the people had a free choice, made in full understanding of the consequences, they would choose this form of association with Portugal, because of its advantages to them.

Finally, he came to the crux of the question, namely the application of his general principles. Here he proposed a federal or confederal solution, allowing for as full a measure of autonomy as possible in all the constituent parts of the Portuguese community. Although this was the solution which General Spínola desired, which would mean the maintenance of a Portuguese community throughout the world, with freely accepted links between the various states, the implication was clear that, if one or more of the states chose

full independence separate from Portugal, it would be free to go its own way. He recognised that there were risks involved in this policy, but he argued that the risks would be greater if the old policy of one indivisible Portuguese nation were to be maintained.

General Spínola could hardly have expected that so soon after the publication of his book, he would be in power, faced with the very real problems of putting new policies into practice. However, he is not in sole power, and in the formation of an effective interim government, various factions have had to be accommodated. So it is not simply General Spínola's ideas which are now being implemented, but one can /^{still} assume that his personal views have not changed radically and that he will attempt to use his great influence, particularly in the army, to work towards constructive change which will include continuing links with Portugal. Brazil, regarded with pride by General Spínola as a Portuguese creation, is perhaps a model which he hopes Portuguese provinces will follow, if they should choose complete independence.

Present trends of Portuguese policy

It will be some time before it becomes clear what political direction Portugal and each of its overseas provinces will take under the new dispensation. The situation is still rather confused and unsettled, not only because the new government is still formulating policies, but also because of the sudden exposure of the people to many freedoms which they had never before had the opportunity to exercise. It is not surprising, therefore, that there have been outbreaks of strikes, demonstrations, extreme demands, the formation of many political groupings (some of an extreme and radical nature), and so on. What is surprising, in fact, is that all this has been taking place with so little serious disorder and almost no violence.

All one can do at this stage is to identify a few areas where significant changes are taking place, particularly those changes with relevance to Mocambique.

1. Liberalisation of Society

The first statement of the military Junta, when it came to power, promised reform and the restoration of civil liberties, and the Junta moved fast to give effect to this promise. Actions in this area have been taken in all Portuguese territories, including Mocambique, and they have included the release of all political prisoners (but not those imprisoned in Mocambique for "violent subversive activity"); the abolition of censorship; permission for

free labour unions and political parties; the abolition of special courts for political offences; and an amnesty to army deserters who had fled from Portugal, provided they reported back to their military units within a certain period.

All this sudden opening up of society naturally created considerable confusion, and many feared that anarchy would result. There have been strong warnings from the government, including General Spínola himself, against irresponsible actions and the dangers of anarchy. In particular there have been efforts to end the rash of strikes which occurred, including a number in Mocambique, and indications are that more ordered conditions are returning. Concessions are having to be made to workers in respect of increased wages, and it is probably fair to say that in many cases improvements were long overdue. It is of interest to note in this regard that Black workers in Mocambique have been saying that they are more concerned about improved working conditions than about their political future.

The withdrawal of restrictions has meant that Frelimo sympathisers and supporters are now openly appearing and demonstrating in Lourenço Marques. They appear to be attracting considerable support, but it is much too early to say how extensive this support is throughout the country.

The existence of a free press will probably have a profound effect on developments in all the Portuguese territories. At least now it will be possible for the people to know what is going on, and also for outsiders to judge more effectively what is happening. Previously one had to rely mainly on official statements, and it is clear now that these were misleading as regards the real views of the people.

2. Policy towards the African territories

There is still a certain amount of confusion regarding the intentions of the Portuguese government regarding the three main African provinces, and it seems that there may be some differences within the government. Initially General Spínola offered self-determination, but insisted that this did not mean necessarily independence. He referred to his federal proposals which, if accepted, he said, would be a "triumph for Portugal". He also said that time would be needed to prepare the three territories for self-determination. Without such preparation, self-determination would have no real meaning. Furthermore, General Spínola at first indicated that he was opposed to negotiations with the liberation movements.

However, once the civilian government was formed (about three weeks after the coup), there was a shift towards a clearer recognition of the possibility of

full independence. This shift reflects a compromise with the leftist elements in the civilian government, and possibly also with the views of some of the young officers who were involved in the coup. The communist and socialist members of the government had indicated previously that they wanted a speedy end to the wars in Africa and the recognition of the rights of these countries to independence. The socialist leader, Dr. Mario Soares, who became Foreign Minister in the new government, is the most important and influential figure in this regard.

Before the formation of the civilian government, General Gomes (who is a leading member of the Junta) said in Lourenco Marques that there would be no independence for Mocambique now, but that autonomy would be granted with all groups participating in political life so that they could decide their own future. After the formation of the government, Dr. Almeida Santos, the new Minister responsible for the overseas territories (who is a well known lawyer from Lourenco Marques), said that the right of self-determination, which General Spinoza had repeatedly said would be recognised, must include the possible choice of complete independence, and he indicated that a referendum or elections would be held within a year, possibly on this issue of independence.

One must conclude that this issue has not yet been completely settled within the Portuguese government. Apart from the differences which there may be, it is likely that the vagueness on this point is at present intentional, because it is a point at issue in the negotiations with the liberation movements and discussions with other political groups.

3. Negotiations with "liberation movements"

The previous Portuguese government set its face firmly against negotiations with the various "terrorist" or "liberation" movements active in Guinea, Angola and Mocambique. It denied that these movements were at all representative of the views of Black people in these territories, and it considered that to negotiate with them would be to give them legitimacy which they did not deserve. This policy has been completely changed, and the Portuguese government is now actively seeking talks with these movements. It has already had one round of negotiations with the PAIGC of Guinea, and it is about to begin talks with Frelimo. However, here again there is still considerable confusion about the Portuguese intentions, and it would probably be unrealistic to expect any clarity at this stage, because the government is still feeling its way.

It is clear at least that these movements have now been recognised as factors

which must be dealt with, if a peaceful solution is to be found. Whatever we may think of a policy of negotiating with "terrorists", one has to concede frankly that this is a realistic approach, if one accepts that a purely military solution is not possible in this kind of situation.

These negotiations will, however, not be easy, because the Portuguese are under considerable pressure to bring an end to the fighting, with the expectations of peace having been aroused and the will to continue the wars consequently reduced.

The official position of the Military Junta is that the liberation movements can freely enter the political arena in the respective territories, if they stop the fighting. They have in effect been challenged to continue their fight by democratic means and test their support among the people in free elections. Originally General Spinoza did not intend going beyond this offer and actually entering into negotiations. The willingness to negotiate came about with the formation of the civilian government, and it is now the socialist leader, Dr. Soares, who is conducting these negotiations.

The confusion now arises as to what these negotiations are actually about. Officially the Portuguese are negotiating for a cease-fire, after which the liberation movements will be permitted to contest freely elections in the territories. The liberation movements, on the other hand, regard themselves as the potential governments, and they wish to negotiate about independence. It would, of course, be much easier for them to obtain recognition as the future independent governments, than to become involved in competing with other groups for the peoples' support. In the case of the PAIGC it has already received recognition from about 80 countries as the legitimate government of Guinea-Bissau. Frelimo has not yet claimed or received such recognition, but it has explicitly regarded itself as representing all the people of Mocambique. The Portuguese for their part realise that, to agree to independence for these territories under the control of the liberation movements, would be to make a mockery of the concept of self-determination. One can expect, therefore, that they will continue to insist that these groups must submit themselves to a democratic test of their support, possibly with outside governments or the United Nations being called in to supervise the elections or referenda.

A further point to watch in these negotiations will be whether the Portuguese government is prepared to commit itself to granting ^{full} independence, before the right of self-determination is exercised by the people concerned. If the exercise of this right is to be genuine, then the choice of remaining in the

Portuguese community as an autonomous state, rather than fully independent, should be allowed. This is the course that General Spínola has advocated, and he has said that, if the people choose this course, it will be a victory for Portugal. But there are indications that the negotiations with the PAIGC may be leading fairly directly to independence for Guinea, rather than simply a cease-fire after which the people's will would be determined.

In the case of Mocambique, Frelimo has indicated that it might be prepared to give up its demand that independence should be given under a Frelimo government, but that it would continue to insist that there would be no cease-fire until independence was recognised. In other words, the people of Mocambique would not be given the choice, for instance, of maintaining federal links with Portugal. Even if this outcome were to be acceptable to certain elements in the Portuguese government, one cannot believe that it would be acceptable to President Spínola and the military Junta which, it must be recalled, is still the power behind the civilian government.

Under the circumstances, it is still much too early to speculate further about the possible outcome of these negotiations. The outcome may well be very different in the case of Guinea from that of Mocambique, and the case of Angola - where the Portuguese are in a strong position - may well be different from both the other two. One can only hope that they will lead to cease-fires in all cases, without the necessity of concessions, on the part of the Portuguese, which will in effect mean a compromise on the principle of self-determination - that principle which General Spínola has maintained is the basis of the new policies.

4. Relations with South Africa and Rhodesia

Officially there has been no change in relations with South Africa, and the Portuguese government has behaved very correctly in this regard. There is obviously a recognition of the need to maintain cordial relations with the South African government, because of the Republic's close links with Angola and especially with Mocambique. Dr. Almeida Santos has in fact said that the economic ties between Mocambique and South Africa are too strong for any possible future government to consider cutting the links. He has also said that Mocambique will not harbour anti-South African movements which choose violence to achieve their aims.

One will have to expect that, in its attempts to win international support, the Portuguese government will be more critical of South Africa. This will probably become especially evident in the United Nations. This tendency

will not be made any easier by the fact that the Foreign Minister is a socialist, although even Dr. Soares has recognised the importance of the links with South Africa and has so far not said anything to disturb relations.

Relations with Rhodesia may be somewhat more difficult, and there have already been reports that the new Portuguese government has ended the arrangement whereby Rhodesian forces could pursue terrorists into Mocambique. If true, this could be very significant for the conduct of the security operations in north east Rhodesia. An aspect to watch will be whether the Portuguese government takes any steps to assist the British government in enforcing sanctions against Rhodesia. While there have been hints that this is being considered, nothing concrete has yet emerged.

South African reactions

To turn now to the reactions in South Africa to the changes taking place, one can say at once that the government's official reaction has been entirely proper and in line with its declared policy of non-interference. There have been indications of some concern, for instance in Mr. Vorster's statement that he is not concerned about the type of government which will be established in Mocambique, but only that it should be a good and stable one. Obviously long-term instability or even anarchy would upset the constructive development of the whole region, including that of the small Black states. But, as Mr. Vorster implied, instability and anarchy are not the necessary consequences of a Black government, and we should at all costs avoid the tendency - which is not uncommon in South Africa - to equate Black rule with instability. There are many more examples of stable governments in Africa than of unstable ones, and in any case one need only look at the situation in Northern Ireland to realise that instability and violent conflict are not confined to areas which we so easily regard as simply "uncivilised".

After all, here in South Africa we are busy creating Black governments, with which we hope to live at peace, even though we do not know what form they will take in the future. In fact we are already co-existing with several Black-ruled countries in this part of Africa, in spite of fairly strong political differences.

The professed basis of the government's policy in South Africa, as well as of the policies of the opposition parties, is to resolve actual or potential differences between the various groups or races by political means, through negotiation rather than confrontation - which is what the Portuguese are now trying to do, admittedly under more difficult circumstances.

In principle, therefore, we have no reason to react negatively to present Portuguese policy, and potentially, if it succeeds, there could be great benefit for us in the long run. We may have the opportunity of co-operating in practical ways with a relatively strong Black state on our borders, even if for a time there are political differences, and such mutually beneficial co-operation could greatly improve South Africa's position in Africa generally. This is not simply a naive pipe-dream, because there are good material reasons why Mocambique in the future should continue to maintain co-operative relations with South Africa. There is, for instance, the great importance to both countries of continued traffic through the port of Lourenco Marques. There is the

considerable income derived from the export of labour to South Africa. There is the vital new factor of Cabora Bassa, which no future government of Mocambique can neglect if it is at all interested in the development of its peoples. The economic viability of the Cabora Bassa project depends for the foreseeable future on the purchase of power by the Republic, and the income derived from this will play a fundamental role in the development of the Zambezi Valley - development which is intended to benefit mainly the Black people of Mocambique. In this regard one can say that there is much more advantage to Mocambique than to South Africa in the continuation of the Cabora Bassa agreement, because, while South Africa has invested a lot in this project, it is not yet dependent on the power to be received from it.

There are doubtless many other factors, too, which militate in favour of co-operation, such as the assistance which South Africa could give in the exploitation of Mocambique's considerable resources. I am not simply closing my eyes to the possible difficulties or even dangers in the political field, especially if a government comes to power which is so hostile to white rule in South Africa and Rhodesia that it places political considerations above any thought of practical economic development, and seeks merely confrontation with the South African government. But we have no evidence at present that any meaningful political group in Mocambique is adopting this extreme line - not even Frelimo itself. As the Prime Minister has suggested, it is perhaps pointless even to speculate at this stage about the nature of the eventual government which will emerge. It could perhaps even be dangerous, because the expression of fears and suspicions could encourage the type of hostility among black Mocambiqueans, which we sincerely hope will not develop.

A greater potential danger for us, and for all in this region of Africa, is probably the threat of anarchy, in which extreme and irresponsible small groups could operate without control. So, in the first place, our best interests will be served if an effective, representative government is formed, which has wide support throughout Mocambique and which will have sufficient authority to implement its policies. We in South Africa should do all we can to encourage and support such a development and avoid doing anything which might make the situation any more difficult for the present Portuguese authorities than it already is. Certainly it will not serve our own long-term interests if we give the impression that we were so committed to support of previous Portuguese policies that we are unwilling to accept change. For instance, there can be no constructive purpose in criticising the present Portuguese government and condemning the concept of Black majority government.

which may be the product of their policies. Wisely the government has not even suggested such criticism. Nor even has Mr. Ian Smith who probably has reason to feel more under pressure on this score than anyone else. But there are a few unfortunate cases in South Africa of things being written and said which could cause animosity and even hostility, where at present this does not exist. This completely pessimistic approach emerges only where there is a natural tendency to look always for the negative factors and the extreme cases to prove that the future is full of doom, rather than looking also for the positive factors and the challenge in any new and changing situation.

In this connection, I am baffled by the decision of the Southern Cross Fund to suspend aid to the army in Mocambique. Without any reasonable explanation for this decision, the impression may have been given that there is a highly critical attitude in South Africa towards the Portuguese army and the change which it has brought about. Such an impression would be an erroneous one and very unfortunate with a view to future relationships between South Africans and the Portuguese.

If we believe in the policy of non-interference, then the last thing we in South Africa should do is to give the impression that we wish to bolster up, or even come to the aid of, any White group in Mocambique which does not want to come to terms with the current changes. Apart from the fact that this would amount to interference, it would raise false hopes, because South Africa is not in a position in any case to defend the special interests of other groups in Southern Africa. The Prime Minister has in fact described as "absolute nonsense" the suggestion that South Africa would consider sending troops to help Whites in Mocambique, and furthermore he said that he could not foresee any situation where South Africa would send troops there. All South Africa was interested in, he said, was maintaining its own territorial integrity.

Under these present delicate circumstances, therefore, South Africans should be very wary of adopting a critical and negative attitude, and of sowing suspicion about developments in Mocambique and about the ability of Black people to govern themselves. We should perhaps take note of the statement on Republic Day by the South African Consul General in Lourenco Marques, who commented that there was no feeling of acute crisis among South Africans in Lourenco Marques, who were closer to the situation than people in the Republic. He said that the present situation involved "unavoidable changes"

which
/ in the last analysis could only be to the advantage of Southern Africa
and all its peoples. This positive attitude is, I believe, a legitimate
one at the present time, while we wait to see what course these changes
will take, and how they will affect us here in South Africa.