

# **SMALL ARMS PROLIFERATION and CONTROL in SOUTHERN AFRICA**



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**Glenn Oosthuysen**

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**SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

**SAIIA SOUTHERN AFRICA SERIES**

**SMALL ARMS PROLIFERATION  
AND CONTROL IN SOUTHERN AFRICA**

by

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## Foreword

This publication is a result of a project set up and managed by the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) with the financial assistance of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP).

Founded in 1934, the SAIIA has a long and proud record as South Africa's premier forum on international issues. It is an independent, self-governing institute, whose purpose is to encourage wider and more informed interest in international affairs. It is both a centre for research excellence and the home of stimulating and informative public debate in international affairs.

The issue of small arms - or 'micro' - proliferation is one of great concern to developing countries as they seek to establish conditions of social stability necessary for prosperity to flourish. Years of inter- and intra-state conflict in Southern Africa have left behind a legacy of weaponry which, if not controlled, could undermine the progress made with peace and democracy in the region. This study sets out clearly the extent of the problem of small arms proliferation in Southern Africa and makes a number of clear and innovative policy suggestions for control.

Greg Mills  
SAIIA National Director  
October 1996

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## Preface and Acknowledgements

This study examines the proliferation of small arms in Southern Africa in the light of the peace processes which have brought an end to the armed conflict in the region. The control of these weapons which have been distributed far and wide, both legally and illegally, is crucial to the region's future, since the failure to control small arms could conceivably exacerbate crime, new political antagonisms and general instability, thereby undermining the region's development and growth.

A number of questions are addressed in the study, including:

- \* What is the extent of small arms proliferation in Southern African countries?
- \* What factors have fuelled small arms proliferation?
- \* What are the consequences of small arms proliferation?
- \* What measures are deployed to control small arms in Southern African countries?
- \* What factors limit efforts at small arms control?
- \* What measures can be taken to improve small arms control?

A project of this nature cannot be undertaken, given the sensitivity of the issue under discussion, without the co-operation and assistance of many individuals and organisations.

The financial assistance of the *United States Institute of Peace* is gratefully acknowledged. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this programme are, however, those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace or the South African Institute of International Affairs.

The assistance offered to the project by the following individuals is much appreciated:

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All factual errors or omissions remain mine alone, however.

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Finally I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my family for their ongoing support.

Glenn Oosthuysen  
Johannesburg, October 1996



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## Notes on the Author

Glenn Oosthuysen was born in Durban, South Africa in 1970. He holds an Honours degree in International Relations from the University of the Witwatersrand. He has a special interest in post-Cold War security threats and conflict issues affecting South and Southern Africa and has contributed work to journals, academic papers and regularly contributes to the local media. His research has taken him to much of Southern Africa, including Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Namibia. In January 1996 he attended an Organisation of African Unity Seminar on the *Establishment Within the OAU of an Early Warning System on Conflict Situations in Africa*, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. In September 1996 he was invited by the United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms to contribute to the UN's Regional Workshop on Small Arms, held in South Africa.

Mr Oosthuysen is currently working on a project to investigate the **Illegal Narcotics Trade in Southern Africa**.

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## Executive Summary

The terms 'arms control', 'proliferation' and 'disarmament' have come to be associated largely with the nuclear and conventional weapons arms race and the development of weapons technology such as artillery systems, aircraft, missile systems and tanks. However, another category of weapons known as 'small arms', warrants the same concern and attention of the world community and policy-makers. This becomes obvious when one considers that the tendency towards crime, intra-state and ethnic conflict throughout the world is exacerbated and facilitated by the availability of these cheap, yet deadly, light weapons. In Southern Africa, the consolidation of security is a precondition for the implementation of any meaningful peace-building and development projects. The control of small arms - or so-called 'micro-proliferation' - is, therefore, crucial in achieving this end.

In the long-term, the removal of causal factors (that is, the demand for weaponry) is the ideal solution to small arms proliferation and control. However, in order to limit the immediate consequences of small arms proliferation in Southern Africa, there is much which can and must be done in the short-term.

Within South Africa, both legal and illegal weapons have contributed to the violent nature of crime. More effective controls on the legal weapons market are vital to limit the availability of weapons to the criminal element. In addition, whilst not a solution in themselves, border controls need to be tightened to achieve greater effectiveness, if government is to curb the cross-border trafficking of weapons. This requires political will, more effective utilisation of existing resources and increased resource allocation to enforce measures for control. Control measures which are not enforced are of no value.

South African policy-makers and law enforcement officials cannot strengthen or devise any small arms control measures or strategies for both legal and illegal weapons, without taking into account the limited capacity of the region's states. Nor can they ignore that their primary responsibility lies with South Africans who demand protection from the effects of small arms proliferation. Given the absence of or limited effectiveness of weapons control measures in the region, South Africa, with its greater institutional capacity, must take the lead in increasing regional small arms control. A small arms policy which depends too much on the capacity, resources or political will of the neighbouring states is likely to fail to meet the security needs of South Africans.

The institutions of state within the region - particularly military, police and

customs - are generally far weaker than those within South Africa. Widespread corruption, lack of accountability on the part of officials, limited manpower, training and operational resources are just some of the factors which mitigate against effective controls being implemented by these states.

Co-operation will go a long way towards restoring control and containing further proliferation. However, the final responsibility for small arms control in the region lies with each individual state. The extent to which the states of Southern Africa are able to build their own institutional capacity and exert state authority will ultimately determine the extent to which small arms are brought under control in the region. Until then, small arms proliferation will continue to hang, like the Sword of Damocles, over Southern Africa's prospects for future growth and stability.

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# Glossary

|         |  |
|---------|--|
| AA      | Assembly Area  |
| AK-47   | Kalashnikov Assault Rifle                                |
| AKM     | Later version of Kalashnikov Assault Rifle               |
| AMODEG  | Association for Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique       |
| ANC     | African National Congress                                |
| APLA    | Azanian People's Liberation Army                         |
| ARMSCOR | Armaments Corporation of South Africa Limited            |
| AWOL    | Absent Without Official Leave                            |
| BMATT   | British Military Advisory and Training Team              |
| CCF     | Ceasefire Commission                                     |
| ESPU    | <i>Endangered Species Protection Unit</i>                |
| FAA     | Angolan Armed Forces                                     |
| FADM    | Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique                   |
| FAM     | Forças Armadas de Moçambique                             |
| FRELIMO | Frente de Libertação de Moçambique                       |
| GDP     | Gross Domestic Product                                   |
| GPA     | General Peace Agreement                                  |
| IFP     | Inkatha Freedom Party                                    |
| INAROE  | Instituto de Remoção de Obstáculos e Engenhos Explosivos |
| ISDSC   | Inter-State Defence and Security Committee               |
| KNP     | Kruger National Park                                     |
| MK      | Umkhonto we Sizwe  |
| MPLA    | Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola                |
| NAMPOL  | Namibian Police  |
| NCACC   | National Conventional Arms Control Committee             |
| NCIS    | National Crime Investigation Service                     |
| NDF     | Namibian Defence Force                                   |
| NGO     | Non Governmental Organisation                            |
| NSF     | Non Statutory Force                                      |
| PAC     | Pan-Africanist Congress                                  |
| PF      | Polícia Fronteira  |
| PLAN    | People's Liberation Army of Namibia                      |
| RAD     | Regional Arms Depot                                      |
| RENAMO  | Resistência Nacional Moçambicana                         |

|         |  |
|---------|--|
| RSF     | Rhodesian Security Forces  |
| RSP     | Royal Swaziland Police   |
| RSS     | Re-integration Support Scheme  |
| SADC    | Southern African Development Community                                   |
| SADF    | South African Defence Force  |
| SANDF   | South African National Defence Force                                     |
| SAPS    | South African Police Services  |
| SARPCCO | <i>Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation</i> |
| SDF     | Swaziland Defence Force  |
| SDU     | Self-Defence Unit  |
| SPU     | Self-Protection Unit   |
| SSM     | Serviços de Segurança Militar  |
| SWAPO   | South West African People's Organisation                                 |
| SWATF   | South West African Territory Force                                       |
| TBVC    | Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda and Ciskei                                |
| UDF     | United Democratic Front  |
| UNAVEM  | United Nations Angola Verification Mission                               |
| UNDP    | United Nations Development Programme                                     |
| UNHCR   | United Nations High Commission for Refugees                              |
| UNITA   | <i>União Nacional para a Independência Total d'Angola</i>                |
| UNOMOZ  | United Nations Operation in Mozambique                                   |
| UNTAG   | United Nations Transition Assistance Group                               |
| ZANLA   | Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army                                |
| ZDF     | Zimbabwe Defence Force   |
| ZDI     | Zimbabwe Defence Industries  |
| ZIPRA   | Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army                                     |

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## Introduction

Freed from the ideological burdens of Cold War rivalry and from apartheid, Southern Africa is in the process of transformation. However, the prospects for the post-conflict reconstruction of the region are dependent upon the creation of a *stable security environment*. The proliferation of small arms in Southern Africa is a direct consequence of the years of militarisation and conflict which have characterised the region. The availability of vast quantities of arms - in the possession of civilians, former combatants and the security forces - continues to fuel a myriad of political and criminal ambitions.

*Small arms*, by definition refers to those weapons that can be carried on the person or be moved without the use of any mechanised vehicle or platform - the equipment most suitable to traditional guerilla and infantry warfare. Revolvers, pistols, semi-automatic and automatic rifles, hand-grenades, landmines, shoulder-fired rocket launchers and grenades, form the bulk of small arms weaponry.

In an effort to contribute to the goal of stability through security, this study seeks to reflect on the extent of this proliferation and to propose possible methods of control.

**Part One** focuses on South Africa. It outlines the historical basis for the militarisation of South African society, briefly tracing developments from both liberation-inspired and state-directed militarisation, through to the demobilisation in the wake of the negotiated political dispensation. The extent to which years of conflict and mobilisation created highly militarised and well-armed state and civilian structures, which continue to facilitate the proliferation of small arms both legally and illegally, is explored.

The link between the proliferation of small arms and the soaring crime rate is presented both in terms of the nature of crimes committed and the effects of crime on society. No study of proliferation in South Africa can be complete without acknowledging the regional dimension and difficulties encountered in combatting cross-border weapons flows. Thus a study of border control is included with a view to informing the debate and presenting a realistic view of the limited capacity of border control measures.

**Part Two** focuses on small arms proliferation in the rest of Southern Africa, both collectively and on a state-by-state basis. Based largely on research and information gathered during visits to each country, this section seeks to analyse

the extent of proliferation and the types of control measures in place. The prospects for tighter controls and for closer bilateral or multilateral co-operation are also explored in the light of prevailing conditions and weaknesses found.

**Part Three** concludes by proposing various measures for improved control in Southern Africa.

***Part One: South Africa***



## 1.1

---

### **A New South Africa Living with its Past**

*Unless the South African Police Service is given every means to fight crime, South Africa will risk becoming a gangster state where hijackers, druglords, muggers and other criminals will trample hard-won democratic rights into the dust.*

George Fivaz, National Police Commissioner<sup>1</sup>

Crime and political violence could be said to characterise life in post-apartheid South Africa. However, crime and violence were no strangers to the previous apartheid era either. What then, apart from the fundamental political changes which the country has undergone, has been the difference? An often neglected and even downplayed phenomenon - small arms proliferation - provides part of the answer. The roots to the proliferation of small arms can be found in historical, domestic and regional developments which have led to an expansion of the sources of supply. This has been facilitated, if not exacerbated, by the failure on the part of the authorities to develop policies and control measures which could effectively account for and respond to these developments.

#### **Militarisation**

The militarisation of South African society found its most widely recognisable expression in the system of compulsory military conscription of white youth and the mobilisation of black township youth. Both were taught the skills necessary to either maintain the apartheid state or to win liberation through the use of weapons of war. Militarisation of self and society was romanticised as a brave, honourable and noble step for the protection or advancement of the respective community's interests.

Amongst white youth, introduction to the military began at school through the school cadet programme. Cadet training prepared and educated white youngsters for their later role as soldiers in the South African Defence Force (SADF). Their mindset was shaped and moulded to prepare to confront their fellow countrymen in a war for survival against the perceived Communist onslaught of the Soviet Bloc. This war was deemed necessary to preserve culture, language and freedom. In some sectors, the SADF's successes and bravery were hailed in the war against the superpower might of the Soviets and the Cubans in Angola. Pride was instilled in the SADF's capabilities and heroes were created through the publicising of battle-front acts of bravery and the awarding of medals of honour.

Black township youth, too, were mobilised to prepare to fight for their liberation from the white oppression of the apartheid state. They were to aspire to be freedom fighters and liberators of their people. Underground networks were there to recruit them and to send them off to be trained and to learn the art of guerilla warfare. Graffiti on township walls recalled the names of those who fought, lived, died, were exiled or jailed for the cause - Mandela, Sisulu, Hani, Biko, Slovo, Tambo and others.

The 1980s were crucial to this institutionalising of militarism as successive States of Emergency were declared and troops moved into townships and cities. Action by paramilitary police units became the normal method of response to ever-increasing and violent political protests. The state security structures, synonymous with the reign of PW Botha, took hold of the country and led to the infiltration of military networks into civil society and social organisation. In the townships, the rise of civic organisations and the role of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in mobilising popular resistance in the townships confirmed the shift to militarisation. As the two forces squared up to each other, so too was there a perceived need to arm each side in response to the other. The creation of Self-Defence Units (SDUs) became a method of defence against the state security forces. In a classic example of divide and rule, elements within the security forces armed Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) supporters to counter the SDUs and the IFP established its own Self-Protection Units (SPUs). White South Africans sought protection by acquiring private firearms to defend themselves against 'die swart gevaar' ('the black peril'). The proliferation of small arms, both of legal, licensed and illegal weapons, was well established within all communities of South Africa by the time of the momentous political changes of 1990.

## Demobilisation

The February 1990 speech to Parliament of then-President FW De Klerk, heralded a break from the years of armed struggle and oppression with the unbanning of various military and political organisations. Efforts at demilitarisation moved in tandem with the political negotiations process. Memories of this time recall protocols such as the Pretoria and Groote Schuur Minutes, which were aimed at laying the foundation for the demobilisation of military formations and the integration of the Non-Statutory Forces (NSF) of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), along with the statutory forces of the Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda, Ciskei (TBVC states) and the SADF. The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was born.

However, there were shortcomings in this transition. For one, initially, the SDUs of the ANC and the SPUs of Inkatha, were not considered for the

military integration process. Cadres of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) were integrated into the new SANDF, but the SDUs and SPUs were largely excluded. As a result, unskilled, embittered former SDU and SPU members have allegedly resorted to criminal activities or follow their own political agendas, armed with the weapons acquired for previous roles. The belated inclusion of SDU and SPU members into the SANDF and South African Police Services (SAPS) has not been successful. In fact, of the 2,000 SPU members in KwaZulu-Natal, only 20 had reported to the SANDF.<sup>2</sup>

## **Integration**

Former cadres of the ANC and PAC were still awaiting integration into the SANDF, years after the process began. The expected number of cadres who turned up for their allotted date of integration were far below those which should have reported. Major-General DJ Mortimer, Vice-Chairman of the SANDF Integration Committee, reported in May 1996, that intakes of NSF members had become progressively smaller, 'there is cause for concern that the last planned intakes will be completed leaving a considerable residue of names on the certified personnel register. The MK intake [in April 1996], for example, was planned to consist of 1,620 members but only 258 reported'.<sup>3</sup> The same applied to APLA members. The decline in numbers is attributed 'to a waning interest in full-time service in the SANDF'.<sup>4</sup> The time delay in the integration of all cadres, whilst logistically unavoidable, could have been a contributory factor in the continued proliferation of weapons and militarisation within society.

As of April 1996, integration of the former TBVC states' military forces had been completed. By contrast, only 57% of the NSF (MK and APLA) had been assembled. As of May 1996, 19,964 former NSF members had reported to assembly areas of which 3,437 had opted for demobilisation. Roughly 88% of those reporting had been integrated into the army, 7% into the medical services, 2% into the navy, just over 1% into the air force, whilst the chaplains and intelligence service recruited less than 1%.<sup>5</sup> Some 12,903 men and 1,968 women have received permanent appointment to the SANDF. Of these, two are Lt.-Generals, nine Major-Generals, 21 Brigadiers, 52 Colonels, 125 Lt.-Colonels, 277 Majors, 277 Captains, 456 Lieutenants, three Second-Lieutenants, 87 Warrant Officers, 183 Staff Sergeants, 540 Sergeants, 1,055 Corporals, 1,309 Lance-Corporals, 10,244 Privates plus seven civilian appointments.<sup>6</sup>

## Disarmament

The demobilisation and integration process of the SANDF arguably did not make adequate provision for the disarmament of all former combatants or communities. In the course of the SANDF integration process, very little attention was paid to the development of a concerted programme to recover arms caches which may still have been in the possession of former NSF members. Whilst this was a politically sensitive topic at the time of integration discussions, it was undoubtedly too important an aspect of the integration and demobilisation process to have been placed on the backburner. The experiences of Mozambique and Angola have emphasised the need for all weapons used in the course of a conflict to be brought under the control of the authorities as soon as possible to avoid their use in criminal activities or as a source of supply for other regional conflicts. Only in October 1994, six months after the democratic elections, did the SANDF launch *Operation Rollerball* - a top secret operation designed to recover ANC arms caches within South Africa and in the neighbouring states.<sup>7</sup> The SANDF's then Acting Chief-of-Staff, Lt.-General Siphwe Nyanda announced in February 1995 that the operation had 'been completed successfully'<sup>8</sup> - despite the fact that the Operation only recovered 70 AK-47 rifles, 935 handgrenades, 53 pistols and 316 limpet mines.<sup>9</sup> Many cache sites could not be located despite the use of locator maps provided by MK's regional commanders. Equally disturbing is the fact that many of the cache sites which were found, were empty. This was hardly surprising perhaps, given the time-lapse. Of the weapons left in the other states of Southern Africa, the SANDF estimated the value of the weapons to be more than R22 million.<sup>10</sup> Ownership of R17 million worth of weaponry was transferred to the host country governments - which also acquired responsibility for these weapons. It is possible that the 'lost' weapons belonging to the NSFs have subsequently been utilised in other illegal and destabilising activities.

## Re-integration into Society

The Service Corps programme, specifically aimed at military personnel who chose to be demobilised, had only trained 885 people by May 1996 - 650 in September 1995, 105 in November 1995 and 130 in January 1996. They had been trained as carpenter assistants, motor mechanic assistants, motor vehicle drivers, panel beaters, welders, bricklayers, plumbers, plasterers, electricians, computer trainees, tilers and painters. The role of the Service Corps is crucial to the re-integration of former combatants into society. For without skills which are of utility in civilian life, many demobilised soldiers could resort to crime.

The disarmament, demobilisation and integration process in South Africa has largely been a success. However, there have been cracks through which many ex-combatants have fallen. Effectively, the failure to include SDUs and SPUs

early enough in the process has sustained the gang culture which still exists in many townships. In the East Rand townships of Katlehong, Vosloorus and Tokoza, former SDU members seeking to preserve their personal levels of prestige in the community they used to serve, have reportedly sought to recreate a role for themselves. Invariably this has led to gangsterism and involvement with criminal organisations. Feeling abandoned by their former political masters, the lure of organised crime and gangsterism, which provides its own riches, power and respect could be seen as an irresistible and natural substitute for many. Similarly, those ex-combatants who have had to wait months and even years before reporting for integration and demobilisation, have long since found alternative ways of life. These factors, in the context of the widescale availability of arms accumulated in the course of the decades of militarisation, have facilitated not only the rise in crime, gangsterism and violence, but continue to perpetuate it through further demand for small arms.

### **The Arms Industry**

The South African arms industry is both an indication and a consequence of the militarisation of the South African state and society. There are numerous companies which manufacture small arms in South Africa: Reutech, Cape Armoury, Tressitu Ammunition, Aserma, Republic Arms, Musgrave, Pretoria Metal Pressings and Littleton Engineering Works. However, the role of the arms industry extends beyond the mere contribution of small arms to the local market. It plays a subtle role in the continued militarisation of South African society and continues to be a supplier of weapons to an already oversupplied sub-continent.

In 1992, the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR) was relieved of its manufacturing and production capacity and tasked instead with the sole responsibility of procuring weapons for the state security forces and contracts for the defence manufacturing industry, as well as marketing locally-manufactured weapons, systems and technology to the international arms market. Whilst directly involved in the procurement of small arms used by the security forces, ARMSCOR has 'no involvement in the supply of small arms to the civilian market'.<sup>11</sup> All arms destined for the civilian market are regulated by the South African Police Service (SAPS) and subject to the provisions of the Arms and Ammunition Act, No.75 of 1969. In terms of the Act, arms manufacturers must obtain permits for the sale of weapons to civilians. Weapons supplied to the market in this manner join the ranks of those weapons intended for legal, licensed gunowners.

On 30 August 1995, the South African Cabinet approved the appointment of a National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) to ensure that the export of arms was conducted responsibly and in accordance with government

policy. However, as the debate around the Cameron Commission (set up to investigate illegal arms exports and to make recommendations on control measures) and the NCACC subsequently showed, there is a great deal of disagreement on the role of the arms industry and therefore the extent of the controls which should be imposed. The debate included issues such as: the desirability of limiting the discretionary powers of the NCACC by dividing countries into three broad categories of export classification, and public and Parliamentary debate on export decisions. The NCACC approves all arms exports according to subjective criteria of morality and responsibility. These subjective decisions are made behind closed doors, thereby excluding the public from making representations. This lack of transparency has prompted calls for Parliament to be given greater input into the process so as to avoid decisions being based on political expediency and financial rewards of a particular export order. Reports in August 1996 tell of South African arms being supplied to Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire, suggesting that the control of arms exports is not effective. The need for export controls should arguably not only focus on the regulated arms industry, but also ensure that all cargo leaving South Africa does not contain illegal arms (see Part 1.4).

It is in the context of the above-mentioned militarisation of society that South Africa has to confront the consequences of small arms proliferation.

## 1.2

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### Crime and Small Arms - The Deadly Link

*I see it as a war to the death, a war of filth against decency. It is guns against freedom. It is my life and liberty against their immediate gratification. They want it now and they have got a gun to prove it.*

Crime victim

*We need to get rid of the bad elements because they want to be in power and firearms give them power.*

Police spokesman

Despite public outrage at the high incidence of violent crime prevalent in South Africa, the tools of the trade with which these crimes are committed are not sufficiently targeted as objects for policy action. Would hijacking continue to be a source of widespread paranoia and fear if hijackers did not have access to firearms? Would people have as much fear of being attacked in their homes if they thought that robbers were unlikely to be armed with a firearm? Can crime be tackled by focusing on the instruments of fear, death and violence, the instruments of commission - small arms? If the tools of the trade, small arms, were to be targeted specifically would it have an effect on the level of crime? Answers to the above depend largely on the extent to which small arms can be said to be utilised in criminal acts. Crime statistics suggest that the link is firmly established.

According to the Nedcor Project on Crime, Violence and Investment, in 1995 crime cost South Africa R31,3 billion or 5,6% of the estimated Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 1996. Professor Robin Lee, the chairman of the project, said the study 'shows a relentless rise in the levels of crime and violence in our society ... . Business is hurting badly from crime and domestic investment is decreasing'.<sup>1</sup> Since 1989, South African murders have increased by 61%, armed robberies by 119% and rapes by 80%.<sup>2</sup>

South Africans have daily experienced the effects of weapons proliferation as robberies, vehicle hijacking, gangsterism, murder, rape, taxi violence and an assortment of other crimes are increasingly committed with firearms. In addition, doctors working at various casualty/trauma units have reported an increased number of injuries and deaths being caused by firearms. On another level, victims of shootings create an added burden to the taxpayer, as many are not insured or covered by medical aid and thus their medical treatment is paid for by the state. In the United States, a study showed that the average stabbing victim cost US\$6,446 to treat in 1992, whereas a gunshot victim by comparison cost US\$14,541 to treat.<sup>3</sup> When injuries are caused by multiple gunshot wounds

or cause more extensive damage, the costs rise exponentially. The reason for the increased costs is the nature of the tissue damage caused by gunshot wounds, known as disruption.<sup>4</sup> Doctors have also reported an increase in spinal injuries, particularly when the victim is shot while seated in a vehicle; victims of car hijacking account for a higher than normal incidence of spinal injuries given their body position relative to the shooter standing alongside them.

In South Africa, over the period 1990-93, political violence accounted for only 10-13% of the overall national deaths due to violence.<sup>5</sup> In the two areas most affected by political violence in this period (the former Witwatersrand and KwaZulu-Natal), more than 50% of all those injured, died - 'a situation which is highly characteristic of trauma largely caused by short-distance gunfire'.<sup>6</sup> By contrast, the mortality rate among victims of non-firearm violence is almost never in excess of 5%.<sup>7</sup> Over the period 1985-95, wounds caused by firearms had increased by more than 800% in KwaZulu-Natal alone.<sup>8</sup> In the same period, gunshot wounds were responsible for three times as many deaths as were stab wounds.<sup>9</sup> This reflects the preference for small arms over traditional weapons, as the political and criminal violence took hold in the province and demanded more 'effective tools'.

In reality, potential victims of crime and violence are more likely to be confronted with a firearm than any other weapon. In the first six months of 1995, firearms accounted for 3,346 (39,8%) of the 8,407 murders reported. Over the same period, a total of 33,441 robberies were reported of which 26,563 (79,4%) were committed with firearms. The table below reflects the increased use of firearms in criminal acts:

| Use of Firearms in Violent Crime |        |                    |         |
|----------------------------------|--------|--------------------|---------|
| Year                             | Murder | Attempted Murder   | Robbery |
| 1991                             | 3,803  | Not Available      | 17,821  |
| 1992                             | 6,122  | 13,276             | 26,665  |
| 1993                             | 7,764  | 16,023             | 33,198  |
| 1994                             | 7,803  | 17,744             | 43,279  |
| 1995                             | 7,169  | 7,245 <sup>1</sup> | 45,216  |

1 : For the period 1 January to 30 June 1995.  
Source : National Crime Investigation Service (NCIS), SAPS

Whilst the use of illegal AK-47 assault rifles in common criminal activities is alarming, it must be said that the popular perception of the AK-47 being the dominant weapon of crime is false. Press headlines and media reports often begin with terms such as 'AK-47 wielding gang' or 'Robbers with AKs' but



closer reading almost always reflects that the majority of gang members were armed with revolvers or pistols. This sensationalist reporting has misinformed and created a public perception which is resistant to control measures aimed at tightening possession and storage of legal firearms. Such suggestions almost always provoke a cry of 'why target my firearm when it is the illegal AKs which are to blame for crime'. Police statistics reflect just how distorted this belief is and confirm that it is rather pistols and revolvers which are most frequently used in crime (see table below):

| <b>Annual Murders Committed Using Various Calibre Weapons</b> |               |                         |               |                         |
|---|---------------|-------------------------|---------------|-------------------------|
| <b>Weapons Used</b>   | <b>1994</b>   |                         | <b>1995</b>   |                         |
|   | <b>Deaths</b> | <b>Weapons Used (%)</b> | <b>Deaths</b> | <b>Weapons Used (%)</b> |
| Assault Rifle   | 458           | 5.9                     | 408           | 5.7                     |
| Pistol/Revolver   | 5,872         | 75.3                    | 5,377         | 75                      |
| Rifle/Shotgun   | 753           | 9.7                     | 763           | 10.6                    |
| Homemade/Unknown  | 720           | 9.2                     | 621           | 8.7                     |
| <b>Total</b>  | <b>7,803</b>  | <b>100</b>              | <b>7,169</b>  | <b>100</b>              |
| Source: NCIS, SAPS  |               |                         |               |                         |

With crimes, such as armed robberies or housebreaking, the pistol is preferred to the assault rifle because of the ease with which it can be concealed on the street. Police statistics also show that in instances of vehicle hijacking, '90% of vehicle hijackers are armed with handguns or pistols ...'.<sup>10</sup> The one exception to this trend is the attacks which occur on armed security company vehicles which transit cash and other valuables. According to security companies, attacks are carried out by large gangs with up to 10 members, who mostly carry assault rifles, particularly AK-47s and in 80% of cases they even use armour piercing bullets.<sup>11</sup> The use of this type of weaponry, is largely the reason why 'robberies of vehicles carrying cash ... involve extreme violence'.<sup>12</sup>

Surprisingly enough, incidents of taxi violence also reflect the greater preference for pistols than might have been expected (see table below):

| Weapons Used in Taxi Violence 1994 - 26 April 1996 |      |      |                   |
|--|------|------|-------------------|
| Type of Weapon Used                                | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 (- 26 April) |
| AK-47 Rifles                                       | 45   | 76   | 12                |
| 9mm Pistols  | 111  | 111  | 46                |
| 7,65mm Pistols                                     | 10   | 7    | 7                 |
| R4 Rifles  | 8    | 16   | 3                 |
| Stechkin Pistols                                   | 1    | 0    | 0                 |
| Makarov Pistols                                    | 1    | 0    | 0                 |
| Shotguns   | 2    | 0    | 0                 |
| Unidentified Firearms                              | 186  | 185  | 89                |
| Handgrenades                                       | 2    | 1    | 1                 |
| Limpet mines                                       | 1    | 1    | 0                 |
| Cultural weapons                                   | 14   | 22   | 10                |
| Petrol bombs                                       | 4    | 2    | 1                 |
| Revolvers  | 2    | 0    | 0                 |
| Commercial Explosives                              | 0    | 1    | 0                 |
| R1 Rifles  | 0    | 2    | 0                 |
| Skorpion Pistols                                   | 0    | 0    | 1                 |
| Stone Throwing                                     | 10   | 11   | 9                 |
| Total Incidents                                    | 512  | 563  | 231               |
| Deaths   | 199  | 222  | 84                |
| Injuries   | 346  | 391  | 164               |
| Arrests  | 256  | 299  | 73                |
| Source: NCIS, SAPS                                 |      |      |                   |

Juvenile crime rates reflect the spread of small arms in South African society. In the first six months of 1996, 32 murders were reportedly committed by children under 12 years. The murder weapons were mostly handguns, commercial weapons like shotguns or were unknown. Over the same period, children between the ages of 12 and 17 committed a total of 29 murders using firearms. They mostly used handguns, except for one incident in which a military weapon was used. By contrast, 12 attempted murders were committed by children aged 12-17; again, because of the use of firearms, more fatalities (29) than injuries (12) were reported.<sup>13</sup> In Gauteng in 1995, 506 juveniles

between the ages of seven and seventeen, were arrested on charges of robbery with a firearm.<sup>14</sup>

Whilst criminals may prefer to use more easily concealed weapons such as pistols and revolvers, in KwaZulu-Natal observers of the political violence report the increasing use of automatic weapons (as suggested by the medical statistics mentioned earlier). Yet, mysteriously, there would appear to be a vast gap between the high number of AK-47s smuggled into South Africa and the low number which are actually used to commit crimes. It could be that many of the automatic weapons being smuggled into South Africa, particularly in KwaZulu-Natal, are being systematically stockpiled for use in support of a political cause at some future date or are being trans-shipped by criminal networks to other regions of the world.

The Minister of Safety and Security, Sydney Mufamadi, told Parliament in June 1996 that there were altogether 481 known crime syndicates operating in South Africa, of which 112 were involved in vehicle and weapons smuggling.<sup>15</sup> The inter-relationship between organised crime in its many forms and weapons proliferation must be considered, since the two are complementary. Given the fluidity of international crime organisations and the international arms market, it is possible that weapons obtained cheaply in the region could be transferred to support a multitude of other criminal, political or ethnic conflicts - with obvious consequences for South Africa's foreign relations (see Part 1.3).

According to the SANDF, 'the proliferation of illegal weapons is probably the most significant contributing factor to crime in the country'.<sup>16</sup> Amidst all the debate and threats of vigilante action in response to the crime crisis in South Africa, little attention has been focused on the primary instruments of violence. Given the obvious and growing correlation between small arms proliferation and crime, the situation calls for a concerted effort to reduce the supply of illegal weapons to the criminal elements. This will increasingly place a burden on the policing efforts of the SAPS and the support of the SANDF.

## 1.3

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### Policing Small Arms

*Rather have a gun and not need it, than need a gun and not have it.*

South African Gunowners Association bumper-sticker

*Devote massive resources to get rid of the illegal weapons first. Until that is done, however, allow me the privilege of defending my family when and where the police are unable.*

Letter to the Editor, *The Star*

There are two major factors fuelling the proliferation of small arms in South Africa:

- \* the continued growth in legal, licensed firearms; and,
- \* illegal weapons consisting of former licensed firearms which are stolen or lost, and weapons which are smuggled across the country's borders.

Both legal and illegal weapons fuel a spiral of proliferation which can only partly be addressed through improved policing.

#### Licensed Firearms

The decades of apartheid insecurity gave rise to the widespread practice of obtaining a personal firearm for the purpose of self-defence, particularly amongst white South Africans for whom the approval of such a licence was relatively easy. In the post-apartheid era, the rise in violent crime has sustained this practice. The Arms and Ammunition Act, No.75 of 1969, which regulates the licensing procedure, does not set overly-stringent requirements for the issuing of a licence. As a result, the personal acquisition of a licensed firearm is largely determined by the costs incurred by the purchase of the weapon, rather than by the licensing procedure.

As of the end of 1995, there were more than 4 million licensed firearms in South Africa, an increase of 64% on the 1986 total of 2,492,633 licensed firearms (see table below). Some 4,7% of licence holders were classified as 'non-white' in 1983, but by 1993 some 28% of the members of the South African Gunowners Association were black.<sup>1</sup> This increase in licensed firearm ownership among the black community reflects not only the demand for firearms in this community, but also the less restrictive nature of the licensing system in post-apartheid South Africa.

| Licensed Firearms in South Africa |           |               |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|---------------|
| Year                              | Total     | Gun Owners    |
| 1986                              | 2,492,633 | 1,061,281     |
| 1993                              | 3,717,463 | 1,637,141     |
| 1994                              | 3,954,083 | Not available |
| 1995                              | 4,100,015 | 1,944,066     |

Source: SAPS

During 1993 and 1994, in the run-up to and in the wake of South Africa's first democratic elections of April 1994, applications for firearm licences were approved at an average rate of 20,208 per month (see tables below).

| 1994 Firearm Licence Applications |               |               |               |               |
|-----------------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Region                            | Jan-Mar       | Apr-Jun       | Jul-Sep       | Oct-Dec       |
| National Head Office              | 5,750         | 5,829         | 3,972         | 2,792         |
| Gauteng                           | 31,757        | 26,767        | 16,076        | 14,325        |
| Kwazulu/Natal                     | 12,249        | 9,678         | 6,566         | 6,477         |
| Mpumalanga                        | 5,898         | 4,568         | 3,154         | 3,077         |
| Northern Province                 | 3,154         | 2,624         | 2,469         | 2,149         |
| Northern Cape                     | 2,053         | 1,862         | 1,318         | 1,207         |
| North West                        | 5,415         | 4,309         | 2,979         | 2,670         |
| Eastern Cape                      | 4,852         | 3,857         | 2,344         | 2,290         |
| Free State                        | 6,120         | 4,884         | 3,086         | 2,880         |
| Western Cape                      | 12,075        | 8,803         | 6,118         | 5,508         |
| <b>Total</b>                      | <b>89,323</b> | <b>73,181</b> | <b>48,082</b> | <b>43,375</b> |
| Total Applications : 253,961      |               |               |               |               |
| Source : SAPS                     |               |               |               |               |

| <b>1994 - Licences Issued</b>  |               |               |               |               |
|--------------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Region                         | Jan-Mar       | Apr-Jun       | Jul-Sep       | Oct-Dec       |
| National Head Office           | 3,497         | 3,984         | 1,467         | 1,113         |
| Gauteng                        | 27,881        | 26,270        | 13,579        | 11,630        |
| Kwazulu/Natal                  | 10,425        | 9,152         | 5,311         | 4,914         |
| Mpumalanga                     | 5,247         | 4,628         | 2,718         | 2,328         |
| Northern Province              | 2,753         | 2,520         | 1,807         | 1,553         |
| Northern Cape                  | 1,964         | 1,847         | 1,096         | 953           |
| North West                     | 4,963         | 4,239         | 2,568         | 2,343         |
| Eastern Cape                   | 4,254         | 3,875         | 1,993         | 1,771         |
| Free State                     | 5,647         | 4,820         | 2,634         | 2,244         |
| Western Cape                   | 10,472        | 8,766         | 5,194         | 4,530         |
| <b>Total</b>                   | <b>77,103</b> | <b>70,101</b> | <b>38,367</b> | <b>33,379</b> |
| Total Licences Issued: 218,950 |               |               |               |               |
| Source : SAPS                  |               |               |               |               |

In 1995, the average number of firearm licences approved fell to approximately 12,000 licences per month (see tables below).

| <b>1995 Firearm Licence Applications</b> |               |               |               |               |
|--|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Region                                   | Jan-Mar       | Apr-Jun       | Jul-Sep       | Oct-Dec       |
| National H/O                             | 1,818         | 2,459         | 2,202         | 3,020         |
| Gauteng                                  | 14,097        | 16,338        | 17,472        | 16,358        |
| Kwazulu/Natal                            | 6,000         | 5,546         | 6,815         | 8,712         |
| Mpumalanga                               | 2,930         | 2,952         | 3,349         | 3,140         |
| Northern Province                        | 1,696         | 2,149         | 2,402         | 2,271         |
| Northern Cape                            | 1,028         | 1,158         | 1,406         | 1,157         |
| North West                               | 2,453         | 2,747         | 3,195         | 3,299         |
| Eastern Cape                             | 2,069         | 2,162         | 2,795         | 3,999         |
| Free State                               | 2,510         | 2,726         | 3,137         | 3,024         |
| Western Cape                             | 4,861         | 5,521         | 6,585         | 5,747         |
| <b>Total</b>                             | <b>39,462</b> | <b>43,758</b> | <b>49,358</b> | <b>37,957</b> |
| Grand Total: 170,535                     |               |               |               |               |
| Source : SAPS                            |               |               |               |               |

| 1995 Licences Issued           |               |               |               |               |
|--------------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Region                         | Jan-Mar       | Apr-Jun       | Jul-Sep       | Oct-Dec       |
| National H/O                   | 717           | 819           | 1,455         | 1,460         |
| Gauteng                        | 11,780        | 13,199        | 14,290        | 13,168        |
| Kwazulu/Natal                  | 4,926         | 3,193         | 3,953         | 6,046         |
| Mpumalanga                     | 2,448         | 2,410         | 3,032         | 2,800         |
| Northern Province              | 1,417         | 1,640         | 2,083         | 1,985         |
| Northern Cape                  | 923           | 852           | 1,247         | 1,052         |
| North West                     | 2,176         | 2,165         | 2,832         | 2,652         |
| Eastern Cape                   | 1,862         | 1,729         | 2,199         | 2,432         |
| Free State                     | 2,180         | 2,342         | 2,724         | 2,605         |
| Western Cape                   | 4,368         | 5,084         | 6,104         | 5,583         |
| <b>Total</b>                   | <b>32,797</b> | <b>33,433</b> | <b>39,919</b> | <b>39,783</b> |
| Total Licences Issued: 145,932 |               |               |               |               |
| Source : SAPS                  |               |               |               |               |

However, in the first three months of 1996, the number of licences approved again increased, to an average of 18,164 per month (see tables below).

| January-March 1996 Applications |               |
|---------------------------------|---------------|
| Region                          | Jan-Mar       |
| National Head Office            | 2,955         |
| Gauteng                         | 20,034        |
| KwaZulu/Natal                   | 7,836         |
| Mpumalanga                      | 4,157         |
| Northern Province               | 2,853         |
| Northern Cape                   | 1,181         |
| North West                      | 3,663         |
| Eastern Cape                    | 7,978         |
| Free State                      | 3,834         |
| Western Cape                    | 7,153         |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                    | <b>61,644</b> |
| Source: SAPS                    |               |

| January-March 1996 Licences Issued |               |
|------------------------------------|---------------|
| Region                             | Jan-Mar       |
| National Head Office               | 1,332         |
| Gauteng                            | 18,720        |
| KwaZulu/Natal                      | 6,754         |
| Mpumalanga                         | 3,982         |
| Northern Province                  | 2,622         |
| Northern Cape                      | 1,196         |
| North West                         | 3,822         |
| Eastern Cape                       | 6,479         |
| Free State                         | 3,487         |
| Western Cape                       | 6,547         |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                       | <b>54,491</b> |
| Source: SAPS                       |               |

*The renewed increase in the acquisition of licensed firearms would appear to be a response to the increased levels of violent crime - including vehicle hijacking and armed robberies.*

*As the above statistics reflect, 86% of all applicants have been granted a firearm licence. This suggests that, far from discouraging firearm ownership, the law is actually designed and applied so as to facilitate private firearm proliferation. The background checks of applicants do not arguably provide sufficient grounds for determining eligibility to carry a firearm. Additional criteria could include: compulsory attendance of a recognised firearm skills training course to ensure responsible firearm usage and knowledge of the law (section 2A of the Act, inserted in 1988, requires that the applicant obtain a certificate of competence, but this is of no force since the amendment has yet to be ratified); and a physical on-site inspection of the safe or weapon's storage facility (in 1994 it became mandatory for gunowners to possess a safe) to determine, firstly, whether the applicant does actually have a secure facility (applicants have been known to share the 'proof' of having acquired a safe by sharing invoice slips or simply making a false declaration on the application form) and, secondly, whether or not it meets with the safety standards set out in Section IX of the Arms and Ammunition Regulations of 1994. Physical inspection of applicants' homes could contribute to a reduction in the number of weapons lost through thefts and housebreaking, since gunowners without safes often leave their weapons in a drawer or cupboard. As a result, 'one of the sources of illegal arms is housebreaking'.<sup>2</sup> It could also help prevent accidents which occur as a result of weapons falling into the hands of children. If the police could ensure that owners had a safe, then most responsible owners would probably use it, thus limiting opportunities for such consequences.*

*The requirement of annual renewal of a firearm licence could arguably also further improve the Arms and Ammunition Act. In terms of this, a renewal could require that firearms be physically presented to the local police station commissioner for verification and extension of the licence period. If the owner has moved from his previously registered residence, then an on-site inspection of storage facilities at the new residence could again be made mandatory. This procedure would also help to keep account of firearms which are lost or stolen but not reported to the police by owners fearing prosecution for negligence. Whilst these recommendations would demand more active police enforcement and manpower utilisation, the burden need not be so great if it were to be devolved to local police station level. The station commissioner could be entrusted with the responsibility of approving firearm applications following an on-site inspection of the safe. This would also assist in building police-community relations at the local level. Critics may argue that the costs of such requirements would place ownership beyond the reach of most, but if one considers the costs of purchasing a firearm (average price is R1,500), then it is obvious that most licensed firearm owners could afford such extras. The point*



is not to make firearm ownership exclusive, but rather to curb the consequences of poorly handled and stored weapons. As with cars, not all can afford them, but that does not mean one should sacrifice safety and driving standards to bring them within reach of all.

A further element of the *Arms and Ammunition Act*, which arguably requires revision is Section 8(1). This section permits the owner of a firearm to give written permission for his/her licensed weapon to be used by another person (who need not possess a firearm licence but should be competent). This clause is open to abuse as legal firearms can be used by an individual for criminal acts but not be linked to the user. Should the owner have an alibi and not identify the individual to whom the firearm was entrusted, then the culprit could escape accountability. This is particularly true in so far as gunshops are concerned. Some gunshops will loan a firearm to an individual ostensibly for a trial period of 14 days (as permitted by the Act) after which the individual can decide whether or not to buy the firearm and apply for a licence. The opportunity is thereby created for that weapon to be used in a crime and not be traced to any registered owner through ballistics tests. Were the weapon to be traced to the gunshop, it could not be held liable since it is legally entitled to loan the weapon for the trial period. Why would a gunshop run this risk? Because they have nothing to lose. Should the weapon not be returned, the gunshop collects the deposit and claims from its insurance company as it has not acted beyond the law and cannot be held liable. The extent of this practice is larger than most would suspect since there are more than 600 registered arms and ammunition dealers in South Africa. In the words of a senior police official, 'if we went into every gunshop in this country we would solve half the problem'.<sup>3</sup> Section 8(1) is of questionable value and would require urgent revision to provide safeguards against such abuses.

One may question why it should be necessary to tighten controls on legal, licensed firearms, when it is illegal firearms which are most often used to commit crimes. The answer to this is that the legal market is a significant source of firearms for the illegal criminal market. To quote an official SAPS document: 'the main internal sources of illegal firearms remain the theft, robbery or loss of firearms in legal possession'.<sup>4</sup> This is also reflected in the higher incidence of handguns being used in crime than is the case with typically perceived illegal weapons such as AK-47s (see Part 1.2). The incidence of licensed firearms being reported as stolen or lost continues to increase (see table below). In 1994, at least 16,110 (1,342 a month) licensed firearms were reported lost/stolen. In 1995, this figure increased to at least 17,617 (1,468 a month) and in the first three months of 1996 the number of weapons reported lost/stolen was 5,246 (1,749 a month).

| Firearms Stolen/Lost/Recovered: 1994 - April 1996 |        |           |       |
|---|--------|-----------|-------|
| Year  | Stolen | Recovered | Lost  |
| 1994  | 16,075 | 7,150     | 35    |
| 1995  | 16,121 | 11,610    | 1,496 |
| Jan-Apr 1996                                      | 5,175  | 3,852     | 71    |
| Source: SAPS                                      |        |           |       |

Many gunowners, fearing prosecution in terms of the Arms and Ammunition Act for their negligence or failure to comply with safekeeping regulations, may choose not to report the theft or loss of their firearms. These official statistics should, therefore, be seen as a conservative estimate of the actual number of registered weapons illegally in the hands of unlicensed and unaccountable individuals.

Another internal source of illegal weapons 'is the loss of firearms suffered by the Security Forces'.<sup>5</sup> Between 1 April 1990 and 12 September 1995 the SAPS suffered the loss of 7,261 firearms and the SANDF lost 1,324 weapons over the same period. The former homeland and TBVC states' security forces have also accounted for considerable losses of weapons - for example, in a 1995 stocktake of the former Transkei police, 2,120 (38%) of the 5,634 weapons meant to be under its control could not be accounted for.<sup>6</sup> There is a need to tighten official controls over state-provided weapons and armouries, particularly if one considers the manner in which some of these weapons were lost or stolen. Of the 7,261 firearms lost by the SAPS, 3,404 were robbed from police officials, 950 were lost in burglaries of police officials' homes or quarters, 322 were stolen out of policemen's vehicles (some at the scene of accidents in which policemen were killed or injured), 1,438 were lost from charge offices 'during transfers of shifts', 101 were *forgotten* in cloakrooms and 1,046 were lost during official duties or visits to discos and shebeens.<sup>7</sup> The killing of policemen is another source of firearms and often a motivating factor in such attacks, but the irresponsible manner in which many of these weapons were lost should be severely dealt with by the authorities.

The growth in the private security industry raises related concerns. Section 8(2) of the Arms and Ammunition Act entitles an employer to provide an employee with a firearm for the purpose of discharging his duties. In terms of this, more than 40,000 registered security guards in South Africa are armed.<sup>8</sup> As at January 1995, there were 2,707 security companies and 78,390 security officers registered with the Security Officer's Board (excluding companies in the former TBVC states and homelands).<sup>9</sup> Not all security companies are registered with the South African Security Federation, which acts as the industry's umbrella

organisation and was formed in 1986, and thus they are not subject to training standards and regulation. Estimates put the total number of private security personnel at roughly 200,000.<sup>10</sup> Speculation abounds that some security companies are fronts for the paramilitary training of right-wing groups, SPUs and SDUs. Government proposed legislation in late 1996 to outlaw the paramilitary training of individuals or groups unless lawful authority for such training had been acquired. The Minister of Safety and Security, Sydney Mufamadi, has stated that 'illegal firearms continue to find a market through the paramilitary training and equipping of various groups'.<sup>11</sup> However, the Security Officer's Board (the legislative body which oversees the industry) does not have the authority to impose regulations pertaining to the issuing of weaponry or the storage of weapons in armouries: apparently, 'those things are covered by the Arms and Ammunition Act and are regulated by the police'.<sup>12</sup> The draft Judicial Matters Amendment Bill, containing measures to ban 'unlawful' paramilitary training of individuals and groups, will hopefully be supported by increased transparency within the security industry in so far as paramilitary activities are concerned.

Between 1 April 1993 and 30 June 1995, a reported 169,783 firearms entered the illegal weapons market as a result of thefts or losses.<sup>13</sup> Over the same period, only 69,736 firearms were seized by the SAPS.<sup>14</sup> Thus, the proliferation of legal, licensed weapons and illegal weapons cannot be separated.

### **Illegal Weapons**

Small arms, stolen or lost whilst in the legal possession of private gunowners, the arms industry and the security forces, as well as arms caches supplied to cadres of the liberation movements and members of the SDUs and SPUs, constitute the major internal sources of illegal weapons. The external source of illegal weapons stems from the cross-border trafficking of weapons (see Part 1.4). However, the number of illegal weapons circulating in South Africa is not known. Figures vary from 400,000 to eight million, but ultimately are just 'guesstimates'. The extent of the problem is best reflected by the ease with which criminals, political antagonists, vigilante groups and others can acquire firearms. The number of weapons seized by the SAPS (see table below) is another useful indication of the extent of proliferation, since they estimate that they only recover approximately 10% of all illegal weapons entering the country. This measure is, however, subject to such influences as changes in police capacity and the frequency and scale of search-and-seizure operations. This is evident from the comparatively huge seizures since the SAPS launched unprecedented operations in 1996 - such as Sword and Shield, Operation Anvil and Operation Rooivalk amongst others - in which 3,568 firearms<sup>15</sup> were seized.

| <b>Weapons Seized: 1993 - 1995<sup>16</sup></b> |               |               |               |
|---|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| <b>Weapons &amp; Type</b>                       | <b>1993</b>   | <b>1994</b>   | <b>1995</b>   |
| <b>RIFLES</b>                                   |               |               |               |
| AK-47   | 1,403         | 1,589         | 1,392         |
| Other   | 1,170         | 1,297         | 892           |
| Shotguns  | 593           | 691           | 632           |
| <b>Total</b>                                    | <b>3,166</b>  | <b>3,577</b>  | <b>2,916</b>  |
| <b>PISTOLS</b>                                  |               |               |               |
| Stechkin  | 20            | 10            | 4             |
| Scorpion  | 11            | 16            | 32            |
| Makarov   | 174           | 164           | 172           |
| Tokarev   | 77            | 56            | 58            |
| Other   | 4,327         | 5,150         | 6,934         |
| <b>Total</b>                                    | <b>4,609</b>  | <b>5,396</b>  | <b>7,200</b>  |
| <b>REVOLVERS</b>                                | <b>1,894</b>  | <b>2,364</b>  | <b>2,842</b>  |
| <b>HOME-MADE FIREARMS</b>                       | <b>1,991</b>  | <b>3,123</b>  | <b>2,624</b>  |
| <b>GRAND TOTAL</b>                              | <b>11,660</b> | <b>14,460</b> | <b>15,582</b> |
| Source: SAPS                                    |               |               |               |

| <b>Ammunition Seized: 1993 - 1995</b> |             |             |             |
|---------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
|                                       | <b>1993</b> | <b>1994</b> | <b>1995</b> |
| 7,62mm                                | 119,610     | 103,424     | 40,717      |
| Other                                 | 1,194,826   | 203,367     | 108,259     |
| Source: SAPS                          |             |             |             |

Reactive policing measures, such as those launched in 1996, can play an important role in combatting illegal weapons, but the costs incurred by such operations suggest that they cannot be sustained long enough to seriously affect the proliferation of illegal weapons.

Proactive policing is a vital longer-term approach to the effective control of illegal weapons. In terms of the 'Community Safety Plan: National Priority Crimes', the SAPS has focused on restructuring, intelligence, operational aspects, technology, co-operation and co-ordination, legal aspects and

community support as its short-term strategy to deal with illegal firearms.<sup>17</sup> The key objectives of the Plan are to:<sup>18</sup>

- \* curb the availability, trade in and possession of illegal firearms;
- \* curb police corruption with regard to the loss of and trade in firearms;
- \* implement effective border control mechanisms;
- \* *target the activities of organised crime syndicates regarding the importation and distribution of firearms; and,*
- \* promote stricter regulation of related legislation, including current licensing systems and stricter safekeeping and storage practices.

However, these efforts at improved policing of firearms have been hindered by the continued lack of respect for the law and for those who are tasked with its enforcement. In fact policemen are no less likely to be targets of criminals than the average citizen - 3,051 police officers died 'unnaturally' between 1994 and 1996. Most of these deaths were in Gauteng - 1,042, KwaZulu-Natal - 817, Western Cape - 337, Eastern Cape - 300, Free State - 144, Mpumalanga - 138, Northern Province - 102, North West - 90, Northern Cape - 57 and Far North - 24.<sup>19</sup> Between January and May 1996, there were 466 attacks nationwide on policemen, resulting in the deaths of 60 and the loss of 99 firearms from policemen in Gauteng alone.<sup>20</sup> A 'Protecting the Protector' project was launched in 1996,<sup>21</sup> in which policemen from one area visiting another area receive backup support from those more familiar with the dangers of the area - an indication of the role small arms play in empowering criminals and weakening the authority of the state security forces.

In August 1996, vigilante action in the Western Cape and violent clashes between rival political groups outside the Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court were just some of the more publicised incidents in which firearms were brazenly brandished in front of the authorities who were powerless to act against them. (This led to the promulgation of a ban, in September 1996, on the carrying of firearms at a public gathering.) Further threats to police efforts come from within, in the form of corruption fuelled by poor salaries, poor working conditions and the influences of organised crime syndicates. In fact, in 1995-96, of the 14,277 prosecutions instituted against members of crime syndicates, only 7,995 resulted in convictions.<sup>22</sup> This points to a breakdown in the investigative capacity of the police as well as the poor state of the judicial system. The shortage of manpower and logistical capacity within the SAPS is an indictment of its organisational management and control. However, lack of government funding is also apparent in the lack of a computerised ballistics 'fingerprinting' system - which could link illegal weapons to specific crime scenes. The SAPS

has had access to this technology but has not been able to acquire it due to the cost which is in excess of R9 million.<sup>23</sup> This could drastically improve the SAPS' investigative capacity and provide it with substantive evidence for the prosecution of offenders. As with crime in general, the combatting of illegal weapons cannot, arguably, be left solely to the SAPS, but rather requires a multi-pronged approach involving support and co-operation from the SANDF, intelligence services, the judiciary, government funding, regional partners (see Part 2) and the broader community.

The distinction between legal and illegal weapons is a blurred one given the fact that legal weapons are partly a source of illegal weapons. Police capacity to tackle both must be boosted if any headway is to be made in the battle against proliferation. This battle could be assisted by community re-education and co-operation against illegal or negligent firearms possession and the restoration of respect for the law - all of which would appear to be beyond the scope of responsibility of the SAPS.

## 1.4

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### Trafficking and Border Controls

*The initiative lies with the smuggler.*

SANDF official

*Weapons coming from Mozambique (or Angola) would not be a problem for South Africa if there was no demand for them in South Africa.*

UNHCR official

The smuggling of illegal weapons into South Africa is likely to continue in the foreseeable future, particularly since the peace process in Angola has 'freed' and might continue to 'free' vast quantities of small arms. Weapons are entering South Africa from Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, Swaziland, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Lesotho and even Zaire. At issue is the viability of border controls as an effective short-term measure to stem the tide of weapons smuggling. As the first line of defence in the short-term, border controls should be made more effective to deter this. Border controls are neither the perfect solution nor foolproof, but the porosity of South Africa's borders serves only to facilitate the proliferation of illegal weapons and other trans-national smuggling activities.

The availability of small arms throughout Southern Africa is a legacy of the conflicts which have racked the region for years. For more than two decades, Southern Africa has experienced civil wars in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) and guerilla insurgencies in Namibia and South Africa to name but a few of these conflicts. Many of the weapons used in these conflicts have since made their way, illegally, to South Africa where there is a strong demand for them by criminal elements. Yesterday's weapons of war and political liberation in the region, have become today's weapons of crime and violence in South Africa.

Speaking in August 1994, the South African Minister of Safety and Security, Mr Sydney Mufamadi reported that in 1992-93 cases of illegal firearm smuggling increased by 227% over the 1991-92 figure. This period coincided with the signing of the Rome Accord on 4 October 1992 by RENAMO and FRELIMO, ending the 16 year civil war in Mozambique. Ironically, those weapons which were silenced inside Mozambique by the peace process found new 'life' in South Africa as Mozambicans motivated by greed or desperation, found an eager and rich market for their arms in South Africa. Mozambique is said to be the largest source of illegal weapons destined for South Africa's

criminals and participants in the ongoing political violence in KwaZulu-Natal.<sup>1</sup> The Mozambican peace process and subsequent outflow of weaponry serves as a warning of what might be expected once peace in Angola is secured. If the peace process in Angola remains on track and disarmament is as poorly controlled (see Part 2.3) as was the case in Mozambique (see Part 2.2), then South Africa should be prepared for an alarming increase in illegal weapons supply.

The major weapons-smuggling routes from within the region are:<sup>2</sup>

- \* from Mozambique to Mpumalanga and Gauteng;
- \* from Mozambique via Swaziland to northern KwaZulu-Natal and the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands;
- \* from Mozambique to northern KwaZulu-Natal, via the temporary border posts near Ndumo Game Reserve and Kosi Bay;
- \* from Nyanga and Nyangapanda on the border of Zimbabwe to Komatipoort (Mpumalanga);
- \* from Angola via Namibia (Ariansvlei and Nakop border posts) to Gauteng and the Western Cape; and,
- \* from Angola via the Caprivi Strip in Namibia, via Botswana, to Gauteng.

The most common weapons-smuggling methods include the following:<sup>3</sup>

- \* pilot vehicles are used to reconnoitre routes for weapons-carrying vehicles to detect security force presence;
- \* weapons are carried by individuals on passenger trains;
- \* weapons are concealed in heavy vehicle payloads, such as freight containers, and are often transferred from one vehicle to another en route;
- \* weapons are concealed behind panels, in tyres, fuel tanks, luggage compartments and false compartments;
- \* individuals are dropped off near the South African border, cross on foot and then rendezvous with gun-runners or vehicles on the South African side of the border;
- \* illegal aliens bring arms with them to be sold in order to obtain money for food, housing or transport;
- \* weapons are often transported and distributed by making use of the mini-bus taxi networks; and,



- \* weapons are flown aboard aircraft into small airfields or private airports such as Lanseria, Wonderboom and Grand Central where minimal customs and security measures are maintained.

South Africa's eastern border area has long been the major supply route for illegal arms entering South Africa from Mozambique. Typically, weapons are smuggled over the border and transported via the N4 highway from Nelspruit into Johannesburg's East Rand townships, from where they are distributed to other parts of the country. However, the political violence in KwaZulu-Natal led to the development of more direct supply routes from Mozambique, through Swaziland and into KwaZulu-Natal. Known as the 'Norex fence', the border from Komatipoort to Mbusini (on the border with both Mozambique and Swaziland) stretches a distance of 62,2 km and falls within the area of responsibility of the SANDF's Group 33 unit based in Nelspruit. Despite the impressive-looking rolls of barbed wire and electrodes which are monitored by eight high-tech control rooms or sub-stations, the effectiveness of this fence, erected in 1986, is in practice somewhat less awe-inspiring. It takes an illegal immigrant or smuggler anywhere from 30-90 seconds to climb through the fence. Since the voltage on the electric fence was turned down from 12,000 to 2,300 volts (non-lethal mode) in 1990, its major function has been reduced to that of an alarm. The computer system is able to identify the location of a disturbance along the fence to within 100 metres.

Most border-jumpers are ordinary Mozambicans desperately seeking opportunities in South Africa to escape Mozambique's widespread poverty, where the average annual per capita income is US\$60. In 1993, 96,600 illegal immigrants were repatriated from South Africa, of which 80,926 were from Mozambique.<sup>4</sup> It should be noted that fewer than 10% of border-jumpers arrested by Group 33 are involved in the smuggling of firearms. Those ordinary Mozambicans who do bring firearms across invariably do so in order to sell them and use the money to pay for food or a taxi trip to Johannesburg.

The majority of illegal weapons entering South Africa are smuggled by professional, organised syndicates using a variety of ingenious methods to escape detection. Some of these include the use of 'pilot' vehicles. Cellular phones or simple flashes of headlights are also employed. Weapons are thrown over the border-fence or kept in a safe-house near the border, from where they rendezvous with a vehicle which immediately leaves the area with the cargo before security force informers can detect their presence in the area - a method known as 'sudden death' carriers. The use of people to carry weapons to the border from where they are loaded into vehicles overcomes the risk of detection, minimal as it may be, were the weapons to be smuggled through the border post. It is also a cheaper and simpler method than the use of secret compartments, panels and containers. Crucially, the smugglers or suppliers of these weapons are not at risk because they rarely carry the weapons themselves.

Rather, in return for transport to South Africa or assistance in crossing the border fence, illegal immigrants take the risk, as payment for such services offered by the smuggler. Given that smugglers make use of these and other resourceful methods, it is not surprising that the reactive operational measures (such as roadblocks, border patrols and the electric fence alarm system) utilised by the SANDF have met with increasingly less success (see table below). In the words of an SANDF officer, 'the initiative lies with the smuggler'.<sup>5</sup>

| <b>Border Incidents Involving Group 33: 1 January - 31 August 1995</b><br>(figures in brackets are for the same period in 1994) |                |        |                        |
|---|----------------|--------|------------------------|
| Border Area   | Arrests        | Deaths | Reported Infiltrations |
| Norex 1   | 11,104 (5,003) | 3 (4)  | 164 (127)              |
| Kruger Park   | 2,396 (2,193)  | 1 (0)  | 24 (20)                |
| Swaziland   | 856 (455)      | 0 (1)  | 0 (0)                  |
| Source: Group 33, SANDF   |                |        |                        |

| <b>Illegal Weapons seized by Group 33: January - August 1995</b><br>(1994 figures in brackets). |                 |               |                |                       |
|---|-----------------|---------------|----------------|-----------------------|
| Month   | AK-47s          | Pistols       | Other          | Ammunition            |
| January   | 3 (16)          | 2 (0)         | 8 (2)          | 234 (257)             |
| February  | 6 (23)          | 2 (2)         | 9 (21)         | 29 (976)              |
| March   | 3 (10)          | 4 (0)         | 4 (0)          | 95 (214)              |
| April   | 3 (16)          | 0 (0)         | 3 (2)          | 808 (587)             |
| May   | 1 (38)          | 4 (1)         | 0 (5)          | 56 (3,222)            |
| June  | 1 (15)          | 1 (5)         | 2 (2)          | 46 (5,279)            |
| July  | 8 (13)          | 7 (1)         | 14 (2)         | 1,017 (196)           |
| August  | 1 (6)           | 3 (0)         | 4 (5)          | 104 (359)             |
| <b>Total</b>  | <b>26 (137)</b> | <b>23 (9)</b> | <b>44 (39)</b> | <b>2,398 (11,090)</b> |
| Source: Group 33, SANDF   |                 |               |                |                       |

According to Group 33, the use of roadblocks is increasingly less effective, not only because of the ingenuity of smugglers, but also because of the limitations imposed upon the SANDF by South Africa's interim constitution. In any area more than 10 km from the country's borders, a roadblock cannot be initiated by a member of the SANDF without SAPS authorisation or the issuance of a search warrant. In operational terms this causes delays and inevitably results in

the failure of the roadblock to achieve its objective, particularly on occasions when information is passed to the SANDF personnel on the ground. Given that the N4 is the main road used by smugglers to transport illegal weapons to Gauteng and that the SANDF is dominant in policing this border area, the legal limitations on the use of roadblocks is palpably shortsighted and an obstacle to the optimal employment of security resources. In effect, the SANDF's operational limitations are reflected in the poor results achieved (in the table above) despite the extent of smuggling activities.

The development of a policy sensitive to both the operational control requirements of the country and the desire to protect civil liberties is set to remain a vexing issue in civil-military relations in South Africa. However, it would not be a factor if proper operational co-operation existed with the SAPS. On the ground there is good co-operation between the SAPS and the SANDF, but at some senior levels the relationship has been described as obstructionist. It is alleged that one or two senior officials in both the SANDF and SAPS, refuse to allow the troops or policemen under their command, to participate in joint operations. This poor operational environment is also evident in the Kruger National Park (KNP). As one senior KNP official put it, 'if the SAPS has an illegal immigrant and firearms unit, why is the SANDF here? Whose responsibility is it? If it belongs to the SAPS and the SANDF get involved, then there is a clash of interests and the Kruger Park is caught in the middle'.<sup>6</sup> Such inter-force 'politics' is a luxury South Africa cannot afford. (It was also evident in the run-up to the launching of *Operation Rachel* with the Mozambican authorities when the SAPS and SANDF competed for operational responsibility.) It is apparent that there is an urgent need to clearly define the operational responsibilities of both the SAPS and the SANDF in relation to border control problems. Duplication of scarce resources and failure to fulfil respective responsibilities only contributes to the weakening of South Africa's capacity to prevent illegal weapons smuggling.

Another problem affecting border control is the extent of land which is subject to control. South Africa's northern border is more than 3,700 km long and is shared with five different states, namely, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Swaziland. South Africa's coastal border is 2,881 km long. The land borders are partly secured by two electric fences - the 62,2 km long Norex 1, from Komatipoort to Mbusini on the border with Swaziland and Mozambique, and the 137 km long Norex 2, which stretches from the Sand River (near Messina) almost to the Botswana border. The Norex 1 fence costs R300,000 a month to maintain.<sup>7</sup> In July 1995, Defence Minister Joe Modise proposed the erection of an 120 km electric fence (at a cost of R50 million) on South Africa's border with Zimbabwe. However, the future of this plan and indeed of Norex 1 and 2, may well lie with the Constitutional Court. Legal advisers to the SANDF fear that the Constitutional clauses guaranteeing 'freedom and security of the person' and 'freedom of movement of residents'

may render the electric fences unconstitutional, with fundamental consequences for border control.

Of the approximately 130 ports-of-entry, 48 are formal ports-of-entry manned by a force of only 500 policemen with support from SANDF personnel.<sup>8</sup> According to SANDF figures, 55 companies of troops are involved fulltime in border and area protection. Some 7,337 troops are on fulltime patrol, utilising 15 companies in KwaZulu-Natal, 11 in Northern Province, 10 in Mpumalanga and five in Gauteng.<sup>9</sup> According to the 1995 annual report of the SANDF, border control deployed on average 13 companies of about 2,000 soldiers at a cost of R47,1 million. The SANDF states that their main concerns are unlawful border crossings and the cross-border smuggling of weapons.<sup>10</sup> During 1995, SANDF personnel detected 28,763 unlawful border crossings and apprehended 15,216 people. The SANDF confiscated 1,872 unlawful weapons, of which 235 were AK-47s.<sup>11</sup> At first glance one could be forgiven for asking whether the investment in border control is justified by the limited success achieved. The problem is not necessarily inefficiency, but could point to a failure on the part of government to formulate an holistic policy to enhance border control.

Two examples of government's policy difficulties are:

- \* the 'failure', in the eyes of some, of the legal system to prosecute those who are arrested by the SANDF for illegal crossings into South Africa.
- \* the lack of adequate inspection facilities at border posts such as equipment for the offloading of containers as well as facilities for the inspection of refrigerated cargo.

The use of more sniffer-dogs may make a difference to inspection capacity at some border posts. If the South African government wanted to prevent illegal weapons and other illicit goods from entering the country through its border posts, it would do well to scrutinise other international practices. Israel's policy, for example, demands the thorough inspection of all containers and vehicles, regardless of how long it may take or what equipment may be needed to offload or store cargo - 'they (Israel) do not care if it takes three days for one truck to go through the border'.<sup>12</sup> It is a question of government priorities: if the problem were deemed to be real and of sufficiently serious proportions, then government would muster the political will and find the resources to impose *more effective control*. There is much that government could do in order to assist the efforts of those entrusted with border control responsibilities.

The Draft White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa (which contained the government's Defence policy), was published in June 1995. This was followed by a consultative Defence Review process, underway in February 1996, which debated long-range planning on amongst others,

doctrine, posture, force design, force levels, logistic support, armaments, equipment, human resources and funding. Whilst much of the discussion centred on identifying and prioritising South Africa's security threats on a socio-economic and military level, little acknowledgement was given to the role which small arms play in shaping both. In fact, the Ministry of Defence indicated that it plans to withdraw entirely from the role of border policing and operational support of the SAPS within three to five years.<sup>13</sup> Given the resource-imposed limitations on the SAPS' capacity to deal effectively with both internal crime and border policing, such a move by the SANDF may leave an institutional vacuum which the SAPS may be unable to fill, even in the medium-term. In the light of the above-mentioned problems, the solution to the problem of border control may lie in the allocation of full responsibility (except for that which belongs to the Department of Customs and Excise) for land border controls to the SANDF. The SANDF is largely carrying the burden of this responsibility already, but it lacks the necessary sanction to perform this task more effectively. Such a move would allow SAPS personnel to be freed from border post responsibilities and to be redeployed in the battle against crime and at the poorly controlled airports, airstrips and harbours. The time has come for government and the SANDF to recognise that illegal weapons smuggling, in particular, and trans-national crime, in general, are a threat to the security of the country. As such it should be met with the same resolve and resources as a hostile foreign invasionary force would provoke.

The Department of Customs and Excise is also a major roleplayer in efforts to enforce border controls, but is primarily responsible for verifying and imposing duties and customs charges on goods moving across the country's borders. However, with a total revenue service staff complement of 1,600 - compared with London's Heathrow Airport which alone employs 1,800 officials - it has achieved limited success. It has been estimated that R3 billion in state revenue remains uncollected each year by Customs and Excise.<sup>14</sup> Smuggling and customs fraud is reputedly facilitated by the poor inspection of containers. According to the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce and Industry, fewer than one percent of containers are inspected to verify contents; contents of containers being shipped through South Africa are swapped in transit to evade duty charges; and 'empty' containers crossing the borders contain undeclared goods.<sup>15</sup> Whilst acknowledging that the percentage of containers which are inspected should be higher, a senior police official claimed that inspection capacity has increased to 12% of containers.<sup>16</sup> In an effort to bolster the capacity of both the SAPS and the Department of Customs and Excise, a specialist border policing unit has focused on crime linked to international goods and people traffic.

The degree of control exercised on South Africa's borders impacts on the operation of trans-national crime syndicates within South Africa. The criminal use of weapons in South Africa does not end on the city streets and in residential areas, but also extends to the country's game parks. Poaching with

AK-47 rifles has become more common and game rangers report an increased number of rhino and elephant found with AK-47 bullet wounds. (AK-47s generally are too low a calibre weapon to kill a rhino or elephant. However, the bullet-wounds often become infected and the animal eventually dies as a result.) The KNP, which shares a 320 km long border with Mozambique, is particularly vulnerable to poaching activities.

The KNP is used as a transit route into South Africa by illegal immigrants some of whom bring weapons with them (they bring them either to sell in South Africa or for protection from the larger game in the park) and some of whom are involved in poaching. Opportunistic acts of poaching are often motivated by the fact that the illegal immigrant knows that there is a black market value attached to the ivory or hide which could help him in establishing himself in South Africa. How to cash-in on this value is not always easy for them as some do not have the contacts or access to the network of black market buyers. As a result, 'they can sit on it [poached goods] for months at a time because they do not know to who or how to get rid of it'.<sup>17</sup> However, the majority of poaching activities are organised and conducted by well-trained and heavily armed men operating from Mozambique. According to the Chairman of the Honorary Game Rangers Association of Pietersburg, Johan Niehaus, hardened poachers are armed with AK-47s and are well-paid by their masters.<sup>18</sup> Most poaching incursions occur in the Nwanetsi area near the border with Mozambique, in the park's central region.

Three factors facilitate these poaching activities:

- \* There is no electric fence alarm system to detect illegal border-crossings into the KNP, which makes the SANDF's task of controlling this cross-border activity all the more difficult. The border fence is a simple wire animal fence which in some places has been broken down. Operating from the Sand River Base in the KNP, the SANDF would reportedly prefer the Park to approve the erection of a fence which could more effectively assist them in their efforts to deter illegal activities. However, the KNP authorities oppose the erection of an electric fence because of the potential damage to wildlife and its effect on soil erosion. The bottom line, however, is that they do not believe that the expenditure would be justified since 'it is not a deterrent anyway'.<sup>19</sup>
- \* There is a notable lack of policing capacity in the KNP. There are two police stations within the KNP, one at Pafuri and the other in Skukuza. These police stations do not deal with any problems except petty crimes such as theft from bungalows, rowdiness and other minor problems. More serious crimes (such as murder) are referred to the SAPS in Nelspruit. The KNP authorities are themselves responsible for enforcing security relating to vehicle movements, firearms control and general entrance and exit control of visitors. These controls are very poorly

enforced, so much so that the possibility exists that a transit route for illegal immigrants and weapons could easily operate within the KNP. The information relating to passenger numbers is not confirmed by KNP authorities: upon entering the KNP - the driver of a vehicle simply tells an official in the reception office how many passengers s/he is carrying and pays for that number. Upon exiting, drivers simply park their vehicles and take the permit into the office to be stamped. This type of information could be verified to prevent a vehicle entering the KNP, picking up illegal immigrants and/or firearms near the border with Mozambique and then leaving without being searched. Whilst the KNP does have authority to stop and search a vehicle this is only done 'when a strong suspicion exists because we are careful not to infringe upon people's rights'.<sup>20</sup> The KNP authorities do not believe this illegal activity is occurring because they have not made any such arrests. The question is, how can they expect to make arrests for an activity they do not police in the first place?

- \* Poaching activities are increasing due to the operation of meat syndicates from within Mozambique. They target smaller game such as impala for their meat as opposed to the traditional elephant and rhino horn poachers. The total absence of an investigative police unit such as the Endangered Species Protection Unit (ESPU) in the Lowveld is an obstacle to investigations or follow-up of information on a continual basis. This has long been a weakness in the anti-poaching effort and partly accounts for why the ESPU, is deemed to be 'a little bit out of touch'<sup>21</sup> with events in the area. The consequences of this are most directly felt in the ESPU's intelligence gathering and syndicate-busting work.

| Weapons seized in KNP: January-September 1995<br>(Figures in brackets are for the whole of 1994) |        |        |
|--|--------|--------|
|  | AK-47s | Other  |
| Rhino and Elephant Poaching  | 3 (5)  | 4 (11) |
| Possession   | 4 (31) | 5 (5)  |

Source: KNP Anti-Poaching Unit

The numbers of weapons seized (see table above) should not be confused with the number of poaching incidents in which AK-47s are being used undetected. The ease with which poaching syndicates operate in the KNP from Mozambique are arguably symptomatic of the state of border controls in South Africa.

Without improvements to the legal system and the legislation relevant to border control, the sense of impunity with which illegal activities occur will most likely

continue. Any border controls which are not supported by adequate resources or legislation dealing with the violation of international borders will almost certainly have little effect. However, the whole issue of border control is politically sensitive. Calls for tighter measures are perceived to run counter to the spirit of regional economic integration and co-operation. But should the influx of weapons and the incidence of armed crime continue unabated, South Africa will have to make the choice between weak borders - with the resultant influx of small arms and illicit goods which breed violent crime and instability - or tighter border controls, at the perceived cost of regional relations.

It is questionable whether South Africa can, in the short-term, continue with a 'soft' policy of border control purely in the interest of fostering regional relationships. This relates to a large number of factors and hinges on the need to acquire accurate information about the costs-and-benefits of illegal immigrants to South Africa in both political and economic terms. Illegal immigrants - or 'aliens' as they are sometimes known in the South African context - are commonly perceived to be a cost to the South African economy in terms of health care, housing and also the jobs they 'take away' from South African citizens. Hence the, at times, xenophobic political reaction to this flow. But most immigrants would appear to be of working-age, and male; an influential school of thought suggests that they are thus more likely to *contribute* rather than *take away* from the South African economy. There seems to be little evidence statistically supporting either contention but perhaps the late-1996 census could help to clarify the position.

But, so long as these 'soft' controls are in place, South Africa may be forced to resort to even more severe measures at a later date in order to break the cycle of rising crime and violence, and shore-up hostile domestic political constituents. Having said this, border controls are not the entire solution to the longer-term problem of socio-economic decay and lack of opportunity. However, an examination of border controls shows that there is significant room for improvement. Tighter border controls can make a difference to the illegal arms supply network which operates with impunity, just as improved methods of policing can impact in a positive way on criminal behaviour. Unlike many of its neighbours, South Africa does have some capacity to tighten border controls as an effective short-term measure. Besides, border controls and regional trade and co-operation are not mutually exclusive. It is not a question of one or the other, but rather how best to protect South Africa from the effects of trans-national crime and small arms proliferation whilst at the same time continuing to contribute to regional development. Ultimately more creative solutions will have to be devised, both in the short-term and in the long-term, for all of Southern Africa. When all is said and done, the prosperity of the region is inextricably linked to that of South Africa. To imperil it for the sake of political hypothesis will benefit no-one in the short- or long-term.



## **Conclusion**

In order to consolidate democracy, promote and sustain economic development and curb crime in South Africa, small arms proliferation must be recognised as a fundamental threat to these objectives. This applies equally to the greater Southern African region and elsewhere in the post-Cold War world.

Small arms control in South Africa is a multifaceted problem given the many differing sources of proliferation. However, two central issues can be identified in South Africa:

- \* poor control over increasing numbers of legal firearm owners; and,
- \* the increase in illegal weapons resulting from weak border control policies.

How South Africa deals with these central issues will largely determine the extent to which small arms in the country as a whole can be brought under control.

***Part Two: Small Arms  
and the States of Southern Africa***

## 2.1

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### Introduction

Southern Africa has to come to grips with an arms race which has yet to be the subject of international arms control negotiations - small arms proliferation. The proliferation of small arms in Southern African states has been fuelled by various conflicts: the struggle for independence from colonial rule; Cold War superpower proxy wars; internal conflicts; full-scale civil wars; and apartheid-state-sponsored regional destabilisation.

In the post-independence, -Cold War and -apartheid eras, the region must face up to the challenge of placing the weapons which have been accumulated and distributed in the course of the past few decades, under official and effective control. Failure to do this will allow these weapons to continue to circulate both within and beyond the region's borders, to be used in support of any number of political, socio-economic, racist, ethnic or criminal objectives. The potential for intra-state conflict is given added impetus by the availability of small arms and light weapons.

The years of conflict and war have transformed the region into a small arms bazaar. Many, if not most of the weapons which were used in the numerous liberation and post-independence wars in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa are no longer in the hands of the authorities. As a result there is a flourishing regional black market trade in these weapons. The porosity of borders, the movement of people between states (legal and illegal), poverty, smuggling by organised crime syndicates (peddling drugs, ivory, diamonds and weapons), and a lack of resources for effective policing are some of the factors that have added to the proliferation of weapons within Southern Africa. The decades of armed conflicts have left millions of landmines, automatic rifles, firearms and ammunition, unaccounted for and in the hands of clandestine groups or individuals.

The proliferation of small arms in Southern Africa has both immediate and long-term developmental consequences stemming from the rising levels of violent crime, continuing political violence and instability, banditry, loss of investor confidence and capital flight. Any of which could be decisive obstacles to the consolidation of democracy and sustainable development in the region.

## 2.2

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### Mozambique

*These things (the guns) did not come here to create well-being among us. We shall take away those things that are foreign to our Mozambican identity.*

Anglican Bishop Dinis Sengulane, Maputo<sup>1</sup>

Whilst the words of Bishop Sengulane may reflect the desires of many Mozambicans, any resolution of Mozambique's problem of small arms proliferation is inextricably linked to the social transformation which the country must undergo if it is to break out of the cycle of poverty and corruption. These two factors, poverty and corruption, combine effectively to fuel proliferation and undermine present controls as well as future prospects for control of small arms both within the country and Southern Africa.

Since the outbreak of civil war in 1975, Mozambique has been the recipient of millions of weapons supplied by the Cold War superpowers and their allies, as well as South Africa. The civil war was ended by the General Peace Agreement (GPA) signed in Rome in October 1992. In terms of the GPA, the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) and Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) agreed that the United Nations (UN) should be involved with a mandate to structure and implement the demobilisation of both Forças Armadas de Moçambique (FAM) and RENAMO troops. The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) was established in 1992. The failure of the UNOMOZ mission to undertake effective disarmament and secure control over the weapons in the hands of former combatants to the Mozambican civil war has contributed to the legacy of small arms proliferation in the region. This legacy is exacerbated by the prevailing institutional and social breakdown which characterises post-civil war Mozambique.

#### The United Nations in Mozambique

The UN was tasked with overseeing the demobilisation, disarmament and integration aspects of the GPA.<sup>2</sup>

As with most peace operations which have required the demobilisation and disarming of former combatants, the UN had to deal with the problem of distrust of the process by RENAMO and FAM soldiers. It also had to walk a fine line so as not to overstep the boundaries prescribed by its (unfortunately) limited resources and political mandate on the one hand, and the need to

implement effectively the requirements of the peace process on the other. In terms of small arms control and proliferation, the UN operation in Mozambique was important because it reflected the extent to which the implementation of a peace process which fails to undertake effective and secure disarmament could contribute to instability in a region.

## **Demobilisation**

Both the Mozambicans and the UN had expected to establish a new Mozambican Defence Force (FADM) of 30,000 men, consisting of an approximately 50:50 contribution from RENAMO and FAM. In the course of the demobilisation it became apparent that this target of 30,000 would not be met. More than 90% of all soldiers who registered in UN assembly areas (AAs) expressed their intention to opt for demobilisation, rather than serve in FADM. A number of factors may account for this, but war weariness was one of the more common reasons. A whole generation of Mozambicans had grown up only knowing war. Many were kidnapped, forced or conscripted into the respective forces and were now presented with an opportunity to return to their former civilian lives. As one soldier who had chosen demobilisation explained, 'I wanted to become a doctor, but then I was forced into the army [through conscription]. I have never had a chance to get that education until now, so why should I stay in the army?'<sup>3</sup> Many others had no such hopes or opportunities, as they had received little or no previous schooling. For most soldiers, demobilisation seemed far more appealing given the short-term financial rewards and freedom from military discipline.

Whilst in the AAs, soldiers received six months salary and an additional three months salary was paid after demobilisation. Furthermore, in order to assist with re-integration into civil society, demobilised soldiers received 18 months pay from the Re-integration Support Scheme (RSS). According to the Association for Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique (AMODEG),<sup>4</sup> most soldiers received US\$8 per month paid out every second month by the RSS. These payments were scheduled to end in February 1996. By contrast, those who opted to join FADM could look forward to little more than receiving a new uniform in addition to the normal 'comforts' of military life. The result was that 77,800 of the 91,570 soldiers who registered, chose demobilisation (see table below). A further 10% of those who registered chose to sacrifice their demobilisation payments and left the AAs early. They were apparently under the impression that they would be compelled to join FADM. This suggests that there was a lack of official communication and information available to soldiers. As one FRELIMO official commented, 'they did not know what was happening, there was no direction and so they stopped reporting to the assembly areas. Where did they go with their guns?'<sup>5</sup>

Many soldiers did not report to AAs and therefore were not compelled to hand in weapons or be placed under some degree of control. Those that did report to the AAs allegedly mostly handed in old weapons<sup>6</sup> and held back their other weapons. It would appear that even at that stage they were aware that they could sell their weapons for personal gain - suggesting that the market and demand was already well established in South Africa.

| Registration and Demobilisation<br>of RENAMO and FAM Forces                                       |        |        |        |
|---|--------|--------|--------|
|   | FAM    | RENAMO | TOTAL  |
| Registered  | 66,922 | 24,648 | 91,570 |
| Demobilised   | 57,281 | 20,519 | 77,800 |
| An additional 15,087 FAM troops were demobilised prior to the opening of the registration points. |        |        |        |
| Source: <i>Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique</i> , UNIDIR, Geneva, p.87.               |        |        |        |

AMODEG has been critical of the UN sponsored demobilisation programme. The period of cantonment lasted more than six months as opposed to the expected one month, partly due to the slow arrival of troops at the AAs. Lack of information in explaining the delays generated frustration until finally many soldiers simply withdrew from the process and left the AAs. Some were able to take their guns with them. It should be remembered that the UN was not in a position to enforce compliance with the process as it was authorised to act only within the scope of a peacekeeping mission. This was an obvious weakness in the effort to achieve disarmament.

The failure to pass information on to the soldiers also impacted upon the formation of FADM. Many former soldiers elected to be demobilised rather than join the new defence force because they were not sufficiently informed of the working conditions and salaries they could expect to receive.

According to AMODEG and also the former United States Ambassador to Maputo, Dennis Jett, the number of ex-combatants was closer to 150,000, many more than the official registration figures suggested. Many ex-combatants did not make the effort to report to the registration points. Yet, despite having 150,000 potential recruits, FADM could only muster a force size of 10,936 (of the 12,353 soldiers who initially joined FADM, 1,417 were subsequently absent without official leave (AWOL).) Whatever the number of ex-combatants, the failure of the FADM to recruit sufficient numbers had a profound effect on Mozambique. Firstly, the higher-than-expected number of former soldiers returning to civilian life placed additional strain on the already overstretched resources of the country. Secondly, the lower than expected manpower levels

have further weakened the capacity of the Mozambican security forces to police the growing trans-national smuggling and criminal activities in the region, which have flourished in the wake of the GPA. According to one FRELIMO official,<sup>7</sup> the FADM has not yet resumed its border patrol functions which were suspended in terms of the Rome Accord. It is unclear whether this is primarily due to a lack of political will, manpower or resources.

In Mozambique, illegal access to small arms is made easier due to the poor policing and domestic arms control policies (which will be dealt with in more detail later), but the failure of UNOMOZ to ensure adequate disarmament, contributed directly to the exacerbation of what was always going to be a serious post-civil war problem.

### **UNOMOZ Disarmament**

The Soviet Union was the single largest supplier of small arms to the FAM, along with East Germany, Bulgaria and North Korea, who also supplied AK-47's.<sup>8</sup> Chris Smith, in an analysis of proliferation in Mozambique, estimated that roughly six million AK-47s were 'at large' in Mozambique. According to Interpol, the FRELIMO government distributed 1.5 million assault rifles to the civilian population during the civil war.<sup>9</sup> As civilians were not demobilised and hence disarmed, we can assume that most of these weapons are freely available in the society. South Africa supplied RENAMO with captured Soviet equipment from its operations in Namibia and Angola. RENAMO also drew upon support from the World Anti-Communist League and funded its arms purchases with poached meat, hides and ivory.<sup>10</sup> Yet, despite knowing the general source of weapons provided to FRELIMO and RENAMO, their total number is difficult to calculate.

A glaring weakness of the UNOMOZ mandate, was the UN's failure to negotiate an arms embargo on Mozambique at the time of the implementation of the GPA. This led to a farcical situation where the UN was attempting to implement disarmament whilst arms were still being brought into the country by RENAMO and FAM as an insurance policy against the collapse of the GPA.

Each time a FAM soldier was transferred to a new post during the war he was issued with new weapons regardless of whether he still had others or not.<sup>11</sup> As a result when it came to the *cantonment of soldiers by UNOMOZ and the handing in of weapons at AAs*, soldiers could hand in one issue of weapons whilst keeping the other accumulated weapons at their homes or in hiding places. There was no registration of weapons issued and so there is 'no database of weapons holders'.<sup>12</sup> This also applies to those weapons provided to the militia and community representatives and subsequently re-issued by these leaders. A combination of factors, such as non-existent record-keeping and the covert

nature of supply and transportation deals, has ensured that calculations of the number of weapons in Mozambique can be no more than an educated guess, anywhere between one to six million.

With that as its starting point, the UN had no way of knowing to what extent it was achieving the objective of disarmament. The table below reflects the disarmament achieved by UNOMOZ:

| Disarmament Achieved by UNOMOZ                    |                |
|---|----------------|
| Weapons Collected From                            | Total          |
| FAM   | 94,063         |
| Unilaterally Demobilised FAM Troops               | 12,736         |
| RENAMO  | 17,468         |
| Armed, Paramilitary, Private and Irregular Troops | 43,491         |
| <b>Total</b>                                      | <b>167,758</b> |
| Source: UNIDIR, <i>op.cit.</i> , p.88.            |                |

Of the 111,531 weapons collected from FAM and RENAMO by UNOMOZ, not all were small arms. The report of the Ceasefire Commission (CCF) includes at least 157 armoured vehicles, 30 pieces of artillery, and 6,738 'collective arms'.<sup>13</sup> The remainder are listed as *individual arms* which we can understand to mean weapons defined as small arms. That means that after more than 16 years of civil war, roughly 104,606 small arms were recovered from civilians and 91,570 registered FAM and RENAMO troops.

Restrictions imposed by the CCF did not allow UNOMOZ to undertake disarmament outside of the AAs. Later a verification process was negotiated with the CCF to allow UNOMOZ to recover weapons which might be outstanding from the demobilisation process. Whilst UNOMOZ was not able to complete its verification before the expiry of its operations mandate, it did visit 744 sites and recovered a further quantity of weapons (see table below).

An additional problem, however, was that UNOMOZ's control over the collected weaponry was not adequate. Weapons stored at the AAs were kept in a room and secured with two padlocks, but 'these locks were mostly a symbolic deterrent as there were ways to enter the storage areas other than utilizing the two keys'.<sup>14</sup> These weapons were transferred to one of the three UN regional arms depots (RADs) - in Nampula, Chimoio and Matola. Neither weapons nor ammunition were destroyed except in the cases where transportation of certain explosives was considered to be hazardous. This storage of weapons became a serious problem. Unconfirmed accounts of UN storage rooms being looted of their weapons abound among South African security force and UN officials.



Poor controls, plus the fact that UN personnel in the AAs and storage areas were not armed, afforded numerous opportunities for looting of the armouries.

| Weapons Recovered during Verification  |                    |
|--|--------------------|
| Type of Weapons                        | Number             |
| ARMS<br>Various types                  | 46,193             |
| AMMUNITION<br>rounds<br>boxes          | 2,703,733<br>4,217 |
| MINES                                  | 19,047             |
| EXPLOSIVES                             | 5,687              |
| HAND GRENADES<br>individual<br>boxes   | 4,997<br>220       |
| Source: UNIDIR, <i>op.cit.</i> , p.88. |                    |

The armouries were safeguarded by a 'dual-key' system shared between Mozambican and UN officials. When the UN left, the Mozambicans were granted sole authority over both keys. Given the poverty and levels of corruption, the opportunity was there for the taking, should the camp commanders have wanted to sell a few 'on the side'. Numerous incidents have been reported by both Swaziland and South African officials of Mozambican military vehicles and trucks transporting arms to locations far from FADM armouries but close to the border. This of course highlights the need for the UN to maintain secure control of the weapons, rather than entrusting them to local commanders. SAPS video footage gathered in the course of Operation Rachel (a joint South African and Mozambican operation to recover illegal firearms within Mozambique) shows numerous instances of warehouses and storerooms filled with arms, having been left by the UN with the minimum of security measures. It would be interesting to know how many of the roughly 170,000 weapons collected for the FADM actually made it to the central military armoury and can still be accounted for. Neither the UN nor the FADM seem willing to disclose this, each referring the question to the other. This raises the question of whether it would not have been more sensible to destroy the weapons and ammunition recovered rather than risk their being stolen.<sup>15</sup> FADM opposed the destruction of weapons in the hope of being able to use these weapons for its own armoury. Perhaps FADM would be more motivated to recover weapons from the community if it had not received the UNOMOZ recovered weaponry. FADM now has an abundance of weaponry for its nearly 11,000-strong army and would appear to be less than enthusiastic about assisting in weapons recovery operations.

## Integration

Responsibility for the integration of FAM and RENAMO troops into FADM was entrusted to the Mozambican authorities. Their lack of experience in dealing with this task has partly accounted for their failure to form a capable new defence force for the country. There is no comparison between the Zimbabwean, Namibian or even South African experience with integration and that which the Mozambicans have undergone. The levels of discontent on the part of the FADM troops with both their new lives and the integration process as a whole, is well illustrated by the fact that more than 10% of those who joined FADM have since gone Absent Without Official Leave (AWOL).<sup>16</sup> The FRELIMO government attributes these problems to former RENAMO troops, suggesting that their experience as an irregular guerilla force had not prepared them for the levels of discipline required in FADM. But as the table below shows, the soldiers who had gone AWOL were almost equally drawn from both RENAMO and FAM - 12,75% of the RENAMO troops which joined FADM were AWOL, as opposed to 10,93% of FAM troops.

| AWOL FADM Troops                       |       |        |        |
|--|-------|--------|--------|
|  | FAM   | RENAMO | TOTAL  |
| FADM                                   | 8,691 | 3,662  | 12,353 |
| AWOL                                   | 950   | 467    | 1,417  |
| Source: UNIDIR, <i>op.cit.</i> , p.87. |       |        |        |

The weak integration process suggests that Mozambique could well have used the experience and professionalism of foreign trainers and planners, such as the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT). In AMODEG's view, the UN 'did not care about what the new army would look like, it only cared about demobilisation'.<sup>17</sup> This raises the question of just how involved the UN should be in the process of establishing the new defence force of a country. How far should the UN's responsibility stretch? Should it take responsibility for the social re-integration of demobilised soldiers and oversee the military integration of former combatants? To answer yes to the above would also be to deny the Mozambicans the obligation to take responsibility for their own future. In the words of a senior FRELIMO official,<sup>18</sup> 'they (the UN) could not do everything, the UN was here to help but not to impose the peace. In the end the responsibility belongs to the Mozambicans'.

Whilst FADM has been hamstrung by discontent and indiscipline, the former combatants of both RENAMO and FAM are equally unhappy with their lot in the post-war society. Some have joined AMODEG which is designed to lobby the government to address their needs and provide opportunities for demobilised

soldiers and their families. AMODEG claims to have an active membership of 9,000 former soldiers and is said to be strengthening as many former soldiers are turning to them now that their demobilisation payments have ended. According to an AMODEG official, 'every week 8-10 people come into this office alone to register with us'.<sup>19</sup> AMODEG represents all demobilised soldiers irrespective of whether they were FRELIMO or RENAMO soldiers. However, the impression is that the leadership of AMODEG is largely drawn from the ranks of former FRELIMO soldiers and therefore one assumes that former RENAMO soldiers are far less likely to join the organisation. How they choose to channel their grievances and frustrations may well be reflected in the levels of crime and banditry.

AMODEG's relationship with the FRELIMO government would appear to be poor. The government feels that it can do no more for the demobilised soldiers given its lack of resources - 'the government treats us like refugees who have left their home areas'<sup>20</sup> - and by implication they should be looked after by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and other non-governmental organisations (NGO) and aid programmes. According to AMODEG 'they [the government] do not even assist by requesting international projects and funds to help retrain demobilised soldiers'.<sup>21</sup> AMODEG has been demanding that the government actively seek to employ demobilised soldiers, but to no avail: 'there are people connected to government but they will not consider employing demobilised soldiers'.<sup>22</sup> This highlights the point that vocational training and development of other skills must be followed by employment or funds to start a small business or else they serve no purpose other than to raise expectations of opportunities which cannot be met. An ex-soldier can hope to receive a maximum of US\$250 from an aid agency to start a business project. Unwilling to accept this, AMODEG organised a series of strikes (some described them as riots) by demobilised soldiers in Maputo to demand government action. The government in turn sought to marginalise AMODEG by branding them as disruptive and mobilisers of strikes and as a result 'NGOs are not interested in working with us'.<sup>23</sup> AMODEG claims that the failure of NGOs and development projects to consult with them, particularly on the issue of illegal weapons recovery programmes, is the reason that NGO programmes have achieved so little: 'we are informed and know the soldiers so they must talk to us'.<sup>24</sup> In a country of 16 million mostly impoverished people, it is not only 150,000 demobilised soldiers who stand in need, but they do merit special attention if only because of their access to weapons.

The demobilisation, disarmament and re-integration process of the GPA was what one academic calls a 'technical solution'.<sup>25</sup> The technical solution of UNOMOZ calls into question the long-term validity of the demobilisation process as a socially stabilising mechanism. One can, therefore, expect some continued instability on the more volatile social level as Mozambique completes its transition.

## **Crime**

Given the inability of the Mozambican government to do anything further to aid former soldiers, AMODEG believes that many who still have their weapons will choose to turn to crime 'in order to survive'.<sup>26</sup> Petty crime has increased, but the incidence of more serious crime is largely determined by access to firearms. Unfortunately, no statistics on crime in Mozambique are publicly available, so one cannot verify the trend.<sup>27</sup> According to diplomats and international aid officials based in Mozambique, crime is 'definitely on the increase'.<sup>28</sup> This is particularly true of the overcrowded urban areas where people are forced to seek out a living and compete for limited resources.

In Mozambique's Zambezia Province a significant increase in the number of armed attacks on vehicles has led to the creation of a special unit to patrol the roads in an effort to improve security. Minister of the Interior Colonel Manuel Antonio has noted that the unit will receive all necessary technical and material support from the PRM General Command (the Mozambican police).<sup>29</sup> Their well-armed and professional skills suggest that the gangs employed to undertake these criminal activities are drawn from the ranks of demobilised soldiers.

## **Policing and Control**

As has been discussed, the UNOMOZ mission failed to recover most of the weapons supplied to combatants and civilians. The burden of weapons recovery therefore has rested on the FRELIMO government and its policing capacity. Therein lies one of the greatest obstacles to the recovery of small arms. The functioning of government institutions is poor and the lack of financial resources is exacerbated by the lack of human resources. In the view of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Maputo, there 'are insufficient capable or qualified staff to work with. If you want to get something done there is only a handful of people to deal with, but they can do only so much with their time'.<sup>30</sup> According to World Bank estimates there are only 3,000 professionals in Mozambique. It is clear that there is a great need to train and develop human resources, particularly manpower in the middle and senior levels of government. Without this, the aid received will continue to be absorbed unproductively and, more pertinent to the issue of small arms, policing efforts will be of limited effect.

Corruption is rampant amongst all ranks and departments of government. It would appear that an unwritten rule allows government employees to determine and extract their own perks, through corruption, to offset poor salaries. Poor pay, absence of policy guidelines and lack of supervision result in people being trained and then 'let loose to do what they want',<sup>31</sup> particularly in the case of the police. Little effort at active policing or enforcement is visible in Maputo. The

same source claims that the police apparently 'receive minimal training'.<sup>32</sup> The conditions within FADM are also marked by corruption: 'when your officers are such a bad example, you either become a cynic or you join in with them'.<sup>33</sup> It is suspected that retired generals may be involved in supplying weapons to mafia-like smuggling syndicates and gangs. Some would say that not all who are involved are retired. Generally, the security forces are in a dismal state.

### **Small Arms and Potential Threats**

At a broader political level, there is a need to address the political tensions between FRELIMO and RENAMO.<sup>34</sup> In late 1995 there were threats and warnings of a return to conflict emanating from Afonso Dhlakama, which even prompted a diplomatic intervention from South African Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, but these threats had more to do with the local elections scheduled for 1996 (since postponed to 1997) than a genuine threat to the peace process. Generally the political parties have shown greater maturity and willingness to consolidate their fledgling democracy than had been expected. Nonetheless, the threats to this system are likely to emerge from splinter groups in the parties, all of which could easily take up arms, given the levels of armaments still present in society. One senior FRELIMO party official downplayed the 1995 crisis as a political problem which would not be addressed by a use of force as there is a reduced capacity for violence on the part of most Mozambicans. He argued that 'we suffered a long 16 years and it is enough'.<sup>35</sup> However, he did add a chilling rejoinder: 'if war were to come again it would be worse than Rwanda. Now we know each other and who supports who. If my neighbour is a RENAMO, I will not wait for him to maybe kill me'.

Whilst not supporting a coalition government with RENAMO, it is FRELIMO's opinion that RENAMO has undermined government authority by urging people not to pay taxes. One must however, question whether the machinery of central government is capable of effectively collecting taxes. FRELIMO claims that RENAMO is mobilising people to obstruct government programmes designed to provide infrastructure, so as to be able to accuse the government of not delivering any development. This of course could add to the deprivations felt among the communities and increase the level of crime and banditry. It appears as though the potential for isolated and localised conflict between RENAMO and FRELIMO still exists particularly in the provinces in which RENAMO is predominant but which are controlled by centrally appointed FRELIMO governors.

One UNHCR official has acknowledged that 'security factors are a risk to the whole process. There have been no major violations of the ceasefire since 1992, but political tensions do exist'.<sup>36</sup> Whilst he did not foresee a return to war as 'no external party would support the war option and once you have disbanded

a military force it is hard to re-establish', he did, however, share the view that banditry would increase as people 'use arms as a means to survive'. Given the weak policing capacity, particularly in rural areas - 'there is no state in place in the countryside. If an act of banditry occurs in a village it could take 2-3 days before the police even hear about it'<sup>37</sup> - the prospects for recovery of weapons in the hands of rebellious demobilised soldiers are not good. It is AMODEG's belief that most of the weapons in illegal supply are in the hands of demobilised soldiers as they know where weapons were cached. The head of the RENAMO Parliamentary group, Raul Domingos, speaking to journalists, concurred: 'the soldiers have not got any money and there is lots of military equipment in the bush'.<sup>38</sup>

The subsidy paid to the final group of demobilised soldiers was scheduled to end in February 1996 and the extent to which they have failed to be absorbed into the economy could determine the potential for banditry: 'the more the absorption the less the risk, and vice versa'.<sup>39</sup> In a country where economic activity is low and opportunities limited, it seems a foregone conclusion that levels of banditry will increase, particularly since the number of small arms available is high. The increased activity of the Chimwenjes, a dissident group active in Zimbabwe, which consists partly of former RENAMO soldiers is one such example. The Chimwenjes, whilst claiming a political agenda (opposition to Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe) have mostly carried out acts of robbery and looting under the alleged leadership of a former RENAMO commander, General Armando Mabache.

### Domestic Firearm Control Measures

Mozambique's domestic firearm control regulations are problematic. If one wishes to acquire a legal firearm then one must apply for a licence from the police, stating the reason it is needed. However, the criteria according to which a licence is granted are not publicly known. In practice, the licensing authority resides with the police at their sole discretion. The opportunity for the police to act corruptly is in turn dependent on the systems of transparency and accountability. If an application has been approved, then a licence to import a firearm must be obtained. (All firearms other than police or military firearms must be imported as there are no gunsmiths or gunshops permitted in Mozambique.) Having obtained an import permit, the firearm must be paid for with foreign currency at a below-market exchange rate, along with import costs and duties. The expense involved in this process would appear to make it prohibitive for ordinary Mozambicans to acquire a firearm legally. In contrast, illegal weapons are freely available, cheap and, given the low level of policing, unlikely to be detected by the authorities. It is not surprising then that the more accessible black market is a preferred source of firearms for many Mozambican gunowners.

Small arms control measures are impeded by the absence of any tradition of formal licensing of weapons in Mozambique. The government in the past simply distributed arms to people for their defence via their local leaders and chiefs. This suggests that many people in possession of unlicensed weapons may not actually realise that they are now committing an offence by still being in possession of these arms. Given that a whole generation grew up with the concept of weapons being freely and readily distributed by the government or local leaders, there is a need to re-educate and re-socialise many Mozambicans to the fact that this is not how firearms should be controlled.

### **Gun Swaps**

The method by which illegal weapons already in circulation may be retrieved in Mozambique is a vexing issue. As a FRELIMO official said, 'administrative controls are not enough, we need more things like swap campaigns and social programmes'.<sup>40</sup> The Christian Council in Mozambique has initiated a gun swap programme, however, with some success. It started the programme, dubbed *Guns into Hoes*, on 20 October 1995. By the end of 1995 it had collected over 300 firearms, 6,000 explosive devices and 12,000 rounds of ammunition. (The weapons handed in will be melted down, possibly in South Africa.) *Guns into Hoes* was planned for two years and is budgeted at US\$1.2 million. In return for giving up weapons, the Christian Council gives bicycles, sewing machines and mostly agricultural handtools and seeds. Anonymity is strictly observed. Thus far the programme has been restricted to Maputo city and province. The programme is apparently more successful in rural than in urban areas due to the attractiveness of farm implements as a swap item.

Offers of money and food reputedly would work better because 'everybody has to eat but not everybody wants to farm'.<sup>41</sup> The SAPS has also indicated that food swaps are more successful. Any gun swap programme must meet two criteria: firstly, the media have to be used extensively to inform people and secondly, it must not be run by the government because, as a FRELIMO official admitted, 'if the government were to do it, the people would not trust it'.<sup>42</sup> Distrust of the police or government authorities does not only apply to RENAMO supporters. *The public in general distrust the authorities, partly due to the widespread corruption and extortion they are subjected to by individual policemen.*

The model of transition in Mozambique has also presented problems. FRELIMO's dominance of power means that RENAMO will not participate in any government-linked programmes. A UNHCR official believes that any gun swap programmes would have to be conducted under the auspices of an independent group with credibility - Red Cross, UNHCR, the head of the National Election Commission or the Christian Council of Mozambique - 'any

programme which cannot be seen as a *FRELIMO* thing'.<sup>43</sup> They would also be required to provide all the funding and resources.

### **Landmines**

Although this is not an issue within the brief of this study, another issue which calls for foreign funding is the need to remove thousands of unexploded landmines in Mozambique. There are estimates of two million landmines in Mozambique, but, according to land surveys conducted by the UNDP in 1995, this may be an overestimation.<sup>44</sup> Landmines directly affect the efforts of aid agencies, such as the UNHCR, which require access to areas which are mined. Whilst the demining process is beginning to take shape, most have resigned themselves to the reality that it will take years to complete demining - some estimates say between seven to 10 years at a cost of R160 billion.<sup>45</sup>

Landmines do not only restrict road access. Their greatest effect is on the lives of the Mozambicans themselves. An estimated 7,000-15,000 people have been killed by landmines and thousands more crippled.<sup>46</sup> The social and economic effects of this are huge, given that Mozambicans rely, generally, on subsistence agriculture for survival. The sustainability and self-sufficiency of agricultural production is hampered by landmines to such an extent that an UNHCR official ventured to say that 'if free of mines this country would be different'.<sup>47</sup>

### **Arms Smuggling**

Illegal weapons are known, as highlighted earlier, to flow out from Mozambique into the whole of Southern Africa. The largest known flows have been traced to South Africa from the provinces of Maputo and Gaza which border on Northern Province, Mpumalanga, the Kruger National Park, Swaziland and northern Kwazulu-Natal. AMODEG believes that there is an organised network of civilians who supply weapons for buyers in South Africa. They, in turn, are supplied by demobilised soldiers and people within the army and police. At present, weapons control must rely upon the limited capacity of the Mozambican security forces to exercise control over their own weapons (unconfirmed reports state that 12,000 weapons were stolen from the security forces in 1994) as well as to recover weapons from demobilised soldiers and the civilian population. The failure to deploy FADM troops on the borders continues to facilitate cross border weapons flows.



## Conclusion

Given the lack of domestic institutional capacity, joint regional or bilateral efforts should conceivably reap greater dividends. A formal bilateral agreement on Mozambican and South African co-operation was formally signed in March 1995. The agreement makes provision for access to detainees for interrogation, exchange of information on arms smuggling, contact with security force members at ground level and co-operation in pointing out arms caches in the respective countries.<sup>48</sup> The agreement has produced some fruits in the form of *Operation Rachel* (685 AK-47 rifles, 154 sub-machine guns, 255 rifles, 47 mortar tubes, 29 rocket launchers, two anti-aircraft heavy machine guns, 170 mortar bombs, 84 anti-personnel mines, five pistols and 23,415 rounds of ammunition were recovered)<sup>49</sup> and *Operation Jumbo*, which were joint search and destroy operations between the respective police forces. According to a senior police official, co-operation in the gathering and analysis of intelligence was the critical factor to the success of these operations.<sup>50</sup> In the long-term, Mozambique needs to build its own state capacity to fulfil this task itself. In the short-term, Mozambique's neighbours will have to rely primarily on their own border and policing instruments.

The civil war which has devastated this country, economically and socially, has left a legacy of weapons of war in the hands of the civilian society. The shortcomings of the disarmament process which was implemented by UNOMOZ and the demobilisation and integration processes have presented the Mozambican government with a task too large for its resources and institutional capacity. Given the abject poverty, widespread unemployment, institutional collapse and corruption, it is not surprising that those with access to weapons - civilians, demobilised soldiers, police and military officials - are often linked to the lucrative supply of illegal weapons to the South African market. In Mozambique, the issues of control and policing of weapons would appear to be inextricably linked to the question of personal profit and corruption. An absence of accountability to authority within the police in particular, will continue to weaken the institutions of state entrusted with exercising control over small arms. Without regional and international assistance to build capacity and develop a new social ethic, Mozambique's development path is likely to be a long and rocky one.

## 2.3

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### Angola

*To sell guns is very good business, mostly to South Africa because in South Africa they pay well for the guns, it is easy money. There is no food [in Angola] so people sell the weapons just to survive.*

Polícia Fronteiriça official

The 20 years of civil war in Angola, which erupted on the eve of independence from Portugal in 1975, has killed more than half a million Angolans and destroyed this once prosperous economy.

Angola, particularly Luanda, is a contrast of wealth and poverty. The vast majority of people live in shanty houses with little or no regard for town planning, yet Luanda is a bustling city which relies mostly on the fishing industry for food and employment. It is not unusual for the average middle class citizen to eat only once or maybe twice a day. The poor are desperately so, and often crowded into vast squatter camps. By contrast, the so-called 'Dollar economy' consists of an élite segment of Angolan society, which earns and spends its income in US dollars and lives a life of luxury. Some fly to South Africa and Namibia on weekends to do their shopping and they generally have few concerns about money or how to spend it. The 'Dollar economy' élites owe their wealth to their positions or their contacts within the military, the government or the oil and diamond industries. It is in this context that small arms provide the means for both rich and poor to exploit the opportunities offered by illegal activities and the potential for armed mobilisation around socio-economic grievances.

#### Militarisation

As in Mozambique, an entire generation of Angolans have grown up knowing only war and its effects. Participation (whether voluntary or involuntary) in the armed conflict which has ravaged Angola extends to almost the entire male population. In the words of one demobilisation trainer, 'every guy over 16 is or was a soldier'.<sup>1</sup> This alone has broadened the extent of militarisation which is found in Angola, in contrast to conflicts in other countries of shorter duration and narrower scope.

There exists a high degree of personal association with militarism which could impact significantly upon the success or failure of efforts aimed at demilitarisation and disarmament. This is most clearly illustrated by the attitude

of soldiers towards the military equipment which they use; it has become common practice for soldiers to treat their vehicles, weapons or any other equipment issued by the respective forces, as their own. This has not been helped by the fact that military vehicles were handed over to their drivers or to soldiers when they were replaced by newer vehicles or re-registered. Often this was done in lieu of salary payments. These military vehicles can be seen on the streets of Luanda operating as private taxis or personal transportation. The understanding of many Angolans is that the equipment either belongs to them as individuals or to the military, both of which are seen to be separate from the state. In fact, for a country which has been at war for 20 years, the state has been subverted by the military to such an extent that it has no meaningful status as a civilian authority. With such little respect or appreciation for civilian control, one can expect the military to continue to dominate life in Angola for many years to come. This in itself may impact detrimentally upon the prospects for small arms control, since it is likely to sustain militarism.

### **United Nations Angola Verification Missions (UNAVEM)**

UNAVEM I was mandated to observe the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, in terms of the Namibian independence process, which was completed by the end of May 1991.<sup>2</sup> UNAVEM II was tasked with observing and verifying the implementation of the May 1991 Bicesse Accords and the Protocol of Estoril (the latter committing the Angolan police to neutrality). In September 1992, the peace process collapsed as fighting broke out in the wake of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola's (UNITA's) loss to the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) government in the UN-monitored elections. In November 1994, the Lusaka Protocol restored the peace agreement and paved the way for UNAVEM III.

UNAVEM III consists of a multinational force of some 7,282 soldiers and civilian police<sup>3</sup> entrusted with the task of overseeing the quartering and disarming of government and UNITA troops. UNAVEM III was, in 1996, the largest UN peacekeeping mission costing an estimated R1,43 million a day.<sup>4</sup> At the time of writing, UNAVEM III was still engaged in the task of quartering and disarming the combatants and thus could not be adjudged as to the effectiveness of its role. However, anecdotal and preliminary reports would suggest that the shortcomings and weaknesses of UNOMOZ are being repeated in Angola - with serious consequences for small arms control in Angola and the region.

Anecdotes are also illustrative of the difficult conditions under which the UN has operated in Angola, reflecting the desperation and poverty of many who have suffered from the civil war: UN vehicles have been stolen (50 in one week according to an unconfirmed report), and UN personnel have been robbed and

hijacked. The UN often has to deal with food and medical supplies being stolen from its warehouses and storage depots (recalling the television footage from Mogadishu harbour during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia), but in Angola it has also had to deal with a particularly brutal method of *extortion*: a group of SAFAIR (a private South African air transport company) pilots (chartered by the UN to fly supplies in Angola) recalled how upon landing at a remote airstrip, the crew were confronted by a group of men. They demanded the supply plane's cargo but when the pilots refused to hand it over, the group of men turned on a young child, who was with the group, and began to beat him. Despite the pilots' protestations, the men demanded that the pilots hand over *their cargo* or they would continue to beat the child. 'What could we do?' asked one of the pilots 'we had to hand it [the supplies] over to protect the kid'.<sup>5</sup> The child's father was reputedly one of the men who participated in the beating.

### Disarmament

UNAVEM III has also encountered problems in ensuring effective disarmament. According to two UN trainers who have been in Angola for two years providing technical and agricultural training in demobilisation camps, 'they [demobilised soldiers] come to the demobilisation training carrying their weapons with them. It is a part of them, they see it as theirs personally and you cannot take away a personal weapon. They do not trust the process enough to give in their weapons'.<sup>6</sup> Distrust for the peace process can be heard from all quarters throughout Angola, *stemming largely from the experience of 1992 when fierce fighting broke out after the elections and halted the peace process for nearly two years.* This experience has compelled a revision of some aspects of demobilisation planning. In 1992 some AAs were located within Luanda, which had a devastating effect on the city when renewed fighting broke out. UNAVEM III subsequently decided to locate assembly points in rural areas so as to avoid a possible recurrence. More importantly, there is widespread resistance to disarmament as 'people do not want to be left unarmed if it [war] starts again'.<sup>7</sup> This applies not only to soldiers but also to civilians.

When fighting broke out in Luanda in 1992, 'weapons were just given out freely to everybody by the government. We could just go down and collect them [without having to give personal details]. They do not know who has guns'.<sup>8</sup> According to press reports, 700,000 weapons were distributed to civilians in Luanda after the collapse of the peace process in 1992.<sup>9</sup> These weapons are still being held by civilians out of fear, reinforced by the intensity of the 1992 fighting, when it was a simple case of 'kill or be killed'. Given this fear and the tendency of the military to see their weapons as belonging to themselves, the prospects for voluntary disarmament are extremely poor. The vast majority of weapons were distributed to soldiers, 'people's militia', village chiefs and community leaders, who in turn distributed the arms further afield.

Since no register was kept either of the weapons issued or the recipients, it is not realistic to expect the Angolan factions to simply recall or trace their weapons. No doubt once confidence exists in the peace process, relative stability will bring with it opportunities to sell these weapons on the black market, widening their distribution still further.

It is obvious that there are factors at play which have an impact upon the level of disarmament which are beyond the control of the UN. Despite this, among Angolan authorities there exists a great deal of reliance on, and an unrealistic expectation of what the UN will achieve. As one official explained, disarmament will apparently proceed smoothly because it is 'the UN's responsibility to collect weapons from UNITA and the government [MPLA] will collect their [own] weapons, so there will be no fight'.<sup>10</sup> However, as initial reports have shown, the extent of disarmament achieved has not kept pace with demobilisation, particularly with regard to UNITA troops. According to a UN report in February 1996, a total of 12,571 UNITA soldiers had been registered and disarmed, from whom 12,144 weapons had been recovered. By 4 July 1996, 52,127 UNITA troops had arrived at AAs for quartering, from whom only 26,000 personal weapons had been received.<sup>11</sup>

One can expect then, that the UN disarmament process in Angola, as in Mozambique, will leave thousands of weapons in the hands of the population. The effect of this availability of weapons on an impoverished, unskilled and unemployed population could be crucial to the prospects for development and stability or crime and violence.

## **Landmines**

Landmines also continue to pose a threat not only to lives and limbs, but also to prospects for peace. The Instituto de Remoção de Obstáculos é Engenhos Explosivos (INAROE) is responsible for co-ordinating the process of demining and implementing the *National Plan to Demine Angola*. In terms of the National Plan, Angola is divided into four parts based on economic and population criteria according to which demining priorities can be determined. The difficulties facing the plan are purely financial according to INAROE: 'we are looking to foreign companies and donors to help. If the financial problem [for demining] is solved, we can overcome all others such as logistics, food, labour, transport and training because with money they can be transferred to others'.<sup>12</sup> Despite some obvious bitterness towards South Africa, given its previous role in the conflict, INAROE believes that 'South Africa have all the right to help us'.<sup>13</sup> South African assistance has included the training of programme managers and deminers. In June 1996, the SANDF's SA Army Engineer Formation began the first of three 12-week training courses for former MPLA and UNITA combatants, funded by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs

(DFA).<sup>14</sup> The courses have focused on mine surveying and mapping, which have been identified as the most critical need. This training is in keeping with part of the National Plan's aim to train UNITA and MPLA soldiers in demining techniques so that they can 'go back to their troops to try to recover mines'.<sup>15</sup>

International agencies disagree on the number of landmines in Angola, but INAROE estimates that there are eight to nine million mines, of which 80-90% are anti-personnel mines.<sup>16</sup> Demining is progressing steadily, if somewhat slowly. Since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol to February 1996, only 3-5% of the mines had been removed.<sup>17</sup> Most demining activity has centred on clearing main roads, most of which are in MPLA areas. As of February 1996, 80 km of road had been cleared. The highway from Luanda to Malanje, and roads in Cunene, Bie and Luena have been given top priority. Mechem, a subsidiary of the South African arms manufacturer Denel, secured a contract to undertake demining on behalf of the UN so as to enable the UN to get supplies to areas which otherwise would remain cut-off from them. As of May 1996, Mechem disclosed that it had cleared 25,000 mines in Angola, as part of its two-team US\$8 million UN contract to clear mines from 1,500 km of roads.<sup>18</sup> All landmines and other explosive devices discovered are destroyed on site or moved to a safer area before being destroyed. The Angolan government is negotiating a contract with Mechem to clear railway lines<sup>19</sup> but such is the cost and slow progress being made that landmines are likely to continue to exact their toll on Angolans. More than 70,000 Angolans have been killed by landmines and one in 470 have had a limb amputated.<sup>20</sup>

An important shortcoming of the National Plan is its focus on MPLA-held areas to the detriment of UNITA areas. The danger is that UNITA may well feel vindicated in its distrust of the peace process if it perceives the process to be only delivering peace dividends to MPLA areas. INAROE justifies its concentration on MPLA areas, arguing that access to UNITA areas is limited particularly in Cunene where 'the central problem is communication'<sup>21</sup> with UNITA troops on the ground. This lack of communication is said to be the reason for a number of ambushes and attacks by armed groups on demining teams. This was confirmed by demobilisation trainers who recounted the example of a General who admitted that 'he had not spoken to his men for three months, so how were they supposed to know about the ceasefire or UNAVEM or Mechem?'.<sup>22</sup> Whilst INAROE denies that it has suffered any casualties as a result of these attacks, it admits that there have been 'four or five casualties'<sup>23</sup> but attributes these to negligence in the course of demining. Even in relation to demining, it is obvious that there is an urgent need for soldiers from all sides to be demobilised and disarmed, so as to allow access to areas which otherwise would remain mined and potentially become a source of political tensions.

## **Demobilisation and Re-integration into Society**

Demobilisation of MPLA and UNITA soldiers has proceeded separately, thus far, but training for the new Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) is to be given jointly. An estimated 100,000 soldiers are expected to return to civilian life in the wake of demobilisation and the formation of FAA.<sup>24</sup> The *Serviços de Segurança Militar (SSM)* which has been tasked with the civilian retraining of demobilised soldiers and the creation of a service corps to be re-integrated into society, has an important role to play in fostering stability in Angola. Whilst there is no target figure for demobilisation, SSM expects that small groups of demobilised soldiers who have received training will be tasked to use their newly acquired skills 'in the reconstruction of the country. They will be integrated into society in health services, schools, carpentry, fishing and others'.<sup>25</sup> However, the problem for both trainers and trainees is that the soldiers frequently do not have basic literacy skills. Having been involved in the war for so long, many have not learnt basic reading or writing skills. In an attempt to address this, basic aptitude tests are planned for all trainees to determine the skills training which would best suit them. Soldiers who receive training will be given documentation to verify that they are retrained ex-combatants and the private sector will be offered incentives to employ them.

Demobilised soldiers will receive a salary whilst they are receiving training but the level of remuneration will be determined by a 'standard test' designed to ensure that those with greater competence or potential are rewarded more than others. This could potentially do more harm than good since MPLA soldiers are likely to have an educational advantage over UNITA's bush fighters. Should MPLA fighters be seen to be favoured by the system it could result in further conflict and discontent amid allegations of bias from UNITA. Despite SSM's assurances that 'the government is prepared to support them until they can be on their own',<sup>26</sup> one foresees the newly trained soldiers being left to fend for themselves and their families with limited opportunities for employment. Whilst demobilisation may establish opportunities for acquiring skills more suitable to civilian life, insufficient provision has been made for the securing of employment after such training.

Despite the efforts of SSM, the fact remains that the prospects for trainees are not good, given the lack of opportunities in Angola. Much of SSM's hopes for its trainees rests on the government's plan to employ many of them in a service corps. This is dependent on foreign donors coming forward to fund this since the MPLA government is facing overwhelming financial difficulties. According to Prime Minister Franca Van Dunem, external debt is more than US\$12 billion, the balance of payments is negative, inflation reached 84% in May 1996, unemployment is between 40% and 55%, the local currency is overvalued and the country owes millions of dollars in outstanding dues to international organisations.<sup>27</sup> The absence of a contingency plan should funding

not be forthcoming or be sufficient - which appears to be the likely case - has ensured that the success or failure of the demobilisation and social re-integration processes will play an unduly influential role in the prospects for peaceful political consolidation and stable development. Hope of funding is not going to feed an ex-combatant and his family. The importance of the re-integration process must be seen in the context of the limited disarmament which has already taken place. Should ex-combatants not be able to utilise their newly acquired skills productively, many may choose instead to utilise the skills, not to mention the weapons, they acquired in the course of the war.

The concerns raised here are unlikely to be addressed by either the MPLA government or the UN. In the short-term, Angola does not appear to possess the capacity to absorb demobilised soldiers into its economy. Training alone will not help. The most obvious economic opportunities for demobilised soldiers lie in crime and illicit activities - oil, ivory, diamonds and weapons - the same commodities which helped to sustain them throughout the years of war. As it is, UNITA controls half of Angola's mines, which were not dealt with by the peace accords and over which control must still be established.

## **Crime**

The crime rate in Angola is apparently 'increasing'.<sup>28</sup> Unfortunately, the police cannot provide statistics to either support or repudiate this view - which in itself is indicative of their limited institutional capacity. The weapons used to commit crime include AKMs, Uzis and Makarov pistols, 'mostly weapons from the war'.<sup>29</sup> Incidents of car hijacking have been reported as has banditry, which in rural areas has taken the form of ambushes and armed robberies. The explanation forthcoming from the police is that ex-soldiers are turning to crime, partly due to the 'very weak control of weapons in the hands of soldiers'.<sup>30</sup>

Crime and banditry seem to be one of the few areas in which UNITA and MPLA soldiers have been able to work together. In fact, in 1995 a group of both government and UNITA soldiers collaborated to steal an undisclosed quantity of weapons from a state armoury in Grafanyal and then sold them at Luanda's main market. Most of these firearms were the Spanish-made Star firearms used during the war. These thefts started after 1992, which coincided with 'a big lack of control over weapons during this period'.<sup>31</sup> This provides sufficient indication that security and controls at state armouries need to be tightened, so as not to feed more illegal weapons into an already highly armed society.

Thefts from state armouries also raise the question of official corruption. The Angolan authorities readily acknowledge that corruption is rife - 'a lot of the members of the police are involved in crime'<sup>32</sup> - but deny that it is in anyway related to the establishment of organised crime syndicates in Angola. According



to the police, cross-border smuggling does not happen on an organised basis: 'the cross-border sale of arms is not organised, it is just individual people taking the opportunity to make money'.<sup>33</sup> In the Cuando Cubango region of Angola's Caprivi border with Namibia, which is under UNITA control, weapons smuggling is said to be rife because of the level of poverty. Whilst it is likely that individuals driven by poverty to sell their weapons need not be involved in an organised syndicate, there are other smuggling activities which suggest a high degree of organisation. This is particularly evident in cases of smuggling which have extended beyond the region's borders to South and Central America. Since November 1995, Angolan authorities have been investigating a case involving the smuggling of Pioneer hi-fi speakers filled with guns and flown to Brazil.<sup>34</sup> The Angolan police have downplayed this case as an isolated incident involving an individual opportunist. However, since it required the corruption of customs officials at the airport, in both Angola and Brazil, one could assume that this is at best an indication that organised crime syndicates dealing in small arms could be planning to take root in Angola. The opportunities for organised crime in Angola are great - there are diamonds, oil, ivory and of course, small arms - all highly attractive commodities to international crime syndicates.

## **Border Control**

Angola is an exception in Southern Africa in that it has a formal and independent border control force, known as *Policia Fronteira* (PF). PF is a paramilitary force which combines both the policing and economic functions of customs control in Angola. There are at least 30 men, depending on the size of traffic through the border, deployed at each of 95 land border posts. If one includes sea ports then there are 125 formal border control posts. PF believe that they 'need 15,000 men to patrol the borders'<sup>35</sup> but if they had resources such as helicopters, roads and observation towers, then they could make do with 8,000. At present, PF has manpower resources of fewer than 4,000, no operable helicopters, no observation towers and few roads which provide vehicle access to its borders.

Despite being responsible for controlling Angola's 4,000 km long border, PF only has access to 20% of this border, mostly along the coastline. The MPLA government controls less than '10% of the Cabinda border with Congo and Zaire and 5% of the border with Zaire'.<sup>36</sup> Along the border with Zambia, there are border posts but they are unmanned.<sup>37</sup> Along the border with Namibia in Cuando Cubango, there is 'no control'.<sup>38</sup> In Cunene and Namibe there is 'minimum control'.<sup>39</sup> According to a PF official, most borders have no control at all because of landmines, geography (making them inaccessible) or because they fall within UNITA held territory: 'we do not have good border controls because the government forces do not have control of all border areas'.<sup>40</sup> As a

consequence of this absence of border controls, the prospects for the large-scale and undetected trafficking of thousands of weapons from Angola, into the region and elsewhere, are exceptionally good - particularly if the government fails to regain control of those borders across which UNITA soldiers have engaged in illicit cross-border trafficking.

The total absence of border control in UNITA-held territory, which amounts to 80% of Angola's border frontier regions, has serious negative consequences for any plans to tighten border controls from within Angola. In terms of the Lusaka Protocol, the movement of troops into new areas is not permitted. As a result, the PF is not yet able to move into UNITA-held areas to secure the borders. However, PF claim to have plans in place to move back into these areas once the peace process is secured. The danger is, of course, that UNITA soldiers may resist any attempts at border controls since they have a vested economic interest in the unrestricted movement of people and goods. Even if political agreements on border controls were to be reached with UNITA's leaders, it is possible that local leaders would not abide by such an agreement as many of them rely on the absence of official border controls to illegally exploit the diamond and oil resources under their control. Given the desperation and poverty of Angolans, there exists a very real threat that lucrative trans-national crime, in general, and arms smuggling, in particular, could expand beyond control in Angola.

Despite the plans to expand and improve controls, the Angolan authorities acknowledge that the government will not be able to finance these border control plans. Despite the potential wealth of the country, the government has far more pressing needs to meet than those of border control. Without the political will to support improved border controls through provision of the necessary resources, effective controls are unlikely to be achieved. After all, the consequences of the illegal export of small arms will not be felt in Angola. In fact, the more cynically-minded observer might be inclined to believe that large-scale cross-border small arms exports from Angola could actually be a positive contribution to the long-term stability of the Angolan peace process. The institutional capacity of those entrusted with border controls, in particular, and policing, in general, is too low to significantly prevent the internal distribution or regional flow of illegal weapons or even to recover weapons from potentially destabilising elements.

## **Policing**

The institutions of the Angolan state are weak and characterised by rampant corruption and abuse of power. This impacts directly on the prospects for small arms control in that it is generally security force officials who are personally profiting from these practices.

Lack of discipline and the concomitant abuse of power for personal gain could arguably be called a societal norm in Angola. Senior government officials are themselves under suspicion of misappropriating funds and self-enrichment. In their private capacity, government ministers and military officers also buy Land Rovers to such an extent that, according to a senior Luanda-based foreign diplomat, in 1995, the Land Rover agent in Angola was reputedly recognised by his company as the biggest seller of their vehicles in the world. The influx of relief agencies and NGO's would no doubt have boosted this total, but if the number of Land Rovers being driven by military men in Luanda is any indication, then it is likely that the majority were sold to government or military officials. Locals complain that government and military officials are always the recipients of *gifts* from local businessmen and foreign investors who are required by law to grant a 51% shareholding to an Angolan business partner. It helps to overcome the red tape if this shareholder is in a position of influence, that is, in the military. Other military officials are said to extract their *gifts* from others by using more intimidatory methods.

Given the example of the top leadership, is it any wonder then that those who are responsible for policing small arms in Angola are not equal to the task? Corruption in the police and defence force is reputedly rampant, partly because of poor salaries - said to be US\$1 a month. A further hindrance to effective control of weaponry is related to the ongoing institutional rivalry and lack of co-operation between the police and the military. Some local observers go so far as to say that the army and the police 'hate each other'<sup>41</sup> and talk of shoot-outs between soldiers and policemen.

Enforcement of the law is more likely to be pursued as a means of extorting income, than with the intention of ensuring observance of the laws. Nevertheless, according to police officials, strict controls are exercised over the issuing of firearm licences. Provision is made for annual renewal of firearm licences and such renewal is subject to final approval from the police. Customs and import licences must be obtained by private companies who wish to import firearms - this would include banks and security companies. (It is not clear to what extent this was observed and applied to groups such as Executive Outcomes.) Diplomats who wish to bring their firearms into Angola can only obtain permission if the firearm is of no larger calibre than a 9mm pistol. Any weapons imported without licences will be confiscated. Should a policeman or soldier be found in illegal possession of a weapon, he will be dismissed and sentenced before a military tribunal as they are only allowed to carry their weapons for official duties and for self-defence. Conviction of the illegal possession of a firearm can result in a minimum prison sentence of two years and a maximum of 24 years. In reality 'very few'<sup>42</sup> weapons are seized and the police are unable to quantify the numbers of 'legal' firearms. Given these shortcomings over 'legal' weapons, what then are the prospects of bringing illegal weapons under control?

Illegal weapons which are in the hands of ordinary Angolans include AK-47s, AKM assault rifles and other weapons of various calibres.<sup>43</sup>

There are two weapons recovery programmes in Angola. The first is the UN programme to disarm UNITA and government troops in terms of the demobilisation process. The second is a recovery programme headed by the Angolan police to recover weapons from the public. The police programme 'is not an immediate programme, it will happen only after UNITA have been disarmed'.<sup>44</sup> The reason for this delay is no doubt due to the distrust and fears of another 1992-type outbreak of fighting. The police are very reluctant to divulge any details of their recovery programme but it is unlikely to imitate traditional 'weapons-for-cash' projects, since the government is in no position to fund such programmes. The police are, therefore, more likely to rely on operational measures such as roadblocks or search-and-seize operations which will test their capacity to the limit.

The number of weapons to be recovered is not known. Some PF officials estimate that 'over 90% of the population have guns'<sup>45</sup> while one senior police official contended that 'less than 10% of the people have weapons. We will only need about 1 month to recover all weapons'.<sup>46</sup> This contrasts with UN official estimates of one million weapons in the hands of 11 million civilians. There are two immediately identifiable problems:

Firstly, the Angolan authorities would appear to be placing an inordinately high amount of faith in the UN's ability to carry out secure and effective disarmament of UNITA forces on their behalf. This is unlikely to happen. Instead one can expect soldiers to hand over their old and damaged weaponry rather than their more valuable supplies.

Secondly, the divergent opinions over the extent of proliferation could lead to inadequate measures being taken on the part of the authorities. In this regard, the PF might be more inclined to deal with the problem, than the police who have downplayed the issue.

The PF earnestly recognise the need for a programme to recover weapons, so much so, that 'consultants from Uganda and Ethiopia have come to Angola to share their experiences with us'.<sup>47</sup> PF appreciate the costs involved in any cash-based rewards system: 'any reward programme must offer the highest price or else they [weapons] will go to Brazil or South Africa for more money. Crime has increased so we need a good programme to convince ordinary people to hand in guns, not only ex-soldiers'<sup>48</sup> - but given the corruption in Angola, one cannot help but question the wisdom of a cash-based rewards system.

In July 1996, it was reported that the Angolan government had given civilians until the middle of August to voluntarily hand over their weapons, after which

date they would be arrested and charged for illegal possession. According to Angolan National Radio, police had received 250 guns and rifles, and different types of ammunition, but little information has since been forthcoming.

One of the most important social obstacles to the recovery of these weapons is the *change in status* which they have undergone since the peace process: a generation of Angolans has grown up never knowing peace or what firearm controls are. In their experience firearms are issued without licensing requirements or procedures. Registration is the exception rather than the established norm. Now they are told that weapons which were issued to them by the government, village elders or faction leaders are illegally in their possession. In the minds of many (particularly ex-combatants), these weapons are rightfully theirs. This, of course, makes it difficult for any programme designed to recover weapons to succeed - whether it be voluntary hand-overs or amnesties, United Nations disarmament programmes or community reporting on persons in illegal possession. Given the unlikely chances of control being achieved through policing or border controls, it is not surprising that many Angolan authorities are relying on collaboration with neighbouring countries to establish better control over small arms.

### **Regional Co-operation**

The Angolan Police believe that there is a need for 'a common strategy to control trans-national crime and to strengthen relationships'.<sup>49</sup> The Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPPCO) is seen as an important step along this path. However, very few tangible benefits have been produced thus far, apart from the installation of e-mail facilities for the 11 respective police chiefs, which was donated by the South African-based Business Against Crime. Another tool supported by the Angolans in the fight against trans-national criminality is co-operation between the region's police forces: 'to identify and distribute information on known criminals to neighbours and have them extradite him'.<sup>50</sup> However, Angola still has no formal co-operation agreements with any of its neighbours and there are no extradition treaties. There is, however, informal bilateral co-operation and a strong desire to extend this: 'we would like to set up exchanges on a permanent basis'.<sup>51</sup> Presently, negotiations involving police affairs are conducted at diplomatic level rather than on a direct police-police basis. This is a weakness which could be rectified, possibly through the appointment of police attachés to diplomatic missions.

The Angolan authorities recognise the need for increased police co-operation, particularly with Namibia, where, by their own admission, cross-border crime is particularly problematic. However, Angola also believes that some of its neighbours are not doing enough to assist in curbing smuggling: 'they do not

help to control [smuggling], they help the trafficking, especially Zaire<sup>52</sup> which is widely accused of continuing to facilitate the provision of supplies to UNITA. Apart from these problems, Angolan authorities also point to the difficulties experienced by PF in working with other countries which do not have specialised border forces: 'they do not work like we do, which makes it difficult for us to communicate with the relevant authorities on their side'.<sup>53</sup> In order to overcome this, Angola has participated in a number of joint commissions with its neighbours with varying degrees of success:

Commissions were set up with Zambia, Namibia, Congo and Zaire. The commission with Zambia was established in 1979, but as the area has been under UNITA control, 'it does not work anymore'.<sup>54</sup> The commission with Namibia came into operation soon after its independence in 1990. Regular meetings are held and it is the most active commission and rightly so, given the potential for smuggling across this border to feed the South African arms market. The Congo commission was started soon after Angolan independence and operates with a minimum of problems. The same cannot be said for the commission which was started in 1978 with Zaire. This was suspended in 1990 due to Zairean support for UNITA. After the signing of the Bicesse Accord, a new attempt was made to establish a commission with Zaire, but talks collapsed: 'this is our most problematic border'.<sup>55</sup>

## **Conclusion**

Given that policing and border controls as well as attempts at co-operation have not been as successful as was hoped, the measures employed to control small arms in Angola would appear to have been found wanting. These or other more effective measures must be made to deliver better control. An important step towards achieving this would be to develop a greater spirit of self-reliance among Angolans, to empower their own institutions and people without relying on outside intervention.

The prospects for stability in Southern Africa hinge on the successful implementation and conclusion of the Angolan peace process. Angola's prosperity or, alternatively, continued conflict must inevitably continue to shape the perceptions and fortunes of the region.

## 2.4

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### Swaziland

*We are always victims! Some of the guns on their way to South Africa stay in Swaziland to be used by criminals against us.*

Swaziland Ministry of Foreign Affairs official

Unlike Angola and Mozambique, Swaziland is not a source of weapons to the region. However, Swaziland is fast becoming a market in its own right as demand for weapons has increased with growing political unrest and crime. Proliferation in this country is fuelled by three elements - legal licensed weapons, former liberation movement arms caches and the illegal trafficking of weapons from Mozambique to South Africa via Swaziland. Undoubtedly the major challenge lies in controlling the flow of illegal weapons from Mozambique.

#### Domestic Firearm Controls

The firearm licensing procedure operating in Swaziland is grounded in the traditional chief or village elders system. An individual seeking to possess a licensed firearm must obtain an application for a licence from a police station. The applicant must seek the approval of his village elders and inform them of his reasons for wanting the firearm. If they approve and believe him to be competent and responsible he may obtain a licence from the police. Should the applicant not have a traditional authority to refer to, a panel appointed by the King will review his application.

A system of annual licence renewal is in place, but is not strictly enforced. Every year a gun-owner must report to a police station and present the licensed firearm to be verified and his address and details updated. According to the Royal Swaziland Police (RSP) Criminal Investigation Division, the regulations which require owners to renew their licences every year assist in the counting of firearms and in detecting any unreported losses or thefts. The requirement of annual renewal is, however, dependent on the enforcement capacity of the RSP. Yet the RSP have no computer systems to record this information and are thus unable to follow-up efficiently on any of the gun-owners who do not renew their licences. The RSP have admitted that the manual filing and record-keeping system is 'slow and inefficient'.<sup>1</sup> In any event, in instances where the RSP do find and act against a firearm owner who has failed to renew his licence, they

can only impose a 'petty fine'. In order for this system of annual renewal to work effectively, the penalties should be stiffer and the system more actively policed.

As of November 1995, there were 8,549 registered firearm owners in Swaziland who possess 10,135 licensed firearms (see table below).

| Firearms Registered in Swaziland                                      |                       |                       |
|---|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Type of Firearm   | Total Registered 1990 | Total Registered 1995 |
| Rifles  | 1,393                 | 2,217                 |
| Single Barrel Shotguns  | 3,499*                | 4,176                 |
| Double Barrel Shotguns  | -                     | 880                   |
| Revolvers   | 471                   | 667                   |
| Pistols   | 285                   | 2,101                 |
| Combinations  | 27                    | 41                    |
| Miscellaneous   | 9                     | 53                    |
| <b>TOTAL</b>  | <b>5,684</b>          | <b>10,135</b>         |
| * Includes both single and double barrelled shotguns.<br>Source: RSP. |                       |                       |

In terms of the '1964 Act' possession of unlicensed firearms is prohibited. The vast majority of illegal weapons originate from one of two sources - arms caches belonging to the liberation movements which used Swaziland as a transit point, and weapons smuggled from Mozambique to elements in both South Africa and Swaziland itself.

Despite the fact that Swaziland officially prohibited MK and APLA cadres from operating from its territory (in keeping with the 1982 Non-Aggression Pact signed with South Africa), many transit routes were established as cadres moved from Mozambique into Swaziland before entering South Africa. During this time, the cadres reputedly built up a network of sympathisers who helped to cache their weapons and assisted them in crossing the borders from Mozambique into Swaziland and then into South Africa. Some of these caches are still buried in Swaziland and are often discovered by accident. As one member of the Intelligence unit of the Swaziland Defence Force (SDF) has remarked, 'weapons caches are still lying in the bush'.<sup>2</sup> Many of the local sympathisers who assisted MK and APLA have now apparently seized the opportunity to sell the caches left in Swaziland to locals for self-defence or criminal purposes or to South African buyers. It would appear that the network of methods and contacts used to smuggle cadres into and through Swaziland still



operates in smuggling weapons both from Mozambique and Swaziland. The motives are no longer necessarily political but financial.

The arms caches also pose a threat to the internal security of Swaziland. Given the growing demands for constitutional and political freedom in Swaziland, the potential exists that some political groups may be able to arm themselves with weapons cached in Swaziland or those coming from Mozambique, to press their demands. Swaziland must therefore expect an increase in armed crime as small arms continue to proliferate.

### **Weapons Recovery**

From 1991-95, the RSP have seized the following weapons:

| <b>Weapons Seized by the Royal Swaziland Police</b> |               |                 |               |                 |
|---|---------------|-----------------|---------------|-----------------|
| <b>Year</b>   | <b>AK-47s</b> | <b>Handguns</b> | <b>Rifles</b> | <b>Shotguns</b> |
| 1991  | 61            | 40              | 8             | 17              |
| 1992  | 65            | 30              | 15            | 17              |
| 1993  | 50            | 38              | 3             | 15              |
| 1994  | 21            | 52              | 15            | 12              |
| 1995  | 10            | 46              | 5             | 11              |

Source: RSP

In addition, two rocket launchers, seven surface-to-air missiles, two landmines and 18 sub-machine guns were recovered in 1993; four handgrenades in 1994; and two rocket launchers and three landmines in 1995. The small number of weapons recovered or seized could, however, be an indictment of government's abilities to police the problem effectively. The route from Mozambique through Swaziland into Kwazulu-Natal has been one of the largest (if not the largest) smuggling route for illegal weapons into South Africa, and yet the RSP have only seized a total of 207 AK-47s and 206 pistols/revolvers in the period 1991-95. This is further indication of the limited capacity of South Africa's neighbours to effectively prevent illegal weapons from moving into South Africa.

### **Swaziland's Border Controls**

The 2,600-strong SDF is tasked with patrolling the borders and dealing with all border control measures, while the 3,000-strong RSP are responsible for maintaining peace and order within the state. Any illegal weapons or smugglers

seized by the SDF are handed to the police. However, the SDF admit that they do not know how many weapons they have seized because 'there are no good records'.<sup>3</sup> There would appear to be a need to create this type of basic institutional capacity in Swaziland.

The vast majority of the security force personnel are male (not surprising given Swaziland's traditional, male-dominated society) and smugglers have not been slow to exploit this fact. Smugglers have used women to carry weapons strapped to their bodies because they knew that 'there were no female soldiers to search the women'<sup>4</sup> at the border posts. This highlights the need for Swaziland to employ more sophisticated border inspection systems. One such alternative is the use of sniffer dogs, the effectiveness of which has already been seen by the SDF following South Africa's loan of sniffer dogs to Swazi officials at the Namaacha border post with Mozambique: a 'sizeable number'<sup>5</sup> of weapons were found in heavy vehicles, under the cargo and inside fuel tanks and false compartments as a result of this operation.

Corruption at border posts involving customs officials or even soldiers on patrol has aided smuggling activities as 'a smuggler will wait until he sees a *friendly* customs official he knows'<sup>6</sup> before crossing the border with his weapons.

The Swazis would appear to rely mostly on information provided by the SAPS and informers, who are recruited to gather information on planned smuggling activity, but the country will have to do more if it hopes to be able to build its own intelligence gathering capability.

However, one notable result of its intelligence work has been to pinpoint the involvement of a number of transport companies in smuggling weapons across the region's borders. It is also becoming more apparent that it is not only the truck drivers who of their own initiative are becoming involved but rather people higher up in the company hierarchy: 'sometimes the drivers do not even know that they [weapons] are there. He drives his truck to the depot and two or three days later the company phones him to collect it. Then when he gets to the border and we find the guns he cannot tell us how it got there. I can see when I question some of them, they do not know where it comes from'.<sup>7</sup> This points to the need for greater control to be exerted over the cargo carried by the many trucking and transportation companies which move throughout the region. Future controls should facilitate greater ease of inspection and possibly ban the 'one-key' locking system (one key is held at the point of departure and another at the point of arrival to prevent unlawful opening of the container en route, however, it also prevents inspection of the cargo). As with most border posts in the region, Swaziland does not have sufficient human and financial resources to ensure effective inspection of containers and cargo moving across its borders. Laws which facilitate inspection may alleviate this weakness.

## **The Mozambican Connection**

Given Swaziland's geographic position relative to both Mozambique (a key supplier of small arms) and South Africa (the principal market for small arms), Swaziland has had to focus attention on its relationship with Mozambique. The SDF believes that demobilised soldiers in Mozambique are earning a living by selling these weapons. Although no organisation can be directly pinpointed, 'some of the smuggled small arms even come from the official armouries of FRELIMO troops'.<sup>8</sup> Another party to weapons smuggling, in Swaziland's experience, are migrant mine-workers. It would appear that some mine-workers take the opportunity to obtain small arms from Mozambique and then take them back to South Africa to sell them. This could account for the use of weapons in some of the unrest and violence experienced periodically on various mines in South Africa. The SDF has alleged that, in most instances, weapons are only smuggled once a buyer in South Africa has been arranged.

## **South African Co-operation**

As mentioned above, South Africa has lent support and assistance to the Swazis and co-operation is described as 'good' by the SDF. A Joint Co-operation Agreement, giving the SAPS and RSP free access to each other's territory was signed by President Mandela and King Mswati on 10 August 1995. There is a Joint Security Committee which has been set up to discuss problems on the ground relating to border crossings and other issues. Information and co-ordination of troop deployments are shared so that 'we are not thinly deployed on both sides of the border at the same time'.<sup>9</sup> According to one member of the Swaziland Ministry of Foreign Affairs<sup>10</sup> who serves on the Joint Security Commission which meets with Mozambican and South African officials, the working agreements established between South Africa and Swaziland have been successful. The Joint Co-operation Agreement has also helped to bridge the gaps in the old, bilateral extradition treaty. Apparently, there is no major weakness in the Swaziland-South Africa relationship apart from limited resources. South Africa, Swaziland and Mozambique also meet in a Tripartite Commission, although the Swazis have attributed its weaknesses in effectiveness to the Mozambicans.

## **Mozambican Co-operation**

The Swaziland authorities are disenchanted with the lack co-operation received from Mozambique: 'it is very difficult to work with them. You make an agreement with one man today. Tomorrow he is no longer there and you must make a different agreement with somebody else because he does not agree with the original agreement. I do not know if that is deliberate or not'.<sup>11</sup> The border

between Swaziland and Mozambique is mined in areas. The Mozambican government has apparently denied laying the mines and has told the Swazis to discuss it with RENAMO. The Swazis on the other hand would appear convinced that FRELIMO laid the mines. Despite the obvious concerns over the mines' presence, they have another effect. The Swazis are forced to maintain an animal fence on the Mozambican border to prevent the spread of foot and mouth disease to Swaziland's cattle. (Should Swaziland's cattle be infected by foot and mouth from Mozambique, it would have a significant impact on their economically important meat market.) The presence of landmines has made maintenance work difficult and the Swazis do not have the resources to demine the areas.

Despite the formal creation of a Joint Commission between Swaziland and Mozambique, it reputedly failed to meet as regularly as intended. Another factor which apparently retards Swazi-Mozambican co-operation is Mozambique's failure to ratify an extradition agreement. While Mozambicans often blame 'the language difficulty' for the misunderstandings and lack of co-operation, Swazis have pointedly noted that they 'find it very difficult to work with them, they are very unco-operative'.<sup>12</sup>

Mozambique's alleged failure to act against criminals has been the cause of much unhappiness on the Swazi side: 'once a criminal or stolen vehicle ends up in Mozambique there is nothing that can or will be done'.<sup>13</sup> One incident was related as an example: the Swazis had demanded that the Mozambicans co-operate in arresting a car thief, and handed the handcuffed thief to the Mozambican police in the police station. A few minutes later when the Swazi police asked to see him again, he could not be found - 'they just let him go! We are always victims! Some of the guns on the way to South Africa stay in Swaziland to be used by criminals against us. Mozambican criminals are active in Swaziland but the Mozambicans do nothing. We definitely need their co-operation'.<sup>14</sup> Ultimately, there needs to be greater policing within Mozambique to prevent illegal shipments from reaching the border. It has been claimed that large consignments of weapons have originated deep in the interior of Mozambique, travelling undetected to the Swaziland border.

There is a need for the agreement between the two governments and their police forces to be strengthened. Unfortunately, little or no progress has been made in this regard. In the light of these circumstances, Swaziland has little option other than to rely on its own border control procedures.

### **Southern African Development Community (SADC)**

Given that weapons proliferation is a problem affecting most of the region, one Swaziland official has contended that 'we really need a co-ordinated approach,

but treaties and conventions on paper are not worth much. We need to establish bilateral regional agreements like with South Africa'.<sup>15</sup> The short-term preference would thus appear to be for bilateral working agreements rather than multilateral Protocols and Treaties which cannot yet effectively meet the situational needs on the ground.

Those responsible for security matters in Swaziland are concerned that the SADC Protocol on the Free Movement of People will facilitate criminal activities. The 1996 signing of the Protocol on Drug Trafficking has not been followed by any initiative to extend this thinking to the question of weapons trafficking in the region. However, Swaziland appear to support a move to place the issue on the SADC agenda.

### **Crime In Swaziland**

The level of crime in Swaziland is increasing and becoming more violent, as is the case throughout the region. According to the police, Swaziland experienced its first violent armed robbery in 1986. Prior to that 'Swazis were very quiet people, they would not dare use firearms'.<sup>16</sup> As crime has increased in Swaziland, the demand for cheap weapons for self-defence has increased: 'taxi drivers get robbed and hijacked and so they want a gun. They can buy an AK-47 for R25 or R50 if it comes with ammunition. It is cheap because the person selling it does not know the real value of it. He needs to buy food, not keep the gun'.<sup>17</sup> A handgun can reputedly be bought for R200, or even less depending on the seller. Licensed handguns stolen from South Africa have apparently been used in incidents of crime in Swaziland, a reversal in the normal direction of illegal small arms flows. However, in contrast to the high number of thefts of firearms in South Africa, the RSP report an 'insignificant'<sup>18</sup> number of thefts from Swazi citizens. The low number of licensed firearms in Swaziland no doubt contributes to the low theft figures, a luxury which South Africa does not share.

In the battle against crime there is a general shortage of manpower, vehicles, communications equipment and resources to pay informers to maintain the flow of intelligence information. In an effort to counter this, the Swazis initiated a community policing programme in 1990, the aim of which was to 'increase local awareness and make them security conscious, to win public support and to obtain information'.<sup>19</sup> The community policing committees are 'taking a lead in crime prevention'.<sup>20</sup> There is good public co-operation as 'people do not want to see anybody with a firearm'.<sup>21</sup> However, these committees receive token amounts of financial support from the government, which retards their effectiveness. The success of these committees would seem to lie in the strong sense of obedience to authority which still exists in Swaziland, even in the urban areas. However, as has been witnessed in the growing anger towards the

political domination of the Monarchy, the seeds for political unrest are in place. The 1996 anti-government protests and trade union demands for a system of multiparty democracy, could be a foretaste of the type of opposition to come if demands for moves towards democracy remain unfulfilled.

### **The Solution**

The RSP believe that the ideal solution to small arms proliferation lies in 'stopping the demand'.<sup>22</sup> So long as there is demand for illegal weapons in South Africa or even Swaziland, 'the market will always be there and the traffic will always be there'.<sup>23</sup> All the police can do is try to 'keep it under control, but [they] cannot prevent it. It is beyond police capabilities'.<sup>24</sup> In the short-term there is little hope of preventing smuggling activities. If the task is to try to control illegal weapons flows, then far greater resources and co-operation are required.

## 2.5

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### Namibia

*There is a real risk for Namibia, because we are the only close and lucrative economy for those Angolan soldiers.*

Senior Officer, Namibian Defence Force

Having dealt with the problems of military demobilisation and integration in the wake of the implementation of UN Resolution 435 and Namibian independence in 1990, the challenge to small arms control in Namibia emanates from that country's proximity to Angola. Namibia is a vital link in the effort to prevent weapons flooding out of Angola, particularly to the weapons market in South Africa. However, Namibia's control efforts are limited by political and resource considerations. Failure to address these will likely lead to increased cross-border trafficking of weapons from Angola, with direct consequences for Namibia and the region.

#### Demobilisation

As in the case of Angola, Mozambique and South Africa, Namibia too has undergone a process of military demobilisation, disarmament, integration and re-integration. In contrast to the shortcomings of the other processes, the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) operation in Namibia was, for the most part, successful. The 8,000-strong UNTAG force, consisting of 4,500 military, 2,000 civilian and 1,500 police personnel, played a 'critical role'<sup>1</sup> in the demobilisation of ex-combatants. This was largely due to the extent of the UN's authority in Namibia: as a transitional authority it was empowered to enforce and control the peace process, rather than play a secondary role to the power and authority of the state. The fruits of this were clearly visible in the result and the UNTAG operation today stands as one of the most successful in the history of UN peace operations.

However, in contrast to what has become normal demobilisation practice, the approximately 20,000 demobilised People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) soldiers did not qualify for any special packages. Instead they received the same resettlement package given to civilian refugees by the UNHCR. This package included repatriation, a transition allowance, mattresses, blankets, food, kitchen utensils, temporary shelter in a transition centre and transportation to their final destination. The South West Africa Territory Force (SWATF)

numbered approximately 22,000 upon demobilisation, which was completed by 1 June 1989. All SWATF arms, equipment and ammunition were under the guard of UNTAG, but SWATF ex-combatants did not receive any of the demobilisation benefits received by PLAN ex-combatants. According to the Namibian Defence Force (NDF), because SWATF ex-combatants did not leave the country, there was 'no need'<sup>2</sup> for repatriation or basic assistance for establishing a civilian life during and after the transition period in Namibia. Instead, SWATF ex-combatants merely continued to receive their salary payments until independence.

The absence of demobilisation benefits has since been a bone of contention among those who were demobilised without any source of financial support and has led to protests and demands for these. The most dramatic expression of this unhappiness came in October 1995, when about 300 former PLAN fighters took Deputy Minister for Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation, Hadino Hishongwa, hostage.<sup>3</sup> In response, Prime Minister Hage Geingob rejected requests to consider lump sum payments to former guerillas, citing the fact that they were not paid during the war and have the honour of enjoying the freedoms for which they fought. Unfortunately, freedom and honour do not feed a family. Despite government job creation programmes, not all ex-PLAN fighters can be assisted. Given the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) government's refusal to address the plight of ex-combatants and the availability of weapons from Angola, Namibians might expect a further increase in crime and ultimately political violence.

## **Integration**

The issue of integration of the respective forces into a new NDF and into Namibian society was not accorded any consideration in the peace process of Resolution 435, and many ex-combatants were left roaming the streets both before and after independence. In early 1990, a committee was established under the chairmanship of UNTAG to develop a structure for the post-independence NDF. A battalion of 500 men, drawn from both sides, were trained by Kenya to form a guard of honour on independence day. After independence, more were inducted and trained by BMATT. The NDF today stands at 7,000-strong, of which only 4-5,000 can be deployed as ground troops, the rest being support staff. Approximately 30% of the NDF are former SWATF soldiers and 70% ex-PLAN. According to one Lt.-Colonel, the integration of ex-guerillas into a formal government armed force was 'a difficult process, [but] the individuals who were inducted quickly picked up pace and today are professionals'.<sup>4</sup>



## **Disarmament**

The key to the UNTAG operation and the relative success of the demobilisation and integration processes, would appear to lie with the disarmament process. One reason for its comparative success, according to ex-PLAN officers, is the fact that PLAN was a semi-regular force (as opposed to a guerilla force) and thus was subject to auditing and control of its weapons. It is interesting to note that most of the weapons used by the NDF were previously used by PLAN. Two other factors were also of great value to the disarmament process:

Firstly, the cantonment of PLAN forces occurred in southern Angola. These soldiers would not have found it easy to bring their weapons on the UN aircraft which repatriated them to Windhoek.

Secondly, those PLAN fighters who chose not to hand their weapons over to the UN would more than likely have left them with the MPLA troops in Angola, or at least have abandoned them in Angola. The fact that SWATF weapons were audited and subject to SADF control would also have helped to limit the number of weapons which were 'lost' in the system.

Disarmament was, therefore, an important peace-building factor for Namibia. The UNTAG operation also demonstrates that, given similarly favourable circumstances, UN peace operations can play a vital role in contributing to the peace-building process in other countries.

## **Landmines**

One aspect of disarmament which could not be accounted for in the UNTAG operation was that of demining. Landmines 'of different types and origin'<sup>5</sup> were planted by both PLAN and the SADF. The SADF apparently laid mines around the perimeter fences of some of their bases and around electricity pylons to protect them from sabotage; whilst PLAN reputedly planted mines largely along roads and in fields. Casualties continue to be reported as civilians 'fall victim to the mines and other ordnances that are remnants of the war'.<sup>6</sup> On 4 September 1995, a national demining campaign was launched in order to clear the areas of Ruacana, Mahenene, Omafo and others of mines. By 18 December 1995, the company of engineers from the NDF tasked with the mine clearance had disposed of 195 mines and 273 other explosive devices. No casualties were recorded among the engineers, helped no doubt by provision of 'refresher training and other equipment'<sup>7</sup> by the US Army. The operation has since moved on from Ruacana to Mahenene. Of concern is the fact that demining operations have thus far been limited to Ovamboland, SWAPO's major support base, reflecting the unduly influential role accorded to political interests.

## **Policing**

Until 1996, Namibia had applied the same firearms legislation as operated in South Africa prior to 1990. Finally, in February 1996, Namibia produced its own draft legislation for the control of firearms. Still borrowing largely from the South African Arms and Ammunition Act, the most notable provisions of the draft include the following:

- \* a one-off requirement of all firearm owners to re-apply for new licences within a period of 18 months;
- \* all automatic weapons to be declared illegal unless a permit to possess such a weapon has been issued by the Inspector-General of Police; and
- \* no person may licence more than four weapons of various calibre.

However, despite the existence of its own firearms legislation, Namibia is still largely dependent on South African institutional support.

South Africa still lends considerable assistance in areas such as training, forensics, processing of licence applications and maintenance of all statistical data relating to policing in the former territory. This often leads to great embarrassment for the Namibian Police (NAMPOL), who must direct requests for statistical data older than 12 months to the SAPS: 'we keep records for the current year on a manual filing system, but anything older than that you have to get from Pretoria'.<sup>8</sup> (However, the SAPS are unwilling to release these figures without NAMPOL's authorisation.) This reliance is claimed as a reflection of the '100% police co-operation' between Namibia and South Africa. From the South African perspective, 'we do it to help them and for our own good'.<sup>9</sup> The SAPS are willing to preserve this relationship in the interests of assisting NAMPOL to exert control over small arms and thereby serve South African interests. This is a very politically sensitive issue and elicits very little comment from NAMPOL. It could be argued that this reliance on South Africa reflects on the lack of institutional capacity of NAMPOL to perform the tasks which policing and arms control measures require of them.

This lack of capacity is also evident in the number of illegal weapons seized by NAMPOL, mostly in the Rundu and Katima Mulilo area which in itself suggests that these weapons originate in Angola. From 1993 to August 1995, NAMPOL made 64 arrests for illegal possession of a weapon, seized 285 weapons and 1,763 rounds of ammunition.<sup>10</sup> This is a small proportion of what the SAPS believes is entering Namibia from Angola. The SAPS estimates that over the same period, at least ten times the amount of weapons seized by NAMPOL could have been smuggled into South Africa from Angola via Namibia.<sup>11</sup> This lack of effectiveness is partly due to the limited human resources available to police the problem. Of the total police force of 2,700, the unit entrusted with policing firearms and all smuggling activities consists of

'only five to seven people'.<sup>12</sup> Given the scarcity of resources, one could expect that it would welcome the opportunity to involve others and to co-operate with a variety of roleplayers. The unit is, however, said to be very suspicious of external co-operative efforts: in the words of one South African official, 'they are still caught up in the old way of doing things, where they do not want to share any information, it is theirs and nobody else must know'.<sup>13</sup> Namibia and South Africa are, however, keen to expand the training of personnel.

South Africa has provided training for 21 NAMPOL officers and is expecting ratification of an agreement which will see 400 more undergo training with the SAPS. A Draft Agreement on Co-operation was approved on 12 June 1995 by the SAPS and NAMPOL. NAMPOL officials concede that 'training is the big thing'.<sup>14</sup> This may be an important step in helping NAMPOL to develop their own capacity to fulfil their tasks without having to rely on South Africa.

## **Crime**

Whilst NAMPOL are reluctant to admit that crime is increasing, anecdotal evidence suggests it is. Stories of hijacking, robberies and assaults abound and according to one diplomat living in Windhoek, 'for such a small population the crime rate is relatively high'.<sup>15</sup> As the table below shows, crimes committed with firearms are significant given that the country is home to only 1.5 million people. (Windhoek, the largest urban centre, has a population of roughly 150,000 people.)

Nampol has confirmed that criminals 'first and foremost demand to know from their victims where any firearms are. They sometimes seem more interested in stealing a gun ...'.<sup>16</sup> It can be assumed then that crime will increasingly be perpetrated with illegal firearms (see table below).

| <b>Firearm-Related Crime in Namibia: 1995</b> |                            |
|---|----------------------------|
| <b>Type of Crime</b>                          | <b>Number of Incidents</b> |
| Illegal Possession                            | 232                        |
| Theft of Firearms                             | 204                        |
| Murder  | 82                         |
| Attempted Murder                              | 264                        |
| Armed Robbery                                 | 212                        |
| Victims of Armed Crime                        | 607                        |
| Suicides                                      | 54                         |
| Source: NAMPOL                                |                            |

The Namibian government implemented an amnesty programme to recover any unlicensed weapons in the community, though this was apparently 'not successful'.<sup>17</sup> No research has been done to find out why weapons were not handed in. One of the reasons for the failure of the amnesty could be the lack of reward. If firearms are being used as a means of generating income, either through committing crimes or supplying criminals or syndicates with firearms, then a voluntary handover of such weapons would not make economic sense without some form of compensation. This suggests the need for more creative and directed recovery programmes.

An interesting response to the increase in armed crime lies in the expansion of the private security industry in Namibia. According to NAMPOL, there are just over 40 private security firms in Windhoek and a 'few others' in the smaller towns.<sup>18</sup> Security companies have benefited from the resignation of many NAMPOL officers, seeking to earn higher salaries or unwilling to work in the new political dispensation.<sup>19</sup> There is, however, no equivalent of the (South African) Security Officers Board to govern and regulate the security industry and its weapons. Instead, the industry is subject to the provisions of the Act which governs all firearms in Namibia. The same applies to the little known Keetmanshoop-Namib Arms and Ammunition factory - Namibia's own mini-defence manufacturing industry - which was established in 1991 ostensibly to produce ammunition for the NDF. The factory is said to produce 30,000 rounds of ammunition per day.<sup>20</sup>

Private firearm ownership has responded to the perceived increase in crime levels. In 1995, 2,957 firearms were licensed and registered in Namibia. Traditionally, the Namibian private firearms market has been dominated by farmers and hunters, mostly seeking rifles and shotguns. That is changing as gunshops report an increase in the sale of pistols and revolvers which are more suitable for personal defence. By 1996, more than 45% of the market share was held by handguns (see table below).

| Firearms Licensed in Namibia: 1995 |       |
|------------------------------------|-------|
|                                    | Total |
| Licences Issued                    | 2,957 |
| Pistols                            | 856   |
| Revolvers                          | 483   |
| Shotguns                           | 567   |
| Combination Shotguns               | 25    |
| Air Rifles                         | 129   |
| Dart Gun                           | 1     |
| Carbines                           | 2     |
| Rifles                             | 893   |
| Muzzle Loader                      | 1     |
| Source: NAMPOL                     |       |

### Smuggling and Border Controls

The smuggling of illegal weapons from Angola into Namibia is a more alarming source of proliferation. Unknown quantities of small arms are smuggled into Namibia from Angola and then on into South Africa. Since August 1993, 'there has been a steady stream of arrests'<sup>21</sup> of weapons smugglers by both the SAPS and NAMPOL. Smugglers exploit the fact that, what should be Namibia's first line of defence against these activities, border controls, are in such disarray as to be nearly non-existent. As the peace in Angola is consolidated and more weapons become superfluous to the needs of that society, so too could more weapons head for markets elsewhere. Namibia's border controls have failed to prevent this, as evidenced by the neighbouring Northern Cape Provincial Safety and Security MEC, Ms Eunice Komane's acknowledgement that weapons are increasingly being smuggled into that province from Namibia.<sup>22</sup>

NAMPOL, with support from the NDF, is responsible for countering weapons smuggling activities, but the NDF do not have the powers of arrest or authority of policemen. The NDF, which supplies the bulk of the troops operating on the ground, admits that 'it is difficult'<sup>23</sup> to contain smugglers. According to NAMPOL, most smugglers are South Africans: '99% are Xhosa women'.<sup>24</sup> Women are less likely to be suspected and, therefore, more likely to escape detection than are men. On an organised level, these women reputedly meet with Angolans in Namibia to arrange for a shipment to South Africa or storage of the weapons in safehouses. Alternatively, they buy second-hand clothes in

South Africa, take them to a town or village near the Angolan border (such as Rundu) to be sold to locals. The money earned is then used to buy weapons from the Angolan soldiers. The price of an AK-47 in Namibia can vary depending on whom the question is put to: NAMPOL have placed it at N\$250, the NDF suggest it is closer to N\$20, while others report that even blankets, food or clothes could be bartered. The latter price is dependent on the level of desperation of the Angolan seller; 'life is a battle in Angola' commented one official, 'so the people will sell or give their weapons if people want them'.<sup>25</sup>

Once the weapons have been acquired, they are then smuggled into South Africa for further distribution. When the smuggling is organised, it is said to often involve the complicity of transport companies, light aircraft or the use of other syndicate-provided transport. In the case of less organised gun-running operations, smugglers have to win the support of individual truck drivers - another reason for the involvement of women. As is the case in other countries of Southern Africa, the use of refrigerated transportation trucks is a particular headache: 'AKs are hidden in the carcasses'<sup>26</sup> or other cargo, but most trucks are never searched because of a lack of facilities at the border posts. In Namibia, too, the need for better inspection facilities at border posts is critical.

Namibian officials defend the lack of infrastructure and facilities at the Namibia-South Africa border posts, by invoking the historical legacy of South African operational activity in the country. Since the NDF has simply taken over former SADF and SWATF bases, there are very few resources deployed in the south and east: 'you will not find any bases down there because when the South Africans were here they put all their bases up in the north'.<sup>27</sup> Given that the majority of the population live in the north of the country and that South Africa is not seen to pose a threat to Namibia, few resources have been allocated to address the lack of infrastructure along the border with South Africa. Instead, in an effort to secure its own frontier against illegal activities, South Africa has plans to build a fence along this border.<sup>28</sup> The Ariansvlei border post on the Namibia-South Africa border, has been the subject of numerous Namibian press articles which have been highly critical of the poor control exercised. The press<sup>29</sup> have highlighted problems such as staff abandoning their posts and the fact that the border control point at Ariansvlei is 34 km inland from the South African border, creating a large 'no-man's' land for illegal activities. This has given rise to speculation that weapons smugglers could be making use of this border post to smuggle weapons into South Africa.<sup>30</sup>

Despite the concentration of bases in the north, more serious problems are still encountered along the vital 1,500 km long border with Angola - a fact the NDF readily concedes.<sup>31</sup> The border from Katwituri eastward through the Kavango and Caprivi regions was closed to all traffic in August 1995. The NDF claim this decision was taken due to the increasing number of attacks on tourists in

the area. However, judging by the talk in diplomatic circles, it is more likely that the decision was taken as the result of a request from Angola's MPLA government, with the intention of cutting off UNITA's access to supplies. UNITA is in control of the Angolan side of this border and its closure, therefore, effectively prevented UNITA soldiers from crossing into Namibia, as they formerly did, to buy supplies from rural stalls. The NDF have not been in a position to determine when the border should be re-opened and acknowledge that 'it is a political decision'.<sup>32</sup> Whilst there have been no formal dealings with UNITA forces on the Angolan side of this border, on the ground, they are 'on good terms'<sup>33</sup> speaking the same language and often belonging to the same tribe or even the same family. Given that Namibia has actively been trying to increase its role as a peace-broker in Angola and has tried to improve relations with UNITA's leader Jonas Savimbi, this border could soon be re-opened. The NDF fear, however, that this could 'open the way for illegal activities'<sup>34</sup> from within these areas. However, the NDF's description of UNITA-controlled areas as the source of all illegal activities has not been a true reflection of the extent of the problem. Despite the stringently<sup>35</sup> enforced closure, the smuggling of small arms from Angola and Namibia has continued. In fact, the closure of this area has seen a shift in smuggling activities to the west, from Katwituri to Ruacana and along the Cunene River. Far from being under UNITA control, this border lies between Ovamboland and MPLA-held areas.

In the Ovamboland region, the whole of the border is open: 'you can climb into a vehicle and cross anywhere, there is no fence or anything'.<sup>36</sup> There was an unofficial agreement between Angola and Namibia which permitted unrestricted crossings, but this was withdrawn in 1995. Despite this, crossings have continued unhindered as the border fence has been cut down by locals or fallen into disrepair, allowing 'smugglers to cross the river, especially during the dry season'.<sup>37</sup> The NDF themselves confirm that there is 'no proper control'<sup>38</sup> along this border. The NDF think they could control it, 'maybe only with an electric fence - but that is very expensive'.<sup>39</sup> Apart from the prohibitive expense of such a measure, there are more important obstacles, which are primarily political, as will be seen:

Ovamboland is the main support base of SWAPO and so the government is 'extremely sensitive'<sup>40</sup> to what impacts upon the Ovambos. To complicate matters, this area has been the source of some popular dissent, including the establishment of a cultural organisation independent of SWAPO. This organisation did set up a radio station broadcasting comments critical of the government, though it was promptly closed down in 1995.<sup>41</sup> The SWAPO government could be, therefore, unlikely to rock the boat any further by imposing border controls which would be unpopular for two major reasons:

Firstly, 50% of Ovambo live in Angola. Strict border controls could inhibit, if

not prevent, families' and relatives' their traditional cross-border contacts. Consider the family that used to take the most direct route to Angola by crossing the river - they would now have to walk 10, 20, 50 km or more to the nearest border crossing control point and then double-back to their relatives on the other side.

Secondly, some of Namibia's wealthiest businessmen are found in Ovamboland, and also happen to be among SWAPO's most significant financial supporters. If cross-border access was restricted, their businesses would be cut off from the Angolan market which relies on them for supplies. The impact on their business turnover could be as much as 50%.<sup>42</sup> Neither of these two consequences, stemming from improved border controls, would endear SWAPO to the majority of their supporters in Ovamboland. SWAPO might, therefore, be hesitant to consider such politically costly measures, even in the face of the continued weapons smuggling. However, as one foreign diplomatic official put it, 'border controls are up to maggots'.<sup>43</sup> As the potential small arms supply line of the future, greater effort needs to be expended on controlling this border.

NAMPOL ostensibly has plans to create a special border patrol unit consisting of at least 2,000 men. This would appear to be optimistic given that the total police force only totals 2,700 men, and has apparently been battling with growing resignations of experienced staff. As constructive an effort as this plan may be, ultimately, the failure of the SWAPO government to allocate sufficient resources and to remove party political interests from its strategic and security decision-making process, reduces the chances of Namibia being able to effectively control Angolan traffic in small arms.

### **Co-operation**

Given the indicated shortcomings of border controls in dealing with small arms trafficking, co-operation with neighbouring states is of utmost importance. The NDF 'is seeking and will continue to seek regional military co-operation'.<sup>44</sup> The most important instrument for achieving this co-operation, in the NDF's opinion, is the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), with its sub-committees on operational co-operation, intelligence co-operation, personnel development co-operation and logistics co-operation, which Namibia has viewed as 'attempts to narrow the previous gap between the military forces of Southern Africa'.<sup>45</sup> NAMPOL too, is seeking joint co-operation with its neighbours 'out of mutual interest' and with a view to 'communicating and disseminating information'.<sup>46</sup> One area of potential co-operation could involve the expansion of training for specialised personnel, which would help, *inter alia*, in the investigation and detection of arms trafficking. Thus far, co-operation has not brought Namibia the required results, plagued as it has been by political machinations.



Further hampering Namibia's efforts, has been the lack of proper policing capacity on the part of Angola, which has made co-operation difficult. In an effort to boost contact with the Angolan police, NAMPOL has made use of an officer based with Interpol, but in their view has still achieved 'very little response',<sup>47</sup> despite the existence of a co-operation agreement between Namibia and Angola. For this specific purpose, monthly meetings have been held with the Angolan Governor and some joint operations have been undertaken to recover stolen vehicles in MPLA-held areas, although none have taken place in UNITA-held areas. The lack of full territorial authority and capacity on the part of the Angolan police, is also a major obstacle to effective co-operation in the war against smuggling.

### **Conclusion**

Given that Namibia has not had much success in stemming the tide of weapons through its reliance on border controls and co-operation, it may be forced to seek the involvement of the community more actively. This will require an innovative and all inclusive approach if it is to overcome the generally short-term financial rewards which communities reap when they embrace illegal activities. The question is: does Namibia have the capacity and the political will to make this kind of effort, particularly since most weapons move on to South Africa and are not primarily intended for Namibia's criminals or political antagonists? Bordering as it does on Angola, Namibia would be well advised to act immediately to staunch the flow of small arms or face the spiralling consequences of proliferation.

## 2.6

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### Botswana

*Our geographical position puts us in a precarious situation ....*

Botswana Police official

While the rest of the region armed itself for both internal and external campaigns of war, Botswana has, been the only Southern African state to enjoy a semblance of peaceful democratic rule. It is not surprising then that the level of militarisation in Botswana is conspicuously low relative to its neighbours. Equally uncharacteristic of the region, is Botswana's negligible contribution to the problem of small arms proliferation. This is partly due to the very strict and controlled system for the licensing of private firearms. However, the existence of a new source for the acquisition of firearms - Angola - threatens to change the image of Botswana as a gun-free society.

#### Firearm Licences

Botswana has by far the most stringent legislation governing private firearms and is the most unarmed society in Southern Africa. Firearm licences are not issued for personal handguns except for temporary permits for diplomats, who must take their handguns with them upon departure - they may not sell them in Botswana. An Arms Quota Board, a responsibility of the Commissioner of Police, governs the issuing of firearm licences in accordance with government policy. Only 400 licences are issued every year, 200 for rifles and 200 for shotguns. (This number may vary from year to year at the prerogative of the Minister of Police.) There are approximately 5-6,000 applications for firearm licences submitted annually.<sup>1</sup> If applicants meet the standard criteria such as sound mental health condition and no criminal record, then their names are included in an annual lottery, which normally takes place in March.

Application cannot be made for more than one heavy calibre rifle, one light calibre rifle and one shotgun. If unsuccessful, all applications must be resubmitted if they wish to be eligible for the next lottery. By 1995, there were 28,223 registered firearms in the hands of an estimated 10-15,000 people.<sup>2</sup> The precise number of firearm owners is known, but due to the manual nature of the filing system, is not readily accessible.

It is interesting to note the effect that the ban on handguns has had on the social fabric of Botswana. The average Motswana does not appear to link personal security in terms of access to firearms. Instead security is measured by socio-economic factors, such as housing, employment and education. Significantly, the remedy for socio-economic ills such as crime and violence is not seen to lie in the arming of civil society, a factor which has helped to contain the proliferation of small arms in private hands. Despite the increased levels of crime and violence there has not been any concerted effort on the part of citizens to demand greater access to private firearms, particularly handguns. This alone makes Botswana the odd-man-out in the region.

According to the Botswana Commissioner of Police, there has not been an increase in the provision of private security to combat crime. In fact the Commissioner stated that he would be 'very surprised'<sup>3</sup> if there were more than 15 private security companies in Botswana. Whilst it would seem that the citizens have not as yet resorted to militarisation in response to the increasing levels of crime, the police have. Given the increased incidence of armed robberies and crimes being committed in Botswana - 'since 1993 and 1994 it has been getting worse'<sup>4</sup> - the government has introduced specially trained and armed police patrol units (a unit similar to the SAPS' Flying Squad) to respond to these crimes. The rest of the force remains unarmed. Time will tell whether citizens will follow the police example and demand the right to carry firearms such as handguns for their protection. The decisive influences could lie in external factors - especially illegal weapons originating in Angola.

### **Illegal Weapons**

In Botswana, the majority of weapons in illegal possession allegedly come from two sources:

First, handguns stolen or bought illegally in South Africa: 'it is easy to cross the border into South Africa where you can buy a gun easily and then come back to Botswana'.<sup>5</sup> According to the Botswana police, the incidence of South African registered weapons, particularly handguns, being used in acts of crime is growing. Unlike in South Africa, where the large number of illegal weapons in circulation are partly comprised of stolen licensed firearms in private possession, in Botswana the theft of licensed weapons is said to be 'negligible'.<sup>6</sup> The ban on handguns no doubt makes the theft of licensed weapons less appealing. The Commissioner of Police has reported that he is not aware of the loss of any firearms belonging to the police's armed response unit. In order to safeguard against such thefts, those policemen who are armed have to keep their weapons concealed at all times, according to departmental regulations.

Secondly, from the 'arms of war' originating in Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and leftover arms caches in Botswana. The political asylum offered to the liberation forces in the region has resulted in the discovery of a number of arms caches. The largest threat, however, comes from the weapons stockpiled in Angola.

### **Smuggling**

Botswana has been used as a transit point for the movement of arms from Angola into South Africa. Historically, Botswana's largely peaceful relations with the region have not required it to concentrate its resources on bolstering its defence or border protection capabilities - a virtually impossible task given its roughly 3,100 km of borders. As a result, border inspection facilities are poor and create many opportunities for the unhindered trans-shipment of arms. Adding to this problem are the regional attempts to encourage the free movement of goods, which in the opinion of Botswana's law enforcement officials, will work against the requirements for inspection of cargo.

As in all countries of Southern Africa, not all 'incoming' cargo transport and container trucks are inspected as insufficient facilities exist at the borders to offload the trucks. Truck drivers often claim that the only keys to the cargo hold are at the point of departure and at the point of arrival. In such cases, the cargo cannot be opened and if any smuggled goods are in the truck, they move through as legitimate cargo. Ironically this 'one key' system was introduced by transport companies, ostensibly, in an attempt to prevent the use of their trucks for the transport of contraband and to prevent theft from their cargo. The Botswana police have confirmed that without specific information and tip-offs, the chance of detecting smuggled weapons is 'very small'.<sup>7</sup>

### **Recovery of Illegal Weapons**

Despite the fact that policing of weapons should be made easier by the total ban on handguns, the Botswana police only recover 'approximately 50 illegal weapons a year'.<sup>8</sup> The law provides for a mandatory sentence: a minimum of five years imprisonment for illegal possession of 'arms of war' such as AK-47s. According to the police, a few individuals have been arrested for the illegal possession of firearms, but often the serial numbers have been filed away and cannot be traced back to their source.

In comparison to the seizure of illegal weapons, the number of weapons which have been forfeited or surrendered (such as a legal South African firearm owner entering Botswana without declaring the weapon) is very high. In 1992, a total of 1,632 firearms were forfeited or surrendered; in 1993, the number was

1,955; and in 1994, 352<sup>9</sup> (the decline in 1994 has been attributed to increased awareness of this requirement on the part of South African travellers to Botswana, and hence their increased compliance).

## **Poaching**

Though far less severe than in other states of Southern Africa, the regional proliferation of small arms has exacerbated not only the levels of violent crime in Botswana, but also fuelled poaching activities. Poaching is a problem particularly in the Okavango region of northern Botswana. In an attempt to combat poaching, troops from the 7,000-strong Botswana Defence Force (BDF) (soon to be increased to 10,000) have been deployed in this region. As a result, the incidence of poaching has been 'tremendously reduced'.<sup>10</sup> Most poachers have operated from Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The BDF patrols have concentrated on the Chobe National Park, the Caprivi Strip and in the north-east where there are 'border problems'<sup>11</sup> with Zimbabwe. These border problems are largely due to the illegal movement of people across the Botswana border - of the 40,300 illegal immigrants repatriated from Botswana in 1995, some 14,300 were Zimbabwean citizens. In the south-west, the Kalahari Gemsbok National Park is a target of poachers who smuggle their goods through to Walvis Bay in Namibia for quick and easy export. This particular smuggling route is arguably encouraged by the lack of border control and policing in southern Namibia (see Part 2.5).

## **Regional Efforts**

Given the problem of Botswana's very long borders and its apparent lack of resources for tackling illegal smuggling of weapons effectively, it has looked to its regional neighbours for co-operation and assistance: 'the Botswana government is concerned about the small arms circulating in the region and has always wanted to co-operate with its neighbours'.<sup>12</sup> The police have emphasised the need for co-operation with colleagues in neighbouring countries to 'exchange information, mount joint operations and implement special controls'.<sup>13</sup>

In Botswana's experience, such co-operation and communication with South Africa, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe 'couldn't be better', but there is 'very little communication with the Angolans, as they are still not open to communicating with others'.<sup>14</sup> That is of most concern, given that Angola needs to be at the forefront of efforts to control the outflow of small arms from its territory. Without their co-operation, Botswana could be reduced to simple reactive policing, with its concomitant limitations. Far from being indicative of hostility between the two governments, the lack of communication can be

'attributed to the conflict which has occupied the minds of the Angolans. They have not sat down to do normal things like this because you cannot do it until you are sure of the safety of the government and country. When that stage is reached in Angola there will be no problem'.<sup>15</sup> Of greater concern, however, is how many weapons will leave Angola for Botswana before such a mechanism for co-operation can be established? It is after all during the Angolan demobilisation period that weapons are most likely to become available. Another problem is: once peace is established in Angola, how capable will the Angolan authorities be of assisting their neighbours with any meaningful co-operation? (see Part 2.3).

Botswana has participated in a forum to share information and planning on the establishment of a network of databases relating to illegal trans-national activities. Known as the Joint Commission of Co-operation, it meets with Zambia, Namibia and Zimbabwe on a bilateral basis. According to a Botswana Foreign Affairs official, 'we do not have any problem at all in the joint commission mechanisms, not in principle or implementation, as there exists a natural desire by the countries because nobody benefits from that kind of thing [illegal activities]'.<sup>16</sup> Such a forum may be created with South Africa in the future as 'there is a desire on both sides'<sup>17</sup> to establish it.

## **Conclusion**

Botswana, with its relative wealth in a region of poverty, is an attractive target for banditry and criminal activities. Should it become a target of gun-running activity in its own right, the police could be compelled to resort to more militarised (armed) policing. Given the limited capacity of the police, the public could potentially respond by arming themselves or resort to private armed security, thereby setting in motion the cycle of small arms proliferation to which South Africans have long become accustomed and leaving behind that gun-free society which the Botswana have long taken great pride in.

## 2.7

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### Zambia

*Every night you can hear gunshots. It happens so regularly that we do not even notice it anymore.*

Zambian-based foreign military attaché

As a consequence of its supporting role, for many of the factions which have engaged in the region's civil and liberation wars, Zambia has inherited a legacy of former guerilla weapons which can be found in the hands of criminals, poachers, civilians and political antagonists. The country's long and unprotected borders (facing on eight different countries) also make it vulnerable to the trafficking of weapons from Mozambique, Angola and Zaire. If left uncontrolled, it must have serious consequences for Zambia's future stability and development, as crime and political tensions threaten to reduce the state's control and authority to token gestures of statehood.

#### Licensed Weapons

Zambia has strict regulations in place for the issuing and possession of legal, licensed firearms. Applications must be submitted to the police, who run background checks before the Police Board can approve a licence. A permit to purchase a firearm is then issued and must be produced before buying a weapon from a gunshop. It is easier for farmers to obtain a licence than for most other citizens, since farmers require weapons for the day to day demands of looking after livestock and guarding against predators. Military weapons cannot be purchased.

The number of licences issued for firearms is limited to a number which varies from year-to-year. However, the Zambian Police are reluctant to divulge that figure, or for that matter, any other statistical information. The apparent lack of statistical information could be taken to reflect the nationwide failure of state capacity to maintain accurate and credible statistical data from which efforts at policing can be planned. Until this gap is filled, policing efforts will continue to operate in a vacuum, simply going through the motions without actually meeting the most immediate challenges.

## **Former Liberation Movement Arms**

The housing of former liberation movements is viewed as the primary cause of the availability of small arms. In the words of one Lusaka-based academic, 'this is what has led to the proliferation'.<sup>1</sup> Most of the illegal weapons in circulation in Zambia are said to originate from guerilla caches left near the border, or weapons which found their way to Zambians whilst in the possession of the cadres. Having taken the decision to support the liberation movements directly in their objectives, Zambia placed all freedom fighter groups under the supervision of the Ministry of Defence. The Ministry provided a special unit of Border Centre Officers to ensure that the guerillas were successfully ex-filtrated: 'we had to keep an inventory of each guerilla who the Zambian border officials helped to cross the borders'.<sup>2</sup> In order to secure control of the small arms provided to them, the cadres were required to report to the central distribution centre every month, to account for their weapons and to receive instructions: 'we were the liberation centre where these chaps were reporting to. We were directing their movements and operations'.<sup>3</sup> In practice, this control would appear not to have been as effective as intended. Many cadres apparently failed to report or reported without their weapons and were simply re-equipped.

The Zambian authorities have been particularly critical of the role of ANC cadres in spreading the supply of small arms to the wider Zambian society. In the words of one, 'the return [repatriation] of ANC cadres was very uncertain in comparison to others [other liberation movements]. Funding and support was not good, so they resorted to selling off their arms or became involved in criminal activities'.<sup>4</sup> The near unanimous condemnation of the ANC by Zambian officials, could be taken to reflect the poor relationship between President Chiluba's government and the ANC. This may partly be a result of the ANC's public support for its long time ally and opponent of the Chiluba government, former Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda. Whenever a Zambia-based liberation movement came to power, the weapons which were controlled on their behalf by the Zambian Ministry of Defence, were subsequently handed over to the former liberation movement's new government. This has yet to happen in the case of the ANC: 'we have not done it yet [with the ANC] because we are waiting to speak to Mandela'.<sup>5</sup> The Zambian authorities have been said to be reluctant to hand over the ANC's weapons for fear that they might be redirected into the hands of Kenneth Kaunda's supporters.<sup>6</sup>

One noteworthy benefit of the Ministry of Defence's involvement with the liberation movements of Southern Africa is the existence of records and files which contain all the serial numbers and identities of the recipients of the weapons which were distributed by Zambia.<sup>7</sup> These records show the type and serial number of the weapons or munitions issued, as well as the recipients' names and addresses. These may be the only known records of the weapons and



munitions supplied to Southern Africa's liberation movements by the former Soviet bloc. They could be valuable both in tracing the origin and calculating the number of weapons supplied to the region as well as being able to trace (via serial numbers) the organisation or individual into whose hands they were entrusted.

As mentioned earlier, whilst the housing of liberation movements has led to the proliferation of small arms in the wider Zambian community, it was not solely responsible. One needs, therefore, to look at the role of the traffic in small arms from neighbouring countries to complete the picture.

### **Border Security**

Zambia shares borders with Zimbabwe (640 km), Botswana (0,4 km), Namibia (185 km), Malawi (640 km), Mozambique (360 km), Angola (1,200 km), Tanzania (300 km) and Zaire (1,650 km). This multitude of borders placed Zambia in a geographically advantageous position in terms of its facilitation of the liberation and guerilla forces which operated in the region. However, the downside of this multiplicity of borders is evidenced by the movement of weapons and other goods, such as drugs, vehicles and ivory, into and through Zambian territory. Given the fronts from which illegal activities have emanated, there is a short-term need for better controls, but the Zambian state probably lacks the necessary capacity to meet the challenge. The consequences of this are that illegal weapons traffic is likely to increase in Zambia and the region (given its extensive borders) as the state becomes a victim of its own failings.

The most problematic border has been that shared with Angola. There are no established border posts on the Angolan side, as these areas are under the control of UNITA. Given the desperate conditions in their own country, the cross-border movement of Angolans has been fuelled by their reliance on Zambia for food. In fact, UNITA troops regularly trade their weapons for food from Zambians - 'one AK-47 can be exchanged for some mealie meal'.<sup>8</sup> In an attempt to prevent this trade, the Zambian Defence Force has deployed one company of troops in the west and another in the north-west border areas - some 300 troops to patrol a busy 1,200 km long border.

Co-operation with the Angolan authorities would ease the burden on Zambia. However, it is impossible for the Zambians to set up effective bilateral structures as the Angolan government, as has been mentioned, cannot exercise the required authority as this area is under the control of UNITA forces. Whilst the Zambian government does not recognise and 'does not deal with UNITA',<sup>9</sup> they do have informal relations on the ground: 'we interact with UNITA over illegal weapons, there is even a UNITA representative here in Lusaka. UNITA have respect for us, we have an old friendship with them',<sup>10</sup> but at the same

time no effective state-to-state controls can be implemented. Zambia-UNITA liaison has not been approved of by the MPLA government, who no doubt have seen it as an acknowledgement of their failure to maintain their territorial integrity. In fact, Angola's MPLA government have requested that Zambia 'hand UNITA cadres over to them'.<sup>11</sup> In order to take account of the MPLA's concerns, the Zambian government has sought to build a relationship of mutual understanding with both UNITA and the MPLA through the stationing of MPLA diplomats at the Zambian border posts, to ensure that no irregularities occur with UNITA: 'they can see for themselves that the [Zambian] government is doing a balancing act'.<sup>12</sup> Among the many obstacles to the implementation of effective border controls with Angola, is the fact that the Angolans who seek to cross into Zambia do so without passports or passing through domestic control points. Instead, 'people pass freely through the four border posts from UNITA areas. There are no controls or officials on the Angolan side'.<sup>13</sup> Zambia has not demanded passports from Angolans - mainly because the people living in these areas would not be able to obtain them even if they wanted to (there is no local home affairs office to report to). As a result of these factors, the burden of border control rests solely on the limited capacity of the Zambian state.

For the Zambian authorities, the biggest problems have stemmed from the lack of logistical resources - 'there are no vehicles, they [the troops] are just sitting there'.<sup>14</sup> Given that these and other limitations (such as manpower shortages, poor training standards and lack of policy direction) drastically limit the control options available to the Zambian authorities, they have introduced a system of border passes. This arrangement, which exists with all Zambia's neighbours except Angola, has removed the need for passports. This system will, however, require the agreement and co-operation of the Angolan government and their ability to take control of their own border posts, before it can be implemented bilaterally. In the meantime, there is concern over the quantities of illegal weapons which, in the absence of even minimal controls and authority on the Angolan side, could have made their way into Zambian society. In any event, the level of controls which the Zambians have in mind would do little to address the cross-border flow of small arms, being aimed at individual migrants who report to the control points and not the smugglers who use alternative points and methods of entry. Ultimately, it would seem that token control measures are all the Zambian authorities can impose realistically without enhanced capacity.

Along the Zairean border, the Zambians claim to have a problem with the Zairean military and allege that Belgian agents have been involved in 'funding some break-ins at armouries and then taking the weapons to Zaire'.<sup>15</sup> Zaireans are also accused of recruiting Zambians to commit armed crimes in Zambia. In an effort to address these problems Zambia and Zaire created a Joint Permanent Commission which meets regularly and also in emergencies. However, a senior

Zambian police official has dismissed its effectiveness by arguing that there is 'nothing tangible with Zaire ... Things are very bad ... There is an uncontrolled flow and use of firearms there'.<sup>16</sup>

Along the Botswana, Tanzania and Namibia borders, the Zambians 'do not have any problems'.<sup>17</sup> However, the Namibian and Botswanan authorities have not concurred in this assessment, and have accused Zambians of involvement in incidents of poaching and vehicle theft in their countries. The Zambian authorities are also faced with a serious problem along the Mozambican border, where former RENAMO soldiers allegedly enter Zambia to 'rustle cattle and trade arms'.<sup>18</sup> In response, a Joint Permanent Commission has been established which permits Zambia to conduct joint hot-pursuit operations with the Mozambican government. The effectiveness of these operations are, however, dependent on the capacity of the Mozambican and Zambian authorities to respond timeously and proactively. Given the limitations of both countries' military and police forces, the agreement has not yet produced significant success in the battle against cross-border activities. Similarly, the Malawi border is troubled by the activities of the 12,000-strong 'Young Pioneers' (armed militia) of the Malawi Congress Party. Efforts at co-operation with Malawian authorities have apparently been hampered by poor communication links. Ultimately, co-operation between weak states will inevitably be limited, as will the effectiveness of any measures for control.

Co-operation with neighbouring security forces has been 'informal, but good'. Zambia has no extradition treaties with its neighbours but they 'do facilitate requests from each other'.<sup>19</sup> Zambia's reliance on co-operation without formal extradition treaties with its neighbours has given rise to problems: 'we do not have any extradition agreements, only co-operation, when it suits them'.<sup>20</sup> The final clause of this comment reflects the difficulty of securing consistent and effective co-operation at all times. It also suggests that agreements on co-operation and control do not necessarily amount to improved physical control of illegal cross-border trafficking on the ground.

### **Crime and Policing**

The combination of small arms proliferation and widespread socio-economic hardship (Zambia is in the process of applying tough economic austerity measures) has raised fears of a rise in criminal and political instability. The political/constitutional crisis triggered by the electoral ban on Kenneth Kaunda's Presidential candidacy is expected to develop into a volatile pre-election period. Many of the walls and bus stops in Lusaka have carried graffiti which read 'KK come back' and other slogans of dissent against the government of President Chiluba. Whilst doubts have been expressed about the existence of the so-called Black Mamba group, it is certainly within the bounds of possibility that a

dissident group could acquire and use arms against the state. Nonetheless the effects of small arms proliferation are more obvious when measured in terms of crime.

Much of the crime-induced instability in Zambia has been experienced along the borders with Angola, Zaire and Mozambique, and is due to cross-border incursions by armed criminals. Poaching and armed robbery are the most common and overall, 'the number of armed crimes has shot up'.<sup>21</sup> Zairean groups from the Katanga (Shaba province) have often raided mining towns near the borders during which they 'come in and steal everything'.<sup>22</sup> Crime is not only committed by outsiders, but also, 'it is Zambians who have obtained arms and resorted to crime'.<sup>23</sup> The Zambian 'Copperbelt' region would appear to be a particularly popular target for criminals due to the large number of mining and support businesses there. Significantly, the increase in armed crime threatens to jeopardise Zambia's economic development because 'there is no perception of Zambia as a safe place for investors. The general lawlessness scares off new investment. People are afraid to go there [the Copperbelt] because of the armed crimes. If we can remove these arms then we can do a lot for economic development in Zambia'.<sup>24</sup> Small arms proliferation is not only of significance to matters of security, but also to economic stability and growth.

However, a Lusaka-based diplomat echoed an apparently widespread view that many in the Zambian Police are 'totally inefficient and corrupt'.<sup>25</sup> A lack of resources, training and supervision are largely to blame and are reflected in the almost total absence of visible policing. The Zambian Police possesses a force of approximately 8,000 men, and it is planned to increase this to 10,000 by the end of 1996 - an admittedly small number of policemen for such a large country. The police force had lost a sizeable number of policemen in the course of 'restructuring improvements'<sup>26</sup> - or for the more cynically minded, the purges which followed the 1991 electoral defeat of Kenneth Kaunda's government. What are the chances then that the police can act against illegal weapons?

In an effort to tackle the problem of illegal weapons, the police initiated an amnesty programme in 1994, based on an exchange for cash or food. While the police describe it as being 'very successful'<sup>27</sup> they are unable to provide statistics. There is widespread ignorance among the public of its existence (no academics, journalists or ordinary citizens spoken to in Lusaka admitted to being aware of it). This failure to involve the community and to inform them would appear thus to undermine the police emphasis on the role of the community ('crime prevention is not the responsibility of the police. There is no way that we can police this country without the community').<sup>28</sup> It also throws into doubt the Zambian Police's assertion that recovery and arrest rates have increased (although no statistics are available) since community involvement began - 'I am very pleased with the rates now since the increased information flow'.<sup>29</sup> According to the police, the efforts against illegal firearms

have been helped by 'the unstable relationships experienced in communities with firearms and which have prompted a quick change in the mindsets of these people towards firearms'.<sup>30</sup> It is doubtful, especially given the resources at hand, that policing is having any significant impact on the problem of weapons proliferation and crime. As one academic has commented, 'a campaign which does not offer alternatives or incentives must at least be backed up by a campaign to search and prosecute people - that has not happened and that is why it has not worked - I do not think they [the police] are capable'.<sup>31</sup>

Weapons recovery in Zambia is hampered in that possession is not solely an urban phenomenon which will respond to urban-centred incentives. In the rural areas 'people aspire to get a gun for hunting and to use on their farms'.<sup>32</sup> Yet it is in rural areas that nearly all poaching occurs. Policing and anti-poaching efforts will thus have to focus equally on the rural areas if they are to be successful.

Crime has been described as 'increasingly organised if somewhat disjointed at this stage'.<sup>33</sup> The police identified in 1995 one Zambian-based regional syndicate, but claim to have not yet identified the organised smuggling of weapons. Businesses and the more affluent sectors of society have responded to the increased crime and poor levels of policing by turning to private security. The security firms, which tend to enjoy a higher presence and visibility than the police, are subject to stringent entry measures. They need to submit fingerprints of all their guards and can only employ people approved by the police. Once again the Zambian authorities cannot supply any statistics relating to private security firms.

It is apparent that the challenge of controlling small arms is beyond the capacity of both the Zambian military and police. Given this weak state capacity, the need to mobilise civil-society is more urgent than ever. In order to facilitate this there must be a *deliberate funding effort made to train manpower and increase capacity* both in the police and the community.

## 2.8

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### Zimbabwe

*Zimbabwe is not keen on co-operation. Their attitude is 'why must we be bothered? It [arms trafficking] is your problem, not ours'.*

South African military official

As a relatively stable and productive country, Zimbabwe could play an influential role in any regional efforts to control small arms. But, Zimbabwe has adopted policies which might conflict with control measures. The creation and expansion of its fledgling arms industry, Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI), and its active promotion, within SADC, of weaker border controls could both exacerbate difficulties.

#### Policing

The Zimbabwe police force consists of approximately 15,000 men and women. The average policeman is armed and the 1-2,000-strong paramilitary support unit is reportedly heavily armed. This latter unit is also responsible for protecting various national strategic points and President Mugabe himself.

Within Zimbabwe, both legal and illegal weapons are the focus of police activity. However, as in most of Southern Africa, statistics on small arms and related crime are not freely available. The police, who bear the responsibility for maintaining firearm-related statistics are neither keen to meet with outsiders, or supply this information to them. According to a local observer, occasional press releases supply some data,<sup>1</sup> but not sufficient to provide confirmation of any weapons-related trends. In fact the police can best be described as indifferent to research efforts. As one military official noted, 'they are still stuck in the old way of doing things, they need to learn that independent research can help them and is not a threat to them, but it will take time'.<sup>2</sup> Anecdotal evidence suggests that whilst levels of armed crime are rising, it has not yet impacted significantly on urban areas. This can partly be accounted for by the fact that 'people do not all crowd into the urban areas. People are spread out and it is a big country for a population of 11 million. A lot of people are still involved in farming, so we do not see as much crime in the towns'.<sup>3</sup> Rural areas do however, report an increase in weapons-related crimes such as poaching and armed banditry.

The control of licensed firearms has been said to be effective: 'the system is so rigorous it is scary. It is very difficult to get a weapon - they even refused me permission. If a burglar comes into my house he will think that because I am a Brigadier that I will have a gun, but I do not, because they have not given me a licence'.<sup>4</sup> All firearm licences, the vast majority of which are issued to farmers and businessmen, must be renewed every six months.<sup>5</sup>

## **The 'Rhodesian' War and Arms**

Despite the experience of the 'Rhodesian' War, Zimbabwe has apparently not had problems with old guerilla force weapons or arms caches falling into illegal hands. The British government brokered the transition to peace and democracy, but did not attempt to disarm the parties. Instead a Commonwealth Monitoring Force observed the process and BMATT was sent to help in the training and integration of the 18,000 Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), 6,000 Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and 16,000 Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) personnel after Robert Mugabe's election victory of March 1980.<sup>6</sup>

Most small arms used by former guerillas were of Soviet bloc origin, and form the bulk of weapons used by the Zimbabwe security forces. The Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF) consists of some 30,000 permanent force members and an equal number of reservists, but there are plans to downsize to a total of some 40,000.<sup>7</sup> According to the ZDF Chief of Policy and Planning, 'the liberation struggle never escalated beyond small arms and at least seven-eighths were accounted for [after the war] ... because you had to hand in a gun in order to be recognised as an ex-combatant'.<sup>8</sup> Failure to hand in a weapon disqualified guerillas from receiving ex-combatant benefits, pensions and employment opportunities in the new defence force. This was a crucial requirement and condition from which the UN could learn in its demobilisation and disarmament operation mandates, and as a tool to encourage more effective disarmament. It would not be unreasonable to suggest that the recovery of 'seven-eighths' of the weapons in the hands of former guerillas is what has largely accounted for the relatively low levels of small arms proliferation in Zimbabwe.

The controls which the guerilla organisations exercised over their weapons were also important: 'all weapons were recorded and a register was kept when they were issued'.<sup>9</sup> The RSF also had a 'good system of control'.<sup>10</sup> Weapons were only issued for operational activity and then had to be returned as opposed to the guerillas who due to operational circumstances, maintained their weapons with them. These provisions were instrumental in securing the later control of small arms in Zimbabwe. However, press reports<sup>11</sup> have pointed out the theft of weapons from ZDF armouries. The Zimbabwean Army has been forced to tighten security at all its armouries following a number of firearm thefts which

were attributed to former soldiers who used their knowledge of the army's day-to-day activities to steal the firearms.

One of the less well-known legacies of the 'Rhodesian' War, which Zimbabwe is battling to overcome, concerns the proliferation of landmines. During the 1960s and 1970s, the guerilla forces waged a campaign of mine warfare because 'you could use just one soldier to plant a mine that would blow up a farmer but that would have a big impact on the country psychologically. We used a mine warfare strategy for maximum impact. Only when the number of guerillas increased could we develop a new strategy'.<sup>12</sup> It is apparently difficult to put an exact figure to the number of mines. The RSF laid minefields over a belt of more than 700 km, from Victoria Falls to Crooks Corner. This minefield still exists today, and has been argued that 'if we demine every day, manually, it will take 7-10 years before we clear that area'.<sup>13</sup> Zimbabwe has created its own demining skills and capability which are deployed for this task. Efforts thus far have been localised in order to concentrate on important transport links to provide greater access to strategic areas. Given the demining experience of Mozambique and Angola, along with South Africa's expertise and technology, a regional effort might drastically reduce the 7-10 years of manual demining techniques which Zimbabwe has apparently settled for.

### **Border Control**

The availability of weapons from neighbouring countries has reputedly enabled Zimbabweans to buy illegal weapons for criminal purposes. These weapons apparently originate from Mozambique along Zimbabwe's eastern border. Spillover supplies, however, are likely to become increasingly available from Angola. At this stage the Zimbabwean authorities do not believe that the weapons are being smuggled on an organised basis, but rather that it is 'peasants that are selling them'.<sup>14</sup> However, whilst they may not be sold by syndicates, authorities have noted that weapons are increasingly 'being bought by organised crime syndicates'.<sup>15</sup> Given this development, Zimbabwe might expect an increase in organised crime and a concomitant increase in illicit cross-border activities.

The border with Mozambique is also troubled by an influx of refugees and illegal immigrants; but another more serious threat along this border has emanated from the so-called *Chimwenjes*. This group is said to consist of an alliance between former RENAMO fighters and Zimbabwean dissidents linked to the ZANU-Ndonga opposition party, whose leader Ndabaningi Sithole is facing conspiracy charges related to the attempted assassination of President Mugabe in August 1995. Mr Sithole denies any link to the group.<sup>16</sup> The political origins and goals of the Chimwenjes are debated by many both within and beyond Zimbabwe's borders. However, what has not been disputed is the



existence of a group of armed bandits in the Chipinga area. The ZDF is of the opinion that they are 'a criminal element - we do not know of any political agenda or links with opposition parties. They are a small group - maybe ex-RENAMO soldiers who have not been integrated or they could be connected to the sellers of weapons'.<sup>17</sup> A report released in June 1996 by Mozambique's Beira-based *Diário de Moçambique*, claimed, however, that the Chimwenjes have in fact moved their base closer to Zimbabwe, preparatory to stepping up their military operations against the Mugabe government. The report also claimed that the Chimwenjes have been led by a demobilised former RENAMO general, Armando Mabache. This potential threat raises the concern that the demand for small arms within Zimbabwe may increase as a consequence of continued criminal banditry or political violence.

The border with Zambia is apparently a staging area for well-armed gangs of poachers who operate from over the Zambezi. Poaching activity was at its worst in 1994 when the Minister for National Parks called in the ZDF to combat poachers actively. The poachers engaged in quick cross-border strikes and then retreated with their bounty to Zambia. The Zimbabwe authorities have argued that these poachers are internationally controlled, providing further allegations of the activities of organised crime syndicates in Zimbabwe. Intensive Protection Zones have been drawn up to protect endangered species (the targets of the poachers) and the army and police have acted in support of the National Parks. Since the deployment of the ZDF, the problem has diminished because 'once we deployed, it showed that we were serious'.<sup>18</sup> Problems emanating from Zambia are limited as the Zambezi River is a useful natural obstacle to the movement of people and contraband into Zimbabwe - 'there are very few [problems originating] from Zambia, except poachers'.<sup>19</sup>

According to the Zimbabweans, the Botswana-Zimbabwe border is an 'area where things are really working well, a good example of what we would like to see in future'.<sup>20</sup> In Botswana, to recall, the authorities have not shared this view (see Part 2.6), given the problems with illegal Zimbabwean immigrants. This reflected an attitude found throughout the region. Subjectively, a border is considered to be working well, so long as it is not the border through which illegal activities are 'imported' into the country. There is no appreciation for the effects of a border through which a country itself 'exports' illegal activities. The Zimbabwe-South Africa border is also an example of a border which is plagued by illegal immigration. In 1994, some 12,931 Zimbabwean illegal immigrants were repatriated from South Africa.<sup>21</sup> Given the one-sided focus on import controls rather than export controls, what are the prospects for effective regional co-operation with Zimbabwe over small arms?

## Regional Co-operation

One measure of co-operation which the Zimbabweans have pursued involves the establishment of protocols with provinces of neighbouring states. A Joint Operational Command System between authorities of the neighbouring provinces is designed to facilitate an exchange of information on the movement of criminals and border-jumpers. There is a danger, however, that this type of exchange could be duplicated at both provincial and national levels, given the formation of the ISDSC and SARPCCO, thereby potentially causing a waste of valuable resources.

The Zimbabweans acknowledge the importance of the ISDSC at national level because there is 'the understanding that as we [Southern Africa] move towards integration, we [the military] will need to co-operate and exchange information. The police are also busy with this'.<sup>22</sup> However, there has been a hesitancy to embark upon initiatives which do not stem from SADC. This was made clear after the May 1996 meeting between the South African and Zimbabwean Defence Chiefs, where the ZDF rejected SANDF Chief, General Georg Meiring's proposal to conduct joint operations in Zimbabwe. According to a South African military source, 'Zimbabwe is not keen on co-operation. Their attitude is *why must we be bothered. It [arms trafficking] is your problem, not ours*'.<sup>23</sup> Such an attitude would seem to be contrary to the spirit of co-operation, but Zimbabwe has defended its rejection of the South African proposal by arguing that an institution has to be established within SADC to do this and it should not be the responsibility of a particular country. The fear of South African domination would appear to have been at the root of this demand. Whilst the ZDF have envisaged the creation of a central databank as a first step, they have also admitted that 'there has been no movement to establish physical structures. This is a major weakness. Things are not actually happening on the ground where we actually need these things'.<sup>24</sup> Given that the appropriate SADC institution - the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security - is only in its embryonic stages, and that direct South African action is not acceptable, there would thus appear to be little hope for meaningful co-operation between South Africa and Zimbabwe.

## Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI)

Zimbabwe possesses a fledgling arms industry. The Zimbabwe Defence Industry was created in 1994 to supply ammunition to the Zimbabwe security forces. It manufactures small arms ammunition from 7,62mm to 39mm, 51mm, 54mm and blank, but just for rifles because 'the market for handguns is too small, the quantities needed are too small'.<sup>25</sup> The creation of ZDI occurred at a time when Southern Africa was moving towards peace and demilitarisation, when the future of South Africa's sizeable arms manufacturing industry was being debated.

The Zimbabwean authorities have defended the creation of ZDI by arguing the cost advantage in Zimbabwe's manufacture of its own ammunition. They also insist that ZDI was not created with the sale of ammunition in mind, or in the words of ZDI's Chief Executive, 'the creation of ZDI was based on a strategic decision rather than a commercial one'.<sup>26</sup> According to Chris Smith's<sup>27</sup> analysis of African weapons manufacturing industries, the ZDI ammunition plant was set up with the assistance of China, following the Chinese creation of a similar plant in Uganda (which has been rumoured to have supplied the Rwandan and Burundian forces with ammunition). He has also alleged that ZDI (along with other states) violated the 1991 Bicesse Accord by supplying ammunition to the Angolan government after the collapse of the 1991 peace process. The Bicesse Accord expressly forbade both UNITA and the MPLA government from acquiring new weapons.<sup>28</sup> Given that ZDI manufactures 7,62mm ammunition, which is suitable for use in AK-47s (the world's intra-state conflict weapon of choice), the opportunities for its commercial manufacture and export are great.

Whilst ZDI does not manufacture firearms, it does sell old military weapons to private security companies, most of which date back to the guerilla arsenals. ZDI has also attempted to manufacture an RPG-7 rocket system, though this was suspended on cost grounds. It does, however, serve as an indication of the expansionist intentions of the industry. ZDI also denies allegations that they are involved in the manufacture of landmines:<sup>29</sup>

This claim is not true at all. We have never adopted any technology to manufacture arms or landmines. The former Rhodesian government used to manufacture landmines but this ended in 1977. The only technology we have is for Claymore mines, and even they are not landmines because they must be detonated by remote; but following pressure from the UN we closed it down.

As noted earlier, the ZDI has estimated that Zimbabwe has inherited approximately 1,5 million landmines in the 700 km belt from Victoria Falls to Crooks Corner. The ZDI has been responsible for the demining effort. Although it claims to have no plans to expand this role into demining operations outside of Zimbabwe, there are many lucrative regional opportunities which could encourage this sector.

### **The Future of ZDI**

ZDI has invested in the manufacture of sports ammunition for the US market as 'we are planning to diversify into civilian products, not of our own choice but because the market is getting thinner and thinner'.<sup>30</sup> Before 3 June 1996, ZDI employed approximately 400 people, but after that time took over responsibility for all civilians working with the Zimbabwe Ministry of Defence. The changeover has been justified as a means to allow ZDI to sub-contract civilians for the maintenance of aircraft, production of uniforms and other services. ZDI denies that this transfer of personnel was made to facilitate any

plans to expand into further arms production or export. As a new industry which is highly aware of the economic opportunities and the profitability of the arms trade, the denial of any plans for expansion appear somewhat disingenuous.

As the next most powerful state (in terms of GDP) to South Africa within SADC, Zimbabwe could play a pivotal role in the establishment of an effective and dynamic regional security regime. To do so, it will have to balance the weight of domestic economic and social imperatives with a mature regional approach. The control of small arms proliferation in Zimbabwe and the region, centres on control of ZDI, the cross-border movement of weapons and the government's political reservations with regard to some forms of co-operation. Failure to address these will weaken the region's efforts to curtail small arms proliferation.

***Part Three: Proposals for Small Arms  
Control in Southern Africa***

## 3.1

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### Introduction

*Across the international system, the proliferation of light weapons gives greatest cause for concern when they cease to be in the control of security forces and become the charge of sub-state actors and organisations. This is the point at which control is crucial.*

Chris Smith<sup>1</sup>

Having reviewed the origins and extent of small arms proliferation and the levels of control exercised, this section provides recommendations for measures which may further improve the control of small arms in Southern Africa.

## 3.2

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### South Africa

The control of small arms in South Africa requires a combination of measures to address both legal and illegal weapons. Some of the measures proposed here may be less than eagerly received in certain quarters, particularly as the measures may be misconstrued to run counter to the perceived rights of citizenship in the new South Africa and the spirit of regionalism. However, moralistic arguments against control, from whatever quarter, are often nothing other than shortsighted attempts to protect vested interests of those who have failed to be impressed with the seriousness of the current proliferation and who have failed to realise that unless effective controls are implemented without delay the future of South Africa and the region as a whole will be held hostage to escalating crime and instability in all its forms.

Small arms control is a vital step towards the restoration of the rule of law and the authority of the state. In the words of a distinguished statesman, 'a state which has security but lacks moral values is like a ship without a rudder. But a state with moral values and no security is like a rudder without a ship'.<sup>2</sup> Small arms control must be effected if the citizens of South Africa are to have a basis of security from which to pursue progress and the longer term goals of economic development, growth and stability.

The following measures are proposed to enhance small arms control in South Africa:

1. Education in schools should include classes which teach conflict resolution and non-militant problem-solving skills to young people. The aim of this should be to reverse the decades of militaristic and revolutionary culture, instilled in the youth during the apartheid and Cold War era.
2. Social mobilisation campaigns such as South Africa's pre-election 'Peace Campaign' could be instrumental in rebuilding the optimism and the sense of a South African community spirit, to counter the feelings of vengeance and bitterness which have become widespread in the face of political violence and violent crime. They could also assist in mobilising communities to report illegal weapons within the community.

3. Transparency with regard to previous arms caches and illegal weapons distribution on the part of both the security forces and the liberation movements needs to be addressed. An investigative committee composed of members of the security forces and the liberation movements should be formed to share information relating to arms caches and distribution of weaponry with the aim of recovering these weapons, including those in the neighbouring states as well.
4. Technical development to counter small arms availability should be encouraged within the armaments industry. South Africa has been successful in converting its landmine development programmes into leading landmine clearance and detection systems. There is surely much that the industry could do to develop weapons detection technology for use at borders and other points of entry.
5. Transparency, consistency and public participation in the arms export decision-making process of the NCACC must be improved. As the September 1996 decision to sell arms to Rwanda showed, the subjectivity of the current export criteria are open to political expediency. The final approval of arms exports should rest with Parliament and allow for public comment and submissions *before* export decisions are made.
6. Curbs on the proliferation of licensed firearms should be aimed, not at disarming the average citizen in the face of criminal violence, but rather at the irresponsible firearm owner and the abuse of the current system:
  - 6.1 Ratify section 2A of the Arms and Ammunition Act to require compulsory firearms skills training and instruction of legal rights and responsibilities - this must be demonstrated prior to the approval of a firearm licence through attendance and passing of an approved and regulated training course at the expense of the applicant.
  - 6.2 On-site inspection and verification of weapons storage facilities by local station commissioners *prior* to the approval of a licence.
  - 6.3 Introduce a system for annual renewal of all firearm licences.
  - 6.4 Amend section 8(1) of the Act so as to forbid the lending of a firearm to others. The implication of this section as it currently stands is to licence the firearm rather than the user. The emphasis needs to be solely on the user. If an individual does not possess a licence to own a firearm, he should not be entitled to use one by virtue of another licence-holder's transferral of authority to do so. *Licence the user, not only the firearm.*



- 6.5 Tighten controls on ammunition. All gunshops should be required to account for all ammunition sold and to record the serial numbers of the weapons for which they were bought, including the buyer's personal particulars and licence details. All this information should be transferred to the central firearms registry and recorded on each licence owner's personal file. This information would highlight inordinate consumption of ammunition by individuals possibly involved in the supply of ammunition to illegal weapons users. All ammunition records should be open to verification by the gun-owner upon annual renewal of the firearm licence application. Excessive and unaccountable use of ammunition should constitute grounds for denial of a firearm licence.
  - 6.6 Control over state-owned weapons must be tightened at all police stations, armouries, military installations and residences. There must be greater accountability by individuals entrusted with state-owned weapons. Negligent loss of a weapon by a police or military officer must constitute a criminal offence, as is the case with civilians. A special investigative and audit team drawn from the ranks of the anti-corruption unit should be tasked with ensuring greater control of state weapons.
  - 6.7 Private security companies must provide greater transparency and should be subject to tighter regulation of weapons than that which is provided for by the Arms and Ammunition Act. The self-regulating nature of the industry does not provide sufficient control particularly with regard to paramilitary forces and the arming of guards. Legislation to address this and the extension of the powers of the Security Officers Board to police this, should be introduced.
  - 6.8 Increase the *minimum age limit to carry a firearm* from 16 to 18 years of age. This may help to combat violent juvenile crime.
7. Measures for the control of unlicensed firearms are not as easily identifiable. Voluntary reward programmes and amnesties have enjoyed little success. This is due to two factors: lack of opportunities for income-generation other than crime and feelings of personal insecurity. Often the rewards and opportunities afforded people who hold illegal weapons far outweigh the incentives offered for giving them up. Without the creation of opportunities for employment and advancement in the economic mainstream of a country, people will continue to seek financial reward in the illegal second economy. With this comes continued demand for the tools of the trade - small arms. Alternatively, people fearing attack from either criminals or political opponents, choose to hold on to illegal weapons to defend themselves and their families. In the short term,

control measures must rest upon police enforcement, both within the country and at all ports of entry. Given that the short term response to illegal weapons lies with enforcement, the resources of the security forces must be expanded and managed so as to ensure maximum resource utilisation. This includes the following measures:

- 7.1 Lift the government-imposed moratorium on the recruitment of policemen, so as to expand current manpower levels. This must be backed by salary scales which render corruption and bribery less attractive.
- 7.2 Increase the resources available to the firearms investigation units countrywide, especially with regard to building intelligence-gathering capacity.
- 7.3 Expand search-and-seizure operations to recover weapons, not only in urban areas but also in the neglected rural and mining areas. These operations have the added benefit of serving as educational tools in that they can be used to raise awareness of the seriousness of illegal weapons proliferation.
- 7.4 Speed up the full implementation of the Community Safety Plan dealing with illegal firearms and expand it to all communities.
- 7.5 Police enforcement must be supported by competent and efficient judicial processes and laws. The current sense of impunity and the perception of the judiciary's tolerance of crimes committed with firearms must be addressed by measures such as mandatory prison sentences for all crimes committed with firearms, mandatory prison sentences for repeat offenders and the denial of bail to all charged with a crime involving small arms. These are tame in comparison with countries like Singapore where the death penalty is mandatory for anyone who uses or attempts to use a firearm in an illegal act.
- 7.6 The acquisition of technology systems for the ballistics fingerprinting of firearms must be instituted to trace and prosecute those found in possession of weapons linked to crime scenes.
- 7.7 Internal management controls of SAPS resources need to be improved for more effective resource utilisation. The establishment of police station-level management training programmes could assist in this as would the devolution of wider powers and accountability to local station commissioners. The example set by former New York Police Commissioner William Bratton could be emulated to achieve this.
- 7.8 Government must take an unequivocal public stand against illegal weapons possession by supporting full enforcement of laws rather than just promulgating intentions to achieve control. A focus on the

guns themselves as a priority, will encourage the development of other multiple intervention strategies at various levels. The laws governing small arms control must stop being a wish list for control and be made effective through actual enforcement!

8. Shopping malls and businesses could re-install metal detectors and parcel searches to deter acts of armed robbery.
9. Maximum utilisation should be made of more effective border controls, such as:
  - 9.1 The imposition of a penalty against those who cross international borders illegally. This could provide a boost to the morale of those who are currently entrusted with border control but feel that their task is irrelevant. In the words of one soldier on border duty, 'if you keep arresting the same faces, you start to ask why you should bother'.<sup>3</sup>
  - 9.2 Legislation regulating incoming cargo destined for South Africa should be revised to ensure that inspection of all traffic moving over South African borders and arriving at all ports of entry can take place. The standardisation of container loading procedures throughout the region could assist significantly in achieving this end.
  - 9.3 In order to give effect to proposal 9.2, a substantial increase must be made in the allocation of resources and equipment provided to those entrusted with border control. Resources required should include the means to inspect all containers and refrigerated vehicles, the provision of X-ray machines, recruitment and training of customs and excise officials, acquisition of sniffer dogs and the stationing of Customs and SAPS officials at small airports and airfields. The latter should be a priority.
  - 9.4 Agreements need to be formalised with neighbouring states to provide for the repatriation and extradition of those who are involved in illegal activities and for there to be a penalty affixed.
  - 9.5 Police attachés should be placed at all regional embassies and high commissions to expand and develop police co-operation against weapons smuggling activities.
  - 9.6 Full responsibility for land border control should be transferred from the SAPS to the SANDF. The SANDF has the resources and equipment for the off-loading of large containers and the monitoring of border activities, whilst the SAPS could make more

productive use of its personnel in the fight against crime and at the country's undermanned airports, airfields and harbours. This should include an extension of the SANDF's legal area of operation to permit it to establish roadblocks and follow up information beyond the present 10 km from the border limitation.

- 9.7 Cross-border poaching within wildlife sanctuaries such as the Kruger National Park, should be combatted through the reinforcement of investigative policing in these areas. The establishment of an ESPU in the Lowveld should be undertaken.
- 9.8 Verification controls as applied to the entry and exit of vehicles and people in game parks should be improved by the game park authorities so as to prevent the smuggling of weapons through their border fences.
- 9.9 Border control requires political will which is currently lacking. Government must realise and convey to its regional partners that it intends to achieve the maximum possible border control, whilst at the same time continuing to build its regional relations - the two are not mutually exclusive. As one observer succinctly stated, 'when friends visit my house I do not expect them to sneak in through the windows'.<sup>4</sup>

Given the costs of these measures, initiatives such as Business Against Crime should be encouraged to expand their role to ease the financial load on central government. This should, however, not amount to a shifting of responsibility to the private sector as the responsibility of providing security rests firmly with government. A country's security cannot and should not become privatised. In fact this responsibility is an integral part of the 'social contract' between the state and society. If government reneges on this element of the 'contract', it should not be surprised when society in turn fails to maintain its 'contractual' responsibilities. What hope then for small arms control?

The above proposals are meant to serve as a basis for further discussion and needless to say, debate. They do however, constitute the basis of what this study believes are crucial measures for any efforts designed to deal with the proliferation of small arms in South Africa. However, small arms control in South Africa cannot be seen in isolation from the poor levels of control which exist and which need to be strengthened in the rest of Southern Africa through both co-operative measures and the building of capacity for control in these states.

## 3.3

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### Southern Africa

Throughout Southern Africa, there are a number of common problems which need to be addressed in order to improve small arms control. It is these common themes which will be expanded upon here, rather than specific country-by-country recommendations, since they are generally applicable to all the states of the region.

1. Capacity-building is the single most important ingredient for small arms control in Southern Africa. In order for any efforts at small arms control to be implemented, the respective states must have the institutional capacity to pursue the objective. Without sufficient capacity, policies for small arms control will be nothing more than hollow promises of good intentions, with very little improvement achieved on the ground. The following measures may assist in this task:
  - 1.1 The establishment of a regional fund (in the mould of Europe's post-Second World War Marshall Plan), administered by an independent regional institution, to solicit donor support for the building of institutional capacity specifically within the ranks of the region's police forces and to increase resources and capacity for border control.
  - 1.2 The establishment of regular training exchanges and training programmes between regional and international police and military experts.
  - 1.3 Organisational management training of middle and upper level police and military officials.
  - 1.4 The acquisition of computers for the maintenance and compilation of statistical data, in order to speed up the creation of a regional databank.
  - 1.5 The creation of more specialised policing units dealing specifically with small arms. The policing of narcotics through organisational structures such as the South African Narcotics Bureau and the Zambian Drug Enforcement Commission has proved that specialised policing units can operate with relative success in Southern Africa. Given the extent of small arms proliferation, there is an equally pressing need for specialised investigative units to be formed and where they currently exist, to be expanded.

2. Corruption must be rooted out from within those institutions which are entrusted with small arms policing and control responsibilities. This is important not only to inhibit or prevent illegal activities, but also to regain the trust and co-operation of the public who must play an important role in assisting to police small arms. Community policing initiatives need to be expanded but are unlikely to achieve much so long as corruption continues to characterise community-police relations.
3. Civilian disarmament programmes must provide sufficient education and incentives to achieve their goal. Educational programmes must be undertaken within communities to raise awareness of the change in status (from quasi-legal to illegal) which many weapons have undergone since the ending of hostilities between warring factions. This requires a simultaneous campaign to inform people of the criteria for acquiring a legal firearm licence. Incentives for the handing in of weapons need to be targeted specifically to the needs of particular communities and administered by an independent and credible institution.
4. Demilitarisation of societies needs to be undertaken through the strengthening of civilian state structures and authority within society, particularly at the political level.
5. Landmines need to be removed through a regionally co-ordinated and shared programme to provide an obvious peace dividend to post-conflict communities. A comparative study on regional and international demining strategies and techniques would make a useful contribution in this regard.
6. Efforts should be made to trace the records, quantities and serial numbers of those weapons distributed by the former liberation movements and other military forces in the region, such as the former Soviet Union and its allies, the United States and South Africa. The records held by the Zambian and other Ministries of Defence should be similarly utilised to build up a databank of information to track the flow of small arms and thereby assist with investigations.
7. Tighter controls should be imposed on private security forces, particularly so-called 'mercenary forces'. Recruitment of former military soldiers to provide protection of oil and diamond concessions in Angola raises concern as it further fuels small arms proliferation. These forces should be prohibited from importing or acquiring their own weapons, relying instead on host-state owned, supplied and controlled weaponry.

8. Permanent co-operation agreements need to be concluded with all the states of Southern Africa. These should include the following:
  - 8.1 Extradition agreements.
  - 8.2 Fully functioning bilateral committees.
  - 8.3 The establishment of a regional arms register. The arms manufacturing industries in the region need to adopt more transparent operating procedures. A regional arms register should be established to reflect arms exports, production and acquisition within the region as a confidence-building measure and a spur to further co-operation.
  - 8.4 The creation of structures for co-operation on the ground and not only at senior bureaucratic and diplomatic levels.
  - 8.5 The conclusion of a Protocol against Weapons Trafficking by SADC.
  - 8.6 Speedy co-operation by the states of Southern Africa to assist Angola in preventing the outflow of small arms into the region.
  - 8.7 The portfolio responsibility for small arms control should include the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and not only the police and military. This may help to raise small arms control as an issue of national priority.
  - 8.8 The appointment of police attachés within the region's diplomatic offices to build levels of police co-operation.
9. Border controls need to increase emphasis on inspection of exports rather than focus primarily on imports. Better export controls on the part of neighbouring states will ease the need for improved inspection of imports. It will also help to detect arms smuggling activities from within the state which could more easily be investigated by the source state than by the recipient state.
10. The UN operations in Southern Africa have illustrated a number of failings or weaknesses which if addressed could ensure better control of small arms in future operations. These include:
  - 10.1 The initiation of UN operations and the deployment of UN troops should only occur under circumstances in which the UN mandate, which governs its operation, provides sufficient power and authority to achieve effective disarmament. Ideally the UN should assume the role of a transitional authority with the power to effect full disarmament and policing functions throughout the subject or

host country and not only in the AAs. Difficulties in negotiating this requirement may no doubt drastically reduce the number of UN operations undertaken, but it may also help to avoid the costly long term effects of ineffective disarmament which has characterised so many UN operations.

- 10.2 The provision of information to soldiers in assembly areas must be given greater emphasis. They need to be informed of their future prospects and opportunities so as to allow them to make informed decisions.
  - 10.3 An arms embargo must be imposed and enforced on the country in which any UN operation is occurring. Neighbouring states, in particular, need to be strictly monitored to ensure compliance with this.
  - 10.4 All weapons recovered must be destroyed on site to prevent the loss of weapons in storage.
  - 10.5 The UN (or possibly BMATT) should remain involved in the management of the recruitment and training process for the creation of any new military force. This will provide continuity throughout the transition process from the initial demobilisation stage to the later formal establishment and functioning of the force.
11. Demobilisation planning should provide former soldiers with an immediate opportunity to generate income. Instead of paying out large amounts of money for demobilisation benefits and salaries, that money should be utilised to establish a small business project for each individual ex-combatant. The money could thus better be utilised as a capital injection to the country and a source of income generation to the individual, thereby encouraging long-term stability and economic growth. The ex-combatant will thus have a visible alternative to resorting to crime or other less productive ways of life.
  12. The states of Southern Africa need to take personal responsibility for achieving small arms control within their sovereign territory. It is not the responsibility of the UN, SADC or any other body to impose small arms control through handouts, or other means, but rather it is primarily up to each state to fulfil its claim to sovereignty. Outside assistance may help but ultimately each state must assume and act upon its fair share of responsibility.



## 3.4

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### Conclusion

*Without security there can be no development. Security first assistance remains the cornerstone in efforts to build the peace.*

Brigadier-General Henry van der Graaf (Ret.).<sup>1</sup>

In the post-Cold War world, the need to control the supply of small arms is evident from the growing list of intra-state conflicts, as in Rwanda, Somalia and Liberia, and the subversion of state control and authority to armed non-state actors, such as the growing power of crime syndicates worldwide. In Southern Africa, stability and security are vital preconditions for the achievement of any meaningful economic development and growth. This process must begin by addressing the legacy of small arms proliferation and restoring control in every facet.

What becomes clear, when undertaking a study such as this one, is how little analysts, policy makers and practitioners actually know about the problem. Very little hard data exists and where it does exist, it is often difficult to access or not particularly useful in guiding policy. It is clear that many areas of potentially fruitful research require urgent attention.

Future research into the problem of small arms in Southern Africa could focus on:

- \* The threats posed to the security of the state and the stability of the region by international arms dealers, organised crime syndicates and the 'employment opportunities' provided by these non-state actors;
- \* The policy implications of the debate between the 'gun-free' and the 'gun-owners' lobbies;
- \* The role of small arms in domestic/national social power structures (gangsterism versus police/state authority);
- \* The role of the legal arms industry in supplying shipments of small arms to non-state actors;
- \* The role of the private security industry and private paramilitary (mercenary) forces in contributing to small arms proliferation and regional instability;
- \* The exploration of the effects of small arms on development and security; and,

- \* The link, if any, between such factors as illegal immigration, legitimate regional trade, poaching, drug trafficking and small arms proliferation.

In this study it was only possible to touch on some of these areas. Nonetheless, it is clear that small arms proliferation in Southern Africa has fuelled a cycle of politically motivated violence and instability for decades. Unless it is brought under control it could again assume similar proportions, this time in the hands of non-state actors pursuing criminal, ethnic or other objectives. The effects on development and security in the region would be no less devastating.

## ***Endnotes***

*Names and positions of interviewees may be supplied upon written request, and are withheld for reasons of confidentiality.*

### **Part 1.1: A New South Africa**

1. *Citizen*, 4 January 1996.
2. *The Star*, 25 July 1996.
3. *The Star*, 10 May 1996.
4. *Ibid.*.
5. *Ibid.*.
6. *Ibid.*.
7. *Rapport*, December 1994.
8. *Citizen*, 4 February 1995.
9. *Ibid.*.
10. *Rapport*, December 1994.
11. Conversation with ARMSCOR official, Pretoria, October 1995.

### **Part 1.2: Crime and Small Arms**

1. *The Star*, Business Report, 12 June 1996.
2. *Citizen*, 14 June 1996.
3. *US News and World Report*, 1 July 1996.
4. *Disruption* - a bullet causes trauma to human tissue by transmitting energy beyond the capacity of the tissue to absorb and dissipate it.
5. Private communication with Dr Johan Van der Spuy, National Trauma Research Programme, 20 November 1995.
6. *Ibid.*.
7. *Ibid.*.
8. *The Star*, 28 November 1995.
9. *Ibid.*.
10. *The Star*, 28 June 1996.
11. *Citizen*, 23 May 1996.
12. *Ibid.*.
13. *Citizen*, 5 July 1996.
14. *The Star*, 8 July 1996.
15. *Sowetan*, 20 June 1996.
16. As stated in the June 1996 Defence Review Position Paper.

### **Part 1.3: Policing Small Arms**

1. Mills G, 'Small Arms Control - Some early Thoughts', *African Defence Review*, 15, May 1994.
2. *Annual Plan of the SAPS*, 1996/7, p.9.
3. Interview with SAPS official, Pretoria, 30 October 1995.
4. *Firearms in South Africa: An Escalating Problem*, SAPS, 1995, p.3.
5. *Ibid.*, p.3.
6. *Ibid.*.
7. *Ibid.*.
8. Mills G, *op cit.*.
9. Shaw M, 'Policing for Profit', *Crime and Conflict*, Autumn 1995.
10. *Ibid.*.
11. *Citizen*, 6 August 1996.
12. Conversation with Security Officers Board official, Pretoria, October 1995.
13. *Firearms in South Africa: An Escalating Problem*, *op cit.*.
14. *Ibid.*.
15. *Sowetan*, 5 September 1996.
16. Basing calculations on the number of AK-47s recovered since 1993 and a 10% recovery rate, an estimated 40,000 of these weapons should have been in circulation in recent years alone - sufficient to expect these weapons to account for greater criminal usage than would appear to be the case. The reasons why these weapons are smuggled to South Africa but apparently not used (as reflected by crime statistics, see Part 1.2) are not known. One suggestion could be that these weapons are being acquired and stockpiled by one or more political factions for future use. Another possibility, with more direct consequences for South Africa's foreign relations, could be that these weapons are being bought cheaply from desperate Angolans or Mozambicans, smuggled to South Africa and then sold and transshipped at a profit by organised arms dealing syndicates, to meet the small arms needs of the worlds numerous intra-state and factional conflicts.
17. Divisional Commissioner André Pruis, National Standards and Management Services, SAPS, 2 October 1995.
18. *Annual Plan of the SAPS*, *op.cit.*, p.16.
19. *Sowetan*, 26 June 1996.
20. *Ibid.*.
21. *Ibid.*.
22. *Citizen*, 20 June 1996.
23. Interview with SAPS official, Pretoria, 30 October 1995.

### **Part 1.4: Border Controls**

1. Interview with SANDF official, Komatipoort, 14 September 1995.
2. *Firearms in South Africa: An Escalating Problem*, SAPS, 1995.

3. *Ibid.*
4. Carim X, 'Illegal Migration to South Africa', *Africa Insight*, 25, 4, 1995.
5. Interview with SANDF official, Nelspruit, 14 September 1995.
6. Interview with KNP official, Skukuza, 15 September 1995.
7. Mills G, *op cit.*
8. *The Star*, 10 May 1996.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *The National Defence Force in Transition*. Annual Report of the SANDF: 1994-1995.
11. *The Star*, 10 May 1996.
12. Interview with SANDF official, Nelspruit, 14 September 1995.
13. Deputy Minister of Defence, Ronnie Kasrils, 12 February 1996, Cape Town.
14. *Financial Mail*, 27 September 1996.
15. *Ibid.*
16. SAPS official speaking at a workshop on *War and Peace in Southern Africa: Crime, Drugs, Armies and Trade*, Jan Smuts House, Johannesburg, 4-6 August 1996.
17. Interview with KNP official, Skukuza, 15 September 1995.
18. *Citizen*, 3 July 1996.
19. Interview with KNP official, Skukuza, 15 September 1995.
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Ibid.*

## Part 2.2: Mozambique

1. *Mozambiquefile*, February 1996.
2. For a more detailed analysis of the UN peacekeeping operation in Mozambique, see *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique*. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 1996.
3. Interview with FRELIMO official, Maputo, 20 November 1995.
4. Interview with AMODEG official, Maputo, 22 November 1995.
5. Interview with FRELIMO official, Maputo, 20 November 1995.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*
8. UNIDIR, *op cit.*, p.50.
9. Third International Symposium on Firearms and Explosives, Interpol, Lyons, 7-9 September 1994, p.8.
10. UNIDIR, *op cit.*, p.52.
11. Interview with AMODEG official, Maputo, 22 November 1995.
12. *Ibid.*
13. UNIDIR, *op cit.*, p.88.

14. *Ibid.*, p.72.
15. Chris Smith suggests a simple portable hydraulic press at each AA.
16. UNIDIR, *op cit.*, p.87.
17. Interview with AMODEG official, Maputo, 22 November 1995.
18. Interview with FRELIMO official, Maputo, 20 November 1995.
19. Interview with AMODEG official, Maputo, 22 November 1995.
20. *Ibid.*.
21. *Ibid.*.
22. *Ibid.*.
23. *Ibid.*.
24. *Ibid.*.
25. Interview with Maputo-based academic, 22 November 1995.
26. Interview with AMODEG official, Maputo, 22 November 1995.
27. Mr Pedro Ronda, the Mozambican Police Commissioner, declined this author's request for a meeting either with himself or another police official. Instead he offered to reply to written questions - at the time of publication some eleven months later no reply had been received.
28. Interview with UNHCR official, Maputo, 22 November 1995.
29. *BCG Bulletin*, August 1995.
30. Interview with UNDP official, Maputo, 20 November 1995.
31. *Ibid.*.
32. *Ibid.*.
33. *Ibid.*.
34. It should be noted that RENAMO refused numerous requests for a meeting with the author to state its perspective.
35. Interview with FRELIMO official, Maputo, 20 November 1995.
36. Interview with UNHCR official, Maputo, 22 November 1995.
37. *Ibid.*.
38. *Mozambiquefile*, February 1996, p.14.
39. Interview with UNHCR official, Maputo, 22 November 1995.
40. Interview with FRELIMO official, Maputo, 20 November 1995.
41. *Ibid.*.
42. *Ibid.*.
43. Interview with UNHCR official, Maputo, 22 November 1995.
44. *Ibid.*.
45. *Sowetan*, 29 March 1996.
46. *Ibid.*.
47. Interview with UNHCR official, Maputo, 22 November 1995.
48. SAPS document, *Arms Smuggling in South Africa*.

49. *Infospec*, 4, 3, 1995.
50. *Ibid.*.

### Part 2.3: Angola

1. Interview with demobilisation trainers, Luanda, 3 February 1996.
2. Established in December 1988 by United Nations Security Council Resolution 626.
3. *The Star*, 4 July 1996.
4. *Sowetan*, 25 July 1996.
5. Interview with SAFAIR pilot, Luanda, 5 February 1996.
6. Interview with demobilisation trainers, Luanda, 3 February 1996.
7. Interview with civilian, Luanda, 6 February 1996.
8. *Ibid.*.
9. *Citizen*, 9 July 1996.
10. Interview with SSM official, Luanda, 6 February 1996.
11. *The Star*, 4 July 1996.
12. Interview with INAROOE official, Luanda, 6 February 1996.
13. *Ibid.*.
14. *Citizen*, 16 August 1996.
15. Interview with INAROOE official, Luanda, 6 February 1996.
16. *Ibid.*.
17. *Ibid.*.
18. *Sunday Times*, 5 May 1996.
19. Interview with INAROOE official, Luanda, 6 February 1996.
20. *Sowetan*, 29 March 1996.
21. Interview with INAROOE official, Luanda, 6 February 1996.
22. Interview with demobilisation trainers, Luanda, 3 February 1996.
23. Interview with INAROOE official, Luanda, 6 February 1996.
24. *Citizen*, 12 August 1996.
25. Interview with SSM official, Luanda, 6 February 1996.
26. *Ibid.*.
27. *Citizen*, 30 August 1996.
28. Interview with Angolan police official, Luanda, 8 February 1996.
29. *Ibid.*.
30. *Ibid.*.
31. *Ibid.*.
32. *Ibid.*.



33. *Ibid.*
34. Interview with PF official, Luanda, 7 February 1996.
35. *Ibid.*
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Ibid.*
38. *Ibid.*
39. *Ibid.*
40. *Ibid.*
41. Interview with demobilisation trainers, Luanda, 3 February 1996.
42. Interview with Angolan police official, Luanda, 8 February 1996.
43. *Ibid.*
44. *Ibid.*
45. Interview with PF official, Luanda, 7 February 1996.
46. Interview with Angolan police official, Luanda, 8 February 1996.
47. Interview with PF official, Luanda, 7 February 1996.
48. *Ibid.*
49. Interview with Angolan police official, Luanda, 8 February 1996.
50. Interview with PF official, Luanda, 7 February 1996.
51. Interview with Angolan police official, Luanda, 8 February 1996.
52. Interview with PF official, Luanda, 7 February 1996.
53. *Ibid.*
54. *Ibid.*
55. *Ibid.*

## **Part 2.4: Swaziland**

1. Interview with RSP official, Mbabane, 24 November 1995.
2. Interview with SDF official, Matsapa, 23 November 1995.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*
10. Interview with Swaziland Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Mbabane, 24 November 1995.
11. Interview with SDF official, Matsapa, 23 November 1995.

12. Interview with Swaziland Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Mbabane, 24 November 1995.
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*
16. Interview with RSP official, Mbabane, 24 November 1995.
17. Interview with SDF official, Matsapa, 23 November 1995.
18. Interview with RSP official, Mbabane, 24 November 1995.
19. Interview with SDF official, Matsapa, 23 November 1995.
20. Interview with RSP official, Mbabane, 24 November 1995.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*

## Part 2.5: Namibia

1. Interview with NDF official, Windhoek, 2 February 1996.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Citizen*, 11 October 1995.
4. Interview with NDF official, Windhoek, 2 February 1996.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*
8. Interview with NAMPOL officials, Windhoek, 1 February 1996.
9. Interview with SAPS official, 1 February 1996.
10. *Windhoek Advertiser*, 28 August 1995.
11. Interview with SAPS official, 1 February 1996.
12. Interview with NAMPOL officials, Windhoek, 1 February 1996.
13. Interview with South African official, Windhoek, 2 February 1996.
14. Interview with NAMPOL officials, Windhoek, 1 February 1996.
15. Interview with a Windhoek-based foreign diplomat, 2 February 1996.
16. Interview with NAMPOL officials, Windhoek, 1 February 1996.
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*
19. NAMPOL personnel are said to earn 40%-60% of what their South African counterparts do.
20. *Engineering News*, 20 September 1991.
21. *Namibia Development Briefing*, 3, 4, January-February 1994.

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22. *Windhoek Advertiser*, 28 August 1995.
23. Interview with NDF official, Windhoek, 2 February 1996.
24. Interview with NAMPOL officials, Windhoek, 1 February 1996.
25. Interview with NDF official, Windhoek, 2 February 1996.
26. Interview with South African official, Windhoek, 1 February 1996.
27. Interview with NDF official, Windhoek, 2 February 1996.
28. Interview with South African official, Windhoek, 1 February 1996.
29. *Tempo*, 23 July 1996.
30. *Ibid.*
31. Interview with NDF official, Windhoek, 2 February 1996.
32. *Ibid.*
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Ibid.*
35. The NDF was accused of being *trigger-happy* following a number of shooting incidents along the banks of the Okavango River.
36. Interview with South African official, Windhoek, 1 February 1996.
37. *Ibid.*
38. Interview with NDF official, Windhoek, 2 February 1996.
39. *Ibid.*
40. Interview with Windhoek-based foreign diplomat, 2 February 1996.
41. *Ibid.*
42. *Ibid.*
43. *Ibid.*
44. Interview with NDF official, Windhoek, 2 February 1996.
45. *Ibid.*
46. Interview with NAMPOL officials, Windhoek, 1 February 1996.
47. *Ibid.*

**Part 2.6: Botswana**

1. Interview with Botswana Commissioner of Police, Gaborone, 30 January 1996.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.*
4. Interview with Botswana police official, Gaborone, 30 January 1996.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*

9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*
12. Interview with Botswana Department of Foreign Affairs official, Gaborone, 30 January 1996.
13. Interview with Botswana police official, Gaborone, 30 January 1996.
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*
16. Interview with Botswana Department of Foreign Affairs official, Gaborone, 30 January 1996.
17. Interview with Botswana police official, Gaborone, 30 January 1996.

## Part 2.7: Zambia

1. Interview with Lusaka-based academic, 31 May 1996.
2. Interview with Zambian Ministry of Defence official, Lusaka, 30 May 1996.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Interview with Lusaka-based academic, 31 May 1996.
5. Interview with Zambian Ministry of Defence official, Lusaka, 30 May 1996.
6. Interview with foreign Lusaka-based military official, 30 May 1996.
7. The Ministry of Defence do not have records of weaponry issued prior to 1980 as these were allegedly destroyed in a fire.
8. Interview with Zambian Ministry of Defence official, Lusaka, 30 May 1996.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*
16. Interview with senior Zambian Police official, Lusaka, 31 May 1996.
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.*
20. Interview with Zambian Ministry of Defence official, Lusaka, 30 May 1996.
21. Interview with Lusaka-based academic, 31 May 1996.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*
25. Interview with Lusaka-based foreign diplomat, 30 May 1996.

26. Interview with senior Zambian Police official, Lusaka, 31 May 1996.
27. *Ibid.*
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*
31. Interview with Lusaka-based academic, 30 May 1996.
32. *Ibid.*
33. Interview with senior Zambian Police official, Lusaka, 31 May 1996.

## **Part 2.8: Zimbabwe**

1. Interview with Harare-based academic, 28 May 1996.
2. Interview with military official, Harare, 28 May 1996..
3. *Ibid.*
4. Interview with ZDF official, Harare, 28 May 1996.
5. Regrettably, the Zimbabwe Police would not make data available relating to numbers of licence holders and registered firearms. Further analysis of weapons losses and their contribution to crime can therefore not be made.
6. Figures provided by ZDF official, Harare, 28 May 1996.
7. *Ibid.*
8. Interview with ZDF Chief of Policy and Planning, Harare, 28 May 1996.
9. Interview with ZDF official, Harare, 28 May 1996.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Citizen*, 4 July 1996.
12. Interview with ZDF official, Harare, 28 May 1996.
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*
16. *Citizen*, 6 July 1996.
17. Interview with ZDF official, Harare, 28 May 1996.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Ibid.*
21. Mills G, 'South Africa and Regional Immigration', *South African Yearbook of International Affairs, 1996*, South African Institute of International Affairs, 1996.
22. Interview with ZDI official, Harare, 28 May 1996.
23. Interview with South African military official, 28 May 1996.
24. Interview with ZDF official, Harare, 28 May 1996.
25. Interview with senior ZDI official, Harare, 29 May 1996.

26. Interview with ZDI official, Harare, 29 May 1996.
27. Smith C, in *Small Arms Management and Peacekeeping in Southern Africa*, UNIDIR, Geneva, 1996.
28. *Ibid.*, p.29.
29. Interview with ZDI official, Harare, 29 May 1996.
30. *Ibid.*

### Part 3.2: Control - South Africa

1. Smith C, in *Small Arms Management and Peacekeeping in Southern Africa*, UNIDIR, Geneva, 1996, pp.10.
2. Henry Kissinger quoted by Greville J, *Janners Complete Speechmaker*, Century Limited, London, 1994, p.260.
3. Conversation with SANDF soldier, Komatipoort border, September 1995.
4. Donna Snyman, Johannesburg, 30 September 1996.

### Part 3.4: Conclusion

1. Internal UN Memorandum from Brigadier-General Henry van der Graaf (Ret.), Deputy Leader of the Advisory Mission on the Collection and Control of Light Weapons in Mali, to UN Secretary-General Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, dated 22 July 1995.

A number of additional publications have resulted from the SAIIA-USIP study on *Small Arms Proliferation and Control in Southern Africa* which may be consulted for additional information and sources. These include:

Oosthuysen G, 'Small Arms Proliferation and Control', *The South African Yearbook of International Affairs*, 1996, pp.157-164. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA).

Oosthuysen G, 'Weapons Control Measures in Southern African States', *International Update*, 12/96. Johannesburg: SAIIA.

Mills G, Oosthuysen G & J Katzenellenbogen, 'Disarmament and Arms Control in Africa: A South African Perspective', *Defense Analysis*, Vol.12, No.1, 1996, pp.113-131.

Oosthuysen G, 'Small Arms Proliferation in South Africa: The Role of Border Security', *International Update*, 01/96. Johannesburg: SAIIA.

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
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*This book examines an up-until-now neglected topic in the field of South Africa's international relations. The decades of civil conflict in Southern Africa have left behind a legacy of weaponry, and some of it is finding its way into the hands of criminal elements. This study pinpoints the magnitude of the problem facing the region, and highlights policy strategies for control.*



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