

SOUTHERN AFRICA:

INTRA-REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

by

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A paper delivered by Professor G.M.E. Leistner at the same Conference, on "The Economic Problems and Policies of South Africa's Neighbouring Black African States", is also being reproduced and will shortly be available for members of the S.A. Institute of International Affairs.

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INTRODUCTION

A study of the foreign policies and international relations of the various states of the African sub-continent is not a simple matter, because there are no clear-cut and consistent policies that can be summarised and analysed. The foreign policies of individual countries amount in each case to numerous decisions on specific issues. For a thorough study one must understand who makes the decisions, how they are arrived at, i.e. by what process, and what are the influences brought to bear on the decision-makers - external and internal - and their relative strength. All this is complicated by the fact that the environment in which these decisions are taken - i.e. all the internal and external influences and pressures - is not static. There is constant change, and what may be especially relevant one day is not so the next. This is true of all states, but perhaps even more so of African states, where change can be rapid and where, therefore, one notable characteristic of politics is its unpredictability.

To attempt a thorough study of all these factors in this paper is not possible. But it is intended to try to identify some of the major determinants in the foreign policies of the independent Black states of the African sub-continent, which have a bearing on relations between the countries of this region. This means inevitably mainly their relations with South Africa as the strong power centre of the region.

The theme of the conference - Intra-Regional Dependence and the Quest for Self-determination - implies a possible conflict between the forces pulling the countries together and those tending to pull them apart, i.e. the centripetal and the centrifugal forces. The foreign policies of the states concerned, as well as the various external pressures on the region as a whole, will therefore be looked at in this paper with that possible conflict in mind.

It is assumed that South Africa, and the South African government in particular, desires closer regional co-operation for a variety of possible reasons. It is not necessary to dwell on this; there are many policy statements and decisions which clearly indicate closer regional co-operation as a goal. What is more important for our subject is to determine to what extent South African actions contribute towards the achievement of this goal, and what seems to stand in the way of closer co-operation in the light of the policies and attitudes of Black states. It must be expected that, as with the other states concerned, and with all states in fact, South Africa's own interests will be paramount in determining policies. But, if closer regional co-operation is considered to be one of South Africa's major interests, then some adaptation of other interests lower on the scale of priorities may be involved. The same holds true for the other states concerned. However, the necessary accommodation of the interests of all these countries, in order to achieve this intra-regional co-operation, will depend on the relative importance attached to it as a

goal in each case. There may be goals which have a much higher priority for certain countries at the present time, and to judge this it is necessary to try to look at the situation from the point of view of all concerned and not simply from the standpoint of what we in the Republic may wish to achieve and what we may think is the best for the other countries of the sub-continent. This does not mean that South Africa must adopt all its policies to suit others, but, if it is hoped to find common interests and to build on them, then in the first place we must honestly try to understand what the interests of the other countries are.

As it is expected that this paper should deal with political factors, it is necessary to say something about the relationship of politics and economics. The pattern of relationships between the countries of the sub-continent, and between each of them and other countries in Africa and overseas, is largely based on, and continually concerned with, economic matters. These economic factors have been shown in other papers and elsewhere to have created a considerable number of links between the Southern African states and territories. They are extremely important factors for the development of each of the countries and of the sub-continent as a whole, as well as for the relationship between these countries. Therefore, although this paper is focussed on political factors, the economic factors can never be lost sight of. Moreover, they influence politics to a large degree; in fact it is not really possible to separate the two completely. But it is necessary to try to identify the political factors - external and internal - influencing the direction the countries are taking. It is also necessary to recognise that while economics influence politics, and vice versa, it is ultimately the political decisions which determine a country's direction. In some cases economic considerations may be the over-riding factor. This seems to be true often in the case of Malawi, for instance, as expressed in Dr. Banda's remark, "No country can reasonably be expected to cut its own throat,"¹⁾ - in spite of the strong commitment during his career to African solidarity and to African independence. But there are many cases in Africa where economic interests have apparently taken second place. President Idi Amin's current behaviour in Uganda is one rather extreme example which comes easily to mind, but there are less dramatic indications of the paramountcy of political considerations, even in the affairs of Southern Africa.

There are, of course, also cultural factors which influence decisions on foreign policy and, as with the economic factors, it is not possible neatly to separate the cultural factors from the political. "A particular foreign policy position may reflect personal convictions or cultural ties of the members of the leadership group, which have little or no obvious connection with the problem under discussion".²⁾ Another problem is that the distinction between foreign and domestic policies is often difficult to establish. "Activities and decisions, which on the surface fall within the realm of foreign policy, may well be designed as much or more for internal consumption as for their effect on relations with other states".³⁾ This is a problem in examining the foreign policy of any state and must always be borne in mind. Examples of the clear influence of domestic considerations will appear in the course of the paper, but sometimes these are not easily discernable to the outside observer.

Finally, it should be explained that this is not intended to be a theoretical study, as it concerns practical matters of vital importance to all those living in this sub-continent. Although certain concepts will have to be dealt with in fairly general terms, the discussion of this subject should be made as relevant as possible to current developments, even at the danger of seeing some aspects out of proportion in the long term view. In other words, the subject of our discussion is academic in the sense that it should be as objective and well informed as possible,

but it is not a subject on which one can adopt in any way an "ivory tower" mentality, as it is one of immediate and urgent relevancy for all.

SOME FACTORS AFFECTING FOREIGN POLICIES

Geography

In determining their policies towards each other and towards states outside this region, the governments of the countries of Southern Africa have to take into account certain basic considerations, which limit or extend their freedom of action. One of these which they cannot escape, is the fact of the geographical situation of each country in the region and in relation to the rest of the world. The size of a country is not by itself a determining factor; but smallness combined with a geographical situation such as that of Lesotho - with no outlet to the sea and surrounded on all sides by one relatively very powerful neighbour - imposes severe limitations on the exercise of fully independent policies. Swaziland is in a similar position, although it has some advantage in sharing borders with two countries, which gives it somewhat more flexibility.

Botswana is by no means small in size, having an area nearly nineteen times greater than that of Lesotho and over thirty-three times that of Swaziland, but it has a small population and suffers from the same disability of being landlocked and surrounded on three sides by South African, or South African-administered, territory and on the fourth by Rhodesia - with a tiny, disputed outlet to Zambia.

Under the circumstances, these three Black states are locked into South Africa, and it is impossible for them to make decisions about their international relations without bearing in mind the proximity of South Africa, and to a lesser extent that of Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories. This does not mean that they have no way of asserting their independence, but it does mean that their foreign policies are inseparably linked, for better or for worse, in peace or in conflict, with those of the powerful neighbour which surrounds them geographically.

This limiting factor does not apply to the other countries of the sub-continent to anything like the same extent. Rhodesia, Zambia and Malawi are also land-locked, it is true, and this does provide problems, but on a geographical basis (leaving current political questions aside for the present) their choices are wider.

Economics - Dependence or Interdependence

Another basic factor which policy makers in the countries of the sub-continent must bear in mind in most foreign policy decisions, is their degree of economic independence now, as well as their potential for economic development leading to a greater independence in the future. This is a wide subject, already dealt with in other papers at this Conference, and it is only intended to pursue certain aspects here, which have a bearing on the political decisions taken in regard to intra-regional and wider international relations.

Economic dependence of a weak country on a much stronger neighbour obviously imposes a limitation on the freedom of action of the former. This is a condition which applies in Southern Africa in regard to several countries in relation to South Africa. They are naturally sensitive about this, especially the three neighbour states, and they are trying to diversify their economic links to the extent that they are able to do so. Botswana hopes to become more independent as a result of the development of its mineral resources. Swaziland is already in a more favourable position, with considerable natural resources and with 85% of its exports going to

countries outside the Southern African Customs Union area. It also has an active policy of developing new industries, and of further expanding its trade relations with countries overseas and with other African countries outside the Southern African region.⁴⁾ Lesotho's opportunities are much more limited, but even there attempts are being made to diversify economic relations. In reviewing recently the work of the Lesotho National Development Corporation, Chief Jonathan spoke of his country's development taking place in association with a variety of older countries, and he mentioned prospecting agreements with American and Canadian companies. He noted that the Corporation was "in stiff competition for investments with territories and other countries of Southern Africa", and he made no mention at all of South Africa's role in Lesotho's development.⁵⁾ But in spite of all these efforts, there is - and will remain - a considerable degree of dependence on the one economically strong country in the region, which in effect limits the political freedom of these smaller countries in intra-regional relations and in the international sphere, too.

This condition of dependence is often loosely described as interdependence which is the ideal for all those who wish to see closer co-operation, as it does not involve the same type of limitation, but rather implies more equality between the parties - a two-way rather than a one-way dependence. It also implies a dependence more or less freely accepted for the mutual benefit of both or all parties concerned. A distinction should be drawn between these two concepts, and the temptation should be avoided of confusing dependence with interdependence. While economic dependence may be unavoidable in some cases, it is a condition which any self-respecting nation will want to change if at all possible, and it will be tempted to try to compensate by aggressively asserting its political independence. This may already be happening in the case even of Lesotho, the most economically dependent of these states. In any case, it must at least never be assumed that economic dependence of one state on another ensures political friendship between the two.

On the other hand, interdependence, while it still involves limitations for the interdependent partners, is a positive concept which can bind the states concerned together in a more healthy relationship. There are obvious difficulties in converting dependence into interdependence. Even without the political difficulties, which will be dealt with later, there is the relatively overwhelming economic strength of South Africa. There are, however, examples of attempts to create greater interdependence, which have been supported and even initiated by South Africa. Cabora Bassa and the Kunene River scheme are such examples, but, as these both at present mainly involve Portugal and South Africa, they do not directly approach the real problem. A better example would be the exploitation of Lesotho's water resources in the proposed Malibamatso scheme. This would involve South Africa becoming dependent to some extent on Lesotho's resources, while Lesotho would become dependent on the revenue earned from South Africa. There may have been some reluctance in South Africa to become dependent in this way for such a vital resource as water, but it is in fact a mutual dependence, and in any case some risks have to be taken for a greater long term benefit. There are also advocates of a scheme which would involve bringing water from the Okavango Delta in Botswana, but in this case it is probably reluctance on the side of Botswana to become so closely interdependent with South Africa, which is preventing serious consideration of such a scheme.⁶⁾

A relevant example of interdependence is perhaps the Customs Union Agreement and especially South Africa's willingness, after lengthy negotiations, to revise the Agreement so that the terms became much more favourable to the three smaller partners than previously. Labour relations, too, which have been dealt with in a separate paper, involve elements of interdependence.

The co-operation involved in the work of SARCCUS, on the basis that the problems dealt with are not contained by national boundaries, is a recognition of interdependence.⁷⁾ It is hoped that in the future the proposed organisation to co-ordinate tourism, namely SARTOC, will come into being and further foster interdependence.

Because of its powerful position, the onus rests primarily on South Africa to go out of its way to create conditions for interdependence, even if this means sacrificing some of its own independent advantages. If it is desired, for reasons of South Africa's own national interest, that there should be co-operative relations between the states of the sub-continent, then all past experience in relations between states dictates that the degree of simple dependence on South Africa should be lessened as far as possible. In Botswana's National Development Plan, 1970-75, as published in September, 1970, this paragraph appears (after enumeration of the advantages and disadvantages to Botswana of the Customs Union and joint monetary system) :

"Thus Botswana's economic dependence on South Africa is great. It is considered to be in the interest of both countries to transform this dependence into a relationship of interdependence. Despite the differences in political and social systems, and the disparity of wealth and resources between the two countries, and given the close economic links, Botswana and South Africa have achieved, and wish to maintain a stable relationship based on inter-dependence, co-existence and mutual non-interference."⁸⁾

This is surely a definition of policy that should be accepted by all, and, although directly concerned with economic matters, it has important implications for healthy political relations between the countries of the sub-continent. It is in line with the South African Government's aims, as expressed on numerous occasions. For example, in April, 1970, Dr. Hilgard Muller said in an important speech at the University of South Africa:

"As is generally known, the Government's standpoint is that international friendship and co-operation must at all times be based on mutual respect, the recognition of the sovereign independence of states and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of others. Differences in political concepts and approaches in respect of internal affairs should not be obstacles to fruitful co-operation between governments in matters of common interest. It goes without saying that no country should strive to dominate another in the political, economic or any other terrain. Where one country helps another the main aim of such help must be to enable the recipient to help itself. South Africa is strongly opposed to any form of neo-Colonialism or economic Imperialism."⁹⁾

To find more effective ways of applying this policy of interdependence in practice is a matter for the economists to pursue further. But political decisions are also required in South Africa, as well as in the other countries concerned, to make the policy of greater interdependence effective in the economic sphere generally, and in particular in important areas such as the Customs Union, where regular consultation is now required by the Agreement, and in the monetary union, where no formal machinery for consultation exists, but seems to be wanted by the smaller partners.¹⁰⁾ There is also the

question as to what extent industrial development in the neighbouring states is being encouraged or frustrated by South Africa.¹¹⁾ These are all matters which are hopefully receiving attention, in order gradually to make economic interdependence a practical reality, and they are all matters which profoundly affect inter-regional relations on a political level.

Development Assistance

Apart from the full recognition of the formal independence of our neighbour states, there is no doubt that South Africa desires to co-operate in aiding their development. Already much is being done¹²⁾ and the philosophy behind the assistance is not designed to create more dependence.¹³⁾ This type of co-operation has helped to link the countries of Southern Africa closer together, and some governments clearly see advantages for their countries in technical assistance and financial aid from South Africa. Malawi is probably the prime example. But for them to accept South African assistance requires a positive decision by each of these governments, as distinct from the unavoidable necessity of continuing economic links of various kinds (because of dependence on South Africa), and there is obvious sensitivity and hesitancy on this point. Take the example of Botswana again. President Seretse Khama has said (28 March 1970) : "We do not intend to seek aid from South African official sources. It would not be in the interest of either country to increase Botswana's dependence on South Africa. We are determined that no word or deed on Botswana's part will give comfort to the advocates of race supremacy."¹⁴⁾ On another more recent occasion (Sept. 1971) Sir Seretse is reported to have said that in skills, knowledge of African conditions and proximity to Black Africa, South Africa has much to offer. But Botswana was morally and politically unable to accept official South African aid.¹⁵⁾ However, Malawi, in particular, Lesotho and Swaziland are recipients of some official South African assistance, financial and technical. In the case of Swaziland, the Prime Minister, Prince Makhosini Dlamini, referred during a visit to Cape Town in March, 1971, for talks with Prime Minister Vorster, to various examples of assistance which, he said, showed "the considerable contribution which your country (South Africa) is making towards my country's development ...".¹⁶⁾

This question of development is the crucial one with which all governments in the sub-continent are concerned, including South Africa where the progress of the Homelands is a sine qua non for the evolution of the Government's internal policies, as well as for an improvement in its international relations. For the Black states their policies for accelerated development are intimately linked with their foreign policies. They are all actively seeking development assistance from governments outside Africa, as well as from international organisations. In fact they are considerably more active in seeking such outside assistance than assistance from South Africa, probably because they accept that South Africa's ability to assist them is limited, in view of the development needs within the Republic, but also for political motives - including the desire to diversify their sources of aid and not be limited to dependence on South Africa (in the same way as they are trying to diversify their trade). While it is not intended to compare the value of aid from different sources - even if this were possible - it may be useful to give an indication, by means of some examples, of the extent of development assistance which is being received from outside sources by all the independent Black states of the sub-continent.

(a) *International Organisations*

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)¹⁷⁾ co-ordinates the work of the U.N. and the Specialised Agencies in developing countries throughout the world. It has a regional office in Lusaka, responsible for Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi and Zambia, and there are also separate offices in all these countries. The UNDP representatives in the five countries meet two or three times each year to discuss, in particular, projects covering more than one country of the region. The Specialised Agencies, notably FAO, also have their own representatives in some of the countries. The UNDP regional office co-operates closely with the headquarters of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in Addis Ababa.

The extent of the UNDP assistance to the five independent Black states of Southern Africa is illustrated by the following Indicative Planning Figures for the current 5-year period, beginning January, 1972 : (These are estimates of the resources allocated to these countries, for the purpose of advance planning.)

Botswana - \$5,8 million; Lesotho - \$8,3 million
Swaziland - \$5,7 million; Malawi - \$7,5 million
Zambia - \$15 million. (As Botswana, Lesotho and Malawi have been included in a U.N. list of "least developed" countries, they are able to receive further U.N. funds over and above these amounts.)

The approximate numbers of expert personnel in these five countries, financed by UNDP and provided by the various international organisations in the U.N. family, are currently as follows :

Botswana - 41; Lesotho - 50; Swaziland - 45
Malawi - 35; Zambia - 150.

(As compared with the total of 321 UNDP personnel currently operating in Southern Africa, there were altogether 28 seconded South African officials working in Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi in February, 1972.¹⁸⁾)

As an illustration of the type of international assistance to these countries, further details are now given of the projects in one country, namely Botswana, where the UNDP provided technical assistance during 1971 worth over R700 000. This assistance was channelled through the FAO (for a project "Surveys and Training for the Development of Water Resources and Agricultural Production"), the ILO (for a Co-operative Development Centre and a National Vocational Training Scheme) and UNESCO (for the Teacher Training College in Francistown), as well as WHO, WMO, ITU and the World Bank. About 40 technical assistance experts were provided during 1971 by these agencies, and in addition the U.N. Office for Technical Co-operation (UNOTC) provided an expert and two consultants plus 5 fellowships from its own funds (outside UNDP). Other UN assistance came from the U.N. Children's Fund and the U.N.

Fund for Population Activities. These UN technical assistance activities are continuing this year, and from next year (1973) a new, more effectively co-ordinated Country Programme will be introduced, planned for a 5-year period.¹⁹⁾

The most important international financial aid in the sub-continent is the loan of R23 million arranged in 1971 by the World Bank for the Shashe Project in Botswana. Another example is the R2,9 million loan from the International Development Association for the tarring of the 89-mile Leabua Jonathan Highway in Lesotho.²⁰⁾

By far the largest amount of international assistance is received by Zambia. In 1970 the U.N. and its Specialised Agencies spent nearly K3 million on technical assistance activities, to which was added over K4 million in Zambian Government counterpart funds. The organisations operating in Zambia through the UNDP include : FAO, the World Food Programme, UNICEF, WHO, UNESCO, ILO, ITU, UPU, ICAO, WMO, IAEA, and UNIDO (UN Industrial Development Organisation). Most of these bodies have experts stationed in Zambia, totalling 123 in April, 1971, and approximately 150 a year later. In 1969-70 World Bank loans to Zambia totalled K7,6 million, for the purpose of education and of commercial farming.²¹⁾

(b) Bilateral Assistance

As all the independent Black states in the sub-continent are ex-British colonies or protectorates, it is not surprising that the United Kingdom has been the major donor in all these countries. British financial aid has been in the form of direct budgetary grants and development loans. The budgetary grants have been of considerable importance, because most of these countries were not able to balance their budgets from their own revenue when they became independent. But they have all now substantially reduced or even eliminated their deficits, and the increased revenue resulting from the revised Customs Union Agreement of December, 1969, has been a major cause of this improvement for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Lesotho, for instance, has reduced its dependence on external budgetary aid from over 50% five years ago to 10% now.²²⁾

Examples of annual British development assistance to all these countries are loans of R2 million to Lesotho for the 1969/70 year²³⁾ and nearly R4 million to Botswana for the 1972/73 year.²⁴⁾ The Commonwealth Development Corporation is doing important work in all the independent Black states of the sub-continent.²⁵⁾

For its 1972/73 Development Fund Botswana is also receiving grants and loans totalling R16,4 million from Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Canada and the United States; by far the largest amount (over R10 million) is from Canada, followed by the United States with nearly R3,8 million and Sweden with over R2 million.²⁶⁾

In addition, an agreement was recently signed with the United States for a loan of R9 475 000 for the construction

of the BotZam road, to which further reference is made later in this paper.²⁷⁾

Several of the above countries, notably the United States, are active in providing financial and technical assistance in Lesotho and Swaziland, too, as well as in Malawi and Zambia.

These examples - not an exhaustive account - indicate the importance to the other independent states in Southern Africa of their relations with a number of countries overseas, as well as with the United Nations and the Specialised Agencies. The degree of the influence on intra-regional relations of this outside assistance, including the growing number of experts and advisers from international bodies, as well as from individual foreign countries, who are working in all these states, can only be guessed at. But it must be considerable, and it is an influence with which South Africa has no connection at all, and with which it cannot compete at its present level of development assistance. However, looking to the future, it can be suggested that although South Africa is not in a position to compete in quantity with all the aid - technical and financial - from extra-regional sources, it could perhaps contribute more effectively in quality, if there were more overall planning and co-ordination of development assistance. Clearly it is the Government's policy to assist other African states, and the foreign policy implications of such assistance are recognised, as evidenced by the fact that the Economic Co-operation Promotion Loan Fund is administered by the Department of Foreign Affairs. (This Fund was established in 1968, with an initial capital of R5-million, and it has had further amounts allocated to it since then.²⁸⁾) But there does seem to be a need for co-ordinated planning and for the establishment of guidelines for the most effective use of the resources, financial and technical, which South Africa is able to contribute in this field. Has the time perhaps not arrived for an international or regional development agency in South Africa, such as exists in several western countries? The role of such an agency would be to plan and channel South African development assistance to developing states and territories in the sub-continent, including the emerging Homelands at present within South Africa's borders (as soon as they reached a certain stage of self-government). This agency could be linked to or eventually replaced by, a multi-national organisation, so that the development assistance could become largely multi-lateral, at least in its planning and allocation (assuming that South Africa would remain the largest contributor). In his proposal for the establishment of an Economic Commission for Southern Africa²⁹⁾, Professor J.L. Sadie suggests that its main functions should include the provision of development aid, as well as the creation of an Institute of Development Studies. (The first function he mentions is that of promoting intra-regional and external trade.) He points out that the advantage of a multi-lateral operation of this kind, rather than the continuation of bilateral arrangements between South Africa and other countries, is that the latter "lacks generalised mutuality, and economically, administratively and diplomatically is less efficient".³⁰⁾

The aspect of "mutuality" is important for the success of such a multi-national organisation from the political point of view, and is linked with the need for greater interdependence, as discussed above. This should be the goal in all thinking about the effective co-ordination of development assistance in the future. In the meantime, however, while the creation of a multi-national organisation (which would include the independent Black states of the sub-continent) remains impracticable mainly because of differing political approaches, the establishment of a South African agency for international development assistance might be a constructive beginning.³¹⁾

The African Environment - Nationalism and Unity

We have dealt at some length with the implications for intra-regional relations of the economic dependence on South Africa and the need for more interdependence, as well as the striving of the Black states to diversify their economic links, both in trade and in satisfying their needs for development assistance. These are basic questions underlying the decisions which they must take on their external relations, both within the region and outside, and running through them all one sees the urge to consolidate their formal independence and to determine more effectively their own destiny. While the economic dependence and the elements of interdependence certainly create strong intra-regional links and constitute centripetal forces within the sub-continent, 32) this urge to exercise self-determination more effectively has centrifugal effects. These centrifugal forces are strengthened by certain aspects of the particular environment in which these states are evolving - an environment which links them with Black Africa as a whole, as well as with the White-ruled countries of the sub-continent.

One of these aspects is African nationalism, and linked with this is the aspiration for greater African unity. These are in a sense ideological aspects, the effects of which on intra-regional relations are difficult to measure, but which nevertheless do have a political influence on relations, as evidenced by many statements of Black leaders. Moreover, these influences - of African nationalism and African unity - are not generally shared by the Whites of Africa, who tend to have a more pragmatic approach and regard economic realities as the ones which should be paramount when policy decisions are made.

This complex subject deserves fuller treatment than can be given it here, but some light may be thrown on it by considering what Doudou Thiam, who was Foreign Minister of Senegal, has referred to as the two forms which nationalism takes in Africa, namely micro-nationalism and macro-nationalism. 33) The first is concerned with the nation in terms of its territory, with boundaries settled during the colonial period, and with the maintenance of sovereign independence. The second is the movement towards a greater African unity - in its more radical form known as Pan-Africanism. While there has been some conflict between these two forms of nationalism during the past decade, they do not seem to be contradictory in the African context. They are both a reflection of an African nationalism which seeks to defend and consolidate its independence, while at the same time recognising that this concept is wider than the individual state. This wider African nationalism resulted partly from the common independence struggle, and it has therefore lost some of its momentum during the past decade. But it remains a reality, and it is reflected in the constant concern expressed for those African peoples who are considered not yet to be free. 34) It is seen too, as a means of safeguarding independence. When the new African states continue to denounce colonialism (or neo-colonialism) and racism, they may be considered by outsiders to be governed by an obsession or to be reacting to an imaginary threat. But their attitude that independence is not final, and must be continually safeguarded and extended, is a reality and is an important ideological base for the foreign policies of many states. Even those states which are not extreme in this respect are nevertheless affected by this ideology and are therefore suspicious of, or at least sensitive about, anything which they may regard as being an infringement of their independence, and/or a denial of self-determination and independence for other Black Africans.

In its extreme form this is best reflected in Nkrumah's philosophy, which has had a considerable influence on the political development of Africa, even though Nkrumah himself was personally discredited after his fall from power in Ghana. His admonition, "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all things shall be added to you", has had wide currency in Africa and is felt by many to have been borne out in practice, because in some cases the achievement of self-determination and independence has in fact provided the motivation and means for more all-round development. In any case, whatever the results, this nationalism as defined by Nkrumah and others, does not put economic considerations first, it seeks effective independence and equality, with economic development as a means to that end. As Rupert Emerson commented in an article written in 1960: "The prime rival to nationalism as a driving force is presumed to be the desire for an improved standard of living. From time to time, it is asserted that the ordinary poverty-stricken Asian and African is really interested only in seeing an end put to his poverty. This is a highly dubious proposition. The evidence indicates that he regards at least temporary economic privation as an appropriate price to pay for national salvation. It has also been contended that his real demand is for a transition to modernity, as manifested in economic and social development. In some part the pressure for economic development derives from the same root as the desire for an improved standard of living. However, it also has nationalist implications in its drive for equality."³⁵⁾

Economic development has come to absorb much more of the attention of most African leaders than it did in the first years of independence, and it is clearly of the highest priority for the leaders of all the Black states of the sub-continent. But even today this question is inseparably linked with the urges of nationalism for self-determination and full independence.³⁶⁾

Nkrumah was also an apostle of African unity, and the social "revolution" which he advocated was seen as an instrument of genuine African unity. "Every African regime should be concerned with its success in every other state and is consequently justified in taking steps to protect it where it has occurred or to foster it where it has not yet been fully realised."³⁷⁾ Nkrumah's position, as thus defined, is an extreme one, and has certainly not been accepted generally in Africa in that form, because of the implication of interference in the internal affairs of those Black states not considered to be carrying out the "revolution". But it is nevertheless an extension of the widespread conviction that the social, economic and political problems of African states are common African problems that must be solved together.

The desire which Black Africans have for unity is possibly confused, often emotional and seemingly divorced from reality. But it is nevertheless real. It may still remain simply a vague aspiration, but, as Doudou Thiam states, whenever African unity is mentioned "it strikes a powerful chord in the minds of the people".³⁸⁾

In practical terms and in relation to our subject this all means that on the one hand the Black states of Southern Africa will jealously guard their independence, and on the other hand they will always be conscious of their links with the rest of Black Africa. For instance, one of the strongest arguments used in the OAU against dialogue with South Africa has been that African unity on the issue should not be broken. This has been an effective

argument, and several governments claiming to be in favour of dialogue in principle, have nevertheless argued that they will not undertake this on their own. Even Chief Jonathan has been speaking more in this vein recently and has reportedly tried to prevent other individual states, such as the Ivory Coast, from starting bilateral dialogue.³⁹⁾ That he nevertheless still favours dialogue is shown by the efforts which he has made in the past to encourage a unified approach and to oppose confrontation and violence. But this means that such dialogue will have to be on the basis of the Lusaka Manifesto which all Black African states, with the possible exception of Malawi, now seem to have accepted as a starting point for any substantive discussions. The Botswana Government has always based its position on the necessity of African unity in general and on the Lusaka Manifesto in particular, and now this appears to be true of Swaziland and Lesotho, too. (Further reference to the dialogue issue, and, in particular, to the Lusaka Manifesto is made later in this paper.)

The possibility of closer political relations must therefore be seen in the context of this African environment, which exerts such a strong pull on the Black African states, and on their leaders especially. There are many in South Africa who have recognised the strength of African nationalism, and this is reflected to some extent in the separate development policy. But this seems to be a recognition only of the micro-nationalism⁴⁰⁾ to which Doudou Thiam refers, and not the equally strong macro-nationalism.

External Pressures - Africa

The discussion above of the African environment in which the independent Black states make their foreign policy decisions, has already indicated some of the general pressures on them, tending to militate against closer regional links which might be considered to be contrary to general African unity. This would apply also to other regional groupings, as for instance in West Africa, which might be considered to be pulling away from a wider unity, as expressed through the OAU. But in the sub-continent this potential conflict between regional loyalties and African unity is aggravated by the issue of South Africa's internal policies, which issue has effectively isolated the Republic from Africa as a whole.

It is not necessary now to go into the history of this conflict in any detail, as it has developed since the fifties and in particular since the crucial year of 1960.⁴¹⁾ During this period South Africa, for its part, has moved from a defensive position in the early sixties to a more dynamic policy of attempting to build links in various ways with other African states. This policy has been assisted by the presence in Southern Africa of several Black states with which the Republic has so far been able to maintain at least satisfactory working relationships, based mainly, of course, on the fact of their economic dependence. In the case of Malawi, the relations could even be said to be cordial. Madagascar did, until a few months ago, provide a special example of progress in this outward movement into Africa, as it was a country not dependent on South Africa, which nevertheless saw advantages in closer economic relations and inevitably - because they cannot be completely separated - closer political relations, too. Madagascar was also providing a potential bridge for contacts further afield in Africa. But for the time being at any rate, progress in that direction has been halted by the new government which has found it necessary to bow to strong internal pressures linked with the general African pressure on countries communicating with South Africa.

Most of the African states for their part have during the past decade or more developed their policy of hostility into one of confrontation as expressed mainly through the OAU. Since the formation in 1963 of this Organisation, of which all African states except South Africa are members, its major objectives have been to remove Portugal from Africa, to bring about majority rule in Rhodesia and to effect a revolutionary change in South Africa (although there have been many differences and no clear exposition of what is envisaged in place of the present system).

The official instrument established to carry out these objectives is the Liberation Committee, which has existed since the beginning of the OAU, with its headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam. Its functions include the co-ordination of operations against the White South, the distribution to national liberation movements of funds received from African states, as well as from other outside sources, the overseeing of guerilla training and the care of refugees. This Committee has, however, not received support from all OAU members. A few states have contributed funds regularly, more have supported it with words, but not with money, and a few have disagreed with its activities in principle. In addition there have from the beginning been differences within the Committee, and in the OAU itself, over which nationalist or guerilla movements to support, and about the administration of the Committee's affairs.⁴²⁾ As a result the Liberation Committee has not been an effective instrument, but it remains more than simply a symbol of the OAU majority policy of confrontation, including the use of force, against the White South, and in recent times the more radical states have been making a concerted effort to obtain meaningful support for the Committee.

The last OAU summit meeting (June 1972) paid special attention to this matter, as did the recent summit meeting (early September 1972) of the East and Central African States in Dar-es-Salaam. At the former meeting it was decided to increase by 50% the Liberation Committee's annual budget, and several Heads of State were reported ready to make special individual contributions. This included King Hassan of Morocco who pledged \$1 million and who also maintained that African States bordering on countries under colonial rule should allow liberation movements to instal military bases on their territories. (No decision was, of course, taken on this suggestion.) Membership of the Committee was increased from 11 to 17. This more aggressive tone was evident amidst much talk of 1972 as being a "year of reconciliation" among African states. Malawi was the only country not represented at the meeting.⁴³⁾

At the Dar-es-Salaam meeting there was agreement among the 15 states represented that their arrears of dues to the Liberation Committee would be paid, that members of liberation movements would be given free passage through their countries; and that other aid should be given to "front-line" countries bordering on White-ruled areas, so that the latter in turn could assist the liberation movements.⁴⁴⁾

The Southern African independent Black states, with the exception of Zambia, have not given support to the liberation movements or other subversive activities; they have made it clear that their territories cannot be used for these purposes, and they have claimed that in any case they do not approve of the use of force to solve problems of the sub-continent. The public explanations of their policies have varied, however. President Banda of Malawi has been most openly critical, and has poured scorn on the efforts of certain African leaders, which, he has often said, amount to empty threats which will not influence South Africa. Sir Seretse Khama of Botswana has often spoken against violence as a means of bringing about change, but he has commented that he was not condemning

those who had to resort to violence when all other paths were closed. 45) At an African-American conference held in Lagos in March, 1971, he is reported to have said : "We can no more condemn those who resort to violence to gain freedom (in Southern Africa) than we could condemn the violence of European resistance movements against German occupation or the violence of the Hungarians against the Russians in 1956.46)

The Swazi Prime Minister, Prince Makhosini, seems to have consistently adopted a low profile on this question and, while certainly not supporting the use of violence, has shown more reluctance to comment on the liberation movements than the other leaders. He has, however, spoken strongly at meetings of the OAU in favour of the need for OAU members to do "all in their power" to ensure freedom and self-determination for peoples in every part of Africa47), without being specific on the means to be employed.

Chief Jonathan's attitude at the present time is not clear. While he has spoken strongly in the past against terrorism and subversion, there has been a change in the tenor of his more recent statements. He is reported to have said that the "freedom fighters", who should no longer be called "guerillas" or "terrorists", feel frustrated by the absence of constitutional machinery and therefore take refuge in violence.48) His Foreign Minister went further in a statement at the Non-Aligned Conference in Georgetown, Guyana, in August, 1972, referring specifically to the Portuguese territories : "The African majorities in these countries are involved in a military struggle against the imposed Portuguese administration. My government will continue to lend its whole-hearted support to these freedom movements."49)

The conclusion which must be reached from the public statements of these leaders is that, with the exception of President Banda, they are at least reluctant to criticise the militant position of the OAU in general and the "liberation movements" in particular, although they do not give any indication of changing their basic policy of not allowing their own countries to become involved in subversive activities against their neighbours, including South Africa. This policy would seem to be based on a realistic assessment of their geographic and economic dependence on South Africa. (The apparent shift in the attitude of the Lesotho Government is still not clear.)

A notable development in the campaign against the "White South", on what may be termed the diplomatic front, was the adoption of the Lusaka Manifesto. This Manifesto was first adopted at a meeting between the East and Central African States in Lusaka in April, 1969. It was reported to have been drafted mainly by Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda. It was then approved by the OAU as a whole, and finally endorsed by the U.N. General Assembly towards the end of 1969. There is no doubt that the Lusaka Manifesto has become an important basic document in the policies of African states, explicitly endorsed and frequently referred to by most of them - again Malawi is probably the only exception - including South Africa's three immediate neighbours. Botswana has always approved of it, but the approval of Lesotho and Swaziland only became clear more recently.

While the Manifesto is perhaps open to different interpretations, depending on which sections of it are emphasised, it is claimed by African states to represent their common attitude towards the White-ruled

countries and to indicate the minimum change required in those countries before their governments can be accepted in Africa. The Manifesto says that the African states would prefer to achieve "the objectives of liberation" without physical violence. "We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill. We do not advocate violence ..."

However, the Manifesto goes on to say that "while possible progress is complicated by actions of those at present in power in the states of Southern Africa, we have no choice but to give the peoples of these territories all the support of which we are capable in their struggle against the oppressors." It is true that it recognizes "that all the peoples who have made their homes in the countries of Southern Africa are African, regardless of the colour of their skins". It also recognizes that "for the sake of order in human affairs, there may be transitional arrangements while a transformation from group inequality to individual equality is being effected", and it acknowledges that within the states which issued the Manifesto, "the struggle towards human brotherhood and unchallenged human dignity is only beginning". But the Manifesto does not contain the slightest indication that the Black African states recognise a possibility that these principles may be given effect to under present policies in the White-ruled states. For instance, there is no hint that the policy of separate development in South Africa, even if carried out at a faster rate and more equitably, may provide a solution. On the contrary, the Manifesto maintains that the South African government's policy, supported to a greater or lesser extent by all the White citizens, "is based on a rejection of man's humanity" and "on the denial of human equality". The Manifesto goes on to say:

"South Africa should be excluded from the United Nations Agencies, and even from the United Nations itself. It should be ostracised by the world community. It should be isolated from world trade patterns and left to be self-sufficient if it can. The South African government cannot be allowed both to reject the very concept of mankind's unity, and to benefit by the strength given through friendly international relations. And certainly Africa cannot acquiesce in the maintenance of the present policies against people of African descent."⁵⁰⁾

The actual effectiveness of the OAU's actions against the White South has been in inverse proportion to the torrent of words, condemnations, resolutions, etc., which have come from OAU meetings (as well as from U.N. meetings where OAU proposals have received strong support in the General Assembly). Nevertheless, the Organisation has created serious problems for healthy intra-regional relations in Southern Africa. Its political and material support has helped to maintain guerilla wars against Portugal in Mocambique and Angola, which show no signs of ending, even if they are not at present seriously threatening Portugal's position in Africa; it has mobilised opinion against the Rhodesian Government to such an extent that a settlement of the Rhodesian constitutional question is not possible without a complete reversal of policy in that country; and it has kept South Africa largely isolated politically and economically from the rest of Africa.⁵¹⁾ Its militant position has meant, too, that the Black states of Southern Africa are continually being forced to choose between their allegiance to the OAU and to the concept of African unity, on the one hand, and the development of their relations with the White-ruled States of their region on the other. Every time the need for a decision arises, involving closer contacts with South Africa, for instance, these governments have to take into account the possible reaction in the rest of Africa, as well as the reaction of their own people who are also influenced by the political currents in Black Africa.

An important change in the seemingly solid anti-South African stand of the rest of Black Africa has, however, appeared in recent years with the evolution of a new line of thinking among some African states. This has come to be known as the movement for "dialogue", and it broke into the open with the announcement by President Felix Houphouët Boigny of the Ivory Coast in November, 1970, that he was planning to urge other African leaders to have direct talks with the South African Government, because he considered that force would not solve the problems of apartheid. His country, he said, supported negotiation and dialogue. "We hope to succeed by dialogue. For seven years we have had nothing but grand and violent speeches, with tragic and sometimes ridiculous results. We cannot make threats without the means to apply them."⁵²⁾ Strong support came from several other French-speaking African states, including Madagascar, and from Malawi and Lesotho. (President Banda and Chief Jonathan, however, justifiably claimed that they had been saying much the same thing for several years.) President Houphouët Boigny's initiative was cautiously welcomed by the South African Government.

A separate initiative was taken by Prime Minister Busia of Ghana, who at about the same time suggested that African states should negotiate with the South African Government while encouraging "constitutional and moral change" from within.⁵³⁾ He also maintained that the policies of violence and isolation were not the only ones on which African states should rely.⁵⁴⁾

This dialogue movement appeared to be gathering strength particularly among the French-speaking states, and it was introduced by the Ivory Coast at the OAU Summit Meeting in June, 1971. Although President Houphouët Boigny himself was not present, he explained the motives of his dialogue proposals in a message to the Conference. The main theme was the need for a "true neutrality" in Africa which "will put each of us in a position to break the alliances we have with the blocs and which will from this point be likely to take our Africa away from the consequences of this divided world and away from war". To obtain this objective there must be peace and, "peace is set up and maintained by dialogue".⁵⁵⁾

Although the dialogue proposals were rejected by the OAU, 11 of the 41 states either supported them or abstained from voting against them (and 2 states were absent). The countries which did not oppose dialogue included Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi and Madagascar. That more than one quarter of the Black states were willing to take this moderate position in the face of all the pressures which had been built up within the OAU, was seen as an indication that a new wind of change was blowing in Africa, which might reduce the pressures on the sub-continent and also South Africa's own outward movement to progress further into Africa. This, it was felt by many in South Africa, would be to the benefit of Africa as a whole and would reduce the dangers of outside intervention, in line with President Houphouët Boigny's philosophy. However, during the past year there has been little positive development and, if anything, the dialogue movement has lost strength. Two important countries, mainly Ghana and Madagascar, have withdrawn their support for any form of dialogue as a result of sudden changes of government caused by internal dissatisfaction and frustrations. Though President Houphouët Boigny has not changed his policy, other French-speaking African states appear to have lost their enthusiasm.

President Senghor of Senegal stated in July, 1972, that it was clear that there was now a less lenient attitude towards South Africa among African states. He said he was himself in favour of a united, well-balanced, and even "moderate" attitude to South Africa, and he proposed a three-point plan,

which he felt OAU members would accept. (He explained that he would have submitted it to the last OAU summit meeting in June, 1972, if President Houphouët Boigny had been present). The three points are (a) that all OAU members must jointly confirm that the Lusaka Manifesto (meaning, in his view, Black/White dialogue within South Africa before external dialogue) is the basis of OAU policy towards South Africa; (b) that OAU members must all agree that the only proper dialogue would be one which included the "lawful representatives of the Black majority"; and (c) all OAU members must agree that to bring about this type of dialogue "each African state must be free to work out its own tactics". On this third point President Senghor explained that, if the whole plan were supported, individual African leaders, such as himself, could then make unilateral proposals to South Africa (and also to Portugal and Rhodesia). But all this would have to take place within the framework of the OAU.⁵⁶⁾

In Southern Africa Botswana has not changed its policy, namely that dialogue is not possible except on the basis of the Lusaka Manifesto, and both Lesotho and Swaziland have now moved closer to that position. Malawi has not changed, and only recently President Banda told the annual congress of his party that good neighbourly relations would be maintained with South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal because "screaming against the Whites of Southern Africa would not effect any change".⁵⁷⁾ Malawi, however, seems to have become reconciled to "going it alone" in its relations with the White-ruled countries.

As a result of this decline of support for dialogue over the past year, the matter has not again been seriously discussed in the OAU or even in OCAM, the grouping of French-speaking African states. This may be a temporary lull, or even setback, in a movement which may later gather strength again, on the basis perhaps of President Senghor's proposals. But it does mean that for the present there is no further reduction in the pressures from Africa, which are making it difficult to build meaningful links between the Black and White-ruled states of the sub-continent.

External Pressures from outside Africa

The pressures from outside the continent, namely from the United Nations, the Communist powers, the United States and some other Western countries, cannot all be dealt with in any detail here. They are in any case closely related to the conflict in Africa itself. In other words, it is safe to conclude that, if there were to be an improvement in relations between the White-ruled countries and the rest of Africa the pressures from outside the continent would immediately decrease. For instance, the multifarious statements and resolutions emanating from United Nations bodies, including the threats of sanctions (with the actual imposition of sanctions by the Security Council in the case of Rhodesia), are largely sponsored by the Black states and supported by other groups of states for that reason.

It is intended therefore simply to deal here with the intervention of China in Africa, as this is an issue of some immediate concern in Southern Africa, and the influence of the United States.

Not the least of the pressures which is affecting the pattern of relationships in Southern Africa, is the increasing involvement of China in Africa, particularly in the affairs of Tanzania and Zambia, and the support being given by China to action against the White-ruled states. In China's search for status and power in the world, its attention is directed at

influencing the peoples of the Third World which in Mao's philosophy constitutes the countryside encircling and eventually overcoming the "cities" of the industrialised first and second worlds. The two worlds of the American led West and the Soviet bloc fall into the same category in Chinese eyes, and it is the Third World led by China, which will eventually - in the long term historical process - overcome them. But first China must extend its influence in this Third World, of which Africa is such a significant part.

China's prime interest, therefore, is not in taking over Southern Africa, but rather in becoming the dominant influence over the peoples of Black Africa, which in the long run would mean the whole of Africa. But one of the means of increasing this influence, which comes most easily to hand at relatively little cost, is to lend support - moral and material - to the campaign against the White South. In this way the Chinese combine with Black states against what is considered to be the common enemy, while at the same time they are infiltrating the Black states themselves. (This was a tactic employed in China itself in the struggle against the Nationalists, with Japan in the role of common enemy.) Chinese forces are unlikely to become involved in this particular struggle; Africans are to undertake the struggle themselves, but with strong Chinese backing. Then, in terms of the Chinese scenario China will take the credit and Africa will be indebted to and more dependent on China.

It does not particularly matter to the Chinese how long this struggle is drawn out. In fact, it is probably a case of the longer the better, because then there is more time for Chinese influence to increase and become entrenched. And the more fuss made about their presence in Africa by White governments in Africa and elsewhere, the more propaganda value can be squeezed out of the exercise. In all this it must not be forgotten that the Chinese are able to take a very long-term view, and they are no doubt convinced that in this long term the world is moving steadily in their direction.

In terms of Chinese communist strategy employed elsewhere, it has been suggested by experts on this strategy that the process could be speeded up in Africa, if the White governments could be provoked into retaliating, thus weakening the Black governments and making it easier for Chinese trained persons to take over in the Black states, under the pretext that they will be more effective.

This all means for the countries of Southern Africa that, as long as there are strong differences between the so-called White South and most Black states, these differences will be exploited by China in the form of aid for liberation movements and in other ways calculated to encourage confrontation rather than accommodation. Such aid projects as the Tanzam railroad, the naval base and factories in Tanzania, radio transmitters and an important road in Zambia, and so on, as well as the training of the army and guerillas in Tanzania, are all designed to this end.

Having given this brief assessment of China's aims in Africa, and Southern Africa in particular⁵⁸), one must also briefly consider the position of the African states themselves vis-a-vis China, especially the countries of Southern Africa. It must be said immediately in this connection that the Black African states are not passive subjects for Chinese exploitation, as the history of Chinese/African relations during the past decade or more has shown. Both the Soviet Union and China - as well as the United States and other lesser powers for that matter -

have not found that their attempts to win influence in Africa plain sailing. They have all had their ups and downs, as a result of the strength of African nationalism and the resentment of foreign domination, and also as a result of the unpredictability of African politics.

Therefore it must not be assumed that Tanzania will forever remain subject to Chinese influence, or that this influence will continue to increase in Zambia. Furthermore, there are at present a number of important African countries strongly opposed to the extension of Chinese influence, notably Zaire which stands in the way of the probable Chinese policy of establishing a zone of influence right across Africa from Tanzania to the Peoples Republic of the Congo - which would effectively cut off Southern Africa. In our immediate neighbourhood the Black states all still recognise the Republic of China (Taiwan) and have no dealings with mainland China. There are no indications of changes of policy in this regard, even though Botswana voted in the U.N. last year for the seating of the Communist Chinese representatives at the expense of the Republic of China. The one important shift in policy has occurred in Madagascar, where the new Foreign Minister recently indicated that relations might be established with Communist countries and clearly hinted, after a visit to Tanzania, that this might include China.⁵⁹⁾ If this happens, it will be a considerable advance for China and will pose an increased threat to Southern Africa, not only in the obvious strategic sense, but also because it might encourage future changes of policy elsewhere in the southern part of Africa.

In sum, the indications are that, while China does not dominate the scene as far as the external pressures on Southern Africa are concerned, Chinese influence on the borders of Southern Africa is increasing and is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Under normal conditions this type of external pressure, originating moreover from outside the African continent, could be expected to increase the cohesiveness of countries within the region, and it is only to be expected that those in South Africa, seeing this threat and wishing to promote closer ties, will argue that the other states should turn to South Africa for protection. Thus, for instance, Mr. Theo Gerdener, when still Minister of the Interior, said earlier this year that the five Black states and the future independent Homelands could play a decisive role in the defence and security of the sub-continent. It was, therefore, in the best interests of South Africa as well as the other states that there should be co-operation, when threatened by a common enemy, and he referred in this connection to the terrorist movements operating from Tanzania and to Communist China.⁶⁰⁾ Mr. R.F. Botha, M.P., has referred to the "message" which he feels must be conveyed to Africa and the world, namely that South Africa seeks to promote the peaceful co-existence of different nations in this region of Africa, and thereby to halt the danger of Communist penetration.⁶¹⁾ The Prime Minister has himself spoken in a similar vein on several occasions.

Unfortunately, however, it has to be admitted that, because of political differences within the region, the potentially positive results of this alien pressure are not being achieved, except between the White-ruled states themselves, plus to some extent Malawi which is in an especially exposed position. Because the Chinese-supported action is directed ostensibly against the policies of the White governments, and because it is being carried out by certain Black African governments, the tendency of Black governments in Southern Africa is to maintain neutrality as far as possible, lest they be considered in the rest of Africa to be succumbing too much to South African influence. In other words, their opposition to the internal policies of South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal, is still such that it prevents the

development of a sense of common purpose - even against a potentially serious external threat. While they act correctly, in the sense for instance, that there is no question of their territories being used for subversion against South Africa, and while they are opposed to Communism within their own countries, their reaction to the outside threat tends to be that there should be change within the White-ruled states, thus removing the object of the threat. So, to some extent the Chinese-supported policy of confrontation is serving to keep alive, and perhaps even deepen political differences within the region, rather than lessen them.

The question of United States relations with the countries of Southern Africa, and with South Africa in particular, is a wide and complex one, and it is intended to mention only certain aspects here, which have a direct bearing on the theme of this paper.

It is difficult to define United States/South Africa relations, they certainly cannot be described as "normal" bilateral relations on the political level. Although South Africa is not high on the list of priorities in American foreign policy, it does receive special attention, because of concern about the racial issue. According to Mr. David Newsom (Assistant Secretary of State in the U.S. State Department), the American official attitude towards this issue has been constant, and he has said that there is "no question of us condoning or acquiescing in these policies. We stand on the side of fundamental human rights in Southern Africa as we do at home and elsewhere."⁶²⁾ In fact, however, the expressions of concern about South African domestic policies have increased over the years in number and strength, in proportion to the rise of Black nationalism and independence on the African continent and to the development of Black influence in the domestic politics of the United States itself. This is borne out by Mr. Newsom's statement that American policy "springs from our own ethnic composition in the U.S., and from our very keen and appropriate interests in the many independent countries of Black Africa".⁶³⁾

Apart from condemnations of South African domestic policies in the U.N. and elsewhere, American policy includes the maintenance of an arms embargo, in terms of the U.N. Security Council's recommendation of 1963, and a refusal since 1967 to allow American warships to visit South African ports. These moves were indicative of a tendency in American policy towards isolation of South Africa internationally. Although these specific moves have not been reversed, there has been a shift in policy in recent years, during the Nixon Administration. The policy is now described as one of "communication" rather than isolation, and it is clear that this is conceived of not simply as between governments, but between peoples, at various levels.⁶⁴⁾ The implication in this policy of communication is that American influences can assist in a process of change in South African society. In fact the policy has been referred to as "communication for change".⁶⁵⁾

The area where it has been clearly claimed that American official policy could help toward bringing about change, is in U.S. relations with South Africa's three neighbours - Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. During recent years the United States has considerably developed its relations with these countries, both on the level of its diplomatic representation and in the financial assistance given to them. In September, 1971, the first American Ambassador to the three countries referred, in presenting his credentials to the President of Botswana, to the "unique role" of the new states of

Southern Africa, and in particular to Botswana's non-racial democracy which, he said, constituted "a model that might well be studied by other African states". In his reply the President, Sir Seretse Khama, welcomed American assistance "because it serves to demonstrate that the U.S.A. shares our desire that the values of non-racialism and democracy ... should eventually triumph throughout Southern Africa".⁶⁶⁾

United States policy is consciously directed towards strengthening the independence of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland vis-a-vis South Africa, as well as their associations with other African states, and this policy fits in with the urges of the countries themselves, as indicated above. This policy includes financial aid which has increased considerably in recent years, totalling approximately \$10 million in 1971.⁶⁷⁾

The bulk of this American aid is going to Botswana. It has included a substantial loan for the development of the Selebi-Pikwe copper/nickel project and an even larger amount for the construction of the so-called BotZam road from Nata to Kazungula.⁶⁸⁾ This project is intended to provide Botswana with an all-weather road link with Zambia, using the ferry crossing of the Zambesi at Kazungula. While the potential economic value of the road is not clear, there is no doubt that the Botswana Government attaches great importance to it, for reasons which are probably mainly political. It is in fact a symbol of Botswana's intention to lessen its dependence on the south and to develop as far as possible its links with Zambia and other African countries to the north.⁶⁹⁾ To assist Botswana in this direction is clearly an element in American policy.⁷⁰⁾

In so far as the United States is supporting the efforts of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland to lessen their dependence on South Africa, its policy can be considered as an influence which is weakening the intra-regional ties in Southern Africa, at least in the short term. Coupled with this are its cool political relations with South Africa and its oft-expressed moral disapproval of South African domestic policies. But in the long terms it may be that the encouragement of greater independence on the part of South Africa's neighbours, will help to make possible a healthier interdependent relationship, if and when the racial issue loses its diversive strength.

Furthermore, United States policy does not support violence as a means of bringing about change, and it is not apposed to "dialogue" as such - although American spokesmen have insisted that this is a matter to be resolved between African states themselves,⁷¹⁾ implying that the United States will not use its influence either for or against such dialogue proposals as those of President Houphouët Boigny or President Senghor, in view presumably of the strong differences between African states on this issue.

Internal Pressures

As indicated in the Introduction above, the influence of domestic considerations on the foreign policies of the states of the sub-continent must be mentioned as one of the political factors affecting intra-regional relations, even though it is often difficult to distinguish between domestic and foreign policies. Reference has already been made to the link between the development needs of African states and foreign policies. Likewise the striving to assert independence, which is so noticeable in these states, is intimately connected with internal nation-building

Sometimes a foreign policy position may be taken directly for domestic purposes. For instance, in Lesotho Chief Jonathan is making a major effort to effect "reconciliation" between various conflicting groups or forces. In this process he is trying to bring members of the former opposition Congress Party closer to his own government, with the aim of developing some form of national movement and returning the country to a more democratic form of government. One of the differences between the parties has been their respective attitudes to South Africa, with the Congress Party more radical in its African nationalist position. It is not surprising, therefore, that a change in attitude towards South Africa should now be observable as part of this reconciliation process - especially as the process has also included the shedding by Chief Jonathan of what can be termed his "right wing".⁷²⁾

More obvious even, was the result on Madagascar's foreign policy - in particular its attitude towards South Africa - of the change in government there in May, 1972.

In South Africa itself the effect of domestic pressures on foreign policy is a factor constantly to be borne in mind. It has been especially relevant to the question of relations with Black African states, and, although the outward policy has not been an issue between the main political parties, the Government has clearly been sensitive to possible reaction from the White electorate. In this regard the increasing assertion of their independence by our Black neighbouring states and their more critical statements about South African policies may well have an effect on the White electorate which will make it harder for the Government to develop constructively its relations with other African states. The importance of these relationships, not only for their own sake, but also because of the their effect on South Africa's wider international relations, will therefore mean that strong and imaginative leadership will be needed to educate the electorate and to counter the possible reaction.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The main focus of this paper on political factors affecting the intra-regional and international relations of the states of the African sub-continent has been on the independent Black states. The consideration of the political factors has been directed mainly at the relations of these states with South Africa. But references to Rhodesia and to the Portuguese states of Mocambique and Angola have inevitably occurred throughout this discussion, and there is no need to stress the fact that Rhodesia and Portugal are linked to South Africa in the attitudes of Black African states when the latter refer to the "White South" or the "White-ruled states".

The same factors mutatis mutandis apply to relations with Rhodesia and Portugal as to relations with South Africa. However, it must be noted that the disputes or conflict situations in which they are involved are themselves factors influencing the other states of the sub-continent, which aggravate the general centrifugal forces dealt with above, and further complicate South Africa's own difficult international relations. These disputes also create centres of instability or potential instability within the region and provide opportunities for outside intervention. Moreover there is the constant threat for South Africa of being drawn unavoidably

into deeper involvement in these specific issues, even in the military sense.

If the settlement terms between the British and Rhodesian Governments had been found by the Pearce Commission to be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole, and a settlement of the dispute had followed, the pressure would have been reduced, allowing for a possible gradual relaxation of attitudes on the part of the Black states. But this would not have happened immediately, because officially even Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland condemned the proposed settlement and welcomed the Pearce Commission's Report. It is one of the strange contradictions of Southern Africa that Botswana, which must have daily dealings with Rhodesian authorities - for instance in regard to the railways - is the country with the strongest political stand on this issue in the sub-continent. President Banda of Malawi, on the other hand, is prepared to admit that he has communication with Mr. Smith's government, although there has been no suggestion that Malawi recognises Rhodesia as an independent state.

It is no doubt the hope of Portugal that the economic and social development of Angola and Mocambique, together with greater autonomy for these territories, will gradually convince the African states, inside and outside the sub-continent, that Portugal's place in Africa should be accepted. The issue with the Black Africans in this regard is "colonialism", not "racism" as in South Africa's case. The two are closely linked, of course, in Black African attitudes, but Portugal makes every effort to avoid being identified with South Africa in respect of internal "racial" policies.

Zambia has a crucial strategic position in regard to Rhodesia, Angola and Mocambique (as well as South West Africa). Although Zambia is geographically part of Southern Africa and is still linked economically to other countries of the sub-continent - including primarily South Africa and Rhodesia - it has turned radically away politically. However, Zambia's future development, both economically and politically, is highly uncertain, and it is by no means clear what role it will be playing within a few years time. In any case its role is and will be extremely important, and it will have a direct bearing on the political and economic development of the sub-continent as a whole.

South West Africa remains a vital issue for South Africa. Although special attention has not been given to this issue in this paper, its bearing on South Africa's general international relations must be recognised. No countries - and this includes the other independent Black states of Southern Africa - acknowledge South Africa's right de jure to administer the Territory. There are at present important negotiations with the U.N. Secretary-General in progress, holding out the possibility of some form of accommodation between U.N. and South African positions, if sufficient time is allowed for the negotiation process. In any case, the fact that there are negotiations, has meant a reduction of pressure on this score for the time being.

However, the issue of South West Africa remains part of the central issue on which attention is constantly focussed, namely the separate development policies of the South African Government, which are known in the outside world simply as "apartheid". That this is the central issue is obvious, but it serves no purpose simply to say, therefore, that the answer to the problems of Southern Africa is for South Africa to

remove that issue. The big question would still remain, namely how this is to be done, given the realities of the situation. A discussion of this question is beyond the limits drawn for this paper, although it is necessary to recognise clearly that this is the basic political factor in South Africa's relations with its Black neighbours in the sub-continent, and that it has strong centrifugal effects. While this remains true, there will never be a deep commitment to regionally oriented development - economic or political - in the sub-continent of Africa.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

1. Quoted by Andrew M. Kamarck in African Diplomacy, edited by Vernon McKay, London, Pall Mall Press, p.55.
2. L. Gray Cowan in African Diplomacy, op. cit., p. 120.
3. Ibid, p. 120.
4. See for instance interview with the Minister for Commerce, Industry and Mines, the Hon. Sishayi S. Nxumalo, entitled "Swaziland and Inter-African Trade" in Swaziland Today, No. 1, Feb. 1972, and also paper by Mr. Nxumalo entitled International Trade and Investment: The Case of Swaziland, presented at Conference on "Accelerated Development in Southern Africa", Johannesburg, March 1972.
5. Statement published by Lesotho National Development Corp., Maseru, 11 August, 1972.
6. See, for instance, paper by Professor D.C. Midgley and the comments thereon by Mr. A.C. Campbell, as reproduced in Chapter III of The Use and Protection of Natural Resources in Southern Africa, published by the S.A. Institute of International Affairs, 1972. According to Mr. Campbell there is also concern in Botswana about the ecological effects of drawing water from the Okavango Delta.
7. The South African Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Hendrick Schoeman, when he opened the 13th meeting of SARCCUS on 18 September, 1972, pointed out that all Southern African countries were striving towards economic viability and independence. But to achieve this, he said, they would have to acknowledge their mutual interdependence. He praised the "dialogue" conducted by SARCCUS and wondered whether this could not be emulated in other fields of science and technology which were essential to raising standards of all the peoples of Southern Africa. Noting that SARCCUS is a non-political organisation which aims at ensuring the best use of natural resources through international co-operation, Mr. Schoeman said it had functioned for 22 years and it would be accepted that its work was appreciated by member governments. Otherwise they would have ceased supporting it.
(From report in Rand Daily Mail, 19 Sept. 1972, p.4)

For an account of the origins, history and work of SARCCUS see article by Dr. D.M. Joubert (Secretary-General) in appendix 1 of The Use and Protection of Natural Resources in Southern Africa, published by the S.A. Institute of International Affairs, 1972.

8. National Development Plan, 1970 - 75, Govt. Printer, Gaborone, Sept. 1970.
9. Bulletin of the Africa Institute of South Africa, Vol. X No. 6, July 1970, p.256. Among other relevant policy statements see the Prime Minister's speech on "South Africa's Outward Policy" in July 1969, in South Africa in the World, Suid Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns, 1970, p. 101.

10. Botswana officials, for instance, expressed concern over the fact that South Africa suspended foreign currency dealings in December, 1971, without informing Botswana (or presumably the other two monetary union partners) and the same occurred when the subsequent rand devaluation was announced - see report in The Star, 8 March 1971, p.28. Similar concern has been expressed by Lesotho officials - see report in The Star, 20 July, 1972, p.27.
11. There have been reports about difficulties created by South Africa in regard to the proposed establishment of certain factories in both Swaziland and Lesotho - see, for instance, the Financial Mail, 4 February, 1972, p.283, S.A. Financial Gazette, 21 April 1972, p.7, The Star, 20 July, 1972, p. 27 and The Star, 11 Sept. 1972, p.23.

See also in this connection P.M. Landell-Mills, The 1969 Southern African Customs Union Agreement, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 9,2,(1971). p.269.
12. See for instance G.M.E. Leistner, Co-operation for Development in Southern Africa, paper (No. DEV/72/C2/2) presented to Conference on "Accelerated Development in Southern Africa", Johannesburg, March 1972.
13. Ibid, p.2
14. Kutlwano, May 1970, p.20, quoted in paper by Dr. P. Smit in Samewerking in Suidelike Afrika, Sentrum vir Internasionale Politiek, Potchefstroom, 1971.
15. The Star, 7 September, 1971, p.25.
16. Rand Daily Mail, 27 March, 1971.
17. The following summary of UNDP activities in the Southern African region is based on information provided by the UNDP Regional Representative in Lusaka, which is set out more fully in the Appendix to a paper (No. DEV/72/C3/3) by David Hirschmann, entitled The policies, Interests and Attitudes of Donor and Recipient Countries; and the Role of Multi-lateral Aid presented to the Conference on "Accelerated Development in Southern Africa," , Johannesburg, March 1972.
18. G.M.E. Leistner, op. cit., p.17.
19. The above details from Botswana Daily News, Weekly Edition, No. 19, 5 April, 1972.
20. Lesotho: An Economic Survey, published by Barclays Bank D.C.O., London, Feb. 1970, p.26.
21. Activities of the U.N. and its Family of Agencies in Zambia, Govt. Printer, Lusaka, April 1971.
22. Koena News (Maseru), Vol. 6 No. 162, 25 August, 1972.
23. Lesotho, An Economic Survey, op. cit., p. 26.

24. Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure for the Development Fund, 1972-73 Govt. Printer, Gaborone.
25. See, for instance, the latest report of the CDC, for the year ended 31 December, 1971. The work of the Corporation in Africa is organised in four regions : Southern Africa, covering Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Rhodesia (although it is apparently not operating in the latter country at present); Central Africa, covering Zambia and Malawi; East Africa; and West Africa.
26. Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure for the Development Fund, 1972-73 Govt. Printer, Gaborone.
27. Botswana Daily News, No. 140, 6 Sept. 1972.
28. See G.M.E. Leistner, op. cit., p. 18.
29. J.L. Sadie, An Economic Commission for Southern Africa, South Africa International, Vol. 1 No. 4, April 1971.
30. Ibid, p. 169.
31. An interesting recent development has been the establishment of a new development Bank for Southern Africa - EDESA - with the object of assisting developing states, including the Homelands. It is registered in Luxembourg with capital of \$25 million (± R20 million). See report in The Star 19 Sept. 1972, p.28.
32. As Chief Jonathan said in 1967 in respect of Lesotho, "... you cannot build Utopia overnight, and you cannot ignore the facts of geography and economics". (Quoted in M.C. Eksteen, Lesotho in Uitwaartse Beweging, 1972, Perskor-Uitgewery, Johannesburg, p. 127.)
33. Doudou Thiam, The Foreign Policy of African States, London, J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1965, p.5 et seq.
34. Ibid, p.15
35. Rupert Emerson, Nationalism and Political Development, reprinted in Development: For what?, ed. John H. Hallowell, 1964, Duke University Press, p. 4.
36. Even Nigeria, which has fuller economic and political independence than most African states, is an illustration of this point. The late Olasupo Ojedokun, who was Director of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, wrote earlier this year: "Increasingly, economics have come to dominate modern international relations. Not that there was a time when nations ignored economic considerations in their daily contacts; however the extensive percolation of economic issues into all aspects of international affairs is of a recent origin. Nigeria's external relations have shown traces of this trend. Indeed, the most marked feature of her foreign and domestic policies in the last quarter has been the prominence of economic issues.

The drive for a truly non-aligned position in world affairs, and the pursuit of the objectives of the Organisation of African Unity are only matched by a determination to secure economic independence at home. There is now a feeling of self-assurance and self-reliance - a widespread realisation, that, in the words of General Gowon, 'our only way to development lies through self-reliance and a determination on the part of all of us to make it on our own'."

- Nigeria: Bulletin on Foreign Affairs, Lagos, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 1 No. 4, May 1972, editorial.

37. L. Gray Cowan, op. cit., p. 125.
38. Doudou Thiam, op. cit., p. 117.
39. See, for instance, report in The Star, 6 March 1972, p.1. Previously Chief Jonathan had spoken about the need for African states to find a basis for unity on the dialogue issue, before approaching White governments. See The Star, 3 December 1971, p. 7, Rand Daily Mail, 17 December, 1971, p. 2; The Star, 17 December 1971, p. 11. Even earlier, in September 1970, Chief Jonathan was reported to have told an OAU conference in Addis Ababa that Lesotho was the only country qualified to speak with authority on the problems of Southern Africa and he requested that Lesotho be consulted on any decision taken by the OAU or individual member states on proposed solutions to these problems. See report in Rand Daily Mail, 9 September, 1970.
40. Thiam's "micro-nationalism", however, refers to the states inherited from the colonial powers, within their presently recognised boundaries. So it would not, strictly speaking, allow for partition and the independence of various nations within these present international boundaries, as envisaged in South African policy for South West Africa and the Republic itself.
41. For background and further details see, among others, J.E. Spence, Republic under Pressure, 1965, OUP, London; Gail-Maryse Cockram, Vorster's Foreign Policy, 1970, Academica, Pretoria and Cape Town; Amry Vandenbosch, South Africa and the World, 1970, the Univ. of Kentucky Press; Gerrit Olivier, South African Foreign Policy, in Denis Worrall (ed.), South Africa: Government and Politics, 1971, Van Schaik, Pretoria; John Barratt, South Africa's Outward Policy: From Isolation to Dialogue, in Nic Rhodie (ed.) South African Dialogue, 1972, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Johannesburg.
42. Zdenek Cervenka, The Organisation of African Unity and Its Charter, 1968, C. Hurst & Co., London, p. 26 et seq., and L. Gray Cowan, op. cit., p. 138.
43. Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 9 No. 6, 15 July 1972, pp. 2497, 2498, and 2499; The Times (London) 16, 17 and 20 June 1972.
44. The Star, 11 Sept. 1972, p.23. Malawi was not represented at the meeting, although President Banda has acknowledged the special efforts of President Nyerere to persuade Malawi to attend, which President Banda regarded as a sign of improving relations with Tanzania.

45. The Star, 15 December 1970.
46. The Star, 9 March 1971
47. Die Transvaler, 3 September 1970
48. Die Vaderland, 12 September 1972.
49. Translated from Afrikaans report in Die Vaderland, 11 August 1972, p. 5.
50. Extracts from the text of the Lusaka Manifesto as reproduced in Questions Affecting South Africa at the 24th Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly (1969), S.A. Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 1970, Annexure I.
51. While South African trade with Africa as a whole has steadily increased, this has been the result of the development of trade in the sub-continent only. Trade with the rest of Africa has in fact declined. See e.g. "Afrika-handel is 'n Taaie" in Rapport, 3 Sept. 1972.
52. Malawi News, 17 November 1970.
53. The Times (London), 11 November 1970.
54. From a statement in December 1970, quoted in The Star, 23 March 1971.
55. From text of message as reproduced in the Bulletin of the Africa Institute of South Africa, Vol. IX No. 6, July 1971, pp.250 and 251.
56. From report in Die Burger, 4 July 1972. This policy statement was given in an interview to "Le Monde", Paris, after President Senghor's meetings with President Pompidou of France and also with British Prime Minister Heath. President Senghor's stature in Africa and his closer relations in recent times with President Houphouët-Boigny made this a significant statement.
57. Die Vaderland, 11 Sept. 1972.
58. For a fuller analysis, which has been drawn on for the above summary, see lecture on "Chinese Foreign Policy" given by W.A.C. Adie to the S.A. Institute of International Affairs, Witwatersrand and Pretoria Branches, July 1972. Text to be issued by S.A. Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg.
59. Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 6, 15 July, 1972, p.2501A; Die Transvaler, 2 Sept. 1972, p.3, and The Star, 5 Sept. 1972.
60. Die Transvaler, 1 June 1972.
61. Die Transvaler, 5 May 1972.
62. From statement during press conference in Johannesburg, 10 November 1970, as reproduced in S.A. Institute of International Affairs, Newsletter, No. 8, Dec. 1970, p. 12.
63. Ibid, p. 15.

64. See, for instance, remarks of Assistant Secretary of State David Newsom to the African Affairs sub-committee of the U.S. House of Representatives in December, 1970, as quoted in S. A. Institute of International Affairs, Newsletter, 1971 No. 1, Feb. 1971, p.20 et seq.
65. U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers has, for instance, referred to the "continued contacts with South Africans of all races in the belief that this is the most effective way of assisting in this process" of change. U.S. Foreign Policy 1971: A Report of the Secretary of State, Dept. of State Publication 8634, March 1972.
66. Botswana Daily News, 15 September 1971. U.S. President Nixon has also said: "We have sought to provide assistance and encouragement to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in their efforts to prove the viability of multi-racial societies in the heart of Africa." - The Times, (London) 11 Sept. 1972, Special Supplement, p. 1.
67. The Times (London), 11 September 1972, Special Supplement, p. 1.
68. The agreement for the latter loan of R9 475 million was signed only in September, 1972. It is therefore not included in the total figure for 1971 given above.
69. The Botswana Vice-President, Dr. Masire, has recently described the road as a "major landmark" in the development of Botswana. "Hitherto we have had to rely on the minority regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa for all our means of communications and trading links with the rest of the world. Now we shall have a direct all-weather road to Zambia, a country with which we have close friendship."

- Botswana Daily News, No. 140, 6 Sept. 1972, p. 2.
70. When the loan agreement was signed, U.S. Ambassador Charles Nelson assured Botswana of American co-operation in achieving the goal of closer links with countries north of the Zambezi. "This closer association with a majority-ruled state in Southern Africa is an objective which I feel merits the support of all African nations." - Ibid, p.1.
71. See, for instance, Mr. David Newsom's press conference in Johannesburg, referred to above (note 62).
72. The Times (London), Special supplement, op. cit., p.iv.