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Numbers Twenty-five and Twenty-six, Desember/December 1981

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### **Namibia**

The hon. member for Sea Point asked . . . whether in decisions of the Government, when it comes to tactical moves such as our operations against Swapo in Angola, due weight was given to the international implications. The hon. member should bear in mind that in this country there is a Security Council of which I am a member. There is also a Cabinet of which I am a member.

Every time matters of that nature are discussed, it is my task to inform fully the hon. the Prime Minister and my colleagues as to the probable and expected international consequences of our decisions. That is my task. Without implying that I am the only one qualified to do so I do have a little experience in this field having served in the Department of Foreign Affairs for 18 years before I entered politics in 1970. I think that by now I should know more or less what the international consequences would be of just about every decision this Government takes with an international bearing.

My task is to point out to the Government those consequences and then it is also my task to weigh together with the Government members the pros and cons, the advantages and disadvantages international and domestic of the action contemplated. Sometimes we are not in the position where we can weigh the advantages and disadvantages in the positive sense but we find ourselves in a position where our alternatives are limited to painful ones, all of them, and then we must choose the less painful of two painful alternatives.

I cannot remain in the Cabinet if, after I have given my opinion on the probable consequences of a decision of the Government, I do not support that decision after it has finally been taken. That is why, after I have pointed out the consequences which a certain decision will have on our international relations my task ends there. Then comes the weighing up. If

\* Statement made during the debate on the Minister's budget vote.

we then decide to take a decision despite the fact that we know full well that that decision is going to have very and sometimes extremely harmful consequences in so far as our international relations are concerned, we must have the courage to take that decision. That is the way in which a country is governed; a country cannot be governed merely by the taking of popular and uncomplicated decisions. I nevertheless thank the hon. member for the way in which he phrased that question.

He also asked me what it was that I told the President of the USA, Gen. Haig, Mr Clark, Mr Abrahams and Dr Crocker. He wanted to know what I had told them, what it was that I told them which gave rise to expectations and favourable dispositions on their part. However, it is not clear to me what the expectations are. I have not asked a single member of the present American Administration to make any statement on South Africa. Even before I went to the United States, President Reagan, Gen. Haig and other members of the American Cabinet and members within the Government circle made certain statements that were considered by the world at large as pro-South African, as favourable towards our country. I did not solicit those statements. I went to the United States and informed Gen. Haig of my Government's ideals and objectives and concerns both in South and Southern Africa. I told him that this Government was faced with a dilemma and that there were indeed certain matters that we would wish to rectify or change. However, should we do it without the required support or at too great a pace, there would be a White back-lash. This Government would then be out-voted, and the only party that could then take our place was not the PFP, but the HNP. And that is a serious matter, and it ought to be a serious matter for hon. members on the other side as well . . . I explained our internal situation to Gen. Haig and told him that we had recently held an election in which the HNP got almost as many votes as the official Opposition. That is a fact, Sir. I pointed out to him what the record of the hon. the Prime Minister, the leader of the NP, is. All this nonsense of the hon. the Prime Minister suddenly backtracking is part of an evil strategy. The very same people who make these allegations privately admit that the hon. the Prime Minister is moving ahead, that he is strong and firm in his resolve to go ahead. They merely want to push him a little, force him to move a little faster. Others hope that he may trip up. In an effort to arouse suspicion within his own party ranks, they say he is back-tracking and try to play him off against my colleague Dr the hon. Andries Treurnicht in attempt to sow dissent and suspicion all round. This, Sir, is part of a strategy, and I am aware of it. I know it because a member of the editorial staff of an English newspaper who is a friend of mine, told me so himself. He said that that was the kind of thing they discuss at their editorial meetings, and I believe this gentleman.

I further informed Gen. Haig of the unstable situation in Africa, and I

shall refer to that again in a moment. I told him that unless he, and the rest of America, accepted the arithmetic of Africa, they would be unable to play a role in this continent, because Africa was dying. I realize that Nigeria holds a very prominent position in America's approach to African issues because of her oil production. However, I shall refer to the relevant statistics in a moment in regard to another argument that I wish to develop. But I gave Gen. Haig some statistics, startling statistics, not because we derive joy from the fact that Africa finds itself in a desperate state. When 63 million people, 45 per cent of the economically active population of Africa are unemployed, it is a statistic that cannot be laughed away. It is no joke, but a very serious matter. That statistic has a certain devastating meaning, which must be analysed. If I say that the total external debt of the African countries this year will run into \$50 billion, then I do not say it because I want to show that we are in a better position. Irrespective of our position, that statistic will remain and the debt will remain, and the causes for that condition will have to be analysed and faced, otherwise Africa has no hope. If the trade deficit of the African countries ran into \$20 billion last year, it is a serious matter. If some African countries now spend more than half of their earnings on their exports to defray their oil bill then I say they have no hope, not because they are Black. They have no hope because the statistical fact says they have no hope. I explained these points to General Haig out of fear that — I say this without intending to reflect negatively on particular American representatives — what reaches him will be filtered by the diplomatic process.

I discussed with General Haig our internal situation to some extent, although I did not go there with the primary purpose of doing that. The primary purpose at that stage was really to get down to talks on South West Africa, a matter to which I will revert in a moment. That was the primary purpose, and most of our time was indeed devoted to a discussion on South West Africa. It was only after we had completed that part of our discussion that I started to talk about bilateral matters. The question of military attaches was discussed, as also the question of a consular treaty. We also broached other subjects, such as the question concerning fuel for Koeberg, which is a very complicated and delicate subject about which I will not say any more and, so also I hope, no one else in the debate. We also touched briefly on the future of the Southern African region. I gave him my views on this, and I warned General Haig that the countries of Southern Africa were drifting towards a conflict situation. I did say that, and I pointed out that there was an urgent need for this drift to be arrested soon, before it reached the precipice, the point of no return. I think Dr Chester Crocker's Honolulu speech<sup>1</sup> recently which, *inter alia*, also encompassed

1. See pages 43-57 of this issue.

this subject, was realistic and constructive. However, the moment we respond too favourably to that speech we will hear that the South African racist Foreign Minister is conspiring with Chester Crocker, and then Chester Crocker will be in trouble. This is the way things work. Therefore suffice it for me to say that it was a constructive speech, one indicating a realistic direction which I think the States of Southern Africa could follow in order to achieve mutually beneficial co-operation.

To conclude this part of my remarks I want to say that I did not make promises to General Haig, to Mr Clarke, to Mr Abrahams, to Dr Crocker or, for that matter, to President Reagan when I saw them, nor the other Ministers I saw, and I saw four other Cabinet Ministers. I did not make promises. I stated the views of our Government and conveyed the objectives of my Prime Minister. I told them what my Prime Minister stood for. I told them what he would like to achieve, and I warned them that some of these objectives would not be achieved easily or fast. I gave the reasons for that, and I did not ask whether they approved of them. I can also say that no one in the United States indicated to me that they would wish this Government to relinquish its political power base in order to work towards a better understanding. I will not take this matter further. I have purposely phrased this observation in the vaguest possible way, and I do not think I should take it further than that.

### **US and Soviet interests**

I do not believe that we in South Africa should base our long-term planning exclusively on this more realistic, constructive approach of the United States. We should not overlook it, but as far as the future is concerned — I am talking of the next two decades, because we are not living for the next five years only — dramatic changes may occur in the present power structure as we know it, and in the balance of power between the East and the West. As we all know, since World War II the global power structure has been dominated by tension and conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. At one of the interminable international conferences on peace and security, speaker after speaker went to the platform and bemoaned and lamented the lack of communication which existed between the Soviet Union and the United States. They said if only they could communicate, if only there could be better understanding between the two countries, then maybe they would get to the stage where international agreements could be concluded on the decisively important matter of world security and world peace. Then late in the afternoon it was the American representative's turn, and as he walked to the speaker's rostrum, he put aside the text of his long and well-prepared speech, looked up and said:



"Ladies and gentlemen, we know exactly what the Soviet Union wants, and the Soviet Union knows exactly what we want. We consistently want the same thing. There is nothing wrong with our communication. As a matter of fact, our communications are designed precisely to prevent each other from attaining our respective objectives. The Soviet Union knows this, and we know it. What is more, we know that they know that we know, and they know that we know that they know. Therefore we understand each other perfectly."

When he sat down he received considerable applause because he was the only one who did not beat about the bush. Be that as it may, I personally believe that there are indications — although they are not clearly visible now — of developments which may force a far-reaching transformation in the present power struggle structure, which may bring about new political options especially for key States in the southern hemisphere. That is what I am interested in — the southern hemisphere, the other States of importance in this region. The competition between the two super-powers — for the moment Afghanistan is still too much in the mind of Western leaders and the Polish situation is heating up to a boiling point — may nevertheless in time become less accentuated and more attenuated and new political and economic centres in the North-South complex could become more prominent.

Even if the strains and stresses in the relations between the Soviet Union and America do not become less accentuated, I still believe that each of the super-powers will start looking towards other allies or constellations of allies in order to further their own aims. Among the most important of the new political groupings which I foresee could be the Europe-Arab-African triangle; linkages could develop among States in the southern hemisphere as a counterpart to the industrialized northern alliance. The USA in an effort to retain possession of its unchallenged global leadership may have to seek special relationships with key southern States outside its influence in the western hemisphere.

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On the part of the USA certain adjustments need to be made. There is a growing need for the USA to placate traditional European allies whose proximity to the Soviet Union makes them vulnerable to Soviet military power. I do not want to mention countries, but we are aware of European powers which at present already enjoy such a volume of trade with the Soviet Union that it will be extremely difficult for them to entertain an anti-Russian policy, even at the instigation of the USA. These European States may become increasingly reluctant, as I have said, to support politi-

cal initiatives of the USA that could provoke a reaction from the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union has a structural weakness in its ability to compete with the USA. Its economic power is inadequate for it to sustain the military or political contests in the long run against the American campaign. About that I have no doubt. Its only effective leverage in expanding influence has been its military aid. It is interesting to know that the total contribution of the Soviet Union towards development in Africa does not amount to more than about \$350 million, while the total aid from the USA and Western countries now runs into well over \$15 billion. So the Soviet Union has not given a fraction of the aid the West has given, but of course it still commands a majority of votes in the general Assembly of the UN.

The Soviet Union's economic power is inadequate, I claim, to sustain a long-term campaign against the USA. Because the Soviet Union cannot satisfy the long-term economic development needs of client States — this is another important fact — it may be expected to encounter political setbacks, especially in the Middle East and Africa. The Soviet Union will in the short term remain a serious danger to all states in strategically important regions, but I predict that in the long term it will not be able to satisfy the economic needs of its African clients. It does not have the technical know-how. It does not have the funds. It also does not have the psychological disposition to manage cordial relations with Africa. That is the prediction I am making. Domestically the Soviet Union will face increasingly difficult problems of an economic and ethnic nature, as I have said, problems which will weaken its ability to compete with the United States. It is uncertain, however — and this is my problem — whether the West, because of its own divisive interests, will be able to take advantage of the erosion in Soviet influence which I expect to occur in the long-term.

Indications are that a closer alliance may develop between Western Europe and Africa, as I have already said. The two continents may develop a mutual interdependence to provide for their security through their own devices rather than through protection by super-powers. The Europeans may wish to develop a greater independence from the United States in their political relationship with Africa. The first signs of this are already there. France, under a Socialist Government, has already started to promote a Euro-Arab-African concept in terms of which European Governments will encourage Arab financing of African economic development to provide lucrative markets for imports from Europe. It is not an unrealistic concept. Of course, Africa will have to overcome its own problems of instability and socio-economic retrogression if it wants to attract sufficient investment and technological assistance.

Although Red China's impact on the global political balance cannot be ignored, its economic constraints impair its ability to project effective

power beyond its borders at this stage. It is a menace as far as the future is concerned, but for the time being it has too many people to feed and too many internal problems to solve. China is nevertheless expected to remain politically active in developing countries, Third World countries, in an attempt to offer an alternative alongside the European initiative to Soviet aid and influence.

### **Southern hemisphere**

As far as the southern part of the globe is concerned, owing to continuing competition among northern global powers, new linkages among developing countries in the southern hemisphere may emerge. This is the point which I want to make. Amongst the most important southern powers likely to play an important role outside regional boundaries, will, in my opinion, be Brazil and Argentina, South Africa and Nigeria, India and Australia. Economic, political and security considerations will be determinants in future decisions by southern hemisphere States seeking to counter regional dominance of the northern alliances. The common interests of the South Atlantic States in protecting their growing commercial ties will favour the evolution of a more formal South Atlantic co-operation.

If one looks at the map, it is very interesting to note how Nigeria and South Africa, on the African continent, and Brazil and Argentina, on the South American continent, straddle the South Atlantic Ocean. It is almost as though the ocean invites the four of them into closer co-operation. Personally I believe that if South Africa and Nigeria could be drawn closer together, it would be of tremendous benefit to the whole of the African continent, because — and let us face it — Nigeria produces and possesses resources which we need, and we have resources and manage technologies which Nigeria needs. I should hope that the opportunity which is being offered, probably by new linkages in the north-south constellation of interests — to call it that — will enable Nigeria and South Africa to be drawn closer together, if for no other reason, than for the very good reason that they are being threatened by the same power, and they also have — South Africa perhaps not to the same extent at this stage — to contend with the same clients of the Soviet Union. Mr Gaddafi will certainly not stop short at Chad. He will not stop short at what he is doing in Mauritius. He will not stop short at what he is doing in other parts of the world. Therefore I believe that, with a little bit of realistic assessment on the part of Nigeria, and with certain adjustments on the part of South Africa, these two important African countries could become a bulwark, in the real sense of the word, against foreign intrusion on our continent.

In the medium and long run we may witness drastic adjustments in the global political *status quo*. Traditional linkages, antagonisms and alliances

are likely to be restructured. Political pragmatism may displace ideological preference. On the continent of Africa the prospect of diminished super-power involvement could open the way for expanded influence for South Africa. The opportunities for South Africa to gain advantage from its strengths — economic and technological development, strategic location and valuable mineral and human resources — are expected to grow wider. South Africa could serve as a key southern support both for European engagement in African development and security for the United States' interest in developing powerful regional allies throughout the southern hemisphere. Of importance will be the role that South Africa can play in promoting political stability in the region, which will minimize the causes of potential disruption by outside military engagements in Africa. The benefits that this country might gain will strongly depend on South Africa's ability to establish its credibility and status, not only as a necessary, but also as an acceptable and desirable partner for other Governments on the continent. Other African States will respond favourably to South African initiatives to the extent that association and identification with South Africa will no longer present a political liability.

Having said that, hon. members may ask me: But what is holding us back? With these very substantial prospects there is an unlimited potential for South Africa to play a key role in the development and security of Africa, in the South Atlantic and in the southern hemisphere and to link up with Western interests, thereby rendering Soviet adventures and interference ineffectual for decades to come. What is holding us back? It is true that particularly in this respect South West Africa does present a very severe problem. I cannot deny that. I cannot deny the divisive effect that the problem of South West Africa has on the improvement of relations in Southern Africa. On the other hand, if we are to stand by and allow the achievement of power in South West Africa by a party through the barrel of a gun, then, too, nothing can come of the potential role that South Africa could play in 10 or 20 years' time on this continent or in the South Atlantic. Then that dream will have been dreamt in vain.

### **Namibia**

I appreciate the way in which the hon. member for Sea Point raised the South West Africa issue today. There are still a number of important matters concerning this intractable problem that are unresolved, but progress has been made. Hon. members will remember that we reached an impasse after the Geneva Conference earlier this year, and we are not yet at the stage where I can predict that agreement is imminent, because the hurdles that must still be crossed are quite high. However, if one looks at the distance we have travelled from, when we had to pick up the pieces to see

what could be salvaged of the settlement plan, and we see where we are now, then I think it is correct to say that substantial progress has been made, and it has been made on the basis of mutual confidence between us and those with whom we talked.

I consider that further discussions will be required urgently between this Government and governments of the Five. We have reached a delicate stage where it will be necessary to clear up a number of decisively important points in order to decide whether or not we can go forward at all. The South African Government cannot act on its own in these negotiations, a fact of reality which is not often very well understood by a number of people. This sometimes leads to the accusation that we are dragging our feet or delaying matters, which is not true. Our approach is that it is for the people of the territory to decide. This Government cannot on its own make decisions affecting the future of that country. Every time I return from the United States or Mr Clark visits us or I receive a telegram or a communication or a message from a European power in this regard, I have to approach the Administrator-General of the territory. He then has to call together the members of the Ministers' council in that territory for consultation with a view to procuring their consent for the proposal in question. That is the way it is. There is no way in which my Government can unilaterally start taking decisions for South West Africa. That is not our approach. What makes it particularly difficult for us is that as long as we have this bias in favour of Swapo on the part of the General Assembly of the United Nations — and now even on the part of the Security Council of the United Nations — so long will it make my task and the task of the hon. the Prime Minister and the task of my hon. colleague, General Malan that much more difficult. My colleague, the hon. the Minister of Defence, helps me very often in persuading the leaders of the territory towards a viewpoint that will facilitate the negotiations with a view to achieving an internationally acceptable agreement. It is not always easy. In April of this year even the Security Council refused the DTA a hearing. Members of the DTA at that stage took a very serious view of that unfortunate event and were considering the exclusion of any military component of Untag from service in the territory during any period that might lead up to an election or independence in the territory. That problem amongst others has not yet been resolved. I believe that we have now been given some flexibility by the democratic parties in the territory on this matter. Whether it will be enough, I do not know but I do not wish to say any more about it.

In relation to the Cuban presence in Angola, although not directly linked to this matter — I do not wish to be misunderstood here — and although we do not insist that Cuban withdrawal should be a precondition for further negotiations, the fact of the matter is that in practice their presence in such large numbers does increase the political stress and contributes

towards a feeling of insecurity raising the fears and suspicions in that region. This again makes it so much more difficult to make progress in persuading the parties to come to an agreement. After all, Mr Chairman, is there an hon. member in this House today who would really expect me to persuade parties in South West Africa to trust certain elements of the United Nations when I know full well that they have already stabbed me in the back? This is part of the problem. The hon. member for Sea Point also mentioned this. There is this problem of the pro-Swapo bias of the United Nations which has not yet been resolved, not at all. In addition there are a number of other matters that remain unresolved. However, I want to repeat this: Nothing has happened — and this is sometimes how progress is measured — which makes it impossible to resolve the outstanding issues. I want to thank the hon. member for Sea Point as well as the hon. member for Umhlanga for the responsible and serious manner in which they dealt with the South West Africa issue.

Mr Chairman, as I see it, a further matter that makes constructive co-operation in Southern Africa very difficult if not impossible is that the African States have a petrified concept of the Whites of this country. They blindly accept the fact that the Whites of this country regard themselves as being superior to Blacks, hating Blacks, despising them, dehumanizing them, denigrating them and ill-treating them. This attitude of theirs is as a result of reports sent out of this country. Let me say immediately here that I have enough fronts to fight on today and I do not want to have to fight the press as well. However, I am referring here to the way in which reports leave this country. One can have 999 successful sport events in this country where Black and White athletes compete and where the audience applauds the Black winner of an event, but one will not read about such an event in the newspapers. However, just let one official somewhere make an error or a *faux pas*, then the incident receives headline publicity, and what is read abroad is that such an incident is characteristic of the sport practice in this country. This is the sad part of it.

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### **Southern Africa**

What I am trying to do is to explain why it is that African leaders to the north of us as well as many other people elsewhere in the world harbour so much ill-feeling towards the Whites of South Africa. I want to make one thing clear to my hon. friends on that side of the House. If they think that a distinction will be made as to PFP, NRP, NP and even HNP when a major conflict occurs, they are making the mistake of their lives. That such a distinction will be made is just not true. . . .

The point I want to make is that there rests a responsibility, not only on this side of the House, but on all of us and also on our newspapers to approach relations between our diverse peoples in a balanced and responsible way. I do not want to criticize them, but I should like to point out that they will find that the Government is always prepared to listen to constructive suggestions and proposals. We are not, however, going to be told how to run this country and we are certainly not going to be told to refrain from action which the Government considers to be in the interests of the stability, security and safety of this country.

I said earlier that I am present in the Cabinet when decisions are taken which I know will have extremely harmful effects on our relations abroad. Those effects must be weighed against the stability of the country, its security and the maintenance of law and order. Why? The businessman, the industrialist, the investor, in the first instance — I do not say that he is an immoral man or that he is not sensitive to injustices in the country — looks for stability. He looks to see whether in the country there are available developed and efficient infrastructures such as harbours, ports, railway lines, roads, bridges and adequate and secured energy and water supplies. Businessmen want to know whether there is an independent judiciary functioning which can protect the rights and interests of such industrialists. They also want to know whether there is the possibility that the Government might nationalize their enterprises. They look to see whether in that country there is freedom of the press and of expression, whether there are opposition parties in the Parliament, whether there are regular and genuine elections etc. That is the dilemma of Africa. I have already referred to our dilemma and will refer to it again. However, Africa, north of us also has dilemmas, and I do not say this in a pejorative sense. I do not believe in racial superiority and neither does the Government. The Government is in fact prepared to prove to a Black man that he is the equal of a White man. We are prepared to help Black farmers, technicians, clerks and railway workers in every phase of life.

I have already approached Black leaders and asked them to put aside a small section of their countries for private ownership, as this would enable a Black farmer to own 1 000 or 500 ha. I have assured them that we will help them with the training of the farmers, that we will assist them in every respect and teach them the market mechanisms. The Black farmer would then refuse to give his cattle to his family and instead send them to the market for cash. We are prepared to teach them bookkeeping, how to dip their cattle and repair the fences of their farms; in other words, to do the right thing at the right moment and to do it efficiently. We are prepared to do all this to prove to the Black man that he is the equal of the White man, because in that way one can instil dignity in a man and help him to get rid of his beggar image. Who are those responsible for the beg-

gar image of the Black African? They are the United Nations, the industrialized nations and the leaders of Africa. What has happened to Mr Nyerere's scientific socialism? Only 28 of his 2 800 social towns are functioning.

I am, however, not here today to quarrel with Africa; I am here to appeal to them in their own interest. We find it difficult to co-operate with certain African countries because of their inherent and basic instability. Nevertheless the reasons for co-operating with one another remain compelling. Co-operation would help me tremendously in my task but it is not going to help me if the taxpayers ask what has happened to the R10 million that I loaned to A, B and C and it has gone. We therefore all have a dilemma, the rest of Africa and South Africa, and the time is approaching that we must face the facts as they are without demanding confessions. Southern Africa is not a house of confession [*sic*]. What is required is a realistic appraisal of the dilemmas in which we find ourselves. If we fail to do this, the drift towards confrontation and conflagration in Southern Africa will become inevitable. Invective and acrimonious exchanges and eventually hatred, suspicion and mistrust will accumulate and will become a driving force towards a situation of general war in Southern Africa, and no winner will emerge from such a conflict situation.

I can quote — although I do not have the time to do so — pages and pages of statistics drawn from United Nations' documents to illustrate the general picture of deterioration in most African countries. These are not my figures but those from United Nations' documents that indicate that the socio-economic situation in Africa is perilous; that Africa is collapsing politically, and that unless drastic and radical changes are effected by African leaders, there is little hope for them. It will not benefit them to go to the United Nations year after year, putting up a flamboyant show, anaesthetizing themselves with the majority of votes they can muster against us. In terms of economic power their votes are worthless. This week in the General Assembly 117 votes were registered against us, but they do not even represent 30 per cent of the UN budget. The 25 abstaining countries probably pay 60 per cent of the UN budget, and this is what the Africans do not take into account. Recently an African leader who had visited Peking, Moscow and Europe came to see me. He told me that he was given presidential treatment in one of the European capitals. The red carpet was laid out and he enjoyed good wines, an excellent dinner and an impressive toast in his honour. However, he said, what worried him was that when on the next day he met banking officials, they inquired after the size of his country, its population, the number of children attending school, the extent of its railway lines, the availability of ports and its gross national product. They wanted to know the value of his country's total exports and imports, the amount of its external debts and loans and many other details



and this African leader's reaction to all this was: "What silly questions"!

I talked to this man and told him that these were not silly questions. I suggested he draft a document — that I would help him — setting these things out for those bankers because unless the arithmetic was correct he would not get the money. They would not give it to him. That is the way they work in Europe. They will vote with Africa at the United Nations against South Africa but they will not pay up. They will keep on controlling the prices of raw materials of African countries. Then I said to him: "Cannot you see the tremendous work that we have in front of us?" I pointed out a number of obvious examples like standardization. I mentioned that they could not afford to have too many types of cars, fridges, power stations and power supplies systems in his country. We have to standardize these things for him. He has enough problems as it is. Food production, protein increase, the eradication of plant, animal and human diseases, efficient transport and communication systems — there is such a vast job of work for us to do, all of us, if only certain decisions could be taken.

That is why to my mind the choice is quite clear. It is imminent. South West Africa is only a part of the Southern Africa scene. It is, as far as I am concerned, the tip of the iceberg. The bulk is underneath and much more dangerous. I believe the Angolans, the Zambians, the people of Zimbabwe and the people of Mozambique are tired of the turbulence of our region. If that is the case then I believe there rests an historical responsibility on all the leaders of Southern Africa to get together somehow and objectively and constructively to review the whole situation in Southern Africa. I believe the time for this is ripe. If it is true that Swapo is tired, has been demoralized and merely wishes to return to the territory of South West Africa, and if it is true that the Angolan Government very much wants to get rid of them but does not know how to do so unless they either win an election or are received back in the territory, we must look at the situation, all of us, responsibly to get to the truth of the matter. This Government is prepared to do so and act in that spirit. It is of decisive importance for the stability of Southern Africa that the governments of the region must discuss with each other their grudges and concerns as well as their hopes and aspirations. I had a constructive meeting recently with the new Lesotho Foreign Minister, Mr Mooki Molapo. (Mr Charles Molapo now has another portfolio. The Foreign Minister is now Mr Mooki Molapo.) I had a meeting with the Foreign Minister of Botswana. I had several meetings with the Foreign Minister of Swaziland. The King of Swaziland who recently celebrated his diamond jubilee made a constructive speech urging the States of Southern Africa to talk with each other instead of confronting each other. The Zimbabweans took it amiss that we had withdrawn locomotives, a matter which involves my colleague and friend, the hon. the

Minister of Transport Affairs. The point is that we do not want to be difficult about it. They think that we want to use government-to-government discussions to humiliate them, to boast to the press and to use it for propaganda purposes. That is not our purpose. There are indeed certain practical matters that must be discussed at government level. We will not, however, be intransigent about that. If there is another practical way to do this, we are prepared to follow that course but it is not necessary to shout every time a thing like that happens and to engage in the invective to which Mr Mugabe is given more and more. He should stop that. He has enough problems in his own country. That is why he is already heading for a one-party State. I do not approve of everything he is doing in his country. I do not approve of the way in which he is now dealing with the White people in that country or with other minority groups. I do not approve of the fact that his government has taken control of the Press in that country and also of the broadcasting station. I do not approve of the communal system that is allowed in many African countries. I do not approve of many aspects of their internal policies and practices, but I do not shout at them about it. I respect their right to conduct their affairs their way for I know that I have enough work in my own sphere. I know that it will take us more than a lifetime to do even a little of the vast volume of work that lies ahead of us in this country.

There are therefore these ominous signs of a perceptible drift towards confrontation which, in my opinion, would be disastrous for Southern Africa. The potential consequences should be deterrent for all of us because there can be no winner. There ought to be no doubt about this. If countries still think they can destroy South Africa, they are making a mistake. It is too late. The country has become too powerful. This is not boasting. This country has become too powerful to be destroyed by conventional means. A stalemate has been reached and so I believe that the pendulum which is swinging towards confrontation must swing back. It cannot continue in that direction. I believe that the gravitational power, so to speak, of our geographic propinquity and the economic determinants and imperatives is already exercising a retarding effect on the momentum of this pendulum. What is badly needed now, is a decision by the leaders of Southern Africa to stop it altogether and swing it back towards constructive co-operation. That is what is needed at this particular moment. I believe it is possible. It is not going to be an easy decision because we are dealing here with mental attitudes, suspicion, a history of invective, publicly committed positions, acrimonious exchanges, fears and mistrust. These abound. The decision is obvious but it is not an easy one. I realize that. However, I also believe that unless this decision is taken soon, the drift towards confrontation will become irreversible, with disastrous consequences for all of us. I believe that the economic imperatives of Southern Africa should set the scene. We

should put aside ideological differences for the time being. We can always come to agreement on our differences later and effect changes later, but right now this drift towards confrontation must be arrested before we reach the precipice. That is why, in my opinion, there also rests a heavy responsibility on all hon. members in the House to facilitate agreement and to avoid polarized confrontation. A momentous decision will have to be taken, a decision for which I hope our children and their children, generations from today, will thank the Black, White, Coloured and Asian leaders of Southern Africa one day as being the right decision. The South African Government stands ready to take just that decision.

Extract, concerning the loan of locomotives to Zimbabwe, from a statement in Parliament by the South African Minister of Transport Affairs, the Hon. H. Schoeman, on 22 September 1981\*

Yesterday hon. members of the Opposition kept harping on the question of why we do not want to supply Zimbabwe with diesel locomotives. The hon. member Dr. Welgemoed gave a detailed exposition of our relations with African countries in this regard. Is it wrong for me to tell Mr Joshua Chinamano of Zimbabwe that we are prepared to help him and that we must discuss matters? If he does not want to talk to me he can talk to the hon. the Minister of Foreign Affairs or even to the hon. the Prime Minister. The matters we must discuss are for example the role played by the ANC in Zimbabwe, and the presence of terrorist bases in that country. Is it wrong to want to co-operate with a country, even if it has just been reproaching you about the amount of your country's rolling stock it has in comparison with its own rolling stock in your country? Is it wrong of us to ask it in a friendly way to discuss matters with us? Why must the allegation now be made against us that because negotiations on these matters in the past were traditionally conducted between officials, it is not necessary for us to try and hold them at ministerial level now? Is it unfair of us to want to hold discussions with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Zimbabwe? . . . The hon. member (for Berea) should not forget that his own child or the son of the hon. the Leader of the Opposition could be attacked by gangs sheltering in Zimbabwe. Is it then so very wrong for this Government to say not that diesel locomotives should be withheld from Zimbabwe but that an opportunity should be created to talk about matters of mutual interest? Why must I now be accused of trying to obstruct the supplying of aid to Zimbabwe and other countries in Africa?

It does not help us to keep on discussing these matters. We must also not forget that there are other people who are talking about this. For example I can quote what is being written about this in European countries. The German newspaper *Der Spiegel* is not favourably disposed to-

\* Statement made during the debate on the Minister's budget vote

wards us at all. It is a newspaper with millions of readers. However, that same newspaper wrote the following:

The conference in Maputo, capital of the People's Republic of Mozambique, seemed to be seriously endangered. Then rescue was in sight from Johannesburg. A special plane of S.A. Airways supplied the necessary documents so that delegates could finally come to the actual subject in question: Less dependency on the racial Republic of South Africa.

That was the point of this discussion:

South Africa did not only supply the necessary documents, simultaneous systems and teleprinters for journalists for the successful outcome of the conference in November, but also the champagne to enable the conference participants to celebrate in the Polana Hotel the attempt to become less dependent on the country of apartheid.

South Africa delivers nearly everything which makes life bearable in the otherwise already tedious and boring People's Republic. In Nelspruit, South Africa, approximately 150 km from the Mozambique border, cars of the Frelimo State which are loaded up to the top, block the streets during weekdays. In Kaputo . . .

Kaputo is of course a pun on the German word "kaput", which means "finished", "destroyed", "ruined". This is what the Germans themselves write. This is a translation of a report which appeared in *Der Spiegel*.

In Kaputo, a nickname used for Maputo by the East Germans . . . The East German soldiers in that city use this nickname for Maputo:

. . . most of the basic food supplies are delivered by the hostile neighbour — maize, oil, flour, rice and meat. The foreign currency for this is earned by 35 000 guest workers from Mozambique in South African mines.

All I ask is whether we cannot hold discussions with these countries when the question of aid to them in the field of transport arises. The conclusion of this article is also interesting. It goes on to say:

Zambia's President, Kenneth Kaunda, who, beside Samora Machel and Tanzania's Julius Nyerere, is one of the leaders fighting against the apartheid régime, imported 3,5 million sacks of corn from South Africa. Although several alternative routes through allied countries are available for the transport of Zambian copper they prefer the S.A. Railways' goods trains because they are quicker and more reliable than Tanzanian, Mozambican and Angolan trains. Only when Kaunda controverts racism too intensively for Pretoria's liking there are delays. Copper vans remain on sidings, customs formalities take days instead of hours, and without any visible reason there is suddenly a lack of locomotives. . . .

This is what the Germans themselves write. This is a serious matter.

This is what is being written about our country in the outside world. And now the hon. member wants to make political capital here out of a few locomotives. I think I have said quite enough about this matter. It is a question of co-operation and it does not come from one side only.

SOUTH AFRICA. *Republic*. House of Assembly Debates, no. 7, 1981. Cols. 4424-4427

Extract, concerning Southern Africa, from the Commonwealth  
Heads of Government Meeting in Melbourne, 30 September –  
7 October 1981

Heads of Government reviewed developments in Southern Africa since their Lusaka Meeting which established the basis for Zimbabwe's independence under majority rule. They affirmed that the Lancaster House Conference and the negotiations which preceded it, demonstrated in a decisive and compelling manner the ability of Commonwealth members to work together to achieve consensus and to make a positive contribution to the resolution of major problems. In this respect they paid tribute to the central role of Britain in facilitating the process which enabled Zimbabwe to take its place as a sovereign independent country in the international community and the Commonwealth.

Heads of Government congratulated the Government of Zimbabwe which had earned the respect of the world community and fully justified the trust placed in it by the Commonwealth. Deep concern was expressed that, despite the significant achievement of Zimbabwe's independence, grave problems remained to be resolved in Southern Africa. Heads of Government acknowledged that, in fact, the situation had deteriorated. They recognised the urgent need to find solutions to these unresolved problems and renewed their total commitment to this objective.

Heads of Government stressed that at the core of these problems is the apartheid system which the white minority regime in South Africa continues to sustain and strengthen in a variety of ways, including the brutal internal repression of the African majority, the persistent refusal to implement the relevant Security Council resolutions providing for Namibia's long-delayed independence, the pursuit of policies of destabilisation against neighbouring states, the repeated threats to and violations of their territorial integrity and the expansion of South Africa's military capability. They considered that these developments not only threatened the stability of the region but also gravely endangered international peace and security. They therefore called on the international community to strengthen its collective resolve to eradicate apartheid.

Recalling their Declaration of Racism and Racial Prejudice proclaimed at Lusaka in 1979, Heads of Government reaffirmed their total and unequivocal

cal condemnation of apartheid as a crime against humanity and their total rejection of all policies designed to perpetuate this inhuman system. They accepted that it was the solemn and urgent duty of each of their governments vigorously to combat the evil of apartheid by the adoption of effective measures against it and to assist those struggling to rid themselves of it.

Heads of Government reaffirmed their Glencagles Agreement of 1977 and reiterated their commitment to fulfilling effectively their obligations under it.

Heads of Government took special account of the efforts of the United Nations to reach universally accepted approaches to the question of sporting contacts within the framework of the international campaign against apartheid. They agreed to redouble their own efforts to secure such international agreement.

Heads of Government expressed deep concern that there had been no progress towards the achievement of independence for Namibia. They registered their grave disappointment that the Pre-implementation Meeting in Geneva in January 1981<sup>1</sup> had been aborted by the refusal of the South African Government to agree to a date for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435. Heads of Government reaffirmed their determination to ensure that the people of Namibia should be allowed without further delay to exercise their right to self-determination and independence. Mindful of the role being played by the Western Contact Group, which included two of their members, they urged the group, as a matter of particular urgency, to intensify efforts to secure the implementation of Resolution 435 without modification or dilution as early as possible in 1982.

Heads of Government noted that, notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 418 (1977), imposing a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, the apartheid regime's expenditure on military expansion and nuclear development had increased alarmingly. They therefore called for a full and effective implementation of the arms embargo, including its efficient monitoring, and urged all governments to desist forthwith from any collaboration with South Africa which undermined the implementation of the arms embargo.

Heads of Government condemned the South African regime's repeated threats to and violations of the territorial integrity of the States of Southern Africa, in particular its recent invasion and occupation of Angolan territory. They called for an immediate withdrawal of all South African troops from Angola and an end to all such violations. They also condemned any attempt from any quarter to subvert the legitimate Government of Angola

1. See *Southern Africa Record*, No. 23, June 1981, pp 3-17.



through interference in the internal affairs of the country. In this connection, they expressed strong solidarity with the Front-Line States. They also expressed the view that African states should be able to pursue their own affairs without interference from any source.

In endorsing the report of the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa, Heads of Government expressed appreciation for the effective and constructive manner in which the committee had discharged its responsibilities in the past two years. They authorised the committee to continue its work and to pay particular attention to the developments on Namibia. They noted with approval the important role played by the Commonwealth, both bilaterally and multilaterally, in enhancing the supply of trained manpower for both Zimbabwe and Namibia, and commended the Secretariat for its efficient administration of Commonwealth humanitarian assistance programmes in this regard.

Heads of Government noted that the increasing number of young refugees from South Africa in neighbouring countries was imposing severe burdens on those countries. They therefore approved in principle the recommendations of the committee for the establishment of a Commonwealth education and training programme for the benefit of these refugees as a concrete manifestation of their concern and reinforcement of their political commitment against apartheid and their support for majority rule in South Africa. They requested the Secretary-General to prepare detailed proposals for establishing such a programme for consideration by Commonwealth governments through the committee. Heads of Government also welcomed the recent UN/OAU/UNHCR Conference on Refugees in Africa and expressed appreciation to the participating countries and institutions and urged them to fulfil their pledges made at the conference to help alleviate this grave humanitarian problem.

Heads of Government recalled that at their Lusaka meeting in 1979, they had acknowledged that the persistent problems of Southern Africa were damaging the development efforts of the states of the region which were in great need of further international assistance on a substantial scale. They therefore specially welcomed the establishment of and the progress made by the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) aimed particularly at strengthening co-operation among the majority-ruled states in the region and reducing their economic dependence on South Africa. While noting that significant bilateral and multilateral assistance is already being provided to SADCC to which Commonwealth countries are contributing, Heads of Government drew attention to the need for even greater international assistance to meet the emergent needs of SADCC countries.

From: *Commonwealth Heads of Government*. The Melbourne Communiqué, October 1981.

# Namibia negotiations

- A. Revised draft resolution, S/14460/Rev. 1, submitted to the UN Security Council on 29 April 1981, by Niger, Tunisia and Uganda, but not adopted\*

*The Security Council,  
Having examined the situation in Namibia,  
Having heard all the statements made before the Council,  
Taking into account the statement of the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia,*

*Taking into account the statement of Mr Peter Meushihange, Secretary for Foreign Relations of the South West Africa People's Organization,*

*Taking into account the statements made by the Foreign Ministers mandated by the Organization of African Unity and the movement of non-aligned countries,*

*Having examined the report of the Secretary-General contained in document S/14333,*

*Reaffirming the inalienable rights of the people of Namibia to self-determination, freedom and national independence in a united Namibia, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and the legitimacy of their struggle to secure the enjoyment of such rights,*

*Reaffirming its resolutions 276 (1970), 283 (1970), 385 (1976), 431 (1978), 432 (1978), 435 (1978) and 439 (1978), as well as the other relevant resolutions and decisions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly on the question of Namibia,*

*Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations with respect to Namibia in terms of General Assembly resolutions 2145 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V),*

\*Three other draft resolutions — S/14459, S/14461, S/14462 — were submitted on 27 April, 1981, but were also not adopted owing to the negative votes of permanent members of the Council.

*Strongly condemning* South Africa for its continued refusal to implement United Nations resolutions and decisions on the question of Namibia,

*Strongly deploring* the policies of those States which, despite the relevant decisions of the United Nations and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971, continue to co-operate with South Africa in respect of its illegal administration in Namibia,

*Further deploring* the fact that those States continue to maintain diplomatic, economic, consular and other relations with South Africa as well as military and strategic collaboration all of which have the effect of supporting and encouraging South Africa in its defiance of the United Nations,

*Deeply concerned* about the present critical situation created by South Africa in and around Namibia, which constitutes a serious breach to international peace and security,

*Acting* therefore under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations;

1. *Reaffirms* the inalienable rights of the people of Namibia to self-determination, freedom and national independence in a united Namibia including Walvis Bay and the Penguin and other offshore islands, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2145 (XXI) as well as in subsequent resolutions and decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly related to the question of Namibia;

2. *Reiterates* that Namibia is the legal responsibility of the United Nations until genuine self-determination and national independence are achieved in the Territory;

3. *Determines* that South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia, its persistent defiance of the United Nations, its war of repression being waged against Namibians, its repeated acts of aggression launched from Namibian territory against independent African States, its colonialist expansion and its policy of *apartheid* constitute a breach of international peace and security;

4. *Decides* that all States shall sever all diplomatic, consular and trade relations with South Africa;

5. *Decides* that, in furtherance of the objective of bringing to an end South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia in accordance with United Nations resolutions and decisions, all States shall prevent:

(a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in South Africa and in illegally occupied Namibia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution (whether or not the commodities or products are for consumption or processing in their territories, whether or not they are imported in bond and whether or not any special legal status with respect to the import of goods is enjoyed by the port or other place where they are im-

ported or stored);

(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or are calculated to promote the export of any commodities or products from South Africa and occupied Namibia, and any dealings by their nationals or in their territories in any commodities or products originating in South Africa and occupied Namibia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to South Africa and occupied Namibia for the purposes of such activities or dealings;

(c) The shipment in vessels or aircraft of their registration or under charter to their nationals, or the carriage (whether or not in bond) by land transport facilities across their territories of any commodities or products originating in South Africa and occupied Namibia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution;

(d) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories of any commodities or products (whether or not originating in their territories, but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, educational equipment and material for use in schools and other educational institutions, publications, news material and, in special humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs) to any person or body in South Africa and occupied Namibia or to any other person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from South Africa and occupied Namibia and any activities by their nationals or in their territories, which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply;

(e) The shipment in vessels or aircraft of their registration, or under charter to their nationals, or the carriage (whether or not in bond) by land transport facilities across their territories of any such commodities or products which are consigned to any person or body in South Africa and occupied Namibia, or to any other person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from South Africa and occupied Namibia;

6. *Decides* that all States shall not make available to the illegal régime in South Africa and occupied Namibia, or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking, including tourist enterprises, in South Africa and occupied Namibia, any funds for investment or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from making available to the régime or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within South Africa and occupied Namibia, except payments exclusively for pensions or for strictly medical, humanitarian or educational purposes or for the provision of news material and in special humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs;

7. *Decides* that all States prevent the entry into their territories, save on exceptional humanitarian grounds, of any person travelling on a South African passport, regardless of its date of issue, or on a purported passport issued by or on behalf of the illegal administration of South Africa in Namibia;

8. *Calls upon* all States to prohibit all travel including tourism, sports and scientific and cultural exchanges by their nationals to South Africa and occupied Namibia;

9. *Decides* that all States shall prevent airline companies constituted in their territories and aircraft of their registration or under charter to their nationals from operating to or from South Africa and occupied Namibia and from linking up with any airline company constituted or aircraft registered in South Africa and occupied Namibia;

10. *Decides* that all States shall take all possible measures to prevent activities by their nationals and persons in their territories aimed at promoting, assisting or encouraging emigration to South Africa and occupied Namibia, with a view to stopping such emigration;

11. *Decides* that all States shall withhold from their nationals or companies of their nationality not under direct government control, government loans, credit guarantees and other forms of financial support that would be used to facilitate trade or commerce with South Africa and occupied Namibia;

12. *Decides* that all States shall ensure that companies and other commercial enterprises owned by the State or under direct control of the State cease all further investment activities in South Africa and occupied Namibia;

13. *Decides* that all States shall enact the appropriate measures to prohibit investments or obtaining concessions in South Africa and occupied Namibia by their nationals or companies of their nationality not under direct governmental control and, to this end, shall withhold protection of such investment against claims of a future lawful Government of Namibia for compensation and reparation;

14. *Calls upon* all States to take all possible further action under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations in order to put an end to the illegal occupation of Namibia and bring about its genuine independence in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council;

15. *Calls upon* all States to ensure that their national legislation includes penalties for violations of the provisions of this resolution;

16. *Calls upon* all States to carry out, in accordance with Article 25 and Article 2, paragraph 6, of the Charter of the United Nations, the provisions of the present resolution, and reminds them that failure or refusal by any one of them to do so would constitute a violation of the Charter;

17. *Further calls upon* the specialized agencies to take all necessary

measures to implement this resolution;

18. *Calls upon* States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies to report to the Secretary-General and to the Security Council Committee on measures taken to implement the present resolution;

19. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution not later than \_\_\_\_\_;

20. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

**The vote on the above draft resolution on 30 April, 1981, was taken by a show of hands as follows:**

*In favour:* China, German Democratic Republic, Mexico, Niger, Panama, Philippines, Tunisia, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

*Against:* France, United Kingdom, United States.

*Abstaining:* Ireland, Japan, Spain.

The draft resolution was not adopted owing to the negative votes of permanent members of the Council.

**B. Explanation, on 19 May 1981, by Sir Anthony Parsons, United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the UN, of Britain's vote in the Security Council on 30 April 1981**

The United Kingdom has from the outset been vigorously involved in the effort to achieve internationally recognised independence for Namibia, which has been in progress since 1977. We were one of the co-authors of the Western Plan which formed the basis for Security Council resolution 435. Throughout this arduous and protracted negotiation, the Western Five have drawn strength and confidence from the united support demonstrated by the Security Council, support which has also been a crucial factor in the strenuous efforts exerted by the Secretary-General and his staff to achieve the implementation of that resolution.

We bitterly regretted the failure of the pre-implementation meeting at Geneva last January and we sympathised with the feelings of frustration and impatience which this setback inevitably produced on the Continent of Africa, and indeed in the international community as a whole.

Nevertheless, my delegation profoundly regrets the fact that the previous unity of the Security Council has been broken by the deep divisions which we have just experienced in the voting on the draft resolutions before us. My delegation has worked until the very last minute to reach a compromise which would have preserved the unity of the Council. We

and other delegations, including notably your own, Mr President, who worked to the same end, have I am sad to say, failed.

I state without reservation that a negotiated settlement leading to internationally accepted independence for Namibia remains the first objective of my government and, we trust, the first objective of all countries concerned for the future of Namibia and of the region. It is our intention to keep open if at all possible the prospects for such a negotiated settlement.

It is our firm view that the imposition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions could not fail to hamper efforts to reach such a settlement. It was for this reason that we voted as we did. We voted against the five draft resolutions before us because we believed that such a vote was necessary in order to keep open the prospects for a negotiated settlement. So far from having the desired effect, sanctions, if applied, would simply cause economic harm to many African and western countries including the United Kingdom.

To those who have been tempted in the past, or who may be tempted in the future, to frustrate progress towards a peaceful, negotiated settlement, I say that the imperative of internationally acceptable independence for Namibia will not go away. The concern and responsibility of the United Nations for Namibia will not go away. A continued denial of independence to the people of Namibia will perpetuate instability and bloodshed in the region. Only a settlement offers hope for peace and stability.

Notwithstanding what has happened in the Council today, my government will continue actively with our partners in the Western Five to develop ways to enhance the possibilities of the implementation of Security Council resolution 435. The search for peace and justice must continue and the consensus of the Security Council on which we have all depended for so long, must be re-established as soon as possible.

Text supplied by the British Information Services, Johannesburg. *For the Record*, no. 8, May 1981

- C. Extracts, concerning Namibia and South Africa, from the opening speech by the Lord Privy Seal, Sir Ian Gilmour, in the Foreign Affairs debate in the House of Commons on 7 May 1981

A settlement in Namibia is essential for progress and stability in Southern Africa. The Five intend to intensify the search for agreement. Foreign Ministers agreed on 3 May that the United Nations' plan provides a solid basis for a negotiated settlement and that it should be strengthened in order

to facilitate agreement. They instructed their officials to draw up proposals which would include constitutional arrangements for the future independent Namibia.

The Five can use their good offices only if there is will to reach agreement. We regret that it was not possible to reconcile differences of view in the Security Council last week on the breakdown of the negotiations in Geneva in January. The Five hope to re-establish a common approach among the parties involved and call on them to play their part.

Our vote against sanctions in the Security Council, in the company of France and the US was not a sign that our will to work for a settlement has diminished. It is not a sign that we side with apartheid — we voted against sanctions in order to keep open the prospects for a negotiated settlement. Such prospects may not look bright at present but they are brighter than the prospects of reaching early independence by the means proposed by others, which means relying on economic or military strength.

### **South Africa**

It has always been our view that sanctions against South Africa would discourage rather than promote internal reform in South Africa. Our views on apartheid are well known. While congratulating the South African Government on its recent electoral victory we hope the opportunity thereby created to move forward towards more internal reform will not be missed. In our view this is essential for the maintenance of peace and stability in Southern Africa.

Text supplied by the British Information Services, Johannesburg. *For the Record*, no. 10, May 1981

- D.** United States Secretary of State, General Alexander Haig, reaffirms US commitment to an independent Namibia, in a question and answer session at the Foreign Policy Association of New York on 14 July 1981

Secretary of State Haig reaffirmed the Reagan Administration's commitment to achieving a "fully independent, internationally recognized Namibia" and called the task of accomplishing this; "A tough and anguishing job."

General Haig said that when the Reagan Administration came to office, it was faced with the urgent requirements of re-establishing "a level of credibility and influence" with South Africa in order to end its intransigence on independence for Namibia.



"It is very easy", the US Secretary of State said, "for South Africa to sit in a situation of intransigence over an extended period of time, given the assets available to them."

He noted that South Africa is the fifth largest arms producer in the world and would not be affected by an embargo on arms and other items.

General Haig said he was not especially optimistic; "nor am I pessimistic" on Namibia. "We have hope of a sufficient level of progress that will indicate some further movement toward Namibia's independence."

Transcript telex text supplied by the United States International Communication Agency, Pretoria.

**E. Statement, concerning allegations of a South African incursion into Angola, by the South African Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, on 30 July 1981**

It has been brought to my attention that the overseas media reported prominently this morning that South Africa was engaged in a so-called attack on and occupation of parts of Angola.

I want to make it clear that the report is nothing more than a planned attempt to divert the attention of the Group of Five Nations on the eve of their continuing discussions on South West Africa.

The South African forces are not involved in any particular or large-scale operations in Angola at present, although certain follow-up and hot pursuit operations are constantly carried out against SWAPO terrorists in Southern Angola for which we do not have to apologise.

I trust that those governments concerned, and the public, will be able to see through these transparent attempts to label South Africa as the aggressor, especially when viewed against the regular publicity attacks against South Africa before some or other international conference which may concern South Africa.

News release by South African Defence Headquarters, Pretoria.

**F. Extract concerning Angola, from a statement in Parliament by the South African Prime Minister, the Hon. P.W. Botha, on 26 August 1981**

Mr Speaker, hon. the Leader of the Opposition asked me at lunch-time to make a statement, and I do so gladly.

In recent times the Government of South Africa has consistently addressed serious appeals to our neighbouring states and other African countries for their co-operation in striving for and achieving peaceful economic prosperity, welfare and stability for all. At the same time this Government has also warned these countries and requested them not to shelter the communist-backed terrorists who take action against SWA/Namibia and the RSA or to allow them to operate against us from the territories of our neighbouring States.

As regards the spate of allegations from Angola, it must be made very clear that these reports of a large-scale invasion of Angola are not only exaggerated but also a complete misrepresentation of the true state of affairs.

The territorial force of South West Africa, supported by units of the SA Defence Force, is continually engaged in combating terrorism and protecting the local population, particularly in Ovambo, against deeds of terrorism. From this it follows as a matter of course that we cannot simply sit and wait on our side of the border until the terrorists cross the border in order to commit murders, lay land-mines and intimidate people. Moreover, we shall not stop our pursuit operations when these anarchists flee across the border. The so-called invasion to which the Angolan authorities refer was just another of these operations which would have taken place without incident were it not for the fact that the MPLA interfered, as it has been doing in the recent past. However, the security forces were prepared for such interference and defended themselves successfully and at the same time managed to mop up several terrorist positions and arms caches.

I trust that the MPLA Government will now heed our request not to interfere, as well as our ideal to live in peace with our neighbours, and will stop getting involved in operations which are not directed against them but against terrorism. We also hope they will accede to our requests to enter into talks with us. I also trust that the Angolese will not make further use of this opportunity in another endeavour to lay all the actions of organizations such as UNITA in Southern Angola at South Africa's door. The Government is fully aware of the fact that the UN is holding a special session on 3 September, and it is obvious that this date has a serious influence on the intensity of reporting and allegations from Angola, and consequently the present over-reaction on the part of Angola is completely in line with the spate of allegations made against South West Africa and the RSA, particularly during the past fourteen days. South Africa evidently remains the easy scapegoat to be blamed for Angola's inability to keep its own house in order.

Statement made during the debate on the Prime Minister's budget vote. SOUTH AFRICA. *Republic*. House of Assembly Debates, no. 4, 1981. Cols. 1949-50.

G. Report on a meeting on 31 August 1981, between US Secretary of State, General Alexander Haig, and an OAU delegation

United States Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, on 31 August, discussed the current efforts aimed at achieving the independence of Namibia, with a high-level delegation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).

The Head of the OAU delegation, Kenyan Foreign Minister Robert Ouko, characterized the two-hour meeting at the State Department as "frank and fruitful" and indicated satisfaction at the outcome.

"We have reached a meeting of minds on various aspects of the discussions we held, and we have achieved a greater understanding of each other's position of the matter," Foreign Minister Ouko said.

A State Department Spokesperson said the United States welcomed the opportunity for an extensive discussion on the Namibia issue with the OAU delegation. She called the meeting constructive and added that the United States looked forward to continuing consultations.

When asked by reporters whether Secretary Haig gave assurances that the US government still considers United Nations resolution 435 as the basis for Namibian independence, Minister Ouko said;

"Yes, the United States is committed to the implementation of resolution 435."

The meeting with United States officials on 31 August concludes the OAU delegation's mission of discussing the Namibian question with the five Western Governments that make up the Contact Group on Namibia. The OAU mission was scheduled in conjunction with the upcoming session of the United States General Assembly on the subject. The Contact Group includes Britain, Canada, France, West Germany and the United States.

The OAU delegation headed by Foreign Minister Ouko, who is Chairman of the OAU Council of Ministers, also included Zimbabwean Foreign Minister, Witness Mangwende, and a number of senior officials from other African nations and the OAU Secretariat.

Among the senior US officials attending the meeting with Secretary of State Haig, was Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Chester A Crocker.

Press release issued by the United States International Communication Agency, Pretoria.

- H. Press Conference held by the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, following the Southern Africa Debate during the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Melbourne on 5 October 1981

### **Namibia**

*Lord Carrington:* After we have had the debate on Southern Africa in the Conference this morning, I thought it might be helpful to set out as shortly as I can the position reached in the Contact Group, who were responsible for developing the UN plan endorsed in Security Council resolution 435.

We fully support the resolution. We are committed to self-determination and independence for Namibia in accordance with resolution 435, and we have been working resolutely with the Front Line States since 1978 to secure its implementation.

We thought nine months ago or so that we were close to success when we had the pre-implementation meeting in Geneva, in January.

You will recollect that that meeting was derailed by the South African unwillingness to fix a date for implementation and since then, over a period of time, we have been trying to get the train back on the rails again. I believe that the Contact Group has now succeeded in doing that, which is not to say that we have got a solution or that the road ahead will not be difficult, but the train is back on the rails and it is moving in the right direction.

Recent exchanges between the Americans and the South Africans do give ground for qualified optimism, and the five Foreign Ministers who met in New York on 24 September developed proposals for a timetable for further and final negotiations with the objective of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 in 1982.

We also agreed on a number of constitutional principles for the Constituent Assembly. These ideas are to be discussed first in confidence with the Front Line States, the South Africans, SWAPO and those involved, and a team from the Five is going to visit the African capitals this month, probably in a week or ten days' time.

So you would not expect me to give you details of the proposed principles because they must obviously be given to the parties involved first, but I do not think that you would find them particularly suprising. They are the generally recognised constitutional principles on the lines of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and they are solely designed to engender greater trust and confidence amongst all the parties concerned and thus make it easier to implement 435.

Well, having said that, I think that everyone in the Contact Group understands the impatience that there is at the slow pace of progress. All of

us wish that we could move faster than we are doing. But the Five constitute the only diplomatic mechanism in sight which might ultimately deliver a peaceful, independent and sovereign Namibia. I think that prize is worth a little patience because the consequences of failure are awful to contemplate. So I think that what we are proposing is deserving of support from the Commonwealth and I must say that I was encouraged by the reception that my Prime Minister's remarks had this morning in the Conference. I do not know what the exact wording of the communique will be on the subject of Namibia but hope very much that what we shall do there is to reaffirm resolution 435 and stress the need for urgent and speedy progress and, certainly, if that were the outcome we would endorse that warmly.

### **Cuban Forces**

*Question: Is the Contact Group still insistent on the withdrawal of the Cuban forces from Angola as a pre-condition to Namibia's independence?*

*Lord Carrington:* No, there is no question of the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola being a pre-condition of independence. It would clearly make things easier if Cuban forces were withdrawn from Angola, and certainly in the conversations that I have had elsewhere — not here, but elsewhere — I am led to suppose that if the Namibian settlement was agreed there would not be all that much difficulty about withdrawal of forces from Angola, because one has to recall the reasons why they are there.

### **Namibian Constitution**

*Question: Does South Africa still insist that a constitution be drawn up incorporating minority rights?*

*Lord Carrington:* No, no, that has been abandoned and indeed it would be quite impossible to achieve. In Zimbabwe it was possible to achieve a constitution because we were in charge and we had the responsibility. But the United Nations has a responsibility in Namibia and the complications of getting a constitution agreed between that number of parties would really be almost impossible. This is why we felt that a constitutional principle of a general kind would be reassuring. But it must be up to the Constituent Assembly to draft the constitution.

*South Africa has dropped its demand?*

Yes.

### **Consequences of Failure**

*Question: Could you tell us what you see as being at stake in getting a solution in*

*Namibia: what is the importance of trying to resolve it. What is, you know, the hazard if we do not crack the nut fairly quickly?*

*Lord Carrington:* Well, as you say, I know Namibia quite well and I have a commitment, like my government, to see the independence of Namibia take place. I think that if these negotiations do not succeed — and they have got to succeed — we shall be faced with a situation in which the war will escalate, in which there will be probably a growing Soviet-Cuban-East German involvement helping SWAPO against South Africa. You see the military strength of South Africa, and I see nothing but a bloody war and in the course of that bloody war I think you would see the devastation, or at any rate the crippling, of Namibia and that would seem to me to be something that we all ought to avoid. Consequently, although — and this is the reason why I said this earlier on — I understand the impatience of my African friends at the slowness of progress, it does seem to me that the only conceivable way in which Namibia itself can be rescued from something which is far more awful than is happening now is by this process of negotiation, on which we must be resolute and determined to succeed.

### **Confidence in the United States**

*Question: Have you been able to dispel any of the doubts that the African Nations have about the United States as a middle man?*

*Lord Carrington:* In private meetings with each of the Front Line leaders here in Melbourne, I have told them very frankly what had happened in the Contact Group and I got the feeling on the part of all of them that they were relieved now that the Contact Group were united and were all pulling in the same direction. There was no feeling, I think, that the Contact Group were divided.

### **Help for SWAPO**

*Question: Do you support the appeal for moral and material help to SWAPO?*

*Lord Carrington:* If you are going to have an election in Namibia in which both the internal parties and SWAPO are allowed to fight the election, you must allow the people of Namibia to choose whom they want for their government.

### **Pressure for details**

*Question: Were there any requests or pressure from Heads of Government at the meeting for the constitutional principles to be revealed?*

*Lord Carrington:* No, I think what the Heads of Government wanted at the meeting this morning was a progress report from the Contact Group, not, I think, the details, since they understood the problems.

## **Effect on South Africa of the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting**

*Question: What chances are there, do you think, that the perceived intransigence on the part of South Africa might to any extent be exacerbated by the emphasis that this Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting is putting on the Namibia question, given that it is widely accepted to be a United Nations problem?*

*Lord Carrington:* well, I think that the South Africans are going to agree to 435 and a settlement of the problem and an election and the independence of Namibia, if they actually have decided to do it and they believe that it is right and in their interests to do it. I doubt whether hard words spoken in Melbourne or elsewhere will deflect them from what they believe to be what they ought to do.

Edited transcript of text supplied by the London Press Service; *Verbatim Service*

1. Press briefing, on 12 November 1981, by a senior US official on the accomplishments during the previous five months of the Western Five Contact Group

### **US guardedly optimistic on early Namibia solution**

The five Western nations pressing for an internationally acceptable plan that would bring independence to Namibia feel that they are on the track to success. But their optimism remains guarded, because there are still *some issues remaining to be resolved*, according to a senior US official.

He emphasized that the Western Five Contact Group which has been conducting the effort is united on the issue of Namibia, on the status of negotiations so far, and on the way they are to proceed.

The briefing took place a few days after the Contact Group completed a mission to Nigeria, the Southern African States, including Namibia; with a stop in Kenya to brief President Daniel Arap Moi, the current Chairman of the organization of African Unity. The senior US official said:

Our mission, was designed to do three things: to put before all the parties a target and timetable for bringing Namibia to its independence on the basis of UN resolution 435. Secondly, to define what we agreed were the remaining issues that need to be resolved so that there is no ambiguity from here on as to what those issues are. And thirdly, to put on the table for the first time, a set of proposals, constitutional principles for the reaction of the parties.

The mission has resulted in putting the Namibian negotiations 'back on track' toward a rapid achievement of independence for the Terri-

tory. He added that the implementation of the independence process should begin in 1982.

Reviewing the process, the US official said, when the Reagan Administration came into office, the negotiations were stalemated.

While there was agreement among all the parties in principle, on a certain framework known as UN resolution 435, that . . . was little more than an agreement in principle and one of the key parties, South Africa, had begun to make evident its lack of confidence in that process and in that framework. The result as you all know was the failure (of the negotiations) in Geneva last January.

Since February, the US Administration has worked both individually and within the context of the Contact Group on Namibia to find a framework that would be acceptable to all parties and that would renew the momentum of the negotiations.

He revealed that a key step in the process was an exchange of correspondence in September between the Western Five Contact Group and South Africa. He said the exchange indicated that "we had a basis to move forward. The mission that we have just conducted in Africa was a direct outgrowth of that meeting of the Five in New York on September 24", he asserted.

The senior official said that while the Contact Group did not expect, nor did it receive, definitive responses on the proposal they took on their recently completed ten nation trip in Africa, such responses were expected soon.

He stressed that all the parties to the consultations held on the recently concluded trip to Africa by the Western Five were seriously interested in getting the negotiations started again. He pointed out, for example, that the Contact Group was received at the highest level in each country they visited. "It was obvious to us", he added, "that all the parties are indeed interested in the approach that we have taken."

While he readily expressed guarded optimism as the result of putting negotiations on Namibia 'back on the track', he added that he did not want to minimize serious issues still to be negotiated.

He outlined three phases in the negotiating process still to come:

- First, the Western Five expect a response from the African countries and Namibia's political parties on the constitutional principles they suggested. As the result of this feedback these principles may have to be refined.
- Second, a general agreement with all parties concerned "on means for assuring all parties that the implementation process under (resolution) 435 will be carried out in a fair and impartial manner — a key factor which has always in the past bedevilled these negotiations."



Also part of phase two, the US official said, would be working out the details, such as size, composition and deployment of the United Nations military component, known as the UN Transition Assistance group (UNTAG), to take charge in Namibia until an elected government is in place. He explained that this involves a series of questions dating back to the earlier negotiations. He said these questions "never were fully pinned down and they need to be pinned down." Specifically, he emphasized the importance of all parties having confidence in the UNTAG force.

- Third, the Western Five expect a public commitment from all parties "to a date certain for beginning of implementation," including the passing of an implementing resolution by the UN and the arrival on the ground of (the) UNTAG force.

He said the Western Five Contact Group has set 1982 as a goal for the beginning of implementation of a plan to bring independence to Namibia.

He reiterated that the UN Security Council resolution 435 and the internationally acceptable principle that it implies remains the "only basis for Namibian independence."

Text supplied by the United States International Communication Agency, Pretoria.

## **J. Principles concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution for an independent Namibia proposed by the Western Five Contact Group during their visit to Africa beginning on 20 October 1981**

### **A. Constituent Assembly**

1. The Constituent Assembly should be elected so as to ensure fair representation in that body to different political groups representing the people of Namibia.

2. The Constituent Assembly will formulate the Constitution for an independent Namibia in accordance with the principles in part B below and will adopt the Constitution as a whole by a two-thirds majority of all its members.

### **B. Principles for a Constitution for an Independent Namibia**

1. Namibia will be a unitary, sovereign and democratic state.

2. The Constitution will be the supreme law of the state. It may be

amended only by a designated process of either the legislature or the votes cast in a popular referendum.

3. The Constitution will provide for a system of government with three branches: an elected executive branch will be responsible to the legislative branch; a legislative branch to be elected by universal and equal suffrage which will be responsible for the passage of all laws; and an independent judicial branch which will be responsible for the interpretation of the Constitution and for ensuring its supremacy and the authority of the law.

The executive and legislative branches will be constituted by periodic and genuine elections which will be held by secret vote.

4. The electoral system will ensure fair representation in the legislature to different political groups representing the people of Namibia — for example, by proportional representation or by appropriate determination of constituencies or by a combination of both.

5. There will be a Declaration of Fundamental Rights, which will include the rights to life, personal liberty and freedom of movement; to freedom of conscience; to freedom of expression, including freedom of speech and a free press; to freedom of assembly and association, including political parties and trade unions; to due process and equality before the law; to protection from arbitrary deprivation of private property or deprivation of private property without prompt and just compensation; and to freedom from racial, ethnic, religious or sexual discrimination. The Declaration of Rights will be consistent with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Declaration of Rights will be enforceable by the courts, at the instance of an aggrieved individual.

6. It will be forbidden to create criminal offences with retrospective effect or to provide for increased penalties with retrospective effect.

7. Provision will be made to secure equal access by all to recruitment to the public service, the police service and the defence services. The fair administration of personnel policy in relation to these services will be assured by appropriate independent bodies.

8. Private cultural, social, health and educational institutions will be open to all without discrimination.

9. Provision will be made for the establishment of elected councils for local and regional administrative and fiscal purposes.

Text as given in *Namibia since Geneva*, by André du Pisani, pp. 15–16. Johannesburg: SAIIA, Occasional Paper, November 1981.

- K. Statement, dated 19 November 1981, presenting the position of the Front Line States, plus Nigeria, Kenya and SWAPO, on the West's proposals for an independent Namibia

#### **A. Constituent Assembly**

1. Election will be held to select a constituent assembly which will adopt a constitution for an independent Namibia. The constitution will determine the organization and powers of all levels of government. Every adult Namibian will be eligible, without discrimination or fear of intimidation from any source, to vote, campaign and stand for election to the constituent assembly. Voting will be by secret ballot, with provisions made for those who cannot read or write. The date for the beginning of the electoral campaign, the date of elections, the electoral system, the preparation of voters rolls and other aspects of electoral procedures will be promptly decided upon so as to give all political parties and interested persons, without regard to their political views, a full and fair opportunity to organize and participate in the electoral process. Full freedom of speech, assembly, movement and press shall be guaranteed.

2. The constituent assembly will formulate the constitution for an independent Namibia in accordance with the principles in part B below and will adopt the constitution as a whole by a two-thirds majority of its total membership.

#### **B. Principles for a constitution for an independent Namibia**

1. Namibia will be a unitary, sovereign and democratic state.

2. The constitution will be the supreme law of the state. It may be amended only by a designated process of either the legislature or the votes cast in a popular referendum.

3. The constitution will determine the organization and powers of all levels of government. However, we note that most governments are structured on the basis of an elected executive, a legislature elected by universal and equal suffrage which is responsible for the passage of all laws, an independent judiciary which is responsible for the interpretation of the constitution and for ensuring its supremacy and the authority of the law, and that the executive and legislative branches are constituted by periodic and genuine elections which are held by secret vote.

4. The electoral system will be consistent with A (1) above.

5. There will be a declaration of fundamental rights, which will include the rights to life, personal liberty and freedom of movement, to freedom of conscience, to freedom of expression, including freedom of speech and a free press, to freedom of assembly and association, including political parties and trade unions, to due process and equality before the law, to protec-

tion from arbitrary deprivation of private property without just compensation, and to freedom from racial, ethnic, religious or sexual discrimination. The declaration of rights will be consistent with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Declaration of Rights will be enforceable by the courts, at the instance of an aggrieved individual after proven breach of these rights.

6. It will be forbidden to create criminal offences with retrospective effect or to provide for increased penalties with retrospective effect.

7. Provision will be made to secure, equal access by all to recruitment to, and balanced restructuring of the public service, the police service and the defence services. The fair administration of personnel policy in relation to these services will be assured by appropriate independent bodies.

8. Private cultural, social health and educational institutions will be open to all without discrimination.

Provision will be made for the establishment, by an act of parliament, of elected councils for local administration.

Statement published in the *Windhoek Observer*, 21 November, 1981.

# United States and Southern Africa

- A. Extract concerning Southern Africa from a speech by Dr Chester A. Crocker, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, to the Foreign Relations and National Security Committees of the American Legion, in Honolulu on 29 August 1981\*

It is to Southern Africa that I would like to direct the thrust of my remarks. The African policy of this Administration places a very high priority on addressing the problems, and opportunities, of this key region. We have dedicated a substantial effort, engaging the energy and attention of the highest levels of government, to reviewing the regional situation, weighing our options, and consulting in-depth with all the key players, including our allies and the governments of Southern Africa.

During the early months of this year we concluded that US and Western interests can only be advanced by serious and determined US leadership aimed at strengthening the region's security and backing its development potential. We have defined a new regional strategy, responsive to our national security, economic-commercial, and political interests. That strategy is based on three basic realities of Southern Africa.

First, US economic interests in Sub-Saharan Africa are heavily concentrated in the southern third of the continent. Nearly 3 000 million dollars of direct investment, or about 6 percent of the Sub-Saharan total, is located there. Our Southern African trade totals over 6 000 million dollars. This concentration of our interests reflects Southern Africa's tremendous mineral wealth and the relative sophistication of the area's economies — especially those of South Africa and Zimbabwe. Southern Africa accounts for over 40 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa's GNP, 70 percent of its indus-

Dr Crocker re-stated many of the views contained in this speech in his statement to the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa, on 16 September 1981

trial and 60 percent of its mining output; 80 percent of the steel and 85 percent of the electricity consumed. The area contains immense deposits of many strategic minerals which are vital to industrial economies like ours including: the platinum group (86 percent of world reserves), manganese (53 percent), vanadium (64 percent), chromium (95 percent), and cobalt (52 percent), as well as a dominant share of world gold and diamond output and an internationally significant output of coal, uranium, copper and other minerals. Many of these minerals are vital to Western defense and high technology industries.

There is no longer much debate about Southern Africa's economic significance: With regional stability, the area can prosper and serve as a focal point of African economic progress. Trade and private investment flow from the US and other Western nations can reinforce this potential and provide a solid basis of mutual interest for US-African relations. If there is a slide toward regional turmoil, however, Southern Africa's potential economic dynamism becomes a mirage. This Administration strongly supports *Southern African economic development through encouragement of trade and investment throughout the area, and through the provision of timely and carefully tailored foreign assistance*. Equally important, we support regional development by an active diplomacy aimed at addressing outstanding conflicts and thus discouraging the recourse to violent solutions and foreign intervention.

A second reality is that Southern Africa is an increasingly contested arena in global politics. The worldwide significance of the region derives from its potential — unless nations of the area can find a basis to resolve outstanding conflicts and coexist — to become a cockpit of mounting East-West tension.

Despite the ending of the drawn-out struggle in Rhodesia and the successful transition to independent Zimbabwe, there remains a combination of local and external pressures that could lead to expanded conflict and polarization. Since Portugal's departure from its ex-colonies in 1975, the USSR and its clients have shown every interest in keeping the pot of regional conflicts boiling. Six years after Angola's independence, substantial Cuban combat forces plus Soviet advisers remain there, as participants in a still-unresolved and tragic civil war. This external factor inevitably shapes the calculations of Angola's neighbours.

Warsaw Pact countries have arms agreements with four nations of the area and provide the bulk of external military support to guerrilla groups aimed at Namibia and South Africa. Faced with large-scale foreign intervention, the pressure of African guerrilla groups, and strains in its relations with its traditional Western partners, South Africa has significantly expanded its defense potential in recent years. The Republic, through a sustained self-sufficiency drive, is now an important regional military power.

It has clearly signalled its determination to resist guerrilla encroachments and strike at countries giving sanctuary.

Let us make no mistake. This is an explosive combination. The potential damage to Western interests is enhanced by Southern Africa's geopolitical importance along the strategic sea routes around Africa and by its growing importance as a source of critical minerals. It is imperative that we play our proper role in fostering the region's security and countering the expansion of Soviet influence. We intend to do so by building the confidence necessary for equitable and durable solutions to conflicts and by encouraging the emergence and survival of genuine democratic systems and productive economies. We will not lend our voice to support those dedicated to seizing and holding power through violence. If the peoples of Southern Africa are to have the chance to build their own futures, it is essential that military force not become established as the arbiter of relations between states or the means of effecting needed political change. In this respect, Southern Africa could become a crucial arena for defining the rules of international conduct in the decade ahead.

The third reality is that Southern Africa is a highly complex arena which must be understood on its own regional merits if we are to succeed in our efforts. There are powerful linkages — transport systems, labour migration, electric power grids, flows of capital and expertise, active and vital trade ties that bind together the states of Southern Africa. Inter-dependence is reinforced by the presence in the region of six landlocked states. Economic pragmatism is strengthened by the many nearby examples of negative growth rates and falling living standards. But there are also deep-rooted sources of conflict within the region itself. The political basis for regional co-operation is strikingly absent. The racial and ethnic pluralism of these societies, and the raw emotions generated by colonialism and white minority rule, make it difficult for them to come to terms with themselves and their neighbours.

The legally entrenched apartheid policies of South Africa are anathema to its African-ruled neighbours. They see lessened dependence on South Africa and increased political pressures on it for domestic change. All parties are aware of the enormous price that will be exacted if the pressures in and around South Africa degenerate into destructive revolutionary violence.

Angola has been plagued since independence by continuing ethnic and factional struggle, complicated by foreign intervention, that spills into neighbouring countries and diverts attention from needed development. It is unlikely that the struggle between the MPLA government and opposition forces — chiefly UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi — can be resolved militarily. Cuban troop withdrawal and national reconciliation would be supported by all Angola's neighbours, but these in turn are intimately re-

lated to the question of Namibia.

The low-level guerrilla conflict over Namibia's status has gradually expanded in recent years, as Western-led efforts to find a negotiated basis for independence from South African control continue. All parties accept the principle of independence, and some measure of agreement exists about the procedures for a transfer of power, but talks under UN auspices led by the Western Contact Group states; the US, Great Britain, France, Germany and Canada, had stalled by early 1981. *It is clear that Namibia is a focal point of regional conflict and African diplomatic concern. It is also clear that the war could continue and expand unless the core concerns of all parties, including South Africa, are addressed in a settlement.*

Thus, it is clear that Southern Africa contains within itself the seeds of growing violence. To ward off this possibility we must have a realistic strategy; one that assures our credibility as a regional partner. We cannot and will not permit our hand to be forced to align ourselves with one side or another in these disputes. Our task, together with our key allies, is to maintain communication with all parties — something we in the West are uniquely able to do — and to pursue our growing interests throughout the region. Only if we engage constructively in Southern Africa as a whole can we play our proper role in the search for negotiated solutions, peaceful change, and expanding economic progress.

In South Africa, the region's dominant country, it is not our task to choose between black and white. In this rich land of talented and diverse peoples, important Western economic, strategic, moral and political interests are at stake. We must avoid action that aggravates the awesome challenges facing South Africans of all races. The Reagan Administration has no intention of destabilizing South Africa in order to curry favour elsewhere, neither will we align ourselves with apartheid policies that are abhorrent to our own multiracial democracy. South Africa is an integral and important element of the global economic system, and it plays a significant economic role in its own region. We will not support the severing of those ties. *It does not serve our interests to walk away from South Africa any more than it does to play down the seriousness of the domestic and regional problems it faces.*

The Reagan Administration recognizes that the future of Southern Africa has not yet been written, it would be an act of political irresponsibility and moral cowardice to conduct ourselves as though it had been. We need policies that sustain those who would resist the siren call of violence and the blandishments of Moscow and its clients. The US enjoys fruitful ties with most of the African states in this region. *Zaire, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland and Tanzania.* We seek to strengthen and expand these relationships through diplomatic efforts on the inter-related conflicts in Namibia and Angola, through strong pro-



grams of foreign assistance, and by fostering expanded trade and investment. The US also seeks to build a more constructive relationship with South Africa, one based on shared interests, persuasion, and improved communication. There is much ferment in South Africa today centered on the question of how all South Africans can more fully share and participate in the economy and political process. We recognize that a measure of change is already underway in South Africa. At such a time, when many South Africans of all races, in and out of government, are seeking to move away from apartheid, it is our task to be supportive of this process so that proponents of reform and non-violent change can gain and hold the initiative.

Let me now sketch out for you briefly what we are trying to achieve in Namibia and Angola. Much has been said and written on this subject over the past six months — some of it has even been accurate. We believe that our straightforward and realistic approach is increasingly understood, at home and abroad.

On Namibia, I would emphasize that this Administration did not inherit a blank slate. We inherited a long-standing and highly contentious issue over which Western-led diplomatic efforts had reached an apparent impasse. We immediately recognized that the Namibia negotiations formed a central part of our developing relationship with Black Africa and South Africa, as well as an important item on the allied agenda. Namibia, we concluded, was an issue that, unless resolved, could bedevil these relationships and offer splendid opportunities to our adversaries.

All parties shared our view that South Africa held the key to a settlement, and agreed further that the new American Administration was uniquely positioned to explore with the South Africans conditions under which they would be prepared to turn that key. We recognized that UN Security Council resolution 435 represented a significant diplomatic achievement, having been agreed to in principle by all parties. The issue was to identify the obstacles to its actual implementation and develop a means to address those obstacles. In extensive consultations with all parties on three continents, Secretary Haig, Deputy Secretary Clark and I have explored the issue. We believe that progress has been achieved and we are now working closely with our European and Canadian allies in the Contact Group to shape concrete proposals to put before the parties in Southern Africa.

A Namibia settlement is, we believe, desirable and obtainable at an early date. To succeed, it must be internationally acceptable, under UN auspices and in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 435 which must form the basis of a settlement. That framework, in our view, can and should be supplemented by additional measures aimed at reassuring all Namibian parties of fair treatment and at answering certain basic consti-

tutional questions prior to elections that will lead to independence. A Namibia settlement, to be successful, must offer a genuine and equitable resolution of the conflict and lead the way toward an independence that strengthens, not undermines, the security of Southern Africa.

Our diplomacy recognizes openly the intimate relationship between the conflicts in Namibia and Angola. We have repeatedly made clear our position that progress toward a Namibia settlement could set the stage for withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. There is little debate about the logic of this proposition which the Angolan government itself accepts in part. But we do not share the view that there is anything automatic or predictable about that relationship, as some would argue. The assumption that Cubans will depart, or that UNITA will evaporate like the morning dew as South Africa withdraws from Namibia, is problematical. What if the civil strife in Angola continues after Namibia's independence? We also wonder how a young government in the fragile new state of Namibia can be expected to survive and prosper with a seemingly endless civil war on its northern border, with a substantial Soviet-Cuban presence nearby and with the consequent prospect of a new sequence of intervention involving perhaps both South African and communist forces.

Clearly, the relationship between Namibia and Angola cuts both ways, one of our first priorities has been to inject some greater logic and candor into this discussion and to stimulate creative thinking about how progress on each front might contribute to progress on the other. I would like to emphasize that we are not laying down preconditions to any party.

We believe that movement on Namibia can reinforce movement toward Cuban withdrawal and vice versa. Furthermore, we are convinced that a satisfactory outcome can only be based on parallel movement in both areas. In our dialogue with the Frontline States, including the MPLA government in Angola, we have repeatedly underscored our sincere commitment to a process with benefits for all, one that need threaten no one. Thus, as we make clear our view that UNITA represents a significant and legitimate factor in Angolan politics, we have also maintained our mutually fruitful commercial ties with Luanda as a symbol of the future relationship that could one day be possible.

In conclusion, I believe the objectives and strategy defined here represent an approach responsive to regional realities and consistent with US national security and foreign policy interests. The time has come for us as a nation to erase any shadow of doubt about the importance of Africa to US interests, and to demonstrate by our actions that we can conduct a serious and sustained diplomacy in Africa.

Telex transcript of text supplied by the United States International Communication Agency, Pretoria.

B. Extracts from a speech by Dr Chester A. Crocker, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, on 19 November 1981

My subject today is Africa's economic dilemma and this Administration's response to a problem which endangers vital US interests:

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Let me digress briefly to note two familiar aspects of Africa's condition: poverty and diversity. Africa has the worst economic growth rate of any continent: it contains two-thirds of those countries certified by the UN as the very poorest. It is the only continent which is afflicted with declining per capita food production. An alarming proportion of African countries, including several of major strategic importance, are caught in a merciless squeeze between soaring oil prices, stagmating export production, and ever mounting debt.

Yet for all its problems, Africa has both great human potential and vast, largely untapped mineral and agricultural wealth. The most populous Black African country, Nigeria, is our second largest source of imported oil. Southern Africa — from Zaire to the Cape — contains mineral wealth of great importance to both the US and European economies. Africa has great plains and valleys with major agricultural potential and untapped hydroelectric capacity beyond that of any other continent.

Africa's unsatisfactory economic performance is rooted in many factors, including an often harsh environment, post-independence civil turmoil, and lack of both human and physical infrastructure. I do not want to underemphasize these factors, but it must also be realized that these handicaps have all too often been compounded by questionable government policies.

Perhaps most important, trade and exchange rate policies of many African countries have systematically discriminated against agriculture, holding down the returns to producers of both food and export crops, while raising the prices of imports and consumer goods. Producers of traditional exports like coffee, cocoa and sisal frequently receive far less than the real value of their crops, while they pay inflated prices for even such basic implements as animal drawn plows and engines used in irrigation.

This discrimination against domestic agriculture is reinforced by government-controlled marketing, common to many African countries, which operates to keep farm prices low as a way of reducing prices to the urban population. The result has been one major cause of declining per capita food production and increased dependence on food imports. As food imports increased, African governments subsidized the local selling price of these imports, again to keep urban prices down. The result has

contributed to spiralling budget deficits which are now becoming untenable, even as the removal of subsidies causes political tension.

Industrial policies offer another example. In the post-independence period, most African countries combined nationalization with the creation of public enterprises. These state-owned firms were in many cases called upon to increase employment, to deliver goods at low prices to key groups, and in short to do everything but produce economic returns. Governments often intended that public enterprises operate economically and provide revenue, but over time, political pressure for low prices and constant shortfalls in revenue led to their being starved of returns to cover depreciation and capital investment. As a result, Africa is strewn with so-called "Parastatals" that are seriously under-capitalized and run down.

Economic policy in Africa often derived from social goals or represented carry-over from colonial practice, as in the use of Government Marketing Boards for agricultural goods. Government nationalization of foreign firms and involvement in new enterprises was also designed to substitute for the genuine lack of an indigenous private sector at the time of independence. All too often commercial activity was, in the colonial era, controlled by ethnic minorities (whether Lebanese as in West Africa or Indians in the East) which raised nationalistic emotions. But the record makes clear that replacing such elements with bureaucracies is rarely workable. (We should bear in mind that bureaucrats too can be predatory, especially when they act to protect favored clienteles at the expense of others with less political clout.) In general, governments have not been able to provide the goods and services that a thriving private sector could. As a result (and in part because of the pricing policies mentioned earlier) the rural areas of many African countries are starved for goods.

In summary, the productive sectors in Africa have been over-regulated and under-assisted. All too often, farmers have their prices held down and their marketing freedom restricted, typically, imports are closely controlled and licensed, the public sector overwhelms the private, and conflicting social goals interfere with the operation and capitalization of even essential industries.

The full cost of these policies to the economies of Africa was masked for a long time by periods of high prices for some African commodities; heavy foreign borrowing, and foreign assistance. But with the slow-down of economies in Africa's industrialized country markets, falling prices for many primary products, escalating debt service costs, and sharply rising oil prices, African countries are today facing an economic crisis of enormous magnitude. In some cases debts are staggering. Often foreign exchange shortages are so great that imports of spare parts and other essential goods must be controlled. The weight of public subsidies and obligations is so great as to choke off investment and prevent adequate maintenance for

existing activities.

More and more African countries must seek short-term balance of payments help from institutions like the International Monetary Fund, and debt rescheduling from both public and private creditors. But in country after country, it is becoming apparent that this is not enough, that something more fundamental is needed to pull Africa out of this most dangerous situation.

### **Unsatisfactory results of foreign aid to date**

We need to ask ourselves about the role of outside influences on these events, including the role of foreign aid. Total economic aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, bilateral and multilateral, is now running at the rate of approximately 9,000 million dollars a year. Of this, the US share, including our contribution to the World Bank and other multilaterals, is approximately ten percent. Given the situation described above, the effectiveness of this considerable effort clearly leaves something to be desired.

Foreign aid, to be sure, has accomplished a great deal. These accomplishments include:

The enormous development of human resources in Africa since independence, when there were practically no Universities or University graduates.

The building of agricultural research and extension services for food production, when previously these only existed for export crops.

The creation of basic infrastructure such as roads and railroads into some hitherto isolated areas unable to market crops and minerals.

The exploration and documentation of Africa's economic potential.

The conquering of several major diseases and the development of basic health infrastructures.

All of these accomplishments owe much to foreign aid and to technical co-operation between Western and African governments, nor should one expect instant results in a field as complex as economic development, and the twenty years or so in which we have been involved seriously in aid to Africa is an instant in the historical development of modern economies.

Nevertheless, it is a fact that we, the donors, in close dialogue with African decision-makers themselves, need to adjust our own policies to deal more effectively with the African crisis.

One problem is that international aid trends and policies have pursued a somewhat erratic course. Well-intentioned theories have been developed with excessive zeal, pressed upon African governments, then abandoned before they could be fairly tested. Aid donors must learn to adapt new policies without automatic, wholesale rejection of the old.

The development policy emphasis of the seventies was basic human needs. Pioneered in the US but widely adopted by others, it resulted from

liberal impatience over the fact that economic growth is an uneven process, and from a genuine and well-placed concern that some economic programs were not benefitting the majority population in developing countries. But in its more elaborate forms this policy became divorced from the recognition that productivity — economic growth — is a *sine qua non* for development.

All too often, therefore, foreign aid in the last decade has created elaborate pilot projects which foreign countries can barely keep in operation, much less replicate. The maintenance costs of complex service-oriented projects and indeed of much of the basic infrastructure that was created, in the absence of economic growth, have become unmanageable. One study has suggested that old irrigation systems in Africa may be falling into disrepair at about the same rate that donors are building new ones, at great expense.

Without throwing out all we have learned about the basic human needs of food, health, and education, nor abandoning all the programs we have now under way to build up African institutions, we must look afresh at the way our aid reaches or does not reach the productive sectors, and how we can link social and humanitarian concerns once again with sound growth policies.

### **Reassessing development policy**

Recognition of unsatisfactory performance by African countries and donors alike has led in fact to a healthy and broad-based re-examination of development policies for Africa. As I noted earlier, this re-examination is coming from several quarters. It comes from those as concerned with equity as with growth, from those long and deeply involved with African problems and accomplishments, as well as from those in bank and donor offices fretting over debts and deficits. And there is a growing consensus about the inadequate attention that has been given to the productive sectors.

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The World Bank at recent international meetings has called for caution in the funding of new projects and new institutions in this period of economic crisis in Africa. In many cases, the Bank is now recommending non-project forms of aid that can be disbursed quickly to rehabilitate old and decaying infrastructure; that will go more directly to the productive sectors, and be used in conjunction with policy reforms related to growth.

Most impressive is the response of the Africans themselves. Increasingly we observe nominally marxist governments from Guinea to Mozambique

seeking increased private trade and investment from the West to stimulate growth and employment. Governments like Mali, with a strong socialist tradition, have announced their intention to reduce the role of Parastatal corporations and revive private sector activity in both agriculture and industry.

Meeting in Lagos in 1980, the OAU Heads of State endorsed a plan of action to achieve far-reaching economic goals. More recently, and in response to deepening economic problems, the African Governors of the World Bank commissioned a report, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: an Agenda for Action*, to propose means by which the attainment of the Lagos plan's objectives could be accelerated. The conclusions of this report, billed as a "new social compact," calls for a doubling of foreign aid to Africa, but emphasizes that increased aid must be accompanied by policy changes to provide more incentives, such as higher prices for farmers, for the productive sectors of African economies.

With the nature of the African development dilemma more clearly in mind, we can, I believe, reach a more satisfactory definition of "private sector" than the stereotype limited to multinational corporations. As the World Bank Report notes; in Africa the most important aspect of the private sector is the small producer — the artisan, the businessman, the trader, the road builder, the fisherman, the co-operative, and above all the farmer, whether he is producing food or export crops.

Growing emphasis on policy reform, a major feature of the recent World Bank Report on Africa, is based on the assumption that no amount of aid can help if governments are suffocating their own productive elements. But it also assumes that aid can, through a range of instruments, support and encourage governments that are willing to embark on self-help efforts which often involve a high degree of political risk.

Inappropriate economic policies are at least partially responsible for the pervasive balance of payments problems in African nations. In the context of balance of payments adjustment, the International Monetary Fund is the oldest and most effective practitioner of the art of encouraging policy reform. It offers significant temporary financial support to governments that agree to undertake economic reforms required to restore financial equilibrium and growth. The World Bank and other bilateral and multilateral donors can, particularly if they work together, offer much additional support.

It should be obvious from what has been said that emphasis on the productive sectors, usually private, does not mean a total rejection of a government role. It remains a valid truism that each country must work out the mix between private and public sector in accordance with its own priorities. Good government is what policy reform is all about. Certainly we remember from our own history that government played a major part

in setting the state for successful capitalism. One of our own greatest success stories, agriculture, is also one sector of the US economy where government's involvement has been both long and creative, providing at various times infrastructure, technical assistance, research and extension, and direct financial support.

### **Implications for US policy in Africa**

Where does this lead us? Several new approaches to US aid and development policy are evolving within the Administration. All would emphasize economic growth and assistance to the productive sectors. I hope I have made it clear that in the African context, the term "private sector" includes both the highly-capitalized, multinational sector and the more widespread phenomenon of small producers. We must never forget, in discussing development, that our mainstream economic interaction with African economies comes overwhelmingly through the private sector, through our markets and investments, and that US Banks and Corporations are our most potent agents of economic growth.

Our policies will emphasize working more closely with other institutions as well as with governments to encourage policy reforms which free the productive sectors to produce both more food and more growth. In addition, we will structure our programs to utilize wherever possible the potential of the US private sector and encourage it to play a greater role in Africa.

Let me describe a policy framework in relation to what I see as the three broad economic categories of Sub-Saharan African countries.

The first category, unfortunately not yet very numerous, consists of those countries with relatively healthy market economies, in many (but not all) cases supported by oil or mineral wealth. These include Nigeria, Gabon, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and, of course, South Africa.

Here we can pursue our mutual economic interests mainly through improved trade and investment policies. These include elimination of legal and regulatory disincentives to US businessmen operating abroad, including the revised tax policy already enacted, proposed revision of the foreign corrupt practices act, and proposed legislation to permit export trading companies. We are also reinvigorating our trade promotion efforts and making the facilitation of US business activities abroad a primary concern of American Ambassadors.

In some countries unique bureaucratic mechanisms may be called for. The best example in Africa is Nigeria, where the Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee (JACC) has been established. The JACC is an association of US Agri-business firms formed in response to Nigeria's keen de-



sire to overcome an alarming food deficit. It has already resulted in proposals for substantial new US trade and investment in a country where at present we run a massive trade deficit — our second largest anywhere last year — because of oil imports.

Unfortunately, perhaps, Nigeria is atypical. The “average” African country is a non-oil LDC characterized by moderate to severe economic difficulties, small market size, and little to attract the transnational entrepreneur. In these countries the term “private sector” means primarily the small operators and institutions mentioned earlier.

Here our policy must continue to emphasize concessional assistance but focussed more on the productive sectors. As suggested above, aid can encourage and support policy reforms. We can stretch official aid dollars by financing feasibility studies and otherwise encouraging the US private sector to get involved in the development process, as for example through co-financing of profitable, development-oriented projects. Direct participation by commercial institutions will make it more likely that development projects contribute to real growth. Aid’s new bureau for private enterprise is already in the process of developing new programs in these areas.

Direct participation by the US private sector in development activities can have a number of additional beneficial effects. Aid can, as the Europeans have discovered, serve as a valuable means of encouraging business in high-risk environments typical of LDC’s everywhere — for example, by providing technical assistance and seed capital for joint venture opportunities. And the participation of business can serve as an important source of technology transfer, enhancing indigenous entrepreneurship and managerial skill.

This approach will involve a considerable shift away from the government-to-government aid programs favored exclusively in recent years. It will not mean a wholesale, indiscriminate rejection of “orthodox” project aid. Such assistance will continue to be vital, with emphasis on food production and human resource development, including management capacity in both public and private sectors.

Finally, there is a third category of countries, the least developed or LLDC’s. As currently defined by the UN, these have per capita GNP lower than 220 dollars. Twenty-one, or two-thirds of them, are in Africa. Some such as Somalia and Sudan, are of major geopolitical significance, and all have the potential to develop, but it cannot be denied that most LLDC’s have been dealt a bad hand by history and environment. Many are landlocked, and all too often their boundaries, drawn at the Congress of Berlin, accord with neither economic nor political reality.

Some of the new approaches to aid policy mentioned above are applicable to the LLDC’s, all of which do have important agricultural sectors typically afflicted with severe over-regulation. But generally speaking, aid

policy in the LLDC's will continue to be somewhat different, with more emphasis on humanitarian requirements (especially where refugees are present), regional integration (particularly vital for the small and land-locked) and basic institution building.

Finally, I would emphasize that the Administration's emphasis on our own domestic economic recovery and growth will benefit virtually all LDC's. Combined with vigorous emphasis on free trade, an expanding US economy will strengthen markets for our African friends, whether they are producers of commodities (typically the case today) or nascent manufacturers. The US currently absorbs about one-half of all manufactured goods that non-OPEC Developing Countries export to the industrialized world, even though our market is only one-third the industrialized world market. And as President Reagan noted before Cancun, every one percent reduction in our interest rates due to lower inflation improves the balance of payments of Developing Countries by 1,000 million dollars.

The urgency of our own domestic recovery program dictates that for the next few years, budgetary restraint will be a matter of the highest priority. Because of this, there is little chance that our official foreign assistance outlays will increase dramatically in the near future. It is therefore all the more important that we redouble our efforts to make our development policies more effective.

### **Conclusion**

I have outlined a spectrum of policies designed to respond to Africa's varied conditions. It assumes three major innovations:

(A) More support for policy reform that will stimulate the indigenous productive sectors.

(B) More direct private sector participation in development, and

(C) More integration of foreign aid the foreign trade and investment policies.

This approach will demonstrate our conviction that the "private sector", writ large, involves most Africans, must be encouraged by government if growth is to occur, and can be helped by aid programs as well as by interaction with the foreign private sector.

I care deeply about this subject because I know that the growth of healthy economic systems in Africa will in the long run do more than anything else to reduce the prospects for contagious regional conflict and externally-based destabilization of shaky governments. We are convinced that African economic security, like other dimensions of security, is a central ingredient in reaching the goal of a Continent of stable and friendly States.

In the years ahead, as we and other donors rethink with African leaders the dilemmas of development, we must operate with empathy and sensi-

tivity. Development does not occur in a vacuum. Seldom in history have young governments faced such an awesome and simultaneous mixture of challenges as those in Africa — imperatives of growth, equity, dignity, stability, and institution-building. Economic policy reform cannot work unless it is politically feasible for decision-makers to take tough decisions. *We recognize this reality. Our approach, therefore, will be summed up by the phrase — let us do the most to help those who help themselves.*

Text supplied by the United States International Communication Agency, Pretoria.

C. Official statement by US Ambassador Kenneth Adelman during the plenary debate on apartheid in the UN General Assembly, on 30 November 1981

- US opposition to the policy of apartheid
- The need for common standards for evaluating human rights conditions worldwide
- The inevitability of change in South Africa
- Non-recognition, by the United States, of the “independence” of the Homelands, including the Ciskei
- US opposition to forced re-settlements of any kind
- Support for internal forces in South Africa working for peaceful and purposeful change
- The US belief that South Africa should be allowed to again take its seat in the United Nations General Assembly

Mr President, I welcome this opportunity to address the General Assembly on a matter of such moral, political, and human importance as apartheid. I speak as the representative of a relatively new nation, one founded squarely on the belief that the most basic function of government is to protect the rights of its citizens — all its citizens. I speak here in the United Nations, which has no more important mandate than to protect and expand the rights of persons around the world. And I speak, of course, on apartheid, which so flagrantly violates such rights for the majority of South African Citizens. Hence do I welcome the United Nations' focus on this critical moral and human subject. I wish similar occasions were held about each and every systematic violation of human decency perpetuated by unjust governments or groups around the world. Fairness would dictate that different countries' human rights practices be judged by the same moral standards.

This, regrettably, is not true here in the United Nations, which highlights real and tragic indignities said to be perpetuated by a select, few

countries while sliding over (if noticing at all) just as real and even more tragic indignities perpetrated by many other countries and groups. Were the United Nations to devote as much time to each existing vile system of rule as we are here devoting to apartheid, the General Assembly would need considerably more time to finish its work, and that work would become far more important. Injustice afflicts so much of the world.

Saying this, Mr President, is not to say that apartheid is of marginal importance, for it is of major importance. Since it assigns legal, political, economic rights by pigmentation — which no human can alter, as he or she can alter education, skill, or even virtue — apartheid is morally repugnant. As it violates the natural rights of Black, Colored, and Asian peoples, as it denies equal access to freedom, economic opportunity, and equal protection of the law, and as it allows a minority to dictate the rules of that State, it is reprehensible.

Nonetheless, apartheid is not the most brutal form of repression, only the most blatant. South Africa is not the only repressive regime in Africa. There are many other ways, besides apartheid, of denying people the enjoyment of freedom, the right to choose and criticize their political leaders, the rule of law, the opportunity for a good job, a good education, a good life.

However, South Africa has the only system of denying a citizen's natural rights which is openly and legally based on racism. This bestows upon apartheid special distinction as the world's most condemned system.

Mr President, while it is entirely appropriate for the United Nations and its agencies to condemn the spirit and practice of apartheid — as we are doing here, as we do in so many arenas of the United Nations, so often — this World Organization should demonstrate a serious moral concern for freedom, equality and the law wherever violated, by whatever race, religious authority, nationality, or ideology. An oppressed individual cares less about the color, religion or ideology of the tyrant or the tyrannical system than he or she does of the fact that oppression is being inflicted upon that person.

While this World Body has — as I said — an obligation to contemplate the horrors of apartheid and the future of South Africa, the government of South Africa has an even greater obligation. Its examination of this issue is far more important than ours. As its all-while parliament soon reassembles — no longer able to ignore growing internal and external forces making for political change — the South African leaders will grasp how the welfare of the white minority has become intrinsically tied to the welfare of the other three races there.

Change is coming to South Africa: of this there can be no doubt. What type of change? How fast a pace? Leading where?

There are signs of progress, small steps — to be sure too small, too

slow — but steps and signs of progress nonetheless. The reforms of the Wiehahn Labor Commission, the elimination of many petty apartheid measures, and the establishment of the President's Council are such steps in what we hope — for the sake primarily of white and black South Africans — will become a steady, consistent march to a just society.

Such a society will be one in which the contending nationalisms of Afrikaners and Black Africans are finally reconciled. And such a march will face serious opposition by those seeking to flee present reality and substitute a false view of past security. In every society are those lacking vision of a better future, whose eyes remain fixed on a fading idyllic view, of the past, who are prepared to sacrifice their children's future to pursue unrealistic, sometimes twisted goals.

Apartheid is a twisted goal. While South African leaders acknowledge the economic unity of the Republic — a single economy, and not eleven separate economies — some have yet to acknowledge political realities, particularly the failure of apartheid as an ideology and as the basis of a stable and just nation.

To this day, South Africa remains basically a democracy for whites and an authoritarian system for blacks. All the coercive powers of an authoritarian regime are exercised by the white government against the black majority: suppression of dissent, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, and the systematic elimination of all opposition.

Clinging to its discredited homelands policy the government intends to grant the fragmented Ciskei "independence" this week.<sup>1</sup> Just as the United States does not recognize the Transkei, Venda and Bophuthatswana, so we will not recognize Ciskei. Why this homelands process continues when its ideology has been discredited, when its perpetration has become ludicrous, and when its practice is grounds for greater scorn, remains a mystery. The policy becomes cruel when it "bestows" homelands "citizenship" in far-away areas to some six million urban blacks who may never have seen these poor areas at all. What does such "citizenship" mean next to the loss of South African citizenship, which is at the root of territorial apartheid?

The United States abhors apartheid, adorned by whatever name: "separate development," "parallel development," "separate freedoms," "differentiation," or "multi-national development." It matters nothing what it is called; apartheid remains white rule. 4.4 million whites, 16.1 percent of the population, thereby continue domination over and disenfranchisement of the black majority, 22.9 million persons.

The most evident manifestation of apartheid, by whatever name, is the horror of forced population relocations. Admittedly, Mr President, this is

1. The Ciskei attained independence on 4 December 1981.

a practice evident in a number of countries, some represented in this Assembly now. In South Africa since 1960, more than two million citizens have been forcibly moved from one area to another of their own country. The practice of forced resettlement continues. It is just as squalid as ever. Government should rest on the will of its citizens and the will of no citizen is to be resettled by force, without due regard for law and basic human decency. That it is all too common a practice in Africa and in other Continents does not make it less odious in South Africa. We hope for reform here, as throughout the rest of the region.

Mr President, my government and the governments of the United Kingdom, France, West Germany and Canada are currently engaged in a sustained and determined effort to bring about a settlement of the Namibia independence issue based on United Nations Security Council resolution 435. The United States believes that with success, South Africans and all Africans can witness first-hand and up-close a problem being resolved through peaceful negotiations, as opposed to violent confrontation. Lessons learned in Namibia can be educational elsewhere. Resolving the problem of Namibian independence can help determine and even usher in a new manner of race relations within the Republic of South Africa itself.

Meanwhile, the United States supports those elements inside and beyond the Republic which foster peaceful evolutionary change there. These people constitute the moral vanguard of South Africa's future leadership. They need to be strengthened rather than undermined, championed rather than castigated, and supported rather than shunned.

Internal forces can and ever more strongly do challenge apartheid. They offer hope of meaningful political change, hope of moving towards a political system engaging blacks and whites together. Such a system the United States keenly supports. We do not presume to prescribe how the process of political change in South Africa should be carried out — who can be presumptuous enough to do so? But we vigorously support equality and justice for all races in South Africa; let there be no mistake on that score.

History bears out our commitment to racial justice in South Africa. The United States was the first country to impose a complete arms embargo against South Africa, in 1963, a full fifteen years before the United Nations imposed a universal arms embargo. Even though South Africa is of modest economic interest to the United States — with only some one percent of United States overseas investment in and only some one percent of American trade with South Africa — we have long been at the forefront of those concerned with human rights in that troubled country.

We will continue to be in the forefront. The legacy of America, as a nation founded on freedom and a beacon of liberty to all oppressed abroad, permits no less.

What is the proper role of the United Nations in bringing constructive change to South Africa? As a first step, we firmly believe that South Africa should be allowed to take its rightful place in this Assembly. To do otherwise is to do violence to the United Nations Charter, to the standard of fairness, and to shy away from rather than to face the political realities in South Africa.

The continued illegal exclusion of South Africa constitutes a serious violation of the Charter. More importantly, it diminishes the United Nations' capacity to influence the government of South Africa in a constructive fashion.

South Africa's exclusion from the General Assembly has clearly failed to erode apartheid but has succeeded thus far only in underscoring the United Nations' sad irrelevance to the future of South Africa and its people. Since that exclusion has so palpably failed to benefit either the World Body or the peoples of South Africa, why not change course and see if engaging South Africa directly will provide better results? We believe that it would.

The United Nations can contribute to the ultimate erosion of apartheid, if the organization becomes more realistic and less repetitive in calling for more and more boycotts, embargoes, sanctions and other punitive steps — actions which have not brought about constructive political reforms in any instance in modern history.

But the major factors which may be bringing the destruction of apartheid are located closer to its source. These are three parallel trends: the spread of democratic ideals, the expansion of education, and the demands of a growing economy. These have already produced social and cultural changes within the country.

Those seriously dedicated to achieving peaceful, non-destructive change in South Africa can help advance these trends. Those not so dedicated or not so serious can continue the United Nations' sole emphasis on punitive measures designed to communicate the universal abhorrence of apartheid. While still castigating apartheid, the United Nations should now broaden its focus, help bring about change and consider concrete ways to expand democracy, education, and economic opportunity in South Africa.

The United States will soon expand programs designed to meet the education needs of black South Africans, both refugees and those who remain. The United Nations may join ours and other governments already active in this role to help provide educational assistance to blacks within South Africa, either through scholarships or other education projects.

Such concrete programs, coupled with opening an honest dialogue with the South African government, will place the United Nations in a better position to pursue peace and decency in South Africa. The United Nations would then fulfil its mandate as a mediator and facilitator of change in that troubled land.

Mr President, how much easier it is to become morally indignant against apartheid than against ills closer to, or even within, one's own country. How much more difficult it is to realize that the true evils of apartheid, of rule according to pigmentation, can only be eliminated by engagement and concrete programs to help the oppressed in that tragic country. The United States considers this the only serious and indeed moral course for those interested — truly interested, and for those dedicated — truly dedicated — to the welfare of all South African citizens, Black and White, Asian and Colored.

Text supplied by the United States International Communication Agency, Pretoria.

- D. Excerpts from the testimony of Dr Chester A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, before a joint hearing of the Human Rights and African Affairs Subcommittees of the US House of Representatives, on 10 December 1981

As a signatory to the Universal Declaration, the United States has an obligation to support its provisions, but our desire to defend and enhance the basic freedoms of the peoples of the world is far more pervasive than even the Universal Declaration in that it permeates the very foundation of what we are as a people. It was one of the premises upon which this nation was founded.

To fail to support the quest for human liberty in the world would be to deny our own heritage.

President Reagan emphasized this commitment in nominating Elliot Abrams as the new Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs when he said that, human rights considerations are important in all aspects of our foreign policy.

Secretary Haig also stressed this concern on the same occasion when he said, "we do not intend, in this Administration to develop our foreign policy and then to add on to it a few concerns about liberty. On the contrary, the future of liberty is at the center of our policy."

This is certainly our policy in the Africa Bureau.

The United States can be, and I believe has an obligation to be, a force for human freedom in Africa. Although our influence on the continent is somewhat limited, we can use the many means at our disposal to lend our support to the improvement of conditions in Africa.

While I believe the channel of traditional diplomacy generally to be the most effective, we will not hesitate to use other fora where we believe



them to be more effective routes. These means include, of course, sections 116, 116(E) and 502(B) of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended, Section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act and Section 31 of the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1978.

In conjunction with the traditional diplomatic channels, these tools provide us flexibility in dealing with a broad spectrum of policies in countries where our relations vary from very good to virtually non-existent. Our overall interests in any given country are a major factor in the formulation and the implementation of our human rights policy toward that country. Thus flexibility is important if we are to protect US interests on the one hand and enhance the cause of human rights on the other. We are somewhat restricted in our ability to bring about desired changes, however, in those countries where our influence is limited.

Let me now turn specifically to the Africa Bureau and our efforts with regard to human rights.

Concern for human rights is an integral part of our policy decision-making process. In an effort to keep abreast of current human rights events in Africa, we have two officers within the Bureau specifically assigned to monitor events affecting rights in Africa. These officers are in contact on a regular basis with those working in the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. It is my hope that (this bureau) will soon have an individual specifically and permanently assigned to handle Sub-Saharan Africa.

In addition, each of our embassies in Africa has a designate Human Rights Officer and we receive a continuous flow of information concerning the state of human rights in individual countries. I personally look forward to working with Assistant Secretary Abrams, who is being sworn in today.

Perhaps the most significant, and certainly the most time-consuming effort currently under way in the Africa Bureau is the Namibia negotiations through which we hope to bring about an independent Namibia which constitutionally guarantees human liberty for all of its citizens.

We are encouraged by our progress to date, but many obstacles remain. If we and the other members of the Contact Group are successful in helping to bring about a Namibia Settlement, it will be a substantial victory for human rights not only in Namibia itself, but throughout Southern Africa.

On a smaller but also significant scale, we have worked with more than a dozen individual countries in Africa to improve their human rights conditions through the use of the Human Rights Fund authorized by Section 116(E). The Africa Bureau has been particularly active in this regard. I would like to take a few moments to outline some of the projects for you.

The largest is a 200,000-dollar grant to Zimbabwe to continue the program begun last year to train the first black magistrates, primarily court officers and legal draftsmen. This has been a highly successful program and

is contributing to the improved capability of court officials in Zimbabwe.

In Zambia, we provided assistance to the Lusaka Bar Association for the compilation of the handbook of human rights legislation and pertinent Zambian legal cases to serve as a ready reference work for lawyers, government officials and others interested in human rights.

In Togo, we used the fund to help support a conference on children's rights and to cover the visits of Togolese experts to the US to explore and expand contacts with US institutions concerned with the protection of children.

We have found the human rights fund to be an effective tool in promoting human liberty in Africa and to be a positive encouragement to those countries seeking to improve their own human rights performance. We intend to continue its use in 1982.

At the same time, we are mindful of the provision of Section 502(B) of the Foreign Assistance Act as we initiate and maintain security assistance programs.

In private dialogue, we continue to raise human rights concern with a number of countries. We have also used public condemnation when we believed this forum to be more effective and will, no doubt, continue to do so.

We have utilized other approaches, such as a lowered US profile and reduced assistance levels as well as refusal. In the case of South Africa, to recognize the so-called Homelands.

This brings me to the situation in Africa today. Before moving to the specific country updates you requested, I would like to take a few moments to give you a general overview of the human rights situation in Africa today. We are in the midst of preparing, in conjunction with the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, the annual human rights country reports for submission to Congress which will go into more detail.

While the actions of government officials impact heavily on human rights conditions in any given country, there are additional factors which come into play.

The fact that many of the states of Africa are among the world's poorest generally does not enhance human rights practices as national priorities are focused on other basic needs. Instability, arising from a multiplicity of factors, also contributes to human rights violations as restraints are placed on citizens in the name of national security.

I offer these comments not as an excuse for the condition of human rights in Africa, but as background for our discussions on their current status.

In fact, there is evidence of a continued trend of African attention to the concern with human rights issues. But the fact remains that the human

rights performance remains a mixed picture.

To cite a few specific examples, Burundi last month elected a National Assembly and approved overwhelmingly a new constitution providing for basic civil rights. Rwanda held open trials for dissidents for the first time.

The Congo reaffirmed its commitment to religious liberty and expanded the role of the National Assembly. Mali held a series of elections and made additional progress in the movement from a military to a civilian government and Niger encouraged greater civilian participation in the government.

At the same time, Africa in 1981 saw arbitrary arrest, torture, religious repression, apartheid, limitations on political participation and curbs on free speech and on the press. In some instances, progress on one front was offset by declines on another.

Generally, however, the trend reflected a growing concern over the improvement of conditions in Africa.

In recent years, we have seen a series of conferences and meetings on human rights which are reflective of and which tend to indicate continued improvement.

The consultation on violations of human rights held in Khartoum in 1975 called upon African churches to become involved in human rights activities and support the creation of a Human Rights Commission for Africa.

This was followed in 1976 by the Dar-Es-Salaam Seminar which focused on human rights in one-party states and emphasized their obligations to the protection of basic freedoms and rights.

There were three more conferences in Africa in 1978: a Colloquium on Economic Development and Human Rights in Francophone Africa in Rwanda; a second similar colloquium in Dakar and the Freetown Conference in Sierra Leone.

In 1979 there was additional focus on human rights through the first International Conference on Human Rights in South Africa, a Francophone lawyers' conference in Dakar, a conference on refugees in Tanzania and the African Regional Human Rights Conference held under UN auspices in Liberia.

The most recent and perhaps most significant was the OAU's Ministerial Conference in Kenya last January which resulted in the adoption of an African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the establishment, subject to ratification, of an African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights under OAU auspices.

In my own conversations with African Heads of State, I have found an increasing awareness of and support for the protection of basic human liberties to the extent that I am hopeful of continued progress in the coming years. . . .

## South Africa

Apartheid continues to be the basis for most Human Rights violations against blacks, coloureds and Asians in South Africa while government security measures impose restrictions on the civil liberties of individuals of all races.

In 1981, these restrictions resulted in the closure of the largest circulation black newspaper, *The Post*, and actions against journalists. In addition, a South African court upheld an interpretation of the banning orders which prohibits banned individuals from attending social gatherings.

The South African government continues to pursue its so-called "homelands" policy, and the latest, Ciskei, was formally established December 4. The United States does not recognize the status accorded these areas.

Internal South African security was disturbed during the year by attacks on targets from both the right and the left.

While the basic structure of apartheid remains intact, there was improvement in practice on some Human Rights fronts through non-enforcement of some existing racial laws.

Although most of these were mentioned in our recent submission to the Africa Subcommittee as a follow to our October 15 testimony, I will mention a few of them here.

The creation of the President's Council, which offers the potential for expanded government participation by coloureds and Asians, but not Africans, is at least a step in the right direction. The Council is expected to produce in the near future specific recommendations for legislation and for changes in the South African constitution.

There has also been expansion in the black trade unionist movement, and the recognition of black unions by the South African government is encouraging.

Text supplied by the United States International Communication Agency, Pretoria

## **Extracts from the UN report of the International Conference on Sanctions against South Africa, held in Paris from 20–27 May 1981**

The International conference on Sanctions against South Africa was organized by the United Nations, in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), in accordance with resolutions 34/93C and 35/206I adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 12 December 1979, and 16 December 1980, respectively, and held at UNESCO House, Paris, from 20–27 May 1981.

### **A. Keynote address by the Vice-President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, H E Dr Alex I Ekwueme\***

Three weeks ago, an anxious world waited in suspense as the count-down began in the United Nations Security Council debate on the imposition of sanctions against South Africa for its persistent violations of various United Nations resolutions on Namibia. At precisely an hour to midnight in New York, on 30 April 1981, after nearly 10 days of debate and negotiations, the hopes of the entire world were doomed and shattered under the weight of the triple veto cast by France, the United Kingdom and the United States against the cluster of sanctions resolutions for which there was an overwhelming global consensus.

The votes which so outrageously desecrated the august chambers of the Security Council, and made a travesty of the Charter of the United Nations, were cast by civilized and democratic nations. They were cast by the nations which gave the world the "Magna Carta", that gave it the cry of the Enlightenment of "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity" and that gave it "The Declaration of Independence". They were the same countries who emerging from the debris of World War II, which they fought to secure these rights, established the United Nations whose aim was, and remains:

"To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of

\* pp. 54–57 of the *Report*.

threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace . . .”.

And yet in New York, at the heart of the United Nations the Security Council, in defiance of an established global consensus that sanctions represented the only peaceful means for the “removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression” by South Africa these defenders of the so-called “free world”, stalwart custodians of democratic principles, permanent members of the Security Council, cast their veto, not for peace or democracy, but to strengthen the hands of the aggressor and perpetuate his rape of democracy. We must ask, why?

The presence of so many distinguished participants at this international conference on sanctions against South Africa vividly demonstrates that the triple veto did not succeed in stifling the global consensus, and that Western Bureaucracy is out of step with the decent opinion of the vast majority of mankind.

This conference reaffirms the abiding commitment of the vast majority of mankind, to continue the search for a peaceful resolution of the crisis created by *Apartheid* South Africa in the whole southern Africa region, while at the same time asserting the obligation of the international community to take enforcement measures to put an end to South Africa’s intransigence and defiance.

This conference represents a repudiation of the reactionary policies of those who, as Permanent Members of the Security Council, have abused the trust placed upon them and vitiated the purposes and principles of the United Nations by acting contrarily to Article 24 (2) of the Charter.

This conference, at the end of the day, must override and render null and void, the triple veto by appealing directly over the heads of Governments to the hearts and conscience of the vast majority of those in the West, who still place personal freedoms above the lure of South African gold.

The call for the imposition of sanctions against South Africa is not an act of pique or vengeance. It is simply that South Africa’s act of illegality has given rise to consequences of the gravest magnitude characterized by a serious threat to international peace, and acts of aggression, all of which fall within the purview of Article 39 of the Charter. Among others, the specific elements of breach of international peace and security created by South Africa’s illegal occupation of Namibia are as follows:

(a) South Africa’s massive military presence in Namibia by which it ensures its continued repression of the population and forcible occupation of the territory;

(b) Continued use by South Africa, of Namibia as a spring-board for armed aggression and terrorization of neighbouring African States, for example, against Zambia in 1976, Angola in 1978 and

1980, Mozambique also in 1980 and 1981;

(c) Acts of torture, repression, execution, detention and forced labour perpetrated against Namibian citizens by South Africa;

(d) South Africa's relentless exploitation of Namibia's mineral wealth, and persistent designs to dismember the territory of Namibia through the purported annexation of Walvis Bay in contravention of the Charter and various other resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly.

All the above give rise to consequences that exhaust all these categories of Article 39 of the United Nations Charter; namely threat to peace, breach of peace and act of aggression. Therefore, the Security Council was under a clear obligation to apply Article 41 of the Charter and impose comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against South Africa. Its failure to do so, in spite of the established global consensus, was an act of grave dereliction of responsibility which Member States present at this august assembly must now rectify by imposing individual and collective sanctions.

Mr Chairman, this is of course not the first international conference on *apartheid*, nor is it the first time the international community, including those who profit by the activities of the multinationals in South Africa, has been called upon to act, in concert, to bring coercive measures to bear on South Africa. The evidence suggests that all previous attempts on this score have been feeble, inconsistent and even observed more in the breach, than in the observance. Many here who were at the World Conference for Action against *Apartheid* which was held in Lagos, Nigeria in August 1977 will readily appreciate how unsuccessful has been the summons for action urged at that conference. The Lagos conference, while calling for an arms embargo against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter stressed that:

"The conference recognizes the urgent need for economic and other measures, universally applied, to secure the elimination of *apartheid*. It commends all Governments which have taken such measures in accordance with the United Nations resolutions. It calls upon the United Nations and all Governments as well as economic interests, including transnational corporations, urgently to consider such measures, including the cessation of loans to, and investments in, South Africa. It requests the Special Committee against *apartheid* in co-operation with the Organization of African unity and all other appropriate organizations, to promote the implementation of the above recommendations."

This conference should not only review the measures taken by the international community since the Lagos conference towards the elimination of *apartheid*, but it should, in the light of the failure, recently, of the Security Council to impose comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against South

Africa, promulgate an international Plan of Action to bring South Africa to its knees. In this connexion, I most earnestly urge this conference to give serious consideration to items 2 and 3 of the agenda of this conference dealing with this subject-matter.

Mr Chairman, those who oppose sanctions because they claim that:

(a) It will not work;

(b) That it will have no adverse effect on South Africa itself; and

(c) That it would have a devastating effect on the economies of neighbouring African States; urge instead the counsel of unlimited patience. Our efforts to end the bantustanization of South Africa and the reign of terror unleashed daily by South Africa on Namibia and independent African States bordering Namibia, by using the instrument approved by the United Nations Charter, which is the imposition of mandatory sanctions as provided for under Chapter VII, are characterized as "confrontation", and yet we are provided with no other alternative or viable solution. Again we must ask, why?

Mr Chairman, the time has come when the international community must wake up to the gravity of the situation in southern Africa. There is no longer any time left for ambiguity and prevarications over *apartheid* South Africa. Everyone of us must now stand and be counted either for or against *apartheid*. We can no longer afford to ignore the legitimate demands of the blacks in South Africa and Namibia for their freedom. We owe it as a duty, both to them and to ourselves to bring this pernicious system of *apartheid* to an ignominious end by acting collectively to impose mandatory and comprehensive sanctions against *apartheid* South Africa. Mankind must once and for all dramatically and decisively repudiate this racist doctrine which seeks to undermine human civilization itself. We neglect to do so only at our eternal peril.

Mr Chairman, often times, in the past, when we speak of the evils of *apartheid*, we are assured of the "sympathy" of the Western countries; but when we call for sanctions to end the shame of Western civilization which *apartheid* South Africa represents, suddenly the glitter of gold in the form of high dividends becomes a more convincing consideration than the lives, the liberty and the wellbeing of Africans. Those days are gone. We are no longer willing to permit the cheap exchange of African blood for South Africa's gold and diamond. If need be, Africa will seek and utilize whatever means is open to it to secure the final liquidation of *apartheid* South Africa, even if the heavens fall.

Mr Chairman, we did not come to this conference to seek confrontation, but neither did we come here to compromise in further prevarications regarding the liberties of those to whom it has been denied for more than a hundred years. We reject the counsel of eternal resignation in order to facilitate the exploitation commerce between the Western multina-



tionals and Namibia. Indeed in their frantic economic rape of Namibia the multinationals may well wish to pause and ponder on these words by Thomas Jefferson:

"I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just, that his justice cannot sleep forever. Commerce between master and slave is despotism. Nothing is more certainly written in the book of fate than that these people are to be free."

Mr Chairman, we are at the high noon in Namibia's journey to independence. The shadow may lengthen into eventide but who here has the audacity to doubt that Namibia soon will be free — and that the pernicious system of *apartheid* will be eradicated once and for all? But Namibia will not be free, nor will *apartheid* be eradicated soon enough however much we will it. These things will only come about through the collective and affirmative action of the international community. Mr Nelson Mandela, whose heroism and indefatigable fight for freedom from behind the fortress of his Robben Island prison where he has been incarcerated for 18 years should inspire us, shows us the way when he says:

"Only through hardship, sacrifice and militant action can freedom be won. The struggle is my life. I will continue fighting for freedom until the end of my days."

Mr Chairman, it is my honour and privilege to pledge my country's best endeavours to the attainment and fulfilment of Nelson Mandela's hopes and aspirations for his beloved South Africa. I urge and beseech this international conference on sanctions against South Africa to do no less; for to do less will be an act of betrayal which will diminish us all, and place in jeopardy not only our own freedoms but the survival of liberty around the world.

- B. Extract from the address at the opening meeting of the Conference by the Tanzanian Foreign Minister and President of the Conference, H E Mr Salim Ahmed Salim\*

This International Conference brings together representatives of governments, specialized agencies, non-governmental organizations and distinguished individuals to view the present situation in South Africa and in southern Africa as a whole. It is obvious that in spite of the numerous appeals and overtures to the South African *apartheid* régime in the name of

\* pp. 67-69 of the Report.

reason and morality, not much has happened to indicate a change of heart on the part of that régime.

This occasion brings us together to consider international action in response to this objective situation. We had in 1977 a similar occasion, the World Conference for Action against *Apartheid*, held in Lagos. This then is a follow-up to that Conference. Now we have come together for the specific purpose of considering sanctions against South Africa.

It seems to me that the situation in South Africa poses such a political, legal and moral question that there is a danger of our yielding to despair.

Because the questions of South Africa and Namibia have been with us for such a good part of this century, there is a danger of cynicism creeping into our midst that the problem is beyond our ability to solve. The aspirations of the peoples in these countries and those of humanity in general could be compromised by inaction by those on whom primary responsibility has been placed to arrest such ominous developments. In such a situation a loud public opinion is all the more called for. That opinion craves for an end to this complex, strange and anachronistic phenomenon which still manifests itself on the African continent.

For, the reality is that the situation in southern Africa constitutes a threat to international peace and security. When a régime suppresses millions of its population through ruthless exploitation, imprisonment, internment or other restrictions based on arbitrary laws of *apartheid*, a threat to the peace exists. When a régime defiantly clings to a territory whose mandate has been terminated by the international community and uses it as a staging ground for acts of aggression against neighbouring countries, a threat to the peace is posed. Bearing in mind the fact that breach of peace in one region is a threat to universal peace, and considering the magnitude of the implications of racial conflagration, the world cannot watch with indifference the flouting of the principles on which the United Nations is based.

The situation calls for urgent and meaningful action by the international community.

While every benefit of doubt has been granted those who genuinely believe that the South African regime has the rationality to heed to the voice of reason, experience both on South Africa and in situations of oppression elsewhere has amply demonstrated that appeals to reason alone have not impressed those responsible for such evils. It has been consistently evident that a certain amount of minimum pressure is necessary to deliver the message.

This Conference, therefore, is an ideal forum for a correct analysis of the situation in South Africa and Namibia. It is a forum for unequivocal and concerted measures to bring pressure to bear on South Africa, the main actor in the subregion. The presence amongst us of high government

officials, parliamentarians, trade unionists, the presidents of the liberation movements in particular, churchmen and other distinguished officials offers a unique opportunity for laying down a strategy for international mobilization against South Africa. Measures against South Africa can take different forms. I wish to underscore a few of them.

The measures to be taken can be a combination of factors. They can be political, economic, diplomatic and cultural. The Conference should express solidarity with national liberation movements. This is important because whatever can be done to assist the movement's legitimate struggle will further isolate South Africa. A renewed call from this Conference for material, humanitarian and moral support for the African National Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress and the South West Africa People's Organization could be a boost to the struggle already being waged in South Africa and Namibia.

One of the objectives of this Conference is the consideration of all aspects of sanctions against South Africa. This is a subject which raises different reactions from different quarters. In certain quarters it raises apprehension and sanctions are labelled impractical and unworkable. In other quarters, sanctions are hailed as effective but are frustrated in their realization by the opposed camp. I believe that this Conference should examine this issue carefully and methodically. While this Conference cannot itself impose sanctions, it can help by gathering factual and technical information which should be disseminated as widely as possible after the Conference.

In this regard I wish to suggest that the Conference should not be bogged down in minute details of sanctions. It should not be sidetracked by cynics who urge patience and tolerance. Instead it should concentrate on measures which world opinion has demanded but never realized. For I believe that if implemented faithfully and if coupled with other pressures, sanctions can and do work. Sanctions against South Africa have been thwarted by the half-hearted approach to them. For besides the 1963 voluntary arms embargo and the 1977 limited mandatory arms embargo, nothing much has been done. This Conference should resolve that sanctions against South Africa be made comprehensive and mandatory.

While this Conference should avoid confrontation on sanctions, it should not go for the lowest common denominator either. For either scenario will encourage South Africa to continue with its intransigency. This Conference should speak with one voice and give South Africa an unambiguous message that the world can no longer condone racism, racial discrimination and *apartheid*.

At this Conference we must examine specific aspects of sanctions, especially an oil embargo. Thanks to the dedication and effort of certain individuals, we have enough data on which to act. May I take this opportunity

to thank those countries that have imposed a unilateral voluntary oil embargo against South Africa. South Africa is vulnerable, especially because of its dependence on oil for industrialization. We should not fail to exploit this vulnerability for the sake of the suffering millions in South Africa. To this end, this Conference should examine ways and means of ensuring that the voluntary oil embargo against South Africa imposed by the members of OPEC is made more effective.

Another area which needs to be looked at is the diplomatic, cultural and sports fields. There is nothing which gives solace to South Africa than knowing its friends are there. If South Africa was made and felt to be the international pariah that it is through severing diplomatic and cultural links, she would rethink about her abominable policy of *apartheid*. If sporting links were cut off through the conclusion and enforcement of an effective convention against sports contacts, South Africa would end her complacency and know that the world is determined to act.

Closely related to the whole question of enforcement of sanctions against South Africa are the legitimate problems facing some of the independent States in southern Africa whose economies are — through the circumstances of geography and history — very much linked with *apartheid* South Africa. This Conference should examine ways and means to assist these countries so that they can overcome their present undeniable delicate and in some cases precarious situation.

We all stand accused for allowing *apartheid* to survive despite our collective condemnations and repeated expressions of outrage and revulsion. Its victims in millions while reproaching us, will not sit by and dissipate their energies through frustration. They will take any action at their disposal to get rid of this scourge.

Indeed an armed resistance is very much in evidence within South Africa thanks to determination of the national liberation movement there. If we do not help the people of South Africa to minimize their suffering in overthrowing *apartheid* we shall have ourselves to blame for any resulting and inevitable conflagration.

Time is truly running out. We must act now. For by whatever means *apartheid* must be brought to an end in South Africa. Namibia must be free. Final victory is not at issue. At issue is how we can shorten the period by taking appropriate measures. I believe this Conference can contribute tremendously by correctly assessing the threat posed to the peace in southern Africa and recommending immediate and meaningful measures, especially economic sanctions, a comprehensive arms embargo, oil embargo and ending nuclear collaboration with South Africa.

C. Address at the opening meeting of the Conference by the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, H E Mr Edem Kodjo\*

On behalf of the Organization of African Unity it is a pleasure for me to welcome you and thank you for responding to our appeal. I am also aware of the efforts you have made and will continue to make to ensure the success of the cause entrusted to you. We express our deep gratitude for your remarkable dedication which was already well known to us.

The present conference is an act of faith in mankind and in civilization. Its objectives are based on the highest ideals of solidarity, justice and peace which are set forth in all our constitutions and are a source of inspiration for us.

These ideals underlie the case I am going to present to you on behalf of Africa. They constitute the basis of our revolt and indignation. While the past 20 years in Africa have been characterized by decolonization and the struggle for human dignity, it is an astonishing fact that, contrary to all common sense, a retrograde régime of domination and blind oppression is seeking to persevere and to lose (*sic.*) in the southern part of our continent. *To prolong its reign, it has chosen the most degrading forms of human debasement: racism and apartheid.* Africa and the international community have on several occasions called the masters of Pretoria to reason but in vain. The time has therefore come, in view of their diabolical stubbornness, to intensify our struggle against this citadel of shame and bastion of barbarism.

How can our world, so proud of its scientific and technical achievements, how can our civilization, always so intent on rediscovering intrinsic human values, tolerate a situation whereby race and the colour of one's skin serve as a basis for an entire political, social and economic system? Yes . . . in Africa today, in our countries, on our continent, people are scorned, killed and tortured in the name of the degrading principles of racism and *apartheid*. On these two bases there stands a colossus with feet of clay which tries to challenge not only Africa but also the entire international community. Our rightful cause concerns much more than political emancipation: it concerns human beings, their special nature and productive liberation, which in our view constitute the only cause worth fighting for in today's turbulent world.

Yes, a State terrorism holds away which uses inhuman measures to maintain the total domination in South Africa of a white minority over an overwhelming black majority. Hardly 16 per cent of the population reigns over the others and holds them hostage. An entire arsenal of repressive

\* pp. 58-62 of the *Report*.

measures is dedicated to maintaining this tragic situation. You can judge for yourselves: 153 laws in 33 years! Two of them, which are unfortunately famous, illustrate clearly the barbarity of this régime: the Internal Security Act and the Terrorism Act. Their contents and methods of enforcement are such as to defy description. Under such a judicial system torture and brutality have reached a stage of sophistication and cruelty which leaves one aghast. Arbitrary detentions may last for years in conditions which surpass all understanding. What can one say of these coldly executed murders that are later crudely disguised as suicides? Can one speak of guarantees of justice when it is known that Act 83 of 1967 allows every police officer to arrest any person suspected of terrorism without a warrant and without a charge being made? He can even hold the person arrested in solitary confinement until he considers the replies to his questions satisfactory. You may well imagine these outrageous prerogatives that are granted to executioners who are insane with fear and the so-called confessions wrested from the victims in such conditions. Several reports by international organizations give frightening descriptions of the means used in this connexion and reveal their excesses: physical violence, electric shocks, threats of death, deprivation of sleep and, if cause, death . . . The statistics on the consequences of such treatment are terrifying: in September 1977 alone, 22 detainees, including Steve Biko, died. When they are not cynically murdered, the prisoners wallow in incredibly inhuman conditions. The nationalist Nelson Mandela, Govan Mbeki, Walter Sisulu and Herman Ja Toivo are vegetating in this way in tiny cells. The numerous appeals made by African Governments and the international community on their behalf have been to no effect.

Nevertheless, all this deterrent and repressive legislation, all these humiliations, all the military and police apparatus available to them are not sufficient reassurance for the racist régime of South Africa. Factors which are beyond their control throw them into a state of alarm and lead them to intensify their system even more. Thus the fact that the black birth rate is four times higher than the white one indicates that, in the year 2000, the population of South Africa will have only 11 per cent of whites as compared with the present 17 per cent. But it is mainly the accession of Zimbabwe to independence which has pushed back the frontiers of colonialism to the point where the underpinnings of the South African régime have been seriously cracked.

The result has been a policy of the stick alternating with the carrot. In defiance of all common sense "bantustans" are created, in other words lands reserved for blacks for a separate civilization. They tout the story that these are independent States. But we know that the secret dream, I mean the illusion, of their creators is to surround the nucleus of Pretoria with puppet States that have no basis, no substance and no future. We hear

about political liberalism, about an easing of the system, about perceptible change. But these ephemeral velleities soon disappear.

In January 1981, however, the Pretoria Government had a unique opportunity to prove its liberalism, to reconcile itself with Africa and the international community. The negotiations on Namibia organized by the United Nations at Geneva were to enable us to explore all paths of convergence, to agree on a date for the cease-fire and on the initiation of a United Nations assistance programme.

It is particularly painful for me to give you this exposition of the consistently negative and deliberately hostile attitude of South Africa towards these negotiations. Hiding behind subterfuges, constantly spreading a dense smokescreen of legalisms which were as untenable in substance as they were in form, thrusting its own creatures, marshalled as members of eight so-called "internal" parties, to the front of the stage, heaping insults and invective, through its spokesmen of the DTA and other parties in its pay, upon SWAPO and the United Nations, which were accused of bias, South Africa rejected outright all that it had accepted earlier and had the effrontery to ask the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Security Council to go back on their previous resolutions.

But does this need repeating? The inevitable liberation of Namibia and South Africa are now for us only long-term objectives. All this explains the destructive malevolence with which South Africa attacks the front-line States in order to ruin their economies and destabilize their régimes. Air raids, bombings, economic sabotage — all play their part in this. Angola, Mozambique and Zambia are the favourite targets of the régime of terror and *apartheid*. Who can forget the murderous raid on Maputo when, on 30 January of this year, several freedom-fighters of the ANC were killed?

These things are the serious facts that we present in our case against South Africa. I would add something of which you are well aware, namely the report of the international mission of inquiry into the acts of aggression committed against the Peoples Republic of Angola. This document describes the crimes committed against the Angolan people and Africa. The perpetrators are known: we must condemn them. The material damage has, of course, been quantified, but who can evaluate the losses in terms of human lives, the dignity of an entire scorned people, the development efforts that have been reduced to nought? Who will guarantee us that such acts will not be repeated tomorrow? For how long will we be the victims of such affronts?

The Organisation of African Unity endorses the conclusions of that international commission. We repeat:

- (1) That the acts of large-scale aggression repeatedly committed by South Africa constitute a *crime against humanity*;
- (2) That these acts create a situation of undeclared war against

an independent African State and constitute a *crime of aggression*;

(3) That these acts constitute a serious threat to international peace and security, a *crime against peace*.

Now, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, which on this matter is based on the Charter of the United Nations, imposes on us the obligation to establish and maintain conditions for peace and security in the cause of human progress, and that is why the Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, adopted at Lagos in April 1980 by the Heads of State and Government, in its preamble, denounces 'the renewed and desperate attempts by the Pretoria régime to arrest the tide of history and to perpetuate the *status quo* in Namibia and South Africa'.

The threat to peace is one of the unchanging elements of the policy of South Africa which continues to equip itself with the most sophisticated armaments and uses them not only against the black population but also against neighbouring States. Thus thousands of refugees flee to surrounding areas to escape the bombings and repressive measures.

We appeal to international solidarity in order to bring South Africa to reason and to avoid an intensification of the war.

History has taught us that when peace, freedom and justice have to be defended, Africa and its peoples have never begrudged their solidarity to anyone. We very soon sided with the oppressed. Thus, when nazism surged over Europe, we were in the forefront of the attack led by the free world. Its victory was also our victory, because for us it meant a return to peace, freedom and justice.

It is this feeling of solidarity that we are also asking Europe and America to share. South African *apartheid* is a close replica of what nazism once was. In our struggle against it, we expect to receive from the same open and total commitment those who were our partners on yesterday's battlefields.

No country can call itself a friend of Africa if it ignores this struggle by continuing to maintain shameful economic or political relations with the racist régime of Pretoria. We know that South Africa, which is rich in various mineral resources, constitutes an essential reservoir for the Western nations. Early this year several United States and European enterprises announced major investments in South Africa. At present there are over 2 000 branches of foreign companies there. It is estimated that 40 per cent of growth in the gross national product from 1957 to 1972 was generated by foreign know-how. At the end of 1979, 56 per cent of the investments in South Africa came from the European Common Market.

Here are some of the figures which abound and can be found in the newspapers and official reports. All those who support the Pretoria régime politically, economically or militarily are thus prolonging its diabolical resistance and encouraging it in its desperate stubbornness. To all those who might be tempted believe that South Africa is the bastion of the ideals of a



free society, we say 'South Africa is the world's most pernicious régime, the most terroristic State, which oppresses and kills.' In our struggle against it we want to know who are our friends and allies. in the final and arduous phase of the present confrontations in southern Africa, it is a total and binding commitment that we are asking from the West and America. We say that the struggle for liberty and human dignity take precedence over royalties and supplies of raw materials.

Quite recently at Geneva we gave proof of our open-mindedness, of our determined quest for peace. South Africa countered with arrogance and insults.

We wished to be clearly understood: 50 independent African States and their peoples can no longer tolerate the situation in which their brothers of southern Africa are living. That is why, at its 36th ordinary session at Addis-Ababa last February, the OAU Council of Ministers issued an appeal to the international community to the effect that we should all work together swiftly to impose global and mandatory sanctions against South Africa, including an oil embargo.

We are told — and what aren't we told? — that economic sanctions do not solve the problem of the challenge that South Africa hurls at the entire international community. And it is on the basis of such arguments that three Western Countries vetoed the recent proposal for sanctions submitted by the African group in the Security Council. We duly denounced what seems to us to be *de facto* complicity with the racists of Pretoria and the attitude of the United States of America likewise deserves condemnation, for today that country is welcoming the champions of *apartheid* by openly receiving the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa.

To the West, which juggles with its own principles in the name of short-term economic interests, we wish to make it clear that, even though sanctions are not a cure-all they are today one of the most effective ways of bringing down the South African bastion and bringing to repentance those who have built their policy on hatred, contempt and crime.

The aim is to explore all possibilities of exerting pressure on South Africa, and sanctions are essential elements of this strategy, if not exclusive elements thereof.

The aim is to put an end to a situation condemned by the world's conscience and harbouring the germs which destroy the ideals that are dear to the hearts of us all.

The aim is, in short, to overcome racism and eliminate *apartheid*.

At this conference let us join together in examining the ways and means of achieving this aim.

I thank you on behalf of Africa.

D. Résumé of the address by the President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), Mr Sam Nujoma\*

Mr Nujoma, speaking on behalf of the national liberation movements of southern Africa, said that the Conference was meeting at a crucial time in the history of the struggle for liberation in southern Africa. On the one hand, the triumph of liberation in Zimbabwe acted as a powerful spur for SWAPO in Namibia and the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC). On the other hand, the South African racist régime, unnerved by the demoralizing defeat of its sinister manoeuvres to preserve Zimbabwe as a buffer, sought deliberately to reverse the irreversible tide of liberation and national independence in southern Africa. Terrorist, racist South Africa had now a friend in the White House in Washington who went out of his way to let the world know that there was an emerging unholy alliance between Pretoria and Washington. That was a major development with far-reaching implications for the whole of Africa and southern Africa in particular. The Boer racists felt that they could more than ever before defy with impunity the will of the international community.

There was a general agreement that the threat to international peace and security in southern Africa, arising from the policies and actions of the racist régime of South Africa was a source of grave concern to the United Nations and the wider international community. But the recalcitrant Western Powers — by increasing their collaboration with the brutal *apartheid* régime and by persistently protecting it from sanctions and other punitive measures provided for under the United Nations Charter — reinforced that régime's destructive power in the region, undermined the effectiveness of the United Nations and aggravated the threat and breach of the peace and security in southern Africa. On 30 April 1981 the whole world saw yet another demonstration of antagonism and insensitivity of the three NATO powers on the United Nations Security Council when they ganged up to cast triple vetoes to frustrate the will of the majority demanding comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa.

The level of participation in the present Conference, he said, assured that its stated objectives would be realized. Meanwhile, the fighting forces and patriots of Namibia and South Africa would continue to intensify the armed liberation struggle for exerting maximum pressure on the enemy. The *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, the military wing of ANC, had already carried the struggle to the very nerve centres of fascism. Its revolutionary actions would continue to grow until the settler minority oppressors would come to their senses and surrender power to the majority.

\* pp. 7-9 of the Report.

SWAPO and its military wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia, had been waging the liberation war for the past 15 years against the most powerful war machine on the continent of Africa. Not only did they demonstrate their capacity to confront the massive enemy forces but they also drove the point home to the racists that military victory by them was not possible.

Mr Nujoma stressed that racist South Africa was nothing more than a front-line manager and police of Western powers dutifully protecting their interests and global designs in southern Africa. It was they who had massively armed this neo-Hitlerite régime to the teeth with the most devastating and sophisticated weapons and technological know-how. It was an open secret that racist South Africa was now a nuclear Power posing a constant threat to the continent of Africa, thanks to the Western powers.

He said the ever-expanding relations of trade and commerce by multinational corporations from the Western countries in South Africa and Namibia and their ruthless exploitation of human and natural resources to the detriment of the African masses were exhaustively discussed in the United Nations and other international forums. The continued supply of arms and ammunition to the fascist régime in violation of the existing arms embargo and the clandestine shipment of oil which enabled the Botha régime to conduct a terrorist war of aggression against the people aggravated the already serious situation in southern Africa. Recruitment of mercenaries from certain countries continued. The Western Powers, through their vetoes and other political actions, protected South Africa in the United Nations.

SWAPO had stated time and again that it accepted Security Council resolution 435 in its final and definitive form. It insisted that this resolution be implemented without any further delay, modification, qualification, dilution or the so-called strengthening.

**E. Extracts from the address at the concluding meeting of the Conference by the Tanzanian Foreign Minister and President of the Conference, H E Mr Salim Ahmed Salim\***

The conference has brought together representatives of 122 Governments, 15 specialized agencies and other intergovernmental organizations, 37 international non-governmental organizations and 53 national anti-apartheid and other organizations as well as a large number of individuals

\* pp. 70-73 of the *Report*.

including statesmen, members of Parliaments, experts and well-known personalities. They have all reaffirmed their support for the oppressed people of South Africa and Namibia who have been represented here through their national liberation movements.

It has been a conference of commitment — commitment to the cause of freedom in South Africa and Namibia and to the noble principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

This impressive commitment to the cause of the freedom of the South African people displayed not just by Governments, and intergovernmental organizations but also by non-governmental organizations and eminent individuals remind us of the words of the much remembered and respected Jean Paul Sartre. Speaking at the inauguration of the anti-apartheid movement in France in 1966 he declared and I quote:

The South African people, whose heroism is to fight in solitude, must know that they are not by themselves, that not only the United Nations has condemned *apartheid*, but that also private organizations in all parts of the world — organizations of which the great trade unions, churches, and human beings in general without distinction are part — are with them.

This Paris Conference follows the earlier Oslo Conference of April 1973, the Muputo Conference of May 1977 and the Lagos Conference of August 1977 — all those conferences marked important stages in the long struggle for African liberation and we regret that some Governments which participated in those conferences have chosen not to take part in this Conference which was called to explore and give serious consideration to all avenues of peaceful change available to the international community to help avert an enormous and menacing catastrophe which threatens humanity as a whole.

However, despite the refusal of certain governments to participate in this conference the spirit of the earlier conferences has been present throughout this conference which has given testimony to the fact that the fighters for liberation in South Africa and Namibia have many friends on all continents and that solidarity with their struggle transcends the many ideological and other divisions that plague the world.

This conference has been an affirmation to those who may seek to link their policies to the apartheid régime of South Africa that we shall stand firm and counter any such measures. It is important to recall it was more than 20 years ago that South African liberation movement and the All African People's Conference appealed to the world for sanctions against South Africa because the racist régime had systematically closed all the doors to peaceful change, embarked on a massive military build-up and reign of terror — leaving the oppressed people with no choice but to surrender to the humiliating rule of apartheid or to organize underground resistance includ-

ing armed struggle in order to attain their freedom and dignity. For over two decades the racist régime of Pretoria has become more and more intransigent, it has refused to heed reason and persistently defied the world community; it constitutes today the world's Number One outlaw which relies entirely on the constant use of violence and terrorism in order to maintain an evil and outdated doctrine of racial superiority.

As we close this conference today the white régime and its supporters in South Africa are preparing to celebrate two decades of the apartheid Republic — when that racist Republic was established 20 years ago South Africa was driven out of the Commonwealth and today it has become the pariah of the world. During these two decades the oppressed people of South Africa have continued to resist with courage and determination, in the face of enormous odds, and today we witness the maturity of that struggle reflected by the reports of strikes, and other forms of resistance, referred to by among others Oliver Tambo, President of the ANC, which demonstrate to the world a massive national upsurge of the South African people.

This conference has taken place at a crucial time for the future course of events in southern Africa. We have met within a month of the Security Council debate on Namibia and the use of the triple veto; we have adopted a Special Declaration on Namibia as embraced in Security Council resolution 435 (1978); and we have adopted a declaration which forms the basis for intensified mobilization of the governments and peoples of the world in support of freedom and the Charter of the United Nations.

The proceedings at this conference showed that it is becoming increasingly untenable for certain countries and multinational companies to have the best of both worlds: friendship and good relations with South Africa and collaboration with apartheid South Africa. They do not have much time to make the choice and should understand that there can only be one side, the side of justice and of the Charter of the United Nations.

This conference has not only demonstrated the importance of enforcing sanctions against South Africa as a vital element to bring about an end to the apartheid régime, it has also served to dispel the myth that sanctions will hurt more the poor people of South Africa and the independent African States in Southern Africa. In the course of the deliberations we have had articulate spokesmen of some of the Southern African States concerned clearly rejecting all attempts to use their presumed plight as a pretext for not imposing sanctions. We have also heard clear and powerful voices of the representative of South African people through their liberation movements making it abundantly clear that sanctions will, in the final analysis, be crucial in the struggle for their own liberation. In discussing the issue of sanctions, the conference has none the less not ignored some of the short-term difficulties which will affect the southern African States.

And to this end, the conference has called for practical assistance to enable these countries to overcome such difficulties. To those who have, in the past, used the argument of the presumed plight of the Black people in South Africa as well as the southern African States, this conference has given a clear and resounding response: sanctions are important and are vital in the struggle against *apartheid*; suffering of the people in southern Africa in the sense that they will shorten the period of their humiliation and degradation.

The people of South Africa and Namibia and their national liberation movements will bring about their own liberation. The duty and task of the international community is to support them in their righteous struggle, thereby reducing the suffering and the casualties in the irresistible march to freedom. It is towards that end that we appeal to the governments and organizations and peoples of the world to mobilize for sanctions against South Africa in the light of the Declarations of this conference.

We are indignant at the constant crimes of the White racist régime of South Africa. We have been frustrated by the resistance of some of the Permanent Members of the Security Council and the main trading partners of South Africa to any meaningful action against that régime. But it is neither anger nor frustration that has moved us for over two decades to call for sanctions but our commitment to freedom, justice and peace; our vision of a South Africa in which all the people will live in harmony and which shall make its rightful and valuable contribution to co-operation and development in Africa and the world.

This conference marks an important stage in the international community's supportive acts in the struggle for African liberation. Let us pledge to work for our common objective. Let this Paris Declaration as well as the Special Declaration on Namibia serve as a catalyst in our common endeavours.

I thank you for your attention.

*A Luta Continua!*

The struggle continues.

#### F. Paris Declaration on Sanctions against South Africa, including Special Declaration on Namibia\*

The International Conference on Sanctions against South Africa, organized by the United Nations in co-operation with the Organization of Afri-

\* pp. 36-47 of the *Report*.

can Unity, was held at Unesco House, Paris, from 20–27 May 1981.

The Conference was attended by representatives of 122 Governments, the United Nations organs, Organization of African Unity, Movement of Non-aligned Countries, specialized agencies of the United Nations, inter-governmental organizations, national liberation movements, international and national non-governmental organizations as well as a number of experts and leading statesmen. The national liberation movements of South Africa and Namibia — the African National Congress of South Africa, the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania and the South West Africa People's Organization — were represented by high-level delegations led by their respective Presidents.

The Conference reviewed the situation in South Africa, and in southern Africa as a whole. There was also an extensive exchange of views on the feasibility of sanctions and other means as credible measures not involving force, which the world community can employ to exert diplomatic, economic and other pressures against the racist régime of South Africa. Such measures could avert the grave danger to international peace and security arising from the policy and action of racist régime of South Africa. The International Conference, then adopted the following declaration which it commends for the earnest and urgent attention of all Governments, organizations and peoples for appropriate action to secure the expeditious eradication of *apartheid* and the liberation of Namibia from illegal occupation by South Africa's racist régime.

### **Grave situation**

The Conference expresses its profound concern over the situation in South Africa, and in southern Africa as a whole, resulting from the policies and actions of the South African régime of racism, repression and terrorism.

The stubborn efforts of that régime to perpetuate racist domination by an ever-increasing dependence on violence and repression and to continue its illegal occupation of Namibia, in defiance of repeated appeals by the international community and in flagrant contravention of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, have created an explosive situation in southern Africa and constitute no longer a threat to, but a manifest breach of international peace and security.

The Pretoria régime is, moreover, continuing its illegal occupation of Namibia in defiance of the United Nations and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, thereby undermining the authority of the United Nations and violating the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It has resorted to the militarization of the Territory, for which the United Nations has assumed direct responsibility, and to brutal repression

of the Namibian people. It has frustrated the implementation of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia through free and fair elections. To this end, the South African racist régime deliberately caused the collapse of the pre-implementation meeting held at Geneva from 7 to 19 January 1981. The result has been a continuing and escalating armed conflict against the people of Namibia and its sole and authentic representative — the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO).

In pursuance of its policies of seeking to perpetuate racist domination in South Africa and to maintain illegal occupation of Namibia, as well as expand its imperialist influence beyond its borders, the Pretoria régime has resorted to constant acts of aggression, subversion, destabilization and terrorism against neighbouring independent African States, thereby aggravating existing international tensions.

It has built up a massive machine and repressive apparatus and has embarked on acquisition of nuclear weapon capability in an attempt to suppress resistance by the oppressed people and terrorize neighbouring States into effective subservience.

Acquisition of military equipment and nuclear weapons capability by the racist régime of South Africa, with its record of violence and aggression, poses a grave menace to humanity.

The situation in southern Africa is, therefore, characterized by repeated breaches of the peace and acts of aggression and an ever-growing threat of a wider conflict with grave repercussions in Africa and the world.

The continuing political, economic and military collaboration of certain Western States and their transnational corporations with the racist régime of South Africa encourages its persistent intransigence and defiance of international community and constitutes a major obstacle to the elimination of the inhuman and criminal system of *apartheid* in South Africa and the attainment of self-determination, freedom and national independence by the people of Namibia.

### **Action by the international community**

The United Nations and the international community must take energetic and concerted action because the oppressed people of South Africa and Namibia deserve full support in their legitimate struggle for self-determination, freedom and national independence. The independent sovereign States of southern Africa have a right to protection from the repeated armed attacks, acts of aggression and depredations by a racist régime which acts as an international outlaw.

The United Nations and the international community must take action to stop the continuing breaches of the peace, and to avert a wider conflict. Such action is urgent and indispensable for the maintenance of inter-



national peace and security; for the elimination of *apartheid* and illegal occupation; for the discharge of the solemn obligations to the people of Namibia; for ensuring the emancipation of Africa after centuries of oppression, exploitation and humiliation; and for promoting genuine international co-operation.

The Conference strongly condemns the minority racist régime of South Africa for its criminal policies and actions.

The Conference declares that the racist régime of South Africa — by its repression of the great majority of the people of the country and their national liberation movements, by its illegal occupation of Namibia, and by its acts of aggression against neighbouring States — bears full responsibility for the present conflict and for its inevitable escalation.

The Conference further stresses that this responsibility of South Africa is shared by those States whose assistance and multifaceted support encourage the aggressive policy of the Pretoria racist régime.

It expresses its deep conviction that the situation in South Africa, and in southern Africa as a whole, is of deep concern to all Governments and organizations and to humanity as a whole.

It declares that the United Nations and its family of organizations, as well as other intergovernmental organizations, have a vital interest in the elimination of *apartheid* and the achievement of genuine independence by Namibia. It recognizes that Governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, as well as men and women of conscience can and must play a role in the international effort to support the oppressed people of South Africa and Namibia.

It emphasizes the importance of close co-operation between the United Nations and OAU, as well as of co-operation between Governments and public organizations to contribute to the elimination of *apartheid* and the independence of Namibia.

### **Consensus achieved**

During the many years that the United Nations and the international community have considered the problem of *apartheid* in South Africa and its international repercussions, a consensus has emerged on the fact that *apartheid* is a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind, incompatible with the provisions of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. There is also consensus that reliance on violence and repression by the South African racist régime and its continuing denial of human and political rights to the great majority of the South African people will certainly lead to escalation of a violent conflict and to a racial conflagration, in South Africa with serious international repercussions. The international community recognizes that the struggle of the

South African people for the elimination of *apartheid* and for the establishment of a democratic society, in which all the people of South Africa as a whole, irrespective of race, colour or creed, will participate freely in the determination of their destiny, is legitimate.

There is also an international consensus on the legitimacy of the struggle of the Namibian people for self-determination, freedom and national independence. Namibia, being a direct responsibility of the United Nations, the international community has repeatedly condemned the continued illegal occupation of the territory by South Africa in defiance of United Nations decisions and the advisory opinion of the international court of Justice of 21 June 1971. South Africa's brutal repression of the Namibian people and its ruthless exploitation of the resources of their territory is a matter of profound concern to the international community.

It is on the basis of the foregoing consensus and in response to the aspirations of the oppressed people of South Africa and Namibia that the Conference has made its recommendations.

It recalls that the United Nations and the international community have adopted a number of measures, including a mandatory arms embargo, aimed at forcing South Africa to abrogate all its racist and oppressive laws, to terminate its illegal occupation of Namibia, and to put an end forthwith to its repeated and flagrant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighbouring African States. It is a source of the deepest regret and concern that these measures have been circumvented or not fully implemented, particularly by some of the very Security Council members who are essential parties to them. The Conference, therefore, considers that action taken so far by the international community has proved inadequate.

### **Need for further action**

The Conference considers it imperative that the Security Council should recognize that the situation in southern Africa, arising from the policies and actions of the racist régime of South Africa, is characterized by constant breaches of the peace and therefore, measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter must be taken.

The Conference expresses its concern that the Security Council of the United Nations has yet been unable to effectively perform its solemn responsibilities in this connexion due to the opposition of the Western permanent members of the Council. It draws the particular attention of those permanent members of the Security Council to their responsibilities under the Charter. It urges all Governments and organizations to exert their influence to facilitate action by the Security Council.

The Conference expresses grave concern and dismay that the Security

Council, convened in April 1981 at the instance of the member States of the OAU and the Movement of Non-Aligned States to impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa for its continued illegal occupation of Namibia, failed to adopt the necessary decisions. The Conference supports the report of the OAU and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries for an early meeting of the Security Council to adopt comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the racist régime of South Africa for its policies of *apartheid*.

### **The need for sanctions**

The Conference affirms that the sanctions provided under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, universally applied, are the most appropriate and effective means to ensure South Africa's compliance with the decisions of the United Nations. The choice is between an escalation of conflict and the imposition of international sanctions, if all other attempts to reach a peaceful settlement have failed.

The Conference notes that an overwhelming majority of States — as well as *most* governmental and non-governmental organizations, including trade unions and religious organizations — share this view. It notes with appreciation the sacrifices made by many States, especially the developing States, in accordance with the decisions of United Nations, OAU, and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries to promote freedom and peace in southern Africa. It urges those Powers which have so far opposed sanctions, to heed the views of the rest of the international community and harmonize their policies in order to facilitate concerted action.

### **Purpose of sanctions being recommended**

The purpose of sanctions is:

(a) to force South Africa to abandon its racist policy of *apartheid* and to put an end to its illegal occupation of Namibia;

(b) to demonstrate, by action, the universal abhorrence of *apartheid* and solidarity with the legitimate aspirations and struggles of the people of South Africa and Namibia;

(c) to deny the benefits of international co-operation to the South African régime so as to oblige it and its supporters to heed world opinion, to abandon the policy of racist domination and to seek a solution by consultation with the genuine leaders of the oppressed people;

(d) to undermine the ability of the South African régime to repress its people, commit acts of aggression against independent States and pose a threat to international peace and security;

(e) to remove economic support from *apartheid* so as to miti-

gate suffering in the course of the struggle of the people of South Africa and Namibia for freedom, and thereby promote as peaceful a transition as possible.

### **A programme of sanctions**

In the light of the above, the Conference urgently calls for a programme of sanctions and related measures against South Africa. The mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, instituted by a unanimous decision of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, must be effectively implemented and reinforced, so as to serve its purposes fully and should be the first step in the programme of sanctions.

The Conference attaches great importance and urgency: (1) to the cessation of all collaboration with South Africa in the military and nuclear fields; (2) to an effective oil embargo against South Africa; (3) to the cessation of investments in and loans to South Africa; (4) to the cessation of purchase and marketing of South African gold and other minerals as well as co-operation with South African marketing organizations for such minerals; and (5) to the denial to South Africa of certain essential supplies such as electronic and communications equipment, machinery and chemicals, as well as technology.

The Conference expresses its conviction that South Africa is vulnerable to sanctions and that sanctions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter are feasible and will be effective. South Africa is more dependent on world trade than the rest of the world is on trade with South Africa.

*The Conference recognizes that sanctions against South Africa will involve adjustments and sacrifices by other States, as well as hardships for the oppressed people of South Africa. It takes into account the possibility that the South African régime may, in its desperation, retaliate against the oppressed majority of the population of South Africa as well as against neighbouring States.*

*Nevertheless, the Conference affirms that the cost of sanctions is very small compared to the cost of the existing human suffering and degradation in South Africa and to the dangerous consequences of a widening conflict in southern Africa, both to the people of southern Africa and to the international community.*

The Conference considers that the international community can and should devise ways and means to enable the independent states of southern Africa to withstand the effects on them of sanctions against South Africa, rather than use their presumed plight as a pretext to avoid applying swift and effective sanctions against South Africa.

The Conference recognizes that for sanctions to be decisive, they must be effectively applied so as to remove their "immunization potentials" which prolong unnecessary suffering to innocent persons. Above all, they

must be implemented by all members of the international community, particularly the major trading partners of South Africa. Financial and economic relations with the South Africa racist régime, based on cheap labour and exploitation of resources which should be used to improve the quality of life of the majority of the population of South Africa, buttress and sustain the nefarious system of *apartheid*.

It urges all States to take note of the fact that their trade with the independent States of Africa along — not to count their trade with all countries committed to sanctions against South Africa — is already far greater than trade with South Africa.

While stressing the importance of action by the major trading partners of South Africa, the Conference recognizes the importance of action by the entire international community, and of measures by the public.

The Conference considers that concerted action by all States and organizations committed to sanctions has not merely a moral value but can have a significant political, economic and material impact. Such action can also exert a positive influence on the attitudes of Governments opposing sanctions and facilitate mandatory action by the United Nations Security Council.

The Conference expresses appreciation of the measures taken by many States — members of the OAU and Non-Aligned Movement, the socialist countries, the Nordic and some other west European States and hopes that other countries will take similar measures.

The Conference urges all States, while vigorously campaigning for action by the Security Council, to take immediate unilateral and collective action to impose comprehensive sanctions against the racist régime of South Africa.

### **Arms embargo**

The Conference attaches utmost importance to the effective implementation and reinforcement of the existing mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.

The Conference endorses the recommendations submitted in September 1980 by the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 421 (1977) on the Question of South Africa for the implementation and reinforcement of the embargo and urges that the Security Council adopt them without delay. It expresses the hope that the Committee will be provided with all necessary means to accomplish fully the task which has been entrusted to it.

The embargo, as so far implemented, has not succeeded in reducing the danger of aggression and repression by the South African régime. To this end it calls upon all States to enact effective legislation or issue appropriate

policy directives on the arms embargo, covering all forms of military collaboration, direct or indirect, transfers through third parties and involvement in arms production in South Africa, and including end-user clauses designed to monitor and enforce the embargo scrupulously. Such legislation should also cover the existing loop-holes with regard to "dual purpose" items and related materials including computers, electronic equipments and related technology.

The Conference further emphasizes the need for strengthening the relevant provision of Security Council resolution 418 (1977) in order to ensure the immediate cessation of all nuclear collaboration with South Africa.

The Conference expresses concern at reports regarding the efforts by the South African régime to force military alliances and arrangements involving certain Western Powers and certain régimes in other regions, and to convene a conference to that end.

It considers that any military alliances or arrangements with the South African régime would be an act of hostility against the legitimate struggle of the people of South Africa and Namibia and would greatly aggravate the situation in southern Africa. It commends those States which have firmly opposed any links by existing military alliances with the South African régime and calls for vigilance by the international community to prevent any military arrangements with that régime.

### **Oil embargo**

The Conference considers that an effective oil embargo against South Africa is an indispensable complement to the embargo on arms and nuclear co-operation. The racist régime of South Africa, having no oil of its own, is vulnerable to an oil embargo and will remain so notwithstanding the expansion of its oil-from-coal plants (SASOL).

Supplies of oil and petroleum products facilitate the acts of aggression and repression by the racist régime of South Africa. The need for an oil embargo is therefore urgent and complements the embargo on arms and nuclear collaboration.

The Conference notes with satisfaction that major oil-exporting States have imposed an embargo on the supply of their oil to South Africa. It further welcomes with appreciation their intention to consider establishing a mechanism, including a monitoring agency, to ensure that their oil embargo is effectively and scrupulously respected. It calls on other countries which supply oil or refined oil products to South Africa to join in implementing the oil embargo against South Africa through legislative enforcement measures or appropriate policy directives.

The Conference calls upon the Security Council of the United Nations to take action to support the measures by the oil-exporting countries, and to institute a mandatory embargo on the supply of oil and oil products to

South Africa and on the provision of any assistance to the oil industry in South Africa.

### **Economic sanctions**

Pending action by the Security Council to impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions, the Conference urges all States to unilaterally and collectively impose economic sanctions against the *apartheid* régime of South Africa.

It recommends, as a first step, that all Governments end any promotion of trade with South Africa, including the exchange of trade missions, government guarantees and insurance for trade with South Africa or investment in South Africa.

The Conference calls for a freeze on all new investments in, and financial loans to, South Africa. It is a well-established fact that foreign capital, loans and other financial facilities sustain the *apartheid* economy, provide it with resources to expand its repressive apparatus, as well as to acquire and increase its military and nuclear capability, to the detriment of peace and security in the entire southern African region.

It notes with satisfaction that the United Nations General Assembly has, repeatedly and by overwhelming majorities, recognized that "a cessation of all new foreign investments in and financial loans to South Africa would constitute an important step in international action for the elimination of *apartheid*, as such investments and loans abet and encourage the *apartheid* policies in that country".

It welcomes the actions of those Governments which have taken legislative and other measures towards that end.

### **Transport**

The Conference calls for the adoption of measures aimed at terminating airline and other connections with *apartheid* South Africa and Namibia while under South African occupation. It further urges all countries concerned to take action to ensure that airlines registered in their countries terminate "pool arrangements" with South African airlines.

### **Other measures**

The Conference urges all States to take appropriate steps to prohibit sporting, cultural and scientific contacts with South Africa. Formal agreements promoting activities in these fields, except in dire humanitarian cases, should be abrogated.

The Conference also urges all States to take appropriate steps to prohibit or discourage emigration of their nationals to South Africa, especially of skilled personnel.

### **Public actions**

The Conference emphasizes the importance of action by local authorities, mass media, trade unions, religious bodies, co-operatives and other non-governmental organizations, as well as men and women of conscience, to demonstrate their abhorrence of *apartheid* and their solidarity with the legitimate struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa and Namibia.

It draws particular attention to the constructive value of consumer boycott, sports boycott, cultural and academic boycott, divestment from transnational corporations and financial institutions operating in South Africa. It encourages assistance to the victims of *apartheid* and their national liberation movements, as appropriate actions by the public, in support of *international sanctions against South Africa*.

### **Assistance to neighbouring States**

The Conference draws attention to the problems encountered by the independent States in southern Africa as a result of the aggressive actions of the South African régime, and the sacrifices they have made in the cause of freedom and human rights.

It recognizes that these States will be adversely affected by a programme of sanctions against South Africa.

It considers, therefore, that the imposition of sanctions must be accompanied by a programme of assistance to those States in the southern African region which would be seriously affected, in accordance with Article 50 of the United Nations Charter. Such assistance should include the provision of supplies of food, oil and other essential commodities, and the establishment of facilities for their stockpiling, as well as necessary financial assistance.

It urges support by all States to the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) aimed at reducing the dependency of the neighbouring States on the racist régime of South Africa.

States carrying out their international duty of assistance to the liberation movements of southern Africa are entitled to the protection of the international law, when confronting the violence of the racist régime and have the right to seek and obtain assistance from other States in protecting their territorial integrity and political independence.

### **Conclusion**

The Conference declares its solidarity with the oppressed people of South Africa and Namibia in their legitimate struggle for freedom, to all persons imprisoned, restricted or exiled for their participation in the struggle, and to the independent States in southern Africa.



The Conference affirms its solidarity with Nelson Mandela, as well as all other leaders and patriots, imprisoned or restricted for their part in the struggle for freedom and demands their immediate and unconditional release.

It recognizes the right of the oppressed people and their national liberation movements to choose their means of struggle, including armed struggle, for liberation from the oppressive régime in South Africa.

It declares that the racist régime of South Africa, by its escalating repression and defiance of world opinion, bears full responsibility for precipitating violent conflict. It draws the attention of those States which oppose sanctions but express their fulsome abhorrence at the brutalities of *apartheid*, particularly during dramatic crises such as Sharpeville and Soweto, that their policies are in effect aiding and abetting the escalation of violence. Sanctions are a legitimate and appropriate instrument of coercion prescribed by the Charter of the United Nations for the resolution of conflicts.

The Conference considers that the oppressed people of South Africa and Namibia, and their national liberation movements, deserve the support of the international community in their legitimate struggle. It considers that comprehensive sanctions against South Africa constitute appropriate and effective support to facilitate freedom for the people of South Africa and Namibia and to put an end to racist violence.

The Conference recognizes the urgent need for the mobilization of all Governments and peoples for comprehensive sanctions against the South African régime, as well as for all other appropriate assistance to the oppressed people of South Africa and Namibia and their national liberation movements.

It calls on all Governments and organizations committed to freedom and human dignity, to counteract all moves to assist and encourage the *apartheid* régime. It appeals to them to concert their efforts in an international campaign for comprehensive sanctions against South Africa, in the light of the discussions and decisions of the present conference.

It commends the United Nations Special Committee against *apartheid*, the anti-*apartheid* and solidarity movements and other organizations for their efforts in support of comprehensive sanctions against South Africa.

It urges the United Nations, in co-operation with the OAU, and in close co-operation with the national liberation movements and other organizations, to take all necessary measures to promote, secure and monitor the programme of comprehensive sanctions against South Africa.

The Conference recognizes and pays tribute to the historic and continuing struggle of the peoples of South Africa and Namibia to end *apartheid* and illegal occupation, as well as to promote justice, freedom and independence in their countries. It is their courageous and persistent struggle

which have made the Conference possible and relevant. The Conference responds to the noble aspirations and efforts of the South African and Namibia patriots and issues a fervent appeal for individual and collective support to them.

### **Special Declaration on Namibia**

The Conference reaffirms the solemn, direct responsibility of the United Nations for Namibia which under General Assembly resolution 2248 (1967) is exercised through the United Nations Council for Namibia, the legal Administering Authority for the Territory until genuine independence is achieved in a united Namibia.

The Conference expresses its solemn support for the legitimate struggle of the Namibian people for self-determination, freedom and national independence under the leadership of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), their sole and authentic representative.

The Conference expresses its profound concern over the situation in Namibia resulting from the continued illegal occupation of the Territory by South Africa in defiance of United Nations resolutions and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971. South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia, its brutal repression of the Namibian people and its ruthless oppression of the people and exploitation of the resources of Namibia, as well as its attempts to destroy the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia are acts which undermine the authority of the United Nations and violate the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The Conference strongly condemns the South African racist régime which has escalated its militarization of Namibia and intensified its massive repression of the Namibian people, increasing its arrests and detentions of leaders and members of SWAPO.

The South African régime has furthermore:

(a) Increased its military attacks against independent African States, particularly Angola, Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia, and its threats and acts of subversion aimed at destabilizing neighbouring States, in particular, Angola;

(b) Taken various measures to subvert the territorial integrity of Namibia notably by attempting to separate Walvis Bay from Namibia and by claiming sovereignty over the Penguin and other islands off the coast of Namibia in acts that have been rejected and declared illegal, null and void by the General Assembly;

(c) Persisted in the systematic plunder of Namibia's natural resources in collusion with foreign economic interests in violation of United Nations resolutions and Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia enacted by the United Nations

Council for Namibia in 1974; and

(d) Persistently frustrated the implementation of Security Council resolutions 385 (1976) of 30 January 1976 and 435 (1978) of 29 September 1978 which envisage the attainment of independence by Namibia through the holding of free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations.

Concerned that the Western Contact Group of Five has so far failed to exert the necessary pressure on the Pretoria régime to force it to comply with the United Nations Security Council decisions on Namibia, particularly resolution 435 (1978), the Conference deeply deplores the obstacles placed in the way of the implementation of those decisions and calls upon the Western Contact Group of Five to exert the necessary pressure on the South African régime in order to enable Namibia to attain independence without further delay.

Having assessed the current situation in Namibia, the Conference considers that in view of South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia, its defiance of United Nations resolutions, its brutal repression of the Namibian people, its intransigence as demonstrated most recently in its refusal at the Geneva Pre-implementation Meetings to accept the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), its military escalation, its repeated acts of armed aggression against the people of Namibia, its use of the Territory of Namibia to launch armed attacks against African States, the situation in Namibia constitutes a threat to international peace and security. In this regard, the Conference solemnly calls upon all Member States to impose comprehensive sanctions against South Africa in order to ensure South Africa's immediate compliance with the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations relating to Namibia.

The Conference strongly condemns South Africa for the recruitment of mercenaries and other agents in order to perpetuate its illegal occupation of Namibia and to carry out military attacks against African States. It calls upon all States to take effective measures to prevent the recruitment, financing, training and transit of mercenaries for service in South Africa and occupied Namibia.

The Conference further calls upon all States to discourage their nationals or companies of their nationality from investing or obtaining concessions in occupied Namibia.

The Conference, deeply concerned about the rapid depletion of the natural resources of Namibia as a result of their systematic plunder by foreign economic interests in collusion with South Africa, strongly condemns the activities of all foreign economic interests operating in Namibia and demands that they cease their illegal activities forthwith.

The Conference further reaffirms that South Africa and the foreign economic interests which are exploiting Namibian resources are liable to

pay reparations to Namibia for the damages caused by the illegal occupation and the ruthless plundering of the Territory's resources.

The Conference strongly condemns the plunder of Namibian uranium by South Africa and urges the Governments of the States, whose nationals and corporations are involved in the trade and traffic of Namibian uranium, to take immediate measures to prohibit their State-owned corporations and other corporations from all dealings in Namibian uranium and all prospecting activities in Namibia.

The Conference condemns South Africa's inhuman exploitation of Namibian workers in detriment of the health of the Namibian population and future generations.

The Conference recognizes the fact that because of the intransigence and brutal repression by the illegal régime, the Namibian people, under the leadership of SWAPO, felt obliged to embark on an armed struggle as a last resort. It declares that the South African régime bears full responsibility for the armed conflict in the Territory.

The Conference, furthermore, emphasizes the need for increased political and diplomatic pressure reinforced by sanctions against racist South Africa to ensure the speedy independence of Namibia. It calls upon the international community to provide increased material, financial, political, diplomatic and moral assistance to the Namibian people and SWAPO to strengthen their efforts for the liberation of Namibia.

The Conference calls for an urgent and scrupulous implementation of the United Nations Plan for Namibia as embodied in Security Council resolution 435 (1978).

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