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# Namibia Negotiations

A.

- (i) Joint statement by the Foreign Ministers of the Western Five Contact Group, issued after their meeting in New York on 24 September 1981

The Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and United States, met in New York on 24 September to review the progress made in their search for an early settlement of the Namibian question.

The Ministers noted that there have been extensive discussions with interested African governments and the OAU (Organization of African Unity). The Ministers also noted that discussions had taken place between the US Government and the South African Government and that there had been a recent exchange of messages between the Five and South Africa. It is therefore now possible to identify more clearly the issues involved and a process for their resolution which would lead to implementation of Security Council resolution 435.

The Ministers noted that the stage reached in their work and the consultations in which they have engaged, have enabled them to consider proposals to deal with these issues and thus to create the confidence necessary for all parties to proceed.

In their consultations, the five governments have developed proposals for a timetable for further and final negotiations with the objective of implementation of Security Council resolution 435, in 1982.

The Five have now completed their initial consideration of possible constitutional principles for the Constituent Assembly. The Five believe that these proposals would be likely to secure the confidence of all concerned. Accordingly, the Five now intend to begin discussion of these proposed constitutional principles as well as a timetable and an approach to other remaining issues with the parties concerned, starting in October.

The Foreign Ministers recognized and shared the desire of the inter-

national community to see early and meaningful progress toward the implementation of the United Nations Plan and the independence of Namibia. They reaffirm their determination to pursue their efforts in cooperation with the parties concerned, to resolve the remaining outstanding issues and thus secure without further delay a peaceful solution to the Namibian problem.

(ii) Press briefing by a senior US official, following the meeting of the Contact Group in New York, on 24 September 1981

Senior Official: I think you all have the joint statement that was issued a little while ago. I might say a few introductory words about it, and then if you have any questions.

I think it is a document which, in the main, speaks for itself, but I would emphasize a couple of aspects. We have been seeking, since April and May, to discover if there is indeed a basis to move forward the negotiating process on Namibia.

That exploration has involved, first of all, extensive discussions with the South African Government to identify what problems and issues remain in their view, that would be hurdles in the way to implementing the independence of Namibia.

And, secondly, to figure out how those issues might best be resolved.

We have also, in that time period, been involved in extensive discussions with all the African parties — the Front Line States — Nigeria, Kenya, Zaire and others — and, of course, a good deal of internal work within the Contact Group itself.

I won't recap the entire history here, but there have been numerous meetings in which we have within the group been seeking to define a process that would enable us to move the negotiations forward.

The significance of what has happened in this meeting to-day is that we are now able to say that we have identified those issues and defined that process upon which we intend now to move forward, as a group, with all the parties in an effort to deal one by one with the remaining issues.

It is our hope, as is indicated, that we will be able to move this process forward in order to resolve those issues, and the goal is that implementation of resolution 435 would begin in 1982.

As the statement indicates, we will be, in the month of October, going to all the parties to discuss the issues that are indicated, starting with the question of some constitutional principles that would guide the work of the Constituent Assembly envisaged in 435, and to discuss, in addition, a proposed timetable, as well as to identify the remaining issues that will need to be addressed.

In sum, what I would say about the statement and the meeting that took place to-day, which was preceded by a good deal of intensive activity, is that it is a significant step, that we believe we have a basis to go ahead.

Obviously, we are well aware that there are many issues that have not in fact been resolved. They have been identified, and we have defined a process for resolving them. That's the way I would like to characterize what has been done.

So I don't think I would add much more to that point, but I will be happy to take any questions.

*Question: Can you go down a list of the issues that you have identified?*

There is, first of all, this question of constitutional principles. There is the question of some remaining issues that never were fully addressed in the past concerning how 435 would be implemented., the question involving the transitional arrangements, security arrangements. For example, the whole issue of UNTAG, its deployment, its size, and so forth, what nations would contribute forces to it. These are all long-standing issues that in fact never were fully resolved in prior years.

The issue also of the impartiality of the United Nations, which was discussed extensively but never resolved, going back to last October and also at the Geneva Pre-implementation Meeting last January.

These are, I think, the primary headings that I would point to.

*You're saying you're now going to address the issues, but what have you done in the preceding weeks? Have you sent language of the constitutional principles, and that sort of thing, to the South Africans?*

No. On the question of constitutional principles, there's been extensive work, but it has been within the Contact Group. What we're starting to do in October, as indicated, is to, as a group, present these suggestions to all the parties.

*Isn't the issue you mentioned of the impartiality of the UN an issue unidentified, an issue unresolved? But it's not really a major stumbling block because that's code language for simply saying SWAPO, and you have 50 African states saying SWAPO is the representative of the South West African People.*

I don't think that any of these issues are insuperable.

*How big is that one?*

It's a significant concern, but I wouldn't rate it higher than any of the others that I've mentioned. Obviously, if there is a desire for a settlement and a desire for peace, which we believe there clearly is, there'll have to be give and take on all sides.

*Are we still talking of linkage in this, linkage with Angola, linkage with Cuban and Soviet presence?*

The issue of Angola is not part of the UN Plan for Namibia, and is not in any way related to 435. But the issue of Angola is a very real question, and we are still talking very much about our view that progress on the one front will lead to progress on the other, absolutely.

*Everyone else here, may know the answer to this except me — If you agree among all the parties involved in the diplomacy on constitutional principles that should be applied, how would that be factored into the process?*

We will be seeking consensus of all the Namibian Parties to a set of constitutional principles which would be in effect an endorsement of them prior to the election of the Constituent Assembly.

*In other words, it would be a condition established at the time of the election of the Constituent Assembly, that would be understood by all parties?*

That's right.

*Given that so many of these problems have been identified but not resolved, is there any reason that you can give us why you think the South Africans are serious about this? Why they really are going to go through with this. You hear a lot of reasons from some sources in South Africa about why it is not such a hot idea, from military personnel. There's evidence of settlements and so on; South Africans moving into the area. So there are a lot of things that are floating around that people cite as evidence that the South Africans are not serious, they're just stalling again. Can you give us anything to suggest that we ought to take them seriously?*

The evidence in these matters can sometimes be tangible and sometimes be intangible. Let me just say that we have had an extensive exploration of this whole subject in our discussions with the South Africans over the previous months.

We are operating on the basis of reciprocal good faith and have no reason to question this. We'll continue to do so unless there's evidence to the contrary.

We have, as I say, no evidence of anything to the contrary. Obviously, we have, in addition, as you are well aware, enunciated a new policy *vis-a-vis* South Africa, which we have called constructive engagement.

We believe that there is merit in that approach. We believe that Namibia is the issue that is uppermost in the minds of all of our friends in Africa, and we're focusing a considerable amount of our energy in southern Africa on the Namibia question.

I think there can be no doubt in anyone's mind that we're dead serious about this, whether here or in South Africa.



*When it says that the Five Governments have developed proposals for a timetable for further and final negotiations with the objective of implementing the resolution in 1982, does that mean that the South Africans have agreed to a 1982 implementation or just the Contact Group?*

It mean's exactly what it says: That it is our objective to achieve it in 1982.

*Is that a deadline?*

No, it is not a deadline.

*What happens if it doesn't happen by the end of '82?*

All I can tell you is that we have defined the process, including a timetable, which is going to be our goal. And if we can resolve the issues that remain, we believe that objective can be met.

*You may have already mentioned this — October — the contacts with all parties — how physically will that be done? Will it be a Contact Group delegation, an American delegation? If there is a delegation going anywhere, where? And specifically, will there be direct contact with SWAPO?*

There are several answers — several parts to your questions.

We have not defined — it would be premature for me to define here unilaterally exactly what the itinerary will be and who the members of delegations will be. But it will be, number one, a Contact Group initiative, so it will be the Five we're talking about.

Number two, all parties will be contacted during that exploration and that mission, which obviously includes SWAPO, yes.

*There will be a physical mission, a group travelling to the area?*

Yes. In general terms it will be a physical mission, a group travelling to the area, but beyond that I cannot go. We haven't defined with precision the level, the size, and the itinerary and exact dates.

*Do you expect to be going with the mission?*

It's a possibility.

*Would you give us any further details about what you have in mind as a timetable? I think in the statement you made earlier in this briefing, you referred to beginning the process of implementation in 1982. I'm not too clear exactly what sort of a timetable during '82 the Group has in mind.*

I wouldn't want to go beyond what it says there. That is the stated objective for the beginning of implementation, that implementation would get underway in '82 as it says there.

*It doesn't say here, "beginning". I thought that was something that was omitted, or unless it is somewhere I haven't noted.*

Let me finish this point. The objective is that implementation would take place; but implementation, if you read 435 and all the associated documents — and I invite you to do so at some point — is a fairly elaborate process, it does take some time. We want to get it underway in '82. That's the objective.

*If it did get underway in '82, what would be a reasonable time for Namibia to become independent?*

That's not for us to determine. That's completely up to the Constituent Assembly under the UN Plan.

*I wanted to ask you; how operational are those documents? I did have occasion to look them over recently, and it is rather elaborate and detailed. Are those points that were put forth in '78 still on the table as far as the Contact Group is concerned, and everybody else?*

Yes, indeed.

*What about the additional things that were added? I'm not sure whether they were agreed upon, such as negotiations that took place with President Neto before he died, about a kind of demilitarized zone on both sides of the border. Was that agreed upon by all parties or was that just an idea that has been kicked around?*

It was agreed upon in principle, obviously, subject to the other issues that were still unresolved being resolved.

*Because if you really look through it, there isn't — you talk about principles in that document. There were principles enunciated in that original working paper, documents, as I recall, about rights of people and everything else in Namibia.*

*Can you be more explicit on what kind of principles we're talking about on this constitution? Would it be explicit principles such as Zimbabwe — the Constitutional Assembly would be obligated to allocate a certain number of seats to various people — or is it more broadly-based, like rights of property?*

The kind of document we have in mind is one we have already worked on. We have developed some initial ideas, and we're going to go and take those to the other parties concerned, get their reaction to them, and I would presume we would then refine them in the effort to get the maximum amount of common ground.

It is not an effort to write the constitution of Namibia. That is the job of the Namibian people as provided for in the UN Plan. The Constituent Assembly is going to write the constitution for Namibia.

What we're seeking to do is develop a document that would guide its work and, if you will, endorse some very basic concepts and principles.

*Would that be binding in any way?*

It certainly would be binding in the sense that those who are running for election would presumably have endorsed it.

*Could you give us any idea of the current US thinking on the makeup of a UN peacekeeping force, if that is the correct terminology? Specifically, would we envision US participation in that?*

I can't say anything on that. We are not at that stage. But no thought has been given to US participation.

*No thought?*

I don't rule it out in saying that, either, but we simply haven't gotten to that point.

*What's the linkage between the impartiality problem and the composition of the membership?*

Obviously, all the parties have to be consulted on that, and we're talking about impartiality in the eyes of more than one party, so there'll have to be a balancing of interests and concerns in the composition of UNTAG. But impartiality affects a whole lot of other issues as well, including what the UN says and such things as were discussed at Geneva, such as financial support for SWAPO, that sort of things.

*Has the US ruled out the possibility, in your view, of changing what is fairly evidently a very pro-Soviet slant within SWAPO? In working at the problem from that end rather than working it from the other end. Do you have any hope that SWAPO'S wedded bliss with the Soviet Union would come to an end?*

I would say that, as I said before, we don't prejudge the orientation of SWAPO, were this process to work and were SWAPO to win. Obviously, there are concerns and I think legitimate ones, based on the present situation as to Soviet influence on SWAPO, but, by the same token, we don't prejudge what that outcome would look like if these elections actually took place.

What we're seeking to do is to provide an atmosphere of confidence in which all the parties can have greater assurance about what the future of the Territory would look like if independent. And, at the same time, I think the reality should be apparent that any government in that Territory is going to have to live with the local realities of southern Africa which undoubtedly would have an effect on any government that took office there.

But the key question is that there's got to be a sufficient atmosphere of confidence for the necessary decisions to be taken.

We are often struck by the fact that people are saying, "Well, gee, this is

a situation in which we had an agreement, we thought, but now the African parties are going to be asked to make additional concessions.”

I would emphasize that all parties in this arrangement, if it works, are going to have to be asked to make major concessions. And it is South Africa that's being asked to take the decision to get out, so we do need an atmosphere of confidence or that decision is not going to be taken.

*Are we going to have to make concessions with respect to recognizing the Government of Angola in advance of the Cuban withdrawal, or dropping support for Jonas Savimbi?*

I'm being asked to walk out on quite a number of limbs here this afternoon.

I think the issue of recognition has been stated in the past with sufficient clarity. I don't need to change in any respect our position on that.

We do believe that the Cubans — their foreign forces — should leave southern Africa. We've said so many times. And there can be no question of our recognition in the absence of progress on that issue.

*Am I right in inferring from this document that the projected scenario would go like this? First, there would be the constitutional principles. Then there would be independence. Then there would be the writing of the constitution. Then the actual elections.*

No. It's a very complex process; 435 and the associated documents, I can't summarize them here, they're that complicated. But they do require the arrival of a UN transitional assistance group — UNTAG — a lengthy period — several months — in which there is a draw-down of South African forces, election campaign activity leading up to the election, the Constituent Assembly is then elected, it takes whatever timing is required to draft a constitution — and that time, obviously, is up to it and not to us — and then at a subsequent time, as decided by the Constituent Assembly, an independence date is selected.

*Is that decision being made by the Constituent Assembly?*

Yes.

*Can you discuss what it was they are — what type of thing the South Africans were seeking clarification for?*

In general terms, we have been in discussion with them — we, the Five — as well as in our own bilateral discussions with them, defining the issues and defining a process which would enable those issues to be resolved, a sequential process. So the reason for secretary Crocker's travel to Zürich was to address questions that the South African Government had about those messages on those subjects. The issue of constitutional princi-

pals we will start formally launching in October, and there was no discussion of that in the meeting in Zürich.

*In simpler terms, they have accepted this tentative timetable you put forward today, is that correct?*

We have defined the issues, and we have defined amongst ourselves in the Five, a timetable that we would like to see. If the issues can be addressed in that timetable effectively, we believe that timetable will hold.

*Have they agreed, then, to a document or something that was sent to them by the Contact Group? Have they now signed off on it? Is that the sense of what you come back with?*

I would go back to some remarks I made in the *Backgrounder* (I believe it was, in May), in which we defined the purpose of Pik Botha's visit to Washington at that time, asking, first of all, is there in fact a will or a desire on the South African Government's part to continue this process, to move it forward — and, secondly, what are the issues that are outstanding?

*And have they given now a definitive answer to that?*

We believe they have, yes.

*As a result of Zürich?*

As a result of our extensive conversations with them over the past four or five months, including the one referred to in this, which is the most recent event, and that's a message from the Five to the South Africans.

*And have they sent a message back?*

We have a message back, yes.

*And you've got the message?*

Yes.

*And it says yes?*

It says that we have identified the issues and we have identified a basis for their being addressed.

*Does the discussion here on — the identification of UNTAG is one of the issues — suggest that despite some of the things Botha has said when he was in the United States, that the South Africans now have accepted some form of United Nations Transitional Group?*

We have made clear from the outset that this process must be on the basis of 435, and 435 has as a central element, an UNTAG group, a military component of UNTAG.

*But they objected, I remember, when Botha came to this country.*

That's correct.

*Have they now reversed themselves and dropped those?*

We believe we've made progress on that question, yes.

*The date of January 1, 1983, for Namibian independence has been casually mentioned. From what you said about this process, that seems hopelessly impossible. Would you throw an axe at the year?*

No. I wouldn't want to speculate beyond what I've said. If we can get implementation underway in '82, as I said, we will have achieved our objective. It may be possible to speed it up.

*Back to the question I had earlier about what's operational — I think in the original plan there was talk of UNTAG being comprised of seven battalions. Is there still an agreement on that or — that has been variously written about as 7 000 or fewer actual forces. I mean, is it still agreed that that number is about the number that the Namibian Police Force would be in charge of local security and that sort of thing?*

I would emphasize that there are a number of issues in various reports by various officials of the UN, as well as the Western Plan that was incorporated by reference in 435, and that not all the questions and all the points and all the details were agreed to in fine-print term. For example, on the issue of the size of UNTAG, there's a reference in one of these key documents to a force of up to seven battalions, up to 7 500 men, as being a figure at that time — this is going back three years — seemed appropriate, but there are some issues that have to be defined further. There is a greater precision that has to be obtained. So I think it would be erroneous to give the impression that we are either wedded or not wedded to that figure. That has to be resolved.

*I still want to know — that's why I keep asking, if those documents are operational. I gather they're not necessarily operational now?*

They're as operational now as they were then, but there were many caveats then, is the point I'm making.

*So on the security question, that's still to be resolved?*

There are still security issues to be resolved, yes.

*How does it envision dealing with the SWAPO sanctuaries in other countries, or is that one of the other issues that is left to be discussed?*

The question of SWAPO sanctuaries? I wouldn't highlight that as a pat-

ticular issue, no. There had been discussion in '78, '79, about the whole question of whether and how the UN might monitor those facilities in neighbouring countries, again, which was not resolved at the time.

*To put it another way, to have free and fair elections SWAPO people would have to be invited to come back home?*

Right.

*There would then have to be arrangements for their disarming?*

That's correct.

*And is there an agreement on arranging for that à la Zimbabwe and stations in the past, and so on?*

There's an agreement that it must happen, but the modalities for it, I believe, will still require further definition.

*Does one of these constitutional principles involve the future of Namibia's foreign policy and its military relations with foreign countries? From the point of view of South African security needs.*

The whole question of guarantees has been discussed extensively. I would simply say that we will continue to have an open mind about that.

*When we asked you earlier what types were resolved, you listed three categories, the first being the question of the constitutional principles and things that had been left unresolved (inaudible) and the issue of UN impartiality. Is that a kind of working timetable for attacking these issues? That you'll take it in that order? I mean, you said you're starting in October on the constitutional principles. Do you want to do one chunk at a time, is that it?*

We clearly are going to be discussing with all the parties the overall approach we're taking, but I think the first area of negotiations logically would be, since it is a new element, and it is one that all parties are aware of, that we've discussed with them, at least in general terms, and now comes the time to get more specific about it. So that is, as indicated in the joint statement, going to be on the agenda at this first step, but it will not be the only question on the agenda.

*This may be a bit off the subject, but can you tell us something about what Moi is going to be in to discuss and whether this is more than a routine visit?*

There is a tradition, and a very important one, of the OAU Chairman coming both to address the General Assembly and also to meet with the President, which he is doing tomorrow, and I think it's logical to assume that there will be discussions both of a bilateral nature between the United States and Kenya, but also discussions of Africa-wide issues, including

southern Africa, and other regional problems in Africa which are logically to be discussed when you have the Chairman of the OAU on a visit. So the agenda will be both regional issues and bilateral issues.

*The designated Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs was quoted as having said in an earlier phase of all this about the constitution, "we see a panel of experts consulting all parties, writing a constitution, and then selling it to the contact group, with South Africa's help".*

*Is this basically the concept that you have in mind?*

The panel of experts has been busy. We have been hard at work on this for the past two weeks within the Contact Group, and have developed, as I said, some preliminary ideas, and we are now going to take them to all the parties. So in that sense I think it's pretty consistent with what you said.

*Some good ideas?*

That's right.

*And you now have some confidence that these ideas would — that South Africa would go along with them?*

All parties have to go along with them.

*Yes, but they're the ones that have to get out.*

They're designed, obviously, as confidence-building measures but not only to build the confidence of one party. So they have to be reflective of that need for balance and equity. We have not, as I tried to emphasize in my response to a previous question, sought to, if you will, stack the deck in any way to pre-selling these with the South Africans before taking them elsewhere. We don't expect that it's going to be a one-trip operation on the constitutional principles. We will have to get feedback from all parties; get input, and then see what we can do to reflect the concerns of all, and then try it again.

*One more question: there has been some impatience from some members of the Contact Group lately. Do you feel from your meeting this week that they are satisfied, especially the West Germans and the French and the Canadians, with the progress you have made so far? The pace of this thing?*

I wouldn't want to speak for other governments on this. I think that question is best addressed elsewhere. The fact is that we had a very useful meeting this morning for some hour and forty minutes, and we have obviously made what I believe is a significant step in this joint statement, which gets the group formally back in motion. As a group, collectively



back in motion, with all the parties, which it has not been since January. And I think that speaks for itself.

Transcript texts for items (i) and (ii) supplied by the United States International Communication Agency, Johannesburg.

**B. Statement, dated 7 January 1982, by the UN Secretary General to the Council for Namibia**

I declare open this first meeting of the United Nations Council for Namibia for the year 1982. In doing so, I wish to extend a warm welcome to all of you and express my fervent hope that your efforts for carrying out the Council's important mandate will be rewarded with success.

I am sure that I am voicing the sentiments of all present here in paying a tribute to His Excellency Ambassador Paul Lusaka and congratulating him for his re-election as President of the Council. Ambassador Lusaka's talents, *experience and commitment to the mission entrusted to this Council* are known to all at the United Nations and I would like to express to him the widely shared appreciation of the manner in which he has guided the work of the Council during the last two years.

The standpoint of the United Nations in regard to the Namibian problem has been consistent and free from any ambiguity. It is based on the responsibility of the international community to enable the people of the Territory to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and national independence, through a process of free and fair election, in a united Namibia.

The United Nations Council for Namibia has played an indispensable role in the endeavour to mobilize international support for the cause. I would also like to mention with deep appreciation the contribution made by the Organization of African Unity in enlightening the international community on the situation in Namibia, in focusing the world's attention on it and in making sustained efforts to facilitate an acceptable solution to the problem. Moreover, I would like to commend the valuable co-operation which the United Nations has received from the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in advancing the cause of Namibia's independence.

The last few years have witnessed a series of developments giving rise to alternations of hope and disappointment. At more than one stage, the reaching of the goal of Namibia's independence appeared to be in sight. But at each point South Africa's reservations as to one or another aspect of

the proposed plans has caused a setback. The present impasse is dangerous not only for the situation in Namibia itself but also for the prospects of a peaceful and prosperous future for the region as a whole. An important diplomatic initiative on the part of the five Western States, involving contacts with the parties concerned as well as the front-line States, is currently in progress. It is my earnest hope that this initiative will help overcome the obstacles to the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 which must remain the basis of a just and lasting solution. We must all work to bring about a speedy end to the present situation of stalemate and suffering, bitterness and conflict. I pledge my personal endeavours to this end.

The coming months will bring new challenges to the United Nations Council for Namibia. In addition to efforts in the political field, the United Nations has to sustain programmes of assistance which are vital for the welfare of the people of the Territory and essential to preparing them for independent national existence.

Since this is my first statement as Secretary-General on the question of Namibia, I wish to stress the importance which I attach to the activities of this Council. Members of the Council can count on my fullest co-operation in their effort to protect the interests of the people of Namibia and promote progress towards an objective which rightly commands universal support.

Press release SG/SM/3232 NAM/618

C. Letter, dated 8 January 1982, from the South African Permanent Representative to the UN to the Secretary-General

I have been instructed by the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information to draw Your Excellency's attention, with reference to the statement delivered to the Council for Namibia on 7 January 1982, to the fact that the South African Government has repeatedly stressed and warned in its negotiations with the Five that the United Nations Organization, and especially the Secretary-General, must act in an impartial manner if the United Nations desires to be involved in a final settlement of the SWA/Namibia issue. This standpoint, which also reflects the wishes of the internal parties of the Territory, has been repeated in numerous communications to your predecessor by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information.

Bearing in mind the sensitive stage which has now been reached in the pursuit of a new initiative, Your Excellency will no doubt agree that it is

imperative, now more than ever before, not to violate one of the main principles without which a solution would not be possible and to create the impression that the principle of impartiality means nothing. Therefore, the South African Government would like to be informed how Your Excellency could reconcile the statement referred to with the necessity of adhering to the principle. In addition, the South African Government would like to inquire how it could be expected, in the light of such statements, to continue trying to persuade the internal parties of SWA/Namibia of the impartiality of the Secretary-General. The South African Government would also wish to know how Your Excellency could expect the South African Government to convince the internal parties that free and fair elections will take place in their country when the envisaged referee makes such a statement in favour of SWAPO while not even mentioning the internal parties.

The South African Government also rejects Your Excellency's accusation that "South Africa's reservations to one or another aspect of the proposed plan have caused a setback".

I am also instructed to refer Your Excellency to the fact that South Africa is in SWA/Namibia, *inter alia*, to protect the inhabitants against murderous SWAPO attacks. It is noted, however, that Your Excellency is silent on these terrorist attacks.

D. Letter, dated 13 January 1982, from the Secretary-General to the South African Permanent Representative to the UN, in reply to his letter of 8 January 1982

Excellency

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 8 January 1982 concerning the statement of 7 January which I made at the opening session of the United Nations Council for Namibia.

It is unfortunate that exception should have been taken to this statement, as I firmly believe that the principle of impartiality, as well as all other principles essential to the successful implementation of resolution 435, must be scrupulously observed by all parties.

I should like to make clear that I intend to accord the highest priority to the peaceful settlement of the question of Namibia, in the manner envisaged by Security Council resolution 435 (1978), to which we are all committed. I believe that full advantage should be taken of the extensive discussions of the past three years and that everything possible should be done this year to proceed with the implementation of the United Nations plan.

- If we are to succeed in our endeavours, it is essential that all concerned

should adhere to the commitments and agreements which have already been worked out. To this end, I sincerely hope that I can count on the cooperation of the Government of South Africa.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

**E.** Letter, dated 12 January 1982, from the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information to the UN Secretary-General

Your Excellency

Your public outrage yesterday against South Africa reflects the institutionalised intolerance, bias and prejudice that have become the trademark of the UN and its officialdom in violation of clear charter provisions. With your assumption of the post of Secretary-General a unique opportunity was presented to initiate a process to restore some measure of credibility in the UN Organisation. The fact that my Government is again prompted to object to public remarks made by you within a matter of days since your damaging comments on SWA/Namibia is a strong indication of the direction that you have set upon in the conduct of world affairs. By publicly demonstrating your personal attachment to the political cause of ideological adversaries of the South African Government you have clearly demonstrated your inability to act in a just and unbiased manner towards member states who are excluded from power blocs and who are made scapegoats for the inequities which are characteristic of the Governments of the majority of the members of the UN.

The latest outburst against South Africa is particularly reprehensible considering the audience whose approval was catered for. I urge you to reflect seriously on this manifestation of subservience to groups and alliances that command majorities in voting but show little regard for the most elementary norms of human dignity.

The impotence of the UN today and the ridicule with which it is viewed is a direct consequence of this pattern of behaviour. For, it can never satisfy the extremists while it causes alienation among those who respect fair play. The South African Government does not claim or pretend that it has no shortcomings or inadequacies. These are recognised and sought to be resolved. However, it strains the conscience that you should concentrate on South Africa. While poverty plays havoc with the lives of millions in most of the developing world, threatening their very survival, the Governments of these countries remain obsessed with the internal affairs of South Africa.

The total disregard for basic freedoms in the majority of UN member states is seemingly of no interest to you or your organisation. Since it is

impossible to plead ignorance of the facts must we then assume that the lack of freedom and progress in those countries are tolerated, excused or condoned so as not to anger the perpetrators whose piety is reflected in their professed concern over the affairs of South Africa?

If Your Excellency will permit me a word of friendly caution at the outset of your term of office: Heed the warnings in the social and economic reports of UN Commissions, show concern for the misery of the millions of people in the majority of UN member states, negotiate the real enemies of mankind, namely hunger, disease, illiteracy and poverty, dedicate your talents and energy without fear or favour to the upliftment of the affected. *In so doing you may salvage something of the UN's dignity, idealism and credibility and you will earn credit for your own efforts.*

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

F. Letter, dated 13 January 1982, from the UN Secretary-General to the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information, in reply to his letter of 12 January 1982

Excellency

I have received your message of 12 January 1982 concerning my statement to the Special Committee against Apartheid.

I must confess that the tone and the substance of your message surprised me. My statement reflected with clarity and accuracy the views of the United Nations with the exception of your Government. In these circumstances, it can hardly be described as "subservient" to any group or alliance. You must surely be aware that the system of apartheid is viewed with grave and universal concern, and not only within the United Nations.

Nor do I believe that it was felicitous to have spoken of the "impotence" of the United Nations and the "ridicule" in which it is held. I can only assume that such terms reflect the fact that your Government does not agree with United Nations resolutions on this matter of principle. As to the "alienation of those who respect fair play", I would suggest that this admirable concern can scarcely be reconciled with the policy and practice of apartheid. May I add that the question of apartheid is one of scores of major issues with which the United Nations deals each day. You referred to the priority that should be accorded to economic and social problems around the world, I should like to remind you that it is precisely towards the problems of poverty and survival that the United Nations system directs the largest share of its resources and energy.

I have taken the liberty of answering you frankly since, in your last two messages to me you have been, if I may say so, more than frank yourself. I would hope that our dialogue will be constructive and primarily directed to the search for solutions to the great problems of our time. For my part, I shall be guided by the principles of the Charter alone.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

- G. Letter, dated 21 January 1982, from the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information to the UN Secretary-General in reply to his letter of 13 January 1982

Your Excellency

In your letter of 13 January 1982 which you sent in reply to my message to you of 12 January, you state that you will be guided by the principles of the Charter alone. Since it has consistently been the South African Government's standpoint that the business of the United Nations should be conducted in terms of the provisions of the Charter, this would have been an encouraging statement were it not for the glaring contradiction in your public utterances. By Your Excellency's own admission you also acknowledged allegiance to the opinion of the majority of member states of the United Nations.

Although there ought not to be any incongruity between the Charter provisions and the decisions of the Organs of the United Nations, it is a known fact that the majority speaks and acts with contemptuous disregard for the provisions of the Charter. In all future instances, it seems that Your Excellency will be faced with the dilemma of determining whether you are going to be the servant of the Charter or of the majority.

Your Excellency is no doubt aware that the majority has denied South Africa the right of participation in the deliberations of the General Assembly on several occasions in contravention of the Charter. Since this can happen again in future — and not only to South Africa — I submit that Your Excellency will either have to advocate adherence to the provisions of the Charter or acquiesce in the violation of the Charter by the majority.

May I suggest that it is reasonable to expect of the Secretary-General of the United Nations that he remains emotionally unaffected and personally independent of ideological objectives in the decisions of the United Nations, especially those of the General Assembly. Your Excellency must know that South Africa is not the only country critical of irresponsible United Nations resolutions and of the conduct of majorities sponsoring

such resolutions while they are demonstrably unwilling to finance their own verbal extravaganza.

Nor is the South African Government alone in its view that self-interest and ideological objectives, rather than concern for the real ills of the world and its peoples, often inspire those resolutions. Likewise, Your Excellency's derogatory comment on South Africa while remaining silent on the events in Poland and Afghanistan will not go unnoticed.

As I have pointed out in my letter of 27 May 1981 (A/36/290) to your predecessor, mere lip service is being paid to the improvement of living conditions on the African continent while millions are being deprived of the most basic human requirements such as food, shelter, health, education, freedom of expression and security of the person. I would also like to remind Your Excellency again of the letter of 2 January 1981 (A36/34) in which I stated:

"By transposing its chagrin at its own impotence, into fury against South Africa, the General Assembly not only demonstrates its own incompetence to accomplish anything to alleviate the oppressive living conditions of the majority of peoples of the world, but ironically focuses attention on the one country in Africa where progress is marked in every important sphere of life: I challenge the institutionalised bodies of the United Nations to prove statistically that black Africans in the rest of Africa today enjoy more effective political rights, greater stability and security, better employment opportunities, higher wages, better housing and medical facilities, communications and transport systems, healthier diets, more civil rights that are in practice enforced, better quality education and training than the black peoples of South Africa.

A society or country should be judged not by impressions, but by the long term direction it is taking and the degree of advancement it is able to generate for all its peoples."

Despite these and related considerations, Your Excellency has deemed it fit to proceed from the distorted premise of so many United Nations resolutions relegating your argument in your letter of 13 January 1982 to a fallacious *petitio principii* argument. I would like to suggest that if Your Excellency is going to be guided by the principles of the Charter alone, you would have to accept that nearly all the decisions of the General Assembly concerning South Africa are *ultra vires* the Charter; that they cannot amend that document and that you yourself are in no way bound by such decisions.

There are many initiatives and developments in the economic, social, labour, education and other fields which demonstrate South Africa's determination and ability to confront and resolve its own problems. South Africa's sincere efforts to work towards the establishment of a confedera-

tion of states in southern Africa with a view to creating a region of stability, peace and progress are simply brushed aside by the majority in the General Assembly. The vengeful attitude of the majority in that Organ has reached such an intensity that it would rather see all the states of southern Africa condemned to economic waste and social degeneration than recognise South Africa's vital role in the development of the region. It is of decisive importance for the stability of southern Africa that political differences and ideological obsessions be set aside in favour of constructive co-operation. The drift towards confrontation should be arrested, not encouraged. The peoples of southern Africa will be made to suffer the consequences of the conflict which the majority in the United Nations actively seeks to provoke. I, therefore, appeal to you to nourish the seeds of reconciliation and progress in southern Africa and Africa as a whole rather than to fan the flames of disharmony and mistrust by supporting outrageous demands which aggravate the region's problems.

I note in Your Excellency's response of 13 January 1982 to South Africa's reaction to your statement on 7 January 1982 that you recognise that it is essential for the principle of impartiality to be scrupulously observed by all parties. I need not remind Your Excellency of the institutionalised commitment to SWAPO as the "sole and authentic representative" of the people of South West Africa/Namibia by the General Assembly and a majority of its members. It is imperative that Your Excellency dissociates yourself from that majority statement well in advance if you have any intention of demonstrating your impartiality.

Equal treatment of all the political parties, of which SWAPO is but one, is a *sine qua non* for the successful implementation of any settlement proposal. This has consistently been the position of the internal leaders of South West Africa/Namibia. The South African Government fully shares that view and demands that it be honoured and respected.

It is self-evident that the establishment of the credibility of the referee's impartiality and of his evenhandedness before and during the electoral process, with the concomitant creation of trust and confidence, are prerequisites for the commencement of such implementation. To reverse this order would be farcical and futile. It will not create peace but will lead to an escalation of conflict. Moreover, redress of the bias in favour of SWAPO would have to be genuine, comprehensive and visible. The Geneva Conference, 7-14 January 1981, was inconclusive because the United Nations was unable to disengage itself from its extensive pro-SWAPO embrace over many years. Your Excellency's remarks on SWAPO are bound to further reinforce the belief of leaders in South West Africa/Namibia that the United Nations lacks the will and the capacity to act impartially in South West Africa/Namibia and that public manifestation of impartiality by the Secretary-General will be exceedingly difficult.



It is expected of the South African Government to convince the internal parties of South West Africa/Namibia of the impartiality of the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and his assistants. Surely this is not possible when the Secretary-General himself is publicly scornful of this image. It should be patently obvious that the onus is now on Your Excellency to dispel those doubts and to furnish proof of such impartiality in this matter as can be expected of you by the dictates of fairness and the provisions of the Charter.

In the final instance I wish to record my appreciation for the candour in Your Excellency's letter of 13 January 1982 and your intimated preference for constructive dialogue to characterize your future relationship with South Africa. In turn I want to give you the assurance that the South African Government shall continue to avoid efforts to score debating points against the United Nations or any of its Organs, but shall, as always, bring to your attention considerations and facts which, provided they receive proper consideration, should be conducive to solving the problems which have resulted in the abyss between South Africa and the United Nations.

*Having been assured of frankness in articulating your views, the South African Government now awaits the manifestation of that commitment in the conduct of southern African affairs.*

*In view of past disillusionments I am constrained to introduce a cautionary note of scepticism. Only Your Excellency's actions in the spirit of the Charter can ultimately bring that reassurance.*

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Texts for items B-G supplied by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and Information.

## United States and Southern Africa

- A. Address by US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr Chester A. Crocker, to the Council on Foreign Relations, in New York on 5 October 1981.

It is a pleasure to be with you this evening and to have this opportunity to discuss US interests in Africa and the actions we are taking in pursuit of those interests. I believe we are at a particularly important juncture in our Africa policy and so welcome the chance to exchange ideas with a group so knowledgeable about foreign affairs issues.

United States interests in Africa are wide and varied, spanning the spectrum of investment, trade, human liberties, political, security and strategic concerns. They touch every corner of the African continent, from the largest country to the smallest, from the Horn to Cape Verde and from the Cape of Good Hope to the Mid-East front line states.

On the economic side, the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa are the source of many minerals which are vital to our own development and defence. These nations supply the majority, and in some instances virtually all of our requirements for chrome for our automobile and defence industries, manganese for the steel industry, cobalt for jet engines and mining equipment, copper, industrial diamonds and mica to cite but a few.

During the oil embargo of 1973, Nigeria became the first, and is now the second largest foreign supplier of oil to the US. Angola and Gabon are also African oil exporters. Several other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are actively exploring for oil, often with American companies as contractors.

The countries of Sub-Saharan Africa bought more than 3,200 million dollars worth of commodities, technology and equipment from the United States during the first six months of this year and represent a market for greater exports.

Our political and strategic interests in Africa are significant. We have agreements with countries in Black Africa which permit US Naval and air

access, including that needed for our rapid deployment force. Others grant us tracking station rights and house our VOA transmitters and our relay stations.

African countries are an important dimension in defining our strategy in the Indian Ocean and the southern Atlantic areas.

Let me now turn to Africa's interests:

The overwhelming economic problem in Africa is of development. The persistent long-term problems of food, shelter, education remain far from solved. There is, however, an even more urgent and crisis character to the economic situation in Africa today.

The adverse economic impact of the 1973 and 1979 oil price increases, record high debt servicing costs, galloping inflation rates and slowed economic expansion due to the recession in the West have brought many African states to the verge of bankruptcy.

Development programmes must be scaled down and major internal structural reforms will have to be carried out to weather this crisis. The recent meeting of the IMF and IBRD focused on these grim issues and could offer no easy outs, no quick fixes.

While development is undoubtedly the pre-eminent common problem in Africa, it is, nevertheless, not the only interest of the peoples of Africa. They are also concerned about threats to their security due to internal instability and external adventurism. Very few African states have been free of such threats, and for some there has been continued internal or broader struggles for decades.

The sources of such instability are varied — often having roots in long-standing ethnic rivalries or in border disputes arising from unclear colonial agreements. Because African states are economically poor, they are also often unable to manage adequate security forces. This leads to outside involvement, sometimes in the form of legitimate assistance, but sometimes in the form of exploitation of these conflicts by outside powers.

While the sources of instability usually have their roots within Africa, African states are worried that regional problems such as those in the Horn or in southern Africa will erupt into superpower confrontations. There is a saying in Africa that when elephants fight, it is the grass which gets trampled.

And finally, of course, African states are deeply committed to removing the last instance of colonial rule in Africa — Namibia — and in seeing an end to apartheid in South Africa.

We are very much aware of these interests. I would like to focus my remarks today on key areas where our interests and those of the African states converge with mutually beneficial consequences.

The first great area of mutual interest is economic. There is no question, when all is said of international economic orders and North-South re-

lations, that the West offers Africa the greatest opportunity for growth and development, access to technology and eventual graduation from the need for concessional assistance. Much of this potential, indeed the greatest part, is in our markets for African goods and in the expansion of Africa's linkages with our private sector.

Just as we need access to African raw materials, Africa seeks expanded markets abroad. In 1980, our exports to Africa totalled 5,250 million dollars while our imports rose to 18,700 million dollars. Africa is already a substantial market for US technology and commodities. Its markets offer major growth potential for American exporters. Most of this trade is now with South Africa and Nigeria, but the trend in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa is one of rapid increase. From this trade, key technologies and skills are transferred to a continent that increasingly recognizes that its economic future is naturally intertwined with our own.

When the West is in recession, Africa also suffers deeply, buffeted by high inflation and interest rates. These macro-economic trends are of far greater significance to our African partners than government assistance levels. Our current efforts to revitalize our own economy are, therefore, of major importance to the Third World, as well, and they also contain the key to the future of government assistance programmes.

Notwithstanding our own budgetary constraints which impact on the role we are able to play, the United States continues to be a major contributor to bilateral and multilateral programmes in Africa. Our assistance in all forms is approximately 1,200 million dollars annually, concentrated on the poorest countries.

As Secretary of State Alexander Haig noted in his address to the UN General Assembly recently, "The poorest developing countries require long-term and generous concessional aid from developed and other developing countries . . .", but, he said, "ultimately, the objective must be to involve them in the international economic system, thereby strengthening opportunities and incentives for self-sustaining growth".

In this regard, the Secretary said, the United States can offer what it knows best from its own experience. "We have seen that policies which encourage private initiatives will promote better resource allocation and more rapid economic growth", he said. This same view is emphasized in a recent World Bank report on Africa, and — in spite of rhetoric to the contrary — is being accepted by many countries as the way out of the current crisis.

One of our greatest resources is our free market economy and it is a resource which we can utilize to our own benefit and to that of the peoples of Africa.

US private investment in Sub-Saharan Africa now approaches 6,000 million dollars. It is contributing to our own economy and to development in.

Africa. Whatever the rhetoric from some quarters, it is unmistakably clear that African decision-makers are increasingly aware of the benefits of expanding African-American economic links.

Because of our recognition of the great potential for expanded economic ties with Africa and the benefits which could be accrued from these ties, this Administration has begun a concerted programme to encourage increased private sector involvement in Africa.

This programme includes discussions with banks and multinational lending institutions to elicit their assistance, requesting Congress to remove provisions in law which inhibit US investment and trade opportunities, and discussions with individual governments in an effort to improve the foreign investment climate and to remove, where necessary, existing obstacles to US investment. USAID (US Agency for International Development) is reorganizing its programmes to provide more support to the private sector.

We are already beginning to see positive results from these efforts.

One case which illustrates the progress and the potential for such co-operation is Nigeria. I have already indicated Nigeria's importance to us as a source of oil and a major focus of US investment. Nigeria is also a country which has recently returned to civilian government, with a constitution very similar to our own. It is an important partner for us both politically and economically.

Nigeria, in spite of oil resources, is a country of great poverty. Food is becoming a major problem. Between 1970 and 1980, its agricultural imports rose from 123 million dollars to more than 1,950 million dollars.

In 1980, in US-Nigerian economic consultations, we agreed to the formation of a Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee (JACC). The unique feature of the JACC is that the membership on both sides is primarily from the private sector. It is a major effort to bring our agri-business skills to bear on Nigeria's food problem. Progress has been very encouraging. In meetings this past month, the JACC negotiated several specific projects.

We also signed this year with Nigeria co-operative programmes in education and health. Substantial progress was made on a trade agreement. All of these arrangements are outside of any USAID programme, for we have no bilateral aid programme in Nigeria.

I believe this is illustrative of the contributions and benefits of private sector involvement in Africa, to which we are giving encouragement. We are hopeful that the Nigerian-US efforts will expand our ties with that country and will provide us with experience for developing similar relationships with more African countries. It is in our national interest as well as in the interests of the developing countries of Africa.

A second important sphere where African and US interests intersect is in

the search for peace and security. This Administration recognizes and respects the fact that African states have chosen historically the path of non-alignment. The majority of them continue to adhere to that course, and we in this country have nothing to fear from their choice. Having experienced our own nationalist revolution, we are sensitive to the desire of African leaders to reduce or eliminate altogether foreign intervention and foreign military presence. Let there be no mistake. The OAU Charter and the foreign policy principles of most African states do not run counter to American national interests. There are three factors that underscore US respect for Africa's non-alignment:

- We have no interest in seeing the developing world become a battleground of East-West rivalries. We do not aspire to a military mandate in Africa.
- Our growing economic interests in Africa and in African development are not well served if Africa becomes a more militarized and unstable zone. The continent's economic growth will inevitably be hampered in such circumstances.
- Our interests in a stable world order, especially in the developing world, hinges on mutual restraint between the superpowers. Our goal — in Africa as elsewhere — is the establishment of rules of the game among the most powerful nations that limit the application of external force in regional conflicts and the exploitation of these conflicts for purposes of Great Power aggrandizement.

But there is another side to this coin which African decision-makers are well aware of, even if many in the West are not. Africa does not exist in a vacuum. The state of the global balance inevitably affects regional security in Africa. Unilateral self-denial by the US and our allies cannot strengthen the principle of African non-alignment — on the contrary, it can only erode the climate of confidence necessary for true independence and economic growth. It is a truism that most of Africa's instability is of regional origin. This reality is clearly understood and clearly reflected in our African policies. But it is also time to recognize, as we have done, that the solution to regional disputes does not lie in Western abstinence at a time when Libyan, Soviet and Cuban policy seeks actively to exploit and fuel the fires of instability.

It is striking that African leaders are increasingly sensitive to regional security issues. Their concern to see the removal of Soviet-Cuban military presence is increasingly evident. Their desire to come to grips with Libya's diplomacy of violence and subversion is also clear, even if the tactical remedies appear elusive or obscure. This Administration is committed to providing assistance to our friends in Africa to meet their legitimate security needs. It is no denigration of the principle of non-alignment when African leaders take heart from the fact that the US and other Western nations

are today prepared to do their part to bolster African security.

Our security assistance programmes are also sensitive to the interplay of economic and security problems. We know that simply adding large amounts of arms to the local scene will exacerbate both the security situation and the countries' development efforts. The Soviet Union has been notorious in doing just this: providing very large arms shipments to selective parts of Africa while providing almost no economic assistance. Our programmes are different. While increasing our security assistance to our friends in Africa, we still maintain a ratio of more than three to one of economic over military assistance in our bilateral aid. We have also asked Congress for concessional terms for military assistance to poor countries like Sudan which should not be asked to shoulder large new debts to meet a security threat, especially when that threat is of vital concern to us.

At a time when security issues have come more to the fore, greater burdens are placed on African statesmanship and on the institutional mechanisms of the OAU as an instrument for regional problem-solving. It is decidedly in the US interest for these efforts to make progress, as OAU-sponsored initiatives on the Western Sahara problem appear to have done during the past three months. With little fanfare, the activity of the current OAU Chairman — President Moi of Kenya — played a role in dampening border tensions between Nigeria and Cameroon in recent months. In the case of the Chadian conflict, complicated by the continued presence of thousands of Libyan troops, we have made clear US support for OAU decisions aimed at restoring national unity and ending the Libyan presence. If it proves possible to organize an inter-African force to assist the Chadian authorities, the US would look sympathetically at appropriate requests to support that effort.

The case of Sudan, Africa's largest nation, illustrates our approach to African security questions. It is clearly in our interest to assist its moderate and stable government which shares our goals for peace in Africa and the Middle East. Flanked by strife-torn neighbours, and directly threatened by Libyan activities, Sudan's political and economic health is of obvious concern to many of our closest Arab and African friends. It is our goal that Sudan weather the storms that surround it, having emerged successfully from its own prolonged civil war and having played involuntary host for years to refugees and movements from neighbouring lands. The US is currently providing a package of assistance to Sudan which addresses its economic and security needs, including military training, assistance in the purchase of needed equipment, and significant support through bilateral and multi-lateral channels for its troubled economy.

### **Namibia and Angola**

The US and the states of Africa also share a strong desire for reduced

conflict and enhanced security in Southern Africa. These regional conflicts — especially the interrelated ones in Namibia and Angola — inhibit economic development and have the potential for heightened East-West tensions in the area. There can be no doubt that the region contains within itself the seeds of heightened violence. Unless voices of compromise and co-existence are strengthened, a cycle of deteriorating security could develop with potentially dangerous consequences going well beyond the immediate area.

We are determined to press for an internationally acceptable settlement for the independence of Namibia. That settlement must be one which meets the vital security needs of Namibia's neighbours as well as permits the exercise of self-determination by Namibia's people. We believe we have made progress toward that objective. In the next few weeks I will accompany representatives of our Western partners in the Contact Group to discuss the latest proposals with the African front line states, Nigeria, South Africa and other involved parties.

The process of negotiation on Namibia has been long and hard these past few months. In January of this year, when this Administration took office, the negotiations had come to a complete standstill, and the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 435 was totally stalled. We undertook to restore momentum to the negotiations through uncovering and dealing with the fundamental obstacles to progress. That could only be done through a process of quiet and private diplomacy, one in which our *bona fides* would be clearly established with South Africa, which is key to the solution, as well as the other parties.

As I have said on other occasions, while this leadership role is not one which we have sought, it is one which the United States is uniquely qualified to fill. It is the right course, the only course which has the possibility of succeeding.

I know you have heard about a US "tilt" to South Africa. There has been much other misinformation printed about our policy. But we have received encouragement not only from our allies in the Contact Group but from Black African leaders as well. This is because we are actively addressing a problem of great concern to the Africans, and they know we have a unique role in bringing about a peaceful as well as satisfactory resolution.

Let me speak frankly to you also of Angola. We have not made Cuban troop withdrawal a pre-condition of the Namibia settlement; the Namibia negotiations are proceeding on their own track, but the problems are empirically related. The presence of Cuban troops undoubtedly makes the Namibian independence process more difficult. As long as the Angola situation remains unsettled, and dangerous to Angola's neighbours, the prospects for peace and stability in the region are made very dim.

We are not seeking the downfall of any African government. We have



had useful discussions with the government of Angola, and we have continuing economic involvement there. Recently, a major EX-IM (US Export-Import Bank) loan was approved for Angola.

We do recognize, and our African colleagues recognize, that the Cuban troop presence is a major impediment to progress on Namibia. It is also a situation which allows the Soviet Union and Cuba to foment disorder: to keep the pot boiling, to continue a dependence on Soviet arms, and to prevent development of regional cohesion. By contrast, if there is a solution to the Cuban troop problem, along with that of Namibia, we foresee an economic development process across southern and central Africa of enormous dimension and of benefit not only to the people there but to neighbouring African states.

We have begun to contribute to that process through a very substantial economic assistance pledge to Zimbabwe, and through assistance to the Southern Africa Development Coordinating Committee of Black African states in the region. Our private sector is increasingly aware of and interested in opportunities in the region — US investment on the basis of mutual benefit can add to the area's potential.

It is in this promise that we and the African states have a common set of basic objectives. In the coming months, I hope this mutuality of interest will come to dominate more our discussion of southern Africa, and of Africa generally, especially as we together make concrete progress on the issue of Namibia.

**B.** Statement on the subject of apartheid by US Ambassador, Kenneth Adelman, to the UN General Assembly on 17 December 1981

The United States Government — a government founded on the proposition that all men are created equal — has always opposed apartheid and has always voiced its position consistently, clearly and unequivocally. We have done so in this Assembly and other arenas and on every occasion when the subject has been raised, most recently in the American statement on December 1st in the debate on apartheid<sup>1</sup>.

We must oppose these resolutions, not because we wish to defend such a policy — we certainly do not — we certainly would not. But we oppose these resolutions because their intemperate language and the impractical actions they propose make it evident that these resolutions are not designed

1. For US statement in the plenary debate on 30 November, 1981, see *Southern Africa Record*, no. 25 and 26, December 1981, pp. 57-62.

to promote change leading to apartheid's demise, but rather to engage in sterile polemics, which can have no effect other than, in all likelihood, to thwart attaining the goal the resolutions' authors ostensibly seek.

We particularly regret, Mr President, that the resolutions' authors seem not to have intended for the resolutions to be supported by the United States Government.

The language in these resolutions, various phrases hostile to the United States, goes beyond even the distortions we have endured in the past. Rather than seeking our co-operation — which was genuine — these resolutions tend to put the United States in the dock alongside the Government of South Africa. We resent this.

Operative paragraph three of the resolution on the situation in South Africa goes far beyond anything remotely reasonable by stating that the assembly "reiterates its firm conviction that the apartheid regime has been encouraged to undertake these criminal acts by the protection afforded by major Western powers against international sanctions and especially by the pronouncements, policies and actions of the government of the United States of America."

That statement, Mr President, is a despicable perversion of the truth. It is outrageous. I cannot be stronger in our position, for this is an outright assault against the good name of the United States and all my Government is attempting — seriously, patiently, realistically attempting — to accomplish in southern Africa. Passage of such a resolution including such a phrase undercuts our efforts and the support of the American people for such efforts. Condemning the United States in such a malicious manner is not the way to encourage our efforts for serious efforts against apartheid.

The position of my Government, Mr President, on the substantive issues of these resolutions is well known by all members here. Therefore, I will devote but little time to comments on them. Certain aspects of them should, however, be highlighted once again, since our past statements have not been reflected in these resolutions.

- First, I again denounce, and again in the strongest possible terms, the malicious fabrications contained in the resolution on military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa. As the United States delegate pointed out last year in the General Assembly, and on many other occasions, the United States was the first country in the world to impose an arms embargo against South Africa, some 16 years before such a measure was adopted by the United Nations in 1977. We were in the forefront of this move and have ever since vigorously supported ours and the United Nations' arms embargo.

- Second, the United States, contrary to the malicious charges in this resolution, does not export nuclear fuel nor provide facilities to South Africa.

- Third, and just as shocking, is the false charge in this most flawed of resolutions that the United States Administration intends to create a "South Atlantic Treaty Organization" with the participation of South Africa. This too is a *canard*. These charges, Mr President, are so specious, so demonstrably false, as to be worthy of nothing more than ridicule. Let us hope that none of the delegates takes them as anything more than ridiculous.

- Various resolutions dwell on sanctions and boycotts. I can only *reiterate the firm conviction of my Government that these are ineffective ways through which to attempt the eradication of apartheid*. History is clear on this point: such measures have not brought about constructive political reforms in any instance in modern times. Talk of such measures diverts us from considering and then implementing more positive and productive actions.

This is especially true in terms of cultural and sports exchanges. As my delegation has stated so often, yet to such little effect, sports in the United States are not a matter for government control. Sports are private activities, engaged in or not by free individuals as they see fit. Unlike many states which would and do go to almost any length to regiment the lives of their citizens, the United States Government believes there are many areas of human endeavor in which the government has no role to play. Sports is one such area.

Besides, Mr President, I would point out that sports is one of the few — all too few — areas in South Africa in which racial integration is evident and spreading. To the extent that sports teams in South Africa become fully integrated and sports facilities — playing fields, gymnasiums, locker rooms, spectator areas — are open to members of all races without discrimination, sports becomes a microcosm of the kind of inter-racial society we and the whole world seek in South Africa. Sports — because of its vanguard role in real-life integration and because South Africans are so enamored of sports events — could thus become the seed from which wider integration of the races in the whole society grows. It is quite revealing that the authors of this resolution condemn sports contacts with South African teams altogether, rather than taking the more practical and constructive step of encouraging yet more integration in South African sports activities, again as a spearhead toward far greater integration in South Africa as a whole.

- In the matter of public information and the role of the mass media in relation to apartheid, I would reiterate the United States stance enunciated in the first committee last month that mobilizing world public opinion is an activity singularly unsuited to this organization. The United Nations is an assemblage of governments. Its appeals are

properly directed to governments, and not to so amorphous an entity as "world public opinion". For this Organization to undertake to mobilize world public opinion — be it for disarmament, against apartheid, or on any other worthy goal — would constitute a serious departure from its legitimate role, that of a forum of nations. Moreover, we have reasonable fears that the gross distortions of truth found in the resolutions before us now could well find their way into United Nations "information activities" on apartheid, if such activities were allowed.

- One of these resolutions concerns the situation in southern Africa, rather than within South Africa alone. My government's deep involvement in the latest round of talks seeking a solution to the Namibia problem is testimony — testimony in serious and tireless action rather than in empty and easy words — to our dedication to peace and stability in the region. We oppose any attempt from either side to achieve a military solution to that problem. We, therefore, deplore the most recent South African action in Angola, just as we deplore any escalation of violence in southern Africa from any quarter. We must, however, oppose the resolution presented to the Assembly on this subject, for its obvious flaws.

Violence, Mr President, begets violence. Until all the parties to the conflict agree to set aside their arms and commit themselves wholly to the negotiation process, this tragic loss of life and of property is likely to escalate. We who are actively engaged in the Contact-Group search for a negotiated solution based on Security Council resolution 435 hope and pray that the day will come soon when a peaceful, negotiated settlement will be reached.

The United States supports assistance to victims of apartheid but opposes aid to or through the so-called national liberation movements. We consider it totally inappropriate for the United Nations or any of its specialized agencies to channel UN funds through liberation movements. The attempt to identify UN specialized agencies with political groups and causes seriously interferes with and undermines their effectiveness in performing the technical and humanitarian functions for which they were established. To politicize them not only endangers their overall effectiveness, but seriously jeopardizes American support for the United Nations. It is for this reason that we abstained on the resolution dealing with women and children under apartheid.

In closing, Mr President, I would like to reiterate our deep regret that the authors of these resolutions chose the path of confrontation rather than co-operation in their approach to this critical issue.

Apartheid is a consensus item and should be the subject of a consensus resolution. Apartheid is so repugnant in and of itself that it needs no exaggeration. Indeed, exaggerating the real evils of apartheid raises doubts

about credibility and diminishes the noble cause which unites us all. It would have been an easy matter, Mr President, to frame resolutions that would have won the unanimous support of the members of this Assembly. We were eager to co-operate. Rather than do that, the framers of these resolutions chose to fabricate and distort in an attempt to make this system appear even worse than it is. For reasons I am at a loss to explain, they sought to attack governments, including my own, whose co-operation one would think they would have sought to enlist.

C. Speech concerning US assistance in the education of black South Africans, by the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr Chester A. Crocker, at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, on 17 December 1981

Changes in education in South Africa are paralleling significant changes in South Africa's social outlook.

Throughout South Africa's history, education has played a central role in defining social goals and as an engine for social change. The significance of education to the Afrikaners was underscored in the National Party's 1948 Manifesto for Christian National Education which stated that "Native education should be based on the principles of trusteeship, non-equality and segregation; its aims should be to inculcate the white man's way of life, especially that of the Boer nation, which is the senior trustee". In 1981, education remains a key engine of social change in South Africa, with some important differences. The report of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) investigation in education stands in stark contrast to the 1948 National Party Manifesto. The HSRC, as its first principle for the provision of education in the Republic of South Africa, asserts that "equal opportunities in education, for every inhabitant, irrespective of race, colour, creed or sex, shall be the purposeful endeavour of the state".

The HSRC report is a signal of the process of change that is underway in South Africa. But, as in the areas of economic and political change, the extent of social change, and therefore, the true nature of South Africa's education reform remains undefined.

I would like to note here how we see those changes which have occurred or are occurring in South Africa . . . not for the purpose of endorsing any specific item, but as a clear indication that progress is being made. What we see as a continuing evolution away from apartheid, is in fact underway.

Formal changes in the constitutional structure providing for power sharing have not yet taken place. Nevertheless, for the first time the govern-

ment has created a multi-racial, consultative body in the President's Council (which includes "coloureds" and Asians, but not Africans). The task of this body is to make recommendations to the government for legislative or other action concerning a new constitutional framework for South Africa. We fully recognize the limited nature of the representation on the President's Council . . . the deliberate exclusion of Africans and the apparent failure of the Government to act on some of the Council's initial recommendations. A final determination on the President's Council may be possible after the submission of its recommendations. In the interim, it is important to note that the President's Council represents a partly inclusive multi-racial deliberative body at the national political level.

There have also been other developments which, although not essentially political, are particularly important for the future of South Africa's Black. They indicate that South Africa is beginning to think in terms of one unitary economy encompassing all its people, rather than eleven separate ones. We have seen the South African Government moving to:

- Co-opt the private sector through the forging of an informal political, military and business elite as an ally in the reform effort.
- Emphasize regional development based more on economic growth than on ideological consideration as in the past. The new strategy embodies both development corridors (deconcentration) and regional growth poles (decentralization).
- Establish a workable labour conciliation mechanism.
- Accept in practice, if not in principle, the permanence of some urban Blacks through the creation of a 99-year leasehold programme and demonstrate more responsiveness to their economic needs and aspirations. In this regard, the South African Government recently authorized, for the first time, private real estate development in the urban black townships, thereby abandoning the government's monopoly on township housing and eliminating a major obstacle to alleviating the chronic black housing shortage.

Although all developments in the implementation of the limited reform programme outlined above have not been clearly positive, there are some indicators of forward movement. These indicators include the following:

- As a result of black wage gains in manufacturing and mining, the black share of national income has risen appreciably since 1970. The ratio of white wages to African wages in manufacturing dropped from 5,8 to 1 in 1970 to 4,3 to 1 in 1979. In mining, it dropped from 19,8 to 1 to 6,6 to 1 over the same period. Some redistribution of wealth from Whites to Blacks as a group has probably taken place.
- Some petty apartheid has been eliminated, as well as certain restrictions on black business and housing. I should point out, however, that many of these changes in petty apartheid have been made.

by creating special legal exemptions to apartheid laws, the basic structure of which remains intact.

- Most significant with respect to the basic economic structure, black unions have won recognition and black apprentice training has been accelerated.
- The government has moved to de-racialize sports by eliminating all government laws and regulations in this area, permitting sports bodies and athletes to compete on the basis of personal choice.
- Within the context of the structure of separate education in South Africa the South African Government appears to be taking a first step toward greater equality in education. This commitment has largely gone unnoticed by world public opinion which remains focussed on the continued separation within the educational system.

Starting this year, free compulsory education through the seventh grade is being phased in for black Africans in selected areas. However, this programme is not expected to be in place nationwide until 1992. Black enrolment at "white" universities in subject areas not available in the segregated black schools has grown substantially.

Spending on black education has increased from R13.2 million in 1952-1953 to R27 million in 1972, to R369 million in 1981-1982. The 1981-1982 budget for black education is itself 51 per cent higher than the comparable budget for the preceding year. Still, the disparities remain enormous, with per capita expenditures for black students estimated at R113 against R1 071 for whites.

The education problem confronting the South African Government is not to be minimized. In the year 2000, only 19 years from now, South Africa will have a total population of 46,3 million; 40,7 million blacks and 5,6 million whites. Substantially higher growth rates for black population groups than for white South Africans mean that the white percentage of the population will continue to decrease steadily while the groups' share grows. Already 49,7 per cent of the black population is under age 18 compared to 34,8 whites. The youthfulness of the black African population indicates that its school-aged and economically active groups will continue to increase at an even more rapid rate over the next decade. This will add significantly to the burden of unemployment and demands on social infrastructure. The implications for the size of school-going population are staggering. By 1990, 41,1 per cent of an estimated black African population of 26,7 million will be under 14 years of age. This breaks down into a primary school population of 6,9 million and a secondary school population of 2,8 million, figures which by 2000 are projected at 8,5 and 3,6 million, respectively. Between 1990 and 2000, the white school-age population, is projected to increase 8,8 per cent, from 1 345 000 to 1 464 000. The black African school-age population, on the other hand, should increase by 25,7

per cent, from 9 705 000 to 12 199 000, with the numerical increases in the so-called Coloured and Asian groups not far behind.

The South African Government, in its response to the Human Sciences Research Council has emphasized its continuing commitment to separate education. What is changing from previous government policy, therefore, is not the separateness of education, a manifestation of apartheid, but its inherent inequality is of such a magnitude as to call into question the South African Government's ability to redress the imbalance. We are, therefore, dealing with two parallel and inseparable issues: The system which has produced these inequities and the commitment and will to redress them.

*In the context of changes in South African Government perceptions of its educational goals, an opportunity exists for the United States and other like-minded nations to play a helpful role in meeting the educational needs of disadvantaged black South Africans. The government's continued commitment to separate education, however, raises questions about the nature and extent of United States involvement with education in South Africa. To the extent that separation in education continues to be a keystone of South Africa's apartheid policy, United States involvement in South African education must be clearly distinguished from a separate but equal policy we ourselves have rejected as unacceptable.*

However, in recognition of the process of change that is now underway in South Africa and to the extent that education is a key to that change, the United States would be remiss in not participating in addressing the educational needs of those black South Africans who are the recipients of separate and unequal education.

Three markers must be observed in attempting to design a US response to the educational needs of black South Africans. First, any approach which is interventionist in nature will be opposed by the South African Government as it would by any sovereign government. Second, any approach which calls on the United States to play the role that is properly that of the South African Government will be opposed by that portion of the population it is intended to benefit. Third, our approach should be formulated in consultation with South Africans of all groups, including, particularly, the black community. It should reflect their needs and priorities and not be dictated to them.

A programmatic approach based purely on scholarships for study abroad offers one method of addressing these needs and priorities. Such an approach, though, only partially addresses the various aspects of educational advancement for South Africa's black communities. It would not address the educational needs of those students who failed to make the grade as scholarship candidates. In effect, a purely scholarship programme could be said to benefit the top achievers within apartheid education while writing off apartheid education's saddest victims.



The multiple dimensions of the South African education equation are being considered by the Administration as we review the substance and possible structure of a broader US response to the educational needs of black South Africans both in terms of the education system and the need of students themselves. The policy review process takes into account the advantages of education in the US as opposed to South Africa, of undergraduate versus post-graduate education, and formal university education versus vocational training. It is also considering curriculum development, teacher training, bridging programmes, technical skills training, management training, and education television schemes.

As in our overall approach to relations with South Africa our focus in the education area is on the process of change that is underway. In the education areas as well as elsewhere, change in South Africa is primarily motivated by enlightened self-interest. Certainly it would be difficult to ascribe that change which is underway to the plethora of rhetorical exhortations, sanctions and punitive measures which have been invoked against South Africa over the past two decades. More likely it is coming from the pressures and realities of South African society itself and the efforts of South Africans of all races, who are convinced of the need for change.

If change is underway in South Africa, albeit slowly the choice confronting South Africa between radical violent revolution and peaceful evolutionary change is becoming ever more starkly drawn. It is too simple a dichotomy, but in a sense the choice which confronts South Africa and those who would influence it lies in part between the battlefield and classroom. Certainly, failure in the latter will hasten violent confrontation on the former. Education is, therefore, central to peaceful evolutionary change — in that sense the classroom suggests itself as one very important key to our policy toward South Africa. We are dealing in this instance not with a rhetorical position, but, rather, the requirements of a considered and sustained foreign policy initiative reflective of balanced US interests, contributing to peaceful resolution of South Africa's unsettled but urgent political agenda.

We believe that education of black South Africans is a field appropriate of US attention for three reasons. First, because we perceive that South Africans of all races welcome such cooperation. Second, because it is change-orientated but not interventionist in the sensitive area of sovereign political and legal structures, and third, because we and others know education is a central variable in the process that will influence attitudes and opportunities in years ahead.

The question US policy must therefore address is how we relate the classroom to the context of our interests in peaceful evolutionary change. More, precisely, our policy is aimed at developing a package of education initiatives which will act to encourage a constructive process motivated by

self-interest and not hindered by the continuing ideology of separateness on the one hand or the ideology of armed struggle as the only option, on the other. Our goal is to harness that self-interest in order to lead us all in the right direction.

We are moving toward such a peaceful outcome to the problems of southern Africa, in Angola, Namibia, and in South Africa. As an administration we have eschewed rhetoric in favour of quiet diplomacy. In dealing directly with South Africa's apartheid policy it is incumbent upon us to do so in a sober and realistic fashion, laying aside domestic partisan political postures which have sometimes divided us in favour of the common goal which unites us.

Significant steps in the area of education have already been taken by private sector foundations and firms. The Institute for International Education's South Africa Education Programme is significant among these efforts. Also noteworthy is the Pace Commercial High School which offers yet another possible approach to the problem.

As a government the United States has also renewed its long-standing commitment to helping meet the educational needs of South African and Namibian refugee students. We are undertaking two programmes in fiscal year 1982. First the United States will initiate a new intake of 50 Namibian and South African refugee students this year under the southern Africa training programme. Through this programme nearly 800 southern African students have been placed in university and other post-secondary training programmes since 1976.

Second, the United States has contributed one million dollars to the United Nations education and training programme for southern Africa in fiscal year 1982. This programme will also directly benefit Namibian and South African refugee students.

The refugee education programmes add a valuable element to a mix of scholarships and in-country programmes designed to further remedy the education inequalities inherent in South African's apartheid policies.

In conclusion, let me reiterate the US commitment to helping in meeting the educational needs of black South Africans and to underscore our view that education is a key to the process of social change in South Africa. The question is complex. There is no single or simple answer. Our approach as a government is, therefore, to be as responsive as possible to the multiple interests involved through a broad range of education activities, all of which are linked by their orientation toward both educational equality and social change.

D. Extract from an interview on 12 February 1982, with Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr Chester A. Crocker, reviewing United States relations with Africa during the first year of the Reagan Administration in office.

*Question: During the Reagan Administration's first year in office, it undertook a major policy review, the results of which are now guiding US policy toward Africa. What were some of the major decisions made?*

Crocker: We looked in depth at the question of; first of all, how active a policy we wish to have in the continent, specifically on the most vexing questions, the most troublesome questions to do with southern Africa. And I think it's pretty obvious that we decided that it was not in our interest to have a passive policy, to seek to walk away from southern Africa. Nor was it going to be very fruitful to simply seek to continue a process on Namibia specifically, which had already, in our view, run out of gas.

So, the decisions that were taken: first, we determined that we are going to have an active African policy — it was not going to be an arena that we're going to downplay or to give the backburner treatment to in any sense. And, secondly, we were determined that it was important in terms of both Western and, specifically, American interests, that we engage constructively in southern Africa.

It is sometimes thought, I believe, that constructive engagement applies only to South Africa: it applies to the whole region. We're seeking to engage constructively throughout southern Africa — as I said in my speech in Honolulu back in August<sup>1</sup> — which means that no one is going to tell us that we must choose between Black Africa and South Africa. We are in a unique position to communicate across that barrier, or that fence, if you will. We are determined to do so because it is in our interest to do so, and we also believe it's in the interest of Africans that we do so.

To get more specific, we looked at the Namibia problem — we were absolutely convinced that it was important to move it forward, to get a negotiated settlement that would be internationally acceptable, on the basis of United Nations resolution 435 — and the sooner the better. The continuation of the Namibia problem could only undermine our African position, undermine the Western position, and play into the hands of our global adversary.

By the same token, we needed a new basis for moving this effort forward, a realistic basis. There should be no illusions that anybody can force the South Africans to simply pack up and go home. It's more a question of persuasion, of convincing them that it is in fact in their interest to grant

1. See: *Southern Africa Record*, no. 25 and 26, December 1981, pp. 43-48.

Namibia independence — under certain circumstances, and we have had a very close review of what those circumstances would be.

Namibia does not exist in a vacuum. The Namibia conflict and the Angola conflict are so closely interrelated that it would be artificial and, we are convinced, doomed to failure to operate strictly on the Namibia issue, without relationship to Angola.

Obviously, in addition, we looked at the South African dimension, and reached some basic decisions, which, I think, are now well known. South Africa is a country with which we have many ties — ties of commerce, ties of investment, ties of friendship. It is a country whose domestic system is repugnant to Americans, as we have said, and we do seek to encourage a process of evolutionary change in South Africa, which we believe is most likely to happen if we do engage in that relationship, rather than seeking to wash our hands and walk away.

Those are some of the broad points that came out of that early review.

*What role have East-West considerations and US strategic interests played in this Administration's approach to African problems? Have these considerations predominated over African concerns?*

In our view, the choice that is sometimes posed between a “regionalist” and a “globalist” approach is a false choice. No realistic policy can be either one or the other. A globalist that doesn't operate on the basis of regional realities is going to fail. A globalist who doesn't take into account the many national differences that exist in Africa, the many regional differences, cultural differences, and so on, is simply going to not be operating on the basis of facts, but external stereotypes, and you won't succeed that way.

By the same token, the regionalist who pretends that Africa is living in a vacuum and is not influenced by outside factors and is not, in fact, an integral part of the global political system, is going to fail. Africa is very interdependent with the world system — politically, economically and militarily. We think that's an artificial dichotomy, the way it's posed.

Of course, East-West considerations play a role in our African policy — no question about it — but they are not the dictating and sole element of it. We have African interests that are African in their origin. We have African goals. We do seek to advance the process of economic development, which is stalled in so many countries in Africa, because it's good for Africa and it's also very good for us. We have economic and commercial interests which we would like to see pursued, both in terms of export potential and in terms of access to African products and raw materials, and all the rest.

Historically, we have not always played a very active role in pursuing those interests, and we're determined to do so. This is an activist Administration in Africa.

*In looking over the first year of the Administration in office, with respect to Africa, is there anything that you could point to with satisfaction as having occurred while you were in office?*

There are a number of things I would touch on. I think we have successfully communicated to our friends in Africa that we would like to encourage in every way we can regional stability — not because we have any mandate to become a policeman in Africa, but rather in the sense of encouraging those countries that want to work for negotiated solutions to regional problems in Africa, such as the Western Sahara conflict, such as Chad, and others. I think it is clearly understood that we are not seeking to get out in front of African leaders on this question. If they define the Libyan presence in Chad as being unacceptable, as they have, that enables us to stand behind those countries which seek to define an OAU solution to that problem, an OAU alternative.

So to answer your question, one example: I think it's noteworthy that we have seen for the first time in the OAU's history a peacekeeping force fielded in an African conflict situation. A whole series of factors accounts for this development: Libya's reputation, an active French role, our own quiet encouragement — but above all, the active desire of Africans to solve their own problems.

Second, we have relaunched the Namibia settlement process after months of stalemate and simply no action. I think there are hopeful signs that this is on the tracks and is moving forward. Obviously, I've spent a good portion of my time on that — I have to consider it, at least so far, a success. We have gotten the process rolling with the active support and contribution of our allies and of all the parties in the field — the Frontline States, South Africa and the political parties of Namibia.

I think we've begun to enter into a very interesting dialogue in terms of the potential role that the private sector can play in Africa's economic development — both the African private sector and our own. We've begun to identify some of the problems that lie behind the economic crisis that afflicts Africa. And there is, interestingly, more and more discussion about some of these problems. It is not uniquely an American view. The African leaders and specialists on economics, I think, are in substantial agreement with a lot of what we're saying about the need for a fresh approach to economic development in Africa, one that emphasizes the productive factors, assuring that farmers have incentives to produce, one that provides incentives for investment, and that sort of thing.

## Namibia

*In talking about the Namibia negotiations, you spoke of progress having been made. Could you go into that in more detail?*

I'd be happy to. We've come close to completing the first phase of these negotiations, which entailed getting agreement on a set of general constitutional principles which we and our Contact Group allies put on the table for discussion back in October and November. We've had replies from all parties both to a first set of proposals and to a revised set of proposals, and the gap that exists still has been narrowed substantially. I believe that in the near future we will be able to complete that process and move formally into the second phase of these negotiations.

As you know, in September we announced that our approach was to seek the beginning of the implementation of UN resolution 435 during 1982. To get to that point will require that we successfully resolve phase-by-phase the outstanding issues that we have identified that are obstacles, if you will. *The first phase involves constitutional principles — the second phase will involve the whole question of the size and composition of the UN Transitional Assistance Group — UNTAG, as it's called, which is to be present in Namibia during the election period, as well as related issues concerning the United Nation's role — the impartiality question.*

Once we have dealt with those obstacles, we believe that we will be in a position to start talking about a date of the actual implementation, which, as I said, would be we hope during 1982.

*The negotiations on Namibia moved from a position of complete stalemate, when you came into office, to a position you've just described. Was there any single event or occurrence that gave them the impetus to move forward?*

I think it's hard to define the precise point. There was obviously a good deal of mutual review and exploration amongst the allies, first of all, as to what might we do next amongst the Western Five to try and move the talks forward. There were extensive US-South African exploratory discussions. It started with my visit to South Africa and other countries in April; was continued when Foreign Minister Pik Botha was here in May, and pursued further when Deputy Secretary, Judge Clark and I went down with Assistant Secretary Abrams, also in June of this past year. That, in turn, led to further review, further discussions and exchanges amongst all the parties and to the formal commitment by the Western Five Foreign Ministers in September, in New York, to re-launch the negotiating process. Thereafter, as you know, we took our mission to Africa in October.

So, I think what you can describe it as is an elaborate series of reviews and exchanges between all the key parties to try and find a basis to move forward that all would have some confidence in.

*The UN Security Council resolution 435<sup>2</sup> is always being referred to as the basis for the independence of Namibia. Why is 435 so sacrosanct, and can the current discussions on constitutional principles be interpreted as a deviation from 435?*

The resolution is important to us for a couple of reasons. First of all, it does reflect the reality that the international community, including ourselves, does accept that there is a UN role — or responsibility, if you will — for the whole Namibia question, as a matter of past decisions, and we're not debating those decisions. So there is a requirement for that element. Secondly, it is a resolution which reflected years of effort in the past, and we're not seeking to "throw the baby out with the bath water". It is a substantial accomplishment.

The only problem with 435 by itself is that it was never implemented, nor was it likely to be, by itself. So we've sought — rather than scrapping things or throwing things out — to reinforce it and strengthen it.

The constitutional principles don't bear any relationship to 435 as such, but agreement on those principles we have described as a confidence-building measure, which would make it possible for the key parties to say "Yes, okay, let's go ahead with 435". So it doesn't take away from 435, it really provides the right climate for 435.

*Why is the United States in the forefront in the Namibia negotiations, even more so than in the case of Zimbabwe?*

Zimbabwe was a different historical and legal situation. In a formal sense, it was a British sovereign responsibility. The international community never recognized Rhodesia as a sovereign entity, and there was a continuing British mandate to deal with that question. We worked with them on it, but it was the British role that ultimately led to the settlement there.

Namibia is a very different question in which, *de facto*, South Africa is the administering power — no one denies that — but in legal terms it's considered to be an international, or a UN responsibility.

As a practical matter, the only way Namibia is going to be resolved is if we, as leader of the West, together with our Western allies are able to mediate a solution between South Africa, on the one hand, and the Frontline States, on the other, and that's what we're seeking to do.

Without American participation — and an active American participation — I would be very pessimistic that this could work. We believe that this Administration does have a certain credibility, perhaps a growing credibility, with the Government in South Africa, and that may be a pretty

2. See: *Southern Africa Record*, no. 14, December 1978, p. 43.

central ingredient in moving this forward.

But, by the same token, we can't do it alone. We need the support and the active involvement of our allies in this process.

## **Angola**

*During the course of the negotiations, the United States raised the point about Cuban troops in Angola, saying that the situations in Angola and Namibia are interrelated. At the same time, it was emphasized that a Cuban withdrawal was not a precondition in the negotiations on Namibia. If so, why was it raised in that context?*

There may be some misunderstanding on this, which I would like to take this opportunity to clarify. We have said from the outset of this Administration that, in our view, the two questions are very closely interrelated, and that movement on one would make a decisive contribution to movement on the other. We've never changed our view on that. Nor have we ever said that one side must go first. That would not be a workable proposition. If we said that South Africans must leave Namibia first — that's not going to work. If we said the Cubans must leave Angola first — that's not going to work. We're seeking to provide a basis and a framework within which both these questions can be addressed in parallel.

The word "precondition", I think, has been misunderstood. You don't get very far in diplomacy by laying down public preconditions to anybody.

*You and other US officials have been meeting with Angolan officials for some time now in the context of the Namibia negotiations. In January, however, you met with officials of the Angolan Government in what were described as "bilateral" talks. How did these talks differ from the previous contacts, and will they continue?*

The answer to your second question is yes, they will continue, and that's because both sides want them to.

On the first question, I don't think there's a dramatic difference. It's really a question of pursuing the dialogue. We have had some discussions, as you said. Previously, before January, with the Angolan Government on Namibia issues but not always confined just to Namibia, and this recent meeting in Paris gave us a chance to go into much greater depth on all the questions that are on our respective agendas — their agenda and our agenda. That includes the question of regional security, the question of how might peace come once again to Angola, as well as the question of Namibia, and bilateral issues between us, in terms of our commercial relations, and the possibility for ultimate normalization of our bilateral relations. So, all these things were discussed in Paris.



*What is the state of US relations with Angola now, and has there been an improvement over the past year?*

We certainly have been communicating quite intensively and getting down to the real issues. As I said, one of the things that is on the agenda in the context of all these other issues is the prospect ultimately for a normal relationship with the Angolan Government.

*Under what conditions would that normal relationship come about?*

Well, we are seeking to address a number of issues, all at the same time. They are being discussed actively and will continue to be discussed. I don't think it would advance our discussions in any way for me to identify for you what the Angolan conditions are or what the American conditions are.

## **South Africa**

*Could we go back to "constructive engagement" It's been interpreted in many ways. Critics call it everything from a "tilt" towards South Africa to collusion with South Africa. You've explained it many, many times, as have other US officials. Would you explain now what exactly "constructive engagement" is, what it isn't, and why is it necessary?*

Let me very briefly outline some of the options that there might be to a policy of constructive engagement, and that might make it clearer what constructive engagement is.

One possible option might be for us to decide that the situation in South Africa was so fraught with the risk of danger and of violence, and that our possibility for influence was so little that we should just walk away from it, disengage from it, which might imply trying to reduce trade or investment — those kinds of things — and just let southern Africa "stew in its own juice."

Another option would be to do what our predecessors did, which is to have a relationship in some areas that was fairly normal, but to be continuously adopting a very hostile public posture of taking every opportunity for gratuitous criticism, as I would put it, of domestic problems in South Africa in the public arena.

In our view, constructive engagement means something very different. It means that you are not interested primarily in the way you look or the way you feel but in the results that you have on the situation on the ground.

South Africa is an important country and where we have important interests. If we mean what we say about wanting peaceful change, we should do more than just talk about it. We should actively seek to encourage it.

\*And that means to demonstrate by what we do that if there is improve-

ment, we will stand up and say so, we will give credit where credit is due, which has not always been the case in the past. It also means that if we see things that we might have some chance to influence, such as, for example, fair employment practices by firms in South Africa, we will encourage that, as we are doing. It means, in the case of the field of education, as you know, we have begun some initiatives to try and support the resolution of the educational problems and bottlenecks that exist for the majority of South Africans, which we think can only be constructive, given the situation, in that country.

We're seeking to actually have an effect on events and decisions. To do so in a way that works in the diplomatic arena means that one has to operate with some degree of civility and sensitivity in relation to the government of a sovereign country.

*Is there any change in policy contemplated on the UN embargo on arms shipments to South Africa and the additional US export controls to South Africa?*

There are two parts to the question. There is no intention or likelihood that we are going to be reviewing or changing the arms embargo or our adherence to it. In fact, the United States has historically the strongest record of adherence both to the voluntary embargo and post 1977, to the mandatory embargo of any major industrial country. And that is not under review.

At the same time, there is currently a review, and has been for some months now, of the whole question of export controls, trade controls. That review is not completed yet, so I wouldn't be commenting on that until it is complete. We have made clear our position on two key points — there is an arms embargo, but we're not interested in, or impressed with the efficacy of economic sanctions. We're not persuaded by the argument that the way to develop influence is to engage in what amounts to economic sanctions through the back door of an arms embargo. There must be a clear line on this question, and we're reviewing precisely where that line is.

### **Economic Development**

*As you mentioned earlier, the Reagan Administration has been calling for an increased role of the private sector in development. What has the Administration done to bring this about?*

There are a number of things one could point to that are world-wide policies and not strictly African policies. We have, for example, made efforts to get through Congress legislation which would have the effect of permitting the establishment of consortium trading companies, which is the kind of vehicle that would be very sensible in the African context,

where it is often not economic for an individual small firm to establish itself, but where, by pooling of overheads, it is economic.

We have already successfully gotten a change in the tax laws concerning taxation of Americans working in our firms overseas, which has a very direct effect on corporate decision-making about exploring and setting up subsidiaries overseas, and that kind of thing.

There is a new bureau within the Agency for International Development that has been set up by this Administration — the Bureau for Private Enterprise — which has reached some preliminary conclusions, and is still reviewing its possibilities for programmes of various kinds to facilitate the involvement of our private sector in Africa and other parts of the Third World.

I think I would also point to the reality that we have been talking and communicating both diplomatically and in public a good deal with the international financial institutions and African leaders about the need for a fresh approach, which would provide the incentives and the environment for a greater degree of participation by our private sector.

The reality is that American public money — foreign assistance — is simply not great enough in size, and never can be, to solve Africa's development crises. So we must think imaginatively and creatively about how to engage the American economy as a whole, not just the US Government, with Africa.

These were among the themes that were discussed during the recent trade mission led to Africa by Secretaries Baldrige and Block when they visited the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Cameroon and Morocco.

We've also in the bilateral context encouraged and developed some new efforts to pursue the involvement of our corporate sector with Africa. For example, the joint Agricultural Consultative Committee that exists between Nigeria and the United States in the field of agriculture has been actively and enthusiastically pushed by this Administration, and it is moving forward.

These are some illustrations. There's a lot to do still. We've just begun.

*How about some of the smaller African countries or those with weaker economies that do not attract private investment, will the Reagan Administration's budget for foreign assistance cover them well, or is it going to decrease?*

I don't think our foreign assistance allocations are defined in terms of the size of the country. And, of course, in the case of the most populous country in Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria, there's no foreign aid programme at all because it's an OPEC member and is, relatively speaking, better off. So we don't make those decisions in terms of the size of the country. We, in fact, have quite substantial assistance programmes in some countries that are not all that huge, and we'll continue to.

Our aid decisions are a function of the success of the government in tackling development problems, among other things, as well as our overall political, commercial, strategic interests in the country. Many factors enter into these decisions.

I think we have tried to get one clear message across on the development side, and that is that we want to do the most for those countries that do the most to help themselves by adopting *rational economic policies*.

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