

DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDEN
THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

THE S.A. INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

NOT TO BE REMOVED



Southern

Africa

Record

Number 28

SOUTHERN AFRICA RECORD contains the original texts of, or extracts from, important statements by political leaders, government representatives and international organisations, concerning international relations in the southern region of Africa. In addition to statements on issues of current concern, some significant statements made in the past are included in the RECORD from time to time. The reproduction of these policy statements of the past and present is intended for information and reference purposes, not only for students, but also for all those who are concerned with the relations between the countries of Southern Africa.

Statements are reproduced if and when texts become available (not in chronological order), and it must be emphasised that the selection of statements included in SOUTHERN AFRICA RECORD should not be regarded in any sense as indicating a viewpoint as to the relative importance of one or other statement over another not reproduced or reproduced in a later number of the RECORD. In any case, as the Institute itself cannot, in terms of its Constitution, hold a viewpoint on any aspect of international affairs, no views expressed in any statement reproduced in the RECORD should be identified with the Institute.

Published by the South African Institute of International Affairs. Four issues per year. Subscription rate R10,00 per annum (surface mail). R14,00 per annum (airmail) Africa and Europe. R15,00 US and elsewhere.

Price per copy R2,50 (plus postage for overseas airmail).

Uitgegee deur die Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut van Internasionale Aangeleenthede. Vier uitgawes per jaar. Intekengeld R10,00 per jaar (landpos). R14,00 per jaar (buitelandse lugpos) Afrika en Europa. R15,00 VSA en elders.

Prys per eksemplaar R2,50 (plus posgeld vir buitelandse lugpos).

Southern Africa Record

Number Twenty-eight, October/Oktobor 1982

Contents/Inhoud

Namibia negotiations

- A. Statement on 23 June 1982, by Mr Dirk Mudge, Chairman of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, in answer to press questions concerning the possibility of elections in March 1983 page 3
- B. Reply, on 26 June 1982, by Mr Moses Katjuongua, President of SWANU, to Mr Dirk Mudge's call on 3 June 1982, for an election before the end of March 1983 page 8
- C. Statement on 30 July 1982, by the Mission of the Western Contact Group, on their arrival in Namibia for discussions with the political parties within the Territory page 10
- D. Uittreksel uit 'n toespraak deur Sy Edele, P.W. Botha, Suid-Afrikaanse Eerste Minister, tydens die Transvaalse Nasionale Party Kongres te Pretoria, op 13 September 1982 page 11

Angola and South Africa

Correspondence concerning Angolan allegations of South African military incursions into Angola:

- (i) Letter dated 15 July 1982, from the Angolan Permanent Representative to the UN to the President of the Security Council page 18
- (ii) Letter dated 20 July 1982, to the UN Secretary-General, being the South African Governments' response to the Angolan allegations of 15 July page 19
- (iii) Letter circulated as Security Council document S/15321 on 29 July 1982, from the Angolan Permanent Representative to the UN to the President of the Security Council page 20
- (iv) Letter dated 3 August 1982, from the South African Permanent Representative to the UN to the President of the Security Council, in response to Security Council document S/15321 page 22

South Africa and Swaziland

Statements concerning proposed border adjustments between the two countries:

- (i) Formal response on 14 June 1982, at Ulundi, by the Chief Minister of KwaZulu, the Hon Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, to the South African Government's suggestion that Ingwavuma be excised from KwaZulu and incorporated into Swaziland page 24
- (ii) Statement in Pretoria on 23 June 1982, by the South African Minister for Co-operation and Development, the Hon P.G.J. Koornhof page 30
- (iii) Persverklaring op 28 Junie 1982, deur Sy Edele P.W. Botha, Suid-Afrikaanse Eerste Minister, na aanleiding van Proklamasie NR121 van 1982, in verband met moontlike aanpassings van die internasionale grens tussen die RSA en die Koninkryk van Swaziland page 31

United States and Southern Africa

- A.** Address entitled "The United States and South Africa: Where do We Stand at Present?" by the South African Ambassador to the United States, Mr Donald B. Sole, to the Seattle Committee on Foreign Relations, on 2 March 1982 page 39
- B.** Statement on 22 March 1982, concerning Soviet influence in Southern Africa, by the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr Chester A. Crocker, to the US Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism page 45

United States and Zimbabwe

Address on 26 March 1982, by US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr Chester A. Crocker, at a Conference on Zimbabwe sponsored by the African-American Institute and the American Bar Association page 50

Namibia Negotiations

- A. Statement on 23 June 1982, by Mr Dirk Mudge, Chairman of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, in answer to press questions concerning the possibility of elections in March 1983.*

Mr Mudge was asked, for the sake of argument, if the proposals contained in the various phases to pave the way for implementation of an internationally supervised election in South West Africa, could not be agreed to, and in the face of a refusal of such demands as the withdrawal of the mechanised Cuban troops from Angola, whether an election would still take place as envisaged in March 1983.

Mr Mudge: I am in favour of independence which must be recognised . . . in other words I would prefer independence by means of a democratic election under the supervision of the United Nations Organisation and as closely as possible to United Nations Security Council Resolution 435¹. For should it happen that we do not have an election in that manner, it is not necessary for me to tell you, but I think then we will have problems. Any other type of election for independence will not be recognised by other countries, even if a certain few would grant recognition.

This is my first choice but I do have my conditions. This basically amounts to a free and fair election in which no single party enjoys a psychological advantage. I do not wish to go into details and could perhaps at a later stage put more specific questions but I do believe when I ask for a free and fair election I was not forwarding an unreasonable demand.

1. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 14, December 1978, p. 43.

* This statement was first published in the *Windhoek Observer*, 26 June 1982, and is reproduced here with kind permission.

Now to return to your specific question. Well, if our requirements cannot be met, we are going to continue with an election and independence for South West Africa.

This in the first place is the standpoint of the South African Government and in the course of our discussion today I will soon associate myself with that point of view. I have put very clearly in the National Assembly the following: I do not see my way open for the status quo. The present dispensation influencing our political situation here, is determined to a large extent by South African politics unacceptable to me. We have entered the phase where we must under all circumstances follow a policy acceptable to the people of South West Africa. We cannot have our political situation here influenced by what people in South Africa want.

Presently the Administrator General is the Chief of State in this country, and it follows axiomatically that he would not like to take a decision; it follows that the South African Government does not want to take a decision here for which it can be criticised domestically. Therefore the things which had to be rectified, the things which had to be done had as yet not been done and it is not necessary for me to refer to such matters — it is known to all.

Now on my last visit to the South African Government, I told them that if they could not do these things that had to be done, it was quite clear to me that we could only rectify matters by making South West Africa independent. Therefore, I believe that independence must come now, with international recognition, but if without international recognition then at least with the biggest possible measure of recognition.

But in particular, I want recognition of the country's population. In other words, that independence must enjoy the approval of the inhabitants of this country, for they are the people who will have to live with that independence.

In short thus, it boils down to this: I do not see my way open any longer to continue indefinitely with the present dispensation, because in the process in which we are, nobody is going to win — all of us are going to lose.

Without going into the merits of the December 1978 election, let us forget for the moment our interpretation of that result. Mr Mudge, what are you going to do if in an internal election you once more have the result of December 1978? Are you going to, for example, do away with Proclamation AG 8?

We are definitely going to do away with that Proclamation. Proclamation AG 8 merely constitutes an interim government, an interim constitution. After the election a constitution must be compiled, as would have been the case even if there was a United Nations controlled election. In other words, the elected representatives will meet at one table and no longer will

the Administrator General compile the constitution, but the people of South West Africa will be responsible. And they, by virtue of their assignment, will compile a constitution enjoying the approval of the majority of those elected representatives.

Now in all probability you would like to know from me, not that I will be solely responsible for what is going to be decided, for the majority will determine the future — now you would like to know from me what is my personal point of view and which in my opinion will be acceptable to the people of South West Africa.

Then I can only tell you that in my heart I had believed that the system of representative authorities, with all its shortcomings, was the closest to a solution, enjoying the approval and support of at least the majority of the country's people. Whether it is a justifiable ground or not, there is a fear of one group dominating another. It is not only the white minority harbouring this fear. There are also others having similar fears. For example the German speaking people and the Afrikaans speaking people are worried what will happen to their language and culture. This is normal and no wishful thinking can get rid of this, it is the simple truth.

We have thought of a system in which you have a central government based on one man one vote and responsible for the overwhelming number of government functions. Then we have thought of a system of representative authorities, which must be the caretaker of mainly the cultural interests of the groups, for we do not wish to repress that. After all, we cannot repress that, for then you invite resistance.

Then there is the question of community land. It is an unfortunate fact which we cannot ignore. And when I speak of community land I do not speak of separate states. For example the Kavangos have such lands, and we all know they are jealous of that. We all know they are anxious to retain a measure of control over that land, not as a separate state, but at least as far as property rights are concerned.

I have also thought of that as a possible solution but I do admit that it is optional and that such issues can eventually disappear if the groups no longer want it. Then they would be abolished.

However, I wish to be very honest about a certain issue. The actions of certain representative authorities, have brought the system of representative authorities into serious discredit. There is no argument about that and I would like to make the statement that if this system will be rejected in future by a constitutional assembly, then there should not be those turning to me to accuse me of being responsible for its removal. Then they will have to look for the mistake in their own ranks. I am speaking of those who are so selfish about their own interests that as a result of their attitude they have spoiled their own chances to in fact protect their own interests. However, how the system of representative authorities will work is a mat-

ter for the constitutional assembly. I would like to add though, that if it does make provision for the survival of the representative authority system, those authorities will not develop to a situation where an authority could enjoy preferences at the cost of others. No representative authority will be allowed to use its powers to discredit and humiliate others.

If, and again we are arguing on the basis that you are winning an election, an internal exercise, are you in favour of a uniform education policy and of placing education under the central government?

Yes, there is a very strong feeling at this stage already that education should be under the central government. There are feelings the representative authorities are abusing their powers to gain advantages for themselves. I can think of examples, such as the Teachers' Training College in Windhoek, not fully utilised but an institution that should be available to all. Without referring to the issue of schools. I am thinking of the main school buildings in this country not being used, while there are those not enjoying any such facilities. It is my opinion such issues cannot be accepted. I wish to emphasise though, that in the ranks of language groups — please forget about colour for it is not an issue — there is anxiety in these groups about the survival of their languages.

Your newspaper has in the past expounded its view that there should be one official language, being English, but how can I take a German speaking citizen or an Afrikaans one, at his throat and force him to cede his language if he does not want to?

This is a matter which must happen in the evolutionary sense of the word and with the co-operation of the people. In an education policy for the future, I would prefer, without doing damage to the objective of national unity, that there is an understanding for the cultural interests of the people. Those who do not take cognisance of this fact will invite resistance, which could only lead to tensions.

It is one of my ideals to do away with tensions, not to create them, but to improve human relations, in fact to cherish them and rather to convince people than to force them. However, I must confess, and I am quite honest about it, that we have those, and one feels impatient about it, whose very stubbornness is endangering the future of us all. I wish to repeat that colour and race are no longer issues. Language and culture, yes, they are issues.

But do you not foresee that eventually this country must have an official language as a contributing factor to a common outlook on life?

Look, a language does not necessarily assist in creating a common out-

look on life. I know of many countries having more than one language, yet leading a life of national unity.

Let us be practical. I do not deny that a future South West Africa will arrive at a decision that it must have only one official language, but certainly in my view you cannot force this on the people. You are going to have reaction once you are forcing this on the language groups, for let us please do away with the term "population groups". That is undoubtedly the case and you yourself know how bitter the language struggle in South Africa was. One cannot ignore those issues which are important to people. At this stage I am prepared to disregard colour for I believe that we have succeeded to a large extent in recent years to overcome colour prejudices but I do not know what the future government will decide about a common language for the country. Yet, a future government will not act in the best interests of the country if it ignores a people's cultural assets. Such an action would not lead to co-operation but once more, as I have said, it would invite resistance.

I do not want you to confuse my points of view about minority rights with the viewpoints of the National Party in this country. The National Party intends with minority rights, isolation, and they themselves want to demarcate themselves, place themselves in a cage. That is not my approach.

But you only have to look at Zimbabwe where there was an election, but where there has as yet not been a success to bring the Mashona and the Matabele together.

Here we must rather attempt to cultivate patience and understanding and to show those notions as long as we do not have here any discrimination. National unity will not be achieved by means of legislation. Earlier today I told you that national unity, like human relations, comes from the heart, and not by means of legislation. It is something that must grow, that must develop, and we must create the climate for that development. We must take great care in that process not to allow the development of tensions for already we do have tensions, particularly in the ranks of the whites.

How are you going to safeguard South West Africa militarily, once again on the basis that your Alliance takes over Government in March 1983, against military attacks?

I hold the South African nation must look after its own military interests and protect itself. It is unthinkable that as a nation we must call in the aid of others to maintain our internal laws and internal order. We have available human material to build an own security force, and I hope from my heart that our future military force will be there to maintain law and order, and not in an offensive capacity.

We want to live in peace with our neighbours and do not want to depend on another country for our military protection, an undesirable situation. But in the event of a military force against us, we hope there are those who will come to our aid.

We cannot continue to look at South Africa for that future military aid in the event of such aid being required. I hope there will be others who will look after South West Africa militarily . . . and I don't want to go into that now . . . I don't wish to name those whom I have in mind".

B Reply, on 26 June 1982, by Mr Moses Katjuongua, President of SWANU, to Mr Dirk Mudge's call on 3 June 1982, for an election before the end of March 1983

During the last couple of days and weeks, beginning with Mr Dirk Mudge's so-called historic statement of 3 June about an election by March next year and the accompanying ultimatum, there has been increased talk about the possibility of a real and final solution to the Independence crisis of Namibia.

At the time of Mr Mudge's statement, which was quickly supported by the South African Prime Minister, Mr P. W. Botha, SWANU generally declined to make comment because we wanted to have time to assess the significance and implications of those statements and other related developments. We now believe that this is the appropriate time to state our position.

1. Clearly Mr Mudge was only using his voice to circulate the words and opinions of the South African Government. After all he had just come back from secret talks with the Government in Pretoria. He was well briefed of things to come and was instigated to play the role of a shrewd and anticipating statesman who was in a hurry to bring "independence" to his country. However, since Mr Mudge is of little consequence in terms of real decision-making about this country, we would rather direct our comments to the South African Government. In his statement giving support to Mr Mudge's announcement Mr P. W. Botha said that he supported an election here because "The international community was not satisfied with the result of the 1978 election as a decisive solution . . ." to the independence problem of Namibia. SWANU would like to ask the South African Prime Minister to tell the people of Namibia in clear, unmistakable and

This letter was first printed in the *Windhoek Observer* of 26 June 1982, and is reproduced here with kind permission.

categorical terms how the election advocated and preached by Mr Mudge, on South African behalf, will differ from the 1978 exercise. There should be no double and convoluted talk. The people want concrete facts and honest information to be able to make a clear and informed choice.

2. SWANU views Mr Mudge's announcement not only as a camouflaged manoeuvre to pave the way for the possibility of an internal settlement but also as a desperate attempt to salvage the sagging moral and declining credibility of the DTA. Mr Mudge is struggling to make the DTA to be seen as a device to win votes. But this is a pipe-dream. The fact that Mr Mudge made his announcement after secret talks with the South African Government and the circumstance that during its 4-year "rule" the DTA has dismally failed to come up with something of its own in terms of concrete policies and visible and meaningful improvement but merely administered South African Bantustan policies is enough evidence that the DTA is a South African stooge taught to practice neo-colonialism even before formal independence.

3. SWANU will never commit itself to taking part in an "election" whose content and function are not spelled out. Also, we will never associate ourselves with an "election" designed to make Namibia a puppet state or a buffer zone. Our first preference is a settlement based on Resolution 435 — free and fair election based on supervision by the UN. Should this prove impossible, we can consider an alternative settlement only, and only if it is another way of bringing about genuine independence to Namibia without making this country a South African puppet state, or a satellite, mineral-rich desert Republic of one of the superpowers, or a sanctuary for the stooges of social imperialism.

4. Again, South Africa has come up with the tricky issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a condition for a Namibian settlement. The problem here is to find out whether this is stated as a necessary condition for South African co-operation for a settlement here or whether it is propaganda for domestic consumption. We have information to the effect that South Africa and Western Five, particularly the US, have already arrived at written agreements and concrete undertakings that there should be no question of linking the withdrawal of Cuban troops to Namibian settlement during the transition; that both South Africa and SWAPO have accepted an UNTAG force of 7 500 troops and civilians, which should arrive here by September, to monitor their troops in Namibia and Angola respectively. Would the SA Government deny this information? Also, we are informed they would like to normalize their bilateral relations, they have reached an understanding that the Cuban troops be withdrawn after a Namibian settlement. Assuming that their friends in Namibia will win an internationally supervised election, the Angolans are said to have had no problem agreeing to a deferred withdrawal of the Cu-

ban troops.

SWANU considers an impartial monitoring by the UN of South African troops in Namibia and of SWAPO guerrillas in Angola an adequate measure to allay the fears of all concerned and there is no point to keep on raising the issue of Cuban troops in Angola as a manoeuvre to delay a settlement here. However, since SWANU does not support the occupation of countries by foreign troops as a means of propping up tottering regimes, we sincerely hope that on a settlement here and the eventual withdrawal of South African troops from this country there will no longer be any basis or justification for the presence of Cuban troops in Angola and therefore there will be no reason for fear between us and the Angolans to live as good neighbours in harmony and peaceful coexistence.

5. We want the UN to come quickly here, hopefully by September as it is being reported. Since the UN time-table for a run-up before the election to the Constituent Assembly is 7 months, we hope that a UN presence here by September will effectively abort any diabolical machination to have a quick "election" by March 1983 for an internal settlement.

6. Since impartiality and fairplay are crucial to a free and fair election, we call upon the UN to immediately put an end to its favouritism for SWAPO. Similarly, we demand that South Africa immediately dismantle the puppet Turnhalle political dispensation.

7. We appeal to all the parties concerned to put an end to their dilly-dallying and delaying tactics about the electoral procedures and immediately accept the system of proportional representation, which SWANU has long advocated, as the most practical and fairest system for our situation and get on with the job of giving our people their long-awaited right to have a free and fair chance of choosing their representatives to the Constituent Assembly.

8. We would also like to avail ourselves of this opportunity to inform our friends and the wider public that on Friday next week, 2 July, Comrades Moses K. Katjiuongua, the President of SWANU, will leave his employment with Rössing Uranium Limited to work fulltime for SWANU in an effort to make our organization a much more dynamic contribution to the freedom struggle of our people and the process of change and renewal in Namibia.

C. Statement on 30 July 1982, by the Mission of the Western Contact Group, on their arrival in Namibia for discussions with the political parties within the Territory

In the context of continuing discussions on the range of issues related to

implementation of UNSCR 435, the Contact Group (Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States) have come on this mission to Namibia for discussions with the political parties within the Territory. We hope these consultations will afford the parties the opportunity to make known their views on the Namibia settlement process and for the Contact Group to discuss with them the present status of the negotiations.

We consider that an historic opportunity exists to begin implementation of UNSCR 435 in the near future with elections in the first half of 1983. We have talked to all sides in the negotiations and we believe that they are aiming towards the same objective — free and fair elections under UN auspices and independence for the Territory.

The Five's goal, as it has been throughout, is to seek an opportunity through our negotiations and contacts with all sides to give all Namibian parties an equal opportunity to participate in an electoral process which grants to every political group the right to present candidates and to make known its positions on issues to be considered by the Constituent Assembly.

This statement first appeared in the *Windhoek Observer*, 31 July 1982, and is reproduced here with kind permission

D. Uittreksel uit 'n toespraak deur Sy Edele, P.W. Botha, Suid-Afrikaanse Eerste Minister, tydens die Transvaalse Nasionale Party Kongres te Pretoria, op 13 September 1982

Ek wil nou meer direk na aangeleenthede in en rondom SWA verwys vir 'n oomblik, omdat ek dink die tyd het gekom dat hierdie regering sy standpunt baie duidelik uiteen moet sit. Die Regering het begrip daarvoor dat leiers van SWA ontsteld is oor die onsekerheid wat daar oor die toekoms van daardie gebied hang. Ek sê ons het daarvoor begrip. Juis daarom het die Suid-Afrikaanse regering die afgelope aantal maande uit sy pad gegaan om daardie onderhandelinge te bespoedig. Ons wil ook graag tot finaliteit kom wat Suidwes se toekoms betref.

Trouens, dit is geen geheim nie, dat die Suid-Afrikaanse regering Fase 1 van die onderhandelinge vir die internasionale gemeenskap in Januarie vanjaar aanvaar het, ten spyte daarvan dat sommige partye van SWA nie hulle weg oopgesien het om die grondwetbeginsels wat in Fase 1 voorgestel is te aanvaar nie. Dit is bekend watter partye dit is. Trouens daar was en is elemente in die grondwetbeginsels onder Fase 1 wat die Suid-Afrikaanse re-

gering ook nie aanstaan nie, maar omdat daardie beginsels in ooreenstemming was met die ooreenstemmende handelinge bepalings van die 1978 skikplan, toe ek nog nie Eerste Minister was nie, en omdat die spoedige afhandelinge van die onderhandelingsproses vir die Suid-Afrikaanse regering van groot belang was en steeds is, het ons dit aanvaar, alhoewel ons nie van alles gehou het nie.

Trouens, die Suid-Afrikaanse Kabinet was eenparig in sy aanvaarding van daardie beginsels. Die grondwetbeginsels is skriftelik op 21 Desember 1981 — 21 Desember 1981 — en ek noem spesiaal hierdie datum, want dit moet by u registreer, die grondwetbeginsels is skriftelik op 21 Desember 1981 aan al die lede van die Nasionale Kabinet gestuur. 'n Volle maand voordat die Kabinet die aangeleentheid indringend op 20 Januarie 1982 sou bespreek. M.a.w. ons het gesorg dat elke Minister in die Kabinet voor Kersfees verlede jaar hierdie beginsels gekry het en dat hy dit 'n maand tot sy beskikking sou hê om op 20 Januarie te bespreek.

Om enige onduidelikheid hieromtrent finaal uit die weg te ruim, voel ek verplig om vannaand hier voor hierdie kongres te konstateer, dat elke Minister by die bespreking oor hierdie aangeleentheid versoek was duer my om sy standpunt te stel en nie een Minister het beswaar gemaak teen die aanvaarding van die grondwetbeginsels soos deur die Vyf Wesmagte op 17 Desember 1981 aan ons voorgelê. Die aangeleentheid is ook in die Parlementêre Koukus van die Nasionale Party na die aanvang van die Parlementsitting bespreek, asook in die Nasionale Party se Parlementêre studiegroep oor Buitelandse Sake en Inligting. Ook van die Koukuskant was daar geen besware teen die aanvaarding van daardie grondwet beginsels nie.

Nogtans het die regering begrip daarvoor dat sommige leiers van SWA nie gediend was met daardie beginsels nie. Ek sê sommige leiers van SWA was nie daarmee gediend nie. So was die Nasionale Party van SWA nie gediend daarmee nie. Maar ons het vir die leierskap van die Nasionale Party in SWA verduidelik dat ons nie van hulle verwag om hulle standpunte daaromtrent prys te gee nie. Trouens ons het dit juis benadruk dat as die Nasionale Party 'n meerderheid kon wen vir sy standpunte of betreklik stewige steun kon verwerf vir sy standpunte, dat hy dan in 'n sterker posisie sou wees om 'n positiewe bydrae te lewer vir die opstel van 'n grondwet vir daardie gebied. Ons het ook met hulle oopkaarte gespeel. Die regering kon egter nie in Januarie 1982 teruggaan op ondernemings wat 25 April 1978 skriftelik aan die Vyf Wesmagte oorgedra is, en daarna op rekord gekom het nie. (Ek sê weer, ek was toe nie Eerste Minister nie. Let daarop dat ek eers na 25 April 1978 Eerste Minister van Suid-Afrika geword het.)

Die regering is dus reeds maande lank besig om die onderhandelingsproses ten spoedigste afgerond te kry. Die regering is net so, indien nie meer bewus van die noodsaak dat daar oor die toekoms van SWA seker-

heid moet kom nie. Daarom het ons die afgelope maand of twee naartiglik pogings aangewend in ons gesprekke met die Amerikaners om Fase 2 van die onderhandelings afgesluit te kry, om sodoende by 'n datum uit te kom waarop staakvuur selfs voor die implementering van die skikplan in werking sou kon tree.

Uit sommige onverantwoordelike kringe word ons na die hoof geslinger dat ons besig is om die oorlog moedswillig in Suidwes voort te sit. Is dit nie 'n verskriklike ding om te sê teenoor mense wie se eie seuns op die grense staan en terwyl Suid-Afrikaanse seuns sterwe vir die veiligheid van Suider-Afrika. Nou is ons by 13 September en die staakvuur het nog nie in werking getree nie, alhoewel ons verwag het dat dit op 15 Julie 1982 sou wees.

Daar is wel enkele aspekte in verband met die afronding van Fase 2 waaroor nog nie finaal uitsluitself gekry is nie. Die regering het dit duidelik aan die Amerikaners gestel dat hierdie aspekte betreklik maklik opgelos sal kan word, sodra daar helderheid verkry is oor die kwessie van die Kubaanse teenwoordigheid in Angola. En ek wil dit beklemtoon vanaand, ek wil dit onomwonde stel dat die Suid-Afrikaanse regering van sy kant af alles gedoen het en gereed staan om tot Fase 3 van die onderhandelinge oor te gaan, nl. implementering, maar dat die Kubaanse teenwoordigheid in Angola die struikelblok uitmaak.

Wat die Suid-Afrikaanse regering aanbetref het ons nie ingestem bloot dat 'n verkiesing gehou kan word nie, maar dring ons daarop aan dat die verkiesing vry en billik moet wees, sonder intimidasie van welke oord ook al. Die nadruk val op 'n vrye en 'n billike verkiesing en na die oordeel van die Suid-Afrikaanse regering, en die oordeel van die meeste leiers van SWA kan daar nie sprake van 'n vrye en 'n billike verkiesing wees, so lank as wat die Kubane 'n direkte bron van bedreiging skep in SWA nie. "Jaag hulle uit!" My vriend, ons het hulle al laat hardloop dat dit bars, dit kan ek jou verseker. En elke Suid-Afrikaner wat in sy hart 'n greintjie van trots het, behoort trots te wees en dankbaar oor wat ons Suid-Afrikaanse soldate en polisie verrig het.

So onlangs as Julie vanjaar, het ons dokumentêre bewyse voorgelê toe ons dokumente vrygestel het wat in 'n SWAPO-basis gevind is waarin SWAPO self 'n program aangekondig het om die leiers van SWA te vermoor. Die Minister van Buitelandse Sake en Inligting het hierdie en ander belangrike sake saam met die Minister van Verdediging in Windhoek op 28 en 29 Julie vanjaar breedvoerig met al die partye bespreek en het daarna gewaarsku dat as SWAPO met sy moordplan sou voortgaan, die Suid-Afrikaanse regering sy posisie ten opsigte van die verdere onderhandelings en implementering van enige plan in herooringewig sal moet neem. SWAPO word dus in staat gestel om by voorbaat 'n vrye en billike verkiesing in die wiele te ry deur die sambreel van beskerming, sielkundig en fisies, wat die

Kubaanse magte in Angola aan hom voorsien.

Die Suid-Afrikaanse regering het 'n billike houding aan die dag gelê wat betref die voorwaardes van 'n skikplan en het die voortou geneem om die onderhandelings afgerond te kry, maar die Suid-Afrikaanse regering is nie nou nie en sal ook nie in die toekoms gewillig wees om enige skikplan ten opsigte van SWA ten uitvoer te bring, tensy 'n duidelike ooreenkoms vooraf tot stand gekom het ingevolge waarvan die Kubaanse magte uit Angola moet onttrek nie. Indien hierdie standpunt van die Suid-Afrikaanse regering ons by die VVO en die algemeen by die internasionale gemeenskap in botsing bring, dan aanvaar ons die gevolge van sodanige botsing.

Of andere daarvan hou of nie, die Republiek van Suid-Afrika is 'n toonaangewende staat van Suider-Afrika en hy het belange in sy omgewing net soos ander state. Suid-Afrika staan daarop dat magte van vreemde lande nie in Suider-Afrika saamgetrek moet word nie. Afgesien van ons standpunt oor die uitwerking van die Kubaanse teenwoordigheid in Angola, of 'n vrye en regverdige verkiesing in SWA, is dit ook ons standpunt, dat die teenwoordigheid van Kubaanse troepe in enige land van Suider-Afrika 'n bedreiging vir die belange van hierdie land uitmaak en ek wil dit vanaand duidelik stel dat ons dit nie sal en kan duld nie.

Ek moet herhaal wat ek op 2 Februarie vanjaar in die Volksraad gesê het; nl. oor die jare heen het SWAPO daarna gestreef om deur middel van intimidasie en wapengeweld in die gebied aan bewind te kom. SWAPO is van plan om sy wil op die mense van SWA deur die loop van 'n geweer af te dwing. Tot dusver het die weerstand van die mense van die gebied en die optrede van die gebiedsmag van SWA en die Polisie, bygestaan deur die Suid-Afrikaanse Weermageneenhede, SWAPO se oogmerke verydel.

Suid-Afrika kan nie 'n bedeling in die gebied aanvaar wat sal lei tot die onderwerping van die mense van SWA aan 'n kommunisties beheerde SWA en 'n kommunisties beheerde bewind wat deur die loop van 'n geweer afgedwing word nie. Suid-Afrika sal nie deel hê aan die skepping van so 'n dwinglandy nie. Ons is vasbeslote om so ver moontlik saam met die VSA en ander lede van die Vyf, asook enige ander lande wat opreg begaan is oor die welsyn van die mense van SWA en hulle toekoms, na oplossings te soek. Dit is vir die toekomstige vrede, stabiliteit en die ontwikkeling van SWA van die allergrootste belang dat waarborge oorweeg moet word en nie net in die vorm van beloftes nie, om onafhanklike regstelsel, vrye ekonomie, eiendomsregte, gereelde verkiesings en godsdiensvryheid vir die volke van SWA te verseker.

Voorts het die Suid-Afrikaanse regering dit duidelik aan die Vyf gestel, dat die beskerming van minderheidsregte ernstige aandag moet geniet. Dis fundamenteel. As daardie regte nie beveilig word nie, wat sou die toekoms vir daardie gebied inhou? Die regering is bewus daarvan dat daar pogings aangewend word in SWA om die Administrateur-Generaal wat tans daar

diens doen, te diskrediteer. Ek het gesê dat ons begrip het vir die diepe kommer wat daar by leiers van SWA heers oor die onserkerheid van SWA se toekoms, maar ek het vir u aangetoon hoe dat die regering uit sy pad gaan om die onderhandelings afgesluit te kry. Die regering is nie gewillig om onbepaald voort te gaan soos nou nie. Dit sou egter onverantwoordelik wees om na soveel jare van delikate onderhandeling nou so te gaan optree dat die onderhandeling skipbreuk lei en ons die skuld daarvoor moet kry. Ek kan nie vanaand vir u sê of ons pogings om internasionaal aanvaarbare oplossing te kry gaan slaag nie, maar ek kan sê dat as dit nie slaag nie, ons van regeringskant alles gedoen het om 'n billike oplossing te kry. Ons is egter nie gewillig om bloot ter wille van 'n oplossing 'n toestand tot stand te bring waardeur die stabiliteit van die ganse Suider-Afrika in die gedrang sal kom nie.

My vriende, uit wat ek gesê het sal vir u almal duidelik wees dat al die leiers van SWA nie altyd met die Suid-Afrikaanse regering saamgestem het nie en waarskynlik sal hulle in die toekoms ook nie altyd met ons saamstem nie. Dit is hulle reg, maar die basiese uitgangspunt van die Suid-Afrikaanse regering oor baie jare heen was dat ons nie vir die mense van SWA sal voorskryf wanneer dit kom by die bepaling van hulle interne sake nie.

En dit bring my by 'n belangrike aangeleentheid wat in die afgelope weke ter sprake gekom het. Ons eis geen duim grond van SWA nie. Dit het my voorganger by herhaling gesê, maar ons bestee groot bedrae geld in SWA. Afgesien van die belangrike indirekte voordele wat SWA op grond van sy buurskap met Suid-Afrika geniet en afgesien van die privatektor van Suid-Afrika se bydrae sal dit die belastingbetalers van die Republiek vanjaar meer as 800 miljoen rand uit sak jaag, by wyse van bystand aan SWA. Daardie fondse is broodnodig in die Republiek van Suid-Afrika. Ons moet belangrike ontwikkelingsprogramme, die bou van infrastrukture, en selfs salarisverhogings in die Republiek aan bande lê, onder andere weens die finansiële bystand wat aan Suidwes-Afrika verleen word. Maar ons is gewillig om hierdie bydrae ter wille van Suidwes-Afrika se welsyn en veiligheid te lewer omdat ons glo dat ons daardeur tot die stabiliteit van die hele Suider-Afrika bydra. Solank ons hierdie verpligtinge teenoor Suidwes-Afrika nakom kan die regering en die publiek van Suid-Afrika egter met reg verwag dat die gebied doeltreffend bestuur moet word.

Die Suid-Afrikaanse regering het 'n verantwoordelikheid teenoor sy belastingbetalers want dit is hulle geld wat in die gebied Suidwes-Afrika gespandeer word. Die Administrateur-Generaal van Suidwes-Afrika het insgelyks 'n plig om toe te sien dat Suidwes-Afrika doeltreffend geregeer word, want hy is die Suid-Afrikaanse regering se verteenwoordiger daar. Die Suid-Afrikaanse regering het volle vertroue in die Administrateur-Generaal en as sy pogings om doeltreffende administrasie in die gebied tot

stand te bring hom in botsing bring met leiers van Suidwes-Afrika, dan aanvaar die Suid-Afrikaanse regering verantwoordelikheid daarvoor.

Ons is egter nie voornemens om af te sien van ons eie en van ons eis dat Suidwes-Afrika doeltreffend bestuur moet word nie. Dit is 'n feit dat die termyn van die huidige nasionale vergadering reeds op verskeie geleenthede verleng is en dat dit weer binnekort verstryk. Dat partye wat aan die 1978 verkiesing in Suidwes-Afrika deelgeneem het veranderings ondergaan het en dat dit noodsaaklik geword het dat die nasionale vergadering meer verteenwoordigend moet wees en ook dat daar 'n meer doeltreffende uitvoerende instansie tot stand moet kom en daarmee is ons besig. Afgesien van die noodsaak van doeltreffende administrasie in die gebied tot tyd en wyl daar groter helderheid kom oor die verloop van die onderhandelings benadeel dit die Suid-Afrikaanse regering in sy onderhandelings indien die gebied nie op die mees doeltreffende wyse bestuur word nie, dit sal u as verstandige mense verstaan.

Ek het persoonlik, vergesel van ons Ministers van Buitelandse Sake en Verdediging, op 24 tot 26 Februarie na Windhoek gegaan saam met voor-aanstaande senior amptenare om samesprekings daar te voer met elke moontlike leier van belang in Suidwes; dit, tussen hakkies, was dieselfde dag wat die latere KP leier uitgesoek het om 'n Transvaalse Hoofbestuursvergadering bymekaar te roep om te probeer om die party in Transvaal te kaap. Een van sy aanhangers het na aanleiding van die samesprekings wat ek en my geselskap in Windhoek gaan voer het, gesê dat ek 'n "cocktail party" in Windhoek gaan bywoon het. Nou al wat ek wil sê is dit, as dit hulle idee van 'n "cocktail party" is dan kan ek verstaan dat hulle van elke ding 'n grap maak van belang in Suid-Afrika.

Hierdie besoek is gevolg deur 'n besoek van die Ministers van Buitelandse Sake en van Verdediging aan Windhoek op 28 en 29 Julie. Maar tussen in het ek en, by geleentheid, die Ministers van Buitelandse Sake en van Verdediging op versoek van die Administrateur-Generaal van Suidwes-Afrika ook samesprekings gevoer met individuele leiers en met groepe leiers uit Suidwes-Afrika. So onlangs as 12 Augustus 1982 het ek en die Ministers wat ek genoem het 'n aantal leiers van die gebied, insluitende mnr Mudge, op versoek van die Administrateur-Generaal in Pretoria, te woord gestaan. Ek weet van geen geleentheid waar ek of enige van my kabinetskollegas saam met die Administrateur-Generaal van Suidwes-Afrika enige leier van Suidwes op die Administrateur-Generaal se plaas ontmoet het soos beweer word nie. Trouens ek weet van geen geleentheid waar hy hulle daar ontmoet het nie.

Wat van belang is, is dat die Administrateur-Generaal, in 'n poging om meer doeltreffender regering in die gebied tot stand te bring, by geleentheid versoek het dat ons met individuele leiers moes praat, en dat ons aan daardie versoek voldoen het. Die doel was om soveel leiers as moontlik te

raadpleeg ten opsigte van 'n meer aanvaarbare bestel. Die regering wil ook graag sien dat daar op tweede vlak van regering doeltreffendheid ingevoer word en daaraan word ook aandag gegee. Doeltreffender regering eis doeltreffender strukture. Die Administrateur-Generaal in oorleg met die leiers van Suidwes-Afrika beywer hom tans om die Nasionale vergadering meer verteenwoordigend te maak en 'n doeltreffende uitvoerende instansie tot stand te bring en ek hoop dat die leiers ons sal help om dit tot stand te bring, dan sal daar ook vir Suidwes-Afrika beter dae aanbreek.

Teks verskaf deur die van die Eerste Minister se Kantoor.

Angola and South Africa

Correspondence concerning Angolan allegations of South African military incursions into Angola:

- (i) Letter dated 15 July 1982, from the Angolan Permanent Representative to the UN to the President of the Security Council

Upon the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to bring, through you, to the attention of the Security Council, violations of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the People's Republic of Angola by the racist régime of South Africa. My Government wishes to register the strongest protest against the continued military occupation of parts of Angola by the racist South African troops and the brutal acts being committed daily by the racists against innocent Angola civilians.

The President of the MPLA-Workers Party and President of the People's Republic of Angola, His Excellency, Mr Jose Eduardo dos Santos, on 13 July 1982, informed the 5th Session of the People's Assembly in Luanda of the barbarous acts of aggression being committed by the racist Armed Forces of South Africa in the south of Angola.

The racist régime is still engaged in an undeclared war on Angolan territory, utilizing a massive military machine to terrorize the population and undertake sabotage, all aimed at destabilizing the politico-military, economic and social situation.

The racist troops are still in illegal military occupation of a part of the Angolan province of Cunene, where civilians are being massacred, women are being raped, and children are being brutalized. The people are daily subjected to terrorist acts of vandalism, kidnapping and theft and their livelihood is being destroyed.

Excellency, these acts of state terrorism, part of an all-out war against the People's Republic of Angola and the military occupation of a part of Angola, are taking place at a time when the Government and the people of Angola are engaged in serious negotiations on whose successful outcome depends future prospects for peace in all of southern Africa. The Government of Angola has spared no effort in contributing to these negotiations,

but no independent sovereign State can allow the continuation of an already intolerable situation.

The racist régime in Pretoria has consistently displayed contempt for principles of international law, and disrespect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola. Angola, on its part, has always acted with the utmost regard for international law in its search for peace in southern Africa and in the world. However, Angola is not prepared to compromise on the matter of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Therefore, my Government wishes to alert the Council to the magnitude of the threat posed by the racist troops and to place on record, as it has done many times before, of the need for a speedy and lasting solution to South Africa's military adventurism and terrorizing in all of southern Africa.

I request that this communication be circulated as a document of the Security Council in connection with the question of South African aggression against the People's Republic of Angola.

(Signed) Elísio de FIGUEIREDO

Ambassador

Permanent Representative

S/15295

- (ii) Letter dated 20 July 1982, to the UN Secretary-General, being the South African Government's response to the Angolan allegations of 15 July

Excellency

I wish to refer to the letter (Document S/15295) addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of Angola.

The South African Government rejects the allegations contained in the letter. The activities of the South African Security Forces are aimed at curbing the violence and aggression perpetrated by SWAPO terrorists against the civilian population of SWA/Namibia.

The South African Government has kept the Secretary-General and the Security Council informed, on a regular basis, of acts of atrocity committed by SWAPO terrorists against the people of SWA/Namibia. In so doing, the South African Government has submitted full and specific details of these atrocities, and has always been willing to submit this information to independent scrutiny and confirmation.

It would seem that the Angolan Government's allegations are intended as a calculated smokescreen to hide SWAPO's real intentions. The South

African Government is aware that SWAPO plans to step up its violence and aggression, and the allegations now made against the South African Security Forces are aimed at directing attention away from these plans.

As Your Excellency will be aware, the South African Government accepted Phase I of the current negotiating process on 26 January of this year. SWAPO delayed its acceptance of Phase I for a considerable time because, among other things, it is demonstrably unwilling to cease its acts of violence and aggression in SWA/Namibia.

However, the whole matter can be put to an elementary test. If SWAPO were to cease its terrorist activities the South African Government would immediately suspend its operations against SWAPO. Removal of the SWAPO threat to the people of SWA/Namibia would render the activities of the South African Security Forces unnecessary.

The South African Government wishes to move to a conclusion of Phase II as early as possible, and is actively engaged in deliberations in an effort to achieve this end.

The South African Government accordingly calls upon the Secretary-General to use his good offices to urge SWAPO to abandon its designs to expand its armed activities in the region. Should SWAPO decline to heed this call the South African Security Forces would have no alternative but to retaliate.

I should be pleased if this communication could be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

- (iii) Letter, circulated as Security Council document S/15321 on 29 July 1982, from the Angolan Permanent Representative to the UN to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to my earlier communication to you on the subject of armed aggression against the People's Republic of Angola by the racist régime of South Africa dated 15 July 1982 (S/15295), I am instructed by the government of the People's Republic of Angola to communicate to the Security Council, through you, information on additional and continuing acts of aggression being committed by the racist troops against the territory and people of Angola.

My Government is in possession of military intelligence which points to the inescapable conclusion that the armed forces of the racist Pretoria régime are poised to attack Angola again with all the advanced and sophisticated military machine that South Africa uses in its state terrorism, destabilization and subversion in southern Africa.

The geographical fact that Angola has no borders with South Africa, that Angola has never attacked the racist troops across our borders, that Angolan troops have never crossed their own borders, that Angola has no presence, military or otherwise, in the territory of Namibia — none of these has deterred the South African armed forces from constantly attacking and bombing Angola from 1975 to the present. In fact, South Africa is not only in illegal occupation of the territory of Namibia in violation of United Nations resolutions, but it is still, after many months, in illegal military occupation of parts of southern Angola.

Acts of terrorism and sabotage against civilian targets is the hallmark of racist South African military activity in southern Africa, in general, and in Angola, in particular. Racist troops are raping women, beating young men, brutalizing children, kidnapping livestock, burning houses and destroying homes, schools and churches regularly.

The racist régime is not only perpetrating and strengthening its illegal and rapacious hold over Namibia, it is helping gangs of criminals, thugs and mercenaries to run havoc in parts of southern Angola, giving them sanctuary inside Namibia to escape the just retribution by the people and armed forces of Angola.

The latest racist actions include the bombings by six South African Mirage-type of Mulondo and Cahama on 26 July 1982. The airport of Jamba was also attacked, causing great material damage. Cahama, in the province of Cunene, is located 150 kilometres from Angola's border with Namibia. More than 24 Angolans were killed by the bombing, which left a great number seriously wounded and maimed. It is important to note that Cahama was also attacked last Wednesday, 21 July 1982, by 11 South African Mirage aircraft.

My Government wishes to alert the international community to the serious threat posed by the racist régime's terrorist activities in southern Africa, in particular, in Namibia and Angola. South Africa's apartheid system needs and breeds military expansionism and colonial-type economic activity both inside and outside South Africa.

The racist régime has played a contemptuous game with the international community long enough. Its obstructionist and intransigent policies and activities, political, social, diplomatic, military and economic, have prevented the Namibian people from gaining lawful and genuine independence, and have seriously affected Angola's urgent task of national reconstruction.

Under the leadership of Comrade Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, President of the MPLA-Workers' Party and of the People's Republic of Angola, the Angolan Government and people have made, and are continuing to make, heroic efforts to assist the international community's effort at negotiating a genuine independence for Namibia.

My Government has continued to assist this international effort and has, time and time again, presented proposals to break deadlocks deliberately created by the racist régime and its imperialist friends. However, silence in the face of genocide by the racists or attempts at destabilizing the legitimate and sovereign government of Angola by the illegitimate, non-representative racist régime in Pretoria are not part of our revolutionary ideology. And my Government will have to take steps to defend its territorial integrity and its people against the aggression and massacre perpetrated by the racist South African military machine.

The Security Council of the United Nations is mandated by the Charter of the United Nations to safeguard international peace and security but the violations of that peace and the contravention of the principles enshrined in the charter go unattended and unpunished.

I have the honour to request that this communication be issued as a document of the Security Council, in connexion with South Africa's aggression against the People's Republic of Angola.

(iv) Letter dated 3 August 1982, from the South African Permanent Representative to the UN to the President of the Security Council, in response to Security Council document S/15321

Your Excellency

Upon instruction of my Government, I wish to inform Your Excellency that the South African Government rejects the allegations levelled by the Angolan Government in the letter addressed to you by the Permanent Representative of Angola on 29 July 1982, and circulated as Security Council document S/15321.

The position of the South African Government is quite clear: the people of South West Africa/Namibia rely on the security forces to protect them from the violence of SWAPO. This organization, while reluctantly participating in the negotiations regarding independence for the Territory, has continued with its campaign of violence and intimidation against the people of South West Africa/Namibia. Indeed, SWAPO's designs were again exposed in documents which were revealed last week.

These documents illustrate that SWAPO openly espouses violence while at the same time claiming that it wishes to secure an end to conflict in the Territory.

At this very delicate stage of the negotiations SWAPO's leadership directs its members to:

- murder leading politicians in South West Africa/Namibia;

- lay landmines throughout the Territory;
- stockpile arms, ammunition and explosives in the Territory;
- continue infiltration into the Territory;
- continue their campaign of violence and sabotage against the people of the Territory.

This evidence of SWAPO's true intentions raises the question of whether a free and fair election can be held in South West Africa/Namibia. SWAPO is in effect saying that it will brook no opposition, and anyone who opposes its views must be eliminated.

These are the people whom the Government of Angola has chosen to support. These are the people against whom the people of South West Africa/Namibia expect protection. South African and South West African/Namibian actions are not directed against the Government or people of Angola, but against SWAPO.

The arguments advanced by the Permanent Representative of Angola do not address the fundamental issue: if SWAPO were not harboured in Angola and assisted in continuing its campaign of violence in South West Africa/Namibia there would be no reason for the security forces to seek them out.

Violence and instability in southern Africa would be neither in South Africa's nor Angola's interests, nor any of its neighbours. South Africa has demonstrated, through its willingness to co-operate with neighbouring states, that it desires peace in the sub-continent. However, forces from outside Africa apparently consider it imperative for the achievement of their own objectives that southern Africa should be engulfed in conflict. The South African Government is earnestly seeking peace but it cannot do so at the cost of destroying the stability of the sub-continent.

I would be pleased if this letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

Texts for items ii-iv issued by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and Information

South Africa and Swaziland

Statements concerning proposed border adjustments between the two countries:*

- (i) Formal response on 14 June 1982, at Ulundi, by the Chief Minister of KwaZulu, the Hon Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, to the South African Government's suggestion that Ingwavuma be excised from KwaZulu and incorporated into Swaziland

Chief Buthelezi made this statement on the occasion of the visit of The Hon The Minister of Co-operation and Development, Dr P.G.J. Koornhof, as the Central Government's Messenger to convey the South African Government's intentions to the Zulu people.

Mr Minister, Sir. Our history is one of internal strife. South Africa has never been threatened by violence from without. It is true that acts of violence against the South African State are being planned and executed from beyond our borders. These are, however, no more than the extensions of internal violence. The actual violence we know around us today has come from our own hearts and minds and our souls have been witness to our inability to come together as a nation.

The old fashioned language which talks of hardening one's heart has a great deal of meaning for me. Whites have been hardening their hearts and their refusal to share power with us is a rejection of us as persons. It is a White way of despising our beings, our souls, and of rejecting us as fellow God's creatures.

Whites refuse to share the very things which God gave to man to distinguish him from beasts. This fuels fires of anger which empower Black

* The KwaZulu Government won its third major court battle on 30.9.82 when the Natal Supreme Court ordered officials of the Department of Co-operation and Development to leave the Ingwavuma area and banned it from interfering in the administration of the area.

politics and gives rise, Sir, to the growing belief in Black circles that Whites will have to be thrashed before Blacks can love them.

If this in fact is the case, we see looming before us prospects of the alternatives which Mr Vorster saw as too ghastly to contemplate. We are reaching a point when these ghastly alternatives are getting more and more conceivable, not because of we Blacks, but because of White political conduct.

Mr Minister, you, Sir, and I need to look directly at each other here this morning to give ourselves the opportunity for each to say to the other: "Do I really have to fear for my life because of you?"

Today's political events make me as a Black afraid of the future. I fear for my children who will not be given the opportunity to know Whites as their fellow countrymen. I fear Whites will one day shoot my children because they fear them.

These fears will be justified by events if my children are not afforded the opportunity of learning, playing, working and living with your children. Our children and grandchildren will never experience the closeness which common commitment to a country's hopes, joys and victories creates between men standing shoulder to shoulder facing the future. If we do not take care, our children will not be bound together in common loyalty which gives them more in common than they would have with men from any part of the world. This means our common alienation as fellow South Africans, because of our failure to find each other.

Our children may only know apartheid division and distrust. The only intergroup relations they will experience will be those based upon calculated things which we need from each other as Blacks and Whites.

Mr Minister, Sir, in my whole life and throughout my political career, I could never believe that the politics of division and hatred will survive. I have always fervently hoped that the conflict and the degree of bloodletting which we see around us would bring us all to our senses. I had hoped that we would by now have seen the need for the politics of unity and would be involved in forging a new future with each other, for each other.

I must share with you, Mr Minister, my apprehensions. I have to tell you that I personally as Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi have to stand still once more and ask myself whether what I am doing still makes sense. You see, Sir, I cannot be dragooned into participating in the carving up and the destruction of South Africa. My people trust me not to betray them and I have to remain involved in the politics of national unity. I cannot carry out my commitment to national unity and at the same time aid and abet your Government, as they irresponsibly use their long knives to cut to pieces and destroy that national unity, and make South African Blacks, left, right and centre, aliens in the land of their birth.

As I sense my own position in our political spectrums of responsibilities, I am particularly aware of the pivotal role which Zulu/Afrikaner relations have for every South African. If Zulu/Afrikaner relations cannot be the gem for a new South Africanism in which all Blacks and all Whites must participate, it is not worth our while to value its existence by nurturing it. If we see seeds for our destruction in such Zulu/Afrikaner relations, we must see it as our national duty to abandon any effort to nurture its existence.

We battle against the disadvantage that this relationship rests on a heritage of distrust. Blacks have known betrayal in White politics ever since Black first met White. Blacks have watched Afrikaners emerge from being wanderers on the African veld to become the controlling interest in White politics. Blacks have seen Afrikaner fortunes rise through both fair and foul means. They have seen power advantages grow through honest competition as well as through the murky entanglements of secret societies and hidden wheeling and dealing. They have seen all this take place at the expense of Black liberty. The growth of Afrikaner power has been achieved only by such strategies and tactics which made South Africa the shame of the civilized world. We have been dragged into the gutter of world opinion. Because I as a Black do not treat Afrikaners as a scourge which has to be trampled upon and eradicated with violence, I am disdained and attacked in the world wherever I have gone.

I have not treated Afrikaners as the sub-human witches of politics. I have been courageous enough to venture there where the Afrikaner struts, and to ask him there, to sit down with me, so that we could talk about the future. Each time I have done so, I have been intensely aware that the Afrikaner could do something which would make it impossible for me to continue in my hopes of reconciliation.

If there proves to be no reconciliation, history will one day point to the place and the circumstances when it was impossible for me to act constructively.

When I stop to review my role, I have to assess the situation around me. I have to ask myself whether this or that event or this or that twist of the political road is the event or the turn beyond which hopes must perish.

When I admit the possibility that hope may not be able to survive, I cannot regret doing what I have done in politics. There is only one South African history and we are all caught up in it. As I review this history, I cannot see how I could have acted differently in the past.

Many have fled across our borders as though there are alternative modern histories of South Africa among which we may choose. This is not so. There is only one struggle and the only history we will one day have is the history of this internal struggle. Our strategies in the struggle for liberation do not create history. They should be determined by history. I have stayed

to deal with the Afrikaner in the reality of our history. When I stop from time to time to reconsider things, I stop to rethink how best to deal with them. I have to ask whether this or that is for South Africa a doomsday event.

Afrikaner/Zulu relationships are pivotal. There is the danger that the heritage of hate, fear and anger between us becomes reincarnate. If this happens, to hate and to lash out will become a matter of national pride. If there is any real danger of this then I must perforce speak out so that all may hear me. If there is a danger, I must recognize it.

As I look around me now, I do recognize that danger. I recognize it as a chain of events which could culminate in the present Prime Minister forcing on us all his confederal dream. Now we have to fight for the inclusion of Blacks in the country's existing power structures. The alternative fight to this is the fight to get Whites to sit down with us to design new power structures.

We cannot fight for our inclusion in a confederal political set-up. Confederation of unequal states with Whites retaining power is permanently Black political slavery.

As I look around me now, I see the danger of this country passing the point of constructive opposition politics and the danger of entering into an era of revolutionary cures.

If I see that danger, I must say so. If that danger is there, the people must know it. I must sound these warnings even if I will later be accused of wishing these horrible events on us all.

When the Prime Minister met us as the so-called "homeland" leaders and we began to work our way to a statement of intent which Black and White could subscribe to, there was a surge of hope. That hope was turned into anger and shame when it became clear that the Prime Minister had already decided on his President's Council and Black Advisory Council. This sense of shame was deepened when the Prime Minister was forced by me to abandon the Black Advisory Council, but he did not sit down with us then, to see where we go from there. My shame was deepened yet again when we were subjected to persuasive talk to accept the confederal solution which necessitated us accepting Pretoria type so-called independence. Here was a series of events moving us to the brink of disasters.

Then there was the Government's refusal to participate in the Buthelezi Commission and its subsequent rejection of the politics of reconciliation which the Report of the Commission contained.

And now there is the present crisis of the proposed border adjustments between South Africa and Swaziland, or as we Zulus prefer to call it the *KwaZulu and the KaNgwane areas incorporation into Swaziland*. For all our sakes and for the sake of posterity, let me put the position as starkly as its reality demands.

- (1) Soulless apartheid is friendless in Africa and needs endorsement if Afrikaner credibility is to improve.
- (2) The P. W. Botha régime needs to demonstrate to its right wing that the National Party can deal with Blacks who are a problem while they seek Black endorsement.
- (3) The only hope for White South Africa along the confederal path is to get Blacks to endorse this form of politics.
- (4) The so-called independent homelands will endorse confederalism.

But

- (5) Without Zulu endorsement the majority of South African Blacks will be seen to reject confederalism and Afrikanerdom will be seen to be under political siege.
- (6) To offset KwaZulu rejection of confederalism, Swazi blessings for South Africa's White politics has to be bought.
- (7) The pay-off to Swaziland is the addition to Swaziland of KaNgwane and north-eastern KwaZulu, together with a number of economic guarantees by South Africa to Swaziland.
- (8) The step to give our land to the Swazis is a crucial link in the chain of events which will lead to the implementation of P.W. Botha's confederalism dream if we fail to oppose.
- (9) Whether we like it or not, the north-eastern areas of KwaZulu will be taken and given to the Swazis who have always owed us allegiance.
- (10) The consequences will be:
 - (1) The establishment of a permanent rift between Afrikaners and the Zulus.
 - (2) The establishment of a rift between the Zulus and the Swazis which would endure for generations.
 - (3) The radicalization of Black/White politics in South Africa.

These are the things I see. These are the dangers we face. We have only one country, we have only one history and the mainstream of our history is rushing us all headlong in the direction I have sketched.

- I am expected to say to tens upon tens of thousands of our people that I can do nothing for them and that they will become citizens of a foreign country.
- I am expected to abandon so many of our graves, including the grave of King Dingane.
- I am expected to survive the shock of world opinion which will ridicule me for being powerless to halt this kind of Afrikaner political chauvinism.
- I am expected to shrug off the abandoning of some of our people when Inkatha branches elsewhere in the country ask me about the

Ingwavuma and Maputa areas.

● I am expected to stand muted when I am asked whether Inkatha is made of words and can show no teeth in actions.

No good can come to the Nation if we elect to become good kaffirs and to do no more than swallow hard, as yet again, our borders are altered by neo-colonial pens.

If this thing takes place, there is nothing left to talk about between ourselves, and the Central Government. I will be muted by this thing which the South African Government wants to ram down my throat.

Anyone who is publicly betrayed becomes humiliated. I will have to decide how I can exonerate myself.

For the people I represent from every part of South Africa and in every walk of life I say this.

I will not be stampeded by these events into taking precipitous action which will fail for us all. Even if night gets darkest before dawn, dawn does come. We will win. We will know liberation because all mankind's options remain open for us. The thing that will have changed is not our middle and long run future. Our option may now be narrowing. My final word, however, is a word of concern and even love for the Afrikaner. This is his death-knell. These events are the kind of events which prove that Afrikanerdom is a colonial anachronism which cannot survive the twentieth century. These events do not mark the road of our destruction. They are the writing on the wall, writ large for all to see, that we will fashion the future with those who are not Afrikaners, and it is the political conduct of your Prime Minister and Cabinet colleagues which has forced that choice on us.

I have never said that I would initiate bloodshed, but this sort of thing makes bloodshed inevitable. It is not an issue of whether this bloodshed happens during my lifetime or after my death. It is not a question of whether this bloodshed happens while I am a leader. This whole issue will start a chain of events which will only mean bloodshed. Bloodshed is a very tragic thing. Not since 1853 has there been bloodshed between the Zulus and the Swazis and I am saddened by the prospects of such bloodshed in this day and age when our own King is married to the daughter of the Swazi King, who is behind this excision of Zulu territory because we Zulus as unarmed people are easier to fool around with in this way than President Machel. There is every prospect of bloodshed emerging not only between Zulu and Afrikaner but also between Zulu and Swazi.

There is every prospect that disputes about the chieftainship in the Ingwavuma area will involve localized violence if the deposed Mngomezulu Chief tries to return to a position of power. I am not so sure that such violence will remain localized. Dare we evoke the prospects of violence a few kilometres away from our own King's palace? Can we be sure that in-

cidents will not involve the King who has marriage connections with the Swazi royal household?

I am aware that in situations where there is the danger of bloodshed such as I have talked about today, local events can trigger off a chain reaction which could lead to what future historians describe as a bloodbath.

Does Mr P.W. Botha, or do you, Mr Minister, or does your colleague, Mr Pik Botha, or the Afrikaner nation, want to have the blood that will inevitably be shed for generations, to be on their heads, and on your own head, Mr Minister?

We know from our own sources of information that the external mission of the ANC disagrees as violently with this suggestion as we do, and it seems to me that this is one of the issues on which they and we agree totally. Perhaps it is an issue which broadens our common concern.

As I close my remarks I want to make a personal appeal to you, Mr Minister. You may be caught in the crossfire between warring factions in the National Party's Caucus. We do not know how far this is true. My appeal is for you to tell us simply that you can no longer campaign for our cause and that you as a politician seek to protect your position by abandoning us. Or, Mr Minister, could you tell us that you stand with us and will return to Pretoria to tell your colleagues that you side with us and leave history to reward or abuse you. This is an appeal between the two of us who have had Christian fellowship, Mr Minister. Mr Minister, this event could prove that our fellowship had less meaning than many in the world thought. It could wipe off from the pages of our history books the common stand we took at SACLA, which gave so many people so many hopes. I am saddened by the prospects of these being proved to have been false hopes.

(ii) Statement in Pretoria on 23 June 1982, by the South African Minister for Co-operation and Development, the Hon. P.G.J. Koornhof

The South African Government has noted that feelings are being whipped up throughout the country concerning the border adjustments of Swaziland. An appeal is being made to all to remain calm and to grant the Government the opportunity to create a situation in which it would be possible to conduct further negotiations, in a constructive manner, without prejudice and intimidation, between all interested parties with a view to implementing the decisions taken by the Government.

As has been the case with the implementation of the consolidation programme for the National States until now, the Government will satisfy itself regarding the true feelings of the people concerned.

As has been reiterated, the final authority vests with Parliament. Bodies and persons who are trying to make political capital out of this in the meantime, are not serving the interests of the RSA or promoting the maintenance of sound relations with neighbouring states, and an appeal is made to them to refrain from doing so.

The Government is not disposing of land belonging to the RSA, but is negotiating border adjustments which have been in dispute for more than 80 years, in the best interest of the RSA and southern Africa, and trying to finalise the matter in such a way as to involve the minimum of RSA land.

Text issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information at the request of the Department of Co-operation and Development

(iii) Persverklaring op 28 Junie 1982, deur Sy Edele P.W. Botha, Suid-Afrikaanse Eerste Minister, na aanleiding van Proklamasie nr R121 van 1982* in verband met moontlike aanpassings van die internasionale grens tussen die RSA en die Koninkryk van Swaziland

(1) Aangesien hofverrigtinge wat betrekking het op die geldigheid van Proklamasie R109 van 1982 wat herroep word deur Proklamasie R121 van 1982 wat hierdie verklaring vergesel, nog nie afgehandel is nie en die Regering nie die indruk wil laat ontstaan dat dit deur sy standpuntinnames die verdere verloop van daardie verrigtinge enigsins wil probeer beïnvloed nie, sal ek my daarvan weerhou om in hierdie stadium met enige aangeleentheid te handel wat op daardie hofverrigtinge betrekking het.

(2) Die uitwerking van hierdie proklamasie is dat daardie gebiede in die distrik Ingwavuma wat deel uitmaak van die gebied waarvoor die kwa-Zulu Wetgewende Vergadering ingestel is, met ingang van 18 Junie 1982 uit genoemde gebied weggeneem word en onder die gesag van die Minister van Samewerking en Ontwikkeling geplaas word.

(3) Wat betref die onderhandelinge wat met die Koninkryk van Swaziland gevoer word oor moontlike aanpassings aan die internasionale grens tussen daardie staat en die Republiek van Suid-Afrika, moet ek daarop wys dat dit 'n beginsel van die internasionale reg is dat State nie alleen bestaande dispute moet probeer bylê by wyse van vreedsame onderhandelinge nie, maar ook dat hulle die ontstaan van interstaatlike dispute by wyse van onderhandelinge moet probeer voorkom. Hierdie beginsel word ook verwoord in artikel 2(3) van die Handves van die Verenigde Nasies Organisasie.

* Proclamation No. R121, 1982, in both Afrikaans and English, is appended to this statement which was issued in Afrikaans only

Dit moet ook benadruk word dat Suid-Afrika in die voer van sy buitelandse betrekkinge nog altyd die toepaslike regsbeginsels nougeset nagekom het.

Die onderhandelinge met die Koninkryk van Swaziland moet dus gesien word teen die agtergrond wat ek so pas geskets het asook die feit dat dit die Regering se verklaarde beleid is om, binne die perke van die redelike, goeie verhoudinge met buurstate te handhaaf.

(4) Op 25 April vanjaar het ek dit duidelik in die Volksraad gestel "dat ons nie in die weg sal staan van volkere wat opnuut met mekaar een wil word in gevalle waarin hulle oorheersend gemeenskaplike verledes, kulturele bande en 'n gemeenskaplike toekoms het nie" en bygevoeg dat dit "uit eie keuse en sonder inmenging en intimidasie" moet geskied.

(5) Die Tomlinson-kommissie het hierdie beginsel reeds in sy verslag van 1955 na vore gebring met die aanbeveling dat 'n gebiedsowerheid vir Swazi's wat buite Swaziland woonagtig is (byvoorbeeld in die omgewing van Barberton, Piet Retief en Umbombo) nie ingestel behoort te word nie tensy dit geskied onder die sentrale leiding van die Opperhoofhuis in Swaziland.

(6) Voordat stappe met betrekking tot die uitsnyding en samevoeging van gebiede gedoen is, is die Leier van die Opposisie en die leier van die Nuwe Republiekparty persoonlik deur die Minister van Samewerking en Ontwikkeling in verband met die saak ingelig ofskoon ek verwag het dat hulle van die Regering sou verskil.

(7) Op 6 Mei 1982 het die Minister van Buitelandse Sake en Inligting 'n verklaring oor die onderhandelinge met Swaziland in die Parlement gemaak¹ tydens die bespreking van sy begrotingspos. Hy het bekendgemaak dat die Suid-Afrikaanse Regering reeds talle samesprekings met Swaziland oor hierdie aangeleentheid gevoer het en dat die Koning van Swaziland verskeie briewe aan die Suid-Afrikaanse Eerste Minister gerig het.

Hierdie kwessie van moontlike grensaanpassings is 'n netelige saak waarby verskillende belange op die spel kom.

Die Koning van Swaziland het voor onafhanklikwording herhaalde verhoë aan die Britse regering gerig oor hierdie aangeleentheid en Swazileiers in Suid-Afrika het herhaaldelik versoekskrifte aan die Koning voorgelê waarin die staatkundige eenwording van alle Swazi's en Swazigrond bepleit is.

Aan die Suid-Afrikaanse kant het alle regerings na Uniewording totdat dr Verwoerd Premier geword het, die beginsel onderskryf wat in die Zuid-Afrika Wet beliggaam is, naamlik dat die Hoëkommissarisgebiede by Suid-Afrika ingelyf kan word as die inwoners dit sou verlang en as die goedkeuring van die Britse regering daarvoor verkry sou kon word. In

1. Dié verklaring sal in die volgende uitgawe van *Southern Africa Record* verskyn.

toesprake op 10 April 1961 en 3 September 1963 het dr Verwoerd namens die Regering van die moontlikheid van inlywing afgesien.

In laasgenoemde toespraak het hy hom uitgespreek ten gunste van die konsolidasie van aangrensende gebiede waar daar kulturele affiniteite was, met 'n aanbod om te help met die aankoop of uitruil van grondgebied in Suid-Afrika.

'n Ruk voor die onafhanklikwording van Swaziland in 1968 het die Britse regering Swaziland formeel gevra of Brittanje namens Swaziland met Suid-Afrika moes onderhandel oor grensaangelcenthede. Die Swazi Regering het geantwoord dat hy verkies om ná onafhanklikwording regstreeks met Suid-Afrika te onderhandel.

Swaziland het gevolglik kort na sy onafhanklikheid onderhandelinge met Suid-Afrika aangeknoop oor die kwessie van grensaanpassings. Ek wil herhaal dat die Minister van Buitelandse Sake en Inligting hierdie agtergrond en alle belangrike fasette van die onderhandelings in sy verklaring in die Parlement op 6 Mei 1982 behandel het.

(8) Wat die Ingwavumagebied betref het Swaziland sy verhoë gebaseer op kulturele en historiese bande soos onder andere weerspieël in die spesiale verhouding tussen die kapteins, hulle stamme en die Koning sowel as op sekere historiese feite wat daarop neerkom dat die betrokke stamme oorspronklik nie deel van Zoeloeland uitgemaak het nie — soos onder andere bewys deur die feit dat hulle nie opgeroep is om deel te neem aan Brittanje se oorlog met die Zoeloes in 1879 nie. Ingwavuma is ook nie ingesluit in Zoeloeland toe Brittanje die gebied na die oorlog geannekseer het nie. Swaziland het ook daarop gewys dat die Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek in 1895 beswaar aangeteken het teen die proklamasie van die Britse regering wat Ingwavuma by Natal wou inlyf.

(9) Op die basis van petisies wat onder die aandag van die Regering gekom het sowel as verslae van verskeie gesaghebbendes, insluitende die Kommissie vir Samewerking en Ontwikkeling, is daar getuienis dat persone van Swazi-afkoms in Suid-Afrika in die algemeen 'n grensaanpassing sou verwelkom op voorwaarde dat die aanpassing nie hulle verblyf- en werksgeleenthede en algemene lewensomstandighede sou benadeel nie. Die Suid-Afrikaanse Regering het hiervan kennis geneem en het derhalwe in samesprekings met Swaziland aangedui dat indien grensaanpassing sou plaasvind reëlins getref sal moet word om ekonomiese en maatskaplike ontwinging en ontbering te verhoed. 'n Hele reeks aangeleenthede, benevens grensaanpassings, sal dus aandag moet geniet om te verseker dat die bestaande regte, geriewe en lewenstandaarde van die mense wat deur die grensaanpassings geraak word, nie nadelig getref word nie.

In die onderhandelinge tussen Suid-Afrika en Swaziland is die feit herhaaldelik beklemtoon dat albei regerings die grootste waarde heg aan die rol van die privaatsektor in hul onderskeie lande en aan die eerbiediging

van eiendomsreg en -besit.

(10) Soos die Minister van Buitelandse Sake en Inligting op 6 Mei 1982 in die Parlement gesê het, het die samesprekinge met Swaziland, wat die noordwestelike grens van Swaziland betref, groter dringendheid verkry met die verhoging van die status van die Swazi-gebiedsoowerheid in Oktober 1977 tot die Wetgewende Vergadering van KaNgwane en die vooruitsig van verdere grondwetlike ontwikkeling in KaNgwane kragtens Wet 21 van 1971. Die Regering was dus heeltemal openlik hieromtrent. Die Regering beklemtoon dat in sy onderhandelings met Swaziland oor KaNgwane hy nie voornemens is om grond tot die Koninkryk van Swaziland toe te voeg wat in ieder geval nie vir die konsolidasie van KaNgwane geoormerk was nie.

(11) Die besluit wat die Regering geneem het kan vanselfsprekend nie 'n finale besluit wees nie want soos in vroeëre verklarings deur die Ministers van Samewerking en Ontwikkeling en van Buitelandse Sake en Inligting herhaaldelik benadruk is sal parlementêre goedkeuring verkry moet word. Dit was en is steeds vir die Regering nodig om in te gaan op die weersprekende eise wat toegeskryf word aan persone in die betrokke gebiede wie se posisie regstreeks geraak sou word en ook om uiteenlopende belange te probeer versoen. Vir hierdie doel moet kalmte en stabiliteit teweeggebring word. Die doel van hierdie proklamasie is om die Regering in staat te stel om die verdere onderhandelings in 'n onbevange atmosfeer te laat plaasvind. Dit sal die Regering in staat stel om sy plig teenoor die Parlement na te kom indien 'n ooreenkoms wel bereik sou word.

(12) Die proklamasie is ook uitgereik om stabiliteit en die voortsetting van doeltreffende administrasie en die goeie orde in die gebied van die distrik Ingwavuma wat binne die jurisdiksie van die Wetgewende Vergadering van KwaZulu geval het, te verseker en die verwarring en onsekerheid wat in die gebied heers uit die weg te ruim sodat onderhandelings in verband met die toekoms van die gebied en sy mense vrylik kan voortgaan.

PROKLAMASIE

van die Staatspresident van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika

No. R. 121, 1982

WEGNEEM VAN SEKERE GEBIEDE IN DIE DISTRIK INGWAVUMA UIT KWAZULU

Nademaal dit in belang van die voortsetting van doeltreffende admi-

PROCLAMATION

by the State President of the Republic of South Africa

No. R. 121, 1982

EXCISION OF CERTAIN AREAS IN THE DISTRICT OF INGWAVUMA FROM KWAZULU

Whereas it is necessary in the interests of the continuation of effec-

nistrasie en die goeie orde nodig is dat die geskil oor die geldigheid van Proklamasie R. 109 van 1982 uit die weg geruim word;

En nademaal ek van oordeel is dat vertraging in verband daarmee tot nadeel van die algemene belang sou strek;

So is dit dat ek, kragtens die bevoegdheid my verleen by artikel 25(1) van die Swart Administrasie Wet, 1927 (Wet 38 van 1927), gelees met artikel 21(1) van die Ontwikkelingstrust en Grond Wet, 1936 (Wet 18 van 1936), en artikel 30(4) van die Grondwet van die Nasionale State, 1971 (Wet 21 van 1971), hierby —

(a) verklaar dat, ondanks die bepalings van enige ander wet of regsreël —

(i) die gebiede bedoel in artikel 25(1) van die Swart Administrasie Wet, 1927 (Wet 38 van 1927), gelees met artikel 21(1) van die Ontwikkelingstrust en Grond Wet, 1936 (Wet 18 van 1936), wat deel uitmaak van die gebied van 'n stamowerheid of gemeenskapsowerheid ingestel ingevolge die bepalings van die Wet op Swart Owerhede, 1951 (Wet 68 van 1951), in die distrik Ingwavuma (hieronder "die Gebiede" genoem), ophou om deel uit te maak van die gebied waarvoor die KwaZulu-Wetgewende Vergadering by die Proklamasie op die KwaZulukonstitusie, 1972 (Proklamasie R. 70 van 1972), ingestel is;

(ii) die kapteins wat ingevolge paragraaf (b) van subartikel (1) van artikel 2 van Deel II van Bylae II by die Proklamasie op die KwaZulukonstitusie, 1972 (Proklamasie R. 70 van 1972), deur die Ingwavuma-Streeksowerheid as

tive administration and good order to remove the dispute concerning the validity of Proclamation R. 109 of 1982.

And whereas I am of the opinion that delay in regard thereto would be prejudicial to the public interest;

Now, therefore, under and by virtue of the powers vested in me by section 25(1) of the Black Administration Act, 1927 (Act 38 of 1927), read with section 21(1) of the Development Trust and Land Act, 1936 (Act 18 of 1936), and section 30(4) of the National States Constitution Act, 1971 (Act 21 of 1971), I hereby —

(a) declare that, notwithstanding the provisions of any other law or legal rule —

(i) the areas referred to in section 25(1) of the Black Administration Act, 1927 (Act 38 of 1927), read with section 21 (1) of the Development Trust and Land Act, 1936 (Act 18 of 1936), which form part of the area of a tribal or community authority established in terms of the provisions of the Black Authorities Act, 1951 (Act 68 of 1951), in the District of Ingwavuma (hereinafter referred to as "the Areas"), shall cease to form part of the area for which the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly has been established under the KwaZulu Constitution Proclamation, 1972 (Proclamation R. 70 of 1972);

(ii) the chiefs appointed in terms of paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of section 2 of Part II of Schedule II to the KwaZulu Constitution Proclamation, 1972 (Proclamation R. 70 of 1972), by the Ingwavuma Regional Authority as members of

lede van die KwaZulu-Wetgewende Vergadering aangestel is en die lid van genoemde Wetgewende Vergadering wat ingevolge paragraaf (d) van daardie subartikel verkies is, ophou om lede van daardie Wetgewende Vergadering te wees;

(iii) geen lid van die KwaZulu-Wetgewende Vergadering ingevolge genoemde paragraaf (d) ten opsigte van die Gebiede verkies word nie;

(iv) die administratiewe beheer van, en alle regte, bevoegdhede, gesag, pligte, verpligtinge en werksaamhede in verband met die een of ander aangeleentheid wat onmiddellik voor 18 Junie 1982 uit hoofde van die een of ander wet in die Gebiede berus het by die Regering of 'n ander gesag van KwaZulu of 'n persoon of liggaam deur daardie Regering of so 'n gesag aangewys, vanaf daardie datum berus by die Minister van Samewerking en Ontwikkeling of 'n persoon of liggaam deur hom aangewys;

(v) behoudens die bepaling van hierdie Proklamasie, alle wette wat in die Gebiede van krag was onmiddellik voor 18 Junie 1982 van krag bly in die Gebiede totdat hulle deur die bevoegde gesag herroep word of behalwe vir sover hulle deur hom gewysig word; en

(vi) 'n kennisgewing, lisensie, sertifikaat, magtiging, goedkeuring, vrystelling of enigiets wat uitgereik, verleen of gedoen is deur die bevoegde gesag kragtens 'n bepaling van 'n wet in subparagraaf (v) bedoel ten opsigte van die Gebiede onmiddellik voor 18 Junie 1982, van krag bly vir die tydperk waarvoor dit kragtens die

the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, and the member of the said Legislative Assembly elected in terms of paragraph (d) of that subsection shall cease to be members of that Legislative Assembly;

(iii) no member of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly shall be elected in terms of the said paragraph (d) in respect of the Areas;

(iv) the administrative control of, and all rights, powers, authorities, duties, obligations and functions in connection with any matter which, by virtue of any law, were vested, immediately prior to 18 June 1982, in the Areas in the Government or any other authority of KwaZulu or a person or body designated by that Government or any such authority shall, from that date vest in the Minister of Co-operation and Development or a person or body designated by him;

(v) subject to the provisions of this Proclamation, all laws which were in force in the Areas immediately prior to 18 June 1982 shall continue in force in the Areas until repealed or except in so far as they may be amended by the competent authority; and

(iv) any notice, licence, certificate, authority, approval, exemption or anything issued, granted or done by the competent authority under any provision of a law referred to in subparagraph (v) immediately prior to 18 June 1982 in respect of the Areas shall remain in force for the period for which it would have remained in force

betrokke wet van krag sou gebly het, tensy dit vroeër deur die bevoegde gesag ingetrek of gewysig word:

(b) die Proklamasie op die KwaZulukonstitusie, 1972 (Proklamasie R. 70 van 1972), wysig ooreenkomstig die Bylae hierby,

(c) Proklamasie R109 van 1982 herroep; en

(d) verklaar dat hierdie Proklamasie geag word op 18 Junie 1982 in werking te getree het: Met dien verstande dat die geldigheid van enigiets wat op of na 25 Junie 1982 en voor 29 Junie 1982 in of ten opsigte van die Gebiede deur die Regering of 'n ander gesag van KwaZulu gedoen is nie deur die bepalinge van hierdie paragraaf geraak word nie tensy die Minister van Samewerking en Ontwikkeling anders bepaal.

Gegee onder my Hand en die Seël van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika te Pretoria, op hede die Agt-en-twintigste dag van Junie, Eenduisend Negehoenderd Twee-en-tagtig.

M. VILJOEN, Staatspresident.

Op las van die Staatspresident-in-rade:

P.G.J. KOORNHOF.

BYLAE

(a) Skrap paragraaf (i) van Bylae I.

(b) Vervang paragraaf (ii) van Bylae I deur die volgende paragraaf:

“(ii) Die gebiede bedoel in artike! 25(1) van die Swart Administrasie Wet, 1927 (Wet 38 van 1927), gelees met arikel 21(1) van die Ontwikkelingstrust en Grond Wet, 1936 (Wet 18 van 1936), wat deel uitmaak van die gebied van 'n stamowerheid of

under the law concerned, unless it is sooner withdrawn or amended by the competent authority;

(b) amend the KwaZulu Constitution Proclamation, 1972 (Proclamation R. 70 of 1972), in accordance with the Schedule hereto;

(c) repeal Proclamation R. 109 of 1982; and

(d) declare that this Proclamation shall be deemed to have come into operation on 18 June 1982; Provided that the validity of anything done by the Government or any other authority of KwaZulu in or in respect of the Areas on or after 25 June 1982 and before 29 June 1982 shall not be affected by the provisions of this paragraph unless the Minister of Co-operation and Development determines otherwise.

Given under my Hand and the Seal of the Republic of South Africa at Pretoria this Twenty-eighth day of June, One thousand Nine hundred and Eighty-two.

M. VILJOEN, State President.

By Order of the State President-in-Council:

P.G.J. KOORNHOF.

SCHEDULE

(a) Delete paragraph (i) of Schedule I.

(b) Substitute the following paragraph for paragraph (ii) of Schedule I:

“(ii) the areas referred to in section 25(1) of the Black Administration Act, 1927 (Act 38 of 1927), read with section 21(1) of the Development Trust and Land Act, 1936 (Act 18 of 1936), which form part of the area of a tribal or community authority es-

gemeenskapsowerheid ingestel ingevolge die bepalings van die Wet op Swart Owerhede, 1951 (Wet 68 van 1951) (hieronder in hierdie Bylae bepaalde gebiede genoem), in die distrik Piet Retief;"

(c) Vervang die woord "vyf-en-vyftig" in artikel 2(1) (d) van Deel II van Bylae II deur die woord "vier-en-vyftig".

(d) Skrap paragraaf (a) van artikel 3(1) van Deel II van Bylae II.

established in terms of the provisions of the Black Authorities Act, 1951 (Act 68 of 1951) (hereinafter in this Schedule referred to as defined areas), in the District of Piet Retief;"

(c) Substitute the word "fifty-four" for the word "fifty-five" in section 2(1) (d) of Part II of Schedule II.

(d) Delete paragraph (a) of section 3(1) of Part II of Schedule II.

In: South Africa. *Republic*. Government Gazette No. 8297, 28.6.1982.

United States and Southern Africa

- A. Address entitled "the United States and South Africa: Where Do We Stand at Present?" by the South African Ambassador to the United States, Mr Donald B. Sole, to the Seattle Committee on Foreign Relations, on 2 March 1982

Most of us are agreed that this decade of the eighties in which we find ourselves, will be a decade of conflict and confrontation. Clearly there has been a disturbance of the uneasy balance of power set up in the fifties in the wake of World War II. There is little doubt that the super powers are far less in control of events in their spheres of influence than at any time since 1945.

It was against this background that President Carter's National Security Adviser, Dr Brzezinski made his reference to "an arc of crisis" stretching from Bangladesh through India, Pakistan, Iran, the Middle East, Somalia, central Africa down through southern Africa to the Cape of Good Hope. This emphasis on the arc of crisis was, as far as South Africa was concerned, one of the few examples of what might be termed global thinking on the part of the Carter Administration. Our experience of that Administration was very much that its foreign policy tended to be compartmentalised. South Africa and its problems were not viewed in a global perspective but purely in an African regional perspective. It was believed that normal relations between South Africa and the United States are against the best interests of the American people and this contention was based on the premise that the United States is required to make a choice between South Africa on the one hand and much of Black Africa and the Third World on the other. It was argued that to have normal relations with South Africa invokes the hostility of Black Africa which the United States cannot afford, particularly bearing in mind such factors as:

- (1) Nigeria is the second largest supplier of oil to the United States and could, by way of reprisal, turn off the tap if South Africa ceased to be

treated as something less than a pariah or outcast in American eyes.

(2) Africa and the Third World command a two-thirds majority in the United Nations, a fact constantly borne in mind by Andrew Young and his successor, Donald McHenry, who were the principal architects of United States policy vis-à-vis Africa and South Africa.

(3) The normalisation of relations with South Africa would prompt much of Black Africa to turn to the Soviet Union and its satellites for military and economic aid, with the result that American influence in Africa would be more undermined than ever, thus precipitating Soviet dominance, especially in the mineral-rich complex of southern Africa.

(4) The correct course for the United States to follow was, accordingly, to apply increasing pressure to South Africa designed to facilitate and accelerate the eventual and unavoidable take-over by a Black majority which, it was argued, would then be prepared to align itself to a considerable extent with the United States' objectives and policies.

This thesis continues to be expounded in one form or another by many representatives of the media in this country. It has the support of many church groups. It is backed on a number of campuses. It is, to a considerable extent, endorsed by organisations such as the AFL/CIO and has a not inconsiderable following in Congress.

I have been in Washington since just after the beginning of the Carter Administration. To me, as a career Foreign Service Officer, the thesis I have just described was an over simplification of issues typical of the weakness, which, in the past, has so frequently characterised much of American foreign policy thinking. Such over simplification, furthermore, so easily exposes the country to blackmail not to speak of all the potential for mischief making. In this context, let me emphasise that the over simplification tendency is not limited to what is described as the South Africa/Black Africa confrontation. Other examples are the demands to choose between Israel and the Arabs, between India and Pakistan, between Taiwan and the Chinese People's Republic and, on a lesser scale, between Greece and Turkey. In all these cases what is overlooked is that a super power, which the United States is, should not have to choose between South Africa and Black Africa, between India and Pakistan, between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. In every case blackmail tactics may be applied by one or other of the parties concerned. But for a super power to succumb to blackmail is, above all, to be guilty of an admission of impotence.

As an observer of your last presidential election, it seemed to me that what your electorate was seeking from its President was that the United States should not only be strong economically, politically, militarily, but should be seen to be strong and that the credibility of the United States should be restored as quickly as possible, that as part of this credibility the United States should identify who its friends are and that, having done so,

should stand by its friends, that the United States, in its role as world leader, should base its policies on what might be described as enlightened self-interest of the United States people and not on any particular ideology, whether of the left or of the right.

In the first year of the Reagan Administration what we have seen in broad foreign policy terms has, above all, been an emphasis on the need to develop a global strategy with particular reference to the worldwide Soviet threat, to look at every problem as part of a global mosaic and to move away, as rapidly as a bureaucracy will allow, from the compartmentalised approach so typical of the Carter Administration, at least until disillusioned by the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan.

Turning now to the narrower issues of United States/South African relations under the Reagan Administration, it is my judgement that the alleged "tilt in favour of South Africa" so far from being a "tilt" is in fact a redressing of the imbalance which had been created under Carter on the basis of formulating policy in a regional rather than a global framework.

The Reagan Administration policy vis-à-vis Africa and particularly southern Africa was clearly defined in a statement by Dr Chet Crocker in Honolulu on August 29¹.

This policy statement pointed out that United States economic interests in sub-Saharan Africa are heavily concentrated in the southern one-third of the continent where there is nearly three billion dollars of direct investment — or about 60 per cent of the sub-Saharan total. Southern Africa's trade totals over three billion dollars, and this concentration of American interest simply reflects southern Africa's tremendous mineral wealth and the relative sophistication of the area's economies.

As a second reality Dr Crocker emphasised that southern Africa is an increasingly contested area in global politics — a region of worldwide significance deriving from its potential to become a cockpit of mounting East-West tensions, an area where, since 1975, the Soviet Union and its clients have shown every interest in keeping the pot of regional conflicts boiling.

Dr Crocker pointed out that the potential damage to Western interests deriving from Soviet and surrogate involvement was enhanced by South Africa's geo-political importance along the strategic sea routes and as a source of critical minerals.

A third reality was the interdependence of southern Africa, the powerful linkages — transport system, labour migration, electric power grids, flows of capital and expertise, vital trade ties — that bind together the states of the area.

He recognized South Africa as the dominant country of the region and

1. See *Southern Africa Record* nos. 25/26, December 1981, pp. 43-48.

emphasised that, and I quote a few short passages from his speech as follows:

- It is not our task to choose between Black and White.
- We must avoid action that aggravates the awesome challenges facing South Africans of all races.
- The Reagan Administration has no intention of destabilising South Africa in order to curry favour elsewhere. Neither will we align ourselves with apartheid policies that are abhorrent in our multiracial democracy.
- South Africa is an integral and important element of the global economic system and it plays a significant economic role in its own region. We will not support the severing of those ties.
- It does not serve our interests to walk away from South Africa any more than it does to play down the seriousness of the domestic and regional problems it faces.
- We need policies that sustain those who would resist the siren call of violence and the blandishments of Moscow and its clients.

These few quotations are a very limited summary of a wide-ranging statement of policy which, as far as South Africa is concerned, has been popularly characterised as one of "constructive engagement". This policy rests on two main pillars: the one is the need to achieve an internationally recognised settlement or *modus vivendi* in Namibia: the other is the need to demonstrate — to what is conceded to be a sceptical world — that the Reagan approach to South Africa's domestic policies, which is one of curtailment of critical rhetoric and its replacement by private encouragement, is producing dividends in the form of clearly visible evolutionary progress for the less privileged components of the South African population.

With respect to both these pillars, 1982 is seen to be a crucial year. If there is to be breakdown on Namibia — if the Namibia locomotive, to use another metaphor, should be derailed — the current Reagan initiative in this field will come under heavy fire, also from this country's traditional allies. If also the evolution of South African domestic policy does not, by the end of 1982, produce observable and registrable changes, here again the Reagan policy will run into heavy weather.

What are the prospects?

First of all, it is perhaps appropriate to emphasize that, although the advent of the Reagan Administration generated a lot of euphoria in South Africa, the South African Government, from the outset, recognized the path towards normalisation of relations with the United States would inevitably be a thorny one, given the strength of what might be described as the domestic constituencies in both countries. What we sought was the restoration of mutual credibility as between the two Governments. We have

consistently tried to set out honestly and accurately precisely where we stand with respect to the various issues which have bedevilled United States/ South African relationships under the Carter Administration, and we have requested the United States Government similarly to be as candid and as frank in explaining its attitude to us.

After thirteen months of the Reagan Administration I can say, quite objectively, that the progress achieved in restoring mutual credibility has been highly encouraging. This is particularly so with respect to Namibia.

In other areas, e.g. the easing out of some of the controls of the Export Administration Act, which, incidentally has had the effect of allowing millions and millions of dollars worth of business that would normally have gone to the United States, to be diverted elsewhere, there were no important changes last year, but we hope for better things this year. A striking example of lost sales in terms of export control regulations is in the area of computers where, although the United States has the best technology in the world, because of uncertainty about supply there is an increasing tendency to turn to other sources. Another example is machine tools where, according to the US Machine Tool Builders Association, there was formerly a \$90 million annual import from the United States, the source has been switched to Japan and the imports from that country have increased to approximately \$220 million.

We know that the Department of Commerce is anxious to step up economic ties with South Africa. The State Department is adopting a somewhat more "political" position and much will depend on the degree of opposition in Congress to the normalisation of economic relations between the two countries.

We are on the way to the restoration of the normal Service Attachés representation of our respective Embassies, and the *status quo ante* will be fully restored by the end of next month.

In the consular field, I hope to secure approval for the establishment of an Honorary Consulate for the State of Washington with headquarters in Seattle. Investigation of this possibility is one of the reasons for my current visit to your city.

In the nuclear field, we have had a number of both political and technological discussions designed to re-establish mutual confidence as the prerequisite to reverting to the kind of relationship for which the United States/South African Nuclear Agreement of 1957, now in suspension, makes provision, but here we are, of course, faced, as is the Reagan Administration, with the problems flowing from the passage of retroactive legislation by Congress — I refer to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act which had the effect of making it impossible for the United States Government to fulfil its contractual obligations but, at the same time, it was expected of South Africa that it should carry out — and be subjected to puni-

tive penalties if it did not — provisions of the contract requiring it to deliver fuel for enrichment, even although the purpose of the contract was frustrated by the inability of the United States to grant an export licence for the return of the enriched fuel to South Africa — very much a “Catch 22” situation if ever there was one.

In terms of the economic relationships, it has traditionally been United States Government practice neither to encourage nor to discourage trade between the two countries, but in practice, under the Carter Administration, there was a certain amount of discouragement, which was reflected in the fact that where, historically, the United States always had a favourable balance of payments situation vis-à-vis South Africa, by 1978 this had been so turned around that we had a more than 2.1 balance in our favour — an unhealthy state of affairs which meant that whereas normally it is an Ambassador’s duty to promote his country’s exports, from the end of 1978 onwards I gave far more attention to the promotion of United States exports to my own country. We have had some success in this campaign and the figures for 1980 showed:

United States Exports to South Africa \$2 452,7 million

United States Imports from South Africa \$3 320,5 million

the export figure representing an increase of approximately 74,3 per cent over the figure for the previous year.

In 1981, as a result of the renewal of confidence in American ability to supply, consequent upon the advent of the Reagan Administration, United States exports have risen even further:

United States Exports to South Africa \$2 911,7 million

United States Imports from South Africa \$2 445,3 million

the export figure reflecting an increase of approximately 18,7 per cent over the previous year. All this is very important in the context of an overall trade balance deficit. . . .

Although the pace of acceleration will obviously depend on the state of the economy in both countries, I am confident that in the remaining years of the Reagan Administration there will be major developments in the field of trade expansion, this despite the campaign waged by various anti-South African groups and by some university campuses to persuade American corporations to withdraw from South Africa.

Now what about evolutionary change at home?

This is, of course, essentially our business, not the business of any other country. However, like it or not, we have to recognize and accept the inter-relationship of domestic policy and external political and economic ties.

Looking at these problems from the standpoint of a South African Foreign Service Officer serving in the United States — admittedly a very limited perspective — what is the objective, what are the priorities for South

Africa, as seen through the eyes of friendly and responsible Americans?

If my interpretation of such American thinking is correct, I would describe the objective as the establishment of a politico-socio-economic order in South Africa itself which will in order of priorities:

- (i) ensure stability and orderly development;
- (ii) improve the quality of life for all
- (iii) progressively provide for the elimination of discrimination against the person and for equality of economic opportunity for all;
- (iv) make it possible for all national, ethnic and other groups to participate suitably in the decision-making process; and
- (v) ensure a fair and equitable role for all in the exercise of political power, not on the basis of one-man-one-vote, with all votes equally weighted as urged upon us by your former Vice-President Mondale, but on a basis which will have to be worked out, largely through consensus, in the course of the coming decade.

This, then, is the challenge immediately ahead. How we face up to this challenge will affect not only our destiny but the destinies of all the countries of southern Africa since southern Africa, in spite of its political diversities, is fundamentally an economic unit and will grow and flourish as such provided we in South Africa can maintain a pattern of peaceful change and resist attempts, both from without and within, to transform, on a basis of violence and intimidation, evolution into revolution.

B. Statement on 22 March 1982, concerning Soviet influence in southern Africa, by the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr Chester A. Crocker, to the US Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism

As I understand it, the topic that will be the principal focus of these hearings will be the role of communist influence in southern Africa. The scope will include not only external communist influence in the area — the role of the Soviet Union, its Warsaw Pact associates, and Cuba — but also communist influence in political movements indigenous to the area, including the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) and the African National Congress (ANC). Consideration of communist influence in southern Africa would also include the question of relations of various communist countries with the independent states of the area, all of which consider themselves to be non-aligned nations.

It is an indisputable fact, faced squarely in policy terms by President Reagan's Administration, beginning in January 1981 in consultation with our Western allies, that a wide range of vital Western interests, and US in-

terests in particular, are engaged in the southern African region. The ten nations of southern Africa comprise an area of great mineral wealth, including resources critical to Western strategic interests. Angola, South Africa, Mozambique and the territory of Namibia are all littoral states on the strategic Cape sea route, a lifeline of Western commerce. United States' two way trade with the countries of southern Africa amounted in 1980 to 7,200 million dollars and US direct investment in the region is estimated at 2,300 million dollars.

All of these factors obviously make southern Africa an area of great interest also to the Soviet Union and to its surrogates. In recent years, we have remarked a substantial increase in Soviet interest and involvement in the area. In Angola and Mozambique the number and range of activities of Soviet, Cuban and other foreign communist advisers and technicians, in the civilian and military domains, has increased, implying concomitant political and economic influence. The Soviet Union has concluded arms agreements with Zambia and Botswana, complementing those countries' previous arms supply relationships with Western nations. Zimbabwe recently requested North Korea to train and equip a brigade, although that country continues to work closely with Great Britain as its primary foreign source of military equipment and training.

Other countries of the region and of Africa in general have remarked with concern the increase in Soviet activity in the region, noting particularly that the Soviet Union has concentrated its efforts there on military assistance, showing little interest at all in contributing to the economic development of the region.

It is also clear that the Soviet Union has continued to play a very active role in southern African political/military organizations such as SWAPO and the ANC, on whose activities the hearings will focus. SWAPO is the primary external Namibian organization seeking power in Namibia. Its military elements are based primarily in Angola and other neighbouring countries and carry out some actions within Namibia itself. It exists also as a political structure, inside and outside Namibia, and is one of the parties — with the Western Contact Group, the African Front Line States, South Africa, the United Nations, and other Namibian political organizations — to the present negotiations underway to reach a settlement of the Namibia issue. We estimate that SWAPO receives some 90 per cent of its military support from communist sources. It also receives direct assistance from African states, Western states other than the US, and from some UN bodies.

The ANC, which seeks to replace the present government in power in South Africa by violent as well as other means, receives comparable percentages of its military and other support from communist and other sources. It is basically an African nationalist organization with a long his-

tory, founded in 1912, five years before the 1917 revolution in Russia. A main thread in the history of the ANC over the years is the varying degrees of internal and external communist influence that have characterized what is basically an African organization. These conflicts within the organization have often been very bitter and have resulted in various segments and individuals breaking with the ANC at different points in time.

We categorically condemn all terrorist and other violent acts that either of these organizations take to try to bring about change in Namibia and South Africa. Our policy in relationship to both seeks to channel the impetus toward change into peaceful channels. We seek in general in pursuing our objectives in southern Africa to strengthen and make more viable the possibilities of peaceful change. As we have repeatedly stated in the Namibia/Angola context, we believe the spiral of violence is a two-way street, and we deplore it. In so doing, we seek to obviate the necessity for terrorism that some parties involved in developments in the region choose to perceive.

In Namibia, we have been working very actively since last April (1981) to arrive at a negotiated settlement of the Namibia issue that would bring that territory to an internationally recognized independence based on UN security council resolution 435¹. We are pursuing a carefully drafted, three-phase negotiating process, with co-ordination at all stages with all of the interested parties, including South Africa, SWAPO, and other Namibian political elements.

In South Africa, we are pursuing a careful policy of constructive engagement, encouraging the government of Prime Minister P.W. Botha and other elements in South African society to move away from apartheid toward a South Africa changed, modern and strong, with bright prospects for stability and development rooted in justice, free of the problems that now stand in the way of closer US/South African relations. We believe that a process of peaceful, evolutionary change promises a much better immediate and long-term future for all South Africans than the protracted, bloody terror and violence that is the alternative for that nation.

Speaking directly to the purposes of these hearings, I believe that the policy that the Administration is pursuing under President Reagan's leadership is one calculated to meet head-on the intentions that the Soviet Union may have in southern Africa. These objectives would represent not only a serious threat to our own interests there but are objectives which would also push the people of that area deeper into an environment of chaos, violence, and disorder, the antithesis of the peaceful economic development that I believe the leaders of the countries of southern Africa seek for their people. We proceed on the basis that the Soviet Union does not

1. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 14, December 1978, p. 43.

have a grand design for southern Africa, but that it is, in fact, taking advantage of targets of opportunity that present themselves to act counter to Western interests. The Soviet Union, alone, has a vested interest in keeping the region in turmoil. It is to no one else's advantage — neither to that of the South Africans, the other southern Africans, nor certainly to the United States and the West.

We seek a settlement in Namibia that will permit a fair and democratic expression of the will of the Namibian people and will bring to power a constitutional government not only with the support of the Namibian people but also with solid long-term prospects for stability.

We seek an end to the guerrilla warfare that has continued in northern Namibia and southern Angola for fifteen years now and which has cost the lives of many people in the area, most recently in the South African attack on SWAPO in southern Angola this month (March 1982).

In seeking to resolve the Namibian problem through negotiations, we strip the Soviet Union and its surrogates of any excuse they have to continue to fuel violence in southern Africa through military aid to SWAPO and through the Cuban forces in Angola.

We seek an end to the conflict between political elements in Angola which has preoccupied that country since 1974.

We seek the withdrawal of all Cuban combat forces from Angola — their continued presence in Angola represents a threat to regional security that is an obstacle to resolution of the Namibian issue. Their removal can also be part of a process of national reconciliation among Angolans that can result in time in a unified, peaceful Angola whose leaders can concentrate the country's efforts on national economic and social objectives.

We seek, through our own programs of assistance and co-operation, alternatives to Soviet involvement in and attempts to dominate the national security structures of independent southern African nations.

Finally, in seeking to encourage South Africans to resolve their problems through peaceful, evolutionary change, we strip the Soviet Union not only of any justification that it may put forth to justify its efforts to fan tensions within South Africa itself into racial war, but we also make it very clear to the people of other African nations and to the world the gravity with which we view developments in southern Africa and the strength of our own policy.

I think it is important that we all understand that in southern Africa the world faces a dangerous conjunction of factors. Vital Western interests are involved, vital American interests are involved. The Soviet Union is involved. The region itself is severely troubled by problems that inevitably carry with them general instability. South Africa is strong, economically and militarily, but the momentum of events in the area — whether it be toward independence for Namibia, national unity and peace in Angola, or

toward change within South Africa itself — is also strong and vital. We believe that the diplomacy that the United States is pursuing in southern Africa can be a key factor in the outcome of these developments and that our diplomacy is, in fact, essential if hope for a peaceful solution of southern Africa's problems is to remain alive.

Text supplied by the United States International Communication Agency, Pretoria.

United States and Zimbabwe

Address on 26 March 1982, by US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr Chester A. Crocker, at a Conference on Zimbabwe sponsored by the African-American Institute and the American Bar Association.

Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this conference and to speak on a subject on which I feel strongly, the present and future relationship between the United States and Zimbabwe. The United States has many and varied links with Zimbabwe, the more important of which include substantial political, economic, religious and educational ties. The high regard shown for Prime Minister Mugabe when he visited in August 1980, and for President Banda when he came in October of last year demonstrates the overall esteem Americans have for the Zimbabwean people and for their leaders.

I am honoured and pleased to be sharing this platform with Zimbabwe's distinguished Minister of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, Dr Bernard Chidzero, who is accompanied by a delegation representing Zimbabwe's public and private sectors. I am also pleased to see so many distinguished members of the American business community here today. Your presence underscores the seriousness of this meeting.

The United States believes that Zimbabwe can become a showcase of economic growth and political moderation in southern Africa, a region of substantial strategic importance to us. That belief rests on facts, not illusions. At a time when much of neighbouring Africa risks sliding into an economic abyss, Zimbabwe has the possibility of pointing by example to a brighter future whose central element is economic rationality. Endowed with rich resources, diverse and talented manpower, exceptional economic self-sufficiency, and a solid legacy of infrastructure and administrative institutions, Zimbabwe has the ingredients for a positive programme of development and nation building.

We are committed to assist Zimbabwe and Prime Minister Mugabe toward achieving those goals. We share fully Zimbabwe's strong belief that relations among the nations of southern Africa must be based upon the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity as well as the pursuit of practical policies of political restraint and

the belief in negotiated solutions to festering conflicts. Within that context, we believe that the recent extension of the preferential trade agreement between Zimbabwe and the Republic of South Africa is a concrete reflection of the region's potential for mutually beneficial co-existence in the face of basic political difference.

We are aware that Prime Minister Mugabe and his colleagues face tough choices as the leaders of their nation, choices that call for resourcefulness and determined leadership. Often in such challenging circumstances, consistent pursuit of a path of vision and of moderation requires the leaders of a nation to walk a tightrope. Our judgement is that Prime Minister Mugabe seeks to follow such a course. It is in substantial part for this reason that we have sought a good overall relationship with Zimbabwe since independence.

Lest you conclude that I plan to talk today of grand strategy or the tactics of the Namibia negotiations, let me assure you that I am aware of our agenda: investment and development. But these things do not occur — or fail to occur — in a political vacuum.

Zimbabwe is a very special country. Zimbabwe is also an important partner and friend of the US at the centre of the destiny of southern Africa. One of the roles of a friend is sometimes to speak plainly in the knowledge that the friend may then choose to heed or to disregard what is said. Among nations that clearly respect each other's sovereignty and independence, friendship can be strengthened by the good will expressed by the act of speaking plainly. What I am about to say about how we see the future of the economy of Zimbabwe falls in that category.

In an effort to encourage the post-independence government and to demonstrate our firm commitment to Zimbabwe's success as a new nation, the United States pledged 225 million dollars over a three-year period at the March 1981 Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development. That pledge is consistent with this Administration's stated objectives of constructive engagement in southern Africa and with the goal of assisting the economic development of African nations. It specifically indicates our recognition of both Zimbabwe's obvious potential and its special needs during the first three years of independence.

However, the modern history of economic development demonstrates that government-to-government assistance programmes — important as they are — cannot by themselves assure the capital, expertise, or motivation required to achieve sustained economic growth. The worldwide economic downturn has exacerbated the problems inherent in strategies which depend primarily on public sector activity and which ignore or actively discourage individual initiative and the private sector. The need to correct the widespread imbalance between public and private economic activity is increasingly recognized in scholarly studies, analyses by international de-

velopment institutions, and by the leaders of developing countries themselves.

We are fully aware that in Zimbabwe, as in other developing countries, the reputation of capitalism has suffered by association with colonialism. But what is past need not be prologue. As Prime Minister Mugabe has stated clearly, only Zimbabwe's exceptional private sector can generate the resources needed to improve national welfare. Sadly, the experience of some African and other developing countries illustrates the tragedy of economic planning that only redistributes poverty and stifles the universal drive of people to produce and to earn.

As part of the Reagan Administration's worldwide policy of support for economic development, we have embarked upon several new approaches in our assistance programmes. We believe these will strengthen the role of indigenous private sectors and facilitate US private investment to stimulate developing economies.

An excellent example of this approach is our aid-funded Commodity Import Program (CIP) which the Zimbabwe Government is presently considering. This programme has been consciously designed to assist local business firms overcome the constraints imposed by the shortage of foreign exchange. It also gives priority to the replacement of outdated and obsolete capital equipment, particularly in the transportation, civil engineering and manufacturing sectors. The CIP will also provide balance of payment support, help to stimulate economic growth rising from the private sector and will create new jobs for Zimbabwe's rapidly expanding work force. Local currency counterpart funds generated by the programme will be used by the Zimbabwe Government for mutually agreed-upon activities in the fields of education, health, agriculture and small-scale enterprise, with priority being given to reconstruction and rehabilitation of facilities in the former tribal trust lands. Used in this manner the CIP will have the dual purposes of stimulating the Zimbabwe commercial sector and of helping the Zimbabwe Government meet its development needs.

Zimbabwe, as suggested above, has a magnificent asset in a well developed, modern infrastructure which includes a relatively well-trained labour force, food self sufficiency and export capability, a good and improving transportation system, a sound communications network, a strong industrial base, and sophisticated financial institutions.

While this infrastructure is exceptionally well developed by regional standards, it functioned in the past basically to meet the needs of only a small segment of the population. At independence the Government of Zimbabwe made very clear its commitment to expand and share more broadly the conomy's wealth and improve social and economic services as rapidly as possible. As a result, there have been increased expectations and large public spending to meet those expectations which could eventually

threaten Zimbabwe's economic viability, particularly if economic growth does not keep pace.

The formidable challenge, then, for Zimbabwe is to attempt to adapt a highly productive economy in the direction of greater equity and broadened participation without succumbing to sometimes inflated expectations for immediate gratification, a process that could place excessive strain on finite resources, manpower and infrastructure and thereby weaken the base of the economic system. Such a development could also weaken the Zimbabwe Government's own capacity to meet its peoples' needs and might risk sending the country into the position of so many other states today: low growth, loss of food self-sufficiency, and expanding budget deficits.

To meet this challenge, the path of wisdom for Zimbabwe is not to permit unique opportunities for dynamic economic growth with equity to escape, perhaps irretrievably. We hope, instead, that Zimbabwe's leaders will devise an innovative approach to economic policy free of the theoretical rigidities which could bar the achievement of the practical results that they and their people want.

The US recognizes that in the coming decades Zimbabwe will need massive amounts of capital for social programmes to redress the past imbalances. Although Zimbabwe has the capacity to generate some of this capital domestically, there will be a need for a substantial injection of external capital including private investments.

Zimbabwe's own private sector is unique because of the economy's high degree of self-sufficiency. Where the local private sector provides social as well as economic benefits — employment, training, expansion of opportunities — these should be sustained, not subject to the limitations of budget shortfalls. The private sector is an important source of new talents and ideas. With independence and the end of sanctions, foreign investor participation can play a comparable role. Because the US is sympathetic to and supportive of the Zimbabwe Government's efforts to respond to rising expectations, we are convinced that the American private sector can be an additional major factor in helping Zimbabwe achieve sustained growth and a continued broadening of effective participation with the modern economic sector.

Zimbabwe as a market for trade and investment is no stranger to the US private sector, and the lifting of sanctions refuelled considerable interest among US firms for expanded and new involvement there. Expanded trade which would flow from new investment would help to strengthen ties between our two countries.

Private foreign investment, however, does not always automatically occur even when it appears natural and logical to governments that it should. By the same token, the private sector cannot assume that conditions and policies in developing countries are designed primarily to max-

imize opportunity for profit. It is a two-way street.

It is our view that both the Zimbabwe Government and the US private sector have responsibilities, therefore, to smooth the way for investment and to make it productive. Today, however, it appears that both parties have become somewhat wary and cautious to the point that progress in attracting investments may not get properly launched and may fall short.

I see the following issues as potentially discouraging to US foreign investment, problems which I would signal to the Government of Zimbabwe and the foreign investors:

- Lack of a clear, publicly stated government policy on the role and rules of the game for the private sector. Some companies have found particularly unsettling suggestions of eventual State control of most economic activity. The private sector might interpret as detrimental to its productive role the creation of a Minerals Marketing Board. We believe that the Zimbabwe Government's efforts to clarify its approach to the role of the private sector will be especially helpful, and that its readiness to work with the private sector toward achieving these goals through private investment will bear rich fruit.
- A second factor is uncertainty over foreign exchange availability, remittances of earnings, transport facilities, expertise availability, and the effect of government deficits on the ability of the private sector to operate effectively.
- Third, the business community, for purposes of its longterm planning, is following current domestic political developments in Zimbabwe as they assess whether the country's hopes for stable and orderly progress will in fact be realized.
- Fourth, delays or difficulties in reaching common understanding on agreements which will promote increased private investment (the OPIC agreement as a case in point), are bound to encourage critics and discourage friends of the positive relationship which is developing between the US and Zimbabwe.

In sum, American investors are unsure if they can enter Zimbabwe's market, make money and remit a competitive portion of their profits. What they need, therefore, is predictability, a clearer idea of what the ground rules are, better channels of communications, clear signals that the Government of Zimbabwe has assessed the evidence and has opted to create a climate designed to stimulate investment.

Despite these issues, it is our basic assessment that Zimbabwe offers considerable and varied opportunities for the American investor. To take advantage of these opportunities, the American business community will need to demonstrate its ability to produce and to respond to locally relevant needs. This can best be done by developing specific, creative, and versatile investment proposals which will benefit Zimbabwean society as a

whole. For example:

- Agro-industrial projects that emphasize training, expanded opportunities for all Zimbabwean farmers, and growth of production, i.e., projects which help meet several of Zimbabwe's objectives even more efficiently than government programmes aimed at the same sectors.
- Industrial activities that promise employment, economic advancement, and increased foreign exchange earnings for the country.
- Innovative management styles that allow for co-operation with government, the most rapid pace of development of Zimbabwean top management, and sensitivity to local conditions.

In our view, it is clear that Zimbabwe is at a major crossroad of its economic future. I want to stress the potential that can be exploited if the public and private sectors of our two countries can work energetically and co-operatively to keep Zimbabwe on the road of economic growth.

This conference can mark the beginning of a determined effort on both sides to build a climate of positive reinforcement, spurred by extra efforts on each side to create and follow through on specific promising investment opportunities.

If this opportunity is seized, we will all reflect on this conference as an historic step in a process to the greater good of Zimbabwe, the US, and southern Africa. In my view, failure to do so would represent, on our part and on the part of Zimbabwe, that we have done much less than our best and that a great opportunity has been lost.

Telex text supplied by the United States International Communication Agency,
Pretoria.

Occasional Papers 1982

Barratt, John; *The Namibian Dilemma*.

de Montbrial, Thierry; *The Outlook for Southern Africa: a View from Europe*.

du Pisani, André; *Namibia After Geneva*.

Geldenhuys, Deon; *What Do We Think? A Survey of White Opinion on Foreign Policy Issues*.

Gutteridge, William; *Prospects for Arms Control and Disarmament*.

Lankin, E.; *The Middle Eastern Outlook*.

Savigear, Peter; *Political Agitation and Terrorism in Western Europe*.

Spicer, Michael; *Sanctions Against South Africa: the Changing Context*.