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Namibia

- A. Extracts from statements in Parliament by the South African Minister for Foreign Affairs and Information, the Hon. R.F. Botha, on 6 May 1982*

Walvis Bay

The hon. member for Sea Point addressed himself to the question of the Falkland Islands matter and drew an analogy between the present situation in the South Atlantic and the position of Walvis Bay. Hon. members must please bear with me because this is an important matter. The Falklands conflict has assumed a grave and ominous character, and we should be cautious in our public comments not to embroil the status of Walvis Bay in a manner that might be harmful to our negotiating position in relation to South West Africa. The position of the South African Government regarding Walvis Bay is well known and has been publicly documented.

Walvis Bay is South African territory. It is not part of South West Africa. Its legal status and its historical position are indisputable. It has been part of the Cape Province for more than a century. On 12 March 1878 the Port and Settlement of Walvis Bay was occupied by the British. On 14 December 1878 British Letters Patent were issued annexing Walvis Bay to the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope. In the South Africa Act of 1909, which came into force on 31 May 1910, it was clearly determined that the original provinces would have the same limits as the respective colonies at the establishment of the Union. Thereby South Africa's sovereignty over Walvis Bay was again confirmed. Thus the legal position regarding sovereignty is clear. During the 32 years following the British annexation of Walvis Bay, there had never been any dispute over its status. Never. As the result of a German protest against the delimitation of the borders of Walvis Bay in 1886, the matter was referred to arbitration, and the boundaries of Walvis Bay as determined by Wrey in 1885 were con-

* During the Committee Stage of the Minister's budget vote.

firmed. Hon. members will know that while Germany protested against the precise delimitation of boundaries, the question of sovereignty was never disputed.

Sir, I have given the House a very brief outline of the history of Walvis Bay because I believe that it is important that we have a clear understanding of the facts and of the legal position in this regard. The South African Government's position in regard to Walvis Bay is not only based on the provisions of a treaty — and I stress the word "treaty" — which also determines other boundaries, but also on a treaty that has never been disputed by other countries. Moreover, the position as I have outlined it was recognized by the League of Nations and the International Court of Justice. Furthermore, most Afro-Asian and Latin American countries have accepted that colonial boundaries must under international law, continue to be the boundaries after independence. Paragraph 11 of the manifesto on Southern Africa, approved by the conference of East and Central African States at Lusaka on 16 April 1969, and adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its sixth ordinary session held at Addis Ababa from 6 to 9 September 1969, states in part —

As far as we are concerned, the present boundaries of the states of Southern Africa are the boundaries of what will be free and independent African states.

This manifesto was welcomed by the General Assembly itself in its resolution no. 2505 of 20 November 1969. It is thus clear beyond a shadow of doubt that Walvis Bay is as much part of the Republic of South Africa as Alaska is part of the United States of America.

To demonstrate how intricate, complex and delicate this whole issue is, namely any parallel that is sought to be drawn between the Falklands and Walvis Bay, let me remind hon. members that on 27 July 1978 the Security Council of the United Nations adopted resolution no. 432, which —

(1) declares that the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia must be assured through the re-integration of Walvis Bay within its territory;

(2) decides to lend its full support to the initiation of steps necessary to ensure early re-integration of Walvis Bay into Namibia;

(3) declares that, pending the attainment of this objective, South Africa must not use Walvis Bay in any manner prejudicial to the independence of Namibia or the viability of its economy;

(4) decides to remain seized of the matter until Walvis Bay is fully re-integrated into Namibia.

Who voted for this? All 15 members of the Security Council, including the five permanent members; the USSR, China, Great Britain, France and the USA.

I have said that once we start discussing this issue, we must be careful what we say. At the time that this resolution was adopted Secretary of State Cyrus Vance made the following statement on behalf of the five Western members, including the United Kingdom —

We have confirmed our position that we do not wish to enter into disputes of a legal character concerning the various claims as to the status of Walvis Bay. Nevertheless, we recognize that there are arguments of a geographic, political, social, cultural and administrative nature, which support the union of Walvis Bay with Namibia. Our Governments have also taken due note of the fact that political parties in Namibia hold the view that Walvis Bay must be part of an independent Namibia. All these considerations lead to the conclusion that it is appropriate that the Security Council should adopt the resolution which calls for the initiation of steps necessary to ensure the early re-integration of Walvis Bay into Namibia. This resolution does not prejudice the legal position of any party. It does not seek to coerce any party. For our part we should like to state our understanding of our role with respect to the future of Walvis Bay. The commitment of our five Governments, our undertaking by voting in favour of this resolution, is to stand ready to offer the diplomatic support of our Governments to achieve the objective of a successful negotiation. We view our undertaking as consistent with the fundamental principle of the Charter of the United Nations that disputed questions are to be settled peacefully. We consider that the “steps necessary”, referred to in operative paragraph 2 of this solution, are negotiations between the two parties directly concerned.

The two parties referred to are South Africa and the future Government of an independent Namibia. I objected to this attitude of the Five at the time and I made it very clear in a statement which I made in the Security Council on 27 July 1978.¹ However, to indicate how our Government is always flexible and endeavours to look for a solution in an imaginative way, I went on that day, 27 July 1978,¹ so far as to say in the Security Council, and I read from the records —

Perhaps there is a desire to modify the situations which today exist throughout the world in regard to enclaves or islands in the immediate vicinity of the mainland in such a way as to require them to form part of the contiguous or mainland territory concerned. If any attempt is made to modify such cases, then all such cases must be reviewed simultaneously on a global basis. If that is the intention and if the responsible Powers are willing to submit to a new international

1. See *Southern Africa Record* no. 13, September, 1978, p. 8.

arrangement, such examples as Gibraltar, Cabinda, Hong Kong, Northern Ireland, Berlin, Belize, the Panama Canal, Gauntanamo Bay and Macao, to mention only some, then, and then only, would South Africa for its part, be prepared to have the case of Walvis Bay examined on the same basis. Naturally I can add, any arrangements that might be arrived at will have to be based on principles equally applicable to all and certain rights would have to be secured in terms of such arrangements to the satisfaction of all the parties concerned.

This is what I said way back in 1978. Now we are being asked what the Government is doing. Four years ago, in a prophetic way, a member of this Government told the United Nations: Be careful! You are today trying to get at us over Walvis Bay. We deny that it is yours; we deny that there is any uncertainty as to the legal status of Walvis Bay. But nevertheless, because we are not intransigent, a member of this Government offered the world body a possible way out of the potential conflicts that might and could have developed out of situations of this nature. Now I am asked what we are doing. We suggested something constructive. Four years ago; it is a matter of record.

.....

Proclamation AG.8

The hon. member for Sea Point also referred to proclamation AG.8.² This is a proclamation — and I have to concede this — which elicited a great deal of discussion and resulted in considerable difference of opinion. Allow me just to explain briefly how this proclamation came into being before — as the hon. member put it — we are attacked about discriminatory measures which, according to him, have allegedly not been removed in South West Africa. Basically, what this proclamation amounts to is a switch from a system of territory government to that of population group government, viz. representative authorities at the second level have been established for the various population groups in the regions that ask for this. I repeat: Only those ethnic groups that ask for this. *Inter alia*, the proclamation also regulates matters relating to the delimitation of functions and the division of funds and assets among the authorities at the first and second levels. What led up to the proclamation was a motion accepted by the National Assembly — in which the DTA has representation — on 26 July 1979 in which, *inter alia*, the following two paragraphs appeared. I quote —

... vestig weer eens die aandag daarop dat Suidwes-Afrika/Namibië onherroeplik op die pad na onafhanklikheid is met behoud van die territoriale integriteit van die gebied en met die regeringstelsel wat

2. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 28, October 1982, p.4 for Mr Dirk Mudge's statement concerning this proclamation.

daarvoor voorsiening behoort te maak dat elke bevolkingsgroep die grootste moontlike mate van seggenskap in sowel sy eie landsake sal hê deur die daarstelling van verteenwoordigende owerhede vir elke bevolkingsgroep, en 'n sentrale regering waarin magsdeling op 'n sinvolle wyse uitgeoefen kan word.

Then came the following —

. . . onderskryf die beginsel dat die gesagsgebied van 'n verteenwoordigende owerheid die lede van die betrokke bevolkingsgroep sal wees en nie 'n geografiese gebied nie, en dat die funksies wat aan 'n verteenwoordigende owerheid toegeken sal word, groepsgebonde en nie gebiedsgebonde nie moet wees.

After the acceptance of this motion the Administrator-General, having consulted with the leaders of the various political parties, including the DTA and other organizations in South West Africa, submitted to the National Assembly certain proposals for the implementation of the motion, which was to form the basis for legislation and which, after debate, was accepted by majority vote in the National Assembly with minor amendments. The proclamation was promulgated on 24 April 1980. I therefore wish to state very clearly that this Government did not prescribe proclamation AG.8 for South West.

Status of SWA/Namibia

Mr Chairman, I do not often find myself in agreement with the hon. member for Sea Point, but I can agree with him when he stated this yesterday —

We . . . can do without carpet-bagging politicians who go from South Africa to Namibia in order to make racist speeches . . . instead of trying to help the conciliation process.

I agree with the hon. member that the South West African issue is complex and should not be complicated by persons who are interested only in interfering with that territory's internal affairs. In this regard I can inform the hon. member that the authorities in South West Africa are contemplating steps to introduce measures to regulate the admission into and residence in South West Africa of all South African citizens who are not permanent residents of South West Africa. I hope they will then be able to control the kind of activity to which the hon. member objected and upon which he and I agree.

I think it is of great importance, with reference to the other questions which the hon. member for Sea Point and other hon. members raised, to place on record here today one decisive facet of South Africa so that the leaders in South Africa may take cognizance of this. They must indeed take cognizance of this. I also wish to place this facet on record so that the world at large and hon. members in this House may take cognizance of it.

This facet relates to the status of South West Africa and the right of its inhabitants to decide on their own future.

It concerns what the Government is supposed to have promised or guaranteed and what it has not guaranteed. It also concerns international obligations which the Government has accepted after consultation with the leaders of South West Africa. I do not know whether these facts are generally known in the territory of South West Africa. Nor do I know whether they are propounded there. What I do know is that the hon. the Prime Minister and other members of the Government are being maligned and slandered for having allegedly committed a breach of faith in regard to the Whites of South West Africa. Therefore the time has come to place on record, for once and for all, the facts relating to what successive South African Governments have and have not promised, and what the status of that territory was and is.

The then Union of South Africa lost the struggle to incorporate South West Africa at the Peace Conference of Versailles. It is there that the struggle was lost. Therefore, if there are parties in South Africa today that raise a fuss about the separate status of South West Africa, they must go back to General Louis Botha. He invaded the territory and conquered it by military means, but then, at Versailles, we lost the international political struggle for its incorporation in the Union of South Africa. General Smuts and the Allies wanted the territory incorporated in the then Union of South Africa, but President Wilson refused. These facts have been documented.

In any event, arising out of these conflicting standpoints, the mandate proposal was put forward as a compromise. In terms of that mandate, the then Union Government would have to report annually on its stewardship of the territory to the permanent mandate commission of the old League of Nations in Geneva, and this was accordingly done.

The old League of Nations disappeared in April 1946 when the UN came into being in 1945. Soon after that there was an argument about the status of the territory. That is where the argument began. General Smuts consulted the inhabitants of the territory. I do not have the exact figures available, but approximately 208 000 people, including Blacks, were in favour of incorporation in the then Union according to General Smuts' consultants — they were the people who carried out the consultation — while a relatively small minority, equivalent to approximately 10 per cent to 15 per cent of those who were in favour of incorporation, were opposed to incorporation with the Union. What South West African, then, can come and tell me today that the idea of a "one man, one vote" election is a new one, because here I am presenting the history in which the grandfathers and fathers of the present people in the territory participated? Now all of a sudden it is P. W. Botha and Pik Botha who are selling out! One be-

comes a little weary of these stories. Long before that, in the thirties, General J.B.M. Hertzog, as Prime Minister of South Africa, admitted to the League of Nations in writing that the Union of South Africa did not have sovereignty over South West Africa. The situation in international life is a little different to the domestic situation. Internally political parties can change their standpoints as they like and deny what they did yesterday, only to follow a new path the next day, but in international life, in international law, that is not how things work. Once a State has adopted a standpoint, cannot suddenly perform an about-face *vis-à-vis* of the other states of the world. Then a dispute arises, and dispute leads to conflict. By disputes which amount to the repudiation by a State of its categorical commitments, a people or country acquires a bad name, loses its integrity, its conduct is regarded as scandalous and no one trusts it. This eventually has an effect on the commercial transactions and financial integrity of the country. In spite of the fact that we have been so vilified in the UN, in spite of the fact that we are being isolated to such an extent by the world at large, it has often been asked that our representatives at international gatherings do the counting — not as with divisions in this House — because it is recognized that they can be trusted. That is the point. When this Government adopts a standpoint *vis-à-vis* another country which amounts to a clear understanding, an express undertaking, then it cannot, without endless harmful repercussions, escape the implications it entails. No, I wish to discuss these matters at length today. Since the time of Gen. Smuts, and subsequently under all the Nationalist Prime Ministers down to Mr P.W. Botha, we have never advanced article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter of the UN when South West Africa has been discussed in the UN. Anyone can look this up, because all the UN documentation is in this Parliamentary library. In other words, neither Dr Malan nor Mr Strijdom, Dr Verwoerd, Mr Vorster or Mr P.W. Botha has ever used that article, which states that the UN may not interfere in the internal affairs of member countries, to avert a discussion of South West Africa in the UN, and hon. members are also aware of the many committees and commissions that have been there. It is unnecessary for me to tell hon. members about Arden Clark, Carpio and De Alva, and Dr Escher. That was decades ago, but why did those people come here? They did not come to interfere in the internal affairs of South Africa. However, they were allowed by successive Prime Ministers to visit South West Africa because successive Governments realized that although we did not recognize the UN's right of government or administration of South West, we did realize that this was an international problem. If a man draws a knife on one, it is pointless telling him that what he is doing is illegal. One either has to do something or be attacked. It is pointless saying that someone has broken a law when he is coming to beat you up. One has to do something. I think that if a vessel is bearing down

on one, it makes no difference that you have the right of way. One has to get out of its way or else make some plan.

Then there was the court case, the long-drawn-out case of Ethiopia and Liberia against South Africa from approximately 1960 to 1966. Why did Dr Verwoerd have South Africa fight that case? He could merely have said that he would ignore it. I was a member of that legal team. We were told that we had better fight like people who had to win, because if we lost and did not implement the finding, there would be sanctions. This was said because it is stated in the Charter of the UN that if a country loses a contentious action, the Security Council may take direct action against it by way of penal measures.

Then there was a book we issued in 1967, shortly after the death of Dr Verwoerd. I helped write this book. It was drawn up from the pleadings of the case in the World Court which had been personally approved by Dr Verwoerd. Mr Vorster had then just become Prime Minister. With the approval of the Government, we included the following passage in this book in 1967, viz. 15 years ago —

At this stage it is impossible to foresee with any degree of accuracy the ultimate interactions of the various population groups. Circumstances will alter radically. What is considered anathema today may well become sound, practical politics tomorrow, and *vice versa*; nor is it necessary to embark on speculation as to what the ultimate future political pattern will be, i.e. whether and to what extent there may be amalgamations, or unions of some kind, federations, a commonwealth or common market arrangements. The peoples themselves will ultimately decide.

That was in 1967.

What I now wish to point out is very important. It is not widely known. In 1971 the case again came before the World Court. This was not a matter of contentious proceedings, but an advisory opinion of the World Court. There is a difference between the two. The one is binding on the parties, but a World Court opinion is not. In the course of the advisory opinion proceedings the legal team was officially authorized on behalf of the South African Government to make a plebiscite proposal to the court. Now hon. members must not ask me, but must go and determine for themselves who was in the Government in 1971, who was in the NP caucus and who was in Parliament and therefore authorized that proposal. On 27 January 1971, at the instance of the Government, we wrote the court a letter in which we said: "We would wish to make a proposal of overriding importance to the Court." —

. . . The proposal will seek to put the allegations of oppression, repression and the denial of self-determination to the most fundamental test of all, that of the expressed will of the inhabitants of South West Africa

themselves by way of a plebiscite.

That was 11 years ago. Then, on behalf of the Government, we wrote a second letter to the World Court on 6 February 1971 in which we said —

I accordingly hereby apply . . .

That is on behalf of the South African Government —

. . . formally that the Court take all necessary steps to put the following proposal into effect:

(a) That a plebiscite of the inhabitants of South West Africa be held to determine whether it is their wish that the territory should continue to be administered by the South African Government or should henceforth be administered by the United Nations.

Imagine that, Sir: The South African Government dared to say to the World Court 11 years ago: "We ask you to put the necessary machinery into effect to determine whether the inhabitants of the territory still want to be governed by the South African Government or by the UN." Imagine, Sir, that the South African Government of the day did that! Now other people have to bear the blame when international discussions are conducted on this basis.

In April 1973 the Government officially informed the UN that South Africa would respect the wishes of the population as a whole as regards the territory's self-determination and independence.

I want to refer hon. members to another document. It seems to me as if this, too, is something which is often forgotten. In 1977, as hon. members are all aware, we began negotiations with the Five. The five Western powers approached us at that stage to negotiate on South West Africa. At that time we were constantly negotiating, as was our practice, with the most important political parties in South West Africa. This took hours. In practice we conducted discussions with the representatives of those countries on a given day in a session which, for example, took four hours. Those were still the days of Mr McHenry, Sir James Murray and others. Then, on the same day, we had to discuss the proposals again with all the parties of South West Africa. Moreover, in those days the Turnhalle was in a different form. At that stage it had not yet split. There was not yet a DTA. At the beginning of 1977 we were on the point of introducing a Turnhalle constitution. We had virtually reached a point of confrontation with the Security Council of the UN. The five Western Powers represented in the Security Council at the time — the name "the Five" dates from that time — then put forward the suggestion that a discussion with South Africa be conducted on the matter, because there was a possibility that our basic points of departure did not differ too widely and because we could be striving to achieve the same aim. They also argued that we should hold discussions before the final break occurred. Mr Vorster declared himself to be prepared to speak to them. They then came here to speak. Unfortunately, I

had just become Minister at that stage. That was in April 1977. Accordingly I had to undertake most of the talking with them, something which was certainly not pleasant, or at least not always. Be that as it may, we spoke to the Turnhalle representatives and put it to them that if we were to go ahead and implement their constitution, the South African Government would have grave problems, which would of course mean problems for South West Africa as well. Mr Vorster told them that he did not want to exert pressure on them, that the final decision should be their own. They then adjourned and met in an hotel here in Cape Town. Shortly afterwards they submitted to us the document I now have before me. What I have here is a photocopy of the original document submitted to Mr Vorster on 27 April 1977. We now come to what is stated in the document. It is the document of the Turnhalle in which the National Party of South West was represented at that stage. I quote —

1. We accept that all the inhabitants have the right to participate in a fully democratic process in the exercise of their right to self-determination.

2. We further accept that before independence elections will be held in terms of a constitution.

3. We have not been hammering out constitutional proposals over a long period for nothing. We do, however, fully accept that a constitution cannot be imposed on the inhabitants. In circumstances where some organizations allege that the constitutional conference of Turnhalle was not constituted in such a manner as to truly represent the majority of the inhabitants, we are prepared to test the final draft constitution on a country-wide basis before elections in terms of the constitution are held.

Could I put it more clearly? Is further evidence necessary? Is further evidence necessary of how every leader of that time co-operated and agreed at all times? Now, of course, we must ask who was in the Government and who was in the National Party. Who was in the Government and who was in the Party when we held the election of 1977? That, too, is important. It is important that we take note of that time as well.

The NP — not I — issued a booklet at the time entitled *Vrugte van die Nasionale Bewind*. With that we went to the voters. Hon. members are all aware of this; at any rate, hon. members who took part in the 1977 election. The booklet had a foreword written by the hon. Adv. B.J. Vorster, Prime Minister. In the foreword he said, *inter alia*, —

Ek is daarom des te meer dankbaar dat die NP, ná bykans 30 jaar aan die stuur, nog steeds met trots sy rekord van goeie regering in hierdie publikasie aan die kiesers van Suid-Afrika kan voorhou.

What is part of that record of the National Party? As far as South West is concerned, hon. members can read it up. It appears on page 34 of this pub-

lication. It also forms part of the archive documents. I quote —

Suidwes sal so gou as moontlik, maar in elk geval voor einde 1978, onafhanklik word;

Die gebied sal as 'n geheel onafhanklik word;

Verkiesings sal landwyd gehou word om 'n grondwetgewende vergadering te kies op die grondslag van een mens, een stem, ten einde oor 'n grondwet te besluit;

'n Administrateur-generaal, aangestel deur die Staatspresident, administreer die gebied tot onafhanklikheid, en is verantwoordelik vir die opstel van regulasies vir die verkiesing;

Die Sekretaris-generaal van die VVO kan homself tevrede stel dat die verkiesingsregulasies billik en regverdig is en dat geen intimidasie gepleeg word nie;

Diskriminasie gegrond op kleur word verwyder.

I am now quoting from *Vrugte van die Nasionale Bewind*, a 1977 publication. . . . from international commitments I was obliged to enter into on behalf of the Government. Now it is being denied. The following is stated here:

Diskriminasie gegrond op kleur word verwyder . . . I quote further:

Aangehoudenes en politieke gevangenes, indien daar enige is, sowel binne as buite die gebied, sal vrygelaat word.

Here it is, in black and white.

Mr S.P. Barnard: We did not hold an election on South West.

The Minister: No, but that was our policy. I say these things because the hon. member for Waterkloof said yesterday that we must stand by guarantees we have given. I am now dealing with the guarantees that my party and this Government have authorized me to give the international community. . . . We must settle this matter here today, and settle it finally. I am not dragging it in. The hon. member knows very well who is dragging it in here. He knows very well with whom liaison is occurring in South West Africa.

Sir, these negotiations have a long and arduous history, and I hope and trust that I have demonstrated to this House clearly, unequivocally and irrefutably this afternoon how many successive governments have over a period of years committed themselves to dealing with the South West African issue in a certain way. Consequently I am now making an appeal to all parties represented in this House to help us bring about peace and stability in South West Africa. We want to do this, not on the basis of new principles which the hon. the Prime Minister or I have produced out of the blue overnight, but on the basis of one consistent, ongoing principle which we have pursued with regard to South West Africa. I did not accuse any specific party of not agreeing with this principle. I was speaking with reference to the question of guarantees. Therefore I now assume that all parties

assembled in this House agree with the clear premises I have set out here.

During the past few days various reports have been received in which it is stated in the first place, that Swapo does not find the proposed electoral system acceptable. This is the electoral system in terms of the constitutional proposals which were formally accepted by the South African Government in January 1982, and which were formally accepted by all the members of the Cabinet prior to 26 January. These proposals were submitted to the Cabinet in written form, and in the Cabinet discussion every member of the Cabinet addressed his opinion on these proposals to the hon. the Prime Minister, and these were placed on record. Consequently we have accepted those constitutional principles. But now Swapo is finding them difficult to swallow. It is now being reported that Swapo does not find the envisaged electoral system acceptable. Moreover, it is also being reported that Swapo is convinced that the approach of arriving at a solution by means of various phases will not produce the desired results. According to the reports, Swapo not only rejects that twofold electoral system but the method of negotiation as well. Hon. members will recall that one section of the constitutional principles provided that a constituent assembly would be elected.

This constituent assembly would, say for argument's sake, comprise 100 members. Fifty of those members would have been elected country-wide, proportionately on a "one man, one vote" basis, while the other 50 would have been elected on a single constituency basis.

Swapo has now rejected that twofold system, but what is even more serious — according to the report — is that it also rejects a solution by means of the various phases.

When negotiations with representatives of the American Government commenced, the Americans asked us and the other parties whether we would accept a three-phase approach. The first phase which would consist of the negotiations on the constitutional principles, should strictly speaking have been completed by the end of last year, but because the five Western countries only submitted the amended constitutional principles to us on 17 December 1981, we were only able to convey our decision formally on 26 January 1982. Swapo has not yet conveyed its decision in connection with the first phase to the Five.

In phase two we were to have discussed and reached agreement on very important matters. According to the schedule of the five Western powers, phase two should have been accepted by the middle of this year. This is already May and June is just around the corner. Hon. members will therefore realize how far behind we already are with that schedule. It is now being reported that apparently Swapo also rejects the approach of finding a solution by means of the proposed three phases. The third phase was to have entailed implementation of the plan.

In addition, Swapo is apparently making another appeal to the five Western powers to give favourable attention to a previous proposal of Swapo to arrange an international conference, similar to the one which was held in January 1981, in Geneva, to finalize all outstanding points, and I understand that they have not excluded other methods of achieving that object. Hon. members will consequently understand that I do not wish to state any particular standpoint today because the matter has become extremely sensitive and serious, and has extremely serious implications for South West Africa and South Africa. For that reason I wish to refrain from trying to indicate today what the immediate road ahead looks like or is going to look like, or even from placing any provisional ideas on record. What I should like to say and emphasize, however, because it is in line with our constant premise in respect of South West Africa is that the Government will, as usual, deliberate on that future road with the Administrator-General, and through him with leaders in political, economic and other spheres of life. When this occurs, attention will inevitably have to be given to the maintenance and strengthening of internal stability and effective government in South West Africa and to what extent steps will be necessary to prevent any further erosion in various important spheres of life from occurring. That process will be initiated without marring or terminating international negotiations and efforts to find solutions. Hon. members will understand that the internal stability of South West Africa has now become a matter of burning importance to South Africa and the whole of southern Africa.

In conclusion I should like to emphasize that on the road ahead, where the inhabitants of South West Africa will materially be able to work out their own salvation within the framework of the constitutional principles, it is encouraging to know that all parties in this House support those constitutional principles, the principles of 26 January 1982, which the Government accepted after consultation with the internal parties. This is a great encouragement to us, and in my opinion will contribute to the negotiations in South West Africa being conducted on a realistic basis.

South Africa (Republic). House of Assembly Debates, No. 13, 3-7 May 1982. Cols. 6231-6235, 6238-6251.

- B.** Letter dated 12 July 1982, from the Governments of the Five to the UN Secretary-General, and circulated as Security Council document (S/15287) on 13 July 1982

On instructions from our Governments we have the honour to transmit to you the text of Principles concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution for an independent Namibia put forward by our Govern-

ments to the parties concerned in the negotiations for the implementation of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation (S/12636)¹ in accordance with Security Council resolution 435 (1978)² adopted on 29 September 1978.

We have pleasure in informing you that all parties to the negotiation now accept these Principles. Our Governments believe that a decision on the method to be employed to elect the Constituent Assembly should be made in accordance with the provision of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). All parties are agreed that this issue must be settled in accordance with the terms of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and that the issue must not cause delay in the implementation of 435 (1978). In this regard, our Governments are in consultation with all parties.

We have the honour to request that this letter and the Principles be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Gérard Pelletier
Permanent Representative of Canada
to the United Nations

(Signed) Luc de La Barre de Nanteuil
Permanent Representative of France
to the United Nations

(Signed) Ernst-Joerg von Studnitz
Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.
of the Federal Republic of Germany
to the United Nations

(Signed) Hamilton Whyte
Deputy Permanent Representative of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland to the United Nations
Chargé de'Affaires, a.i.

(Signed) William C. Sherman
Acting Permanent Representative
of the United States of America
to the United Nations

1. See *Southern Africa Record* no. 12, May 1978, pp. 25-30.

2. *ibid.* no. 14, December 1978, p. 43.

Principles concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution for an independent Namibia

A. Constituent Assembly

1. In accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), elections will be held to select a Constituent Assembly which will adopt a Constitution for an independent Namibia. The Constitution will determine the organization and powers of all levels of government.

- Every adult Namibian will be eligible, without discrimination or fear of intimidation from any source, to vote, campaign and stand for election to the Constituent Assembly.
- Voting will be by secret ballot, with provisions made for those who cannot read or write.
- The date for the beginning of the electoral campaign, the date of elections, the electoral system, the preparation of voters rolls and other aspects of electoral procedures will be promptly decided upon so as to give all political parties and interested persons, without regard to their political views, a full and fair opportunity to organize and participate in the electoral process.
- Full freedom of speech, assembly, movement and press shall be guaranteed.
- The electoral system will seek to ensure fair representation in the Constituent Assembly to different political parties which gain substantial support in the election.

2. The Constituent Assembly will formulate the Constitution for an independent Namibia in accordance with the principles in Part B below and will adopt the Constitution as a whole by a two-thirds majority of its total membership.

B. Principles for a Constitution for an Independent Namibia

1. Namibia will be a unitary, sovereign and democratic state.
2. The Constitution will be the supreme law of the state. It may be amended only by a designated process involving the legislature and/or votes cast in a popular referendum.
3. The Constitution will determine the organization and powers of all levels of government. It will provide for a system of government with three branches: an elected executive branch which will be responsible to the legislative branch; a legislative branch to be elected by universal and equal suffrage which will be responsible for the passage of all laws; and an independent judicial branch which will be responsible for the interpretation of the Constitution and for ensuring its supremacy and the authority of the

law. The executive and legislative branches will be constituted by periodic and genuine elections which will be held by secret vote.

4. The electoral system will be consistent with the principles in A. 1. above.
5. There will be a declaration of fundamental rights, which will include the rights to life, personal liberty and freedom of movement; to freedom of conscience; to freedom of expression, including freedom of speech and a free press; to freedom of assembly and association, including political parties and trade unions; to due process and equality before the law; to protection from arbitrary deprivation of private property or deprivation of private property without just compensation; and to freedom from racial, ethnic, religious or sexual discrimination. The declaration of rights will be consistent with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Aggrieved individuals will be entitled to have the courts adjudicate and enforce these rights.
6. It will be forbidden to create criminal offences with retrospective effect or to provide for increased penalties with retrospective effect.
7. Provision will be made for the balanced structuring of the public service, the police service and the defence services and for equal access by all to recruitment of these services. The fair administration of personnel policy in relation to these services will be assured by appropriate independent bodies.
8. Provision will be made for the establishment of elected councils for local and/or regional administration.

C. Extract from an address by the Zimbabwean Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Hon. Witness Magwende, to the 37th session of the UN General Assembly, in New York, on 11 October 1982

I wish to start this review from the southern African region. There the apartheid and racist Pretoria regime continues its oppressive and repressive policies against the black majority in South Africa.

The same racist regime continues its illegal occupation of Namibia in defiance of the resolutions, decisions and declarations of this organisation, the OAU and the movement of non-aligned countries, and the wishes and demands of the people of Namibia.

When in 1978 the five Western countries, known as the Western Contact Group, successfully persuaded the Security Council to adopt the now

well-known Resolution 435 (1978)¹, they argued that this proposal offered prospects for an immediate peaceful ending of racist South Africa's illegal colonisation of Namibia. Indeed, 435 has since been universally accepted as the only fair, practical and realistic basis for the peaceful settlement of the Namibian independence question. Efforts have since been made to implement the plan, which the illegal regime has also accepted. And yet, Namibia still remains occupied.

I wish to briefly refer to the most recent efforts involving the Frontline States, Nigeria and SWAPO on one hand and, on the other hand, the Western Contact Group and South Africa.

The Frontline States, Nigeria and SWAPO co-operated with these efforts genuinely hoping that they would be facilitative of the implementation of the United Nations plan which is outlined in Security Council Resolution 435 (1978). During and after the abortive Geneva Conference of 1981.² The Western Contact Group had informed all concerned that South Africa had certain concerns which should be dispelled before the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibian independence. We were further persuaded that once these so-called concerns were dispelled, South Africa would co-operate in implementing Resolution 435.

We can say without hesitation, that all the participants in the recent consultations, including South Africa itself, were agreed at the end of the exercise that South Africa's concerns regarding Resolution 435 have all been completely allayed. That is, all matters and questions relating to Resolution 435 and the implementation of the United Nations plan have been discussed and fully clarified to the satisfaction of all concerned, including South Africa. I should mention in passing, however, that South Africa still has to specify which of the two electoral methods will be employed in Namibia, between the single member constituencies and proportional representation.

It must be emphasised here that SWAPO has, time and again reiterated its readiness to sign a ceasefire and to take part in free and fair elections under United Nations supervision, and provided for in the United Nations plan. As distinguished delegates here will recall, this has been SWAPO's position since the abortive Geneva Conference of 1981.

What then, this distinguished assembly must be asking itself, is blocking progress towards the implementation of Resolution 435. Frontline States, Nigeria and SWAPO are, and have long been, ready to proceed to the next point at any time, as soon as the electoral method is known. SWAPO needs to know this in order to make necessary preparations for the elections.

1. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 14, December 1978, p. 43.

2. *Ibid.* no. 23, June 1981, pp. 3-18.

What I have said so far indicates tremendous progress towards a peaceful settlement of the Namibia question. Let me also say that this progress is greatly attributable to SWAPO's co-operation and to an air of optimism and momentum generated by the capitals of the Western Contact Group, before and during the six weeks of consultations. Yet all this momentum and goodwill may soon be lost if South Africa and some members of the Western Contact Group continue to manufacture pretexts to delay the implementation of Resolution 435.

In this regard, let me make Zimbabwe's position very clear. I am referring to the political issue of linkage and parallelism, which has been formulated to make the departure of Cuban troops from the People's Republic of Angola a precondition for the independence of Namibia. This strategy, which is not related to Resolution 435, and which is the creation of certain members of the Contact Group and apartheid South Africa, in order to promote and serve their own bilateral interests, is totally unacceptable to Zimbabwe.

Dragging the issue of Cuban presence in Angola into the Namibian question is an unwarranted and unacceptable interference in bilateral affairs and relations between the sovereign states of Angola and Cuba, members of this organisation and of the movement of non-aligned countries. Moreover, let those who subscribe to this ridiculous and absurd view be reminded that while racist and colonialist South Africa continuously aggresses the People's Republic of Angola, the Cuban troops have never set foot on South Africa's soil.

Press statement supplied by the Zimbabwe Department of Information.

- D. Extract from an address by the Zimbabwean Prime Minister, the Hon. Robert Mugabe, at a state banquet for the United States Vice-President, Mr George Bush, in Harare on 16 November 1982

While we enjoy democracy and independence in our own country we wish the same for the rest of the people of southern Africa. We are, therefore, very gravely concerned that there are still millions of people in our region who are denied their rights. As you are well aware, the burning issue in this regard as far as Africa as a whole, and southern Africa in particular, is concerned, is the question of Namibia's independence.

South Africa continues to occupy Namibia and suppress its people in defiance of the wishes of the entire world as expressed in the United Nations. There is no doubt that the people of that country, under the lead-

ership of SWAPO, are justified in their heroic war to end political subjugation, racial oppression, economic exploitation, and foreign military occupation.

We who were engaged in a similar war for national independence only less than three years ago fully understand the hardships being encountered by the Namibian people. Therefore, while we firmly support SWAPO in its liberation struggle through the OAU, we want to see the speedy resolution of the Namibian problem and the establishment of peace; for those reasons, we have sincerely and actively supported all efforts towards an agreement to implement UN Resolution 435.¹ We strongly feel that the United States, as a country which fought its own war of independence 200 years ago, should strongly support the principle of independence and side with Africa in the struggle to achieve independence for Namibia.

It needs to be reiterated and I hope you will agree that the Namibian question is strictly one of decolonisation. South Africa exercises harsh colonial control in Namibia and we strongly feel that the question of decolonisation in this case is clear cut and should always be considered first and foremost, and also on its own merit. To us, there can be no conjunctive link with other issues such as the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, because the right to independence and self-determination being a basic inherent and inalienable right cannot be subjected to such an extraneous precondition.

Mr Vice President, the situation in Angola is of greatest concern to us in this region.

We all are fully aware that Angola was invaded by South Africa at the inception of its independence and has since then been fighting to repulse South African invaders from its territory. It was under these circumstances that Angola sought outside help to defend itself against external aggression. We know that Angolan people have not known peace, but instead have suffered untold killings and massive destruction of their economic infrastructure because of incessant invasion by South Africa.

As far as we are aware, the Cuban troops in Angola have not set foot in Namibia, let alone in South Africa itself. Their mission is to assist the Angolans to defend themselves against South Africa. We are certain that if South Africa desists from occupying Angola and withdraws from Namibia, the Angolans will be in a position to meet their genuine security needs by themselves.

1. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 14, December 1978, p. 43.

Text issued by the Prime Minister's press unit, Zimbabwe.

- E. Extract from an address, "a new partnership with Africa", by the United States Vice-President, Mr George Bush, to the Kenya Chamber of Commerce, in Nairobi, on 19 November 1982

The United States is committed to the search for constructive change in southern Africa. In cooperation with our allies and in direct response to the will of Africa's leaders, the United States has engaged its influence and resources in the effort to bring Namibia to independence. We are determined to help turn the sad tide of growing conflict and growing tension in southern Africa. We are fully committed to work for a settlement that will enhance regional security and assure Namibia's early independence on terms acceptable to its people, and to Africa and to the world at large.

Let me say that again: We are fully committed to an independent Namibia.

I can assure you that significant progress — news reports to the contrary notwithstanding — has been made. A year ago the settlement effort was relaunched with vigor. Since then the United States and its Western Contact Group partners have worked closely and intensively with all parties. This past July agreement was reached on the principles which will guide Namibia's Constituent Assembly. Since then substantial progress has been made on remaining issues concerning the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435.¹ We are close to agreement on implementation of the UN plan. We are confident that the remaining issues can be resolved.

From the outset of this Administration's engagement in the peace process, we have emphasized that there are vitally important issues arising from the situation in Angola which must be resolved if Namibia's independence is to be achieved. For seven years Angola has been engulfed in war, its territory invaded, its progress toward a better economic future stalled. Thousands of Cuban troops remain in Angola. And the question is this: Wouldn't Angola and the region itself be better off with all foreign forces out of that country, South African forces and Cuban forces?

The history of foreign conquest in Africa is replete with examples of armed foreigners who came with the professed purpose of helping others but who stayed in order to help themselves. The withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola in a parallel framework with South Africa's departure from Namibia is the key to the settlement that we all desire. In the final analysis, it is also the surest way to guarantee Angola's long-term security and independence. The United States wants the earliest possible independence for Namibia. Let me repeat that: We want the earliest possible independence for Namibia. At the same time the United States wants an end

1. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 14, December 1978. p. 43.

to Angola's suffering, and to the dangerous cycle of violence that everyone sees in that region. My government is not ashamed to state that the US is interested in seeing an end to the presence of Cuban forces in Angola. Our position on that has long been clear. Their introduction seven years ago tore the fabric of reciprocal restraint between the US and the Soviet Union in the developing world. Such restraint is vital if African regional security and the global balance are to be maintained.

We recognize that there will be no agreement unless all the parties know that their own security is protected. We also recognize that there will be no settlement unless each party is prepared to make the concessions necessary. If the challenge is accepted we believe peace can be achieved and a brighter future for southern Africa can begin, and can begin soon. The substantial progress already made is based on a diplomatic partnership of equals in which all parties share burdens. That partnership remains vital in our continuing efforts for peace.

Text supplied by the United States Information Service, Pretoria.

F. Extracts from a briefing by a senior US State Department Official, on 30 November 1982

Senior Administration Official: One of the immediate purposes of this afternoon's backgrounder is to provide a little context on the visit of South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha.

.....
Also concerning the Vice President's trip, which we regard as an unqualified success. . . .

First, despite an impression which I think has been created to some extent, his visit was not timed to or does not figure into any particular state of play on the Namibia-Angola negotiations. That trip was planned six months previously and had far broader objectives than to seek to engage the parties he met in an actual negotiation concerning Namibia and Angola.

The Vice President was not seeking to establish new policies, but rather to provide a detailed opportunity for face-to-face exchange, to explain our goals and policies, and to hear the views of our hosts.

The Vice President made clear a number of things on our side, including our support for African Development, our desire to be as helpful as we can given the economic crisis facing so many African countries, and the fact that we are able to do more to the extent that our friends are prepared to do more to help themselves.

He emphasized our commitments in the field of human rights and justice under law. On all of his stops he made clear our readiness to bolster African regional security, whether in West Africa, in the Horn of Africa or in southern Africa. He repeated our commitment of longstanding to seek an agreement leading to Namibia's independence and explained our position on the need to address at the same time and in the same context the broader question of regional security, including and involving the presence of foreign forces in southern Africa, notably in Angola.

He made the point, in essence, that we can play and are prepared to play through our active diplomacy the role of catalyst, something which perhaps we are uniquely suited to play.

We have seen some stories about the reaction, if I can put it that way, of a number of the leaders with whom the Vice President met, which purport to indicate a rejection of American policy in southern Africa.

I assume that you know that we have not been seeking to establish in any formal sense a linkage of Cuban troops' to Namibian independence. We're, rather, trying to get across the point that there is a practical requirement for parallel movement, however it might be described.

We do believe that it's vital to address regional security, and we do think that the Cuban issue in Angola is integral to that.

What I would like to say on this background basis is that while, of necessity, many African leaders have to publicly state their position of dissociation from any linkage of these two issues, virtually all of them have considerable sympathy for our effort, support for our effort, to achieve this overall regional settlement, particularly in light of the reality that it will be necessary to do it that way in order to get a settlement.

We fully appreciate and understand that it is not possible for them to say so publicly. Many governments have their constraints and their various domestic and other audiences, but the point is that no one should be deceived about the rhetoric in this regard. In fact, a number of our interlocutors, far from privately condemning our approach, made helpful and constructive suggestions as to how we might bring it to successful conclusion.

As to the visit of Foreign Minister Pik Botha itself, I'll make a few general comments before taking your questions.

This was not seen as a negotiating session. Neither we nor the South Africans had planned it to be a negotiating session on either bilateral issues or on the Namibia-Angola process. It was, rather, a chance for two men (Botha and Secretary of State George Schultz) who had not previously had any chance to work together to get acquainted, to exchange views, review the premises behind the policies of each side, so that there will be the maximum possibility for being able to work successfully together down the road. Personal contact in this regard, we feel is very important.

From our standpoint, we found the meetings to provide a useful opportunity to reaffirm — to identify and to discuss a sustainable basis for constructive relations between our two countries. On the Namibia-Angola negotiations, yes. On the broader questions of regional security and how it might be strengthened in southern Africa, yes. And also on how we can best encourage a process, which we believe to be under way, of constructive change in South Africa toward a system based upon consent and away from a system based on legally entrenched racism.

I think with those few general observations, I will stop there and take your questions.

Q: When he was downstairs, Foreign Minister Botha said something I wonder if you would agree with. He said there are slight differences of opinion on certain methods, but by and large (he was) not aware of any substantial disagreement facing the two governments at the present time.

Would you agree?

A: I don't have any arguments to pick with that statement.

Q: Would you also agree with his statement down there that he thinks the United States has a real chance of achieving an internationally acceptable solution, and there is no impasse?

A: We've said so repeatedly. Yes.

Q: What about the multinational force (to replace Cubans in Angola) idea? He seemed cool to the idea. Who was supporting it? How far has this proposal gone?

A: It is described in various media as a proposal. I wouldn't want to go beyond saying that it's not, at this point, a concrete proposition that's being put before any party. It is among the possibilities that hypothetically one might talk about.

So in that sense the minister was simply saying that he hasn't been asked to comment upon it, apart from by the press. I mean, he hasn't had a proposition along those lines put before him by us or by anyone else.

Q: What is the American view?

A: We have an open mind. We're prepared to look at the various questions that are raised by the Angola Government as to how the Namibia transition and its own security could be addressed under the framework that we're suggesting. So we rule out nothing *a priori*, but I don't want to imply that there is a proposal along those lines that has any concrete status as an American proposal or a contact group proposal or anything else.

Q: Are the Americans going to negotiate with the Cubans on this issue directly?

A: We are negotiating this as a catalyst between the parties who are directly concerned in the region — those who live there — I mean those who live there permanently — and we don't think that it would be a confidence-building measure for anyone if we were to start implying that the

solution lay elsewhere, that we were going to be involved in an act of deciding the fate of others over their heads. That's just not the approach we have taken, and we haven't been asked to take that approach by any of the parties concerned.

Q: Can you tell us what are the hangups in this whole thing? I know that's a general question, but over the past six months we've been told an agreement is imminent, and then it never quite comes about. I'm just wondering if you could just detail what are the problems.

A: I don't think I have anything terribly new to add to that question. We have achieved agreement on virtually all the Namibia issues. As I've said, there are a couple of outstanding ones — at latest count, about one and a half — that relate to Resolution 435¹ in the Namibia process itself — and, of course, there is other question of the necessity of getting a commitment on the issue of Cuban troop withdrawal.

That's to be technical about it. To be more philosophical about it, I don't think I could have put it better myself than the South African Foreign Minister put it when he said there's a problem of trust.

When we started out this exercise, the position on the one side was the Cubans might go after Namibia's Independence, which is asking the people who distrust that promise to take it on faith — and that works both ways.

We are the first to say that there is a gulf of trust in the region which we are seeking to overcome, and that the problem of trust or distrust exists on both sides. So I think that's the underlying question which our negotiation is designed to try and remedy.

Q: I'm wondering how you see the timetable at this point.

A: I can't give you a timeframe. We're not negotiating under any self-imposed deadlines. We did feel earlier in the year that it might be possible to move things rapidly because they had started to move rapidly, which is to say that there is a negotiation under way in which there was give and take being demonstrated.

The most difficult issues of all sometimes are the hardest ones to crack, but we have no reason to believe the negotiation is bogged down, so we continue . . .

We have never set such deadlines, and we're not working under any deadlines now. The South African Government, or the Angolan Government, or SWAPO would not want us to be giving them deadlines, and we're not going to be given deadlines by anybody either.

Q: If you talk about regional security arrangements, what other alternatives do you see besides some sort of a peacekeeping force as a regional security guarantee?

1. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 14, December 1978, p. 43.

A: There are any number of possibilities for guarantees that one can explore, whether they be bilateral, multilateral, in the UN context. There are any number of aspects of the security picture as it faces the Angolan Government, as it faces other Governments, which one can address.

As I indicated, there are an infinite number of ways to define and to work towards a parallel framework for implementation for 435 and Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. It is an extensive period of time, and there are, obviously, hypothetically many ways in which one can achieve the overall result.

Q: Are there any number of things like the prisoner exchange that are pending that could come to fruition and help along the general atmosphere? Did you talk about things like that today with Mr Botha?

A: I wouldn't point to other examples of things like the prisoner exchange. I would just simply point to the prisoner exchange itself as an indication of both the complexity and the feasibility of operating in this fashion, because there isn't anybody else who can do it, and the region is at a dangerous period.

There is the potential for the region to slide into very, very deep trouble, and we don't believe it's in anyone's interest. I mean, sure there can be destruction and without seeking to predict who would win any given particular encounter, everyone will suffer. So in that context I think we have a role to play.

Q: A simple one: You used the word "parallelism". What exactly do you have in mind there?

A: UN Resolution 435 begins on date X and that is the beginning of phase III. Independence of Namibia comes on day Y and that's the end of phase III, and the difference between those two dates will, at a minimum, be seven to eight months and it could well be a year or whatever, depending on how long it takes the constituent assembly to organize itself, to do its work, to write a constitution and so forth.

What we mean by "parallelism" is that in the context of phase III, which provides in detail for South African troop withdrawal from Namibia, that Cubans would be withdrawn from Angola.

Q: Let me just follow up. You mentioned before that virtually all of the questions relating to Namibia have been pretty much settled. What, then, emerges as the central question that is blocking the breakthrough? Is it the Cuban issue, or are there still major ones within Namibia that are blocking?

A: There are a couple of other Namibia-related issues which are outstanding but which we believe are within the powers of the parties to resolve in pretty short order if we can get what we need which is a commitment from the Angolan side.

Q: On the Cuban withdrawal?

A: Yes.

Q: Let me ask you another question, if I may. What would happen inside Angola if the Cubans were to leave? Could the current government stay in power?

A: We have said that we're not asking any party to commit suicide and we mean that. If that's the way the Angolan Government saw the proposition we're putting to it, I presume they wouldn't be interested in discussing it any further than they are.

Q: Who originally broached this idea of the multinational force, or maybe I can ask it another way: Who seems most favourably inclined to accept that concept?

A: From what I can tell, the Western Media.

Q: Wasn't it in Vice-President Bush's speech, though? Didn't he make reference to it?

A: Not to my knowledge. I think I would know if he had. He did make reference to American support, and more generally for regional security in Africa in that context for African-supported and organized peacekeeping efforts, including multinational forces by which, I think, he was referring, in the first instance, to the OAU force in Chad. But he didn't make any concrete proposals in (the) southern Africa context.

Q: You say you don't want to set any deadlines, but how long, in your opinion, do you think it will be before the US, as the mediator, begins to lose credibility in black Africa?

A: We don't see that the situation diplomatically in Africa is one that can be described as the US losing credibility in black Africa. Far from it.

The climate in black Africa, speaking in very "grosso motto" terms now, is favorable to the enhancement of mutually beneficial relations between the West and Africa, between the US and Africa — as I've seen it in twenty years. And to look at it in global terms for a minute, we see no evidence that the kind of interlocutors that the Vice President was speaking with in his tour in Africa are enchanted or attracted by what our global adversary has to offer.

Q: Two questions, away from Angola and Namibia but on South Africa. In the meetings today, I'd like to ask you about two issues and whether they came up.

One, destabilization allegations in other parts of southern Africa and their effects on friends like Zambia, or Malawi by South Africa and, two, human rights with respect to recent bannings in South Africa. Did those come up today?

A: As was indicated in the statement that was made by the South African Foreign Minister, we did discuss a range of international, regional and bilateral issues. Yes, we did discuss regional stability in southern Africa in

several of the meetings that he had today in the building.

We discussed the situation as we saw it and heard their views on a number of other countries in the region, and the importance of working to bolster rather than undermine security. That means, obviously, we talked about such countries as the ones you mentioned — Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe and so forth.

We also had an exchange of views, as the foreign minister indicated, on developments inside South Africa itself.

Q: Back to the prisoner exchange for a second. That was really the first concrete example of any kind of dialogue between the MPLA and UNITA. Do you see that as having any implication beyond the specifics and the dynamic of that whole issue of the mutual interest involved, or is this a harbinger — potential future dialogue between the two? And when you say you don't see a settlement without dealing with Savimbi, is that an observation, and it's up to the Angolan Government or is that somehow part of the package?

A: I think we are confusing two different things here. One of them is the ultimate question of a resolution of the civil war in Angola. The other issue is a settlement of what we're negotiating on, which is Namibian independence and Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola.

Obviously, to get an end to the civil war in Angola, some basis for that will have to happen. We do not believe there's any military solution for that. We do not believe that any party is going to have the strength or be able to acquire the strength to simply impose its will through military means throughout the country, and therefore a political solution is needed.

Q: How would you characterize the relationship between the United States and the other members of the Contact group? For instance, France was very critical last month of the US mention of a Cuban withdrawal.

A: I wouldn't go beyond what we have said. There was a meeting of the western Five foreign ministers a little over a month ago in which we reviewed the bidding, made clear on all sides that there was an acceptance of the reality that this was the only way to get a settlement. I think it's fair to say that we and our allies are all working, all rowing in the same direction.

We may have different public formulation, but I think we share the same assessment of the reality.

Telex text supplied by the United States Information Service, Pretoria.

United States and Southern Africa

- A. Extracts from an address by the United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr Chester A. Crocker, to the Baltimore Council for Foreign Relations, on 28 October 1982.

You in Baltimore do not have to be told about the economic interdependence of nations or about our need to expand trade links in the Third World, which has been the main area of expansion for American exports in recent years. Yet, in considering today the security problems facing Africa, we are also discussing the interaction of political, economic and security factors that comprise American interests in Africa. Security is one component of an equation.

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Perhaps nowhere in Africa have our security concerns, and our security policies, been more intensely engaged than in Southern Africa. This region, from Zaire to the Cape of Good Hope, contains the bulk of Africa's mineral wealth, its most developed industrial structure, and almost two-thirds of the continent's GNP. It is also a region threatened with the prospect of heightened violence and polarization that could lead to great power confrontation. It is precisely to avoid that possibility of violence and confrontation that we have fashioned a major effort to bring about regional peace and security.

Southern Africa is a complex region and its many characteristics and conflicts cannot be easily summarized, but two major sources of tension dominate the scene. One is that South Africa, the richest and most powerful state in the region, governed by a white minority that has erected a structure of legally-entrenched racial separation to protect itself, feels surrounded and threatened by its black-ruled neighbours. South Africa believes that it must pre-empt any armed threat — guerrilla or conventional — from its neighbours, and is prepared to use its military superi-

ority to that end. Until there develops a structure of understanding — some reciprocally understood basis for co-existence — between South Africa and its neighbours, this situation will remain a major source of instability and could result in growing violence across borders. To say this is not to downplay the urgency or the gravity of South Africa's own domestic agenda. Movement toward a system based on consent, shaped by South Africans of all races, is essential for that country's stability and survival. But that process is unlikely to occur peacefully in conditions of heightened international violence across South African borders.

The second great source of tension came with the collapse of the Portuguese empire in Southern Africa in 1974/75, and the decision of the USSR to inject its power into the vacuum that resulted. Soviet arms had been fed to insurgent movements in this part of Africa for many years, but in 1975 the USSR supported the deployment of 25 000 Cuban troops to Angola. This direct injection of Soviet and proxy military force in Southern Africa posed a challenge to the future of the region. It exacerbated South Africa's feelings of threat from its neighbours, and it threatened long-term Western access to the region's minerals and economic resources. Without question, it raised to a new threshold the tension between South Africa and its neighbours, and affected the calculations of all who live in this region.

It is not overstatement to note that the political future of Africa will be shaped by the ways in which the deep tensions and problems of Southern Africa are eventually resolved. It is for these reasons that this Administration has adopted a policy of constructive engagement in Southern Africa. The search for a more stable, secure, and prosperous Southern Africa will be a long and arduous process, but there is no other responsible course for American Policy. There are many aspects to this effort, but we judged that the place to start was with the interrelated conflicts in Namibia and Angola.

A year ago, we were in the initial stages of the revived negotiations on Namibian independence on the basis of UN Security Council resolution 435.¹ Working closely with our Western Five Contact Group partners and the other parties to the negotiations, we have come a long way since then. On July 12, we were able to conclude phase one of the negotiations — agreement on a set of principles concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution for an independent Namibia. Since then, we have also made considerable progress on remaining questions, including the impartiality of all parties in UN-supervised elections and the size, deployment, and composition of UNTAG — the United Nations Transition Assistance Group, which would be responsible for monitoring implementation of the UN plan for Namibian independence embodied in Security Council res-

1. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 14, December 1978, p. 43.

olution 435. With the exception of the electoral system for the Constituent Assembly and final agreement on the battalions from UNTAG, we are close to implementation of the UN plan.

At the same time, we have always made clear that there is also a vitally important Angolan Agenda which must be addressed. Seven years after Angola's independence from Portugal, thousands of Cuban combat forces and a substantial number of Soviet advisers remain in that country, as participants in a tragic and prolonged civil war. The presence of these forces has, since their introduction in 1975, profoundly affected the balance of security in the region and has inevitably shaped the security calculations of other countries in Southern Africa.

From the outset, we have recognized that Namibia does not exist in a vacuum, and that in practice the chances for a negotiated settlement of the Namibian question would be decisively influenced by parallel progress toward withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola. This is not an issue which we contrived on our own. The South African Government which, all parties agree, holds the key to a settlement, has long made clear its deep concern over the presence of these forces.

It would be idle to argue that the United States has no interest in ending the presence of Cuban troops in Southern Africa. The introduction of Cuban combat forces into Angola changed strategic reality and upset the delicate fabric of reciprocal restraint maintained since World War II in the developing world. It was one of a series of events, all of us know too well, that led us to the period of aggravated tension we face with the Soviet Union today. Regaining that balance is in Africa's interest, our interest, and in the interest of a more stable and positive US-Soviet relationship as well.

We have, for nearly a year now, been engaged in an intensive high-level dialogue with the Angolan Government in an effort to reach a broadly acceptable formula for Cuban withdrawal. These bilateral discussions have been held outside the framework of Security Council resolution 435 and are not part of the Contact Group's mandate. Our efforts have attempted to respond to Angola's security concerns, while dealing squarely with the reality of South African concerns, as well. We believe that this is a viable means of achieving the goal to which we are profoundly committed: a stable and peaceful regional context in which Namibia can achieve its independence under the free and fair process envisaged in the UN plan.

We have achieved real progress in our talks with the Angolans, and we will spare no effort in continuing our quest for a comprehensive peaceful settlement. However, this complicated and difficult effort involves fundamental issues and choices for both sides, and it will take time. In the final analysis, there will be no agreement unless the key security concerns of the principal parties are dealt with. We have sought and will continue to seek,

an understanding that meets the basic concerns of all parties and opens a new and brighter chapter in Southern Africa's troubled history.

Text supplied by the United States Information Service, Pretoria

- B.** Extracts from an address, "a new partnership with Africa," by the United States Vice-President, Mr George Bush, to the Kenya Chamber of Commerce, in Nairobi on 19 November 1982.

Mr Chairman, Members of the Kenya Chamber of Commerce, Ladies and Gentlemen:

You do the United States a great honor in receiving me this evening. I bring you the greetings of the President of the United States and of millions of my fellow citizens who are sincerely interested in America's long-standing friendship with the continent and people of Africa. I bring also special greetings to President Daniel Arap Moi, and to all Kenyans. The Vice-President hosted a lunch for us today and I had a chance to discuss with him and one of the Ministers the strength that we feel in the United States about the friendship between Kenya and the United States. It is very, very important to us.

The past ten days have been important to me. President Reagan asked me to carry our message of friendship and of deep commitment to a true partnership with the nations of Africa. We are determined to work with the leaders of this continent in the quest for peace and progress. This visit has been particularly satisfying. It has permitted us to see old friends and make new ones.

I have exchanged views with some of Africa's most impressive leaders. I have had an opportunity to see and feel at first-hand the diversity of this fantastic and beautiful continent and to sense its great promise. In several days I will be able to share with President Reagan and my countrymen the thinking of Africa's leaders on the major issues important to us.

It should come as no surprise to you that President Reagan thought it especially important for me to visit Kenya. Since Kenya's independence, close ties have bound our two countries and peoples. Your nation has been admired in the United States for its political and economic record. We share important values — democratically elected governments, civilian rule, freedom of press and religion, a multi-racial society and an economy guided by the principles of free enterprise.

Kenya has been a strong advocate for peace in the world. Your country and your distinguished President have led the Organization of African

Unity during a year in which Africa faced many problems. Because Kenya has served this year as spokesman for Africa's aspirations, I am especially pleased to speak from the City of Nairobi to all the peoples of Africa. I particularly wish to speak about the hopes and values which grew up during Africa's struggle for independence, and which will guide Africa as she faces the future. Chief among these values is the desire for freedom — freedom of nations from outside pressures and freedom of people within nations. That desire gave birth to the O.A.U., thanks to the recognition that — without regional cooperation — the peace, progress and independence of Africa would not be maintained. Such cooperation is not an easy goal given the great variety of peoples, circumstances and cultures in Africa. This tremendous diversity, coupled with the harsh impact of today's global economic recession, underscores more than ever the importance of African regional cooperation for common purposes.

There is no justification for despair about Africa's future. Despite trials and setbacks, the history of Africa since the independence era has included significant progress, especially in the development of human resources. Education, talent and energy, such as that epitomized by this very audience, prove that Africa has the capacity to make good the promise of its enormous potential in spite of the many problems it faces. Thanks to the abilities and values which men and women, like yourselves, bring to the everyday task of national development, Africa can enter its third decade of independence with confidence in the future.

Because we believe that Africa has the capacity and the will to be master of her destiny, President Reagan has over the past 20 months, worked to forge a new and mature partnership with the nations and people of Africa. We speak of a partnership that begins with mutual respect. We speak of a partnership that includes honest discussions. We speak of a partnership which recognizes that each nation must do its part if the goals we share are to be achieved. Partnership is a two-way street based on shared goals, common principles, and mutual interests.

These principles have guided our Administration's policies toward Africa. The time is ripe for the sort of candid dialogue I have been privileged to experience on this trip. And I have learned a lot. A top priority in our diplomacy is southern Africa, where the choices between regional strife and regional cooperation are stark. The inescapable need for peaceful change is challenged by a climate of fear, distrust, foreign intervention and cross-border violence.

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The United States seeks constructive relations with all the states of southern Africa. We are building bridges of communication to each nation in the region, including South Africa. However, we will not ignore or dis-

guise our strong belief in the importance of justice and equality before the law. Apartheid is wrong. It is legally entrenched racism — inimical to the fundamental ideals of the United States of America. My own country went through the worst. Our commitment, believe me, is a deep commitment. America's history and America's future can only be understood in terms of our commitment to a multi-racial democracy in which all citizens participate and from which all benefit. The rule of law, the principles of consent and participation in the political process, and the right of every human being to citizenship which reflects these principles are to Americans, all of us, a sacred trust.

We will not betray this trust, nor can we escape reality. If there is to be security in southern Africa, South Africa must be involved in shaping it. If there is to be constructive change in South Africa, South Africans of all races — not foreigners — must be the ones who shape the pattern of that change.

The United States is working for constructive change in ways that benefit all South Africans. Our actions match our words as deepening involvement in expanding educational, social and economic opportunities for black South Africans demonstrates. We also believe there is a relationship between the security of southern Africa and the pace of peaceful change within South Africa. We do not believe that the democratic process has been established. They are an essential framework for lasting stability. Experience in Africa and elsewhere clearly demonstrates that the abuse of power, the suppression of diversity and the denial of individual rights only leads to instability and a loss of confidence at home and abroad. My visit to Africa has shown me encouraging examples of African nations that are building their own institutions to broaden political participation and advance the frontier of freedom.

We realize, however, that nations cannot reap the benefit of individual freedom in an environment of insecurity. We attach high importance to strengthening Africa's security and are prepared to be Africa's partner in building the necessary conditions for security.

We have no interest in an East-West confrontation — certainly here in Africa we have no interest in such a confrontation. Such confrontation in Africa increases the threat to world peace. The goal of the United States in Africa is to help establish a framework for restraint and broad rules of conduct which discourage the use of outside force in African conflicts and encourage peaceful settlement of conflicts in the entire region. Our goal is consistent with the goals enshrined in the charter of the Organization of African Unity. It is for this reason, among many others, that we strongly support the institution that is the Organization of African Unity.

At the same time the United States is deeply sensitive to the threats which individual nations and the regions of this continent face and prob-

ably will continue to face. Internal instability, often fueled by outside interference, and long-standing border and ethnic disputes tax heavily the resources of this great continent. The United States has no mandate to act as a policeman in Africa and certainly we seek no such role. But neither do we believe that the sovereignty of African nations will be preserved if the West is unable or unwilling to respond to the legitimate defense needs of its friends in Africa. The United States intends to be a reliable partner, both in working with our friends on a long-term basis to meet these needs, and in responding to these urgent requirements in emergency situations.

We have done so in the past — we are doing so today — let there be no doubt about our determination and capability to do so in the future. At the same time, our overall concern, including the concern that guides our military assistance, is to dissuade countries from undertaking military solutions and to encourage negotiated settlements of differences between them. We believe negotiated solutions are possible for even the most difficult, the most long-standing of the disputes on this continent. We are ready to lend whatever support we can to those efforts in Africa and to give them the highest priority.

In this view we believe that Africa's capacity for collective security deserves our help. We will, when asked, support multi-national peacekeeping forces that Africa creates in its own defense. The record of the United States in support of the O.A.U. peacekeeping role in Chad is the most recent illustration of the importance that we place on regional security. We want African nations to be able to defend their interests and resolve their problems without foreign intervention.

Real security, and with it the confidence that can enhance prospects for peace, cannot be achieved without sustained economic growth. During my travels, I have seen evidence of Africa's most serious economic crisis in more than forty years. Because African countries are often dependent on one or two export commodities, and because they have borrowed heavily to spur growth and meet the costs of higher oil prices, they have been vulnerable to commodity fluctuations, high interest rates, and to the impact of world recession. There has been a long, slow decline in per capita food production; population has increased sharply and balanced growth in many places simply has not taken place. Many nations have experimented with subsidies, centralized economic direction, and extensive public ownership of industry and commerce. Those strategies have proved costly, in our view.

The present state of the global economy is not of Africa's making. In the world economic system, the United States — and we recognize this — has a very special responsibility not only to put its own house in order but to help rekindle the growth in other lands. We are deeply committed to that task and to achieve it, the American people are making real sacri-

fices. We are confident that when we are successful, and we will be, Africa will benefit quickly and significantly. At the most fundamental level, we will remain concerned about those imperiled by strife and by starvation. We have taken the lead both in mobilizing international relief efforts to help African refugees, and in providing emergency assistance. In the past two years, the United States has provided Africa 187 million dollars for such programs. But we are equally concerned about the underlying problems which produce refugees and other forms of human misery.

As we all look at these problems, we can see that the next few years in Africa will be critical. The current economic situation is forcing austerity on all African nations. It points to the need for a re-examination of economic strategies and national economic policies. It would be a mistake to view this period as only a temporary phenomenon, and to believe that as the world recession begins to ease, Africa will be able to resume an easy path of growth and diversity. On the contrary, in the current situation, many fundamental decisions must be made about the future of African development, about the priorities of agriculture and other sectors and about the degree of sacrifice that should be demanded of the various elements of the population. How these decisions are made will affect the future of African development for decades to come.

We in the United States admit that there are serious differences among experts over the best path to development. We believe that there should be a full exchange among all those involved in African development. We must reach a common agreement regarding the kinds of programs which must be developed, be financed and then thoroughly mobilized. Discipline and self-reliance are essential. Courageous leadership is necessary. Now is the time for fresh thinking, and eschewing of old ideologies that have not passed the test of experience.

We are prepared to play our part in helping African governments to take the steps where necessary to restructure their economies. During the past two years, a growing number of African countries have applied to the IMF for assistance in meeting immediate balance of payments crises. This has led to difficult adjustments in exchange rates, budgets, and the other aspects of economic policy.

Recognizing the fundamental nature of the development crisis, we have encouraged a more comprehensive approach by both donors and multilateral agencies in Africa. We have urged that reform be supported with short-term foreign exchange and development assistance adequate to fuel the recovery process. We are fully aware of the importance of debt in this equation; where countries are making serious efforts to restructure their economies, relief from heavy debt must be a part of the recovery program. For our part, we are committed to participating in this difficult process of recovery.

The United States, despite the fact that its resources are under special strain in this time of economic adversity, still remains committed to Africa's stabilization and to Africa's growth. Our bilateral economic aid for all of Africa now totals approximately 800 million dollars a year, and extends to 46 countries throughout Africa. It encompasses a variety of programs, including fast-disbursing balance of payments support, food aid, and development assistance. Including the US contribution to multilateral programs, our total economic aid to sub-Saharan Africa is in excess of \$1,400 million dollars annually. Of the multilateral portion, the largest share by far — almost \$300 million per year — goes to the soft loan programs of the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA).

The Reagan administration has placed a new emphasis on the role of private enterprise in the development of Africa. In Africa, as elsewhere, we define the "private sector" very broadly to include small businesses and farmers, as well as large corporations. Our AID planners are seeking new ways to help develop market institutions and more effective incentives for farmers. Wherever possible, we are encouraging mutually beneficial partnerships between large and small American companies and their African counterparts. The recent enactment of the new legislation in our country, the export trading legislation supported by President Reagan will make it possible for small and medium US firms to pool expenses, and thereby play a much more active economic role in Africa.

The economic task that you and we face is enormous. But it is far from impossible if we all work together in a wise and understanding partnership. The exact nature of that cooperation will be as varied as the countries of Africa, but it will have some common elements. We, the industrialized countries, must help Africans manage their debt burden so that private credit, which is so essential to growth can resume and increase. We must support successful economic policies at both the national and regional levels. We must seek greater coordination among Africa's friends who wish to finance development. The importance of Africa's economic future demands that we do no less.

As we all look to the future and decide how Africa and the United States can work together, the agenda of issues we face is very, very long. It includes essential issues of security, peace-making, human rights and economic progress. It calls for advancing the frontiers.

Text supplied by the United States Information Service, Pretoria.

South Africa and Swaziland

Proposed border adjustments between the two countries

A. Statement in Parliament by the South African Minister for Foreign Affairs and Information, the Hon R.F. Botha, on 6 May 1982*

For later statements, by others, on the issue, and also Proclamation R121, 1982, see Southern Africa Record, no. 28 October 1982, pp 24-38. Following the ruling against the South African Government, on the question of Ingwavuma, by the Natal Supreme Court, on 30 September 1982, it was reported on 5 November 1982 that the Government had appointed a Commission of Enquiry on the issue under Justice Rumpff.

It was further announced on 3 December 1982 that the South African Government and the KwaZulu authorities had decided to reach a legal settlement out of court, following a similar agreement between the Government and the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly in November (see item B in this Section)

The Minister the hon. member for Durban Point raised another important issue, namely Swaziland. The hon. member has referred to reports which have appeared on the question of border adjustments with Swaziland. His complaint is that the Government should have come to Parliament and that there has been no consultation with the province of Natal in accordance with the provisions of our Constitution relating to alterations to provincial boundaries. Let me deal with these two points first, before I come to a historical survey of the matter.

The South African Government is engaged in negotiations with the Government of Swaziland — an independent State — on the question of possible border adjustments for reasons I will give later. I was glad to hear King to the hon. the Prime Minister. He said —

It is now time your Government took up a firm stand and posi-

* During the committee stage of the Minister's budget vote.

that the hon. member acknowledged that he regarded this as a long-standing issue. No agreement has, however, yet been reached. It is not a breach of any practice not to bring a matter of this nature to Parliament before agreement with another sovereign independent State has been reached. No Government can report to Parliament on agreements which are still in the process of discussion and negotiation. Let me put it this way: I am not looking for more work. I can assure the hon. member and the House that I have enough work, and if Parliament wants to take over this task, it can do so. It involves hours of travelling to meeting places with a host of representatives, the studying of maps to iron out all the various alternatives, negotiating claims and counter-claims, etc. If Parliament wants to do that, I will be quite happy. I do not say this in a spiteful manner. I will gladly stand back for Parliament to carry on the negotiations, and we will see where we get. There is no question of horse trading and deals in dark corners as the hon. member expressed it. I am sorry he used that expression. Of course, if we can reach agreement with Swaziland on an adjustment of the borders, the matter will then be brought to Parliament. That is a separate matter. Surely the hon. member knows full well that not one square inch of South African territory may be ceded or transferred to another country without the explicit approval of this Parliament. There exists no constitutional requirement concerning consultations with the provinces of this country in a matter such as the one under discussion. There is no constitutional requirement whatsoever. Section 114 of our Constitution Act was amended last year by Act No. 101 of 1981, and as a result of that amendment there is no legal obligation for Parliament to be petitioned by a provincial council in the event of the boundaries of the province being altered in order to excise from its territory a part which is to be incorporated into another sovereign State. The section as it now reads applies *inter alia* to territory transfers between provinces. That amendment was the subject of a wide-ranging discussion in this House. In addition, section 114 featured prominently in an application before the Cape Provincial Division of the Supreme Court in which hon. members of this House were cited as respondents. The legal position should therefore be well known to all hon. members. This does not mean, however — and this is important — that the Government does not intend consulting all parties, including the Natal Provincial Administration, its Parks Board, organized agriculture and the like.

Mr W. V. Raw: At what stage?

The Minister: Just give me a chance. A distinction ought to be made between the land involved in our negotiations with the Kingdom of Swaziland and, on the other hand, the land involved in the hon. the Minister of Co-operation and Development's discussions with Chief Minister Buthelezi. There is a distinction. The land involved in my discussions with Swa-

ziland is largely — virtually all of it — land belonging to the Trust and to KwaZulu.

Mr W.V. Raw: Not all of it.

Mr H.J.D. van der Walt: All of it.

The Minister: Virtually all of it. The hon. member Mr Van der Walt says all of it. I thank him. Somebody asked me whether we also consult with his commission. He is the man who is virtually in charge of the day-to-day negotiations, the practical side of it, because of his and his commission's intimate knowledge of the land issues in that whole region. As I see the position, however, Natal will have an interest in the proposals and suggestions which the hon. the Minister of Co-operation and Development would wish to discuss with the KwaZulu Government. The hon. the Minister of Co-operation and Development informed me this morning — I spoke to him personally — that his meeting with Chief Minister Buthelezi this week was of an exploratory nature only. He also told me that he had invited the Administrator of Natal and members of the Executive Committee to meet him on 14 May.

I therefore do not understand why there is any ground for complaint on the part of the hon. member for Durban Point. We are in the process of honouring the concept of self-determination. The hon. the Prime Minister again spelt out his views on this subject in this House on 15 April during the debate on his Vote. On that occasion he said that we should accept that there is a situation of multinationalism in Southern Africa. There are self-respecting nations that have the right to self-determination. While the hon. the Prime Minister was dealing with the question of self-determination of nations which belong together, the hon. member for Durban Point interjected by asking whether this would take place of their own free will. The hon. the Prime Minister then said: "Of course, this process would take place of their own free will and without interference and intimidation." Those were the words with which the hon. the Prime Minister qualified his remark. We are at this very moment endeavouring to implement the very principles enunciated by the hon. the Prime Minister. The whole issue should, however, also be seen against the background of tidying up as far as possible the legacies of imperialism and colonialism. We have had numerous discussions with the Swazi Government, and His Majesty the King has addressed several letters to the hon. the Prime Minister, and he is the head of an independent State. When another State addresses a claim or a demand to me, I cannot simply say "No, I refuse; let us fight it out." It is not this Government's style. This Government prefers negotiations.

And that is how we landed in this situation. There is no other way out. This situation goes back quite a number of years. It does not matter which Government is in power. That Government will have to handle this issue. Let me quote to hon. members from a recent letter from His Majesty the

tion to deal effectively with the settlement of the boundary question with the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland once and for all, a question which has been hanging for many years, in fact since before Swaziland regained her independence in 1968.

What must the hon. the Prime Minister do when he receives a letter like this? Must he ignore it? Must he pretend that it does not exist? We cannot run away from history, nor can we argue with history. The determination of the boundaries of Swaziland in the colonial era of the 19th century left numerous Swazi tribes outside Swazi territory, and this is a fact. The Swazis in South Africa have the same language, customs and culture as the Swazis of Swaziland and they acknowledge the King of Swaziland. We have established that this is a fact.

Mr G.B.D. McIntosh: And the Tonga of Maputaland?

The Minister: Mr Chairman, there is a saying in Rehoboth: "Frightened cats leap about in a frightened way."

I did not interfere with the hon. member's statements yesterday, despite the tone the hon. member adopted. Chiefs, community leaders and other Swazis visit Swaziland to call on the King and to participate in traditional ceremonies. Hundreds of Swazi leaders from South Africa attended a reception at the royal residence in Swaziland in November 1981 — just recently — to congratulate His Majesty on the diamond jubilee of his reign. On that occasion they asked him: "But when will we be joined with you?" The King replied: "Be patient. I am in discussions with the South African Government." This goes on all the time and evidence of support for the King is forwarded to us. The King of Swaziland as well as Swazi leaders in South Africa through this whole century nurtured the ideal of unifying the Swazi people. The King of Swaziland made frequent representations to the British Government on this issue before independence, and Swazi leaders in South Africa submitted numerous petitions to the King in furtherance of British Government formally asked Swaziland — and this is on record in South Africa submitted numerous petitions to the King in furtherance of this ideal, and these petitions are on record. They were not confined to oral petitions. They are on record. On the South African side all Governments after Union — and this is an important point — until Dr Verwoerd became Premier endorsed the principle embodied in the schedule to the South Africa Act that the High Commission territories could be incorporated into South Africa if the inhabitants so wished and with the approval of the British Government. In speeches on 10 April 1961 and 3 September 1963 Dr Verwoerd, however, abandoned the concept of incorporation. In the speech of 3 September 1963 he advocated the prospect of consolidation with adjoining areas where there were cultural affinities with an offer to assist in the purchase or exchange of territory in South Africa. Therefore, in 1963, 20 years ago, Dr Verwoerd abandoned the idea of incorporating the

BLS countries, the old High Commission territories. He envisaged purchases and exchanges of land, but now it is being alleged that this is something new, now there is talk of horse-trading and of making agreements in the darkness. Some time before the independence of Swaziland in 1968, the British Government formally asked Swaziland — and this is on record — whether Britain should negotiate with South Africa on boundary matters on behalf of Swaziland. Swaziland replied — and this is important — that it preferred to negotiate directly with South Africa after independence, and we accepted it. How can I go back on that? All of this is in writing; all of this documented.

Swaziland initiated negotiations with South Africa on border issues in the early 70s. Regarding the north-western boundary of Swaziland, the discussions required greater urgency — I admit it and I state it openly — with the upgrading in October 1977 of the Swazi Territorial Authority to the Kangwane Legislative Assembly and the prospect of further constitutional development in Kangwane in terms of Act 21 of 1971. This prospect increased the King's apprehension that the further constitutional evolution of Kangwane would complicate negotiations and would prejudice Swaziland's demands and interests. A well-known principle is involved, because in terms of the law of contracts one must be careful not to act in such a way as to jeopardize the rights of the other party.

In April, 1981, the Executive Council of Kangwane requested the Minister of Co-operation and Development to grant Kangwane the second phase of self-government as provided for in the abovementioned Act. I admit it. In view of a request by the King of Swaziland to the Prime Minister, a decision was deferred, and the discussions between South Africa and Swaziland were continued. The Chief of the Executive Council of Kangwane, Mr E. Mabusa, and his colleagues were aware of the discussions between South Africa and Swaziland. He was informed. He indicated in general terms at that time — I do not know whether his attitude might have changed — that he had no objection in principle to border adjustment. He nevertheless expressed a desire to first obtain the second phase of self-government. He said it had to be left until later, but in principle he was not against it. On 24 November 1981 Minister Koornhof conveyed in writing to Mr Mabusa the South African Government's decision on the request for greater self-government. This was done openly and no facts were hidden. The reply from the Government indicated that the request by the Executive Council of Kangwane had been considered with much sympathy and profound understanding. In its deliberations the Government, i.e. the Government of South Africa, had to recognize certain historical features and constitutional imperatives. Reference was made to King Sobhuza's pre-independence request to negotiate certain border adjustments. The King was guided by aspirations of Swazi unity and the pursuit of the inter-

ests and the ideals of a unified Swazi people. South Africa could not but respond positively to these objectives, and a commitment had since developed to seek a realistic solution of the border issue. Since Mr Mabusa had identified himself with these objectives, although he might have a different view on the method, and appeal was made to him to adjust his demands and to accept the inability of the South African Government to accede to his request. It was emphasized that the South African Government had an inescapable responsibility to work for an environment in Southern Africa which would hold out real prospects of political and economic stability. Dr Koornhof had since repeatedly held discussions with Mr Mabusa to keep him informed of developments. The talks with Swaziland on possible adjustments to its borders are continuing. Should agreements be reached, a whole range of matters, besides border adjustments, will of course have to be dealt with to ensure that the existing rights, amenities and living standards of the people who might be affected by border adjustments should not be impaired. This is of great importance to the South African Government.

Mr W.V. Raw: That is my point: There should be consultation.

The Minister: I have now replied fully to all the points raised in this regard by the hon. member for Durban Point. There is as yet no agreement, and therefore I cannot come to Parliament with what I have. One must first reach an agreement and then come to Parliament. There is no other way.

Mr W.V. Raw: Consultation with the people affected — that was what I talked about.

The Minister: But my hon. colleague, Dr Koornhof, is in the process of doing that. Just recently he held the first exploratory discussions with Chief Minister Buthelezi. Why does the hon. member not wait until he sees what package of possible compensatory land is offered to Natal, the Parks Board and to Chief Minister Buthelezi?

I appeal to the hon. member. I honestly thought that we had a unique matter here, which all parties in this House could support. I shall indicate why I thought so. As far as the PFP is concerned — they have every right to differ with me, but this is what I analysed their standpoint on this matter to be — I think that if they had to make a choice between the full independence of Kangwane on its own — and then of course a capital city will have to be built, a flag designed and a national anthem written and set to music, while across the border there is an independent State with the same people — they would prefer those people who belong together to be brought together in order to have greater viability and greater economic possibilities and to make amalgamation possible. I believe in all honesty that the PFP would prefer the latter and now I do not wish to associate them with the Government's policy. If they would prefer that, it would

surely, in the nature of things, be fair. I thought that the federal policy of the party of the hon. member for Durban Point . . .

Mr W.V. Raw: If they want to do that, we say yes.

The Minister: But my goodness me, that is not what the hon. member had such a lot to say about yesterday. Yesterday the hon. member attacked the Government because we were allegedly negotiating in dark corners, but I have now explained to hon. members that we are not negotiating in dark corners, but the hon. member is now raising the question of willingness. I have just quoted long passages indicating how the people are arriving in their hundreds to see their King — representatives of the Nkundlas throughout the Transvaal — or are writing to the King and asking him when he is going to make them one. The hon. the Prime Minister said that we were engaged in a process of granting self-determination, of ensuring that people were not deprived of their rights, and if we have clarity in regard to these matters, a law will be made and that law will be brought before this Parliament. How else should I deal with this matter? Can I do it more openly or more clearly? Here we have a unique opportunity which in my opinion can be supported by the PFP, the NRP, by the CP, by the NP, by Chief Minister Buthelezi, by the King of Swaziland, by Mr Mabusa, by the Natal Parks Board, by organized agriculture — what a unique opportunity! Let us refrain from confusing one another on this issue. Here we have now found common ground to bring something worth while into existence in Southern Africa

South Africa *Republic* House of Assembly Debates, no. 13, 3-7 May, 1982. Cols. 6251-6259.

B. Statement by the South African Minister for Co-operation and Development, the Hon P.G.J. Koornhof, and the Chief Executive Councillor of KaNgwane, the Hon E.J. Mabuza, on 25 November 1982.

Following on discussions held in Pretoria this morning concerning the applications brought by the Government of KaNgwane against the Government of the Republic of South Africa concerning Proclamation R108/82, the following has been agreed upon:-

- The applicants withdraw both of their applications.
- The respondent will withdraw Proclamation R108/82 with effect from 14 days from date hereof or with effect from such later date as the parties hereto may mutually agree.

- Respondent will pay applicants' taxed party and party costs in both applications which costs are to include the fees of two counsels in respect of the first applicant.
- The applicants and the respondent agree that the question of border adjustment between the Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of Swaziland in so far as it affects kaNgwane be referred to the Rumpff Commission for investigation and report and the first applicant be allowed to nominate three representatives as members of the said Commission.

Text issued by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and Information

C. Statement concerning Ingwavuma by the South African Minister for Co-operation and Development, the Hon P.G.J. Koornhof, on 3 December 1982

Since Proclamation R121 of 28 June 1982¹ — whereby the Government endeavoured to bring the Ingwavuma district of KwaZulu under the control and administration of the Minister of Co-operation and Development and in terms of which Proclamation R109 of 18 June 1982 was repealed — was declared null and void by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court on 30 September 1982, the latter Proclamation was not effectively repealed.

The validity of Proclamation R109 of 1982, which was designed to achieve the same result as Proclamation R121 of 1982 but by virtue of the provisions of another Act, *viz.* Act 21 of 1971, was also in dispute in a court case which was to have been heard by the Durban and Coast Local Division of the Supreme Court today.

Although the Government is of the view that Proclamation R109/82 was validly enacted, *inter alia* by reason of the fact that it had been preceded by proper consultation, it has nevertheless consented today to it being declared null and void.

The decision was taken to enable the Commission of Inquiry into Ingwavuma under the Chairmanship of the Honourable F.L.H. Rumpff, D.M.S., to commence without delay with its commission "to investigate and report on and to make recommendations in regard to the conflicting claims between the Kingdom of Swaziland and kwaZulu over the district of Ingwavuma and taking into consideration the interests of the inhabitants of the Ingwavuma area, consider the desirability or otherwise to make border adjustments between South Africa and Swaziland."

1. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 28, October 1982, pp. 34-38.

Text issued by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and Information

D. Statement concerning KaNgwane, by the South African Minister for Co-operation and Development, the Hon P.G.J. Koornhof, and the Chief Executive Councillor of KaNgwane, the Hon E.J. Mabuza, on 3 December 1982

During amicable discussions held in the office of the Minister of Co-operation and Development in Pretoria today, and which were also attended by members of the KaNgwane Executive Council and senior officials of the Department of Co-operation and Development, it was agreed that the Government of KaNgwane will take over effective control of KaNgwane as from 9 December 1982.

It was further agreed that the Legislative Assembly of KaNgwane will meet during the second half of January 1983 on a date to be determined.

Arrangements were made and agreed upon for the take-over of the administration by the KaNgwane Government. With this in mind a team of officials of the Department of Co-operation and Development will be sent to KaNgwane before or on 9 December 1982 to assist the Government of KaNgwane to effect a smooth take-over of the administrative functions and, with the collaboration of the KaNgwane Executive Council, to ensure that the administration of the National State will be furthered without interruption.

Serious drought conditions are prevailing in KaNgwane and it was therefore agreed that drought relief measures would be provided in the drought-stricken areas with as little delay as possible.

Text issued by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and Information.

Zimbabwe

- A. Address by the Zimbabwean Minister of Industry and Energy Development, the Hon Simba Makoni, to a meeting of the Eastern and Southern African Iron and Steel and Inter-Governmental Experts, in Kwekwe on 8 November 1982.

It gives me great pleasure to welcome all our visitors to Zimbabwe, and all of you to the Ziscosteel works here in Redcliff. The Government of Zimbabwe particularly the Ministry of Industry and Energy Development and I personally, are very grateful to the sponsors of these meetings for choosing our country as the venue of this important gathering.

Your meeting is a historic one; because it brings together for the first time, policy makers, planners and experts from all over eastern, central and southern Africa in the fields of iron and steel and general engineering. It is historic because it is also the first in this field, being held in the context of the Lagos Plan of Action, and in pursuit of the continental industrialization strategy.

In spite of the fact that Africa as a whole, and most of its individual member states are endowed with abundant natural resources, we remain the most impoverished and least developed of all the regions of the world.

We account for two thirds of the world's least developed countries; we have the largest food deficits, suffer the worst ill-health and have the highest illiteracy rates.

In other words, Africa's present socio-economic situation gives credence to the old colonial cliché of the "dark continent".

All our industries put together account for a mere one per cent of the total world industrial production.

In two decades of independence most of our economies and social systems have suffered either stagnation or actual retrogression. Whatever limited development there has been, has been felt by and benefited only a few amongst our populations.

We still remain totally dependent on external sources of technology, capital and technical expertise.

Our socio-economic circumstances typify the situation of the neo-colonialism which the late Dr Kwame Nkrumah so prophetically warned

against.

It is important that we, Africans, make a critical analysis of the problems we face; their causes and the policies we pursue in an effort to find solutions to these problems.

Much too often we have taken cover behind colonialism; blaming the colonialists for all our ills; even for our corrupt practices, our inefficiencies and ineptitudes.

Without underrating the devastation suffered by our natural resources, social and cultural systems, under colonialism; two decades after independence, colonialism can no longer be the major cause of our economic difficulties.

It was against this background that our leaders met in Monrovia and Lagos, to adopt those important documents embodying the Monrovia Declaration and the Lagos Plan of Action respectively.

These two documents pronounced and ushered in a new chapter, or phase, in Africa's long struggle for total liberation — the economic struggle.

Without relaxing in our efforts to achieve total political emancipation, Monrovia and Lagos recognized that an adequate political foothold had been gained to allow the launching of the struggle for economic liberation.

The Lagos Plan of Action aims at the establishment of self-reliant and sustainable integrated economic and social development of Africa. This aim demands that there be a viable industrial base at national, regional and continental levels. On the initiative of the African group, the United Nations General Assembly adopted in 1980, the decade 1980-90 as the Industrial Development Decade for Africa.

At their sixth conference, convened in Addis Ababa in November 1981, African ministers of industry worked out the basis for implementing the Lagos Plan of Action's strategy for industrial development. The ministers recognized that for industrial development to take place meaningfully, certain basic requirements had to be provided.

Firstly, Africa must establish adequate and competent institutional facilities to enable original developments in the fields of research, and standardization.

In this respect, the Africa Regional Centre for Engineering Design and Manufacturing (ARCEDEM) and the Africa Regional Centre for Consultancy, Engineering and Management (ARCCEM) will go a long way in providing such institutional capabilities. Secondly, the ministers agreed on the need for clear policy definition and planning machinery to identify priority programmes and projects to be implemented at national and multi-national levels.

Finally, the need for an adequate financing capability was recognized, and the proposed African Industrial Development Fund is intended to

serve that function.

Both the Lagos Plan of Action and the strategy for the Industrial Development Decade for Africa have identified priority areas for industrial development.

Generally, the priority areas can be described as basic industries, industries whose products serve the basic needs of the broad masses of our people or those which facilitate the provision of such basic needs. With the natural resource endowments that Africa enjoys, we should not continue to be producers and exporters of raw materials and importers of finished products.

We should now exert strenuous efforts both nationally and multi-nationally to establish capabilities for production, beneficiation and fabrication into final products, of most of our raw materials. It is imperative that Africa develops its own iron and steel, general metallurgical, engineering, agricultural machinery and implements, chemicals, building and construction, food processing and many other industries. But for this to be achieved requires a concerted co-operative effort. With the current sizes of our economies and internal markets, industries in the above-mentioned priority areas tend to be too capital and technology intensive to the extent of being beyond the means of most of our individual states.

It is therefore, necessary that we plan and implement developments together in order to avoid duplication and waste of resources. Your meetings here are, therefore, very important. We expect that your deliberations will not only identify and characterize existing facilities; but more so, will make recommendations on the rationalization of the use of such facilities as well as on integrated plans for future developments.

Turning now to the local situation, the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company is the nerve centre of our iron and steel and engineering industry. I am advised that it is the largest integrated iron and steel complex in independent Africa, with a capacity to produce one million tons of steel per year. Zisco's range of products comprises pig iron, billets, blooms, slabs, heavy sections, bars, flats, rounds, squares, angles, hoops and strips railway and light-gauge mining tracks, wire rods, window and fencing sections. All the raw materials such as iron-ore, corundum, coal and limestones required for this operation are produced locally. At least 70 per cent of Zisco's production goes into the export market and the balance feeds the local market. The profitability and even viability of Zisco's operations are, therefore, subject to the vicissitudes of the export markets. Presently, as you all know those markets are extremely depressed. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that, like other Zimbabwean exports, Zisco's products have to be transported to very distant ports by transport systems which themselves have several difficulties. This adds to the costs and, therefore, prejudices the competitiveness of these products in the markets.

Notwithstanding the problems mentioned above, which we consider to be transient, the Government of Zimbabwe and ZiscoSteel plan some major developments here. Approval has been granted for the installation of a new continuous casting plant at an estimated cost of Z\$8 million. This would render the operations more efficient by eliminating the need for ingot casting, and will also facilitate improvements in the quality of products and diversification of product lines. Approval has also been granted for the expansion of the benzole extraction plant at a cost of nearly Z\$2 million.

Very active consideration is being given to the installation of a sinter plant at an estimated cost of Z\$60 million. This development will result in a more efficient extraction of iron from the ores, thereby extending the life-time of our ore-deposits. In addition, consideration is being given to setting up a sheet and plate mill at an estimated cost of Z\$200 million. Several other minor modernizations are planned for the various sections of the mill.

All these developments are not being planned merely for the Zimbabwe economy. In fact developments of this magnitude cannot, for the foreseeable future be viable, if dependent on the local market alone. On the other hand, we are not making these plans in order to capture the overseas markets. Our major objective is that to the extent that it is possible, Zisco must serve the African continent first and foremost. This is your steel complex, make the most of it.

I am advised that your programme includes visits to some selected engineering industries in this country. I hope that you will find this exposure to our industries beneficial not only to yourselves but also for your countries. But to our industrialists, I would advise that you are in the company of some of the best African and international experts on iron and steel and engineering industries. So, as you show them what you do and how you do it, get the most out of them on how you can improve on what you do. Discuss and agree with the programmes which will enable these industries to contribute to Africa's industrial development.

Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to thank the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) for sponsoring this meeting. I would also like to thank the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO) for providing the physical facilities for the meeting. To all the other industries, organizations and individuals whose contributions and assistance have assured the success of this gathering, I say thank you very much. I wish you success in your deliberations and a comfortable and pleasant stay in Redcliff.

B. Extracts from an address by the Zimbabwean Prime Minister, the Hon Robert Mugabe, at a state banquet for the United States Vice-President, Mr George Bush, in Harare on 16 November 1982

On behalf of the Government and people of Zimbabwe, I wish to extend a warm welcome to you, Mr Vice-President, Mrs Bush, and your delegation.

As you are aware, you are the very first American Vice-President to visit our young and emergent nation. In this regard, we see your visit as a very significant and important occasion, and an opportunity for us both to review the good bilateral relations that exist between our two countries, and to discuss other matters of mutual concern.

Zimbabwe, as you know, is still in its early stages of development. In 1980 we were in a position similar to that of the United States in 1776, having emerged from a war of independence. Perhaps we were, and still are luckier than the US was two hundred years ago in that, when faced with problems which we cannot solve alone, we have a much better organized and democratic world and international community to which we can turn for assistance.

In this regard, as you might recall, we were most gratified in March of 1981, when many countries answered our call for help when we organized the Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD).¹

I should like to note on this occasion that the United States made a pledge of over 200 million Zimbabwe dollars at that conference, and I take this opportunity on behalf of the Government and people of Zimbabwe to reiterate our expression of deep gratitude for that assistance. Your country has of course provided us with other aid which is unrelated to the ZIMCORD pledge, and this is equally appreciated.

We sought assistance from others as well, because at independence we were confronted with numerous and formidable problems which we inherited from the colonial past and the years of war. During the years of colonial and minority rule, the needs for the majority of our people in such spheres as education, health services, housing and a good standard of living were largely ignored.

Our first priorities in the political sphere, after my party won the majority of seats in Parliament and the mandate of the people to form a Government, were to invite both our allies during the liberation war and representatives of the white community in order to form a Government of national unity. This achieved, we embarked on a now completed exercise of form-

1. For Mr Mugabe's speech at the opening of the Conference see *Southern Africa Record*, no. 24, August 1981, pp. 32-40.

ing a national army which also incorporated different forces from the war period. These political and military priorities coupled with a policy of reconciliation in order to foster unity, harmony and understanding among the different groups which constitute the Zimbabwe nation, put an end to those elements which wanted to sow seeds of discord, tribalism, disunity and even civil war in Zimbabwe.

Our achievements in creating peace and new political order, have in turn produced a climate that is conducive to the consolidation of democracy and the mobilization of people in our efforts to deal with the problems of development.

As I have already indicated, the economic and social conditions of the majority of our people at independence were unacceptable. Our immediate tasks included the repatriation and rehabilitation of those who had sought refuge in neighbouring countries and elsewhere. In this regard I am glad to say that most of our nationals have now returned home, and the work of rehabilitation is progressing satisfactorily.

Other programmes will take longer to complete because they are designed to build a foundation for our nation's development rather than just to alleviate the situation brought about by colonial oppression and armed struggle. The main focus of my Government's domestic policy is on rural development in order to address the basic issues that affect millions of our people. This is because the question of land is an issue that has always been central to the colonial history of our country.

Mr Vice-President, you may recall that during the Lancaster House negotiations, the whole negotiating exercise was always in jeopardy whenever this issue was under consideration. I may reflect in this respect that at one time, in recognition of the importance of this land issue and in an effort to resolve it, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger hinted that aid amounting to at least a billion dollars would be given to newly independent Zimbabwe for its programme to redistribute the land.

I wish to stress here that our present resettlement programme is not intended to be a simple transfer of land from owners of large commercial farms to those who were denied land by colonial policy. We do recognize that the millions of peasants who were rendered landless during the colonial period have a genuine need, and it is my Government's policy to provide them with adequate land.

Our resettlement programme is thus designed to implement this policy in a more systematic and comprehensive way than that of the mere transfer of land. We intend to ensure that in redistributing the land productivity is not sacrificed and development is promoted. To that end, we have carefully planned the resettlement programme so that every community that is provided with land will also have the necessary infrastructure to develop. This means that we have to provide more roads, schools, medical facilities,

water and transport services.

Needless to say, this is a very expensive exercise and our Three Year National Transitional Development Plan envisages the resettlement of over 162 000. Our programme in this respect may seem too ambitious but, we can assure you, it is the least that we can do to build a firm foundation for economic development, social justice and indeed political stability in our young nation.

We are very hopeful that with the assistance of other countries, including the United States, and through the determined efforts of our farmers and producers in the growing agricultural sector, Zimbabwe will become not only self-sufficient in food but also capable of contributing a very significant share to our region's food needs.

Zimbabwe is also forging ahead with programmes in other priority areas. Having inherited an economy that was geared to the interests of the few, we seek to promote industrial development to meet most of our needs and to produce surpluses for trade with other nations. I am glad to note that over the last two years we have experienced growth rate in the years to come in order to translate our plans in other areas into positive actions.

The schools, hospitals, and other infrastructures we inherited are quite inadequate for our needs. Already we have greatly increased the number of schools (by over a hundred per cent) to cater for more than two million pupils, and we have also had to introduce crash programmes to train more teachers locally and recruit others from outside.

In a nutshell, we face enormous tasks. We are able to solve some of our problems by ourselves; however, as a young nation we find it necessary to seek international assistance to solve the more intractable ones.

.....
Mr Vice-President, the conditions that exist in South Africa are unacceptable to the majority of the people in that country and to the rest of us in Africa, namely the maintenance of harsh and undemocratic minority rule. We wish to see freedom in South Africa and the equal treatment of all its citizens without regard to race, colour or creed. For that reason, we support all efforts that are being made by the people of that country to oppose and dismantle the apartheid system. In this regard, Mr Vice-President, we are pleased to note that your own government has indicated that it does not approve of apartheid.

We urge the United States and the American people to be resolute in their firm stand against the system of apartheid and support for its complete overthrow so that democracy and justice are established.

I must also point out in this connection that if apartheid is not defeated, our own efforts to build non-racial and democratic societies will continue to be threatened, because South Africa is pursuing a vigorous policy of destabilization designed to hinder our efforts to develop economically and

achieve political stability and peace. In order to buttress apartheid within its borders, South Africa has taken it upon itself to attack either directly or through its armed agents most of its neighbours in this region. No one but South Africa alone can benefit from the policy of destabilization, and this is why we urged you and others to apply pressure on South Africa to desist from its destabilization campaign.

Mr Vice-President, against this background of South African hostility, our young nation is actively involved in prompting international co-operation, understanding and peace. We have joined hands with others in this region in creating the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) in order to pool our resources and increase regional economic co-operation. We believe that these efforts are of vital importance in fostering African unity and development and we also hope that this co-operation will grow until it is established on a continent-wide basis as envisaged by the OAU's Lagos Plan of Action. In this regard we appreciate the assistance that we have recently received in support of the SADCC.

We are also committed to the promotion of democracy, equality of nations, and universal human rights, just as we seek the removal of the serious imbalances in distribution of wealth between the North and the South. It is our firm conviction that a world divided between the few who are rich and the majority who are poor, both in the national and international contexts, is an unstable and dangerous world. We therefore strongly support all efforts to bring about the real development in the poor countries which will enable them to raise the standard of life of their people.

We believe that the industrialized North can contribute much in terms of giving technical assistance and paying fairly for the products they import from the non-industrialized South. Such co-operation, we believe, will contribute to the reduction of tensions and the improvement of relations between the developed and developing countries.

Mr Vice-President, I wish to conclude my observations by once again thanking the United States for the assistance it has been giving to Zimbabwe. This aid is exceedingly important to our development plans. Co-operation between our two countries is indeed of great value to our relations. We are pleased that you have visited us and given us an opportunity to discuss some of those possible areas of further co-operation, and I am confident that your visit will add to the strengthening of relations between us.

Text issued by the Prime Minister's press unit, Zimbabwe.

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