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Number Thirty-one, April, 1983

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# United States and Southern Africa

- A. Statement entitled "United States Policy on Trade with South Africa", by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mr Princeton Lyman, to a joint session of the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa and the House Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, on 2 December 1982

## Overview

United States policy objectives toward the Republic of South Africa include: fostering movement toward a system of government by consent of the governed, and away from the racial policy of apartheid both as a form of racial discrimination and national political disenfranchisement of Blacks, continued access to four strategic nonfuel minerals where the US and OECD countries are either import or price-dependent on South Africa, assuring the strategic security of the Cape sea routes through which pass vital US oil supplies from the Middle East, and regional security in southern Africa. Peace and stability are needed so that this key region can develop and prosper, so that peaceful change can occur in South Africa, and so that the region does not slide into an escalating cycle of destructive cross-border violence exploited by our adversaries as we are pursuing these goals. Our objectives are pursued through a regional policy of constructive engagement, constructive engagement not only with South Africa but with all the states of the region. The specific components of our regional approach include:

- First, internationally recognized independence for Namibia;
- Second, internationally supported programs of economic development in all the developing countries of the region;
- Third, a negotiated framework that will permit agreement on the issue of withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola;
- Fourth, detente between South Africa and the other states in the region; and

- Fifth, peaceful, evolutionary change in South Africa itself away from apartheid and toward a system of government to be defined by South Africans themselves but firmly rooted in the principle of government by consent of the governed.

The US is presently leading a major diplomatic effort designed to achieve independence for the territory of Namibia based on implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435<sup>1</sup>.

In a separate but parallel negotiating process the US is seeking to resolve the related issue of the presence of Cuban forces in adjacent Angola, with the impact that their presence has in terms of southern African regional security.

The US believes that a resolution of these conflicts is essential to build a regional climate conducive to constructive change inside South Africa away from a bilateral policy and also an important part of our policy toward a key region, a region also vital in global terms.

President Reagan indicated that the United States views the apartheid system as repugnant to basic US values. He has stated that as long as there is a sincere and honest effort to move away from apartheid in South Africa the United States should be helpful in encouraging that process. On this basis the US has indicated to South Africa that relations with the US are based on the commitment of the South African Government to reform away from apartheid and on South African co-operation in moving toward an internationally recognized settlement for Namibian independence.

The United States has no blueprint for a future political system for South Africa, nor would we have a right to attempt to impose such a plan if we had one. We do have a right to ask South Africa to respect the same universal principles of human rights and human freedoms that we seek for people everywhere.

For all South Africans, as for people everywhere, we ask for a government based squarely on the freely expressed consent of the governed. South Africa's present system of government is not, although there are signs of a willingness to move toward such government.

### **Human Rights Factor**

The Subcommittee has asked whether, as a result of its apartheid policy, the Department considers South Africa to be a gross violator of internationally recognized human rights. The Department's view with respect to the human rights situation in South Africa is expressed in some detail in our annual Human Rights Report to Congress. The Department would not argue that South Africa is not a violator of internationally recognized human rights. However, the Department does not advocate a formal determination that South Africa (or any other country) is a gross violator, be-

1. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 14, December 1978, pp. 43-44.

cause such determinations are barriers to a dialogue that might serve to induce the human rights improvements that we seek. In situations where there is a consistent pattern of gross violations the intent of the legislation is being carried out by refraining from security assistance and from issuance of licenses for crime control equipment. However, formal designations would largely rob the legislation of its desired effect by signalling to the designated party that the United States saw no hope for improvement.

Apartheid is by no means the only system by which contemporary governments deny citizens freedom of speech and assembly, the right to democratic participation in government and equality under the law. Government by and with the consent of the governed remains a rare commodity in our world. The principles of freedom, equality, democracy and the standards of human rights which so many endorse for South Africa are also utterly absent from the political practice of many other nations not similarly subject to either the scrutiny or sanctions applied to South Africa.

This double standard has itself hindered constructive changes in that country by persuading some South Africans that their country will always be singled out for negative pressure and be held accountable to standards not applied uniformly elsewhere, and by persuading others that constructive change, when it does occur, will not be honestly recognized for what it is.

The United States is looking beyond mere expressions of sympathy and outrage toward practical and effective means to help end apartheid. This hearing focusses specific attention on the export of several items to South Africa but might be said to address the general issue of what influence we have to foster change in South Africa. The real issue is whether a policy of denial is, in and of itself, going to cause such disruption in the South African economy that the South African Government will have no choice but to abandon apartheid. We believe that the change we wish to see in South Africa is more likely to take place in a relationship of mutual confidence.

### **Trade Controls**

The committees have asked for an explanation of how trade controls relate generally to United States relations with South Africa. I speak to this question and to the question of what role a regime of trade controls can play in the effective pursuit of peaceful, evolutionary change in South Africa away from apartheid.

The United States has restricted trade with South Africa since 1961 to a greater or lesser extent as a means of denial and symbolic disassociation from its racial system. A strict US arms embargo was followed by a mandatory UN arms embargo in 1977.

The decision of the Carter Administration to go beyond the mandatory

arms embargo to also restrict all exports to the police and military was not similarly emulated by other nations. A call by oil exporting countries for a boycott of oil shipments to South Africa met with very mixed adherence.

Experience presents questions that may legitimately be asked with regard to the use of trade controls as a coercive instrument of foreign policy with regard to South Africa. It would seem a fair assumption to make that symbolism *per se* is not the only objective of trade controls implemented for foreign policy purposes. Trade controls are also expected to have a substantive impact on the situation which one is trying to affect, in this instance South Africa's apartheid policies.

What, then, has been the effect of trade controls on internal change in South Africa? There are some rather particular results. Over the course of the past twenty years South Africa has developed the world's tenth largest arms industry and is now becoming an exporter of arms. Over the course of the past ten years South Africa has become a world leader in synthetic fuel production. Over the course of the past five years South Africa has made giant strides toward nuclear self-sufficiency as regards the production and fabrication of low enriched uranium.

The logic of this sequence does not lead to the conclusion that all controls should be abolished. On the contrary, this Administration has continued to implement a wide set of controls on trade and exports to South Africa. But we do need to question seriously the efficacy of particular controls, to look carefully at them to see whether they are indeed fulfilling their objective — in some cases whether the objective is better addressed by other policy tools. The criteria should be the impact these controls have on events in the country. The record shows that controls have encouraged greater self-sufficiency, and that they have not in themselves been sufficient to encourage a process of change.

### **Constructive Policy**

The point of our policy is not merely to criticize or seem to criticize practices of a government. If our views are to have effect, our objective must be to devise and implement an effective and constructive means policy by which the United States can encourage genuine change in South Africa.

As described earlier, the objective of constructive engagement is to create a climate of confidence in which persons can be encouraged to make difficult changes, on Namibia and on domestic change. In specific reference to export controls, we need to maintain those controls which serve as an instrument for symbolically and substantively disassociating ourselves from the apartheid regime in South Africa. At the same time, we do not believe that a regime of controls or coercive leverage by itself is a sufficient means to encourage the process of change in South Africa. In that regard,



we oppose proposals for total embargoes to South Africa.

The US has identified three areas where significant change is under way in South Africa and which can lead to meaningful reform away from apartheid: economic growth, education and trade union development. In order to help insure that the change which is beginning to take place moves in a peaceful direction away from apartheid, the Administration has moved to support people and programs both inside and outside the government in South Africa seeking to develop a new non-racial system. As this hearing focusses on trade controls as an instrument of foreign policy, let me address the relationship between economic growth and movement away from apartheid as it affects our policy and the activities of the US private sector.

The South African Government and its business community even more so recognizes that it is not possible to segregate South Africa economically into separate economies. The growth of the economy has resulted in a growing demand for skilled manpower. While South Africa's economic growth was historically based on the exploitation of unskilled black labor, the development of a modern diversified economic system requires that Blacks be included on an equal wage base with Whites. Economic growth, therefore, renders ineffective the apartheid political system. The United States has traditionally supported American private sector trade and investment in South Africa. While not promoting US trade and investment in South Africa, we opposed disinvestment by US firms from South Africa and have supported the Sullivan Principles, a voluntary code of fair employment practices.

The Reagan Administration believes that US firms can help to foster meaningful change away from apartheid. United States economic interests in South Africa are substantial. Two-way trade totalled over 5 300 million dollars in 1981, with the US holding its position as South Africa's leading trading partner. US direct investment in South Africa now stands at over 2 500 million dollars. Over 200 US firms, affiliates and subsidiaries do business in South Africa. While the US continues to fully adhere to the arms embargo, the vast majority of United States exports to South Africa are unaffected by any special export controls.

I have prepared for the Committee a detailed description of the legislative and administrative mechanisms of controls which are currently being administered. In the detailed description it will be evident that the existing controls are substantial. The arms embargo remains fully in force, and remains an important symbol of disassociation from apartheid. Where changes have been made in other controls, such as those made earlier this year and discussed with this committee, they were made because they were found to be counterproductive and to be having no effect in encouraging the process of change.

Let me, then, review for the Committees what specific controls do affect United States exports to South Africa.

US export restrictions of importance to our policy toward South Africa fall very generally under three separate regulatory regimes:

- That administered by the State Department under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR);
- That administered by the Commerce Department pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) and the export administration regulations, and
- That administered by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Department of Energy (DOE) under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and regulations promulgated thereunder. Nuclear non-proliferation-related controls are discussed in detail in the testimony of the other agencies. I will concentrate here on controls promulgated under the authority of the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act.

### **Arms Embargo**

The United States has since 1962 enforced an embargo on the sale of military equipment to South Africa. From 1963 to 1977, the US observed a voluntary arms embargo pursuant to Security Council Resolution 181 and 182 (1963). In 1977, the United Nations Security Council, with US support, established a mandatory embargo on the export of arms and related material to South Africa.

Security Council Resolution 418 (1977) provides in pertinent part that the Security Council "decides that all states shall cease forthwith any provision to South Africa of arms and related material of all types, including the sale or transfer of weapons, ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, para-military police equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and shall cease as well the provision of all types of equipment and supplies and grants of licensing arrangements for the manufacture and maintenance of the aforementioned . . ."

The United States Government has implemented the arms embargo primarily through control of items on the United States munitions list. Under the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) promulgated pursuant to the Act, no item on the munitions list may be exported without a license is-

sued by the Department of State. The ITAR also require such license for the export of technical data useful in the production of munitions list items and State Department approval for manufacturing license agreements and technical assistance agreements relating to items on the munitions list. Applications for licenses or other approvals for exports to South Africa, with very rare exceptions for items for non-military use, are denied.

In addition, section 385.4 (A)(1) of the Export Administration Regulation provides that:

“An embargo is in effect on the export or re-export to the Republic of South Africa and Namibia of arms, munitions, military equipment and materials, and materials and machinery for use in manufacture and maintenance of such equipment. Commodities to which this embargo applies are listed in supplement No. 2 to part 379.”

The commodities listed in that supplement are items on the commodity control list (and so not on the munitions list) that are military-related or capable of military use. They include machinery for the manufacture of arms and military equipment, military construction equipment designed for airborne transport, certain vehicles designed for military purposes, ammunition components, non-military shotguns and shotgun shells.

These controls designed to implement the UN arms embargo were not altered by the 1982 revision of the trade controls.

The Subcommittees have asked for the Department's views regarding enforcement of the Department's export control regulations and the arms embargo against South Africa. You requested our reaction to a staff study of the Subcommittee that was published as an appendix to the hearing on “Enforcement of the United States Arms Embargo Against South Africa,” and inquired about actions taken subsequently to strengthen the enforcement of export controls and embargoes.

The Department attaches great importance to its statutory functions and responsibilities under the Arms Export Control Act. As you know, under the supervision of the Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, the Director of the Office of Munitions Control (OMC) is responsible for carrying out the functions assigned to the Department by law to control the commercial export of defense articles and services. In discharging these functions, OMC is directly concerned with enforcing export control regulations. It is standard procedure to refer to reports of violations, which OMC obtains from a variety of sources, including the intelligence community, to the US Customs Service for investigation. OMC provides appropriate support to customs and other law enforcement agencies in the investigation and prosecution of alleged violations. This support takes the form of record searches and certifications, researching material related to alleged violations, and testifying before grand juries and courts.

In direct response to your inquiry, I would like to apprise you speci-

cally of the Department's recent efforts to improve and strengthen export control enforcement. Interagency consultation and co-ordination through established channels have been increased on a wide range of enforcement-related matters. Our foreign service posts, having been reminded of the importance of OMC's enforcement function, have been prompt in reporting alleged or possible violations. OMC has also initiated more frequent end-use checks through our posts in order to verify proposed exports. During the summer, OMC conducted a review of the licensing history of certain weapons-related items to selected countries to ascertain the likelihood of diversion to other than the authorized end-users.

In this connection, you should know that the Department is deeply involved in Operation Exodus, a US Customs Service enforcement program designed to stop the illegal export of defense articles and dual-use technology. To this end, OMC acquired a customs officer on detail, which has markedly increased its capability to support Operation Exodus and a wide range of related enforcement efforts, and has enhanced the already close collaboration between the Department and the Customs Service. To date there have been 765 seizures of all kinds under Operation Exodus, including 10 shipments destined for South Africa.

We have noted the recommendations of the staff study regarding the organization and mission of the Department's enforcement function. In this regard, we believe that the reinforced organizational arrangements and increased level of effort within the Department, the more active participation of foreign service posts in enforcement, and enhanced interagency collaboration are adequate to carry out our statutory export control responsibilities, including enforcement of the arms embargo against South Africa.

### **Restrictions on Exports to the Military and Police**

In 1978 the United States unilaterally went beyond the requirement of the 1977 UN Arms Embargo and imposed a total ban on all exports of goods and technical data to the South African police and military. In 1979 one exception was established for the export of medicines, medical supplies and medical equipment, and related technical data, and parts and components not primarily destined for the South African police and military. In 1981 two exceptions were established to permit the export of commodities, data, parts and components "to be used in efforts to prevent acts of unlawful interference with international civil aviation" (i.e., airport X-ray scanning equipment).

On March 1, 1982, further modifications were introduced that have the effects of: retaining the ban on exports to the police and military as to those goods and technical data controlled for national security purposes, permitting the export of five categories of goods and data to the military and police under a general license, permitting the export of all other goods and

data under a validated license subject to a determination that the export would not "contribute significantly to military or police functions," and establishing two *de minimis* provisions, one allowing the export of US components that will constitute up to 20 per cent by value of goods assembled overseas and sold to the South African military or police, and the other permitting re-export or re-sale to the military or police of insubstantial portions of items originally sold to purchasers other than the military and police if the item would not contribute significantly to military and police functions.

On September 15, 1982, the regulations were further modified to allow companies which have sold equipment to the police and military under approved license to supply service manuals without submitting a separate license application, to place air ambulances under the exception for medical equipment, and to allow the export without license of items falling under the "basket entries" of the CCL (Commodity Control List), namely miscellaneous electronic products and other products not elsewhere specified. In addition, subsidiaries of the South African para-statal arms manufacturing organization, ARMSCOR, were specifically defined as military entities.

### **Crime Control Equipment**

Section 385.4 (A)(5) of the Export Administration Regulations requires a license for export to any end-user in South Africa or Namibia of "any instrument and equipment particularly useful in crime control and detection . . . ." The commodities controlled under this section are listed in EAR section 376.14. This restriction is not unique to South Africa — pursuant to section 6(J) of the Export Administration Act, a validated license is required for the export of such equipment to any country except NATO members, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. EAR section 376.14 provides that applications for validated licenses will generally be considered favorably on a case-by-case basis "unless there is evidence that the government of the importing country may have violated internationally recognized human rights and that the judicious use of export control would be helpful in deterring the development of a consistent pattern of such violations or in distancing the United States from such violations."

The Department does not view favorably the proposal to transfer all crime control equipment to the US munitions list. The munitions list, which derives its authority from the Arms Export Control Act, covers arms, ammunition and implements of war. Crime control equipment, such as handcuffs or detectors, does not logically fall into these categories.

In addition, pursuant to section 107 of the International Security and Development Co-operation Act of 1981, the munitions list is subject to periodic review to determine whether any items should be removed from

it and perhaps transferred to the Commerce Commodity Control List. State's Office of Munitions Control, in consultation with the Department of Defense, thus endeavors to limit the munitions list to defense articles and defense services. To add items which are arguably not defense articles would not be consistent with this effort.

The other two types of export controls, non-proliferation and short supply, also affect trade with South Africa. Short supply controls restrict the export of commodities of which there is a critical shortage in the United States. The nuclear non-proliferation controls effectively supplement those administered by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Energy.

In processing applications for validated licenses, the Commerce Department must consult "to the extent necessary" with other interested agencies. The Secretary of State has the right to review any application for export of commodities controlled for foreign policy purposes.

Text supplied by the United States Information Service, Pretoria.

- B.** Mid-term statement on the Reagan Administration's Southern Africa policy, presented to the United States Congress House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa, by the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr Chester A. Crocker, on 15 February 1983

Mr Chairman, Congressman, it gives me great pleasure to be able to report to you on developments in southern Africa at the mid-point in the first term of President Reagan's administration.

These hearings on progress toward independence for Namibia, and the broader subject of "destabilization" in southern Africa, are indeed important, for they address issues at the core of our southern Africa policy. Over the past 25 years, virtually all of formerly colonial Africa has gained independence from the European metropolitan powers. These newly-independent nations, with many of whom we have significant economic, commercial and political ties, have made clear the importance they attach to eliminating colonialism from their continent. Thus, even apart from the traditional American desire to help the spread of self-government and democracy, there are profound political reasons for engaging in the effort to bring independence to Namibia.

There are equally important reasons for our concern about tension and

instability in the region. Clearly, our desire to strengthen our economic and commercial links with Africa is not served by local conflicts or arms races, or by efforts of outside powers to exploit them from industrial advantage. On the contrary, our own national interests are best served by an atmosphere of political stability and economic growth, which alone can nurture modern African economic and political institutions. It is obviously to our advantage to do whatever we can to ease tensions, and work toward the peaceful resolution of problems and disputes among the nations of the region. This is the fundamental principle behind our policy of constructive engagement in the search for a more stable, secure, prosperous and democratic southern Africa.

I would like to start, Mr Chairman, by restating the administration's objectives, so it will be clear that they have not changed, and that we are continuing to pursue them with vigor and purpose.

- The United States seeks to help strengthen communication between the countries of southern Africa in order to ease tensions, bolster regional security, and encourage negotiated solutions and peaceful change.
- We are intent upon using every diplomatic tool at our command in order to bring about conditions which will lead to Namibia's independence at the earliest possible date.
- Believing that "apartheid", as a structure of legally-entrenched racial separation, is morally unacceptable to a democracy such as our own, we have sought to encourage those elements within South Africa seeking constructive change, in order to see widened the base of participation in government and the economy to include all the elements of South Africa's varied population.
- Finally, we seek constructive engagement with all the states of the region who wish the same with us. We do not approach the region with the belief that our task is to choose sides — on the contrary, it is the fact of our desire for strengthened relations with all the states of the region that enables us to play a role — where such is welcome — in working for regional security, development, and peaceful change. The United States is on the side of peaceful change and negotiated solutions. This is where our interests lie and this is what makes us uniquely relevant to the region.

It has long been clear to all who were genuinely concerned about Africa's efforts to develop modern democratic institutions and processes — social, economic, and political — that tensions and hostility were inimical to those efforts. Certainly a region threatened with the prospect of heightened violence and polarization would find it difficult, at best, to focus positive efforts on its own development.

The recent history of southern Africa must serve as a cause of alarm to us. With the collapse of the Portuguese empire in the mid 1970s, violence has escalated throughout the region to a point today where the fact or threat of violence is a major feature of the area. Cross border conflict risks becoming endemic. The question the United States must answer — alone and with its allies — is whether diplomacy can provide an alternative to violence or whether southern Africa is in the process of condemning itself to violence as a way of life. We have seen this happen elsewhere in the world — in the Middle East — with still-incalculable consequences for world peace and our national security. It is in our national interests to seek to avoid such a development.

Mr Chairman, this administration did not invent violence in southern Africa. We did make it our purpose to do something about it. We have set out as a conscious objective of policy to provide an alternative to conflict — not only in Namibia, our most visible effort, but throughout the region. We have made it our purpose to work with the nations of the region to see if a framework of restraint and broad rules of conduct could be developed which could contain conflicts and provide this basis for solutions. The Vice-President summed up our policy in Nairobi on November 19, 1982 when he said:<sup>1</sup>

“We are determined to help turn the sad tide of growing conflict and tension in southern Africa.”

From the outset of this administration, we sought to establish effective communication with all those nations and other political elements with whom communication was inadequate or had lapsed. It seemed self-evident that unilaterally isolating ourselves from those with whom we had differences, however strongly felt, served no purpose other than to cut us off from an ability to influence or affect their policies.

We began with a series of intensive discussions with all of the major actors in the region in order to identify their concerns, see how these fit in with our objectives, and determine how best we might proceed to advance American and Western interests. The priorities which seemed apparent to us were the ones enumerated earlier: regional security, independence for Namibia, the encouragement of elements favoring peaceful change within South Africa away from the system of apartheid, and constructive engagement with regional states in tackling the larger problems of economic and political development.

With respect to regional security, it seemed clear that one of the major barriers — if not the principal stumbling block — was the inability or unwillingness of parties on either side of South Africa's borders to speak to each other. Instability, coupled with a self-imposed reluctance on the part of the United States to act in concert with potential parties on behalf of our

1. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 29, December 1982, p. 22.



interests, had led to openings which were being exploited by our adversaries. Another major problem was our own lack of a credible dialogue with significant actors in the southern African region — not the least of which were the governments of South Africa and Angola.

Over the course of the past two years, we have worked assiduously to restore communication and get a dialogue going again. I believe we can point to a considerable record of success:

- We have now had an extensive series of discussion at senior levels with the Angolan Government, exploring ways of improving our bilateral relationship with that country and seeking to bring about circumstances which will make possible agreement on Namibian independence.
- After a period of difficulty in our relationship with Zambia, we have worked hard to re-establish a basis of confidence and improving communication, culminating in a highly successful visit that Vice-President Bush paid to that country in November of last year. We hope to have President Kaunda visit the United States in the near future.
- We have continued to attach a high priority to assisting Zimbabwe, now in its third year of independence, as it seeks to meet pressures from the world economic downturn, a devastating drought sweeping across much of southern Africa, and the stresses and strains from political divisions within. Zimbabwe has travelled a rough road over the past two years but those who seek to judge its performance should have the humility to recall our own history at a similar stage in America's independence, as well as the daunting challenges facing Zimbabwe's leadership. We intend to continue our efforts to assist this new country, convinced that it offers important prospects for becoming a keystone in the economic development and regional stability of southern Africa. Just as we seek to foster a regional climate of security and confidence that will encourage constructive change in South Africa, so too do we seek a regional climate conducive to Zimbabwe's success as an independent nation.
- This administration took office just as the United States' relations with Mozambique reached a low-water mark. Communication with the Mozambican Government was practically non-existent, that country's policies seemed unalterably aligned with those of the Soviet Union and its satrapies, its perceptions warped by hostile disinformation. But the utter incapacity of Marxist economics to cope with the problems of a developing country, and the conspicuous inability of the Soviet Union to assist Mozambique with security and political problems stemming from its isolation, led to indications that the Mozambican Government wished to re-establish communication with the United States. We responded by making clear that we were interested in a positive re-

relationship based upon respect for each other's interests and were willing to engage in building bridges between us based upon mutual respect. Within just the past three months, we have had two sets of discussions between senior American and Mozambican officials aimed at engaging the Mozambican Government in a constructive effort to improve regional stability and restore communications between us. We believe that a solid basis now exists for a meaningful improvement in relations between us.

- Similarly, in our contacts with South Africa we quickly moved beyond discussion of the Namibia issue and bilateral questions to the over-arching question of regional security. We believe our extensive contacts with Pretoria have enabled us to more fully grasp the South African Government's concerns about the region's dynamics while also making clear the terms on which we must operate if we are to be credible and effective there. While much remains to be done, the conditions now exist for a candid, sensitive and productive dialogue on regional matters with that country.

I would like to turn now to another facet of our diplomacy in southern Africa — encouraging effective communication between South Africa and its neighbors. We have not engaged in this effort as a search for glory or out of our own ambition. We have done so for the good and sufficient reason that it is obviously in our national interest. The cycle of violence that threatens southern Africa is antithetical to everything this country stands for. Militarized conflict and the recourse to violent means can only advance the interest of our adversaries.

Dialogue alone, of course, will not necessarily solve the problems, but communication among countries that have serious disputes and basic political differences is an obvious first step. Within the past six months, South Africa has had significant and positive discussions with Angola, with Mozambique, and, in fact, with virtually all of its immediate neighbors. It is difficult to over-state the significance of the developing dialogue between South Africa and its neighbors, a dialogue we have sought — in unintrusive ways — to further. We welcome the fact of these contacts, and hope that by a thorough airing of differences, a constructive effort can be made toward their resolution.

It is important, we believe, to recognize that as dialogue itself is, by definition, a two-way street, so, too, is regional security. There is a compelling need for all the parties to recognize this. Although at any given moment following some specific development or event, it might be possible to pronounce a moral or political judgment upon that event, it is not always useful, or even wise, to do so. For that matter, it is not always even possible to know precisely what has taken place, or why. Public posturing and the passing of judgment, however gratifying to those who do it, is not

usually the most helpful way to deal with the root causes of disputes. We seek results. This administration is profoundly conscious of the fact that southern Africa is a highly-charged, politically polarized environment. Some would say it is a minefield. There is ample public posturing by the regional actors themselves without adding our own rhetoric to the mix.

Regional security runs in both directions across international borders, and in southern Africa each side in every dispute claims grievances against the other. We have not chosen to condemn each transgression by one or another of the parties, but have, rather, chosen the perhaps less gratifying but certainly more important long-term task of trying to ease tensions. In our view, our effectiveness depends on our ability to be a credible partner of all who wish our partnership and are prepared to engage in good faith efforts to solve problems. Apart from Namibia, all states of the region are sovereign and recognize each other's sovereignty. That is a fact, and it carried with it certain obvious implications. Some states are not more sovereign than others. We recognize no state's right to harbor plotters or perpetrators of violence across borders and against other lands.

Mr Chairman, I recognize that some observers are less than satisfied with the balance and discretion inherent in what I have just said. But we believe that those who would have us take sides among the parties in southern Africa would have us un-learn every important role of diplomacy. In southern Africa as in the Middle East, it is not by choosing sides that we shape events or resolve conflicts. Our nation should be proud to stand on the side of peace and diplomacy and be prepared to weigh the concerns and interests of the parties involved as we seek to build bridges and explore avenues for agreement.

When President Reagan took office in January of 1981, the Namibia negotiations had broken down, despite the substantial efforts and accomplishments of our predecessors. There was an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and recrimination among the parties whose agreement was essential for Namibia to secure its freedom. The obstacles to agreement between the parties were so great that it would have been tempting for us to walk away from the problem, washing our hands of the negotiations, and leaving it to debate and doubtful resolution by others. Certainly there were other urgent priorities.

Instead, partly in response to what we were clearly told by our African friends and our key allies in NATO, and partly because of America's historic tradition of support for self-determination, we set out to find a way to move toward Namibian independence. In preparation for this, we conducted extensive and exhaustive discussions with each of the major parties to the negotiation — the front-line states, SWAPO, other states in Africa, the South Africans and the internal parties inside Namibia, and our European allies.

We concluded that Namibia's independence could not be achieved in the absence of conditions which gave all participants reasonable confidence that their security interests would be protected. It was obvious to any observer that — irrespective of the reasons for their being there — the presence of Cuban combat forces in Angola was an integral part of the regional security problem.

I know that the members of this distinguished subcommittee are familiar with the charges and counter-charges from both Angola and South Africa about the fighting across the Namibian-Angolan frontier. My point is a simple one: the Cuban troop issue is not an issue we made up, it is an objective reality at the core of the question of regional security. The South Africans, whose concurrence and co-operation must be secured for any agreement leading to Namibian independence, have repeatedly made clear that they regard the Cuban troop issue as fundamental to their security concerns. Quite apart from that, the United States, as Vice-President Bush said in Nairobi on November 19 1982,<sup>2</sup> "is not ashamed to state its interest in seeing an end to the presence of Cuban forces in Angola," just as we seek internationally recognized independence for Namibia. Such an outcome would contribute to both regional security and a global climate of restraint.

We have, for more than a year now, been engaged in intensive discussions with the Angolan Government in an effort to reach a broadly acceptable formula for parallel withdrawal of foreign forces from Namibia and Angola. These bilateral discussions have been held outside the framework of (UN) Security Council Resolution 435, and are not part of the Western contact group's mandate. We are fully prepared to respond to Angola's security concerns as well as to deal forthrightly with the reality of South Africa's concerns. We believe that this is a viable means of achieving the goal of Namibian independence to which we are profoundly committed. We know of no other means.

We believe that Angola wishes to contribute to a Namibian independence agreement, so long as its own security interests are preserved. We have achieved real progress in our talks with the Angolans and will spare no effort in continuing our search for a comprehensive, peaceful settlement.

Your letter, Mr Chairman, inviting me to participate in these hearings, asked what the "short and long-run prospects" are for a Namibian settlement, as well as a number of specific questions about "when" South Africa and the United States made Cuban troop withdrawal a necessary accompaniment to Namibia's independence.

2. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 29, December 1982, p. 23.

The answer to the first question is: "reasonably good." Certainly we intend to continue the effort. But this is a complicated and difficult negotiation, and it involves fundamental issues and choices for both sides. It has taken time and it may take more. I believe the greatest mistake that we could make would be to yield to the historic American impatience with the progress of negotiations.

That carries with it the answer to your second question, about "when" the Cuban troop issue became a prerequisite for Namibian independence. Security, of which the Cuban troop issue is an integral part, has always been a prerequisite for agreement on Namibian independence. As a practical diplomatic matter, it will not be possible to obtain a Namibian independence agreement without satisfactory regional security assurances. Quite apart from the diplomatic problem, it would not be desirable to bring Namibia to independence in circumstances that held the prospects for greater regional instability and turmoil.

This administration would not be a party to it, and I would hope that no one in this room would wish to see that either.

This approach does not mean an indefinite delay for Namibia's transition to independence. Some in the media and elsewhere press for our forecasts on these negotiations. In reply, I would say that we are neither optimistic nor pessimistic — instead, we have a realistic objective, and we are determined to move steadily toward it.

In conclusion, I would emphasize that we have set ourselves goals worthy of the support of all Americans and developed a road map for reaching them. The parties in the region are well aware of our seriousness. Not surprisingly, all of them can find fault with this or that aspect of our diplomacy. But our goals and methods are increasingly understood. Despite the inherent difficulties, the administration sees no reason to shift course and every reason to persevere.

Text supplied by the United States Information Service, Pretoria.

- C. Address entitled "Constructive Engagement at Mid-Term," by the United States Ambassador to South Africa, Mr Herman W. Nickel, to the American Chamber of Commerce in South Africa, on 16 February 1983

It is a pleasure to be among the representatives of American firms which are constructively, and I hope profitably, engaged in the industrial growth of this country. In that fashion, you have been contributing to what I regard as the most potent single dynamic for peaceful change in this country — continued industrial growth.

Many of your companies have been here for a long time. Our policy of constructive engagement is of much more recent vintage. In historical terms, two years may just be a fleeting moment — especially when one considers the vast complexity of the process of change in this country. But the clock of politics, alas, runs faster than the clock of history. We have now passed the halfway mark in this Administration's term of office, and while the tortuous process of changes that we would like to see in South Africa itself and in South Africa's relations with its neighbours will certainly not be completed within the remaining two years, our ability to continue on our present course will surely depend on tangible evidence that we have been making progress towards our goal.

Now, any good football team will take advantage of half-time to evaluate its performance and decide if its game plan should be altered. At that juncture the coach rarely lacks for free advice. But as he listens to it, he better keep in mind that what matters in the end is the result, and that the game is not won in the stands but on the field. If you forgive my Washingtonian's pride in the Redskins to shine through, John Riggins' short gains up the middle may not have been very spectacular, but they helped his team win the Super Bowl.

Yet, as anyone in public life knows, perceptions of policy can be as important as the reality — indeed, perceptions can themselves become political realities. That is why keeping misperceptions from assuming a life of their own is a constant challenge to those who make, articulate and execute policy.

The policy of constructive engagement is no exception in that regard. All too often I have come across a huge gap between preconceived notions about what our policy is supposed to be and what it is really all about. From both ends of the political and racial spectrum we hear suggestions that constructive engagement is somehow a policy designed to undergird the status quo. Among those on the far right, this reflects wishful thinking. Among those on the left, it reflects a fear. In either case, the perception could not be further from the reality. The very basis of constructive engagement is our recognition that the status quo in South Africa is simply incompatible with both our national values and our national interest in peaceful development and stability in this vital region. Constructive engagement, in our view, is a more promising approach to encourage peaceful change than progressive disengagement. But there is a second perception gap which we must overcome, and this concerns unrealistic notions about the degree to which the United States can control developments here.

Let no one doubt that we do have influence — and that we are prepared to use it. The state of relations between this country and the United States Government, I believe, matters very much to the South African leadership,

and it is obvious that the closeness or distance in that relationship depends heavily on the degree of change and the evidence of momentum which South Africa can produce. Regionally, one reason why we can play a constructive role is that, as in the Middle East, we can talk and work with both South Africa and its neighbours. More and more, African leaders are coming to realize that while they may be able to look to the Soviet Union for the tools of destruction and continued conflict, they have to look to the United States and its Western allies when it comes to peacemaking and economic construction.

Yet, despite the leverage and influence this gives us, there are also serious limitations. We cannot dictate policy to any state in the region, nor would we want to. We can influence; we can suggest; we can act as the honest broker, but, in the final analysis, we must deal in the realm of the possible. The notion that if only it wanted to, the United States could somehow wave the magic wand and transform the situation in southern Africa more or less overnight is wishful thinking. We are not *deus ex machina*. What we can do is to add our voice and influence to forces that are already at work here. If we carefully husband our influence for cases in which it can make a difference, there is a chance it can tip the scales.

To be sure, many people will not find this approach as emotionally satisfying as one of constant declamation and posturing. But then simply making oneself feel good is not a serious policy for a great power to follow. The popularity a great power earns by telling people what they want to hear is short lived unless the rhetoric is followed by results. Otherwise, it will soon be exposed as empty and be seen as a sign of impotence.

So let us close the perception gaps and examine what constructive engagement is really all about.

The first point that I would like to make is that constructive engagement is a regional policy, directed not at South Africa alone, but at all of southern Africa. Progress towards a more representative government in South Africa and economic progress throughout the rest of southern Africa are inseparably linked to region-wide stability. This is why we have been working towards a set of interrelated goals. These include:

1. an internationally recognized independence for Namibia;
2. a negotiated withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola;
3. some form of detente between South Africa and the other states in the region, and, since internal conditions in South Africa also contribute to regional conflicts;
4. the peaceful evolutionary change in South Africa towards a constitutional order to be defined by South Africans themselves but one firmly rooted in the principle of government by consent of the governed;

5. recognition of the need for internationally supported programs for the economic development of the region.

These are all vital threads in the fabric of a stable, peaceful and prosperous southern Africa. If we try to weave a fabric with some of the vital threads missing, the cloth will be weak and the cloak of stability easily shredded.

The withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola is one such vital thread. We have recently heard much rhetoric about the alleged "evils" of "linking" Namibian independence to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. We listen to this public criticism philosophically, because we know that privately most of these critics admit that they have no practical alternative. After all, the need for parallel progress is rooted in political reality, and much as one may dislike reality, there is no way to escape it. It is a distortion of events to suggest that Security Council Resolution 435<sup>1</sup> could be quickly implemented if only the United States dropped its insistence that the Cuban troops leave. The fact is that when the Reagan Administration took office the negotiations on implementation of Resolution 435 were dead in the water. It is precisely because we recognized the necessity for parallel progress on the two issues that practically all of the contentious issues that used to bedevil Resolution 435 could be resolved. What we are waiting for now is for the Angolan Government to face up to the necessity of choice. We appreciate its difficulties but we are not asking the Government in Luanda to do anything that is incompatible with its security. On the contrary, the decision we are now waiting for holds out the prospect of peace and economic reconstruction for a country ravaged by war and the presence of foreign forces.

We are following with the greatest interest the evolving direct dialogue between the Angolan Government and the Government of South Africa and hope that it will lead to confidence-building measures that will make it easier for both sides to create the conditions for implementation of Resolution 435.

We have focused on a Namibian solution because we are convinced that a negotiated settlement that meets the security requirements of all sides could set an invaluable precedent for the resolution of other regional conflicts in southern Africa. However, we can ill afford to wait for a Namibian settlement before becoming active to stop these other conflicts from escalating into a vicious circle of violence.

Our concept of regional security is one that takes into proper account the security interests of all parties. This includes South Africa's right to exist without incursions and acts of violence that are staged from the territory of its neighbours. But we do not believe that lasting regional security can be based on one power using its superior military strength to impose its

1. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 14, December 1978, pp. 43-44.



will on its neighbours. As Henry Kissinger once pointed out, under such circumstances total security of one power entails total insecurity for its neighbours. It is precisely such sense of insecurity which provides the Soviet Union with the best opening to establish and expand its influence in this region. That is why we welcome the news that the Government of Mozambique and the Government of South Africa are now talking to each other, just as we have earlier expressed our respect for the courage of President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia in initiating his earlier meetings with the Prime Minister of South Africa. As you know, the United States and the Government of Mozambique have meanwhile entered into their own dialogue aimed at the improvement and normalization of relations.

The United States is particularly concerned about South Africa's relations with Zimbabwe. Despite some recent economic and political problems, Zimbabwe's Prime Minister Mugabe has demonstrated that he is a pragmatic leader interested in working with the West to further develop his country. Except for the Soviets, who never backed him in the first place and whom he has kept at arm's length, it can be in no one's interest to see him fail in this difficult endeavour. That is why the United States has been very forthcoming in providing economic assistance to Zimbabwe. To those in this country who take exception to Mr Mugabe's public utterances, we would give the friendly advice to pay at least as much attention to what Mr Mugabe actually does and does not do with respect to South Africa. Deeds, after all, speak louder than words.

As the only great power which can talk to all the actors in the region, the United States is prepared to play its role as an honest broker. But, quite obviously, this is a role it can play only if the parties are prepared to make use of it and to rely on the process of negotiation rather than confrontation. Cross border violence, from whatever quarter, is bound to lead to steady escalation and is incompatible with regional security.

In South Africa itself, we continue to do what we can to promote an overall atmosphere conducive to evolutionary peaceful change. At the risk of repeating myself, but contrary to what you may have been hearing and reading lately, let me stress that we endorse no one's constitutional formula, nor do we presume to put forward one of our own. What we have done is to state our conviction that the future peace and harmony of this society requires government based on the consent of the governed. We have deliberately not gone beyond this broad formulation because it is the job of the South Africans themselves to work out a constitutional solution which provides for such a government. We have made it crystal clear that when we speak of the consent of the governed this must also include the 72 per cent of the population of this country who are black Africans. We cannot accept that they can be deprived of their South African citizenship against their will.

However, having for so long criticized the conduct of South African national politics as a monopoly of the white minority, we can hardly dismiss it as meaningless when the Government takes a first step away from that monopoly, and is even prepared to face a party split in the process. Evolutionary change, almost by definition, is incremental change — and it is only natural that each increment will be viewed as inadequate by those who feel aggrieved by the present system. We understand their feelings.

What is undeniable is that the Prime Minister's constitutional proposals have become the catalyst for far-reaching tactical decisions which each group in South Africa will now have to make. But just as we offer no substantive constitutional formulas of our own, we recognize the right of South Africans to make their own tactical decisions on how to negotiate most effectively with other concerned parties.

While this process unfolds, we hope to make more progress on alleviating some specific problems which attract a good deal of attention in the United States and create unnecessary friction. Greater freedom to travel, by Americans who want to come here and South Africans seeking to go to the United States, is one area where considerable credit could be earned at relatively little cost.

As anyone who has read our latest annual Human Rights Report knows, this Administration does not wink at violations of human rights in this country, or elsewhere. We recognize that any state has a legitimate interest in the maintenance of law and order and that, indeed, the breakdown of law and order would be incompatible with the process of peaceful change. But precisely for that reason we believe in the judicial process which allows every person his day in court and a fair trial. That is why we cannot accept the concept of detention without trial or the onerous punishment of banning, which restricts people by administrative fiat.

The tactical approach of the Reagan Administration towards the human rights issue may differ somewhat from that of our predecessors. We care less about rhetoric and more about results. But let no one doubt the seriousness of our concern. This should not come as a surprise to anyone, for if there is one thing that conservatives feel strongly about it is that the state should not be entrusted with arbitrary and discretionary powers over the individual.

Our belief that an expanding market economy is a powerful force for peaceful change rests on similar philosophical convictions. Because we believe in equal opportunity on moral as well as economic grounds, racial discrimination and artificial barriers in the labor market strike us as unjustifiable on both counts. They simply run against the practical requirements of an expanding industrial society. While South Africa's early economic growth was based on the exploitation of unskilled black labor, the needs of a modern, diversified economy require that Blacks be utilized in all sec-

tors and at all levels of economic activity. This does not only mean that Blacks gain ever greater economic bargaining power. It means that the constitutional and political system, too, has to come to terms with the ever-growing phenomenon of urbanized Blacks.

It seems odd that the obvious social and political implications of this dynamic are ignored by those activists back home who are now pressuring state governments, pension funds and universities to sell their stock in companies with interests in South Africa. Just how depressing the values of these shares — and thus damaging the present holders — is supposed to benefit the black people of this country remains obscure. If the intention is to slow down South Africa's remarkably resilient economy, we all know who will be the first to pay the price for this dubious gesture of solidarity.

Since it isn't our money, we in this government are reluctant to tell US business whether to invest here or elsewhere. Yet we believe very strongly that the US companies here are a positive force for peaceful change in this part of the world.

The US is now South Africa's leading trading partner. US direct investment in South Africa is over 2,6 billion dollars, and there are over 300 firms and subsidiaries doing business here. This gives us leverage which disinvestment would remove. If you weren't here, your Chamber would hardly have been in a position to add its influential voice to those who persuaded the government to shelve the so-called Orderly Movement of Black Persons Bill.

The efforts the Chamber and your individual companies have made to improve the lot not only of your workers but also of communities in general are examples of what can be accomplished by socially-aware firms. Pace College is a beacon of social concern, but we recognise that this is only the most visible of your efforts in this area.

I recently had the opportunity to glance through the 6th Report of Signatory Companies to the Sullivan Principles and was pleased to note that difficult economic conditions have not prevented your companies from making further progress this past year in implementing the Sullivan Principles.

The statistics in the report are impressive — over 3 400 000 rand spent on employees for training and educational programs, an increase of more than a million rand over last year. Educational assistance to non-employees came to one million two hundred thousand rand and affected almost 8 000 individuals. Contributions to educational institutions totalled almost three million rand, and assistance to the community at large in housing, health and related areas came to over eleven million rand.

You have every right to be proud of this record. It sets an example to others, not only in the private sector, but to us in government as well.

Since you are up against the problem every business day, you need

hardly be told that the economic growth which this country so desperately needs for every conceivable reason is not going to be possible unless South Africa can come to grips with its educational crisis. The dimensions of the problem have been courageously described in the report of the De Lange Commission. As Gordon Luce, US delegate to the UN General Assembly said recently, "the United States, for one, is now looking beyond mere expressions of sympathy and outrage toward practical ways of rectifying the situation."

Specifically, in 1982, in a joint project with the private sector, we sent 117 black South Africans to the US on full scholarships. While this program will continue, we have come to recognise that, in the terms of cost-effectiveness, there are great advantages to providing educational assistance to black South Africans here. Despite obvious pitfalls, we are confident that we can find ways to make sure that our aid is granted in a way that is non-political and at the same time does not associate the US Government with the institutions of apartheid. A final decision has not yet been made as to how the bulk of our funds will be spent, but we already have developed material to assist black students pass the matric exam.

At the same time, our international visitors' program is an invaluable tool for better communication between our two countries. In 1982 thirty-nine South African opinion makers and community leaders of all races and persuasions had a chance to see the USA and meet with their American counterparts from coast to coast. Their reports on their return make some of the most encouraging reading that crosses my desk. This program, I am pleased to say, also happens to be one of the biggest programs of this kind which USIS administers anywhere in the world.

Finally, let me mention one of my favourite programs — our self-help program — which allows our Embassy to make small grants to community groups who have organized themselves to meet their needs — from new boreholes to day-care centres. Not only is it a program that produces maximum benefit from minimal means and red tape, it also keeps us in daily touch with the needs of people at the grass-roots level.

All of these efforts are significant and many have contributed to the process of peaceful change. The concern demonstrated does make a difference, and people's lives are changed for the better.

As I pointed out at the outset, critics tend to over-estimate the power of the US to influence South Africa and under-estimate the complexity of the external and internal changes they demand. Critics tend to ignore the small but significant victories — and we ourselves often don't talk about them. For when you work quietly, it also means that you can't crow about what you have achieved — especially when your influence has been only one of many factors.

What all this adds up to is that halfway through this presidential term,

we are not about to abandon our game plan and start throwing all too risky desperation passes. On the contrary, there is every reason to persevere.

If there is one thing our experience in southern Africa should teach us, it is that supposed solutions imposed without legitimate authority cannot endure, because they lack support. The US has neither the authority nor the will to dictate to the countries of this region. It is important to note, however; that this administration has shown a greater understanding of the difficulties and nuances of the situation than past administrations and could well be more understanding than any future administration. There is a narrow "window of opportunity" for all parties concerned, and I sincerely hope it does not become an opportunity missed.

We know that the process of evolutionary change is not a quick one. Construction engagement is not a matter of putting your coin in the machine and immediately getting your package of gum, and kicking the machine certainly won't help. We plan to continue despite criticism — often based on a distorted view of our goals — to work with both patience and persistence to achieve the longer-term objectives of our policy: a South Africa moving through a process of peaceful evolutionary change away from apartheid and towards a society that addresses the equities of all groups, majority and minorities alike. This Administration is determined to play its role, along with South Africans of good will, to achieve this goal. We know it can be done.

Text supplied by the American Chamber of Commerce in South Africa.

# Zimbabwe

- A. Extracts from a speech, concerning African unity, by the Zimbabwean Prime Minister, the Hon. Robert Mugabe, in Valetta, Malta, on 22 January 1983

It is especially gratifying to me to find myself once again amongst a people who, like my own, have a long tradition of resilience, strength of character and an indomitable love of freedom. The history of your island fortress and your courageous people clearly illustrates that at the heart of everyone of you lies a determined, unyielding spirit which burns in search of justice and freedom and which, through the ages, has stubbornly refused to accept the humiliation of foreign occupation and domination.

.....  
We feel a special kinship with you in this respect, for you are well aware, Zimbabwe too has suffered the evils of occupation and colonial, racist exploitation of the many by the privileged few.

Indeed, our first visit to your country occurred in January 1978, when the colonialist regime of Ian Smith was engaged in a desperate, last-ditch attempt to neutralize the liberation war being waged against its misguided racist system by the oppressed sons and daughters of Zimbabwe.

As you will recall, the then British Foreign Secretary, Dr David Owen, and the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr Andrew Young, asked the leaders of the then Patriotic Front Alliance of ZANU and ZAPU to attend a meeting here in Valetta at the end of January 1978, at the same time as Ian Smith, Bishop Muzorewa and some others were putting together the farcical, unacceptable so-called "internal settlement".

It was a time of grave concern for us for we were convinced that certain powers were collaborating with the illegal Smith regime and its puppets, and were bent on undermining our own position, achieved through a bitter and arduous struggle. Perhaps it was the very atmosphere of inner strength, determination and resistance that we felt here in Valetta which led our delegation to adopt such a positive and direct approach to the conference. Our determination then, as now, lay in the conviction that we were right, that our struggle was a just one and that we would, in the end, succeed.

Had we shown any hesitation or weakness of character at that crucial time in our struggle, it is possible that we would not have achieved our ultimate goal when we did and that our progress towards freedom and independence based on majority rule, would have been frustrated by those forces sympathetic to the maintenance of minority white rule in Rhodesia.

And so we have special ties and friendship and solidarity with Malta — for our strong principled stand here led, inexorably, to the stepping up of the liberation war and the final inevitable defeat of colonial racist rule in Rhodesia. The Malta conference marked an important step in our path towards freedom and we cherish the memories of our stay here during that crucial period in our country's history.

As a further indication of your support for our liberation struggle and your concern for our future, you opened your doors to many young Zimbabweans who came here to study and thus prepare themselves for the task of rebuilding and developing their own nation once freedom and independence had been achieved there. Indeed, some of our students are still here completing their courses — a fine example of the marvellous degree of co-operation and brotherliness that exists between all fellow Commonwealth nations.

We look forward to having them back in Zimbabwe in the not-too-distant future, where they will be able to fully implement the skills they have learned here in Malta. We are deeply grateful to you for the assistance you have given us in this sphere, and for the very positive contribution and support you have given us throughout our long struggle towards freedom.

It is this very love of justice and freedom, not only for ourselves, but for mankind as a whole, which places us in direct and uncompromising opposition to any and all forms of discrimination whether racial, tribal, regional or religious, wherever they might occur and to any form of foreign interference or intervention in the affairs of a sovereign independent state.

.....

We fully support the Polisario Front in its just struggle for freedom in the western Sahara and, along with many other brother African states, we recognize the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic as a sovereign, independent state. We insist that it should be allowed to take its rightful place within the international community of nations and reject the divisive actions of those who would seek to deny the Saharawi people this right.

Our friends in Malta will, no doubt, agree with us when we point an accusatory finger at those external, imperialist forces which, regrettably, have successfully sabotaged two attempts to convene the 19th OAU Summit in Tripoli.

This unwarranted and unacceptable interference by external forces in our affairs must cease. Our detractors have taken much pleasure in the failure of the Tripoli conferences, but let them not underestimate our powers

of recovery or the underlying spirit of unity that binds all African nations and peoples together as one. A third 19th Summit is to be convened in the near future and we are confident that Africa will once more display the unity, determination and strength of purpose so necessary to meet the challenges and threats we face as a continent in today's world.

.....

Non-alignment indeed holds the key to our future prosperity and security. Unable and unwilling to compete with the super-powers in their headlong rush towards self-destruction, we, the non-aligned, seek refuge and draw our strength from the sanity that forms the basis of our movement. The right to genuine independence; the freedom to steer a middle course between the super-powers and their various military alliances; the promotion of universal peace based on the principles of dialogue and negotiation as the means of solving any and all disputes; the rejection of foreign intervention and interference in the internal affairs of independent, sovereign states; above all, perhaps, the urgent struggle towards the establishment of the new, more equitable international economic order. These are the ideals for which we strive in a world almost suffocating from the tension emanating from super-power rivalry.

The insane build-up of nuclear arms and unbelievable costly weapons systems by the main powers, has created unprecedented problems and tensions across our planet, and has developed into the single most dangerous and expensive problem facing our world today. And yet, despite their apparent realisation of these dangers, none of the big powers seems genuinely committed to bringing the arms race to an end. It is true that discussions have been held and that "agreements in principle" have been reached, but all the time, the spread and qualitative improvement of this deadly technology has continued, and the rest of the world has remained, seemingly helpless within the shadow of the aptly named "balance of terror".

As you well know, for years now, we in the developing world have appealed to those who have the funds, to cease this senseless wastage of human and material resources, and to redirect some of the enormous amounts of money they currently channel into the development of bigger and more devastating weaponry into positive development projects within the Third World — projects which would be of immense benefit to all, and which could do much to alleviate the desperate situation affecting those millions of people who presently live in a state of absolute poverty across the world.

Thus far, our appeals have been made in vain with the result that the very large gap between the developed and developing world has widened even further. Borrowing in these difficult times of world recession has become even more difficult, and real social and economic progress within the Third World has, effectively, ground to a halt.



Collectively, as a group of nations working together through the Commonwealth, and indeed, through any other international forum in which we can make our collective voice heard, it is our duty to reject the aggressive practices of superpowers and to reaffirm our unyielding commitment to the struggle for political and economic independence, and control over our own natural resources and economic programmes, and vigorously work towards an inevitable restructuring of the present, inequitable international economic order.

Text 74/83/DB from the office of the Prime Minister, issued by the Department of Information, Zimbabwe.

- B. Extracts from a speech by the Zimbabwean Prime Minister, the Hon. Robert Mugabe, at a banquet in his honour, in Dar-es-Salaam on 24 January 1983

My visit to Tanzania should be appropriately seen as "home coming," the warm welcome that I and my delegation have received is no doubt testimony to the fact. I know that this home-coming sentiment is equally shared by all the comrades in my delegation who have come back home with me.

Let me, on my own behalf and that of my delegation, express my very sincere gratitude to you and the people of Tanzania for the tremendous honour bestowed on us by your kind invitation to visit Tanzania and by the very warm welcome we have received. We feel greatly overwhelmed by your affection and respect for us. I can only hope that my Government and the people of Zimbabwe will live up to your expectations of us.

May I take this opportunity to express to you that my party ZANU (PF), the Government and the people of Zimbabwe feel deeply indebted to you Mwalimu, to Chama Cham Mapinduzi and to the Government and people of Tanzania for that crucial and unequalled role, demanding immense sacrifices, which you played in rendering us abundant assistance.

Indeed, when the history of the liberation of not only Zimbabwe but the whole central and southern Africa is finally written, the crucial role which Tanzania played must necessarily portray it as the main revolutionary mould in which our various territorial struggles took definite shape and content.

Here it was that, even before Tanganyika was independent, the formation of PAIMECA was inspired with a view to linking the freedom struggles of the region as essentially one inter-African struggle. Here it was also

that the politics and diplomacy combined to accelerate the pace towards Kenya's and Uganda's independence. Here it was that we who had been the victims of a contrived British Central African Federation strategy sometimes came to deliberate on how we could dismantle the stupid federations. And when that Federation was dismantled in 1963, here it was that the people of Zimbabwe found a sound venue for the development of their armed struggle.

Indeed, here also it was that the people of Mozambique, Angola, Namibia and South Africa had venues similar to ours for the formation of their struggles. Happily, the OAU had been formed and happily it had created a Liberation Committee as an organ through which Africa could further our decolonisation struggles. But more happily still, here it was that the headquarters of the Liberation Committee was established.

Tanzania, thus, became the melting pot of the revolutionary theory and practice of each liberation movement. Several military training camps accordingly emerged where our cadres were equipped with guerrilla skills for the overthrow of the colonial enemy.

In the case of Zimbabweans alone, our cadres were trained and groomed for their military and political role at such centres as Chunya, Itumbi, Mgagao, Morogoro, and Nachingweya. It was indeed in Tanzania that our national struggle for independence underwent a qualitative transformation and our cadres were systematically instructed in the art of the guerrilla struggle for liberation.

Unfortunately, in circumstances in which there were political divisions amongst us it was inevitable that quarrels would occur sometimes resulting in unfortunate fights and killings. We certainly abused Tanzanian hospitality not only once but on several occasions.

Yet, the Tanzanians remained extremely patient and forgiving for they recognized that their selfless contribution to the struggle for our liberation had to be sustained whatever impediments lay in our way. They recognized that the freedom of Mozambique, Angola, Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, would enhance the independence of Tanganyika in particular and of Africa in general. It is this rare degree of sacrifice and magnanimity which has endeared the people of Tanzania and their great leader, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, to us.

Zimbabwe is now free. The people of Zimbabwe will not tire of repeating to you Mwalimu and their gallant brothers and sisters of Tanzania: "Asante sana;" "Tinotenda zvikuru;" "Siyabonga kakhulu", "we are most grateful." Equally we express our gratitude to the Frontline States, the OAU and its Liberation Committee as headed by Executive Secretary Hashim Mbita for all the assistance given us.

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My visit provides us with another opportunity for a mutual appraisal of

Zimbabwe's and Tanzania's economic relations and examining effective and more practical methods of implementing the agreements that have already been concluded between our two countries. It is their exact fulfilment that must be the concern of all of us.

My delegation and I are aware that you have been engaged, since the Arusha Declaration of 1967 on a more systematic programme of achieving socialist transformation in Tanzania. We in our party, ZANU, having accepted socialism as our guiding philosophy for the transformation of our society, have a lot to learn from how you proceeded in the first instance to organise a socialist programme and secondly how you have gone about its fulfilment.

Whatever constraints you have had, and economic constraints there shall always be on developing countries, regardless of ideology, we applaud the decision by the Tanzanian people to work for the creation of a socialist state. Like you we believe socialism, with its principles of equality of man, and therefore, equal ownership of resources and means of production, equal right to contribute labour inputs and equitable sharing of returns, equal right to social services and amenities is a truly moral and selfless philosophy as opposed to capitalism and its host of inequalities and its emphasis on selfish individualism. Where socialism aims at the collective interest or communal sharing, the other promotes self-aggrandisement and acquisitiveness in the individual.

In Zimbabwe our struggle for equity and justice in the economic sector has hardly begun. We have just published our Three-Year Transitional National Development Plan under which we shall endeavour to lay a basis for socialist transformation across the various economic and social sectors.

This year as the year before, we are continuing all our efforts at rallying all our people whether they be workers, peasants or commercial farmers, industrialists or mining enterprises or whether they are public servants behind the tasks and programmes for fulfilment under the three-year plan.

But, like you and other Third World countries, we have serious economic constraints facing us, arising mainly from our lack of enough capital inputs, technology, skills and the depressed international market which offers our commodities poor prices.

We recognize, therefore, that the struggle for economic independence is going to be difficult. However, we take comfort in the fact that we are related to our neighbours in the region through SADCC and the PTA in the full hope that we can build a system of economic interdependence in the region which would have the effect of reducing our economic dependence on South Africa and other developed countries on which our economies have tended to rely to their detriment.

Whatever attempts we make at regional unity, and whatever regions of Africa we belong to, we all are of the African continent.

The unity of Africa, which you Mwalimu and other African leaders of the time chartered by founding the Organisation of African Unity in 1963, must continue to be sustained. The two attempts to convene the OAU Summit in Tripoli which failed to achieve a quorum have shown us that there are some elements, fortunately a minority of the OAU members, whose negative tendencies if allowed to continue will ultimately wreck our organisation.

Zimbabwe is delighted that those who have proved true to the OAU Charter and its principles are member states upon whose integrity we can continue to rely for the sustenance of the organization whatever the machinations of the dissident members and their manipulative masters might be.

Accordingly, my country hopes that the third attempt at convening the OAU Summit will not be allowed to suffer the same fate as the two previous attempts. Surely, the issue of western Sahara must now be taken as having long been concluded by the recognition granted the Saharawi Republic at the Sierra Leone Summit in 1980.

Zimbabwe and Tanzania have identical positions not only on many African issues, but also on the Middle East and the urgent need to find a home for the Palestinian people in Israel.

Let me conclude my address to you in the way I began by once again thanking you for having us back home. I want to assure you on behalf of the people of Zimbabwe that the bonds of friendship and solidarity between us will continue to grow each day from strength to strength.

Text 75/83/AC from the office of the Prime Minister, issued by the Department of Information, Zimbabwe.

- C. Speech by the Zimbabwean Prime Minister, the Hon. Robert Mugabe, read on his behalf by the Minister of Information, Posts and Telecommunications, at the opening of the United Nations Information Centre in Harare, on 7 February 1983

Let me first of all say how very pleased I am to be here today and how delighted we all are to welcome you, Secretary-General, on this your first visit to Zimbabwe, and indeed, to southern Africa as a whole.

I think the whole reason behind your visit — namely, a familiarization tour of our troubled corner of the world, a frank and open exchange of views and a mutual seeking of information on issues which concern all of us today — underlines and gives emphasis to the great importance we in Zimbabwe attach to this centre which we are opening today.

We are particularly honoured that the United Nations has seen it fit to establish such an information centre in Zimbabwe, and I can assure you that my Government will provide all possible assistance towards ensuring its success.

The efficient dissemination of information is a crucially important aspect of our lives in today's world. So much is happening, so fast, and in so many different parts of our planet, that it is physically impossible for us to keep abreast of all these developments. It is only through careful monitoring, recording and, more important, the distribution of this informational data that we are able to study and analyse world events, and to place them in a correct and balanced perspective.

You are well aware of our attempts within the Third World to work towards what we term a New World Information Order — a system of information dissemination completely free of bias from any quarter: a system which would report factually and faithfully on developments throughout the world without resorting to sensational and grossly distorted misrepresentations of the truth.

For too long now we in the developing world have been fed with information and news as it is seen and interpreted by the Western-controlled media. So much of it is incorrect, distorted and, in many cases, blatantly untrue, and it is a fact that we have all suffered as a result.

Zimbabwe, as a newly independent nation born out of armed conflict but committed to a policy of reconciliation and peaceful development, has received more than its fair share of this biased reporting over the past twelve months or so.

Day after day, our genuine and sincere efforts towards making our policies work within Zimbabwe are undermined by our foes and even by some of our so-called friends who, through selective and often inaccurate reporting, seek to ridicule us and cast grave doubts, within the international arena, upon our prospects for the future.

Of course we are not the only ones to suffer this way — in fact almost all genuinely progressive forces and movements throughout the world are treated in the same harsh, unfair manner as they struggle for liberty, justice and peace. One needs to look no further than the monstrous media campaigns waged by the imperialist information agencies against our compatriots in Namibia and South Africa, in the western Sahara, and our Palestinian brothers as they continue to wage their just struggles against racism and fascist oppression, to understand our ardent desire for a more balanced system of disseminating information.

I can assure you that nothing has so strengthened our common resolve and our determination to work towards such a new information order than the continual barrage of misinformation directed against us.

Ironically, not only are the controllers of the media and their supporters

doing us an injustice, but they also place themselves at a great disadvantage for they have become so enmeshed and entangled in their own distortions and lies that it must be very difficult, if not impossible, for them now to distinguish between truth and falsehood, and between fact and fabrication. And yet it is on the basis of such inaccurate information that policies, strategies and world opinion are formed.

The United Nations has also suffered throughout the years as a result of the negative and one-sided dissemination of information on its activities and its aspirations. For years in this country — when it was known as Rhodesia — the Smith regime and its propaganda element did all they could to tarnish the name of the United Nations and to revile all that it stood for.

All the positive developments of the organization and the major advances made through the efforts of the specialized agencies were kept from our oppressed people. We heard little about the activities of the World Health Organization, for example, or the major contributions made towards the creation of a better world by UNICEF, UNESCO, the UNDP and others. In short, we were kept completely ignorant of the organization and the full extent of its humanitarian efforts.

You know, of course, that one of the first actions of my Government when we came to power in April 1980 was to apply for membership of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. We have made a concerted effort to catch up on all that we missed throughout those dark years and I hope that our participation in the various activities of the organization and our membership, now, of the Security Council, are demonstrative of the full and dedicated commitment we have to the principles and noble objectives of the organisation's Charter.

From what I have said, it is clear that the United Nations Centre here in Harare will have a major role to play not only in Zimbabwe but also within the region as a whole. We are aware that practically all issues of importance to the international community on whatever subject either have been or will be discussed within the United Nations at one stage or another.

Accurate and unbiased records are kept of all sides to any one question and, of course, all parties are given an equal opportunity to present their cases. Now for us to be able to make up our minds as to where justice lies in any case, it is essential that we have access to all this information, to all sides of the story.

The centre here in Harare will be able to provide such balanced information and I am certain that if used properly — and I urge all those concerned to encourage maximum use of the facilities made available here — the centre will have a marked effect upon the development of international awareness amongst all Zimbabweans so important if we are to

make any meaningful contribution to world development and understanding.

We should also note that whereas in the past, we have been largely ignorant of the activities of the United Nations and its agencies, now this new centre will provide the opportunity for us to learn fully the extent of the United Nations' responsibilities, its achievements and, most important perhaps, its aspirations for the future.

In closing I would like to thank you once again for giving me the opportunity to open this Information Centre and I am sure that under the able direction of Cde Magoma, the Director, it will truly fulfil its intended role and will become a reliable, dependable link to international development and progress.

Text 89/83/SN/AC from the office of the Prime Minister, issued by the Department of Information, Zimbabwe.

- D. Extracts from a speech by the Zimbabwean Prime Minister, the Hon. Robert Mugabe, at the passing out parade of the People's Militia first instructors' course, in Bindura on 25 February 1983

I am glad to have had the opportunity of reviewing this important passing out parade today, and to observe for myself the results of the first instructors' course to be held for the Para-Military organization or People's Militia. . . .

In particular I would like to pay tribute to our comrades-in-arms, the instructors from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, who, with the assistance of instructors from our own Zimbabwe National Army, have brought the men under their command to such a high standard of fitness, co-ordination and alertness, as demonstrated by the parade's excellence of movement.

Once again we have an example of the splendid generosity and co-operation of our brother, the great leader Kim Il Sung, who from the beginning materially backed our struggle for freedom and has continued to assist us in a variety of ways since we achieved our independence.

In another very important aspect of practical and material aid the training of the 5th Brigade demonstrated the technical, military skill and efficiency of our Korean brothers which has now been transmitted to our own troops, resulting in a first class fighting unit that has proved its value on operations in dissident-affected areas.

One has only to look at the concept and magnificence of Heroes Acre to

appreciate that the beneficence of the great leader and his people extends even to the cultural side of our revolutionary progress. Coupled with this, I would cite the training given to our youth which has enriched the minds of these young people and brought them to an awareness of their own latent capabilities.

More recently the gift of a large shipment of rice was a most welcome gesture, filling a need at a time of shortage of that commodity. These and other acts demonstrate the depth of the solidarity between our comrades in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and ourselves, even though our two countries are separated by thousands of miles.

To the successful instructor graduates who now stand before us, I would say that, although today marks the end of your training, it is in fact only the beginning of your real task. From here you will be posted to various training camps to be established throughout the countryside, where you will undertake the work of passing on to the many thousands of the povo the expert knowledge that you have gained during your own course.

Each of you will now be appointed to a position of trust. Yours will be the responsibility to ensure that the same sense of purpose, enthusiasm and self discipline demanded of yourselves during training is instilled in the minds of those who in turn, will be looking to you for guidance.

The various skills you have acquired are essentially the tools that the povo eagerly await and need in the battle against the potential enemy. Success in imparting them can only be assured through your own dedication and determination to give of your best.

An important point for all of you to remember is that you are not only instructors, but leaders to whom the povo will look for guidance and example. It, therefore, behoves each and every one of you on parade today to abide by the qualities of good leadership in all your dealings with those with whom you will be in contact.

You will not be successful in your endeavours unless you can gain the respect of your pupils. Therefore, you must demonstrate with confidence that you have achieved the requisite knowledge to fit you for the task and the ability to put across your subjects clearly and simply. That, basically, is what your training here has been all about.

On occasion you will find that you need a good deal of patience while instructing because not every individual absorbs knowledge at the same speed.

You should learn, therefore, that it is necessary to keep a balanced outlook and recognize the fact that the aim is to train the greatest number possible, not just a small percentage. The povo will be keen to learn and you must match their enthusiasm with a desire to help them succeed.

As representatives of not only the People's Militia but of Government, your behaviour must always be above reproach and your fairness and hon-



esty must never be called into question. Any laxity in these respects will portray an adverse impression of the Para-Military, the Government and Party as a whole, and will constitute a disservice to the povo also.

As you are well aware by now, the People's Militia is designed to be an extension of the Police and the Armed Forces but will always be in the front line of our battle because it is in the rural areas that the enemy seeks to infiltrate to obtain food, water, money and cover.

The people must be trained to become the eyes and ears of Government, to be vigilant at all times and alert to the possibility that armed men may encroach on their areas. Some may even be armed, not with a weapon, but with dissenting tongues, to sow the seeds of doubt and discord among the people. In many cases these interlopers are more dangerous because they are trained to sound plausible and their objective is to lure people away from the path to socialism. Armed or unarmed, the People's Militia must warn the Armed Forces and police of the presence of such elements immediately they are detected. Only that way can we make their position untenable throughout the whole of Zimbabwe.

Let all evil-doers, including the bandit and dissident elements currently perpetrating heinous crimes in parts of our country, be aware that our forces are capable of hunting them down and destroying them, piecemeal or wholesale. They cannot escape retribution either now or in the long run. They would be advised now to take stock of their situations and aims, whatever these may be, and come to the inescapable conclusion that to grasp the ploughshare is to secure life but to maintain the use of guns is to court death.

There is still time for them to recant but the opportunity is receding rapidly as our patience runs out and as they continue to intimidate, rob, maim and murder our people in the mistaken hope that this will gain them the support to overthrow the people's Government. Their only resource to legitimate power is through the medium of the ballot box but the majority voice of the people has already thundered a complete rejection of what they stand for.

Text 130/83/DB from the office of the Prime Minister, issued by the Department of Information, Zimbabwe.

## E. Relations with South Africa

- (i) Message, dated 13 December 1982, from the Government of Zimbabwe to the Government of Lesotho, following the South African raid into Lesotho on 9 December 1982

It is with a profound sense of horror and deep shock that the Government of Zimbabwe learned of the cold-blooded massacre carried out by the troops of the racist Pretoria regime against the peace-loving and defenceless people of Lesotho in the early hours of yesterday morning.

This latest example of savage aggression waged in the bloody name of apartheid, and in total defiance of the international laws governing respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity of an independent state, left many dead and wounded in its wake. As usual, the racist troops did not only content themselves with the slaughtering of defenceless refugees, but proceeded to murder innocent women and children before fleeing back to their racist bases.

Coming after the Matola massacres in Maputo last year, the continuous massacres in south Angola in the last two years, we see a pattern here of intensified aggression in the whole region. The two attempts to enter Zimbabwe which have been uncovered and neutralized confirm that the racist regime is bent on naked aggression and destabilization of the whole region.

We offer our deepest sympathies to the Government and people of Lesotho and more especially to those whose loved ones fell in this heinous and dastardly attack. We in Zimbabwe feel their losses are our own and are with them in the tears they shed for the victims of Pretoria's genocide.

So often during our own hard struggle for liberation, the racist forces of Rhodesia tried to destroy us and break our spirit and using the same sort of tactics as used by the racists at dawn yesterday. But they failed — and they failed because we knew that we were right, that our struggle was a just one and that in spite of the odds weighing heavily against us, we would win in the end.

And so it is in South Africa. For as the struggle progresses, and as contradictions begin to show within the apartheid edifice, the enemy is becoming more irrational and thus, more savage and vicious in his reactions. In his panic, he is turning his guns onto refugee camps, the shelters for women and children, and onto a small and peace-loving nation.

The Government and people of Zimbabwe condemn, in the strongest possible terms, this monstrous act. We deplore the pain and suffering inflicted upon the people of Lesotho who, despite their small numbers, have stood firm and proud in their opposition to the apartheid evil that surrounds them.

We call upon the international community to condemn this murderous

act of aggression and to come forward to the assistance of the Kingdom of Lesotho.

Text 1209/82/JM/DB from the office of the Prime Minister, issued by the Department of Information Zimbabwe.

- (ii) Extract from a speech by the Zimbabwean Prime Minister, the Hon. Robert Mugabe, in Valetta, Malta, on 22 January 1983

We, like our Maltese brothers, totally condemn the criminal apartheid regime in Pretoria which, despite mounting international opposition and outrage, continues to impose its barbaric policies of racial oppression upon the long-suffering black masses within South Africa itself, and upon the people of Namibia.

Worse than that, Pretoria's military machine pursues its ruthless, arrogant policy of destabilization and outright aggression against its neighbouring black states — including Zimbabwe — leaving untold misery and destruction in its wake. The main victims of these brutal violations of sovereign territorial integrity have been our brothers in Angola, Mozambique and now, Lesotho, where, less than two months ago, hundreds of racist troops swept down upon sleeping refugees and murdered them where they lay in their beds.

Pretoria backs rebel movements in both Angola and Mozambique, and is currently harbouring many Zimbabwean dissidents whom it is training and equipping for eventual reinfiltration back into Zimbabwe for the purpose of spreading terror and fear in our land.

But, as our Maltese brothers have stood firm and faced their foes across the ages, so we of the Frontline States are determined to stand firm against such naked aggression from the apartheid menace across our borders. Through the Organization of African Unity, we fully support the liberation struggle being waged by the ANC and PAC freedom fighters in South Africa, and we will continue to lend whatever moral, diplomatic and political support we can until such time as they achieve their ultimate goals and the scourge of apartheid is eradicated forever.

Similarly, we fully support SWAPO in its just struggle for freedom in Namibia and we call upon the so-called Western Contact Group to stop dancing to Pretoria's tune, but to move towards a speedy and full implementation of United Nations Resolution 435.<sup>1</sup> We reject the recent con-

1. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 14, December 1978, pp. 43-44.

trived demands by the United States Government that Cuban troops be withdrawn from Angola as a pre-requisite for the independence of Namibia — this amounts to no less than interference by the United States and South Africa in the internal affairs of Angola, and we cannot accept that, nor can we bow to such blackmail.

The same love of peace and justice that our two peoples share in common leads us to fully support the struggle for freedom waged by nationalist and liberation movements the world over against oppressive, dictatorial, neo-colonialist regimes which ignore the just aspirations of the broad masses they rule over and revert to brutally repressive measures, reminiscent of the very worst periods of the colonial era, to maintain themselves in power. To those brave patriots, we pledge our unwavering support and solidarity, and we would urge them to fight on and never give up their heroic struggle against the evil forces of imperialism, fascism and neo-colonialism.

Text 74/83/DB from the office of the Prime Minister, issued by the Department of Information, Zimbabwe.

(iii) Extract from a speech by the Zimbabwean Prime Minister, the Hon. Robert Mugabe, at a banquet in his honour, in Dar-es-Salaam on 24 January 1983

We recognize that our African task to effect the complete decolonization of Africa has not yet been completed. The independence process in Namibia continues to be frustrated by the insistence jointly by the United States and South Africa on the withdrawal of Cubans from Angola as a condition.

However else the Americans try to put it, and the other day Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, objecting to my use of the word "blackmail", referred to their stance as "bargaining". We fail to understand the morality underlying their theory of bargaining with the lives of the Namibian people. The Namibian people could never be persuaded to agree that, because their Angolan neighbours have befriended Cubans who are not quite the friends of the United States, their right to independence stands forfeit unless the Cubans are withdrawn.

We reject outrightly this immoral and illegitimate demand and insist that Resolution 435<sup>1</sup> be recognized and implemented against the back-

1. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 14, December 1978, pp. 43-44.

ground of the provisions of the United Nations Charter and the inherent right of self-determination of the Namibian people.

Apart from the situation of political impasse in Namibia, there is the continually worsening situation in South Africa where the apartheid system grows more vicious by the day. In its national dimension, it continues to be more oppressive and exploitative of the broad masses of South Africa.

We take note of, and applaud, the successful strides which are being made by the ANC, PAC and the South African masses in intensifying their fight for the establishment of democracy in the country.

In its international dimension, the apartheid system is sought to be sustained by a planned strategy of a military and economic nature against Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. The recent brutal attack on ANC refugees in Lesotho is another manifestation of this strategy aimed at destabilizing our systems in the hope that such destabilization can lead either to the toppling of our Governments or to our coercion into accepting the system of apartheid and thus become subservient to the South African regime. Zimbabwe refuses to be intimidated into abandoning its basic principles and the moral and political stand it has taken against apartheid.

My visit provides us with another opportunity for a mutual appraisal of Zimbabwe's and Tanzania's economic relations and for examining effective and more practical methods of implementing the agreements that have already been concluded between our two countries. It is their exact fulfilment that must be the concern of all of us.

Text 75/83/AC from the office of the Prime Minister, issued by the Department of Information, Zimbabwe.

(iv) Extract from a speech by the Zimbabwean Prime Minister, the Hon. Robert Mugabe, at the passing out parade of the People's Militia first instructors' course, in Bindura on 25 February 1983

Not all those who wish to destroy us are internal dissenters, however, for there are also external forces who wish to deter us from establishing our new society. I am referring to the apartheid regime of South Africa which has been sponsoring acts of banditry against us and striving cunningly to synchronize them with those of ZAPU's dissidents.

Indeed, in the past few days we have become more aware of a positive link between the external threat from South Africa and the internal activities of Nkomo's dissidents. It is surely to the undying shame of Nkomo and ZAPU that he and his party now seek the active support of South

Africa in order to cause chaos in the country and so attempt to bring down the people's Government. What does he hope to gain?

The people of Zimbabwe will never permit this utterly dishonest and opportunistic man and his discredited party to negate the gains of our revolution. But because ZAPU in its desperation is resorting to South Africa for military support, we must for ever maintain our vigilance and stay permanently ready to defend our hard-won independence. This is why we must hasten our military training arrangements which we are determined to spread to all parts of the country.

I am highly impressed by the tremendous efforts put into the planning and administration of this course by Deputy Minister, Cde Ndangana, and his staff. Despite a lack of proper buildings and having to make do with tentage, a shortage of transport plus a variety of other problems, they succeeded in running a course for over 700 comrades at Gokwe some months ago and, today, have taken a step further by producing this our first team of instructors for the People's Militia. Only by acquiring the ability and capability to defend their homes, communities, and country can our people achieve their total security and peace, and with them their progress and prosperity as envisaged under our plans.

Text 130/83/DB from the office of the Prime Minister, issued by the Department of Information, Zimbabwe.