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## Southern Africa Record

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## Namibia

- A. United Nations Security Council Debate, 23 May to 1 June 1983, held at the request of the African Group and the Group of Non-Aligned Countries.
- (i) Statement, on 23 May, by the Indian Minister for External Affairs, the Hon. P.V. Narasima Rao, as Chairman of the Group of Non-Aligned Countries.

I have come before this august body, along with several of my colleagues from non-aligned countries on the strength of a mandate from the Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries who met at their Seventh Conference at New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983. At that Conference, the Heads of State or Government

. . . called upon the United Nations Security Council to meet as soon as possible in order to consider further action on the implementation of its plan for Namibia's independence thereby assuming its primary responsibility for implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978)<sup>1</sup>. (*S/15675 para. 49*)

The presence here today of a large number of Foreign Ministers from non-aligned countries is a reflection of the fact that the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries has traditionally considered the question of Namibia as an issue of paramount concern and made common cause with the people of Namibia in their struggle for freedom and dignity.

The New Delhi summit devoted considerable attention to this question of critical importance and reaffirmed the fundamental principles highlighted in successive meetings and conferences of the Movement, which are as follows:

One, the people of Namibia have the inalienable right to self-determination, freedom and national independence in a united Namibia, including Walvis Bay, the Penguin and other offshore islands;

1. See *Southern Africa Record* no. 14, December 1978, p. 43.

Two, Namibia is the direct responsibility of the United Nations;

Three, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) is the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people;

Four, the continued illegal occupation of Namibia by the racist South African régime and its refusal to comply with resolutions of the United Nations, as well as its attempts to devise and impose fraudulent constitutional and political schemes from time to time to perpetuate its hold on that Territory, should be condemned vigorously and unequivocally by the international community;

Five, South Africa's exploitation of the natural resources of Namibia, directly by itself as well as through foreign interests under the protection of the occupying administration is illegal and constitutes a serious violation of the United Nations Charter and an obstacle to the political independence of Namibia;

Six, the activities of SWAPO, in particular the People's Liberation Army of Namibia, including armed struggle, against the illegal administration of the forces of occupation are fully justified as a legitimate means to achieve freedom and national independence;

Seven, the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement pledge to render all possible material, financial, military, political, humanitarian, diplomatic and moral assistance to SWAPO in its struggle to secure the total liberation of Namibia;

Eight, Security Council resolution 435 (1978) containing the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia constitutes the only basis for the peaceful settlement of the Namibian question, and any linkage or parallelism between the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola must be categorically rejected.

I have just given a complete recapitulation of the position of the Non-Aligned Movement on what has become a sad chapter in the annals of the United Nations, which otherwise has reason to be proud of its record in the quest for decolonization. The same principles have indeed been endorsed year after year by the United Nations itself. In spite of this, and in spite of the fact that for almost 17 long years now Namibia has been a direct trust of the United Nations, the Territory continues to remain under the illegitimate occupation of a repressive and racist régime which has continued to treat the will of the international community with utter contempt.

All this while the people of Namibia have suffered the tyranny of bondage and deprivation. They have been denied any role in their Government, barred from exercising their basic human rights, forced virtually at gunpoint to join the so-called South West Africa Force to fight their own people and herded into a tiny fraction of their land through the extension within Namibia of the infamous Bantustan system. Ruthless and systema-

tic attempts are being made by South Africa to undermine, discredit and destroy SWAPO. The economic resources of Namibia continue to be plundered.

South Africa has also used the Territory of Namibia to launch acts of aggression, intimidation, destabilization and depredation against independent African States in the region, thus creating a serious threat to regional and international peace and security. Pretoria has similarly carried out reprisal attacks against front-line States on one pretext or another, the air raid against Mozambique reported today is the latest. Apart from the enormous human and material losses to the front-line States as a result of these attacks, hundreds of thousands of people have been made refugees in the many countries which were already bearing the burden of refugees fleeing from Namibia.

Can the international community afford to allow South Africa to continue to flout all norms of civilized conduct in this fashion? For how much longer must the Namibian people endure untold sufferings? What else must be allowed to happen, and at what price to the Namibian patriots, for the United Nations to bring the full weight of its legal, moral and political authority to bear on the racist, illegal régime of South Africa in order to obtain full independence for Namibia, for which the United Nations has assumed unique responsibility?

It is now more than four years since this Council adopted resolution 435 (1978) containing the United Nations plan for Namibian independence. These years have seen the hopes of the world community wax and wane, expectations being raised now and again only to be betrayed on every occasion. The Pretoria régime has raised one issue after another, invariably on flimsy grounds, with a view to delaying a settlement. The latest in the series of pretexts has been the attempted linkage of parallelism by which the issue of Namibian independence has been sought to be entangled with an entirely irrelevant and extraneous question. We deeply regret that certain countries have, together with Pretoria, projected this linkage and have thus only abetted South Africa in its persistent designs aimed at further delaying the independence of Namibia. We note with satisfaction that some members of the Western contact group of five have dissociated themselves from this linkage. But others have not done so, and it is indeed on the support and assistance of these countries that the racist Government of South Africa relies and without which it could not possibly continue to be so intransigent. The feelings and views of the overwhelming majority of the international community on this and other related aspects of the Namibian question have again been clearly expressed in the Declaration adopted by acclamation at the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence held recently in Paris.

Two years ago, when the talks organized by the Secretary-General for

the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) had broken down and when doubt was being cast on the very relevance of resolution 435 (1978), the Security Council was convened in similar extraordinary circumstances, and I had occasion to address the Council. Although the Council was then unable to take an immediate decision, the debate on that occasion helped categorically to reaffirm the continuing validity of resolution 435 (1978). The front-line States and SWAPO have laboured long and arduously since then, through intensive consultations undertaken with the Western contact group, to remove all the doubts and obstacles that had come in the way of implementation of resolution 435 (1978). As we are now informed by the Secretary-General in his report, this phase of the work of the contact group has concluded. According to that report:

the only outstanding issues are the choice of the electoral system and the settlement of some final problems relating to the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) and its composition. (S/15776, para. 18)<sup>2</sup>

SWAPO has given a positive response, but South Africa has been dragging its feet and has delayed giving a reply. This then remains the only impediment, posed by South Africa, to putting into operation the United Nations plan envisaged under resolution 435 (1978).

I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to express a special word of appreciation for the strenuous efforts exerted by the Secretary General of the United Nations towards making Namibian independence a reality. We are all aware of his deep personal commitment to this question and the intensive consultations he has carried out particularly over the last year with all the parties concerned and in various places, with a view to ensuring the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). As he has himself stated in his report the Secretary General regards the problem of Namibia as his special responsibility, in view of the unique relationship between the United Nations and the people of Namibia. We pay tribute to him for his dedication and his assiduous espousal of the Namibian cause. We deem it appropriate that this Council should strengthen his hands in this endeavour.

As I said earlier, considerable time has elapsed since the adoption of resolution 435 (1978). It is high time that the Security Council devoted its attention to the imperative necessity of implementing that resolution without further delay. By doing so, not only would it be addressing itself to its primary responsibility, but it would also demonstrate the will to implement its own decisions as is incumbent upon it in terms of the Charter of the United Nations. My delegation is convinced that the Council must

2. It is intended to publish this Report of the UN Secretary-General in the following issue of *Southern Africa Record*.



now stipulate a definite time frame for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and remain actively seized of the question until that process is completed. If South Africa continues to defy the Council's decisions, the Council should be prepared to consider appropriate action under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Decisive action on the part of the Council will, in turn, demand a display of the necessary political will and co-operation on the part of all its members, particularly those States, both within the Council and outside it, that might especially be in a position to facilitate the process. We hope that all concerned will finally be able to rise above considerations of narrow self interest and help in the fulfilment of their common commitment, namely, the independence of Namibia.

The Indian people and the Government of India have always held dear the Namibian cause, this is of a piece with India's abiding commitment to the universal principles of human freedom and dignity. We have actively participated in earlier deliberations in this Council as well as in other forums on the Namibian question. On every such occasion we have fervently supported the inalienable right of the Namibian people to independence. We have decried South Africa's continued illegal occupation of the Territory, its unscrupulous plunder of Namibia's resources, the repression of its people and South Africa's belligerent acts which threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the front line States and other independent African countries of the region. India was among the first countries to address the question of Namibia at the United Nations in 1946. Also in 1946, India imposed comprehensive voluntary sanctions against South Africa. We have been happy and proud to extend moral and material assistance to the people of Namibia through the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). In the United Nations Council for Namibia we have striven to protect and preserve the interests of Namibia and to promote by all means its early accession to independence.

The Security Council has a solemn responsibility towards the people of Namibia. It must now discharge that responsibility resolutely and expeditiously. It must brook no further prevarication or dilatory tactics. It must not permit itself to be paralysed into inaction and sully its prestige as the most powerful organ of the United Nations and as the guardian of international peace and security. The situation in southern Africa and in Namibia is explosive and is becoming a serious threat to regional and world peace. If Namibian independence does not become a reality soon, the consequences could be disastrous.

In conclusion, I have the honour to read out the following message from Mrs Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India and Chairperson of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries:

For 17 years Namibia has been the direct trust of the United

Nations. Throughout this period, South Africa has continued to occupy Namibia in brazen defiance of the will of the world community and has inflicted indignities on the Namibian people. Lately these acts of aggression have been increasing.

The Security Council has a solemn responsibility for the people of Namibia, whose right to independence can no longer be delayed. The Council must make South Africa comply with the United Nations plan, by imposing mandatory sanctions if necessary. India hopes that this special meeting of the Security Council will support and give hope to the brave freedom fighters of SWAPO.

(ii) Statement, on 23 May, by the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, Sir John Thomson.

This debate is opening against a sombre background. Once again the process of negotiation and of dialogue has been punctuated by horrifying acts of violence. The events of the past four days are a bad augury for our efforts in this debate to promote a peaceful settlement in Namibia. As I made clear in this Council on 15 December last year, my Government has always deplored the use of violence from any quarter in the search for solutions to the problems of southern Africa. Today in London the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Mr Francis Pym, issued the following statement:

I was shocked to hear of the incidents this morning involving attacks by South African forces on targets in Mozambique. I deeply regret the human suffering these will have caused and I deplore this violence of Mozambique's sovereignty. I have repeatedly made clear my view that the problems of southern Africa cannot be solved by violence. I condemn these actions just as I condemn the violence in Pretoria on Friday, when a car bomb caused loss of life and injury. There is a desperate need to break the vicious circle where violence begets violence and to seek peaceful solutions to the region's problems.

The horrifying toll in civilian casualties from the Pretoria car bomb and the openly acknowledged violation of Mozambican sovereignty further underline the pressing need for a successful outcome to current negotiations, which we are now discussing. In the nine months I have been here, it has become plain to me that the Namibian question is one of the most urgent and important questions facing the United Nations. It is a problem for which the United Nations has direct responsibility. And it is a problem which, I am convinced, can be solved peacefully and through negotiation. The achievement of such a solution will be good for all of us and for the United Nations.

My Government, together with our partners in the contact group, have consistently recognized the urgent need for a negotiated settlement. Through our close friendship with a wide range of African countries, we have constantly been aware of the deep feelings aroused by the unlawful occupation of Namibia and of its effect on the security and stability of the region. There has been no ambivalence in our support for a peaceful solution. It was indeed dedication to such a solution which brought together five like-minded members of the Security Council in 1977 and 1978 in a unique exercise in creative diplomacy. This led to the formulation of the settlement proposal and to Security Council resolution 435 (1978)<sup>1</sup>.

I welcome the participation in this debate of many Foreign Ministers, coming from a wide variety of countries — from the front-line States, the Organization of African Unity and the Non-Aligned Movement. Their presence makes it all the more important that we should use this occasion to underline our unanimity on the question of Namibia. On behalf of the United Kingdom, may I also welcome Mr Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), to New York, some 12 years, I believe, since he first took part in a Security Council debate.

The report we have received from the Secretary-General, written with his customary frankness and lucidity, provides useful background to our deliberations. My Government fully agrees with him on the importance of a settlement, the progress which has been made to lay a sound foundation for one, and the urgent need to strengthen efforts to bring about the early independence of Namibia.

I should like not only to thank the Secretary-General for his report but also to express appreciation of the personal concern he has shown for Namibia. Since taking office, he has publicly assigned a very high priority to this subject. As he mentions in his report, he has kept in close and frequent contact with the parties. He has visited the front-line States and he has taken advantage of international gatherings and bilateral meetings to discuss Namibia with a very large number of the world's leaders.

Under the Secretary-General's supervision, the Secretariat has worked impressively to develop the preparations for implementation and for the emplacement of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to their present advanced level. Much credit for this must go to the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Namibia, Mr Martti Ahtisaari. Members of the contact group have co-operated closely with the Secretariat in this preparatory work. The group has held many discussions with the Secretary-General and his officials over the past year. The United Kingdom, like other members of the group has told the Secretary-General

1. See *Southern Africa Record* no. 14, December 1978. p. 43.

that it stands ready to make a substantial contribution to the large and costly exercise of implementing the settlement proposal.

The Secretary-General and his staff have shown their awareness of the importance of demonstrating that the United Nations can act swiftly, impartially and effectively to implement the settlement plan. This will be vital to secure the confidence of the parties, although, of course, it is not sufficient in and of itself to achieve implementation.

It is two years since the Security Council last debated Namibia. Members of the Council and of the United Nations as a whole are concerned, as we are, at the slow rate of progress towards implementation. It is natural that the Security Council should now wish to review the situation. I welcome the opportunity to make a statement on the progress achieved by the group of which the United Kingdom is a member in partnership with the front-line States and with other United Nations Members and the Secretariat.

I begin by reiterating the principle to which the contact group adheres of a peaceful, just and internationally acceptable settlement. I trust that all who participate in this debate will equally state their adherence to this principle. Furthermore, I trust that they will agree that every possible effort should be made to avoid bloodshed and escalation of the conflict, that they will bear in mind the Security Council's particular responsibility for the settlement plan and that they will help to protect the role and standing of the Council.

As all members of this Council are aware, the very nature of the Security Council's work and its ability to take constructive steps to solve the problems brought before it are under separate consideration. We have recently had Security Council debates on various issues which have failed to produce a positive outcome. Last week, however, the Council adopted unanimously a helpful resolution on Nicaragua. It gave the Council's support to the efforts of the Contadora Group, a Latin American form of contact group.

This week we have the opportunity, through a constructive debate and resolution, to provide additional impetus to the march towards a Namibian settlement. I hope that the Council, together with those non-members who give us the benefit of their wisdom, will seize this opportunity and give support to the contact group on Namibia.

Just as we have the chance to help, so also it lies within the power of this Council to hinder a settlement. This is something we have to bear in mind. I cannot believe that there is anyone here who seeks to undermine a peaceful solution. Anyone who did would do ill to the people of Namibia and of the other countries affected by the dispute that so urgently need the settlement outlined in Security Council resolution 435 (1978). But even with the best intentions, we can all make mistakes. Here is a matter on which we

must be practical, not precipitate, prudent rather than prejudicial. We all want the same outcome. We must take care to see that the path we follow will lead to it.

In the first part of his report the Secretary-General has provided the Council with a concise factual summary of developments over the past two years. I should not take up the time of the Council by repeating what he has set out so clearly. However, it may be helpful if I expand on certain aspects of the negotiations in which the contact group has been concerned.

The events of the past two years must be seen against the background of the failure of the pre-implementation meeting in Geneva.<sup>2</sup> Geneva was the low point in the long history of these negotiations. The drive for a peaceful settlement appeared to have reached an impasse. This was particularly disappointing for the United Kingdom, which just over a year beforehand had signed the Lancaster House Agreement to end the conflict in what was then Southern Rhodesia. In his concluding statement at Lancaster House the British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary expressed the hope that the successful outcome to those talks would have a favourable impact on the Namibian negotiations.

On 19 January 1981 Lord Carrington described the failure to reach agreement in Geneva as an especially regrettable setback after the great efforts of the United Nations, the Western Five and the front-line States to meet the reasonable concerns of South Africa and the internal parties. He expressed the British Government's support for the closing appeal of the Chairman of the conference to those concerned to reconsider their position. The appeal to the Government of South Africa to review the implications of the meeting and to reconsider its position was subsequently renewed by the previous Secretary-General in his report to this Council in document S/14333.

The Geneva meeting showed with crystal clarity, that while the negotiations had not formally broken down, there was an urgent need to explore fresh ways of giving momentum to them. This indeed was reflected by the last Secretary-General in the concluding remarks of his report. In response to the Secretary-General's appeal, the contact group undertook an urgent reassessment of the situation at meetings of senior officials and Foreign Ministers in the spring of 1981. The members of the group decided to continue and to redouble their efforts to bring about a settlement. They reaffirmed their conviction that only a settlement under the aegis of the United Nations would be acceptable to the international community and that Security Council resolution 435 (1978) remained a solid basis for the transition to independence of Namibia. In view of the obstacles which had ari-

2. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 23, June 1981, pp. 3-18.

sen to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), the contact group decided to develop proposals which would give greater confidence to all parties regarding the future of an independent Namibia.

The contact group therefore undertook a further round of international consultations during 1981. As in the past, it sought to work in partnership with the front-line States and to keep the United Nations Secretariat informed of its activities. Senior representatives of the contact group held a series of meetings in Africa with counterparts from the front-line States and SWAPO. Parallel consultations were conducted with the South African Government. In these consultations the contact group directly addressed the problems which had resulted in the impasse at Geneva. It was able to secure broad agreement on a constitutional framework which would provide confidence in Namibia's political future.

Having achieved this broad agreement, the contact group gave the first priority to refining a set of constitutional principles which would be acceptable to all. By the spring of 1982 work on these principles was almost complete. Against the background of solid and encouraging progress, the Foreign Ministers of the contact group met in Luxembourg on 17 May 1982. They decided that negotiations on all matters should be accelerated in order to take advantage of the more favourable climate for a settlement which had emerged. They set in hand a further contact group mission, which visited certain African countries in June 1982. As a result of this mission and of a subsequent meeting of the front-line States, it was agreed that informal consultations should be held in New York.

Thus, through the diplomatic partnership of the two informal groups of interlocutors, by the middle of last year we had succeeded in recovering the ground lost in Geneva. In July and August of 1982 the informal consultations took place here in New York. Final agreement was reached on the text of principles concerning the constituent assembly and the constitution for an independent Namibia. As the Secretary-General has reported, these were transmitted to him on 12 July 1982 and were subsequently distributed as document S/15287.<sup>3</sup>

Substantial progress was made in the consultations on other outstanding issues. These, too, are covered in the Secretary-General's report and I need not therefore repeat the details. Throughout this period parallel consultations were being conducted with the South African Government. The contact group also engaged in detailed planning with officials of the Secretariat. By 24 September 1982, at the outset of the last session of the General Assembly, representatives of the contact group and of the front-line States and SWAPO were in a position jointly to report to the Secretary-General on the progress they had made.

3. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 29, December 1982. pp. 15-16.

At this stage I should perhaps summarize the situation which has been reached as a result of the activity I have described. The cornerstone of our approach is, as ever, the contact group's proposal for a settlement of 10 April 1978,<sup>4</sup> which was drafted in accordance with resolution 385 (1976) and was adopted by the Council in resolution 435 (1978). Resolution 435 (1978) has been accepted by all parties and stands as the basis for an internationally recognized settlement.

The principles concerning the constituent assembly and the constitution of an independent Namibia have, as I have already noted, been agreed and published. These lay down unambiguously the eligibility of every Namibian to participate in elections without discrimination or fear of intimidation, to vote in secret and to be guaranteed full freedom of speech, assembly, movement and the press. All political parties are to have a full and fair opportunity to organize and to participate in the electoral process, and the electoral system will seek to ensure fair representation in the constituent assembly of different political parties which gain substantial support in the election. Namibia is to be a unitary, sovereign and democratic State, whose constitution will be the supreme law and may be amended only by a designated process. The executive and legislative branches of the Government are to be constituted by periodic and genuine elections held by secret vote. There is to be a declaration of fundamental rights, which will be consistent with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Criminal offences cannot be created with retrospective effect. Provision is to be made for the balanced structuring of the public service, the police service and the defence services and for equal access by all to recruitment for these services. Provision is also to be made for the establishment of elected councils for local or regional administration.

In accepting these principles, the parties have committed themselves to a future for Namibia in which all the people of the Territory may have confidence. Likewise, the impartiality problem, which was the major stumbling-block in Geneva, has in essence been resolved. This is described in paragraph 12 of the Secretary-General's report.

Substantial progress has also been made on the composition and deployment of the military component of UNTAG. Other essential preparations for the emplacement of UNTAG in Namibia have been taken to an advanced level by the Secretariat. These, too, are recorded in the Secretary-General's report, in paragraph 10.

In paragraph 18 of his report, the Secretary-General states that as far as the United Nations is concerned the only outstanding issues are the choice of the electoral system and the settlement of some final problems relating to UNTAG and its composition. He also says that in his talks with the

4. *Op. cit.* no. 12, May 1978. pp. 25-30.

representatives of South Africa he has stressed the urgency of proceeding with the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). I record my Government's agreement on both points. These are indeed the only outstanding problems under resolution 435 (1978). The United Kingdom would like to see a climate created in which implementation can take place as soon as possible and with the certainty of success.

We appreciate the constructive and flexible attitude of the parties, in particular that of our African partners, which has made possible substantial progress towards the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). We reiterate our commitment to that goal and to the achievement of a settlement in the region. We share the concern that factors relating to the regional situation in southern Africa — which are, however, outside the scope of the contact group's mandate — have not yet permitted implementation of the United Nations plan.

We must find a way to make the final leap forward. The people of Namibia have waited too long for their freedom and independence. We are very conscious too of the hardship which the people of Angola have undergone since 1976 and are still facing. We have much sympathy for them in their protracted suffering. It is time the people of Angola were able to live their lives in peace, free from foreign occupation, from external interference and from acts of violence from any quarter. The problems of the region cannot be solved by violence. There must be a solution in Namibia which assures the security of all States in the region, and the security requirements of Angola and of the Angolan Government must be fully met in any settlement.

In this context we are deeply concerned at the continuing presence on Angolan territory of elements of the armed forces of South Africa. We know that the parties are in direct contact about these problems, and we very much hope that these talks will lead to a successful outcome. The United Nations plan for Namibia cannot, of course, be implemented without the withdrawal of these South African forces. A Namibia settlement requires their withdrawal.

This is of course a sovereign matter for the Angolan Government, and we must all respect its decisions. This being so, we are reluctant to cut across the actions of the Angolan Government. We do not wish to tell it how to conduct its own affairs, and this I am sure is also the view of our friends in the front-line States, yet at the same time we hope that a satisfactory conclusion to these talks will be reached quickly. Then we can focus on the business of the implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

We have struck a road-block, but we are determined to remove it. We are maintaining our efforts with all urgency and believe that, with the continuing support of the international community, they can be brought to fruition. Our concern is to try to solve the practical problem, and together



with our partners we are continuing to work to this end.

While the independence of Namibia is our main goal we must not forget its economic development. This is an important objective which the contact group has borne in mind. We are very concerned about the effects of the extended conflict and also about the drought which has afflicted Namibia for so many years. At the time of independence Namibia will face a difficult economic transition. As in the case of Zimbabwe, we hope to assist the new nation in its efforts to overcome these problems. We have long experience and useful technical skills, developed through economic co-operation with many other countries, which we believe could help to promote Namibia's longer-term economic and social development. We would naturally be happy to work with other Governments and international organizations in such programmes.

At the end of his report the Secretary-General concludes that much progress has been made in laying a sound foundation for the just and peaceful settlement of the Namibian problem and calls urgently on all concerned to strengthen and concert their efforts within the framework of the United Nations. He urges us all to demonstrate the necessary political will to bring about the early independence of Namibia in accordance with the United Nations plan. As the first member of the contact group to speak, I am happy to accept the Secretary-General's call. I am sure that our partners that follow me will do likewise.

The joint efforts of the front-line States and the contact group have brought us tantalizingly close to success. I would like to pay a tribute to the tenacity, patience and skill that members of both groups have shown in the pursuit of a peaceful settlement. I cannot believe that anyone who is genuinely concerned for the people of southern Africa would argue that the progress we have made should be abandoned. There is, as I have said, a practical difficulty which is not of our making but, as I have demonstrated, progress has been made. At Geneva, we were near the bottom of the valley. We have come up a long way since, even if we have not yet quite reached the peak. There are grounds for encouragement in the solid achievements since the last debate in this Council. We have successfully negotiated boulders, gulleys and glaciers. If we maintain this course we shall succeed. We have self-interest as well as justice on our side. Continued occupation of Namibia — in defiance of the international community and at great cost in political, human and economic terms — cannot serve the best interests of South Africa.

There are soft options we could have taken. After Geneva we could all too easily have abandoned the search for a peaceful settlement and thus evaded the brickbats which are from time to time hurled at the searchers. There are moments when membership of the contact group feels like the walnut tree in Aesop's Fables. People passing the tree would fling sticks

and stones at its branches in order to bring down the fruit, and the tree suffered severely. "It is hard," cried the tree, "that the very persons who enjoy my fruit should thus reward me with insults and blows." May I remind our friends that, while the walnut is usually the last tree in the forest to burst into leaf, that is because its strength is going into the making of fruit.

Our task as negotiators has not been easy. We do not accept South Africa's occupation of Namibia as lawful. We have said so again and again, just as we have denounced the system of *apartheid*. But South Africa is in possession, and not surprisingly has various apprehensions. We know the settlement terms are equitable and just and will be administered impartially. It is important to convince not only the South Africans of this but also all sections of opinion within Namibia. We are demonstrating scrupulous fairness in negotiating with them a peaceful solution.

The situation in Namibia, it is true, is radically different from that of pre-independence Rhodesia. The one is not a blueprint for the other. Yet there are two lessons that we learned from Rhodesia which I believe are applicable to Namibia. The first is that it was possible, by being both determined and fair, to persuade through negotiation those who exercised power unlawfully in Southern Rhodesia to submit voluntarily to an election under universal suffrage. It has thus been demonstrated that this is an attainable objective, not an impracticable notion. Secondly, the Lancaster House settlement could not have been implemented without the co-operation and assistance of South Africa. Let us not only criticize where criticism is merited but also give credit where credit is due. South Africa should not have helped to sustain the administration of Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia, but had the South African Government not accepted the Lancaster House settlement, had it done no more than withdraw infrastructural support during the period of implementation and transition, it would have been exceedingly difficult if not impossible to put the settlement into effect. It is to the credit of the South African Government that it helped to implement that settlement. To implement the Namibian settlement, the United Nations will similarly require the co-operation and physical assistance of the South African Government.

The alternative to the course we have pursued would be to leave the war to intensify rather than to strive for peace. This would indeed be the counsel of despair, and we must ask ourselves whose interests it would serve — certainly not those of the people of Namibia. This Council cannot and must not sacrifice the Namibians and abandon them to the disruption and fear and instability that have characterized their lives for too many years. It would be wholly irresponsible of us to set aside the search for a settlement.

The problem of South West Africa was first raised at the United Nations in 1946. It has been before the United Nations almost throughout the

United Nations existence. It takes its place in a range of intractable, dangerous and long-standing issues before the United Nations. Grappling with them is one of the primary purposes of this Organization. We at the United Nations are in a position to see Namibia in the perspective of other problems relating to the unlawful occupation of territory and to the deprivation of the right to self-determination, some dating back for many years, others having arisen more recently. Most of those problems affect the security and stability of the surrounding regions. Most entail casualties, in some cases on a tragic scale, and disruption of the lives of the inhabitants.

In the case of Namibia, however, there are some significant differences. The basis for a negotiated settlement exists and is widely accepted. The right of self-determination is recognized by all. The responsibility of the United Nations is clearly established. We have a viable plan for implementation of that responsibility. And we have two complementary groups of United Nations Members committed to work for implementation.

We have each of us an opportunity in this debate to assist by making constructive contributions and by formulating a resolution which will reinforce, not undermine, the negotiating process.

The Government of the United Kingdom therefore hopes that the message will go out from this Council meeting that there is urgent, legitimate and well-founded pressure from all sides for implementation of the United Nations plan. We trust that the Council will stress that an immediate peaceful settlement is unquestionably in the best interests of all the people of Namibia and of the countries bordering Namibia, including South Africa.

The international community is right to say that there is an urgent need to reach a conclusion. That is what we say too. The difference is that we have taken on the practical responsibility for bringing it about. If we should ever conclude that we cannot manage it, we shall give the task up to others. Meanwhile, we intend to persevere. And we intend to succeed.

(iii) Statement, on 23 May, by the President of SWAPO, Mr Sam Nujoma.

The delegation of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) is greatly inspired by the presence of so many Foreign Ministers and other high officials who have kindly agreed to come to the United Nations in order to participate in this debate. We are grateful to the member States of both the Organization of African Unity and the Non-Aligned Movement for having designated several Foreign Ministers to present a collective demand before this body for the speedy independence of Namibia in accordance with the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations

and particularly on the basis of Security Council resolutions 385 (1976)<sup>1</sup>, 435 (1978)<sup>2</sup> and 439 (1978)<sup>3</sup>. It is indeed heartening to note that, in addition to those Ministers, there are also other Foreign Ministers and high officials from Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe present for the same purpose.

To us the very fact of such high level participation and the seriousness with which all the preparations leading to this important meeting have been conducted, at all stages, have underscored the existence of a clear global consensus on the imperative need for the independence of Namibia as a matter of urgency and without any preconditions or prevarication. Equally, the demand has been that the United Nations Security Council should assume its primary responsibility in the implementation of its resolution 435 (1978) unfettered by extraneous impediments.

Eleven and a half years ago the Security Council accorded me a rare privilege as the first freedom fighter to address this body. Today I can hardly suppress the impulse to recall that historic occasion — but with mixed feelings. On the other hand I recall — indeed with a renewed sense of satisfaction — the congenial and serious atmosphere which prevailed during the meeting of the Security Council in October 1971. Naturally my colleagues and I in the SWAPO delegation were genuinely moved and greatly encouraged by the repeated expressions of support for and solidarity with our struggle by nearly all the speakers throughout the debate, and we left New York reinforced in our conviction that a clear global consensus had already been reached on the imperative need for the speedy decolonization of Namibia. We also felt reassured in the knowledge that, for its part the international community would redouble its efforts towards taking the effective and practical measures against racist South Africa provided for in the United Nations Charter and the relevant resolutions and decisions of the United Nations on Namibia, thus ending once and for all racist domination, colonial oppression and foreign exploitation in Namibia. That was the positive side of the situation, which offered a basis for optimism.

On the other hand, I must register here with deep regret and indignation the fact that our beloved country, Namibia, remains still occupied by a massive South African colonial army of about 100 000 troops, which, in active collaboration with certain major capitalist Powers, has turned Namibia into a garrison State, subjecting the Namibian masses daily to untold sufferings in the form of cold blooded murder and abductions, with victims being held incommunicado for indefinite periods, to constant torture,

1. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 4, February 1976, pp. 40–42.

2. *Ibid.* no. 14, December 1978, p. 43.

3. *Ibid.* p. 54.

incarceration in concentration camps and other fascist detention centres, massacres of innocent villagers, forcible removal of communities for political or military purposes, destruction of property including livestock, rapes and various other notorious acts of intimidation and manipulation. This massive military build-up and reign of terror have led to a critical situation whereby today there is one racist soldier for every twelve Namibians.

In the characteristic fashion of a fascist régime, the occupation régime has been responsible for the continuous disappearance of Namibian patriots. For example Johannes Kakuva, Johannes Nakawa and Matias Ashipembe, to cite but a few, have disappeared without trace since 1979 in Kaokoveld and Ovamboland. Another repugnant case is that of the massacre of the Ampolo family at Oshikuku, which involved the deliberate murder of the entire family consisting of ten members, in March 1982. Yet another case which vividly shows the kind of atrocities committed daily against our people is that of Kasire Thomas. As frequently happens with many Namibians who are held in racist prisons he was handed over to a white farmer to be used as a cheap labourer. While at the farm he was subjected to constant intimidation, accused of being a so-called terrorist and murdered in a brutal manner in March 1983. Furthermore, in 1983 Asser Likuwa was cold-bloodedly murdered while working on his land by a South African military convoy for being a member of SWAPO.

These atrocities are being carried out under the cover of the existing state of emergency, martial law and other illegal Draconian laws being enacted by the so called Administrator-General, who has given the army and police a free hand to shoot to kill.

It is unnecessary to say that while these brutalities, generalized State terrorism and repression continue unabated against our people, perpetrated by the apartheid junta, Namibia's natural resources are being plundered in the most criminal way by the ruthless transnational corporations of the principal Powers, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), whose selfish interest in profits and other strategic concerns are placed above the just rights and legitimate interests of the Namibian people.

The situation is the more outrageous and objectionable in that all this is being done in flagrant violation of international law, of the Charter of the United Nations and of Decree No. 1 adopted by the United Nations Council for Namibia in 1974 for the protection of the natural resources of Namibia, and, last but not least, it is being done to the detriment of the Namibians themselves.

This then is the negative side of the Namibian question and what it demands, as a matter of utmost urgency, is positive action now, not mere exhortations or empty promises about elusive progress which has no basis in truth.

The meeting of the Security Council in 1971 coincided with the fifth anniversary of the termination of racist South Africa's Mandate over Namibia and the assumption by the United Nations of direct legal authority over our country. However, I wish to assure the Council that I have no desire to give a historical account of that decision of the General Assembly in 1966 nor, for that matter, of its legal implications. Suffice it to observe that, true to type, certain Western permanent members of the Security Council somehow managed to find alleged problems with the termination of the Mandate and sought to scuttle all efforts to give full and practical effect to General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 1966.

It will be recalled that it was precisely for the purpose of clarifying this situation that the Security Council decided, *inter alia*, to submit a question to the International Court of Justice, with the request for an advisory opinion, namely:

What are the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970) (*resolution 284 (1970)*)

Nevertheless, I should like to recall briefly what I said when my turn came to make a contribution to the debate in 1971. I said:

This session of the Council has been convened to discuss ways and means of enforcing previous decisions of the General Assembly, as well as those of the Security Council, in the light of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice rendered on 21 June 1971. The International Court gave an unequivocal ruling when it stated in paragraph 133 of the opinion:

“. . . the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory.

Discussing this opinion, *The New York Times* stated

With this historic 13 to 2 verdict, the Court has cleared away the legal and political fog that for years obscured the status of the former German colony. (*S/PV. 1588, paras. 90 and 91*)

I stated further:

The United Nations is confronting the most determined and most serious onslaught on its principles since the Organization was set up. Therefore the Security Council, as an organ which has been assigned the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, should and must not fail to take authoritative and decisive action. (*ibid.*, para. 92)

My statement continued:

Who can doubt that a case has arisen for the Security Council to take action as provided for in Articles 40 and 41? The only people who

doubt this are the major Western Powers. They do so, not because the situation in Namibia does not threaten international peace and security, but because they want their agents in South Africa to continue providing them with cheap labour, which results in enormous profits for their investors. How long will these people who profess to be the champions of equality, democracy and free speech pursue their insatiable greed for material things and ignore the value of human life? How can the situation in Namibia be described as peaceful when South Africa is arming itself to the teeth with the most advanced weapons of destruction? How does one explain the fact that the South African army is today fighting in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe? How does one explain the constant threats made against independent African States? . . . Lastly, what is to become of international law if the countries represented here can ignore with impunity any interpretation of law that is not in their favour? (*ibid.* para. 94)

That is what I had to say.

I thought I should make these pertinent observations in order to underscore two points. First, it follows from some of what I have just quoted that the situation in and around Namibia today remains the same as the one I described before the Security Council in 1971, except that, I must painfully state, the human suffering and destruction of valuable property have increased to alarming proportions, owing to apartheid South Africa's continued colonial oppression, racist domination and regional aggression, as well as other acts of destabilization throughout the region.

Secondly, I wanted to refute, denounce and reject certain notorious notions which are being propagated by the aggressive and militarist circles of imperialism in favour of racist South Africa. It is being argued that the racist usurpers have what are referred to as "legitimate security concerns" in the region. In the process, some irrelevant and outrageous arguments have been advanced which purport to exonerate the racist Pretoria junta from its repeated criminality and its banditry against the African masses, who are demanding the restoration of their right to freedom and national emancipation. Likewise, racist South Africa's case, which is completely indefensible, is being presented, as regards Namibia, in a manner that makes the victims appear to be aggressors or villains and the real aggressors and foreign intruders and illegal occupiers of our country to be victims of an alleged "total onslaught".

The international community has become accustomed to racist South Africa's arrogant and defiant behaviour. Its record of stubborn refusal to implement United Nations resolutions and decisions and to withdraw its illegal colonial administration from Namibia remains a source of deep concern warranting immediate and concerted retribution. The apartheid sys-

tem and its destructive regional manifestations have incurred world-wide condemnation and this anachronistic and repressive system has been declared a crime against humanity. Indeed, international conventions and declarations have been adopted for the suppression and punishment of the crime of apartheid. Similarly, apartheid South Africa's record of international terrorism has been brought up in numerous publications and is being used as a basis for a world-wide campaign to mobilize positive and concrete action against that neo-Nazi, pariah State in order to compel it to accept the political demands of the African people inside the country, to end illegality and colonial occupation in Namibia and to desist from its aggression against independent African States.

Throughout Africa people know that racist South Africa is their public enemy Number One: it has arrogated to itself the right to attack militarily any African State and occupy its territory. The régime continues the intensification of the apartheid reign of terror, perpetrates constant acts of aggression and destabilization against independent African States, under one pretext or another, and is carrying on its vicious programme of massive military build-up in occupied Namibia, while, in keeping with its much-discredited double-barrel approach, pursuing a public show of so-called new constitutional dispensation, just as it continues to pay lip service to consultations regarding Namibia's independence. Could one do otherwise than declare the situation in our region to be one constituting a serious threat to international peace and security?

What also exposes the peculiar mentality of the white supremacists of the Nationalist Party is the fact that they have in a sinister fashion perfected the Afrikaner politics of self-pity — the so-called *laager* mentality. That means that they consider themselves, as always, the object of hatred and of an alleged total onslaught — all of which are mere figments of their rotten imagination. Naturally, there is total and world-wide opposition to apartheid; there is a strong outcry for democracy in South Africa based on the principle of one man, one vote; and there is also an uncompromising demand for early independence for Namibia as much as for peace and co-operation in the region.

However, the struggle is not inspired by racial considerations nor by a desire to rob certain sections of the population of their property or to deny individuals their fair share in society. Therefore, these allegations are outrageous and unfounded.

During the past two years — which have been years of trials and tribulations for us — we have learned with dismay that the United States of America is advocating the greater acceptance of South Africa within the global framework of Western security. These are the same people who have publicly embraced the racist State as a friendly ally. The net result of this policy is that Namibia's independence has been further delayed and the



suffering of our people prolonged as they are being held to ransom for the sake of the global ambitions of the United States. How selfish and how hypocritical that is.

Allow me at this juncture to make a few observations about the internal situation in Namibia, in order to show that the illegal occupiers there have no intention whatsoever of permitting Namibia's accession to independence for a very long time to come.

Despite the fact that South Africa has been forced to concede the idea of Namibia's independence, the apartheid rulers have not abandoned their traditional ambition to keep Namibia as either a direct colony or a neo-colony of the white settler State in South Africa; and, with Pretoria's failure in recent years to create a credible political force which would be favourably disposed to serving South Africa's neo-colonial interest and ambition in Namibia, the *apartheid* régime has been left with no other choice but to rely on its military machine in order to continue its illegal occupation of our country. In this connection Namibia has been turned into a vast besieged garrison. The *apartheid* régime has deployed more than 100 000 troops throughout the country. It has established 75 major military bases and numerous camps, which are deployed throughout the length and breadth of the northern areas of our land. These bases are continually being expanded as well as extensively fortified and equipped with a vast array of arms and ammunition, an ever-increasing number of tanks and armoured personnel carriers and other military vehicles and war-planes. Moreover, there is a general arming of all Whites in Namibia; and every white male in Namibia between the ages of 16 and 30 is required by law to perform two years of national service in the South African army of occupation. This is followed by 240 days' service in the so-called Citizen Force, or Commandos. In addition, many of them are called upon for operational duty for indefinite periods. Recently the South African military establishment in Namibia also began to call upon white women for service in the Commando and Citizen Forces. Furthermore, many young black Namibians have been impressed into the militarization process through a variety of devices applied by the South African army of occupation. This started with the extension of compulsory military service to black Namibians in January 1981, using coercion and huge financial bribes.

With the introduction of compulsory military service for all black youths, there has been a growing militarization of the schools, with the students becoming one of the prime targets for conscription. The occupation régime's Department of Education regularly sends out circulars to all schools, instructing principals to register all boys due to reach the age of 16. This is intended to facilitate the call-up process. African teachers have increasingly been seeing their schools taken over by South African soldiers, who have been planted there to try and promote the idea of the South Afri-

can Army as a social benefactor and, what is more and more important, to act as informers.

Those black Namibians who, through either economic necessity or other forms of pressure, have been incorporated into the South African military machine of occupation are deployed in one of the tribally based, paramilitary units known as Home Guards, or in the so-called South West Africa Territory Force (SWATF). These units have become notorious for atrocities and killings carried out by the South African Army against the civilian population in Namibia. In other words, the units are increasingly being used to terrorize the local population. These tribally based institutions are meant as seeds and fertile ground for civil war for an independent Namibia.

That is the extent and nature of South Africa's repugnant attempts to place the Namibian population under Pretoria's brutal and oppressive military domination and permanent control.

Another dimension of the militarization process has been the creation of so-called protected villages and fortification of towns, especially in the areas of northern Namibia: Kaokoveld in the north-west and Okavango in the north-east.

As was the case with the United States war in Viet Nam and the war in Smith's Rhodesia, the strategic aim of the South African Army in establishing the protected villages is to try to isolate our guerrilla combatants from the masses of the people and exert the occupation army's total control over the movement of our oppressed people. Nearly every town in these regions is a South African military base; the towns are surrounded by military communication towers and watch-towers equipped with machine-guns dominating the skyline around them.

It is precisely because Pretoria has failed to create a credible political alternative for perpetuating its domination of Namibia that the régime is relying more and more on its military and security forces to prolong its occupation of our country. This increasing reliance on the army means also that South Africa's top military brass has taken over the primacy once held by the civilian colonial administrators in influencing Pretoria's policies towards Namibia.

Evidence of the powerful influence being exerted on South African policy towards Namibia by the Generals began to emerge more clearly last year when Lieutenant-General Pieter van der Westhuizen, Chief of South African Military Intelligence; General Jan Geldenhuys, Chief of the Army; and General Charles Lloyd, Commanding Officer of the South African forces in Namibia travelled to Washington on several occasions to discuss the Namibian issue with their Pentagon counterparts.

It is believed that it was these Generals, working in strategic partnership with the Pentagon establishment, who conceived the so-called linkage

issue. They have also played a crucial role in influencing the recent decision by the Botha régime to dump its Turnhalle puppets. The Generals felt that the Turnhalle puppet crowd was merely wasting millions of rands without delivering the necessary political goods for Pretoria. The military establishment felt that such money should go to the army to enable it to continue the occupation of Namibia.

In short, South Africa's continued militarization of Namibia has transformed large parts of our country into a permanent war zone, and the massive military presence in the country is the key instrument in Pretoria's attempt to perpetuate its control over Namibia as its last buffer zone between the racist State and independent African States to the north.

In the face of this colonial tyranny and of the fascistic state terrorism and aggression being perpetrated by the apartheid racists against our people, the national resistance of our people has remained firm and their patriotism has never been found wanting. Moreover, the support being given by the oppressed masses of Namibia to SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people, is ever increasing and deepening. The Turnhalle puppets have been totally rejected by our people. Various bogus constitutional or political entities have fallen under a persistent onslaught by SWAPO and the concerted resistance of the people themselves.

As I pointed out earlier, the apartheid régime has always considered itself a regional super power regarding the whole of Africa as fair game for its expansionist ambitions and using economic blackmail and military aggression as instruments of its policy.

In this context racist South Africa has, for instance, launched armed aggression, using Namibia as a launching pad, against The Peoples Republic of Angola in the form of a massive military invasion and occupation which has continued since August 1981. It has also launched military attacks both directly and indirectly through its local puppets against the People's Republic of Mozambique, the Republic of Zambia, Zimbabwe, Lesotho and the Republic of Seychelles. Angola and Mozambique have become the main arenas of Pretoria's destabilization campaign. There the régime is making extensive use of its surrogates, the so called Mozambique Resistance Movement and UNITA respectively. To this end the régime has extensively been training, recruiting, financing, arming, transporting, deploying, commanding and rescuing foreign mercenaries and local puppets and bandits to and from these countries.

In the case of UNITA, racist South Africa is using its military bases in Namibia and occupied parts of Angolan territory to step up its destabilization activities against the People's Republic of Angola. Specifically, the racists are using the air bases at Ondangua, Grootfontein, Runtu, Mpacha, Ruacana and Ohopoho in Namibia to carry out these dastardly acts.

What I had affirmed in 1971 before this Council was confirmed four

years later by Comrade President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, the then Foreign Minister of Angola, when he said in 1976 in Addis Ababa on the occasion of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit devoted to the problem of Angola.

On 11 November, Angola was invaded by South African forces with the objective of imposing another foreign rule on the Angolan people.

He added:

It is our objective to mobilize the masses of Angola to put a stop to this aggression and drive away these aggressive forces which are active in our country in collusion with organizations which have betrayed the Angolan people and Africans as a whole by seeking alliance with South Africa.

In other words, the Angolan people were the victims of racist aggression long before the independence of their country. That aggression has since reached astronomical proportions.

This Council is fully aware of South Africa's sinister schemes which have so far prevented the implementation of the United Nations plan endorsed in Security Council resolution 435 (1978). Since the adoption of that resolution, the Pretoria racist régime has created all kinds of pretexts to frustrate the early independence of Namibia.

The characteristic intransigence and prevarication of the régime were manifested clearly during the Geneva pre-implementation meeting<sup>4</sup> held in January 1981. Contrary to the hopes and expectations of the international community that final arrangements would be agreed upon, the Pretoria régime refused to sign a cease fire agreement with SWAPO and to agree to a date for the emplacement of United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) components in Namibia, thus thwarting the implementation process.

As is well known, SWAPO, for its part, reiterated its willingness and readiness to sign a cease-fire agreement right then and there and renewed its pledge to co-operate with the United Nations Secretary-General and his staff in order to ensure the smooth and peaceful transition of Namibia to independence.

The SWAPO delegation is grateful to the United Nations Secretary-General for releasing his latest report in good time before the meeting. We have found the report to be serious, honest and straightforward in presenting the developments since the failed Geneva meeting and particularly the extraneous and irrelevant issues which have created the present impasse.

In this connection, I wish to state that SWAPO fully associates itself

4. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 23, June 1981, pp. 3-18.

with the concluding observations of the United Nations Secretary-General's report of 19 May 1983, contained in document S/15776, especially those in the last three paragraphs. In our view, these paragraphs accurately reflect the current state of affairs and show who is responsible for the impasse.

In this connection SWAPO has accepted the need to protect the white minority and its property because we believe that a future independent Namibia has an obligation to protect all its citizens. It is in this spirit that SWAPO has agreed to consider the proposal containing principles for the constituent assembly and the constitution for an independent Namibia, although we have some serious reservations about the manner in which the text was transmitted to the Secretary-General.

On the other hand, in conformity with the mandate I have received from the Central Committee of SWAPO, I should like to state categorically and clearly that our movement, having reviewed the history of the negotiations and the role of the so-called contact group, led by the United States, has concluded that that group has lost proper contact with the letter and spirit of resolution 435 (1978) and that the whole exercise has now turned out to be a mere rescue operation for the white, racist, illegal occupiers in Namibia. In particular the Central Committee of SWAPO has singled out the Reagan Administration, which, because of its public embrace of apartheid South Africa, has injected into the decolonization process of our country an extraneous issue, by linking the independence of Namibia to the withdrawal of Cuban forces from the People's Republic of Angola. The Central Committee categorically rejects and vehemently condemns this unjust, arrogant, irrational and objectionable policy of linkage. The position of SWAPO is that the oppressed people of Namibia are entitled to independence without any further delay, pre-condition or prevarication.

It is in the light of this that SWAPO has come to the conclusion that the role of the five Western Powers has ceased to be that of an honest broker in terms of the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). These Powers, and the Reagan Administration in particular, must be prevailed upon to desist forthwith from their sinister attempts to hijack and misuse the Namibian negotiating process in their own economic and strategic interests.

We are not unmindful of the commendable position taken by the Government of France on the issue of linkage or parallelism, as stated by its Foreign Minister, Mr Claude Cheysson, at the recent International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris. We urge the other members of the so-called contact group to show that they have the courage of their convictions, otherwise mooted privately, and follow the French example by publicly dissociating themselves from this notorious and unwarranted imposition.

Once again we are appearing before the Security Council and pleading for the adoption of effective, concrete measures against the defiant racist régime of Pretoria. In particular, we call urgently upon this Council to shoulder its primary responsibility in the implementation of the United Nations plan as endorsed in Security Council resolution 435 (1978). It is our strong belief that the United Nations legal authority over Namibia must be ensured through the direct involvement of the Organization in all efforts to secure genuine independence for Namibia. In this connection it is our considered view that the role of the United Nations Secretary-General in all practical arrangements having to do with the implementation of the United Nations plan should be strengthened. For it is the Secretary-General, and he alone, who is charged with this responsibility in terms of resolution 435 (1978) — not the British or any other member of the contact group; they are self-appointed, and therefore I reject what the British representative has just said: that they want to continue their illegal intervention in the question of Namibia.

Furthermore the Security Council should oblige South Africa to make a firm commitment as to its readiness to sign a cease-fire agreement with SWAPO, as provided for in the United Nations plan, thus paving the way for the implementation process to start. To this end the Secretary-General should consider initiating immediate contact with the parties to the conflict and report to the Security Council as may be required.

The Namibian people have already suffered for too long, including large-scale massacres of our people during the German occupation on the basis of an imperial extermination order, which resulted in the substantial depopulation of the country. The Security Council has a special responsibility to take the necessary steps to prevent further acts of genocide against our people.

Allow me before concluding to take this opportunity, on behalf of the Central Committee of SWAPO, to express our appreciation to the Secretary-General for his tireless efforts aimed at securing early independence for Namibia. Similarly our thanks go to the United Nations Council for Namibia, led by our brother Ambassador Paul Lusaka of Zambia, and the United Nations specialized agencies for their consistent support of SWAPO and the cause of the Namibian people, and all the indispensable assistance programmes being administered by the Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, Ambassador Mishra.

In conclusion, it is our sincere hope and expectation that at these meetings the Security Council will pay full attention to the Declaration and Programme of Action on Namibia adopted by the Paris Conference on 29 April 1983. We are greatly indebted to all those whose combined efforts ensured the success of the recent Paris Conference, foremost among them His Excellency Moustaphe Niasse, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of

Senegal, the United Nations Secretary-General, the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, the Secretary-General of the said Conference, and the entire United Nations staff.

Finally, I wish that the situation were different and that Namibia's independence had already been achieved, and I wish that I did not have to repeat the following concluding words of my statement before the Security Council in 1971. But the reality is that these are mere wishes, and therefore I am compelled to repeat those words once again in the face of naked aggression on the part of the racist régime of South Africa:

I wish to declare, in the name of the people of Namibia, that unless this body acts decisively to secure the withdrawal of South Africa from the international Territory of Namibia we shall have no alternative but to continue the armed struggle with greater intensity. We do not love bloodshed, but when we are dealing with a Government like that of South Africa, which believes in violence and bloodshed, we must be prepared to meet it on its own terms. Our struggle may be long and protracted; our struggle may be bloody and costly in terms of human life; it is a price we are prepared to pay for our independence.

Texts for items i-iii supplied by the UN Documents Section, State Library, Pretoria.

(iv) Address, on 24 May, by the South African Permanent Representative, His Excellency K.R.S. von Schirnding.

Mr President, the purpose of this meeting is not the promotion of a peaceful settlement of the question of South West Africa. On the contrary, its main objective is to undermine the delicate negotiations which are currently underway.

The time has come to remind the United Nations that South Africa has never accepted the United Nations' view that South Africa's presence in the Territory is illegal. Nor has the International Court of Justice ever delivered a binding judgment to the effect that South Africa's right to administer the Territory had been terminated. As far as South Africa is concerned it continues to administer the Territory legally and in conformity with the spirit of the lapsed mandate from the League of Nations. However, as a purely practical political consideration in the search for an internationally acceptable settlement, South Africa agreed with the proposition put to it by the Contact Group in March 1978, that all sides, *including the United Nations*, should "set on one side the long-standing legal disputes that have bedevilled consideration of this question for thirty years". It

would seem that the United Nations, by its spurious claims, wishes to revert to the legal arguments which characterized the first thirty years of this dispute.

During the past five years South Africa has persistently continued the search for an internationally acceptable settlement.

- It was South Africa, which on 25 April 1978,<sup>1</sup> first accepted the western proposal — some months before SWAPO's equivocal response which contained conditions which almost wrecked the settlement initiative at its very commencement.
- It was South Africa which, on 22 December 1978,<sup>2</sup> after having first consulted with the elected representatives of the people of the Territory, informed the Secretary-General of its decision  
“to co-operate in the expeditious implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978)”<sup>3</sup>.
- It was South Africa which on 6 February 1979<sup>4</sup> advised the Secretary-General that  
“ ‘early implementation’ was ‘imperative’ and urged the United Nations that ‘emplacement of UNTAG’ (even if it only involves certain advance units) should commence not later than the end of February 1979”.

It was not South Africa which created the obstacles which have since February 1979 frustrated agreement on a peaceful settlement.

- It was not South Africa which brazenly altered the independence proposal on 26 February 1979 to remove basic guarantees for the security of the people of South West Africa. It was officials of the Secretariat who did this at the insistence of SWAPO and with the connivance of representatives of certain countries. My Government has in its possession the documentary evidence to substantiate this claim. It will be recalled that on 21 February 1979 telegraphic clarifications were despatched from the Secretary-General's office to a number of Governments which conflicted directly with the express understandings which had previously been reached between South Africa and the Five. In terms of these clarifications SWAPO would be given bases inside South West Africa which it had never had and the military component of UNTAG would no longer be required to monitor the restriction of SWAPO to base outside South West Africa. Apparently SWAPO now accepts restriction to base and monitoring by UNTAG, but in February 1979 their refusal to do so directly impeded the negotiations and led to an impasse of long duration.

1. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 12, May 1978, pp. 32-33.

2. *Op. cit.* no. 15, April 1979, p. 2.

3. *Op. cit.* no. 14, December 1978, p. 43.

4. *Ibid.* p. 10.



- It was not South Africa which created well-founded doubts in the minds of the people of the Territory concerning the United Nations bias in favour of SWAPO. It was the United Nations itself through the massive material, political and propaganda assistance which it extended — and continues to extend — to SWAPO. Indeed this very meeting of the Security Council is a cynical demonstration of UN bias in favour of SWAPO. However, I should like to add that the more constructive tone reflected in the Secretary-General's report number S/15776 has not gone unnoticed.
- It was not South Africa which aroused fears that the people of South West Africa would be subjected to intimidation during the election campaign. It was SWAPO which did so through its cold-blooded campaign of terrorism which has left more than 1 300 civilians dead and at least 25 prominent local politicians assassinated. SWAPO has added to these apprehensions with statements which it has made over the "Voice of Namibia" in which it has declared that "the liquidation of traitors may have to be intensified if the revolution is to succeed". In addition the instructions issued to terrorists who recently attempted to infiltrate into the Territory included orders *inter alia* to
  - kill members of the civilian population indiscriminately;
  - kill political leaders opposed to SWAPO; and to
  - lay landmines as widely as possible.
- It was not South Africa which created the deepest misgivings among the people of South West Africa concerning the continuation of fundamental constitutional rights after independence. It was SWAPO, with its terrorist practices and Marxist principles and threats to "discipline" political opponents that has done so. As the leader of SWAPO has said in recent years:
  - “We do not fight for majority rule. We fight in order to take over the power in Namibia for the benefit of the people of Namibia. We are revolutionaries”.
  - “We believe that a really socialistic state in Namibia can only be enforced by means of violent revolution”.
  - “Cuba is the example for revolution. The Cuban revolution is our revolution. It is the revolution of suppressed people”.

In the meantime another threat to stability and the process of self-determination in South West Africa and throughout southern Africa is casting its ominous shadow across our sub-continent — yet another peril for the peace of southern Africa which is growing with each passing month and which has not been of South Africa's making. I refer to the increasing and threatening presence of the surrogate forces of an expansionist and imperial superpower in our region. As my Foreign Minister recently stated in the South African House of Assembly:

“There is an unquestionable *de facto* linkage between the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and the settlement of the South West Africa question. It is ludicrous to suggest that the introduction of the hostile and expansionist surrogates of a superpower into the southern African region will not have the most far-reaching implications for the security of all of the countries of the region, particularly when one considers:

- the doctrine of the superpower, the Soviet Union, which openly proclaims the necessity for the world-wide exportation of communism;
- the record of the surrogate, Cuba, for subversion and the fomentation of revolution in Central America, South America and Africa;
- the threat which Soviet and Cuban supported elements have already posed to a country in the region i.e. the Shaba invasion of Zaire.”

Similarly, Mr President, the SWAPO/Cuban/Soviet link has repeatedly been demonstrated conclusively.

It was these concerns which ultimately led to the impasse of the Geneva Pre-Implementation Meeting in January 1981<sup>5</sup> and which, for some time, left the whole settlement concept dead in the water.

It was against this background that the US Government approached the South African Government in the early part of 1981 to learn whether the South African Government would be prepared to participate in a new initiative in search of a settlement based on Resolution 435. The US proposed a phased initiative in an attempt to address these concerns and to dismantle the obstacles. There is a widespread misapprehension in the international community that there has been some form of “collusion” between South Africa and the USA over South West Africa. Nothing could be further from the truth. It was only with considerable apprehension that South Africa agreed to certain proposals which were put to it by the current American Administration. However, despite its deep-seated misgivings it agreed to adopt a flexible approach with a view to finding peaceful solutions to the problems of South West Africa and southern Africa.

On 26 January 1982 South Africa informed the Contact Group of its acceptance of the revised constitutional principles which the Five had presented to it on 17 December 1981. On two subsequent occasions, in an attempt to expedite the independence process, South Africa agreed to amendments to the proposed electoral system which other parties had demanded. Nevertheless, due to SWAPO intransigence, it was not until 12

5. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 23, June 1981, pp. 3-18.

July 1982 that the Contact Group was able to report to the Secretary-General that all parties had accepted the principles.

Mr President, there should be no mistake concerning the seriousness of South Africa's attitude to these negotiations. South Africa does not regard the proposals which have been made and the undertakings which have been given as so many pieces of paper to be blown away willy-nilly by SWAPO and the international community when they have served their propaganda purpose.

As a result of its bitter experiences in the past South Africa has developed a deeply sceptical attitude toward the United Nations. In its dealings with the international community over South West Africa, South Africa will accordingly not be content with words and paper undertakings. It is seeking firm and concrete signs that the UN is prepared to give serious attention to the justifiable concerns of the people of South West Africa and to the legitimate interests of South Africa in a stable and peaceful southern Africa.

How can we reconcile SWAPO's supposed commitment to the constitutional principles with its totalitarian rantings at the recent Paris Conference and with the expulsion of a representative of one of the South West Africa political parties from that Conference?

How can we reconcile the search for peace implicit in these negotiations with SWAPO's unilateral escalation of its terrorist attacks against the people of the Territory? Only last February SWAPO launched its largest-ever offensive against the people of the Territory, despite the fact that intensive efforts were at that very time underway to try to bring peace to the region. The SWAPO attack, which failed in all of its objectives, involved 600 to 850 specially trained terrorists, divided into 12 to 14 groups. Despite the failure of its last initiative, SWAPO is even now in the process of mustering its forces for yet another desperate attack against the civilian population of the Territory.

How can we reconcile the requirement of impartiality with the United Nations' continuing activities in support of SWAPO as most recently manifested at the Paris Conference?

Mr President, South Africa has also attempted to play a constructive role in removing the last major obstacle to the realization of a peaceful settlement — that is, the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. South Africa felt that it could make a positive contribution in this regard by attempting to establish peace in the border area between South West Africa and Angola.

Representatives of South Africa and Angola met at ministerial level on Sal Island on 7-8 December 1982. During that meeting South Africa made certain practical proposals for the establishment of peace in the border area. A second round of talks, also at ministerial level was arranged for 23 Feb-

ruary 1983, but a week before the discussions were due to take place SWAPO launched its largest-ever offensive against South West Africa, with the knowledge and support of the Angolan Government. South Africa nevertheless decided to send a delegation to the Cape Verde Islands, led by the South African Director-General for Foreign Affairs and Information, to make it clear to Angola that it and SWAPO would have to reciprocate the military restraint which had been manifested by South Africa if there was to be any progress with the peace initiative. The South African delegation also emphasized that a lasting settlement would require the withdrawal of Cuban forces. Within this context South Africa is prepared to hold further talks with Angola. South Africa is still awaiting Angola's reaction to a recent letter in which this position was set out.

Much has been said of the activities of South Africa's armed forces along the borders of South West Africa. Once again the situation which has arisen has not been of South Africa's making. We would much prefer peaceful co-existence with all our neighbours. We have repeatedly invited them to enter into non-aggression pacts and have suggested that they discuss matters of mutual concern with us.

As this Council is no doubt aware, the Governments of Mozambique and South Africa agreed to follow up bilateral ministerial talks which had taken place on 17 December 1982 with a second round of ministerial discussions on 5 May 1983. However the Government of Mozambique deemed fit to send a propaganda story into the world a few days prior to the scheduled meeting to the effect that the South African Government had trained and instructed a South African citizen, Petrus Benjamin Schoeman, *inter alia* to assassinate the President of Mozambique. It must be assumed that this story was intended to give substance to allegations that South Africa was destabilising its neighbours in southern Africa.

When confronted by the South African Government's determination not to continue with bilateral discussions before the facts regarding Mr Schoeman had been established, the Mozambique delegation agreed to a team of South African policemen proceeding to Maputo to obtain Mr Schoeman's fingerprints. These fingerprints established beyond any doubt whatsoever that the person held by the Mozambique authorities had a criminal record spanning a period from 22 March 1961 when he was fourteen years of age to 5 January when he was declared a habitual criminal. Mr Schoeman was released on parole by the South African authorities on 20 January 1982 but broke his parole conditions soon after his release and has subsequently been sought by the South African Police in this regard as well as in connection with allegations of theft allegedly committed after his release.

By their own admission the Mozambique authorities had detained Mr Schoeman in custody for more than a year since approximately the time when he was being sought by the South African Police. It is clear that Mr

Schoeman could have been paraded before the international press at any time over a period of more than a year and it is equally clear that Mr Schoeman is one of life's unfortunate cases who is in urgent need of sympathetic and humanitarian care.

Despite the irrefutable evidence that Schoeman is nothing more than a common criminal, despite Maputo's unambiguous acknowledgement of this fact, the Government of Mozambique nevertheless had the gall to use him in yet another of their propaganda set-pieces, this time by displaying him in their capital last Saturday before a crowd of 50 000 people as a "member of the Mozambique National Resistance". This charade has exposed to the world community the lengths to which certain elements will go to smear South Africa with the label of destabilization.

However, an attitude has developed in the international community, largely as a result of the perverse positions adopted by this Organization, that South Africa and those who are under its legitimate protection may be attacked across international borders with impunity. Let there be no mistake about South Africa's reaction. We shall defend ourselves and the people of South West Africa with all the means at our disposal. Those who harbour terrorists, those who dedicate themselves to our destruction, those who attempt to destabilize our society must understand that South Africa will not take it laying down. We would not have it so, but the choice is theirs.

Mr President, from the foregoing it should be clear that the obstacles to an international settlement of the South West Africa question have not been of South Africa's making. On the contrary, South Africa has consistently worked for the creation of circumstances which will permit the people of South West Africa to determine their own future in conditions of impartiality, secure from terrorist and other forms of intimidation, confident of the continuation of their basic constitutional and civil rights and assured that their country will not fall prey to the predatory expansion of the Soviet Union and its surrogates. South Africa has no intention of deviating from this course.

The recent terrorist outrage in Pretoria and South Africa's subsequent retaliation against ANC targets in Mozambique graphically illustrate the urgency of the choice which must be made in southern Africa between the dangers of escalating confrontation and the benefits of peace and co-operation. As my Foreign Minister stated in parliament on 17 September 1981:

"We therefore all have a dilemma, the rest of Africa and South Africa, and the time is approaching that we must face the facts as they are without demanding confessions. Southern Africa is not a house of confession. What is required is a realistic appraisal of the dilemmas in which we find ourselves. If we fail to do this, the drift toward confrontation and conflagration in southern Africa will become inevi-

table. Invective and acrimonious exchanges and eventually hatred, suspicion and mistrust will accumulate and will become a driving force towards a situation of general war in southern Africa, and no winner will emerge from such a conflict situation."

My Foreign Minister went on to say:

"That is why to my mind the choice is quite clear. It is imminent. South West Africa is only a part of the southern Africa scene. It is, as far as I am concerned, the tip of the iceberg. The bulk is underneath and much more dangerous. I believe the Angolans, the Zambians, the people of Zimbabwe and the people of Mozambique are tired of the turbulence of our region. If that is the case then I believe that there rests an historical responsibility on all the leaders of southern Africa to get together somehow and objectively and constructively to review the whole situation in southern Africa. I believe the time for this is ripe."

Mr President, that choice still exists. I trust that the Security Council will not consider any action or set any deadlines which might force southern Africa in the direction of confrontation and an escalation of conflict. The Council should be under no illusions as to who would suffer most. It would not be the superpowers or the United Nations which would have to pay the price for loosing the dogs of war upon our region. It would be all the people of southern Africa of all the countries of our region.

The world must understand that the South African Government will not bow to threats. We shall not be bound by deadlines or held hostage by intimidation. We shall make our own decisions according to our perception of our responsibilities and interests. This means that in our international affairs we shall continue to deal fairly with all nations in a spirit of good-neighbourliness and respect for the rights of all peoples to self-determination. We shall continue to make our essential contribution to international commerce. We shall meet our obligations and pay our debts and where we can we shall continue to help our neighbours who commit themselves to peaceful co-existence and constructive co-operation. Inside our country we shall continue to maintain order and stability and we shall carry on with the process of controlled reform. We believe that there are more than enough moderate people and people of goodwill within our country, within South West Africa, and within our region to assure us all of peace and prosperity.

At the same time we shall continue to resist radical, alien and malevolent interference in our affairs. We shall not permit surrogate forces to influence developments in our region and we shall not tolerate the expansion of Soviet imperialism on our borders. We have lost patience with those in the international community who incessantly work for our destruction, who call for our isolation and incite terrorist violence against us and who then

throw up their hands in amazement when we have the temerity to defend ourselves. We shall continue to work for peace, prosperity and self-determination in our own country and in South West Africa. But let there be no doubt: those who threaten us increase the chance for confrontation and conflict throughout our region and those who attack us, or who assist others to attack us, do so at their direst peril.

Text supplied by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and Information.

**(v)** Statement, on 25 May, by the United States Ambassador, Mrs Jean Kirkpatrick.

The events of this past week-end in Pretoria and Maputo, are a bloody reminder, if any was needed, of the consequences of violence and of the very real potential that today exists throughout southern Africa for the further escalation of violence. As is all too often the case, the victims of these most recent tragic events include many who were entirely innocent and blameless. The United States deplores such acts of violence, from whatever quarters, whether perpetrated in the name of change or in opposition to it. Violence cannot solve the pressing problems of the region. On the contrary, by creating new victims, new grievances and new grounds for anger and hatred, such acts can only increase the danger of new and greater violence in an ever-escalating tragic cycle. Ultimately we must count among the wounded of these acts all those who seek and hope for peaceful change through negotiation and dialogue.

My Government has for the past several years been seeking to assist the Governments of the region to find peaceful ways to address and to resolve mutual problems. We have been encouraged by the purposeful high-level dialogue between Mozambique and South Africa, a dialogue which the events of last week-end must not be permitted to place in jeopardy. We have made known both to South Africa and Mozambique — and indeed to all Governments of the region — our willingness to help. We have stressed our conviction that the problem of cross-border violence, if allowed to go unresolved, will seriously endanger prospects for both stability and peaceful change.

Let it be clearly understood that the United States deplores violent cross-border activities in southern Africa, in whatever direction and for whatever stated goal. Similarly, we categorically reaffirm the principle that all States have a duty to refrain from tolerating or acquiescing in organized activities within their territory by guerrillas or dissidents planning acts of violence in the territory of another State. There can be no double standard for southern Africa. Cross-border violence cannot be condoned, whether it be in the

form of a bomb placed in a crowded square in Pretoria by externally based organizations or of the continuing violation of Angola's territorial integrity by South African forces.

The Security Council also bears a solemn responsibility to uphold the principles of non-violence and the settlement of disputes by peaceful means. Those principles are especially pertinent to the issue which this meeting of the Council has been convened to consider.

The United States welcomes the opportunity afforded by this meeting to participate in a review of the efforts that are being made to bring about the independence of Namibia, in accordance with decisions previously taken by the Council. As all are aware, the United Nations, and in particular the Security Council, bears a special responsibility for furthering the interests of the people of Namibia and their aspirations for peace, justice and independence. It has been two years since the Council last met to examine the question of Namibia, and it is therefore appropriate that it should wish to review what has transpired in the intervening period.

The participation in this debate of so many distinguished Foreign Ministers testifies to the importance and the urgency which the international community as a whole attaches to the attainment by the people of Namibia of their justly deserved and too long-delayed independence. I especially welcome the presence here of the Foreign Ministers of the front-line States, with which Governments of the Western contact group have enjoyed an active, constructive and vital partnership in our efforts to hasten Namibia's independence.

Finally, I welcome this opportunity to report to you on the role that my Government, in partnership with the other members of the Western contact group, has sought to play in helping to promote a peaceful, negotiated settlement for the earliest possible attainment of Namibia's independence.

Before doing so, however, I wish to pay a special tribute to the Secretary-General. I know at first hand his deeply felt commitment to the attainment of Namibia's independence. I have been impressed by his dedication and objectivity and have full confidence in his ability to carry out the responsibilities assigned to him under Security Council resolution 435 (1978).<sup>1</sup> I am also aware of the efforts he and his staff have made to ensure that all is in readiness for the day when agreement is reached for implementation of the United Nations settlement plan.

I also wish to thank the Secretary-General for his report, which provides an accurate summation of what has transpired since the Council last met on this issue in April 1981. It is not necessary to recapitulate what he has already set out. I would, however, like to recall the very different circumstances that prevailed at the time of that last meeting.

1. See *Southern Africa Record* no. 14, December 1978, p. 43.



The tone and the outcome of that debate were very much a reflection of the widespread disappointment over the failure of the pre-implementation meeting in Geneva<sup>2</sup> to reach agreement on a date for the start of the ceasefire envisaged in security Council resolution 435 (1978). The pre-implementation meeting ended only a few days before the Reagan Administration, of which I am a member, took office in Washington. It became one of the urgent tasks of the new American Government to assess, jointly with its contact group partners, the reasons for the failure of the Geneva meeting.

It would be fair to say that the new American Government was the recipient of a great deal of advice at that time. I will be frank in telling the Council that there were those who advised strongly against a continuing United States role in pursuit of a negotiated settlement of the Namibian problem. It was said by a good many that the obstacles to a peaceful settlement were too great to be overcome and that the interests of the United States in the region did not justify the tremendous commitment of time and energy that would be required. Needless to say, the persons responsible for formulating the policies of this Administration did not share those views. Although they were mindful of the great difficulties involved, they were also aware of the efforts that had already been made and of the opportunity that existed to resolve through peaceful negotiations this pressing issue. They were in this regard sensitive to the cardinal importance attached to Namibia's early independence by the nations of Africa. These goals more than justified a rededication to the efforts which the contact group had first undertaken four years earlier.

At the same time, we were anxious in our renewed approach to the problem to avoid, if at all possible, the frustrations of the past. We sought an approach that would not result in the same disappointment so keenly felt, above all by the people of Namibia, following the failure of the Geneva pre-implementation meeting. With this firmly in mind, we undertook a fresh round of consultations, first with our contact group partners and then with the other parties concerned: the front line States, the South African Government, SWAPO and the Namibian political parties that would also participate in the United Nations supervised elections envisaged in resolution 435 (1978).

In the course of these consultations several facts became abundantly clear. First, we were assured of the interest and the desire of all those directly concerned that the negotiations should continue. Secondly, it was clear that, in the absence of a peaceful negotiated settlement leading to Namibia's independence, the situation of armed conflict and instability in the region would only worsen, with unacceptable consequences for all the inhabitants of the region. Finally, we were assured by those with the great-

2. *Op. cit.* no. 23, June 1981, pp. 3-18.

est stake in the success of the negotiations that the contact group had a continuing and important role to play in helping to bring about a peaceful settlement.

On the basis of this assessment, the Foreign Ministers of the contact group met in May 1981 and decided to redouble their efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement. They reaffirmed their conviction that only a settlement under the aegis of the United Nations would find broad international acceptance and that Security Council resolution 435 (1978) continued to provide the basis for Namibia's peaceful transition to independence. Bearing in mind the difficulties that had arisen at the pre-implementation meeting in Geneva, the contact group Foreign Ministers further decided to develop specific proposals that would address directly the concerns that had thus far prevented the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). They considered that the purpose of these proposals should be to give all concerned greater confidence as regards the future of an independent Namibia.

Since the relaunching of their negotiating efforts in the spring of 1981 the members of the contact group have worked closely and intensively with all the parties concerned. It is a matter of the greatest regret to us as I know it is to all of those here, that the promise of Namibia's independence has not yet been realized. At the same time, however, I believe it would be a mistake to discount the progress that has been achieved towards the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) since the Council last met to review the situation.

First, it is important to note that all parties concerned have reaffirmed their acceptance of resolution 435 (1978). That resolution and the settlement plan it endorsed remain the only agreed and recognized basis for an internationally acceptable settlement of the Namibia question.

All parties have committed themselves to constitutional principles which will serve as a guide to the elected constituent assembly in drafting a democratic constitution for an independent Namibia. This agreement, which was confirmed to the Secretary general in July of last year and which is noted in his report to the Security Council, has helped to reassure all those who will participate in the United Nations supervised elections of the democratic future of an independent Namibia.

Substantial progress has also been made in resolving the issues which were responsible for the unsuccessful outcome of the Geneva pre-implementation meeting. In particular, through intensive consultations which took place in New York and Washington last summer, involving representatives of the front-line States, SWAPO, South Africa and the United Nations Secretariat, understandings were reached that will assure all parties to the elections of the fairness and impartiality of the process leading to Namibia's independence.

Finally, through their own consultations with the parties concerned, the Secretary-General and his staff have made substantial progress in resolving outstanding questions concerning the composition and deployment of the military component of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). Here I should like once again to express our appreciation to the Secretary-General for the determined efforts he has made to ensure that all is in readiness for the implementation of the United Nations settlement plan.

Because of the substantial progress that has been made over the past two years, only two major issues remain to be resolved in preparation for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). These are the choice of the electoral system to be employed in the elections, which all parties are agreed must be settled in accordance with the provisions of resolution 435 (1978) and in a manner that does not cause delay; and final technical matters concerning the composition of the military component of UNTAG.

While the United States is pleased with the record of what has been achieved over the past two years, we are by no means satisfied. Indeed, none of us can rest content until the goal which we seek has been attained. But the fact that much has been achieved justifies continued commitment to the course.

Apart from the specific accomplishments I have just mentioned, there has been the development of an atmosphere of confidence which we hope will make it possible for the parties concerned to take the important political decisions necessary to go forward with the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). We have been particularly gratified by the constructive and flexible attitude displayed by the parties concerned, which has made possible the progress that has been achieved to date.

We share the concern that the factors relating to the regional situation in southern Africa, which are, however, outside the scope of the mandate of the contact group, have not yet permitted implementation of the United Nations plan. We believe that these issues should be resolved rapidly, in a manner consistent with the sovereignty of all States concerned, so that the people of Namibia can exercise their right of self determination. The Ministers have accordingly decided that the contact group should continue its work with all urgency.

We are convinced, now more than ever that, with the continued good faith and co-operation of all concerned, our shared objective of a negotiated settlement leading to a stable, democratic, prosperous and independent Namibia will be realized.

Here I should like to say a word about the role and objectives of my Government in these negotiations.

I wish to stress above all that the United States neither desires nor seeks any special advantage or position for itself in these negotiations.

It is not our intention, nor is it within our power, to impose our own views or wishes on those whose interests and aspirations are most directly involved.

We fully respect the fact that the political decisions needed to proceed with the implementation of the United Nations settlement plan are sovereign decisions that can only be taken by the Governments most immediately and directly concerned.

Furthermore, we recognize that those who must take those decisions will wish to assure themselves that their own interests and security will be respected and protected.

In the sometimes thankless role that we have assumed our sole objective has been to assist the parties in overcoming the difficulties that have to date prevented the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and the attainment of Namibia's independence.

Finally, I wish to assure all those here assembled that the United States will continue to work for Namibia's transition to a stable and prosperous independence once an agreement has been achieved. With other Members of the United Nations, we are prepared to contribute a fair share to ensure the effectiveness of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group. We also stand ready to co-operate with others in providing the assistance that will be essential to giving all Namibians the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

I am keenly aware of the sense of frustration felt by members of this body because the aspirations of the people of Namibia have not been realized. We share that frustration, we have sympathy for the people of Namibia and the region who suffer from the continuing conflict. We will not, however, allow our feelings of frustration to lead us to despair. Our common efforts will succeed. The only alternative to continued, vigorous pursuit of a peaceful, negotiated settlement is a more dangerous and more destructive escalation of the violence that the people of Namibia and those throughout the region have known too well for too long.

Those of us who are privileged to participate in the decisions of this body have a special responsibility to do all that we can to help achieve Namibian independence peacefully and promptly. We are ready to work closely with other members of the Council and with the parties concerned to achieve such an outcome, which we know will also enhance the prospects for peace, security and economic development throughout the region.

Text supplied by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and Information.

(vi) Statement on 26 May, by the Botswana Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Hon. A. Mogwe.

Even as delegations from different parts of the globe were arriving in New York to participate in this Council's debate on the situation in Namibia, South African military aircraft were violating the territorial integrity of the People's Republic of Mozambique, strafing innocent civilians and spreading death and destruction. The raid was not the first one into Mozambique, nor is Mozambique the only state in the region to be so brutalised. Such raids are undertaken to kill, maim, terrorize, and destabilise local populations. They are undertaken in retaliation for acts of sabotage carried out in South Africa by South African nationals. The raid into Mozambique during the present debate illustrates forcefully the danger to which states in the region are exposed on account of South Africa's intransigence and its contempt for resolutions calling for the dismantling of apartheid and the granting of freedom to its oppressed peoples. South Africa alleges that states in the region harbour, train and arm the freedom fighters. This is quite often the pretext for attacking refugee camps.

The economic circumstances of our countries are such that they allow us to spend our limited resources only on the development of our countries rather than on training and arming freedom fighters. We are not at war with South Africa nor do we pose any danger to its security. The South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) is waging a liberation war and has long declared its readiness to sign a cease-fire agreement with South Africa but rather than respond favourably to SWAPO South Africa wants non-aggression pacts with countries with which it is not at war. South Africa's acts of aggression must be condemned.

The explosion which took place in Pretoria last week, resulting in suffering and serious loss of life, should be a matter of profound concern to the international community as it vindicated equally forcefully the fears which have been expressed by our leaders over a long period but which have gone unheeded. The attack was not an accident, an aberration or a hideous dream to be wished away or ignored. It was a fact of the unfolding tragic situation in southern Africa. It is regrettable that the terrorism of apartheid and all it stands for has driven man to violence. It has taken 70 years to make this hard choice.

Faced with a similar problem Brutus said to Cassius

"We all stand up against the spirit of Caesar  
And in the spirit of men there is no blood  
O that we then could come by Caesar's spirit  
And not dismember Caesar."

Mr President, this is our prayer too.

Mr President, my delegation congratulates you on your conduct of the

proceedings of this Council. I have had the privilege of knowing you and working with you over a long period of time, and your impartiality has never been called in question. That also goes for your country, Zaire.

Contrary to what Mr von Schirnding, the Permanent Representative of South Africa, said the other day, the purpose of this session of the Security Council is to promote a peaceful settlement of the question of Namibia. Almost five years ago the Security Council adopted resolution 435 (1978)<sup>1</sup>. Every year since 1978 the Frontline States, the Secretary-General, this Council, the General Assembly, the Organization of African Unity, the Non-Aligned Movement and, recently, the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, have all made every endeavour to facilitate the implementation of the resolution, but to no avail. Angry speeches and declarations, solidarity rallies, resolutions, programmes of action, contemplated sanctions, negotiations and even more patient negotiations, supplicatory pilgrimages to Pretoria and Cape Town and every hope of gentle persuasion — all have failed to induce South Africa's co-operation in the implementation of a plan it accepted in 1978. The plan remains unimplemented. South Africa maintains its illegal and unwanted presence in Namibia with defiant impunity.

The statement made before this Council on Tuesday by the representative of South Africa was a brutal revelation of South Africa's contempt for the United Nations and its resolutions. The statement was depressing and a source of much frustration. It harks back to the mandate of the League of Nations and underlines, in typical Boer frankness, South Africa's non-acceptance of the termination of its League of Nations mandate and its contemptuous refusal to recognise resolutions passed and action taken, consequent upon the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. The statement gave a catalogue of allegations against the United Nations itself, accused its officials of duplicity and partiality for SWAPO. The statement accused SWAPO of embracing Marxist principles, of deriving its inspirations from the Cuban revolution and of some mission to kill and to impose itself by force on the people of Namibia. The statement was a display of the arrogance that is a common attribute of the strong and the powerful. The statement contains a fundamental contradiction, for, whilst South Africa alleges that it accepts the right of all peoples to self-determination, it says in the same breath that it will not tolerate the expansion of Soviet imperialism on its borders.

I have already stated that the objective of this series of meetings is to remove such obstacles as impede the way to a peaceful settlement of the question of Namibia. We have come here because we remain steadfast in our commitment to the implementation of Security Council resolution 435

1. See *Southern Africa Record* no. 14, December 1978, p. 43.

(1978). We have come here because Namibia continues to be a candidate for resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960 and because the territory is a direct responsibility of the United Nations in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI).

We continue to proclaim our devotion to the efficacy of peaceful change. We have come because we believe that the birth of independent Namibia, long overdue, need not continue to be violent and as such to be a source of international anxiety and concern. We are satisfied that the United Nations plan for Namibia provides, in spirit and design, the right conditions for peaceful change. Yet the plan has been sidetracked and rendered ineffectual by insistence on the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola as a pre-condition for its phased implementation.

In January 1981 the Geneva pre-implementation talks<sup>2</sup> were held to advance the negotiations to a stage for determining the date for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). The failure of the meeting to achieve its objectives resulted from South Africa's expressed distrust of the United Nations, and progress towards the implementation of the resolution could only follow the restoration of mutual trust and confidence among the parties. No other reason was given, not even the presence of Cuban forces in Angola. The challenge and the defiance had to be met and obstacles and impediments to the solution of the Namibia problem removed. Principles to be inscribed in the independence constitution of Namibia were formulated and, after careful and deliberate consideration, accepted by SWAPO. We were close to an agreement on the implementation of the United Nations plan, a fact Mr Bush, Vice-President of the United States, acknowledged in Nairobi in November 1982<sup>3</sup>.

Having progressed so far, it is not only surprising but distressing that South Africa should do precisely what it accuses the United Nations of doing, that is, return to the threadbare arguments of the past. South Africa still seeks "firm and concrete signals" that the United Nations has terminated what it regards as bias in favour of SWAPO. The United Nations, through the report of its Secretary-General, has demonstrated its seriousness of purpose in advancing the peaceful solution of the problem. The United Nations, by giving some measure of recognition to the role played by the Western Contact Group in the settlement process and by going along with the constitutional principles formulated by the Group, has demonstrated its desire to dispel any of South Africa's concerns that might hinder peaceful negotiations. Our presence here and the large number of meetings held on this one subject also provide firm and concrete proof, not merely a sign of our concern for the people of Namibia.

2. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 23, June 1981, pp. 3-18.

3. *Op. cit.* no. 29, December 1982, p. 22.

Security Council resolution 435 (1978) is not being implemented yet — not because there are any major outstanding issues still to be resolved but because the United States and South Africa have decided to subordinate Namibia's progress to freedom and independence to the removal of Cuban forces from the People's Republic of Angola.

The representative of South Africa, having recounted what, in the view of his Government, were the reasons for the non-implementation of the resolution, adds:

"In the meantime another threat to the stability and the process of self-determination in South West Africa is casting its ominous shadow across our sub-continent. Yet another peril for the peace of southern Africa which is growing with each passing month and which has not been of South Africa's making. I refer to the increasing and threatening presence of the surrogate forces of an expansionist superpower in the region".

"In the meantime," South Africa says, yet the Cuban forces have been in Angola for the past eight years. "Another threat," "another peril," "not of South Africa's making". Mr President, SWAPO is waging the war of liberation and the people of Namibia are struggling for their independence because South Africa as the administering power resolutely refused to comply with Article 71 of the Charter to place SWA, a non-self-governing territory, under the trusteeship system, refused to transmit information on its administration of the territory, refused to take due account of the political aspirations of the people and to assist in the progressive development of their free political institutions.

Mr President, "Another threat, another peril . . ." not of South Africa's making?

In a major speech in Nairobi last year the Vice-President of the United States declared that "the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola in a parallel framework with South Africa's departure from Namibia is the way to the settlement we all desire."<sup>4</sup> The implication of this statement is that the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia as scheduled in the UN plan must take place at the same time as the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. This condition did not appear in the UN plan accepted by both South Africa and the United States. It has been responsible for the present impasse and the continuing loss of life in Namibia. Repeated assurances by the People's Republic of Angola that Cuban forces in Angola have no offensive designs against any states have failed to dislodge South Africa and the United States from their obstructive role. Cuban forces in Angola are seen as a threat to South Africa's security despite the fact that they leave

4. See *Southern Africa Record* no. 29, December 1982, p. 22.



neither invaded Namibia nor have they ever engaged the South African forces. Reasons for the US/South Africa obstructive collaboration, known euphemistically as "constructive engagement" should therefore be sought elsewhere.

*First*, the independence of Namibia is seen as a decisive step in the encroachment of African nationalism into areas eager to preserve white domination and racism. Would it be far wrong to assume that South Africa is playing for such time as, in its opinion, SWAPO would have lost the support of the electorate?

*Second*, Cuban forces were invited into Angola because of South Africa's invasion of that territory. This was done with the knowledge and tacit support of the United States. May we not therefore surmise that the United States consider it their obligation to get the Cuban forces out of Angola and by that means reverse the situation they helped to create?

*Third*, South Africa's act of aggression against Angola was condemned by SC resolution 387 of 1976. South Africa must have felt betrayed by its allies, because instead of opposing the resolution outright or using their power of veto the United States and others opted for abstention. Would it be wrong therefore to assume that the United States insistence to linkage is atonement for that seeming betrayal in an attempt to restore mutual confidence? United States officials tell the world of some empirical relationship between the removal of the South African occupying army from southern Angola and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. We are told that the introduction of Cuban forces in Angola has "torn the fabric of reciprocal restraint between the US and the USSR". We are told of the dissident UNITA movement as an entity to bear in mind in the structure of this whole settlement. Mr President, east-west ideological rivalry is the altar on which the people of Namibia are being sacrificed. We reject the view that Namibia's concerns are subordinate to South Africa's and that the latter's preoccupations are so overriding that the former's must be compromised, sacrificed or reduced to the level of a mere cold war issue. The presence of Cuban troops in Angola is irrelevant to the search for a solution to the Namibia problem. Their future stay in Angola is a matter to be decided solely by the governments of Angola and Cuba. Namibia is a UN territory. Resolution 435 is a UN plan to be implemented under the authority of the Security Council. We cannot over-emphasize the role of the Secretary-General in this regard. As he himself rightly points out in his report "the problem of Namibia is a special responsibility of the Secretary-General in view of the unique relationship between the United Nations and the people of Namibia". We support the Security Council in the execution of the responsibility.

Botswana recognises that contrary to accusations of gross interference often levelled against them, the Contact Groups' involvement in the Nam-

ibia question is in compliance with the role Africa has long envisaged for them as friends of South Africa. We recognise that their role can only be auxiliary to that of the Security Council and the Secretary-General. Their private national interests should not be allowed to delay or deflect the direction of the course of Namibian independence.

We are here to seek peaceful ways of facilitating the implementation of the UN plan for Namibia. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Zambia, the friend of the Foreign Minister of Tanzania, stated the other day: "We are not seeking a confrontation with any country or group of countries".

Our mission is a limited one. It is to promote the peaceful settlement of the Namibia question through the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 and to require the Security Council and the Secretary-General to assume fully responsibilities laid down for them.

Our political responsibilities, however, compel us to register our opposition to what we seriously consider to be a determined effort by the authors of the linkage and parallelism problem to subvert resolution 435 employing it to serve interests at variance with the objectives of the resolution. Resolution 435 is not a comprehensive plan for the solution of southern Africa's regional problems or an excuse to serve US global strategies. It is a UN plan for the settlement of the Namibian question. We therefore urge the US and South Africa to co-operate fully with the international community towards the settlement of the issue.

This, Mr President, is our modest contribution to this debate. We cannot brandish arms to instill fear in the hearts of those who obstruct the progress of Namibia to independence for we do not have any. What we have is the moral courage to speak out against injustice.

(vii) Statement, on 27 May, by the Permanent Representative of France, M Luc de la Barre de Nanteuil.

This debate is not only important, it is also timely. It is important because the United Nations, and in particular the Security Council, have a special and even a unique responsibility towards Namibia and its people. It is timely because the constructive negotiations that extended from the autumn of 1981 to the autumn of 1982 did not result, as everyone was hoping in the rapid implementation of the settlement plan. It is therefore legitimate and fortunate that the Security Council today is taking stock of what has been accomplished and is reflecting on the ways in which it can reinitiate its action and that of the Secretary-General.

I shall not refer to the past. Others before me have done so, especially the Secretary-General in his remarkable report on 19 May. My delegation particularly values its lucidity and frankness. We fully endorse the analysis contained in it and all its conclusions.

In connection with the present situation, France's position is known to everyone here. It was defined in the clearest way by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Claude Cheysson, one month ago in UNESCO House at the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence. Our position has not changed since then and will not change. It can be expressed in a few words: Namibia's accession to independence and the implementation of Security Council resolution 385 (1976)<sup>1</sup> and 435 (1978)<sup>2</sup> cannot be impeded by external considerations. Those resolutions, which commit all Members of the United Nations, are complete in themselves. They must be implemented fully, as adopted, without conditions or prerequisites.

That is why my delegation can see only advantages in having the Security Council, at the conclusion of our debate, give the Secretary-General a mandate that would enable him to resume contact with all the parties concerned to ensure the effective implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

Looking beyond the near future, we should already be reflecting on the problems that will remain once the United Nations settlement plan is implemented in Namibia. Here I have in mind the security and development of the region, to which the Secretary-General referred in the last paragraphs of his report.

In this connection, I should like to refer to the two suggestions made one month ago at UNESCO House by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs as they directly concern the United Nations and, in particular, in respect of the first suggestion, the Security Council. Mr Cheysson said the following:

"First of all, security problems. France does not fail to appreciate the legitimate concern of every country of southern Africa to guarantee its security. However, it surprises us that some deal with this issue only in terms of the security of the State which is the strongest, the richest and the best armed of the region, whereas it seems to us that the threat is particularly serious for the weak, the poorest and the least armed.

It is true that the desire to ensure the security of every State of the region, present and future — and here I have Namibia in mind is legitimate and must be satisfied, but it is up to each State, and especially Namibia in the future, to decide for itself and in full sovereignty what it considers to be the best way to strengthen and guarantee its security. France is prepared

1. See *Southern Africa Record* no. 4, February 1976, pp. 40-42.

2. *Op. cit.* no. 14, December 1978, p. 43.

to support the actions of the Security Council aimed at ensuring in the field strict respect for the rights and commitments of all, and even to serve as guarantor in situations recognized in the region, if one country or several countries of the region should propose this in full freedom and if the Security Council so decides. This, of course, can be considered for Namibia only if, once independent, once it has a representative Government, the new State requests the support of the international community in upholding the international status which it has freely chosen.

The second problem of concern for the future which we should consider now, is that of the development of the populations of southern Africa most affected by years of difficulties, occupation and war. Significant development aid has already been provided by France, both directly and through the European Community.

We must continue to work resolutely in that direction. France therefore suggests that in support of the settlement plan for Namibia the United Nations should provide for a reconstruction plan covering several years to which the main donors of assistance — States, agencies, institutions — should pledge their contributions. This proposal should also apply to the countries most severely affected by the deplorable and unjust prolongation of the occupation of Namibia. We have in mind particularly Angola, which has not known a single day of peace since its independence and which has been the object of murderous raids, serious destruction and even partial occupation because its people has demonstrated solidarity with the neighbouring people of Namibia.

It is wise and necessary to discuss all this now. The United Nations clearly has a role to play in this reflection, this preparation, but nothing can or should be done without a formal proposal by the country or group of countries concerned. Above all, nothing should delay a settlement in Namibia in accordance with the terms of Security Council resolution 435 (1978).

Bearing in mind the security problems that I have just mentioned, I cannot conclude without referring to the deadly air raid by South Africa against Mozambique. As soon as my Government was informed of that attack it published the following communiqué:

France condemns the South African raid against Mozambique.

Nothing can justify this aggression against the independent State and friendly Republic of Mozambique. France reaffirms its condemnation of the system of *apartheid*, which, through its violation of human rights, engenders a deplorable cycle of violence and reprisals.

Today a sinister chain of events seems imminent. Frustrations are mounting. Despair is deepening. More and more lives are being lost. Soon the violence may become widespread. While we are still on the brink, my country makes another solemn appeal, above all, to South Africa: nothing

will be resolved by force, either in Namibia or elsewhere. In that Territory and outside it the time for peace has arrived.

Texts for items vi and vii Supplied by the UN Documents Section of the State Library, Pretoria.

(viii) Substantive extracts from the explanation of their vote on resolution 532 made by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States in the Security Council on 1 June 1983.

### **United Kingdom**

At the outset of this debate I expressed the hope that the council hold a constructive, not a confrontational debate and that it would formulate a resolution which would reinforce the negotiating process. The council has achieved what I hoped and has passed a resolution for which the United Kingdom voted with pleasure. I would like to record two points detailed which affect my delegation.

With regard to the third preambular paragraph of the resolution I state that the United Kingdom's attitude to the resolutions listed therein, including resolution 301 of 1971 and 439 of 1978<sup>1</sup>, on which the United Kingdom abstained, remains unchanged.

Second, the resolution takes note of the results of the conference held in Paris from 25 to 29 April 1983. My government was represented at the conference, has taken note of its outcome, but was not a party to its decisions. Together with other members of the contact group, the United Kingdom informed the Secretary-General before the conference opened that we would not participate in any decisions which the conference might take, in the light of our special responsibilities as a member of the contact group. The resolution expresses the urgent desire of all members of this council, the desire shared widely throughout the United Nations, as the debate has shown, to bring about the rapid implementation of the United Nations settlement plan for Namibia under Security Council resolution 435<sup>2</sup>. It is incumbent upon us all to give the Secretary-General all possible assistance in the future consultations which we have asked him to conduct. It goes without saying the United Kingdom stands ready to do so.

### **United States**

The United States is pleased to have been able to vote for the resolution

1. See *Southern Africa Record* no. 14, December 1978, p. 54.

2. *Op. cit.* p. 43.

we adopted this morning. We share the common objective of all members of the council, the swiftest possible attainment of Namibian independence, and we believe that this resolution will make a positive contribution to that end. United States must point out that preambular paragraph 2 refers to several resolutions among which there was one, Security Council resolution 439 of 1978 which United States did not support. Our affirmative vote on the present resolution does not imply any change in the US position on resolution 439, with regard to the fifth preambular paragraph, echoing the comments of the representative of the United Kingdom. I would also note that my government, although represented at the Paris conference on Namibia, was not a party to its decisions. Together with other members of the contact group, the United States informed the Secretary-General that it would not participate in the decisions of the conference in view of its role as a member of the contact group in the negotiations aimed at achieving Namibia's independence.

Mr President, over the past two years and longer, my government has been deeply involved in the search for a settlement of the Namibia problem. We understand the frustration that Namibian independence has not, in fact, yet been achieved. However, in addition to the very substantial progress which has been made in fleshing the framework of Security Council resolution 435, we believe a great deal has also been accomplished toward establishing an environment in which all parties are able to take the political decisions necessary to implement the UN plan. If there is to be a lasting settlement, we need to create the conditions in which all countries in the region, most particularly South Africa and Angola, can feel secure and turn their energies to their own development. This would of necessity involve not only complete respect for territorial integrity by all countries within the region, it must also involve the withdrawal of all foreign forces in the region. Creating the secure conditions that in turn may provide a climate of confidence will be an essential part of this settlement for which we all devoutly wish and toward which we are all earnestly working.

Text supplied by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and Information.

(ix) Resolution 532 (1983) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2449th meeting, on 31 May 1983\*

*The Security Council,*  
*Having considered the report of the Secretary-General (S/15776),*  
*Recalling General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960*  
*and 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966,*

*Recalling and reaffirming* its resolutions 301 (1971), 385 (1976), 431 (1978), 432 (1978), 435 (1978) and 439 (1978),

*Reaffirming* the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for ensuring the implementation of its resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978), including the holding of free and fair elections in Namibia under the supervision and control of the United Nations,

*Taking note* of the results of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held at UNESCO House in Paris from 25 to 29 April 1983,

*Taking note* of the protracted and exhaustive consultations which have taken place since the adoption of resolution 435 (1978),

*Further noting* with regret that those consultations have not yet brought about the implementation of resolution 435 (1978),

1. *Condemns* South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia in flagrant defiance of resolutions of the General Assembly and decisions of the Security Council of the United Nations;

2. *Calls upon* South Africa to make a firm commitment as to its readiness to comply with Security Council resolution 435 (1978) for the independence of Namibia;

3. *Further calls upon* South Africa to co-operate forthwith and fully with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in order to expedite the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) for the early independence of Namibia;

4. *Decides* to mandate the Secretary-General to undertake consultations with the parties to the proposed cease-fire, with a view to securing the speedy implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978);

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the results of these consultations as soon as possible and not later than 31 August 1983;

6. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

\*adopted unanimously.

**B.** Further report of the UN Secretary General (S/15943) 29 August 1983, concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) and pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 532 (1983).

In the exercise of the mandate entrusted to me, I initiated preliminary discussions with all concerned with a view to establishing the necessary framework for my consultations and reaching an agreement on the out-

standing issues to be discussed with the parties to the proposed cease-fire.

In my preliminary consultations with senior officials of South Africa on the implementation of resolution 532 (1983), they maintained that the main obstacle to implementation of the United Nations plan was the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, and that as soon as they were withdrawn, the remaining outstanding issues could be addressed and resolved. At the same time, they indicated that I would be welcome to visit South Africa for consultations. I made clear to them that the question of Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola could not be accepted as a precondition for a Namibian settlement. I added that if South Africa was not prepared to discuss the outstanding issues at this stage then there would be little point in visiting South Africa for consultations. I stressed that such a visit could only be justified if it served a useful purpose within the context of Security Council resolution 435 (1978)<sup>1</sup> and resolution 532 (1983).

On 10 August I received a letter from the Foreign Minister of South Africa in which he set out the views of his Government concerning its requirements for a peaceful settlement of the question of Namibia. The letter stated that once firm agreement has been reached on the fundamental requirements of Cuban withdrawal, and a commitment had been obtained from the Angolan Government regarding the implementation of such an agreement, the South African Government was of the opinion that the other outstanding issues could be addressed and resolved reasonably quickly within the framework of the understandings that were reached between South Africa and the Contact Group. In this regard he said that South Africa would insist on compliance with the commitments which were made during the Phase I and Phase II negotiations, particularly with regard to impartiality which remained an essential requirement for the implementation of any settlement. Discussions would therefore have to take place concerning the manner in which the principle of impartiality would be applied in practice.

At separate meetings in New York, I informed SWAPO, the representative of the Chairman of the Front-Line States, as well as the Western Contact Group that should South Africa continue to insist on addressing outstanding issues only after agreement had been reached on the withdrawal of Cuban troops, it would not be possible to make any further progress on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 532 (1983) at this stage. At a further meeting, the Western Contact Group re-confirmed that understandings reached during Phase I and Phase II of the negotiations in 1982 (see S/15776, Paras 4 to 9),<sup>2</sup> as agreed to in parallel dis-

1. See *South Africa Record* no. 14, December 1978, p. 43.

2. It is intended to publish this Report in the following issue of *Southern Africa Record* when the official text becomes available.



cussions with SWAPO and the Front-Line States, as well as with South Africa, remained in force and were still binding on the parties. Following from this, I reaffirmed to the parties that in the implementation of Security Council resolution 532 (1983) discussions should not be re-opened on matters in regard to which agreement and understandings had already been reached, and confirmed as such to the United Nations. In this connection, I drew their attention to the fact that the only remaining outstanding issues which had to be addressed in the context of Security Council resolution 532 (1983) were the choice of the electoral system and some final problems relating to UNTAG and its composition.

On 16 August I met with Ambassadors Fourie and von Schirnding of South Africa to discuss the letter of 10 August from the Foreign Minister in the context of Security Council resolution 532 (1983). At that meeting they assured me that South Africa accepts Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 532 (1983) as the basis for further discussions, and that South Africa was prepared, without prejudice to its position on other regional issues, to discuss the two remaining outstanding issues relating to the electoral system and the few remaining points pertaining to UNTAG and its composition. The Ambassadors also assured me that it was not the intention of South Africa to re-open discussions on matters regarding which agreement has been reached with the parties, and that South Africa also accepted all understandings and agreements reached with the parties, as valid and binding on the parties to the negotiations, and would accordingly insist on their implementation. It was on the basis of these clarifications that I decided that a visit to southern Africa might be useful within the context of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and resolution 532 (1983).

On 17 August, I informed the Foreign Minister of South Africa that following an exchange of views with Ambassadors Fourie and von Schirnding on the points made in his letter, and in the light of clarifications given to me by them, it would be possible within the context of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 532 (1983) to pay a short working visit to South Africa from 22 to 25 August to hold further discussions with the Government of South Africa in regard to the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia. I also emphasized to the Minister that in the context of our discussions, it was important that the question of Namibia be viewed as a primary issue in its own right, and not as an appendage to other issues. I further informed the Minister that I intended, subsequent to my visit to South Africa, to pay a brief familiarization visit to Namibia in regard to my responsibilities and in the context of pertinent Security Council resolutions.

I left New York on 20 August accompanied by Mr Brian Urquhart, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Mr Abby Farah, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Questions, and Mr Martti

Ahtisaari, my Special Representative for Namibia. I arrived in South Africa on 22 August, after a brief stop in Cape Verde, which I made at the invitation of President Pereira for discussions with him.

In Cape Town, I met with Prime Minister P.W. Botha on 23 August and had extensive discussions with him, both on the question of Namibia and the general situation in the region. This was followed by meetings on 23 and 24 August with Foreign Minister Botha and the Minister of Defence, General M. Malan, together with senior officials of the Government. The Administrator-General of Namibia, Dr W. van Niekerk was also present at these meetings. My discussions with the Foreign Minister focused on the two remaining issues mentioned in my last report, namely, the choice of the electoral system and the settlement of some final problems relating to UNTAG and its composition.

At the working session, the Foreign Minister restated the South African Government's commitment to seek a settlement to the Namibia question on the basis of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) within the framework of the understandings reached with the United States and the Western Contact Group. He confirmed that the position of the South African Government was that the one major issue still to be resolved was the withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola, on the understanding that they would not be replaced by any other hostile forces. He further stated that firm agreement would have to be reached on the fundamental requirements of Cuban withdrawal, and a commitment would have to be obtained from the Angolan Government regarding the implementation of such an agreement. The other outstanding issues, he stated, should be addressed and resolved within the framework of the understandings reached with the United States and the Western Contact Group.

In reply, I stated that the United Nations could not accept the linkage precondition for the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia. I made clear that my mandate did not include the question of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and that the terms of reference for my discussions with his Government were exclusively spelt out in resolutions 435 (1978) and 532 (1983). I urged the Government of South Africa to respond positively on the two remaining outstanding issues.

In regard to the electoral system, the Foreign Minister stated that the Western constitutional proposals provided for a choice between the two systems, namely, proportional representation and the constituency (single-member constituency) system, to be made by the Administrator-General after commencement of implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). He indicated that South Africa's choice would now be made by the Administrator-General and communicated to the special representative as soon as a date for implementation had been set, which would be earlier than originally envisaged in the proposals. Members of the Security Coun-

cil will recall that in my last report to the Security Council (S/15776, paragraph 8), I explained the situation in regard to the electoral system as follows:

“As regards the electoral system to be employed in electing the Constituent Assembly, it was agreed that it would be based either on proportional representation or single-member constituencies. I was also assured that all the parties were agreed that this issue must be settled in accordance with the terms of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and that the issue must not cause delay in the implementation of that resolution. The Front-Line States and SWAPO emphasized the view that agreement should be secured on the electoral system prior to implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). To this end, the Western Contact Group undertook to continue their consultations with all the parties.”

In regard to UNTAG, I first took up the composition of its military component. I reviewed the progress made in previous discussions in regard to governments that had agreed to provide the seven infantry battalions for UNTAG. In so doing, I explained that the final decisions on the composition of UNTAG would be made by the Security Council on the basis of proposals by the Secretary-General. Following the discussion, the Foreign Minister expressed agreement on the proposed composition of UNTAG and stated that as far as South Africa was concerned the matter was resolved.

The discussions also resulted in the settlement of outstanding issues regarding the agreement of the status of UNTAG. This agreement would provide UNTAG with the necessary immunities and privileges to facilitate its work and to protect its status in the territory as a United Nations operation.

The Foreign Minister also raised again the question of impartiality. In this connection, he assured me that it was not the intention of South Africa to re-open discussion on this matter, regarding which agreement had already been reached, but that in order to avoid future delays it would be useful for South Africa to know how provisions relating thereto would be implemented. I assured him that in the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) all parties would be treated equally by the United Nations. It followed that South Africa was expected to do the same.

Since I completed my talks with South Africa ahead of schedule, I proceeded to Namibia on 24 August on a brief familiarization visit. I visited Ruacana on the northern border of Namibia, where I was shown the hydro-electric power station and its facilities. The journey to Namibia provided me with an opportunity to learn at first-hand some of the present difficulties facing its inhabitants. While in the territory, I raised these matters and other problems in informal consultations with the Administrator-General, Dr D. van Niekerk.

Namibia is afflicted by a serious drought situation with dire consequences for the entire population, particularly those in the rural areas. In my contacts and meetings with the people of the Territory, most of them, after expressing their desire for peace and stressing the necessity for an early implementation of the United Nations plan, urged me to alert the international community to the plight and to facilitate the flow of humanitarian assistance. The present cycle of drought in southern Africa as a whole is having a devastating impact on the national economy and the everyday life of the people of the Territory. In the circumstances the international community might wish to consider what could be done to provide humanitarian assistance to support local efforts in this regard.

Having concluded the first leg of my visit to southern Africa, I paid a one-day visit to Luanda on 26 August to follow-up discussions I initiated in New York with SWAPO in regard to the implementation of Security Council resolution 532 (1983). I also met with President Dos Santos of Angola to discuss the situation in southern Africa.

I met with Mr Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO, in Luanda to discuss the question of Namibia in the framework of Security Council resolution 532 (1983). He reiterated to me SWAPO's statement of January 1981 during the Geneva pre-implementation meeting<sup>3</sup>. He stated that SWAPO was ready to sign a cease-fire with South Africa and to further co-operate with the Secretary-General and UNTAG, both military and civilian components, in facilitating the speedy implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) without modification, amendment or extraneous and irrelevant issues of linkage and reciprocity.

With regard to the composition of the military component of UNTAG he assured me that SWAPO would support the recommendations which I intended to make to the Security Council with regard to the composition of the seven infantry battalions.

On the choice of the electoral system, Mr Nujoma reaffirmed SWAPO's position that it was prepared in principle to accept either proportional representation or the the single-member constituency system, and urged the imperative need for a decision to be made on this matter as soon as possible and for the establishment of a time-frame for implementation.

### **Conclusions**

I have described above my efforts to carry out the mandate given to me by the Security Council in resolution 532 (1983), namely, to consult with the parties to the proposed cease-fire with a view to securing the speedy implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). These prolonged and intensive consultations have resulted, as far as UNTAG is con-

3. See *Southern Africa Record* no. 23, June 1981, p. 16.

cerned, in resolving virtually all the outstanding issues. In fact we have never before been so close to finality on the modalities of implementing resolution 435 (1978).

However, the position of South Africa regarding the issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a precondition for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) still makes it impossible to launch the United Nations plan. I have repeatedly made it clear that I do not accept this so-called "linkage" and that the question of Cuban troops was not envisaged in Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and is not part of my mandate under resolution 532 (1983). This difficulty can only be dealt with in its own context by those directly concerned, acting within their sovereign rights, and, above all, by a determined effort by all concerned to reduce the tensions and contentious issues and to put an end to conflict in the area as a whole.

My visit to the region brought home to me vividly both the human tragedy of the present situation and the necessity for urgent progress towards implementation. The people of Namibia, on whose behalf this long-standing international effort has been mounted and maintained, are suffering not only denial of their legitimate aspirations for genuine self-determination and independence, but from the effects of procrastination and the uncertainty of their future. To their already great difficulties have now been added the hardships of a long and serious drought. I have now witnessed at first-hand their impatience and disillusionment.

A peaceful solution of the Namibian problem is also the key to a peaceful and co-operative future for all countries of the region. The instability and conflict generated by the failure to resolve this problem has had disastrous results for the neighbouring countries, and especially for Angola. It is in the interest of absolutely no-one to have this situation continue. It is both highly damaging to the peoples and government of the area and also a threat to the wider peace. Another complicating factor is the injection of wider political and ideological issues into this already complex and highly-charged situation.

I have reported above substantial progress since the Council last met on the Namibia question. However, no-one is more aware than I that we cannot claim real progress until an actual date is fixed for the start of implementation of resolution 435 (1978), and the cease-fire comes into force. I have no doubt that further disastrous consequences will result if we do not reach this stage quickly.

The attainment of a peaceful, prosperous, independent and united Namibia would be an achievement of which all members of the international community could be proud. For the sake of the people of Namibia, for the future of this richly-endowed region of the world and in the interest of international peace and co-operation, I appeal to all concerned not to be

distracted from this objective by other issues. I urge them, in a renewed spirit of co-operation, to build on the progress made and to make another major effort for the achievement of independence for Namibia through the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) at the earliest possible date. For my part I am determined to continue my endeavours to this end and also to assist the people of Namibia in any way I can.

## United States and Southern Africa

Address entitled "Southern Africa: America's responsibility for peace and change", by the United States' Undersecretary for Political Affairs, Mr Lawrence Eagleburger, on 23 June 1983

I am grateful for this opportunity to speak to you who are so involved in helping to shape this nation's consideration of critical choices. I have come to speak to an issue that has occupied an important place on this Administration's agenda — an issue of common interest to the Western World, an issue central to international stability.

From this podium, spokesmen from the several Administrations of recent times have addressed the responsibilities which the United States bears for the great crisis areas of the globe — Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Latin America. Tonight I invite you to join me in considering what is at stake in Southern Africa, and what role we can play in shaping that region's future. My message is not an easy one — it is a message of responsibility — responsibility for the use of American influence and power in dealing with a question of substantial and growing national interest.

I do not have to tell this audience that there is a crisis in Southern Africa. Nearly a decade ago, as we stood mesmerized by our engagement in Southeast Asia and by escalating warfare in the Middle East, Portugal's empire in Africa collapsed. In its wake, Southern Africa's conflicts, rooted as they were in longstanding struggles for decolonization and racial equality, became world issues — issues that would engage our national interest and test our resolve. Angola became an area of intense civil strife and contest between the Soviet Union and the West, the war for Zimbabwe's independence intensified, Mozambique was caught up in regional conflict, and the struggle for change in South Africa assumed more violent and polarized forms. Wars which had been more or less contained within national boundaries spread across frontiers, and the cycle of violence which has come to plague the region, took root.

In retrospect, Western indifference to change in Southern Africa played a part in creating this situation. As a nation we were not well equipped to deal with the region. Our involvement had been superficial: We knew little of its actors or its dynamics. Our body politic was polarized. The left was transfixed by the issue of racism, while the right was too often prepared to interpret events only in the light of the East-West competition. In spite of these domestic divisions, three Administrations have attempted to catch up with fast moving events, define our national interests, and decide how to use our influence.

The divisions of the past, I regret to say, still linger. There are those who would assure our irrelevance. As we meet here tonight, voices in our Congress, media and public call for punitive measures against governments which do not please us — banning bank loans to South Africa or Kruggerand imports from South Africa, denying access to the stabilization programs of the international monetary fund or escalating petty trade controls, banning food aid to Mozambique or development assistance to Zimbabwe. Others repeat the slogans of liberation, while denying us the ability to add an ounce of political will or diplomatic investment to solving the region's problems. At a time when we need all the leverage available to us, some argue for disinvestment and escape. They confuse the making of statements with the ability to influence events.

There are those outside Africa whose motives are more cynical. They are the advocates of violence, who would turn the landscape of Southern Africa into an enlarged version of Lebanon, with the sovereignty, independence, and economic viability of the states in the region subordinated to a battle between South Africa and its neighbours. These forces would welcome such an outcome, since it would present new opportunities for neo-colonial exploitation. They are more than willing to shed African blood and to supply copious quantities of weapons, even though they know violence cannot create anything of value in Southern Africa. Violence, for these outsiders, is not a means to achieve national self-determination or to end apartheid. Rather, it is an end in itself, a political vehicle to enhance external influence and permit the political and ideological subjugation of independent Africa. The United States, on the other hand, proceeds from the conviction that our national interest and the interest of the West demand an engagement — constructive and peaceful — in the affairs of Southern Africa. The United States is, I believe, uniquely situated to speak to all sides in the conflict.

The region has enormous potential — positive and negative. Historically it is a zone of western influence and has been so for three hundred years. But direct western control has ended. Decolonization, peaceful and violent, left a legacy of weak institutions, conflicting nationalisms, fear and loss of confidence in any reliable hand.



The implications are clear. If we wish to shape events, we must be prepared to take initiatives, make investments, support those things we believe in, build institutions and bridges. We must, in short, be involved. And we must, as well, be prepared to oppose those from outside Africa who claim a right to violent intervention.

To succeed in Southern Africa, we must define a coherent regional strategy. Apart from Namibia, we are talking about a community of sovereign states. Southern Africa is interdependent economically in its infrastructure, its populations, markets, its natural links and to an important degree in its external orientation. The region, unfortunately, suffers from a current and aggravated temptation to depend upon the instruments of violence.

One way or another the states of Southern Africa have to evolve explicit or tacit ground rules for co-operation and co-existence, for the alternatives are all too obvious. Both South Africa and the independent African States to its North have enunciated at different times a vision of co-existence. Regional co-existence, the only path to peace and stability, has an additional meaning. Unless there is peace and stability in Southern Africa, it will prove impossible to encourage essential change in South Africa — and by change I mean a basic shift away from apartheid.

At present, the issue of Namibia, and South Africa's continuing control there, the presence of Cuban forces in Angola, and the practice of harbouring guerrillas and dissident movements to strike at targets across borders, pose severe challenges to regional security and Western diplomacy. As a region, Southern Africa contains parallels to the tragedies of the Middle East. A cycle of violence has begun — unless it is reversed the interest of the region and the West will be severely damaged. If Southern Africa is at war, the consequences for South Africa will be clear: Increased spending on war — reduced political will for addressing the domestic agenda of negotiated, evolutionary change — and a heightened polarization of attitudes that can only distort the internal South African debate about the means and forms of change. Similarly, if the region is at war, the economies and institutions of the neighbouring African states will be undermined, distorted, and perhaps destroyed. No amount of Western or international support and solidarity with these states will be productive if the politics of development and co-existence continue to be subordinated to the politics of survival and war.

It is for all these reasons that this Administration has committed its prestige and energy to defining a regional strategy and using our influence to shape events. The undertaking has several aspects which, taken together, are directed at encouraging enhanced regional security, economic development, and peaceful change.

## **Namibia**

The quest for Namibia's independence remains for this Administration, as it was for our predecessors, a key object of American diplomacy, the unresolved status of Namibia creates a dangerous vacuum in the area and serves as a magnet for violence and external meddling. Namibia remains Africa's last colony, and a focal point of the continent's and the non-aligned world's attention. Its people suffer from war and outside domination. The United States long ago accepted responsibility for helping to secure Namibia's independence — we have, since then, made a considerable contribution toward achieving that goal. Under President Ford we defined the first procedure for a peaceful move to independence. Under the Carter Administration, we joined with our allies — France, Canada, Great Britain and Germany — in negotiating US Security Council resolution 435,<sup>1</sup> a document of seminal importance which defines how transition to independence under UN authority will occur.

During the Reagan Administration we have faced squarely the need to secure conditions which will make it politically possible for South Africa to relinquish its position in a territory it has controlled since 1916.

We inherited a stalemated negotiating process. Since that time, we and our allies, working through what we call the Contact Group, have elaborated constitutional principles to guide the framers of the constitution for an independent Namibia. We have successfully resolved a series of troublesome issues related to the role of the United Nations. The fruits of this intensive diplomacy are impressive. Through sustained and co-ordinated effort with our allies, the frontline states and SWAPO, the South Africans, the internal Namibian parties, and the UN Secretary General and his officials, we have virtually all elements in place for the implementation of resolution 435.

There is, admittedly, some frustration over the time it has taken to move as far as we have. But these are complex and delicate questions which have required months of quiet negotiation. There is, today, virtually unanimous agreement on the basis for resolving this intricate and important problem. We are at the point where the transition to independence can begin as soon as the key parties are prepared to take the necessary political decisions.

## **Angola**

With the Government of Angola we have undertaken a separate but parallel negotiation which, if successful, will provide for the departure of Cuban forces, thus opening the way to a South African decision to implement the international agreement so painstakingly developed on Namibia's

1. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 14, December 1978, p. 43.

transition to independence — while setting the stage for peace in Angola itself. In a year and a half of talks, we have sought to build confidence in our objectives, and to establish a principle of broad applicability to the region at large.

That principle is reciprocity. Progress in the area can be achieved only if all parties make a contribution, and only if the security and sovereignty of each is respected. South Africa must leave Angola's southern provinces and it must leave Namibia. Angola, on the other hand, can make such steps possible, while remaining true to its principles, by assuring, as a separate sovereign act, the withdrawal of Cuban combat forces from its territory.

The position of the United States is clear. The President is committed to Namibia's independence. He wants to assist in creating a peaceful and independent Angola in a peaceful and prosperous region. He is prepared to use his full influence to achieve these ends.

### **A Framework for Regional Security**

The quest for peace in Southern Africa does not stop with Namibia and Angola. Our diplomacy has consciously sought broader regional security. We have moved to rebuild our relations with strife-torn Mozambique. We have responded to Mozambique's difficult economic circumstances with food aid and will shortly send an Ambassador there. We have pressed for dialogue between South Africa and Mozambique, and an end to cross-border violence. Our efforts have been rewarded with two rounds of talks at ministerial level between the Governments, and a commitment to a continued search for understanding despite the pressures of recurring violence. The dialogue is fragile, but we will continue to do what we can to foster it.

Similarly, between South Africa and Zimbabwe and South Africa and Lesotho we have quietly urged patience, restraint and dialogue. Here again our efforts have achieved a measure of success. But I repeat, the framework is new — it is vulnerable and only through good will and reciprocal undertakings will it survive.

This concept of regional security in Southern Africa rests on several key premises:

— First, we are talking about sovereignty. Apart from Namibia, the region consists of sovereign states which recognize the rights and obligations of that statehood. Respect for international boundaries and renunciation of the use of violence across them are central to any framework for international security. There can be no double standards for either South Africa or its neighbours. The obligations of statehood, in Southern Africa as elsewhere, are basic and reciprocal.

— Second, the United States categorically reaffirms the principle that all states have a duty to refrain from tolerating or acquiescing in organized activities within their territory by guerrillas or dissidents planning acts of

violence in the territory of another state. This applies equally to South Africa and its neighbours.

— Third, regional security cannot rest solely on the activity, the vision, or the influence of outsiders. Our task is not to impose a structure of security. The structure must rest on regional realities, mutual interests, and direct channels of communication. Our role is to foster a climate conducive to building it. We have made a beginning by stressing our readiness to work for reduced violence, to facilitate contact and communication, to build bridges and to serve as honest broker. To be effective, our stance must rest on a capacity to speak credibly to all states. We are uniquely qualified to play this role and we intend to play it. But it is up to the governments directly concerned — in South Africa, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and others — to make the basic choice between the temptations of violence and the challenge of co-existence.

— Fourth, we recognize that it is not realistic to speak of regional security without reference to the domestic political dimension of co-existence between states. The dilemma we face is that peaceful domestic change in Southern Africa and regional security are both urgently needed if the risks of growing international strife are to be avoided.

In South Africa, about which I will speak further in a moment, the imperative of peaceful change is domestic — South Africa has enjoyed sovereign statehood for over 70 years. Yet, a structure of regional stability in Southern Africa is unlikely to take root in the absence of basic movement away from a system of legally-entrenched rule by the white minority in South Africa. By the same token, peaceful change toward social justice and equality for all South Africans is unlikely to happen in a regional climate of escalating strife and polarization.

In Namibia, we and our Contact Group allies are working effectively as a matter of highest priority to bring about negotiated peaceful change to internationally recognized independence. Success would directly benefit in many ways our goals of building regional security, addressing the issue of cross-border violence and foreign intervention.

### **The Dimensions of US Regional Involvement**

There are those who see in Southern Africa's political tensions an opportunity for the West to identify the good guys and the bad guys and then to align itself accordingly. Others argue that the United States cannot maintain constructive ties based on principle and mutual interest with both South Africa and its African-ruled neighbours. Our policy of constructive engagement rejects simplistic stereotypes based on race and ideology as inadequate guidelines for US policy. From the outset of this Administration, we have signalled our hope for constructive relations with all governments

in Southern Africa. No regional state or external power can or should define our relations for us.

Accordingly, if we are to be effective in this region, we must maintain a balanced policy that is relevant to its needs and that fully reflects its diversity and divisions. Politically, we seek to bolster those whose development policies and external actions warrant that support. But we have also consciously held out the option to others to diversify their external orientation and to pursue closer economic ties with the West. Our co-operative diplomacy on Namibia has brought us into intensive contact with the frontline states, a grouping that spans a wide range of African political choices — some of them still evolving. Vice President Bush's travel last November to Zimbabwe, Zambia and Zaire — and return visits here by their leaders — enable us to nurture these important ties. Our substantial commitment to the success and health of newly independent Zimbabwe is another dimension of our effort to help this strategically important region find stability and growth. While Zimbabwe faces serious difficulties, its leadership has committed itself to the principles of political reconciliation and a mixed economy. Because of its key geographic position and relatively strong economic base, it is important that Zimbabwe not fail as a new nation.

Economically, some 25 per cent of US bilateral assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa goes to Southern African states, six of which are land-locked. Though rich in minerals and human potential, most states of the area share to a greater or lesser degree in Africa's current economic crisis.

As part of our effort to deal with the region's economic crisis, we are working to support Zambia's efforts to restructure its economy and stimulate its promising agricultural sector. The recent visit of President Kaunda to the United States and subsequent intensive consultations have given impetus to this process.

Southern Africa's current drought — the worst in decades — represents a serious challenge to economic security and human well-being in the region. After careful review of this potential food disaster, we have recently by 25 million dollars (sic.) our PL-480 food aid programs for affected nations, beyond the 79 million dollars for fiscal year 1983-84 already programmed. Over the longer term, even as political tensions threaten to divide Southern Africa, there are potent factors of geography, history and economics that pull these states together. Transport links, the pattern of interstate boundaries, and the natural flow of goods and people all point in the direction of regional co-operation. We are supporting the regional efforts in transport and food security of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), while also quietly urging South Africa and its neighbors to maintain pragmatic trade and customs agreements based on mutual benefit.

## **South Africa**

It is essential that South Africans get on with the business of deciding and shaping their own future. The political system in South Africa is morally wrong. We stand against injustice, and therefore we must reject the legal and political premises and consequences of apartheid. Indeed, it is increasingly recognized as impossible to maintain by a growing number of South Africans of all races.

We reject unequivocally attempts to denationalize the black South African majority and relegate them to citizenship in the separate tribal homelands. We do not and will not recognize these areas. All Americans are repelled by the sight of long-settled, stable black communities being uprooted and their inhabitants forcibly removed to barren sites in far away "homelands" they have never seen before. Neither can we countenance repression of organizations and individuals by means of administrative measures like banning and detention without due process of law.

By one means or another, South Africa's domestic racial system will be changed. Black South Africans will gain fuller participation in all aspects of South African society and politics. Our policy is directed, therefore, not at whether a non-racial order is in South Africa's future or what the shape of that non-racial order will be, but how that non-racial order will be arrived at. Western policy toward South Africa today must focus on how various black groups acquire the basis and influence necessary to participate in a genuine bargaining process that produces change acceptable to all. The future of South Africa depends on those who participate in shaping it. A peaceful process of change depends on support from those who reject, as we do, both alignment with the current racial order, and violence as a means of ending it.

We believe that South African and US interests are best served by encouraging the change that is now under way in South Africa. We are committed to strengthening the capacity of black South Africans to participate in their country's society as equals — economically, culturally, and politically. It is our view that such "power to participate" can only be made — it cannot be taken. This is not and cannot be a zero-sum game, since power taken by force, or a revolutionary upheaval, will likely leave little worth fighting over.

American efforts should, therefore, concentrate on positive steps which back constructive change and those who are working for it. We applaud the steps which are being taken to expand home ownership opportunities, trade union rights, and access to education. The structure and substance of apartheid is inevitably affected as education budgets grow dramatically and Blacks find new opportunities and new influence as workers and consumers. The recent South African court decision to confirm urban residency rights of Blacks is an important development. Equally, the findings

of the De Lange Education Commission underline the necessity of a sustained expansion of opportunity on a basis of greater equity. The Commission's findings and recommendations deserve recognition and support.

South Africa retains an independent judiciary and a distinguished bar — two institutions which tie it to the finest traditions of Western democracy. Indeed, the rule of law is for South Africa, as for any country, a precious inheritance. In recent years the power of the court has been circumscribed by new acts of Parliament and police practices which remove from the courts the ability to review executive action. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the system of detention, where the right of access to those in the hands of the police has been limited. Such a system leads to abuse. There are few things Americans should be prouder of than the rule of law in our society. Similarly, we admire efforts by South Africans to retain an independent judiciary. Those who work to rebuild the rule of law are forging anew South Africa's more important links to Western democracy. We wish them well.

Our policy — constructive engagement — supports those inside and outside of government in South Africa, who are committed to peaceful change away from apartheid. Our support is both tangible and political. It is essential that we in the West, who have the most to offer toward peaceful change and much to lose if it fails, send an unambiguous message to the people of this increasingly important country. The message is, first, that we agree with those South Africans who recognize that change is imperative and, second, that we are determined to permit them the opportunity to shape and define that change free of the threat of foreign intervention.

Constructive engagement seeks to support trade unionists, students, entrepreneurs, government leaders, cultural-political movements, civic associations, and religious organizations which, through their commitment to peaceful change away from apartheid, can help make a better future for all citizens of South Africa. Such groups and individuals must prosper if there is to be multiracial bargaining leading to a government based on the consent of the governed.

To support the positive aspects of change in South Africa, the Reagan Administration, with the support of Congress, has initiated new programs over the past two years:

— A four-million-dollar-a-year scholarship program which brings approximately 100 black South African students a year to the United States for undergraduate and graduate degrees. The majority of these students are studying in the hard sciences. By 1985 there will be 400 black South Africans enrolled in US institutions of higher education, and we will begin graduating more black engineers, chemists, and computer engineers than now exist in South Africa.

— In co-operation with the AFL-CIO, programs of support are being

initiated to train labour leaders in South Africa in skills which will improve the collective bargaining ability of black and mixed trade unions and enhance the dialogue between the American and South African labour communities. The US contribution to this program will increase from 190 000 dollars this fiscal year to 875 000 dollars next year.

— In co-operation with the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce of South Africa, we are beginning this year a project to support small business development in the black community. Over the next two years, some three million dollars will be invested in this project designed to enhance the economic leverage of the black community.

— In conjunction with black community groups throughout South Africa, we have underway a tutorial program to assist black high school students preparing for matriculation examination which will determine their professional futures. Over the next two years this two-million-dollar project should significantly boost the number of blacks eligible for university admission.

— Moreover, the United States Senate has recently expressed its interest in setting aside five million dollars for an internal scholarship program as a counterpart to the program now bringing black South African students to the United States. This program, implemented through private South African institutions, could provide scholarship support to some 400 black South African students per year.

I do not pretend that these programs, in and of themselves, are the answer to apartheid. But they are indicative of an approach that fully justifies the term "constructive". We are tangibly backing the things we believe in. By strengthening the educational standards of the black population, by enhancing the organizational ability of labour, and by expanding the business base of the black community, we are engaged in institution-building for change away from apartheid while helping to encourage the alternative to it.

In terms of supporting change in South Africa, the American business community has considerably more experience than the US Government. Over the past decade, American corporations with subsidiaries and affiliates in South Africa have become a force for change. The activities of these firms have had an impact far beyond the book value of US investment in South Africa, and far greater than is commonly recognized.

US firms have led the way toward equal employment opportunities in South Africa. Corporate initiative, both foreign and domestic, helped bring about changes in South African labour law permitting blacks to organize trade unions and bargain collectively. US firms, acting through the voluntary Sullivan Code of fair employment practices, have had a significant impact on the well-being of black South Africans on the job. We strongly believe that voluntary adherence to the Sullivan code is one of the



best ways to go beyond rhetoric about apartheid. Equally important, so do the great majority of our corporate leaders.

The record of US corporate citizenship in South Africa, though not perfect, is clear and impressive. Our firms have been pacesetters for change. Those in the United States and other Western nations who would have our firms disinvest not only ignore this record of achievement but propose measures that rest on no discernible philosophic or policy premise. Disinvestment by US firms would undo an avenue of positive effort. Proponents of corporate disinvestment — and of stockholder or pension manager sales of stock of firms operating in South Africa — would have Americans wash their hands of any association with that country. This apparent quest for symbolic dissociation is, in reality, a formula guaranteed to assure America's irrelevance to South Africa's future.

In the final analysis, however, South Africans themselves — both black and white — will have to meet the challenge of their society, drawing for inspiration primarily on their own resources and their own history. Movement toward change in South Africa is taking place. In the economy Blacks have been gaining ever more bargaining power as producers. They are moving into more skilled and responsible positions. As consumers their purchasing power has become essential to the South African economy. Black trade unions have become a major new reality. Politically, Prime Minister Botha put his own political base in jeopardy with his proposal to extend a limited and ethnically-based franchise to the Coloured and Asian communities. What some South Africans see as too much, others see as too little. I do not see it as our business to enter into this debate or to endorse the constitutional proposals now under consideration for South Africa. Nor do we offer tactical advice to any of the interested parties. Yet the indisputable fact which we must recognize is that the South African government has taken the first step toward extending national political rights beyond the white minority.

Many are quick to point out that these proposals make no provision for the national political participation of the black African majority in South Africa, except via the separate tribal homelands. More generally, there is a tendency to reject all incremental improvements in whatever sector of life in South Africa that are not explicitly linked to a full-blown democratic blueprint. We recognize the limits of current change, and for this reason do not make a practice of endorsing individual steps as, in themselves, an adequate response to the dead end of apartheid. At the same time, we believe it is incumbent on us to avoid the arrogance of rejecting such steps. Nor, if we would be credible, can we expect South Africa's would-be reformers to announce their game plan and their bottom line to the world at large.

We state clearly and unequivocally our belief in the concept of government based on the consent of the governed. We do not presume to offer a

formula to South Africa for resolving its unsettled political agenda other than to state that all South Africans must have a say in determining their political system.

### **Conclusion**

Let me conclude by drawing your attention to a little recognized fact. Our Southern African policy of constructive engagement — extending the hand of friendship, co-operation and support to all states and peoples of the area who wish it — has occasioned controversy. Some, it appears, have misunderstood the message or chosen for their own reasons to misunderstand it. Less noticed is the encouraging evidence of a growing consensus across party lines around the core principles of more active involvement in this increasingly important region. Many Americans are coming to recognize that without a strong Western leadership role, it would become a turbulent zone of tragedy. They are pleased to see the United States striving diplomatically to build regional peace, to achieve independence for Namibia, to create conditions for the departure of Cuban troops from Angola. I detect a common sense public awareness that we can do these things only if we develop close and credible working relations with all the parties in the region. Whatever tactical debates may exist, I perceive a growing consensus in Congress, among businessmen, church leaders, trade unionists, and the media that it is right for Americans to do more than preach about apartheid. The time has come to support what we believe in, not to walk away in self-righteous indignation.

Text supplied by the United States International Communication Agency, Johannesburg.