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*Southern*

*Africa*

**Record**

Number 321

SOUTHERN AFRICA RECORD contains the original texts of, or extracts from, important statements by political leaders, government representatives and international organisations, concerning international relations in the southern region of Africa. In addition to statements on issues of current concern, some significant statements made in the past are included in the RECORD from time to time. The reproduction of these policy statements of the past and present is intended for information and reference purposes, not only for students, but also for all those who are concerned with the relations between the countries of Southern Africa.

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## United Kingdom and Southern Africa

### A. Statement in the House of Commons on 31 March 1983, by the British Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr Cranley Onslow

I welcome this opportunity to discuss the important subject of British policy towards Southern Africa. I echo the closing remarks of my Honourable friend the Member for Havant and Waterloo, Mr Lloyd . . . I am grateful for the first chance that I have had since taking on my present responsibility nearly a year ago to talk to the House on this important subject. I shall respond, as far as I can, to the speech that my Honourable friend has made in as constructive a way as he opened the argument.

Southern Africa is a region with which we as a country have deep-rooted historical connections. Our links go back a long way and remain close and strong through settlement, trade, investment, aid and many varied personal and individual bonds. I welcome the fact that many countries in the region are Members of the Commonwealth, and we should not undervalue their contribution.

I cannot debate now whether my Honourable friend is right in his assessment that the region is more important than the Middle East. Certainly it is an important part of the world and we have contributions to make there.

We properly took on, and successfully discharged, the responsibility for bringing Zimbabwe to independence, and it is right that we should be closely involved in the search for a settlement in Namibia. Many countries in the region look first to us for help and advice and many people in this country and elsewhere regard us as having a special role to play in Southern Africa.

I assure my Honourable friend that I share his anxiety about the reports that he quoted of Soviet or Soviet Bloc involvement in, if not domination of independence movements in Africa and elsewhere. I am not sure that that is a new situation. I remember a pamphlet produced by, I think, the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies nearly 30 years ago entitled "Defence and the Cold War", which defined Soviet objectives as being all

mischiefs short of war. There is scope for the Soviets to make mischief in Southern Africa, and it is in the nature of things that they should seek to take advantage of the situation.

That makes it all the more important that our policies and responses should be right and related to the prevailing circumstances. With respect to my Honourable friend, I am not sure that he covered all the considerations.

Southern Africa is an important part of the world in which we have substantial interests. The commercial figures speak for themselves. South Africa is our twelfth largest export market and took nearly £1,200m of our exports in 1981. About 7 per cent of our overseas investment is in South Africa. Of course, trade is not the only consideration; there are strategic considerations. The importance of the Cape Route is well known, as is the importance of the *mineral resources in Southern Africa to which my Honourable friend referred*. There are also family ties.

However, we cannot consider those aspects in isolation and ignore the realities of international politics. There is no getting away from the fact that South Africa's racial policies are a continuing barrier to a closer relationship. We know how complex they are, but the House knows the Government's view on apartheid. It was expressed by my Right Honourable friend the Prime Minister in July 1979:

"The policy of apartheid, with its emphasis on separating peoples rather than bringing them together, and all the harshness required to impose it on the South African population is wholly unacceptable."

(Official report, 25 July 1979, Vol. 971, C.629)

I wonder whether my Honourable friend gave all the weight that he would have liked to give to that factor. We cannot escape it. Apartheid is deeply morally repugnant to many people in this country and throughout the world. We must accept that fact and I do not take a different view about its moral repugnance.

*Mr Ian Lloyd:* Does my Honourable friend agree that in the past two or three years there has been a considerable, contrived and perhaps tortuous attempt to retreat from apartheid? I believe that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary of South Africa have condemned apartheid and, although condemnation is not the same as abolishing the system, should not we encourage the process of retreat from a doctrine which I also wholly deplore?

*Mr Onslow:* We should certainly do that. It is one of the objectives of our policy, and I shall deal later with how we should assess the development of the internal politics of South Africa. I am glad to have my Honourable friend's agreement to the proposition that we must balance the factors.

We must also take account of the future. Only last week President Kaunda of Zambia forecast an explosion of violence in South Africa within the next four years that, he claimed, would make the French Revolution seem like a *children's Sunday morning picnic*.

We have to prove President Kaunda wrong. I am sure that he has no wish to see it happen. I hope and believe that the Government of South Africa have no wish to see it happen. Part of our policy objective has to be to try to move events forward in a way which makes it unthinkable that this should happen.

It is not for us to dictate to the Government of South Africa how they should resolve all their difficulties by internal political change. It must be for the South African people and for their Government. I am not pretending that I can see any quick or easy solutions to the problems. But, as my Honourable friend said, South Africa is not a static country. The political situation is a developing one, as is the economic situation. Observers agree that economic growth over recent years has brought the political rights to which the black community aspires and is entitled to aspire.

There have been proposals for constitutional change which the South African Government have put forward. These affect the Indian and Coloured communities especially. I do not discount them, but the standard by which these proposals must be judged is the extent to which they meet the wishes of the people of South Africa as a whole. So I cannot give them an unqualified welcome.

I have to choose my words with care born of experience, because I know how quick some journalists in South Africa are to quote selectively or misleadingly. My Honourable friend understands that.

We cannot avoid noting that the process of constitutional reform does not at present offer any role for the largest population group in South Africa, the black community. In that situation, the House will know that we feel it right to apply certain limitations to our contacts with South Africa, as do a great many other countries. We are not alone in our attitude. Sporting contacts was one aspect mentioned by my Honourable friend, and I emphasise our continuing support for the Gleneagles Agreement. My Honourable friend may feel that the House should debate it. It is a subject which may be considered in other fora in the country in coming months. But the Government believe that it is the right policy to adopt, just as we believe that it is right to restrict our nuclear and military collaboration with South Africa in the ways with which my Honourable friend will be familiar. As I have said, this is also the view of the international community.

We also believe that the best way to promote change in South Africa is by maintaining and fostering our other existing links. Our commercial interests with that country play a role here. As the House knows, the Government encourages British companies to comply fully with the European Community Code of Conduct which lays stress on improving the wage levels and training of black employees and especially on the development of representational rights for black workers through organisations of their own choice. We believe that the Code has been a successful instrument in the improvement of working conditions for black employees of British companies in

Africa, and I am glad to be able to tell my Honourable friend that my Honourable and learned friend the Minister for Trade will be answering a Parliamentary Question on that subject today so that there is an up-to-date statement available to the House of the way in which the Government see the Code working.

I am conscious that in the time available I can cover very little of what is a very large subject. However, I wish to say a little about Zimbabwe, if my Honourable friend will allow me. It is an important part of Southern Africa, and we cannot ignore it. We have been greatly concerned about the reports of excesses committed by the Fifth Brigade of the Zimbabwe Army in Matabeleland, and the Government of Zimbabwe are well aware of our concern.

The Zimbabwe Government has a serious security problem. When I was in Harare in January, I heard about it, about the kidnappings of tourists, about the attacks on whites and blacks, about the ambushing of white farmers and their black employees and about the general state of dissidence which had built up in Matabeleland and which the Government could not ignore.

Exactly what has happened is still not clear, but the Government welcome the assurance which President Mugabe has given the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace that there will be an investigation into reported cases of abuse on the part of the Army.

I should have liked to discuss other aspects of Southern Africa. I am conscious that I have not dealt with Namibia. That is an important issue. We are doing our utmost to help events forward. The momentum is slow, but I believe that progress can be made and there is still a prospect of a peaceful solution to that difficult and long-standing problem. We seek a peaceful evolution. Our policy towards South Africa and the rest of Southern Africa involves peaceful settlements and the use of peaceful means to resolve the difficult problems. In that I am sure that our policy is right and I hope that my Honourable friend will give it his full support.

*For the Record* Ref. No. 1, 19.4.1983, issued by the British Information Services, Johannesburg.

**B.** Letters concerning Anglo-South African relations, from the British Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, to Mr Ian Lloyd, M.P.

**(i)** 28 July 1983

Thank you for your letter of 17 July. I am grateful for this clear expression of your views. Let me say straightaway that it is general Government policy to maintain our contacts and links with South Africa. This policy is based on a full recognition of the importance of our trade with and investments in South Africa and of the strong human, historical, and other ties between our two



countries. Nonetheless, we have been much criticised for this policy by those who believe that South Africa should be isolated from the international community and that our links support the system of apartheid. In turn we have argued, along with some other Western countries, that such isolation would be counterproductive; it would not produce the changes desired in South Africa itself, it would damage British and wider Western interests and harm other countries in Southern Africa. We have chosen instead to try to promote peaceful change through dialogue, encouragement and example. But there are areas of contact where we, along with the great majority of other nations, have thought it right to accept certain constraints — defence and nuclear collaboration are examples. The 1977 Commonwealth statement on apartheid in sport — the Gleneagles Agreement — must be seen against this background.

In your letter you advance three objections to the Commonwealth statement: firstly, that it unfairly singles out apartheid and South Africa for condemnation; secondly, that it is in breach of the UN Charter; and thirdly, that Gleneagles protagonists are now seeking to continue the boycott until the apparatus of apartheid has been dismantled. I shall try to deal with these in turn. We have not singled out South Africa and its internal policies for any special treatment. As we have made clear on many occasions our concern for human rights is universal. The United Kingdom was the first state to ratify the European Convention on Human Rights in 1951, and in 1976 we ratified the International Conventions on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights. We are also a signatory to the Helsinki Final Act. Human rights considerations are an important factor in the formulation of policies towards individual countries and our views on, for example, Scharansky are well known. Our approach is a case-by-case one. But we must recognise that South Africa, by its institutionalised separation of the races and the repressive measures used to enforce this policy, is a unique case and one which arouses particular emotion in the international community, especially in the Commonwealth.

You are, of course, quite right to say that the UN Charter (in its Article 2(7)) provides that the UN shall not intervene in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states. Of course the Commonwealth statement is not a statement of a UN body. More important, as a matter of practice Article 2(7) is not regarded as a bar to consideration of any human rights issues, so long as the majority wish to discuss them. We certainly consider it has become accepted (both to the UN and in CSCE) that human rights are a legitimate object of international concern. This underlies our approach to all human rights abuses, be they in the Soviet Union, South America or South Africa.

Thirdly, it is a widely held view in the Commonwealth (and one we acknowledge) that sport cannot be separated from other aspects of life, and that

sport in South Africa cannot be completely integrated until apartheid is abandoned. In this context, I am sure that my colleagues in the Commonwealth will wish to discuss the Commonwealth statement at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Delhi in November. Some may argue that its terms should be strengthened. I do not believe that this would be justified or helpful. But as Neil Macfarlane has recently pointed out, the Commonwealth statement can only be changed when there is a clear consensus for such change amongst the Commonwealth at large. I should be surprised if those attending the Delhi meeting would agree that changes had taken place in South Africa to justify any modification in the direction you would favour. There is a further important point which is that in considering our obligations under the Commonwealth statement, we have to take account not only of our sporting relations with South Africa, but of those with the Commonwealth and beyond. I believe that those most affected in this country, that is our sportsmen, are beginning to take a similar realistic view. They understand that in considering the resumption of sporting contacts with South Africa, they must have regard to the wider consequences of such a decision and to their sporting links elsewhere. The recent MCC decision seems to confirm this. Perhaps those who voted against the proposed tour also had in mind that Mr Vorster took the first and significant step towards sporting isolation when he refused to accept Basil D'Oliveira as a member of the 1968 MCC touring party.

Lastly you refer to arms supplies to the Frontline States. I understand that the recent report to the US Congress on World Trade in Armaments alleges that the UK supplied \$100 million of equipment (not, as you stated in the House on 14 July \$1 billion) to these States between 1979 and 1980. As you will know, it is our general policy to supply arms only on commercial terms and under a strict licensing procedure according to what we perceive as the purchasing country's reasonable requirements. The one exception to this was the supply to Zambia without payment in 1978 of defence equipment worth nearly £10 million. This decision by the Government of Mr Callaghan has to be seen against the background of the civil war in Rhodesia which at the time was threatening to spill over into neighbouring countries. In fact the Frontline States today secure the great bulk of their weaponry not from Western sources, but from the Soviet Union and its allies. It is these opportunities for communist involvement and meddling in African affairs that I see as the most worrying aspect of the escalation of tension in the Southern African region, the underlying cause of which is the internal situation in South Africa itself. The well-being and stability of the region requires there to be peaceful and timely change in South Africa. As I have made clear, our policy is directed towards this end.

*For the Record* Ref. no. 4, 5 October 1983, issued by the British Information Services, Johannesburg.

(ii) 26 September 1983

- Thank you for your further letter of 8 September on our policy towards South Africa. I entirely agree that our foreign policy towards any country must be determined by our interests and reflect reality. I do not, however, accept your contention that our policy towards South Africa has lost touch with the realities of the situation.

You complain that we attach too great importance to South Africa's racial policies and to the reactions to these of members of the Commonwealth, particularly the Frontline States. We recognise that there have been many changes in South Africa in recent years; similarly, we remain ready to acknowledge and to welcome further progress in resolving the country's complex and delicate racial problems. I understand, too, the political constraints under which the present Government of South Africa have to operate. Nevertheless the policies pursued by successive South African Governments have inevitably affected our relationship. We have national interests wider than those related to any one country, however important; and we are bound to take proper account of the widespread international concern and emotion that result from apartheid and its enforcement. Equally we must have regard to the strength of feeling in this country about South Africa's racial policies.

You point to the dangers of applying double standards in judging abuses of human rights. This can sometimes occur. But since the South Africans assert that they belong to the Western World, they must expect to be judged by Western standards. By any standards South Africa is unique in continuing deliberately to separate people by race, whereas the rest of the world, including ourselves, are trying, however imperfectly and however difficult to achieve, to promote racial harmony. It is this adherence to apartheid which has led the international community to adopt certain measures to signal disapproval. It would be wrong to disassociate ourselves from these international commitments but at the same time we cannot ignore what is happening in South Africa itself. We will, of course, watch this carefully and be ready to form our own judgement on developments.

You allude again to the Commonwealth statement on apartheid in sport. We adhere to this agreement because the Government judges it right to do so and not because of international pressure, as you appear to suggest. Also, as made clear in my earlier letter, any change in the Gleneagles Agreement will require support amongst the Commonwealth at large. In this context you will have seen the recent comments by the South African Minister of National Education at the International Congress for Rugby Media held in South Africa last month where he addressed himself to the point that Sports Administrators could only go as far as the South African Government would permit and said there was no possibility of change in the position on the reserved areas, schools and the system of Government in South Africa. This

suggests that genuine integration off, rather than merely on, the playing fields of South Africa has still a long way to go.

You also disagree that South African policies are the underlying cause of tension in the Southern African region. The exclusion of blacks from the political process has inevitably led to increasing dissatisfaction. Although not to be condoned, this has been a powerful factor in impelling black political leaders to seek by violence what is denied them by the laws under which they live. The institutionalised discrimination and second-class status accorded to blacks in South Africa in the economic and social as well as political sphere continues to be an affront to the rest of Africa and to those of us who live in a free society and uphold its values. These are facts which are not altered by the undoubted abuse of human rights which occurs elsewhere.

Furthermore, South Africa's judgements about its own security requirements have led it to a more aggressive stance towards her neighbours involving armed attacks and economic pressure and has caused these countries to fear for their own security and stability. We deplore cross-border violence, including incursions by terrorists, from whatever quarter. It is essential that all the Governments of the region should respect each other's territorial rights. This is a two-way street. But so long as the African countries in the proximity of South Africa feel threatened, they will seek support and military assistance, usually from those willing to offer the most favourable terms. As the (revised) figures which you quote in the second paragraph of your letter show, the Soviet Union and their allies have been quick to exploit the opportunities offered by the insecurity of the region. A reduction in the present tensions in the area will reduce these opportunities. It is a major interest for the West as well as for all those who live in the region that this should happen.

We shall continue to work to this end. I can assure you that, as part of this purpose, we wish to have as fruitful a relationship with South Africa as is compatible with the balance of our interests and the realities of the situation in Southern Africa.

*For the Record Ref: no. 5, 5 October 1983, issued by the British Information Services, Johannesburg*

- C. Extract from a speech by the British Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr Malcolm Rifkind, at the South Africa Club, London, on 18 October 1983

Britain has a long tradition, a long history of contact with the Continent of Africa. We have obviously the old colonial relationships that existed for many many years; we have the common bond of language that binds together, even today, much of the African continent with the rest of the

English-speaking world. We have economic, social and political links, and all are important to us. Indeed it is the view, as I think it would be of most of us, that contact and dialogue are important throughout the world; then inevitably it is right and proper that there should be contact and dialogue between Britain and South Africa, because we believe that that contact, and that dialogue, can only be beneficial to the two countries concerned, to the peoples of these two countries; and thereby to prosperity and well-being in that part of the world. We believe that dialogue essentially achieves two things: first of all, it reduces the area of possible misunderstanding, and that can only be a desirable objective. It also enables us to search out for the common ground where it exists, and to try and build on that common ground in order to try and help resolve some of the serious problems that still continue to exist in Southern Africa, as problems exist in other parts of the world.

Now I have mentioned the contacts between our two countries, and indeed they go back a very long time, right back to the 1700s. Over that period, the contact between our two countries has experienced different relationships, different dimensions. We had the tragic period which in this country is known as the Boer War. We had subsequently the creation of the Union of South Africa with all the hope and prosperity that that produced. I want also to pay tribute to the many South Africans who during two World Wars helped fight alongside British colleagues, and those of the other members of the Allies, against Nazism and Fascism, and made a very important contribution during these two conflicts.

Over the years also, Mr President, we have had very important economic and trading relationships. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of trade to a country like the United Kingdom, with such a high proportion of our gross domestic product exported to many parts of the world. In the first six months of this year, we are exporting something like £500m worth of goods to South Africa and importing some £400m from your country. It is comparable to the trade we have with other parts of Africa where in a similar period some £800m worth of exports are going to other parts of sub-Saharan Africa and correspondingly large amounts of imports coming in. Countries like South Africa, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and other countries in the African continent are all major trading partners of the United Kingdom, and we think it is important that trade should be built up. Not only does it make an important contribution towards economic prosperity, but it is also yet another link which forges a connection and a bond between the various countries of the world. Some of those who wish to see political change in South Africa have argued for economic sanctions as a means of bringing pressure for change of that kind. We in the United Kingdom, successive British Governments, including the present British Government, do not believe that a policy of economic sanctions is other than misconceived, and, ultimately, unenforceable and undesirable. We believe that economic contact and economic prosperity

is not only beneficial to the United Kingdom and beneficial to South Africa as a whole, but it is one means of ensuring a continuing growth in the standard of living, of black as well as white, in South Africa and therefore can be welcomed by all sections of the community. We welcome the growth of black prosperity in South Africa where it has taken place, and we welcome the growth of other expressions of black and social political life because clearly these forms of communal activity are important in any country, and therefore to be welcomed.

Mr President, we believe also that British firms operating in South Africa also must concern themselves, not simply with the level of economic activity, but must also recognise social responsibilities in the country in which they are operating. And thus as I said, successive British Governments have supported the European Code of Conduct as a way of making a constructive contribution towards the improvement, quality and standard of life of the peoples of that country.

Now Mr President, I mentioned the various economic and social connections that exist between our two countries; but we have also had a political relationship which itself, as you have indicated, has had its ups and downs over the years of our mutual relationship. Since the war, in a sense there has been a problem, a strain, on our relationship and you, yourself, have recognised that, and it's right and proper to do so. Over that period of time we in the United Kingdom, so far as Africa is concerned, have been primarily involved in the decolonisation of Africa, in providing independence and self-government for those territories that were formerly British colonies. At home in the United Kingdom, we have had to face a situation where we now have a multi-racial society in the United Kingdom, and we have chosen the path of integration as a means of ensuring a full and proper equal relationship for the peoples of the United Kingdom, irrespective of their racial or ethnic background. The South African Government has chosen a different path and has chosen the path of apartheid, a separate development, and that clearly has been one of the problems affecting our bilateral relationship. It is, of course, well known that successive British Governments, including the present Government, have never sought to hide our very strong views on the subject of apartheid, and these are views which are shared by the vast majority of Members of Parliament and indeed a strong spectrum of British public opinion. But of course we recognise that problems that are often referred to under the title of human rights are not problems peculiar to South Africa, and we know the situation involving political controversy and human rights is an issue, a universal issue. And just as it is universally proper for Governments to take an interest in human rights there whenever they arise, so too it is sadly the case that the failure to comply with the higher standards of life that we would all like to see is also found in many countries. It is, however, also a fact that one of the particular reasons which has brought particular controversy in the

case of South Africa has, as you are all well aware, been the particular phenomenon that we have in South Africa of a legalised institutionalised form of racial separation, and that is clearly one of those areas that has given rise to the greatest difficulty in establishing the depth of the relationship that many would like to see between our two countries.

It is not my place this evening to comment on these particular matters. It will ultimately be for the people of South Africa, all the people of South Africa, to determine their own destiny, and that is right and proper. What I would say is that we look forward to the time when South Africa will have the system of Government that so manifestly represents the wishes of all its people, that South Africa will again be able to take its full place in the international community, and make the major contribution in world affairs that a country of its size and importance would undoubtedly justify.

Mr President, I have mentioned that these are essentially internal matters to be determined by the people of South Africa, but there are other issues in Southern Africa, in the region of Southern Africa, which are of international significance and which affect, not only that region as a whole, but also the greater world community. As a Minister in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office it is right and proper that I make a few brief comments about them.

I think one area which has been of growing concern over the last year and a half has been the problem of what is called cross frontier violations and what is alleged to be 'destabilisation' in Southern Africa. The position of the British Government is really quite simple and quite clear; we believe very strongly indeed that there should be respect for international frontiers and that the non-use of violence in the resolution of political problems should be the first priority of any Government. We recognise very strongly indeed that terrorism, wherever it occurs, must be unreservedly condemned, and whether terrorism takes place in Birmingham or Pretoria, or any other city or place around the world, it must be treated as the scourge of our modern times and opposed by all means possible. Any qualification to such a condemnation will be inappropriate and would be unjustified. Terrorism is one of the most serious problems faced at the present time, and we believe strongly that those who indulge in terrorism, whether in South Africa, whether in our own country or elsewhere, have to be condemned and have to be told that they are misguided in the belief that this will in any way help resolve the major political problems, nor will it help encourage the prospects for change in the country in which it takes place. We believe it is also the case that to respond to acts of terrorism by means involving the use of violence, for example, by punitive raids across frontiers into neighbouring countries, also creates difficulties, also creates potential bitterness and hardship, and in the longer-term minimises the prospects for fruitful co-operation in whatever region that such action takes place. I believe that in Southern Africa as much as in any other part of the world, the essential thing to do is to try and encourage contact

between peoples in neighbouring countries and to try and recreate a spirit of trust that will be the only sure basis for lasting friendship, co-operation and stability. I may say, Mr President, that the problem of trying to create trust is a difficult one; it's not one limited to Africa by any means. Indeed it is not even one limited to this century. I was recently reading some comments that were made by the great Austrian Statesman, Prince Metternich, who during the Congress of Vienna was approached by one of his aides, who told him that he had just heard that the Russian Ambassador had died. When Prince Metternich heard this news he apparently replied "really, I wonder what his motive could have been". An absence of trust is not, as I say, a new phenomenon, and it is not one limited to any particular part of the world, and it is, I suspect, an inevitable disposition of diplomats and politicians to assume the worst of their fellow man, and that, some would say, is what we are all paid to do.

Now if I could go on from there to mention one other particular problem of intense interest and importance to South Africa but also of interest to its neighbours and to the world community as a whole. I refer to the problem of Namibia. Namibia is today the last colonial territory in the African continent and once it comes forward to independence then the decolonisation of Africa will be complete and that will be the end of a very important chapter. The United Kingdom, along with the other four Western members of the contact group, have been doing what we can to facilitate a peaceful resolution of this particular international problem and have done what we can to facilitate the negotiations that have taken place on the United Nations' resolution. Recently we had a very important visit by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to South Africa, and that seems to have had a very positive outcome with the resolution of the outstanding problems that existed with relation to the bringing forward of Namibia to full and recognised independence. Some have suggested that the only thing that now remains outstanding before independence can take place, and indeed this is the view of the South African Government, is the question of what is called "linkage" with the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. The British Government view is that the two issues are really quite separate, and should not be connected. That Namibia should be entitled to its independence and this should be facilitated in the earliest possible time in accordance with the resolution of the United Nations. We believe that is the right and proper course of action, and it is one which we hope will now be possible. We recognise also that there is a quite separate issue which is of concern in the region, and that is the presence of foreign troops in Angola. We believe that the best prospect for Angola must be to enable the Angolan people to determine their own future, and we hope that it will not be long before the South African forces are withdrawn from southern Angola and indeed not long before the Angolan Government decides it does not any longer require the presence of Cuban troops in its country.



Clearly the removal of all foreign troops from Angola would be the best way of contributing towards the peace and stability of that very important region.

*For the Record* Ref: no. 16, 31 October 1983, issued by the British Information Services, Johannesburg.

**D.** Extract from a speech by the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe, to the Royal Commonwealth Society on 14 November 1983

Edmund Burke, reflecting on the French Revolution, said that "A state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation". That message needs to ring most loudly in Southern Africa, and in particular in South Africa itself. Change there is inevitable and desirable. I find it unthinkable that a minority will be able indefinitely to deprive the majority of its rightful say in running the country. And apartheid is not only morally abhorrent, it is in practical terms untenable and incompatible with dynamic economic policies.

Developments in the southern tip of Africa are of fundamental importance to Britain. Not only are a number of Commonwealth countries directly involved but our political, economic and strategic interests throughout the continent are affected by the way things go there. I therefore intend to devote the rest of my speech today to Southern Africa.

The question that we must face and that above all the people of the region must face is how change is to come about. Whether it is to occur peacefully and in a way which preserves economic and social development, or whether the evolutionary process falls prey to the forces of revolution, and to the counsels of despair, exacting a dreadful price from all Southern Africans.

The trend I fear at the moment is a trend towards greater violence, terrorist attacks and destabilisation. The British Government deplores that trend. In particular all parties should strictly respect the sanctity of national borders. Cross border violence is in any case counter productive. The black guerrillas should understand that attacks on South Africa merely strengthen intransigence.

They will make the whites even more fearful of making concessions. And the South Africans for their part have to see that destabilisation of their neighbours risks precipitating the situation they fear most: making the Russians and their surrogates a more powerful factor in the equation. Punitive raids may buy a little time, provide a breathing space, but the long term costs are those of fear, bitterness and hatred. These costs will be paid by all concerned, in the region and outside, and will make peaceful change much more difficult.

The key to peace is mainly in the hands of the South African Government and people. Nobody can force them to use it. But use it they must if they are to secure their long-term stability and prosperity. I have been encouraged by the internal economic forces which have already brought about a degree of change in South Africa. The demand for black workers, the increase in their purchasing power, the development of black trade unions — all give impetus to a powerful dynamo for change inside South African society. These are trends which I welcome, and they should be welcomed by all South Africans. To allow the dogma of apartheid to block the benign forces of the market place would be to the benefit of no one. In the end, the result might by some standards in South Africa be ideologically sound but in an economic wasteland.

In my view therefore economic forces offer some hope that the evils of apartheid can be moderated. But political reform is also necessary. I am not going to suggest formulae for reform or try to prescribe precise remedies. We have never deviated from our view that it is for those in South Africa to judge what is best for them, but we have made clear on a number of occasions that we are looking for progress towards constitutional arrangements acceptable to the people of South Africa as a whole. There was strong white support for the new constitutional proposals in the referendum on 2 November. But only part of the population has been consulted about these proposals, and they have been seriously criticised by the majority of South Africans because they make no provisions for them. I see that the South African Prime Minister said that the vote was a mandate for "evolutionary reform". It would I think be inappropriate for me to comment on the outcome of the referendum or on that statement, but we do hope that the referendum will facilitate the process of change which we would like to see. We shall of course continue to take a keen interest in developments.

For apartheid and the absence of a form of government which has the consent of all the people cast a long shadow over Britain's relations with South Africa. Our rejection of apartheid and of the oppression linked with it reflects the firm view of a wide spectrum of British public opinion. It also represents the clear consensus within the Commonwealth. The Prime Minister and I will in New Delhi be reaffirming the Government's commitment to the Gleneagles Agreement on apartheid in sport. I hope our sports bodies will take account of this and reflect too on the wider implications of their decisions about South Africa, not least for other Commonwealth sportsmen. In particular, we shall continue to advise the Rugby Football Union against an England tour of South Africa next year. As for other issues this Government will uphold the United Nations arms embargo. We shall eschew any military collaboration with South Africa, and we shall not help with South Africa's nuclear programme.

But we are not going to cut off contact with South Africa. One of the

messages I want to leave with you today is that you can only influence someone if you are ready to talk to him. That applies to the Western Governments in their approach to relations with the Soviet Bloc, and it applies with equal force to the Western Governments and to the other states of Southern Africa in their relations with South Africa.

You cannot get your point across by refusing even to discuss your differences. Equally we do not think that the case has been made for economic sanctions against South Africa. I have a general objection to interference in commercial relations for political purposes, not least because such interference has normally proved ineffective. I must be frank and admit that sanctions would of course damage important British commercial and economic interests, but they would also inevitably damage Commonwealth countries bordering on South Africa like Zimbabwe and Botswana — and others too.

In any case I believe we should not interfere with the economic forces that are at work for change in South Africa. Nor is it in our interests, or that of South Africans to provoke through drastic action a violent economic collapse there. Rather positive change in South Africa is likely to come about through a growth in contact with the rest of the world, not by treating it as a pariah, and through development of its economy, not by the imposition of a commercial siege. That is why we support the European Code of Conduct for companies with interests in South Africa; not as a punitive measure but as a positive way for improving the situation of black workers.

There are no quick or easy solutions to the problems of Southern Africa. Those who say there are have been badly briefed or are naive. But our policy for the region is consistent and aimed at the long-term. It is a policy of contact and involvement, of working with all the parties in and around South Africa to produce faster change by peaceful means. This is nothing new. We have been working with other Western nations in the Contact Group of Five — including Canada, another leading Commonwealth member — to bring about a fair and lasting settlement in Namibia. The UN Secretary-General's recent successful visit to the region resulted in the resolution of virtually all the outstanding problems on Namibia. I understand the impatience felt by some African states, but the work of the Contact Group has contributed in no small way to the progress already achieved.

It is of course easier to state the objective than to achieve it. The main obstacle is the demand for an agreement on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a precondition for a Namibia settlement. We have made clear that for us the only conditions for Namibian independence are those in Security Council Resolution 435<sup>1</sup>. But as a matter of practical politics we have to recognise that the main parties each have their own security problems. These have to be satisfactorily resolved if there is to be an enduring agreement. I

1. See *Southern Africa Record* no. 14, December 1978, p. 43.

believe that military disengagement and the establishment of greater trust in the area hold the key to this. That is why we want to see the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Angola. But of course the continued presence of South African troops in Angola and continuing armed conflict there make the withdrawal of Cuban troops more difficult. I therefore urge the South Africans to pull back their forces from southern Angola as a vital step. I do not believe this would prejudice their position. Indeed it would be a valuable step in the process leading to a Namibian settlement and greater regional stability. Conversely, I find it hard to see how their continued presence in Angola can serve South Africa's long-term interests.

The British Government and its partners in the Contact Group are committed to continuing their efforts to achieving a Namibian settlement acceptable to all. There are some in this country who would argue that it is better for the West that South Africa retain control of Namibia, that an independent Namibia would fall under Soviet domination. I reject these notions. Indeed I believe the reverse to be true. A settlement which enables the people of Namibia freely and without any kind of external interference to determine their own future would be clearly in Western interests. It would reduce, not increase, the opportunities for external meddling and for further violence, and it could help to promote the removal of the Cubans from Angola. But perhaps even more important, a Namibia brought peacefully to independence and in a way which safeguarded the human rights and political freedoms of the minority communities would make an important psychological, political and economic contribution to the region's future. Indeed in that sense, Namibia could be the key to the future of Southern Africa. If that key can be turned, then the prospects for the region achieving peaceful change, for avoiding Kalandashnikov diplomacy will be much better.

In particular the door would open to far greater cross-border co-operation. The black states in the area already understand the importance of working together. The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference is just one of the ways in which they are helping one another with their mutual problems. We welcome this. More to the point, we are offering concrete support e.g. for the Limpopo railway project. This sort of co-operation makes sense for the futures of these countries. The inescapable facts of geography and economics have also willy-nilly resulted in a measure of practical co-operation between South Africa and its black neighbours.

That co-operation must be developed and expanded. The future for the region as a whole and in all senses — political as well as economic — is likely to depend on it. If the black states and South Africa want to influence one another, they must talk to each other, express their concerns and explain the constraints under which they work. Nothing can or will be solved in an atmosphere of isolation and mutual suspicion.

A peaceful future for Southern Africa will also require the recognition of

the responsibilities of statehood and of the meaning of sovereignty. Those concepts are incompatible with support for or toleration of the work of organisations using violence in the name of politics. They are incompatible with punitive military raids, retaliatory or not, and they are incompatible with policies designed to keep your neighbours off balance, to choke their economic development or to destabilise their Governments. These concepts must be recognised and acted upon on both sides of South Africa's borders. If they are not, the slide to military confrontation, to violence and instability, from which there can be no real winners will continue. In short, South Africans must use the telescope, not the microscope. They need a wide-angle lens, not a narrow focus, if they are to acquire the breadth of vision necessary to allow long-term change through mutual confidence and understanding rather than through confrontation and subversion.

The British Government stands ready to encourage and support cross-border contact and co-operation in Southern Africa. the US Administration have demonstrated the same attitude. We are willing to do what we can with our other allies, inside and outside the Namibia Contact Group, to help remove the mutual suspicion and distrust which impede progress. For the Western countries share with all the Africans of the region — including those of every community in South Africa — an overriding interest in peaceful change and the avoidance of bloodshed. Many Commonwealth states hold strong and uncompromising views about South Africa. I understand those views. I sympathise with their total rejection of apartheid. I believe that the Commonwealth model for successful international co-operation across cultures and races in solving political problems has relevance for Southern Africa. But that model is unlikely to be taken up and used for the benefit of all the people there unless the Commonwealth demonstrates recognition of the political realities of the region.

We in Britain are using our best efforts to promote and encourage the changes necessary in South Africa itself for the future peace and stability of the region. And we are encouraging the black African states to play their part, realistically but without any sacrifice of principle. But this cannot be the sole responsibility of the West. In the end the problems are African ones. The first steps have to be taken by Africans — white Africans and black Africans.

*For the Record* Ref: no. 7, 16 November 1983, issued by the British Information Services, Johannesburg.

**A.** Extracts from a speech explaining Zimbabwe's foreign policy, by the Zimbabwean Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Hon Witness Mangwende, to the Staff College in Harare on 11 May 1983

I am very grateful for any and every opportunity to be able to address senior comrades in the Zimbabwe National Army, but especially so when such an address forms part of a training course for officers who are destined to occupy posts both at home and abroad.

Some of you may ask why a lecture, or discussion, on foreign affairs is necessary within a military context . . . "We are soldiers", you may say ". . . not diplomats . . .", and this, of course, is very true. But, as I hope to show you over the next forty minutes or so, the diplomat and the soldier have a similar role to play and have the same basic responsibilities towards Zimbabwe, although their means and methods may, and very often do, differ enormously. For, basically, both the diplomat and the soldier are engaged in the day-to-day defence of their country's hard won freedom, independence, territorial integrity and national sovereignty.

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The diplomat's task, therefore, is but an external extension of the task entrusted to you comrades, and although our world is less physically dangerous than yours, it is no less beset than yours with the diplomatic traps, ambushes, political flanking attacks, traitors, sell outs and the like. It is because of this similarity in the roles we have to play that I address you today — for whereas we are kept fully aware of your activities and the context in which you operate, it is felt that you, in your turn, should be made fully aware of ours.

As soldiers defending the very principles of freedom and justice upon which our nation is founded, it is felt that you should be made aware of how those same principles have become the cornerstones of our external policies and how others are as deeply engaged, externally, in defending these principles in the international arenas as you are engaged in so doing internally.

I, therefore, intend to take full advantage of this occasion to address myself

to three main themes which are central to a correct understanding of Zimbabwe's conduct of its international relations:

- (i) a clear definition of what foreign policy is, or ought to be, and the context in which we conduct our foreign policy;
- (ii) the principles and principal elements of that policy; and
- (iii) the machinery we use to both project our image abroad and pursue our foreign policy objectives.

The foreign policy of any given country is, essentially, the pursuit of the national interest. "National interest" is an elusive concept which, broadly conceived, refers to the objectives a state seeks to achieve in its conduct of relations with other states. The identification and choice of such objectives or goals is influenced by a number of considerations:

- (i) the state's perception of its objective role and place in the international community;
- (ii) the ideology it follows, which serves not only as the guide to action but also as the filter through which the state in question perceives, evaluates and judges the behaviour of other states;
- (iii) the state's level of aspirations and the psychological value it attaches to certain principles; and
- (iv) the determination with which a state aims to pursue those stated objectives as well as the quantity of resources — human and material it is willing to invest in pursuit of its avowed national interests.

In order to translate the aspirations, desires and values into a programme of action, the state will need to have a principled leadership and a sufficiently and suitably staffed bureaucratic machinery and an arena or environment for the articulation of the foreign policy goals. In Zimbabwe, as in every other country, the head of Government, is the centre of gravity in the conduct of international relations. He/she defines the policies to be pursued and establishes the context, tone and the actual pace at which those goals are to be pursued. The Prime Minister, in our case, thus maps out the guidelines for action. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is charged with the responsibility of both articulating and executing the nation's foreign policy; he implements policy through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its diplomatic missions abroad. Diplomatic style, and the amount of resources to which it has access — all have a crucial bearing on the degree and scope of actual success or failure of its foreign policy programme.

Just as important, the extant environmental setting in which these policies are pursued often establishes not only the perimeter or limits for action, but also, and even more importantly, the parameters and constraints to such action. Despite these limitations, it is still true to say that every state, from a super-power to a micro-state, has a level of capacity to carry out at least some of its objectives, either single-handed or by co-opting other states to assist it in undertaking its tasks.

## **Zimbabwe's foreign policy: The principles and key elements**

I have already said that foreign policy, essentially, is the pursuit of the "national interest". . . . Now, a nation's foreign policy emanates, in large part, from its own domestic environmental conditions, and represents the strategy by which a nation seeks to express abroad, the substance of its internal, domestic policy, and by which it seeks to reconcile internal policy objectives with conditions prevailing in the international arena.

In conceptualising, and in marking out the various dimensions of our foreign policy, we have been, and we continue to be, strongly influenced by the manner in which we achieved nationhood and regained our sovereignty, and you will find that Government's foreign policy direction is moulded around the very basic principles and beliefs upon which our liberation struggle was founded and won — the same beliefs upon which our nation is founded, and in accordance with which our society is gradually being transformed.

In defining that foreign policy, therefore, we are strongly influenced by those same beliefs that so inspired us as a liberation movement, and which guided us to a successful victory over the forces of oppression and reaction.

Of prime importance is our continuing belief in ourselves as a people in charge of our own destiny — aligned to and controlled by no other power. Second, is a respect for other nations and peoples and for their right to chart their own respective destinies free from any interference from external forces, or internal forces working against the wishes of their broad masses. Third, is our continuing co-operation with other nations who, like ourselves, are actively engaged in the struggle to preserve an independent identity and to match our political freedom with an economic freedom from super-power, colonial control.

Thus, the co-operation and understanding we established, as a liberation movement, with all the world's progressive forces, is maintained by Government, and will continue to develop as together, we chart our way through the perilous waters of national development on our way towards a better, more just life for all.

Of overriding importance, however, is Government's continuing commitment to the socialist ideology adopted by ZANU (PF) so very long ago. In defining our foreign policy, we continue to be strongly guided by that ideology — by our belief in the establishment of a society of equals, rather than one in which some are more equal than others: by our belief that the means of production and distribution of national wealth should, ultimately, be controlled by the workers and peasants of Zimbabwe: by our view that the capitalist mode of economic development, be exorcised from an independent Zimbabwe. In short, we are guided by an overriding belief in, and love for, mankind, and the sacredness and inviolability of our national sovereignty, and the need for freedom, justice and equality for all.

But let me see if I cannot better demonstrate to you this very close inter-



relationship between our emergence as a nation, our internal domestic policy and our broader international foreign policy, by providing you with some concrete examples which will also illustrate to you that in our transition from liberation movement to national Government, we have, in all cases, and on all levels, adhered to our beliefs and principles, and to our revolutionary socialist goals.

Let me begin with a subject very close to all of you, and indeed, to all Zimbabweans — the struggle for national liberation and freedom. Under past colonial regimes, we were an oppressed, subjugated people. We lived in perpetual fear of violence, attack and arrest. However, driven by an overwhelming desire and vision of freedom, we undertook and finally won our struggle for freedom and self-determination. It is only right, therefore, as we delight in the first taste of real justice and liberty, that we now place ourselves firmly, and actively, in support of those beleaguered brothers and sisters around the globe, still engaged in their own struggles for freedom from oppression and dictatorship.

Our belief in this freedom, justice and equality for all leads us to totally and unreservedly oppose all forms of racism, colonialism and imperialism, wherever these evils might occur. Whereas at home, these beliefs are translated into policies designed to eradicate the iniquities and inequalities of the past, and to provide our people with a better, more comfortable and rewarding life, on the international scene, they place us quite naturally, and quite willingly, in the forefront of those supporting the liberation struggles being waged by SWAPO in Namibia, by the ANC and PAC in South Africa, and further afield, by our brothers in the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, in Palestine, East Timor, and elsewhere.

Just as we firmly oppose all attempts to undermine our own national sovereignty both from within and from without, so on the international plane, we place ourselves in direct opposition to all those who would seek, either militarily or economically, either openly or clandestinely, to undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other independent states.

Therefore, we totally condemn the blatant aggression and acts of sabotage perpetrated by racist South African troops and South African-backed rebels in Angola, Mozambique and Lesotho, and indeed, the whole policy of destabilisation being waged against Southern African Frontline States by the racist Pretoria regime.

We are also just as opposed to external interference and the presence of foreign troops in Kampuchea, Afghanistan and the southern part of the Korean peninsula, and we totally oppose imperialist intervention in the internal affairs of El Salvador and Nicaragua.

As we see it, and as I have already mentioned, nations have a sovereign right to determine their own destinies based on the will of the majority of their peoples — foreign forces and powers seeking to influence those desti-

nies, in accordance with their own neo-colonialist, imperialist designs, must and will be opposed at all times.

Just as during our liberation struggle, we learned that unity and oneness of purpose were, in fact, the only way through which we could achieve our goals of freedom and justice for all, so, on the international level, we have learned to apply the same principle. We have intensified our co-operation with international progressive forces and with other sovereign states who share with us the same commitment to equality for all, to peace and international security, in the firm conviction that together, we can overcome the international forces of reaction and oppression.

On a regional level and in accordance with our determination to be masters of our own destiny, we have, together with our friends, formed the SADCC and the PTA with the aim of disengaging our economies from South African "economic colonialism" and so as to strengthen and further *protect our hard-won independence from the aggressive, destabilisatory intimidation of the fascist regime through our own voluntary, collective regional unity.*

The determination to safe-guard our liberty, whilst striving to help others, less fortunate than ourselves, to achieve the same status, is further strengthened by our membership of the OAU — a continental body whose main aims and aspirations correspond exactly with our own as an individual state. Since more or less all African states have suffered the same outrages of colonial domination and racial oppression, we all now gather together in order that our unity and collective oneness of purpose will serve to protect us from the continual in-roads and attacks being waged upon our sovereignty, political and economic, by the world's major powers, and those who seek to recolonise us.

Looking further afield still — and yet always conscious of the need to protect our young nation's independence and freedom of movement, we are committed to a policy of non-alignment — i.e. we refuse to become attached to either the Eastern or Western world's blocs. This does not mean that we are neutral — far from it — for how can we be neutral on issues so crucial to our own fate as a small nation struggling to preserve its hard-won freedom in a world where sovereignty of small nations is so frequently and brutally violated by the larger ones.

No — by non-alignment, we mean that we reserve for ourselves the right to examine issue-areas of foreign policy on the basis of merit, and within the context, on each occasion, of either promoting or protecting our own national interests. We will not be dictated to from outside. Although we are always prepared to listen to advice and suggestions from our friends, we will in the end, remain our own masters. And this is the policy we continue to practice at all levels of our relationship with other nations — as an individual state, as a member of a regional group, as a member of the OAU, the Non-

Aligned Movement and, indeed, as a member of the United Nations.

It is in this context that, despite pressures from external sources — and in particular, from one non-aligned nation with whom we have always enjoyed a close relationship — our Government decided to establish diplomatic relations with another sister developing country within the Non-Aligned Movement, with whom we also share many common revolutionary aims.

The reason for the pressure upon us was that these two sister, non-aligned nations are currently at war with each other, and there have been attempts by both sides, and their various supporters, to sway us to support either one side or the other. Instead we have chosen to steer a middle, neutral course between the two, faithfully adhering to our own principles and those embodied in the meaning of “non-alignment.”

Similarly, in the recent violence in the South Atlantic, despite our close historical links with one side, and our understanding of the frustration felt by the other, we nevertheless made known our opposition to the use of force by both sides in the conflict, and let them both know that we were bitterly disappointed by their failure to take full advantage of the possibilities offered to reach a peaceful negotiated solution.

Again, despite continual pressure from other Western powers — particularly certain members of the so-called Western Contact Group on Namibia — aimed at making us fall into line with their position on various international issues, we have steadfastly remained true to our principles and to our own perception of the international environment as we view it from Harare.

Some countries may try to use economic assistance to us as a lever to gain political influence over our Government. They would be foolish not to do so, but we would be equally as foolish if we allowed them to succeed in winning such influence. For, in bending, even once, to their tune, we immediately lose our freedom of action, our independence of thought and movement. In short, we become aligned, and a puppet on someone else's string. That we can never allow, and just as our diplomats, in implementing Government's foreign policy, will strive to prevent that from occurring on an international plane, so you, comrades, will be implementing the same policy at home — ever watchful, ever guarding our independence and national sovereignty against all those who would seek to undermine it and make us their puppets.

### **The New International Economic Order — NIEO**

Just as we strive at home to dismantle the old, iniquitous, capitalist system which ruled our lives for so long, and to replace it with a new, more just internal economic order — one that positively reflects our belief and faith in the socialist ideology — so, on the international plane, your Government as yet another major element of its foreign policy, has placed itself in the forefront of those developing nations seeking to establish a new international economic order, and one that will give true meaning to the words indepen-

dence and freedom. For it is a fact that although the majority of Third World nations have achieved political freedom and independence, we remain the economic prisoners of our former colonial masters and of the overall international, capitalist economic system they serve.

For us in Zimbabwe, and indeed, throughout Southern Africa, the situation is even more invidious, for, here, our economies are, to a large extent, controlled by the racist Pretoria regime which, given its own perilous position, is perhaps more determined than any former colonial power to maintain its exploitative control over us.

In short, the developing world remains a victim of "neo-colonialism" a process which has accurately been described as the "final and most exploitative form of imperialism . . .", for it means that those who practise it enjoy "power without responsibility", and those who suffer it, suffer "exploitation without redress . . .".

Now, the New International Economic Order — the NIEO as it is dubbed — represents for us a complete rejection of that "neo-colonialism", and a refusal to accept the international economic status quo.

It represents thus, a determination to reject dependence in favour of self-reliance and economic sovereignty, so to speak.

But it is more than that comrades . . . for it represents a sincere and determined effort by the developing world to save the capitalist, exploitative, neo-colonialist world from itself. You see . . . a system such as the current international economic order, which is based on injustice and in which, respect for human dignity and human rights is completely overshadowed by a notion of scoring maximum outlay — that sort of system, because of its inherent injustice, carries within it the seeds of its own destruction, and it is doomed, ultimately, to complete failure.

Already, because of the injustices of the current economic order, misery, hunger, poverty and disease are spreading at an alarming rate throughout the developing world, and while the "haves" merely continue to get richer, so many millions of our brothers and sisters are struggling for their very survival. This huge gap between rich and poor, between the developed countries and those struggling to develop, leads to discontent, which leads to unrest, which leads eventually and inevitably to war and general international instability. The rich, Western, capitalist world, by its very indifference to the plight that its economic policies are creating will, in the end, find itself cut off from the very sources of much of its wealth as the developing world is plunged into chaos and warfare.

We have to avoid this situation which, obviously, will benefit no one at all, but to do that, we have to convince the selfish, arrogant developed world that the time has come to talk seriously about the establishment of a new international economic order, based on a more just, more equitable distribution of the world's wealth, and a far greater co-operation, for the benefit of all, be-

tween the developed nations and those still struggling to progress.

A major obstacle to achieving this closer co-operation and a new international economic system, and an indication of just how serious the problem is, is the growing mistrust between nations which results from and also causes, the senseless race between nations for military and nuclear superiority.

Just as at home, your Government believes in peace and unity as the very basis for any real progress, so, internationally, we seek to ease tension by urging the major powers to abandon their arms race, and to channel those billions of dollars wasted in developing such potent weapon systems, into development and assistance projects aimed at improving living conditions of millions of the world's poor, hungry and diseased.

And so you can see, comrades, how our foreign policy is, in fact, nothing more than a more elaborate, more delicate extension of our domestic policy and of our beliefs and aspirations as a new developing socialist state in a world plagued by hostilities, inequalities and caught, right now, in the grip of a dangerous economic recession.

Just as the only way forward within Zimbabwe is through forging peace through unity . . . Your Government is pledged both at home and abroad, to strive towards these often elusive goals.

### **The Implementation of Foreign Policy**

There can be no doubt that the quintessence of foreign policy is diplomacy; consequently, the two domains must display ambience. Diplomacy is an art in itself; it is, so to speak, the art of reconciling seeming irreconcilables. In a more practical sense, however, diplomacy needs to have a context it is to serve effectively in smoothing out the rough edges which often materialise in relations between and among nations. Thus, one would want to distinguish between bilateral diplomacy — the traditional mode — and multilateral diplomacy, whereby a group of states approaches a foreign policy issue-area collectively.

A good example in our region is the multilateral diplomacy of the Front-line States in our efforts to wrest power away from the racist Pretoria regime and deliver independence to the people of Namibia. But for either form of diplomacy, or a combination thereof, to have maximum impact, a country needs to have diplomatic missions abroad with sufficient complement of suitably qualified staff.

For, ambassadors and their supporting diplomatic staff are the proper intermediaries through which relations are conducted between and among states. We in Zimbabwe are most conscious of this fact, and since independence, we have been steadily expanding the range and the scope of our diplomatic representation abroad, similarly other nations and international organisations have been increasing their representation in Zimbabwe.

We believe that this diplomatic intercourse will enable us to present our views to the outside world on issues that may impinge upon our valued interests; equally so, we feel that other governments and international organisations will be able to understand us better and also appreciate our views — be they agreeable or disagreeable — through the establishment of diplomatic missions accredited to our country. In doing so, Zimbabwe will have moved into the mainstream of international relations in the modern world.

Text issued by the Zimbabwe Department of Information. Press statement 330/83AM.

**B.** Speech concerning agrarian and land reform, by the Zimbabwean Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, the Hon Moven Mahachi, at the 40th Annual Congress of the Commercial Farmers Union in Harare on 27 July 1983

I would like to use this platform as an opportunity to announce measures Government is taking to implement its policy on agrarian and land reform.

I understand that some people, including the CFU, complain that we have not been communicating openly enough and it would appear that our recent statements regarding agrarian and land reform have either been misunderstood or misinterpreted, in some cases deliberately, by certain individuals and organisations or institutions in certain quarters.

I would like to take this opportunity to clear the confusion that seems to be growing around the terms “agrarian reform” and “land reform” within the meaning of the policy being pursued by the Government through my ministry, by restating Government policy and what we, in Government, mean when we talk about the need for agrarian and land reform, and the resettlement of people.

First of all, I would like to remind everybody concerned with the question of land in Zimbabwe, and those outside Zimbabwe who have an interest or interests in land in this country, that the stated Government policy on land is that land is regarded as a common heritage and no one should enjoy absolute ownership of it, and Government will, therefore, continue to entrust certain rights in the use of land to private individuals or groups of individuals for as long as such trusteeship best serves the national interest.

Indeed, landowners share their property with the state, which is the sovereign custodian of the nation's natural assets, and the state can restrict the use and practices that are carried out on that land which are contrary to the national interest.

Within this policy, it is Government's intention to achieve an acceptable and fair distribution of land ownership and use; a rapid reduction in the levels of absolute poverty in rural areas, together with an accelerated improvement

in the standards of living of the rural population; an increase in both land and labour productivity in all forms of agriculture; a substantial increase in employment for the rapidly growing labour force; maintenance of food self-sufficiency and regional food security; extension of the role of agriculture as a major foreign exchange earner and a source of inputs to local industry; integration of the two agricultural sectors; viz: commercial and peasant; conservation of land and the environment for future generations, including a programme of conservation awareness; the promotion of regional balance in agricultural development; and the development of human resources in the rural areas to the full potential.

It is these and other objectives of its land policy that the Government intends to see through, inter alia, agrarian and land reform programmes, including the mobilisation of the people in rural areas. In our view agrarian reform means and encompasses all changes or reforms relating to land or its management, including a wide range of institutional factors that affect the agricultural sector, such as pricing policies, the provision of agricultural services, of improvements to the infrastructure; credit facilities etc, and of course, agrarian reform may or may not include land reform.

To this end Government intends to effect the reform and expansion of structures of complementary services, including agricultural credit, marketing facilities, research and extension services; establishment and promotion of a number of production systems, depending on varying conditions, for example communal farming and co-operatives, private/family and corporate farms of a variety of sizes and state farms; promotion of research and appropriate technology; pursuance of appropriate agricultural pricing policies to achieve the objectives of food self-sufficiency; integration of the agricultural sector by, among other ways, resettling a significant number of peasant farmers from overcrowded communal lands; development of various means at its disposal to ensure that unused and under-utilised land is productively utilised; and development of water resources, elimination of tsetse flies, improvement of conditions of health in rural areas, and promotion of research into suitable crops for arid areas. All these are aspects of agrarian reform, some of which include aspects of land reform.

In communal lands, like in other areas, leaseholds will be issued to co-operatives under the provisions of the new law on land tenure, if passed by Parliament, but conditions of land occupation and use will be as stringent as in other areas of the country, where either freeholds or leaseholds were or are issued to private individuals, corporations and companies.

But in the interests of clarity, I would like to state our view concerning land reform as meaning changes in man's relationship with land through redistribution of land, consolidation of existing holdings, changes in land ownership or conditions of tenure. Our view regarding land tenure is that tenure is concerned with conditions under which land is held and, although the

phrase "land tenure" is often confused with land ownership, I understand that the term includes both the concept of ownership and that of tenancy rights.

As you know, land ownership in Zimbabwe at present is divided into two categories, namely state land — owned by the state — and freehold land owned by private individuals, corporations and companies. State land includes all the communal lands, national parks and state farms because they are vested in the President.

Freehold and acquisition of freehold land will continue to be allowed subject to certain restrictions, while leaseholds are expected to become a common feature of land occupation throughout the country.

In the circumstances, we recognise that those who have certain rights or interests in pieces of land owned by the state in the form of leaseholds, such rights will continue to be protected subject to the terms of individual lease agreements. The same will apply in cases where Government is purchasing commercial farm land at present for its resettlement programmes.

In all cases where these purchases are effected, title vests in the President and the land is allocated to settlers, currently on the basis of permits, which will be converted into state farms. Settlers will receive a first lease, whose duration will be short but varying depending upon the kind of farming planned for an individual scheme.

If, at the end of the initial period of say three or five years, my ministry finds that the settler, the producer co-operative or state farm has a high probability of becoming and continuing as an efficient producer, a long term non-transferable lease may be issued.

I should also mention that, in the meantime, the issue of title to people who are leasing state land will remain suspended while legislation on land reform is being generally considered and debated. But in certain selected parts of the country, depending on the purpose for which particular areas are designated, decisions will be made on whether or not to issue title. However, as a general rule, there will be no issue of titles until a review which is being carried out and the land reform measures are completed.

However, because we are fully aware that organisational structures will need to be created and the necessary infrastructure developed, we must be the first to admit that all these changes will not happen overnight. They will have to be implemented over a long period of time, bearing in mind that financial and manpower resources will also continue to be constraints alongside the need for the creation of organisational structures and infrastructure at district, regional or provincial and national levels. Through determination and co-operation on the part of everybody, I am sure that we shall achieve our objectives.

I hope that the foregoing will provide adequate explanation regarding reasons why the Government is preparing a number of different legislative



measures in order to implement its land policies. For example, the new Bill on Land Acquisition is intended to assist the redistribution of land while the one on Land Tenure will usher in new conditions under which land will be held.

We have stated quite clearly and repeatedly that the new land acquisition is intended, if passed into law by Parliament, not only to give the President powers to acquire land compulsorily, but also to give him the right and power to resume ownership of any alienated land, where necessary, in terms of the conditions of title and the right of first refusal, as well as the power to retake possession of under-utilised and derelict land under certain circumstances; while the new Land Tenure Bill is intended to provide a comprehensive and single tenure system with non-discriminatory rights and obligations in the long term; and that it also contains two provisions relating to the acquisition of land: the prohibition against foreign ownership of rural land, in the future, and the prohibition against further concentration of land ownership. The first should apply to a foreign national, corporation or company with more than 25 per cent foreign shareholders; and the second should prevent a person who already owns a farm greater than 500 acres from acquiring more rural land.

Moreover, whilst we have stressed that the main objectives of the Land Tenure Bill include powers of intervention by Government in the prevailing pattern of land ownership; control and use of land, in order to change the structure of landholdings and the extent of private landownership; improvement of productivity and broadening the distribution of land and its benefits, in the immediate term, and the achievement of a single land tenure system in the long term, we have also made it clear that this is our step by step approach towards socialism. The commercial farming sector in some areas will continue to be in the hands of private landowners under the Roman-Dutch Law, within the meaning of the Government policy on land referred to earlier, subject to reduced sizes and improved productivity.

It must be noted by all those concerned that Zimbabwe today has capitalistically organised the commercial farming sector and the Government faces the task of converting it to a socialist system of agriculture. It must convert land ownership and tenure system from private ownership and uncontrolled land use, permitting a high degree of exploitation of man by man, to either producer co-operatives or state farms, spread over a substantial proportion of all the rural land available in Zimbabwe, and introduce reduced sizes of private holdings in the remaining portion of rural land, but it must make these changes while increasing production.

Both the new land acquisition and the land tenure legislative measures are intended to achieve this and thus the commercial farming sector has a place in this country for the foreseeable future.

Some legislative measures will be introduced which will be specifically

concerned with agrarian reform, referred to earlier, while others will be concerned with the introduction of producer co-operatives; the taxing of under-utilised land and the introduction of a new Rural Land Transfer Capital Gains Tax at the rate of between 60 and 80 per cent.

But existing legislation in relation to various rural land matters will also continue to be in force, subject to Government policy, and consequently some may require minor amendments, as necessary. But I must make it clear that all the existing statutes permitting the leasing of Rural State Land will *either be repealed or undergo major amendments, because of the attitude of certain landowners who, despite an announcement by my ministry that the issue of titles even in cases where there are options to purchase will remain suspended until further notice, have, nevertheless, persistently harassed the officials in my ministry with applications.*

*Nonetheless, I think that despite this confrontation we can still continue to use some of the existing legislation because it takes time to introduce new laws, and do away with the old order.*

In this connection, I would like to announce that, on the basis of existing legislation, it is the intention of my ministry to carry out certain investigations regarding the nature and extent of occupation of alienated land in this country in terms of the Alienated Land (Information) Act Chapter 138 of 1925.

Section three of the Alienated Land (Information) Act empowers the President to make regulations for purpose of ascertaining the nature and extent of occupation of any alienated land, requiring owners or occupiers of such land or their agents to supply particulars as to improvements on the land and other matters. My ministry has found and considers it desirable to promulgate regulations under the Act, firstly, in order to ascertain the extent to which commercial farm land is being utilised and, secondly, to ascertain whether the state may repossess any such land in terms of the Land Occupation (Conditions) Act Chapter 145 of 1900.

Accordingly, the promulgation of regulations under the Alienated Land (Information) Act will shortly be gazetted as part of the package of measures that are intended to achieve redistribution of land, on the one hand, and achieve productivity and growth with equity, on the other hand. I trust that everybody concerned will co-operate with Government in this and other measures which are in the pipeline, including the designation of certain areas for resettlement purposes.

Designated areas will be gazetted on the authority of ministerial approval, which must be given under certain provisions of the new law on land acquisition, if passed by Parliament, subject to certain conditions being satisfied. Consultations will take place between my ministry and interested parties prior to designation.

The purpose of introducing a system of designating certain areas for re-

settlement or any other Government or public purposes is to give farmers and all the others concerned with land the opportunity of being able to plan their own future outside designated areas and to ensure that viable resettlement schemes are implemented in a block system.

From now onwards, all land acquisition will be based on the policy of designation as a framework within which both purchases of land on the basis of willing seller, willing buyer, and compulsory acquisitions will take place. I should, therefore, emphasise that in cases where, within a given block of land designated for resettlement, landowners are willing to offer their farms for sale to Government, compulsory measures will not be used. It seems likely, therefore, that compulsory measures will be used to achieve the consolidation of blocks of land in areas where some landowners refuse to offer their land for sale to Government voluntarily.

Finally, I would like to announce that copies of the new Land Acquisition Draft Bill are available and can be obtained from the Rural State Land Office in the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development. People or organisations wishing to obtain further information in connection with the Alienated Land (Information) Regulations should contact the officials of the same office in my ministry.

Copies of this statement will also be made available to those who may wish to study it closely, in order to avoid misinterpretation of what I have said or stated as Government policy.

Press statement 534/83/RM/6R issued by the Department of Information, Zimbabwe.

## Zimbabwe and South Africa

### A. Address by the Zimbabwean Minister of Labour and Social Services, the Hon Kambirai Kangai, to the Conference Committee on Apartheid in Geneva on 16 June 1983

On behalf of my delegation and my country; and on behalf of all those men and women all over the world who have in one way or another contributed, or are contributing, to the struggle against the evil system, apartheid, of the fascist Republic of South Africa, I should like to express my thanks for your electing me Chairman of the Conference Committee on Apartheid.

May I also express my gratitude to you all for your willingness to serve on this most difficult of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) committees.

Let me mention at the outset that I have been closely associated with the *work of the committee from its establishment in 1981, at which time I was its first chairman.*

The committee was established because the international community recognised that apartheid poses a great threat to international peace and security, and that it is an institutionalised negation or denial of all the values, rights and freedoms for which the ILO and the United Nations stand.

From these considerations, it is apparent that the need for this committee is today much greater than it was two years ago. As you all know, during the last two years since the committee was established, the apartheid regime has continued and even intensified its military excursions into the neighbouring states in an attempt to destabilise the Governments of the frontline states. The contradictions in South Africa have sharpened.

South Africa's attacks on Angola and Mozambique very recently have caused loss of lives, property and national economic infrastructures. In Namibia the apartheid regime has continued to cling to its brutal oppression and suppression of the majority against their will, too often with the tacit support of certain seemingly honourable members of the international community.

Having failed to stop SWAPO in waging a resolute struggle of liberation, the regime has now resorted to the most brutal forms of atrocities in order to continue its colonial hold on that country. In fact, in both Namibia and Aza-

nia, this wicked regime is openly pursuing a policy of ruthless oppression.

In Mozambique, as in Angola, the apartheid regime has been pursuing a policy of military raids and economic sabotage. Port facilities, railway lines, power lines and bridges have been systematically destroyed by its armies or its moving bands of paid saboteurs.

In my country the regime's destructive activities have included the sponsoring of murderous gangs of dissidents that are bent on destabilizing the country. Just before last Christmas, the apartheid regime's saboteurs destroyed Zimbabwe's transport routes. As a consequence, our nation was left without any fuel to sustain its economic activities for a period of about two months. However, a machinery to counter those saboteurs has been successfully set up. The country now enjoys a normal flow of goods to and from Zimbabwe.

I have recounted these activities of the apartheid regime on the territories of the neighbouring states only in order for me to emphasise the fact that this regime continues to pose one of the greatest threats to international peace and security today.

As far as the regime's denial of human rights to its black workers, I need not recount anything in this area since you are all quite familiar with this issue. I only need to remind you that contrary to the ill-advised predictions of some of the members of this committee who were insisting in 1981 that the regime was on the way to reforming itself, the opposite has been the case. It has become apparent to everybody that apartheid can never be humanised.

And yet, from the fact that the regime has discredited the positions taken in this committee by the former prophets of internal reform we can at least draw the conclusion that in 1983 the members of this committee will begin and continue to operate on the proven consensus that:

- (1) first and foremost, apartheid is indeed one of the greatest threats to international peace and security today; and that
- (2) the apartheid regime has neither the will nor the capacity to reform or transform itself into a humanitarian institution, therefore, that it must be eliminated.

Given this necessary and obvious framework of consensus among us, I have no doubt whatever that we will effectively and in a spirit of co-operation carry on the work of this committee as our own contribution to the progressive liberation of humanity.

From these few observations of mine, I urge you to appreciate the fact that you have now joined or returned to this committee on apartheid at a time when, unlike in 1981, participation on the committee's activities and concerns has become a cause for unity rather than of division among the members.

**B.** Extract from an address by the Zimbabwean Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Hon Witness Mangwende, to the 38th session of the UN General Assembly in New York on 12 October 1983

We call upon the international community and especially the United Nations, to intervene effectively in South Africa. The racist regime's archaic apartheid philosophy and policies are not only decidedly against the march of the entire human history, but they are increasingly threatening stability, peace and security in the region. We must warn that such a threat to the stability of this vital region will produce vibrations and tremors, with dire consequences for international peace and security.

Feeling itself very much cornered by the escalating domestic liberation struggle, by the Namibian struggle, and by the consolidation of true and genuine freedom and social justice in the neighbouring independent states, the apartheid Pretoria regime is espousing and practising a policy of confrontation and open conflict against the free nations in the region. Thus, no country, from the People's Republic of Angola in the west, to the Republic of Seychelles on the Indian Ocean, and from the Kingdom of Lesotho in the regime's hot belly, to Zambia in the north, is being spared from Pretoria's destabilising campaigns. These campaigns assume all sorts of forms and shapes, including blatantly naked and unprovoked military aggression, as has been unleashed against Angola, during the past two years, Seychelles and Lesotho in 1982, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, occasionally.

It is common knowledge that Pretoria also recruits, trains, equips and infiltrates into our countries unpatriotic and dissident elements, who harass, kill and maim innocent civilians engaged in productive employment. Also taking effective advantage of geographical and historical economic links with its economically weak neighbours, the regime openly and brazenly sabotages their respective economies.

*The catalogue of examples of Pretoria's acts of aggression, brutality, political and economic destabilisation would be too long to read within the scope of an address of this nature. Suffice it to say, therefore, that military aggression and economic brute-bullying and blackmail are causing great difficulty and suffering to the peoples of the region, including the slaughtering and massacring of many innocent souls. As we have pointed out elsewhere, Pretoria's policy of regional destabilisation has the following objectives:*

The negation of the liberation struggles at home, and in Namibia, which in arrogant defiance of the Namibian people and the entirety of the international community, South Africa continues to occupy.

Secondly, to intimidate and deter frontline and other states in the region from supporting the struggling masses in South Africa and Namibia.

Thirdly, the regime is desperately battling to foil and frustrate our regional

economic co-operation and endeavour within the Southern Africa Development Conference.

## **Namibia**

While making it absolutely clear to South Africa, that it will not succeed in any of its insidious and diabolic objectives, we must also warn this august assembly that the lack of any appreciable progress on the question of Namibia's decolonisation is now an international scandal and a great shame to this organisation. Equally disturbing and disconcerting is the apparent indifference of certain members of this organisation, which are also permanent members of the security council, to the gravity of the threat which Pretoria's defiance of international demands for Namibian independence poses to the reputation and effective role of the United Nations.

It is now four years since Security Council resolution 435 (1978)<sup>1</sup>, enabling a realistic and internationally acceptable formula to achieve Namibian independence, was adopted. And yet, not only does the resolution and the United Nations plan remain unimplemented, and gathering thick layers of dust, but there is also real concern that some of the authors are, wittingly or otherwise, casting dark shadows of doubt upon the entire plan by encouraging South African intransigence.

Since the abortive pre-implementation Geneva meeting of 1981, the failure of which is entirely attributable to South African intransigence, which in turn was encouraged by mixed signals from certain capitals, we have been presented with a series of pretexts to delay the implementation of the UN Namibian plan. Firstly, South Africa was said to be harbouring reservations about the UN's impartiality in supervising elections in Namibia, as provided for under the plan.

Although we knew that such reservations were utterly unfounded, we considered them and to the satisfaction of the Pretoria Government and those, among the Western Contact Group, who seemed to be sympathetic to South Africa's view. In retrospect, however, the folly of conceding to that nonsense regarding UN impartiality is painfully obvious. For, when in August last year we were all agreed that every issue relevant to the plan was in place, and we were preparing to approach the Security Council to adopt an enabling resolution, setting in motion the process of implementing the UN plan, further issues were raised, at first by a Security Council member, which also belongs to the Western Contact Group.

The Pretoria regime, then desperately looking for excuses to delay further the independence of Namibia, was only too grateful when one was thrown into its lap by that country. As this assembly knows, since August last year, South Africa and that member of the Western Contact Group have main-

1. See *Southern African Record* no. 14, December 1978, p 43.

tained that the Namibians should remain under Pretoria's illegal occupation unless Cuban forces, in Angola since 1975, when Angola invited them to defend that country against South African aggression, have been withdrawn.

Distinguished delegates will recall that, in an effort to obtain South African co-operation in the immediate implementation of the UN plan, the Security Council adopted Security Council resolution 532 (1983)<sup>2</sup> in May this year, mandating the Secretary-General to hold consultations with the parties to the cease-fire agreement, proposed under the plan.

The Secretary-General has since published a report on his visit to South Africa, Namibia and Angola, in fulfilment of his mandate.<sup>3</sup> The Secretary-General says that, although every outstanding issue relevant to resolution 435 has been resolved and thus bringing us so tantalisingly close to finality on the modalities of implementing the plan, the position of South Africa regarding the issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a precondition for the implementing of resolution 435 (1978) still makes it impossible to launch the United Nations plan.

I must reiterate here my Government's total condemnation and rejection of any attempt, from whatever quarter, to bring any new factors into the Namibian decolonisation equation. Besides the fact that this linkage is obviously unfair, illogical, irrelevant, illegal and grossly immoral, it is also a very serious breach against resolution 435, which was the result of painstaking consultations and negotiations and is still strictly meant to be the basis of a solution to the Namibian question only. It was never, and it is still never, meant to be a prescription for a comprehensive solution of the problems of the Southern African region, least of all to provide for the geo-political concerns and pre-occupations of any power or powers.

It is also becoming increasingly clear that linkage is nothing but a smoke screen designed to conceal the fact that it is South Africa which must unconditionally withdraw its own troops, which have been occupying parts of Angolan territory for over two years now. When are those racist forces, which have brought so much misery and death to Angola going to leave that country? Why should the international community be required to interfere in a matter that rightly concerns Angola and Cuba? Besides, have any of the Cuban soldiers been found on South African territory?

We also reject linkage because it is calculated to give the wrong impression that it is Angola which is responsible for the current deadlock on the Namibian question. We cannot accept this wicked view, which seeks to shift the blame and responsibility from the perpetrator to the victim of the injurious act. It is South African intransigence that has brought about the deadlock and pressure must be brought to bear upon South Africa until that regime leaves

<sup>2</sup> See *Southern Africa Record* no. 33, October 1983, pp. 52-53.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 53-60.



Namibia. In this, the role of the Contact Group members is critical. They must now stop pampering the regime and tell it that enough is enough. As a first step, we call upon each of them to condemn and categorically reject linkage, and demand Pretoria's compliance with UN demands to enable the immediate implementation of resolution 435.

We must warn that the members of the Western Contact Group cannot afford to equivocate on the need to reject linkage and to reaffirm their total commitment to the immediate and unconditional implementation of resolution 435. This immediate clearing of ambiguities will help to arrest the rapid erosion of the little confidence in them that might still exist among frontline states and Nigeria. They have an opportunity to do so now, and at the forthcoming Security Council meeting, which will also consider the report of the Secretary-General.

If, however, South Africa refuses to co-operate, the Council should be asked to take appropriate action, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

Press statement 793/83/SN/DB issued by the Zimbabwean Department of Information.

## South African Statements

### A. Concerning national security and South African/Angolan relations, respectively

- (i) Uittreksel uit die openingsrede gelewer by die Willem Prinsloo Landbouskou deur die Suid-Afrikaanse Minister vir Verdediging, Sy Edele Gnl Magnus Malan, op 13 Augustus 1983

Die aanvullende aspek van enige gemeenskap se welsyn is sy veiligheid. Die aanslag teen Suid-Afrika is reeds 'n werklikheid, waarvan sabotasie, brandstigting, moord en veral die ontploffings in Pretoria en elders getuig. Tot enkele jare gelede was daar geen sprake van terrorisme binne ons landsgrense nie, maar dié deel van die aanslag het geleidelik hiernatoe oorgespoel dog so subtiel word dit gedoen dat die oningeligte dit kwalik beseft.

Die terrorisme-aanslag is besig om toe te neem, en hierin lê die boodskap wat ek vandag aan u bring. Hoewel die aanslae tot dusver hoofsaaklik tot die stedelike gebiede beperk was, beteken dit nie dat die landelike gebiede daarvan gevrywaar is nie. Ons boeregemeenskappe kan oornag ook teikens word.

'n Nuwe dimensie het ontstaan in die terroristiese bedreiging teen die RSA. Internasionale terrorisme en in hierdie geval die meesgehaate organisasie, die PLO, is besig om sy invloed te laat geld in Suider-Afrika. Meer en meer terroriste van dié organisasie word na sekere van ons buurstade gestuur en dit voorspel niks anders nie as die laagste vorm van terrorisme as ons dit nie doeltreffend smoor en beheer nie.

Ons moet geen illusies hê oor die feit dat die aanslag teen Suid-Afrika in die jare wat kom op al vier die fronte, die sielkundige, die ekonomiese, die politieke en die militêre terrein, gaan verhewig nie. Die Marxistiese wêreld is jare reeds besig om al die bestanddele vir chaos mildelik uit te deel aan almal wat dit kan misbruik teen die laaste bastion van die weste in Suider-Afrika, naamlik die RSA.

Laat my net toe om enkele statistieke te noem oor die Russiese pogings om die sub-kontinent te destabiliseer oor die laaste vyf jaar. In hierdie tydperk het Moskou nie minder nie as R10 000 miljoen bestee aan bewapening in Angola. Daarbenewens is die bedrae wat in ander state net aan wapentuig en ammunisie bestee is deur Rusland eweneens astronomies. Dit sluit in veertig miljoen vir Zimbabwe, 350 miljoen vir Mosambiek en 800 miljoen vir Tanzanië. Direkte hulp aan terroristeorganisasies is 64 miljoen rand net vir die opleiding van terroriste teen die RSA in Afrika self en 36 miljoen om hulle in die buiteland op te lei. Altesame 4 200 miljoen rand is bestee om militêre personeel in Angola en die ander sogenaamde frontliniestate te hou.

U moet hierdie syfers sien teen Suid-Afrika se totale verdedigingsbegroting van verlede jaar ten bedrae van sowat 3 100 miljoen rand.

Sedert 1977 was daar 'n toename van 300 persent in gewapende magte in die state wat die totaal nou op sowat 300 000 man onder wapen staan bring. Tenks en vliegtuie se getalle het verdriedubbel en 20 persent van die sowat 600 in die state is MIG 17, MIG 19 en MIG 21 vliegtuie waarvan sommige se vermoëns vergelyk met ons Mirage 3's.

Dit is in hierdie lande waar die aanslag teen ons beplan en van stapel gestuur word. Daar het die ANC terroriste 'n veilige hawe, word hulle opgelei en geïndoktrineer om hul duiwelswerk ten uitvoer te bring.

Met die implementering van die wysigingswet op Verdediging wat in 1982 deur die Parlement geloods is, is daar doelbewus ruim voorsiening gemaak vir die bemanning van die plattelandse Kommando's. Volgens die Wetswysiging kan blanke mans tot op die ouderdom van 55 jaar wat nog nie voorheen enige militêre diens verrig het nie, asook daardie persone wat reeds lank terug hul militêre verpligtinge nagekom het, en tans op die Reserwe dien, by die RSA se verdedigingstelsel ingeskakel word. Dit is ook beleid dat hierdie lede, hul diensverpligtinge sal nakom in die gebied waaruit hulle betrek word.

Omdat dit weens verskeie redes nie moontlik is om met een poging landswyd al daardie persone wat nog nie voorheen enige militêre diens verrig het, by ons verdedigingstelsel te betrek nie, is daar sekere Kommando's geïdentifiseer waar die inskakeling van nuwe lede voorrang sal geniet volgens elke gebied se eie behoefte. Hierdie prioriteite is bepaal aan die hand van die bedreiging, die mannekragbehoefte van die prioriteitskommando's en verskeie ander faktore.

Hierdie inskakelingsproses kom daarop neer dat in die gebied waar die stelsel geïmplementeer staan te word, daar verwag word dat manlike burgers tot op die ouderdom van 55 jaar, wat permanent in die gebied woonagtig is, aan die hand van 'n persoonlike vraelys gekeur en aan daardie betrokke Kommando toegewys word. Hierdie gekeurde lede ondergaan dan beperkte funksionele opleiding. Die plaaslike Kommandobevelvoerder en sy offisiere sal maar al te gewillig wees om u van nog inligting te voorsien.

Die huidige werklike sterkte van die Bronkhorstspuit Kommando is twee derdes (193) van goedgekeurde sterkte van 300 man. Ek verneem dat daar na die bekendmaking van die nuwe dienspligstelsel 'n toename van 30 vrywilligers was wat by die Bronkhorstspuit Kommando aangesluit het. Hierdie reaksie is prysenswaardig en ek wens u daarmee geluk maar wil terselfdertyd diegene wat dit nog nie gedoen het nie, aanmoedig om intussen ook betrokke te raak by die verdediging en beveiliging van u gebied alhoewel dit nie een van die hoogste prioriteitsgebiede is nie.

Allow me, ladies and gentlemen, to refer in conclusion to the close bond between the aspirations of all the inhabitants of our country. None of us can live in isolation or uncertainty. Our future will be determined by our mutual trust and our faith. At the same time we should grasp with both hands every opportunity that is offered. We have to build and stand firm — these concepts are inseparable, and both require great courage and determination. We must bear in mind that the quality of life created for each one of us will have an effect on the welfare and even the continuation of our prosperity. In view hereof it is of the greatest importance that we should support one another by meaningful projects coupled with hard work. As a matter of fact these two elements are our shield against foreign ideologies. And as long as we retain our sense of duty it will be well with all of us in this country.

It is today a matter of mutual understanding that must be acquired. The days when we could afford the right to quarrel mutually about the personal convenience and inconvenience are gone for the present time and the immediate future.

The enemy is known to us, his objective to create chaos in South Africa has been stated repeatedly, and we are aware of his methods. No one, ladies and gentlemen, can thus allege that he or she does not know what it is all about regarding the security situation in South Africa today.

I therefore wish to call upon my fellow citizens throughout the country to contribute their share and to take cognisance of the nature and scope of the threat against us from without and within. Those who ignore this plea are the legitimate prey of them that wish to impose foreign and barbaric ideologies on our land and its peoples. The measure of our ignorance concerning the enemy and his methods is directly proportionate to the measure of his success. Vigilance by itself is laudable, but supported by knowledge and an unshaken will to resist revolutionary tendencies, the combination becomes invincible.

As is customary, this speech was delivered in Afrikaans and English together.

**(ii) Statement by the Chief of the South African Defence Force, General Constand Viljoen, on 15 August 1983**

It is obvious that the Angolans are making the maximum use of accusations and propaganda against South Africa. The current stream of accusations is obviously coupled to apparent successful offensives by UNITA.

It is equally obvious that by using psychological pressure through the media the Angolans wish to force South Africa to reveal its activities in southern Angola. In the light of operational risks the Defence Force will not reveal such details, but categorically denies, for example, that towns were bombed with napalm. It is common knowledge that from time to time South Africa is forced to undertake actions like reconnaissance flights in the south of Angola only because the Angolan regime allows and actively supports SWAPO aggression from their territory.

To demonstrate the absurdity of the allegations that the Air Force attacked towns with Impala aircraft, I can mention that those towns fall completely out of the action range of an Impala with a weapon load. The RSA would in any case never act against Angolan civilians by attacking towns with fire-bombs.

The present reconnaissance flights by the Air Force in which Canberra reconnaissance aircraft were used, are directly coupled to the build-up of FAPLA and Cuban forces in southern Angola and especially the recent deployment of sophisticated Russian weapons like the SAM-8 missiles.

I want to emphasise again that the RSA undertakes no actions against the Angolans other than those regarded as necessary to combat SWAPO — and this regardless of the blatant and hostile action and aggression from the Angolans' direct involvement with SWAPO's cowardly actions against the civilians of South West Africa.

Texts for items A(i) and (ii) issued by the Directorate Public Relations of the SADF.

**B. Press briefing by the Secretary of the State Security Council on 21 September 1983**

**Introduction**

In the past a threat to a country was fairly cut and dried — an enemy or a potential enemy massed its forces on a country's borders and threatened, or became involved in an armed conflict. Today this is not the only way to get at the enemy, and all possible methods are used, with armed combat only the last resort in each case. This implies that the defender must ensure preparedness in many fields other than the military. To ensure this it is accordingly

necessary to have complete departmental participation. Successful national security policy is therefore actually based on the proper and appropriate combination and application of a number of areas of expertise and policy competence. Assessments of relative strengths and weaknesses must include diplomatic, economic, intelligence, military and social factors, and the successful execution of policy must bring all these factors to bear within a well co-ordinated whole. While this has been a truism throughout the history of international relations, advances in technology, in communications, transport and weaponry have increased the need for these policy factors and actions to be well articulated and co-ordinated far in advance of crises, and on a continuing basis.

Theorists in this field perceive a hierarchy of policy, beginning with broad-based national goals, from which stem the necessary policy initiatives and requisite means to defend or achieve these goals. Ideally there should be a constant interchange of information between these levels at all times, so that means reflect desired ends, and ends do not exceed means.

In order to achieve these goals most governments have found it necessary to establish some sort of interdepartmental co-ordinating forum in respect of national security. The best known example is the National Security Council of the USA which is chaired by the President and which advises him regarding the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies. The concept of a State Security Council which advises on and co-ordinates national security is therefore not peculiar to the RSA.

### **Historical Development**

Many of our previous Prime Ministers at one stage or another had a group of advisers assisting the government of the day in the field of national security. We find for example that the late Prime Minister Voster was served by a "State Security Advisory Board" from 1966 until the advent of the State Security Council in 1972.

In 1970 the Potgieter Commission, under the chairmanship of a Judge of the Supreme Court, investigated certain intelligence aspects of state security.

As a result of the recommendations of the Potgieter Commission, a Bureau for State Security was established, essentially as an intelligence gathering, evaluation and dissemination organisation. At the same time the State Security Council was established by law. Reference to Hansard will show that this act, Act 64/72, was passed by Parliament with the support of all the political parties.

The establishment of the State Security Council was covered by the Act in the following way:

"There is hereby established a council to be known as the State Security Council which shall consist of —

(a) (i) The Prime Minister, who shall be chairman of the Council;

- (ii) The Senior Minister of the Republic if he is not a member of the Council under any other provision of this paragraph;
- (iii) the Minister of Defence;
- (iv) the Minister of Foreign Affairs;
- (v) the Minister of Justice;
- (vi) the Minister of Police;
- (b) such other Ministers of the Republic as the Prime Minister may from time to time co-opt as members of the Council;
- (c) (i) the Secretary for Security Intelligence;
- (ii) the Commandant-General of the South African Defence Force;
- (iii) the Secretary for Foreign Affairs;
- (iv) the Secretary for Justice;
- (v) the Commissioner of the South African Police;
- (d) such other Heads of Departments of State as the Prime Minister may from time to time co-opt as members of the Council."

*NB.* It should be noted that the act provides for both politicians and officials to be members of the State Security Council. It should also be noted that the names of some departments and appointments have since been changed.

With regard to the functions of the State Security Council the Act provided that:

"It shall be the function of the Council —

- (a) at the request of the Prime Minister, to advise the Government with regard to —
  - (i) the formulation of national policy and strategy in relation to the security of the Republic, and the manner in which such policy or strategy shall be implemented and be executed;
  - (ii) a policy to combat any particular threat to the security of the Republic;
- (b) to determine intelligence priorities."

*NB* It should be pointed out that the Act provides only for an advisory function for the Council. It has always been the duty of the chairman to take all recommendations and advice of the Council to the Cabinet for further action. The Council has no decision making powers in its own right.

It is clear, from the provisions of Act 64/72, that the intention was to provide for the collection and dissemination of intelligence as well as advice on national security matters.

With the passage of time adaptations were made to the original concept, and experience has helped to shape the system which obtains today but which is still covered by the provisions of the Act.

An investigation was held during 1973 by the Public Service Commission (now the Commission for Administration) into the shortcomings of the state machinery for the combatting of threats to the national security. This investi-

gation culminated in the production of a Report on the National Security Situation which was completed in September 1975. Many of its more important provisions were eventually incorporated into the national security management system which was finally adopted and which is currently operating in the Republic of South Africa.

The Report recommended the establishment of an active national security management system with the necessary functional structures at national, interdepartmental, departmental and sub-departmental levels. A national security staff organisation would be required to be established and the co-ordination of security actions at regional and local levels would be undertaken by area and regional committees. Interdepartmental co-ordination would be undertaken by committees set up to cover the fifteen areas of common concern within the security field, as identified by the Commission of Investigation.

The fifteen areas identified included such important fields as, for example, constitutional matters, economic matters, military and police matters through to civil defence, community services and cultural matters. The philosophy behind these interdepartmental committees was to get the executive departments involved in the identification of the problem areas and the participation of these departments in evolving solutions to these problems. It must be noted that the aim of these committees was to address matters relating to national security in their specific fields.

As a result of these investigations and experience gained, the State Security Council established an interdepartmental committee to go into the question of the necessity for the formulation of strategy on the national level and the organisational structure required for this purpose.

The interdepartmental committee, accepting that the national security of the Republic was the responsibility of the Cabinet on the advice of the State Security Council, recommended that a Work Committee of the State Security Council should be set up, consisting of senior representatives of the departments permanently represented on the Council itself, but also with the proviso that other heads of departments be co-opted when required. This Work Committee was to assist the State Security Council in its functions.

A further recommendation of the interdepartmental committee was that the State Security Council be served by a permanent Secretariat. The head of the Secretariat was to be the Secretary of the State Security Council and he would also act as chairman of the Work Committee.

The committee's other main recommendation was that interdepartmental committees be established for each of the areas of common interest within the security field (as referred to above) and that interdepartmental co-ordination should take place with the jurisdiction of these committees.

The recommendations of the committee were accepted by the Cabinet in 1978 and a start was made with the implementation of the proposals. During



1979, instructions were issued by the Government to establish the Secretariat of the State Security Council on a permanent basis. This final decision was largely due to the fact that the present Prime Minister had then taken over and was rationalising the decision-making process to suit his own style of management. The Prime Minister believes in team work and in the old adage that the product produced by a team will always be better than that which is achieved by an individual. He also believes that team work should cover the whole process of management, i.e. planning, development, execution and through to the monitoring of execution and if necessary the replanning.

At the same time the organisations which are responsible for national security at local and regional level were established to co-ordinate the actions of the various departments and other organisations involved in the implementation of the policies approved at national level. These were known as Joint Management Centres.

#### *The Present System*

The national security management system as it emerged in 1979 took the following form:

#### *The State Security Council*

The aim of the present State Security Council is as defined in Act 64/72. The composition is also as defined in the Act but has been considerably increased by the present Prime Minister in terms of the co-option provisions of the Act. At the last State Security Council Meeting as many as 10 Ministers attended. Furthermore, any Minister who at any time wishes to place a matter relating to national security on the agenda can do so and of course then attend such Council meetings. The Council, just like the other Cabinet Committees, meets every fourteen days.

#### *The Work Committee of the State Security Council*

The aim of the Work Committee of the State Security Council is exactly the same as that of the other Working Groups which support their Cabinet Committees in the implementation of their tasks. The Work Committee is composed of the heads of most of the government departments represented by their ministers on the State Security Council, and the Chairmen of the Working Groups of the other Cabinet Committees, as well as such heads of departments as may be co-opted from time to time. At the latest meeting of the Work Committee 11 departmental heads attended. As in the case of the State Security Council, any departmental head can place an item relating to national security on the agenda and attend the meeting at which it is discussed. The main function of the Work Committee is to discuss all the matters which are to be put before the State Security Council and to make recommendations regarding the advice the Council should give to the Cabinet. Like

the Security Council this Committee also meets every fourteen days — a few days before the State Security Council.

### *The Secretariat of the State Security Council*

The aim of the Secretariat is to support both the Work Committee and the State Security Council in the performance of their functions. As such it provides the necessary full-time staff organisation. The staff is drawn from various government departments, both in a permanent capacity and on a secondment basis.

It is necessary to reiterate that in our modern world national security covers many facets and is threatened on many fronts. It is therefore virtually impossible to place under one roof all the knowledge required to counter all the threats to our national security and it is consequently not the function of the Secretariat to advise the Council on its own. The function of the Secretariat is to ensure that all the participating organisations are given the opportunity to put their problems and their recommendations to the State Security Council. It is the task of the Secretariat to co-ordinate all the inputs affecting a specific situation and to provide the State Security Council, through the Work Committee, with an unbiased and objective recommendation, including all the implications as revealed during the process of joint planning.

The second task of the Secretariat is to ensure that the decisions of the Cabinet in respect of national security are passed on to the various departments for implementation although they, of course, get their instructions direct from their respective Ministers. It must be stressed that the Secretariat has no executive powers and only co-ordinates the implementation to ensure the realisation of the set goal. This is achieved through a monitoring action carried out with the full support of the executive departments.

No planning can be done without intelligence. It is therefore a prerequisite that the Cabinet and all decision-makers be provided with timely, unbiased and objective intelligence. It must be pointed out that the Secretariat is not involved in the actual collection of intelligence. This is provided by the different members of the intelligence community namely the SA Police, the SA Defence Force, the National Intelligence Service and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information, which also have the responsibility to evaluate the intelligence within their respective departments. The interpretation thereof on a national level is however done in the Secretariat and by a joint effort of members of the intelligence community seconded from their respective departments under the chairmanship of a senior member of the intelligence community appointed on a rotation basis from the departments involved. Where necessary other government departments which can make a contribution, are consulted as well. This ensures that joint planning is done on the basis of joint interpretation of intelligence.

An element of the threat which requires specific attention is the battle of

words or, to call it by its name, the propaganda campaign against the RSA. There is no question but that the vanguard of modern warfare is psychological. It is therefore necessary that this matter also be addressed in joint planning and co-ordination.

The Secretariat therefore consists of four branches. The Strategy Branch is responsible essentially for the formulation of strategies and development plans and for the co-ordination of monitoring of the implementation of policies by the executive departments. The National Intelligence Interpretation Branch is responsible for meeting the requirements of the Cabinet and the State Security Council with regard to the interpretation of national security intelligence, as well as the provision of intelligence reports on the basis of which strategies and other plans can be formulated. A third branch, the Strategic Communications Branch, is responsible for advice and co-ordination with regard to the departmental efforts in combatting the war of words. The fourth branch is purely administrative.

#### *Interdepartmental Committees*

As previously stated, co-ordination and planning covers such a wide field that it is impossible for the Secretariat to do it on its own. Co-ordination of the planning and implementation of policies is therefore achieved by means of the interdepartmental committees, which are consulted by the Secretariat at all stages of planning, development and implementation. The interdepartmental committees, just like the Task Groups of the other Cabinet Committees, consist of representatives from the government departments which have a direct interest in the particular field of activity concerned, and the chairmen are provided by the departments most concerned with the committees' roles and functions. For example, the Manpower Committee is chaired by a senior official from the Department of Manpower.

#### *Joint Management Centres*

The Joint Management Centres which operate at regional and local level are responsible for the co-ordination of implementation and the management of national security at those levels. Joint Management Centres consist of regional and local representatives of all the government departments which, through their line functions, make a contribution to the policy concerned. It should be noted that Joint Management Centres, as in the case of the other components of the system, have no executive powers as such. Implementation of any plan is the responsibility of the appropriate government department, but the co-ordination of implementation and the monitoring of results is the primary responsibility of the Joint Management Centre as a whole.

#### *Conclusion*

Such then is the organisation for the management of national security in

the Republic of South Africa. The philosophy upon which the organisation is based is that the Republic is confronted by a multi-dimensional threat — multi-dimensional in the sense that the Republic's enemies attack the constitutional, the economic, the social and the security bases in accordance with a co-ordinated plan or strategy. It is the conviction of the Government that this threat can only be met and turned back by the application of strategies using, in the same way as the enemy, the four main elements: constitutional, economic, social and security. Hence the underlying theme in the management of national security is joint state management involving not only the security services and the intelligence services, but also all the other government departments and organisations. These are brought together in the functions of management to ensure that all their energy and efforts are directed towards and focussed upon the achievement of the national security goals set by the state.

Finally it must once again be pointed out that whereas the State Security Council is charged with the responsibility for advising the Government on national security, the ultimate responsibility rests with the Cabinet and decisions taken by the State Security Council are subject to final approval by that body, while the execution of policy is the responsibility of the various government departments as part of their normal line function.

**A.** Further report of the UN Secretary-General (S/15776 19 May 1983) concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978)

(1) This report is intended to provide the Security Council with a summary of developments since 1981 concerning the question of the implementation of its resolutions 435 (1978)<sup>1</sup> and 439 (1978)<sup>2</sup> on the problem of Namibia. The report covers the period from the conclusion of the pre-implementation meeting held in Geneva in January 1981<sup>3</sup>, which was the subject of the Secretary-General's report of 19 January 1981 (S/14333).<sup>4</sup>

(2) Since the adoption of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) the Secretary-General and the parties concerned have been engaged in extensive consultations aimed at resolving outstanding issues to facilitate the implementation of that resolution. Progress made in those negotiations led to the convening of the pre-implementation meeting in Geneva in January 1981, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, to finalize arrangements for the implementation of the United Nations plan. As members of the Security Council are aware, regrettably that meeting, to the disappointment of the international community, did not achieve its objective, namely, the setting of a date for cease-fire and the start of implementation of resolution 435 (1978) in the early part of 1981 (S/14333).

(3) In the wake of those developments, the Security Council resumed its consideration of the situation in Namibia at its 2 267th to 2 277th meetings held between 21 and 30 April 1981. Draft resolutions on the question were not adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member. New initiatives were therefore undertaken to reactivate the process of consultation with the parties concerned.

1. See *Southern Africa Record* no. 14, December 1978, p. 43.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

3. See *Southern Africa Record* no. 23, June 1981, pp. 3-18.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 18-24.

(4) On 24 September 1981, the Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States (referred to as the Western Contact Group) stated that their Governments had developed proposals for a timetable for further and final negotiations with the objective of implementing Security Council resolution 435 (1978) in 1982. In that connection, they announced that they intended to begin discussion, with the parties concerned, of proposed constitutional principles for the Constituent Assembly, as well as a timetable and an approach to other remaining issues.<sup>5</sup>

(5) I was kept informed of the progress of successive phases of the ensuing discussions and negotiations. I held extensive consultations and exchanges of views with the Western Contact Group, the Front-Line States, Nigeria and SWAPO, the Organization of African Unity, as well as with South Africa, on all aspects of United Nations involvement in the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). In these discussions, I emphasized, in particular, that Security Council resolution 435 (1978) must remain the basis for a settlement of the Namibian situation and urged all concerned to proceed expeditiously to facilitate the implementation of the United Nations plan as prescribed by relevant decisions of the Security Council.

(6) On 12 July 1982, the representatives of the Western Contact Group transmitted to me the text of principles (S/15287)<sup>6</sup> concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution for an independent Namibia put forward by their Governments to the parties concerned in the negotiations for the implementation of the Proposal for a Settlement of the Namibian situation (S/12536) in accordance with Security Council resolution 435 (1978). They informed me in their letter that all the parties to the negotiations had accepted these principles.

(7) During the second half of July, negotiations were resumed in New York with a view to finalizing arrangements for the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) in 1982. I met with the representatives of the Front-Line States, Nigeria and SWAPO, the Western Contact Group, as well as with South Africa, to discuss further details of the role of the United Nations and UNTAG in the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). During these discussions, substantial progress was made on outstanding issues, including the composition and deployment of the military component of UNTAG. It was also agreed that UNTAG, with the co-operation of host Governments and in the context of implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), would monitor SWAPO bases in Angola and Zambia.

(8) As regards the electoral system to be employed in electing the Con-

5. See *Southern Africa Record* no. 27, June 1982, pp. 3-15.

6. *Op. Cit.* no. 29, December 1982, pp. 15-18.

stituent Assembly, it was agreed that it would be based either on proportional representation or single-member constituencies. I was also assured that all the parties were agreed that this issue must be settled in accordance with the terms of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and that the issue must not cause delay in the implementation of that resolution. The Front-Line States and SWAPO emphasized the view that agreement should be secured on the electoral system prior to implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). To this end, the Western Contact Group undertook to continue their consultations with all the parties.

(9) On 24 September 1982, the representatives of the Front-Line States, Nigeria, SWAPO and the Western Contact Group jointly confirmed to me that they had made substantial progress on all relevant points pertaining to the implementation of the United Nations plan as prescribed by Security Council resolution 435 (1978). I was also assured by the Western Contact-Group that the South African Government had confirmed its agreement to those points which related to its responsibilities under the settlement plan. Taking into account the progress which had been made thus far in the negotiations, I alerted the United Nations system to stand in readiness to commence the process of making staff members available for service with UNTAG.

(10) In follow-up discussions, United Nations Secretariat officials met with senior officials and experts from the Front-Line States for consultations on the technical aspects of the military component of UNTAG and certain practical matters related to the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). Senior officials and military personnel from South Africa also held consultations with the Secretariat relating to the military component of UNTAG and on administrative and logistic requirements of UNTAG. Following these discussions, the Secretariat was enabled to advance its state of preparedness to respond to the needs of UNTAG and to update its contingency plans for the emplacement of UNTAG in Namibia.

(11) In the course of the period under review, however, it became increasingly clear that other issues were becoming a factor in the negotiations on Namibia. These issues, which are outside the scope of resolution 435 (1978), had not been raised or envisaged in previous negotiations on that question. Indeed, it was publicly indicated that there could be no implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) without parallel progress on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. A summit meeting of the Front-Line States and the President of SWAPO took place in Lusaka, Zambia, on 4 September 1982. In a communiqué issued after the meeting, the Summit emphasized the importance of separating the decolonization process in Namibia from the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, and stated that insistence on the latter issue could only impede the process of negotiations.

(12) As indicated in paragraph 5 above, I held separate discussions with

senior officials of the Government of South Africa on matters pertaining to the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). In regard to the "question of impartiality", which had been repeatedly raised by the Government of South Africa, I pointed out that Security Council resolution 435 (1978) entrusted to the Secretary-General a wide range of responsibilities in connection with the supervision and control of free and fair elections in Namibia. I informed them that such responsibilities would naturally be discharged with complete impartiality by the United Nations personnel concerned. In this connection, I also emphasized that the same degree of impartiality was expected from the Administrator-General and all other officials in the territory.

(13) Following progress made in the negotiations reported in paragraph 9 above, the representatives of the Government of South Africa reaffirmed to me in subsequent discussions its willingness to co-operate in the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and expressed the hope that it would be possible to do so in 1983, provided that agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. In connection with recent reports concerning the planned establishment of a council for constitutional development within Namibia, I have emphasized to the Government of South Africa the need to respect the relevant provisions of resolution 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) regarding internal elections, which are not recognized by the United Nations.

(14) In February of this year I visited all the Front-Line States, where I had in-depth discussions on Namibia with African leaders, as well as with SWAPO. My visit to southern Africa served to convince me more than ever of the necessity to proceed expeditiously towards the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978).

### **Concluding observations**

(15) I am deeply concerned at the delay in implementing Security Council resolution 435 (1978). Since the adoption of that resolution five years ago, the political situation in the region has deteriorated. There has been recurrent fighting causing numerous casualties among the civilian population of the region, of whom thousands have been made homeless. There have also been other ominous developments, including acts of destabilization, which add to the political tension in the area and impair the fragile economies of the countries of the region.

(16) It is evident that the delay in implementing resolution 435 (1978) is having a destructive impact not only on Namibia itself but also on the prospect of a peaceful and prosperous future for the region as a whole. The delay also has an adverse effect on international relations in a wider sphere, adding to the prevailing sense of frustration and mistrust, with all that that implies for peace and security in the region.



(17) Since assuming the office of Secretary-General, I have sought by all possible means to maintain and strengthen my contacts with the parties concerned with a view to securing the early implementation of resolution 435 (1978). I have impressed upon them the imperative need for full co-operation in facilitating the implementation of the United Nations plan.

(18) Progress has been made in securing a large measure of agreement on the modalities to be employed in implementing resolution 435 (1978). In fact, as far as the United Nations is concerned, the only outstanding issues are the choice of the electoral system and the settlement of some final problems relating to UNTAG and its composition. The views of the South African Government on these problems are still awaited. I have appealed to the Government of South Africa to respond positively on these issues. I have also, in my talks with the representatives of South Africa, stressed the urgency, after five years of postponement, to proceed with the implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

(19) Unfortunately, moreover, the positive side of the balance sheet has been set back by the emergence of other issues which were neither raised nor envisaged at the time when resolution 435 (1978) was adopted or in the subsequent negotiations under United Nations auspices. These issues now apparently constitute the main reason for the delay in the implementation of the United Nations plan. I am deeply concerned that factors which lie outside the scope of resolution 435 (1978) should hamper the implementation of that resolution.

(20) The effects of delay are being felt profoundly not only by the people of Namibia, for whose welfare the United Nations has a special obligation, but also by other states of the region. I regard the problem of Namibia as a special responsibility of the Secretary-General in view of the unique relationship between the United Nations and the people of Namibia. I believe that the settlement of the Namibian question is of overriding importance for the future peace and prosperity of the entire region. For this reason, I urge that the Namibia problem be regarded as a primary question in its own right, the solution of which will in itself ease other tensions in the region and be in the long-term interest of all concerned.

Much progress has been made in laying a sound foundation for the just and peaceful settlement of the Namibia problem. I call urgently on all concerned to strengthen and concert their efforts within the framework of the United Nations and to demonstrate the necessary political will to bring about the early independence of Namibia in accordance with the United Nations plan. I must repeat that I regard the independence of Namibia as the essential and primary issue, which we must now face up to without further delay.

## B. Documents concerning the establishment of a State Council for Namibia

### 1. Press statements by the Administrator-General, Dr W.A. van Niekerk

#### (i) 8 June 1983

In my press statement issued on Monday, 6 June 1983, in which I announced that the proposal regarding the establishment of a State Council for South West Africa/Namibia had been formally conveyed to the South African Government, I noted that, if the proposal were to secure the South African Government's approval, further particulars of the State Council would be made available thereafter.

It is my pleasure to announce that the South African Prime Minister issued the following statement on 7 June 1983:

"The Administrator-General of South West Africa has submitted a proposal to the South African Government for the establishment of a State Council of South West Africa. The South African Government will not stand in the way of the proposed interim arrangement as the parties of South West Africa themselves wish it to be put into effect in the period before independence.

The South African Government must emphasise that the interim arrangement should not hamper or jeopardize the current international negotiations which are of course proceeding."

The time has therefore arrived to announce further particulars regarding the State Council.

In my discussions with the leaders of political parties in South West Africa/Namibia over the past several months, there was, as I have noted before, a remarkably comprehensive degree of consensus apparent among the parties, about the need for political consultation and development, until internationally recognized independence is achieved. There is also a common appreciation of the extent to which the future of the Territory lies in the hands of its own leaders.

The overwhelming majority of parties are of the opinion that a forum ought to be constituted within which political leaders will be able to consult with one another and reach democratically accountable decisions about the future.

On the basis of my discussions in Windhoek, I therefore formally requested the South African Government to approve the institution, by Proclamation, of a State Council for the Territory. The Council's assignment will be to make comprehensive proposals regarding the nature and functions of an interim government until independence.

Every actively functioning political party in the Territory will be allocated a specific number of seats in the Council on the basis of a formula which takes account both of its proven support, as manifested in previous elections, where applicable, and an estimate of its present support. Such allocations will range from one to four seats. The parties will themselves nominate their delegates from amongst their members. It is expected that the Council will consist of between 50 and 55 members.

The Council will be able to make competent decisions with a two thirds majority although it will strive to achieve the greatest possible degree of consensus among its members. The designation of a neutral chairman, perhaps a distinguished retired Judge from the Appellate Division, with no prior political ties to the Territory, appears to be most acceptable. I trust that it will be possible to constitute the Council by the end of June, for a six-month term, which could be extended, if the Council were to request this.

As the Council will consist of persons nominated by the parties rather than elected by the people, it is of the greatest importance that its proposals should be submitted to the electorate for approval. Once the Council has formulated its report, the voters will therefore be afforded an opportunity of determining its acceptability in a territory-wide referendum. The results of this referendum will be tabulated both overall, and in respect of each population group, to enable the Council to assess the extent and distribution of the support which the report enjoys. Once the Council has evaluated the results and held such further discussions as it deems appropriate, the Chairman will formally submit its final report to the Administrator-General. The Council will thereafter disband and the Administrator-General will initiate such further steps as are necessary and appropriate to secure the implementation of the proposals.

In order to foreclose any possibility of misunderstanding, I wish to emphasise that the parties participating in these discussions do not seek to promote a unilateral declaration of independence. The institution of the State Council is intended only to address the commonly felt needs for joint consultation between the political leaders of the Territory, and for concrete guidelines for governing South West Africa/Namibia until internationally recognized independence is achieved.

The evident desire of the great majority of political leaders in the Territory to become constructively engaged in the process of political development, is proof of an emergent spirit of statesmanship in the interest of all the people of South West Africa/Namibia. No active political party is excluded from this process. The need for inclusive participation and co-operation emerged as a consistent theme during all the discussions with the different parties. It is also particularly impressive that the party leaders have adopted the position that national interests must now enjoy priority. These standpoints provide evidence of true statesmanship and their importance for the future of the country cannot be over-emphasised.

The Proclamation providing for the constitution of the State Council will be promulgated on Monday 18 July 1983. I trust that publication of the Proclamation will bring to an end the wave of confusing and occasionally misleading speculation about aspects of this important political milestone, so that political leaders and the public of South West Africa/Namibia can focus their attention on the politico-constitutional future of the Territory.

In the interest of clarity about the key aspects of the proposed Council, and against the background of several inaccurate reports published recently, I wish to refer to my press statement of 8 June 1983 and to confirm the following points made therein:

- The State Council's assignment will be to make comprehensive proposals regarding the nature and functions of an interim-government, until independence. It will neither administer nor govern the Territory itself.
- Decisions in the Council will be able to be taken with a two-thirds majority. An impartial chairman, with no prior political ties to the Territory, is being appointed. The Council will, in the first instance, be constituted for a term of six months, which period can be extended at the request of the Council.
- The Council's report will be submitted to the voters in a Territory-wide referendum. The votes cast will be tabulated both overall, and in respect of each population group, to enable the Council — which will remain in session during the referendum — to assess the extent and distribution of the support which the report enjoys. Once the Council has evaluated the results and held such further discussions as it deems appropriate, the Chairman will formally submit its final report to the Administrator-General. The Council will thereafter disband and the Administrator-General will initiate such further steps as are necessary and appropriate to secure the implementation of the proposals.

I trust that the repetition of these facts will once again bring about clarity with regard to this important matter.

It needs to be stated clearly that the State Council is being instituted exclusively in the interests of the people of South West Africa, to afford the leaders of the various political parties the opportunity to become constructively involved in the process of political development. The State Council provides a forum within which South West Africa's own political leaders will consult with one another and reach democratically-accountable decisions about the future of this Territory and its people. It is apparent that the great majority of leaders of political parties in South West Africa/Namibia feel a need for such an opportunity, both from the positive response to the proposed institution of the State Council by seventeen parties, and from the fact that several other parties, including some which have adopted an attitude of "wait and see" *vis-*

*a-vis* the State Council, have proposed the creation of similar fora in the recent past.

I have noted on previous occasions that I was impressed, throughout my discussions with the leaders of the different parties, by their grasp of the need to afford priority to national interests both now and in the future. It is in the interest of this country and all its people that the leading politicians should now give practical effect to that understanding.

Texts for items B.1.(i) and (ii) supplied by the office of the Administrator-General for the Territory of South West Africa.

## 2. Proclamation No. A.G. 14 of 18 July 1983, by the Administrator-General for the Territory of South West Africa

### PROVISION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STATE COUNCIL FOR SOUTH WEST AFRICA, AND FOR INCIDENTAL MATTERS

Under the powers vested in me by Proclamation 181 of 19 August 1977, I hereby make the laws set out in the Schedule.

W.A. VAN NIEKERK  
Administrator-General

Windhoek, 18 July 1983

#### SCHEDULE

##### *Definitions*

1. In this Proclamation, unless the context otherwise indicates —

(i) "Chairman" and "Vice-Chairman" means the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Council appointed under section 5(1) or (4);

(iv)

(ii) "Council" means the State Council for South West Africa established by section 2; (iii)

(iii) "member" means any member of the Council nominated under section 6(1) or (4); (i)

(iv) "party" means any party the name of which has, in terms of section 6(1), been made known by the Administrator-General by procla-

mation in the *Official Gazette*. (ii)

##### *Establishment and powers of Council*

2. There is hereby established a State Council for South West Africa with power to make recommendations to the Administrator-General as to the manner in which the territory of South West Africa is to be administered by or on behalf of its inhabitants until the attainment of independence of the said territory.

##### *Duration of Council*

3. (1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), the Council shall continue for a period of six months from the date of commencement of this Proclamation.

(2) The Administrator-General may from time to time by proclamation in the *Official Gazette* extend the duration of the Council for periods not exceeding six months at a time.

(3) (a) After the Council has provisionally formulated its recommendations referred to in section 2 and submitted them to the Administrator-General, the Administrator-General shall cause a referendum to be held, in the manner which he determines by proclamation in the *Official Gazette*, of the in-

habitants of the territory of South West Africa mentioned in the proclamation in relation to a matter or matters contained in those recommendations and mentioned in the proclamation.

(b) *The results of the referendum* shall be made available to the Council by the Administrator-General in the manner which he determines, and the Council shall take such results into account when finally submitting the recommendations referred to in section 2 to the Administrator-General.

(4) The Council shall dissolve as soon as the recommendations referred to in subsection (3)(b) have been submitted to the Administrator-General, whether its duration under subsection (1) or (2) has expired or not.

#### *Constitution of Council*

4. The Council shall consist of a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman and the number of members which the Administrator-General shall determine.

#### *Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Council*

5. (1) The Administrator-General shall, subject to the provisions of subsection (2), appoint two persons as Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Council, respectively.

(2) The Chairman and Vice-Chairman shall be impartial persons.

(3) The Chairman or, in his absence, the Vice-Chairman shall preside at any sitting of the Council and regulate the conduct of the business and proceedings of the Council, but shall have no vote.

(4) Whenever the office of Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the Council becomes vacant for any reason, the Administrator-General shall, subject to the provisions of subsection (2), appoint any other person as Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the Council, as the case may be.

(5) Whenever the Chairman is ab-

sent or unable to perform his functions, the Vice-Chairman shall act as Chairman for the duration of such absence or incapacity and the Vice-Chairman may, when so acting, exercise or perform any power or function of the Chairman.

(6) The Chairman and Vice-Chairman shall receive such remuneration and allowances as the Administrator-General may from time to time determine.

#### *Members of the Council*

6. (1) The Administrator-General shall, in due course, by proclamation in the *Official Gazette*, make known the names of the participating parties and the names of the members nominated by such parties.

(2) No person shall be qualified to be nominated as a member by any party unless he is a member of such party.

(3) A member shall vacate his office —

(a) if it is proved to the satisfaction of the Administrator-General that he has resigned as a member of the party that nominated him;

(b) if it is proved to the satisfaction of the Administrator-General that, on account of serious illness, he is not capable of performing his duties as a member any longer;

(c) if he resigns as member by writing under his hand addressed to the Administrator-General and the Administrator-General accepts his resignation;

(d) if he is convicted of an offence for which he is sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a fine for a period of not less than twelve months, unless he receives a grant of amnesty or a free pardon.

(4) Whenever any member vacates his office, the party that nominated that member, shall, subject to the provisions of subsection (2), nominate any other person as member.

(5) A member shall receive such remuneration and allowances as the Administrator-General may from time to time determine.

*Proceedings of the Council*

7. (1) The Council may, subject to the provisions of this Proclamation, make rules and orders with respect to the order and conduct of its business and proceedings.

(2) The Council may establish committees to perform such functions as the Council may determine.

(3) (a) Subject to any rules and orders made under subsection (1), there shall be freedom of speech in the Council and in any committee

of the Council.

(b) No member shall be liable to any legal proceedings by reason of his speech or vote in the Council or any committee of the Council.

(4) A decision of two-thirds of the members of the Council or of a greater number of such members shall be a decision of the Council.

(5) (a) The voting in the Council shall be by ballot.

(b) Ballot papers shall be marked secretly.

*Short title*

8. This Proclamation shall be called the State Council for South West Africa Proclamation, 1983.

VOORSIENING VIR DIE IN-  
STELLING VAN 'N  
STAATSRaad VIR SUIDWES-  
AFRIKA, EN VIR VERBAND-  
HOUDENDE AANGELEEN-  
THEDE

Kragtens die bevoegdheid my verleen by Proklamasie 181 van 19 Augustus 1977, maak ek hierby die wette in die Bylae ver-  
vat.

W.A. VAN NIEKERK  
Administrateur-generaal

Windhoek, 18 Julie 1983

BYLAE

*Woordomskeywings*

1. In hierdie Proklamasie, tensy uit die samehang anders blyk, beteken —

(i) "lid" 'n kragtens artikel 6(1) of (4) benoemde lid van die Raad; (iii)

(ii) "party" 'n party waarvan die naam ingevolge artikel 6(1) deur die Administrateur-generaal by proklamasie in die *Offisiële Koerant* bekend gemaak is; (iv)

(iii) "Raad" die by artikel 2 ingestelde Staatsraad vir Suidwes-Afrika; (ii)

(iv) "Voorsitter" en "Onder-voorsitter" die kragtens artikel 5(1) of (4) aangestelde Voorsitter en Ondervoorsitter van die Raad. (i)

*Instelling en bevoegdhede van Raad*

2. Daar word hierby 'n Staatsraad vir Suidwes-Afrika ingestel met die bevoegdheid om aanbevelings aan die Administrateur-generaal te doen aangaande die wyse waarop die gebied Suidwes-Afrika deur of namens die inwoners daarvan tot onafhanklikwording van genoemde gebied geadministreer moet word.

*Duur van Raad*

3. (1) Behoudens die bepalinge van subartikel (2), bly die Raad in stand vir 'n tydperk van ses maande vanaf die datum van inwerkingtreding van hierdie Proklamasie.

(2) Die Administrateur-generaal kan die duur van die Raad van tyd tot tyd by proklamasie in die *Offisiële Koerant* verleng vir tydperke van hoogstens ses maande op 'n keer.

(3) (a) Nadat die Raad voorlopig sy aanbevelings bedoel in artikel 2 geformuleer en aan die Administrateur-generaal voorgelê het, laat

die Administrateur-generaal op die wyse wat hy by proklamasie in die *Offisiële Koerant* bepaal 'n referendum hou van die inwoners van die gebied Suidwes-Afrika in die proklamasie vermeld met betrekking tot 'n aangeleentheid of aangeleentheid in daardie aanbevelings vervat en in die proklamasie vermeld.

(b) Die referendumuitslae word deur die Administrateur-generaal op die wyse wat hy bepaal aan die Raad beskikbaar gestel en die Raad neem sodanige uitslae in aanmerking wanneer hy finaal die aanbevelings bedoel in artikel 2 aan die Administrateur-generaal voorlê.

(4) Die Raad ontbind sodra die aanbevelings bedoel in subartikel (3)(b) aan die Administrateur-generaal voorgelê is, of sy duur kragtens subartikel (1) of (2) ten einde gekom het, al dan nie.

#### *Samestelling van Raad*

4. Die Raad bestaan uit 'n Voorsitter, 'n Ondervoorsitter en die aantal lede wat die Administrateur-generaal bepaal.

#### *Voorsitter en Ondervoorsitter van die Raad*

5. (1) Die Administrateur-generaal stel, behoudens die bepalings van subartikel (2), twee persone aan as, onderskeidelik, Voorsitter en Ondervoorsitter van die Raad.

(2) Die Voorsitter en Ondervoorsitter moet onpartydige persone wees.

(3) Die Voorsitter of, in sy afwesigheid, die Ondervoorsitter sit voor op 'n sitting van die Raad en behartig die reëling van die werksaamhede en verrigtinge van die Raad, maar het geen stemreg nie.

(4) Wanneer die amp van Voorsitter of Ondervoorsitter van die Raad om enige rede vakant word, stel die

Administrateur-generaal, behoudens die bepalings van subartikel (2), 'n ander persoon aan as Voorsitter of Ondervoorsitter van die Raad, na gelang van die geval.

(5) Wanneer die Voorsitter afwesig is of nie in staat is om sy werksaamhede te verrig nie, neem die Ondervoorsitter as Voorsitter waar vir die duur van bedoelde afwesigheid of onbekwaamheid en die Ondervoorsitter kan, wanneer hy aldus waarneem, enige bevoegdheid of werksaamheid van die Voorsitter uitoefen of verrig.

(6) Die Voorsitter en Ondervoorsitter ontvang die vergoeding en toelae wat die Administrateur-generaal van tyd tot tyd bepaal.

#### *Lede van die Raad*

6. (1) Die Administrateur-generaal maak ter geleger tyd by proklamasie in die *Offisiële Koerant* die name van die deelnemende partye en die name van die lede wat deur sodanige partye benoem is, bekend.

(2) Niemand is bevoeg om deur 'n party as lid benoem te word as hy nie lid van daardie party is nie.

(3) 'n Lid ontruim sy amp —

(a) indien daar tot bevrediging van die Administrateur-generaal bewys word dat hy bedank het as lid van die party wat hom benoem het;

(b) indien daar tot bevrediging van die Administrateur-generaal bewys word dat hy weens ernstige siekte nie langer in staat is om sy pligte as lid te vervul nie;

(c) indien hy deur 'n bedankingsbrief, deur hom onderteken en aan die Administrateur-generaal gerig, as lid bedank en die Administrateur-generaal sy bedanking aanvaar;

(d) indien hy skuldig bevind



word aan 'n misdryf waarvoor hy gevonnis word tot gevangenisstraf sonder die keuse van 'n boete vir 'n tydperk van minstens twaalf maande, tensy amnestie of algemene grasia aan hom toegestaan word.

(4) Wanneer 'n lid sy amp ontruim, benoem die party wat daardie lid benoem het, behoudens die bepalings van subartikel (2), 'n ander persoon as lid.

(5) 'n Lid ontvang die vergoeding en toelaes wat die Administrateur-generaal van tyd tot tyd bepaal.

#### *Verrigtinge van die Raad*

7. (1) Die Raad kan, behoudens die bepalings van hierdie Proklamasie, reëls en orders in verband met die orde en reëling van sy werksaamhede en verrigtinge aanneem.

(2) Die Raad kan komitees instel

om dié werksaamhede te verrig wat die Raad bepaal.

(3) (a) Behoudens enige reëls en orders kragtens subartikel (1) aan-geneem, is daar vryheid van spraak in die Raad en in enige komitee van die Raad.

(b) Geen lid staan bloot aan 'n regsgeding weens sy uitlatings of stem in die Raad of enige komitee van die Raad nie.

(4) 'n Besluit van twee-derdes van die lede van die Raad of van 'n groter aantal sodanige lede is 'n besluit van die Raad.

(5) (a) Stemme in die Raad word by stembrief uitgebring.

(b) Stembriewe word in die geheim gemerk.

#### *Kort titel*

8. Hierdie Proklamasie heet die Proklamasie op die Staatsraad vir Suidwes-Afrika, 1983.

South West Africa. *Official Gazette Extraordinary* No. 4800, 18 July 1983.

### 3. Press statements by the Administrator-General, Dr W.A. van Niekerk

#### (i) 18 July 1983

The State Council for South West Africa Proclamation appears in today's Official Gazette. The Proclamation sets out the framework within which the Council will execute its powers and publication thereof provides all political parties in the Territory with an opportunity to become acquainted with its provisions. It is necessary to emphasize that all active political parties in the Territory are still entitled, in the interests of their supporters and the entire

population of South West Africa/Namibia, to participate in the proceedings of the Council. As is apparent from the Proclamation, such participation presents an historic opportunity to participate in the building of a stable future for this country. No political leader who has the interests of his country and his people at heart, can, irrespective of his ideology and political preferences, afford to allow such an opportunity to pass him by. In this manner, democracy will triumph over violence.

It must be pointed out that the referendum will require a separate proclamation, in which the relevant provisions already announced in previous press statements, will be included.

(ii) 21 July 1983

Enquiries have been made from various quarters about the present state of affairs, now that Proclamation AG.14 on the State Council for South West Africa has been published. I should like to record the following important points:

- As has already been noted several times in previous press statements, the proposed State Council represents a synthesis of the proposals of the different political parties in South West Africa regarding the best means of creating a forum for discussion and reflection by the political leaders of the Territory, in the interests of their people.
- Discussions have been conducted, in a constructive spirit, with the various political leaders for the past five months and are still continuing with those parties with reservations or uncertainties about some aspects of the State Council. It is therefore too soon to state definitively which parties will be represented in the State Council. In the interest of all the people of this country, however, one trusts that the great majority of parties will eventually decide in favour of participation.
- As noted in my press statement of 18 July, the referendum referred to in subarticle 3(3) of Proclamation AG.14, will require a separate proclamation when the date of the referendum is announced in the Official Gazette. I wish to restate the particulars of that referendum which were also contained in my press statements of 8 June and 13 July. The Council's report will be presented to the voters in a territory-wide referendum. The votes cast will be tabulated both overall, and in respect of each population group, to enable the Council — which will remain in session during the referendum — to assess the extent and distribution of the support which the report enjoys. Once the Council has evaluated the results and held such further discussions as it deems appropriate, the Chairman will formally submit its final report to the Administrator-General. The

Council will thereafter disband and the Administrator-General will initiate such further steps as are necessary and appropriate to secure the implementation of the proposals.

Texts for items B.3. (i) and (ii) supplied by the Office of the Administrator-General for the Territory of South West Africa.

**C. Resolution 539 (1983) adopted by the UN Security Council at its 2492nd meeting on 28 October 1983**

The Security Council,

*Having considered* the report of the Secretary-General (S/15943) of 29 August 1983<sup>1</sup>,

*Recalling* General Assembly Resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966,

*Recalling and reaffirming* its Resolution 301 (1971), 385 (1976)<sup>2</sup>, 431 (1978), 432 (1978) 435 (1978)<sup>3</sup> and 532 (1983)<sup>4</sup>,

*Gravely concerned* at South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia,

*Gravely concerned* also at the tension and instability prevailing in Southern Africa and the mounting threat to the security of the region and its wider implications for international peace and security resulting from continued utilization of Namibia as a springboard for attacks against and destabilization of African States in the region,

*Reaffirming* the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for ensuring the implementation of its resolutions, in particular Resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978), which call for the holding of free and fair elections in the territory under the supervision and control of the United Nations,

*Indignant* that South Africa's insistence on an irrelevant and extraneous issue of "linkage" has obstructed the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978).

- (1) *Condemns* South Africa for its continued illegal occupation of Namibia in flagrant defiance of resolutions of the General Assembly and decisions of the Security Council of the United Nations;
- (2) *Further condemns* South Africa for its obstruction of the implementation

1. See *Southern Africa Record* no. 33, October 1983, pp. 53-60.

2. *Ibid.* no. 4, February 1976, pp. 40-42.

3. *Ibid.* no. 14, December 1978, p. 43.

4. *Ibid.* no. 33, October 1983, p. 52.

of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) by insisting on conditions *contrary to the provisions of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia*;

- (3) *Rejects* South Africa's insistence on linking the independence of Namibia to irrelevant and extraneous issues as incompatible with Resolution 435 (1978), other decisions of the Security Council and the resolutions of the General Assembly on Namibia, including General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960;
- (4) *Declares* that the independence of Namibia cannot be held hostage to the resolution of issues that are alien to Security Council Resolution 435 (1978);
- (5) *Reiterates* that Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) embodying the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia is the only basis for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian problems;
- (6) *Takes note* that the consultations undertaken by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 5 of Resolution 532 (1983) have confirmed that all the outstanding issues relevant to Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) have been resolved;
- (7) *Affirms* that the electoral system to be used for the elections of the Constituent Assembly should be determined prior to the adoption by the Security Council of the enabling resolution for the implementation of the United Nations plan;
- (8) *Calls upon* South Africa to co-operate with the Secretary-General forthwith and to communicate to him its choice of the electoral system in order to facilitate the immediate and unconditional implementation of the United Nations plan embodied in Security Council Resolution 435 (1978);
- (9) *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution as soon as possible and not later than 31 December 1983;
- (10) *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter and to meet as soon as possible following the Secretary-General's report for the purpose of reviewing progress on the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978) and, in the event of continued obstruction by South Africa, to consider the adoption of appropriate measures under the United Nations Charter.

**Declaration on a strategy of information for Southern Africa, issued by the Ministers of the Frontline States and Nigeria, following their meeting in Kadoma, Zimbabwe, 30-31 July 1983**

The Ministers agreed:

- (1)(a) to pool their resources and maximise co-operation in the gathering and dissemination of information in the region;
  - (b) to assist and co-ordinate with the Liberation Movements in the struggle against apartheid and colonialism by providing them with greater access to radio and television networks, news agencies, other media and to training facilities;
  - (c) to increase the level of co-operation among news agencies of the region in order to promote a daily exchange of news, features, photographic materials and to make maximum use of the services of the Pan-African News Agency (PANA);
  - (d) to encourage co-operation in the field of broadcasting through the exchange of music, features, documentaries and co-ordination in the use of technical facilities;
  - (e) to facilitate and synchronise the training of journalists and other media personnel of the Frontline States in the various institutions that exist;
  - (f) to promote the exchange of personnel between the various media organs in the region as a means of enhancing practical training and familiarisation.
- (2) To this end, the Ministers decided that heads of their Information Departments meet this September in Maputo, the People's Republic of Mozambique to work out modalities for the implementation of the agreed co-operation.
- (3) They agreed to co-ordinate the positions of their countries *vis-à-vis*, the new International Information and Communication Order within the framework of the Non-aligned Movement, UNESCO and SADCC.

(4) The Ministers urged SADCC member states to give priority to information and communication in the determininal of SADCC projects.

(5) The Ministers noted that South Africa is used as the main information centre about the region, by international agencies and other media. This has resulted in a distorted view and mis-representation of our region and tends to give credence and credibility to Pretoria's biased view of reality in Southern Africa.

Bearing in mind, the Ministers appealed to news agencies and other international media to establish their regional bureaux in the independent countries of the region.

They also noted that some news agencies and other international media have already set up their regional bureaux in one or the other of the independent countries of the region, and urged the other international media to follow this example.

(6) The Ministers decided that foreign correspondents accredited to South Africa and those reporting to regional bureaux in South Africa will not be allowed, in principle, to work in the Frontline States any more.

(7) They decided that a correspondent banned in one Frontline State is deemed banned in all Frontline States.

(8) The Ministers appealed to African news agencies and other media to have their own correspondents in the Southern African region.

(9) The Ministers met informally with the representatives of the Liberation Movements of South Africa and Namibia, and reaffirmed the total commitments of their countries to the just struggle of the people of South Africa and Namibia. They noted with satisfaction the political and military progress and success of the Liberation Movements against apartheid and colonialism.

(10) The Ministers agreed to meet at least once a year to review progress and co-ordinate further joint activities. They decided to hold their next meeting in Lusaka, Zambia, in April 1984.

*Text Z1S/628/83/GR issued by the Zimbabwean Department of Information.*

**Extract, concerning Southern Africa, from the final communique\* issued after the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, held in New Delhi from 23–29 November 1983**

Heads of Government expressed grave concern about the sharp deterioration of the situation in Southern Africa since their meeting in Melbourne. Once again they identified apartheid as the root cause of repression and violence in South Africa, and of instability in the region.

Heads of Government expressed their indignation at repeated violations by South Africa of the territorial integrity of neighbouring states. These acts of aggression, intended to intimidate and destabilise South Africa's neighbours and involved for example ground and air strikes, attacks on refugee concentrations in Lesotho and Mozambique, the occupation of parts of southern Angola, as well as economic sabotage and blackmail. Heads of Government condemned these acts which endangered international peace and security and showed a total disregard for the norms of civilised conduct between sovereign states. They believed that the international community as a whole had an obligation to take effective measures to impose restraint on South Africa, and to ensure that the stability of the region was not jeopardised by further acts of aggression. In that context, they called for the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola and an end to all forms of assistance to the subversive forces. As a significant element in collective action to achieve these objectives, Heads of Government called for a stricter enforcement of the mandatory arms embargo so as to ensure that there are no loopholes in the implementation of Security Council resolution 418 of 1977. They commended the Secretary-General's prompt response to Lesotho's request for

\*It may be noted that Britain dissociated itself from parts of the final communique, particularly concerning (a) South Africa's Constitutional changes and; (b) the question of linkage in the Namibian settlement dispute, on which Mrs Thatcher adopted a more pragmatic stand. See: the *Times* (London) 30.11.83.

assistance in the wake of South African attacks and they urged Commonwealth Governments to respond favourably to Lesotho's bilateral approaches for assistance.

Heads of Government recalled their view, stated on a number of previous occasions, that the denial of inalienable rights to the African majority was at the heart of the apartheid system. In the light of the Lusaka Declaration on Racism and Racial Prejudice, the overwhelming majority of Heads of Government rejected the proposals of the South African Government for "Constitutional" change, since the African majority was wholly excluded from their scope, and the proposals were designed not to eradicate but to entrench and strengthen apartheid. They consequently condemned the recent referendum as fraudulent. The implementation of these proposals could only lead to a rising tide of anger against the injustice of apartheid, with further repression and brutality directed at the African majority and other racial groups acting in solidarity with them.

Heads of Government were of the view that only the eradication of apartheid and the establishment of majority rule on the basis of free and fair exercise of universal adult suffrage by all the people in a united and non-fragmented South Africa can lead to a just and lasting solution of the explosive situation prevailing in Southern Africa.

Heads of Government agreed that Namibia was the most immediate of the remaining issues in Southern Africa. They were in full agreement on the need, without further delay, to bring about the independence of Namibia through the full and unconditional implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978)<sup>1</sup>. Hopes that such independence might be imminent had been frustrated when the United States and South Africa insisted on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a precondition. Heads of Government, reflecting the view of the international community as a whole, firmly rejected any attempt to link the independence of Namibia with the withdrawal of Cuban troops. South Africa's occupation of Namibia is illegal, and acquiescence by any member of the international community in South Africa's attempt to undermine the central role of the United Nations in this matter, strikes at the fabric of international order. In support of Security Council resolution 539 (1983), Heads of Government urged members of the Contact Group to exercise their influence to secure the speedy and unconditional implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). If South Africa continues to obstruct the implementation of resolution 435, the adoption of appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations will have to be considered.

Heads of Government reaffirmed their commitment to uphold, in both spirit and letter, their 1977 Gleneagles Declaration on sporting contacts with

1. See *Southern Africa Record* No. 14, December 1978, p. 43.



South Africa. Recognizing that sport in South Africa cannot become genuinely multiracial until apartheid itself is eliminated, they urged all Commonwealth sportsmen follow copy (sic) noted that, as a result of the sporting boycott, South Africa had resorted to a strategy of massive financial inducements and they commended the many Commonwealth sportsmen and sports bodies who have resisted these blandishments. They also noted with satisfaction that the Commonwealth Games Federation had amended its constitution to enable it to fulfil its obligations with regard to the Gleneagles Declaration more effectively in future.

In the continuing struggle against the evil system of apartheid, Heads of Government attached importance to taking effective public relations measures to counteract South African propaganda in certain target countries, by disseminating the truth about apartheid and about social and economic progress in African countries. To this end they requested the Secretary-General to co-operate with the United Nations in collecting and disseminating such information.

Heads of Government reiterated their support for the efforts of the member countries of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference to strengthen their co-operation and to reduce their economic dependence on South Africa. Recognising that (the) SADCC had evolved into a major force for development co-operation in the region, they renewed their call for greater international assistance to meet its continuing needs.

Heads of Government commended the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa for the effective manner in which it had fulfilled its mandate, and endorsed the recommendations put forward in its report, including its proposals for a Commonwealth Education and Training Programme for South African Refugees. They authorised the Committee to continue its work and to pay particular attention to developments in Namibia as well as within South Africa itself.

Telex text supplied by the British Consulate-General, Johannesburg.

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