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South Africa and Mozambique

Cahora Bassa

A. Background to the Cahora Bassa Project.

1. Following negotiations during the nineteen sixties an Agreement was signed by Portugal and South Africa on 19 September 1969 in terms of which the two countries undertook to co-operate regarding the construction and operation of the Cahora Bassa Project.
2. The Project consists of the conservation dam in the Zambezi River, a hydro-electric power station operated by water from the dam, two 533 kV DC transmission lines and the Apollo Distribution Station near Pretoria.
3. On the same date Escom entered into a supply contract with the Portuguese Government which had the right to establish a supply company — HCB was later established for this purpose.
4. Both parts of the Project, in South Africa and in Mozambique, were constructed by ZAMCO, an international consortium of companies from South Africa, Italy, France and West Germany. Except for minor technical matters the construction was completed and the whole Project taken into commercial service during 1977.
5. During the same year it was agreed that the tariff of 0,3 cent of a Rand per kWh negotiated in 1969 would be increased to 0,5 cent of a Rand per kWh for firm power. This increase was mainly as a result of higher construction costs than those originally foreseen
6. A period of satisfactory operation followed by developments internally in Mozambique caused the Agreement and the supply contract to be suspended from December 1980. Thereafter Escom received some power on an intermittent basis but the supply was not reliable.

7. The Accord of Nkomati was followed by negotiations on a trilateral basis between South Africa, Portugal and Mozambique in regard to the Cahora Bassa Project. These led to the conclusion of a new Agreement between the three countries and a new supply contract between Escom and HCB.

Text issued by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, in Cape Town on 2 May 1984.

B. Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of South Africa, the People's Republic of Mozambique and the Republic of Portugal, in Cape Town on 2 May 1984

The Government of the Republic of South Africa, the Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique and the Government of the Republic of Portugal (hereinafter called "the Parties");

RECALLING that an Agreement was entered into on 19 September 1969 between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of Portugal concerning the establishment and operation of a hydro-electric scheme, known as the Cahora Bassa Project, for the generation and supply of electricity for use within the territories of South Africa and Mozambique and possibly other countries;

RECOGNIZING that conditions have changed considerably since the conclusion of the said Agreement which consequently no longer reflects the realities of the situation in the region of southern Africa;

CONSIDERING that the continued generation and supply of electricity from the Cahora Bassa Project can significantly contribute to the peace and prosperity of the region as a whole, as well as to the economic development and welfare of their respective peoples and countries;

DESIRING THEREFORE to enter into a tripartite Agreement which will take account of the changed conditions prevailing in the region;

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

ARTICLE 1

Use of Terms

In this Agreement, unless inconsistent with the context —
"Apollo" means

Escom's distribution station established on the farm Witkoppies No 105, district of Pretoria.

"Cahora Bassa Project" means

- (i) the conservation dam and works erected on the river Zambezi at the site

known as Cahora Bassa at 15° 35' South and 32° 42' East approximately, within the territory of Mozambique;

- (ii) the hydro-electric power station that has been erected on the south bank of the river and the required ancillary works erected for the purposes of the generation and supply of electricity in terms of the supply contract;
- (iii) the transmission system erected for the purposes of transmitting electricity from Cahora Bassa and delivering the same to Escom at Apollo Distribution Station, including the converter equipment, transformers and ancillary equipment installed for this purpose at Cahora Bassa and Apollo.

“date of operation” means

the date upon which the contractual maximum demand is delivered by HCB for the first time in accordance with the provisions of the supply contract.

“Escom” means

the Electricity Supply Commission contemplated in the Electricity Act, 1958, of the Republic of South Africa.

“force majeure” means

- (i) any overwhelming occurrence of nature which could not reasonably have been foreseen or guarded against;
- (ii) any of the following occurrences initiated by human agency: war, invasion, blockade, foreign hostile act, civil war, rebellion, revolution, insurrection or sabotage;
- (iii) strikes or other similar stoppages of work by employees which are not the result of the unreasonable conduct of a Party, HCB or Escom;
- (iv) any other cause beyond the control of a Party, HCB or Escom if the Parties agree that such cause should be regarded as force majeure.

“HCB” means

the Hidroeléctrica de Cahora Bassa, SARL, a limited liability joint-stock company duly constituted in accordance with the laws of Mozambique on 23 June 1975.

“previous Agreement” means

the Agreement entered into on 19 September 1969 between the Governments of the Republic of South Africa and the Republic of Portugal relative to the Cahora Bassa Project.

“supply contract” means

the contract entered into between HCB and Escom regulating the supply of power from the Cahora Bassa Project to Escom and matters related thereto.

ARTICLE 2

Termination of Certain Existing Arrangements

1. As between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the Republic of Portugal the provisions of this Agreement shall from the date of its operation terminate and replace the provisions of the previous Agreement, subject however to the provisions of Article 4 of this Agreement.
2. As between the Government of the Republic of Portugal and Escom the provisions of the supply contract shall from the date of its operation terminate and replace the provisions of the supply contract entered into between them on 19 September 1969.

ARTICLE 3

Supply Contract

1. HCB and Escom shall enter into a supply contract regulating the supply of power to Escom for use in the Republic of South Africa and the People's Republic of Mozambique and the said contract shall enter into force upon the same date as does this Agreement.
2. The supply contract shall be read with but subject to the provisions of this Agreement and in case of any dispute regarding the interpretation of the supply contract the provisions of this Agreement shall prevail.
3. The Government of the Republic of South Africa guarantees and shall ensure that Escom will comply with the provisions of the supply contract.
4. The Governments of the People's Republic of Mozambique and the Republic of Portugal jointly guarantee and shall ensure that HCB will comply with the provisions of the supply contract.

ARTICLE 4

Financial Obligations Under the Previous Agreement

Nothing contained in this Agreement shall affect any financial rights and obligations of the Government of the Republic of Portugal incurred by it in

regard to the establishment and operation of the Cahora Bassa Project under the previous Agreement.

ARTICLE 5

Export Credit Loans

The Government of the Republic of South Africa undertakes to negotiate with the Governments of the People's Republic of Mozambique and the Republic of Portugal the conditions of export credit loans to HCB for the purpose of financing repairs to and, if necessary, the improvement of the Cahora Bassa Project.

ARTICLE 6

Most Favoured Treatment

Power from the Cahora Bassa Project shall not be supplied to any consumer outside Mozambique at a price which is more favourable, taking into account the load factor, than that payable by Escom in terms of the supply contract, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.

ARTICLE 7

Tapping of Transmission Lines

There shall be no tapping of power from the two monopolar lines initially established between Cahora Bassa and Apollo unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.

ARTICLE 8

Protection of the Transmission Lines

1. The Governments of the Republic of South Africa and the People's Republic of Mozambique shall jointly take immediate steps to ensure the protection of the transmission lines against attack or any other form of interference and to safeguard in the execution of their duties the personnel responsible for the maintenance and repair of the lines and all costs in connection therewith shall be borne by the said two Governments as agreed between them.
2. If the steps taken to protect the transmission lines do not result in the adequate protection thereof within a period of 90 days from the date of signature of this Agreement, any Party may request a meeting of the Parties in order to review the situation and such meeting shall take place without undue delay.

ARTICLE 9

Freedom of Movement

The Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique shall facilitate the entry and exit to and from their respective countries by any person for purposes connected with the Cahora Bassa Project.

ARTICLE 10

Currency, Method of Payment and Rates of Exchange

1. The amount of any payment to be made in terms of this Agreement or the supply contract shall be determined in Rand and payments shall be made to accounts designated by the payee.
2. The payee shall be entitled to elect to be paid in Rand or in such other currency as may be agreed upon with the payer and if the payee elects to be paid in such other currency the amount to be paid shall, after being determined in Rand, be converted into the other currency at the rate of exchange quoted by the South African Reserve Bank to the Government of the Republic of South Africa on the date of payment; provided that the payee shall give the payer at least three full working days advance notice of the currency desired.
3. If payments are required to be made under this Agreement or the supply contract to more than one payee simultaneously, the payees concerned may set off such payments if they so agree.

ARTICLE 11

Percentage Premium Payable to Mozambique

The Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique shall be entitled to receive from HCB 28,57 per cent of the premium referred to in clause 11, paragraph (2) of the supply contract as a contribution towards the costs incurred by that Government.

ARTICLE 12

Force majeure

In the event of the occurrence of force majeure in relation to this Agreement or the supply contract any Party may request a meeting of the Parties,

which shall take place without undue delay, in order to review the situation and to agree on measures to be taken.

ARTICLE 13

Exchange of Information

During the subsistence of this Agreement the Parties shall exchange information and views and consult with one another on all matters concerning the operation, maintenance and further improvement of the Cahora Bassa Project.

ARTICLE 14

Permanent Joint Committee

1. The Parties shall establish a Permanent Joint Committee which shall furnish them with advice and recommendations on any operational, maintenance or economic aspect of the Cahora Bassa Project.
2. Each Party shall appoint an equal number of members to the Committee which shall meet from time to time and function in accordance with rules drawn up by it and approved by the Parties.

ARTICLE 15

Review of Tariff and Premium

1. The Permanent Joint Committee shall, if so requested by any Party, meet specially in order to review and make recommendations concerning the rate of any tariff or premium payable in terms of the supply contract taking into account all relevant factors and particularly —
 - (a) any substantial increase in the actual operating or maintenance costs of the Cahora Bassa Project occurring as a result of circumstances beyond the control of any Party, Escom or HCB; or
 - (b) any substantial decrease in such costs;

provided that in the event of any increase or decrease in the rate of the tariff or premium, the ratio of the one to the other shall remain constant, except that the rate of the premium shall at no time be decreased below that contemplated in clause 11, paragraph (2) of the supply contract as at the date of signature thereof; provided further that any new tariff or premium which may be agreed upon by the Parties shall not take effect before the expiration of one year from the

date of operation of this Agreement and that any subsequent new tariff or premium agreed upon shall not take effect at intervals of less than one year.

2. At any such special meeting the Committee shall also take into account any fluctuation in the value of the Rand in so far as it may affect the viability of the Cahora Bassa Project.
3. If any recommendation in terms of paragraph 1 involves an increase in the tariff or premium payable by Escom, the profitability of the Cahora Bassa Project shall be one of the factors which the Parties shall take into account in their consideration of the recommendation.
4. In their consideration of any recommendation in terms of paragraph 1 the Parties shall arrive at a decision within 45 days of the date upon which the recommendation was made to them.

ARTICLE 16

Special Meetings of the Parties

If at any time one of the Parties requests a meeting of the Parties for any reason in connection with the Cahora Bassa Project and in particular its economic viability and at least one of the other Parties agrees to such a meeting, the Parties shall meet within 45 days of such request.

ARTICLE 17

Duration and Termination of Agreement

1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon the date of signature thereof and shall remain in force until the date of termination of the supply contract but, subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, shall become operative upon the date of operation.
2. The provisions of Article 8 shall become operative upon the date of entry into force of this Agreement.
3. After the termination of this Agreement it may be renewed by the Parties with such amendments as they may agree upon.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned being duly authorized thereto, have in the names of their respective Governments signed and sealed three

copies of this Agreement in each of the English and Portuguese languages, each version being equally authentic.

(Signatories)

Roclof Frederik
Botha

Mario da Graça
Machungo

Jaime Gama

Minister of
Foreign Affairs
of the Republic
of South Africa

Minister of
Planning of The
People's Republic
of Mozambique

Minister of
Foreign Affairs
of The Republic
of Portugal

For the
Government
of the Republic
of South Africa

For the
Government
of The People's
Republic of
Mozambique

For the
Government
of The Republic
of Portugal

C. Statement by the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Hon R.F. Botha

It is my pleasure today to welcome to South Africa Dr Jaime Gama the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Portugal and his delegation, and Mr Mario Machungo, Minister of Planning of the People's Republic of Mozambique and his delegation.

We have just signed a new Agreement relating to the Cahora Bassa Project. The original project was erected and financed by Portugal in terms of an Agreement entered into between South Africa and Portugal in 1969.

As a result, however, of changing times and circumstances and more especially the attainment of independence by the People's Republic of Mozambique it became necessary to conclude a *new* Agreement in which all three countries — South Africa, Mozambique and Portugal — would participate on a basis of sovereign equality.

That Agreement has now been signed and with it the way has been paved for a new era of closer economic co-operation and development.

The new Agreement is one which is undoubtedly of benefit to all three of our countries and which, as it states in its Preamble, can significantly contribute to the peace and prosperity of the southern Africa region as a whole as well as to the economic development and welfare of our respective peoples.

This Agreement follows in the wake of, and indeed was made possible by the Accord of Nkomati¹ signed by the Prime Minister of South Africa and the President of the People's Republic of Mozambique on 16 March — just over

1. See *Southern African Record*, no. 35, April 1984, p. 6

six weeks ago. As you may see we have lost no time in taking a step further the promise of future co-operation foreshadowed in that Accord.

There can, I believe, be few projects as important for the development of a nation as the generation and supply of electricity. It is a vital component for the industrial development of any country as well as for the material welfare of its people.

South Africa therefore deplores those recent acts of terrorism in Mozambique designed to sabotage the transmission lines of the Cahora Bassa Project. They serve only to deprive the people of Mozambique of the benefits that they are entitled to expect from the project—it is they who suffer most from these acts of violence.

South Africa unreservedly condemns terrorism and support for terrorism wherever it may occur and in whatever form it may occur. We believe that Mozambique and Portugal join us in our condemnation.

In conclusion may I express the hope that it will not be long before Cahora Bassa operates at maximum capacity and that the power from it will strengthen the bonds between our respective countries and light the way for further co-operation on the sub-continent of Africa.

D. Address by the Mozambican Minister of Planning, the Hon Mario Machungo

The signing of the Non-Aggression and good neighbourliness Agreement on the banks of the Nkomati River, between the People's Republic of Mozambique and the Republic of South Africa, on 16 March 1984¹, opens up a new stage in the relations between the People's Republic of Mozambique and the Republic of South Africa.

For us it was understandable that, the way that led to the signing of the agreement, only the respect of the universally recognized principles that govern the relations among States would ensure to bring about a climate of peace which would allow the development of the economic relations between our two countries.

By enshrining these principles, governing the relations between sovereign States, *regardless of their political, economic and social systems*, are created the *sine qua non* conditions towards the valorisation of the geographic contiguity characterising the People's Republic of Mozambique and the Republic of South Africa, with regard to the utilization of the infrastructures or of natural resources.

It was against this backdrop that the talks on the Cahora Bassa Scheme were held.

The Agreement we have just signed, one month after the Nkomati Agreement, is in keeping with the principles governing the relations between our

1. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 35

States, and contributes towards the bringing about of a climate of security, stability and progress in this region of the African Continent.

The Cahora Bassa Scheme is indissolubly linked with the economies of our countries.

The Portuguese Government has also realised that only the insertion of the Cahora Bassa scheme in the economy of this region, would make viable the project, and the planning of future developments.

In this connection, its contribution to the realization of this Agreement will benefit all the concerned parties, such is worthwhile and merits to be duly hailed.

Excellencies, the Cahora Bassa scheme Agreement in its text is cognisant of the deep changes that took place in this Region, and doubtlessly, such recognition led to the creation of the conditions which ensure that the interests of the three countries are safeguarded.

The Agreement, in setting out the responsibilities which the three parties shoulder, in order to keep the scheme in operation, reveals that, more than just being mere intention, there is really an unshakeable wish to ensure it going on.

This Agreement will demand a deep commitment from the parties concerned, in its materialization.

However, we are aware that the Agreement we have signed here has enemies: those who suffer from complexes of living in equality and coexistence, those who are opposed to the creation of a climate of respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the States of the Region and those who, wishing to impair the efforts aiming at the political, economic and social progress of the region, will seek ways of hindering the materialisation of this Agreement.

We are nevertheless hopeful that the spirit in which the talks were conducted, will enable us to overcome successfully the difficulties and the bottlenecks arising from the execution of the Agreement.

On the success of our relationship will depend other actions, especially in the field of energy, which will contribute towards the development of the region, that benefit the parties to the Agreement.

Thus concluding, I would like to reassert that you will find in the People's Republic of Mozambique, an unshakeable partner, resolutely willing to comply with the Agreement we signed a short while ago.

E. Address by the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Hon Dr Jaime Gama

The Agreement of Cape Town relative to Cahora Bassa, that I have just signed on behalf of Portugal, is an important and symbolic landmark in the

history of inter-African relations and in the broad framework of friendship between Europe and Africa. This city whose grounds were first sighted by Portuguese sailors and afterwards founded with the purpose of supplying water to the ships of the great international trade, finds again today its dimension of solidarity by linking its name with a significant sharing of energy for the benefit of the countries of the region and, in each one of them, for the radiation of light, of that kind which without distinction of any sort illuminates all men that come to this world.

A laborious route of dialogue, negotiation and compromise has been passed through in order to make us reach this point. When we had a dialogue in depth with President Machel, in October 1983, on the occasion of his unforgettable visit to Portugal, and when we argued for a direct dialogue between South Africa and Mozambique as a progressive way which would lead to the conclusion of an agreement on coexistence between the countries of southern Africa, on the occasion of the visit of Minister Pik Botha to Lisbon at the end of November 1983, we were offering the contribution of Portugal for the gigantic diplomatic, political, economic and strategic mutation that was the "Accord of Nkomati".

By subscribing now to the Agreement of Cape Town, which was negotiated in less than three months, Portugal has established herself as a protagonist of that climate of regional trust and of dynamic security and peace, adding to these the decisive component of the technology for development and the democratic engagement of Europe.

We have been loyal to the international financial commitments which we assumed on the account of Cahora Bassa.

We do not and shall not question the agreements relative to the project that we have with Mozambique and are prior to her independence. We shall fully respect the entailment we now assume together with Mozambique and South Africa on one of the largest hydro-electric potentials of the world. We do not want profit from Cahora Bassa — we just do not want loss. We neither want to continue to watch the absurd and scandalous situation of a fully equipped dam, paid with sacrifice by Portugal, and from which in the end nobody benefits.

Being a contribution of the Portuguese people to the progress of Africa, which is clearly a plurinational and multiracial receiver, Cahora Bassa is an enterprise which has a great economic dimension and that certainly will promote wealth and social progress in the region. It is an enterprise that will satisfy in the best local conditions the energetic needs of very important industrial areas in South Africa and vital regions of Mozambique. But Cahora Bassa has also a potential to develop in what concerns the possible diversification of supply to other eventual African clients. Thus it is of the utmost importance and urgency to establish the conditions for a continual and regular supply of energy from Cahora Bassa. Only in those circumstances and as a

result of the immediate benefits delivered, it will be possible for a generalized feeling of trust in the reliability of the enterprise to be established.

For this reason the eyes of the entire African continent and now, also the eyes of Portugal, are focussed on this country, which is today our host, and on the faithfulness which, I am sure, its leaders will maintain in the stabilizing evolution that is taking place in the region after "Nkomati" and of which, the commitment just now solemnly taken by us, is an expression. Let the "Accord of Nkomati" be respected, let the Agreement of Cape Town be fulfilled and the signal will come across for a new era of tranquility and peaceful evolution for all those who live in southern Africa and wish to build their future within the binding of solidarity. Portugal is proud to contribute and to participate in a commitment which is deeply changing the international relations and in which Africa assumes herself in her entirety without tutelage or guidance of any kind. My best wishes are that the effort made by Portugal will in the end mean peace and well-being for your countries, and for all who live in this region. Looking at the present and glancing at the future I am certain that Cahora Bassa is worth it!

Texts for items (A) to (E) issued by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and Information. A full copy of the Contract wording is available from the SAIIA on request.

South Africa, Namibia and Angola

- A. Proposals conveyed by the South African Government to the Government of the United States, at the US Embassy in Pretoria on 15 November 1984

Political Principles

1. The completion of the disengagement of South African forces from southern Angola and the assertion of Angolan control over the area in question is provided for in the Lusaka Agreement, which also requires the Angolan Government to ensure the exclusion of all SWAPO and Cuban elements from the same area.
2. The South African Government is committed to seeking a settlement to the SWA/Namibia question on the basis of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978)¹ within the framework of the understandings reached with the United States and the Western Contact Group.
The basic position of the South African Government is that firm agreement will have to be reached on the question of Cuban withdrawal.
3. The South African Government has made it known in communications to the People's Republic of Angola and the USA that should SWAPO indicate that it will cease its armed activities the South African Government will reciprocate in an appropriate manner. This proposal has thus far been rejected by SWAPO. In any event, United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 makes provision for a general cessation of all hostile acts. However, Resolution 435 does not preclude the establishment of a cessation of hostilities prior to its implementation.
4. It has been the consistent position of the South African and United States Government that Cuban withdrawal from Angola should be carried out parallel with the reduction of South African forces in terms of UNSCR 435. In the view of the South African Government this is essential, not

1. See *Southern Africa Record* no. 14, September 1978, p. 43

only for free and fair elections in SWA/Namibia but also for the promotion of stability in the region as a whole.

5. The South African Government supports the concept of a Security Council Resolution which would approve of an agreement on Cuban withdrawal from Angola in conjunction with the implementation of UNSCR 435, recognising the commitments and contributions of all interested parties.

Proposal of the South African Government for the implementation of the above-mentioned principles

1. The South African Government proposes that a high-level meeting of the Joint Monitoring Commission should be convened at a mutually suitable date as soon as possible to reach agreement on the completion of the disengagement of South African forces from Angola in accordance with the Lusaka Agreement and to reach agreement on the establishment of a Joint Peacekeeping Commission.
2. The South African Government will take the necessary steps in respect of the implementation of UNSCR 435 as soon as agreement has been reached on the details of Cuban withdrawal from Angola.
3. The South African Government remains willing to reciprocate in an appropriate manner should SWAPO indicate that it will cease its armed activities.
4. The South African Government's position on Cuban withdrawal is as follows:
Cuban withdrawal from Angola must be co-ordinated with the reduction of South African forces in SWA/Namibia in accordance with the annexure to United Nation Security Council document S/12636 of 10 April 1978, i.e.
 - 6 weeks after the commencement of implementation Cuban presence in Angola must be reduced to 12 000.
 - 9 weeks after the commencement of implementation Cuban presence must be reduced to 8 000.
 - 12 weeks after the commencement of implementation Cuban presence must be reduced to 0.

Cuban elements in Angola may not be replaced by any other foreign forces. The number of Soviet, East German and other communist bloc advisers must not be increased above the 1978 figures. In order to promote

mutual confidence it is suggested that the Angolan Government also furnish a list of all such personnel including their functions and whereabouts.

The withdrawal of Cubans must be subject to verification. The Angolan Government should furnish the South African Government with a full list of all Cubans currently stationed in Angola.

The South African Government agrees to the establishment of a Joint Verification Commission to monitor the stages of Cuban withdrawal. It is assumed that the Commission will have the ability to move freely throughout Angola and be in a position to verify all movements and departures.

Text supplied by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and Information.

- B. Message dated 20 November 1984, from the Angolan President, the Hon José Eduardo Dos Santos, to the United Nations Secretary-General, on the problems of southern Africa. (UN Document No.)

Mr Secretary-General:

I have the honour to address myself to Your Excellency to inform you of the steps taken by the Government of the People's Republic of Angola with the essential objective of guaranteeing the independence of Namibia, through the full implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 435/78¹, achieving the withdrawal of South African forces from the south of Angola, securing international guarantees for Angola's security, independence and territorial integrity, and contributing to the establishment of lasting peace in southern Africa.

As I stated publicly on 26 August 1983, on the occasion of your memorable visit to Luanda, the People's Republic of Angola has always shown its willingness to co-operate in the search for an adequate solution to the Namibian problem, thereby taking the first important step towards the establishment of the just and lasting peace we want for our peoples and the international community.

While ratifying the determination of the people and Government of Angola to continue to fight against the racist invaders, I reiterated our willingness to continue diplomatic action to seek a just solution, and I reaffirmed the following positions of our Party and Government:

1. The immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the South African forces occupying part of our territory;

1. See *Southern African Record* no. 14, December 1978, p. 43.

2. The immediate implementation of Security Council resolution 435/78 leading to the true independence of Namibia;
3. The cessation of South African aggression against Angola;
4. The cessation of all logistical support for the Unita puppet bands.

On the basis of these positions, some of which had already been stated in the statement of the Foreign Ministers of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba of 4 February 1982, and are also contained in the joint statement of 19 March 1984 of both governments, we have held both direct and indirect talks with representatives of the governments of the United States and South Africa, with a view to achieving the above objectives.

These principled positions put forward by Angola are a categorical rejection of so-called "linkage" — rejected by almost every government in the world and by world opinion — which seeks to make the implementation of resolution 435/78 contingent on the prior or parallel withdrawal of the Cuban military contingent legally present in the People's Republic of Angola at the request of its Government and in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

On the contrary, the implementation of resolution 435/78 and with it the independence of Namibia, is a fundamental factor which, together with the cessation of direct or indirect aggression and threats against Angola and help from abroad for the counter-revolutionary bands, will make it possible within an adequate period to ensure our security and the subsequent progressive withdrawal of Cuban internationalist troops from Angola, as stated very precisely in the above mentioned joint statement of Cuba and Angola of February 1982 and March 1984.

In the course of our talks with representatives of the United States held in Luanda on 6 and 7 September, we presented them with a platform for negotiations to be conveyed to the Government of South Africa, containing five points.

I here transcribe the full text of the said platform presented by the People's Republic of Angola:

1. The completion of the process of withdrawal of South African forces from the territory of the People's Republic of Angola and control by FAPLA of Angola's state borders.
2. A solemn statement by the Republic of South Africa in which it pledges to honour and to contribute to the implementation of United Nations resolution 435/78 on Namibian independence.

3. A ceasefire agreement between the Republic of South Africa and SWAPO.
4. A statement by the Government of the People's Republic of Angola reiterating its decision, in agreement with the Government of Cuba, to proceed with the start of the withdrawal of the Cuban internationalist contingent, only when the implementation of resolution 435/78 is under way.
5. The signing, within the parameters of the UN Security Council which would act as guarantor, of an international agreement between the governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of South Africa, the Republic of Cuba and a representative of SWAPO, in which would be defined the respective undertakings for achieving Namibia's independence, and the guarantees for the security and territorial integrity of the People's Republic of Angola and lasting peace in South West Africa.

This agreement would consider:

1. United Nations troops having been established in Namibia, together with the UN authorities, within the prescribed period, the Republic of South Africa would completely withdraw its armed forces from Namibia, withdrawing first the air force and the units on the border with Angola, which would come under the immediate responsibility of the United Nations troops.
2. As soon as the air force had completely withdrawn from the territory of Namibia and there remained of the South African troops only one thousand five hundred infantrymen, Angola and Cuba would proceed with the withdrawal of five thousand Cuban internationalists from the troops grouped in the south, as a gesture of good will.
3. The Cuban troops would not carry out any kind of deployment of military units or any type of manoeuvre south of the 16th Parallel.
4. With regard to the remaining numbers of Cuban troops grouped in the south, they would be withdrawn to Cuba over a maximum period of three years.
5. If any act of aggression or threat of imminent aggression against Angola by South Africa were noted, the entire agreement would be suspended or annulled.
6. The Republic of South Africa would undertake from the very start to cease all support of the Unita bands, and the United Nations authorities would have to verify the dismantling of the Unita bases on Namibian territory.

7. The withdrawal of Cuban troops stationed in Cabinda Province and other regions in the north of the People's Republic of Angola, including the country's capital, would be programmed in accordance with a timetable to be established for this purpose by the People's Republic of Angola and Cuba.

As Your Excellency can confirm, the platform directly states the problems that must be resolved to secure the implementation of resolution 435/78 and, therefore, the independence of Namibia, as well as other steps to guarantee the disengagement of South African forces from our territory and the establishment of lasting peace in the region, which would create the requisite conditions to proceed with the disengagement of Cuban internationalist troops from southern Angola; all this, of course, within the framework of an international agreement subscribed to by all the parties concerned and guaranteed by the Security Council.

Subsequently, and as proof of the seriousness with which Angola is carrying out the negotiations, on 9 October this year we presented a text which complemented the platform and rigorously expressed our precise proposals with regard to the Cuban military personnel.

The full text of the document is as follows:

The People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba, in exercising their sovereign rights, and within the framework of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, agree to proceed in the following manner in respect of the internationalist contingent of Cuban troops, so long as the points formulated in the platform of the People's Republic of Angola for an international agreement on independence, security and peace in South West Africa (Angola and Namibia) are accepted, carried out and respected.

First, on the groupings of Cuban troops in the south of Angola (ATS):

1. Within 24 months of the entry of the UN troops contingent for the implementation of Security Council resolution 435/78, the 15 000 men of the present line defending the south of Angola—Namibe—Lubango—Matala—Jamba—Menongue—will be withdrawn in the following manner:

- after the 16th week, within a four-month period, 5 000 men.
- between the 12th and 16th month, another 5 000 men.
- between the 20th and 24th month, a further 5 000 men.

During this period, the Cuban troops would at no time cross the 16th Parallel, which is 160 km from the Namibian border and 1 360 km from the Orange River.

2. The remaining troops of the ATS, comprising approximately 5 000 men, deployed behind the said line, would be withdrawn between the 32nd and 36th month.

During that third year, these troops would at no time cross the 13th Parallel, which is more than 500 km from the land border with Namibia and 1 700 km from the Orange River. That is, as from the 24th month, no ATS unit would cross the 13th Parallel.

Thus approximately 20 000 men of the total number of Cuban troops in Angola would withdraw in 36 months.

Second, on the remaining Cuban troops in Angola:

1. The remaining Cuban troops which have nothing to do with the defence of the south of the country, and no relationship to Namibia or South Africa, as pointed out in point 5-VII of the platform, would be withdrawn from Angola in accordance with an independent timetable to be agreed upon by the People's Republic of Angola and Cuba when the time comes. These remaining troops would also at no time cross the 13th Parallel. Angola and Cuba shall establish the dates indicated as the maximum limits for the ATS to stay in Angola, reserving the right to cut short those periods if security and territorial integrity so permit. In the same spirit, both governments, exercising their prerogatives of sovereignty, shall determine the moment and the appropriate timescale for the withdrawal of the remaining forces once Angola's integrity and security are fully guaranteed.

2. Part of those troops are in Cabinda, which is 1 350 km from the river border (the Cunene River) with Namibia and separated from the rest of the territory and by the Zaire River.

Cabinda is 2 550 km from the Orange River.

Another part of this force would be in Luanda and the surrounding area (Bengo and Kwanza Norte). Luanda is Cabinda's rear, in view of the fact that it is only here that there can be air and naval forces capable of going to the help of Cabinda in the event of aggression, as well as the ground forces which would be transported by air and ship.

Luanda is 945 km from the river border (Cunene River) with Namibia and 2 145 km from the Orange River.

Other units could be stationed in northern and eastern provinces and in strategic points north of the 13th Parallel which ensure communications and supplies to those provinces.

3. That is, the remaining forces would be very far from the southern border, and their mission, together with FAPLA, is to defend the territorial integrity of the People's Republic of Angola against aggression from the north and north-east, and more especially against Cabinda, as has already happened.

4. The People's Republic of Angola does not have the organised manpower resources with the required educational level, or the available material and financial resources to wage a war against the Unita bands and other puppet organisations, and simultaneously to replace the Cuban troops and armaments at strategic points in the south, centre and north of the country. Angola has to give priority to fighting the bandits who, supported trained and equipped from abroad, have caused and are continuing to cause the country substantial human and economic losses.

At the same time, and if agreement is reached in the present negotiations, in only 36 months it will have to replace the strength in men and equipment of the grouping of Cuban troops in the south and assume responsibility for the installations and positions occupied by them.

For this reason, it is only after such replacement has been carried out and peace and internal order has been guaranteed, that Angola itself will be able to take on the tasks which, for the country's security and integrity, are performed by the remaining Cuban military personnel.

This will require time, substantial resources and a tremendous effort in the training of skilled and technical personnel. To demand more of our young State, after five centuries of colonialism, fourteen years of struggle for independence and almost ten years of fighting against foreign aggression and subversion organised from abroad would reflect a lack of realism and a lack of *consideration for our people*.

Angola has given proof of its good will and seriousness in seeking peace.

Angola cannot make concessions which would be suicidal to its national integrity and its political and social process, forgetting the sacrifices made by tens of thousands of its finest sons and daughters.

Angola, Mr Secretary-General, has given proof of its willingness and seriousness in seeking peace, but it cannot accept an arrangement which does not take into account the criteria outlined here or which does not fully respond in a satisfactory way to all the issues related to the rapid independence of Namibia, the disengagement of South African troops from our territory and the cessation of all external help for the Unita puppet bands.

In other words, and reaffirming what is stated at the end of the complementary text, it is not possible either to demand or to expect of Angola concessions which would be suicidal to its national integrity and the development of its political and social process, and would mean forgetting the sacrifices made by tens of thousands of its finest sons and daughters.

Mr Secretary-General, conscious of the fundamental role played by the United Nations in respect of the independence of Namibia and the implementation of resolution 435/78, we consider it indispensable not only that Your Excellency should be fully informed of how the negotiations are going, but also that, at an opportune moment in the not too distant future, that your representative should take part in them, so that you may also make your valuable and necessary contribution to our efforts.

Finally, I should like to say to you, Mr Secretary-General, that Angola has carried out these negotiations in close co-ordination with Cuba and has its full support. At the same time, the leadership of SWAPO has also been informed about the evolution of the negotiations.

I should like to request of Your Excellency that this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

Text from *The Times* (London) 24 November 1984, supplied by the People's Republic of Angola.

- C. Message from the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Hon R.F. Botha, to the United Nations Secretary-General, on 26 November 1984. (UN Document No. A/39/689).

Mr Secretary-General

It has come to my government's attention that the President of the People's Republic of Angola has addressed a letter to your excellency in which he has set out certain proposals relating to the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and the independence of South West Africa/Namibia.

The fact that he has chosen to reveal details of the delicate discussions currently under way between South Africa, the United States and Angola, raises the question of whether he is seriously pursuing these negotiations with a view to achieving a settlement and peace in the southern Africa region.

Under the circumstances it is incumbent upon me to inform your excellency of South Africa's position on these questions. I accordingly enclose, for your information, a copy of the proposals which South Africa conveyed to the United States in Pretoria on 15 November 1984¹.

I must also point out that the Angolan President's letter deviates in important respects from the Angolan proposals as conveyed to South Africa by the United States in the Cape Verde Islands on 31 October 1984. This is a serious matter which raises further questions concerning the basis of the current negotiations.

South Africa has been able to reach broad agreement on the general political principles contained in the Angolan proposal conveyed to my government by the United States. However, South Africa continues to insist on an

1. See first page of this section.

agreement which should provide for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola parallel and simultaneous with the reduction of its own forces in SWA/Namibia in terms of resolution 435¹. This is a position which South Africa has consistently maintained in its dealings with the Western Contact Group and with Angola.

If Angola should insist on the circulation of President Dos Santos's letter, as a document of the General assembly and of the security council I should appreciate it if this letter and its annexure could be circulated simultaneously also as a document of the general assembly and of the security council. I should like to avail myself of this opportunity of renewing to your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

1. See *Southern Africa Record* no. 14, September 1978, p. 43.

United States and southern Africa

"Major Objectives of US Policy Toward South Africa": Testimony by Assistant Secretary of State, Dr Chester Crocker, before the US Senate Sub-committee on Africa, on 26 September 1984

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the sub-committee to express clearly and unambiguously US policy toward South Africa, its relationship to our regional strategy of constructive engagement in southern Africa, and our view of recent events in that region. Let us be frank at the outset by recognizing that the development of a policy that adequately reflects our moral principles, our interests as a great power, and the realities of influence and power in that distant region is one of the thorniest issues in US foreign policy.

The dilemma is not that our principles and our interests are in conflict. They are not: US values and interests can only be served to the degree that there is a strengthened framework of regional security in southern Africa and a sustained process of peaceful change in South Africa. The quest for security and the imperative of change are dependent on one another. The challenge for US policy is to define in an operational sense how we are to pursue these goals. This means that we must understand the extent of and limits on US influence, and then use that influence in a sustained and coherent manner. This Administration has been doing precisely that for the past three and one half years. There have been substantial accomplishments, but a great deal remains to be done. Our country can be proud of its record in defining an agenda of negotiated change and regional security in southern Africa. But, first, that record must be clearly understood.

US Objectives in South Africa

Recent events in South Africa serve to underscore our strong moral and political convictions about a system based on legally entrenched racism. As Americans, proud of our multiracial democracy, we are offended by dramatic television footage showing police action to contain the explosion of black anger in the "townships" of the Transvaal, and by headlines about a wave of detentions of opponents of the new constitution and sweeping bans

on political meetings. Such actions touch a sensitive nerve in the American body politic. They threaten democratic values that we espouse as a nation and that we believe must be reflected in our foreign policy. It was only proper that our government was the first to voice its concern publicly at these events as well as in diplomatic channels.

Similarly, we Americans are united in opposition to laws and practices in South Africa or anywhere else that offend basic concepts of due process and constitutional government. The theory of apartheid is rooted in the concept of ethnicity and ethnic separation. In practice, apartheid translates as a system based on race as the organizing principle of politics and government. Any system that ascribes or denies political rights on this basis—including the right of citizenship itself—is bound to be termed, as President Reagan has said, “repugnant.”

It should be clear, then, what it is we are opposed to. Our goal is equally clear: as President Reagan stated in his address to the UN General Assembly this week, “the US considers it a moral imperative that South Africa’s racial policies evolve peacefully but decisively toward a system compatible with basic norms of justice, liberty and human dignity.” As we have repeatedly stated since the outset of this Administration, we seek constructive change away from apartheid and toward a system based on the consent of the governed. This objective, too, reflects a broad national consensus. Americans reject instinctively scenarios that would have us instigate revolutionary violence and racial strife in that country with all their disastrous consequences in terms of misery and bloodshed for South Africans, their devastating results for southern Africa and their risks of external intervention. No serious critic of our policy dares publicly to call for the apocalypse. Our goals—those of the American people—can only be reached through a sustained process of peaceful, evolutionary change. We remain opposed to the resort to violence from whatever quarter; the fruits of political violence in the world today are bitter reminders of what terrorism and counter-terrorism can mean.

The Context for US Policy

The real issue, then, is not whether apartheid is good or bad, but rather what is the best means of encouraging constructive change in that country. Let us start by recognizing that indignation and strong convictions do not constitute a foreign policy. The issue is how to translate those convictions into results. While we have and we will speak out publicly to make our views known, public confrontation and rhetorical exchanges are not the main avenue for effective policy. The path of rhetoric and preaching has failed in the past, as its practitioners came to realize, and it is no more likely to be successful now. Ultimately, a great power will be measured by its results.

Similarly, we have not relied on bluster, threats or the actual implementation of new punitive measures toward South Africa. All evidence suggests

that US influence for change is unlikely to be increased by "pinpricks" such as restrictions on Krugerrand sales or on landing rights for South African Airways. Such moves are more likely to become a show of impotence and to erode our influence with those we seek to persuade. Our Administration remains totally opposed to the concept of disinvestment or trade and investment sanctions more broadly. We fail to see how waging economic warfare against the government and people of South Africa can advance our goals or serve the interests of either the American people or the citizens of all races in South Africa. Not only would such moves offer a fire sale of US assets to foreign interests, damage our commercial credibility and restrict our access to an important market; in some proposals at city and state level they raise serious constitutional issues. More important, if adopted, they could sabotage desperately needed economic opportunity for the black majority, remove the positive force for change represented by the Sullivan signatory companies, and produce disastrous consequences for those African states neighboring South Africa. Not surprisingly, an authoritative survey by a distinguished sociologist, Professor Lawrence Schlemmer, reports that 75 per cent of black factory workers oppose US disinvestment. There is an Orwellian perversity in proposing such measures in the name of liberal and humanitarian goals.

The starting point in this Administration's approach to South Africa and southern Africa was to recognize the nature of US influence in a regional context and to identify those constructive things we can do to advance our goals. We are one element in a complex regional equation. Our approach is to engage ourselves positively, to add our weight in support of American values, to back ideas, institutions and groups that can add to a dynamic for change, to propose alternatives, to open doors and build bridges—not the reverse.

In the South African context, much of our influence derives, we believe from the self-image of the South African leadership and the white minority, generally as part of the West as well as of Africa, struggling to preserve its identity, to maintain its security and to avoid international isolation. Such attitudes for much of the post World War II period were accompanied by complacency interrupted by sudden shocks as occurred with the Portuguese revolution, the spread of decolonization to Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and the Soweto riots of 1976. Gradually in the last decade complacency gave way to a siege mentality, heightened by internal outbursts of black anger and alienation, by an increase in cross border guerrilla violence, by the projection of Soviet-Cuban military power into the region and by increasingly strident Western criticism of the South African system.

Digging in its heels, the Afrikaner establishment which has ruled the country since 1948 developed an elaborate vision of itself as a regional superpower prepared to go it alone if necessary, to hang onto Namibia, and bring

maximum pressure to bear on neighbours which are the host for guerrilla movements. The siege mentality included, at the time President Reagan took office, a determination above all to maintain Afrikaner ethnic unity inside the National Party and a highly abstract commitment to domestic reform imposed unilaterally from above.

A central element of US policy for the past three years has been to address both the complacency and the siege mentality I have described, and to encourage the emergence of a more favorable climate for change. Repeatedly, we have emphasized the imperative of basic change while making clear that we recognize that such change entails a process, not a single decision. In our dialogue with South Africans of all races we have made clear our view that meaningful change is an urgent matter. At the same time we have stressed that such change can only flow from consultation and negotiation within South Africa and among all South Africans. We do not seek to impose an American blueprint. Recognizing that the cult of Afrikaner unity was hostile to serious reform, we moderated our public rhetoric in an effort to persuade the government there to respond to the realities of the South African situation itself.

This is not the place to recount in detail the sustained diplomatic efforts we have undertaken in southern Africa to reverse the escalating cycle of violence that risked engulfing the region in the early 1980s. But that effort — to obtain an internationally accepted settlement in Namibia on the basis of UNSCR Resolution 435¹, to reduce cross-border violence in both directions between South Africa and its neighbors, and to encourage a regional climate of detente and the withdrawal of foreign forces from the area — has been part and parcel of our South African policy. Our message to the South Africans has been to stress the benefits of co-operation and negotiation within an agenda we have put forward to all governments in the region. At the same time we have spelled out the costs and risk of failure, in terms of South African interests and our bilateral relationship. We believe the effort to define and build upon areas of common interest and mutual benefit throughout southern Africa is far preferable to simply accepting the drift toward polarization and violence. We strongly doubt that serious internal reform in South Africa is likely in a climate of constant fighting with adversaries along its borders. We know with assurance that US regional interests and those of our allies are best served by a regional climate of greater stability, enhanced economic growth, and reduced openings for external intervention.

Today, three years later, we believe there is clear evidence of progress toward a more favourable climate for change. Today, the state of relations between the United States and South Africa matters very much to the South African leadership; the closeness or distance in that relationship depends

1. See *Southern Africa Record* no. 14, December 1978, p. 43.

heavily on internal change, evidence of momentum, and progress toward regional security. Our conscious effort to relax the siege mentality no doubt played a part in enabling the then Prime Minister (now State President), P. W. Botha, to take the bold decision to put forward constitutional proposals which cost the National Party one-third of its core Afrikaner constituency and gained it new white voters beyond Afrikaner ranks.

Debate has raged over the question of South Africa's new constitution, endorsed by two-thirds of the white electorate in November 1983. It is an irony that the turmoil of the past days and weeks and the repression used to suppress it should have coincided with the introduction of a constitution which, to a limited extent, offers opportunities for wider political participation. Even this slight expansion of political rights to so-called Coloureds and Asians has been seen by some Whites as a threat and the "thin edge of the wedge." The fact that the new constitution made no provision for the inclusion of the 73 per cent of the South African population who are black was bound to reinforce black bitterness. This Administration has been consistent in pointing out this fundamental flaw in the new constitution and our opposition to the attempt to "denationalize" Blacks by declaring them citizens of the so-called homelands. Nevertheless, it would be premature to dismiss the new willingness of the Whites to support the concept of reform or to dismiss the potential of the new constitution for stimulating future change. The very exclusion of Blacks ironically has forced the future political role of Blacks on top of the public agenda. State President Botha indicated as much in his inaugural address. The departure from "Whites only" politics may well prove to have a substantial effect on those who govern South Africa. The very fact that participation in the Coloured and Asian elections was so low will add further impetus to existing pressure on newly elected members of the Coloured and Asian chambers to fight for change. We do not believe the debate over whether this new constitution represents a step forward can only be resolved by future historians. For our part, we believe that, whatever the intentions of its authors, it is an irreversible step. Its effect—precisely because of widespread boycotts—will be to accelerate the reappraisal of future options among Whites and to further erode complacency.

We remain confident that there is a new dynamic at work in South Africa, driven by socio-economic and political requirements. This is by no means contradicted by the unrest and rioting of the past weeks. As Alexis de Tocqueville pointed out, this is a phenomenon that historically tends to occur precisely when rigid old patterns are beginning to break down. We are urging the South African government to recognize that repression provides no lasting answer to this problem. We hope that the government will recognize that it is in its own interest to release those recently detained quickly, or, at the very least to charge those it has decided to put on trial, without delay, so that they have a chance to defend themselves in a court of law. We have taken note

that State President Botha himself, in his inaugural address, has stressed that the new system requires dialogue, not only among Whites, Coloureds and Asians, but also with Blacks. The burden now is on the government to recognize and invite valid black interlocutors to the table. This is a process we encourage, even if we have no direct role in it, and do not presume to come up with prescriptive formulas.

A second feature of our efforts to back change is our quiet diplomacy on behalf of specific improvements and concrete problems of human rights and civil rights. By definition, one cannot discuss publicly the content of specific efforts. Nonetheless, while we recognize that the major impetus for change must come from within South Africa itself, we have actively concerned ourselves on several fronts to seek concrete improvements: our interest in such issues as detentions and bannings (until recently, dramatically reduced), urban residency rights for blacks, forced removals of settled black communities, and the issuance of travel documents and visas have been widely recognized in South Africa's human rights community—in sharp contrast to the distant critics who may afford the luxury of dismissing such matters as “mere amelioration” of the current system. We will remain engaged in such endeavors as we are certain the Congress and the American people would wish us to be.

A third element of our approach has been to provide concrete, tangible support of those groups, institutions and processes which are essential to change in South Africa. Through deepened contact with those who are on apartheid's receiving end and who seek the tools to promote peaceful black advancement, we have defined a series of assistance programs of which Americans can be proud. I would like to emphasize as well that we have done so in close co-operation with the Congress which has taken important initiatives to expand our efforts and establish new programs to assist apartheid's victims.

The Congress, most recently in response to your lead, Madame Chairman, and that of your colleague Senator Percy, has vitally contributed to enhanced opportunity for black South Africans. The humanitarian development monies under legislation which you sponsored this year have gone to assist 60 projects with a total of \$500 000. These projects range from assistance to education in particularly deprived areas, to the provision of law libraries to legal centers in urban areas which assist blacks to understand their options under the law. Building from suggestions of Congressman Solarz during the previous Administration, we have gone forward to help educate black South Africans in a program that is a model of co-operation between the government and private sectors. A total of about 7.5 million dollars, over half from the Federal government, has brought about 350 black South Africans to the United States for advanced study. At this point about 50 have returned to use their skills in South Africa.

We are currently seeking to expand educational assistance by instituting a program of scholarship support for university level study within South Africa. If current obstacles can be overcome in consultation with Congress, we should be able to put 70 young people into a five year university at a cost of three million dollars. Nearly 6 million dollars has been committed in support of programs of improving basic black educational skills, entrepreneurial training and the training and support of black trade unionists. The Ambassador's self-help fund has been particularly effective in supporting small scale projects at the community level—some 37 projects costing \$275 000 this year. In another area we have funded some \$500 000 of drought relief assistance via non-governmental groups—half in the form of 3 to 1 matching grants—while stressing that South Africans themselves should carry the bulk of this responsibility.

These efforts lack drama but they are the necessary building blocks of a constructive approach to change. When viewed in conjunction with the far larger efforts of Sullivan signatory companies and a host of US-based foundations, universities, unions and other non-governmental organizations, they make clear what we stand for in South Africa. More could be done and we stand ready to work with Congress in defining additional areas of constructive activity. Black South Africans who seek to improve their quality and standard of life, their bargaining power, their access to equal opportunity and their capacity to participate as equals in all aspects of South African life are eager for support in a wide range of fields. These include health care, fair employment practices and labour relations, education, legal services and housing. While the issue of political rights remains of paramount importance, these areas of expanded opportunity are also high on the list of black priorities. We will not ignore them.

Regional Conclusion

Finally, Madame Chairman, I would be remiss in not saying a brief word about our regional efforts and accomplishments in southern Africa. Today, after three years of active diplomacy with all regional states concerned and our allies, we are closer to the threshold of Namibian independence than ever before. The underbrush has been cleared away. Though negotiations are at a sensitive stage, we have reason to believe we may be close to the fundamental political decisions on implementing Resolution 435 and an agreement on the Cuban troop issue in Angola. We have identified the basis for a settlement and are committed to succeed. On a broader regional basis, the level of cross-border violence in southern Africa is sharply reduced. Despite fundamental political differences, neighbours are increasingly sensitive to the responsibilities of co-existence. Contact and communication are on the increase. The US role is one of a catalyst. Where that role is welcomed by both sides we will play it. Let me make clear, however, that we are not party to any effort to

impose a standard formula on relations between South Africa and its neighbours. Each relationship is distinct and stands on its own merits. The dramatic example of Mozambique and South Africa concluding a formal political agreement met the needs of those two parties. Coexistence can take many forms. What we do support, however, is a regional climate of dialogue that gives negotiation and peaceful change a chance. We can be proud that the doctrines of guerrilla violence and the garrison state have been set aside—at least for now—as the parties explore other roads. We wish them all well.

Text supplied by United States Information Service, Johannesburg.

Zimbabwe

Address by the Zimbabwean Prime Minister, the Hon Robert Mugabe, inaugurating a series of lectures on "The Construction of Socialism in Zimbabwe", in Harare on 10 July 1984

I regard it as indeed a great honour to have been asked to deliver the inaugural address to the series of lectures on the subject of "The Construction of Socialism in Zimbabwe" being launched by the Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies (ZIDS). The decision by ZIDS to launch this lecture series deserves to be commended and it is to be hoped that these lectures, whose major objective is to expose researchers and indeed the wider public more systematically to the practical aspects involved in the implementation of socialist principles in the current and future process of social transformation, will achieve their aim. It is equally hoped that the lectures will lead to a public discussion of socialism and, therefore, to a greater awareness and consciousness of it.

These lectures should, more particularly, achieve the principal objective of initiating discussion and interaction between policy-makers and the ZIDS researchers so that their ideas and hence their role can assist in the process of national development and transformation.

Allow me now to turn to the subject of my discussion, "An Overview of the Construction of Socialism in Zimbabwe." At its inaugural Congress of May 1964, ZANU unanimously adopted a constitution which had as one of its principles, the establishment of socialism in Zimbabwe, in the event of ZANU assuming power in the country.

However, at Chimoio, following the restructuring of the Central Committee in 1977, the restructured and extended Central Committee unanimously adopted scientific socialism, based on Marxist-Leninist principles, as its guiding philosophy for the transformation of our socio-economic system. Indeed, in 1980, our election manifesto clearly showed the ideological direction our policies would take in the event of an election victory coming our way. In brief, my Party and Government have opted for socialism and not capitalism.

It is on that basis that we are determined to proceed to reconstruct society. *It is on that basis that we seek to forge new social relations governing not only the members of our society, but also that society and the natural resources*

which sustain it, as well as the modalities employed for their exploitation. But the question may legitimately be asked, why socialism and not capitalism?

Such a question necessarily invites one to examine and compare the qualitative worth of the two philosophies and thus begs for an evaluative answer. The social ethic that bids us not only to live together but also binds us one to another in the given environment of our village, the district, the province or the state to which we belong, is also an equation of our humanity, for it relates us one unto another, and so as equals we relate to our land, to our trees and forests, to the vast pasturelands, to the mountains and hills, to the rocks and minerals, to the rivers and their fish, to the fountain springs and their cooling water, to our beetles, our bees, our caterpillars, crickets, grasshoppers, to all insects edible and non-edible.

These God-made or nature-made phenomena are ours together. For anyone, therefore, to claim their ownership in the environment in which we are equals is to resort to a mode of self-aggrandisement, which is as much a vitiation of the social ethic of equality as it is a blatant usurpation of the right of others, and in that situation others who constitute the greater part of the whole. It is as if the part had claimed the right to be the whole and the particular had supplanted the universal. Why should an individual or group of individuals claim the right of ownership of our natural resources to the exclusion or detriment of the rest of others?

I have often quoted the Bible, at Genesis I, perhaps to the chagrin of many Christians, in vindication of the right of man — every man, and woman of course, for weren't we in the Garden of Eden together? — to the use and exploitation of natural resources — our God-given wealth. I find my views on this subject in very interesting coincidence with those of Mwalimu Julius Nyerere who says on "National Property":

The second form of wealth — the rain and land — is simply God's gift to his living creation. There is no human effort involved in the rain we get. Both the idle and diligent workers receive equal amounts of it. Equally, there is no human effort involved in land. All human beings, be they children brought up in poor or rich families, or belonging to sinners or saints, or even those whose parents are either slaves or free men, were born to find land in existence. They can neither add to it nor reduce its extent. It is God's gift given to all His creation without discrimination ...

Mwalimu Julius Nyerere then proceeds to state that whenever a man "uses his intellect, his health and his ability to make anything, that thing becomes his property".¹

Indeed, when an individual expends his own labour and energy in exploiting any natural resources at his disposal, provided others are also entitled

Julius K. Nyerere: *Freedom and Unity* (Uhuru na Umoja) — A Selection from Writings and Speeches, 1952-65, Dar-es-Salaam, OUP, 1966, p. 53

alongside him to similar exploitation of that resource, then the product of his labour must morally be his, and he is fully entitled to use such product to his own benefit or in any other manner of his choice. On the basis of this moral reckoning, workers, wherever they are engaged in productive activities or processes, are certainly entitled to the fruits of their labour. But greater justice or equity can, however, only prevail if the workers also become the owners — equal owners — of the means of production.

Socialism thus rests fundamentally on the principle of morality. It is a moral question first and foremost. The difference between socialism and capitalism is, therefore, the difference between equality and inequality, between equity and inequity and between justice and injustice. Fundamentally, it is really the difference between morality and immorality.

To clarify our view of the two systems, the questions may be posed whether it is fair that society should stand deprived of the ownership and control of its resources as that ownership and control vests in the hands of a few individuals. Surely, our own political history, with the obnoxious system of land deprivation and concentration of resources in the hands of a racial minority very familiar to us, demonstrates vividly the injustices that attend the capitalist system.

The social ethic that constitutes the basic norm of the morality of socialism rejects outright the concept of individualism that seeks to prosper at the expense of society. To avoid situations of exploitation of man by man, socialism emphasizes the collective nature of man and its philosophy and thus subordinates the interests of the individual to the common or general interests of society.

Society in interacting with its environment for its own sustenance, becomes as much affected by it in its evolution and development as the environment itself is affected by society's own moulding and shaping of it in order to make it more responsive to man's ever growing needs. Socialism provides in that evolving process a valid social basis on which society can interact with nature to the best advantage of all its members so that the exploitative situation Fidel Castro described in his speech at the meeting commemorating the 25th anniversary of the attack on Moncada Barracks is avoided. He says:

What makes today's people privileged in comparison to those of other periods is the fabulous possibility they have for controlling nature and charting their own course of social development for the first time. This is precisely what makes some of the economic, social and political forms that still persist in many parts of the world such a great crime; it is what may give the will of the people's and men's actions and struggles to change their lives, their highest moral meaning and what gives the concept of revolution its fullest significance.¹

1. Fidel Castro, *Current Problems of Undeveloped Countries*. Selection of Speeches, Oficina de Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado, la Habana, 1979, p. 176.

He then goes on to describe, in his characteristically vigorous and vivid manner, Cuba's colonial past which, although sounding more gruesome than our own, is certainly reminiscent of it:

We also had our masters. Our Indian forebears even had their exterminators; our African fathers their slave owners; the descendants of both and of the masters, as well as their colonisers; the Cuban people, already constituted as a nation, their neo-colonisers; our workers and peasants, their exploiting capitalists and land-owners; our black population and our women, their discriminators; our children, illiteracy, hunger and disease; our adults, ignorance and unemployment; our old people, neglect and oblivion. Such were the injustices; and such, the struggles . . . (p. 176). Castro further goes on to say, "It was the period, the objective conditions in society and in the world, that made us Marxist-Leninists, internationalists, socialists, communists."¹

It was, indeed, because of our own experiences in Zimbabwe under capitalism and the colonial system which it sustained that we came to realise the evils that go with the system. It was also because of our full assessment of the virtues of scientific socialism as an opposite system to capitalism that we later decided to base our socialist philosophy on Marxist-Leninist principles.

Capitalism did not only plunder our land and other natural resources, thus, impoverishing our peasantry and making vast communities landless, it also turned a substantial percentage of the population into a poor wage-worker class. In our situation, therefore, the workers and peasants are the two classes of the community whose interests remain paramount in the furtherance of the cause of social justice and equity under our philosophy of socialism.

If the social ethic of the equality of man in relation to his environment and to the means he should employ in exploiting it for his benefit is to have full expression in our own circumstances, then we must examine both the prevailing wage-worker situation and the condition of the peasantry.

For 90 years, as capitalism took various forms of manifestation, either through the emergence of commercial farming enterprises under the Land Apportionment Act 1930 or the Land Tenure Act of 1969, or through the establishment of manufacturing enterprises in the industrial sector, or through the founding of several mining enterprises, new production relations, completely alien to the production relations of our traditional society, were created. Not only was the new phenomenon of master-servant relationship now introduced, but also introduced as an aspect of the capitalist system was the complete ownership of land, manufacturing enterprises, and mineral and other resources, by a few people—whether these were individuals or companies—at the expense of not only those who provided their labour at these enterprises but of the whole African community,

1. Fidel Castro, *Current Problems of Undeveloped Countries*. Selection of Speeches, Oficina de Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado, la Habana, 1979, p. 176.

once the collective owner of those resources. At no time had our society agreed to sell to foreign capital or to the new usurping settlers the country's natural resources. The new environment now meant that a wage-earner was to be subjected to a process under which his own labour would be creating what Karl Marx called "surplus value" to the advantage of the entrepreneur at his expense. "The capitalist," says Marx "does not produce a commodity for its own sake, nor for the sake of its use-value, or his personal consumption. The product in which the capitalist is really interested is not the palpable product itself, but the excess value of the product over the value of the capital consumed by it."¹

The evil or immoral feature of the production relations in such a situation is not that there is the element of surplus value or profit, per se, but that the entrepreneur and the employees or workers are not equal—the one having the monopoly of the means of production and thus justifying his claim to the profits made. Where correct production relations exist, then the worker is both owner of the means of production and owner of the surplus value earned from his labour. In those circumstances, he also becomes the earner of his profits. Surely, that is a more equitable, more morally sustainable, and more socially uplifting, situation than the former which is a selfish, exploitative and morally unjustifiable position. I am sure we would now appreciate why in 1848 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in their "Manifesto of the Communist Party" put up the now famous slogan. "Workers of the World Unite. You have nothing to lose but your chains." Indeed, as long as capitalism thrives on profit and, of course, it cannot survive without it, the exploitation of the workers is bound to continue.

Whereas the worker, in the sense of a wage-earner in an industrial enterprise, is a new feature to our traditional society and whereas his misfortunes are those of a new situation superimposed on our old society, the plight of the peasant is in a way different. In respect of the worker, a new environment was created for his exploitation. In the case of the peasant, the old environment had been diminished in inverse proportion to the rise in population. Where abundant land, arable and pasture, had previously existed, with thick forests, rivers, and other resources prevailing throughout the country, most land, and the most fertile for that matter, had been forcibly acquired. The native reserves or tribal trust lands created now stood, in contradistinction to the new world of commercial farming enterprises as economically depressed areas acting as a labour reservoir. Thus on the one hand, you had land-rich commercial farmers, and on the other an impoverished and land-hungry peasantry. This disparity created its own antagonism.

These two were the most completely unacceptable socio-economic situa-

1. Karl Marx: *Capital — A Critique of Political Economy*, Vol. III, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1959, p. 41

tions we inherited at the time of independence and on the basis of which other disparities, like those in respect of education, health and residential facilities, were based. It is, therefore, these two principal situations, namely that of the exploited worker and that of the impoverished peasant, which must constitute the focus of our planning. Our initial plan, the Three Year Transitional National Development (July, 1982–June 1985), was our first attempt as a new Government, at a people-oriented programme of social transformation aimed at creating a new social order. We state in Vol. I, para. 3.9¹ who of the Plan, that: “throughout history it is the people who have constituted a dynamic motive force behind material, cultural and social development. The people are both the object of our socialist policies and the means with which we achieve those policies.”

We proceed to elaborate on this aspect of the people-oriented nature of our social philosophy as follows:

What we mean here is that man in our society, but man in the collective sense of his togetherness with other members of his society, must be master of his destiny. In the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, this principle is the basis of the Juche philosophy propounded by Kim Il Sung. Muhammad al Missuru, in his book, *Kimilsungism; Theory and Practice*, quotes Kim Il Sung as follows:

In a nutshell, the idea of Juche means that the masters of the revolution and the work of construction are the masses of the people and that they are also the motive force of the revolution and the work of construction. In other words, one is responsible for one's own destiny and one has also the capacity for hewing out one's own destiny. (p. 19)

This whole principle of mass involvement in the process of socialist transformation runs through the works of Kim Il Sung. Indeed, Volume I of his major works is devoted to the illustration and elaboration of the Juche Idea in the Korean Revolution.

The view that the people be active and collective participants in the socialist process is, indeed, echoed in every socialist country. Erich Honecker of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the *Report of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany to the 10th Congress of the SED* states:

In an unprecedented manner the great community of the socialist countries has made it clear that socialism, and socialism only, means material security. Everybody has access to the highest level of education. The right to recreation and appro-

1. As long as the ownership of and control over the means of production continue to be in the hands of the privileged groups in society, the bulk of the people are destined to remain mere wage-earners to be exploited and manipulated at will by the bourgeoisie. It is, therefore, imperative that the people who constitute the revolutionary force which charted the course of our political history be fully liberated to chart once more the course of our economic history. It is they who must provide the motive force for change.

priate health is concretely guaranteed. Uncertainty and anxiety about the future have lost their social roots. Under real socialism, peoples determine their own fate. Citizens have an increasing share in the management and planning of public affairs. Above all the young have clear prospects and ample opportunity to take an active part in shaping the present as well. (p. 22)

In Yugoslavia, the phenomenon of mass involvement in the social process translates itself into the socialist principle of self-management propounded by J. Tito. In a biography entitled, *In the Path of Tito*, Vilko Vinterhalter, the author, reveals what he calls "the correctness of Tito's thoughts" as contained in the "Programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia" which states the following about a commune:

A commune is the basic politico-territorial organisation of self-management of the working people and the basic socio-economic unit of the inhabitants of its territory.

... As in a commune the working people are at the same time also producers, consumers, and the bearers of the efforts in the process of building up production forces and the general material standard. A commune represents also the basic social community in which the individual and the collective interests are adjusted to each other. . . .

I am sure enough has now been said about the masses as a motive force of a socialist revolution. But I thought our picture would not be complete unless one or two other references were made pertaining, firstly, to the situation in China and, secondly, to that of the Soviet Union. Even as far back as 1934, when the Red Army was locked in battle against the Kuomintang, Mao Tse-Tung, addressing the Second National Congress of Workers' and Peasants' Representatives in Kiangsi Province, had this to say:

The principle governing our economic policy is to proceed with all essential work of economic reconstruction within our power and concentrate our economic resources on the war effort, and at the same time to improve the life of the people as much as possible, consolidate the worker-peasant alliance in the economic field, ensure proletarian leadership of the peasantry, and strive to secure leadership by the State sector of the economy over the private sector, thus creating the pre-requisites for our future advance of socialism.¹

With reference to the role of the people in the revolutionary process, I distinguished above the working class and the peasantry as the two main classes of our society which must receive our revolutionary focus. In the early days of attempts to consolidate the Russian Revolution, we discern this focus. Lenin, referring to a Party Congress Resolution² which emphasized the unity of the workers, the peasants and soldiers, as "the basis for the success

1. Mao Tse-Tung. *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1975, p. 141.

2. Lenin. *Collected Works*, Vol. 25 Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1964, p. 88).

and strength of the Russian Revolution", urged that the unity be a firm stand against "the bourgeoisie or capitalists, and the landowners."

The question now arises, how far the organisation of the workers and peasants, as full participants in the socialist revolutionary process in Zimbabwe, has taken place? I must hasten to remark that a socialist revolution is not a one-day wonder. True, the Party I lead has adopted the philosophy of socialism based on Marxist-Leninist principles and thus has recognised the role of the workers in alliance with the peasants to lead the necessary revolution. Every socialist revolution differs from another, not so much in its goals and qualitative content, as in the manner, mode, pace and time of its implementation, depending, always on the concrete circumstances of the environment of its operation. And even where a given developmental stage has been made, still the next stage must take into account the factors already prevailing. Read Zhivkov's "Report of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist party to the Twelfth Congress and the Forthcoming Tasks of the Party" (Sofia, March 31, 1981).

Having examined our economic situation in the light of the circumstances we have inherited, it became clear to us that a number of factors had first to be fulfilled if socialist transformation were to be launched with full force. The following programmes thus became necessary:

1. The Party had first to be well organised structurally and qualitatively so that a high level of ideological consciousness would prevail within it. The Party has to remain in the vanguard of our revolution and give policy direction to Government. A programme to develop Party cadres with a high political and ideological level of education is underway.
2. The workers had also to be structurally organised into their trade unions and the unions into a single national trade union movement. At the same time, at all work places workers' committees and works councils were to be established. The education of the workers, so they could become more aware of their rights and conscious of their historical role, was to be undertaken by the Trade Union Movement and at work places through their workers' committees. In the interests of the welfare of the workers, minimum wages had to be prescribed.
3. The peasants, on the other hand, needed to be resettled and rehabilitated after the liberation war. At the same time, a start had to be made in organising those of them willing to be persuaded to form co-operatives. Several of these co-operatives have been launched despite the immense problems they have had to face, which include lack of skills, lack of managerial and administrative ability, and lack of financial and capital inputs. But these initial hurdles are being attended to.
4. The Government was to examine priority areas for the establishment of state enterprises as well as for state participation in existing enterprises across the economic sectors. A good beginning has already been made and a faster

pace will no doubt be followed in future.

5. In the area of social services, education, health and social welfare, an increase in facilities became an urgent priority as Government adopted the policy of free education and free health service at given levels, while making secondary education accessible to all children. In this area some good work has been done.

May I, in conclusion, reiterate that only through socialism based on Marxist-Leninist principles can we achieve true social justice in our society. May I also finally re-emphasize that in the process of constructing socialism, the full involvement of the masses, as led by the alliance of workers and peasants in the vanguard leadership of the revolution, is absolutely necessary. I equally would want to repeat that over the last four and half-years circumstances were far from ripe for a full-blooded revolutionary thrust, but that preparatory work has begun for the revolution to encompass a much broader area and assume a faster pace in the future. But if the future is to see a greater pace in the unfolding of our socialist revolution, the Party must assume its proper historical role by being accorded that place in our society in which "all economic and social organisations and institutions of the state" will, as Nicolae Ceausescu says, come "under its political control and act in a single manner for building the socialist system."¹

This situation is only possible when a one-party state democracy has been established.

Text issued by the Zimbabwe Department of Information.

1. (Nicolae Ceausescu, *the Growing Leading Role of the Romanian Communist Party in the Present State*, Bucharest, Meridiane Publishers, 1982, p. 13).

Zimbabwe and South Africa

- A. Address by the Zimbabwean Prime Minister, the Hon Robert Mugabe, to the SADCC Conference at the Commonwealth Institute in London on 19 July 1984

In your letter of invitation, you requested me to highlight ways and means in which I believe the developed countries could assist the SADCC. Before directly addressing this question, I thought it would be pertinent to provide something of the background against which the evolution of SADCC has taken place.

Our region — southern Africa — not only constitutes a part of Africa experiencing rapid change and afflicted by enormous difficulties and complex contradictions, it is itself in the forefront of the arduous, yet necessary, struggle for the creation of a freer, more humane and just social order on a continent long oppressed and neglected.

The existence of stubborn yet thoroughly discredited relics of colonialism and racial oppression in Namibia and South Africa, in part provides the impetus for the SADCC idea. Equally, the existence of a hostile minority-ruled South African with aspirations to regional hegemony imparts both salient justification and a sense of urgency to our multi-functional effort within SADCC to achieve collective self-reliance.

Beyond this, however, SADCC reflects our commitment to the Lagos Plan of Action which was adopted in April 1980 by the States of OAU as a broad framework of principles guiding our common efforts to lift our peoples from the status of the wretched of the earth to that of equal participants in the creation and enjoyment of the fruits of mankind's labour.

The nine members of SADCC — Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe — recognised that economic liberation was as important as political freedom. Without it the latter had very little meaning.

The forging of new links through regional integration was intended to create a genuine and equitable system aimed at heralding a new era of hope and justice. We have resolved to mobilize all our resources to promote the implementation of our national interstate and regional policies. Mr. Chair-

man, in order for me to highlight how the international community can assist in the development of the SADCC region, it is necessary for me to outline the mode of co-operation which has been adopted by the SADCC countries themselves.

The strategy in SADCC has been one of sectoral integration, starting with those sectors considered to be most crucial for development. This step by step approach to problems of economic union through the development of sectoral programmes co-ordinated by technical units in the member states assures that there is harmony at every stage of development and that the gains from integration accrue to all member states.

Within that framework, it was recognised that transport and communications constitute the key sector, because they provide the necessary links to enhance inter-dependence and self-reliance. The other areas of regional co-operation envisaged in the Lusaka Declaration are agriculture, forestry and fisheries, energy, mining, industry, and manpower development.

Recognition of the critical importance of an efficient and reliable transport and Communications network has led the SADCC member states to set up the Southern African Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC) under the co-ordination of the People's Republic of Mozambique. The SATCC is charged with the task of co-ordinating the use and rehabilitation of the existing transport network, the establishment and financing of additional regional transport facilities with a view to removing current distortions and fostering inter-dependence among our largely land-locked countries.

In all these endeavours the standardization and harmonization of the transport and communications systems are regarded as priorities.

However, co-ordination of the regional transport and communications factor has its own problems. There is a great need to mobilize both domestic and external know-how. In this sector there are at present one hundred and fifteen projects under consideration, the estimated cost of which amounts to some US \$2935 million. Of this amount US \$740 million has been committed towards the implementation of sixty-one projects. I hope that negotiations for financing the remainder of the projects, which are going on, will succeed.

Agriculture is another very important sector for the SADCC countries. Natural catastrophes, especially drought, have been endemic to most of the SADCC member-countries. Since 1978, most of our member-states have suffered to a greater or lesser degree from abnormally severe drought conditions. The 1982/83-agricultural season saw one of the worst droughts in living memory.

Direct losses incurred by the countries of the sub-region are estimated to amount to more than one and one-half billion US dollars. This figure is no doubt conservative since it does not take into account the losses incurred by

the commercial and industrial sectors, which are dependent on agriculture. The long-term effects in delayed recovery of national herds, irrigation schemes and so on, will also make an impact on our economies for many years to come.

We are aware the negative effect food shortages have on our balance of payments and development. Foreign currency resources, which otherwise should have been used to import inputs and capital goods for development, have now to be channelled towards the importation of food.

While high priority had been given to the immediate measures necessary to deal with the hardship and economic dislocation caused by the drought, work has, however, continued on long-term measures designed to improve productivity, crop forecasting, storage and distribution. Zimbabwe, which is charged with the task of working out the SADCC food-security plan, has come up with a set of project proposals which, taken together, constitute the first major step in constructing a comprehensive programme for attaining regional food security. The project proposals deal with the development of early warning systems, regional resources information systems, inventory of agricultural resources base, food processing technology, food reserves for the region, post-harvest loss reductions, marketing infrastructure and retention of professional and technical staff for Ministries of Agriculture in the region.

If our agriculture performance, is to improve, it must be serviced and sustained by a viable research programme. Such a research sector, co-ordinated by Botswana, is rapidly growing and an institutional framework is emerging with the establishment in Gaborone of the Southern Africa Centre for Co-operation in Agricultural Research (SACCAR).

The economies of the SADCC member-states are characterized by low levels of industrialization, with some of the participants belonging to the group of the Least Developed Countries. Industrial co-operation thus forms a cornerstone of SADCC economic policy. Member-states try to implement policies leading to structural adjustments for the creation of new industrial capacities, making sure that national plans and priorities conform to the overall regional industrialization strategy. There is an urgent need to erect industrial plants, which in the long-run will take advantage of intra-SADCC forward and backward linkages, as well as the enlarged market, thus achieving economies of scale.

In January, 1983, in Maseru, our annual conference presented a new programme of co-ordinated industrial development comprising some 83 projects requiring a total investment in foreign exchange of US \$ 954 million. Tanzania, which is the co-ordinator in this field, has already secured some expressions of interest in sustaining these projects from possible donors.

Progress made on each project has varied from case to case. As a result, a total of US \$618 million of pledges and commitments have been secured at the SADCC donor conferences that have been held so far. However, this

figure as yet falls short of the envisaged foreign exchange assistance of about US \$954 million referred to above.

Yet another important sector in the co-operation between SADCC countries is mining. It is by far the most important foreign exchange earner for most of the SADCC countries; it contributes a major share in the Gross Domestic Product and Government revenues. Despite determined efforts, industrial diversification and agricultural expansion, it is evident that the mining industry's predominant position as a foreign exchange earner is likely to continue for some time to come.

In a bid to co-ordinate development programmes in the mining sector, a number of projects were approved by the Council of Ministers in Maputo in July, 1983. Thereafter, Zambia, our SADCC co-ordinator in that sector, has carried out consultations which resulted in the approval of nine projects at the meeting of ministers responsible for mining held in Blantyre in May this year. This industry has, however, not escaped the collapse of commodity prices, which has had a particularly devastating impact on our fragile economies that depend on a few raw materials for a large portion of export earnings.

Other fields of co-operation include animal disease control, fisheries, exploitation, energy development and intra-regional trade. In all these spheres some start has been made but much remains to be achieved.

I will be remiss in my statement if I did not deal with the major threat facing SADCC today. This threat, as this audience is probably aware, emanates from the Pretoria apartheid regime. When we launched SADCC in 1980, South Africa also stepped up its efforts aimed at creating a so-called "constellation of States" in our region. At the same time various acts of destabilisation were mounted against all of us. These barbaric activities have been directed towards the crippling of our fledgling economic links, thus rendering SADCC non-viable.

The transport and communications sector co-ordinated by the People's Republic of Mozambique, has constantly been affected almost on a daily basis. Through the use of bandit groups it trains and arms, and sometimes even by the direct participation of its own troops, the apartheid regime is doing all in its power to prevent us, land-locked as we are, from diverting our goods from its transport system even where it is more economical for us to do so, to the routes in Mozambique.

South Africa's hostile acts are not only limited to economic destabilisation but also include activities designed to overthrow the legitimate governments in our countries. To further this aim, the South African regime has created dissident or bandit groups who have been operating for several years in some of our countries. These bands of marauders trained on South African soil by South African instructors are infiltrated into our respective countries to commit hideous atrocities against peace-loving people and to sabotage our econ-

omic installations. I cannot over-emphasize the grim determination with which South Africa is carrying out these acts of aggression.

Distinguished delegates are also aware of the painstaking efforts the international community has made to resolve the question of Namibia's independence, which is illegally occupied by South Africa. For many years the people of Namibia have been waging a relentless political, diplomatic and military struggle to attain their independence. However, South Africa, with the support of certain countries, continues to defy the ruling by the United Nations which calls for its immediate and unconditional withdrawal from that territory.

A unique opportunity arose when the Security Council adopted Resolution 435 in 1978 and subsequently the UN Plan for the independence of Namibia, but because of the intransigence of the Pretoria regime, the beginning of the process leading to the implementation of this resolution is far from sight.

In South Africa itself, the authorities continue to practice the inhuman system of apartheid. This system, which legalises the subjugation of one racial group by another, is the root cause of the turmoil into which the whole region is bound to be thrown sooner rather than later.

Today, thousands of prisoners are languishing in jails and several people are killed every year for expressing even the most mild-form of resentment towards this monstrous system. In spite of the claims by the architects of this evil social order, no genuine steps have been taken to redress the situation. We are deeply concerned when some nations in this part of the world give financial, political, military and diplomatic support to this regime.

Mr Botha's recent visit to some countries in this region was considered a diplomatic triumph by his supporters in South Africa. Indeed, after years of international isolation, the South African government now feels comforted and even encouraged to discover that its leaders are not only welcome as friends in the Western capitals but are indeed given red carpet treatment. We can only hope that this visit has not led the governments Mr Botha met into thinking that South Africa is now ready to work for genuine peace and meaningful change in South Africa.

We strongly maintain that the solution to the tension existing in our sub-region lies in the dismantling of apartheid. Apartheid, as President Julius Nyerere said at our last SADCC Summit meeting in Gaborone, is immoral and such immorality cannot transform into morality by virtue of a mere visit to European capitals by its arch-apostles. Surely the West has a duty to render assistance to the process of change in South Africa?

In this regard, developed countries can contribute enormously towards the overthrowing of the obnoxious system if they redirected their policies on investment programmes from South Africa to the SADCC region. Such policies, along with sufficient political pressure on the South African government, could have the effect of compelling South Africa to accept change and

the genuine democratization of the system in that country.

Let me now come to the current international economic malaise that has engulfed the whole world, whose most devastating effect is being felt by the African countries, particularly the least developed amongst them. This malaise has also affected the SADCC countries. The world economy remains in a state of structural disequilibrium, characterised by slow growth rates with a continuing trend of high inflation and unemployment.

Since 1980, the world economy has been in the throes of the most pervasive crisis since the great depression, most countries being caught-up in a spiral of declining production, employment and trade. Such a crisis is a reflection of the fundamental global and structural maladjustment as well as the persistent lack of balance in the current international economic relations which impose serious limitations on the development hopes and perspectives of the majority of countries and regions of the world.

For many of the developing countries, which at the best of times struggle to fulfil their economic and social priorities, the current crisis has, to a significant degree, meant a cruel imperative to downgrade development as a priority in national policy since available resources have to be diverted to the business of managing the current economic and financial crisis. Our countries are heavily dependent on the growth of international trade.

In this connection, I would like to express concern at the increase in protectionism by the developed countries in raw materials and manufactures, which make up the bulk of our exports.

This is of great concern to us because it has serious developmental consequences as much of our desperately needed foreign currency is derived from these exports. Of course, as developing countries, we are not ashamed to admit that we need concessional and commercial finance to build up our economic infrastructure and productive capacity.

The role of multilateral financial and development institutions continues to be critical. The international financial institutions must necessarily therefore remain at the centre of global efforts needed to effect efficient adjustment and structural transformation, taking into account the prevailing circumstances in the developing regions.

Let me also remind the authorities in the industrial and financial centres of our interdependent world economy that they must not continue to disregard the responsibility which their trade, monetary and fiscal policy stances and practices must bear for the conditions of the world economy. There is an obvious need for all to recognise the necessity for an equitable sharing of the burden of adjustment if what we seek is stability and development for all.

Turning to the problem of the contemporary debt crisis, I believe that it is generally known that in 1983 an unprecedented number of countries had to re-schedule their debts and that there are probably still others yet to do likewise. One major concern here is the ever rising interest rates which have re-

sulted in a number of developing countries being unable to pay even the interest on their loans.

In this regard, it should be noted that according to World Bank statistics, for every one per cent rise in interest rates, about US \$3,5 billion is added to Third World debt servicing costs. African countries presently owe about US \$125 billion and the cost of servicing these debts rose from 8,4 per cent in 1971 to 22,4 per cent in 1983 and today it is even higher.

It is necessary to institute immediate measures to increase resource flows from international monetary institutions and expand the Compensatory Financing Facility so as to provide full, prompt and automatic coverage for financial short-falls without conditionality. These measures will have to be complemented by improved terms of borrowing and rescheduling of official debts owned by developing countries.

Now as a complement to political decolonization, for which we have fought for so long, we yearn for an international framework which can promote economic decolonization. We cannot acquiesce in a world where affluence survives side by side with abject poverty.

We are, in this last but one decade of the 20th century, still confronted by an inequitable international economic system that is conducive to the perpetuation of the concentration of wealth and power in ever smaller numbers of participants. This concentration undermines the possibilities of genuine negotiation and reverses the process of the democratization of international relations in which we have placed our faith and hope. The very concept of multilateralism on which the international community has based its survival is at stake.

Interdependence among nations has become an inevitable phenomenon and every effort must be exerted towards its equitable functioning in the interest of a more stable and prosperous world. We believe in progressive change which will work to the benefit of us all. The substantial reforms we envisage through the institution of a New International Economic Order will obviously bring gains for all and provide increased peace and security to the present turbulent world.

As we meet here today at the Commonwealth Institute, we are tied together by common bonds and objectives. Most of the SADCC countries also belong to the commonwealth, a forum we have always sought to use for the good of mankind. We meet here today not in a quest for utopia, but in an earnest search for practical mutually-agreed measures for solving urgent problems and redressing conditions that stunt and cripple man's capacity and potential for achieving a better and fuller life.

I hope that in your deliberations in this conference you will find these solutions and offer suggestions that will assist us in transforming the SADCC dream into concrete achievements that bring a brighter day to the lives of millions of human beings.

B. Extracts from an address to the British/Zimbabwe Parliamentary Group in London on 19 July 1984, by the Zimbabwean Prime Minister, the Hon Robert Mugabe

In our efforts to implement the policy of national reconciliation, we were dismayed to discover that our war-time allies in ZAPU, who had lost in the general elections, had cached arms with the intention to overthrow my legitimate Government.

Had they succeeded, you could all imagine the catastrophe into which the country would have been plunged. Despite this, we did not punish the whole of ZAPU for this betrayal, but only those we established to have been involved. This is why some political leaders were dropped from the cabinet and some military leaders were detained.

After these unfortunate developments, there were some desertions from the national army by both criminal and politically motivated elements. These have been responsible for carrying out acts of banditry of which, I am certain, you are all well aware.

My Government responded initially by deploying the police to hunt and apprehend these malcontents. However, this development proved to be inadequate, and the dissidents continued their killing, maiming, raping and kidnapping of innocent victims, as well as the destruction of equipment used by Government and other development agencies to develop the rural areas in Matabeleland itself. When the activities of these bandits increased to such levels that law and order was breaking down in that part of our country, my Government was left with no option but to deploy the army and even place some areas under curfew.

Furthermore, my Government is greatly concerned that South Africa is doing everything to use these criminal elements, whom it trains and equips, in a bid to further its criminal strategy of destabilisation in our region.

For any government to fold its arms and allow politically motive motivated lawlessness to continue would be an abdication of its responsibilities. Therefore, we take great exception to those who unfairly criticise us for what have been legitimate steps adopted by my Government in preservation of peace, law and order in the country.

I can assure you that reports of excesses, which in the press in your country are exaggerated far beyond the reality of what has happened, are nothing but an evil attempt to discredit us regardless of the facts and circumstances.

We have no desire to victimize civilians in affected areas, for it is civilians, our operations, whenever these are mounted, are intended to protect. I have stated this repeatedly, but unfortunately there are those who, for reasons of their own, want other impressions created.

Some of you may have now forgotten that, quite apart from the ZAPU-inspired elements to which I have referred above, there is also another large number of armed men who pose a threat to peace in Zimbabwe. We cannot

forget that in 1980, when South Africa withdrew its troops from Zimbabwe, which had been brought there to provide support for the previous Smith and Muzorewa regimes, the departing South Africans left Zimbabwe in the company of some 5 000 Zimbabweans loyal to Bishop Muzorewa. Our security forces have clashed with or captured some of them, and from information we continue to gather, many of them have been deployed in action in South African-occupied Namibia, in Angola and in Mozambique.

It also came to our attention that by last year the Bishop was engaged in subversive activities in collaboration with his allies in South Africa and elsewhere which, by their nature, we considered as highly prejudicial to the security of our country. In those circumstances, my Government was compelled to curb the Bishop's irreligious activities by placing him in detention, at the same time as more investigations into his activities were being carried out.

As I said earlier, it takes a most irresponsible government indeed and one which has no concern for the security and welfare of its citizens to accord freedom to those who seek to conspire with foreign powers to embark on a treasonable course of actions aimed at bringing down a democratically elected government.

We are certainly an ambitious people and believe in moving forward all the time. But for us to be able to fulfil our objectives, given the availability of necessary inputs, we also need maximum peace, as much within Zimbabwe itself as within the region. I am sure, all of you are aware of South Africa's activities within our region and that, in respect of Zimbabwe, South Africa has been sponsoring the MNR in Mozambique to mount concerted attacks on the railway and road systems, as well as on the fuel pipeline we use from the Mozambican ports.

South Africa's acts of regional destabilisation lead us to question its recent claims that it genuinely seeks to live in peace with its neighbours. We remain very doubtful of South Africa's sincerity in signing the two recent agreements with Mozambique and Angola respectively. I am sure many people here in Britain also have their doubts and it is my view that these doubts could not have been removed by Mr Botha's deceptive appearances as he made his recent wooing visits to Western European capitals.

Let it not be forgotten that against the background of that visit was not only the worsening condition of the non-whites in South Africa, characterised by more imprisonments and the ruthless uprooting of the whole African communities in furtherance, of the apartheid system, but also the refusal by the South African regime to accept the demand of the Namibian people, supported by the United Nations, for independence. Instead, attempts are now being made to present groups, most of them bogus, in opposition to SWAPO as a strategem for foiling the procedure to independence enshrined in Resolution 435.

We know from the experience of the recent talks held in Lusaka that such

manoeuvres represent no more than a charade that forms part of the delaying tactics which have so much characterised the South African regime's deceptive strategy on Namibia. Surely, all of us who support the people of Namibia have a duty to combine our efforts in exerting pressures on our governments so they in turn can exert correct pressures on South Africa to be in line with the rest of the world.

Our own experiences of South Africa's role in our region have convinced us not only that South Africa's apartheid system is the greatest threat to peace in our region, but also that as long as that system continues to exist, any supposed changes made by the Pretoria regime, whether in its domestic or foreign policies, are designed to deceive the world into entertaining unrealistic expectations of peace. Here again, must the world allow the majority of the people of South Africa to languish in perpetual bondage or should action not now be taken, whether this be economic, political, or diplomatic, to achieve democracy in South Africa?

In the face of these problems which the southern African region faces, there have, nevertheless, been important regional developments in which we find both solace and hope.

I am referring, of course, to the fact that we now have two regional organisations of which Zimbabwe is a member, namely the southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) and the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for eastern and southern African states.

My visit here on this occasion is very much connected with the former organisation and I have already had the honour of speaking on its behalf. I can only note here that our efforts within the SADCC to promote and co-ordinate regional development have been greatly enhanced by the assistance which we have received from the United Kingdom and other developed countries. We hope this assistance will continue because the success of SADCC will no doubt help to fortify our economies against South Africa's dominance and its ambitions to reduce its independent neighbours into satellite states completely dependent on it.

Texts for items (A) and (B) issued by the Zimbabwe Department of Information.

South Africa and Europe

- A. Extract from an Address by the South African Prime Minister, the Hon P.W. Botha, to the Swiss-South Africa Association in Zürich on 1 June 1984.

Mr Chairman, since all of you are interested in what is happening in southern Africa and since at least some of you have interests in South Africa, I should like to share some thoughts with you on developments in southern Africa.

The realities of the continent of Africa constitute a bleak, if not tragic picture. "Our ancient continent" said Edem Kodjo, former Secretary-General of the Organization for African Unity "is now on the brink of disaster, hurtling towards the abyss of confrontation . . ."

This statement is borne out by facts contained in a recent article entitled "Africa's Woes" in *Time Magazine*, which stated that due to progressive deterioration in numerous respects, the African continent is gripped by a pattern of failure.

Political instability is evidenced by the fact that in the past 25 years, more than 70 leaders in 29 African nations have been deposed by assassination, purges or coups.

Economic disintegration is a sad, yet undeniable reality: the estimated annual foreign debt of African countries amounts to \$100 billion.

Essential government and social services, like education, health care, transportation and many others, are in disarray and deteriorating.

United Nations statistics show that seven out of ten Africans are destitute or on the verge of poverty. In fact, it has been projected that 5 million children in Africa will die of starvation this year.

Per capita food production is declining. While Africa's population increase of 2,9 per cent per annum is the highest in the world, food output grows by only 1,3 per cent.

Already 20 per cent of the continent is desert and experts believe that, due to wrong methods of land use, 45 per cent of Africa may be a desert or semi-desert in 50 years' time.

Few African countries can provide jobs for their citizens. Last year, in trying to secure jobs for its own people, an African country with vast natural

resources and potential expelled 2 million Ghanaian workers.

At the same time one-and-a-half million foreign workers from South Africa's neighbouring states are working in South Africa, the majority illegally, in order to save their families from starvation.

In contrast to the overall picture of Africa, despite the most severe drought in memory and the world-wide economic recession, South Africa stands out as a prospering economic and industrial power within the African context. Even *Time Magazine* refers in its article to South Africa as sub-Saharan Africa's premier economic and military power and as "one of the major exceptions to the litany of failure" in Africa.

This is the reality of Africa. Whether one likes them or not, these are the facts. It might be convenient for some people to ignore this reality: it might for a while be politically expedient for some organisations, even governments, to pretend that Africa's plight can be overcome by more financial hand-outs or more armaments, or to continue to condemn South Africa, but the problem they face is that sooner or later the truth will catch up with them. Such is the nature of truth: none of us can escape it.

I want to make it clear that we have nothing to gain from the misfortunes of our continent. Being of Africa and in Africa, we know that the misfortunes of Africa and southern Africa also affect us. We in South Africa are deeply conscious of the interdependence of the countries of our region. We realise that we have to live together and that we have to come to terms with our differences.

I also want to make it clear that I and my Government do *not* believe that South Africa's relative stability and economic strength have come about because we are White and our neighbours are Black. There are people in my country, and also in many others, who believe in the inherent superiority of the white man, and the inferiority of the black man, but let me assure you they are not members of my Government.

We have arrived at today's situation through a series of very complex historical, social, political, economic and cultural circumstances. Unless we understand these circumstances, and unless we face the realities of Africa squarely and honestly, it seems inevitable that Africa will continue its slide into squalor, starvation, and ultimate disintegration.

None of this is new to us in South Africa. We, together with thinking people from elsewhere, particularly businessmen, industrialists, bankers and others, have been warning Africa and the world for decades that unless the trend was reversed we would eventually inherit the situation which exists today. The only comfort we can gain from being able to say that our predictions were correct is the knowledge that we are well positioned and equipped to participate in the search for appropriate solutions. At this stage it does not help to say "we told you: we warned you". It will help, however, if we say "look, we understand the circumstances of Africa, we accept the realities, and

we have long experience in successfully coping with the challenges of our situation. We are willing and able to co-operate, to contribute our knowledge, our skills and our technology to the benefit of our region so that all the countries of our sub-continent may find peace, stability, and the realisation of their potential”.

This is exactly what we are saying. We have been saying it for a long time. In fact, years ago my Government offered to enter into non-aggression pacts with all of South Africa's neighbours so that we could, without prejudice to *our sovereignty and independence as nations, join forces in tackling our region's most fundamental problems.*

We made this offer years ago, but for a long time it was ignored. It is only quite recently that we have witnessed a very promising sequence of events in southern Africa in the direction of peace, stability and mutual co-operation. As I said earlier, the thing about truth is that one can never escape it: it always catches up with you. There is now a pattern emerging in southern Africa, a pattern which is continuing to grow and develop, whereby the leaders of the region are increasingly coming to terms with the realities of our African situation. The truth is at last beginning to receive its due recognition and consequently I am now more optimistic than ever about our future.

South Africa signed a formal non-aggression pact with Mozambique, known as the Accord of Nkomati on 16 March this year. We have a similar agreement with Swaziland. To us these agreements are of profound significance, and we have every intention of carrying out our obligations in this respect to the letter, and in the spirit of co-operation and good neighbourliness.

We see it as being in South Africa's interest, as well as our neighbours' interests, to promote this new era of realism as best we can. We want to encourage the leaders of southern Africa to seek the peace, stability and co-operation that will lead to development and increasing prosperity. We want our region to turn its back on despair, to reject the hostile ideological posturing of the past, to forget the sterile arguments which have proved to be such a waste of valuable time and effort, and instead to focus its resources and its energies on the fruits of political stability, economic growth and peaceful co-existence.

South Africa's policy in regard to southern Africa is accordingly based on the following principles:

First, that different states with different socio-economic and political systems can exist together in peace and can co-operate where necessary in a spirit of good neighbourliness, in the pursuit of common interests.

Secondly, each country has the right to order its affairs as it sees fit. Interstate relations, particularly between neighbours, should not be disturbed by differences in internal policies, and thirdly, neighbouring countries should refrain from allowing their territories to be used as springboards by subver-

sive elements, terrorists and other powers to interfere in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries.

A fourth fundamental principle in our approach to other countries is that every country has the right to defend itself against any form of aggression.

Guided by these principles, South Africa is committed to co-operation with her neighbours in the sub-continent, because,

- southern Africa's plight is South Africa's plight;
- we are concerned about the millions of people in our sub-continent who are suffering and dying;
- we in South Africa believe in sharing our technological achievements and our prosperity with our neighbours. Consequently we reject boycotts and sanctions, which are at best divisive and destructive and will harm the very people which they are intended to assist;
- we believe in the advantages of co-operation, security, stability and mutual trust.

On a continent where most economies are in serious difficulties while at the same time outside aid is decreasing, the South African economy could provide powerful growth impulses for neighbouring states and help to shield them from the worst ravages of hunger, disease and instability which, as I have indicated, are increasingly afflicting Africa. In this way, South Africa can exert a stabilising influence in the sub-continent. However, South Africa can only play a constructive role if it is done in such a way that it is acceptable to neighbouring countries and their leaders.

We do not believe in hand-outs. Indeed African leaders themselves do not want hand-outs. During some of the discussions I have had with African leaders, I have come to the conclusion that many African countries are disillusioned with aid programmes which they are supposed to carry out with other countries in the world. Some of these leaders, like President Machel of Mozambique, have said to me that they are tired of aid, that they do not want aid anymore because those aid programmes take them nowhere. What they want, they say, is co-operation.

Africa needs expertise, co-operation in the fields of proper utilization of land, the provision of clean water and the productive use of water, training programmes tailored to their needs, and co-operation in joint projects wherever possible.

There are numerous examples of successful joint projects in which South Africa is engaged with neighbouring states:

- South Africa is a member of the Southern African Customs Union, the Rand Monetary Area and the Southern African Regional Council for the Conservation and Utilization of the Soil—institutions which actively promote regional prosperity.
- As regards water and electricity, South Africa is involved with Mozam-

bique in the Cahora Bassa scheme while a similar joint project in the Highlands of Lesotho is being discussed.

- In March this year, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Mozambique invited South Africa to participate in a technical committee meeting on the development of the Limpopo basin.
- In 1983, a Tripartite Permanent Technical Committee was established by means of a multi-lateral agreement between Swaziland, Mozambique and South Africa.
- To promote industrial development through decentralization in southern Africa, a declaration on a co-ordinated Regional Development Strategy was jointly signed in April 1982 by South Africa, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. Private entrepreneurs and overseas investors participate actively and to date, 800 applications for projects, with a capital investment of nearly R900 million have been approved. These projects could provide employment for 50 000 people.
- To provide finance, technical assistance and training for these development requirements, the southern African Development Bank was established and started operating in September 1983 with an initial authorised share capital of R2 000 million.

From what I have said, it should be clear that I am optimistic about the future of southern Africa. This picture of growing co-operation is of course anathema to those intent on destabilising South Africa and her neighbours. This is particularly evident in Angola where 30 000 Cuban troops have been stationed and whose presence is of such a threatening nature that the independence of South West Africa/Namibia cannot be achieved until a firm agreement has been reached on their withdrawal.

Throughout the protracted dispute with the international community on South West Africa, the Republic of South Africa has been guided by four basic principles:

- (i) That the Territory is not and never has been a part of South Africa.
- (ii) That the people of the Territory should themselves decide on their Constitutional dispensation.
- (iii) That the people of the Territory should have the opportunity of developing towards self-determination in circumstances of peace and security.
- (iv) And that our differences with the international community over South West Africa should be resolved wherever possible by negotiation.

South Africa accepted a United Nations plan for the independence of South West Africa/Namibia, commonly known as Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978, and has successfully negotiated with the United Nations in order to eliminate impediments to the implementation of the plan. The pres-

ence of Cuban forces just across the border however simply does not allow for the holding of free and fair elections in the Territory. The position of the South African Government is clear; a firm agreement on the withdrawal of Cuban forces will have to be achieved before the independence plan can be implemented. There are people who reject this so-called linkage, but here again we have a situation where we cannot escape the truth. Whether we like it or not the fact of the matter is that the presence of such a large number of heavily armed Cuban troops poses an obvious threat to the political stability of the region, and they will have to be withdrawn in order to enable the inhabitants of South West Africa/Namibia to proceed peacefully towards their independence as a nation.

- B.** Address by the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Hon R.F. Botha on "Change in southern Africa—South Africa's Policies of Peaceful Co-existence", to the Hanns Seidel Stiftung in Munich on 9 November 1984.

For many years critics of the South African Government believed, and propagated the view that, faced with increasing international pressure, the South African Government was grimly drawing the laager about its beleaguered forces and preparing for a protracted defence. The perception was that the tide of history was flowing irresistibly against us and that increasing confrontation between South Africa and her neighbours was inevitable.

In meeting after meeting with European foreign ministers I have called for Europeans to move away from what I termed their "static view" of South and southern Africa and of Africa in general. We believe that Europeans either do not know what is going on in Africa or that they pretend not to know. Let me illustrate this remark. At one of my meetings in November last year, I asked a European colleague to mention one country in Africa which he would hold up to South Africa as the model for us to follow—a country which displayed the quality of democracy which the Europeans could approve of. The model which was spontaneously put forward was Nigeria. My response was that I would give Nigeria's newly re-discovered western democracy two months.

Ladies and gentlemen, I was wrong that day in November 1983. It did not last two months. The coup d'état in Nigeria came the following month. I use this illustration not to ridicule my African friends but to point out yet again to my European friends that other norms and standards exist in Africa. Africa has traditionally had a style of leadership and government with which the European is not familiar, but which they are going to have to understand. If governments in Europe, and for that matter in other parts of the world, continue to ignore the facts of Africa and the depth of the problems confronting our continent, their views on events on that continent will become irrelevant

and their contribution towards economic development of African countries could become counter productive.

Another example of Europe's ignorance of African affairs is the astonishment generally displayed by commentators in Europe at the signing of the Nkomati Accord earlier this year. One European diplomatic representative in South Africa was even instructed by his government, after the signing of the Nkomati Accord, to establish from my ministry what this "hoax" was all about. That same representative had attended the signing of the accord on the border between Mozambique and South Africa. He had personally witnessed President Samora Machel and Prime Minister P.W. Botha signing the accord. And yet his foreign ministry could not absorb the fact of its occurrence for the simple reason that his government believed that the South African Government was capable only of evil designs and actions. Somewhere there is a moral to this quixotic diplomatic story. Is it perhaps that some governments find it extremely difficult to break down the established conditions of what South Africa is supposed to stand for? In his public remarks on the occasion of the signing of the Nkomati Accord, the then South African Prime Minister and present State President, Mr P.W. Botha, stated that the South African government believed that states with different socio-economic and political systems could live together in peace and harmony. The central theme of the Nkomati Accord is both governments' commitment to non-aggression and good neighbourliness. The maintenance of peace and stability in our region is therefore of overriding importance to us. After years of growing confrontation both governments decided that it was in their mutual interest and in the interest of the region to have peace. This desire culminated in the Nkomati and Cahora Bassa accords.

In terms of the Nkomati Accord neither the South African Government nor the Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique is obliged to assist each other to maintain peace and security in each other's country. Both governments are, however, conscious of the need to resolve differences likely to endanger mutual peace and security in the region by means of negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or other peaceful means and we therefore undertook not to resort, individually or collectively, to the threat or use of force against each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence. South Africa and Mozambique remain committed to these objectives.

The purpose of our most recent initiatives, made public through the Pretoria Declaration of 3 October 1984, has been to facilitate a ceasefire in Mozambique in the interest of all the peoples of our region. A commission was established to work towards an early implementation of the Pretoria Declaration with South Africa in the role of chairman/convener and the People's Republic of Mozambique and Renamo as active participants. I believe that the majority of the people of Mozambique and the majority of South African

citizens share a sincere desire for peaceful progress. We already have enough problems to cope with.

We do not accept that the killing of thousands of Mozambicans will resolve that country's problems. If the armed activity and conflict within Mozambique continues, it is the enemies of Mozambique which will gain and all of us in the region will eventually pay the price, including Renamo. There are indications that foreign interests are working against our efforts to establish peace in our region. This has manifested itself in a temporary setback for our efforts. However, I believe that the leaders of southern Africa will resolve their differences peacefully because we agree that if we are to make progress in the many spheres of life demanding our attention, our problems cannot be solved with bullets. I believe that the leaders of southern Africa agree that our problems can only be resolved by a process of discussion, by trust and by a sincere desire to achieve an understanding based on recognition of each others' particular cultural, social and political needs.

In May and June of this year the then Prime Minister and now Executive State President of South Africa, Mr P. W. Botha, and myself paid an extensive visit to Europe *inter alia* in order to appeal to governments to acquaint themselves with the real problems of Africa and to design development projects tailored to the needs of the peoples of our own continent.

We carried an important message with us: Africa desires and requires economic cooperation, not hand outs. I won't say that this appeal fell entirely on deaf ears but there appeared to us to be a continuing lack of understanding of the dimensions of the problem. As I see it, Europe's great weakness in terms of the third world, is its inability or unwillingness to relate its indisputable technological knowhow and productive capacity to constructive cooperation with the struggling nations of the world. There is an inability or an unwillingness to transfer technological and industrial capability and production to the peoples of Africa and elsewhere in the developing world in such a way that there are tangible results in terms of economic development. To think that the wealthy and overfed nations of Europe can sit with enormous stockpiles of basic foodstuffs such as meat, milk, cheese, butter and cereals while in the course of my remarks here this afternoon roughly 600 africans will have died of starvation. During the course of the day 14 000 will have died.

Last week the *United Nations Disaster Relief Organisation (UNDRO)* reported that 35 million people in 18 African countries face death by starvation. The report continued: "Africa today is in the grip of a human tragedy of unprecedented proportions. And despite a massive relief effort by governments and international agencies there is no end in sight for the silent suffering of the victims".

The fact that Europe hoards and in some cases dumps its surpluses of certain basic foodstuffs rich in protein in order to maintain unfairly high prices

and wages while paying unrealistically low prices for Africa's raw materials, is morally indefensible.

I am aware that European governments over the past few months have been shipping, and, in some cases, airlifting food to certain African nations but I fear that it is indeed a case of "too little, too late".

I read in the London *Financial Times* the day before yesterday that, and I quote: "An emergency EEC aid fund may (underline) have to be set up next year to tackle the famine devastating several regions in Africa".

I fully realise that in making this statement on behalf of the EEC, the Irish Minister of Development was speaking of aid additional to the normal EEC aid budget, but that is not the point. The question firstly is: why Europe did not take earlier heed of all the signs and warnings of this impending tragedy in Africa, secondly, why its food aid package is still so disgracefully low and thirdly, why Europe only may have to provide additional aid next year? Quite frankly, if Europe has a conscience, it has to do it now, not on the basis of charity but as partial compensation for the decades of low prices paid for our raw materials.

I appeal therefore to the West to make a substantial contribution to the needs of the peoples of our continent. Has the time not come to support Africa's need for proper economic planning in an imaginative and realistic way?

Unless this is done soon, the economic and infrastructural collapse in Africa will become irreversible. I wish it were not so. We would far prefer our fellow countries in Africa to be stable and prosperous. Africa, potentially, has so much to offer. The amount of Africa's arable land is more than twice that of Latin America or China and the climate of large parts of our continent is ideally suited to many crops, both for human consumption and industrial processing. There is enough land to support sufficient cattle for the needs of the continent. There are untapped resources of the sea and there are rich forest areas to be developed. Although the continent already produces nearly one-seventh of the world's minerals, new discoveries are regularly made. With oil and gas in the north, coal in the south, and hydroelectric power in the centre, the continent's potential seems to be unlimited. But this great potential is not being realised.

We in southern Africa have come to realise that economic and geographic imperatives ought to outweigh political differences. It is ironic that while we move in this direction in the interests of all the peoples of southern Africa, efforts should be made in the USA, Europe and elsewhere to impede this process. In southern Africa channels of communication, which had previously been disrupted by outdated rhetoric, have opened up. Possibilities for the peaceful settlement of disputes and plans for the expansion of economic cooperation are being discussed and implemented. To the east of us, South Africa has entered into a mutually beneficial relationship with Mozambique,

based on the Nkomati Accord. Relations with other neighbouring states, especially Swaziland and Lesotho, are on a sound basis. To the North and north-west, whatever our differences, there seems to be broad agreement that our territories should not be made available for the planning and execution of acts of sabotage against each other while trade is continuing. Within South West Africa/Namibia there is an important new movement among the leaders who are displaying a firm resolve to determine the future of their country without outside interference.

Winds of change are again blowing through Africa. There is an irresistible attraction of new forces and new continental realities. There is a growing realisation that South Africa is not on the defensive. South Africa is an increasingly confident regional power which has the will, the power and the resources to play the role it has been invited to fulfil in the search for peace in the region.

Another great force which I believe will help to turn the tide in southern Africa, is the growing awareness of the symbiotic relationship which exists between South Africa and its neighbours and between black and white Africans. In nature there are many examples of plants and animals which have coexisted together for so long that if one disappears the other must also die. So it is in southern Africa. The fact is that Mozambique cannot export its hydroelectricity to the Soviet Union. It cannot send its mine-workers to East Germany. The Hungarians cannot export goods through Maputo harbour. Russian tourists cannot fill the Polana beach in Maputo. If foot-and-mouth disease breaks out in Mozambique it is unlikely to affect the cattle herds in western Europe. It will, however, affect our cattle in the eastern Transvaal. The same is true of our relations with our other neighbours. This has nothing to do with whether we approve of each other's domestic policies.

Our differences cannot eliminate the underlying reality which has determined that if we wish to survive and prosper, we must coexist. These imperatives, together with a growing consensus among the leaders of our region to resolve our problems ourselves, are producing tangible results, the most notable of which is the Nkomati Accord between the Republic of South Africa and the People's Republic of Mozambique. The Accord stands out as an important positive event not only for South Africa and Mozambique, but for the entire region. For South Africa, the Accord was a culmination of our patient and long-standing drive towards peace and good-neighbourliness, based on accepted principles of international law.

South Africa has continued to pursue negotiated settlements with regard to South West Africa and Angola. At the end of last year, on 15 December 1983, South Africa informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations that it would be prepared to disengage its forces from Angola on condition that neither Angola, nor the Cubans, nor SWAPO, would take advantage of the resulting situation to the detriment of the security of South West Africa.

This offer led to the eventual conclusion of the Lusaka Agreement on 16 February 1984 in terms of which South Africa agreed to disengage its forces from southern Angola provided that the Angolans excluded SWAPO and Cuban forces from the area in question. Since then South Africa has withdrawn its forces as far south as Ongiva, about 40 km from the South West African border. Over the period of 31 October to 1 November 1984 I met on the Cape Verde Islands with an American delegation led by Dr Chester Crocker. The American delegation brought with them certain proposals of the Angolan government including some specific Angolan ideas on the withdrawal of Cuban troops.

I have no illusions as to the difficulties which will have to be overcome in further negotiations. Nevertheless, the South African government has welcomed the acceptance in principle by the Angolan government of Cuban withdrawal and will soon present its views on this important matter.

Another important subject of our discussions at Cape Verde was the disengagement provisions of the Lusaka Agreement. The South African Government has now suggested that a high level meeting be held before 15 November 1984 with a view to completing the process of disengagement in southern Angola.

In South Africa itself, we have embarked irrevocably on a course of controlled reform. For the first time in our history Coloured and Indian leaders are sharing in cabinet decisions.

The reaction of radical elements in South Africa, both on the left and right, to the new constitutional dispensation, is the best indication of the authenticity of the process of reform and of the concern it provokes in those circles.

To aver that the Black people of South Africa are excluded from the political and constitutional process is not true.

Four states, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei have achieved independence. They are no less viable than many other states in the world.

The six remaining black nations enjoy a considerable degree of self-government. Of course my government realises that we will have to find solutions to the problem surrounding the political future of the black peoples and communities permanently resident in South Africa. Indeed a special cabinet committee has been appointed by the South African State President to address this important but difficult issue.

This committee of which I am a member, is fully aware of the magnitude of the task. Consultations are continuing across the broadest possible spectrum and a great deal of work has been and is being done to find suitable political mechanisms which will be acceptable to these communities. However, there are elements who go out of their way to obstruct our efforts to find peaceful solutions for our unique problems.

Too often the influence of moderate leadership — White, Coloured, Asian and Black — is overlooked or underplayed in favour of the well publicised

activities or radicals. The current period of strikes in South Africa is a case in point. This unrest is presented abroad by journalists and others as symbolising widespread rejection of and dissatisfaction with the reform process in South Africa. There is turbulence in South Africa, which is far less than in many parts of the world. We do not underestimate either the reasons for the present unrest in South Africa or the manner in which it is exploited. The political organisers want to see chaos, destruction and revolution in South Africa.

Their aim is the destruction of fundamental rights in order to impose the only structure they can work with, namely, that of a totalitarian regime. You will also have noticed, I am sure, that moderate leaders of stature in South Africa are speaking up more and more against those bent on violence. They represent a constituency far larger than the so-called "liberation" movements which dominate the headlines. We have said all along that as we achieve progressively greater success with our reform policies, our enemies will step up their counter-action by means of violence. They know no other road but the one that leads to chaos, suffering, destruction and loss of human dignity.

The moderate leaders are following another road. The road to cooperation, tolerance and understanding. Along this road we can all have peace, development and a future to look forward to for ourselves and our children. Those of us who have decided to take this road, will share those hardships which we are bound to experience along the way. But overcoming the hardships will also enrich our lives and strengthen our commitment to work for a future based on a just balance of their rights and interests of all our peoples and communities

Texts for items (A) and (B) supplied by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and Information.

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