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South Africa and the United Nations

The sections following represent the texts in whole or in part of statements made by South Africa's representative at the United Nations and by various other member countries or recognized groups through their representatives on aspects of (1) the Namibia situation resulting from the MPC proposals, (2) the Cabinda/Angola incursion of 21 May 1985 and (3) the Botswana incursion of 14 June 1985.

SECTION 1

A. South African Ambassador K. von Schirnding's address to the Security Council of the United Nations on 11 June 1985 on the Namibia and also the Cabinda incursion.

It is unrealistic to consider the question of South West Africa outside of the regional context to which it inextricably belongs. Developments in neighbouring countries, will inevitably have an effect on South West Africa just as developments in South West Africa will have an important influence on the course of events in Southern Africa as a whole.

South Africa is also an integral part of the Southern African region. Whether one likes it or not this is a fact. It has clear cut regional interests and together with other states insists that countries in the region should abide by certain ground rules.

Firstly, no state should make its territory available to individuals and organizations who wish to promote or prepare for violence against other states in the region. The fact is that all the countries of Southern Africa have disaffected groups and dissident movements. If this ground rule is not accepted there is no limit to the potential escalation of crossborder violence in the sub-continent.

Secondly, no foreign forces should be permitted to intervene in the region. The intervention of foreign forces in any country in Southern Africa is a potential threat to the security and sovereignty of all of the countries of the region. This is particularly so when such forces are acting on behalf of an expansionist superpower. My Minister of Foreign Affairs has repeatedly appealed to the leaders of Southern Africa to consider this threat very seriously, regardless of the rhetorical positions which they might adopt in this forum. Let them consider the fate of other countries which "invited" the Soviet Union or its allies to come to their assistance or who were unfortunate enough to be "liberated" by them. Let them consider the fate of the peoples of Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, South Vietnam and Cambodia. Let them think very carefully about what is happening at this very moment to the people of Afghanistan. The lesson is clear: once a country allows the Soviet Union and its

surrogates to establish a strong presence within its borders, it is very difficult to get rid of them.

Thirdly, South Africa believes that the problems of conflict in our region should be solved by peaceful means rather than by violence.

Fourthly, my Government believes that the problems of South Africa should be solved on a regional basis. We have our differences. But we must resolve those differences ourselves. As President Botha said at the time of the signing of the Nkomati Accord, states with different socio-economic and political systems can live together in peace and harmony, and work together in the pursuit of common interests. Each country has the right to order its affairs as it deems fit and inter-state relations, particularly between neighbours, should not be disturbed by differing internal policies. This is sensible and practical as recognition is accorded to the fact that each country has its own set of conditions for which it must seek its own solution in the interest of its citizens. President Botha also pointed out that uncomfortable facts could not be swept under the carpet and divergent outlooks should not be allowed to distract governments from carrying out their duty to accord their first priority to the welfare and prosperity of their peoples. Only on this basis would we all, as Africans, give our sub-continent a chance to grow and develop.

It is significant that so many participants in this debate should have referred to developments in Angola in conjunction with the question of South West Africa. Although my Government does not agree with the statements which have been made in this regard, this debate has underlined the fact that the problems of Angola and South West Africa are inextricably linked. They are linked, Mr President, in the following respects.

In the first place, the peoples of Angola and South West Africa both wish above all else to exercise their right to self-determination. They are linked, secondly, because the presence in Angola of a large number of surrogate troops of a super power represented in this Council have made it impossible for the people of Angola and the people of South West Africa to determine their own future, free from intimidation. Thirdly, they are linked because in both cases political objectives are pursued by violence rather than by peaceful means and national reconciliation.

Where does the Republic of South Africa stand with regard to these issues?

Firstly, South Africa supports the right of the peoples of both countries to self-determination and independence. Secondly, South Africa insists on the withdrawal of foreign forces from the region. Thirdly, it believes that the problems of both countries should be solved by peaceful means through national reconciliation rather than through violence.

The conflict in Angola has its origins in the violation of the Alvor Agreement of 1975. It will be recalled that in terms of that agreement, Portugal recognized three movements, FNLA, MPLA and UNITA. These

movements together with Portugal were to have formed a transitional government which would have held nationwide elections for a Constituent Assembly before the end of October 1975. The elections were never held because the MPLA imported foreign troops to impose its rule over the country. This is a fact. There have never been free elections in Angola. Despite the fact that the Alvor Agreement was widely endorsed by the international community hardly anyone today protests at the fact that the MPLA regime disregarded the agreement and seized power for itself. What became of the strong support for the FNLA and for UNITA which existed in January 1976 when half the countries of the OAU had steadfastly refused to recognize the MPLA? What became of the call of a large number of OAU members for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Angola? The fact of the matter is that the right of the Angolan people to self-determination has been brushed aside. It would seem that the United Nations is concerned about self-determination, human rights and responsible government only on the southern side of the Cunene River.

South Africa, on the other hand, accepts the right of the peoples of both South West Africa and Angola to self-determination. It has, however, insisted that when the people of South West Africa decide on their future, they should do so in circumstances of fairness, peace and security. In 1978 a nationwide election was held in South West Africa in which 78 per cent of the electorate participated. The election was observed by over 300 journalists and international experts and was judged to be as free and fair as elections anywhere in the world. The Security Council rejected the outcome of the election. Again, in 1980, second-tier elections were held for most of the communities in South West Africa. Again there was a very large voter turnout, but once again the UN rejected this step to give the people of the Territory a say in the management of their affairs. When responsibility for important aspects of the administration of South West Africa was transferred to elected leaders in the Territory in 1980 this Council rejected the step, even though the new administration was unquestionably democratic and carried out important reforms. Now, Mr President, when South Africa, as an interim mechanism, is once again transferring important powers for the internal administration of South West Africa into the hands of South West African leaders, members of this Council are again displeased. Apparently they prefer that total power should reside in the hands of one man, the South African Administrator-General, even though they have repeatedly called on South Africa to withdraw its presence and administration from the Territory.

The Angolan people who are now classified by this Council and by the international community as having been "liberated" desperately desire the same opportunity of expressing their political wishes as the people of South West Africa have enjoyed. They would very much have liked to have been able to participate in free elections of any kind. They would have appreciated

the opportunity of being able to administer their own affairs and bring about the reforms which they regard necessary in their country. However, this opportunity has been denied to them by the MPLA regime, by the Cuban interventionists and by their Soviet masters. Can anyone in this Council seriously maintain that the people of Angola under the MPLA regime enjoy civil and political freedoms?

Mr President, my Government's position with regard to the proposed transitional administration in South West Africa is well known. It was set out by President Botha in a speech which he delivered to the South African Parliament on the 18th of April which was subsequently circulated at the United Nations as a document of the Security Council. I will, for the information of the Council, repeat some of its salient points.

President Botha emphasized that for as long as there is a possibility that the present international negotiations hold any realistic prospect of bringing about the genuine withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, the South African Government will not act in a manner irreconcilable with the international settlement plan. The proposed arrangement in South West Africa/Namibia should accordingly be seen as an interim mechanism for the international administration of the Territory pending agreement on an internationally acceptable independence for South West Africa. However, the people of South West Africa/Namibia, including SWAPO, can not wait indefinitely for a breakthrough on the withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola. Should it eventually become evident, after all avenues had been thoroughly explored, that there is no realistic prospect of attaining this, the parties most intimately affected by the present negotiations will obviously have to reconsider how internationally acceptable independence may best be attained in the light of prevailing circumstances.

In the meantime South Africa will continue to work for an internationally acceptable independence for South West Africa:

- It will continue to search for a reasonable formula for genuine Cuban withdrawal from Angola. If a firm agreement can be reached in this regard, it will carry out its undertaking to implement the international settlement plan.
- It will continue to strive for stability and peace in the region by encouraging all the parties, including SWAPO and Angola, to resolve their differences around a conference table instead of by violence.
- It will continue to encourage dialogue between all the South West African parties in the hope that they will find a basis for still broader consensus in respect of the future of the Territory.
- South Africa will continue to insist that all the South West African parties be treated equally and impartially. If the United Nations wishes to play a role in the future of South West Africa/Namibia, it will consequently have to demonstrate that it will be able to carry out its functions impartially.

I should like to know, Mr President, with what aspects of this programme the Council disagrees? Does it favour the retention of the surrogate forces of an expansionist super power in Africa? Is it opposed to the peaceful settlement of disputes? Is it not prepared to accept that there should be dialogue between the parties of South West Africa on the future of their country? Does it not believe that the parties of South West Africa are entitled to equal treatment in terms of the United Nations settlement plan? If Council members disagree with these propositions then let them say so, so that we will all know where we stand.

Mr President, as I have already emphasized, South Africa has consistently supported the withdrawal of foreign forces from the region. By accepting the international settlement plan, it has already agreed to the reduction and ultimate withdrawal of its own forces from South West Africa. It strongly supports the wish which was expressed by many members of the Organisation of African Unity in 1976 for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Angola. It is prepared to enter into an international agreement in terms of which all foreign forces, regardless of their origin, would be withdrawn from Angola.

Lastly, Mr President, South Africa's position on the peaceful resolution of disputes is equally clear. We have consistently urged all parties in Southern Africa to resolve their differences by peaceful means. Last year, *inter alia*, through the good offices of the Secretary-General we tried to engage SWAPO in a process which would lead to the cessation of hostilities in South West Africa. We made it clear to them that they could return to South West Africa to pursue their political objectives by peaceful means. However, they rejected these offers and decided instead to intensify their so-called armed struggle.

Within the Republic itself we have stated that we are prepared to enter into dialogue with any party or individual who rejects violence.

A number of speakers have also referred to recent events in South Africa. Without conceding the right of the United Nations to interfere in South Africa's domestic affairs, I would like to comment briefly on current developments in the Republic.

The actions of the South African Government have proved its commitment to reform. Coloureds and Indians are now exercising authentic power in Parliament and in the Cabinet. South Africa has proposed the establishment of an open-ended non-statutory forum to negotiate with black leaders over the political future. It is establishing second-tier authorities in which all the population groups and communities will co-operate on bread-and-butter matters affecting the daily lives of the peoples in South Africa. Trade Union rights are now enjoyed by all workers; sport is played on a completely open basis; central business districts, and more and more public amenities, hotels and restaurants are open to all. All South Africans will soon be able to marry

whomever they like and belong to the political organizations of their choice.

However, as we make progress with the resolution of our problems so our opponents become more vitriolic in their rejection of peaceful change. As we create new and authentic channels for all of the peoples of South Africa to deliberate together on the problems which confront us, so they propagate violence and kill, maim and intimidate the genuine representatives of the vast moderate majority of black South Africans.

This reaction proves that our critics are not interested in rational debate and equitable reform. On the contrary, they will ultimately be satisfied only when they have utterly destroyed everything that has been created in South Africa and have replaced it with their own totalitarian alternative. Western States might not agree with this analysis but I suspect that they would limply accept such an outcome in Southern Africa, just as they have done in other parts of the world, shrugging their shoulders in dismay and saying how much they regret this tragic outcome.

Mr President, the time has come for the western countries in this organization to take a stand for the promotion of the democratic values which they profess to espouse. We challenge them to commission some impartial and reputable organization such as Freedom House to carry out an objective and comparative study of the state of human, political, economic and civil rights in all the countries of the world. Such a study should judge whether Governments are attempting to increase possibilities for participation in the political process or to restrict such developments. It should also provide an analysis of the constitutions, record, associations and actions of movements such as SWAPO and the ANC. South Africa would be prepared to co-operate fully with any such study.

In Angola, we have also urged a peaceful resolution to the current conflict between the MPLA and UNITA through a process of national reconciliation. Although we accept that this is a question which the people of Angola themselves must resolve, we are deeply concerned about the ongoing civil war in Angola, not only because of the suffering which it has caused to the people of Angola, but also because of the instability which it has created in our region. This instability has presented opportunities for the Soviets and the Cubans to exploit the suffering of Angola for their own advantage.

South Africa has also sought a peaceful resolution of its dispute with Angola. In a number of Ministerial meetings last year it sought to persuade the MPLA regime to accept the advantages of peace. It entered into the Lusaka Agreement with the MPLA in good faith and carried out all of its obligations in terms of that agreement. In terms of that agreement the Angolan Government undertook to exclude SWAPO elements from the Territory from which South Africa had withdrawn. In the same manner South Africa expressed its grave concern to the Angolan Government over the activities of large numbers of ANC terrorists in various parts of Angola. The South Afri-

can Government repeatedly urged the Angolan Government to remove these terrorists from its territory and to cease assisting them with training, equipment and by making its territory available to them for the furtherance of their violent activities. On 21 May 1984 the South African Government proposed that both South Africa and Angola should issue a joint declaration that they would not allow any person or organization to be trained or accommodated on their sovereign territory to operate against one another or to practise violence against one another. Thus far the MPLA government has failed to respond to these representations. The ANC elements in Angola cannot be characterized as harmless refugees. On the contrary they pose a direct threat to the peoples of South Africa and Southern Africa. South Africa has disconcerting evidence that northern Angola is now the main base area for the training of ANC terrorists who are then despatched via other countries, to the Republic. In addition, it is clear that SWAPO is still being allowed to launch terrorist attacks from Angolan territory against the people of South West Africa/Namibia.

It is an established principle of international law that a state may not permit or encourage on its territory activities for the purpose of carrying out acts of violence on the territory of another state. It is equally well established that a state has a right to take appropriate steps to protect its own security and territorial integrity against such acts.

That is why the South African Government has repeatedly urged the Angolan Government not to permit such activities in its territory and why the South African Government has no alternative but to take whatever action it deems appropriate for the protection of the peoples of South Africa from such acts of violence.

In the circumstances the South African Security Forces have felt it necessary to gather intelligence on the activities of the ANC and SWAPO terrorists in Angola and to consider appropriate counter-actions.

In the course of such an operation a small team of South Africans recently clashed with Angolan military elements. Their objective was to reconnoitre a suspected ANC camp close to the well-guarded Malongo oil installations near to the town of Cabinda. Two South Africans were killed and one was captured. The South African Government immediately informed the MPLA regime of its willingness to discuss the incident.

There should, however, be no doubt about the root cause of what happened in Cabinda. It was the Angolan Government's blatant disregard of international law in allowing and encouraging the ANC to train and to prepare for acts of violence against South Africa. The Angolan Government is, however, not the only culprit. This organization and many of the members of this Council must share the responsibility for having actively encouraged and supported the terrorist activities of the ANC and SWAPO.

The international community and this Council should be in no doubt as to

what South Africa's position is in this regard: It will not tolerate such activities. Although it is committed to resolve its differences with its neighbours by peaceful means, South Africa will not hesitate to take whatever action may be appropriate for the defence of its own people and for the elimination of terrorist elements who are intent on sowing death and destruction in our country and in our region. We will not allow ourselves to be attacked with impunity. We shall take whatever steps are appropriate to defend ourselves. South Africa is nevertheless convinced that the problems of our region cannot and will not be solved by violence.

Despite the heated rhetoric, despite the incidents which flare up from time to time, there is a new understanding throughout the sub-continent of the common interests which we share. There is a new awareness of the dangers of cross border violence, of the importance of reconciliation, of the threat of foreign intervention and of the benefits which regional co-operation can bring. The ground rules for co-existence are slowly but surely gaining acceptance. It is within this context that we are confident that the people of South West Africa will before too long be able to move forward to internationally recognized independence.

B. United States Deputy Ambassador J.S. Sorzano's address to the United Nations Security Council on 12 June 1985 during the "Situation in Namibia" debate.

Mr President, we welcome this opportunity for the Security Council to meet once again to review developments in Namibia. We all can agree that the Security Council bears a unique responsibility for this troubled territory and for moving it rapidly to internationally accepted independence. This is a responsibility that we in the United States take seriously. It is, moreover, a hope we have laboured diligently over for many years to bring to fruition.

Namibia is a subject on which there is a wide area of international consensus. Foremost among these points of agreement is the need to bring the territory to independence in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 435. The United States remains dedicated to this goal. We remain actively involved in negotiations to create conditions to allow implementation of the UN plan to proceed. We are heartened also by the reaffirmations of support for Resolution 435 we have heard from others over the past days, in particular, reaffirmations by the parties and countries most deeply concerned: the Front Line States, South Africa, SWAPO, members of the Contact Group and others. Namibia is an issue on which this Council, acting on behalf of the *international community*, should be prepared to send a strong and unified message. Our goals and our direction are clear, we should not allow extraneous issues to divide us.

As we meet this week on Namibia, we find ourselves at a very serious juncture. This is the first time the Council has met in formal session to discuss the question of Namibia in 19 months. These are months in which we have seen substantial progress toward a Namibia settlement. We have seen developments which seem to bring into question the commitment of some to proceed with implementation of Resolution 435.

It is one of these developments which prompted the call for the present Security Council meeting specifically, the announced intention by South Africa to establish an "Interim Government" in Namibia. The US has made its view on the "Interim Government" absolutely clear. Our statement on that body, published in Security Council Document number S/17119, said:

It has long been our position, and that of our Contact Group partners, that any purported transfer of power that might take place now or in the future to bodies established in Namibia by South Africa is null and void. Such institutions will have, as Secretary Shultz stated on 16 April, no standing. We have not recognized them in the past and will not do so now. Our negotiating effort continues with the governments concerned. Thus, we view the announcement regarding internal administrative arrangements inside Namibia as without effect on these negotiations or the agreements achieved thereunder.

We were also pleased to join the statement by the Security Council on 3 May that was consistent with this position. It is clear that no internal settlement can succeed as long as the international community and this Council stand together in one voice. We must reaffirm that no purported settlement outside the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 435 is acceptable, we must be prepared to reject any attempt by any party to impose such a settlement.

While the Interim Government has not been presented as an independent authority representing an internal settlement outside Resolution 435, this is not sufficient. The international community is entirely justified in rejecting the creation of institutions which have no standing and can serve no conceivable purpose if the early implementation of Resolution 435 is intended.

In our view, all Namibians should have the right to be heard, to express their views freely, to form political parties. They also have the right as provided in Resolution 435 to stand for election to represent their people. By the same token, however, none can be permitted to take power into their own hands, or to proclaim themselves the leaders of the Namibian people or the Government of Namibia. Rather, it is for the people of Namibia to choose their own leaders in free and fair elections under UN supervision and control. This remains our goal.

Mr President, in the absence of Namibian independence, the scourge of war has continued to afflict the region. A major goal of my government in Southern Africa has been to reduce the level of violence, and especially cross-border violence in the area.

It was our goal of reducing violence and tension and ending cross-border operations that led us over a year ago to the negotiations that resulted in the Lusaka Accord. This agreement was intended to give new impetus to the negotiations to stop the violence between Angola and South African forces, and to end the presence of outside forces in Southern Angola. Those objectives were essentially achieved, and the violence that preceded the agreement was followed by 12 months of peace and practical co-operation between Angola and South Africa. Co-operation continues between the military forces of South Africa and Angola along the Namibian border itself and we are heartened also by South Africa's announced withdrawal of its troops from the dams at Ruacana and Calueque.

Nevertheless, the achievement has been marred by the recent incident at Cabinda, which my government has condemned. Respect for the national sovereignty of all states and the inviolability of international borders is a key principle in international relations. The United States cannot condone violations of this principle in whatever direction they may be launched or in the name of whatever goal they may be justified. In this regard, we deplore South African violations of Angolan territorial integrity. Violent actions across borders, be they military attacks, sabotage or terrorism against innocent civilians, can only serve to undermine the confidence necessary for the settlement of disputes. In this instance, they can only detract from the prospects of the early independence of Namibia.

Constructive progress toward the resolution of disputes is the only way to bring about progress toward peace in the region. There can be no military solutions. In our view, the events of the recent weeks — including at Cabinda — underscore the importance of an early and comprehensive settlement which would address the root causes of violence in the region.

A settlement, however, could be within our grasp, given sufficient will by the parties most concerned. Mr President, prior to the Security Council's last meeting on Namibia, the Secretary-General reported that only one barrier remained to the implementation of Resolution 435, South Africa's assistance on an agreement on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Since that report was issued, we have seen substantial movement forward toward the resolution of this final key issue. By late last summer, it became clear that we had moved beyond the stage of rhetorical debate on the issues of "linkage" — whether Cuban troop withdrawal and Namibian independence should be related. Cuban troop withdrawal is — as a practical matter, and with the support of all concerned — being discussed in the context of implementation of Resolution 435. In November, the Angolan government, for the first time, put a detailed and concrete negotiation proposal on the table. This major step forward was followed by a South African proposal. The two proposals showed agreement between South Africa and Angola on a number of broad principles.

My government has been involved for the past several months in intensive discussions with the two parties aimed at narrowing the remaining gap between their positions. We remain convinced that the gap can be bridged. Even in the wake of the events of the past days, it is our view that the door clearly remains open to a settlement and the implementation of Resolution 435. The United States, for one, remains committed to pursuing the search for peace for as long as there is prospect for success. The only alternative would be to acquiesce in continued war and suffering for the people in the region.

My government notes that the Secretary-General's latest report, contained in Document S/17242, confirms that the position of South Africa regarding the issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola remains unchanged. The Secretary-General has urged all parties to make a new and determined effort to expedite implementation. My government will take this call by the Secretary-General seriously, as we have in the past, and continue our efforts to bring the parties together.

I would like to pay special tribute to the role of the Secretary-General in pursuing the task given to him by Resolution 435. We have admired his unstinting efforts to bridge the gap separating the contending parties, in order to bring about independence for Namibia under the Resolution. My government has co-operated closely with the Secretary-General in this effort, and in turn has kept him fully informed of our own efforts toward the same end, so that our actions are mutually reinforcing.

Enormous problems of confidence and trust must be overcome to achieve a settlement. Each party must make difficult decisions regarding its security, its relations with its neighbours and its very future. These issues involve important questions of political will. These are the real decisions before the parties today as we in this chamber debate the issue of Namibia. The answers they give will determine the future course of events not only in Namibia, but throughout the region. It is up to us, as members of the Security Council, to give them every encouragement to make the right decisions, to abandon violence and to choose instead the path of peace.

C. Extracts from the United Kingdom Representative's address to the United Nations Security Council during the "Situation in Namibia" Debate on 14 June 1985

... The Foreign Secretary asked the South African Ambassador to call today. Sir Geoffrey Howe made clear to Dr Worrall the very serious view which the British government takes of the South African attack on Botswana earlier this morning. He strongly condemned the violation of the sovereignty

of a fellow Commonwealth country and deplored this further use of violence which has resulted in much loss of life and injury. Sir Geoffrey told Dr Worral that the British Government regarded the attack as indefensible, the more so given the earlier diplomatic exchanges between the governments of Botswana and South Africa on security matters.

The South African Ambassador was asked to report these views to his government and to communicate to them the widespread concern and shock with which reports of this incident have been received in Britain.

Mr President, the Council is aware of my government's long-standing opposition to all acts of violence. We have ourselves been the victims of such acts. We deplore attempts at political assassination. But in no way does this justify South Africa's behaviour in Gaborone today.

I would like to repeat in this Council the sympathy and support which we have already expressed to the government of Botswana.

The operation undertaken by South Africa against Botswana, Mr President, is unacceptable, short-sighted, and cannot but have a counter-productive effect on the peace and stability in the region which South Africa claims to desire. The same is true of the recent and similar operation by the South African Defence Force in Northern Angola, which my government equally deplores.

Mr President, I am aware that the Council has been asked to hold a separate meeting on this latter subject, which is indeed distinct from Namibia. Nevertheless, I must say a few words on it before turning to the matter in hand, as my delegation said in this Council during previous debates on Namibia in 1983, the question of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, is a separate issue from the matter before us today, which is the implementation of a Namibian settlement. The security of Angola is a sovereign matter for the Angolan government: it is not for this Council to tell Angola how to conduct its own affairs. The Security Council has no role in negotiations which may take place on that matter, unless, that is, we are invited by those concerned to participate. That said, perhaps I may follow the lead of others in expressing the United Kingdom's deep concern about the activities of South African Defence Force personnel inside Angola. The implementation of South Africa's decision to withdraw those forces which had been occupying the southern part of Angola was a hopeful sign. My government had never accepted their right to be on Angolan territory in the first place; but the Lusaka Agreement and the withdrawal which was recently completed seemed to offer the prospect of a reduction of tension on the northern borders of Namibia. This could only have been helpful to the prospects for implementation of Resolution 435. It is therefore all the more disturbing that we should now have to take account of the serious incident in Cabinda. We unequivocally condemn such violations of sovereignty. We have expressed our strong views to the South African government. The involvement of South African

military personnel in Cabinda is both unacceptable in itself and an extremely unhelpful development in the context of the Namibia negotiations.

Security Council Resolution 435 is central to the process of achieving self-determination for Namibia, and to this debate. It is our responsibility to ensure that nothing is done by the Council to undermine its own achievement in adopting Resolution 435.

It was, above all, for this reason that my government, like other Contact Group governments which first sponsored the UN settlement proposal, expressed deep concern in April when the South African government was considering the proposal made by some of the Namibian internal parties for a transitional government. We told the South African government that we would regard any unilateral measures taken by South Africa in relation to the *establishment of constitutional bodies and to the transfer of power in Namibia* as null and void. We said that any arrangements that could be established as a result of such measures would have no status whatsoever under the United Nations settlement plan. We made clear that the South African government's responsibility to bring about the implementation of the United Nations plan could not be delegated to any Namibian party.

For the same reason, the United Kingdom gave its full support to the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 3 May, in which he reiterated that the members of the Council rejected any unilateral action leading towards an internal settlement as unacceptable.

... In the conclusions of his report, the Secretary-General does not disguise the fact that the difficulties surrounding implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 have recently been compounded. He says that it is imperative that all concerned should respect the provisions of the United Nations plan, which is binding on the parties and remains the only agreed basis for the independence of Namibia. Mr President, this is surely the consideration which must be uppermost in our minds when we consider the outcome of our proceedings. We must consider whether a particular course of action will make implementation more likely, or less likely. We must not act in a way which jeopardises the plan, or which could entail any further delay. It has been suggested by some, given that negotiating has been such a prolonged and frustrating process that we should now give up further efforts at negotiation. This would surely be a tragic error. The alternative to negotiation would be to relapse into conflict. That would increase and prolong the suffering of all Namibians, whether inside or outside the territory. That cannot and must not be the objective of the Security Council. It is our responsibility to secure Namibian independence at the earliest possible date on a just and internationally acceptable basis. Such a basis exists in Resolution 435.

As the distinguished Foreign Minister of Tanzania emphasised, Resolution 435 retains its intrinsic validity. I note in this connection that the distinguished representative of South Africa expressed confidence that the people

of Namibia would before too long be able to move forward to internationally recognized independence. We, together with the other members of the international community, are waiting for the South African government to demonstrate the good faith of their undertaking. We urge the South African government to act. It is not only their clear responsibility, it is in their own interests to bring about Namibia's independence on the basis of the settlement plan which has the support of the entire international community. This, therefore, is the answer to the questions which were posed by the distinguished representative of South Africa concerning the Council's wishes for Namibia. He asked whether we preferred that total power should reside in the hands of one man, the Administrator-General. The answer, of course is: "No". We would prefer that total power should be transferred at once through the mechanism of the settlement plan to an independent and democratically elected government representing all the people of Namibia. I accordingly hope that we shall succeed in finding a constructive outcome to this debate which gives a new impetus and a new urgency to our efforts to implement Resolution 435.

D. Extracts from the Angolan Foreign Minister's Address to the United Nations Security Council during the "Situation in Namibia" debate on 12 June 1985.

The present international situation is marked by numerous sources of tension throughout the world. In that context, the situation in Southern Africa—although some claim to detect a certain improvement—has been deteriorating dangerously of late, not only for the South African and Namibian peoples, but also for the peoples of other countries which have suffered the terrible horrors and effects of the war waged by the racist regime of South Africa, as well as for mankind at large, for the persistence of apartheid, with all its consequences and the actions undertaken to strengthen it, could cause the present conflict and tension to result in unforeseeable consequences.

Indeed, the apartheid regime, the illegal occupation of Namibia, and acts of aggression by the racist regime against other states of the region are at the core of the question of Southern Africa. It is perfectly clear that the restoration of peace to the area requires the independence of Namibia and the elimination of the South African racist regime. In our view, therefore, the situation in Southern Africa should be the object of the very closest attention during the current series of meetings, so that the Council may find the most effective means and the most just solutions for the settlement of the problems of the region, in accordance with the numerous resolutions already adopted by this organization, particularly Security Council Resolution 435 (1978).

But seven years after its adoption that Resolution still remains unimple-

mented, in spite of its binding nature. That situation is a result not only of the intransigence of the racist regime of South Africa, but also of the collusion of certain Western powers which have pursued policies of connivance and alliance with the apartheid regime. Those policies include the "linkage" conceived by the United States Administration with the sole aim of delaying, or even preventing the full and effective implementation of Resolution 435 (1978).

Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) contains the legal and political basis for the solution of the problem of Namibian independence, and was adopted unanimously. It should be recalled that, in conformity with one of the principles of the Charter, members of the United Nations are obliged in good faith to discharge their obligations under that Charter. That means that full implementation of the Resolution in question is part of the positive responsibility of all member states. In that context it is unacceptable to put forward elements extraneous to that resolution and thus categorically rejected by the entire international community.

That is why, by its Resolution 539 (1983), the Security Council rejected all South African attempts to link the independence of Namibia with extraneous matters such as the withdrawal from the People's Republic of Angola of Cuban internationalist forces, whose presence is fully in keeping with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and falls within the exclusive sovereign competence of Angola.

The traditional arrogance of the racist South African government, which refuses to yield to United Nations resolutions, is unquestionably being encouraged by the policy of the United States of America regarding Southern Africa. The most recent edition of that policy is the notion of "Constructive Engagement", and it is aimed only at uninterrupted exploitation of the natural resources of Namibia by foreign economic interests, in defiance of Council for Namibia Decree No. 1 for the protection of the natural resources of Namibia, and at strengthening the aggressive military machine of the Pretoria regime by encouraging it to maintain its occupation of Namibia and to continue its acts of aggression and subversion against neighbouring states.

Despite South Africa's persistent and increasing use of force and the threat of force in the undeclared war it has been waging against Angola for more than ten years, the People's Republic of Angola, loyal to its principles and scrupulously respectful of the Charter of the United Nations, has given eloquent proof of its political and diplomatic flexibility and goodwill by making a positive contribution to the establishment of a just and lasting peace in Southern Africa.

The People's Republic of Angola, in order to guarantee the speedy independence of the Namibian people, has put forward a platform for very realistic comprehensive negotiations to break the deadlock on the problem of Namibia. It has proposed a programme for reducing the number of Cuban

troops on our territory, the main features of which are: first, completion of the withdrawal of South African forces from the territory of the People's Republic of Angola and patrol of the Angolan frontier by the armed forces of the People's Republic of Angola; secondly, a solemn declaration by South Africa committing it to ensure implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) on the independence of Namibia; thirdly, a cease-fire agreement between the Republic of South Africa and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people; and fourthly, the signing, under Security Council auspices, of an international agreement between the Governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of South Africa and the Republic of Cuba and a representative of SWAPO, which would define the obligations assumed by each of the parties to assure the independence of Namibia and the guarantees necessary to preserve the security and territorial integrity of the People's Republic of Angola.

Meeting those requirements would be a major step towards the exercise by the Namibian people of its inalienable right to independence and towards the establishment of peace in the region.

However, despite the efforts and good-will of the People's Republic of Angola and other Frontline States, South Africa's attitude continues to be very hostile towards the international community. That attitude is made possible by the complicity and support it enjoys from certain western powers, which should be held directly responsible for the difficult situation in Southern Africa and for the policy of state terrorism pursued by the racist regime of South Africa against neighbouring states.

The lack of sincerity of the racist regime of Pretoria regarding the search for a genuine solution and for peace in the region is increasingly manifest. But while the Angolan government has been showing its traditional good-will, negotiating with the South African government on the holding of a meeting at ministerial level, Pretoria's aggressive military machine has been planning, since January 1985, under the direction of Major-General Liebenberg, Commander of Special Forces, Operation Argon, aimed at destroying the Malongo oil complex in Cabinda Province.

They thought that in that way they would force the legitimate government of the People's Republic of Angola to submit to their will, and to the will of the puppet gangs of UNITA, to whom the operation would be attributed if it were successful.

To carry out this machiavellian operation an experienced group of Pretoria's Special Forces was chosen, one belonging to the Fortieth Regiment of the Special Forces of the South African Defence Force, which has its training camp at the Bay of Saldanha, in Cape Province. This camp of the South African Special Forces was commanded by Captain Du Toit, who was taken prisoner by the Angolan Defence Force. It should be pointed out that Captain Du

Toit has a long record of terrorism and that he had already participated in November 1982 in the destruction of a bridge of the Giraul River in the Province of Namibia, and in 1983 and 1984 in the Cahama actions and in one of the attacks on Maputo, the capital of the sister Republic of Mozambique. After completing training at the Bay of Saldanha, more than 2 000 kilometres from Cabinda, the South African terrorist group, consisting of nine men, embarked for Cabinda on 13 May on board the *SAS Juin Zonde*, a vessel of Israeli manufacture, and landed on 20 May during the night. However, at 17h00 on 21 May, while waiting until nightfall for the carrying out of their sinister plans, the South African terrorist gang was discovered by a patrol of the Angolan Army, which killed two of the enemy and took the leader of the group prisoner . . .

. . . The apartheid regime, which is once again testing the patience of the international community, intends to install on 17 June a puppet government in Namibia on the basis of so-called elections to be held among so-called political parties which in fact represent no one in Namibia and are not recognized by the United Nations or the Organization of African Unity. The People's Republic of Angola strongly condemns this attempt by South Africa to evade the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia and to impose an internal settlement within the framework of the so-called Multi-Party Conference.

Once again the Pretoria regime has shown that it does not have the slightest intention of abiding by the letter or the spirit of decisions and resolutions of the United Nations on Namibia but, on the contrary, is seeking to perpetuate its domination, oppression and repression of the heroic people of Namibia.

That Government, which would be nothing but a colonial South African cabinet on Namibian territory, will not have international recognition, and consequently its actions will be null and void. Furthermore, it should be recalled that any solution for the Namibian problem could have validity only if it is adopted with the participation of SWAPO, the sole and legitimate representative of the Namibian people, and if it is brought about within the framework laid down by the United Nations, because Namibia is an international territory under the mandate of the United Nations Council for Namibia, as the lawful administering authority of the territory until it achieves independence.

It was in that context that the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, meeting from 19 to 21 April 1985, considered that it would be useful for the Security Council to be convened so that it could fully discharge its responsibilities for the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978).

This session of the Security Council presents an exceptional opportunity to live up to our commitments and to the ideals, goals and principles of the Charter and our international responsibilities in this year of the fortieth anni-

versary of the United Nations and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. The People's Republic of Angola hopes that this time the Security Council will justify the confidence placed in it by the international community as the organ whose principal responsibility is the maintenance of international peace and security and will demand the immediate implementation by South Africa of the United Nations plan for Namibian independence. If South Africa persists in its attitude of arrogance, intransigence and obstructionism, the Security Council must envisage the adoption of appropriate measures in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which provides an abundance of means of isolating and eliminating the odious system of apartheid . . .

E. Extracts from the West German Ambassador's Address to the United Nations Security Council during the "Situation in Namibia" Debate on 12 June 1985

. . . The situation in Southern Africa gives cause for great anxiety. My government has observed with dismay the escalation of violence in South Africa over the past few weeks and notes with concern that the use of force has generally increased, not least due to excessive police action. It appeals to those holding responsibility in South Africa to create without delay a political order that will have the support of all South Africans.

In this context the elimination of apartheid in the Republic of South Africa by peaceful means remains a prime objective of our policy. The government of the Federal Republic of Germany regards apartheid as racial discrimination and condemns it without qualification . . .

Regrettably, Security Council Resolution 435 has not yet been carried into effect. Action to implement it is long overdue and my government can understand the embitterment of the African states. It shares their disappointment at Namibia still not having gained independence. My government believes that the right of the Namibian people to self-determination and independence must be recognized and should be implemented irrespective of any other problem, although we appreciate that there are important problems still unresolved.

Our position on the Namibia question has at all times been clear and unequivocal. In the recent past, my government has reaffirmed its unmistakable position time and again, most recently on 28 May in Bonn on the occasion of the 22nd Anniversary of the Foundation of the Organization of African Unity, when Foreign Minister Genscher addressed this topic.

We consider Resolution 435 to be the indispensable basis for a settlement of the Namibia question. In our view, it is the only basis on which Namibia

can acquire internationally recognized independence. According to that resolution, the constitution of an independent Namibia must be elaborated solely by a constituent assembly convened as a result of free and fair elections under United Nations supervision.

The imminent installation of a so-called interim government and of other institutions is an act undertaken by South Africa unilaterally and in violation of the provisions of Security Council Resolution 435. Furthermore, the South African government is not authorized to delegate its responsibility for the implementation of the United Nations settlement plan to any political party in Namibia . . .

We share the critical view expressed by many delegations over the past few days that the measures now envisaged come very close to a unilateral declaration of independence. This would be to embark upon a road which directly affects the role of the United Nations in the task of resolving the Namibia problem . . .

The government of the Federal Republic of Germany will follow developments in Namibia with unfailing attention. In doing so, it will stay in close consultation with the other members of the Contact Group, despite all the set-backs. It will not tire in its joint efforts with them to achieve the early implementation of Security Council Resolution 435. We are convinced that a peaceful settlement of the Namibia question will also be conducive to regional detente and a reduction of military presence in the area.

F. Extracts from the French Permanent Representative's Address to the United Nations Security Council during the "Situation in Namibia" Debate on 13 June 1985

. . . France fully shares the concern of the Non-Aligned Countries, which, at their meeting held at New Delhi last April, decided to ask the Security Council once again to consider the question of Namibia. That concern, that frustration are particularly great for the African countries, which are impatient to see Namibia achieve independence at last.

It is known that France has taken an active part in the efforts of the international community to make South Africa live up to its obligations. I have no wish to go over the past, since everyone here will remember it, but shall try to refer only to the present situation.

The United Nations, particularly the Security Council, bears primary responsibility towards Namibia and its people. There is a United Nations plan, which constitutes the only acceptable basis for a final settlement of the question of Namibia. It is contained in Security Council Resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978). Those Resolutions form a coherent whole and could be fully implemented rapidly.

The difficulties of implementing the plan have been removed through hard negotiations. As the Secretary-General reminds us in his report, virtually all the pending questions concerning the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978) have been practically resolved. All that remains to be settled is the problem of the electoral system to be used in elections to the constituent assembly. In its Resolution 539 (1983) of October 1983, the Security Council called upon South Africa to communicate to the Secretary-General forthwith its choice of the electoral system. My delegation can only regret that such communication has not yet been made. But, as we all know, this is not the essential point.

Resolution 539 (1983) condemned South Africa for its obstruction of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) and rejected South Africa's insistence on linking the independence of Namibia to issues extraneous to the implementation of the settlement plan.

In his report, the Secretary-General points out that the South African government has persisted in its intransigence and has reiterated the unacceptable link between the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978) and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Just a few days ago, the permanent representative of South Africa repeated here his government's demands on that point.

France, which voted for Resolution 539 (1983), has a clear and consistent position on the subject. Although it is well known to everyone here, I hope that I may be permitted to recall it briefly, as follows. Namibia's accession to independence cannot be obstructed by extraneous considerations. Resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978) which bind all member states of the United Nations, are sufficient in themselves. They must be implemented unconditionally and without any preconditions. From the moment that the necessary conditions for the implementation of those resolutions had been met, the French government took the logical step of suspending, in December 1983, its participation in the work of the Contact Group, whose mandate in effect was only to facilitate the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978).

However, France continues to regard itself as being wholly concerned in the matter, and intends to continue its tireless efforts in favour of Namibia's accession to internationally recognized independence. The French government therefore reacted without waiting for the announcement by the South African government of its decision to set up an interim government in Namibia. In a communique of 19 April, it recalled its commitment to Resolution 435 (1978) and stated that it regarded as null and void the effects of any initiative aimed at setting up an interim government in Namibia. That decision by South Africa casts doubt on its willingness to abide by its agreements, and will complicate even further any move to bring about the rapid application of the United Nations settlement plan . . .

I should like to welcome to the debate Mr Sam Nujoma, the eminent rep-

representative of the Namibian people. We are particularly happy that the President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) was able last week to have talks with the French Prime Minister. I am also pleased to be able to say that today the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia is in Paris for talks in the course of which there will be, in particular, an evaluation of my country's contributions to the United Nations funds for Namibia.

The prolongation of the conflict is also fraught with danger for the stability of the countries of Southern Africa, and particularly the People's Republic of Angola. The signing in February 1984 of the Lusaka Agreement, designed to guarantee the region's stability and security, was welcomed. Although there was some delay in its implementation, the agreement made possible the disengagement of South African troops which had occupied the southern part of Angola since August 1981. In the circumstances, one could only be profoundly concerned at the recent action by South African forces in the North of Angola, which once again threatens that country's sovereignty and introduces new obstacles to a peaceful settlement of the regional problems . . .

G. Extracts from Nigerian Ambassador Garba's address to the United Nations Security Council during the "Situation in Namibia" Debate on 11 June 1985. (Ambassador Garba is also Chairman of the UN Committee on Apartheid).

. . . Recent events have unfolded like a well-dressed scenario. First, South Africa announces the withdrawal of its troops from Angola. Mr Botha declared that the move would enhance the prospect of peace in the region and open the way for the peaceful resolution of the question of independence for Namibia. This declaration is followed three days later by another to the effect that South Africa intends to go ahead and set up an interim administration for Namibia. South African troops later marched out ceremoniously. The South African President tells parliament that the move "places the burden of ensuring that cross-border violence does not escalate, squarely on the shoulders of the Angolan government". But a few weeks later, it is Botha's troops who steal back, unaccompanied this time by TV cameras and regimental bands, and are caught trying to blow up vital oil installations in the Enclave of Cabinda. Let it be noted, Mr President, that Cabinda is some 2 000 miles from South African frontiers and 1 000 miles North of the Namibia borders. Writing about the episode the *Daily Telegraph* provides the liberal commentary that South Africa is plainly "prepared to go to any lengths, break any promises, threaten any alliances in order to defend what she regards as her own legitimate interests". This commentary leaves undefined the so called "legitimate interests" of South Africa. The "legitimate interests" of South

Africa are self-evident. They underpin the reasoning of the South African state and feature in the views, the values and the conduct of that state. These are the interests of racism, destabilization of the Frontline States and attempts to bantustanize them. Pretoria serves as the faithful lap dog of the West and in more ways than featuring the original and historical traits of the West which today strenuously seeks to shed lingering attitudes to slavery, religious prejudice, class snobbery, neo-nazi attitudes and pure racism. Although apartheid South Africa is bad enough in serving its own vile and reprehensible interests, evidence is also conclusive that she acts as the Western cat's paw . . .

No meaningful dialogue, in fact no dialogue with Pretoria is possible. Previous efforts have clearly demonstrated this. Yesterday, this august Council as on previous occasions was subjected to the odium, insults and innuendo of racist South Africa. *In his statement he made a number of spurious points:*

South Africa asserts that it is fighting communism and as such it would use any method to fight communism, including the violation of the territorial integrity of Angola. The problem is that in the lexicon of South Africa, independence and self-determination are synonymous with communism. In addition, the talk of the "communist peril" is a catch-all bait for its friends and allies in the West . . .

H. Extracts from the Canadian Ambassador's address to the United Nations Security Council during the "Situation in Namibia" debate on 13 June 1985.

. . . Recent events in Namibia and Angola, however, give cause for disillusion verging on despair. We have been discussing the same plan for Namibian independence for the better part of a decade. That is frustrating for all of us . . . for all members of the Council . . . but any level of frustration which we may endure is as nothing when compared to the plight of the Namibian people and the continued denial of justice which they experience. Such denial is all the more reprehensible when it defies both international law and the international community.

Yet, as if such contemptuous intransigence were not enough, we are now informed that there is to be another interim government in Namibia. Other than wilful provocation, Mr President, what purpose does that serve?

As the Secretary-General notes in his report, Canada strongly supported the position he took on this matter. The evasive and dissembling response given by the government of South Africa was entirely inconsistent with the proposal which the five Western governments submitted to this Council on 10 April 1978. So seven years later, we are faced yet again with measures which are unacceptable to the international community, which challenge the UN plan, and which cannot conceivably succeed.

But that's only half of it. While these steps are being taken in Namibia, we receive word that South Africa is withdrawing its forces from Angola—a step we would warmly welcome, as we would welcome a total South African disengagement from Angola.

However, the appearance was masked in duplicity. We now have sad and vivid evidence that South Africa still seeks what it will never achieve—the reshaping of the region, unilaterally, through the use of force and without regard for the sovereignty and independence of neighbouring states.

South Africa pleads—as an excuse—the need for security. How can anyone give credence to that? The world knows that the challenge to the South African state does not stem from the situation outside its borders. The seeds of change are sown within.

These are all depressing developments because they offer scant reason to believe South Africa is close to accepting its neighbours as they are and living in peace with them. Worse, the developments offer scant reason to believe that South Africa is ready to co-operate with us in bringing Namibia to independence through free and fair elections under UN supervision . . .

Some have implied that part of the responsibility for the current impasse lies at the feet of the Contact Group. That suggestion is unwarranted. The members of this Council know full well that Canada's reason for belonging to the Contact Group has been to facilitate Namibia's independence in accordance with the UN plan. That's the way it began. That is the basis on which some excellent work was done.

That does not mean, however, that we're blind to the delays of the last two years. We're not. The Contact Group, with the best will in the world, has not succeeded, any more than others, in bringing independence to Namibia. It is necessary to admit that, openly, and with candour. Nonetheless, the Contact Group should not disband, because it still has a role to play, one day, under Resolution 435.

Having said that, Mr President, Canada admits that it's very difficult to know how to proceed. We shall have to look to other steps that member states might take—steps which demonstrate that patience is long-gone, and that the time to move strongly is now.

We should perhaps consider reaffirming and re-endorsing the voluntary measures as set out in Security Council Resolution 283 of 1970. Member states may wish to examine what they have done to conform with its provisions. The provisions were strong. Such measures merit further response as we await the setting of a date for the implementation of Resolution 435 . . .

Several times in this debate, speakers have referred to the 40th Anniversary year. That leads me to one final observation. I think everyone agrees that nothing would so serve the reputation of the United Nations as a significant breakthrough on some significant aspect of peace and security. It could, with dramatic impact, turn public perceptions around.

The independence of Namibia is the logical focus. It is the issue on which there is virtual international unanimity. Just as the system of apartheid has only one defender, so freedom for Namibia has only one obstacle. The pervarications of the last seven years, the contempt for UN resolutions, the perpetual state of strife, the introduction of yet another illegal interim government, the recent revelations in Angola, and above all, the prolonged suffering and oppression of the Namibian people must surely win from this Council a resolution on which we can all agree, and which will lead to that elusive breakthrough.

The timing could not be better. There is a rising crescendo of impatience with South Africa throughout the world—mirrored in the speeches at this Council table; signalled—as in Canada and other countries—by reviews of government policy; reflected most recently by the votes in the American Congress . . .

- I. Extracts from the Tanzanian Foreign Minister's address on behalf of the Chairman of the OAU, delivered to the United Nations Security Council during the "Situation in Namibia" debate on 10 June 1985.

. . . The present meetings have been made more urgent by the most recent decision of the apartheid regime to impose an internal settlement in Namibia through the installation of a so-called interim government drawn from a coalition of its puppets under the umbrella of the so-called Multi-Party Conference. The Security Council, therefore, no longer faces simply obstruction of the implementation of its Resolution 435 (1978), it is also confronting the formal beginning of the bantustanization of Namibia.

No policy framework has done more to undermine the international efforts to free Namibia than the so-called policy of constructive engagement. Put into effect five years ago, that policy has attempted to lend the apartheid regime international respectability and has rewarded it with collaboration in all fields as well as with general political protection. That collaboration has found concrete expression in closer diplomatic ties and contacts and in scientific and military co-operation. In the economic field, the certificate of political respectability accorded it by constructive engagement has paved the way for billions of dollars of new investments and loans for South Africa.

Can there be any doubt that constructive engagement has emboldened and sustained South Africa's defiance? I invite the Council to recall the way the apartheid regime brandished that political support and protection when it contemptuously rejected Resolution 539 (1983) in a statement it issued on 29 October 1983, when this council was forced to meet under circumstances similar to the present ones.

Constructive engagement is the twin linkage, that horrendously absurd precept making the independence of Namibia conditional upon the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. It must surely be obvious now that the presence of those troops is being used to mask the deep-rooted political opposition of the apartheid regime and its allies to Namibia's independence as well as to protect the multinational interests, which have convergent desires to continue plundering the natural resources of Namibia. Moreover, the apartheid regime and its friends have settled upon the course of using the presence of those troops to try to attain long-standing political objectives against the People's Republic of Angola. As a result, Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) remains unimplemented, and linkage stands in the way.

Over the past few months the anti-apartheid forces throughout the world have redoubled their opposition to apartheid. Outraged by the unrepentant and ruthlessly oppressive attacks launched by the apartheid regime against the black population and its leaders, anti-apartheid groups are asserting their moral and institutional authority. People march by the thousands, legislatures act on divestment, cultural and sports organizations distance themselves farther and farther away from South Africa. We salute and thank them. Can the Council afford to ignore these spontaneous pleas and impassioned injunctions of the people, of legislatures and of governments?

We have not come to this Council for yet another Resolution. We already have 22 of them. We have come here to urge this Council to assume its responsibilities seriously and ensure that implementation commences. We have come again to impress upon the five Western members of the Contact Group their own responsibility in working for the scrupulous implementation of a plan which they had themselves been instrumental in formulating.

We have come before this Council because we believe that the situation in Namibia has reached a crossroads. The challenge before the Council is therefore enormous. Through its actions, it can help pave the way towards the freedom of Namibia and avert the dangers of the growing confrontation in Southern Africa in general. We earnestly urge the Security Council to respond to the anguished cry of the Namibian people for liberty.

J. Extracts from the Indian External Affairs Minister of State's address on behalf of the Non-Aligned Group delivered to the United Nations Security Council during the "Situation in Namibia" Debate on 10 June 1985.

... With regard to the latest obstacle posed by Pretoria in the way of implementation of Resolution 435 (1978), namely, the decision to establish a so-called interim government in Windhoek, the Bureau expressed its strong condemnation and observed that this development made it all the more im-

perative that the Security Council meet forthwith and assume its responsibilities fully to ensure the speedy and unconditional implementation of Resolution 435 (1978).

It is pertinent to recall here that the Security Council, through the statement made by the President on 3 May 1985, has condemned and rejected any unilateral action by South Africa leading towards an internal settlement outside Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) as unacceptable, and declared the establishment of the so-called Interim Government in Namibia to be null and void.

It is, again, characteristic of South Africa that it should choose to defy international public opinion and the Security Council and press ahead with its plans to install a puppet administration in Namibia. We have learnt with indignation and grave concern of reports regarding the ceremony planned for 17 June in Windhoek. In its communique of 4 June 1985, issued in the course of its Extraordinary Plenary Meetings in Vienna, the Council for Namibia has called upon the Security Council "to take appropriate measures to preempt the installation of the Interim Government and to ensure the immediate and unconditional implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibian independence". We fully endorse this call by the legal administering authority for Namibia until independence.

As the Co-ordinating Bureau noted at its recent meeting, the international community has shown exemplary patience with an arrogant and intransigent regime. If South Africa persists in its intransigence there can be no option but to impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter . . .

K. Text of the Resolution adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations on the question of Namibia on 19 June 1985.

The Security Council,
having considered the reports of the Secretary-General (S/16237 and S/17242),

having heard the statement by the Acting President of the United Nations Council for Namibia,

having considered the statement by Dr Sam Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO),

commending the South West Africa People's Organization for its preparedness to co-operate fully with the United Nations Secretary-General and his Special Representative, including its expressed readiness to sign and observe a cease-fire agreement with South Africa, in the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia as embodied in Security Council Resolution 435 (1978),

recalling General Assembly Resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966,

recalling and reaffirming its resolutions 269 (1969), 276 (1970), 301 (1971), 385 (1976), 431 (1978), 432 (1978), 435 (1978), 439 (1978), 532 (1983) and 539 (1983),

recalling the statement of the President of the Security Council (S/17151) of 3 May 1985, on behalf of the Council, which *inter alia*, declared the establishment of the so-called Interim Government in Namibia to be null and void,

gravely concerned at the tension and instability created by the hostile policies of the apartheid regime throughout Southern Africa and the mounting threat to the security of the region and its wider implications for international peace and security resulting from that regime's continued utilization of Namibia as a springboard for military attacks against and destabilization of African states in the region,

reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for ensuring the implementation of its resolutions, in particular Resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978) which contain the United Nations Plan for Namibian independence,

noting that 1985 marks the Fortieth Anniversary of the Founding of the United Nations, as well as the twenty-fifth anniversary of the adoption of the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, and expressing grave concern that the question of Namibia has been with the Organization since its inception and still remains unresolved,

welcoming the emerging and intensified world-wide campaign of people from all spheres of life against the racist regime of South Africa in a concerted effort to bring about an end to the illegal occupation of Namibia and of apartheid,

1. Condemns South Africa for its continued illegal occupation of Namibia in flagrant defiance of resolutions of the General Assembly and decisions of the Security Council of the United Nations;
2. Reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of the Namibian people against the illegal occupation of the racist regime of South Africa and calls upon all states to increase their moral and material assistance to them;
3. Further condemns the racist regime of South Africa for its installation of a so-called Interim Government in Windhoek and declares that this action, taken even while the Security Council has been in session, constitutes a direct affront to it and a clear defiance of its resolutions, particularly Resolution 435 (1978) and 439 (1978);
4. Declares that action to be illegal and null and void and states that no recognition will be accorded either by the United Nations or any member state to it or to any representative or organ established in pursuance thereof;
5. Demands that the racist regime of South Africa immediately rescind the

aforementioned illegal and unilateral action;

6. Further condemns South Africa for its obstruction of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) by insisting on conditions contrary to the provisions of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia;

7. Rejects once again South Africa's insistence on linking the independence of Namibia to irrelevant and extraneous issues as incompatible with Resolution 435 (1978), other decisions of the Security Council and the Resolutions of the General Assembly on Namibia, including General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960;

8. Declares once again that the independence of Namibia cannot be held hostage to the resolution of issues that are alien to Security Council Resolution 435 (1978);

9. Reiterates that Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), embodying the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia, is the only internationally accepted basis for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian problem and demands its immediate and unconditional implementation;

10. Affirms that the consultations undertaken by the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Resolution 532 (1983) have confirmed that all the outstanding issues relevant to Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) have been resolved, except for the choice of the electoral system;

11. Decides to mandate the Secretary-General to resume immediate contact with South Africa with a view to obtaining its choice of the electoral system to be used for the election, under United Nations supervision and control, for the constituent assembly, in terms of Resolution 435 (1978), in order to pave the way for the adoption by the Security Council of the Enabling Resolution for the implementation of the United Nations independence plan for Namibia;

12. Demands that South Africa co-operate fully with the Security Council and the Secretary-General in the implementation of the present resolution;

13. Strongly warns South Africa that failure to do so would compel the Security Council to meet forthwith to consider the adoption of appropriate measures under the UN Charter including Chapter VII as additional pressure to ensure South Africa's compliance with the above mentioned resolutions.

14. Urges member states of the UN that have not done so to consider in the meantime taking appropriate voluntary measures against South Africa, which could include:

(a) Stopping of new investments and application of disincentives to this end;

(b) Re-examination of maritime and aerial relations with South Africa;

(c) The prohibition of the sale of Krugerrands and all other coins minted in South Africa;

(d) Restrictions in the field of sports and cultural relations.

15. Requests the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of the present resolution not later than the first week of September;
16. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to meet immediately upon receipt of the Secretary-General's report for the purpose of reviewing progress in the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978) and, in the event of continued obstruction by South Africa, to invoke Paragraph 13 above.

L. Extracts from statements made by the Representatives of the United Kingdom, United States of America and France in the Security Council addressing adoption of the Resolution on Namibia on 19 June 1985

(i) *United Kingdom*

... It was clear from the debate that members of the Council were unanimous in condemning South Africa's installation of an Interim Government in Windhoek, in condemning recent attacks by South African forces in neighbouring countries, in regarding Resolution 435 (1978) as the only internationally accepted basis for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian problem, and in pressing for an urgent decision by South Africa to implement that resolution. These elements should and could have provided the basis for a draft resolution commanding the unanimous support of the council. The adoption of such a resolution would have sent a clear signal of our disapproval and our determination to the South African government. It would have assisted continuing efforts to negotiate the implementation of the settlement plan.

My delegation therefore went to great lengths to try to bring about a draft resolution on these lines. As you know, we formulated specific and constructive proposals which, in our view, should have been acceptable to all Security Council members. I must pay tribute, Mr President, to the constructive efforts which you made to the same end. I must regret that these proposals did not meet with the response for which we have hoped, and that a draft resolution has been submitted which it is known we cannot support.

We cannot support any suggestion that armed struggle is to be preferred to negotiations. We do not think it helpful to ask the Secretary-General to undertake steps which, in their nature or time frame, are unrealistic.

Above all, we do not think that the Council should seek to tie the hands of member states in the manner proposed or to prejudge the outcome of future meetings. Our vote on this resolution therefore does not imply acceptance that, in future circumstances which are as yet unknown, the Council will embark on a predetermined course of action. Each member state should act in the way it considers most appropriate to assist the Council in the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978). The Council has a responsibility to protect

and advance the settlement plan. It is in accordance with that responsibility as we see it that the United Kingdom is obliged to abstain today.

It remains our firm intention to continue our efforts to bring about the earliest possible implementation of the United Nations plan. We hope that this aim is shared by all other members of the Council.

(ii) USA

... As you know, Sir, from our long conversations, my delegation sought to support a strong resolution on Namibia which would have sent a clear, united, unambiguous message to the government of South Africa. We regret that, despite these efforts, unanimity was not achieved. Let me be clear in saying that the United States rejects the establishment of a so-called Interim Government in Namibia as null and void. These institutions created by Pretoria have no standing. We condemn any act by any party which could be seen as leading to a settlement outside Resolution 435 (1978), the only internationally acceptable basis for a peaceful solution to the Namibia problem. We have also condemned South Africa's attack on Gaborone, Botswana, and its attempted raid in Cabinda, Angola.

The United States remains committed to and actively involved in the search for Namibian independence in accordance with Resolution 435 (1978). We have come a long way in this search and will continue to pursue our objective, an objective we share with all members of the international community, for as long as there is a prospect for success.

In spite of the recriminations and condemnations we have heard in this Council chamber over the past several days, and in spite of some of the formulations in the resolution before us, it is clear to all of us here that one key issue remains to be resolved before Resolution 435 (1978) can be implemented, finalizing an agreement on the withdrawal of foreign combat forces from Angola. It is not a matter of doctrine or of juridical precondition. It is, however, an objective fact that must be dealt with. This has been recognized by all parties to the negotiations.

In this regard, we welcomed the letter of 17 November 1984 from President Dos Santos to the Secretary-General, setting out Angola's specific proposals for resolving this issue. This was an important step forward. Our contacts with the parties since that time suggests that there exists a real potential for further progress, but this will only happen if they summon the political will to take further decisions towards peace.

Our desire to make clear our opposition to South Africa's action in Namibia has convinced us not to oppose this resolution. However, there were a number of elements in it with which we are not in agreement and which led us, reluctantly, to abstain. We find it hard to reaffirm resolutions that we did not affirm in the first place. Our central concern is that mandatory sanctions are not likely to advance the cause of peace and Namibian independence.

Rather, it is our judgement that they are likely to encourage the necessary social and political changes in South Africa and promote the elimination of the abhorrent policy of apartheid. We cannot, therefore, in good faith conscientiously join in urging others to undertake actions which we believe would slow down the achievement of that objective.

(iii) France

The international community is increasingly irritated by South Africa's delaying tactics and intransigence on the question of Namibia.

For its part, France wishes to reaffirm here the position stated on 31 May 1985 by its Prime Minister. If there has been no significant movement by the South African government within 18 months, France will take unilateral economic measures against South Africa.

In the Security Council, France is prepared, when the time comes, to consider the adoption of appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations. We do not believe that now is the time to resort to measures on the basis of Chapter VII.

Text for all material in Section 1 supplied by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs.

SECTION 2

A. The statement made by Botswana's Minister of External Affairs, Dr G. K. T. Chiepe to the Security Council during the Gaborone incursion debate on 21 June 1985

... The case we have brought to this Council is a simple one, though tragic. The world already knows that on Friday, 14 June 1985, at 01h40, the peaceful capital of my country, Botswana, was invaded by South African Commandos who murdered in cold blood, in their sleep, six South African refugees, two residents, two visitors (one of whom was a six year old child from Lesotho) and two Botswana nationals. The invasion was unprovoked and unwarranted. It was the culmination of a progressively aggressive South African attitude towards my country which has deteriorated as the agitation for change has intensified inside South Africa.

Botswana and South Africa have always coexisted in peace despite their conflicting philosophies of life. My people abhor without reservation the evil policy of apartheid and the rabid racism that feeds and sustains it. But they are realistic enough to appreciate that they and the people of South Africa have been thrown together by fate to share space in the part of the African subcontinent they presently occupy, and will always occupy. They have to live together in peace or they will perish together in conflict. This is why my country has never allowed its very determined opposition to apartheid to undermine its commitment to the principle of peaceful coexistence. Our

fideli ty to this principle is unquestionable, our determination to uphold it sacrosanct.

This is so despite the fact that South Africa has in the past two years continuously insisted that we sign with her a non-aggression pact as if our country is capable of committing an act or acts of aggression against so deadly powerful a neighbour. My country has constantly refused to sign such a pact. We would be mad even to imagine that we can attack South Africa. Botswana is a peace-loving country whose only desire is to develop economically and coexist peacefully with all its neighbours.

We have repeatedly argued that the signing of a so-called non-aggression pact with South Africa would, in addition to compromising our sovereignty, serve no useful purpose since a mere signature cannot enhance our capacity to be more vigilant than we are now against guerrilla infiltration into South Africa. If South Africa herself with all the overwhelming resources at her command is incapable, as is obviously the case, of sealing her borders against infiltration what more of our small country with meagre resources?

Our country has always been punctiliously scrupulous in honouring its word. The truth is that we have never allowed, can never allow, will never allow our vulnerable country to be used as a base for guerrilla operations against South Africa. That is why the South African Commandos found not one military camp or centre on their arrival in our capital on that fateful Friday morning, but a peaceful, even placid, town in bed, fast asleep. It has been the sacrosanct policy of the Botswana government since independence never to permit the presence in our country of instruments of war intended to be employed against any of our neighbours. That we have apprehended, tried publicly in our courts of law and imprisoned and/or deported all those we come into contact with carrying weapons of war bears more than ample testimony to our adherence and commitment to the inviolability of our policy.

But, in fulfilment of our statutory obligations as a state party to the 1951 Geneva Conventions relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1969 OAU Convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa, and as a humanitarian and moral obligation and duty, we give political asylum to refugees fleeing the persecution, the brutalities that result from the inhumanities of apartheid in South Africa. This we will do regardless of the consequences for we are a freedom-loving people and country. It would be morally repugnant to us to deny hospitality to our fellow men in their flight from racial tyranny.

The trail of developments leading to the Friday aggression against our capital is an uncomplicated one, Mr President. Having failed to get us to sign a non-aggression pact whose utility could only be best known to and appreciated by South Africa, in January this year the rulers of South Africa, through the Bantustan of Bophuthatswana, issued an unveiled threat that unless Botswana stopped allowing her territory to be used as a launching pad

to attack South Africa, South Africa would invade Botswana and take retaliatory action. When we publicized the threat the South African Foreign Minister denied that the threat had been issued by his country and said he had simply reported what he had been told by Bophuthatswana. For our part, we reminded South Africa of our well-known policy regarding the regime that governs the presence of refugees in our country.

At the request of the South African Foreign Minister a meeting was arranged for 22 February 1985 between him and myself. In the meantime, on February 13, nine days before the meeting was to take place, a bomb blasted a house in Gaborone, our capital, in which some South African refugees lived. Miraculously, the occupants escaped unhurt.

On 22 February the two sides met and had full and frank discussions on the state of relations between our two countries. Botswana once again explained at great length why we refused to sign a non-aggression pact.

We argued that since it was neither our intention to launch an attack on South Africa, nor did we have the capacity to do so, we saw no reason why we should sign a non-aggression pact with South Africa. We harboured no warlike intentions or ambitions towards South Africa, for that would be sheer madness on our part, as we had repeatedly stated.

On the hackneyed South African staple charge that freedom fighters use our country to infiltrate South Africa, we argued that just as South Africa neither allowed her nationals to leave their country as refugees nor allowed them back as so-called terrorists but is constantly eluded by them in spite of her highly sophisticated and practically unlimited intelligence gathering capacity and over-abundant material, financial and human resources, Botswana cannot be blamed when occasionally the same people elude her and cross into and attack South Africa. We reminded Mr Botha of the case of two British tourists who had a few days earlier been murdered in Mozambique by people who had crossed into Mozambique from South Africa and returned to the latter after committing the murder. We asked him if South Africa were to blame for allowing them to commit the murder? Mr Botha agreed that a government could not be blamed for acts of terrorism perpetrated in such circumstances. In keeping with our well-known policy and tradition of honesty and fairmindedness we have always asked the South Africans to warn us timeously whenever they knew of incidents which needed to be followed up quickly. We reminded Mr Botha of this tradition at the 22 February meeting.

We did not agree on everything, Mr President, we did not solve everything, but the meeting ended amicably with the South African Foreign Minister assuring us that South Africa fully believed what we had said and therefore would not again ask us to sign any agreement. He also assured us that they would no longer block our economic projects which they had attempted to link to the signing of a non-aggression pact in contravention of the terms of the Customs Union agreement to which we both belong. Mr Botha

then announced to the world that our meeting had been so fruitful that Botswana would no longer be pressed to sign a non-aggression pact.

You can imagine the sense of relief we felt, Mr President. We went back to Botswana with a sense of achievement and I was able to say to the Botswana Parliament:

I am pleased to inform honourable members that after difficult negotiations lasting more than a year during which South Africa pressed Botswana to sign a non-aggression accord with her, the South African government has finally accepted our stand and publicly announced that there is no need for Botswana and South Africa to sign an accord. It is my hope that this particular chapter in our relations with South Africa is now closed and never to be re-opened.

We were pleased with what appeared to us a clear signal to the end of the inexplicable nastiness of Pretoria's attitude towards our country, but not naïve enough to believe that all would henceforth be plain sailing. We could never be lulled into believing that we had suddenly earned the unquestionable respect and trust of a self-appointed regional power accustomed to bullying its weak neighbours. We expected some more bullying and arm-twisting in some other direction but not what happened on Friday, 14 June, Mr President.

On Tuesday, 14 May, at around 10h00, a car belonging to a South African refugee, parked outside a block of flats adjacent to a primary school, blew up as the owner tried to start it. Needless to say, the hapless refugee was blown to smithereens. Had he started it earlier when school children were filing in and workers going to work, innocent school children, Botswana citizens and foreign nationals could have been maimed and killed. The perpetrators of these ghastly atrocities have now revealed themselves.

During the week beginning 3 June, Mr Pik Botha, the Foreign Minister of South Africa, suggested that we have a meeting either on 26 June or 2 July. His office was informed that I was away and due to standing commitments could not meet him before 23 July. In the small hours of 14 June South African Commandos raided our capital and later the same morning of 14 June before we could recover from the shock of the early morning's carnage, Mr Botha sent a telex to my office accepting 23 July as suitable for a meeting.

If this is not a Jekyll and Hyde situation, Mr President, it is difficult to imagine one when a responsible Minister can appear to want to discuss issues of mutual interest whilst at the same time he plans and executes the most cold-blooded terrorism with mathematical precision. Or is the meeting being called just to replay the televised wanton destruction accompanied by the display of sadistic pleasure at the fantastic and intoxicating success of the operation? Or is it to deliver another foretaste of things to come when South African Commandos will once more strike Botswana "with ruthless efficiency"? The warning has been given in no uncertain terms. The South African newspapers led by the government-supported *Citizen*, radio and tele-

vision and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Chief of the Army are beside themselves with the sheer delight they have derived in the whole sordid affair.

The excuse given by South Africa is that the recent attempt in Cape Town on the lives of two Coloured Members of Parliament was planned and executed from Gaborone, and it was the last straw on the South African government.

Since Cape Town is about 2000 kilometres from Gaborone, our capital, Mr President, several questions arise in one's mind:

- (i) In view of South Africa's sophisticated intelligence, communications and other resources, why did they not intercept and/or forestall the operation?
- (ii) Was it because the government of South Africa wanted the operation to succeed in order to use the assassination of the Coloured MPs to strengthen Pretoria's war against the ANC?
- (iii) Was it in order to portray Botswana as an unsafe country, the centre of guerrilla activity, and frighten prospective investors away from her?
- (iv) Did they allow it to happen in order to have a pretext to launch an attack on a peace-loving neighbouring country?

Yes, more nagging questions, Mr President. If the real reason for the brutal attack on our small defenceless capital was to flush out ANC nerve centres—as was the reason given for the aborted raid on the Cabinda oil complex a few weeks ago:

- (i) Would every house in which a refugee lived be a nerve centre?
- (ii) Could that justify the shooting, point blank, of a frightened fleeing six year old child?
- (iii) Did they have to shoot a Dutch couple because they lived in a house that had been vacated by the ANC refugees a month earlier—and they should have known this since they claim to know everything that takes place in the houses which they attacked on 14 June?
- (iv) Why did they murder two Batswana women who had absolutely nothing to do with the ANC?
- (v) Why did they shoot at Batswana going to their homes from dinner at an hotel?

Mr President, let us look at the particulars of the victims of the Friday attack to see if there is any truth in Pretoria's charge that they were guerrillas planning military attacks against South Africa from our capital. The murdered "ANC guerrillas" were a 60 year old man who emigrated from South Africa in the early fifties, a holder of a residence permit which was to expire in December this year; a 71 year old man who came to Botswana in 1981 to spend the remaining days of his waning life in peace and freedom in exile; a 47 year old businessman and his social worker wife who worked for our Ministry of Local Government and Lands; a student at the University of Botswana;

a Dutch national of Somali origin who worked for a data processing company and may have never heard of the ANC; a musician; a teacher at one of our secondary schools; a young visitor who had been a student in South Africa; two young Batswana housekeepers who very likely had never heard of the ANC; and worst of all, Mr President, a six year old child who, as I said earlier, had been shot to death fleeing for his dear life.

The six wounded are a Dutch national who, like her Somali husband murdered in the raid, is not even remotely connected to the ANC; two innocent Batswana who were shot going about their own business in their own hometown and country; and three refugees one of whom was a fifteen year old dependant of a refugee.

These are the so-called guerrillas of the ANC — all including the six year old — who were said to be the masterminds of the raging revolution in South Africa. Now, let us look at the geographical location in our capital of the houses they occupied.

Gaborone is a free and open city accessible to visitors including South Africans who require no visa to enter our country. The city is only twelve kilometres from our common border with South Africa and is the location of a popular Southern Sun casino hotel heavily patronized by South Africans of all colours and races in search particularly of weekend non-racial social freedom. These fun-seeking, freedom-hungry victims of the group areas and immorality acts (the latter now abolished) are free to walk the streets of our capital, visit their friends in its suburbs and go anywhere they like.

This is also a small city described so aptly by the London *Observer* Sunday last as being “the size of an English market town, the kind of place where everybody knows everybody else”. Indeed, the kind of place, Mr President, where not even one guerrilla can hide without being discovered in no time, let alone so many of them living publicly in our midst. The dead so-called ANC guerrillas lived all over the town because the houses they occupied were located all over town. These were refugees who could not be moved to the refugee centre called Dukwe in the north because they were in established employment. And so they lived peacefully with their families in ordinary houses mostly rented from the Botswana Housing Corporation. Some in fact lived even closer to the South African border in a village adjoining Gaborone — a village traversed by a popular highway to South Africa. Yes, next to a popular road to South Africa, Mr President — even there the South African Commandos murdered some of what they call ANC guerrillas and our two nationals.

But even more fantastic, Mr President, is the fact that one of the murdered “ANC guerrillas” occupied a house which was sandwiched between two houses owned by two members of the Botswana police — the same police whom refugees should dread if they had anything to hide such as the planning from our soil of military attacks against South Africa. How could they have

engaged in guerrilla activities against South Africa in that kind of location without being discovered?

All the houses attacked by the South African Commandos were scattered all over the city. They were well-known to everybody including our police, and, as it has turned out, even to South Africa itself. They could not by any stretch of the imagination be used as guerrilla bases or nerve centres and fail to attract the vigilance of our police force.

Inspection of what remains of the destroyed houses has turned up no evidence that the houses had ever been used as charged by Mr Botha. No caches of weapons, other than the two suspicious pieces shown to the press, (the pieces could simply have come from South Africa's own arsenal to try to prove a very difficult point), were found. No dramatic, staged display of the morning-after-loot in Pretoria and Cape Town. There was, on the contrary, overwhelming evidence that the murdered refugees had been nothing but peaceful civilian refugees who had been so nonchalant about their innocent stay in Botswana that they did not even have a knife to defend themselves with when they were shot out of their sleep.

Permit me at this stage, Mr President, to comment on some of the specific allegations, the facts and the fiction contained in the press statement made by Mr Pik Botha on 14 June. I will only comment on those I have not already touched on.

In paragraph two of Mr Botha's statement it is stated that my predecessor, the Honourable Archie Mogwe, was given a list at a meeting on 21 April 1983, at Jan Smuts Airport in Johannesburg containing names of "terrorists in Botswana together with an indication of their active participation in the planning and intended execution of violence in South Africa". Yes, the list was given and the allegations about it were thoroughly investigated. It turned out that the so-called terrorists were ordinary refugees who had never violated the legal regime which governs their stay in our country and their recognition as refugees. Most of them were not even in Botswana at the time having left our country some time earlier to seek safer refuge abroad. We could not therefore take action against innocent refugees legally resident in our country and strictly abiding by the laws which govern them, or against people who had left the country.

Mr Botha speaks at length in his statement about several meetings held in the course of 1984 between Botswana and South African officials aimed at reaching an agreement on "appropriate measures" to be taken "to prevent the planning and execution of acts of violence, sabotage and terrorism against each other". This is clearly a nostalgic reference to the long series of meetings we had with South Africa on the signing of a non-aggression pact. Mr Botha knows that Botswana has always co-operated with his country on matters of common security. We have done so without the encumbrances of a meaningless formal treaty, so the measures he is referring to have always been there.

That is why we have arrested, charged, imprisoned and deported those who have violated our policy of not allowing them to operate from our country.

There is of course the presumption in Mr Botha's statement which must be rejected with the contempt it deserves. The presumption is that, but for the intransigence of the political side of the Botswana government, our security services would have signed some non-aggression pact "because of a realization on their part of the destabilizing effect of the growing ANC presence in Botswana". This is a fabrication of facts. No part of the Botswana government has ever felt that a solution to the problem of security along our common border with South Africa lay in the signing of a non-aggression pact. The contrary is true.

Mr Botha further lays great stress on what he calls repeated warnings by his government about "ANC terrorist activities" in Botswana. He admits having threatened in January to invade Botswana if we continued to allow the ANC to use her as an "infiltration route to South Africa". What Mr Botha cannot admit is that in all these charges he has rarely given us proof or evidence that the ANC is indeed doing from our territory what he says they are doing. All we are given are often nebulous vituperative statements or charges based on mere suspicion or simply deliberate fabrications designed to force us to get rid of genuine refugees. Mr Botha knows that whenever we are given facts we follow them up until we are satisfied that no one is indeed breaking our laws by using our country as an "infiltration route to South Africa". The facts are there for anybody to see.

But South Africa will be asking for the impossible if her new policy is that no country in her neighbourhood should host refugees from South Africa, that we should all treat victims of apartheid and racial tyranny as enemies of "regional stability" and peace, and accept the cynical view that the most dangerous "terrorist" is a South African refugee who lives in Gaborone, Maseru, Mbabane, Maputo and Harare and keeps crossing into South Africa clandestinely to spit his venom there. Our very humanity, our sense of morality, international legal instruments relating to refugees to which we are party and our love of freedom as a people will never allow us to bar our doors against victims of political circumstances.

But all this is almost irrelevant, Mr President, for the undebatable issue is that South Africa has violated the territorial integrity of my country with the impunity of a modern scientific goliath. And why, Mr President? Botswana is not responsible for the crimes committed inside South Africa by the policies of apartheid or those who enforce them. We are not responsible for the mounting upheaval in that country. South Africa is, and only South Africa.

We have long warned that the pestilence of racism will consume us all in the region if allowed to go on unchecked, and no commando raids against the Frontline States will bring South Africa and the region as a whole nearer to salvation. The salvation lies solely in putting an end once for all to the brutali-

tics of apartheid in South Africa so that there will be no more Sowetos, Uitenhages, Sharpevilles, Langas and the rest — no more refugees scattered all over the subcontinent and the world at large raring to return to their country at all costs.

The ANC, the dreaded scourge of white minority rule in South Africa, need not resort to armed struggle as an instrument by which it seeks to pry open the barred doors of freedom if the movement is allowed to operate freely and to articulate without fear of persecution the frustrated aspirations of a black South Africa that has been wallowing in misery for so long.

For my people in their hour of crisis and tragedy, Mr President, I ask of the Security Council nothing more or less than the strongest possible condemnation, unequivocally expressed of South Africa's brutal terrorism perpetrated against our capital and refugees given refuge in our country.

I appeal to the Security Council to demand that South Africa desist from further acts of terrorism against Botswana and to abandon her planned attack on our country.

I appeal to Security Council and the international community to find ways of ensuring security in our region.

I request the Security Council to dispatch a mission to see on its behalf and assess the damage caused and possible assistance.

Let me end by assuring you, Mr President, and this august body that we will never give up our values. As my President said on Saturday:

Botswana will neither waver nor compromise its principled position of safeguarding innocent lives that are jeopardized and providing a sanctuary for refugees. It is not possible, in spite of all the military power South Africa possesses and may unleash on us, to destroy our belief in the rule of law or traditions, customs and our civilization.

This is our fundamental promise to you, sir, and your Council.

B. The statement made by the South African Ambassador in the Security Council during the Gaborone incursion debate on 21 June 1985.

As I have listened to the progress of this debate, it has become increasingly apparent to me that this meeting of the Council has been called to create the impression in the international community, that the South African Defence Force's operation against ANC targets, I repeat ANC targets, in Gaborone on 14 June was somehow intended, as the office of the President of Botswana would have us believe, as an act of "brutality and violence perpetrated by the South African government", and that this was particularly deplorable "considering the repeated assurances of the Botswana government that it does not permit its territory to be used for launching attacks against neighbouring countries."

Well, Mr President, the facts are somewhat different. The true state of affairs leading up to the events in Gaborone is contained in the statement issued on 14 June by my Foreign Minister, which has been circulated as Document S/17282 of this Council. In addition, Mr President, Minister Botha despatched a message to the Botswana Minister of External Affairs, on 20 June 1985 in which he expressed regret at the loss of innocent life—an aspect the distinguished Minister failed to mention this morning. Mr Botha went on to observe that he trusted that the Minister would “reciprocate this sentiment, in respect of the lives of innocent people killed and murdered in South Africa as a result of ANC terrorism emanating from Botswana.”

Mr President, Mr Botha further informed Dr Chiepe, that after the signing of the Nkomati Accord, the ANC decided to concentrate on Botswana in seeking new bases for launching its terrorist attacks against South Africa. In the course of 1984 the ANC availed itself of its official political presence in Botswana, and by way of a secret communique to all ANC members in Botswana, placed them on full-scale armed alert and established large caches of arms and ammunition in Botswana.

The Botswana government, Mr President, must be fully conversant with these facts.

The Botswana government, Mr Botha added in his communication, had repeatedly been urged by the South African government and the South African security authorities to curtail the activities of the ANC inside Botswana and in particular the planning and execution of terrorist activities in South Africa from Botswana. The Botswana government had, moreover, on a number of occasions had its attention drawn to the infiltration of ANC terrorists into South Africa from third countries through Botswana and the Botswana government was requested to take appropriate measures to prevent this infiltration.

However, Mr President, the Botswana government was not able to reach an acceptable understanding with the South African government on the combatting of acts of terror against South Africa from Botswana. South Africa therefore made it clear that it reserved the right to take steps to prevent acts of terror and sabotage from being planned and executed from neighbouring states.

Mr President, as Minister Botha pointed out, peace and stability in Southern Africa cannot be maintained if terrorists intent on the overthrow by force of a sovereign government, are harboured in the territory of a neighbouring state, be it with or without that state's knowledge or consent. Such a situation is obviously untenable.

It has always been the South African government's belief that the problems of the Southern African region should be solved by the leaders of the region. It was for that reason that earnest appeals were made to the Botswana government to give urgent attention to this problem with a view to reaching

an understanding on effective and practical arrangements between the security forces of South Africa and Botswana to ensure that the territory of neither was used for the planning or execution of acts of sabotage or terrorism against the other.

Mr President,

Since August 1984 the ANC has been responsible for thirty-five acts of terror and violence which were planned and executed from Botswana. During this period six persons were murdered and extensive damage was caused to a power station near Rustenburg and the properties of individual South African citizens.

Mr President, Foreign Minister Botha has further drawn the attention of the Botswana Minister of External Affairs to the fact that the actions of the ANC in Botswana cannot be reconciled with the public statements of the government of Botswana, to the effect that it would not allow its territory to be used for the purpose of committing violence against its neighbours. Although the Botswana government stated that it had limited the ANC to a political office in Botswana, the action of 14 June 1985 confirmed the existence in Gaborone of operational ANC centres, dealing with logistics and the gathering of information for the purpose of planning and committing violence and sabotage in South Africa. Thus, for example, among the persons who lost their lives in that operation, were persons involved in bomb attacks and other forms of violence in South Africa. Further evidence of the violent intentions of the ANC, operating from Botswana, is provided by the discovery of a huge arms cache in Gaborone, subsequently confirmed by the Botswana government, on 26 April 1985. Certainly, Mr President, these facts refute the claims to refugee status made on behalf of the ANC. They speak, I submit, for themselves.

Finally, Mr President, allow me to quote from an address which my State President made to the South African Parliament on 19 June 1985. President Botha said the following:

Ignoring the incontrovertible evidence as to the actions and plans of ANC terrorists in Botswana, they are portrayed as freedom fighters or refugees in emotional attacks against the alleged tyrannical rule of the South African government. Measures which we are taking within the framework of established principles of international law to protect our population and our property are decried as violations of the sovereignty of other states.

“In other words”, President Botha continued, “Botswana has the sovereign right to harbour terrorists and South Africa is expected to sit back and allow those terrorists to cross our borders and to kill our citizens with impunity. My government”, the President said, “does not accept this warped concept of sovereignty, and if the western countries were true to the norms and standards which they insist on, and which they apply in similar circumstances, they would agree with my government. It is and remains the re-

sponsibility of each government to ensure the security of its peoples. My government will not abdicate this responsibility.”

“It is simply unacceptable to us”, President Botha continued, “that our neighbours pay lip service to the principle that states should not make their territories available for the launching of terrorist attacks against their neighbours, while, at the same time, harbouring terrorists in their countries . . .”

President Botha concluded as follows:

On behalf of the South African government I once again offer to all our neighbours a hand of friendship and a readiness to come to an understanding on the basis of certain ground rules which in my opinion ought to form the guidelines for regulating and normalizing our relations. These ground rules include an unqualified prohibition on support for cross-border violence or the planning of such violence, the removal of foreign forces from the region, the peaceful resolution of disputes, regional co-operation in meeting common challenges, and toleration of the different socio-economic and political systems within our region.

Mr President, although South Africa is committed to resolving its differences with its neighbours by peaceful means, we will not hesitate to take whatever action is necessary for the defence of our peoples and for the elimination of terrorist elements. It is for the government of Botswana to decide whether it is in its own interest and in the interest of the region as a whole, that it should continue to harbour ANC terrorists on its soil or whether President Botha's ground rules for peaceful co-existence which we have enumerated in this Council as recently as yesterday do not provide the best assurances for peace and stability in our region.

As for the ANC, the message is crystal clear: if they attempt to strike at us, we will strike back — wherever they may lurk.

C. Text of the resolution adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations during the debate on the Gaborone incursion, on 21 June 1985 (Resolution No. 568 of 1985).

The Security Council,

Taking note of the letter dated 17 June 1985 from the Permanent Representative of Botswana to the United Nations (S/17279) and having heard the statement of the Minister of External Affairs of Botswana concerning the recent acts of aggression by the racist regime of South Africa against the Republic of Botswana,

expressing its shock and indignation at the loss of human life, the injuries inflicted, and the extensive damage as a result of that action,

affirming the urgent need to safeguard the territorial integrity of Botswana and maintain peace and security in the Southern African region,

reaffirming the obligation of all states to refrain in their international relations from the threat of use of force against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of any state,

expressing its profound concern that the racist regime resorted to the use of military force against the defenceless and peace-loving nation of Botswana,

gravely concerned that such acts of aggression can only serve to aggravate the already volatile and dangerous situation in the Southern African region,

bearing in mind that this latest incident is one in a series of provocative actions carried out by South Africa against Botswana and also that the racist regime has declared that it will continue and escalate such attacks,

commending Botswana for its unflagging adherence to the conventions relating to the status of refugees and of stateless persons and for the sacrifices it has made and continues to make in giving asylum to victims of apartheid,

1. Strongly condemns the recent unprovoked and unwarranted military attack on the capital of Botswana by South Africa as an act of aggression against that country and a gross violation of its territorial integrity and national sovereignty,

2. Further condemns all acts of aggression, provocation and harassment, including murder, blackmail, kidnapping and destruction of property committed by the racist regime of South Africa against Botswana,

3. Demands the immediate, total and unconditional cessation of all acts of aggression by South Africa against Botswana,

4. Denounces and rejects racist South Africa's practice of "hot pursuit" to terrorize and destabilize Botswana and other countries in the Southern African region,

5. Demands full and adequate compensation by South Africa to Botswana for the damage to life and property resulting from such acts of aggression,

6. Affirms Botswana's right to receive and give sanctuary to the victims of apartheid in accordance with its traditional practice, humanitarian principles and international obligations,

7. Requests the Secretary-General to enter into immediate consultation with the government of Botswana and the relevant United Nations agencies on measures to be undertaken to assist the government of Botswana in ensuring the safety, protection and welfare of the refugees in Botswana,

8. Requests the Secretary-General to detail a mission to visit Botswana for the purpose of:

(a) Assessing the damage caused by South Africa's unprovoked and pre-meditated acts of aggression,

(b) Proposing measures to strengthen Botswana's capacity to receive and provide assistance to South African refugees, and

(c) Determining the consequent level of assistance required by Botswana and to report thereon to the Security Council,

9. Requests all states and relevant agencies and organizations of the United Nations system urgently to extend all necessary assistance to Botswana,
10. Requests the Secretary-General to monitor developments related to this question and to report to the Security Council as the situation demands,
11. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Text for Section 2 supplied by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs.

South Africa and Botswana

- A. Message from the Hon. Dr G.K.T. Chiepe, Botswana Minister for External Affairs to the Hon. Mr R.F. Botha, the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, on 18 June 1985.

Honourable Minister,

I wish to draw your attention to the terror raid in Gaborone early Friday morning, 14 June 1985, perpetrated by a detachment of the South African Defence Force which left behind a trail of death, injury and destruction to property. In the wake of this act of aggression, six (6) refugees, two (2) ordinary residents (one of whom was a Somali national who had only arrived in Botswana in 1984), two (2) visitors, a student from South Africa and a six year old child from Lesotho and two (2) Botswana women lost their lives. In addition, three (3) refugees, two (2) Botswana nationals and a Dutch citizen were injured, some of whom will be permanently crippled. Vehicles and machinery were destroyed and houses reduced to rubble. The raiders also fired indiscriminately at passing motorists who were driving home.

It is discernible from the nationalities and the ages of the victims that their status is contrary to and inconsistent with your allegations that they were "ANC terrorists". The action of the SADF therefore constituted an unwarranted act of aggression against Botswana. This act of brutality and violence perpetrated by the South African government is particularly deplorable considering that it was only in February this year at our meeting in Pretoria that you accepted the repeated assurances of the Botswana government that it does not permit its territory to be used for launching attacks against neighbouring states. This latest act of aggression calls into question the sincerity and good faith of the South African authorities.

I wish to register, in the strongest terms possible, the protest of the Botswana government against this unprovoked act of aggression perpetrated by the South African government in violation of the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of Botswana and its people. I strongly reject the use of gun-boat diplomacy and the right to the so-called hot pursuit that South Africa has arrogated to itself in her relations with the other states in this re-

gion. This is inadmissible in the conduct of relations between and among neighbouring states. I call upon the South African government to desist from any further unprovoked acts of aggression against Botswana and its people.

We demand the payment of reparations in respect of the deceased and injured persons, the properties destroyed and all the other damages resulting from this act of aggression. Although your government did not claim responsibility for the February bomb blast in Gaborone, which demolished a house and caused extensive damage to the neighbouring houses and shopping centre, nor for the May bomb blast which killed a South African refugee, destroyed a car and caused damages to a block of flats and houses in Gaborone. The latest act of aggression makes it evident that the two incidents were also the work of your government.

I have received information that on Saturday morning, 15 June 1985, thirty-two Batswana were abducted into South Africa where they were intensely interrogated and only reunited with their families during the night of the same day. The information I have indicates that these people were abducted from the Tuli Block area where they were fishing on the Botswana side of the river. This was yet another flagrant violation of the territorial integrity of Botswana. I therefore wish to register the strong protest of the government of Botswana regarding this incident. I hope that I will in due course receive a commitment from your government that such unfriendly acts will cease forthwith in the name of good neighbourliness.

B. Reply from the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Hon R.F. Botha to Dr the Hon. G.K.T. Chiepe, Botswana Minister of External Affairs, on 20 June 1985

Honourable Minister,

I have the honour to refer to your message of 18 June 1985 and to the telex of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs of 14 June 1985 transmitting to you the statement I had made on the same day concerning the action against ANC targets in Gaborone during the early hours of 14 June 1985.

After the signing of the Nkomati Accord, the ANC decided to concentrate on Botswana in seeking new bases for launching its terrorist attacks against South Africa. In the course of 1984 the ANC availed itself of its official political presence in Botswana and by way of a secret communique to all ANC members in Botswana placed them on full-scale armed alert and established large caches of arms and ammunition in Botswana.

The Botswana government must be fully conversant with these facts.

The Botswana government had repeatedly been urged by the South African government and South African security authorities to curtail the activities of the ANC inside Botswana and in particular the planning and execution of

terrorist activities in South Africa from Botswana. The Botswana government has, moreover, on a number of occasions had its attention drawn to the infiltration of ANC terrorists into South Africa from third countries through Botswana and the Botswana government has been requested to take appropriate measures to prevent this infiltration.

In a discussion on 21 April 1983 at Jan Smuts Airport between myself and your predecessor, the Botswana government was provided with a list of names of ANC terrorists in Botswana together with an indication of their active participation in the planning and intended execution of violence in South Africa and was urged to take appropriate action to curtail their activities. This request was repeated to your predecessor at a meeting in Cape Town on 28 February 1984.

On 22 March 1984 the South African government proposed and on 26 March 1984 the Botswana government accepted that the security forces of the two countries should design measures to prevent the planning and execution of acts of violence, sabotage and terrorism against each other from the territories of the other.

During a further meeting at ministerial level in Pretoria on 24 May 1984 consensus was reached that neither Botswana nor South Africa would harbour elements which planned or executed terrorism.

In a public statement on 12 September 1984, in response to certain remarks attributed to President Masire of Botswana, I said that the Botswana government was not able to reach an acceptable understanding with the South African government on the combating of acts of terror against South Africa from Botswana territory. I therefore stated that South Africa reserved the right to take steps to prevent acts of terror and sabotage from being planned and executed from neighbouring states.

The Security Forces of Botswana and South Africa held a further meeting in Gaborone on 30 October 1984 which ended inconclusively because the Botswana security authorities had no mandate from their Government to agree on practical arrangements to prevent Botswana from being used as a launching pad for terrorism against South Africa.

In the circumstances you will recall, I wrote a letter to you on 14 December 1984 inviting you for further ministerial discussions.

During discussions between the South African Police and the Botswana Police in Gaborone on 24 January 1985 Botswana was informed that there was conclusive evidence that the ANC was progressively using Botswana as a launching pad for acts of terror in South Africa.

In my telex of 29 January 1985 to you, I once again stressed the need for an effective arrangement between the two relevant branches of our security forces to combat organized subversion.

I indicated that since my letter of 14 December 1984, terror against South Africa and its neighbour, the Republic of Bophuthatswana, had increased.

I once more pointed out that peace and stability in Southern Africa could not be maintained if terrorists intent on the overthrow by force of a sovereign government, were harboured in the territory of a neighbouring state, be it with or without that state's knowledge or consent. In short, I said this situation could not continue adding that it had always been the South African government's belief that the problems of the Southern African region should be solved by the leaders of the region. It was for this reason that I once again made an earnest appeal to the Botswana government to give urgent attention to this problem with a view to reaching an understanding on some effective and practical arrangement between the security forces of the two countries, to ensure that the territory of neither was used for the planning or execution of acts of sabotage or terrorism against the other.

During a subsequent meeting between us in Pretoria on 22 February 1985, you will recall, I commenced the discussion by stating that the main purpose of the meeting was to come to an arrangement on the serious issue of the infiltration into South Africa of terrorists from Botswana. You were informed that South Africa knew for a fact that the ANC had chosen Botswana as an important infiltration route to South Africa.

It was agreed during that meeting that the security forces of the two countries would once again attempt to come to an understanding on practical arrangements on how to combat this growing danger.

However, at a meeting between the security forces of our two countries which followed our meeting, the Botswana security forces again indicated that they had no mandate to accept the proposed arrangements although they themselves displayed a willingness to do so because of a realization on their part of the destabilizing effect of the growing ANC presence in Botswana.

Thus after numerous rounds of discussions, it became evident that there was no real political will on the part of Botswana to enter into effective and practical arrangements with South Africa on this serious question.

Since August 1984 the ANC has been responsible for 35 acts of terror and violence which were planned and executed from Botswana. During this period six persons were murdered and extensive damage was caused to a power station near Rustenburg and the properties of individual South African citizens.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has for some time played an important role in the training of ANC terrorists and the cowardly hand grenade attack on Deputy Minister-designate Landers and Mr Fred Peters, National Secretary of the Labour Party, followed a typical PLO pattern.

The South African security forces had no alternative but to protect South Africa and its people from the increasing number of terrorist attacks emanating from Botswana.

It is an established principle of International Law that a state may not permit on its territory activities for the purpose of carrying out acts of violence

on the territory of another state. It is equally well established that a state has a right to take appropriate steps to protect its own security and territorial integrity against such acts. South Africa will not tolerate such activities. Although it is committed to resolve its differences with its neighbours by peaceful means, South Africa will not hesitate to take whatever action may be appropriate for the defence of its own people and for the elimination of terrorist elements who are intent on sowing death and destruction in our country. We will not allow ourselves to be attacked with impunity. We shall take whatever steps are appropriate to defend ourselves.

South Africa is nevertheless convinced that the problems of our region cannot and will not be solved by violence.

The actions of the ANC in Botswana cannot be reconciled with the public statements of the government of Botswana to the effect that it would not allow its territory to be used for the purpose of committing violence against its neighbours. Although the Botswana government stated that it had limited the ANC to a political office in Botswana, the action of 14 June 1985 confirmed the existence in Gaborone of operational ANC centres dealing with logistics and the gathering of information for the purpose of planning and committing violence and sabotage in South Africa. Thus, for example, among the persons who lost their lives on 14 June 1985 were persons involved in bomb attacks and other forms of violence in South Africa. Further evidence of the violent intentions of the ANC operating from Botswana is provided by the discovery of a huge arms cache in Gaborone, subsequently confirmed by your government, on 26 April 1985. Certainly these facts refute the claims to refugee status made on behalf of the ANC.

The loss of innocent life is deeply regretted. I trust that you will reciprocate this sentiment in respect of the lives of innocent people killed and murdered in SA as a result of ANC terrorism emanating from Botswana.

I once more appeal to your government to eradicate this threat to our region in order to save the lives of innocent citizens in our countries.

The allegation contained in your letter, of South African complicity in previous bomb attacks in Gaborone, is unfounded. I also reject the allegation concerning the abduction of thirty-two Batswana in the Tuli Block.

In conclusion, I wish to quote the following from the State President's address to Parliament yesterday: (19 June 1985).

Ignoring the incontrovertible evidence as to the actions and plans of ANC terrorists in Botswana they are portrayed as "freedom fighters" or "refugees" in emotional attacks against the alleged tyrannical rule of the South African government. Measures which we are taking within the framework of established principles of international law to protect our population and our property are decried as violation of the sovereignty of other states. In other words Botswana has the sovereign right to harbour terrorists and South Africa is expected to sit back and allow those terrorists to cross our borders and murder and kill our citizens with impunity. My government does not accept this warped

concept of sovereignty. And if the Western countries were true to the norms and standards which they insist on and which they apply in similar circumstances then they would agree with my government. It is and remains the responsibility of each government to ensure the security of its peoples. My government will not abdicate this responsibility.

It is simply unacceptable to us that our neighbours pay lip service to the principle that states should not make their territories available for the launching of terrorist attacks against their neighbours, while at the same time harbouring terrorists in their countries . . .

On behalf of the South African government I once again offer to all our neighbours a hand of friendship and a readiness to come to an understanding on the basis of certain ground rules which in my opinion ought to form the guidelines for regulating and normalizing our relations. These ground rules include an unqualified prohibition on support for cross-border violence or the planning of such violence; the removal of foreign forces from the region; the peaceful resolution of disputes; regional co-operation in meeting common challenges; and toleration of the different socio-economic and political systems within our region.

The South African government respectfully suggests that the practical application of the ground rules referred to by the State President will contribute substantially to peace and stability in our region.

Please accept, Madam Minister, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Text for Items A and B of this section supplied by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs.

South Africa and Mozambique

Joint press statement by the delegations of the Republic of South Africa and the People's Republic of Mozambique, 15 March 1985.

The government delegations of the Republic of South Africa and the People's Republic of Mozambique met in Maputo on 14 March 1985 for the seventh session of the Joint Security Commission established by the Nkomati Accord.

Both delegations agreed that it was essential for the development of the whole Southern African region that the Nkomati Accord should be fully implemented.

Both governments are concerned at the increase in violence in Mozambique and proposals were discussed as to ways and means of bringing an end to it.

The opportunity was used to review progress made in areas of co-operation and certain proposals were made which will have to be considered by both governments.

Both delegations reiterated their governments' continued commitment to and full support of the Nkomati Accord.

The delegations comprised:

1. RSA

R.F. Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs; General M. Malan, Minister of Defence; Mr D.J. Louis Nel, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; Mr Adriaan Vlok, Deputy Minister of Defence and Law and Order; Dr Neil Barnard, Director-General of National Intelligence Service; Vice-Admiral W.N. du Plessis, SADF; Brigadier J.A. Klopper, SADF; Brigadier J. van der Merwe, SAP; Mr C.F. Paterson, SA Trade Representative in Mozambique and senior officials of the Departments of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Police and National Intelligence.

2. Mozambique

Col S. Vieira, Minister of Security Affairs; Dr T. Hungvana, Deputy Minister Interior; Lt-Col F. Honwana, Special Assistant of the President; Lt-Col I. Mangveira, Moz. Defence Force; Mr A.J.N. Chissano, Director of

the Presidency; Mr P. Commissario, Director of Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mr J.B. Vedor, National Director Interior; Maj G. Chongo, Chief of Staff, Border Guards; and Maj M.G. Chitupila, National Intelligence Service, as well as Senior Officers of the Mozambican government.

Text supplied by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs.

South Africa and Namibia

Speech delivered by State President P.W. Botha, DMS, at the Inauguration of the Multi-Party Conference Transitional Government for South West Africa/Namibia in Windhoek, 17 June 1985

Vir ons almal hier teenwoordig is dit 'n besondere dag wat in die geskiedenis aangeteken kan word as 'n dag waarop verdere stappe ter bereiking van stabiliteit en vooruitgang vir die mense van hierdie interessante en mooi land geneem is.

You will recall that South Africa had envisaged that South West Africa/Namibia should become independent before the end of 1978. We are as disappointed as you are that this objective has not yet been attained. The fact that SWA has not yet acceded to independence may be ascribed to the deviations by the United Nations and SWAPO from the original Contact Group proposal, to the United Nations' continuing bias in favour of SWAPO and to the continuing threat posed by the presence of more than 30 000 Cuban troops in Angola.

I can assure you that nothing would please South Africa more than to be able to lighten its financial, security, administrative and diplomatic responsibilities in regard to South West Africa. On the other hand South Africa has clear-cut regional interests in Southern Africa which it is not prepared to relinquish.

Certain ground rules for relations between the states of the sub-continent are gaining wider acceptance. These ground rules include the following:

- Firstly, no state should make its territory available to individuals and organizations who wish to promote or prepare for violence against other states in the region.
- Secondly, no foreign forces should be permitted to intervene in the region.
- Thirdly, the problems of conflict in the region should be solved by peaceful means rather than by violence.
- Fourthly, these problems should be solved on a regional basis by the leaders of the region themselves.
- Fifthly, although the states of our region have different socio-economic and political systems we can live together in peace and harmony and work together

in the pursuit of common interests. Each country of the region has the right to order its affairs as it deems fit and inter-state relations, particularly between neighbours, should not be disturbed by differing internal policies. This is sensible and practical as recognition is accorded to the fact that each country has its own set of conditions for which it must seek its own solution in the interest of its citizens.

Divergent outlooks should not be allowed to distract governments from carrying out their duty to accord their first priority to the welfare and prosperity of their peoples.

On the basis of these ground rules we will all, as Africans, give our sub-continent a chance to grow and develop.

We, therefore, have a message for the world; for Soviet strategists shifting their pieces on the international chess-board; for Western diplomats anxious to remove at any cost, this vexatious question from the international agenda; for SWAPO terrorists lurking in their lairs in Angola — we are not a people who shirk our responsibilities. The international settlement plan provides categorically and by implication that when South West Africa accedes to internationally recognized independence it will do so in circumstances of freedom, fairness and security. We agree that there will be no armed solution here and that intimidation will not be tolerated. The United Nations can play a useful role if it can assure that it will behave in an impartial manner.

In the meantime, while we continue with our efforts to find an internationally acceptable solution to the future of South West Africa, the South African Government sees no reason why it should continue to retain full responsibility for the day to day administration of South West Africa.

On 24 January 1984 the Multi-Party Conference issued a statement in which it committed itself to the urgency of effecting peace, national reconciliation, independence and economic welfare. They said that these objectives could not be achieved under conditions of “continued subjugation” and complained that the present political and constitutional order was unsatisfactory. They accordingly undertook to work out a political and constitutional system which would be acceptable to the people as a whole and which would fit into the framework which the Republic of South Africa and the Western Contact Group had worked out.

I was very happy to hear this statement which I discussed with the MPC a few days later. I told them that they should be under no illusion about my Government’s determination to resolve this matter one way or another and as soon as possible. I said that it was up to the leaders of South West Africa to decide what they were going to do, and to do so urgently. As I pointed out in my speech of 18 April 1985 the MPC responded positively to this appeal.

On 24 February 1984 it issued a declaration of basic principles. On 18 April 1984 it reached agreement on a Charter of Fundamental Rights and Objectives and on 25 March this year it presented me with its proposal concerning the future of the Territory.

My Government studied that proposal very carefully. We noted that it would have been preferable if the MPC had had a clear mandate from the people of SWA/Namibia. However, a national election at this moment would have complicated current efforts to achieve an internationally acceptable independence for SWA/Namibia. At the same time, I was satisfied that the MPC had done everything in its power to involve all the parties of SWA/Namibia in its deliberations and that it would continue to do so. My Government accordingly agreed that legislative and executive authorities should be re-instituted for SWA/Namibia and a statement to that effect was made in the three Houses of Parliament on 18 April 1985.

We have gathered here today to celebrate the inauguration of those new authorities. The MPC has now received the power to administer the Territory in the interest of all the people of South West Africa/Namibia.

I wish the interim government well in maintaining and broadening the growing consensus between the different groups, communities and parties in the Territory and in providing the type of government to the people of South West Africa which will increase support for your initiative. The challenge is now yours to make a success of this venture.

At the same time there should be no doubt that this is simply a stage on the road to South West Africa's constitutional development and not its culmination.

As I said in Parliament on 18 April the new arrangement should be seen as an interim mechanism for the internal administration of the Territory pending agreement on an internationally acceptable independence for South West Africa. For as long as there is a possibility that the recent international negotiations hold any realistic prospect of bringing about the genuine withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, the South African government will not act in a manner irreconcilable with the international settlement plan. However, the people of South West Africa; including SWAPO, cannot wait indefinitely for a breakthrough on the withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola.

Should it eventually become evident, after all avenues have been thoroughly explored, that there is no realistic prospect of attaining this goal, all the parties most intimately affected by the present negotiations will obviously have to reconsider how internationally acceptable independence may best be attained in the light of prevailing circumstances.

South Africa can do no more than to try its best to ensure that when South West Africa accedes to independence it will do so in terms of freedom, fairness and security. Ultimately it is you, the people and leaders of South West Africa, who will have to decide the future of your country. Ultimately, only you will be able to determine whether this will be a land of peace and prosperity. Only you will be able to meet this great challenge.

Die toekoms behoort aan mense wat met beslistheid en onselfsugtigheid

hulle land bo eie gewin stel. Dis my innige wens dat dit waar sal wees, ook van u.

May God Almighty grant you the ability to proceed on the road ahead with wisdom and devotion.

Text supplied by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs.

South Africa and the Commonwealth

Extracts from the Opening Address by the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Sir Shidraht Ramphal, delivered at the Media Workshop on Countering Apartheid Propaganda in London 20–22 May 1985

... I begin by extending the warmest of welcomes to all of you. Many here are not strangers to Marlborough House; but some of you are with us for the first time. Whether you are 'new' or 'old' in this Commonwealth habitat, the abhorrence of apartheid unifies us all on the threshold of our work.

That abhorrence has unified the Commonwealth over many decades. It did so again at New Delhi a year and a half ago when Commonwealth leaders reiterated their view:

that only the eradication of apartheid and the establishment of majority rule on the basis of free and fair exercise of universal adult suffrage by all people in a united and non-fragmented South Africa can lead to a just and lasting solution to the explosive situation prevailing in Southern Africa.

But in New Delhi leaders looked to a new dimension of the struggle against what they described as 'the evil system of apartheid'. They attached importance 'to taking effective public relations measures to counter South African propaganda in certain target countries by disseminating the truth about apartheid and about social and economic progress in African countries'. To this end, they specifically requested me 'to co-operate with the United Nations in collecting and disseminating such information'. The forums I am called to in many countries provide opportunities for me to contribute in the name of the Commonwealth to that process of disseminating the truth about apartheid and about social and economic progress in African countries.

... Among my very first words, therefore, must be ones of gratitude to our collaborators in this venture, namely the United Nations Committee Against Apartheid, whose support and co-operation in mounting the Workshop I most warmly and gratefully acknowledge.

The Committee has been most generous in its acts of assistance to us and I am particularly happy that we have with us today Ambassador Joe Garba, Chairman of the Committee and an old friend and colleague in the cause of

freedom in Southern Africa. And may I extend a special welcome to the representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr Iqbal Akhund, and his colleague from the United Nations Committee Against Apartheid. And this morning we all have a very special welcome also for Zimbabwe's Minister of Information, the Hon. Nathan Shamuyarira and for the Editor of the *Observer*, Mr Donald Trelford. Who better than an Information Minister of an African Frontline State and a Fleet Street practitioner to help us to open this Workshop by speaking to the theme of the countering of South African propaganda? They place our discussions squarely in the realm of practicality, the area of real action . . .

It is interesting to recall that the first attempt to engage South Africa in a constructive dialogue which would educate it out of its fundamental wrong-headedness, and so help bring about a peaceful change in the country, was made inside the Commonwealth, with Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana playing a vanguard role in it. Shortly after Ghana's independence in 1957, Nkrumah offered to exchange ambassadors with Pretoria in the hope that the example of Ghana's *multiracial society would attenuate the fears and fantasies* of South Africa's white community and thereby contribute to the emergence of a similar multiracialism in South Africa. The offer remained on the table for no less than three years and was only withdrawn when it became clear that the rulers of South Africa had no intention of changing course.

By 1961, it had also become clear that the Commonwealth and South Africa belonged to 'two diametrically opposed orbits' of values and so could not expect to convince each other. This reality then became the basis of Commonwealth policy towards South Africa, beginning with its exclusion in 1961, continuing through the Gleneagles Agreement of 1977 and so down to the decisions of the New Delhi summit of 1983. The decision to launch a Commonwealth initiative against South African propaganda is therefore part of a long struggle against apartheid. But it also marks a turning point in that struggle, a turning dictated in large measure by events in South Africa.

Early in 1979, the present apartheid regime called on White South Africa 'to adapt or die'. South Africa, it proclaimed, was facing a 'total onslaught', from within and without. This threat was only twenty per cent military: the remaining eighty per cent was political and psychological. The regime's answer to this so-called 'total onslaught' was to be a corresponding 'total strategy'. Internally, the regime was to wage a campaign for the hearts and minds of the oppressed majority, by giving it 'something to strive for, to live for and to fight for'. Externally, it would destabilise its neighbours into submission, while seeking to project South Africa in the West as an oasis of stability and prosperity in a continent of turbulence and squalor and a bastion of Western resistance to international communism.

What it had to offer the majority was the new apartheid constitution promulgated in September 1984 in the teeth of strenuous opposition from the

African, Indian and Coloured communities whom it purported to benefit. The introduction of the new constitution inaugurated a period of violent repression unseen in South Africa since 1976 and culminated in the Langa massacre of 21 March this year, the 25th anniversary of Sharpeville.

But even while it was putting together its sham constitutional proposals which would later lead to so much bloodshed, the regime was busy promoting a totally different picture of South Africa in the quality papers of the West. In trying to give you something of the flavour of these advertisements, I can do no better than to quote from some of them.

On 16 October 1983, the South African Tourist Corporation placed an advertisement in the *Daily Telegraph* under the caption 'South Africa', considered under two heads: 'Why it's part of Africa' and 'Why it's not'. Under 'Why it's part of Africa', this is what the advertisement said:

To begin with, it's on the southern tip of Africa. But the similarity doesn't end there. In common with the rest of Africa you'll find vast reserves of wildlife, endless vistas punctuated by majestic mountains. And deserts and lush, green forests. Warm winters under blue skies. A myriad of tribal cultures. Nature untouched by hand . . .

As to 'Why it's not' part of Africa, this is what the advertisement argued:

In 1652, the Dutch brought their architecture. Soon after, the British brought their tradition. The Germans their culture. The French, a knack for making wine. A settlement, startling in its diversity, blossomed. In 1871, diamonds were discovered in Kimberley. 15 years later, gold in Johannesburg. Along with the many fortune hunters came the wealth that makes South Africa unique on the continent . . .

The central objective of this advertisement was, of course, to impress upon its readers the conclusion that before the arrival of the Europeans on the scene, South Africa was little more than a geographical expression: that the country owes its prosperity solely to the industry and ingenuity of its white population and that without them South Africa would have stagnated in primeval darkness: 'nature untouched by hand'.

A month later, on 16 November 1983, the Director of Information at South Africa House placed another advertisement in *The Guardian* entitled 'Ignorance is bias'. As one might expect, even of an apartheid diplomat, the piece was more sophisticated and temperate in its language, but, of course, directed to the same end of further misinforming the uninformed.

"South Africa", said the piece, "arouses more controversy than almost any other country in the world. People tend to have a view whether they have been there or not. Quite often, the views are not based on fact".

"South Africa (in fact) is involved in a remarkable process of providing fair opportunities for all its population groups. The South African government is committed to ensuring that each of South Africa's many nationalities has the ability and resources to realise its social, political and economic aspirations."

Not a word about the new constitution then in preparation and designed

to perpetuate the civil and political inferiority of the black majority; not a word about forced removals which have resulted in the regime dumping more than 3 million black people in the barren wastelands of the Bantustans; and no mention of the vexatious Pass Laws.

To the paladins of apartheid themselves, the term has rapidly become something of a liability. Listen to South Africa's Deputy Foreign Minister addressing the Foreign Correspondents' Association in Cape Town on 6 February 1984:

It is very difficult for South Africa to defend itself against this weapon (apartheid) because the emotive content of the word is based on the perception people have of apartheid: a perception which decades ago might have had some validity, but which in the South Africa of today is false, a fallacy — in fact dead.

One wonders how much of this repeated over and over begins to penetrate the most cynical of foreign correspondents. What condemns South Africa, of course, is not what it says but what it does; and only recently at Langa in the Eastern Cape, its actions again proclaimed in the clearest accents that old-style apartheid is alive and strong and getting on with its grim business. It was Goethe who said that before the word there was the deed! . . .

In one sense, South Africa's decision to try to sell apartheid in the marketplace of ideas is a welcome development. This huckstering of the dross of apartheid is an advance in one sense: for an open market can compel South Africa to own up to its sordid realities or withdraw into its laager of lies. Either way, it will mean a victory for freedom and human decency: because either way, the evil of apartheid will stand exposed for what it is.

H.G. Wells once remarked that 'history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe'. If that is so, we embark on this leg of the race against catastrophe with considerable, indeed overwhelming advantages on our side — but not, perhaps, with much time.

In the first place, the advocates of apartheid are no longer clear in their own minds what it is that they are selling. Within the laager, the ancestral faith in apartheid as divinely inspired and therefore morally right is no longer the received wisdom that it once was: The old certainties of the Volk are no longer a reliable guide to the future, especially now that South Africa is faced with the combined determination of the Frontline States. The emergence of such meaningless concepts as internal 'consociation' and external 'constellation' only serves to lay bare the degree of intellectual confusion that now reigns in Pretoria. But by far the most important development is the firm resolution of the oppressed majority not to allow the rulers of South Africa to continue in the old ways. This was the message of Sharpeville in 1960. Even more emphatically it is the message of Soweto and of Langa. In acting on this determination the oppressed majority can always count on the support of the international community which has pronounced apartheid to be a crime against humanity.

A little over a week ago I addressed the Annual Conference of the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa: an organisation whose crucial role in the struggle against apartheid is underlined by the commencement this week of the UDF treason trials — trials which are in truth a trial of apartheid for treason against our common humanity. In the course of my remarks I made the point that in the fight against apartheid we possessed 'the most priceless of weapons in having the truth on our side'. The truth we certainly have. But, as Pirandello said through one of his characters: 'A fact is like a sack — it won't stand up till you have put something in it'. The challenge to this Workshop is how to fill those many sacks of fact so that the truth about apartheid stands up; so that it is the reality about apartheid that all the world acknowledges.

In responding to that challenge, with the aid of so many representatives of the media with us, I hope that the Workshop:

- will look rigorously at the responsibility of the media in covering developments in South Africa;
- will ask searching questions about the objectivity of the reporting, about the coverage given to all sides;
- will question the credibility given to the professional handouts and studied distortions of the government and its agencies;
- will explore the degree to which the media contributes to the pretence that South Africa is a normal country — like all others, with some flaws;
- will ask to what extent does the media acknowledge the degree to which it can itself be used unwittingly in the cause of apartheid.

These and many others are among the kinds of practical questions which I hope the Workshop will not hesitate to address.

These are critical days for South Africa. They may be critical days for apartheid. Countering Pretoria's propaganda is not on the periphery of the struggle. It may be quite central to success.

Text supplied by British Information Services, Johannesburg.

Zimbabwe and the ANC

Message from Zimbabwe's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cde Witness Mangwende, to the ANC's National Consultative Congress on 17 June 1985.

My dear Comrade and brother, I wish to take this opportunity of your National Consultative Congress to once again pledge ZANU (PF)'s and indeed the government and people of Zimbabwe's militant solidarity with ANC and the struggling masses of South Africa.

As you deliberate the crucial questions of this important stage in the struggle against the horrid apartheid system, we send you our sincere greetings as well as congratulations for the many victories that have already been won and that have contributed to the serious crisis which now grips the Pretoria regime. We are confident that your meeting will provide another important forum for mapping out an appropriate strategy to meet the challenges that lie ahead for your organization and people, and we wish you the very best in that endeavour.

Experience in the last few years has shown that the Boers have become more vicious than ever as seen in their adoption of the policy of murderous brutality both at home and in the neighbouring states, a policy which has already been responsible for the almost daily massacres by racist troops of many innocent people within South Africa and the destabilisation of Southern African states by the same troops and their bandit agents. In the face of such barbarities, it behoves every patriot in this region to rededicate himself to the continuing struggle to rid our region of colonialism, racism, neo-colonialism and all other forms of imperialist oppression.

We are confident that victory is certain, and we look forward to intensification of the struggle in line with the serious decisions which no doubt will be made at your consultative conference.

Please accept, dear comrade and brother, the assurances of both our unflinching solidarity with the ANC and our highest consideration.

Text supplied by the Department of Information, Harare, Zimbabwe.

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