

SOUTHERN AFRICA RECORD contains the original texts of, or extracts from, important statements by political leaders, government representatives and international organisations, concerning international relations in the southern region of Africa. In addition to statements on issues of current concern, some significant statements made in the past are included in the RECORD from time to time. The reproduction of these policy statements of the past and present is intended for information and reference purposes, not only for students, but also for all those who are concerned with the relations between the countries of Southern Africa.

Statements are reproduced if and when texts become available (not in chronological order), and it must be emphasised that the selection of statements included in SOUTHERN AFRICA RECORD should not be regarded in any sense as indicating a viewpoint as to the relative importance of one or other statement over another not reproduced or reproduced in a later number of the RECORD. In any case, as the Institute itself cannot, in terms of its Constitution, hold a viewpoint on any aspect of international affairs, no views expressed in any statement reproduced in the RECORD should be identified with the Institute.

Compiler: Alan Begg

Published by the South African Institute of International Affairs. Four issues per year. Subscription rate R20,00 per annum (surface mail). R28,00 per annum (airmail) Africa and Europe. R30,00 US and elsewhere. Price per copy R5,00 (plus postage for overseas airmail).

Uitgegee deur die Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut van Internasionale Aangeleenthede. Vier uitgawes per jaar. Intekengeld R20,00 per jaar (landpos). R28,00 per jaar (buitelandse lugpos) Afrika en Europa. R30,00 VSA en elders. Prys per eksemplaar R5,00 (plus posgeld vir buitelandse lugpos).

SOUTHERN AFRICA RECORD

Number Forty-one, December 1985

Contents/Inhoud

Southern Africa

- Frontline States and Nigeria — Kadoma Declaration 30/31 July 1983 page 3
Non-Aligned Movement — Ministerial Meeting in Luanda, Angola
on 4–9 September 1985 page 5
Frontline States Meeting in Maputo, Mozambique on 15 September 1985 page 6

South Africa and the Commonwealth

- Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting — Nassau, Bahamas
(a) Extracts from 22 October 1985 Communique page 9
(b) Text of 20 October 1985 Agreement: Southern Africa — the Commonwealth
Accord page 11

South Africa and Angola

- Statement by South African Ambassador Von Schirnding to Security Council on
3 October 1985 page 15
Statement by United Kingdom's Permanent Representative to Security Council
on 3 October 1985 page 17
Statement by the South African Minister of Defence on UNITA page 19

The OAU, South Africa and Namibia — Arusha, 4 July 1985

- (a) Resolution on South Africa page 23
(b) Resolution on Namibia page 25
(c) President Nyerere's speech page 27

US and Mozambique

- (a) White House Press Briefing on visit of President Machel to US
17–19 September 1985 page 34
(b) Departure statements by Presidents Reagan and Machel 19 September 1985 page 41

Southern Africa

Frontline States and Nigeria — Kadoma Declaration 30–31 July 1983

Ministers of Information of the Frontline States and Nigeria, met in Kadoma, Zimbabwe on 30 and 31 July 1983 to discuss a strategy of information of the Frontline States and to define main areas of co-operation in the field of information in the region.

The ministers reviewed the liberation struggle in southern Africa and critically analysed the grave political, economic and military situation in the region which is engendered by South Africa's programme of total destabilisation of the Frontline States and other independent countries in the region.

The ministers specifically analysed South Africa's carefully orchestrated propaganda aggression against the people of the region in its attempts to stem the liberation struggle and to check the region's efforts towards economic independence.

They agreed on a common strategy and action to counteract and launch an offensive against Pretoria's systematic disinformation.

They agreed:

1. (a) to pool their resources and maximise co-operation in the gathering and dissemination of information in the region;
- (b) to assist and co-ordinate with the Liberation Movements in the struggle against apartheid and colonialism by providing them with greater access to radio and television networks, news agencies, other media and to training facilities;
- (c) to increase the level of co-operation among news agencies of the region in order to promote a daily exchange of news, features, photographic materials and to make maximum use of the services of the Pan-African News Agency;
- (d) to encourage co-operation in the field of broadcasting through the exchange of music, features, documentaries and co-ordination in the use of technical facilities;
- (e) to facilitate and synchronise the training of journalists and other media personnel of the Frontline States and the various institutions that exist;

- (f) to promote the exchange of personnel between the various media organs in the region as a means of enhancing practical training and familiarisation.

2. To this end the ministers decided that heads of their Information Departments meet this September in Maputo, the People's Republic of Mozambique, to work out modalities for the implementation of the agreed co-operation.

3. They agreed to co-ordinate the positions of their countries vis-a-vis, the new International Information and Communication Order within the framework of the Non-Aligned Movement, UNESCO and SADCC.

4. The ministers urged SADCC member states to give priority to information and communication in the determination of SADCC projects.

5. The ministers noted that South Africa is used as the main information centre about the region, by international agencies and other media. This has resulted in a distorted view and mis-representation of our region and tends to give credence and credibility to Pretoria's biased view of reality in southern Africa.

Bearing this in mind the ministers appealed to News Agencies and other international media to establish their regional bureaux in the independent countries of the region.

6. They also noted that some news agencies and other international media have already set up their regional bureaux in one or the other of the independent countries of the region, and urged the other international media to follow this example.

7. The ministers decided that foreign correspondents accredited to South Africa and those reporting to regional bureaux in South Africa will not be allowed, in principle, to work in the Frontline States any more.

8. They decided that a correspondent banned in one Frontline State is deemed banned in all Frontline States.

9. The ministers appealed to African news agencies and other media to have their own correspondents in the southern Africa region.

10. The ministers met informally with the representatives of the Liberation Movements of South Africa and Namibia, and re-affirmed the total commitments of their countries to the just struggle of the people of South Africa and Namibia. They noted with satisfaction the political and military progress and success of the Liberation Movements against apartheid and colonialism.

11. The ministers agreed to meet at least once a year to review progress and co-ordinate further joint activities. They decided to hold their next meeting in Lusaka, Zambia, in April 1984.

The Non-Aligned foreign ministers have issued a declaration which states that it will be impossible to achieve peace, stability and security in southern Africa until apartheid is completely eliminated. The Luanda Declaration, adopted in Luanda on September 9th, emphasises that apartheid, a crime against mankind and an insult to the universal conscience, has its roots in the same ideology which provoked World War II.

Based on this situation, the foreign ministers reiterated their urgent plea for the UN Security Council to impose on Pretoria the sanctions specified in the Organisation's Charter. The plea also supports the OAU proposal to convene a world conference to study and adopt sanctions against the racist regime on the tenth anniversary of the Soweto uprising in June 1976.

The ministers also issued a plea to those attending the upcoming British Commonwealth conference, which will be held in the Bahamas, to consider seriously the adoption and implementation of sanctions against Pretoria.

The Luanda Declaration advocates the immediate release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, as well as respect for their status as prisoners of war, in accordance with the 1949 Geneva Convention.

The US Administration's current constructive engagement policy is denounced as an instrument which only serves to aid the racist regime and encourage its defiance of international public opinion.

The document condemns Pretoria regime's militarisation and increase of its nuclear capacity, which represents a threat to international peace and security. Within this context, the document also condemns the nuclear and military co-operation which exists between Pretoria and Israel, and the co-operation which exists between these two countries and various NATO member countries. The foreign ministers note with deep concern the increasing danger derived from the racist Pretoria and Tel Aviv regimes' increasing nuclear power, the document states.

The document expresses sorrow over the official visits that the South African Prime Minister paid to Portugal, the UK, Switzerland, the FRG, Belgium, Italy and the Vatican, as well as his private visits to France and Austria.

The Luanda document issues an appeal to step up moral, political, and material aid to the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania. It also notes with satisfaction the increased armed struggle which is advocated by the first of these two organisations. The positive role played by the frontline countries in the struggle against Pretoria and their sustained support to the South African and Namibian liberation movements is also emphasised in the declaration.

The ministers assert that the Pretoria military regime's occupation of

southern Angola is considered an aggression. The document stresses: We demand a complete and unconditional withdrawal of South African troops from southern Angola, and we must increase material aid to the Angolan government in order to consolidate its categorical rejection of the so-called 'linkage' theory, which is a manoeuvre by Washington to delay Namibia's independence and a brazen intervention in Angola's internal affairs.

The government in Luanda is praised by the foreign ministers for its political will and diplomatic flexibility in the search for a negotiated and peaceful solution to the problems of southern Africa.

The annulment of the Clark Amendment by the US Congress is condemned in the final declaration, which stresses that the reason for its implementation was to stop Washington's intervention in Angola's internal affairs.

In regard to Namibia, the foreign ministers advocate increased material, financial, political, diplomatic and material aid to the SWAPO in its legitimate armed struggle.

In order to make the agreement viable, the meeting decided to promote the call for a special meeting of the UN General Assembly on Namibia in 1986, one week before the world organisation starts its activities.

The declaration also condemns Pretoria's manoeuvre of establishing a so-called provisional government on Namibian territory, which violates UN Resolution No 435. The ministers also rejected the arguments to divert attention from the main problem of Namibia's decolonisation, by claiming an alleged East-West confrontation in the region.

The agreements and decisions adopted by the special ministerial meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau on Namibia, held in April, 1985 in New Delhi, were advocated by the conference.

The declaration also states its deep concern for the political, economic, and military destabilisation plans against Mozambique, Botswana and the Kingdom of Lesotho.

Text as recorded by BBC.

Frontline States meeting in Maputo, Mozambique on 15 September 1985. Attended by Presidents Masire (Botswana), Kaunda (Zambia), Nyerere (Tanzania), Dos Santos (Angola) and Prime Minister Mugabe (Zimbabwe). Final Communique

The summit deeply analysed the explosive situation prevailing in southern Africa. It discussed in particular the situation inside South Africa, the situation in illegally occupied Namibia by the Pretoria regime, and the struggle against the armed bandits in the People's Republic of Mozambique and Angola.

The Heads of State and Government of the Frontline States noted with deep concern the increase of oppression, suppression, violence, and massacres perpetrated by the Pretoria regime against the defenceless population who, inside South Africa, fight for the abolition of the apartheid system. They strongly condemned the state of emergency imposed by the Pretoria regime. They called for the immediate lifting of the ban on the ANC and other African political organisations in South Africa and for the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners. This could bring about conditions for the beginning of talks aimed at the elimination of the apartheid system.

They noted that the so-called constitutional reforms and constructive engagement policy have failed. They warmly hailed the South African people for their political consciousness in their struggle against apartheid.

The Frontline countries also welcomed the growing international condemnation of the apartheid system, particularly in the Western countries. They hailed the growing condemnation of apartheid by Western countries taking the form of different types of pressure, including economic sanctions against the apartheid regime. They called upon these and other countries to broaden and intensify the pressure so that they may effectively hasten the process of dismantling apartheid.

With respect to Namibia the Heads of State and Government of the Frontline countries reaffirmed that Resolution 435 is the only basis for a negotiated settlement of Namibia's independence. They rejected the manoeuvre of conditioning the Namibian independence to the withdrawal of the internationalist Cuban forces from the sovereign territory of the People's Republic of Angola. They hailed SWAPO for the successes it has achieved in the armed struggle against the South African forces of occupation. They categorically rejected and condemned the puppet government installed in Windhoek, and appealed to the full international community not to recognise or give any credibility to the so-called interim government.

The summit hailed the successes of the peoples and the Governments of Angola and Mozambique, in particular the positive results achieved against the armed bandits by the Mozambique armed forces in collaboration with the Zimbabwe armed forces. The summit viewed this co-operation as an important example of the unity and solidarity which bind the Frontline countries in the struggle for peace and stability in the region. The People's Republic of Mozambique thanked the frontline countries.

The Frontline countries hailed the Government of the People's Republic of Angola for the ministerial meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement held in Luanda. They equally hailed the Republic of Zimbabwe for having been elected to host the eighth summit of the heads of state and of government of the Non-Aligned Movement. They stressed that this event constitutes support and encouragement for the struggle of the peoples of southern

Africa and that they are clear manifestations of the commitment of the international community in the struggle for peace and stability, which the peoples of this region are waging.

The Frontline summit paid homage to President Julius Nyerere, chairman of the Frontline countries. The summit stressed that the victories and achievements of the Frontline countries will forever be associated with the personality and relevant role played by President Julius Nyerere as with the wisdom and dynamism with which he always led the Frontline countries.

The summit of the Frontline countries decided that President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia will be the new chairman of the Frontline states.

Text supplied by African Research Bulletin Issue October 15 1985.

South Africa and the Commonwealth

- (a) Extracts from the October 22 communique of the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, Nassau 1985.

(1) Commonwealth Heads of Government met in Nassau from 16 to 22 October 1985. Of the 46 countries which attended, 41 were represented by their Heads of State or Prime Ministers. The Prime Minister of the Bahamas, Sir Lynden Pindling, was in the chair.

(13) Heads of Government stressed the particular problems being faced by small land-locked states in Southern Africa, especially at this time, and the need for increased assistance for domestic and regional efforts to overcome their transportation and other special problems.

(14) Heads of Government asked the Secretary-General to undertake appropriate action to follow-up the report's conclusions and recommendations and to ensure that small states continue to receive priority in the economic and developmental assistance rendered by the Secretariat. They welcomed the fact that the report pointed directions in which small states could take measures to increase their national security capacity and urged the need for a sustained Commonwealth-wide effort to ensure that maximum benefit is derived from it. They also undertook to consider such appropriate forms of collective support as have been referred to in the report, both within the Commonwealth and through the United Nations. In addition, they called for a meeting of Commonwealth officials to formulate a programme of action to implement the recommendations and to press for international action where required.

(15) Heads of Government drew particular attention to the recommendations that the United Nations should strengthen its capacity to safeguard the security of vulnerable states and that the United Nations Secretary-General should play a more active role, in the spirit of Article 99 of the United Nations Charter, in responding to requests from a state feeling itself under military threat.

(16) Heads of Government also stressed the importance of the role that the Commonwealth Secretary-General should play in assisting a country anticipating a security crisis.

(19) Heads of Government, having set out in their separate statement, 'The Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa', a united Commonwealth response to the continuing problem of apartheid in South Africa, also addressed the other major issues of the region: The question of South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia and the regime's acts of aggression against its neighbouring states.

(20) Heads of Government were gravely concerned that Namibia's independence has been further delayed. They considered the establishment of the so-called interim administration as null and void and renewed their call for the immediate implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) which they reaffirmed as the only acceptable basis for bringing Namibia to independence. In accordance with this position, they again rejected attempts to delay Namibia's freedom by linking it to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. They also stressed that the policy of 'Constructive Engagement' had failed to end South Africa's intransigence over Namibia as well as over apartheid.

(21) Heads of Government recalled that in New Delhi they had agreed that if South Africa continued to obstruct the implementation of Resolution 435, the adoption of appropriate measures under the charter of the United Nations would have to be considered. They also agreed that the action which they envisaged in their separate accord on South Africa should be directed equally towards ensuring South Africa's compliance with the wishes of the international community on the question of Namibia.

(22) Heads of Government recalled that when South Africa entered into pacts with Angola and Mozambique early in 1984, the hope had been expressed that they would lead to peace in the region. But far from breaking the cycle of violence, South Africa had continued to occupy Angolan territory and to launch attacks against that country. It had also continued its destabilisation programme against its neighbours as evidenced in its self-confessed active support for UNITA, the Angolan rebel movement, and in the support given to the MNR, the rebel movement in Mozambique. Heads of Government again called for the immediate withdrawal of all South African troops from Angola and an end to all assistance to dissident movements in the region. They also called upon all states to do everything in their power to refrain from any actions which might entail support for or encourage South African attacks on or continue insurgency in these countries.

(23) Heads of Government condemned the South African regime's continued attacks on those neighbouring countries which have refused to enter into pacts with it. They especially deplored the brutal attack against Botswana, a Commonwealth country, in June 1985. In this regard they expressed full support for Security Council Resolution 568 (1985) which called for an end to all such acts of aggression and demanded that South Africa make

full compensation to Botswana for the loss of life, injury and damage to property.

(24) Heads of Government approved the report of the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa and in commending its work asked it to continue paying particular attention to developments in Namibia and South Africa.

(25) Heads of Government agreed that the programme to counteract apartheid propaganda they had launched in New Delhi would be continued.

(26) Heads of Government welcomed the progress made by Commonwealth training programmes for South African and Namibian refugees and agreed that these be expanded.

(b) The full text of the October 20 agreement entitled 'Southern Africa — the Commonwealth Accord': Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, Nassau 1985

(1) We consider that South Africa's continuing refusal to dismantle apartheid, its illegal occupation of Namibia, and its aggression against its neighbours constitute a serious challenge to the values and principles of the Commonwealth, a challenge which Commonwealth countries cannot ignore. At New Delhi we expressed the view that 'only the eradication of apartheid and the establishment of majority rule on the basis of free and fair exercise of universal adult suffrage by all the people in a united and non-fragmented South Africa can lead to a just and lasting solution of the explosive situation prevailing in Southern Africa.' We are united in the belief that reliance on the range of pressures adopted so far has not resulted in the fundamental changes we have sought over many years. The growing crisis and intensified repression in South Africa mean that apartheid must be dismantled now if a greater tragedy is to be averted and that concerted pressure must be brought to bear to achieve that end. We consider that the situation calls for urgent practical steps.

(2) We, therefore, call on the authorities in Pretoria for the following steps to be taken in a genuine manner and as a matter of urgency:

a. Declare that the system of apartheid will be dismantled and specific and meaningful action taken in fulfilment of that intent.

b. Terminate the existing state of emergency.

c. Release immediately and unconditionally Nelson Mandela and all others imprisoned and detained for their opposition to apartheid.

d. Establish political freedom and specifically lift the existing ban on the *African National Congress and other political parties*.

e. Initiate, in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides, a process

of dialogue across lines of colour, politics and religion, with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government.

(3) We have agreed on a number of measures which have as their rationale impressing on the authorities in Pretoria the compelling urgency of dismantling apartheid and erecting the structures of democracy in South Africa. The latter, in particular, demands a process of dialogue involving the true representatives of the majority black population of South Africa. We believe that we must do all we can to assist that process, while recognising that the forms of political settlement in South Africa are for the people of the country — all the people — to determine.

(4) To this end, we have decided to establish a small group of eminent Commonwealth persons to encourage through all practicable ways the evolution of that necessary process of political dialogue. We are not unmindful of the difficulties such an effort will encounter, including the possibility of initial rejection by the South African authorities, but, we believe it to be our duty to leave nothing undone that might contribute to peaceful change in South Africa and avoid the dreadful prospect of violent conflict that looms over South Africa, threatening people of all races in the country, and the peace and stability of the entire Southern Africa region.

(5) We are asking the president of Zambia and the Prime Ministers of Australia, Bahamas, Canada, India, the United Kingdom and Zimbabwe to develop with the Secretary-General the modalities of this effort to assist the process of political dialogue in South Africa. We would look to the group of eminent persons to seek to facilitate the processes of dialogue referred to in paragraph 2(e) above and by all practicable means to advance the fulfilment of the objectives of this accord.

(6) For our part, we have as an earnest of our opposition to apartheid reached accord on a programme of common action as follows:

(i) We declare the Commonwealth's support for the strictest enforcement of the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 418 and 558 and commit ourselves to prosecute violators to the fullest extent of the law;

(ii) We reaffirm the Gleneagles Declaration of 1977, which called upon Commonwealth members to take every practical step to discourage sporting contacts with South Africa;

(iii) We agree upon, and commend to other governments, the adoption of the following further economic measures against South Africa, which have already been adopted by a number of member countries:

(a) A ban on all new government loans to the government of South Africa and its agencies;

(b) A readiness to take unilaterally what action may be possible to preclude the import of Krugerrands;

(c) No government funding for trade missions to South Africa or for participation in exhibitions and trade fairs in South Africa;

(d) A ban on the sale and export of computer equipment capable of use by South African military forces, police or security forces;

(e) A ban on new contracts for the sale and export of nuclear goods, materials and technology to South Africa;

(f) A ban on the sale and export of oil to South Africa;

(g) A strict and rigorously controlled embargo on imports of arms, ammunition, military vehicles and para-military equipment from South Africa;

(h) An embargo on all military co-operation with South Africa; and

(i) *Discouragement of all cultural and scientific events except where these contribute towards the ending of apartheid or have no possible role in promoting it.*

(7) It is our hope that the process and measures we have agreed upon will help to bring about concrete progress towards the objectives stated above in six months. The Heads of Government mentioned in paragraph 5 above, or their representatives, will then meet to review the situation. If in their opinion adequate progress has not been made within this period, we agree to consider the adoption of further measures. Some of us would, in that event, consider the following steps among others:

a. A ban on air links with South Africa;

b. A ban on new investment or reinvestment of profits earned in South Africa;

c. A ban on the import of agricultural products from South Africa;

d. The termination of double taxation agreements with South Africa;

e. The termination of all government assistance to investment in, and trade with, South Africa;

f. A ban on all government procurement in South Africa;

g. A ban on government contracts with majority owned South African companies;

h. A ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa.

(8) Finally, we agree that should all of the above measures fail to produce

the desired results within a reasonable period, further effective measures will have to be considered. Many of us have either taken or are prepared to take measures which go beyond those listed above, and each of us will pursue the objectives of this accord in all the ways and through all appropriate fora open to us. We believe, however, that in pursuing this programme jointly, we enlarge the prospects of an orderly transition to social, economic and political justice in South Africa and peace and stability in the Southern Africa region as a whole.

Text supplied by the British Embassy, Pretoria.

South Africa and Angola

Address to the Security Council of the United Nations on 3 October 1985 by South African Ambassador K. von Schirnding

Mr President,

When this Council met on 20 September 1985 I pointed to the growing conflict in southern Angola and to the role which the Soviet Union and its surrogates were playing in the Angolan civil war. I asked whether the democratic countries would stand aside while the people of Angola fought on alone against foreign interventionists. I pointed to the dangers that the new Soviet imperialism posed for Africa and said that South Africa stood with all true Africans against the forces of the new imperialists.

What was the response of this Council? By adopting Resolution 571 (1985), and particularly operative paragraph 5 of that resolution, the Council issued, on behalf of the MPLA-regime in Luanda, a call to arms to the international community. The Security Council in essence requested all member states to export more weapons, more military personnel and, as an obvious consequence, more violence, bloodshed and killing to Angola.

The Soviet Union and its surrogates have seized upon this invitation and have taken full advantage of the opportunities it offered. Their involvement in the current fighting is even more extensive than I indicated to the Council on 20 September 1985. Soviet pilots are flying some of Angola's Mig 23-aircraft and MI 25 helicopter gunships — the same gunships that they are using to slaughter the people of Afghanistan. It is clear that they are directly involved, and are in fact commanding the current MPLA-offensive.

No doubt the Soviet Union has sought to take advantage of the current international vendetta against South Africa to further expand its influence in Africa. No doubt it imagines that it can intervene militarily in Southern Africa with impunity.

South Africa has no illusions about its relative power. But it does have regional responsibilities, responsibilities for the security of its own people and responsibilities for the security of the people of SWA/Namibia. Even now SWAPO is sending major units southward as part of the Soviet-directed offensive with the intention of opening new fronts in its terrorist campaign against the people of SWA/Namibia. Despite its limited capabilities it must

be understood that South Africa cannot simply shed its responsibilities. Those involved should understand that there will be no cheap victories.

If the Council would like to establish what is happening in southern Angola my Government suggests that they send a fact-finding mission to the area to establish who is fighting whom, who is directing the operations, what armaments are being used, and what the people of Angola would like to see happen in their country. They would then discover what support UNITA enjoys in Angola. If the MPLA wishes to confirm this let them hold free elections. Let the people of Angola determine their future in a peaceful manner instead of by destroying one another in this endless civil war which has been instigated by foreign powers for the promotion of their own interests.

But if the MPLA chooses to continue the civil war, why should it be the only party entitled to call on assistance? The United States Congress, by repealing the Clarke Amendment, has already recognized the admissibility of aiding UNITA.

South Africa is committed to peace and stability in Southern Africa. My Government has often gone on record to invite the leaders of Southern Africa to come together, to negotiate and to work out solutions to the problems of the region. I have often repeated and extended such invitations in this Council. South Africa would far prefer to resolve the problems of Southern Africa by negotiation. It does not believe that military solutions are feasible. I would accordingly like to repeat the appeal which I made on behalf of my Government on 20 September for the resumption of direct talks between South Africa and Angola. The present situation makes such a dialogue more urgent than ever. But peace and stability can not be achieved while foreign interests dictate developments in our sub-continent and while foreign powers abuse the countries of Southern Africa for the furtherance of their own global aims.

Only yesterday the South African State President again appealed to all the leaders of Southern Africa to stand together in order to rid our region of all foreign forces. He said: 'For the sake of its own security, for the sake of its own peace of mind and for the sake of its own progress, I hope that Southern Africa will attempt to free itself from the forces of enslavement now encroaching upon it. Say to the Cubans "Go home" and say to the Russians "Go home" and the minute this happens I will be prepared to contain all our military forces inside South Africa.'

Mr President, South Africa has made an unambiguous call for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Angola. In terms of its prerogative under Article 38 of the Security Council's provisional rules of procedure it has prepared and circulated a draft resolution to give effect to this call. If members of this Council fail to give due consideration and support to this draft resolution we invite them to tell us with what aspects they disagree.

This is a sincere and a serious attempt by my Government to bring about peace in our region. It is not an attempt to score political points or to appor-

tion blame for the development of the current situation in Angola. This proposal of my Government is designed to serve the interests of the Southern African region as a whole.

Draft Resolution

The Security Council

Having considered the request by the Permanent Representative of Angola to the United Nations contained in document S/17510,

Gravely concerned at the escalation of conflict and the worsening situation developing in Angola,

Convinced that the unwarranted presence of foreign forces in Angola seriously impedes the development of a process of national reconciliation in that country,

Conscious of the need and desire of the Angolan people to determine their own future free from any foreign interference and in an atmosphere of peace and tranquility,

- (1) *Demands* that all foreign military forces be withdrawn forthwith and unconditionally from the territory of Angola;
- (2) *Calls upon* all states to scrupulously respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola;
- (3) *Requests* the various factions within Angola to settle their differences through a process of peaceful negotiation and in a spirit of national reconciliation;
- (4) *Requests* Member States to refrain from intervening in the domestic affairs of Angola so that self-determination can at last be achieved in that country;
- (5) *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Text supplied by the South African Dept. of Foreign Affairs.

Text of the UK Ambassador Sir John Thompson's statement to the United Nations Security Council 3 October 1985

Mr President,

I am intervening in a debate on this subject for the second time in two weeks with a deep sense of indignation.

During this Council's debate on 20 September, I stated in the clearest possible terms the British Government's condemnation of South African incursions into Angola and repeated violation of Angolan sovereignty. I spoke against intervention by combat troops from other countries. It is our firm belief that it should be left to the people of Angola to resolve their internal affairs without such external intervention. Intervention from whatever quar-

ter, carries an obvious risk to regional stability, and cannot but impede efforts to resolve the urgent problems of Southern Africa.

While I do not wish to repeat what I have so recently said, I cannot emphasise too strongly that the United Kingdom deplures and condemns the renewed attack by South Africa upon Angola, and is concerned at its consequences. South Africa's action is not merely improper and illegitimate, but utterly short-sighted and certain to be counter-productive. We find it incredible that the South African authorities fail to perceive how damaging such behaviour is to their own national interests and security.

My delegation also finds it incredible and altogether unacceptable that the South African Government should blatantly disregard the decisions of the Council enshrined in Resolution 571 of 20 September. This constitutes a deliberate flouting of international opinion and even more of the United Nations body charged with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. This South African action deserves the severe censure of the Council. The South Africans must understand that these actions forfeit all respect and sympathy.

The South African Government seems extraordinarily blind to the principles and concerns of Governments such as mine. It leaves my delegation with a sense of indignation that they should so misunderstand us. The distinguished permanent representative of South Africa has just given us various pieces of advice. It is ironic that he does not see that in the first place this advice applies to his own Government. The distinguished permanent representative calls for the removal of all foreign forces from Angola. We agree, but what business then do the South African forces have in Angola fighting the legitimate Government of the country?

The distinguished permanent representative has urged the Angolan Government to hold free elections. At one and the same time the South Africans actually negotiate with the Government of Angola—thus acknowledging it—and attack it militarily. How are free elections to be held in these conditions? Moreover, if we are in the business of giving advice to Sovereign Governments about holding elections, what about free and full elections in South Africa? How about beginning at least with a dialogue with the genuine leaders of Black South Africans?

Mr President, I return to the immediate situation before us. In Resolution 571, the Security Council decided to embark on a particular course of action with regard to the conflict within Angola. As the Council urged in operative paragraph 8 of that Resolution, member states are applying pressure to the South African Government. In accordance with operative paragraph 7, the Council has now appointed three of its members to constitute a commission of investigation to visit Angola. In the present situation we should carry through energetically and expeditiously the action upon which we decided on 20 September. It would be most helpful to us if the commission of investi-

gation could visit Angola in the very near future, to carry out its important work and report back to us at the earliest possible date. Their report will be of considerable assistance to the Council as it seeks to establish what further action it can best take to help bring peace to Angola.

Text supplied by the British Embassy, Pretoria.

Statement by the South African Minister of Defence General The Hon. M.A. de M. Malan: South Africa's connection with UNITA 20 September 1985

This statement directly concerns the security and interests of the RSA and deals with Dr Jonas Savimbi's Angolan Liberation Movement, UNITA.

In recent years the RSA has maintained links with this movement. South Africa will break this connection on condition that all foreign forces be withdrawn from Angola. I will shortly explain precisely what I mean by this.

First I would like to point out that recently in certain political and media circles I have been accused of lying about the RSA's relations with Angola. In certain quarters I have been presented as regional ruffian.

The latest series of accusations and allegations concern the Defence Force's follow-up operation in southern Angola. This operation coincided by chance with an increased MPLA offensive against UNITA.

Proper background and perspective is now given.

I have already informed Parliament. During my budget debate, for example, I stated the RSA's attitude to anti-communist movements. South Africa reserves its right to protect its own security interests. I clearly stated that in the past, the present and in the future, South Africa, when necessary and in our security interests, would give its support to such movements.

The facts of South Africa's connections with UNITA and its leader, Dr Jonas Savimbi, are in reality an open secret. This connection is of a material, humanitarian and moral nature.

This connection is in reality an open secret because for what other reason would Dr Savimbi have attended the inauguration of the State President exactly a year ago? For what other reason would he have been treated as an honoured guest?

In addition, over the years a number of South Africans in leadership positions have been introduced to Dr Savimbi.

Let there be no misunderstanding about this: There are connections with Dr Savimbi.

I am not ashamed of this. I do not apologise on behalf of the government for this. This connection is justifiable. From time to time I informed politicians of different parties of this. For many years the MPLA has actively supported SWAPO terrorists.

The Lusaka Agreement concerned only a certain area in South Angola. The MPLA's general support to SWAPO and our relationship with UNITA were clearly not included in the Agreement.

UNITA openly opposes communism. In addition, they oppose the Cubans who are doing Moscow's dirty work in Angola. UNITA is on record that it is prepared to negotiate about Angola's future on condition that the Cubans withdraw.

I will now step by step deal with the reasons why we have connections with UNITA. The connection exists for several reasons.

The first is that we stand for norms and values of freedom and justice—not only within our own borders, but in Southern Africa as a whole.

Secondly, like UNITA, we oppose communism. Our policy is to combat Marxist expansionism and here it concerns those who permit actions against us. In Angola it concerns a Soviet controlled offensive against all of Southern Africa. Angola is Moscow's springboard to Southern Africa.

Thirdly, we cannot yield to opportunistic Western political pressure which uses South Africa as a handy distraction for their own problems.

Fourthly, I am not searching for a communist behind every bush. But South Africa cannot for a moment dare to lose perspective on realities.

In our world realities and facts are too readily violated and twisted to suit *the needs of the moment*. That is why we have to *distinguish between realities* and what people would like to have as realities. There are too many people in the world today who bend realities to suit their cause.

One such bending of realities is to try to slander UNITA into the ground. UNITA stands in the way of Moscow's plans. Actions are taken as if the actual realities—the Marxist grip on Angola and all of Africa—do not exist. The misconception or fraudulent image then arises that the Marxist hold in this part of the world does not really matter.

What is happening now in the world is that the realities of Angola are not being recognised. On the one hand the country is being supported by weapons—highly sophisticated weapons from the communist bloc. On the other hand it concerns media conceptions and images from the West. These conceptions have a blinding effect on those who should know better.

Today Moscow has a new leader with new initiatives. There is a new muscled aggressiveness on the one hand coupled with a refined strategy of pretty words on the other.

The new men in Moscow say: 'Give us a chance'. The Kremlin's policy against the West is one of 'comprehensive settlement'. This is their tactic in the Middle East, it is their tactic in Afghanistan and it is their tactic in Southern Africa, specifically in Angola. That is why they are prepared to achieve a 'lasting peaceful solution'. This is all part of the so-called peaceful strategy and the West believes that this is beautiful. The West is yielding to the Kremlin's game of words, so skillfully carried by the international media.

In Angola UNITA is in Moscow's way. That is why they want to get UNITA out of the way; that is why it is their strategy to remove South African resistance.

Supporting UNITA in Angola concerns stopping foreign intervention by Cubans and other communist soldiers; it concerns stopping marxist infiltration and expansionism. That is why the MPLA is so important to Moscow; that is why UNITA and its connections is an obstacle to Moscow.

Do not let us be misled by distortions of these realities. We dare not give in.

That is why I state again that we will break our links with UNITA on condition that all foreign forces are withdrawn from Angola.

Fifthly, our connection with UNITA is therefore in our own interests. UNITA controls an area in Southern Angola where SWAPO terrorists are not allowed to move freely.

But this question of interests goes much further: Through our connections with UNITA we maintain the interests of the Free World on our sub-continent. And the sooner the Western community realises this, the better the results will be for everybody. The sooner the West understands Russian controlled strategy, the greater the chances will be for lasting peace.

An obvious question is why this connection with UNITA over the years has played so close to our chests. I surely do not have to expand on this. It is obvious that we choose for UNITA's options and our own interests which have to be protected.

As far as Angola is concerned we have reached a watershed. The West will now also have to state clearly where they stand on Cubans and other meddlers. At present Russians are commanding to a large extent operations against UNITA.

The time has now come for us to place our connections with UNITA openly in perspective.

All I can say about this is that in essence we help UNITA to help itself. In this way we serve South Africa and Southern Africa and the West's interests.

Dr Savimbi is a great leader in international terms. He stands for the same norms and values in which we believe. He sacrificed personal comfort and convenience to lead his people against slavery. He is a God-fearing and determined man.

UNITA is a movement with muscle and drive. If it had not been for thousands of Cubans, Russians, East Germans and Eastern-Bloc states, Dr Savimbi and UNITA would probably have taken control in Luanda a long time ago. He would have done this with the support of the majority of the Angolan people.

The MPLA government cannot stand the test of the Angolan people—that is why it is not prepared to hold an election.

UNITA is not a creation of the SA Government. It is a movement in its

own right which came into conflict with the Portuguese in the early 1960's and with the MPLA since 1975.

Should Dr Savimbi be unsuccessful in Angola, then the West will be to blame because they permitted Eastern Bloc countries to act undeterred against Western interests. South Africa, supporting Western interests, will then have a clear conscience.

Now it is on record that South Africa supports UNITA. We will do it again if it is necessary and on condition that it is in our own interests.

Angola's position is another tragic example of the double standards against which the world judges South Africa. We are condemned because of support to a black anti-Marxist people's movement. But in most circles there is silence about the Angolan government's active support to SWAPO and the ANC by providing training and other facilities.

The irony of today's world is that those who support Marxism have a free hand, but those supporting civilised normal Western values, become the outcasts among nations.

Text supplied by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs.

The OAU, South Africa and Namibia

- (a) Resolution on South Africa by the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, meeting in its Forty-Fourth Ordinary Session in Arusha, Tanzania from 4–5 July 1985:

Having heard the report of the Executive Secretary and Statements from ANC and PAC,

Considering the Pretoria regime's total rejection of the principle of universal adult suffrage, and its tenacious commitment to the racist policy of forced removals and denationalisation of the indigenous African people,

Convinced that the so-called constitutional reforms and other equally meaningless reforms are mere ploys designed to placate world public opinion while further entrenching white minority rule,

Noting with satisfaction the united mass action by the oppressed people of South Africa not only to render the apartheid system unworkable but also to make racist South Africa ungovernable,

Gravely concerned about the Pretoria regime's increased acts of terrorism in the form of daily killings of unarmed demonstrators, the assassination, and persecution of leaders and militants recently committed by the racist regime, even as the international community was observing the 25th and 9th Anniversaries of Sharpeville and Soweto massacres respectively,

Noting with satisfaction the growing world-wide opposition to and action against apartheid especially in the Western countries,

Further encouraged by the emergence and dramatic growth of the Free South Africa Movement in the USA in opposition to the policy of constructive engagement stubbornly pursued by the Reagan Administration,

Outraged by the Pretoria regime's invasions, threats and acts of terrorism and war against the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Botswana, the Kingdom of Lesotho, the People's Republic of Mozambique, the Republic of Seychelles and other neighbouring African States,

Convinced that there can be no peace, stability and security in Southern Africa until the apartheid regime is overthrown and replaced by a majority Government,

Further convinced that despite the Pretoria regime is becoming increasingly

vulnerable to the combined efforts made by the oppressed People of South Africa and the International Community in the form of armed struggle, civil disobedience and economic sanctions,

Considering the forth coming UN Decade for Women Conference, particularly the manoeuvres to exclude an item on the plight of women and children under the apartheid regime from its agenda:

- (1) **WARMLY COMMENDS** the oppressed People of South Africa for their struggle against their oppressors and urges them to step up this resistance;
- (2) **CALLS ON** all Member States of the OAU, peace-loving peoples and nations to increase their financial and material assistance to the struggling people of South Africa so as to raise the level of resistance;
- (3) **STRONGLY CONDEMNS** racist Pretoria regime for the recent invasion and acts of aggression against the Republic of Botswana and the People's Republic of Angola during which scores of innocent civilians and refugees were killed in cold blood under the pretext of hot pursuit of ANC and SWAPO freedom fighters and the elimination of non-existent military bases in these countries;
- (4) **COMMENDS** the Frontline States and Lesotho for their unswerving commitment and readiness to sacrifice for attainment of independence in Namibia and majority rule in South Africa;
- (5) **PROPOSES** the organisation and convening of a World Conference on Sanctions Against Racist South Africa in collaboration with the Non-Aligned Movement and the United Nations, to co-incide with the 10th Anniversary of the Soweto uprising of June, 1976;
- (6) **CALLS ON GOVERNMENTS** that have not yet done so to ratify the Convention on suppression and punishment of the crime of apartheid;
- (7) **SUPPORTS** the appeal recently made by the African National Congress and SWAPO for the strengthening of the campaign towards the effective implementation of the oil embargo against racist South Africa;
- (8) **MANDATES** the African Group at the United Nations to step up the campaign for the total isolation of the racist South African regime especially through the convening of the Security Council to consider the possibility of imposing comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against South Africa under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter;
- (9) **WARMLY COMMENDS** anti-apartheid activists throughout the world especially the Free South Africa Movement in the United States of America;
- (10) **REQUESTS** the OAU Secretary-General to establish and maintain close relations with these Movements so as to increase the momentum of their activities;
- (11) **CONDEMNS** the Reagan Administration Policy of Constructive En-

gement which has emboldened the racist regime in continuing to defy international public opinion;

- (12) APPEALS to all peace and freedom-loving peoples and nations participating in the forthcoming UN Decade for Women Conference to be held in Nairobi not only to defeat the attempts to impose racist South Africa's participation in the conference but also to use this forum to highlight the plight of women and children under apartheid in South Africa and Namibia in order to help secure increased moral, political and material support for the national liberation struggle in these territories;
- (13) CALLS FOR THE UNCONDITIONAL release of all South African political prisoners and detainees and salutes their unshakeable commitment to the national liberation struggle as reflected in the message of Nelson Mandela's rejection of P. W. Botha's offer of conditional release.

- (b) Resolution on Namibia by the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, meeting in its 44th Ordinary Session in Arusha, Tanzania, from the 4-5 July 1985:

Having examined the Report of the Executive Secretary and heard a statement of SWAPO,

Recalling its previous resolutions and decisions on Namibia in particular the Arusha Plan of Action on Namibia (1981), and Acora Programme of Action on Namibia (1985),

Noting with indignation that United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) remains unimplemented because of the insistence by the Pretoria Regime and the Reagan Administration on linking the independence of Namibia to the withdrawal of the Cuban internationalist forces from Angola,

Outraged by racist South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia and its use of terror, its policy of repression and oppression against the Namibian people as well as the repeated aggression against neighbouring countries,

Noting with serious concern the racist regime's militarisation of Namibia and its continued action of stepping up the conscription of Namibians into its army of occupation,

Gravely concerned about the unilateral and illegal decision taken by racist South Africa to install the so-called interim Government in Namibia which is another action aimed at consolidating the racist Pretoria regime's occupation of Namibia against the will of the Namibian people and in total defiance of relevant resolutions and decisions of the OAU, United Nations and Non-Aligned Movement,

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia,

Noting with satisfaction the success of the Conference in New Delhi, India, on Namibia,

Cognisant that the armed struggle remains the most effective means to bring about the independence of Namibia:

- (1) **STRONGLY CONDEMNNS** racist South Africa and the United States Administration for delaying the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) by insisting on irrelevant and extraneous issues such as linking the independence of Namibia to the withdrawal of Cuban internationalist forces from Angola;
- (2) **VIGOROUSLY CONDEMNNS** racist South Africa for its continued illegal occupation of Namibia, increased atrocities, murder and brutality against the Namibian people;
- (3) **UNRESERVEDLY CONDEMNNS** racist South African acts of aggression against neighbouring countries such as the recent South African commando raids into Angola and Botswana;
- (4) **VEHEMENTLY CONDEMNNS** racist South Africa's policy of conscription of Namibians into its army of occupation and its use of Namibia as a spring board for military attacks against neighbouring countries;
- (5) **UNEQUIVOCALLY CONDEMNNS AND REJECTS** racist South Africa's installation of the so-called interim government in Namibia;
- (6) **DECLARES THAT ACTION** to be illegal, null and void and urges Member States and the International Community as a whole not to recognize the so-called interim government or organs established in pursuance thereof;
- (7) **CONDEMNNS** the Reagan Administration's policy of 'Constructive Engagement' which has continued to encourage racist South Africa to remain intransigent, perpetuate its acts of aggression which constitute a threat to peace and security in the region;
- (8) **COMMENDS SWAPO** especially its Military Wing, PLAN, for intensifying the armed struggle and inflicting heavy losses on the enemy;
- (9) **URGES ONCE MORE** Member States to implement the Arusha Plan of Action on Namibia to enable SWAPO to effectively carry out the liberation struggle, armed struggle in particular;
- (10) **REITERATES** that the United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) remains the only basis for the peaceful settlement of the Namibian problem;
- (11) **REAFFIRMS** that the United Nations remains the legal authority over Namibia and therefore urges United Nations Secretary-General as a matter of urgency to take appropriate measures to ensure speedy implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978);
- (12) **FURTHER REAFFIRMS** the legitimacy of the armed struggle in Namibia and its commitment to increase concrete material and financial support to the struggling People of Namibia through their vanguard movement, SWAPO;

- (13) RENEW its thanks and appreciation to the Socialist and Nordic countries and solidarity groups for all humanitarian assistance rendered to SWAPO;
- (14) COMMENDS the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement for its continued interest in the Namibian Question as exemplified by the Special Meeting on Namibia convened in New Delhi, India, from 19 to 21 April 1985;
- (15) TAKES NOTE of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 566 (1985) on Namibia and urges the International Community to take the following measures against South Africa: —
- (a) Total ban on new investments;
 - (b) Cessation of maritime and air links with racist South Africa;
 - (c) The prohibition of the sale of Krugerrands and any coins minted in South Africa and Namibia;
 - (d) Total boycott of sporting and cultural relations with apartheid South Africa.

(c) *Extracts from President Nyerere's speech to the 44th Session of the OAU Liberation Committee Arusha — 4 July 1985:*

Mr Chairman,
Your Excellencies and Friends,

I thank you for your invitation to address this 44th Session of the Liberation Committee, although what I would really like to be doing is speaking at a Celebration marking the winding up of your work. For when we in Africa have completed the work we set out to do more than 22 years ago, your Committee will no longer need to exist. But the present reality is that the most intractable tasks of African Liberation still face the peoples of Africa, and therefore the Organisation of African Unity and this Committee acting on its behalf.

We have reached the hard core of the Liberation Struggle. All except four of the 19 African states which have joined the OAU since 1963 won their independence through peaceful means; the political and diplomatic fronts of the Liberation Struggle were sufficient to achieve the objective without the necessity of an armed struggle. But the Liberation Struggle has become increasingly difficult as it progressed southwards. In Angola, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe — three of which border South Africa or its occupied territory — it was necessary for the peoples to take up arms. The fight was in all cases long and bitter, and much suffering was caused; but the ultimate result was in all cases independence.

Now we are left with the problems of South Africa's colonial occupation of Namibia and that of apartheid in South Africa itself. Basically, we are left

with the problem of South Africa. For the apartheid regime is the source of all the violence and injustice and instability in Southern Africa.

The prime motive of South Africa's dogged opposition to genuine independence for Namibia is the defence of apartheid. The only discernible motive for South Africa's aggression and subversive attacks against free African states is the defence of apartheid — that is to say, its fear of the example of stable and progressive African states committed to the principles of human equality. And defence of apartheid is also the purpose of the South African Administration's killings, its torture, and its detentions of South African citizens. In its search for peace, and for economic development in Africa, a vital purpose of the Organisation of African Unity must therefore be the weakening and the ultimate abolition of apartheid.

There are three aspects to this struggle, all of which demand political, diplomatic, economic, and unfortunately also military support activity from African states working through this Committee and bilaterally. The first is that of genuine Namibian independence.

Security Council Resolution 435 was passed in 1978 unanimously. The United Nations Plan for independence has been — in theory — agreed by all those directly involved in the details of this question. That includes SWAPO, the South African Government, the members of the Western Contact Group, and the Frontline States. But Namibia is not free. On the contrary, during the last month — seven years after Resolution 435 — we have seen South Africa purport to establish an 'Interim Government' in Namibia, which consists of its own puppets or dupes. This Interim Government has no international standing — and no support internally. The Security Council has responded to this South African move by threatening future consideration of mandatory sanctions against South Africa. In the meantime the Council has given some encouragement to those countries which are willing to impose limited unilateral sanctions against the apartheid state.

Yet in practice, South Africa is able to remain confident in its defiance of world opinion even on Namibian Independence. For although the words have been many — and have their importance — there is a long record of inaction after Resolutions of the United Nations and other bodies. This leads the South African Government to believe that it will not suffer (either economically or politically) as a result of its defiance, or at least not in the areas of most interest to it. South Africa's confidence is bolstered by the knowledge that in one key area it is serving its own interests while acting on behalf of the United States of America.

The linkage between Namibian Independence under Resolution 435 and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola was not put forward by South Africa until sometime after the so-called 'Pre-Implementation Talks' in Geneva in 1981. It was only submitted as a condition for implementing the Resolution after two things had happened. First, the linkage had been made in

American political campaigning—and those doing so had won the Presidential elections. Secondly, all the other obstacles to implementing the Resolution which had been raised by South Africa had, one after another, been overcome. Linkage thus doubly serves the interests of South Africa. It creates an obstacle to Namibian independence; for all that the South African Government needs to do—and has been doing—is to continue the destabilization of Angola and thus make it impossible for Angola to agree to the withdrawal of Cuban troops. This in turn ensures continued American support for South Africa's defiance of the United Nations. Africa must not turn a blind eye to the United States' policy of 'constructive engagement' with apartheid and official terrorism.

But it does not help very much for Africa simply to bemoan this linkage as though it made Namibian Independence impossible. The purpose of Resolution 435 was to effect a peaceful transfer of power to the Namibian people—to prevent the suffering and misery of an intensifying Armed Struggle for independence. It was an attempt by the United Nations to fulfil one of the functions for which it was set up—the prevention of war or the settlement of conflict by peaceful means. Thus, Resolution 435 was supported by Africa as an alternative method and preferred *route* to Liberation—not as an alternative to Liberation. It still represents a preferred route; but after seven years both SWAPO and Africa have to ask themselves whether it is really a viable alternative route, and if so, for how long and in the face of how much South African and American obstruction it can continue to be regarded as an alternative route.

The People of Namibia, under the leadership of SWAPO, resorted to the Armed Struggle many years ago. It was this fact which caused the international community to take an interest in Namibian independence and finally led to Resolution 435. It is now clear that if the Namibian people are to force the implementation of that Resolution, the Armed Struggle has to be stepped up—to be intensified. This is a regrettable fact, but it remains a fact. While remaining ready for a peaceful process to Liberation, the Namibian people—with Africa as their allies and supporters—must pursue the only means to Liberation which is at present open to them.

The same position holds good within South Africa, where the struggle against apartheid is being waged. From 1912, when the African National Congress was established, right up to 1960, peaceful protests and ultimately passive resistance were the methods used. The South African Governments consistently responded by violence and terror and an intensification of racial oppression. The international community looked on unmoved.

But the patience of the most patient ultimately comes to an end. While continuing to call for negotiated change, the Freedom Movements organized themselves to give a little prod to the process. And the gathering number of independent African states forces the question of apartheid on to the inter-

national political agenda — where it remains as an ever increasing pressure for external action against the South African racists. But until recently the South African response has been the same — more repression, more violence and terror and more defiance of the call for humanity and justice.

In the last few years the South African Government has added a new tactic — that of trying to bamboozle the innocent, and to help those external friends for whom South Africa's open defiance of world opinion is politically embarrassing. It has allowed all races to sit on the same benches in the parks, and — sometimes — to eat in the same restaurants! It has gone further. Finding that despite its bans, African Trade Unions did exist, it decided to try to get control over them by giving them conditional legality. It tried to seduce those whom it had classified as 'Coloured' or 'Indian' by giving them a minor place in the legislative process. And it talks of more 'reforms' to come. What it does not do, and has no intention of doing, is to accept the principle of human equality and negotiate with the real African leaders about the process of abolishing apartheid.

And for those who use their eyes to see, the insincerity of this tactic is made more clear with every day which passes. Certainly the Black people of South Africa are not deceived; the vast majority of those classified as 'Coloured' and 'Indian' are not deceived. These South Africans live with apartheid and know what it means in their everyday existence. So the internal resistance and defiance grows stronger, and more open, and more desperate, all the time.

I do not think a single day has passed for the last twelve months when there has not, somewhere in South Africa, been an act of communal open defiance. And it is a rare day when no African protester or by-stander has been killed by the South African Police or Army — for the Police are now unable to maintain control on their own. Sometimes scores are killed and wounded at once — often while attending a funeral of other victims of oppression. People continue to be detained — and to die violently in detention. Those seeking to organize the protests — the non-violent protests — are arrested in their hundreds and selectively put on trial for treason.

Neither the free African states, nor the Organization of African Unity, nor the Liberation Committee, instigate or control this ever growing internal resistance and defiance. The independent nations of Africa which border on South Africa could not stop it even if they wished to do so. It would continue if there was no Liberation Movement recognized by the Organization of African Unity.

The best support which the Frontline States can give to the South African struggle against apartheid is to consolidate their independence and improve the lives of their people. South Africa knows this — and seeks to prevent it. The border states have not had, do not have, and have no intention of having, guerrilla bases on their territory. South Africa knows this, and regards it as irrelevant; for it knows also that the kind of warfare which led to the liber-

ation of Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe is not an appropriate method of struggle in the South African situation. Such a self-denying ordinance is therefore not sufficient to protect the Frontline States from South African attack. Its purpose in attacking is, by direct and indirect aggression, to destabilise the states on its borders (or Namibia's borders) in the hope of reducing them to Bantustan status.

The price for immunity from such military attacks, or from South African organized subversion, is that the Frontline States should surrender the reality of their independence and act as South Africa's policemen, attacking the South African Liberation Movements on its behalf. Neutrality would not be enough for South Africa. To avoid military or economic attack they must act positively in support of apartheid. They must search into the homes of every South African refugee and resident of their country who may be sympathetic to the Liberation Struggles in South Africa or Namibia, and send to South Africa any letters or essays they may find—or even the person concerned. They must use their resources to make their border with South Africa impenetrable from their side. If—and only if—they do all these things, and other actions which might at any time become helpful to the South African racists, they may—and I repeat may—for the time being be left free to make an occasional speech criticising the system of apartheid.

What harm has Lesotho done to South Africa—indeed what harm could it do—except by the fact of its existence as a genuinely independent nation? Yet South African Army attacks or South African sponsored attacks on Lesotho have cost the lives of 42 people and caused physical damage estimated at three million US Dollars. Having so far failed to find any Batswana traitors willing to act on its behalf, the South African army raided Gaborone last month killing twelve people and injuring six others, as well as destroying houses and vehicles. Six of those killed were citizens or residents in Botswana; the other six were South African refugees who would have been proud of the ANC flags draped on their coffins. But they were refugees not Liberation combat troops.

The whole of Africa knows that Botswana cannot allow combatants on its territory, nor permit any hostile actions against South Africa from inside its own borders. Yet South Africa is completely unrepentant about this wanton attack and those it has made on Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho and Zimbabwe. It proclaims its intention of repeating its attacks on its neighbours whenever it decides this is convenient for the defence of apartheid. Indeed, it has done so again in the last week, with yet another raid on Angola.

All these countries are being attacked and destabilised because they are genuinely independent African states on the border of South Africa. The total cost to them of South African aggression, its subversion, and its economic boycotts is already estimated at almost seven billion US Dollars. The rest of Africa, and the international community which so loudly proclaims its oppo-

sition to apartheid, should not leave them to bear this burden alone. They are suffering for defending the independence which they have won with their blood. And they are suffering as surrogates for all nations which genuinely support the principle of human equality but which are further away from the apartheid state.

Let us be quite clear. It is not the job of independent African states to free the people of South Africa from the scourge of apartheid. And no one in or from South Africa asks them to do so. But nor is it the job of African nations to do the apartheid regime's work for it by fighting the opponents of apartheid. Let South Africa police its own borders; our task is that of defending free Africa's borders against the invasion of South African troops and South African instigated bandits. Even that has so far proved beyond our strength — the borders are long and guarding them in an expensive business. Let South Africa undertake the monetary and military cost of sealing its borders against those of its citizens who seek to return home to resume their fight against injustice. It wants its neighbours to police its borders so that its own troops can be used to suppress the resistance of the people in the towns and countryside of South Africa.

The Frontline States are preparing to play their part. They have organised themselves in SADCC with the purpose of restructuring their inherited economies and reducing as rapidly as possible their present economic and communications dependence on South Africa. Their efforts are being frustrated by South African attacks, — which is another demonstration that it fears isolation.

However, for the time being most of the SADCC members still have no choice but to trade with South Africa, even while knowing — and indeed suffering from — the vulnerability which results from it. But there is no reason, and no excuse, for any other OAU member trading with South Africa or talking with South Africa. It is not enough to argue that such trade helps our poor economies; I repeat, the members of the OAU which border on South Africa have incurred losses totalling seven billion US Dollars because of South African aggression.

The struggle against apartheid is an African struggle and not just one for the people of South Africa and the bordering states. It is a struggle for the dignity of African people and for that freedom of African states to which we committed ourselves when we adhered to the OAU Charter. The very least the rest of us must do is to play our part in working for the international isolation of the apartheid state.

Your Excellencies and Friends. The task of this Committee which still remains to be completed is, on behalf of Africa, to support the struggle against South African apartheid and the colonialism and aggression which stems from the attempt to defend apartheid. It is not a simple task. It is not without economic and even political costs to the nations which engage them-

selves in it. Sometimes it involves disagreements with major international powers which give practical support to South Africa even while speaking against apartheid and for the independence of Namibia. Despite the upsurge of public opinion against the policies of 'constructive engagement', there is no sign that we will soon be relieved of this problem by a change in that United States policy. There are also countries in Europe and elsewhere — some even in the Non-Aligned Movement — which give moral and economic support to South Africa by their trading policies and/or their votes in the UN Security Council.

But the difficulties are there to be overcome. And our task is to hasten the day when the South African people will overthrow apartheid. It is a serious task, and one which demands a serious approach. Attendance at Liberation Committee meetings, and political speeches attacking apartheid are not enough. Our commitment has to be real, and practical. Among other things, it has to take the form of hard cash. The Liberation Movements of Namibia and South Africa cannot exist, much less do their work, without financial support. Despite their great sacrifices and immense efforts, many of the states on the border of South Africa are being pressed beyond their economic strength and need financial support if they are successfully to defend their independence, and Africa's advance towards total Liberation.

The total of assessed contributions to the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity amounts to just 3,3 million US Dollars a year. That is a ludicrously small sum in the light of the task before us; Norway alone has this year voted to contribute about 5 million US Dollars to assist the national liberation movements recognised by the OAU. Yet only ten OAU member states were up to date with their contributions to the Liberation Committee when the books were closed on 31 May, 1985, with another seven having just part of 1984/85 account to settle. That means that 33 states are seriously in arrears. Could people not be asking us — should we not be asking ourselves — whether we are really as serious as we need to be on the liberation of our continent?

United States and Mozambique

A. White House Press Briefing on visit of President Samora Machel to the USA 17–19 September 1985

Sr Admin Official:

As you know, we have worked over the past three years to improve our own relationship on a reciprocal basis with Mozambique to encourage regional diplomacy, most particularly regional detente between Mozambique and South Africa and the agreement reached in March of '84, the Nkomati Agreement, has been a major milestone along the way of trying to establish a more fruitful climate and framework of diplomatic relationships in Southern Africa. Our relationship with Mozambique, as I said, has developed considerably. We have full diplomatic relations, ambassadors in both countries. The Machel visit is the first visit by President Machel to this country since Mozambique's independence. We see a number of important aspects in this relationship which I'll touch on briefly.

Mozambique has been important to us not only in the immediate context of its relations with South Africa and its relationship with us, but also in the efforts it has made, its advice and counsel on the broader Southern African climate, including the Namibia–Angola negotiations where the Mozambican leadership has, at various times, provided us with useful insights and suggestions.

For our part what we have been seeking in this effort has been to encourage Mozambique to move toward a more genuine non-alignment — towards a position in which one can say that it is clearly moving away from an outright Soviet embrace, if you will. The position today I would describe as one in which there has been substantial movement by the Mozambican government. There is, of course, a substantial military aid relationship between the Soviet Union and Mozambique, a function of a continuing war inside that country. Moscow, however, does not have military bases there. The Soviets have been very basically discomfited by the process that we call the Nkomati process, after the agreement of March '84. The Soviets have made a strenuous effort to discredit that whole process and have both behind the scenes and publicly said some very derogatory things about it.

We, these days, find in terms of Mozambique's media, for example, a very considerable degree of supportive commentary, based on what we're doing for Mozambique, what we're doing in the region, what we're doing in general. But I would emphasize, this is a process. It is by no means complete. And so this visit provides a further opportunity for us to get across our priorities and for the Mozambicans to get across theirs.

I think an essential factor in the background of this process has been the learning process. Mozambique reached its independence in 1975, and after (that had) a number of years of experience with a very close Soviet relationship and statist economist policies as well as policies of confrontation vis-a-vis South Africa. Mozambique drew the conclusions of that experience which were conclusions of failure. The Mozambique economy basically (was) destroyed by the decolonization process and further destroyed by these socialist policies, so that you have that as part of the reality that the Machel leadership was facing.

You have the reality as well that the effort, if you will, to serve as a confrontation state, a major hosting point for the ANC (African National Congress) vis-a-vis South Africa also had produced further decline and deterioration — South African pressure, South African strikes against Mozambique — and I think what you can see in the Nkomati Agreement is basically an effort to establish a good neighbourly relationship in which South Africa has fore-sworn attacks into Mozambique and Mozambique has fore-sworn hosting of the ANC vis-a-vis South Africa.

Mozambique in recent years has had a number of further economic pressures as a result of disasters, of drought, of cyclones. We have responded in terms of emergency food, to a major degree. It was in 1984, I believe that Mozambique was among the largest world-wide recipients of disaster assistance from the US. We have this year a program of something like 40 million dollars in aid for Mozambique of which about 13 million dollars represents development aid, and the rest (is) in the disaster and emergency food categories.

I would point out that as we have been seeking to build a more normal relationship with this country that we've been doing so in a broader Western context. Our principle allies in NATO and Europe — the British, the French, the Italians, the Portuguese and the Nordic countries — have been — the Germans as well — have been substantially increasing their efforts to support this government and to make the Nkomati Agreement work. While the results are not yet fully in, this is a process. We believe that process is on the track.

An essential part of it in our thinking has been the need to see a change in Mozambique's internal economic policies. In that regard, we are pleased to note that the government of Mozambique has signed on board with the IMF and the World Bank. That has begun channelling increasing resources to its own private sector, channelling agricultural inputs to the private farming

community in Mozambique, as well as to small factories there. This is an important part of our dialogue, because it's our view, looking across the African landscape, that that is the only approach that works, that market forces in fact have a great deal that they can contribute if given a chance in such situations.

So in brief, we look at the visit as a chance to build on what has already been done (and) to talk about the broader regional situation in Southern Africa, by which we mean not only the peace process in Namibia and Angola but the broader question of how states in the region coexist, to talk about regional developments in general, then and also to talk about the situation in South Africa, compare notes as to what's going on there and how each of us in our very different ways can advance things that I think all of us share. Let me stop there and take a few questions. Yes?

Q: What would you expect in terms of the dialogue on what the President's executive order included in the sanctions, since Mozambique has been one of the neighbouring countries that has objected to the idea of sanctions because of the effect on its own economy? Would you suspect that there would be dissatisfaction with what the President did last week?

Sr Admin Official: I wouldn't want to prejudge that. I think the basic point that we have tried to make is that we see a clear distinction between sending sharp political signals when they are called for and taking measures which would in fact hurt the South African economy in a major way and the neighbouring economies. And in that regard, I don't think we'd have any difference with the visitors. Yes?

Q: What do you think of the South African invasion of Angola?

Sr Admin Official: Well, we obviously deplore it. We don't think that there was any previous fact brought to our attention which would warrant such an activity. We have deplored cross-border violence there from both directions, whether it comes from SWAPO (South West African Peoples Organization) or from South Africa. And we don't think it contributes to the peace process. Yes?

Q: What's the status now of the military aid program with Mozambique, and the foreign assistance bill Congress objected to, what the State Department put forth? What's going on with that now?

Sr Admin Official: Well, Congress has effectively blocked the '85, but not the economic assistance. That remains with support on the Hill, so we're going ahead with that. But there's nothing further I have for you in the way of detail on the military side.

Q: You say the Nkomati process is on track. Yet only this morning, just before he left for Washington, Machel called in Pik Botha and told him that they had captured documentary evidence that South Africans were still supporting RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance), which was, if you

remember, or if I'm correct, part of the deal that they wouldn't. Do you expect that to come up, and in what shape or form?

Sr Admin Official: I wouldn't expect the Mozambicans to discuss their experience with Nkomati, which obviously has been imperfect. In their own discussions with us, they make a very careful distinction between actions of the South African government and actions by South Africans.

Q: Yeah, they're specifically talking about South African government backing documentary evidence.

Sr Admin Official: I'd have to see that to be able to comment any further on it. But I would point out that there are some 700 000 Portuguese-speaking South Africans, many of whom fled Mozambique during the period of decolonization, and it's from that source in part, I think, that the Mozambican authorities believe there may be continuing support flowing to RENAMO.

Q: Could you give us some idea of the military situation inside Mozambique regarding RENAMO and the government. It was pretty bad a while back.

Sr Admin Official: Yeah, I think we would describe it as indeterminate. There continues to be violence in a number of parts of the country . . . We see strikes against convoys widespread throughout the country. We see activity in many different provinces of the country. It's centered primarily in the central provinces. But there is activity beyond them. I wouldn't say we see a clear trend. The government has had a counter-offensive going against RENAMO in recent weeks. Whether that will produce any clear trend for the longer term, we don't yet know . . .

It is an insurgency. It is a guerrilla war, and therefore it goes up and down and it goes all over. The real change in the past year and a half has been that RENAMO is now operating in all the provinces, whereas before it was confined primarily to the central areas and to the north. A lot of the stories that you'll see coming out of there is because Maputo is in the south, and up until maybe November (or) December of last year, Maputo—the province of Maputo—had been fairly free of any type of insurgency. Then all of a sudden the lights started going out as the insurgents hit the pylons, bringing in electricity from South Africa. And people got very, very excited.

Generally, about November, December, January—the situation was very critical in the south, and it was very tense. I think this has improved considerably since then. The lights have been on in Maputo, for instance, since March. In the north, in Nyasa and in Kabuldelgada (?), which are the provinces that border Tanzania, the situation has improved notably. The railroads are starting to run again. The railroad between Nakala that goes into Mawali has opened up, and that's running fairly freely. The railroad from Beira into Zimbabwe is running nicely, although there is considerable activity around that on both sides of the railroad.

So it's one of these things that goes up and down and up and down. At this

moment, I'd say the situation is considerably better than it was at the turn of the year.

Q: Can I ask you a follow-up on that? The large-scale attack that allegedly happened a couple of weeks ago by Zimbabwe in Mozambique (inaudible) the RENAMO headquarters in Casa de Mana (?), was that a major military operation that will have some effect on RENAMO's operation, or is that something that nobody really knows about at this point?

Sr Admin Official: Well, I think it's difficult to assess at this point, because as I say, it is a guerrilla war. It is an insurgency, and there's a tendency for the insurgents to move around. In the sense that it had been a fixed camp, yes, it is a major blow to RENAMO. Also the fact that the Zimbabweans and the Mozambicans were able to dislodge the leader of RENAMO from that area. But the long-term effects on the war, however, remain to be seen — if there's sufficient pursuit by the Mozambicans and the Zimbabweans, or whether it's just a one-time shot then the RENAMO can regroup. I think it's too early to really assess that.

Q: Senator Helms and other supporters of RENAMO in this country assert that RENAMO controls effectively 80 per cent of the territory, and that without Western aid to the government, RENAMO would be able to topple it. What's your reaction to that?

Sr Admin Official: I've travelled throughout the country . . . I would say that that simply is not correct — that the government can go almost anywhere it wishes. There are certain areas where the insurgents might be, and the government does not go, because there simply aren't any people there. Gaza is one example. If you fly over Mozambique at night — if you fly over Africa at night — usually you'll see campfires or something down below. If you fly over Mozambique at night, you'll be very, very surprised in certain areas. There's nothing down there because of the drought. Over the centuries, drought has wiped out the population and the people have moved. So in that sense you could say that nobody controls certain areas.

Q: Well, why not support RENAMO? They are, after all, anti-communist contras, aren't they?

Sr Admin Official: That certainly is the label they've given themselves, isn't it? No, I think that we have identified very real and mutual interests with the government of Samora Machel . . . that we have been able to work very well with that government in the region on regional aspects as well as on the bilateral relationship. And we feel that it is a viable government. It's one that has shown staying power. I believe it's one that's undergoing changes. There have been very real changes both domestically and internationally.

Q: But don't they have a bit of a (inaudible)?

Sr Admin Official: I think the point of context that we would stress is that we've not seen any evidence that RENAMO represents a widespread indigenous base that is capable of forming an alternative government. The

people who might have the strongest interest in reaching that conclusion, namely the South Africans, have themselves come to the point of recognizing that RENAMO does not represent an alternative to Machel. RENAMO has itself, on a number of occasions, recognized Machel's nationalist legitimacy as the man who brought the country to independence and has been its first President and only President so far. I think our view would be that if you wish to displace something which is contrary to our interests, namely a position of Soviet strength in that part of the world, the way you do it is by competing — not by quarantine but by competing. And that doesn't mean that we can and will compete with Moscow in the provision of vast amounts of hardware, but rather that we offer an alternative, an alternative based on genuine development principles. The Soviets have done nothing for Mozambique economically. Competing in the sense of offering a diplomatic framework which gives that government and others in the region an alternative if they wish to pursue it.

Q: You say that he recognizes the government and so forth. What's the problem then?

Sr Admin Official: RENAMO represents a number of different interests. It includes some indigenous African, if you will — black Mozambican — interests, some of them disaffected from FRELIMO earlier. It also represents very clearly the interests of Portuguese who were displaced by the decolonization process, many of whom see that struggle as a way to get their properties back, quite frankly, and that's a major interest behind the movement.

Q: Would you go over again your understanding of how much South Africa's government is supporting RENAMO and to what extent you are willing or able to tell the South Africans to back off?

Sr Admin Official: Well, I'll give it a try, RENAMO is historically based on a number of elements that either broke away from FRELIMO or were set up to fight FRELIMO by the Portuguese during the anti-colonial struggle. As the Portuguese departed the scene in the mid-seventies, the Smith regime in Rhodesia assumed the principal role of backer and supporter for the elements that now constitute RENAMO. With the demise of the Smith regime, it was the South African military that inherited that role and was the principal external backer of RENAMO, right up to the Nkomati Accord, building it up from a force of a few thousand to a force of perhaps 13 000 to 15 000 . . .

It's our assumption that there was something of a golden handshake provided to RENAMO at the time of the signing of the Nkomati Agreement, but that since the signing, the South African government has lived up to — in the main — the letter of the agreement. What the Mozambicans have sometimes complained about is whether they lived up to the spirit of the agreement in full.

There has, as well, been a form of diplomacy between the South Africans and RENAMO and the government of Mozambique, with shuttles going back and forth, trying to get talks started about some kind of an agreement between the two parties, which necessitates South Africans going in and out.

I would stress that the South Africans have been forced to face up to the full implications of their decision to sign the Nkomati Agreement, with time, and to clarify their policy. We have brought our full influence to bear to get them to do precisely that.

Meanwhile, the South Africans have, as well, provided some support to the government of President Machel, in the form of advisers, in the form of assistance for railways and ports, and that sort of thing. Yes, sir?

Q: You've given us sort of an idea of what's on the minds of the Reagan Administration and the United States in its dealings. Recognizing that you've gone as far as you can, what sort of things would you figure would be on Mr Machel's mind when he comes here?

Sr Admin Official: Well, we expect that he will want to talk about the internal situation inside his country, and what's responsible for that. He no doubt will want to talk about Mozambique's need for continuing support from western countries, from the World Bank, from private institutions in the West. He will — we would expect him to talk about his thoughts on development policy, his attitude towards private investment, things of that kind.

But I think he will also have some observations to make about what is taking place, more broadly, in the region, urging us to do what we can in terms of the South African problem, and some in-depth discussion of that, as well as, perhaps, the Namibia-Angola situation.

Q: The very pragmatic approach the United States is taking as far as Mozambique, do you think you can take that approach to other Marxist revolutionary governments in the region?

Sr Admin Official: I think we've got to look at each one on its merits. The Mozambican situation, in many respects, has been kind of unique. There was a clearly expressed desire on their part to explore a reorientation of policy and a new relationship with us.

As I said, it's a quid pro quo here. We don't see any instant parallels for, for example, Angola or Ethiopia. We're looking for changes in the country's behaviour, just as they're looking for support from us. So, I don't see any real precedents here.

Q: Is the administration willing to give military aid to the government of Samora Machel?

Sr Admin Official: The administration had a request, a very modest request, before Congress, which was not approved by Congress for fiscal '85. I can't comment beyond that, for the future . . .

Q: Is there a new arms request?

Sr Admin Official: I don't have anything on a new request . . .

Q: And is that a continuing request, the proposal that failed in Congress?

Sr Admin Official: There is an '86 request I believe, yeah.

Q: Would we support a coalition government of RENAMO and Machel, if they could negotiate one? Are we in favour of negotiation there, between the opposition and the government?

Sr Admin Official: Well, in principle, sure, we're in favour of peace and reconciliation inside every country. If there's an opening for it we'll certainly support it.

B. Texts of departure remarks by Presidents Reagan and Machel, delivered at the end of their meeting September 19 at the White House.

President Reagan:

It has been a pleasure for me to meet today with President Machel of Mozambique. At a time when much attention is focused on Southern Africa, my meeting with the President underscores the determination of the United States to continue playing an active and constructive role in this volatile portion of the globe.

The United States prides itself as a force for freedom and progress and stability, and this is true in Southern Africa, as in other parts of the world. We seek to encourage the development of democratic government in all the nations of Southern Africa. Democracy and a respect for fundamental human liberties are not only consistent with our values as a free people, but are also the surest pathway to economic progress, internal reconciliation, and international peace.

President Machel, you have already taken a step toward peace. And because of your personal foresight and courage, cross-border violence in the region has been reduced and a more constructive relationship with South Africa has begun.

These efforts already have proven to be a great boon to the well-being of your people.

We know that economic recovery and development will require the restoration of peace, a process which will call upon all the statesmanship of Mozambique's leaders.

Mozambique has suffered greatly in the last decade, from drought, domestic violence and economic dislocation. I was impressed today with President Machel's sincere desire to improve the lot of his people. The United States, as is true in other African countries, is doing what it can to alleviate the worst effects of the drought. We are now also involving ourselves in a major effort to rebuild Mozambique's shattered economy. We welcome Mozambi-

que's decision to co-operate with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to design a program of economic stabilization and development.

Encouraging western investment and strengthening Mozambique's private sector is a formula for economic advancement and improving the quality of life. We know you will find, President Machel, that the freer people are in the arena of economics, the more enterprising they become, and the more benefits are enjoyed by the society as a whole.

I was glad to have had this opportunity today to express personally to President Machel America's goodwill towards the people of his country. We look forward to the success of his economic initiatives and movement toward national unity.

Thank you, President Machel for your visit to the United States.

President Machel: Thank you very much.

We have come here on an official visit at the invitation of President Ronald Reagan. We say a sincere thank you for this friendly gesture. Our aim in this visit is to strengthen existing bilateral relations and define a basis for the long-term development of these relations.

I have just had a very positive, fruitful, and constructive meeting with President Ronald Reagan. I had the opportunity to express our appreciation for the food and development aid that the United States of America has granted us.

Mozambique is an independent and non-aligned African country. We value our independence. We are proud of our independence. We are intransigent in the defence of our national interest. We firmly believe that, like ourselves, each people must determine the destiny of its own country.

Our chief concern is to solve the basic problems of our people and to make the region where we live one of peace, stability, good-neighbourliness, co-operation, and development.

In this context, we signed with the Republic of South Africa the Nkomati Agreement, an essential condition for peace and development. The People's Republic of Mozambique has strictly complied with the Nkomati Agreement.

The need for the urgent elimination of apartheid is a matter of common concern. Mozambique took a positive view of the efforts of the international community, including the United States, in this regard.

We hope that such efforts continue, and that they lead to the independence of Namibia, to peace and stability for the whole of Southern Africa.

Mozambique is still a backward and underdeveloped country, but one with vast potential and natural resources. We seek the participation of the United States and of its private sector in putting those resources at the service of our economic and social development.

I am convinced that the meeting I have just had with President Ronald Reagan has established a solid basis for long-term co-operation in all fields

SAIIA PUBLICATIONS

To provide much needed additional space, the Institute is holding a SALE of all publications produced before 1st January 1983 as follows:

Occasional Papers: 50c per copy

All other items excluding hard covers and bibliographies **Discounted by 50% of the List Price**

Please phone or write to SAIIA Johannesburg (011) 339-2021 or P.O. Box 31596, Braamfontein, 2017 for a copy of the latest Publications List.

Valid until 31st March, 1986.

Publications of The South African Institute of International Affairs

Occasional Papers/Geleentheidspublikasies

Issued on an irregular basis, and containing the text of addresses at Institute meetings or original articles.

Latest titles are:

Sara Pienaar: *Gorbachev's Appointment and Change in the USSR.*

David E. Albright: *Soviet Policy in Southern Africa since Nkomati.*

Alan Whiteside: *Past Trends and Future Prospects for Labour Migration to South Africa.*

G. Töttemeyer: *Detente or Aggression? — South Africa's Namibian Policy.*

International Affairs Bulletin

Three issues per year and supplied free of charge to members. Subscription rate for non-members R16 per annum surface mail; R24 airmail Africa and Europe; R26 US and elsewhere. Price per copy R6 (plus postage overseas airmail).

Latest issues, Vol 9, No.2 includes:

Guy Woolford: *The United States Disinvestment Campaign*

L. Boulle: *Constitutional Safeguards and Checks and Balances within the Context of Co-operative Federalism*

M.J. de Wit: *Reshaping the Antarctic Treaty*

Clare Dillon: *Innocent Passage in South African Territorial Waters.*

Forthcoming issue, Vol. 9, No. 3:

Special issue examining the United Nations and South Africa's relationship thereto on the Organization's 40th Anniversary.

Bibliographical Series/Bibliografieserees

No. 12. *South Africa's foreign relations 1980-1984: a select and annotated bibliography.* Compiled by Jacqueline A. Kalley. R25,00 plus postage.

No. 13. *South Africa's Chrome, Manganese, Platinum and Vanadium: Foreign Views on the Minerals Dependency Issue.* An Annotated Bibliography by Eve Andor. R25,00 plus postage.

Note:

Readers are invited to apply to the Compiler for copies of full texts when only extracts have been printed.