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Letter from South African Minister of Foreign Affairs to UN Secretary-General on SWA/
Namibian Electoral System: 12 November 1985

Mr Secretary-General,

I wish to inform Your Excellency that there has been a new development with regard to the choice of the electoral system for the election contemplated in terms of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978).

At a Cabinet meeting on 6 November 1985 the Government of National Unity in Windhoek decided *inter alia* to call on the South African Government to select from the options now available, a system of proportional representation as a framework for elections leading to the independence of South West Africa.

As Your Excellency is aware, South Africa has consistently consulted the leaders of South West Africa on matters affecting the future of the territory and has been guided by their wishes. The South African Government accordingly has no objection to the request of the Government of National Unity. Agreement will have to be reached on how the system of proportional representation will be implemented in practice.

I attach for Your Excellency's information a copy of the statement issued by the Government of National Unity in this regard.

I should appreciate it if this letter and its annexure could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

R. F. Botha

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Statement by the Cabinet of the Transitional Government of National Unity in Windhoek, Namibia: 12 November 1985

The Cabinet has carefully studied the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Security Council, concerning the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978). We share the con-

cern of the Security Council, expressed in its Resolution 566 (1985), that the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the adoption of the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples have passed without resolution of the long simmering dispute regarding the independence of our country. The achievement of peaceful independence for Namibia is of greater importance to the people of this country than it is to any organ of the United Nations.

The Security Council, however, hampers rather than promotes the achievement of independence in South West Africa by attacking and dismissing as 'null and void' the Transitional Government of National Unity, while commending the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) for its endeavours. The Transitional Government is committed to the achievement of peace and national reconciliation, believing that it is only through the realisation of these conditions that the goal of meaningful independence can be reached. We have stretched out the hand of cooperation to SWAPO on numerous occasions both before and after the inauguration of the government, only to have it rejected repeatedly. SWAPO has reiterated its commitment to what it describes as the 'armed struggle' and has expanded its activities into the field of urban terrorism and threats of assassination directed not against South African Security Forces, but Namibian civilians including members of this Cabinet.

We continue to believe, however, that our road is the correct one and invite SWAPO yet again to join us in achieving national reconciliation, peace and independence for all our people.

Both the Security Council and the Secretary-General have expressed concern that the South African Government has not yet indicated which of the two electoral systems for which provision is made in the Western settlement proposal, namely proportional representation or the single member constituency system, should be applied in elections leading to an internationally recognized settlement. We have serious reservations about the fact that the United Nations apparently believes that it is appropriate that South Africa, rather than the people of this country, should exercise this choice. It is precisely this approach to the Namibian independence issue — the assumption that the inhabitants of South West Africa will simply have to accept whatever the governments of other countries or the United Nations may decide — which we find most unacceptable about the present efforts of the international community to secure Namibia's independence.

This issue of an electoral system is, however, one which is, in our opinion, easily resolved. SWAPO has apparently indicated that it has no objection to either of the two systems. Neither, given the choice between the two systems advocated by the five nations of the Western Contact Group, do the parties represented in the Transitional Government of National Unity have a preference for either one of the two. In the interests of economy, however — the

cost of organizing and administering an election on the basis of proportional representation being substantially less than arranging one on a constituency basis — and of restricting the debate about the modalities of independence at this stage to matters of more immediate interest, the Cabinet of the Transitional Government calls on the South African Government to select, from the options now available, a system of proportional representation as a framework for elections leading to the independence of South West Africa.

The Cabinet wishes to make it abundantly clear, however, and to place it on record, that it remains wholly dissatisfied with the present posture of the United Nations on the issue of impartiality as between the parties who will take part in elections under international supervision. We do not accept the General Assembly's ridiculous and insulting designation of the South West Africa People's Organization as the '... sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people'; we object strenuously to SWAPO's 'Permanent Observer' status at the United Nations; to the extensive financial, administrative and propaganda assistance rendered to that party by the United Nations secretariat; and to the Security Council's custom of permitting SWAPO to address it on the Namibian question while denying the same right to other parties. There is no question of our accepting United Nations supervision of independence elections until this wholly inequitable state of affairs has been rectified.

We have made these points repeatedly, but have seen no constructive steps taken by the organs of the United Nations to rectify the situation. At the Namibia Independence talks in Lusaka, in May 1984, His Excellency, President Kenneth David Kaunda, generously undertook that the Zambian Government would convey our concerns to the Security Council, while assuring us that it had been agreed that the matter would be resolved, but SWAPO's refusal to sign the final draft of the joint communique presumably prevented any such communication taking place.

The National Assembly of the Government of National Unity resolved, in a motion adopted unanimously on 19 June 1985, to request the Security Council formally to permit a representative of the Transitional Government to address the Council during its then-current debate on the independence of South West Africa. Inasmuch as the Security Council will be meeting again soon to consider the report of the Secretary-General, dated 6 September 1985, the Cabinet now formally wishes to request that representatives of the parties constituting the Transitional Government be permitted to address the Council on this occasion. Such a step, indicating willingness on the part of the Council to pay attention to the views of a very large number of the people of this country and to begin to correct the indefensible bias manifest within the United Nations in support of SWAPO, would make a most important contribution to advancing the prospect of peaceful independence for Namibia.

We are making this statement available to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the President of the Security Council, and the heads of government of the nations of the Western Contact Group and the Republic of South Africa, as well as a number of other African nations with an interest in the resolution of this question. We trust that it will enjoy their early attention and serious consideration.

Speech by South African Ambassador Von Schirnding during the UN Security Council debate on SWA/Namibia: 13 November 1985

Mr President,

It is a matter of regret that the Council should once again have to devote its time to the question of South West Africa. The world is full of threats to international peace which should be the subject of debate in this Council. At this very moment Soviet and Cuban forces are continuing their efforts to destroy the right of the people of Angola to self-determination, Vietnamese troops are massed along the border of Thailand, the Soviet Union is in the process of annihilating the population of Afghanistan, and the Gulf War drags on into its fifth year.

South West Africa, by comparison with many parts of the world is relatively peaceful. The violence which does exist has been initiated by SWAPO which has been supported and encouraged by the United Nations — by this organization which was established forty years ago to promote the peaceful resolution of disputes. South Africa has consistently tried to solve the problems of its region peacefully. Twice last year it offered to enter into a cessation of hostilities with SWAPO. SWAPO would then have been free to return to South West Africa to participate peacefully in the domestic political process of the territory. SWAPO rejected these offers.

The fact is that, unlike the situation in most of the countries of Africa, there is a multiplicity of political expression in South West Africa today. The fact is that the views of all of the components of South West Africa's population are reflected in the political debate in the territory. This sometimes leads to the airing of different views but it also ensures genuine and uninhibited debate on the key issues which confront the people of South West Africa. This is a refreshing change from the sterility and regimentation of political expression in one-party states.

As this Council will be aware, it has been South Africa's position that it would make a decision on the electoral system which would be employed in the proposed election in terms of UNSCR 435 once a date had been set for the implementation of the settlement plan. This position was consistent with understandings which South Africa had reached with the Contact Group and also with the terms of the settlement plan itself.

However, on 6 November 1985 the Government of National Unity in Windhoek reached a decision on how it wished South Africa to deal with the choice of the electoral system.

On 12 November 1985 it issued the following statement in this regard:

This issue of an electoral system is, however, one which is, in our opinion, easily resolved. The South West Africa People's Organization has apparently indicated that it has no objection to either of the two systems. Neither, given the choice between the two systems advocated by the five nations of the Western Contact Group, do the parties represented in the Transitional Government of National Unity have a preference for either one of the two. In the interests of economy, however—the cost of organizing and administering an election on the basis of proportional representation being substantially less than arranging one on a constituency basis—and of restricting the debate about the modalities of independence at this stage to matters of more immediate interest, the Cabinet of the Transitional Government calls on the South African Government to select, from the options now available, a system of proportional representation as a framework for elections leading to the independence of South West Africa.

After considering the request of the Government of National Unity, the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the Secretary-General that the South African Government had consistently consulted the leaders of South West Africa on matters affecting the future of the territory and had been guided by their wishes. Accordingly, the South African Government had no objection to the request of the Government of National Unity. Agreement would, however, have to be reached on how the proportional system would be implemented in practice.

We hope that the decision on the electoral system will go some way toward achieving progress toward the resolution of the last outstanding problems affecting the international settlement plan. The fact remains that a firm agreement must still be reached on the withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola. Although some progress has been made in this regard and although some momentum was recently restored to the negotiations between the United States and South Africa on Cuban withdrawal, a great deal of work must still be done in order to achieve agreement on this question.

In the meantime it is important to note that although we have succeeded in removing other obstacles to implementation of the settlement plan, the agreements which we have thus far reached, though welcome, are not enough. We require evidence that when it comes to the implementation of the settlement plan the parties involved in these agreements will be willing and able to carry them out in a scrupulous manner. Thus, although we reached agreement during Phase II of the negotiations with the West when matters of security and impartiality were discussed, that the United Nations

would adopt an impartial attitude to the parties of the territory once an implementation date had been set, the United Nations record thus far raises serious doubts concerning the willingness and even the ability of its main organs to honour this agreement. If impartiality is generally held to be a virtue, why is the United Nations so persistent in its adherence to bias in favour of SWAPO? We have reached an understanding with the Secretary-General on impartiality, but will the main and subsidiary organs of the United Nations consider themselves to be bound by agreements entered into by the Secretary-General? (The Security Council's cynical refusal to allow the representatives of a number of SWA parties to address it, while affording this right once again to SWAPO, raises questions which go to the very heart of the settlement plan.)

South Africa will not allow debates such as this to deflect it from the course which it has set for itself in working for an internationally acceptable independence for South West Africa.

As I have already pointed out to the Council on an earlier occasion:

- South Africa will continue to search for a reasonable formula for genuine Cuban withdrawal from Angola. If a firm agreement can be reached in this regard, it will carry out its undertaking to implement the international settlement plan.
- South Africa will continue to strive for stability and peace in the region by encouraging all the parties, including SWAPO and Angola, to resolve their differences around a conference table instead of by violence.
- South Africa will continue to encourage dialogue and reconciliation between all the South West African parties in the hope that they will find a basis for still broader consensus in respect of the future of the territory.
- South Africa will continue to insist that all the South West African parties be treated equally and impartially. If the United Nations wishes to play a role in the future of South West Africa/Namibia, it will consequently have to demonstrate that it will be able to carry out its functions impartially.

Statement by the United Kingdom's Permanent Representative to the Security Council during the debate on Namibia: 14 November 1985

Mr President,

My Government's approach to the Namibian problem is well known and is similar to that of many other members of this Organization. It has two essential elements.

First, our objective is to see Namibia achieve internationally recognized independence at the earliest time and by the most peaceful means. To this end, we joined with the governments of Canada, France, the Federal Republic

lic of Germany and the United States in formulating the UN Settlement Proposal — a plan adopted with the support of all but two members of the Security Council in Resolution 435. Like the other authors of the Contact Group's Plan, we have repudiated any attempt to circumvent Resolution 435 through an internal settlement. Resolution 435 remains the only internationally accepted basis for a Namibian settlement. As such, it is something which this Council should be careful to protect.

Second, we have joined not only with our Contact Group partners but with wider groups of UN members in seeking to coordinate efforts to promote rapid and peaceful change in Southern Africa, including the implementation of Resolution 435. As I explained in a recent speech in the General Assembly, we have formulated a strategy which combines pressure and persuasion.

With regard to Namibia, South Africa must be persuaded that there is no future in a policy of clinging on to the territory or of delaying the implementation of the Settlement Plan, in defiance of the unanimous views of the membership of the United Nations. South Africa must be persuaded that it is in her own best interests, as well as those of all the people of Namibia, to cooperate in bringing Namibia to independence at once. South Africa must understand that the so-called theory of linkage is not acceptable to my Government nor, I believe, to this Council. I would have liked to have been able to greet the South African Government's long awaited decision on the electoral system it prefers as evidence that South Africa will now begin to implement the Settlement Plan. I do indeed welcome the decision. But I am all the more disappointed that it should have been coupled with an uncompromising reiteration of South Africa's reasons for *not* implementing a plan that is complete. I take particular exception, since it concerns the work of the Contact Group, to the suggestion that South Africa is setting a pre-condition concerning impartiality. I would remind the South African Representative that this question was resolved satisfactorily some three years ago; that my Government (and I am sure this goes for our Contact Group partners too, and for the UN Secretary-General) will carry out scrupulously the agreements into which we entered; and that the onus rests with South Africa to begin the implementation process, whereupon these agreements can take effect.

While on this subject, Mr President, I must refer to the request addressed to you by six political parties within Namibia. The distinguished Permanent Representative of South Africa asked the Security Council, in the interests of impartiality, to take prompt action on the request of those parties to participate in the present debate. I would refer the Permanent Representative to the enclosure to his letter of 12 November 1985 to the Secretary-General, circulated as document S/17627. The penultimate paragraph of the enclosure states the following:

The National Assembly of the Government of National Unity resolved,

in a motion adopted unanimously on 19 June 1985, to request the Security Council formally to permit a representative of the Transitional Government to address the Council during its then-current debate on the independence of South West Africa. Inasmuch as the Security Council will be meeting again soon to consider the report of the Secretary-General, dated 6 September 1985, the Cabinet now formally wishes to request that representatives of the parties constituting the Transitional Government be permitted to address the Council on this occasion.

The message addressed to you, Mr President, did not describe the six parties as the 'Transitional Government'. Nor did the South African Permanent Representative tell this Council yesterday that these representatives wished to participate on behalf of the so-called Transitional Government. However, their intentions and purported status seem entirely clear from the passage I have just quoted. My Government has supported requests from the representatives of different groups within Namibia to be invited to address the Security Council under Rule 39. I would refer, for example, to the letter which I signed jointly with the Permanent Representatives of France and the United States on 26 May 1983, circulated as document S/15792. But we cannot endorse any attempt to accord recognition or status to the so-called 'Transitional Government of National Unity'. Like other members of this Council, we regard this so-called government as having no validity. As it is clear that those who have applied for a hearing intend to speak in that capacity, we cannot endorse their request. Needless to say, our view on applications from competent persons remains as set out in our letter of 26 May 1983; and we think it essential that equal treatment should be given to all political parties when implementation of the Settlement Plan commences. This, *inter alia*, will mean that no parties will be able to pass themselves off as the representatives of a 'Transitional Government'.

Mr President, in the face of South Africa's present attitude, we must clearly reinforce our efforts at persuasion with pressure calculated to assist our objective and to underline our determination.

The United Kingdom is therefore participating with her partners in the European Community and in the Commonwealth in a strategic approach to the problems of Southern Africa. My Government, your Government, Mr President, and other governments closely involved in this debate played leading parts in crafting the Accord adopted by the Commonwealth at Nassau in October. To quote the opening words of the Nassau Accord:

We consider that South Africa's continuing refusal to dismantle apartheid, its illegal occupation of Namibia, and its aggression against its neighbours constitute a serious challenge to the values and principles of the Commonwealth, a challenge which Commonwealth countries cannot ignore.

Furthermore, the communique on the meeting of Commonwealth Heads

of Government which was also issued at Nassau declared the establishment of the so-called interim administration as null and void, and rejected attempts to delay Namibia's freedom by linking it to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

As part of their strategic approach, the members of the Commonwealth agreed to adopt a number of economic measures against South Africa and decided to review progress after six months. The Commonwealth commended this approach to other governments. It was agreed that Commonwealth members would pursue the objectives of the Accord in all the ways and through all appropriate fora open to them, in the belief that the joint pursuit of this programme would enlarge the prospects of an orderly transition to social, economic and political justice in South Africa and of peace and stability in the Southern African region as a whole.

Mr President, it is entirely right that the Security Council should once again address itself to the Namibian problem. I acknowledge that the four of us who belong to the Commonwealth are in a minority within this Council. Nevertheless, I hope that our colleagues from other countries will see the merits of a strategy which enjoys the backing of 46 governments from all parts of the world, and that they will assist us in conveying to South Africa a unanimous message of firm and consistent persuasion and pressure. The best way of achieving this will be the adoption of a resolution consistent with the Commonwealth Accord. The South Africans must understand that we mean it when we insist that Namibia must gain its independence without delay.

Draft Resolution submitted to the Security Council during the debate on Namibia: 15 November 1985

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General (S/17442) of 6 September 1985,

Taking into account the statement by the Acting President of the United Nations Council for Namibia,

Taking into account also the statement by Mr Andimba Toivo Ja Toivo, the Secretary-General of South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO),

Commending, once again, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) for its preparedness to co-operate fully with the United Nations Secretary-General and his Special Representative, including its expressed readiness to sign and observe a ceasefire agreement with South Africa, in the implementation of the United Nations Plan for the independence of Namibia, contained in Security Council Resolution 435 (1978),

Recalling General Assembly Resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966,

Recalling and reaffirming its Resolutions 269 (1969), 276 (1970), 301 (1971), 385 (1976), 431 (1978), 432 (1978), 435 (1978), 439 (1978), 532 (1983), 539 (1985) and 566 (1985),

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for ensuring the implementation of its resolutions, in particular Resolutions 385 (1976), 435 (1978) and 439 (1978),

Taking note of the Final Declaration of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Luanda, Angola, from 4 to 8 September 1985, urging, *inter alia*, the Security Council to meet again in order to consider the question of Namibia and also renewing the call for the imposition of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against racist South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Commending those States, agencies and organisations which have already adopted a variety of economic measures against South Africa, and urging them and the international community, as a whole, to adopt further effective measures in a concerted effort to bring about an end to the illegal occupation of Namibia,

Gravely concerned at the future aggravation of the already tense situation and the instability created by the repeated and systematic acts of aggression and occupation perpetrated by the *apartheid* régime over a period of several years throughout Southern Africa, which constitutes a serious threat to the peace of the region as well as to international peace and security,

Conscious of the imperative need, in light of South Africa's continued prevarication and refusal to comply with the provisions of Resolution 566 (1985), to assume its responsibilities fully in order to secure, as soon as possible, the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978),

Conscious also of the obligation of States under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Acting, therefore, under Chapter VII of the said Charter and pursuant to Security Council Resolution 566 (1985), in particular operative paragraph 13 thereof,

1. *Determines*,

- (a) That the persistent refusal of South Africa to comply with Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on Namibia constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security;
- (b) That the continued illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa constitutes a breach of international peace;
- (c) That the repeated armed attacks perpetrated from Namibia by South Africa against independent and sovereign States in Southern Africa constitute grave acts of aggression;

2. *Condemns* South Africa for its continued illegal occupation of Namibia and its persistent refusal to comply with decisions of the Security Council and

resolutions of the General Assembly, thus defying the authority of the United Nations and violating the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

3. *Reaffirms* the legitimacy of the struggle of the Namibian people against the illegal occupation of their country by the racist Pretoria régime and calls upon all States to increase their moral and material assistance to them;

4. *Demands*, once again, that the racist régime of South Africa immediately dismantle the so-called interim government installed in Windhoek, on 17 June 1985, in clear defiance of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council;

5. *Declares once again* that the independence of Namibia cannot be held hostage to extraneous and irrelevant issues such as linkage, which have already been rejected by the Security Council as being extraneous and incompatible with Resolution 435 (1978), which is the only basis for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian problem;

6. *Solemnly declares* that racist South Africa's refusal to co-operate fully with the Security Council and the Secretary-General in terms of Resolution 566 (1985) constitutes a direct challenge to the authority of the United Nations and violates the principles of its Charter;

7. *Decides*, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security, to impose mandatory selective sanctions against South Africa;

8. *Decides*, accordingly and as a matter of utmost urgency, under Article 41, to adopt enforcement measures, including:

- (a) Oil embargo;
- (b) Arms embargo;
- (c) Prohibition of all new investments in South Africa and Namibia;
- (d) Prohibition of all new government and bank loans and credit guarantees to the racist Pretoria régime and the so-called interim government in Windhoek;
- (e) Termination of all export credit guarantees for exports to South Africa and Namibia;
- (f) Prohibition of importation or enrichment of uranium from Namibia and South Africa;
- (g) Prohibition of supply of technology, equipment and licences for nuclear plants in South Africa, including exchange of nuclear information with it;
- (h) Prohibition of visits to and from South Africa and Namibia by military, security, intelligence and other defence personnel;
- (i) Prohibition of the sale and export of computers capable of being used by the racist army, police and security forces;
- (j) Cessation of funding for permanent or temporary trade missions or

- for participating in exhibitions and trade fairs in South Africa and Namibia;
- (k) Termination of double taxation agreements with South Africa;
 - (l) Prohibition of the sale of Krugerrands and all other coins minted in South Africa or Namibia;
9. *Calls upon* all States, in conformity with Article 25 of the Charter, to assist effectively in the implementation of the present resolution and all the other relevant Security Council resolutions;
 10. *Further calls upon* the specialized agencies to ensure the effective implementation of the present resolution and all the other relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions;
 11. *Urges*, having regard to the principles stated in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, States not members of the United Nations to act in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution;
 12. *Decides* to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council to monitor the implementation of this resolution;
 13. *Calls upon* States members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies to report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on measures taken to implement the present resolution;
 14. *Invites* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the implementation of this resolution and to submit his first report by the end of May 1986 at the latest;
 15. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Statement by Mr Okum (USA) during the vote on the draft resolution in the Namibia debate in the Security Council: 14 November 1985

Permit me at the outset, Sir, on behalf of the entire American delegation, to welcome your assumption of the Presidency of the Security Council. We feel confident that our vessel will be well steered under such a distinguished helmsman — distinguished alike for his wisdom, energy and tact.

Permit me also to express the deep regret of my government at the news of the recent natural calamity in Colombia. In expressing sympathy with our sister republic to the south, we do so in the knowledge that the brave people of Colombia will surmount this tragedy as they have other difficult times in the past.

At this critical juncture in the history of Southern Africa, a debate such as the one under way here in the Security Council holds particular relevance. We have come a long way since this body adopted Resolution 435 (1978) seven years ago. One hurdle after another has been overcome, and we find ourselves today — I should like to hope — near the end of an arduous jour-

ney. An act or two more of goodwill, gestures of true statesmanship by the involved parties, and the region will have taken a major step towards a peaceful solution of the problems and strife that now beset it.

My Government welcomes the announcement by the South African authorities that proportional representation has been selected as a framework for elections in Namibia. The United States expects that South Africa will strictly adhere to the election modalities as outlined in the settlement plan and adopted by the Council on its Resolution 435 (1978). I quote from chapters I and II of that plan:

The elections will be held under the supervision and control of the United Nations . . .

The Secretary-General will appoint a United Nations Special Representative whose central task will be to make sure that conditions are established which will allow free and fair elections and an impartial electoral process. The Special Representative will be assisted by a United Nations Transition Assistance Group.

The United States believes it most important that all relevant parties with information to impart to the Council be permitted to speak under rule 39 of this body's provisional rules of procedure. Such a stance is consistent with the universality of the United Nations. Furthermore, all parties should be accorded equal treatment under the terms of the settlement plan. Hence, it is our law that a request from one or another member of a Namibian political party should be accorded sympathetic consideration of his or her request to address the Council Members of the Council, that persons acting as representatives of the so-called Transitional Government, the creation of which was declared null and void by this Council, should not be allowed the right to speak here.

As regards the draft resolution before us, it is with regret that we shall vote against it. My delegation will do so because it would impose mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. My Government's position on this matter is well known. I would add in this case that, actively engaged as the United States is in seeking a negotiated solution of the problem of Namibia, we would negate utterly our good offices by supporting mandatory sanctions. We sincerely regret that this draft resolution persisted in that short-sighted course of action.

Statement by Sir John Thompson (United Kingdom) during the vote on the draft resolution in the Namibia debate in the Security Council: 15 November 1985

The subject of this debate is a problem on which, as I said in my speech yesterday, the members of the Council have one view: we are all agreed on the illegality of South African occupation of Namibia and on the necessity of

Namibia gaining its freedom and independence in accordance with Security Council Resolution 455 (1976) without delay. We agree unanimously on the goal, but sadly it appears that we are not agreed on the details of action.

This is sad because unanimity is perhaps our best means to achieve our common goal. Numerous speakers in this debate have emphasized the importance of reflecting in the vote on the draft resolution unanimity which unquestionably exists within the Security Council with regard to South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia.

I was struck for example by the remarks yesterday by the Permanent Representative of Burkino Faso about the value of consensus. You, yourself, joined me in drawing attention to the common accord on South Africa and you hoped for a firm resolution which would attract unanimous support and which would send a clear and strong signal to South Africa.

The Permanent Representative of Canada spoke in similar terms today. Both the Permanent Representative of Denmark and I strongly hoped for unanimity when I said those things I believed they were achievable. In speaking with other members of the Council for a unanimous resolution, the United Kingdom was not engaging in empty rhetoric or looking for a comfortable berth. It was our belief, which I think is widely shared in the Council and throughout the United Nations, that our last chance of influencing South Africa lay through a resolution which was at the same time firm, realistic and supported by all 15 members of this Council. We feel that a less than unanimous Council, on the other hand would encourage South Africa and anyone else opposed to an early negotiated settlement of the Namibian problem — it could encourage them to play upon our differences.

It would mask our common determination to procure forthwith the independence of Namibia.

As I said in my statement yesterday, the United Kingdom has joined with other countries representing more than one-third of the membership of the United Nations on a strategy designed to exercise firm and controlled pressure upon South Africa through a number of agreed voluntary measures. We proposed, both publicly and in private discussion with the sponsors of this draft resolution, that the Council should adopt a resolution endorsing these measures and consistent with this strategy. We made abundantly clear to the sponsors our readiness to vote for a resolution which included a considerable list of non-mandatory economic measures. It is to our great regret that this serious, realistic and constructive proposal has not been accepted.

It would have shown the South African Government that it had no allies and should hope for none. It would have shown them that if they persisted in their illegal occupation of Namibia the consequences would have been mounting pressure. It would have shown them that their presence in Namibia was — and is — counter-productive for their own interest.

I cannot but feel, as a practical matter, that the rejection of our clear and

principled advice will be unfortunate for the people of Namibia, and also of Angola. We regret this missed opportunity. It is worse than an error, it is a blunder. Defeat has been snatched from the jaws of unanimity and a victory of sorts has been handed to South Africa.

Having offered a better course, my delegation will be obliged to vote against this draft resolution, because it is likely to be counter-productive and because it would have the effect of pre-empting the strategy which we have agreed with our Commonwealth partners. We on our side are not prepared to render nugatory the very significant agreement reached at Nassau barely a month ago. It is a great pity that our efforts to achieve unanimity have been frustrated and that comfort has hereby been afforded to the party which least deserves it, South Africa.

Nevertheless, my Government remains determined to work for the independence of Namibia without delay.

Letter in reply from the Secretary-General of the UN to the South African Foreign Minister on the SWA/Namibian electoral system: 26 November 1985

Excellency,

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 12 November 1985, concerning South Africa's choice of the electoral system in terms of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978).

As you are aware, in my report to the Security Council of 19 May 1983 (S/15776), I outlined the position regarding the choice of the electoral system as follows:

'As regards the electoral system to be employed in electing the constituent assembly, it was agreed that it would be based either on proportional representation or single-member constituencies. I was also assured that all the parties were agreed that this issue must be settled in accordance with the terms of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) and that the issue must not cause delay in the implementation of that resolution. The Frontline States and SWAPO emphasized the view that agreement should be secured on the electoral system prior to implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978).'

Following recent consultations, I wish to confirm to Your Excellency that agreement has been reached on the system of proportional representation for the elections envisaged in Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), in accordance with the settlement proposal (S/12636), and as provided for in Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), follow-up action as to how the system of proportional representation will work in practice, will be elaborated by my special representative and the Administrator-General, in the context of their

respective functions, once the implementation of the United Nations plan has commenced.

With agreement having been reached on the choice of the electoral system, all outstanding issues relevant to the United Nations plan for Namibia have now been resolved. I need hardly recall, in this connection, that the Security Council itself has, on more than one occasion, rejected the linking of the independence of Namibia to irrelevant and extraneous issues as incompatible with Resolution 435 (1978).

I therefore feel it my duty to propose to Your Excellency that we now proceed to establish the earliest possible date for a cease-fire and the implementation of the Security Council resolution.

In view of the circulation of Your Excellency's letter as a document of the Security Council, I am having this letter circulated in the same manner.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration. . . .

All texts in this section have been supplied by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs.

Angola, Mozambique and USSR

The texts of the Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the People's Republics of Angola and Mozambique, although signed in 1976 and 1977 respectively, are included here because of the current intense interest in the Angola/Namibia developments on the one hand and the subsequent completion of the *Accord of Nkomati between South Africa and Mozambique in March 1984, on the other hand.

Excerpts from speeches by Comrades L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and A.A. Neto, President of the People's Republic of Angola, at a dinner in Great Kremlin Palace: 7 October 1976

Speech by Comrade L.I. Brezhnev. . . Angola's victory was a result of the steadfastness and courage of your people and your revolutionary vanguard. At the same time, it was a victory for internationalism and the international solidarity of the forces of progress. All of Africa's freedom-loving peoples were on your side. From the very beginning of your struggle, the Soviet Union, Cuba and other socialist countries actively helped you. You had on your side the Communists and all true democrats of Portugal and the sympathy of all progressive people the world over. . . .

There are now ever louder and more insistent demands that the rule of the racists in Southern Africa be ended. This too is a command of the times. It is opposed only by representatives of extreme reaction.

We are firmly convinced that the problems of Zimbabwe and Namibia should be solved by the peoples of those countries themselves. African events in recent years confirm the fact that only in this event can such problems be solved correctly, fairly and effectively in the interests of the peoples themselves.

It is true that now, when Africa has shown that it is capable of dealing with the vestiges of colonialism and racism, some people, in the name of further-

*Southern Africa Record No. 35, April 1984

ing this process, are making attempts to substitute a fictitious liberation of Southern Africa for the real thing; in effect, they are trying to preserve the positions of imperialism in that region and to shore up that tottering bastion of racism, the government of the Republic of South Africa.

As far as the Soviet Union's position on this question is concerned, it is clear and distinct. We have said many times and want to say again that we have no 'special interests'—and can have none—in the south, the north or any other part of Africa, that we seek no advantages there. All that we want is to have the sacred right of every people to determine its own destiny and to choose its own path of development recognized. This is our unchanging principle, from which our Party and all Soviet people will never depart. . . .

Speech by Comrade A.A. Neto. . . . Soviet aid played the most important role in our historical development, in the winning of our country's independence and in its reconstruction. It could not have been otherwise, since the Soviet Union, which by rights is in the vanguard of the historical development of the peoples, is building communism, having traversed an inspiring revolutionary path that led from an exploiter society to socialism and the birth of proletarian internationalism. . . .

Resolutely rejecting chauvinism and egocentrism, combating imperialism and the exploitation of some peoples by others and steadfastly implementing a policy of internationalist solidarity, the CPSU has made an important contribution to the defence of principles that best meet the interests of the Soviet people and the other peoples of the world. The different periods in the history of the national-liberation struggle in Angola bear witness to this policy of the USSR, both during the first national-liberation war against Portuguese colonialism and against colonial exploitation by the Portuguese and their allies, and during the second war against the agents of imperialism, among which neighbouring countries, South Africa and domestic puppets were prominent. . . .

We are also grateful to the Cuban people, who, by sending thousands of their best sons at the right moment, helped the Angolan people to victory over their external enemies. The peoples of Cuba and Angola are united by common historical and ethnic bonds. The Cuban people are a people to whom revolutionary feelings of internationalism are inherent. The socialist path of development unites the destinies of the peoples of Angola, Cuba and the Soviet Union, despite their different levels of development, in a single destiny meant for the socialist countries.

We are grateful to the progressive African, European and Asian countries, which spared no effort in contributing to the winning of our independence. . . .

As a people, we are proud that we can belong to the great socialist family—a family that at decisive moments in history has been able to preserve its solidarity and its dynamism. . . .

Here we must say something about the actions of China, a country that pretends to be a socialist state but whose action with respect to Angola was to align itself with imperialist forces in combating our revolution. To this day, China's behaviour in Africa is nothing other than a manifestation of perverted anti-Sovietism and continual and highly obvious actions against the peoples' interests. However, China still has an opportunity to free itself from this pseudo-socialist policy, which is linked to the interests of imperialism, *and to side with those who are fighting for socialism and the wellbeing of the peoples.* We are confident that the Chinese people will be able to find the correct path.

The Angolan people, led by their revolutionary vanguard, the MPLA, understand that there is a difference between the Chinese people, who are rich in great revolutionary traditions, and the group that is pursuing an anti-Soviet, anti-Angolan counter-revolutionary course and is acting against the interests of its own people. . . .

Angola belongs to the group of non-aligned countries, so it has no intention of joining any military bloc, but this does not mean that it is not freely developing cooperation with the socialist countries in all fields, as it is doing in relations with the USSR. . . .

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of Angola: 8 October 1976

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of Angola,

believing that the further development and strengthening of relations of friendship and all-round cooperation that have been established between them as a result of the struggle for the freedom and independence of Angola corresponds to the fundamental national interests of the peoples of both countries and serves the cause of peace the world over,

inspired by the ideals of the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and racism in all their forms and manifestations and by an unfailing desire to support *in every way peoples that are struggling for freedom, independence and social progress,*

firmly resolved to promote the consolidation of international peace and security in the interests of the peoples of all countries,

affirming their fidelity to the goals and principles of the United Nations Charter,

advocating the unity of all progressive forces in the struggle for peace, freedom, independence and social progress, and believing that the development of friendly relations and broad cooperation between the socialist countries and the developing states is in their common interest,

taking into account the May 26, 1976, Declaration on the Principles of Friendly Relations and Cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of Angola and actuated by a desire to consolidate the existing relations of friendship and mutually advantageous cooperation between the two states and peoples,

have decided to conclude this Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, and have agreed on the following:

Art. 1. — The high contracting parties declare that there will be indestructible friendship between their two countries and their peoples and that all-round cooperation will be developed in the political, economic, trade, scientific-technical, cultural and other fields on the basis of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in one another's internal affairs and equality.

Art. 2. — The high contracting parties declare that they will cooperate closely and comprehensively in ensuring conditions for the preservation and further development of the social and economic gains of their peoples and respect for each country's sovereignty over all its natural resources.

Art. 3. — The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects the policy of non-alignment pursued by the People's Republic of Angola, a policy that is an important factor in the maintenance of international peace and security.

The People's Republic of Angola respects the peace-loving foreign policy pursued by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a socialist state.

Art. 4. — The high contracting parties will continue to work for peace the world over, the deepening of the easing of international tension and its embodiment in specific forms of mutually advantageous cooperation among states, for the settlement of international problems by peaceful means, for the conclusion of a world-wide treaty on the non-use of force in international relations and for the achievement of general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, under effective international control.

Art. 5. — The high contracting parties will continue to wage a relentless struggle against the forces of imperialism and for the final liquidation of colonialism, neocolonialism, racism and apartheid, and they will work for the full implementation of the UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

The parties will cooperate with one another and with other peace-loving states in support of the just struggle of peoples for their sovereignty, freedom, independence and social progress.

Art. 6. — The high contracting parties, expressing deep interest in ensuring world peace and security and attaching great importance to cooperation between them in the international arena to achieve these goals, will regularly exchange opinions with one another on important international questions, as well as on questions of bilateral relations.

These consultations and exchanges of opinion will cover:

— international questions, including situations causing tension in various parts of the world, with a view to promoting the easing of tension, the development of cooperation and the strengthening of international security;

— questions that are the subject of multilateral talks, including those considered in international organizations and at international conferences;

— questions of a political, economic and cultural nature and other questions concerning relations between the two countries.

These consultations and exchanges of opinion will take place at various levels, including meetings between the parties' governmental leaders and visits by official delegations and special representatives, as well as through diplomatic channels.

Art. 7. — In the event that a situation arises that creates a threat to peace or breaks the peace, the high contracting parties will immediately establish contact with each other for the purpose of coordinating their positions in the interests of removing the threat or restoring peace.

Art. 8. — Attaching great importance to economic, technical and scientific cooperation between them, the high contracting parties will continue to widen and deepen such cooperation and exchanges of experience in industry, transportation, farming, animal husbandry, fishing, the exploitation of natural resources, the development of power engineering and communications, in the training of national cadres and in other economic fields.

The parties will expand trade and navigation between them on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual advantage and most-favoured-nation treatment.

Art. 9. — The high contracting parties will promote the further development of ties and cooperation between them in the fields of science, the arts, literature, education, public health, the press, radio, motion pictures, television, tourism, sports and other fields.

The parties will promote the expansion of cooperation and direct ties between political and public organizations, enterprises and cultural and scientific institutions, with a view to more thorough mutual familiarization with the life, labour and achievements of the two countries' peoples.

Art. 10. — In the interests of strengthening the defence capability of the high contracting parties, they will continue to develop cooperation in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements concluded between them.

Art. 11. — Each of the high contracting parties declares that it will not enter into alliances or take part in any groupings of states or any actions or measures directed against the other high contracting party.

Art. 12. — The high contracting parties declare that their commitments under existing international treaties are not at variance with the provisions of this treaty, and they pledge not to conclude any international agreements incompatible with it.

Art. 13. — All questions that may arise between the high contracting parties in relation to the interpretation or application of any provision of this treaty will be resolved bilaterally in a spirit of friendship, mutual respect and understanding.

Art. 14. — This treaty will be in effect for 20 years from the day it enters into force.

Unless one of the high contracting parties declares, no later than one year before the expiration of the above term, its desire to terminate the treaty, it will remain in force for the next five years and until such time as one of the high contracting parties, no later than one year before the expiration of the current five-year period, gives written notice of its intention to terminate the treaty.

Art. 15. — This treaty is subject to ratification and will enter into force on the day that instruments of ratification are exchanged; this will take place in the city of Luanda.

This treaty is drawn up in duplicate, in the Russian and Portuguese languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Done in Moscow on Oct. 8, 1976. — [signed] For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—L. BREZHNEV; for the People's Republic of Angola—A. NETO.

Agreement on cooperation between the Communist Party of The Soviet Union and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Central Committee of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA),

relying on the relations of friendship and solidarity established between the CPSU and the MPLA during the years of the Angolan people's struggle against the colonialists and foreign interventionists,

noting that the identity of their positions on the basic questions of international life and the two parties' devotion to the ideals of peace, national liberation, democracy and scientific socialism create favourable conditions for the further development of all-round cooperation between the CPSU and the MPLA,

regarding inter-party cooperation as an important foundation of Soviet-Angolan relations,

guided by the interests of the unity of all anti-imperialist forces and the principles of internationalism and comradely equality, have signed this agreement, in accordance with which the CPSU and the MPLA state their intention:

1. To constantly expand inter-party ties at all levels and promote in every

way mutual exchanges of experience in party work;

2. To regularly exchange delegations and systematically hold consultations and comradely exchanges of opinion on questions of mutual interest;

3. To cooperate in the training of party cadres and conduct joint scientific studies of pressing problems of contemporary social development;

4. To strengthen contacts between organs of the party press, as well as other mass information media, and to provide their countries' party *aktivs* and general public with wide-ranging information on the activity of the two parties and peoples on their achievements in all fields of life;

5. To promote the development of contacts and friendly ties between the public organizations of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Angola; and

6. On an annual basis, to coordinate and carry out plans of specific measures for cooperation between the two parties. — [signed] For the Communist Party of the Soviet Union — L. BREZHNEV; for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola — A. NETO.

Joint Soviet-Angolan Statement excerpts: 13 October 1976

At the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Soviet government, Comrade Agostinho Neto, Chairman of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and President of the People's Republic of Angola, has paid an official friendly visit to the Soviet Union as head of an Angolan party and state delegation.

During the visit, talks were held on questions related to the further expansion of cooperation between the CPSU and the MPLA, the development of Soviet-Angolan state relations, the situation in Africa and other international problems of mutual interest. . . .

During the talks, which took place in an atmosphere of friendship and international solidarity, complete mutual understanding and coincidence of views was established on all questions discussed.

I. . . . The Soviet side confirmed its readiness to continue giving Angola support and assistance in accomplishing the tasks confronting the MPLA and the Angolan government in eliminating the legacy of the colonial past and the consequences of the recent foreign intervention and in consolidating a united, independent and democratic Angola and strengthening its defence capability. . . .

II. . . . Advocating the unity of all progressive forces in the struggle for freedom, democracy and social progress, the leaders of the Soviet Union and the PRA believe that the development of friendly relations and all-round co-

operation between the developing African states and the socialist countries helps to strengthen the independence of those states and to create favourable conditions for the complete liberation of the African continent.

At the same time, the two sides note that international imperialism and the forces that support it, have entered into collusion or have been misled and are seeking revenge for the setbacks they suffered as a result of the downfall of the Portuguese colonial empire and the consolidation of the forces of peace and progress in Africa.

Behind the cover of 'new doctrines', the imperialist powers are in fact trying to restore their lost positions, to safeguard the interests of monopoly capital, to hold back the further growth of the national-liberation movement, to block the implementation of progressive social and economic transformations in the liberated countries of Africa and to isolate the African peoples from their natural and tested allies — the countries of the socialist commonwealth. . . .

III. The leaders of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Angola note with satisfaction the broad coincidence of the USSR's and the PRA's positions on the most important international problems. . . .

The Soviet Union condemns attempts to block the PRA's admission to UN membership and resolutely supports Angola's request for admission to that international organization, a request that has already received the support of two-thirds of the world's countries, particularly at conferences of the Organization of African Unity and at the Colombo conference of non-aligned countries. . . .

The two sides express deep satisfaction with the results of their talks; they believe that the visit to the Soviet Union by Comrade Agostinho Neto, Chairman of the MPLA and President of the PRA, and the Angolan party and state delegation has made an important contribution to the further strengthening of relations of friendship and cooperation between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola and between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of Angola. . . . [signed] For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — L. BREZHNEV; for the People's Republic of Angola — A. NETO.

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of Mozambique: 31 March 1977

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of Mozambique, 31 March 1977

believing that the relations of friendship and cooperation that were established between the Soviet and Mozambican peoples during the difficult years of the people's war for the liberation of Mozambique and consolidated after

the creation of the People's Republic of Mozambique correspond to the vital interests of both sides and serve the cause of peace the world over,

firmly resolved to support each other in the creation of more favourable conditions for reinforcing the revolutionary social and economic gains of both peoples,

inspired by the ideals of the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and racism,

actuated by a desire to support the struggle for international peace and security in the interests of the peoples of all countries,

advocating the unity and cooperation of all progressive forces in the struggle for independence, freedom, peace and social progress,

affirming their fidelity to the goals and principles of the United Nations Charter,

seeking to consolidate the existing relations of friendship and mutually advantageous cooperation between the two states and peoples, which are natural allies,

have decided to conclude this Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, and have agreed on the following:

Art. 1. — The high contracting parties solemnly declare their resolve to strengthen and deepen the indestructible friendship between the two countries and peoples and to develop all-round cooperation. On the basis of respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs and equality, the two parties will cooperate in every way in the creation of more favourable conditions for preserving and deepening the social and economic gains of the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of Mozambique.

Art. 2. — The high contracting parties attach great importance to their all-round cooperation and to exchanges of experience in the economic, technical and scientific fields. For this purpose, they will broaden and deepen cooperation in the fields of industry, transportation and communications, agriculture, fisheries, the exploitation of natural resources and the development of the power industry and other economic branches, as well as in the training of national cadres.

The two parties will expand trade and navigation on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual advantage and most-favoured-nation treatment.

Art. 3. — The high contracting parties will promote the development of cooperation, mutual assistance and exchanges of experience in the fields of science, culture, the arts, literature, education, public health, the press, radio, motion pictures, tourism, sports and other fields.

The parties will promote the expansion of cooperation and direct ties between political and public organizations, enterprises and cultural and scientific institutions, with a view to more thorough mutual familiarization with the life, labour, experience and achievements of the two countries' peoples.

Art. 4. — In the interests of strengthening the defence capability of the high contracting parties, they will continue to develop cooperation in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements concluded between them.

Art. 5. — The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects the policy of non-alignment pursued by the People's Republic of Mozambique, a policy that is an important factor in the maintenance of international peace and security.

The People's Republic of Mozambique respects the peace policy pursued by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a policy aimed at strengthening friendship and cooperation with all peoples.

Art. 6. — The high contracting parties will continue to struggle for peace the world over and will exert every effort to deepen the process of the easing of international tension. They will advocate its embodiment in specific forms of mutually advantageous cooperation between states. Both parties will exert every effort for the achievement of general and complete disarmament — including nuclear disarmament — under effective international control, for the settlement of disputed international questions by peaceful means, and for the conclusion of a world-wide treaty on the non-use of force in international relations.

Art. 7. — The high contracting parties will continue a consistent struggle against the forces of imperialism and for the final elimination of colonialism, neocolonialism, racism and apartheid. They advocate the complete implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

The parties will cooperate with each other and with other peace-loving states in support of the just struggle of peoples for their freedom, independence, sovereignty and social progress.

Art. 8. — The high contracting parties, expressing deep interest in ensuring peace and international security and attaching great importance to cooperation between them in the international arena to achieve these goals, will regularly exchange opinions, in a spirit of mutual understanding, on important international questions. Such consultations and exchanges of opinions will also include questions of a political, economic and cultural nature and other questions relating to bilateral relations.

Consultations and exchanges of opinions will take place at various levels, including meetings between the parties' governmental leaders and visits of official delegations and special representatives, as well as through diplomatic channels.

Art. 9. — In the event that a situation arises that creates a threat to peace or breaks the peace, the high contracting parties will immediately contact each other with a view to coordinating their positions in the interests of eliminating the threat or restoring peace.

Art. 10. — Each of the high contracting parties solemnly declares that it will not enter into a military or other alliance or take part in any groupings of states or in actions or measures directed against the other high contracting party.

Art. 11. — The high contracting parties declare that their commitments under existing international treaties are not at variance with the provisions of this treaty, and they pledge not to conclude any international agreements incompatible with it.

Art. 12. — Questions that may arise between the high contracting parties in relation to the interpretation or application of any provision of this treaty will be resolved bilaterally, in a spirit of friendship, mutual understanding and respect.

Art. 13. — This treaty will be in effect for 20 years from the day it enters into force.

Unless one of the high contracting parties declares, no later than one year before the expiration of the above term, its desire to terminate the treaty, it will remain in force for the next five years and until such time as one of the high contracting parties, no later than one year before the expiration of the current five-year period, gives written notice of its intention to terminate the treaty.

Art. 14. — This treaty is subject to ratification and will enter into force on the day that instruments of ratification are exchanged; this will take place in Moscow.

This treaty is drawn up in duplicate, in the Russian and Portuguese languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Done in Maputo on March 31, 1977. — [signed] For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — N. V. PODGORNYY, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; for the People's Republic of Mozambique — SAMORA M. MACHEL, President of the People's Republic of Mozambique.

Texts supplied by The Current Digest of the Soviet Press. Vols. XXVIII, No. 41 and XXIX No. 13.

Zimbabwe

Statement by Minister of Finance, Cde B. Chidzero, on sanctions against South Africa, Harare, 21 November 1985

History, geography and economics combine to determine the position of Zimbabwe in the context of current regional and extra-regional calls to apply sanctions against South Africa. This is not to say these factors are exclusive determinants, or dictate exclusively Zimbabwe's position, but rather that they comprehensively and considerably influence the fortunes of Zimbabwe and therefore, the room for manoeuvre and/or policy decisions which Government must take to safeguard the country's political independence and ensure its economic growth and developments.

History has translated itself into the racial composition of Zimbabwe as well as into economic and financial institutions which the existence of a significant white population of South African origin or with links in that country, has established. This also goes for other connections with South Africa, for example trans-border human traffic. Geography juxtaposes Zimbabwe to South Africa and Zimbabwe's landlocked position determines our transit routes as well as our security situation, with all the geopolitical connotations this carries.

Economics: because of the long existing trade, investment and financial arrangements there is almost something of an umbilical relationship between the two countries, although significant achievements have been made since independence to reduce the high degree of dependency on South Africa. Even so, the economic fortunes of the two countries are closely inter-twined.

I discuss below this inter-relationship with particular reference to trade, transport, financial flows and investment/industrialization.

To begin with, Zimbabwe has very high trade ratios, meaning that the economy is closely and almost inextricably linked to developments in the outside world. In 1984 our total exports to the world, including South Africa, were 25,5 per cent of our gross domestic product, compared to 28,2 per cent in 1979 and 1980 respectively, representing a slight decrease in the degree of dependence on the outside world. But trade ratio is still significant, meaning that if we lost our world markets the impact would be felt immediately and would be pervasive.

Similarly, our world imports as a percentage of total consumption stand at about 20 per cent compared to 23 and 27 per cent in 1979 and 1980 respectively. This is a significant ratio, the more so considering the nature of our imports which are basically essentials, for example, fuel, industrial raw materials, machinery and equipment, and so on. Complete disruption of trade in this regard would also have an immediate adverse effect on the economy.

The South African relationship in this regard is also significant. In 1983 we exported over \$186,5 million to South Africa, or slightly over 18,4 per cent of our total exports in value. At the same time we imported from South Africa \$259,9 million or 24,5 per cent of total imports. The preliminary figures for 1984 in percentage are 18,8 and (n.a.) respectively. Thus while we have somewhat reduced our dependence on South Africa in respect of both imports and exports, the percentages are still high and significant. Moreover, our imports consist essentially of basic items such as machinery and transport equipment, chemicals and manufactured goods and sometimes mineral fuels.

Our exports to South Africa relate mainly to products of our manufacturing sector, that is to say manufactured goods including textiles and clothing. But we also export significant amounts of tobacco, cotton and other crude materials.

The point I wish to emphasize is simply that our high degree of trade dependence, both on the outside world in general and on South Africa in particular, suggests that the Zimbabwe economy is sensitive to developments in these markets and is vulnerable to any actions which might disrupt trade relationships. This is not to say the economy would collapse but rather it would function at a reduced rate generating unemployment, shortage of goods and general hardship.

In all this our access to the sea is vital. Assuming routes to the sea via Beira and Maputo were open, we would ensure our trade with the outside world via Mozambique as well as cheaper transport.

Unfortunately as things stand at the moment the Chiqualaquala line is virtually inoperable because of disruptions and sabotage by the MNR and we are forced to concentrate on the use of Beira, which can carry only a maximum capacity of about 30 per cent of our total trade, and that at relatively high cost in view of defence and security arrangements.

It is estimated that in 1982 the Chiqualaquala/Maputo line and the Machipanda/Beira line accounted together for nearly 53 per cent of our exports and imports and South African lines for 47 per cent. In 1983 the figures were 46 per cent and 54 per cent respectively. In 1984 the situation had greatly deteriorated as far as the Maputo line was concerned and only 33 per cent of our traffic went through Mozambique, with South Africa taking 67 per cent. In 1985 the bulk of our trade is via South Africa, reversing the situation which had existed before the closure of the border with Mozambique in 1974/1975

when about 75 per cent of our goods went through Lourenco Marques and Beira.

It is quite clear that transport is going to be a critical area if sanctions are imposed on South Africa and South Africa retaliates by closing routes to us or by intensifying or sustaining the disruptions of the Chiqualaquala line. Thus it is essential that both as a nation and within the SADCC context appropriate anticipatory measures are taken to ensure transit routes via Mozambique, and to this end to mobilize international support as well as our own resources, human and financial.

There is a two-way relationship in terms of financial flows between South Africa and Zimbabwe. In 1984 in respect of total services (freight, insurance, and so on) South Africa received over \$83 million from Zimbabwe. To this must be added nearly \$19 million in terms of profits, dividends and interest remitted to South Africa, plus another \$63 million in terms of pensions and annuities and pension commutations. This gives a combined total of \$165 million. A similar amount is likely to be transferred in 1985. On the other hand, *inflows from South Africa to Zimbabwe amounted to slightly more than \$23 million, being \$7 million in terms of services, \$15 million income and \$1 million pensions.*

It is clear in this regard that South Africa benefits more from Zimbabwe and this is because of large South African investments in Zimbabwe and of course, the utilization of the South African transport system, as well as the constitutional obligations on the part of Zimbabwe in regard to pensions. There could be some leverage here, in the sense that a skilful handling of this matter, drawing on the strong business and personal interests of South African companies and individuals who would stand to lose a great deal if the outflows from Zimbabwe to South Africa were stopped, could provide us with some muscle. The same is true with regard to trade, which is two-way traffic.

It may also be noted that Zimbabwe owes South Africa about \$200 million, largely inherited from the Smith regime. While this may strengthen our hand, the same cannot easily be said of the Zimbabwe dollar and rand relationship, which could be in our favour or against it, depending on whether the rand depreciates, in which case our exports suffer but imports benefit, and the reverse if it appreciates, assuming there is still trade.

Conceivably Zimbabwe could gain from sanctions if she ensured transport and communications with neighbouring countries, that is, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and Malawi, and if she could capture these neighbouring countries' trade, they would cease to trade with South Africa. This could lead to the need to expand industrial and agricultural capacity and therefore to increase employment in Zimbabwe.

It is also conceivable that investment might move from South Africa to Zimbabwe but at the same time, one can also see a possible situation in which

the whole of Southern Africa could become so unstable that there would be great reluctance on the part of investors to take risks by investing in any one of the countries. Disinvestment could also be accelerated. Transport would become uncertain and unreliable, currencies would fluctuate left and right, economic stability could be in peril. But much would depend on the nature and intensity of sanctions imposed and on the reaction of South Africa herself as well as the posture which the international community would take in political, economic and financial terms vis-à-vis the Frontline States.

From what I have said above it would appear that the imposition of sanctions on South Africa could have different and possibly disastrous effects on Zimbabwe depending largely on the nature of sanctions imposed and on whether South Africa retaliates or not. If the sanctions were comprehensive or total and involved blockading South African harbours, this would automatically affect Zimbabwe in a devastating manner unless the Maputo line and the Beira line were open. Equally, if South Africa reacted by closing its borders and therefore the traffic through South Africa from and to Zimbabwe were affected, the impact would be equally sharp on Zimbabwe, again, unless the Mozambique routes were open.

However, in view of certain advantages South Africa would not contemplate total closure of borders but could take selective measures while carefully manipulating the use of the routes of trade via South Africa. At the same time it may be envisaged that she would intensify her support for terrorist activities in Mozambique to disrupt our routes in order to force us to deal with her.

Again, in all this the reaction of the world and the support we would get, both political and material, would be important as would the mobilization of our own domestic and regional resources. *Contingency planning is therefore of the essence in this regard.*

Text supplied by Department of Information, P O Box 8150, Causeway, Harare.

Speech by Prime Minister Cde Robert Mugabe at USSR Council of Ministers State Banquet in his honour. Moscow, 2 December 1985

I and my entire delegation are extremely pleased and honoured to be with you here tonight. Your own words of welcome, the warmth and hospitality extended to us by your Party, Government and people of this magnificent and historic city of Moscow, have touched our hearts most profoundly. I wish to assure you most sincerely, that we feel very much at home and most welcome among our friends.

Our visit to your wonderful country is in fulfilment of a long-standing wish and desire on my part and I am most grateful to you for having made it possible. The visit, as you know, is not a mere fulfilment of an official obli-

gation, important though that may be; it is, more importantly, a mission of friendship, motivated by the comradeship, mutual respect and love which exist between the peoples of Zimbabwe and the Soviet Union.

In this regard allow me, therefore, to convey to you very warm greetings from the Central Committee of our Party, the ZANU (PF), and from the Government and revolutionary people of Zimbabwe.

The current excellent relations which very happily exist between our two governments are most valued by our two peoples. They are without doubt, going to grow from strength to strength, because they are built on a very firm foundation traceable to the days when the oppressed people of Zimbabwe were waging a bitter struggle against colonialism, imperialism and international capitalism.

Our liberation struggle was, as the liberation struggles in other parts of the world, the result of a natural desire on the part of our people to regain their freedom and their rightful place in their own country and in the international community.

Our struggle, either directly or indirectly, benefited from your own struggle against feudalism which culminated in the glorious October Revolution of 1917, and then from the moral, political and material support so generously and selflessly rendered us by socialist countries, including your own.

The history, experience and ultimate success of your own revolution were very crucial factors in our own bitter revolutionary liberation struggle because they became a source of inspiration to our people. With material, political, diplomatic and moral support from both your country and other progressive states in the world, we were able to sustain our struggle and to face the enemy who often was over-supplied and over-equipped for the unjust cause he was fighting.

It is a source of encouragement and, indeed, great joy, for us in Zimbabwe to note that your country's interest in Zimbabwe has continued to grow even after the attainment of our freedom and independence. Our two countries enjoy mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields, such as those that encompass cultural, political, diplomatic and economic areas, where again, we of the young Republic of Zimbabwe, look to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries for example, for inspiration and, indeed, guidance.

My present visit, thanks to your kind invitation, provides an excellent opportunity for us to exchange experiences, ideas and views on how to expand and deepen our cooperation in various fields. As you know, the Zimbabwe liberation struggle had, as one of its guiding principles, the philosophies of Marx and Lenin. It is not surprising, therefore, that Marxism-Leninism has been adopted by my party and Government as the basic philosophy whose principles shall guide us in the process of our socio-economic transformation.

After nearly a century of political oppression, and cultural and economic

exploitation by imperialism under the banner of successive settler racist regimes, our people have decided that new Zimbabwe should be a socialist society. At its Second Congress held in August 1984, my party produced a development programme on the basis of which Government is now formulating its five-year development plan due to start next year. The people of Zimbabwe have become increasingly aware of the fact that they must not only be their own political, but also economic masters, for political power without economic power is hollow.

True democracy must thus demonstrate itself not only in terms of the right of a people to political votes but also in terms of the right to own, exploit and benefit from their natural resources. For us the best modality of ownership of our economic resources is that which vests the means of production in our workers and peasants.

Our humble efforts at qualitative socio-economic transformation have, despite many hurdles created by historical and other forces beyond our control, met with modest success. Our countries, over the last four years, as you know, had to contend with very long years of the most devastating droughts in living memory.

I am glad to say, however, that partly because of the people-oriented drought relief programmes initiated by the Government, and partly because of the hard work and cooperation on our people's part, Zimbabwe went through the three consecutive years of drought remarkably well. Thanks to the good rains, the past year was one of our best agriculturally. We are, naturally, looking forward to another good year.

Unhappily, there is a conflict situation in our area. The racist white minority regime in South Africa has, in a desperate bid to entrench its system of apartheid and ensure white supremacy, carried out a three-pronged strategy in the area, namely the internal oppressive and repressive legislative and administrative measures. Second, the illegal occupation of Namibia and refusal to comply with UN Resolutions meant to achieve Namibia's independence and third, its acts of naked aggression and destabilization aimed at neighbouring states.

The Pretoria regime is thus waging a vicious war against every person and every nation in our region daring to champion the cause of democracy, social justice, human dignity and progress.

We, for our part, have however, opted to support, in every way possible, the oppressed people of South Africa and the Namibians in their just struggle against their oppressors and colonisers, whatever the consequences.

We, therefore, call upon all our friends and the international community to exert every pressure possible, including the imposition and effective enforcement of mandatory economic sanctions against the obstinate racist regime in Pretoria.

We categorically reject as hypocritical nonsense the argument advanced by

those who, after all, reap economic and financial profits from the continued oppression and exploitation of the South African and Namibian masses, that mandatory economic sanctions will only hurt and harm the oppressed peoples of South Africa and Namibia. The same hypocrites also go about telling the world that sanctions will harm the economies of the independent states in our region.

The real reason for opposing sanctions has nothing to do with the need to protect the interests of the oppressed masses of South Africa and Namibia, who have everything to gain by the imposition and effective implementation of sanctions against their oppressor.

Zimbabwe notes with satisfaction and gratitude the moral and material support, which the Soviet Union and other socialist countries give to those in our region and other parts of the world struggling for their freedom and human rights. We are also very grateful for the diplomatic and material support which you and other socialists and progressive countries render to the independent African countries in the region to enable them to withstand the destabilization, intimidation and blackmail of the apartheid regime.

As the liberation struggle gathers even greater momentum, the frightened regime will also intensify: first, its repression against the black people inside South Africa and in Namibia and, second, its acts of destabilization against neighbours. We are heartened that we can continue to count upon your vital support.

Zimbabwe and other small and developing countries are also greatly concerned about the current world situation. In particular, we feel insecure about the tense relations between the two world blocs, heightened by the current race in the production of nuclear arms.

We are grateful and encouraged, however, that your recent historic meeting with President Ronald Reagan took place and that it might be the beginning of a new climate of world peace and understanding. I wish to commend your personal efforts, statesmanship and vision in trying to reduce the current world tension in favour of world peace and security.

Zimbabwe joins the rest of the world in hoping that much more will be achieved in future meetings, that is the halting of the nuclear arms race leading to total disarmament. Zimbabwe, like all non-aligned countries, stands firmly opposed to the extension of the arms race into outer space, nor does it accept the concept of 'star wars'.

What the world wants and is earnestly yearning for is the ultimate elimination of the nuclear threat to human civilization. Once again, I and my delegation are very delighted to be here with you. Once again, may we thank you for your friendship, kindness and hospitality. May this friendship lead us yet to greater friendship and cooperation.

Text supplied by Department of Information, P O Box 8150, Causeway, Harare.

Extracts from speech by Deputy Minister Cde C. Sanyangare at ACP/EC joint assembly in Swaziland: 29 January 1986 (ACP: African, Caribbean, Pacific States, *vide* Lomé Conventions)

It is indeed a singular honour and great pleasure for me and my delegation to be able to contribute to the deliberations of this occasion which is poignant and extremely significant particularly to us in this unfortunate turbulent region and the world at large.

However, I must first pay special tribute to the assembly for accepting Mbabane in Swaziland as our 1986 venue. It was a timely and most welcome choice because it has brought the assembly right on the doorstep of the racist apartheid regime in Pretoria which has and is raining terror, torture and death throughout the region.

You are so close as to physically see the abominable apartheid, feel its horrendous vibrations and even hear its torturous whips striking the backs of innocent blacks and its murderous guns flushing out the lives of politically and socially conscious South Africans whose only crime is a genuine desire for establishment of black majority rule.

Black lives are lost daily on the altar of the abhorrent racial policies enacted for the sole purpose of the maintenance of this evil, diabolic, anti-human and inhumane system of apartheid. After this hellish personal experience you must go away strengthened in your resolve to assist the fight against apartheid to the finish. There can be no two ways about removing this downright evil from the face of the earth.

This murderous racist apartheid regime is recruiting, training, arming, giving logistic and financial support to terrorist gangs masquerading as liberation movements designed solely for the total destabilization of the socio-economic developments in the region.

The gangs are UNITA in Angola, MNR in Mozambique, the Tanzania Liberation Front in Tanzania, the Mushala gang in Zambia and the Super-Zapu in Zimbabwe, and possibly a terrorist group in Botswana. All these aim at creating total chaos in the region and bringing about complete dependence on Pretoria for all that a full life requires.

At our Inverness Assembly last September, 1985, we all agreed to invite all democratic forces interested in majority rule in South Africa here in Mbabane. But unfortunately some of our European colleagues wrongly assumed that this included racist members of the apartheid Pretoria regime. What a farce!

Never in the progressive history of this honourable assembly must the racial apartheid regime be given a platform to pollute us with their evil, abhorrent policies.

Zimbabwe adheres to the UN charter on human rights and is totally opposed to all forms of discrimination and disrespect for human dignity being

perpetrated against the innocent peace- and freedom-loving masses of blacks in South Africa.

In the light of the racist apartheid South African regime's racial attitude towards the freedom of the black majority population in that country, we in the ACP are vehemently opposed to any contact with that regime, until they resolve their differences face to face with the majority population of that country, that is, the freedom fighters.

ACP and EC must campaign vigorously for the exclusion for all time of the apartheid regime from participating in these assemblies.

The racist apartheid South Africa is the single factor that has for a long time now disturbed the politico-socio-economic development of the Sub-Saharan region. It has militarily made certain that there is no peace in the whole of this region by her acts of aggression, destabilization, disinformation, psychological warfare and hot-pursuits of self-made guerrillas into neighbouring states.

Violation of human rights is a daily affair in apartheid South Africa. Until that regime ceases these abhorrent acts and starts working for majority black rule this assembly must never allow them the golden opportunity to disinform us. A clear deliberate programme for talks on black majority rule with the legitimate liberation movements' leaders (ANC and PAC for South Africa and SWAPO for Namibia) must be outlined by the racist Botha regime before they seek to talk to the Joint Assembly.

Namibia

Apartheid South Africa continues its illegal occupation of Namibia, and has further installed a puppet regime in Windhoek from among the so-called internal parties. This is a myopic exercise bearing no reference to the suicidal experience of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia 1979 internal settlement.

It should be brought to the minds of the EC that the Frontline States do not support this internal arrangement and that the genuine leaders of the Namibian people, SWAPO, will continue to wage the war against racist South African troops occupying Namibia until genuine independence is achieved. The application of economic pressure on the South African Government is again, necessary to bring about a solution to the Namibian problem, and thus, the EC and indeed the whole international community, should be discouraged from observing the internal arrangement in Namibia. The implementation of United Nations resolution 435 is evidently far from the mind of the South African racist government.

The problem of the Frontline States and the SADCC Region

Amidst internal revolt from the masses of apartheid South Africa, the racist regime, I reiterate, has continually invaded and murdered in Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland and continues to train, arm and control murderous

bandits in Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique. Its troops have violated the sovereignty of its neighbours time and again and the regime continues its destabilization campaign in the SADCC region. In short, South Africa practises state terrorism on a scale not matched by any other country.

It is indeed startlingly surprising, therefore, to note the stance being taken by the international community in matters relating to bringing about peace and justice in South Africa and the Southern African region as a whole. It is thus offensive to learn from the EC, as was the case at the ACP/EC Joint Assembly in Inverness, that although the black people of South Africa are worse off politically than those in other African countries, they are materially better off than their counterparts. This can only come from those who have vested interests in the maintenance of apartheid. I can only hope that there are not many among us nursing serious guilty consciences because their comfort and welfare is derived from the upholding of apartheid in racist Pretoria.

Time and again, the Frontline States have called for punitive measures to be taken against the Pretoria regime but the cautiousness with which this is being done leaves a lot to be desired, especially when the developed countries claim to be champions on human rights. Granted, in the short-term the countries in the Southern Africa region would suffer from the effect of economic sanctions and other punitive measures against South Africa, but these short-term effects are worth sacrificing for the future wellbeing of the masses of South Africa and the region as a whole.

In the context of SADCC, aid and other economic factors could be brought into play in order for the SADCC countries to rely less and less on South Africa until that country becomes independent. This means billions of dollars investment which EC is capable of granting if only it had the will to do so.

For example, in the context of the Lomé III Convention, some chapters of which stress the need for self-reliance and sustenance of individual ACP States, the EC should help a lot by *improving the conditions of access for products from the SADCC region into the EC market*, thus ensuring economic growth which would bring about the diversification of industry in these countries and thus creating a buffer system against the effects of applying punitive measures against racist Pretoria.

Further, with greater financial and technical help from the EC, the Frontline States and SADCC could open up viable trading routes which would lessen the dependence of those countries on South Africa's transport network and sea ports.

In Zimbabwe, the flow of trade (both on imports and exports) has been greatly affected by the aggressive policy of South Africa towards neighbouring Mozambique and her continued support for MNR bandits who continually attack railway lines to Maputo and also some other forms of transport which move through Mozambique. This is a deliberate attempt by the

Botha regime to divert trading routes from Mozambique to South Africa itself, thus making Zimbabwe depend more and more on that country.

It should also be brought to the attention of EC and the international community as a whole that a huge sum of money is being channelled, by the Frontline States, into defence operations aimed against South Africa's invasions and support for bandit activities. For instance, since 1975, Angola alone has spent more than \$11 billion in operations aimed at countering South Africa's invasions of that country. This money could have gone to better social use in developing that country's economy.

The problems of indebtedness in ACP countries

Aid flows have played a principal role in ACP developing countries in expanding financial facilities and in dealing with the peculiar hardships that confront these states. However, these same aid flows have in general failed to respond adequately to the greatly enlarged requirements.

The ACP States and indeed most developing countries borrowed on the world money markets on the expectation that the economy, and in particular the exports market would rapidly grow. But this has not been the case. Thus those who had hoped to bring about rapid improvements in their external balances through increased investment and expanded volume of exports have had their hopes dashed. Debts have accumulated to the extent that reborrowing is becoming a critical problem.

Price movements of internationally traded goods are the prime cause of pressures on developing states' accounts. The collapse of commodity prices in the 1980s led to a terrible loss in export earnings by commodity exporters. The long and severe recession in the developed market-economy have also contributed immensely to the deterioration in the debt-servicing problems. The ability of developing countries to make the correct responses has depended to a considerable degree, *inter-alia*, on the export opportunities afforded to them.

Thus, in the Lomé III Convention, great service could be rendered to the ACP countries' indebtedness by reducing the protective barriers in the EC market for ACP products, which would bring about an increase in the exports to that market. Of particular interest in this case is the sugar issue which has been worrying members of the ACP Sugar Group. The ACP Sugar Group has been continually seeking better access for its raw sugar to the Community market as well as a reasonable, non-discriminatory increase on the guaranteed prices for the 1985/1986 delivery. Further, during the accession negotiations between Portugal and the other 10 member states of the EC, the ACP asked for an increase in its global sugar quota.

But no positive move can be seen from our economic partners. What we received are some 70 000 tonnes to be sold to the Community market at world prices. This is clearly a breach of the spirit embodied in the Lomé III

Convention which is to the effect that partners should not ignore nor abet the undermining of the Convention.

These policy initiatives can never work for a noticeable and quick recovery of the developing economies. There seems to be a paralysis of will rooted in a deep-seated reluctance to entertain any possibility of subordinating national self-interests to the new economic order. Such practices will not and can never ensure developing countries an economic environment full of hope and promise, which enables them to resolve their problems.

They totally ignore the obvious fact that solutions to world economic ills depend on both the developed and developing economies' recognition of the *mutual interest between them*.

Both must initiate an imaginative economic programme that will lead to the survival of the human race. The EC has the capacity to do just that. What it lacks is a determined WILL to act positively. Let us all hope and pray that they will have that will and act soon so that mankind can survive.

Text supplied by Department of Information, P O Box 8150, Causeway, Harare.

Southern Africa

Frontline States and European Community Meeting in Lusaka, Zambia. Ministerial Joint Communiqué on Southern Africa: 4 February 1986

1. The Foreign Ministers of the Frontline States and those of the Member States of the European Community as well as a member of the Commission of the European Community met in Lusaka, Zambia on 3 and 4 February 1986 to consider the situation in Southern Africa.
2. The meeting was held in an atmosphere of cordiality and complete trust and understanding.
3. The ministers examined the general situation prevailing in the sub-region. In particular, they reviewed recent developments and the current situation in South Africa and discussed such issues as the policies to be followed vis-à-vis South Africa aimed at contributing to the abolition of apartheid and thereby facilitating a peaceful solution in South Africa: the relations between the Republic of South Africa and other states in the region: and the question of the independence of Namibia.
4. Regarding South Africa, the ministers deplored the violence and the progressively deteriorating situation inside that country resulting in the continuing loss of life and destruction of property. They attributed this state of affairs to the existence and entrenchment of the immoral policy of apartheid and the refusal by the South African Government to abolish that system to pave the way for negotiations with all its citizens regarding the future of that country.
5. The ministers regarded South Africa's policy of apartheid as a violation of the fundamental human rights laid down in the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. In this regard, they reaffirmed their unqualified condemnation of apartheid and called for its total elimination in the interest of peace and stability in Southern Africa.
6. In order to ameliorate the situation inside South Africa, the ministers called on the Government of the Republic of South Africa to declare categorically that apartheid will be dismantled completely: To end the state of emergency: and to initiate a dialogue with the genuine representatives of those South Africans now excluded from the present government structure on the future of that country. As a necessary step, they appealed to the South African Government to release unconditionally all political prisoners and detainees, includ-

ing Nelson Mandela, to facilitate the process of negotiations. In this regard, they also urged the Government of South Africa to lift the ban on the African National Congress of South Africa, Pan Africanist Congress of Azania and other political parties so as to create an atmosphere conducive to the desired political dialogue. Furthermore, the ministers welcomed the creation of a group of eminent persons by the recent summit of the Commonwealth aimed at promoting a dialogue in South Africa and urged the Government of South Africa to cooperate with the group.

7. Concerning the policies to be followed vis-à-vis the Republic of South Africa aimed at contributing to the abolition of apartheid, the ministers considered a wide range of options. They stressed the importance of continuing international pressure on the Government of South Africa to bring about the abolition of apartheid through peaceful means, in the interest of peace and stability in South Africa itself and in the region.

8. They agreed that the measures against South Africa announced by the EC, the Commonwealth, the Nordic countries, The United States of America and other governments and organizations are very important. In the event that all these various measures fail to achieve the desired results, the ministers agreed that further measures should be considered.

9. Regarding relations between the Republic of South Africa and other Southern African states, they noted that the dismantling of apartheid would significantly contribute to the peaceful co-existence of all the states in the region. The ministers condemned the military acts of aggression and destabilization perpetrated by South Africa against the neighbouring states in the region. In this connection they demanded the complete withdrawal of all South African troops from Angola. They deplored the loss of human life and destruction of property resulting from these actions on the part of South Africa. They recognized the fact that these actions cannot bring peace to the region; on the contrary, they endanger the peace and stability of the region.

10. The ministers equally condemned South Africa's policy of destabilization in all its manifestations, including the use of any direct or indirect armed actions in neighbouring states, in particular Angola and Mozambique. In this regard they agreed to deny perpetrators of such actions any assistance or support.

11. In relation to Namibia, the ministers condemned South Africa's continuing illegal occupation of that international territory and the stalemate in efforts aimed at securing its independence within the framework of the United Nations Independence Plan for Namibia. In this connection, they reaffirmed the centrality and relevance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), which to date represents the only valid basis for a peaceful solution to the question of the independence of Namibia. They called for the implementation of this resolution without further delay. In this connection, the ministers rejected attempts to delay Namibia's independence by linking it to

the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

12. In this connection, the ministers considered as null and void the so-called interim administration in Namibia which was set up contrary to Resolution 435, and appealed to all countries to desist from giving it any form of assistance.

13. The ministers reaffirmed the commitment of their respective countries to work towards the abolition of apartheid in South Africa and to promote efforts aimed at bringing about independence for Namibia.

14. The ministers expressed their thanks and appreciation to the government and the people of Zambia for hosting the meeting and for the warm hospitality accorded to them during their stay in Lusaka.

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