

DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE
THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS



Southern
Africa **Record**

Number 56

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Compiler: Alan Begg

Published by the South African Institute of International Affairs at Jan Smuts House, PO Box 31596, Braamfontein 2017, South Africa.

Four issues per year. 1990 subscription rate R27,00 per annum (South Africa). R37,00 overseas (surface mail), R60,00 overseas (airmail).
Price per copy R7,00 (plus postage for overseas airmail).

Uitgegee deur die Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut vir Internasionale Aangeleenthede by Jan Smuts-Huis, Posbus 31596, Braamfontein 2017, Suid-Afrika.

Vier uitgawes per jaar. 1990 intekengeld R27,00 per jaar (Suid-Afrika). R37,00 buiteland (land pos), R60,00 buiteland (lugpos).
Prys per eksemplaar R7,00 (plus posgeld vir buitelandse lugpos).

ISSN: 0377 5445

SOUTHERN AFRICA RECORD
Number Fifty-six, 1989

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SOUTH AFRICA, NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA

TEXTS OF SUNDRY RESOLUTIONS AND A DECREE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
PERTAINING TO ANGOLA AND NAMIBIA

January/February 1989

UN Security Council Resolution 628 (16 January 1989)

The Security Council,

Recalling its Resolution 626 (1988) of 20 December 1988, taking note of the tripartite agreement signed by the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba and the Republic of South Africa on 22 December 1988 (S/20346), taking also note of the bilateral agreement between the People's Republic of Angola and Republic of Cuba, signed on 22 December 1988 (S/20345), emphasizing the importance of these two agreements in strengthening international peace and security.

1. Welcomes the signature of the tripartite agreement between the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba and the Republic of South Africa on the one hand, and of the bilateral agreement between the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba on the other hand,
2. Expresses its full support for these agreements and to that effect decides to follow closely the developments in their implementations,
3. Calls upon all parties concerned, as well as all member states, to co-operate in the implementation of these agreements,
4. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully informed on the implementation of this resolution.

UN Security Council Resolution 629 (16 January 1989)

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its relevant resolutions, in particular Resolution 431 (1978) of 27 July 1978 and 435 (1978) of 29 September 1978, taking note of its Resolution 628 (198) of 16 January 1989, noting that the parties to the Protocol of Brazzaville, contained in document S/20325 of 14 December 1988, agreed to recommend to the Secretary General that 1 April 1989 be established as the date for the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978),

Recognizing the progress in the south-western African peace process, expressing concern at the increase in the police and para-military forces

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and the establishment of South West Africa territory force since 1978 and stressing the need to ensure conditions under which the Namibian people will be able to participate in free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations, noting also that these developments make appropriate re-examination of the requirements for UNTAG effectively to fulfil its mandate which include, inter alia, keeping borders under surveillance, preventing infiltration, preventing intimidation, and ensuring the safe return of refugees and their free participation in the electoral process; recalling the approval by the Security Council of the Secretary General's statement on 28 September to the Security Council (S/12869),

Emphasizing its determination to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations, in accordance with its Resolution 435 (1978) of 29 September 1978, reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia,

1. Decides that 1 April 1989 shall be the date on which implementation of Resolution 435 (1978) will begin,
2. Requests the Secretary-General to proceed to arrange a formal ceasefire between SWAPO and South Africa,
3. Reaffirms the responsibility of all concerned to co-operate to ensure the impartial implementation of the settlement plan in accordance with Resolution 435 (1978),
4. Calls upon South Africa to reduce immediately and substantially the existing police forces in Namibia with a view to achieving reasonable balance between these forces and UNTAG so as to ensure effective monitoring by the latter,
5. Requests the Secretary General to prepare at his earliest possible date a report to the Council on the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978), taking into account all relevant developments since the adoption of that resolution,
6. Requests also the Secretary General, in preparing his report, to re-examine requirements necessary for UNTAG in order to identify wherever possible tangible cost-saving measures without prejudice to his ability fully to carry out its mandate as established in 1978, namely, to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations,

7. Calls upon members of the United Nations to consider, in co-ordination with the Secretary-General, how they might provide economic and financial assistance to the Namibian people, both during the transitional period and after independence.

UN Security Council Resolution 632, 16 February 1989

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its Relevant Resolutions, in particular, Resolution 431 (1978) of July 1978, 435 (1978) of 29 September 1978 and also 629 (1989) of 16 January 1989,

Confirming its decision contained in paragraph 1 of Resolution 629 (1989) of 16 January 1989 that 1 April 1989 shall be the date on which implementation of Resolution 435 (1978) will begin.

Having considered the report submitted by the Secretary-General (S/20412) and his explanatory statement of 9 February 1989 (S/20457),

Taking into account the assurances given to the Secretary-General by all its Members as contained in paragraph 5 of his explanatory statement (S/20457),

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia until independence,

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General (S/20412) and his explanatory statement (S/20457) for the implementation of the United Nations Plan for Namibia,
2. Decides to implement its Resolution 435 (1978) in its original and definite form to ensure conditions in Namibia which will allow the Namibian people to participate freely and without intimidation in the electoral process under the supervision and control of the United Nations,
3. Expresses its full support for and co-operation with the Secretary-General in carrying out the mandate entrusted to him by the Security Council under its resolution 435 (1978),
4. Calls upon all parties concerned to honour their commitments to the United Nations Plan and to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in the implementation of the present resolution,
5. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully informed on the implementation of the present resolution.

Appendix

Decree No. 1

For the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia

Conscious of its responsibility to protect the natural resources of the people of Namibia and of ensuring that these natural resources are not exploited to the detriment of Namibia, its people or environmental assets, the United Nations Council for Namibia enacts the following decree:

Decree

The United Nations Council for Namibia,
Recognizing that in the terms of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 the Territory of Namibia (formerly South West Africa) is the direct responsibility of the United Nations,

Accepting that this responsibility includes the obligation to support the right of the people of Namibia to achieve self-government and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

Reaffirming that the Government of the Republic of South Africa is in illegal possession of the Territory of Namibia,

Furthering the decision of the General Assembly in resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 which declared the right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources,

Noting that the Government of the Republic of South Africa has usurped and interfered with these rights,

Desirous of securing for the people of Namibia adequate protection of the natural wealth and resources of the Territory which is rightfully theirs,

Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971,

Acting in terms of the powers conferred on it by General Assembly Resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967 and all other relevant resolutions and decisions regarding Namibia,

Decrees that

1. No person or entity, whether a body corporate or unincorporated, may search for, prospect for, explore for, take, extract, mine, process

refine, use, sell, export, or distribute any natural resources, whether animal or mineral, situated or found to be situated within the territorial limits of Namibia without the consent and permission of the United Nations Council for Namibia or any person authorized to act on its behalf for the purpose of giving such permission or such consent;

2. Any permission, concession or licence for all or any of the purposes specified in paragraph 1 above whensoever granted by any person or entity, including any body purporting to act under the authority of the Government of the Republic of South Africa or the "Administration of South West Africa" or their predecessors, is null, void and of no force or effect;
3. No animal resource, mineral, or other natural resource produced in or emanating from the Territory of Namibia may be taken from the said Territory by any means whatsoever to any place whatsoever outside the territorial limits of Namibia by any person or body, whether corporate or unincorporated, without the consent and permission of the United Nations Council for Namibia or of any person authorized to act on behalf of the said Council;
4. Any animal, mineral or other natural resources produced in or emanating from the Territory of Namibia which shall be taken from the said Territory without the consent and written authority of the United Nations Council for Namibia or of any person authorized to act on behalf of the said Council may be seized and shall be forfeited to the benefit of the said Council and held in trust by them for the benefit of the people of Namibia;
5. Any vehicle, ship or container found to be carrying animals, mineral or other natural resources produced in or emanating from the Territory of Namibia shall also be subject to seizure and forfeiture by or on behalf of the United Nations Council for Namibia and shall be forfeited to the benefit of the said Council and held in trust by them for the benefit of the people of Namibia;
6. Any person, entity or corporation which contravenes the present decree in respect of Namibia may be held liable in damages by the future Government of an independent Namibia;
7. For the purposes of the preceding paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 and in order to give effect to this decree, the United Nations Council for Namibia hereby authorizes the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, in accordance with resolution 2248 (S-V) to take the necessary steps after consultations with the President.

The foregoing is the text of the Decree adopted by the United Nations Council for Namibia at its 209th meeting on 27 September 1974 and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its 29th Session on 13 December 1974.

CORRESPONDENCE FROM THE SA MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UN ON ANGOLAN/NAMIBIAN BORDER VIOLATIONS BY SWAPO
March/April 1989

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Cape Town
2 April 1989

Excellency,

With reference to our telephone conversation of 1 April 1989 I have to inform you that a grave situation has arisen on the Northern Border of South West Africa/Namibia as a result of continued and escalating violation by SWAPO of the agreements signed in New York on 22 December 1988 by the People's Republic of Angola, Republic of Cuba and the Republic of South Africa.

The incontrovertible facts are:

1. During the night of 31 March 1989 and on 1 April 1989 an estimated 600-800 SWAPO elements crossed the border from Angola into Namibia. This figure could be as high as 1 000. They are heavily armed, with AK-47 semi-automatic rifles, mortars and even ground to air missiles. These elements entered the territory in their uniforms.
2. On the basis of information obtained from those captured SWAPO elements were ordered to cross the border into South West Africa/Namibia in uniform and under arms, inter alia in order to establish bases in Namibia. They claim that their Commanding Officers informed them that, as a cease-fire was in existence they need not fear resistance. Should resistance be encountered the United Nations would take care of them. Reliable information indicates that between four thousand and five thousand SWAPO elements are presently below latitude 16°S.

Mr Secretary-General, this inexplicable action on the part of SWAPO constitutes a clear violation of agreements reached between South Africa, Cuba and Angola. These agreements were endorsed by the Security Council. We are clearly dealing with a situation where SWAPO is flouting those agreements and is defying the Security Council.

In addition, SWAPO has of course violated the written undertaking it gave to you to cease all hostilities as of 1 April 1989.

I trust you will agree that this is an intolerable situation. The Republic of South Africa has acted strictly in terms of its commitments and will continue to do so.

It is significant, Mr Secretary-General, that at the time of writing no statement has been made by the leadership of SWAPO on this cynical disregard of its obligation to you, the Security Council and the international community at large.

One cannot help feeling compassion for such unnecessary carnage of SWAPO elements who could have re-entered Namibia quite legally to participate peacefully in the political process, according to the agreed procedures of which they had obviously not been informed. The leadership of SWAPO will have to account for their callous disregard for human life and contempt for international agreements. They will have to explain their action and its dire consequences to the people of Namibia. SWAPO's leadership should urgently be brought to its senses.

As you are aware SWAPO was required by this time to have all its personnel confined to bases north of latitude 16°S. These bases should in terms of agreement be monitored by UNTAG.

I should be grateful to learn whether UNTAG is, in fact, monitoring such bases and to enquire whether the monitoring reports could be made available to me.

The Administrator-General will continue to act in concert with your Special Representative regarding the steps considered necessary to deal with the situation. I was in the territory on 31 March and 1 April 1989 where I met with your Special Representative and his staff. I have a deep understanding of the onerous task assigned to them, particularly at this time of such threatening crisis.

I trust Mr Secretary-General that you and the Security Council will make it possible for my Government to continue to co-operate and fulfil its commitments in terms of the agreements. I appeal to you and to the Security Council to take a firm and clear stand on this act of defiance by SWAPO.

Please accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

R F Botha
Minister of Foreign Affairs

H E Mr Javier Perez de Cuellar
Secretary-General

Minister of Foreign Affairs
4 April 1989

Dear Mr Secretary-General

With reference to my letter to you of 2 April 1989, I regret to inform you that I have now received further disconcerting evidence to the effect that

- Over 1 000 SWAPO (PLAN) forces have now infiltrated into Namibia;
- over the period 21 to 30 March 1989, SWAPO forces of the First Mechanised Brigade redeployed from Lubango to locations at Xangongo and Techipa (ie from 300 kilometers north of the Namibia/Angola border to approximately 70 and 50 kilometers from the border, respectively);
- SWAPO tank elements were moved from Luanda to the border area during the same period to be deployed for offensive action into Namibia;
- approximately 4 450 SWAPO forces are now deployed south of the 16th parallel;
- two mixed PLAN/Cuban semi-conventional battalions of a strength of 450 each are positioned 600 metres north of Beacon 12 on the border and at Ongiva airfield respectively;
- SWAPO elements inside Namibia are in continuous radio contact with their command posts in Angola.

It is my duty to bring to your attention that unless active and effective measures are taken to stem the rapid deterioration of the situation, the whole peace process in Namibia is in danger of collapse.

The President of the Security Council, Ambassador A Belanogov, yesterday stated inter alia -

"In my view, the interests of independence of Namibia require full co-operation of the parties with the Secretary-General and his Special Representative and scrupulous respect for the agreements relating to the settlement plan".

There can be no doubt as to what the agreements referred to by Ambassador Belanogov, and endorsed by the Security Council, require of each of the parties. What are the obligations undertaken by SWAPO under these agreements?

- On 12 August 1988, the President of SWAPO informed you by letter that SWAPO had agreed to comply with the commencement of the cessation of

all hostile acts, in accordance with the Geneva agreement. He also stated that SWAPO would be ready to abide by that agreement until the formal cease-fire under resolution 435 (1978). (Paragraph 10 of your report S/20412 of 23 January 1989 to the Security Council).

- Paragraph 5 of the Geneva agreement referred to provides that Angola and Cuba "shall use their good offices so that once the total withdrawal of South African troops from Angola is completed, and within the context also of the cessation of hostilities in Namibia, SWAPO's forces will be deployed to the north of the 16th parallel".
- Various of the relevant agreements affirm the principle of abstention from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of states.
- On 18 March 1989, in a letter to you, the President of SWAPO confirmed SWAPO's agreement to abide by the cease-fire from 1 April 1989 and reconfirmed SWAPO's acceptance of the de facto cessation of hostilities "in and around Namibia between South Africa and SWAPO, in accordance with the Geneva Protocol of 5 August 1988".

Since the above obligations were endorsed by the Security Council, the South African Government would be grateful if you would as soon as possible confirm that the Council is willing to do everything in its power to secure SWAPO's compliance with them. If not, must the South African Government assume that the Council is now of the opinion that SWAPO is no longer bound by its obligations?

The facts of the developments over the past three days speak for themselves. Heavily armed SWAPO personnel crossed the Namibian/Angolan border in large numbers on 1 April 1989. They carried with them not only semi-automatic rifles but also mortars, anti-tank weapons and ground-to-air missiles. On their own evidence they were instructed to enter Namibia and establish bases inside the territory. These facts are borne out by the report of the Special Representative.

You will realize, Sir, that the South African Government cannot be expected to implement its undertakings under the relevant agreements while SWAPO continues to act in flagrant violation of the provisions of those agreements with the acquiescence, tacit or otherwise, of the Security Council. In such circumstances South Africa has the undoubted right to suspend its compliance with its obligations. If, on the other hand, it is alleged that South Africa is in breach of its own obligations under the agreements, I shall be glad to learn which they are and how they have been breached.

In conclusion, SWAPO must now face up to the realities. Effective and immediate steps must be taken to ensure its compliance with all its

obligations. Otherwise, in the exercise of its rights, the South African Government will have no option but to consider its reciprocal obligations suspended until such time as UNTAG is in a position to ensure SWAPO's scrupulous observance of the provisions of the relevant agreements.

Please accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

R F BOTHA

Minister of Foreign Affairs
5 April 1989

Dear Mr Secretary-General

Further to my letter of 4 April 1989 I wish to inform you that the South African Government feels encouraged by the firm and positive reaction of various Governments endorsing the provisions of the Geneva Protocol including the obligation on SWAPO to remain north of latitude 16°S in terms of paragraph 5 of the Protocol.

I would like to repeat my urgent appeal to you to bring influence to bear on the SWAPO leadership to cease the senseless course on which it is embarked. The SWAPO leadership must be persuaded to immediately call a halt to the continuing illegal armed incursions of its members into Namibia which is the cause of the needless human carnage taking place at the moment. I have been informed that a further 300 SWAPO armed personnel crossed the border from Angola last night. A captive today disclosed to the Police that he was on the border on 3 April 1989 with his group awaiting instructions. They received orders by radio to cross the border on the same day.

In an effort to relieve the situation, the South African Government has requested the Administrator-General to broadcast a message to the northern region of the Territory. His message will contain an appeal to the infiltrators to surrender and to lay down their arms or to withdraw northwards to Angola. He will explain that it is unnecessary to return to their own country to die in this way when they could return to vote and to live in their land in a peaceful way as provided for in agreements to which SWAPO has subscribed. *Whoever gave the order for SWAPO members to infiltrate into Namibia in uniform and heavily armed to establish bases and caches of arms, misled them as this action is in violation of the agreements for a peaceful settlement reached by Angola, Cuba and South Africa which were endorsed by the United Nations and accepted by SWAPO.*

The message will add that the decision to return in peace and to work for progress in Namibia is in the hands of the people of Namibia. SWAPO

members who lay down their arms in peace will be given a guarantee that no steps will be taken against them and they will be given safe conduct to assembly points under UNTAG supervision from where they can be transported safely to suitable points north of latitude 16°S with the cooperation of the Angolan authorities. Further, SWAPO members who wish to return northwards into Angola, are assured that the Namibian Police Force will not pursue them.

This appeal will also be broadcast by the Administrator-General on television. The radio broadcast will be repeated at regular intervals for the next week or more. It would be helpful if the United Nations as well as all Government members of the United Nations could assist in this effort to save human lives.

Please accept, Mr Secretary-General, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely

R F BOTHA

Minister of Foreign Affairs
7 April 1989

Dear Mr Secretary-General

I wish to refer to my letters to you of 2, 4 and 5 April 1989. I arrived in Windhoek some 5 hours ago and on the basis of a briefing on the latest developments in the northern part of Namibia, it is with great dismay that I must report to you that the situation has further deteriorated.

I attach the latest information supplied to me as well as to your Special Representative and to General Prem Chand. Even if all the information cannot as yet be confirmed conclusively, I am satisfied that on the basis of that information which can be confirmed, the general pattern of developments since 1 April 1989 is persisting, namely that continued orchestrated SWAPO incursions into Namibia from Angola are still occurring. The groups are in uniform. They are heavily armed with lethal weapons of war including semi-automatic rifles, anti-tank rocket launchers, mortars and surface to air missiles.

It is manifestly preposterous to suggest that this amounts to peaceful regrouping.

Mr Secretary-General, what is beyond dispute is that:

- (a) SWAPO undertook to be confined to bases north of latitude 16 degrees South at least from 1 April 1989 where they would be monitored by UNTAG;
- (b) SWAPO is not confined to base in Angola north of latitude 16 degrees South and is not being monitored by UNTAG;
- (c) SWAPO is accordingly violating the following obligations:
 - (i) It is not confined to bases north of latitude 16 degrees South.
 - (ii) Its forces are in areas in Angola south of latitude 16 degrees South.
 - (iii) It has crossed, and continues to cross, the border into Namibia under arms.

SWAPO commanders are regularly in radio contact with the groups which are still in Angola and also those that have already crossed the border. The SWAPO leadership need only issue an instruction to its commanders that SWAPO lay down its arms and return to Angola. Instead of doing this, the SWAPO leadership encourages more SWAPO groups to flout the authority of the Security Council.

There is at this moment one SWAPO group heading for farming districts south of Owamboland.

On my arrival in Windhoek the Chief of the South-West Africa Police appealed to me to urge you to ensure that you and the members of the Security Council are apprised of the seriousness of the situation. He has asked me to invite the Security Council to despatch immediately a fact-finding mission which can accompany the police in order to verify the situation on the ground. The Chief of Police has requested the Administrator-General and Mr Ahtisaari for minimum additional assistance required to counter the growing threat of SWAPO incursions and to relieve forces which have been operationally engaged for almost a week. He assured me that any action taken will be carried out in terms of the injunction of the President or the Security Council that maximum restraint be exercised.

As you know, Mr Ahtisaari and General Prem Chand are simply not in a position to supply the additional assistance and the Administrator-General has accordingly, in the exercise of his responsibility to ensure law and order in the Territory, agreed that the Chief of Police may call upon such resources as he may reasonably require from immediately available security forces.

As regards the farming districts in the far northern area mentioned earlier, the district civil guard units have now been reactivated to ward

off possible attacks on the population on isolated farms by the SWAPO group heading in that direction.

SWAPO incursions are assuming such proportions that in the words of General Prem Chand, no UN force would have been able to handle the situation in any event. Although the South African Government appealed to you and the Security Council to speed up the arrival of the full component of UNTAG, this has not happened. I must inform you that unless the Security Council takes steps to stem the SWAPO incursions, the contingents of UNTAG will be *incapable of monitoring the restriction of SWAPO troops to base in Angola and Zambia, of keeping the borders under surveillance or of preventing infiltration.*

While I stress the necessity for expediting the despatch of UNTAG forces, I am aware of the danger of creating the impression that a larger UN presence in the Territory would provide a solution. I do not believe that UNTAG contingents alone could prevent further infiltration and, as necessary as it might be, it would be undesirable to raise expectations only to have them subsequently frustrated. This might further delay implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 in all its aspects.

The root cause must be addressed and you, Mr Secretary-General, and the Security Council know what this is. I assure you that the South African Government, for its part, remains committed to UN Security Council Resolution 435, the Trilateral Agreement of 22 December 1988 and all commitments we undertook in various other agreements and undertakings enumerated in your report of 23 January 1989.

I am sure that if requested, General Prem Chand would confirm that South Africa has fully complied with its commitments as of 1 April 1989, on which date SWAPO commenced violation of all the obligations undertaken by its leaders. SWAPO had no military bases in Namibia on 1 April 1989.

There is only one solution: SWAPO must undertake to implement its obligations. South Africa remains prepared to comply scrupulously with its obligations.

A meeting of the Joint Commission consisting of representatives from Angola, Cuba and South Africa is scheduled to take place tomorrow in Namibia with observers present from the USA and the USSR. We shall endeavour on our part to consider what practical steps might be taken to save the peace plan signed in New York on 22 December 1988. We shall let you know of any developments which may result from our meeting.

In the meantime, please ensure that the Security Council is informed of any appeal that pressure be brought to bear on the SWAPO leadership to give the

necessary instruction to its commanders to end their illegal operations immediately. There is simply no other practical way to stop the senseless killing of people.

In terms of the settlement plan, SWAPO members can of course return to their country anyway to participate peacefully in the democratic determination of their future.

I would be grateful if this letter, together with my previous communications mentioned above, could be circulated as documents of the Security Council.

Please accept, Mr Secretary-General, the assurances of my highest consideration and esteem.

R F BOTHA
WINDHOEK

Situation Regarding the SWAPO Infiltration: 070800B Apr 89

1. Total Strength

Latest Intelligence Reports which have not all been confirmed indicated that between 1 800 and 1 900 SWAPO have infiltrated to date of which approximately 350 infiltrated in the past 24 hours.

2. Distribution

The infiltrators are distributed in groups as follows:

- a. **Kaokoland** ± 350
- b. **Western Owambo** ± 450
- c. **Central Owambo** ± 600 (Includes the latest infiltration of 200 at St Mary's Mission.)
- d. **Eastern Owambo** ± 500 (Includes a group of 100 which is reported to be on their way to the Northern Farming Areas.)

3. Groups Not Yet In

- a. **Ruacana Area.** Information received indicates a group of ± 150 SWAPO North of Beacon 3 has the intention of attacking Ruacana. the presence is confirmed.
- b. **Namacunde/Oshikango Area.** Various unconfirmed reports were received of a mixed PLAN/Cuban Battalion which redeployed from Ongiva to the Oshikango area. The battalion has tanks and artil-

lery. Although tanks have been spotted, it could not yet be confirmed whether it belongs to this Unit. This matter had previously been raised at the Joint Military Monitoring Commission and was not denied by either Cuba or Angola. Cuba has subsequently indicated that it no longer acts jointly with SWAPO.

- c. **Central Owambo.** A group of 50 heavily armed SWAPO was reported 6 km North of the border by 08h00 on 6 April 1989. Other reports of SWAPO groups in the Chiede/Oshikango areas could not be confirmed, but reports from different sources will probably confirm this presence.
- d. **Eastern Owambo.** At various locations ranging from as near as 1 km to 13 km North of the border SWAPO groups have been reported (and some already confirmed). Total strength could be as high as 500.
- e. **Caprivi.** Several reports have been received in the last 48 hours that a group of 200 PLAN fighters have been moved to Sesheke (Zambia) just North of Katima Mulilo and that this group is ready to infiltrate the Caprivi.

4. The Present Situation as Compared to 04 April 1989

The latest infiltration into Kaokoland means that the distance over which the infiltration is taking place is now more than 500 km.

- a. **Western Owambo.** The strength of SWAPO in this area has increased by 350. The group that infiltrated at Swartbooisdrift intends to move to the Opuwa area in order to maintain a presence in the Kaokoland. SWAPO groups of 150 at Beacon 3 and 300-450 North of Beacon 12 pose a threat.
- b. **Central Owambo**
 - i. A battalion supported by tanks in Namacunde/Oshikango area have an offensive capability and poses a direct threat to Central Owambo.
 - ii. The heavily armed SWAPO groups as well as the SWAPO group which infiltrated at St Mary's Mission is an indication that SWAPO have increased force levels in Central Owambo.
 - iii. Actions by SWAPO groups indicate offensive aggressive actions. Examples are the laying of deliberate ambushes (which include trench systems) and firing at aircraft and casevac helicopters.
- c. **Eastern Owambo.** The SWAPO groups which have infiltrated to areas South of the Oshakati-Oshivello road have not yet been located due

to the limited number of Security Forces available. These groups are a direct threat to the farming areas South of the Operational Area. Due to the terrain vegetation and the sparse population these groups may be further South than is presently appreciated.

5. Despite the repeated calls for the maintenance of the cease-fire by several countries, SWAPO (PLAN) continues to increase force levels inside Namibia. The redeployment of the semi-conventional Battalions and the Mechanised Brigades (unconfirmed) to the border areas are a further indication that SWAPO does not only intend establishing bases in Namibia. There has been no indication to date of any Northward movement of groups. Members of the population have reported that SWAPO in Owambo have said the following:
 - a. SWAPO intends occupying Owambo. SWAPO will then fight to free the whole of Namibia.
 - b. SWAPO waited until implementation of Resolution 435 because the South African Defence Force would have withdrawn.
 - c. SWAPO (PLAN) will not return to Angola. They will fight to the end.
 - d. There are still a large number of SWAPO waiting to infiltrate.

Minister of Foreign Affairs
8 April 1989

Dear Mr Secretary-General

I have just had the opportunity to peruse your Statement at the informal consultations of the Security Council on Friday, 7 April 1989.

I have noted with great concern your remark to the effect that you have not received a response from the South African government to your suggestion regarding a cease-fire and the choice which SWAPO would have to return north of latitude 16°S or to remain unarmed in Namibia. In this connection I wish to refer you to a letter of the Administrator-General to your Special Representative dated 5 April 1989. A copy is attached for ease of reference.

The effect of your proposal, and more so that of the Frontline States to which you refer, would be that SWAPO would have completely succeeded in its objective of projecting itself as an intimidatory military force in violation of its obligations in terms of the Geneva Protocol, the Trilateral Agreement of 22 December 1988, the cease-fire as well as the Security

Council Resolution endorsing your report of 23 January 1989.

Mr Secretary-General, surely you and the Security Council would agree that it is indisputable that:

- (a) SWAPO must retire north of latitude 16°S;
- (b) SWAPO must be confined to bases north of latitude 16°S, there to be monitored by UNTAG;
- (c) SWAPO must remain restricted to base for at least 6 weeks;
- (d) SWAPO forces can then be repatriated peacefully under UN supervision through designated entry points between week 6 and week 9 from the date of implementation of UNSCR 435.

Mr Secretary-General, the mere fact that you thought that the South African government might contemplate the proposal you made, came as a personal shock to me. I well remember the day when you met with the State President and myself in Pretoria. On that occasion you personally assured us that you would expect all the parties to comply with UNSCR 435 as well as the subsequent understandings and agreements. By that time Mr Sam Nujoma had already replied to you in his letter of 12 August 1988, in which he accepted the Geneva Protocol.

There can be no doubt that your proposal would amount to a unilateral amendment of the Geneva Protocol, the Trilateral Agreement and of the understandings and agreements reached subsequent to 1978. If you or the Security Council are now of the opinion that there is perhaps a need to renegotiate UNSCR 435, as well as the other agreements, my Government is in principle prepared to consider such a proposal. There are, in fact, elements in UNSCR 435 and in subsequent agreements, which at the time were unpalatable for South Africa.

To avoid any misunderstandings, my Government is not proposing the revision of any agreement. What I wish to convey is that your proposals amount to a proposal for revision.

I wish to make my Government's position very clear. South Africa remains committed to all the obligations undertaken by my Government on condition that all the other parties give the same assurance in regard to their obligations. I wish to stress that it will not be possible to complete the *peace process successfully unless each party complies with its obligations.*

The President of the Security Council made an appeal on 3 April 1989 to all parties to scrupulously respect the agreements relating to the settlement

plan. The South African government respectfully requests you and the Security Council to comply with the President's injunction.

In order for my Government to consider whether it can continue to comply with its commitments I should be grateful to be informed whether the Security Council intends complying with its decision formulated in Resolution 632 of 16 February 1989 endorsing the peace plan and all its components.

Please accept, Mr Secretary-General, the assurances of my highest consideration.

R F BOTHA
MOUNT ETJO

THE MOUNT ETJO DECLARATION

Text of the Meeting of the Joint Commission created by the Protocol of Brazzaville held at Mount Etjo, Namibia, on 8-9 April 1989, including statements by Sam Nujoma of SWAPO and the US State Department relevant to the proceedings.

The Joint Commission created by the Protocol of Brazzaville of 13 December 1988, met at Mount Etjo, Namibia, on 8 to 9 April 1989 in an extraordinary session.

Delegations of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba and the Republic of South Africa, parties to the New York accord of 22 December 1988, attended this meeting.

Delegations from the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics participated in their capacity as observers.

- (a) The parties reaffirm their commitment to fulfil the obligations undertaken in the accord of 22 December 1988 for the peaceful resolution of the conflict in the southwestern region of Africa and in conformity with United Nations Security Council Resolution 632 of 16 February 1989.
- (b) In order to facilitate the restoration of peace and to promote the full application of Resolution 435/78 of the Security Council of the United Nations and the subsequent agreements subscribed to by the

parties, as well as the restoration of the situation in existence on 31 March 1989, and taking into account in this regard the declaration by the leadership of SWAPO on 8 April 1989, the parties agree to a package of recommendations which are reflected in the attached annexure.

- (c) The parties urge the Secretary General of the United Nations to urgently adopt all the necessary measures for the most rapid and complete deployment of UNTAG so that it can fully and effectively carry out its mandate. They likewise urge all member states of the United Nations, particularly those who are members of the Security Council, to extend to the Secretary General their full cooperation with the carrying out of UNTAG's tasks.

Mount Etjo
Namibia
9 April 1989

ANNEXURE TO THE MOUNT ETJO DECLARATION

Principles

1. The withdrawal procedure has as its purpose the restoration of the situation in existence on March 31, 1989.
2. The Administrator-General and UNTAG shall verify the departure of SWAPO troops from Namibia.
3. The security and protection of the SWAPO elements and of the security forces in Namibia enjoy the highest level of importance.
4. A period will be established during which SWAPO forces will be granted free passage to the border assembly points and those assembly points south of the border which are contained in the annexure to this document.
5. As of the signing of this document it will be considered that the SWAPO forces will be able to deploy with full safety to the established assembly points.
6. The procedure will be simple and practical to allow its implementation in the shortest time possible.
7. This procedure will be executed under UNTAG supervision.

Sequence

1. The People's Republic of Angola commits itself to receive on its territory the forces of SWAPO which leave Namibia and to ensure that these forces and others on its territory are confined north of latitude 16 degrees S under UNTAG's supervision.
2. As of (9 April 1989) SWAPO troops who are still in the territory of Namibia should present themselves to the border assembly or to the assembly points south of the border herein established, enjoying the right of freedom of passage.
3. All assembly points shall be under UNTAG supervision and shall contain personnel drawn from UNTAG and personnel authorised by the Administrator-General. SWAPO shall utilise the normal chain of command for the communications as well as the broadcast on commercial networks to notify its members of said arrangements.
4. The Joint Military Monitoring Commission shall be temporarily re-activated without Cuban representation, unless requested by both parties, until the situation existing on 31 March 1989 has been re-established.

At the border assembly points which appear in the annexure to this document, joint border posts manned by forces of the PRA and the RSA will be established with the presence of UNTAG to guarantee the control of the crossing of SWAPO forces.

5. The terms of this agreement, the assembly points on the border as well as the assembly points south of the border herein established shall be communicated to SWAPO forces by all means possible.
6. SWAPO forces which turn themselves over to the custody of UNTAG shall lay down their weapons with UNTAG.
7. SWAPO members who present themselves to the assembly points south of the border shall be transferred by air to north of latitude 16 degrees S by UNTAG or by Angola under the supervision of UNTAG.
8. SWAPO members who present themselves to assembly points on the border will be transferred to bases north of latitude 16 degrees S by Angola under the supervision of UNTAG.
9. The Administrator-General and the Special Representative shall be notified as to the number of SWAPO forces which return to the bases north of latitude 16 degrees S from the territory of Namibia.

10. By 15 April 1989, the Special Representative will be informed by SWAPO about the conclusion of the removal of its forces from the territory of Namibia.
11. The end of this process will be based on two essential points:
 - Information provided by SWAPO to the Special Representative upon the conclusion of the removal of its forces from Namibian territory.
 - Joint verification by the Administrator-General and the Special Representative of the exit of all SWAPO forces from Namibian territory.

Once these two conditions are met, the situation existing on 31 March 1989 will be considered to have been restored.

12. Having agreed to the foregoing principles and procedure the three Governments take note of a press release by the SWAPO leadership announcing the withdrawal of SWAPO forces from the northern part of Namibia to Angola. The three Governments recommend that the Administrator-General and the Special Representative of the Secretary General give immediate attention as to how SWAPO's decision can be put into effect within the framework of the agreed withdrawal procedure with a view to ensuring that lives are spared.

Mount Etjo
Namibia

ANNEXURE

Proposed Assembly Points Within Namibia

1. Operette (near Oshivello)
2. Nkongo
3. Eenhana
4. Okankolo
5. Ondangwa
6. Ombalantu
7. Ruacana
8. Opuwa
9. Ehomba
10. Ikangwati

Border Assembly Points

1. Epupa
2. Swartbooisdrif
3. Beacon 1
4. Beacon 7
5. Beacon 14
6. Beacon 19
7. Beacon 25
8. Beacon 34

PRESS STATEMENT BY SAM NUJOMA, PRESIDENT OF SWAPO Luanda, 8 April 1989

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Press,

I am sure that you have been following the tragic and very grave military situation prevailing in Namibia. Over the past week, SWAPO has made several appeals to South Africa and to the UN Secretary General for them to do everything possible within their power to stop the fighting in Namibia. We did this through a number of bilateral and multilateral channels of communications. The Secretary General has put forth a seven point proposal for the immediate restoration of the cease-fire. SWAPO supported by the Frontline States accepted the proposal with one minor amendment. South Africa flatly rejected the proposal out of hand and demanded that SWAPO troops should raise the white flag of surrender and run to Angola.

The origin of the breakdown of the cease-fire lies in differing and contradictory interpretations of the procedures about the implementation of UNSCR 435. I am sure that you all would agree with me that now is not a time to go into the argument regarding such contradictory interpretations. Historians will perform that task. We in the leadership of SWAPO are at the present moment preoccupied with the restoration of the cease-fire in Namibia in order to stop the further loss of lives and destruction of property. We are also extremely concerned to prevent the collapse of the independence process. We believe South Africa needs every pretext to stop Namibia's independence. Therefore although we are very clear in our minds that the UN plan for the independence of Namibia provides very clearly for the confinement of SWAPO troops to assembly points inside Namibia after the cease-fire came into effect, we have decided to make a concession of this issue because we realised that South Africa fears that such assembly points will make SWAPO win the planned UN supervised elections.

The concession which the leadership of SWAPO has come to announce to the world through you is that we have taken a decision to order all PLAN troops inside Namibia to stop fighting, regroup and report to the People's Republic of Angola within 72 hours under the escort of UNTAG. We have come to this difficult decision because we are aware of the historic responsibility that we have to our people and to humanity as a whole.

We have made this concession fully aware that the refusal by South Africa to allow our troops to be confined to base and be monitored by UNTAG inside Namibia is a unilateral abrogation of one of the key provisions of UNSCR 435. We are also aware of the deep feelings and complete determination of our armed cadres inside Namibia to fight and die for their right to be under confinement in their own and only motherland, to the tenacity with which they have been fighting for the last six days is a clear testimony of that deep feeling and commitment. But the leadership of SWAPO has decided to order them to stop fighting and report to the People's Republic of Angola against their wishes because we are convinced that this is in the long-term interest of our nation. SWAPO and the people of Namibia have nothing to gain by further loss of lives and the collapse of the UN independence plan for our country.

The SWAPO leadership is also mindful of the fear that the South African troops have been deliberately butchering the innocent civilian population in the war-affected areas under the cover of fighting SWAPO forces. Whole families have been wiped out. Villages have been heavily bombed by South African jet fighters while ground troops have moved in with orders to shoot anything moving. As a matter of fact, the majority of the SWAPO casualties South Africa is claiming are composed of civilian victims of the South African genocidal onslaught. Therefore, in taking the decision to order our troops to stop fighting and leave the country SWAPO wants to remove the South African pretext to continue their barbarian carnage.

It is our sincere hope that the UN Secretary General will prevail on South Africa to respond positively to this proposal to end the fighting. We hope also that UNTAG will announce without any further delay locations where our combatants should assemble before departing for the People's Republic of Angola with their arms.

We are grateful to the PRA for having agreed to receive our cadres who are now being expelled from their motherland under the UN flag. I thank you.

ANALYSIS BY US STATE DEPARTMENT ON SWAPO ENTITLEMENT TO BASES IN NAMIBIA

The 1978 contact group proposal approved by UNSCR 435 provided for "the restriction of South African and SWAPO armed forces to base". No specific

locations were given for the SWAPO bases. However, the proposal stated that "provision will be made for SWAPO personnel outside the territory to return peacefully to Namibia through *designated entry points* to participate freely in the political process". South Africa categorically rejected any implication that SWAPO bases already existed on Namibian territory and made it crystal clear that the SAG would not/not permit such bases to be established as part of the UN plan. In an attempt to address South African concerns, the Secretary General informed the SAG in March 1979 that SWAPO would not/not "be entitled, after the cease-fire, to introduce personnel who had not previously been based in Namibia to bases which would be established by the United Nations on their behalf. No party to a conflict may expect to gain after a cease-fire a military advantage which it was *unable to obtain prior to it*" (S/13156). In June 1979 the Secretary General informed South Africa that "The Governments of Angola and Zambia have reassured me that no infiltration of armed SWAPO personnel would take place from their territory into Namibia after the cease-fire" (S/14011).

Despite these assurances, South Africa insisted that SWAPO could be confined to bases only outside Namibia and that those bases *would have to* be monitored by UNTAG. This view prevailed: It was agreed in 1982 by SWAPO, the FLS, Nigeria, the contact group, and South Africa "that UNTAG, with the co-operation of host governments and in the context of implementation of resolution 435 (1978), would monitor SWAPO bases in Angola and Zambia" (S/15776). (Note that there are no longer any SWAPO bases in Zambia.) In paragraph 35 of his report of January 23, 1989 (S/20412), the Secretary General stated expressly that this agreement was included in the "United Nations Plan for Namibia". The Security Council, in turn, approved in resolution 632 the Secretary General's Report for the Implementation of this UN Plan. In summary, the UN Plan contemplates no/no SWAPO bases in Namibia either before or after the April 1 implementation date. SWAPO personnel may return to Namibia peacefully through designated entry points under the auspices of the UN. On the other hand, the *infiltration of armed SWAPO personnel* is prohibited.

In the "Protocol of Geneva" signed on August 5, 1988, it was agreed that "Angola and Cuba shall use their good offices so that, once the total withdrawal of South African troops from Angola is completed, and within the context also of the cessation of hostilities in Namibia, SWAPO's forces will be deployed to the north of the 16th parallel". (The Geneva Protocol was reaffirmed expressly in the Brazzaville Protocol of December 13 and implicitly in the Tripartite Agreement of December 22.) As required by the Geneva Protocol, South African troops withdrew from Angola prior to the deadline of September 1. The three parties also maintained in force the existing *de facto* cessation of hostilities. Accordingly, Angola and Cuba are required by the Geneva Protocol to ensure that SWAPO's forces are deployed to the north of the 16th parallel. It is obvious that permitting

the infiltration of SWAPO combatants into Namibia, not to mention supporting the establishment of SWAPO bases there, would be a flagrant violation of this obligation.

Although not a signatory to the Geneva Protocol, SWAPO's President, Sam Nujoma, informed the Secretary General in a letter dated August 12 (S/20129) that SWAPO would comply with the cessation of hostilities agreed by the three parties and that "in accordance with the spirit of the Geneva Agreement" SWAPO had "committed itself to take the necessary steps to help make the peace process in the South West African Region irreversible and successful". In his letter to the Secretary General of March 18, 1989 - in which he agreed to a formal cease-fire with South Africa - Nujoma cited his August 12, 1988 letter, referring specifically to "SWAPO's acceptance of the de facto cessation of armed hostilities ... in accordance with the Geneva Protocol of 5 August 1988". SWAPO cannot now argue in good faith that it is free to act in utter disregard of the Geneva Protocol or otherwise seek changes in the Tripartite Settlement Accords that made implementation of UNSCR 435 possible. (It should be noted that the Geneva Protocol was formally transmitted to the Secretary General on October 7, 1988, initially on a confidential basis, and was subsequently mentioned expressly in paragraph 30 of the report by the Secretary General that was approved in UNSCR 632.)

TEXT OF STATEMENT BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON 21 APRIL 1989

Delegations of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba and the Republic of South Africa, at the request of the People's Republic of Angola, met at Swawek, Namibia, on 20 April 1989 for a special session of the Joint Commission created to oversee the fulfilment of the Tripartite Agreement signed by the three governments in December 1988.

Delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America attended the meeting as observers.

The Joint Commission examined the difficulties and practical problems that have arisen in the implementation of the plan adopted at Mount Etjo to re-establish the situation prevailing in Namibia on 31 March 1989. In this regard the parties reaffirmed their commitment to and validity of the understandings attained regarding the need for having all SWAPO forces returned to the territory of the People's Republic of Angola north of the 16th Parallel and the continuation of the process of implementation of Security Council Resolution 435.

The parties exchanged views and proposals which will be examined by their respective governments. The delegations of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba will apprise the leadership of SWAPO of the decisions taken ad referendum at the meeting.

PRESS RELEASE BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON 21 APRIL 1989

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr R F Botha, after consultation with the State President stated that, following the extraordinary meeting of the Joint Commission which was held at Ruacana on 20 April 1989, the South African Government had decided that the security forces in SWA/Nambia would return to base and remain there for a period of 60 hours starting at 18h00 on Wednesday, 26 April 1989, to enable SWAPO infiltrators to leave the territory.

South Africa gives the assurance that SWAPO infiltrators will be allowed unhindered return to Angola during the period in question.

Mr Botha urged SWAPO leadership to call upon its members to avail themselves of this opportunity to leave Namibia peacefully.

All available means will be used to ensure that this announcement will be made known as widely as possible.

Mr Botha again reiterated South Africa's commitment to the process for a peaceful settlement in Southwestern Africa and said that the above measures confirmed this commitment.

TEXT OF THE JOINT MEDIA RELEASE ISSUED BY THE JOINT COMMISSION IN LUANDA ON 8 JULY 1989

The IV Ordinary Meeting of the Joint Commission set up under the terms of the Protocol of Brazzaville of 13 December 1988, with the mandate of facilitating the settlement of any disputes resulting from the interpretation or implementation of the Tripartite Agreement, was held in Luanda, People's Republic of Angola, from the 7th to the 8th July, 1989.

The meeting was attended by the members of the Joint Commission, namely the delegations from the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba and the Republic of South Africa.

The delegations from the United States of America and the Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics attended the meeting in their capacity as observers.

The Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations for Namibia and the Representative of the Administrator General of Namibia attended the meeting as invited guests.

The delegations reviewed the state of the implementation of the said agreement, of the implementation of UNSCR 435/78, as well as the situation in Namibia.

The Commission took note of the report on the state of compliance to the time schedule for the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola, in terms of the Bilateral Agreement.

With regard to the situation in Namibia their parties conducted a comprehensive review and expressed their views.

Members of the Commission confirmed that they were complying with their obligations in terms of the Tripartite Agreement signed in New York, on 22 December 1988.

The delegations attending the meeting were received separately by His Excellency, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, President of the MPLA Workers' Party and President of the People's Republic of Angola.

The participants showed their appreciation to the government of the People's Republic of Angola for the excellent conditions and facilities granted for the holding of the meeting.

As established, the Joint Commission has decided to meet again, in ordinary session, in the month of September, in the Republic of Cuba.

[Texts for this section provided by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs.]

SOUTH AFRICA AND EUROPE (1992)

OPENING ADDRESS BY MR N P VAN HEERDEN, DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
TO THE "EUROPE 1992" CONFERENCE, JOHANNESBURG, 24 APRIL 1989

In two years' time Europe is taking itself and the world over a threshold into a new future which will undoubtedly set the tone for decades to come and leave no single country in the world untouched - also not South Africa. Coming as it does close on the heels of glasnost and its consequences for super-power cooperation it constitutes nothing short of a sea change in the conduct of international affairs.

I want to congratulate the Centre for Business Economics of the University of South Africa for arranging this conference and for focussing attention on this topic and its implications for South Africa - particularly since South Africa's geographic location often makes for lower public awareness of European issues.

A trading bloc of leading European nations, with a combined population of 320 million people, will be a dynamic entity presenting new challenges and varied opportunities to other trading nations. Realisation of the objectives of a single market, which will include monetary systems, production methods, professional qualifications, taxes, customs regulations and laws, will affect not only traditional bilateral and multilateral trade patterns but will, inevitably, also have important political consequences.

Against the background of South Africa's traditional diplomatic, economic and cultural ties with Western Europe, the new order which will emerge in 1992 will hold important implications for us. For this reason we should timeously make a clear assessment as to how our interests will be affected and adapt to the new decision-making environment which is bound to emerge.

It is premature to venture predictions about the possible political implications this new phase in European integration might have for South Africa. I think it is more prudent if we applied our minds to the more verifiable and, therefore, more predictable economic and commercial elements of this new development. This is precisely the task of our conference and with the expertise assembled here, I am sure an important contribution will be made in this regard over the next two days.

Economic power is a central element of a nation's strength and well-being, and changes in economic power eventually affect other dimensions of a nation's power. Recent declinist literature (of Paul Kennedy, Mancu Olson and others) project images of a nation winding down economically, living beyond its means, losing its competitive edge to more dynamic nations, sagging under the burdens of "overstretch", and suffering from a variety of intensifying social, economic and political ills. Clem Sunter's familiar

"Low Road" scenario is well known in South Africa and corresponds with this analysis.

South Africa's prospects for decline or renewal depend also on its relations with the outside world. Over fifty per cent of our GNP is generated by foreign trade alone. The value of South Africa's strategic mineral resources and our track record as a reliable trading partner to the West have not alone been sufficient to safeguard our markets abroad.

South Africa is generally recognized to have considerable economic potential, but (it is my submission that) any agenda to develop this potential will fail if it does not take serious account of the external dimension.

The philosophic rationale of Europe 1992 is very much a manifestation of the type of future world for which we have to prepare ourselves. Two themes are particularly important if we are to understand the challenges of the international politics of the future. These are the growing interdependence among nations and the blurring of the traditional dividing line between the domestic and foreign interests of states.

This does not mean that nationalism or, more particularly, the national state has given way completely to some irreversible trend towards internationalism. On the contrary, "national survival", and "national welfare" will for the foreseeable future remain the raison d'être of international exchange. No state will, however, be able to realise its national interests if it remains outside the main stream of international life.

The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, no state in today's world can rely solely on domestic resources to meet the growing demands of welfare and security. Complete national self-sufficiency is not within the grasp of any single state today. In fact, as Japan has demonstrated so forcefully, there is not necessarily a correlation between national welfare and natural resources.

Secondly, themes such as human rights and environmental concerns are compelling issues which define the "spirit of our time" - the "Zeitgeist" - with which the nations of the world will increasingly have to align themselves. All the world's peoples are in the same leaky boat, for better or for worse, and if we are to survive, we shall have to think beyond exclusive ideological and national frontiers. Traditional exclusivity is making way for greater inclusiveness and also South Africa's future role and status in international affairs will depend to an increasing extent on the way it deals with this reality.

We are seeing the emergence of an awareness in South Africa of the challenges and opportunities which this new global situation holds for our country and our region. South Africa (and indeed Southern Africa as a

whole) must assume its rightful place in the family of nations. Government's commitment to internal reform and also its policy to live in peace with our neighbours and the rest of the world provide an important impetus in this direction.

Recent progress to restore peace in the South-Western part of our region, as well as the high priority being placed on normalizing relations with Mozambique indicate that a new order, based on peace and co-operation in Southern Africa, is not an impossible dream.

What has happened in Western Europe since the Second World War is, in many ways, a model we could follow in our own region. In a relatively short period of time, conflict and instability have made way for co-operation, peace and prosperity.

Of course, the relatively favourable and mature circumstances underpinning regional integration in Western Europe do not automatically apply to Southern Africa.

On the other hand, Southern Africa is a natural region and the geographic and economic realities that prevail are, by themselves, important stimulants for greater co-operation among the constituent states.

When looking at the European experience we must not forget the trials and tribulations on the road to European unity. This idea has been cherished ever since the demise of the Holy Roman Empire. It was kept alive throughout the 19th Century, only to be shattered by two devastating World Wars. But the moment peace broke out, the movement sprang up again with renewed force because Europe had come to know first hand what the consequences of conflict were.

The historical development of the idea of greater European co-operation and unity is an important example to us in Southern Africa where the prospects for peace have come much closer to reality. We, too, should now pursue the ideal of greater economic integration and co-operation in Southern Africa. The Governor of the South African Reserve Bank said in New York recently that he "sincerely believes that there is a solution for the current problems of Sub-Saharan Africa ... probably the only solution ... and that is economic co-operation and market-orientated growth policies".

Indeed, some real progress has already been made in this direction. Various bilateral and multilateral agreements which have over the years been entered into between South Africa and its neighbours, underline the fact that regional co-operation is a long-standing policy objective of the South African Government. Similarly, with the emergence of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) and the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) some progress has also been made in the rest of the

region.

As in Europe, obstacles can be overcome through the catalytic effect of economic development and growth. Africa is learning that very little or no progress is possible without the sustaining and energising force of a strong and viable economic system. This was the key to Europe's success and for Southern Africa there is no different route to follow.

Logically, just as Europe's recovery after World War II was facilitated by strong economic, political and moral support from outside, it would be impossible for Southern Africa to reach its point of economic take-off and sustained growth without similar outside support.

At the end of the Second World War it was realised that renewed conflict and instability in Europe would be in nobody's interest, but that there was an alternative way to resolve the problem of competing nationalisms. The far-sighted ideas of people like Aristide Briand, Jean Monnet, Paul-Henri Spaak, and Robert Schuman and, of course, the massive and indispensable economic support of the Marshall Plan paved the way to solving this problem. Today Europe, and indeed the whole world, can reap the fruits of this.

As in Europe, this is a time of change in Southern Africa. Real progress is being made to bring peace to our region. A new positive environment is being created in which the real needs of Southern Africa, such as poverty, underdevelopment and deprivation, can be seriously addressed. We need bold steps, perhaps similar in scope and substance to those that helped Western Europe to discover a new order founded on economic security and enduring peace.

There are important lessons in the European experience for us in Southern Africa. We must learn from them. At the same time we must convince Europeans of the viability of our cause and in so doing obtain their support and assistance - for a prosperous and stable Southern Africa is also in their interest.

We must, however, also be aware that the countries of Europe are motivated in the first place by self-interest and it must be an important objective of the countries of Southern Africa to understand what precisely the new dispensation in Europe will mean. To this end this conference can make a significant contribution.

In conclusion I would wish to extend a warm welcome to our foreign participants in this meeting and to express the hope that their sojourn here will be rewarding and enlightening.

[Text provided by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs.]

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE COMMONWEALTH

COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

Text of the Fourth Meeting: Canberra, 7-9 August 1989
(Concluding Statement)

1. The Committee's fourth meeting considered developments and progress in the implementation of earlier decisions arising from its mandate from Commonwealth Heads of Government and the Okanagan Statement and Programme of Action. Its conclusions in Canberra included the following.

The Situation in South Africa

2. The Committee noted that despite talk about reform the situation in South Africa had not improved since its last meeting in Harare. Apartheid remained in place and the state of emergency had been renewed for the fourth consecutive year. Nelson Mandela and the other political prisoners remained incarcerated. Most of the detainees released at the beginning of the year following the country-wide hunger strike had since been restricted as part of the regime's effort to contain all opposition to the system. The Committee was distressed by the increasing and distorted application of the legal doctrine of "common purpose". Of particular concern was the sentencing to death of the Uppington 14. Equally disturbing were growing instances of informal repression and attacks on anti-apartheid activists. The murder of Dr David Webster on 1 May followed an all too familiar pattern of assassinations. According to a United States State Department report issued in February, South African "death squads" were said to be operating "completely outside the law inside and outside the country". The South African Government had also continued its pressure against the media on several fronts as part of the wider effort to quell peaceful opposition to apartheid. The ban on political parties remained in force and, notwithstanding the declarations of the new leadership of the ruling National Party, no beginning had been made on negotiations between the Government and the acknowledged representatives of the black majority.

Namibia

3. The Committee considered recent developments in Namibia as a matter of priority concern. Ministers stressed the importance of 'impartiality' and elimination of 'intimidation' in the implementation of Resolution 435. The presence of former Koevoet personnel had already been the

subject of complaint by the United Nations Secretary-General. Pretoria's evident hostility to all opposition and its retention of Koevoet personnel within the South West Africa Police (SWAPOL) constituted a most disturbing indication of intimidation of South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) and other opposition supporters by the authorities, and a clear danger to free and fair elections. There was urgent need for a strict adherence by South Africa to the basic principles of the 435 process.

4. Beyond these matters of a physical nature, there were serious questions that remained unresolved in relation to the proclamation that would govern the conduct of the elections, the operations of the Constituent Assembly and the entire process leading to independence. Fundamental changes appear to be needed to ensure the integrity of the secret ballot. Particular proposals for tightening the proclamations that in our view require very careful consideration include the following:
 - (a) voter identification must take place before a voter is issued with a ballot paper and the subsequent use of fingerprint experts, etc, abandoned;
 - (b) party agents must be permitted to play their full and proper role in the polling process;
 - (c) UNTAG's role must be fully consistent with the requirements of Resolution 435;
 - (d) counting must take place at each polling station and the final determination concluded expeditiously;
 - (e) the Constituent Assembly must be recognised as the only authentic representative body and as such must exercise its rights in an unfettered manner in both drafting and adopting the Constitution and (should the Assembly so wish) in reconstituting itself as the first parliament under the new Constitution from such date as it should choose as Namibian Independence Day;
 - (f) the Administrator-General in the performance of his role until Independence Day should be guided by the wishes of the Assembly.
5. Commonwealth governments had been alerted to these issues. Their several Governments would exert every effort to ensure that the final legislation was in conformity with the expectations of the international community and the requirements of the 435 process; but there was very little time in which to ensure this. Heads of Government would be meeting in Kuala Lumpur three weeks before the elections. It was absolutely essential that the international community as a whole gave maximum support to the United Nations at this moment in ensuring that the basic legislative framework existed under which the electoral process and the Constituent Assembly thereafter did not become a distortion of international expectations for Namibia's independence.

The Committee felt that it could not urge too strongly the utmost vigilance in relation to these basic arrangements. The fulfilment of Commonwealth expectations for a free Namibia within the family of the Commonwealth could very well turn on how these questions were resolved.

6. Resolution 435 vested responsibility for the supervision and control of the elections and the election campaign in the United Nations. However, as had already been demonstrated by a considerable number of visits, there was scope for others to observe the process and lend weight to international efforts to buttress the United Nations operation. In this regard, Ministers were of the view that the Commonwealth Secretary-General should explore urgently the possibility of constituting a representative observer group from the Commonwealth which would visit Namibia prior to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in order to report to Heads of Government in Kuala Lumpur on the situation and on possible future arrangements.
7. Ministers noted with approval that the expanded United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) police force would soon reach its authorised target of 1 000 and that several Commonwealth countries were among the contributors. At the same time, they expressed concern at the ongoing problem of SWAPOL and, in particular the continuing presence of Koevoet personnel in SWAPOL, and resolved to draw this concern to the attention of the United Nations Secretary-General. To help the United Nations address the problem, the Committee agreed that the Commonwealth Secretary-General would encourage Commonwealth member countries to be prepared to supply additional police officers if the United Nations Secretary-General requested them. The Commonwealth would make this offer of support to the United Nations Secretary-General to ensure that the United Nations had all the resources needed to resolve the serious problem posed by SWAPOL.
8. In this regard the Committee reiterated its earlier call on member states of the United Nations, including members of the Security Council, to assure the United Nations Secretary-General that the required resources will be provided to enable him to deploy, up the upper limit of 7 500, the full military component judged by him to be necessary for carrying out effectively all the relevant tasks specified in the UNTAG plan.
9. The Committee concluded that the challenge facing Namibia in the post-electoral period both before and after independence would be daunting. Conditions were very uncertain and, even if as was to be hoped, the election process was free and fair, the success of the expression of the people's will could be frustrated by subsequent political and economic pressures from South Africa. In light of these dangers the Namibian people would need assistance in preparing

themselves administratively for independence and in effecting rapid economic development. The Commonwealth already provided extensive training and other development assistance. Ministers asked the Secretary-General to explore the possibilities for significantly expanded aid in the operational, development and constitutional fields. In anticipation of these needs and the expectation of increased assistance, the Committee thought that consideration should be given to sending Commonwealth expertise at the appropriate time to provide assistance and advice, while participating in the planning of future activity with the new Government.

Destabilisation

10. The Committee noted that despite the welcome improvement in the security situation in South Western Africa, South Africa's campaign of destabilisation in other parts of the region continued to exact a high toll both in human life and material loss. According to an independent study on the subject of destabilisation commissioned by the Committee, the resulting instability in the region in the period since 1980 had caused the death of 1,5 million people, no less than four million made homeless, several thousand disabled, and material damage estimated at some US\$45 billion.
11. The Committee was particularly concerned that Mozambique continued to suffer from the ravages of the South African-backed Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). The Committee applauded the initiative of the Government of Mozambique to achieve peace and national reconciliation and in this connection called upon Pretoria to show by deed that it had truly abandoned its support for the rebel MNR.
12. The Committee denounced South Africa's campaign of destabilisation against its neighbours and saw in that campaign a major contributory factor in the region's economic problems. In this regard the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), with its objectives of promoting regional self-reliance and economic independence from South Africa, deserved increased support and encouragement.
13. The Committee also welcomed the outcome of the Gbadolite Summit of 20 June and pledged its support for the African initiative to help bring about peace and genuine national reconciliation in Angola. The Committee also welcomed a similar initiative being mounted in the case of Mozambique.

Sanctions

14. Recent developments in South Africa have reaffirmed the Committee's belief that sanctions are having an increasing economic and political

impact. It saw evidence of a heightened recognition within the white community that in the absence of fundamental political change, South Africa's relationship with the world was unlikely to improve and that the economy and living standards would continue to deteriorate under the pressure of trade and financial sanctions. If Pretoria did, indeed, turn towards the dismantling of apartheid, sanctions would have contributed to forcing that change. The Committee was united in the belief that sanctions would need to be sustained, and intensified, until progress in the direction became irreversible.

15. In that context, the Committee noted that Pretoria had not taken any of the steps Commonwealth leaders had urged at Nassau in October 1985, namely: to declare that the system of apartheid will be dismantled and specified and meaningful action taken in fulfilment of that intent; terminate the existing state of emergency; release immediately and unconditionally Nelson Mandela and all others imprisoned and detained for their opposition to apartheid, establish political freedom and specifically lift the existing ban on the African National Congress (ANC) and other political parties; and to initiate, in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides, a process of dialogue across lines of colour, politics and religion, with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government.
16. The Committee reiterated its conviction, confirmed by its further consultations with several black South African leaders, that most black South Africans continued to look principally to sanctions for pressure on Pretoria for peaceful change. Sanctions, in the Committee's view, remained the most effective peaceful path to the ending of apartheid.

Expert Study on Sanctions

17. In receiving the final report on the Evaluation of the Application and Impact of Sanctions against South Africa, prepared by an independent expert study group, the Committee recalled that at Okanagan, Heads of Government, with the exception of Britain, had agreed that pending the acceptance by the international community as a whole that comprehensive and mandatory sanctions would be the quickest route to bring Pretoria to the negotiating table, a wider, tighter and more intensified application of sanctions must remain an essential part of its response to apartheid.
18. Ministers shared the overall conclusions of the report that existing sanctions - adopted by the Commonwealth, the United States, the Nordic States and other countries - have through their impact on South Africa's economy and policies, confirmed the legitimacy of sanctions as an instrument of policy to induce dismantling of apartheid in South

Africa and, in the circumstances, the urgency of even stronger signals to the new Government in South Africa.

19. The Study makes 30 recommendations for action. The Committee believed these recommendations deserved careful consideration by all countries, most of whom now apply sanctions of one kind or another against South Africa. It was therefore making the Study available not only to Commonwealth governments but to the wider international community. Since important questions of timing arise in the consideration and application of further measures, Ministers felt that all governments would wish to examine these recommendations carefully and in the framework of overall strategy. For Commonwealth countries, they have particular significance in relation to the Kuala Lumpur Meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government later this year.
20. The Committee also noted the Study's conclusions that the policies of certain countries had continued to undermine the effectiveness of existing sanctions adopted by the Commonwealth and other countries. They noted that, particularly in the light of the publicity fostered by the Committee, some of the countries which have expanded their links with South Africa in recent years have become conscious of the need to curtail them, particularly in certain sectors where Commonwealth sanction apply. They expressed concern, however, at the unwillingness of those countries with the most leverage to apply pressure on South Africa through more concerted action on sanctions. South Africa should not be encouraged to believe that it may delay indefinitely in responding fully to the legitimate aspirations of the majority of its citizens. There was a critical need for those countries to look again at responding to the urgency of the South African situation and the Committee called on them to demonstrate by concerted actions their commitment to hastening the end of apartheid.

South Africa's Links with the International Financial System

21. The Committee welcomed the publication of "Apartheid and International Finance" by Keith Ovenden and Tony Cole commissioned by the Australian Government, noting that it was an updated and expanded version of the report of the Intergovernmental Group on South Africa's Relationship with the International Financial System commissioned by the Committee and considered by it in Toronto. It supported the authors' conclusion that financial sanctions applied by the private sector, governments and non-governmental organisations had been, and continue to be, one of the most effective forms of pressure on Pretoria.
22. The Committee reaffirmed its Toronto decisions on widening and tightening financial sanctions. It had an extensive discussion on further

action to enhance the effectiveness of financial sanctions against South Africa. It also considered means of further defining the Commonwealth ban on new bank lending to South Africa. As a result, the Committee invited Commonwealth and other governments to take further action, as specified in the Annex to this Statement, which was issued as a press release on 8 August.

Arms Embargo

23. South Africa's policies of destabilisation and repression highlight the importance of maintaining and strengthening the arms embargo. Ministers received a report from Canada on recent efforts at the United Nations to further the recommendations on tightening the embargo. Ministers also received an updated report on the United Nations arms embargo from the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa (WCMNC). The Committee was encouraged by the recent meetings of the United Nations Security Council's 421 Committee charged with monitoring the embargo. They welcomed efforts to compile a new report on the Committee's work, hold hearings with experts and undertake thorough investigations of recent breaches of the embargo. They agreed to consult at the United Nations with a view to encouraging further progress along these lines.

Démarches

24. Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to secure a more concerted application of a global sanctions programme and reviewed their efforts through démarches on a wide range of governments to encourage universal adoption of the Commonwealth package of measures, including the actions recommended by the Committee. They made plans to continue their efforts in the months ahead, taking into account the opportunities presented by forthcoming conferences and the United Nations General Assembly for joint activity by Committee members.

Security Needs of the Front-Line States

25. The Committee reviewed the continuing threat to the security of the Front-Line States and stressed the ongoing need for practical security assistance, especially for Mozambique. While acknowledging the generous contributions in this area by a number of Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth countries, the Committee stressed that much remained to be done to help meet the security needs identified in the special report by General Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria. The Committee asked the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to encourage increased security assistance for the countries of the region, particularly Mozambique.

Special Commonwealth Fund for Mozambique

26. The Committee reviewed and commended the Secretary-General's Report on operations in the first 18 months of the Special Commonwealth Fund for Mozambique, and noted the further strong evidence of successful implementation and of continuing demand for Commonwealth assistance under the programme. The Committee urged all Commonwealth governments, as part of their preparations for the Kuala Lumpur Heads of Government Meeting, to consider pledging generously so that the Fund's momentum is maintained and the promise of Vancouver becomes a reality.

Promotion of Trade and Investment in Front-Line and Neighbouring States

27. In the light of the importance of strengthening their economic independence and disengagement from South Africa, the Committee reviewed the draft strategy paper submitted by Canada on trade and investment promotion in the front-line and neighbouring States. The extremely useful efforts already being undertaken in this regard in a number of different fora, including SADCC and the Preferential Trade Area (PTA), were recognised. The Committee requested the Secretariat to develop an Action Plan taking into account the views of the Front-Line and neighbouring states, SADCC and the PTA and all Commonwealth countries concerned.

Dialogue

28. In keeping with its mandate from Vancouver, the Committee has continued to place a premium on dialogue between the South African Government and the true representatives of the non-white majority as the only peaceful route to a resolution of the conflict. The Committee welcomed recent growing instances of dialogue among South Africans across racial and political lines. For example, in Lusaka in July more than 100 white South Africans from the "Five Freedoms Forum" met with the ANC. The Committee also took particular note of the meeting between State President PW Botha and Nelson Mandela on 5 July in Cape Town. The Committee recalled that in its Report the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) had underlined the centrality of Nelson Mandela in any genuine negotiation to bring about the resolution of the conflict. If the meeting was an indication that at long last the South African Government too was beginning to share this assessment of Nelson Mandela's place in the South African political equation, the next logical step should be his immediate and unconditional release. In this regard, the Committee stressed the continuing validity of the Negotiating Concept elaborated by the EPG as a basis for future negotiations.

Countering South African Propaganda and Censorship

29. The Committee noted that since its last meeting the apartheid regime had taken its campaign against the media further with bannings of newspapers and journalists and the imposition of crippling fines. Against this background the Committee reaffirmed the continuing validity of the Commonwealth effort to expose the truth about apartheid and to combat media censorship. In this connection they warmly welcomed and endorsed the report for Heads of Government from the Working Party established by the Secretary-General to develop a Commonwealth strategy for this purpose. The Committee paid tribute to all the Commonwealth governments which had in various ways contributed to the work of the Working Party and to the wider effort to counteract South African propaganda and censorship.

Aid to Victims and Opponents of Apartheid

30. The Committee continued to emphasise the importance of practical and financial assistance to victims and opponents of apartheid, in particular educational, legal and humanitarian assistance and aid to trade unions. Efforts already being made by Commonwealth and other countries were recognised and the Committee called for further responses from all countries opposed to apartheid.

31. The Committee strongly endorsed the work of the newly-established Commonwealth network of non-governmental organisations, Skills for South Africa, which will provide high level training and work experience for black South Africans and contribute both to the process of change in South Africa and the development of skills required in a post-apartheid society.

32. The Committee noted the support the network had already received from a wide range of governments and institutions, commended it to the Commonwealth, and urged governments to provide appropriate support and resources to assist in the implementation and co-ordination of this work.

Sporting Contacts with South Africa

33. The Committee took account of recent developments in relation to sporting contacts with South Africa. Ministers reaffirmed the importance of Commonwealth Governments' stand against such contacts and of the Commonwealth's commitment in relation to them under the Gleneagles Agreement, and unreservedly condemned the efforts by South Africa to induce cricket and rugby players from Britain and other Commonwealth countries to play in South Africa.

34. They expressed extreme disappointment at the action of players who had indicated their willingness to go to South Africa in violation of the Gleneagles Agreement, describing such conduct as unworthy of the highest tradition of Commonwealth sport and gravely detrimental to it, and called on the players in question who had not already done so to decline these invitations. Sporting contact with South Africa could not be justified on the basis of its contribution to the development of non-racial sport within that country: the very structure of South African society and the actions of the white minority Government necessarily confined non-whites to second class participation in sport, as in all other aspects of South African life. Nothing could justify giving comfort to the apartheid regime or undermining the position of other sportsmen and sportswomen who remained faithful to the Gleneagles Agreement.
35. In the case of cricketers who had agreed to go to South Africa, the Committee called for the rigorous enforcement of the penalties agreed earlier this year by the International Cricket Conference. Ministers also called upon other sporting bodies to develop and apply similar rules and penalty structures in respect of the sports they controlled.
36. Ministers called on all Commonwealth Governments to express their own strong opposition to such sporting contacts with South Africa and to use their utmost endeavours through all political and other channels to discourage them. They were mindful of the efforts which had already been made in this respect and were particularly appreciative of the strong stands taken by the Australian and New Zealand Governments. They looked for the furtherance and intensification of all such efforts.

Auckland Commonwealth Games

37. The Ministers expressed their strong and unanimous desire that next year's Commonwealth Games in Auckland should be an unqualified success. They recognised that the Games were an important element in the strength of the Commonwealth association and the fraternity of its peoples, particularly the young people of the Commonwealth. They agreed that they would pursue a process of consultation in relation to the Games in the months ahead, and would seek the involvement of all other Commonwealth countries in that consultative process.
38. Ministers welcomed the opportunity afforded by their meeting in Canberra for discussions on the Auckland Games and related matters with the Foreign Minister of New Zealand, the Hon Russell Marshall. They took the opportunity to express to him the value they placed on the strong support his Government had given to the Gleneagles Agreement and

to the wider Commonwealth effort to bring about the dismantling of apartheid.

Future Organisation of Commonwealth Games

39. Ministers received with interest a proposal from Canada for placing the Commonwealth Games on a firmer financial footing and for arrangements which would facilitate their being staged in developing Commonwealth countries. They supported the idea of a meeting of Commonwealth representatives to examine these proposals further.

Consultations

40. The Committee greatly valued the opportunity for direct consultations with leading personalities from the liberation movements and anti-apartheid organisations from within South Africa. Making presentations before the Committee were Father Smangaliso Mkhathshwa, Director of the *Institute of Contextual Theology*, Dr Max Coleman, a Commissioner of the Human Rights Commission, Mr Moses Mayekiso, General Secretary of the National Union of Metalworkers, Mr Ahmad Gora Ebrahim, Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the *Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC)*, and Mr Aziz Pahad, Chief Representative of the ANC to Britain. Their perspectives on the situation in South Africa considerably assisted the Committee's deliberations. Ministers expressed their profound disappointment that the Government of South Africa should have prevented Mr Azhar Cachalia, the Treasurer of the United Democratic Front (UDF), from being present at their meeting.

ANNEX

COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

APARTHEID AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE

At their meeting on Tuesday 8 August 1989, the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa agreed to the following statement:

The financial sanctions already being applied by Commonwealth and other Governments and their respective financial institutions have proved to be among the most effective of all instruments of pressure against South Africa. South Africa's exclusion from world capital markets is placing significant pressure on its balance of payments and, as a consequence, on its capacity for economic growth.

In order to ensure that the pressure from these sources is maintained, the Committee reaffirmed its Toronto decisions on widening and tightening

financial sanctions and invited Commonwealth and other Governments, and financial institutions within their respective jurisdictions, to take further action in each of the following areas.

(a) Tightening conditions for debt repayment

Ministers reaffirmed the key importance of June 1990 in terms of the rescheduling of South African debt, providing the opportunity to exert further pressure on South Africa's debt servicing obligations. They noted that there was some evidence of relaxation in the second rescheduling (1987-90) in that South Africa was required to repay annually less capital under it than under the first rescheduling agreement (1986-87). They called on banks in the context of the 1990 rescheduling negotiations to exert the maximum possible pressure on South Africa consistent with the need to avoid precipitating South African default on its debt and in particular recommended:

- provision for substantial capital re-payments;
- the application of the highest possible interest rates to South African debt;
- the rejection of exit options, including the long term rollover*.

To this end, Ministers agreed that a delegation of senior officials would seek access to senior executives of the member banks of the coordinating committee presently negotiating the 1990 rescheduling arrangements.

(b) Imposing further restrictions on trade finance

Ministers recognised the advantage that accrued to South Africa in having much of its trade credit business still insured with official export credit agencies. In order to send a clear signal about the

* Under the 1987 rescheduling agreement, creditors were offered two methods of escaping from the unilateral moratorium that South Africa had placed on commercial loans. One was to convert debt to a long term schedule (the 1997 option) with defined interest and capital repayments. The other was to convert the debt into equities on the local South African share market and then export the funds through the financial Rand exchange system - at a substantial discount. Since 1987 a further exit option has developed in the form of an international secondary market for South African debt. Use of any of these options has the effect of lessening the pressure on South Africa in some degree.

need to curtail sources of foreign funds to South Africa and, at the least, to expose that country to the unfettered judgment of the market place in this field, they urged that all countries that had not done so now take South Africa "off cover" with official government agencies for official trade credit and insurance purposes.

Ministers noted South African claims that trade financing was being used as a balance of payments cushion. They therefore called on all financial institutions in Commonwealth and other countries to impose tougher terms for trade financing including, in particular, reducing the maximum credit term to ninety days.

(c) **Monitoring the ban on medium and long-term lending**

Recognising the importance of promoting public awareness of South Africa's dealings with the international financial community, Ministers supported in principle the establishment of an independent mechanism to review and report on South Africa's links with the international financial community on a regular basis. It would involve a small, specialist staff with proven research skills in the area of financial markets and be located in one of the world financial centres. The cooperation of finance houses in ensuring the regular publication of factual information covering the broad field of South Africa's links with international finance would need to be assured.

Ministers agreed that a specific proposal along these lines should be developed for further consideration at Kuala Lumpur in October.

(d) **Ban on new bank lending**

Ministers discussed Commonwealth experience of the application of the existing ban on new bank lending to South Africa in the context of South African controlled international companies operating outside South Africa. They reaffirmed the intent of the lending ban which is to put pressure on South Africa's balance of payments. Ministers noted, in this connection, that loans to South African owned or controlled entities incorporated abroad may in certain circumstances enable South African companies to strengthen their marketing network, improve their access to technology and otherwise enhance their capacity to frustrate sanctions.

They also noted that lending to such entities may, on the other hand, involve in certain circumstances an outflow from South Africa of capital and expertise such as to reinforce the impact of financial sanctions.

As a result Ministers proposed that the following general guidelines be applied by banks and other financial institutions in respective national jurisdictions, as criteria for assessing the acceptability of a proposed loan:

- That banks and other financial institutions responding to a loan request from any entity outside South Africa that may possibly be controlled by south African interests should:

(a) require a declaration by the borrower stating the source of control of the entity seeking the loan; and

(b) where South African control is established:

- obtain an assurance that the purpose of the loan is not for activities designed to circumvent sanctions;

- require an assurance that the funds will be used for the stated purpose of the loan and will not be transferred to South Africa;

- be satisfied that the purpose of the investment is not to repatriate profits to South Africa;

- be satisfied that, on balance and in all circumstances of the individual case, the loan would not result in significant net benefit flowing to economic interests within South Africa, or the South African economy as a whole;

and not grant the loan in question unless so assured and satisfied.

Canberra
8 August 1989

SOUTH AFRICA AND ZAMBIA

STATEMENT BY SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MR R F BOTHA, ON 15 AUGUST 1989, ON THE PROPOSED OFFICIAL VISIT TO ZAMBIA

Letter to the State President of the Republic of South Africa by the President of Zambia dated 14 August 1989 together with the response of the Acting State President of the Republic of South Africa dated 15 August 1989:

A letter, dated 14 August 1989, from the President of Zambia to the South African State President, the text of which is appended below, was received by the Department of Foreign Affairs per telex at 18h11 on 14 August 1989 and faxed to the Office of the State President in Pretoria at about 18h57 after the officials concerned could not establish contact with the State President's office in Cape Town.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs was at the time at the SABC studios in Johannesburg and could not be contacted. The Minister left the SABC at about 19h30 for a public meeting in Randburg. Dr Kaunda's letter was brought to his attention for the first time during the morning of 15 August 1989. The Minister brought the letter to the attention of the Acting State President who has requested that his response be forwarded to the Zambian President.

A. His Excellency P W Botha
State President of the Republic of South Africa
Pretoria

While I do not have any accurate details, I have been following, Mr President, with increasing concern, press reports on some anxiety you may have in connection with my forthcoming meeting with Mr de Klerk.

I thought I should, therefore, reach you to explain that the meeting is not in any way intended to slight or undermine you as the State President. I believe you know me well enough, Mr President, to appreciate that this is not so even without my having to point it out as I am doing now.

I value the forthcoming meetings with Mr de Klerk because I believe, according to the rules of your Party, he is destined to succeed you after the general elections which are due shortly. I know you well. You and I have dealt with each other frankly and openly over a long period of time and have done so with deep respect even over those matters on which we have differed. As a result, we have friendly feelings towards each other. I will do nothing to injure these.

However, I cannot pretend to know your likely successor well at all. In fairness to him and to me, to the offices we shall hold and to the peoples of our countries and the region, it is important that we get to know each other a little more, especially about how we look at things and the future as individual persons. This is especially important for Mr de Klerk as the new man now coming on the scene.

You are leaving for him, Mr President, an enormous and complex programme. You want him to succeed. I want him to succeed. It is so vital to all the people of Southern Africa that we move forward into the future together as one united, peaceful and free people. South Africa has an enormous task in this regard. Mr de Klerk as your successor has a forbidding and immediate challenge.

Anything I can do to help continue to build peace for all our people of Southern Africa I will do. All that I therefore hope and wish for is to continue to help build effective co-operation for peace for all regardless of race, colour and creed in our region. This cannot come about without leaders and without those leaders understanding one another well even over those matters on which they may differ.

Mr President, I plead that you have no anxieties at all about Mr de Klerk meeting me at this time. He will meet me as President of Zambia and not as a representative of any other country or organisation. It is a person to person meeting. It is him and me only to see how we look at things and in that way start to figure out how we proceed to work together in the future. We do not have much time.

I have no programme from anyone to put to Mr de Klerk. I want to meet him as a person who will occupy in our region a position of leadership whose interaction I cannot in the circumstances avoid. He is the man you, your Party and the people of South Africa, are putting before us to deal with. I have to know him. That is the reason for the meeting. Nothing more, nothing less.

Indeed, when I have a serious matter of state while you are still in office, I will not hesitate to reach you immediately. This Mr President, you know very well.

This comes with love, respect and my best wishes. With God's blessings.

KENNETH DAVID KAUNDA
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA
14 AUGUST 1989

B. Your Excellency

15 August 1989

Your letter of 14 August 1989 to the State President of the Republic of South Africa has been referred to me for attention.

I am pleased to inform you that it will be a pleasure to meet with you in Livingstone on 28 August 1989. I will be accompanied by the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr R F Botha, and senior officials of his Department.

May I avail myself of the opportunity of assuring you of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely

F W DE KLERK
ACTING STATE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

[Text provided by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs.]

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE OAU

DRAFT DECLARATION OF THE OAU AD HOC COMMITTEE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA ON THE QUESTION OF SOUTH AFRICA: HARARE, ZIMBABWE, 21 AUGUST 1989

1. Preamble

- 1.0 The people of Africa, singly, collectively and acting through the OAU, are engaged in serious efforts to establish peace throughout the continent by ending all conflicts through negotiations based on the principle of justice and peace for all.
- 2.0 We reaffirm our conviction, which history confirms, that where colonial, racial and apartheid domination exist, there can neither be peace nor justice.
- 3.0 Accordingly, we reiterate that while the apartheid system in SA persists, the peoples of our continent as a whole cannot achieve the fundamental objectives of justice, human dignity and peace which are both crucial in themselves and fundamental to the stability and development of Africa.
- 4.0 With regard to the region of Southern Africa, the entire continent is vitally interested that the processes in which it is involved, leading to the complete and genuine independence of Namibia, as well as peace in Angola and Mozambique, should succeed in the shortest possible time.

Equally, Africa is deeply concerned that the destabilisation by SA of all the countries of the region, whether through direct aggression, sponsorship of surrogates, economic subversion and other means, should end immediately.

- 5.0 We recognise the reality that permanent peace and stability in Southern Africa can only be achieved when the system of apartheid in SA has been liquidated and SA transformed into a united, democratic and non-racial country.

We therefore reiterate that all the necessary measures should be adopted now, to bring a speedy end to the apartheid system, in the interest of all the people of Southern Africa, our continent and the world at large.

- 6.0 We believe that, as a result of the liberation struggle and international pressure against apartheid, as well as global efforts to liquidate regional conflicts, possibilities exist for further movement towards the resolution of the problems facing the people of SA.

For these possibilities to lead to fundamental change in SA, the Pretoria regime must abandon its abhorrent concepts and practices of racial domination and its record of failure to honour agreements, all of which have already resulted in the loss of so many lives and the destruction of much property in the countries of Southern Africa.

- 7.0 We reaffirm our recognition of the right of all peoples, including those of SA to determine their own destiny, and work out for themselves the institutions and the system of government under which they will, by general consent, live and work together to build a harmonious society.

The OAU remains committed to doing everything possible and necessary to assist the people of SA, in such ways as the representatives of the oppressed may determine, to achieve this objective. We are certain that, arising from its duty to help end the criminal apartheid system, the rest of the world community is ready to extend similar assistance to the people of SA.

- 8.0 We make these commitments because we believe that all people are equal and have equal rights to human dignity and respect, regardless of colour, race, sex or creed.

We believe that all men and women have the right and duty to participate in their own government, as equal members of society.

No individual or group of individuals has any right to govern others without their consent.

The apartheid system violates all these fundamental and universal principles.

Correctly characterised as a crime against humanity, it is responsible for the death of countless numbers of people in SA.

It has sought to dehumanise entire peoples.

It has imposed a brutal war on the whole region of Southern Africa, resulting in untold loss of life, destruction of property and massive displacement of innocent men, women and children. This scourge and affront to humanity must be fought and eradicated in its totality.

- 9.0 We have therefore supported and continue to support all those in SA who pursue this noble objective through political, armed and other forms of struggle. We believe this to be our duty, carried out in the interest of all humanity.

10.0 While extending this support to those who strive for a non-racial and democratic society in SA, a point on which no compromise is possible, we have repeatedly expressed our preference for a solution arrived at by peaceful means. We know that the majority of the people of SA and their liberation movement who have been compelled to take up arms, have also upheld this position for many decades and continue to do so.

11.0 The positions contained in this declaration are consistent with and are a continuation of those elaborated in the Lusaka Manifesto, two decades ago. They take into account the changes that have taken place in Southern Africa since that manifesto was adopted by the OAU and the rest of the international community.

They constitute a new challenge to the Pretoria regime to join in the noble effort to end the apartheid system, an objective to which the OAU has been committed from its very birth.

12.0 Consequently, we shall continue to do everything in our power to help intensify the liberation struggle and international pressure against the system of apartheid until this system is ended and SA is transformed into a united democratic and non-racial country, with justice and security for all its citizens.

13.0 In keeping with this solemn resolve, and responding directly to the wishes of the representatives of the majority of the people of SA, we publicly pledge ourselves to the positions contained hereunder.

We are convinced that their implementation will lead to a speedy end of the apartheid system and therefore the opening of a new dawn of peace for all the peoples of Africa, in which racism, colonial domination and white minority rule on our continent would be abolished forever.

Statement of Principles

14.0 We believe that a conjuncture of circumstances exists which, if there is a demonstrable readiness on the part of the Pretoria regime to engage in negotiations genuinely and seriously, could create the possibility to end apartheid through negotiations.

Such an eventuality would be an expression of the long-standing preference of the majority of the people of SA to arrive at a political settlement.

15.0 We would therefore encourage the people of SA, as part of their overall struggle, to get together to negotiate an end to the apartheid

system and agree on all the measures that are necessary to transform their country into a non-racial democracy.

We support the position held by the majority of the people of SA that these objectives, and not the amendment or reform of the apartheid system, should be the aims of the negotiation.

16.0 We are at one with them that the outcome of such a process should be a new constitutional order based on the following principles, among others:

16.1 SA shall become a united, democratic and non-racial state.

16.2 All its people shall enjoy common and equal citizenship and nationality, regardless of race, colour, sex or creed.

16.3 All its people shall have the right to participate in the government and administration of the country on the basis of a universal suffrage, exercised through one person one vote, under a common voters' role.

16.4 All shall have the right to form and join any political party of their choice, provided that this is not in furtherance of racism.

16.5 All shall enjoy universally recognised human rights, freedoms and civil liberties, protected under an entrenched bill of rights.

16.6 SA shall have a new legal system which shall guarantee equality of all before the law.

16.7 SA shall have an independent and non-racial judiciary.

16.8 There shall be created an economic order which shall promote and advance the well-being of all South Africans.

16.9 A democratic SA shall respect the rights, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries and pursue a policy of peace, friendship, and mutually beneficial cooperation with all peoples.

17.0 We believe that agreement on the above principles shall constitute the foundation for an internationally acceptable solution which shall enable SA to take its rightful place as an equal partner among the African and world community of nations.

Climate for Negotiations

- 18.0 Together with the rest of the world, we believe that it is essential, before any negotiations can take place, that the necessary climate for negotiations be created.

The apartheid regime has the urgent responsibility to respond positively to this universally acclaimed demand and thus create this climate.

- 19.0 Accordingly, the present regime should, at the very least:

19.1 Release all political prisoners and detainees unconditionally and refrain from imposing any restrictions on them.

19.2 Lift all bans and restrictions on all proscribed and restricted organisations and persons.

19.3 Remove all troops from the townships.

19.4 End the state of emergency and repeal all legislation, such as, and including the Internal Security Act, designed to circumscribe political activity; and

19.5 Cease all political trials and political executions.

- 20.0 These measures are necessary to produce conditions in which free political discussion can take place - an essential condition to ensure that the people themselves participate in the process of *remaking their country*.

The measures listed above should therefore precede negotiations.

Guidelines to the Process of Negotiation

- 21.0 We support the view of the liberation movement that upon the creation of this climate, the process of negotiations should commence along the following lines:

21.1 Discussions should take place between the liberation movement and the South African regime to achieve the suspension of hostilities on both sides by agreeing to a mutually binding ceasefire.

21.2 Negotiations should then proceed to establish the basis for the adoption of a new constitution by agreeing on, among others, the principles enunciated above.

- 21.3 Having agreed on these principles, the parties should then negotiate the necessary mechanism for drawing up the new constitution.
 - 21.4 The parties shall define and agree on the role to be played by the international community in ensuring a successful transition to a democratic order.
 - 21.5 The parties shall agree on the formation of an interim government to supervise the process of drawing up and adoption of a new constitution; govern and administer the country, as well as effect the transition to a democratic order, including the holding of elections.
 - 21.6 After the adoption of the new constitution, all armed hostilities will be deemed to have formally terminated.
 - 21.7 For its part, the international community would lift sanctions that have been imposed against apartheid SA.
- 22.0 The new SA shall qualify for membership of the Organisation of African Unity.

Programme of Action

- 23.0 In pursuance of the objectives stated in this document, the OAU hereby commits itself to:
- 23.1 Inform governments and inter-governmental organisations throughout the world, including the Non-aligned Movement, the UN General Assembly, the Security Council, the Commonwealth and others of these perspectives, and solicit their support.
 - 23.2 Mandate the Frontline States, acting as the representatives of the OAU, to remain seized of the issue of a political resolution of the South African question.
 - 23.3 Step up all-round support for the South African liberation movement and campaign in the rest of the world in pursuance of this objective.
 - 23.4 Intensify the campaign for mandatory and comprehensive sanctions against apartheid SA. In this regard, immediately mobilise against the rescheduling of Pretoria's foreign debts; work for the imposition of a mandatory oil embargo and the full observance by all countries of the arms embargo.

- 23.5 Ensure that the African continent does not relax existing measures for the total isolation of apartheid SA.
- 23.6 *Continue to monitor the situation in Namibia and extend all necessary support to SWAPO in its struggle for a genuinely independent Namibia.*
- 23.7 Extend such assistance as the Governments of Angola and Mozambique may request in order to secure peace for their peoples; and
- 23.8 Render all possible assistance to the frontline States to enable them to withstand Pretoria's campaign of aggression and destabilisation and enable them to continue to give their all-round support to the people of Namibia and SA.
- 24.0 We appeal to all people of goodwill throughout the world to support this Programme of Action as a necessary measure to secure the earliest liquidation of the apartheid system and the transformation of SA into a united, democratic and non-racial country.

The declaration acknowledges it is based upon a draft adopted by the African National Congress, Lusaka, August 10, 1989, in a concluding footnote.

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