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## SOUTH AFRICA

### ADDRESS BY STATE PRESIDENT F.W. DE KLERK AT THE OPENING OF THE THIRD SESSION OF THE NINTH PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA FRIDAY, 1 FEBRUARY 1991

Mr. Speaker, Members of Parliament. From this Chamber a year ago tomorrow, South Africa was placed finally on a new course. Events succeeded one another in rapid succession and I have no doubt that our country is irrevocably on the road to a new dispensation. The goal, with the removal of discrimination, is to give all South Africans full rights in every sphere of life.

In the short span of a single year, substantial progress was made. The Government is determined to build on the foundations laid purposefully, efficiently and with due speed.

South Africa cannot allow or permit the dynamic process of reform to slow down.

Consequently, the process of fundamental reform and all it entails, is the first priority, not only among politicians, but among all. Organisations, columnists, academics, churches and especially the man in the street are thinking and talking about reform continuously. It could hardly be otherwise, since it is, indeed, the future of our country and of every one of its people that is at stake.

Two basic questions arise in relation to reform:

What has to be done?, and  
What needs to be abolished?

Today I wish to emphasise the positive, but shall also make announcements on that which has to be abolished.

The initiatives of the past year have prepared the way for a new South Africa. Our task this year, will be to give greater content to our vision of what the new South Africa should be like. Simultaneously, we have to give impetus to our resolve to build a new South African nation.

There were centrifugal forces that promoted confrontation, hatred and violence, that thrived on envy, suspicion and fear, and which alienated South Africans from one another.

Against this, the vision of a new South Africa brought most South Africans increasingly closer together. In most hearts there is a yearning for peaceful solutions and co-operation. The majority are tired of the negative and destructive. They wish to take hands, but do not always know how to do this.

These facts place the responsible and positive leadership corps in our country before this challenge: The time has arrived for nation-building.

I wish to accept this challenge today and invite every leader in every field to join me in doing so.

In South Africa the task of nation-building is formidable because of the diversity of our population. We lack the natural cohesion of a single culture and language that frequently forms the cornerstone of nationhood. consequently, we shall have to rely heavily on the other cornerstone - that of common values and ideals.

I have taken the liberty, on the basis of an analysis of the views of a wide spectrum of leaders, of formulating a set of these common values and ideals. Without laying claim to it being complete or the last word on the subject, I believe that it may serve as a point of departure in the search for a national consensus.

The full text will be released today under the title Manifesto for the New South Africa.

I believe that these values and ideals could provide the cohesiveness of a new South African nation, of a nation that will include all peace-loving South Africans on an equal footing. furthermore, a Manifesto such as this will be able to be associated with a Bill of Human Rights to which the Government is already committed. It should also give direction to the constitutional negotiations that lie ahead.

In a nutshell, the basic values and ideals, as formulated in the Manifesto, and as they have crystallised out of the national debate, could be summarised thus:

The basis of the new South Africa should be justice. The great majority of South Africans desire a just state which will guarantee basic liberties, rule out arbitrary actions and domination, and which will require and assure responsible citizenship. Everyone desires a just dispensation on which fairness will be the point of departure.

On this basis, South Africans ask that the new South Africa should epitomise the following objectives:

- They want peace. They wish to be assured that they and their families and their property will be safe.
- They want prosperity. They wish to share in a sound and growing economy that will make employment opportunities and better living conditions possible for everybody and allow everybody to reap the fruits of their labours.

- They want progress. They wish to have effective educational, health and welfare services, as well as adequate housing and recreational facilities.
- They want participation in democratic institutions. They wish to feel that they are part of government on every level, that they are not dominated and that they may be proud together of our country, South Africa.

On these broad basic values and ideals we can found a new South African nation. They do not, belong exclusively to any single political party. They are universal.

They find expression in the hearts and dreams of all successful, prosperous and stable nations.

We may differ about how we should realise these values and ideals. It is in the nature of political parties within a democracy to differ with one another. But we have to agree with one another on basic value systems. There simply is no room in the new South Africa for the alternatives to these values and ideals. There is no room for injustice, tyranny, domination, violence, or for social degradation and economic decline.

South Africa dare not make the mistakes that have led to impoverishment and dictatorship in so many countries of the world.

Therefore: No matter the pressure or from whence it comes, I shall not be instrumental in creating a dispensation here that is out of step with the basic values and ideals of the world's successful democracies and economies.

If we build the new South African nation on the foundation of these values and ideals, a good future awaits us and our children:

- We shall be able to unite the rich diversity of our population behind common goals.
- We shall be able to settle our differences through co-operation and peaceful negotiation.
- We shall be able to lay the foundations for a new, comprehensive South African nation which will include all our people with allegiance and loyalty to our common fatherland.
- We shall become part of the international community – finally, fully and with honour and dignity – and play a full part in the rest of Africa and the world.
- We shall be able to enter the new century as one of the most successful and dynamic nations of the world.

That is our vision. That is our intent. That is our challenge.

To this I commit myself. And I ask every leader to support me in this. If South Africans make the essence of a Manifesto such as this their own, then the foundations of our new nation will have been firmly laid.

With single-minded unity of purpose, we must build our new South African nation around these values and goals. Constructively, we have to mobilise all the energy, skill and inventiveness of every individual towards building a new South African nation, a nation that will stand proudly in its rightful place amongst the nations of the world. If South Africans do not truly become a nation, there will be no peace.

Naturally, the adoption of these values is merely a first step. Giving them constitutional content will require long and thorough negotiation. And before that can happen, agreement will have to be reached on the nature of the negotiations, procedures and structures.

### MULTI-PARTY CONFERENCE

Discussions on the way forward in this regard have taken place regularly and with increasing frequency among political parties and interest groups. There is growing consensus that the time has arrived for a multi-party conference.

The Government is playing a key role in promoting this idea. So have others. At the end of a fully representative meeting of leaders of first and second tier governments, which was attended by the Chairmen of the three Ministers Councils, Chief Ministers of the Self-governing Territories and Provincial Administrators, a joint statement was issued on the 30th November last year.

I quote from it:

The meeting strongly supported the view that a multi-party conference must be convened urgently in order to set in motion a process through which consensus on a future negotiation forum could be reached. Such a multi-party conference should include as many political parties as possible.

Against this background, the Government was pleased to take note of the Anniversary Message of the ANC on the 8th January this year, in which the principle of a multi-party conference as a first step that could lead to the adoption of a new constitution, was also accepted.

The result is that most of the major political groupings are now ready to attend multi-party exploratory talks. I trust that these talks will begin soon.

I am also convinced that this approach is the best way to ensure that the process, as well as the outcome, will be legitimate, durable and acceptable to the majority of South Africans.



In this connection, the Government declares its opposition to the idea of an elected constituent assembly. It is of the opinion that the negotiation of a new constitution should be the responsibility of the representatives of all political parties which enjoy proven support and are committed to a *peaceful and negotiated solution*.

In respect of constitutional development I wish, further, to state the Government's point of view clearly on an interim government. The idea that the present, legally-constituted Government should relinquish its powers and simply hand over its responsibilities to some or other temporary regime, cannot be considered in a sovereign, independent state. Effective government and administration in terms of existing constitutional legislation has to continue until a new constitution has been negotiated and been implemented after the acquisition of a mandate.

However, consideration may be given to certain transitional arrangements on the various legislative and executive levels to give the leaders of the negotiating parties a voice in the *formulation of important policy decisions*.

#### LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Other interim measures may be considered as well. Local Government is an example.

The Government has been giving attention to reform at the local authority level for quite some time. The options concerning possible models, as contained in the report of the Co-ordinating Council for Local Government Affairs, have stimulated debate at the local level.

In many cases, discussions opened doors to co-operation which could not be implemented because of legal impediments. This leads to frustration which has a negative influence on the process of reform.

The Government does not wish to anticipate the national process of negotiation in any way. Therefore, without wishing to establish a final structure at the local level, the decision has been taken to initiate interim steps to accommodate the dynamics of co-operation which have developed in many communities in respect of co-operation, and to give legal sanction to agreed joint actions and joint structures.

Consequently, legislation will be submitted during this session to enable communities to enter into discussions with one another on a voluntary basis and establish joint structures.

In terms of this legislation, room will be created for the following:

- The joint provision of services and the establishment of a single  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n   f o r   v a r i o u s   p a r t i c i p a t i n g   l o c a l  
authorities.

- The possibility for participating local authorities to take decisions at joint meetings that will be binding on all of the participants.
- The admissibility of the various local authorities that wish to enter into such an agreement, proceeding to the establishment of a single body or bodies to which the powers, duties and functions of the various participating authorities may be assigned, either wholly or in part.

Currently, the Government is also giving attention to the financial implications, since progress in the development of structures for co-operation should not be impeded by financial limitations.

In fact, substantial progress has already been made with the planning of a new system of local government that will give recognition to the concept of one municipality, one tax base. Therefore, the strategy of radicals to destroy existing structures on the local level has to end.

This senseless and futile disruption serves no purpose and merely causes pain and suffering, particularly in Black communities. Moreover, it is a serious obstacle in the way of reform and negotiation on every level. It is to the latter in particular, that those who are fighting about something which will disappear in any event, should rather direct their efforts.

Apart from local government, the Government is also looking at present, and with a view to interim arrangements, at the problems arising from the fragmentation of administration, especially in respect of education, housing, health and agriculture. In this context, there is a serious need for fundamental rationalisation linked to effective protection of standards and the rights of individuals and communities.

Before further progress is possible in this regard, wide consultation will have to take place and I urge all who have an interest in this, to co-operate in this process of deliberation. Overly hasty action is not indicated in this regard.

## REMOVAL OF STATUTORY DISCRIMINATION

The elimination of racial discrimination goes hand in hand with the constitutional process. The Government has expressed its intention repeatedly to remove discriminatory laws and practices. Many of them have been abolished already. Those remaining could not be repealed out of hand, because their complex nature required in-depth investigation.

These investigations have now been completed to the extent that I am able to make certain announcements today.

Legislation is to be tabled shortly for the repeal of the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, the Group Areas Act of 1966 and the Development of Black Communities Act of 1984, as well as all other stipulations that determine rights concerning land according to membership of population groups.

The Government will also table a White Paper in which it will fully state its approach to the future treatment of land and land questions. Both the White Paper and the relevant legislation will be at the disposal of members shortly.

No-one dare under-estimate the emotions and even the conflict potential relating to land rights.

Everybody has a natural need for access to land and its utilisation as living space and source of livelihood. Therefore, much more is necessary than the mere repeal of discriminatory legislation. At the same time, provision will have to be made for the protection of rights and of making landowners accessible.

On the one hand, there is a need for the protection of private property rights and security of title and tenure with due consideration for common and indigenous law. On the other hand, land ownership and financing for it have to be accessible to all in a non-discriminatory manner.

These points of departure will be contained in the envisaged White Paper.

The Population Registration Act of 1950 has been subjected to scrutiny as well.

On the part of the Government, the view was held that the Population Registration Act would have to be repealed eventually, but that this could not be done immediately because the Act was technically necessary for the maintenance of the present constitutional dispensation. Therefore, it would be possible to repeal the Act, provided that this is accompanied by the adoption of temporary transitional measures towards the acceptance of a new constitution. Consequently, I announce that legislation to this effect will be tabled during this session of Parliament.

Should Parliament adopt the Government's proposals, the South African statute book will be devoid, within months, of the remnants of racially discriminatory legislation which have become known as the cornerstones of apartheid.

#### OWN COMMUNITY LIFE

The ending of apartheid and the repeal of these last remaining discriminatory laws will bring us to the end of an era – an era in which it was sought to deal with the reality of a diversity of peoples and communities within the same national boundaries, by means of discriminatory coercion.

However, the removal of discrimination and coercion, which is now being completed, does not alter the reality of the existence of a variety of peoples and communities. This is not unique to South Africa either.

Throughout the world, there are certain communities within countries and states that have maintained a specific identity. Individuals, who feel attracted to certain communities and feel happy and secure in them, are also allowed to do so.

In South Africa, too, a deeply-rooted desire exists among some communities for a system in which certain human needs may continue to be met in a community context – without coercion, without discrimination and without apartheid.

The Government is convinced that recognition has to be given to this reality in any new dispensation. Therefore, it remains committed to ensuring community rights for those who desire them and believes that they will have to be accommodated in the new South Africa.

The Government's points of departure in this respect are that:

- people cannot be coerced into communities,
- the authorities may not discriminate against certain communities in favour of others,
- a community life of one's own has to be sustained by one's own inherent will and abilities and not by statutory coercion,
- community recognition has to be based on freedom of association, as it is recognised constitutionally and otherwise by various countries in the world.

Against this background, urgent consideration will have to be given to the question of how community rights may be rightfully accommodated in South Africa. Important political role players, inside and outside of Parliament, are in favour of the principle, and work on proposals in this regard is being widely undertaken.

## LEGAL REFORM

The concept of an own community life may be associated logically and meaningfully with the concept of a bill of human rights. As is already known, the Government favours such a bill of rights and is currently awaiting the final report of the South African Law Commission.

In the widest context, the Government wishes to bring the aims it has concerning community life, into line with the concept of a just state in which the rule of law prevails, a state which does not seek to prescribe communities or community life, nor force them upon anybody, but which maintains the legal principles, measures and courts that will make it possible for people to feel secure in the communities of their choosing.

Our legal system has to be subjected to continuous scrutiny to ensure that it meets the need of the ever-changing demands of our society. In this regard the recognition of indigenous law, alongside common law, remains important.

The maintenance of the independence of our courts is indispensable to a stable and secure future. In this respect, our legal system, and specifically our judiciary, enjoys international recognition and respect.

Where we find ourselves on the eve of constitutional developments in which our jurisprudence will have a decisive role to play, the Government will ensure continuously that the status of our jurisprudence is enhanced and even strengthened further. This applies to all its facets, but especially to judges and magistrates.

The Chief Justice, judges-president and the Minister of Justice are working on this continuously. Specific attention is also being given to the status of positions such as those of attorneys-general and magistrates.

Against this background of the world-wide trend towards simplifying legal procedures, making the legal process more accessible and involving the community with it to a greater or larger extent, several further initiatives are now indicated:

- Envisaged is a broadening and expansion of the basis of appointing assessors. The intention is to extend the system, as it currently prevails in the supreme court, to the lower courts in specific cases, as well as to make use in future, not only of jurists and experts as assessors, but also to involve ordinary members of the public served by the court concerned.
- Greater status and significance for the position of justice of the peace of a similar position, is envisaged to give them a role in the disposal of less serious, decriminalised misdemeanours. In this way, local communities will become more intimately involved with the administration of justice, and faster settlements will be assured.
- The intention is also to make civil procedure simpler, faster and cheaper by instituting a mediation procedure and courts for an abridged procedure in certain civil cases. A Bill to this effect was submitted to Parliament today.

The Government is also occupied in numerous other fields with reform, renewal and progress directed at a new and stable dispensation. I wish to deal with some subjects in this regard.

## EDUCATION

An exceptionally topical aspect of our society is education. It is well-known that the Government is fully aware of, and deeply concerned about, serious problems in education.

Problems such as inadequate vocational emphasis in our school syllabuses, fragmented state administration, equal financial treatment for all pupils, finding alternative sources of finance for education, the adequate provision of facilities, liaison between formal education and the informal sector, and distance education as an alternative mode of providing education, receive continuous and urgent attention. To equip the individual better for his task, renewal in the educational dispensation is essential to make it more career-oriented and more closely-related to the economy.

Therefore, the Government announced an investigation into a comprehensive educational renewal strategy last year already. The results are expected soon. Thereafter, the matter will be taken further seriously.

Education affects the future of everyone of us. If we wish to create a future South Africa without discrimination and with equality of opportunity, this will have to be true of education as well. However, distinctive or autogenous education, conducted with Government assistance within a single system of those who desire it, has to remain an option. For this we need the constructive co-operation of all who have an interest in education.

It is gratifying, therefore, that leaders and organisations with divergent political programmes have begun to raise their voices against the disruption and chaos which characterised the school year of 1990. I also wish to urge all involved – parents, teachers and the children themselves – to place the interests of the pupils above all else.

Political and community organisations should encourage teachers and children to make use of education and not allow schools and pupils to be abused for political purposes.

The present educational system shall and must be changed. Work on this is being done on the political and educational levels. In the meantime, education has to continue in an orderly manner.

We are determined that our ultimate system of education shall enjoy the acceptance and support of the majority of our population. It will have to be an educational system that will be affordable and in which appropriate education is offered. In addition, it will have to keep abreast of changing needs and trends in our society.

## THE ECONOMY

One other great imperative facing us in this closing decade of the twentieth century is economic restructuring. It is the only way through which we will be able to return to a high growth path and meet the reasonable aspirations of all our people. No economy, least of all that of a developing society, can do this overnight, but we can and must promote the creation of employment opportunities and the generation of incomes to meet the basic needs of our rapidly growing population in the shortest possible space of time.

Economic growth and constitutional reform have to be mutually reinforcing. Unless the pressing problems of poverty and unemployment are alleviated, constitutional models will be of little avail to us.

There is room for debate on economic structures, but not on the necessity of effective macro-economic management. Throughout the world, a stable, non-inflationary environment has been rediscovered as a key element of sustained economic growth. Therefore, our own fight against inflation has to enjoy top priority, as well as united and ongoing support. Failure on this front will leave us with scant hope of success on any other. Inflation does not alleviate poverty – it aggravates it.

The Government has neither the capability nor the desire to intervene directly in the price and wage determination process of the private sector. However, unjustifiable wage increase, especially in times of economic downturn, do not serve the overall public interest: they may well result in lost jobs and fan inflation. The same applies to excessive and routinely instituted price increases that fuel the wage-price spiral. Fortunately, the past year has seen several economic gains. Our programme of economic restructuring, in line with the political and socio-economic exigencies, is firmly on course. Progress has also been made in short-term stabilisation, especially concerning monetary policy. The current account of the balance of payments has been performing well and the real effective exchange rate of the rand has been comparatively stable.

Of special importance has been our new access, in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, to markets long closed to our exports, as well as our readmission to capital markets in Western Europe. These and other opportunities resulting from the positive international reaction to the Government's initiatives, have to be grasped firmly and decisively.

We shall continue to sustain and enhance the competitive ability of our exporters. Surplus capacity in areas such as electricity generation and transport, is being exploited through favourable power and freight charges to our manufacturers. Increased beneficiation of our abundant raw materials will continue to be encouraged. We simply cannot forego the much-needed employment opportunities this will bring about.

All concerned South Africans working for a peaceful transition to a new society wish to see the reduction and ultimate elimination of the disparities that still exist. Restructuring the economy and allocating resources to specific needs are essential to this end. Equally important, however, are the channels for deploying the resources, the involvement of the people concerned, and their acceptance of mutual responsibility.

All of our citizens have to join both in shaping and in sharing the national product. I believe the vast majority of South Africans prefer opportunities for the self-advancement of all, to largesse and patronage for some.

To achieve even the goal of parity in social expenditure will require hard work and stern discipline over the next decade and beyond. Attempts to shorten this inevitably incremental process by militant action in the labour or other fields, will merely serve to lengthen it.

By contrast, some form of social accord on economic goals and actions would be a powerful instrument for achieving the shared national goal of a common society, offering wider material prospects and a higher quality of life to all its members. However, such an accord has to recognise these realities and provide a time span and a structure for orderly economic and social development.

I have been greatly encouraged by the progress made in the field of economic development by the Development Bank of Southern Africa, the South African Housing Trust, the Small Business development Corporation and other agencies. Similarly, the Independent Development Trust and the newly-announced Private Sector Initiative, operating under the aegis of the Urban Foundation, are set to make major contributions towards addressing endemic problems in housing, health and education.

The recently announced allocation by the Independent Development Trust of substantial resources directed at giving poor people access to land ownership, is of great significance. For its part, the Government is currently taking an urgent look at innovative methods of financing the provision of land and housing.

I should also like to mention the committee of Deputy Ministers which, in close liaison with the private sector, is investigating imaginative ways of raising substantial capital funds for further development projects.

The Government places a high premium on job and income-creating growth. In broad terms, this requires:

- Firstly, that maximum private sector development be encouraged.
- Secondly, that the State's economic involvement be reduced in consequence to a minimum, with its residual activities based increasingly on business principles.
- Thirdly, that Government policy and actions be geared to the fullest utilisation of national resources. This includes a shift from import replacement and strategic self-sufficiency to an export-oriented strategy, involving limited protection of domestic industry, and aimed at maximum productivity and cost-effectiveness.

Development agencies have an important role to play in adding impetus to job creation. While celebrating its 50th anniversary, the Industrial Development Corporation is to be restructured so as to promote the optimal industrial development of South Africa.



The agricultural sector is primarily responsible for feeding the nation – a most important strategic consideration. It also provides both a direct and indirect base for employment and for small and informal business, and is an important contributor to the domestic product and to our foreign exchange earnings.

It has had to grapple with severe problems during the past year, but is assured of a helping hand from the Government where appropriate. However, aid on a blanket basis cannot be considered. Assistance has to be targeted as a bridging measure to those whose viability is not in doubt, in order to fulfill the essential mission of this sector of our economy.

The pursuit of greater economic growth demands that the remaining inhibiting legislation and administrative regulations of structures be vigorously scrutinised. Good progress has been made here too.

Deregulation, however, does not mean no regulation at all. The consumer's interests have always weighed heavily with Government. The creation of the Business Practices Committee in 1988, the proposed general codes for specific business sectors now being finalised, and the role of the Competition Board, represent some of the evidence of the Government's ongoing commitment to consumer protection and the proper functioning of markets.

Given the expected slowdown in the world economy, quite apart from the Gulf crisis, the economic outlook for South Africa in 1991 is one of consolidation of the gains already made, and a continuation of the restructuring process. I wish to urge all South Africans – particularly those involved in the creation of wealth – to join hands with the Government in this great and urgent effort to provide jobs and incomes.

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS

*Internationally, far-reaching changes have taken place during the past year. The world scene was dominated by the events in Central and Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, the process towards European unity, including German unification, and lately, the conflict in the Gulf region. These turbulent events, which have coincided with rapid and fundamental changes in our own country, will have a significant impact on the future of world politics.*

With Communism a discredited and defunct ideology, and the Cold War virtually something of the past, we have witnessed the removal of major obstacles in the way of achieving values and objectives which will benefit mankind as a whole. Obviously, much remains to be done.

The Gulf War is particularly regrettable at this time. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, an independent Muslim state which has long been a recognised member of the United Nations and of the Arab community of states, was an act of aggression which cannot be condoned. South Africa's position in regard to this is based on accepted principles of international law and is in line with the position adopted by the vast majority of states, Islamic states included.

Having said that, let me add that it is our earnest hope and prayer that this conflict will soon be brought to an end with a minimum loss of life, injury and destruction.

In addition to the Gulf War, the Palestinian issue, unpredictabilities occasioned by the unfolding situation in the Soviet Union and the spectre of AIDS and poverty looming ominously over Africa, should all serve as warnings that the elimination of world crises and flashpoints has not yet been accomplished.

Nonetheless, the important reality is that a new beginning has been made out of the vortex of world events, that a climate was created, before the Gulf war erupted, in which greater freedom, greater security and greater peace could prevail than at any other time this century.

There is so much at stake for mankind, that the world dare not allow the crises now confronting it to re-create the attitudes of hostility, rivalry and suspicion which characterised international relations in all the years since the Second World War.

*It is remarkable how the convergence of South African and international events has brought about greater harmony between us and the rest of the world.*

The fundamental change of course we embarked upon a year ago, was motivated primarily by our national interests. Yet, the progress we have made since then has created an entirely new situation for South Africa internationally. I am happy to be able to say that we have succeeded in breaking out of the dead end of isolation.

The exploitation of regional conflict in our part of the world to further ideology and power has come to an end. Political opportunism, diplomatic blackmail and playing off the two major powers against one another for the achievement of questionable political objectives cannot be used effectively against us any longer. Revolution is no longer a marketable product in the world today. The resources of the destabilisation and propaganda campaigns against South Africa are drying up. The anti-South African industry is facing insolvency. Sanctions are withering away.

Mr. Speaker, I have high hopes that we shall further improve our situation internationally in the year ahead. We shall be opening several new Missions in Central Europe and Africa. Our contact with the rest of Africa is growing. Reciprocal visits by delegations are a frequent occurrence. We see this continuing in the future. We are also looking to the East as an area of greater opportunities. *I will be undertaking further visits abroad during the course of the year.*

*All of this means that we are now able to look forward with greater confidence towards resuming our rightful position in the wider community of nations and restoring the many ties which were severed over the years.*

South Africa is also interested in how current world events will affect our region. At a time when there is talk of a looming marginalization of the African continent, Africa has to take stock. If Africa remains poor, underdeveloped, unstable and undemocratic, then it will isolate itself and move into inevitable obscurity.

Therefore, Africa's reaction to the new international spirit which favours multi-party democracy and free-market systems, is of vital importance. We in Africa have to realise that we have to save ourselves. The world will certainly not do it for us.

Regional development is of decisive importance to Southern Africa. The eleven states of Southern Africa have a combined population of more than 100 million. The region is endowed with valuable natural resources and has the potential to become one of the most prosperous regions in the world. However, the nations comprising the region, divided for so long by colonialism, wars, conflicts and racial strife, will have to join forces, work together and plan together.

If we succeeded in this, our region should be able to realise the common aim of a better future. If we work together, we will succeed in obtaining active involvement by Europe, the USA and other developed countries in the developing economies of Southern Africa.

## SECURITY

This positive picture, which I was able to sketch over a wide area is contrasted by the high level of political and criminal lawlessness in the country. It is worrying and unacceptable. It has the potential to abet serious delays and even undermine the progress already made. Therefore, everything is being done to create a more conducive climate.

One of the great evils is the abuse of mass actions which degenerate all too often. In this connection a clear distinction has to be drawn between peaceful mass actions which are part of the normal democratic process and mass actions with revolutionary aims or which lead to crime or infringe against the safety and rights of others. Lately, there has been a tendency to challenge the legal order and exceed the bounds of the normal democratic process.

Political opponents who assault and murder one another, negate every democratic principle and fan flames of hatred which will remain difficult to extinguish long after a new constitutional era has dawned.

Demonstrators who disrupt the public, harm individuals and undermine the economy, are not engaged in democratic activities.

Mass action has to take place peacefully, responsibly and within the law. Should the current trend towards the abuse of this method continue in any way, the Government will be obliged to apply stronger measures to prevent abuse.

Of course it is not the task of the Government alone to act in this respect. The pressure and demands exerted on our security forces – on the Police Force as well as the Defence Force – are already enormous. Political and community leaders have to accept co-responsibility for settling disputes, controlling supporters and creating a climate for negotiation.

*By and large our security forces are doing an excellent job and do not deserve the vilification to which they are subjected from many quarters. I wish to urge all the inhabitants of South Africa to give their full support to the security forces. If the authority and integrity of our policy are undermined, all of us will have to pay a heavy price.*

On the part of the Government, everything possible will be done as a matter of high priority to make our police force more effective and efficient.

In respect of crime in general, the Minister of Law and Order has already announced that the Police are launching a special campaign. The cumulative effect of the increase in the numbers of police officers, the optimal utilisation of manpower and special actions and campaigns, should have the result, in terms of all reasonable expectations, that crime will be combatted more effectively. The Defence Force, in particular, is making an exceptional contribution in a supporting role, to the capabilities of the Police Force. The joint capacity resulting from this co-operation will continue to be deployed effectively against the forces of chaos and anarchy.

Together with the South African Police, the Defence Force and Armscor ensure that South Africa is able to depend on a strong and ready security base that makes peaceful change possible. We will have to build on this further. The security forces of the new South Africa will have to be manned and managed properly. Continued national service and training have to be seen in this light. A professional and well-trained Defence Force and Police Force, which are not subject to political expediency, are the best guarantee for the maintenance of a safe environment in which everybody is able to live and work. The Government will continue to ensure this.

## CONCLUSION

The Parliamentary session beginning today, will exact high demands from us. The year ahead will be as decisive as 1990.

Our ability, here in Parliament and in our relations with extra-parliamentary organisations, to broaden co-operation and rise above petty politics, will be of decisive importance.

There is neither time nor room for turning back. There is only one road – ahead.

Ahead with courage, boldness, deliberation and planning, understanding and balance.

Ahead with purpose and dedication.

Ahead with faith and certainty in the knowledge that our future is in the Hands of the Almighty God, Lord of the destinies of peoples and nations.

It is my prayer that He will lead and sustain us in all our labours and deliberations.

Mr. Speaker, Members of Parliament, I now declare this Third Session of the Ninth Parliament of the Republic of South Africa to be duly opened.

## MANIFESTO FOR THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA

WE, as South Africans from all walks of life,

ASSOCIATING ourselves with the goodwill and the shared desire for justice, peace and freedom among the majority of our fellow South Africans,

DECLARE THAT a just and fair New South Africa, free from apartheid, requires a strong South African nation,

THAT there exists, therefore, an urgent need for the leaders of all our people and communities to come together to shape a mutually acceptable new constitution for our country,

THAT such a constitution should be based on the rule of law and lay the foundation for a nation dedicated to justice, democracy and freedom for all, through the pursuit of participation, peace, progress, and prosperity,

THAT Christian values and universally accepted civilised norms and standards should be maintained in South Africa together with recognition and protection of freedom of faith and worship,

THAT all the people of our country should take part in this endeavour,

THAT WE, to this end, SUBSCRIBE to the following:

### PARTICIPATION: A FREE AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM

WE COMMIT OURSELVES to the creation of a free and democratic political system in South Africa, in which:

- All people shall be free in this, their country of birth,
- All the people of our land shall participate fully at all levels of government on the basis of universal adult franchise,
- The government of the country shall at all times be based upon the consent of the governed,
- All people shall be equal before the law, and shall enjoy equal rights regardless of race, colour, sex or creed,
- The rights of all individuals and minorities defined on a non-racial basis shall be adequately protected in the constitution and in a constitutional guaranteed and justiciable Bill of Rights,
- Freedom of movement and of association shall be guaranteed for all.

**PROGRESS: AN EQUITABLE SOCIAL SYSTEM**

**WE COMMIT OURSELVES TO** the creation of an equitable social system in South Africa in which:

- The human dignity of each individual, being a unique creature of God, shall be respected at all times,
- Freedom of religion and of worship shall be guaranteed for all,
- All discrimination between groups of people or between individuals shall be eliminated and discriminatory legislation shall be repealed,
- The goal of just and equitable educational systems, accessible to all, shall be striven for unswervingly,
- Access for all to affordable shelter shall be a high priority.

**PROSPERITY: A FREE AND EQUITABLE ECONOMIC SYSTEM**

**WE COMMIT OURSELVES TO** the creation of a free and equitable economic system in South Africa in which:

- All people shall be free to sell their labour and market their products,
- The ownership of property shall be open to all,
- Economic growth with the emphasis on the creation of employment shall be vigorously promoted,
- The resources of the state shall be fairly used for the common good, with special regard to the socio-economic backlogs existing in our country,
- The Stater and all the members of our society shall accept our responsibility as custodians of our environment and resources.

**PEACE: FREEDOM AND SECURITY FOR ALL**

**WE COMMIT OURSELVES TO** the maintenance of South Africa as a sovereign independent state, secure against foreign interference, in which:

- The protection of, and respect for life, liberty and property shall be a first principle,

- The peaceful settlement of political and other disputes between groups and individuals shall form the foundation of a democratic society,
- Violence and intimidation shall not be tolerated as tools to attain political ends,
- The State shall be charged with the duty to ensure the maintenance of stability in a peaceful and orderly society,
- The application of the powers of State shall be limited to the minimum necessary for the maintenance of a peaceful and orderly society, and shall be governed by the law.

WE, who associate ourselves with this Manifesto,

RECOGNISE that we are still divided by many differences concerning the manner in which these ideals may best be realised, but

WE ALSO RECOGNISE that we are UNITED in our love for our country and all its people, and therefore

WE DECLARE that we are DETERMINED to apply all our talents and our labours to overcome these differences and to find a peaceful way to build a great South African nation and a better future for the generations to come.

Issued by The Bureau for Information on behalf of: The Office of the State President.



## NAMIBIA

### 'A FORMIDABLE TASK OF DEVELOPMENT'

#### General Policy Statement of the Namibian Government

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

After achieving independence, Namibia is confronted with the formidable task of reconstruction and development. It will be greatly appreciated if the international solidarity shown during the fight for independence could be maintained, especially during the difficult transitional period of restructuring and rehabilitation of old institutions, policies and infrastructure.

In order to ensure that such transition is achieved for the benefit and with the full participation of all Namibians, priority issues are addressed in this policy statement with a view to identify actions required during the transitional period (1990-1992)

Committed to the promotion of the welfare of the people, the Namibian Government highlights in this general policy statement the priority areas which will constitute the main focus of the programme for the reconstruction and development of Namibia during the transitional period. The priority sectors identified are agriculture and rural development, education, health and housing. In addition to this statement an over-all assessment of investment requirements will be presented as a separate document.

#### 2. FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES

While the people of Namibia have emerged victorious in the struggle against colonialism, racism and apartheid, it is now determined to strive towards achieving national reconciliation and fostering of peace and unity.

Every Namibian should have the right to dignity and life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Fundamental human rights and freedoms should not be violated and no repeal or amendment of the Namibian Constitution shall be permissible in this respect.

The legislative and executive powers in Namibia are derived from free and fair elections. The first National Assembly contains several political parties, which, however, adopted the Constitution and elected the first president of the Republic unanimously. Multi-democracy and human rights will be cornerstones in nation building and in social progress in Namibia.

The government of Namibia is committed to the promotion and maintenance of the welfare of the people adopting, inter-alia, policies aimed at the following:

- \* to ensure that every citizen has a right to fair and reasonable access to public facilities and services;
- \* that consistent planning is undertaken to raise and maintain an acceptable level of nutrition and standard of living of the Namibian people and the improvement of the public health;
- \* to ensure equal opportunity for women to enable them to participate fully in all spheres of society;
- \* that the ecosystems, essential ecological processes and biological diversity of Namibia are maintained and living natural resources are utilised on a sustainable level for the benefit of all Namibians, both present and future.

The economic system in Namibia is based on the principles of a mixed economy with the objective of securing economic growth, prosperity and a life of human dignity for all Namibians. Public as well as private co-operatives, co-ownership and small-scale family ownership are allowed and encouraged. Foreign investment is encouraged within Namibia subject to the provisions of an investment code to be adopted by parliament.

A strong and democratic state is necessary to initiate reconstruction and development, redistribute income and wealth, and establish social security for the Namibian people. A dynamic private sector and well-functioning markets are, on the other hand, safeguards against stagnation, which would otherwise result from extraordinary centralisation and bureaucracy. It is of vital importance that the wealth creating sector must be in balance with the wealth distributing sector.

### 3. POLICIES ON BASIC INSTITUTIONS AND INFRASTRUCTURE

The government of Namibia has inherited an unusually expensive and unbalance public administration. In 1988 the country had a total government expenditure as high as 56% of the gross national product. Part of the excessive public sector was due to the establishment of the ethnic administrations, including the fragmentation of essential services such as agricultural extension, education and health.

Through the restructuring of the central, regional and local administrations the government of Namibia will abolish forever all forms of social discrimination in public services and benefits.

The abolition of second-tier authorities will take place via decentralization once the new structures of regional and local governments have been completed.

The restructuring of public administration will be based on the policy of the government, in a spirit of reconciliation, as defined in the constitution that any person holding office at independence shall continue to hold such office until he or she resigns or retires, is transferred or removed from the office in accordance with law. Many of the people affected by the

restructuring can be absorbed by the unified regional and district administrations. During the transitional period, however, it is unavoidable that the redeployment of the civil servants of the eliminated administrative structures will place a financial burden on the Namibian government.

During the period of South African rule part of the costs of public administration was covered by direct budget aid from the South African government. At the maximum this amounted to R469 million or 30% of the central government expenditure. After independence this direct budget support will be discontinued immediately while elimination of the administrative fat take a somewhat longer time.

The Namibian government is committed to the establishment of a public administration which is effective and proportionate to the level of development in the country, and is capable of serving all Namibians. To this effect it will, however, need both technical assistance as well as financial support from the international donor community.

In monetary and trade administration and policies, Namibia is still short of some basic institutions and infrastructure. The government has inter alia decided to establish an independent Central Bank and to join the South African Customs Union (SACU), of which Namibia already has been a de facto member.

The first step to establish a Central bank will take the form of taking over the branch of the Reserve Bank of South Africa in Windhoek. An experienced governor and other members of the board will under the auspices of the parliament, take charge of the Central Bank and oversee and plan the implementation of a Namibian currency and monetary policies. By establishing a Central Bank with own currency and giving its board great autonomy in monetary matters so as to enable the Namibian government to cope with external financial shocks. It is envisaged that within two years the new Namibian currency should be established and emerge as a strong and stable currency both internally and externally within a context of relatively liberal capital movements.

About 75% of Namibia's exports go outside SACU while more than 90% of imports come through member countries of SACU, particularly South Africa. Independent Namibia will formalize in the near future the de facto membership of SACU. Since Namibia lacks comprehensive trade statistics and Customs Administration, the share of the common revenue pool allocated to Namibia is arbitrary. As a first step toward improving the situation the Namibian Government has introduced customs border posts between Namibia and South Africa and will negotiate with RSA a new scheme for allocating customs revenues based on actual trade figures. While establishing a new Customs Administration, Namibia may need some external technical assistance.

In addition to joining SACU, the Republic of Namibia will also take full advantage of the existing sub-regional economic co-operation arrangements, particularly the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa by joining their membership. Also as a member of the organization of African Unity, Namibia will contribute to the achievement of the objectives contained in the Lagos plan

of Action and the Final Act of Lagos for the establishment of an African Economic community. In the same spirit, the Government of Namibia is fully committed to international economic co-operation in the framework of the United Nations System and is prepared to join its various agencies as well as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)

While joining the family of independent nations, Namibia is expecting to get development aid for a considerable time from the international donor community. Namibia is fully aware of the importance of development planning, aid co-ordination and debt management. To this effect the government has established a National Planning Commission, whose task it is to plan the priorities and directions of national development. In its infancy as an independent nation, Namibia invites the donor countries and international aid organizations to close co-operation in order to establish a well functioning aid co-ordination mechanism within the National Planning Commission. *Clear directives must be drawn up to control and co-ordinate grants, loans and direct investments for the benefit of the nation.*

#### 4. RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES

As reconciliation and unity are driving forces of independent Namibia, it is important to underscore the main socio-economic problems of Namibia so that the immediate task of restructuring and rehabilitation could focus on the most salient issues. First, the dual nature of the Namibian economy and society has led to a lopsided development in various sectors resulting inter alia in (i) glaring poverty among the majority of the population, (ii) wide-spread unemployment, (iii) a high illiteracy rate, (iv) inadequate health care, and (v) poor housing conditions. Indeed, while the overall per capita income of Namibia of US\$1,044 in 1988 (UNSO estimate) is comparable to that of a middle-income developing country, its lopsided development pattern is such that per capita income of 55% of the population supported by traditional economy was only US\$63. Such an indicator, together with the high illiteracy rate and the meagre contribution of the manufacturing sector to Gross Domestic Product (less than 5% in 1988) would as such qualify Namibia among the United Nations Least Developed Countries (LLDC's). Also, it should be noted that despite the low population density of Namibia, the carrying capacity of land has not kept pace with population growth. The main social and economic problems need therefore be urgently addressed, in a global perspective.

Secondly, the structure of production of the Namibian economy is characterized by the relatively low contribution of the agricultural sector. Over 70% of the population is involved in agricultural activities, but the commercial agricultural sector accounted for only about 10% of Gross Domestic Product in 1988. Such a disparity clearly point to the urgency of not only ensuring an equitable and more productive land tenure system, but also raising substantially agricultural production and productivity.

## PRIORITY SECTORS AND PROGRAMMES

In the spirit of maintaining peace and reconciliation, and given the present socio-economic structure and characteristics briefly outlined in this statement, it is clear that the main focus of the restructuring and rehabilitation programmes during the transitional period should be the promotion of popular participation in the development process. To this end, the following sectors will receive special attention:

1. agricultural and rural development, on which the livelihood of the majority of the Namibian people depends;
2. education and training to give an opportunity to all Namibians to participate fully in the development process;
3. health care for the so far neglected majority of the population; and
4. affordable housing for the less fortunate.

### 1. AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

The majority of Namibia's population (70%) lives in the rural areas and depends partly or wholly on subsistence or commercial agriculture. Two important features characterise the agricultural sector in Namibia namely the skewed distribution and unequal development of land, on the one hand, on the other the predominance of livestock and the relatively minor role played by crop production, in terms of food security. Such a situation, in a context of a rising rate of unemployment and increasing hunger in the rural areas, needs to be urgently addressed.

The available information shows that the agricultural sector has registered a very dismal performance in 1988 growing by about only 2%, which is below the already low overall growth of the economy. Investment in the sector increased by only R2.5 million in 1988, or declined in real terms. Indeed real capital stock in the agricultural and fishing sector has consistently declined since 1980. In 1989, in addition, part of agriculture suffered from a drought.

There is an obvious need to devise policies aimed at increasing agricultural production, through increased investment and improved productivity. Despite a harsh natural environment in parts of the country, the existing viable agricultural areas in Namibia have potential for both pastures and crop production. It is an established fact that the northern part of Namibia has the potential for growing most of the country's crops particularly millet which accounts for more than 50% of the staple food of Namibia, but also other crops such as maize, sorghum, beans and cassava. However, water supply is a crucial constraining factor that must be addressed. The main focus, particularly during the reconstruction and rehabilitation period, would therefore be the increase and diversification of crop production, so as to improve the country's food self-sufficiency ratio which is presently particularly low.

It should also be noted that the dichotomy between commercial and communal farming is the result of the concentration of modern inputs and finance on commercial farms. Many peasants had thus been deprived of incentives with the consequence of confining most of communal farming to subsistence production. A major agricultural policy shift is therefore the removal of the existing gap between communal and commercial farms. In doing so, due attention will be given to the need for expanding the existing commercial farming with a view to increasing its foreign exchange earning capacity and cater for domestic consumption. In this regard, expropriation of land without full compensation is excluded as unconstitutional. Instead natural progress towards transforming communal farming into commercial farming as well as improved use of less optimally cultivated areas is favoured. Individual successful farmers in the present communal areas will as far as possible be financially assisted to buy existing commercial farms.

*Immediately after independence, Namibia will take full control of her 200 nautical mile fishing zone. All foreign fishing will stop until a detailed survey of the stocks is made available. After the renewal of resources, ample opportunities will emerge for investing in local fishing fleets. Another key element of the agricultural policy is the linking of the sector to processing industries especially in the livestock and fisheries sub-sectors. In addition to bringing about economic diversification, through the processing of local raw materials, such a policy will greatly contribute to reducing the high rate of unemployment. In view of the above policy orientations, the main elements of a priority programme in the agricultural sector should include:*

- a) getting into use new, under-utilized and un-utilized lands to be identified - especially in the northern region - for dry land crop production through e.g. irrigation programmes in some areas when economically feasible;
- b) the devising of a financing scheme to enable existing communal farmers to embark on commercial farming;
- c) the encouragement of commercial farmers to expand into production for domestic consumption;
- d) rehabilitation and expansion of agricultural training facilities for teachers, extension workers and farmers;
- e) development of farmer support programmes including applied research to improve seed varieties, provision of low cost basic inputs, extension services, marketing infrastructures, credit facilities, etc.;
- f) the promotion of agro-industries especially in the small-scale sector;
- g) the development of alternative sources of energy with a view to preserving sustainable growth of forest resources.

## 2. EDUCATION AND TRAINING

The salient features of Namibia's education system has been that between 30–40% of school-age children do not attend classes, and that 60% of the teachers are unqualified, while 30% are under-qualified. Such a situation was the result of an educational system sub-divided into 11 authorities each responsible for providing education to members of its ethnic population; for training teachers for primary school under its jurisdiction; for building and administering schools, training colleges, hostels and other institutions related to education.

The previous education structure has also resulted in a discriminatory allocation of resources. It was estimated by UNESCO that the resources allocated to the 10 ethnic authorities for blacks represented only one tenth of those devoted to white education, in per capita terms. Thus, over 99% of the untrained teachers and over 80% of those that are under-qualified are in the 10 black educational authorities. For this reason, Namibia is faced with an army of out of school, unskilled and un-employable youth and adults, since the population concerned represent over 90% of the total population of the country.

The administrative structure of the education system is also grossly skewed with a heavily staffed central Administration not directly involved in educational activities including teaching, curriculum development, production of reading materials, etc. Obviously, such a non-productive staffing structure is not commensurate to the resources allocated to education which represented about R350 million in the financial year 1988–1989, or 20% of total current expenditure. The school system is therefore disfunctional with inadequate, wasteful and inefficient schools that are irrelevant to the needs of the majority of the Namibian youth. The role of education is central to the objective of bringing about a human-centred development in Namibia, which is a basic social and economic objective of the Namibian Government. During the transitional period of reconstruction and rehabilitation, a major policy orientation will be the establishment of a uniform and universal education system, open to both children and adults, as well as a corresponding appropriate administration. Other policies to be devised relate to the development of more adapted curricula, the upgrading of the general level of the teaching staff and the promotion of a non-formal education scheme tailored to the needs of the drop-out and the rural population, especially women.

In line with the above policies, an education and training programme for restructuring and rehabilitation would include:

- a) the development and implementation of a comprehensive in-service training programme, involving foreign teachers as an interim arrangement while training Namibian counter-parts in vital areas such as English language, mathematics;
- b) the preparation of more adapted teaching materials especially in vital disciplines;

- c) the launching of non-formal vocational training programmes in such areas as construction, maintenance and repair, carpentry, marketing, etc. with a view to developing income-generating skills for the drop-outs and unemployed;
- d) the devising of a financing scheme to enable the establishment of small-scale businesses in industry and trade for the newly skilled manpower;
- e) the building of the necessary infrastructure for both formal and non-formal training institutions;
- f) budgetary support to the restructuring of the school administration system.

### 3. HEALTH

The health sector has been as adversely affected as education by the system of institutionalised apartheid in the form of second-tier ethnic administrations. This has resulted in the costly duplication of facilities and services, as well as the serious weakening of the sector due to the fragmentation and competition for scarce resources inherent in the system. Rural, preventive, primary, occupational and community health have been largely neglected. The health system has until now been base towards urban centres and has been mostly curative in nature. Health facilities, manpower, supplies and so on are unequally distributed and technology has been acquired and used inappropriately. Most Namibians live in poor and overcrowded houses, they use inadequate and unsafe water supplies and sanitary conditions are substandard. As a result most of them suffer from environmentally-related preventable diseases.

Most blacks are poorly paid and live and work under poor conditions and are therefore victims of exposure to occupational and environmental hazards. Their low incomes affect the nutritional, housing and sanitation standards available to their families. The majority of mothers and children in Namibia have been affected by these conditions and consequently the priority health problems identified, relate to women of child-bearing age and young children.

The Government of the Republic of Namibia has devised a health policy based on the equitable provision of health services and has embraced WHO's social goal of Health for All by the Year 2000, making primary health care services the focal point of all health care services provided to communities in Namibia. This implies restructuring the services to comply with the principles of equity, accessibility, affordability and community involvement.

The key features of the health programme during the first years after independence shall consist of:

- a) the strengthening and expansion of primary health care services provided in community health centres and clinics and by mobile services and village health workers to the rural disadvantaged community;



- b) strengthening and improving the transport services to support primary health care outreach programmes in order to achieve the goal of accessible health services for all Namibians;
- c) the promotion of proper nutrition, adequate safe water supplies and basic sanitation;
- d) maternal and child-care, including family spacing;
- e) immunisation programmes against the major preventable infectious diseases;
- f) the development of national control programmes against major communicable diseases such as tuberculosis, malaria and Aids;
- g) the reconstruction, renovation and upgrading of key health facilities including mission hospitals, to provide a national system of referral support for primary health care services;
- h) establishment of an assistance fund to integrate returnee health workers into the restructured health care system;
- i) budgetary support to strengthen the provision of primary health care services free of charge to all Namibians; and
- j) the establishment of an Institute for Health, Manpower Development and Training aimed at strengthening mid-level management and training health workers in categories needed to achieve the policy objectives of the Government.

#### 4. HOUSING

Like education and health, housing conditions in Namibia have been negatively affected by regulations related to ethnic residences, especially in urban areas. As a result there is an acute shortage of housing, particularly for workers employed in industrial centres, and there is an increasing emergency of squatters. A similar situation prevails in the rural areas, especially among employees of commercial farmers and also for those living in the communal areas. Generally, the rural sector has so far been totally neglected in terms of support and assistance in the acquisition of decent housing.

It is estimated that, given the present shortage of decent houses and the return of a large number of returnees, an annual production of 16,000 units will be required, for both urban and rural areas. In other respects, housing is presently not affordable to the majority of Namibians because of the high cost of building materials which are imported.

In order to alleviate the pressing housing problems, the main policy options of the government of Namibia during the restructuring and rehabilitation period would be the revamping of the housing parastatal Nasboukor, the people participation in housing through co-operatives and greater use of local materials. The main objective is the construction of affordable but not necessarily low-standard houses. In addition, priority will be given to the development of rural areas in order to prevent slums and peri-urban settlements. Such a policy would be complementary to those that would be evolved in agriculture and rural development. The priority programme in the area of housing would therefore include:

- a) improving regional and local spatial planning and supply of communal services, in order to facilitate new settlements;
- b) *supply of building sites for self-help house construction;*
- c) the development of locally-produced building materials including assistance to existing indigenous production units;
- d) the promotion and training in indigenous entrepreneurship and self-help in house construction;
- e) the devising of a public construction programme using the expertise available in the existing parastal; and
- f) supply of long term subsidized financing for affordable housing.

## 5. OTHER IMPORTANT SECTORS AND INTER-LINKAGES

While focusing on selected priority sectors, it is important to ensure that activities in other sectors also contribute to the achievement of the immediate and short-term objectives outlined in this statement. These include inter-alia infrastructural development especially in the transport sector, agro-related industries and overall economic and financial management.

Agricultural and rural development, particularly in the northern region, would require an integrated approach including among other things the construction of an appropriate feeder road system. The immediate and short-term restructuring and rehabilitation programme should therefore also focus on improvement of roads in rural areas as well as on the improvement of links with Namibia's northern and eastern neighbours. Projects and programmes in this regard would also focus on the use of low volume road-building techniques based on labour intensive construction and maintenance methods.

Similarly, emphasis will be put on the links between the agricultural and industrial sectors. In this regard, encouragement will be given to industries processing locally produced raw materials, especially small-scale private enterprises, as well as to industries providing essential inputs to

agriculture such as agricultural tools and implements and to construction industries in the rural areas.

Finally, the importance of sound economic policy and management during the transitional period of reconstruction and rehabilitation cannot be over-emphasized. Prominent among the major requirements in this regard are the issues of employment generation and "balancing" the budget. Nearly all the policy orientations outlined in this statement would require increase government expenditures particularly for the financing of the new, less cumbersome and more efficient administrative structures that are essential to carry out the restructuring and rehabilitation programme.

While every effort will be made on the part of the Namibian Government to minimize the deficit in current expenditure, the assistance of the international community is of paramount importance during the transitional period. Particularly, foreign aid will be required not only in the implementation of projects and programmes in priority areas and related sectors, but also for their recurrent costs as well as for the maintenance of inherited infrastructure.

#### 6. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS LONG-TERM SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

The Government of Namibia is fully convinced that the implementation of the restructuring and rehabilitation programme outlined in this statement will lay the foundation for long-term sustainable development. As repeatedly emphasized, the programme is primarily aimed at promoting popular participation of all Namibians in the development process with equal rights and without any form of discrimination. The success of the programme is essential for translating into concrete terms the noble objectives contained in the Constitution of Namibia, with respect to democracy, peace and welfare of all Namibians.

The Government of Namibia is equally convinced that the international community will spare no effort to provide the necessary assistance, to enable the country to implement successfully its reconstruction and development programme. Thus, the transitional period would, undoubtedly, lay foundations to a more balanced and equitable growth and development in the future.

## ENVIRONMENT

**UNITED NATIONS: PROTOCOL ON SUBSTANCES  
THAT DEplete THE OZONE LAYER\*\***  
(Done at Montreal, September 16, 1987)  
Cite as 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987)

## I.L.M. BACKGROUND/CONTENT SUMMARY

The Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, known as the Protocol on Chlorofluorocarbons, was negotiated as a protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer [see I.L.M. page 1516]. The Conference of Plenipotentiaries met in Montreal, September 14-16, 1987, under the auspices of the United Nations Environment Programme. The Final Act was signed by the following forty-seven participants on September 16, the same day on which the Protocol was opened for signature (an asterisk indicates that the Protocol was also signed): Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium\*, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Byelorussian SSR, Canada\*, Chile, China, Congo, Democratic Yemen, Denmark\*, Egypt\*, Federal Republic of Germany\*, Finland\*, France\*, Ghana\*, Indonesia, Israel, Italy\*, Japan\*, Kenya\*, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico\*, Netherlands\*, New Zealand\*, Nigeria, Norway\*, Panama\*, Peru, Philippines, Portugal\*, Republic of Korea, Senegal\*, Sweden\*, Switzerland\*, Thailand, Togo\*, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, United Kingdom\*, United States\*, Venezuela\*, and the European Economic Community\*.

The Protocol establishes specific obligations to limit and reduce use of chlorofluorocarbons and possibly other chemicals that deplete the ozone. The substances that the Protocol currently addresses are listed in Annex A.

**FINAL ACT - I.L.M. Page 1544**

[List of participants, observers, officers, and committee members; the agenda; basic documents]

**1. RESOLUTION ON THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL - I.L.M. Page 1547**

[Urging all countries to become parties to the Protocol and the underlying Convention and "to control emissions of CFCs..."]

\*\* [Reproduced from the text provided to International Legal Materials by the United Nations.]

2. RESOLUTION ON THE EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION - I.L.M. Page 1548  
[Urging participation with respect to Arts. 9 & 10 of the Protocol.]
3. RESOLUTION ON REPORTING OF DATA - I.L.M. Page 1549  
[Urging action and expert assistance to acquire data needed to implement the Protocol]
4. TRIBUTE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA  
[Not reproduced]

DECLARATIONS - I.L.M. Page 1549

[By the delegate from Egypt, Denmark on behalf of European Economic Community, and the Soviet Union]

MONTREAL PROTOCOL ON SUBSTANCES THAT DEplete  
THE OZONE LAYER - I.L.M. Page 1550

[Preamble: Considering the need for research and development relating to the control of substances that deplete the ozone layer, especially regarding the needs of developing countries]

## ARTICLES

1. DEFINITIONS
2. CONTROL MEASURES [Deadlines by which consumption on Group I & II substances (Annex A) shall not exceed 1986 (base year) levels of consumption and deadlines by which such consumption shall not exceed 80%, then 50% of 1986 levels; provisions for 'transfers of production'; procedures for amending the lists of substances and the base year levels]
3. CALCULATION OF CONTROL LEVELS [Procedures for calculating consumption of controlled substances (production + imports - exports)]
4. CONTROL OF TRADE WITH NON-PARTIES [Trading controlled substances with non-parties is banned after one year; importing products containing controlled substances is banned one year after list is drawn up; importing products produced with, but not containing, controlled substances is banned one year after list is, if at all, drawn up; the parties shall discourage export of related technology to non-parties; exception is made for non-parties in compliance with Art.2 and Art.7]
5. SPECIAL SITUATION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES [Delayed compliance is allowed, but consumption cannot exceed 0.3 kilograms per capita annually]
6. ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW OF CONTROL MEASURES [Beginning in 1990 and then every 4 years through panels of experts]
7. REPORTING OF DATA [Parties must provide the secretariat with consumption data for 1986 and for every year after becoming a member]
8. NON-COMPLIANCE [Procedures to be determined at the parties' first meeting]
9. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC AWARENESS AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION [To contain, recover, recycle, destroy, and find alternatives to controlled substances and to improve public awareness; the parties shall report every two years to the Secretariat on these activities]
10. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE [The parties shall engage in technical assistance, especially with developing countries, to bring about participation in an implementation of this Protocol]
11. MEETINGS OF THE PARTIES [Ordinary meetings shall convene in conjunction with the Conference of the underlying Convention; extraordinary meetings shall convene if supported by one-third of the parties; agenda of the first meeting; general agenda of all the meetings]

12. SECRETARIAT [Function of the Secretariat]
13. FINANCIAL PROVISIONS [Rules to be adopted at the first meeting]
14. RELATIONSHIP OF THIS PROTOCOL TO THE CONVENTION [Provisions of the Convention apply]
15. SIGNATURE [Open for signature in Montreal on September 16, 1987, in Ottawa on September 17, 1987, and in New York from January 17 to September 15, 1988]
16. ENTRY INTO FORCE [On January 1, 1989, or 90 days after 11 countries representing two-thirds of global consumption have expressed intent to be bound]
17. PARTIES JOINING AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE
18. RESERVATIONS [None permitted]
19. WITHDRAWAL [Except for developing countries described in Art.5, Art.19 of the underlying Convention on withdrawal applies]
20. AUTHENTIC TEXTS [Arabic, Chinese, English, French,Russian and Spanish]  
[Done September 16, 1987, at Montreal]

ANNEX A:CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES [Groups 1 & 2] - I.L.M. Page 1561

## FINAL ACT

1. The Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Protocol on Chlorofluorocarbons to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer was convened by the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) pursuant to decision 13/18 adopted by the Governing Council of UNEP on 23 May 1985.
2. The Conference met at the Headquarters of the International Civil Aviation Organization, Montreal, with the kind support of the Government of Canada, from 14 to 16 September 1987.
3. All States were invited to participate in the Conference. The following States accepted the invitation and participated in the Conference:

Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Greece, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela.

4. The European Economic Community also participated.
5. Observers from the following States attended the proceedings of the Conference:  
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Hungary, India, Kuwait, Poland.
6. Observers from the following United Nations bodies, specialized agencies, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations also attended the Conference:

World Meteorological Organization (WMO), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Organization of African Unity (OAU), Council of the European Communities (CEC), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Federation of European Aerosol Associations, European Chemical Industry Federation, Chemical Manufacturers Association, Natural Resources Defense Council, World



Resources Institute, Environmental Defense Fund, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, Seattle Foundation (Canada), Mammouth International Humanitarian Societies Square Projects Inc. (Canada), Watto Laboratories International (Canada), Dr. F.A. Homonnay and Associates (Canada), International Organization of Automobile Manufacturers, Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy, Air-Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute (USA), Environmental Protection Agency (USA), Institute for European Environment Policy, National Fire Protection Association, Dupont Canada, The Beloff Group (Canada), Produits Chimiques Allied Canada Inc., United States Air Force.

7. The Conference was formally opened by Dr. Mostafa K. Tolba, the Executive Director of UNEP. In the course of the inaugural ceremony, the Conference heard a welcoming address by the Honourable Tom McMillan, P.C., M.P., Minister of the Environment, on behalf of the Government of Canada.
8. Dr. Mostafa K. Tolba served as Secretary-General of the Conference and Dr. Iwona Rummel-Bulska (UNEP) served as Executive Secretary.
9. The Conference unanimously elected Ambassador W. Lang (Austria) as its President.
10. The Conference also elected the following officers:
  - Vice-Presidents : Ambassador E. Hawas (Egypt)  
Dr. V. Zakharov (Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics)
  - Rapporteur : Mr. C.R. Roque (Phillipines)
11. The Conference adopted the following agenda:
  1. Opening of the Conference.
  2. Organizational matters:
    - (a) Adoption of the rules of procedures;
    - (b) Election of the President;
    - (c) Election of Vice-Presidents and Rapporteur;
    - (d) Adoption of the agenda;
    - (e) Appointment of the members of the Credentials Committee;

- (f) Appointment of the members of the Drafting Committee;
  - (g) Organization of the work of the Conference.
3. Consideration of the draft Protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer.
  4. Report of the Credentials Committee.
  5. Adoption of the Protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer.
  6. Adoption of the Final Act of the Conference.
  7. Signature of final instruments.
  8. Closure of the Conference.
12. The Conference adopted as its rules of procedure document UNEP/IG.79/2 proposed by the secretariat.
13. In conformity with the rules of procedure, the Conference established the following Committees:

Committee of the Whole:

Chairman : The President of the Conference

General Committee:

Chairman : The President of the Conference  
Members : The Vice-President of the Conference  
The Rapporteur and the Chairman of the Drafting Committee.

Drafting Committee:

Chairman : Mr. Jon J. Allen (Canada)  
 Members : Argentina  
 Australia  
 France  
 Japan  
 United Kingdom  
 United States

Credentials Committee:

Chairman : Ambassador Jose M. Bustani (Brasil)  
 Members : Finland  
 Federal Republic of Germany  
 Indonesia  
 Kenya  
 Mexico  
 Norway

14. The main documents which served as the basis for the deliberations of the Conference were:
- Seventh Revised Draft Protocol on [Chlorofluorocarbons] [and Other Ozone Depleting Substances], UNEP/IG.93/3 and Rev.1;
  - Reports of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts for the Elaboration of a Protocol on Chlorofluorocarbons to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Vienna Group), UNEP/WG.151/L.4, UNEP/WG.167/2 and UNEP/WG.172/2.
15. In addition, the Conference had before it a number of other documents that were made available to it by the Secretariat of UNEP.
16. The Conference approved the recommendation of its Credentials Committee that the credentials of the representatives of the participating States as listed in paragraph 3 should be recognized as being in order.

17. On the basis of the deliberations of the Committee of the Whole, the Conference, on 16 September 1987, adopted the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. The Protocol, which is appended to this Final Act, will be open for signature at the Ministry for External Affairs of Canada in Ottawa from 17 September 1987 to 16 January 1988 and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 17 January 1988 to 15 September 1988.
  
18. The Conference also adopted the following resolutions which are appended to this Final Act:
  1. Resolution on the Montreal Protocol.
  2. Resolution on the exchange of technical information.
  3. Resolution on the reporting of data.
  4. Tribute to the Government of Canada [not reproduced]
  
19. At the time of the adoption of this Final Act, some delegations made declarations which are recorded in this document.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the representatives have signed this Final Act.

DONE at Montreal, this sixteenth day of September one thousand nine hundred and eighty seven in one original in the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish languages, each language version being equally authentic. The original text will be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

**1. RESOLUTION ON THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL**

The Conference,

**Having Adopted** the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,

**Noting with appreciation** that the Protocol was opened for signature in Montreal on 16 September 1987,

**Recalling** the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, adopted on 22 March 1985,

**Bearing in mind** the Resolution of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Protection of the Ozone Layer adopted on the same day which urged in the sixth operative paragraph 'all States and regional economic integration organizations pending entry into force of a protocol, to control their emissions of CFCs, *inter alia* in aerosols, by any means at their disposal, including controls on production or use, to the maximum extent practicable',

1. **Calls upon** all States and regional economic integration organizations that have not yet done so to implement the sixth paragraph, bearing in mind the relevant provisions in the Protocol concerning the special situation of the developing countries;
2. **Appeals** to all States to become Parties to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer;
3. **Urges** all States and regional economic integration organizations, including those that have not participated in this Conference, to sign and become Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer;
4. **Requests** the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme to forward this Resolution to the Secretary General of the United Nations and to circulate it to all States and regional economic integration organizations.

## 2. RESOLUTION ON THE EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

The Conference,

**Having adopted the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,**

**Realizing the importance of reducing as quickly as possible the emissions of these substances,**

**Recognizing the need for an early exchange of information on technologies and strategies to achieve this,**

1. **Requests the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), pending the first meeting of the Parties, to make appropriate arrangements to facilitate the exchange of information on technology referred to in Articles 9 and 10 of the Protocol;**
2. **Appeals to interested States and regional economic integration organizations to sponsor, at the earliest opportunity, in cooperation with UNEP, a workshop with the aim of:**
  - (a) **exchanging information on technologies and administrative strategies for reducing emissions of the substances listed in Annex A to the Protocol and for developing alternatives, taking into account paragraph 2 of Annex II to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer; and**
  - (b) **identifying areas in which further research and technical development are required,**
3. **Urges all interested parties to participate in and contribute to such a workshop and to make expeditious use of the information so gained in order to reduce the emissions of those substances and to develop alternatives.**

**3. RESOLUTION ON REPORTING OF DATA**

**The Conference,**

**Having adopted the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,**

**Convinced that the timely reporting of complete and accurate data on the production and consumption of controlled substances is critical to the effective and efficient implementation of this Protocol,**

- 1. Calls upon all Signatories to take, expeditiously, all steps necessary to acquire data and report on the production, import and export of controlled substances in a complete and timely fashion in accordance with Article 7 of the Protocol and taking into account paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer;**
- 2. Invites Signatories to consult with other Signatories, and to seek advice and assistance from the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and other relevant international organizations, as necessary, in designing and implementing data reporting systems;**
- 3. Calls upon the Executive Director of UNEP to convene, within six months of the adoption of this Resolution, a meeting of governmental experts with the assistance of experts from relevant international organizations to make recommendations for the harmonizing of data on production, imports and exports to ensure consistency and comparability of data on controlled substances.**

**4. TRIBUTE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA**

[not reproduced]

## DECLARATIONS

made at the time of adoption of the Final Act of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.

1. Speaking on behalf of the developing countries, the delegate from Egypt stated that the developing countries' understanding on Article 2 of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer is that any of its provisions will in no way affect the agreement reached on sub-paragraph (c) of Article 3 and on Articles 4 and 5.
2. Speaking on behalf of the European Economic Community, the delegate from Denmark stated that all Member States of the European Economic Community and EEC will sign the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and that all Member States and EEC will ratify the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer as soon as possible to allow the Montreal Protocol to enter into force on 1 January 1989.
3. The delegate from the Soviet Union stated that while fully sharing the idea that the trade in CFCs should be controlled, the Soviet Union finds it necessary to include into a corresponding Article a provision allowing Parties to fulfil their earlier commitments. That would be consistent with the letter and spirit of all international agreements. At the first meeting of the Parties an effort should be made to introduce amendments and corrections into a number of Articles to make the Protocol more flexible and responsive to the needs of different countries, in particular, those with a low level of consumption of ozone depleting substances. At the first meeting of the Parties, among other things, they should consider, besides the ozone depleting substances, the scientific data on the effect of the use of alternative substances on human health and environment as well as ecological consequences. Scientific experts, to this end, should prepare a review of alternatives. In iterating the will of our country to develop international co-operation in the field of environmental protection and that of the ozone layer, the delegation of the Soviet Union considers, in general, that the present Protocol seems to be ready for signing and that after having considered the legal basis of the provisions contained in certain Articles formulated in the last few days of the Conference, the question can be solved.



**MONTREAL PROTOCOL ON SUBSTANCES THAT DEplete THE OZONE LAYER**

The Parties to this Protocol,

**Being Parties to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer,**

**Mindful** of their obligation under that Convention to take appropriate measures to protect human health and the environment against adverse effects resulting or likely to result from human activities which modify or are likely to modify the ozone layer,

**Recognizing** that world-wide emissions of certain substances can significantly deplete and otherwise modify the ozone layer in a manner that is likely to result in adverse effects on human health and the environment,

**Conscious of the potential climatic effects of emissions of these substances,**

**Aware** that measures taken to protect the ozone layer from depletion should be based on relevant scientific knowledge, taking into account technical and economic considerations,

**Determined** to protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary measures to control equitably total global emissions of substances that deplete it, with the ultimate objective of their elimination on the basis of developments in scientific knowledge, taking into account technical and economic considerations,

**Acknowledging** that special provision is required to meet the needs of developing countries for these substances,

**Noting** the precautionary measures for controlling emissions of certain chlorofluorocarbons that have already been taken at national and regional levels,

**Considering** the importance of promoting international co-operation in the research and development of science and technology relating to the control and reduction of emissions of substances that deplete the ozone layer, bearing in mind in particular the needs of developing countries,

**HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:**

## ARTICLE 1: DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this Protocol:

1. "Convention" means the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, adopted on 22 March 1985.
2. "Parties" means, unless the text otherwise indicates, Parties to this Protocol.
3. "Secretariat" means the secretariat of the Convention.
4. "Controlled substance" means a substance listed in Annex A to this Protocol, whether existing alone or in a mixture. It excludes, however, any such substance or mixture which is in a manufactured product other than a container used for the transportation or storage of the substance listed.
5. "Production" means the amount of controlled substances produced minus the amount destroyed by technologies to be approved by the Parties.
6. "Consumption" means production plus imports minus exports of controlled substances.
7. "Calculated levels" of production, imports, exports and consumption means levels determined in accordance with Article 3.
8. "Industrial rationalization" means the transfer of all or a portion of the calculated level of production of one Party to another, for the purpose of achieving economic efficiencies or responding to anticipated shortfalls in supply as a result of plant closures.

## ARTICLE 2: CONTROL MEASURES

1. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on the first day of the seventh month following the date of the entry into force of this Protocol, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level of consumption of the controlled substances in group 1 of Annex A does not exceed its calculated level of consumption in 1986. By the end of the same period, each Party producing one or more of these substances shall ensure that its calculated level of production of the substances does not exceed its calculated level of production in 1986, except that such level may have increased by no more than 10% based on the 1986 level. Such increase shall be permitted only so as to satisfy the basic domestic needs of the Parties operating under Article 5 and for the purposes of industrial rationalization between Parties.

2. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on the first day of the thirty-seventh month following the date of the entry into force of this Protocol, and in each twelve month period thereafter, its calculated level of consumption of the controlled substances listed in Group II of Annex A does not exceed its calculated level of consumption in 1986. Each Party producing one or more of these substances shall ensure that its calculated level of production of the substances does not exceed its calculated level of production in 1986, except that such level may have increased by no more than 10% based on the 1986 level. Such increase shall be permitted only so as to satisfy the basic domestic needs of the Parties operating under Article 5 and for the purposes of industrial rationalization between Parties. The mechanisms for implementing these measures shall be decided by the Parties at their first meeting following the first scientific review.
3. Each Party shall ensure that for the period 1 July 1993 to 30 June 1994 and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level of consumption of the controlled substances in Group I of Annex A does not exceed, annually, 80% of its calculated level of consumption in 1986. Each Party producing one or more of these substances shall, for the same periods, ensure that its calculated level of production of the substances does not exceed, annually 80% of its calculated level of production in 1986. However, in order to satisfy the basic domestic needs of the Parties operating under Article 5 and for the purposes of industrial rationalization between Parties, its calculated level of production may exceed that limit by up to 10% of its calculated level of production in 1986.
4. Each Party shall ensure that for the period 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level of consumption of the controlled substances in Group I of Annex A does not exceed, annually, 50% of its calculated level of consumption in 1986. Each Party producing one or more of these substances shall, for the same periods, ensure that its calculated level of production of the substances does not exceed, annually, 50% of its calculated level of production in 1986. However, in order to satisfy the basic domestic needs of the Parties operating under Article 5 and for the purposes of industrial rationalization between Parties, its calculated level of production may exceed that limit by up to 15% of its calculated level of production in 1986. This paragraph will apply unless the Parties decide otherwise at a meeting by a two-thirds majority of Parties present and voting, representing at least two-thirds of the total calculated level of consumption of these substances of the Parties. This decision shall be considered and made in the light of the assessments referred to in Article 6.
5. Any Party whose calculated level of production in 1986 of the controlled substances in Group I of Annex A was less than twenty-five kilotonnes may, for the purposes of industrial rationalization, transfer to or receive from any other Party, production in excess of the limits set out in paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 provided that the total combined calculated levels of production of the Parties concerned does not exceed the production limits set out in this Article. Any transfer of such production shall be notified to the secretariat, no later than the time of the transfer.

6. Any Party not operating under Article 5, that has facilities for the production of controlled substances under construction, or contracted for, prior to 16 September 1987, and provided for in national legislation prior to 1 January 1987, may add the production from such facilities to its 1986 production of such substances for the purposes of determining its calculated level of production for 1986, provided that such facilities are completed by 31 December 1990 and that such production does not raise the Party's annual calculated level of consumption of the controlled substances above 0.5 kilograms per capita.
7. Any transfer of production pursuant to paragraph 5 or any addition of production pursuant to paragraph 6 shall be notified to the secretariat, no later than the time of the transfer or addition.
8.
  - (a) Any Parties which are Member States of a regional economic integration organization as defined in Article 1(6) of the Convention may agree that they shall jointly fulfil their obligations respecting consumption under this Article provided that their total combined calculated level of consumption does not exceed the levels required by this Article.
  - (b) The Parties to any such agreement shall inform the secretariat of the terms of the agreement before the date of the reduction in consumption with which the agreement is concerned.
  - (c) Such agreement will become operative only if all Member States of the regional economic integration organization and the organization concerned are Parties to the Protocol and have notified the secretariat of their manner of implementation.
9.
  - (a) Based on the assessments made pursuant to Article 6, the Parties may decide whether:
    - (i) adjustments to the ozone depleting potentials specified in Annex A should be made and, if so, what the adjustments should be; and
    - (ii) further adjustments and reductions of production or consumption of the controlled substances from 1986 levels should be undertaken and, if so, what the scope, amount and timing of any such adjustments and reductions should be.
  - (b) Proposals for such adjustments shall be communicated to the Parties by the secretariat at least six months before the meeting of the Parties at which they are proposed for adoption.

- (c) In taking such decisions, the Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement by consensus. If all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, and no agreement reached, such decisions shall, as a last resort, be adopted by a two-thirds majority vote of the Parties present and voting representing at least fifty per cent of the total consumption of the controlled substances of the Parties.
  - (d) The decisions, which shall be binding on all Parties, shall forthwith be communicated to the Parties by the Depositary. Unless otherwise provided in the decisions, they shall enter into force on the expiry of six months from the date of the circulation of the communication by the Depositary.
10. (a) Based on the assessments made pursuant to Article 6 of this Protocol and in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 9 of the Convention, the Parties may decide:
- (i) whether any substances, and if so which, should be added to or removed from any annex to this Protocol; and
  - (ii) the mechanism, scope and timing of the control measures that should apply to those substances;
- (b) Any such decision shall become effective, provided that it has been accepted by a two-thirds majority vote of the Parties present and voting.
11. Notwithstanding the provisions contained in this Article, Parties may take more stringent measures than those required by this Article.

### ARTICLE 3: CALCULATION OF CONTROL LEVELS

For the purposes of Articles 2 and 5, each Party shall, for each Group of substances in Annex A, determine its calculated levels of:

- (a) production by:
  - (i) multiplying its annual production of each controlled substance by the ozone depleting potential specified in respect of it in Annex A; and
  - (ii) adding together, for each such Group, the resulting figures;
- (b) imports and exports, respectively, by following, *mutatis mutandis*, the procedure set out in sub-paragraph (a); and

- (c) consumption by adding together its calculated levels of production and imports and subtracting its calculated level of exports as determined in accordance with sub-paragraphs (a) and (b). However, beginning on 1 January 1993, any export of controlled substances to non-Parties shall not be subtracted in calculating the consumption level of the exporting Party.

#### ARTICLE 4: CONTROL OF TRADE WITH NON-PARTIES

1. Within one year of the entry into force of this Protocol, each Party shall ban the import of controlled substances from any State not party to this Protocol.
2. *Beginning on 1 January 1993, no Party operating under paragraph 1 of Article 5 may export any controlled substance to any State not party to this Protocol.*
3. Within three years of the date of the entry into force of this Protocol, the Parties shall, following the procedures in Article 10 of the Convention, elaborate in an annex a list of products containing controlled substances. Parties that have not objected to the annex in accordance with those procedures shall ban, within one year of the annex having become effective, the import of those products from any State not party to this Protocol.
4. Within five years of the entry into force of this Protocol, the Parties shall determine the feasibility of banning or restricting, from States not party to this Protocol, the import of products produced with, but not containing, controlled substances. If determined feasible, the Parties shall, following the procedures in Article 10 of the Convention, elaborate in an annex a list of such products. Parties that have not objected to it in accordance with those procedures shall ban or restrict, within one year of the annex having become effective, the import of those products from any State not party to this Protocol.
5. *Each Party shall discourage the export, to any State not party to this Protocol, of technology for producing and for utilizing controlled substances.*
6. Each Party shall refrain from providing new subsidies, aid, credits, guarantees or insurance programmes for the export to States not party to this Protocol of products, equipment, plants or technology that would facilitate the production of controlled substances.
7. Paragraphs 5 and 6 shall not apply to products, equipment, plants or technology that improve the containment, recovery, recycling or destruction of controlled substances, promote the development of alternative substances, or otherwise contribute to the reduction of emissions of controlled substances.

8. Notwithstanding the provisions of this Article, imports referred to in paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 may be permitted from any State not party to this Protocol if that State is determined, by a meeting of the Parties, to be in full compliance with Article 2 and this Article, and has submitted data to that effect as specified in Article 7.

#### ARTICLE 5: SPECIAL SITUATION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

1. Any Party that is a developing country and whose annual calculated level of consumption of the controlled substances is less than 0.3 kilograms per capita on the date of the entry into force of the Protocol for it, or any time thereafter within ten years of the date of entry into force of the Protocol shall, in order to meet its basic domestic needs, be entitled to delay its compliance with the control measures set out in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 2 by ten years after that specified in those paragraphs. However, such Party shall not exceed an annual calculated level of consumption of 0.3 kilograms per capita. Any such Party shall be entitled to use either the average of its annual calculated level of consumption for the period 1995 to 1997 inclusive of a calculated level of consumption of 0.3 kilograms per capita, whichever is the lower, as the basis for its compliance with control measures.
2. The Parties undertake to facilitate access to environmentally safe alternative substances and technology for Parties that are developing countries and assist them to make expeditious use of such alternatives.
3. The Parties undertake to facilitate bilaterally or multilaterally the provision of subsidies, aid, credits, guarantees or insurance programmes to parties that are developing countries for the use of alternative technology and for substitute products.

#### ARTICLE 6: ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW OF CONTROL MEASURES

Beginning in 1990, and at least every four years thereafter, the Parties shall assess the control measures provided for in Article 2 on the basis of available scientific, environmental, technical and economic information. At least one year before each assessment, the Parties shall convene appropriate panels of experts qualified in the fields mentioned and determine the composition and terms of reference of any such panels. Within one year of being convened, the panels will report their conclusions, through the secretariat, to the Parties.

**ARTICLE 7: REPORTING OF DATA**

1. Each Party shall provide to the secretariat, within three months of becoming a Party, statistical data on its production, imports and exports of each of the controlled substances for the year 1986, or the best possible estimates of such data where actual data are not available.
  
2. Each Party shall provide statistical data to the secretariat on its annual production (with separate data on amounts destroyed by technologies to be approved by the Parties), imports, and exports to Parties and non-Parties, respectively, of such substances for the year during which it becomes a Party and for each year thereafter. It shall forward the data no later than nine months after the end of the year to which the data relate.

**ARTICLE 8: NON-COMPLIANCE**

The Parties, at their first meeting, shall consider and approve procedures and institution mechanisms for determining non-compliance with the provisions of this Protocol and for treatment of Parties found to be in non-compliance.

**ARTICLE 9: RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC AWARENESS AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION**

1. The Parties shall co-operate, consistent with their national laws, regulations and practices and taking into account in particular the needs of developing countries, in promoting, directly or through competent international bodies, research, development and exchange of information on:
  - (a) best technologies for improving the containment, recovery, recycling or destruction of controlled substances or otherwise reducing their emissions;
  - (b) possible alternatives to controlled substances, to products containing such substances, and to products manufactured with them; and
  - (c) costs and benefits of relevant control strategies.
  
2. The Parties, individually, jointly or through competent international bodies, shall co-operate in promoting public awareness of the environmental effects of the emissions of controlled substances and other substances that deplete the ozone layer.



3. Within two years of the entry into force of this Protocol and every two years thereafter, each party shall submit to the secretariat a summary of the activities it has conducted pursuant to this Article.

#### ARTICLE 10: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

1. The Parties shall, in the context of the provisions of Article 4 of the Convention, and taking into account in particular the needs of developing countries, co-operate in promoting technical assistance to facilitate participation in and implementation of this Protocol.
2. Any Party or Signatory to this Protocol may submit a request to the secretariat for technical assistance for the purposes of implementing or participating in the Protocol.
3. The Parties, at their first meeting, shall begin deliberations on the means of fulfilling the obligations set out in Article 9, and paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, including the preparation of workplans. Such workplans shall pay special attention to the needs and circumstances of the developing countries. States and regional economic integration organizations not party to the Protocol should be encouraged to participate in activities specified in such workplans.

#### ARTICLE 11: MEETINGS OF THE PARTIES

1. The Parties shall hold meetings at regular intervals. The secretariat shall convene the first meeting of the Parties not later than one year after the date of the entry into force of this Protocol and in conjunction with a meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention, if a meeting of the latter is scheduled within that period.
2. Subsequent ordinary meetings of the Parties shall be held, unless the Parties otherwise decide, in conjunction with meetings of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention. Extraordinary meetings of the Parties shall be held at such other times as may be deemed necessary by a meeting of the Parties, or at the written request of any Party, provided that, within six months of such a request being communicated to them by the secretariat, it is supported by at least one third of the Parties.
3. The Parties, at their first meeting, shall:
  - (a) adopt by consensus rules of procedure for their meetings;
  - (b) adopt by consensus the financial rules referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 13;
  - (c) establish the panels and determine the terms of reference to in Article 6;

- (d) consider and approve the procedures and institutional mechanisms specified in Article 8; and
  - (e) begin preparation of workplans pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article 10.
4. The functions of the meetings of the Parties shall be to:
- (a) review the implementation of this Protocol.
  - (b) decide on any adjustments or reductions referred to in paragraph 9 of Article 2;
  - (c) decide on any addition to, insertion in or removal from any annex of substances and on related control measures in accordance with paragraph 10 of Article 2;
  - (d) establish, where necessary, guidelines or procedures for reporting of information as provided for in Article 7 and paragraph 3 of Article 9;
  - (e) review requests for technical assistance submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 10;
  - (f) review reports prepared by the secretariat pursuant to sub-paragraph (c) of Article 12;
  - (g) assess, in accordance with Article 6, the control measures provided for in Article 2;
  - (h) consider and adopt, as required, proposals for amendment of this Protocol or any annex and for any new annex;
  - (i) *consider and adopt the budget for implementing this Protocol; and*
  - (j) consider and undertake any additional action that may be required for the achievement of the purposes of this Protocol.
5. The United Nations, its specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as any State not party to this Protocol, may be represented at meetings of the Parties as observers. Any body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non-governmental, qualified in fields relating to the protection of the ozone layer which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a meeting of the Parties as an observer may be admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present object. The admission and participation of observers shall be subject to the rules of procedure adopted by the Parties.

**ARTICLE 12: SECRETARIAT**

For the purposes of this Protocol, the secretariat shall:

- (a) arrange for and service meetings of the Parties as provided for in Article 11;
- (b) receive and make available, upon request by a Party, data provided pursuant to Article 7;
- (c) prepare and distribute regularly to the Parties reports based on information received pursuant to Articles 7 and 9;
- (d) notify the Parties of any request for technical assistance received pursuant to Article 10 so as to facilitate the provision of such assistance;
- (e) encourage non-Parties to attend the meetings of the Parties as observers and to act in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol;
- (f) provide, as appropriate, the information and requests referred to in sub-paragraphs (c) and (d) to such non-party observers; and
- (g) perform such other functions for the achievement of the purposes of this Protocol as may be assigned to it by the Parties.

**ARTICLE 13: FINANCIAL PROVISIONS**

1. The funds required for the operation of this Protocol, including those for the functioning of the secretariat related to this Protocol, shall be charged exclusively against contributions from the Parties.
2. The Parties, at their first meeting, shall adopt by consensus financial rules for the operation of this Protocol.

**ARTICLE 14: RELATIONSHIP OF THIS PROTOCOL TO THE CONVENTION**

Except as otherwise provided in this Protocol, the provisions of the Convention relating to its protocols shall apply to this Protocol.

**ARTICLE 15: SIGNATURE**

This Protocol shall be open for signature by States and by regional economic integration organizations on Montreal on 16 September 1987, in Ottawa from 17 September 1987 to 16 January 1988, and at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 17 January 1988 to 15 September 1988.

**ARTICLE 16: ENTRY INTO FORCE**

1. This Protocol shall enter into force on 1 January 1989, provided that at least eleven instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval of the Protocol or accession thereto have been deposited by States or regional economic integration organizations representing at least two-thirds of 1986 estimated global consumption of the controlled substances, and the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 17 of the Convention have been fulfilled. In the event that these conditions have not been fulfilled by that date, the Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date on which the conditions have been fulfilled.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, any such instrument deposited by a regional economic integration organization shall not be counted as additional to those deposited by member States of such organization.
3. After the entry into force of this Protocol, any such State or regional economic integration organization shall become a Party to it on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

**ARTICLE 17: PARTIES JOINING AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE**

Subject to Article 5, any State or regional economic integration organization which becomes a Party to this Protocol after the date of its entry into force, shall fulfil forthwith the sum of the obligations under Article 2, as well as under Article 4, that apply at that date to the States and regional economic integration organizations that became Parties on the date the Protocol entered into force.

**ARTICLE 18: RESERVATIONS**

No reservations may be made to this Protocol.

**ARTICLE 19: WITHDRAWAL**

For the purposes of this Protocol, the provisions of Article 19 of the Convention relating to withdrawal shall apply, except with respect to Parties referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 5. Any such Party may withdraw from this Protocol by giving written notification to the Depositary at any time after four years of assuming the obligations specified in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 2. Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of one year after the date of its receipt by the Depositary, or on such later date as may be specified in the notification of the withdrawal.

**ARTICLE 20: AUTHENTIC TEXTS**

The original of this Protocol, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF THE UNDERSIGNED, BEING DULY AUTHORIZED TO THAT EFFECT HAVE SIGNED THIS PROTOCOL.

DONE AT MONTREAL THIS SIXTEENTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY SEVEN.

## ANNEX A

## CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

Group	Substances	Ozone Depleting Potential*
Group I	$\text{CFC}_3$ (CFC-11)	1.0
	$\text{CF}_2\text{Cl}_2$ (CFC-12)	1.0
	$\text{C}_2\text{F}_3\text{Cl}_3$ (CFC-113)	0.8
	$\text{C}_2\text{F}_4\text{Cl}_2$ (CFC -114)	1.0
	$\text{C}_2\text{F}_5\text{Cl}$ (CFC-115)	0.6
Group II	$\text{CF}_2\text{BrCl}$ (halon-1211)	3.0
	$\text{CF}_3\text{Br}$ (halon-1301)	10.0
	$\text{C}_2\text{F}_4\text{Br}_2$ (halon-2402)	to be determined

\* These ozone depleting potentials are estimates based on existing knowledge and will be reviewed and revised periodically.

## SOUTH AFRICA – EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

## DECLARATION ON SOUTH AFRICA

by

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Brussels, 19\12\1990

The Community and its member States have consistently followed developments in South Africa with the greatest attention and have given a favourable reception to the initiatives which have been taken to bring about the abolition of apartheid and the establishment of a united, non-racial, and democratic South Africa. They have already expressed approval of the results of the talks between the Government and the ANC, in particular those of the Pretoria meeting in August which opened the way to the negotiation of a new Constitution.

They deplore the phase of serious violence through which South Africa is passing which may endanger these developments. They welcome, however, further indications serving to confirm that the process of change already begun is going ahead in the direction advocated by the Strasbourg European Council. They have decided to continue to encourage this process.

Against this background, the European Council has decided that as soon as legislative action is taken by the South African government to repeal the Group Areas Act and the Land Acts, the Community and its member States will proceed to an easing of the set of measures adopted in 1986.

As of now, so as to contribute to combating unemployment and improving the economic and social situation in South Africa, and to encourage the movement underway aimed at the complete abolition of apartheid, the European Council has decided to lift the ban on new investments.

At the same time, the Community and its member States, with the objective of sending a clear signal of political support to the victims of apartheid, and intending to contribute to a new economic and social balance in South Africa, have agreed to strengthen the programme of positive measures and to adapt it to the requirements of the new situation, including requirements related to the return and resettlement of the exiles.

The Community and its member States hope in this way to be able to contribute to the speeding up of the process underway through sending to all the parties involved in negotiation a concrete sign of support for the establishment of a new South Africa, united, non-racial, and democratic, and capable of resuming the place which it deserves in the international community.

## SOUTHERN AFRICA - SADCC

STATEMENT BY HON. P.S. MMUSI  
 CHAIRMAN OF THE SADCC COUNCIL OF MINISTERS,  
 VICE PRESIDENT AND MINISTER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
 AND LANDS, REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA  
 AT THE 1991 SADCC ANNUAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE  
 WINDHOEK, REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA: JANUARY 31, 1991

Honourable Ministers, Your Excellencies, Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen,

First of all, allow me, on your behalf, to thank His Excellency Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of the Republic of Namibia for his kind words of welcome to this beautiful city of Windhoek and to this wonderful country. For many years, Namibia has held a special place in SADCC. It has always been our conviction that:

An independent Namibia would bring nearer the SADCC dream of a region united from the Indian Ocean in the east to the Atlantic in the west, working harmoniously to bring a better life for all of its peoples;

An independent Namibia would see the end of South Africa's detabilisation and *aggression in Angola, and bring nearer the day of reconciliation in that country; and,*

an independent Namibia would make it possible for SADCC to develop transport and communications trade, travel and other exchanges in ties that will bind the people of the region toward a common future and destiny.

Namibia's independence was a culmination of many years of struggle and personal sacrifice by the people of this country under your able leadership, Sir. On this occasion, Mr. President, we would like to formally congratulate you for leading Namibia to independence and bringing nearer the realisation of the SADCC dream. It is, therefore, fitting that this tenth anniversary Conference of SADCC should be held in the tenth member of the Organisation. I believe I speak on behalf of all delegates in welcoming Namibia to the Conference.

The independence of Namibia was a product of international solidarity and effort, expressed in the various resolutions of the United Nations, the non-Aligned Movement, and the OAU. I believe it is also fitting on this occasion that we should recognise the sacrifices made by the people of Angola, who have made an invaluable contribution in bringing independence to Namibia and greater peace to the western side of the SADCC region. It is our sincere hope that the people of Angola will also find peace in their country and the opportunity to give of their best to the socio-economic progress of the whole region.



May I now, on behalf of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, welcome you all to the 1991 Annual Consultative Conference. I am sure you join me in extending a special word of welcome to Nelson Mandela, the Vice President of the African National Congress of South Africa. If there is one man who epitomises the struggle against apartheid and racism in Southern Africa and has been an inspiration to men and women of conscience everywhere, it is Nelson Mandela. We are certainly very glad to have you among us today, to share with you our dream of a Southern Africa free of apartheid, conflict and united in a common desire to improve the lives of its peoples, regardless of race, colour or creed.

Southern Africa has changed, and it is still changing. All the countries and organisations represented here have contributed in no small measure to the economic and political changes taking place in the region. I am sure that you will stay with us the rest of the way, and that we can count on your continuing support to consolidate and expand the achievements that have been made over the last ten years.

SADCC has always maintained that peace was a pre-requisite for economic progress, and that apartheid was the principal cause of instability and conflict in the region. As the South African Government has seemingly committed itself to abandoning apartheid, the level of violence in the region has consequently markedly declined. However, apartheid violence remains a daily reality for the black majority in South Africa. Powerful and sinister forces remain loose, and engaged in a bloody terror campaign to reverse the little that has been achieved to date to bring apartheid to an end. This Conference must condemn the perpetrators of these acts and call upon all concerned, especially the South African Government, to bring the cycle of violence to an end. The long term solution remains the dismantling of apartheid and the formation of a government acceptable to all South Africans.

SADCC, like the rest of the international community, welcomes the steps taken by President de Klerk and the African National Congress, to begin the process of negotiation aimed at giving all South Africans equal economic and political rights in a united country. However, we also know that apartheid still lives in South Africa and black South Africans still suffer its deprivations and indignities daily. It is therefore, a matter of great concern to us when some call for the lifting of international pressure on South Africa which has been responsible for the modest changes which have taken place to date. There are yet others, even in Africa, who seek to normalise their economic and political relations with South Africa. Our view in SADCC is that as much as we appreciate the moves toward reform which have been made by the South African Government, it is premature for the international community to normalise relations with South Africa. Indeed, leaders of the democratic forces in South Africa have called for the existing international sanctions to be maintained. Our view in SADCC is that the decision as to when the international community should lift sanctions and normalise relations with South Africa, should be left to the South Africans themselves.

Elsewhere in the region, fundamental, political and economic changes are taking place, providing for greater democratisation of political institutions and increased participation of the people in and responsibility for, the economic decisions that affect their lives and the commensurate

reduction of constraints and controls on the economy.

Significant progress has already been made in the efforts to bring a negotiated peace to Angola and Mozambique. However, it is clear even at this stage, that when peace returns to these member States, a major reconstruction effort will be necessary to assist the millions of people who have been displaced by these terrible wars, to go back to whatever remains of their homes and to resume productive lives. The scale of the problem, is such that it will take a major international effort to restore the socio-economic infrastructure in these member States to enable the people to resume normal lives. We hope we can count on the traditional support of SADCC's Cooperating Partners in facing this challenge of peace. Failure to respond to the situation could stoke the fires of discontent and subject the region to continuing instability. At a time when there are more demands on the resources and the attention of those of you who are in a position to assist, arising out of the situation in the Middle East and the changes taking place in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R., we hope it will still be possible for you to maintain your involvement in this part of the world. We are gratified by indications we have received already to that effect.

...

... Let me now turn to the questions that we have been asked repeatedly and I hope that I can lay this matter to rest once and for all. One question which we are repeatedly asked is whether SADCC will have any role, mission or relevance in a post-apartheid South Africa. The other is what kind of economic and other arrangements we can foresee for Southern Africa after apartheid, and whether SADCC is making any preparations toward bringing about these arrangements. In certain quarters, it has even been suggested that SADCC would be irrelevant after apartheid and that South Africa, once politically acceptable, would assume the role of a "regional power" to dominate, lead and give aid to the rest of the region. In this regard, others have even suggested that Cooperating Partners might disengage from Southern Africa in deference to South Africa as a "regional donor".

SADCC is an economic development organisation and its formation was not predicated on the existence of apartheid. Rather, the imperative for the creation of SADCC was the recognition that, although the countries of the region were politically independent, they remained overwhelmingly economically dependent particularly on South Africa. It was also recognised, that with our small economies and meagre resources, the only way to reduce this dependence was through regional cooperation. South Africa was specifically mentioned because she both dominated the region economically, sought to exploit this situation to impose her will on the newly independent states of the region, and practised a policy of racist oppression, all of us in the region found totally repugnant and demeaning of the people of this region.

The result of South Africa's apartheid policies and military adventures in the region are still with us today and will be for some time to come. The culture of violence both inside and outside South Africa, the disruption of the region's physical infrastructure, the dislocation of families and uprooting of whole communities, and poverty are a few examples of the legacy apartheid has bequeathed on the region. Hence, the challenge to improve the socio-economic conditions will become more urgent in the region including South Africa. We are convinced that regional

cooperation will still offer the only real viable alternative to continuing economic underdevelopment in the region.

SADCC has never consciously undertaken projects on the basis of political expediency or as a response to the aggressive actions of the apartheid regimes in South Africa, although the temptation was always there. The criteria has always been long-term economic viability. All the major infrastructural programmes which constitute more than half of the SADCC Programme of Action are aimed at the rehabilitation of existing transportation systems which were established long before independence. The transport corridors of Beira, Dar es Salaam, Lobito, Maputo and Nacala carried most of the region's traffic before independence, and remain today, the shortest and the most economic routes to the sea. This reality will not change in a post-apartheid South Africa.

At any one time, over a quarter of a million men and women from SADCC member States are employed in South Africa's factories, farms, homes and mines as migrant workers. At the same time, South Africa enjoys a balance of trade surplus with the region near US\$1 billion annually. Many (including the current South African leaders) have pointed to this number of migrant workers and the trade surplus as an indication of the high level of dependence of SADCC member States on South Africa. But, it should also be seen as an indication of South Africa's own dependence on the rest of the region. The migrant workers contribute in no small measure, to South Africa's export performance while affording their countries of origin the financial ability to import South African goods.

However, we are also aware that there is a serious unemployment problem in South Africa, and that the migrant labour system is not a reflection of a labour shortage but a product of apartheid's grand design to ensure that black labour remained transient and hence incapable of forming strong workers' organisations. A post-apartheid government in South Africa will, therefore, be hard-put to maintain the migrant labour system at current levels, in the face of the serious domestic unemployment problem.

It is therefore, imperative that conditions and arrangements are created for the economies of all the countries of the region to create increasing job opportunities preferably at home; and to bring about the necessary arrangements to enable capital, labour and expertise to move across national boundaries in a manner that will spread economic growth across the region. This is the mission of SADCC, which is relevant today, and will remain so even in a post-apartheid Southern Africa.

We cannot deny the importance to the region of a post-apartheid South Africa which is evidently the most advanced economy on the continent, with large human, natural and scientific resources at its command. However, we must also underline the fact that all the countries of the region need each other.

The long-standing SADCC policy is that a post-apartheid South Africa will be most welcome in the Organisation. Cooperation in SADCC is based on the principles of mutual benefit, inter-dependence and equity as opposed to dependence and domination. SADCC expects South

Africa to join the Organisation on the basis of the same principles. It is our conviction that it is only on the basis of these principles that an economic community of Southern African States can be built. We know that the views of our colleagues in the Liberation Movements on this matter coincide with our own. ...

... We remain hopeful that recent developments in South Africa will finally turn the region from centuries of racial confrontation to an era of peace and cooperation. In anticipation of this eventuality, the last SADCC Summit agreed that South Africa's Liberation Movements will participate in SADCC meetings at all levels. The Summit also directed our Executive Secretary to begin consultations with the Liberation Movements on matters of mutual interest in a post-apartheid Southern Africa. This work has already started and a machinery and the agenda for consultations has already been agreed.

As to the question of a post-apartheid South Africa, assuming the role of a "regional donor", we believe it is a prospect that exists only in the apartheid mentality and those who are ignorant of the situation in South Africa. A democratic government in South Africa will face an enormous task of redressing the imbalances of apartheid; by providing social services and other socio-economic infrastructure for the black majority in that country, in the form of housing, schools and health services. It is very doubtful that the South African economy, even in the best of times, can meet these immediate demands with a surplus to give assistance to the rest of the region. ...

... Allow me now to turn to the situation within SADCC. Last year the Organisation celebrated its Tenth Anniversary. Most commentators agree that the founding of the Organisation, ten years ago, was indeed a milestone in the history of the region. SADCC has helped to hold the countries of the region together, at a time of a savage economic, political and military aggression by the South African apartheid regime. SADCC provided the framework for both political and material regional and international support. This alone could be considered achievement enough. However, SADCC has also done more, in engendering a strong regional identity to the extent that we can today talk about a Southern African community of nations bound by a common experience and a common destiny.

With the assistance of our cooperating partners, SADCC has also made progress in the implementation of the SADCC Programme of Action, covering Food and Agriculture, Energy, Human Resources Development, Industry and Trade, Mining, Transport and Communications and Tourism. The greatest progress has been made in the sector of Transport and Communications which remains the largest sector in the Programme. To date 60% of the transit traffic from the six landlocked states move through SADCC ports, compared to only 20% in 1980, thus reducing significantly the transport bills of these member States. Between 1985 and 1990 the numbers of possible flight services per week, among SADCC member States, increased by 94%. Telecommunications in the region have also improved substantially providing direct links between most SADCC member States.

The main exception has been the transport and communications links to the west of the region, through Angola and Namibia; where South African occupation and military aggression and destabilisation activities made it impossible for projects to be undertaken in these two member States. A number of projects have recently been added to the Programme to redress the situation. It is my hope that these projects will receive your support, so that for the first time in post-colonial history, direct coast to coast links can be established in the region.

In this regard we must underline the importance to the region of the Port of Walvis Bay. We hope it will be possible for your Government, Mr. President, to find the means to bring Walvis Bay under Namibian sovereignty. On this matter, you can count on the strong support of the region and this Conference.

In the Energy Sector much infrastructural work has been done to interconnect the national power grids. To date the programme has covered six member States: Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Plans are underway to interconnect the grids of the rest of the member States including Angola-Namibia across the Cunene River, and Namibia-Zambia interconnections. The challenge in this sector remains the provision of energy supplies to the rural areas, where the majority of the people live, in a manner consistent with the environment.

In the sector of Agriculture, work continues to promote food security through increased production, increased intra-regional trade and the improved husbandry of our soil, range, and water resources. Agricultural Research and Training and the Early Warning System are already making a significant impact on the food supply situation in the region.

It was the recognition that the viability of these essentially infra-structural programmes must be underpinned by increased production and trade, that the Organisation initiated a debate on the best conditions to promote investment and production in the region. As a result of this debate, a consensus emerged:

that investment and production was the *primary responsibility of the enterprise sector* and that both the regional and the international business community has to be mobilised towards this end.

In pursuance of this effort, a dialogue was initiated with the region's and the international business community to establish ways in which the promotion of investment could be achieved. Regional Business Councils were established, with a head office in Gaborone, to provide a mechanism for continuing consultations between the Governments and the region's business community. SADCC's productive sectors of Food and Agriculture, Industry and Trade, Mining and Tourism have been instructed to find ways of involving the business community fully in their activities.

In all member States, efforts are being made to improve the investment climate, and to address some of the concerns of the business community. As a result of these efforts, most of the economies of the region have realised positive real economic growth rates over the last three

years. This has not been immediately recognisable, given the very poor economic performance of member States over many years. It is hoped that, with the support of the international community, these improvements can be consolidated and expanded. Unfortunately with the war in the Gulf, these improvements could be significantly negated, unless ways are found to sustain these economies through and beyond the crisis.

The primary constraint in both developing and using to full advantage the region's infrastructure and its productive capacity, remains the shortage of well trained manpower and low productivity. The problem has adversely affected both the management of public institutions and the profitability of business enterprises, and hence economic growth generally. The situation has further been compounded by a serious brain drain, as those with the skills have moved on in search of conditions of employment which are better than those offered at home.

Hence the theme for this year's Annual Consultative Conference: SADCC: Human Resources – Primary Factor in Development. The challenges facing the region are set out clearly in the theme document before you. The region needs to train managers, teachers, technicians, scientists and policy analysts, and create the necessary conducive environment for individuals to apply fully *their skills*. *Not only is the infrastructure required in the form of schools, colleges and universities*, but also there is need to establish an environment of free enquiry and expression, and to make merit and excellence the primary factor for advancement.

SADCC itself must create a capacity to initiate, design and implement the programmes necessary to address the problems of human resources development in the region. The Government of Swaziland, as Sector Coordinator for Human Resources Development, has been requested to do all it can to ensure that the Organisation has the capacity to develop and implement the necessary programmes to address the situation. I will leave it to the presentation of the theme document, to inform the Conference in more detail what the issues are in this area, and how the Organisation proposes to tackle them.

In recognition of the capacity constraints that the region faces in implementing and maintaining projects, the SADCC Council of Ministers has decided to place a moratorium on the creation of new sectors, and on the expansion of the existing Programme of Action through the addition of new projects. In the meantime, the whole Programme of Actions is being reviewed, to establish the regional relevance and priority of all projects.

At their meeting here in Windhoek, the SADCC Council of Ministers discussed ways of mobilising the region's own resources for the implementation of the regional programme, and assisting the Secretariat and the Sector Coordinating Units to study ways in which this might be brought about.

All these initiatives are aimed at streamlining the programme and ensuring that only projects of high priority in the national and regional context are included in the SADCC Programme of Action...

... Let me conclude my statement by thanking you, personally Mr. President and through you, the People and Government of Namibia for their hospitality and for the comfortable arrangements which have been made for this Conference. For a country that is hardly a year old, the standard of the facilities and organisation at this Conference are truly outstanding and should be a source of great pride for all Namibians.

I thank you.

STATEMENT BY HIS EXCELLENCY, DR. SAM NUJOMA,  
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA  
AT THE OFFICIAL OPENING OF THE  
SADCC CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE  
WINDHOEK, 31 JANUARY 1991

Honourable Peter S. Mmusi, Vice-President of the Republic of Botswana and Chairman of the SADCC Council of Ministers, Honourable Ministers, Leaders of South African Liberation Movements, Representatives of SADCC's Cooperating Partners, Excellencies, Members of the Diplomatic Corps, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It gives me great pleasure to welcome you all to Windhoek, capital city of the independent Republic of Namibia, and to this year's Annual Consultative Conference of SADCC with our Cooperating Partners. It was in Lusaka last year that we offered to host this Conference and invited you all to come to Windhoek. We are pleased that you all could make it to Windhoek.

Allow me, Mr. Chairman, to extend a special welcome to the representatives of the Liberation Movements, who are today present with us here, particularly to my brother, Comrade Nelson Mandela. Their presence further demonstrates that we of this sub-region, including a post-apartheid, democratic, united and non-racial South Africa, are fully committed to pooling our resources for the common good of our countries and peoples. It is also a further demonstration that the people of this region, even when the obnoxious apartheid system is removed, will still have the need to reach out to one another for regional growth and prosperity and SADCC will, no doubt, provide the right framework for the community of nations of Southern Africa.

The participation of Liberation Movements at all the levels of SADCC will now be a regular feature as a result of our Summit decision in Gaborone last year, to admit representatives of the Liberation Movements to all the organs of the SADCC family. This was a timely and wise decision.

Mr. Chairman, on the occasion of Namibia's accession to SADCC in April last year, I observed that we are living in times where countries the world over are moving towards integrated production and trade areas. In our own sub-region, we have already made substantial progress in establishing a framework for future closer cooperation and must now examine more closely the modalities of a truly integrated single SADCC economy.

I am aware that SADCC Ministers and Officials have been working hard over the last couple of days and have, among other things, been examining some projects and programmes which may constitute basic elements of this single integrated economy.



Mr. Chairman, I refer here to the work done on the export credit facility, the cross border investment facility and other initiatives which are all meant to facilitate trade, business and commerce beyond the confines of our national borders. We all are, of course, anxiously awaiting the report on the formalisation of SADCC which we hope will not limit its recommendations to the institutional framework but also recommend a practical and realistic time-table for increased trade and business for our region and beyond.

Mr. Chairman, the founding fathers of SADCC conceived of an organisation which will not entirely rely on resources made available by our Cooperating Partners but which will also be able to raise resources, limited as they might be, from our own sources to complement what our friends are able to put at our disposal.

I am glad that your last Council meeting reaffirmed this fundamental principle of our cooperation and self-reliance. We believe that we are, and must, finally be our own developers.

Mr. Chairman, the theme of this Annual Consultative Conference is: "SADCC Human Resources: Primary Factor in Development". This is very appropriate in view of the fact that our theme for the second decade of cooperation is "Enterprise, Skills and Productivity".

I am sure that we all realise that our dreams of increased productivity and enterprise will be doomed in the absence of properly trained and well motivated manpower. To this end, it is heartening to note that our region is increasingly beginning to critically address itself to questions of Human Resource Development.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

The theme document clearly summarises some of the serious problems facing us in the area of Human Resource Development. These issues are all critically linked to our output levels and thus development. The document states in part, and I quote, "... To achieve sustainable development, the SADCC region needs to increase the number of educated and trained people and their productivity through education, training and promoting science, technology, entrepreneurship and sound management", unquote. The challenge – the document states – is how best to increase the supply of highly qualified people, given the current state of education and training efforts.

The document further discusses problems of bloated and often not well motivated public sector, the absence of the right kind of training programmes and institutions, the limited and declining budgetary resources and the increasing numbers of technical assistance programmes throughout the region. These are problems which are common to all our countries.

For us in Namibia, education and Human Resources Development is one of the four sectors which my Government has singled out as a priority sector. The others being Agriculture, Health and provision for affordable housing. Our first budgetary allocations indeed reflect these priorities. For example, in our 1990/91 budget, education and training were allocated about 19%

of the total expenditure. This is the second biggest expenditure item. We are totally committed to redress the backlog of colonial neglect and the theme of this Conference, is, therefore, appropriate for our own national objectives.

As the youngest member of the family we have, soon after independence, established trade and commercial links with our SADCC neighbours. Already Zambian copper is being shipped through the port of Walvis Bay. We are finalising arrangements with our Botswana neighbours on the Trans-Kalahari Highway and are now submitting project in the areas of energy, mining, communications and transport to our Cooperating Partners. These are all projects which are meant to counter-balance our unequal relationship with South Africa and increase our further integration with all our neighbours.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Last year this time, Namibia was preparing for its independence which finally came on the 21st March 1990. In Europe, the two German states were moving towards reunification; the peoples of East and Central Europe had started reorganising their political and economic systems. The mood globally was euphoric that the cold war was finally over and that we all could reap the "peace dividends". Little did we perhaps then realise that the unsolved problems in many parts of the world still represent potential flashpoints which could plunge the world into other crises.

Mr. Chairman, I am referring to the grave events in the Gulf, where a destructive war is raging. My Government fully endorses the UN Resolutions calling on Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. However, we are not convinced that diplomacy was given ample time to resolve the problem and can, therefore, not endorse the unnecessary loss of human life, destruction of property and the environment which are the sure outcomes of these flames of war. We continue to hope for peace and urge the Secretary-General of the United Nations to continue to use his good offices to find a speedy diplomatic solution to this destructive war. We call upon the warring parties to exercise restraint and end the hostilities.

We are all acutely aware that in a conflict of this kind, the weak and defenceless women and children are often the victims. We call upon the UN system and UNICEF in particular to intervene on behalf of these children, whose playgrounds have been turned into a theatre of war.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Closer at home, we note with gratification the processes of negotiation, particularly in Angola and Mozambique, and call for an early return to peace for these two neighbours. In South Africa, despite the changes set in motion by Mr. de Klerk's speech of 2 February 1990, apartheid still remains in place and the majority of the citizens of that country are still excluded from the political process. We fully endorse the spirit of both the Groote Schuur and the Pretoria Minutes and anxiously await that at the opening of the Parliament this week, Mr. de Klerk will rise to the

occasion and remove the remaining institutionalised pillars of apartheid. At any rate, we hope that this will be the last unrepresentative session of the South African Parliament. We support the struggle of the South African patriots to eradicate apartheid. We welcome the efforts of the anti-apartheid forces in South Africa to strengthen unity and find a common position for negotiations with the South African government. In this connection, the meeting two days ago between the ANC and Inkatha is a step in the right direction.

Mr. Chairman,

In Namibia, we have moved from a war-ravaged and racially divided society to one which embodies all the essential elements of a democracy. Our democracy, however, is still fragile as the political freedoms are still not matched by equal economic opportunities for all. We are hopeful that through international cooperation and goodwill, we will be able to establish in Namibia a model of a democratic and prosperous State. For this to succeed, we will need all your support and assistance at this crucial phase of transition from our colonial past to nationhood.

Mr. Chairman, as we approach the first anniversary of Namibia's independence, the port of Walvis Bay still remains under South African control. We are soon to embark on the negotiations for the integration of Walvis Bay with the rest of Namibia, for without the integration of Walvis Bay and the offshore islands, our independence remains incomplete.

Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I hope you enjoy your stay in Windhoek and have fruitful and meaningful deliberations. It is now my pleasure and privilege to declare this Eleventh SADCC Annual Consultative Conference officially open.

I thank you.

**"HUMAN RESOURCES AND SOUTHERN AFRICA"****ADDRESS BY THE HON. WALTER MACLEAN  
CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA  
AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS  
AT THE 11TH SADCC ANNUAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE  
WINDHOEK, 31 JANUARY 1991**

Mr. Chairman, President Nujoma, Executive Secretary Makoni, Ladies and Gentlemen:

It is always a pleasure to be with the people who make up SADCC, and an honour to represent Canada at such a gathering. Indeed, this is my fifth SADCC conference, and the third time I have led the Canadian delegation... so personally, this occasion is full of meaning, and rich with memories.

The Eleventh Annual Consultative Conference is all the more memorable an experience, for each of us, because it is taking place in a free and independent Namibia. We waited a long time for such a thing to be possible. It is a great joy to see the dream turn into reality.

I bring you warmest greetings from the government and people of Canada, and specifically from our Minister for External Relations and International Development, Monique Landry, who was here with many of us for the Namibian Independence Celebrations. Unfortunately, the Gulf War has prevented her attendance at this meeting.

**A YEAR OF CHANGE**

The past year witnessed historic, indeed revolutionary, change and in particular in the political and economic structures of Eastern Europe. The winds of change also are blowing in Africa. One nation after another has reached the conclusion that economic recovery will best be accomplished by complementing economic liberalization with political democratization. At their summit meeting in Addis Ababa last summer, OAU leaders affirmed the importance of democratization and good governance as essential elements on the road to economic recovery.

Profound and encouraging change is occurring here in the SADCC region. Like Botswana's, Namibia's democracy is flourishing. Zimbabwe has decided to maintain its multi-party system. Mozambique has adopted a multi-party constitution and Angola is moving in the same direction. In both of the latter countries, negotiations have reached a stage to provide real prospects for peace and reconciliation in the coming year.

Zambia too has embarked on a programme of political reform with multi-party elections scheduled for October. In Tanzania and Swaziland the debate on political reform and democratization has been engaged.

These trends, Mr. Chairman are encouraging in themselves. But they are also important in terms of Africa's image and international stature. There are concerns that Africa may be marginalized in political and economic terms as attention focuses on eastern Europe and more recently the Gulf crisis. We are convinced however, that Southern Africa can hold the attention and commitment of its international partners by pursuing regional economic cooperation and further liberalization of economic and political systems. I believe as well that such trends are taking the region in the right direction towards a future of greater stability and prosperity.

Momentous events have marked the year in the Republic of South Africa starting with President de Klerk's historic speech of February the 2nd, 1990 - the closing day of our Lusaka meeting. Now, one year later, we find ourselves awaiting with anticipation his speech to Parliament on February the 1st. We all agree that the changes we have witnessed in South Africa are significant. But are they irreversible? We pray they are. But I am convinced we must continue to encourage further basic change and the peaceful transition to majority government. I hope the announcements on February the 1st will signal progress towards these objectives.

There is still uncertainty in the Republic, and too much violence. We very much welcome the positive developments which occurred in Durban on the 29th.

We live in a world of growing interdependence, a Global Village where our lives are tied together more closely with each year that passes - so southern Africa, like every other region, cannot entirely shape its future through its own decisions. Other realities intrude.

We are all of course deeply concerned by the Crisis in the Persian Gulf, with its severe implications for all countries. It has meant uncertainty and higher oil prices for a period. All SADCC members have suffered. Higher oil costs have cut deeply into the investment and consumption budgets of most countries and mean hardship and setbacks for all concerned. Our earnest hope is that the situation in the Gulf will be quickly resolved through the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions.

#### AFRICA: PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS

SADCC economies have been hit hard since August by the Gulf crisis. This has been a serious setback to the efforts being made in seven member countries to carry out economic reform through programmes of Structural Adjustment. These have been having a beneficial impact, especially in countries, such as Tanzania and Mozambique, that started sometime ago.

Canada recognizes that, in addition to new difficulties arising from the events of the past year, the countries of southern Africa still face immense and fundamental problems –

- ( i) debt,
- ( ii) terms of trade,
- ( iii) population growth,
- ( iv) declining Health reflected in diseases like AIDS,
- ( v) energy costs,
- ( vi) shortage of foreign exchange,
- ( vii) famine in Mozambique and Angola,
- (viii) environmental stress,
- ( ix) refugees in Malawi and Zambia – all of which are all too familiar.

But we also recognize, and are encouraged by, a number of favourable signs.

Food security, at the regional level, has been improving. This is of great importance, and a welcome sign of a brighter future. In the 1989–90 crop year there was, in fact, a regional surplus, thanks largely to Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. But ability to move the food to areas of shortage was inadequate. Civil disruption and a lack of purchasing power still means serious shortages in Mozambique and Angola. And there are other problems that need to be addressed...

The sectoral document prepared for this conference on Agriculture and Natural Resources pinpoints the problem. It says: "The elimination of financial, marketing and logistical constraints that inhibit intra–regional trade in food and other commodities, and also prevent an efficient system of collecting food and other commodities from areas of production to national storage facilities, is an issue that should be tackled as a matter of urgency".

Actually, this problem affects not only food but many other aspects of the region's economic life. Trade and investment cannot flourish in such an environment. We need to focus our minds and resources on removing unhelpful barriers. It is vitally important to Africa's future that we work toward greater economic cooperation in the region.

## HUMAN RESOURCES

This year's theme – "Human Resources: Primary Factor in Development" – flows very naturally from last year's "Enterprise, Skills and Productivity". In my remarks last year, I said: "If the '90s are to build on the success of the '80s, then I believe that greater efforts must be made, not only to develop but to use the human resource base of the SADCC member states".

I like the theme document's broad definition of human resources development as "... all activities which improve the productivity of people". I think the document is entirely right in emphasizing not just training, but improvement of the environment in which people live and work.

This approach to human resources – to human development, really – grows logically out of a political environment that enables people to take command of their own lives. It lets them have voice in the policy decisions that affect them. This can only help in the process of strengthening the development of southern Africa's greatest resource, its people.

We all know that basic literacy and primary education remains a problem... and that secondary and higher education must expand. Much can be done on a bilateral basis. But as the theme document points out, some training – particularly for the development of sophisticated analytical and managerial skills – can be done most effectively on a regional basis.

Canada recognizes that it isn't always easy to change an existing institution into a regional resource, or – if necessary – to create a new one. But we think that such decisions make good sense in certain disciplines.

Regional coordination of training is also important. The regional blueprint, for instance, developed by the Deans of Faculties of Agriculture for rationalizing professional manpower in the agriculture and natural resources sector is a sensible and useful idea. Canada supports it in principle. We hope to back it in a material way as well. It's encouraging to know that similar initiatives are under way in the road, rail and power sectors.

Other essential elements of regionalization involve special burdens and efforts on the part of SADCC members. Host countries must be willing to protect a certain number of training places in their institutions for regional students. Other countries must be prepared to contribute toward the running costs of regional institutions, or at least to accept a differential fee structure if the host country is bearing all operational costs. And, looking ahead, the question of the role and needs of a post-apartheid South Africa will surely arise. The response will require careful planning.

Ironically, there has been a trend in many SADCC states for the budget percentage going to education to decline, even as enrolment climbs. Obviously, this is a trend that needs to be reversed. And more effort must be put into technical and vocational training.

Canada is happy to see the emphasis SADCC is putting on improving the environment in which human resources can develop. We are pleased to see you focus on management to provide productive skills, and on the concept of 'education for life'. We also recognize the importance of analytical thinking. More attention for certain relatively ignored subjects, such as science and mathematics, is welcome.

Last year in Lusaka, and the previous year in Luanda, I stressed the importance and the benefits of including women as full partners in development programmes and projects.

In the words of the theme paper: "Human resources development policies and strategies which fail to give due emphasis to the enhancement of women's involvement in all development endeavours are not only socially unfair and unjust but more importantly, wasteful and inefficient".

Equality is not just a legal concept; it must be seen as a question of opportunity as well, and as a decisive factor in making the best use of our human resources.

We look forward to the time when projects in the SADCC Programme of Action really reflect fully the intent of the words that appear in the document. Only with action do words have meaning. And that makes us ask the questions:

- What has SADCC done over the past year?
- Are there more women in decision-making positions of the Secretariat?
- Are there more in such positions in Ministries of member Government?
- How have programmes been redesigned to reflect the crucial role of women?

In tackling the vast need for human resources development, institutional linkages can be important and effective vehicles. Often, the connection far outlives the project that initially creates it. Canada has had considerable success in creating institutional linkages in this region. I think, for instance, of the links between the Universities of Brandon and Swaziland, and between the University of Zimbabwe and MacGill. One of the great advantages of the institutional linkage approach is that it puts responsibility for planning into the hands of both partners in the project, giving it roots here in southern Africa.

That reminds me of two other groups whose resources and services are often forgotten by government institutions when we speak of human resource development. And I raise this because I believe a flexible approach is essential.

- ( i ) How many programmes make full use of Non-government organizations with their close links to the grass roots?
- (ii) *And how many make full use of the business sector for whom much of the training is done?*

## SADCC-CANADA COOPERATION

Following the SADCC Summit in Gaborone in August last year, SADCC issued a communique. It said that the Summit received a progress report on the proposal being developed for the formalization of SADCC. The communique noted the intent to review the final results of the proposal at the next summit in 1992. I can tell you that we, as donors, are also interested in these results. And, speaking for an interested donor, I would like to express our concern that, whatever organizational structure is contemplated, a fundamental characteristic should be that it can be sustained by SADCC member states. Without this characteristic, its future will be in doubt!



Another development that attracts our attention is the move towards sectoral planning. Canada supports the concept of sectoral planning being pursued by SADCC. We agree that this approach should precede discussions on individual project proposals. We would welcome the opportunity to meet regularly with SADCC to discuss Canada's sectoral involvement in your Programme of Action.

We are discouraged, however, to hear that only 38% of the funding required for the Programme of Action was actually secured at the time of writing the Annual Report, with a further 7% under negotiation. This leaves a big gap – 55%. We ask ourselves: what does this really mean? Are priorities being established clearly enough?

Of equal significance is the question of sustainability of projects already completed. Does the Programme of Action put enough emphasis on the maintenance of these projects? Do SADCC member-states recognize the critical nature of this issue? Do they have the resources to carry out this essential work? Are SADCC member-states prepared to sacrifice national priorities and concerns for regional priorities and concerns? Without this will, without concrete action which confirms this will, SADCC projects will not bear fruit, donor support for the regional effort will decline, and the organization and region will shrivel under the impact.

On a more optimistic note, 1990 was an active year for Canada, in this part of the world. The length of our relationship with SADCC was becoming evident as more projects moved into their second phase – in agricultural research, and in aspects of energy including hydrology and conservation.

We are pleased to be able to report that Canada's development cooperation programme is very much in step with SADCC's own priorities. Canadian policy is moving to put increasing emphasis on human resources development – including the involvement of women. We are already involved, for example, in preparing for a project which supports the strengthening of faculties of agriculture, as well as a power-sector training study, and a road transport training study.

We hope to be able to assist with the improvement of institutions, or – in other words – "capacity building". We like the use of local consultants, as another way of building up regional capacity. We encourage this approach.

In assuring this gathering of Canada's continued commitment to cooperation with the countries of southern Africa, I can say that we intend to keep assistance levels in the region at, or above, what they have been. There could be fluctuations, of course, caused by the irregular flow of expenditures on projects, with disbursements going up or down a bit in successive years. But the commitment stands. The Gulf war does not diminish it. Nor does the new situation in Eastern Europe. Nor does the changing situation in the Republic of South Africa.

And that brings us back, yet again, to the crucial, central, unavoidable subject of your neighbour to the south. At the Lusaka meeting I referred to the need for planning, and for dialogue, concerning the Republic of South Africa. The events of the past year have made this even more important. We cannot plan for the future of southern Africa without taking its largest, richest, most powerful country into account.

In 1991, it is still hard to know just what role South Africa can play, and should play, in the region's progress. The future of SADCC and its role as an organization remains something that SADCC members have to determine. Canada stands ready to help with this process.

1991 SADCC CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE, WINDHOEK  
UK RESPONSE ON BEHALF OF THE COOPERATING PARTNERS  
GIVEN BY THE RT. HON. LYNDA CHALKER MP  
MINISTER OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Mr. Chairman, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen

I feel greatly honoured to have this opportunity to respond on behalf of the Cooperating Partners to the Addresses, from His Excellency the President of Namibia and from yourself, Mr. Chairman, which mark the opening of this the 11th Consultative Conference of SADCC. In doing so, I am sure I speak for everyone here in expressing thanks for the warm welcome extended to us, and for the wise words which will guide our deliberations over the next two days.

This is the second Consultative Conference which I have had the opportunity to attend. It is a great pleasure to see so many familiar faces around this table. It is the warmth of personal contacts which does so much to make these meetings memorable and enjoyable occasions as well as a forum for the exchange of views on the major issues of concern to the region and to its friends outside.

It is fitting that we should be gathering here in the capital of Namibia, the most recent addition to the membership of SADCC and the newest independent nation in Southern Africa. The transition of Namibia to a hopeful, purposeful and, above all, peaceful independence has been the highpoint of an eventful year since we last met in Lusaka. Namibia's achievements over this last year bode well for the future. Mr. President – your country gives us new hope of what might before long be achieved elsewhere – nearby.

Again, I know I can speak for everyone here today in thanking the Government of Namibia for its hospitality and for the care which has been devoted to the arrangements for this Conference. Thanks are due no less to you, Mr. Chairman, as Chairman of the SADCC Council of Ministers, to Dr. Simba Makoni and his staff in the Secretariat and to all those who have contributed so ably to the work of the organisation over the past year.

There can be no doubt that we are at a pivotal point in the history of Southern Africa. It is important that we should not be distracted from that realisation by the momentous developments taking place elsewhere. For any observer of world events, there is much to cause concern as we move forward into the 1990s.

The events in the Gulf are so much in our minds. None of our economies will remain unscarred by the effects of the tragic illegal invasion of Kuwait on August 2 and Iraq's total refusal, despite all requests for over five months, to withdraw peacefully and unconditionally according to the twelve UN Security Council Resolutions. We hope and pray that the actions of the multi-national forces to restore the independence of Kuwait and peace and security in the Gulf will be complete and swift, incurring a minimum of casualties, both civilian and military.

Despite the serious setback to developing countries' economics, there is hope too. Looking around Southern Africa, even the most jaundiced of observers could hardly fail to assent to that. I have referred already to the independence last year of our host country, Namibia. There have been significant movements towards peace in Angola and Mozambique, moves which offer real hope of an early end to years of destructive conflict and the beginning of reconciliation and rebuilding. The determination of the governments of both countries to secure a just peace and a new beginning deserves our firm support and warmest good wishes.

There has been progress, too, for many of the countries of the region along the hard road of economic adjustment. Many are seeking, too, with equal determination, to match economic progress with progress towards more open and responsive political systems. It is the realisation of the link between these two objectives – the two faces of a single coin – which will provide the driving force of progress in this new decade, and not just in this region or this continent.

The people of South Africa are always in our thoughts. The past year has seen real progress towards ending apartheid. Despite the tragic violence and bloodshed in the townships which we all deplore, the end of apartheid is, at last, in sight. The process of creating the non-racial democracy we all want to see is under way. We warmly applaud the outcome of the meeting in Durban on Tuesday between ANC Vice-President Nelson Mandela – who we are delighted to see here – and Chief Buthelezi. However difficult it was to bring this meeting about, its outcome shows a new determination to work together peacefully for the new South Africa.

It is in particular these changes in South Africa which present new challenges and new opportunities for SADCC and its Member States. There is some concern among the countries of the region about the economic implications for them of a democratic, post-apartheid South Africa. Understandably so. South Africa's economy is without doubt a powerful one, sustaining as it does some 40% of the region's population and generating around three-quarters of the region's GDP. With the shackles of apartheid removed, there is potential for renewed expansion.

On the other hand, there is a counter-argument to the fears of South African economic power. It is something like this:

"South Africa is the engine of economic growth, the prime mover which will draw the rest of the region along, almost effortlessly, in its train".

We must not allow ourselves to be misled either by excessive fears or excessive hopes for South Africa. The opportunity is there, but it must be grasped by us all. There are two pitfalls to be avoided. The first is a South Africa which resorts to the failed policies of excessive centralism and government control. Any new government will face a daunting problem in satisfying the legitimate and far too long-suppressed expectations of the majority of its citizens. To stand any realistic chance of doing so, it will need growth, investment and the vitality of a free enterprise system to create new wealth. There are encouraging signs of a growing consensus in South Africa about the sort of policies which will be needed. We must do all we can to encourage this.

The second danger is that other countries in the region might turn inwards upon themselves. Southern Africa needs a redoubling of efforts to secure the benefits of peace and stability in the region and the opportunities for renewed growth and productive investment which the policies of economic adjustment afford. Southern Africa must be able to demonstrate that it can offer a welcoming, safe and profitable home for investment if it is to be able to compete with Eastern Europe for scarce private flows.

The challenge for SADCC and its Member States is to provide the framework for an open and liberal regional economy which will draw a newly-democratic South Africa into productive co-operation with her neighbours. The opportunities for such co-operation, as the economic distortions of forty years of apartheid economics are eliminated, are obvious. SADCC has a decade of experience to offer and a real record of success to show in developing the mechanisms of regional co-operation.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I should like to say a few words about the theme of this Conference, Human Resource Development. This is both apt and timely. At a time when we all feel we are in the grip of great and unpredictable forces of history, it is a valuable reminder that economic and social development is ultimately about giving new meaning to the life of each individual.

The theme document for this conference, which is admirably comprehensive in its treatment of the subject, contains a number of important insights. The first is the objective of developing each individual's capabilities to the full: this is a complex and life-long process involving not just education and training, but also other vital components such as adequate nutrition, shelter and health care, all of these complementing and reinforcing each other.

The second is the need to establish an environment in which individuals can express and develop their capabilities. I do not believe, and events in Central and Eastern Europe have borne this out, that any nation can flourish which does not grant freedom of economic, political and cultural expression to its citizens.

The third insight which struck me in reading the document is the need to ensure that all groups, particularly women, are fully involved in the process of human resource development, both as a matter of simple justice and of economy. We cannot afford to waste the capabilities of a single citizen. There are lessons here for each of us to take away from this Conference.

To conclude, Mr. Chairman, I believe this is a challenging, but also exciting and hopeful period ahead for the region. There could be no better time for tackling its problems. The economic and social models on show until recently in Central and Eastern Europe were bankrupt and are being dismantled. The new models which offer real hope of economic and social progress are now being worked out. SADCC has a vital role to play. There is much to be done in each country and the Cooperating Partners are ready and willing to help. I am sure I can say for all of us that there is no thought of abandoning Southern Africa in the face of new problems and new pressures elsewhere. There is a formidable task to be completed here. As true partners, we shall see it through together.

## **SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM**

### **UK POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA AND OTHER STATES OF THE REGION REPORT OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS**

#### **SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA**

1. It is highly unlikely that the current reforms in South Africa will be reversed under the present administration, although there are still many obstacles on the way to a post-apartheid South Africa. (para. 3.1)

#### **POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA**

##### **Building Democracy and "Good Governance"**

2. The old argument that tribal and regional divisions in Africa make it impossible to construct a workable multi-party democracy seems no longer to be a bar to the introduction or preservation of democracy in Southern Africa. (para. 4.16)
3. African people themselves demand that government be more answerable to the governed. Democracy is in itself not enough to create stable societies in which economic development can occur. There needs also to be good, efficient and incorrupt government – "good governance". (para 4.16)
4. There is no single model of democracy which may be simply adopted in each country. All the countries of Southern Africa have their own traditions and conditions, and western models may be worse than useless. Certain principles, however, are essential. They are a multi-party democracy, with free elections and freedom of the press; the rule of law; an independent judiciary, an efficient and incorrupt government and civil service; and a separation between the state and the party in power. It should be brought home to the countries of Southern Africa that these principles are not options, but essential for economic development. If they are permanently to emerge from poverty, they will need to create wealth for all of their people, not only a section of them; and they will need to do so with the consent and co-operation of their people. (para. 4.16)

##### **Economic Problems and Solutions**

5. The help of the developed world will be essential in the process of economic reform; but the main burden of change will lie upon the countries themselves. (para. 4.17)

6. The recognition that the efforts of aid donors should be more fully co-ordinated, more long-term, and more concerned with the final benefits of their aid promises better results for the future. It will of course always be essential to monitor aid closely to ensure that it pursues the goal of effectiveness and sustainability. (para. 4.35)
7. We believe that further research and consideration should be given to the basic economic choices facing Southern Africa, and recommend that the government promote such research and new thinking. (para. 4.36)

## THE UK'S POLICY OPTIONS

### Diplomacy

8. If apartheid is swept away in South Africa, and a new Southern Africa emerges in which regional cooperation could provide a stimulus to real economic growth, much of the UK's approach to the region will need to be rethought. Our diplomacy will no longer be dominated by the issues of apartheid. This moment has not yet arrived, and realistically, our diplomacy, aid and trade will need to deal with the situation as it is at the present time. We must, however, look forward, to the new diplomatic, aid and trade opportunities and problems which will emerge in the future. (para. 6.2)

### Sanctions

9. It is clear to us that President de Klerk is genuinely committed to the abandonment of apartheid and the creation of a multi-racial democracy: Sanctions were imposed on South Africa not just because of its rejection of universal suffrage and its imposition of authoritarian rule but because apartheid imposed by law segregation and discrimination on the basis of race and colour. When the legal foundations of apartheid are uprooted, sanctions which were intended to achieve precisely that result, will no longer be required while South Africa badly needs new investment and greater trade links. Britain, having maintained strong connections with, and a positive role in the country, is now in a good position to move beyond the sanctions debate, and become more closely involved still with the process in South Africa. We believe that the time is fast approaching for the UK to remove all of the economic sanctions against South Africa. They include not only those which remain from those agreed by the EC in 1986 - a ban on imports of certain South African iron and steel, and of certain South African gold coins - but also all of those agreed in other fora - which would include the bans on the sale and export of oil to South Africa. They should be lifted as soon as legislation for the repeal of the Group Areas Act, Land Acts and Population Registration Act has been enacted by the South African parliament. Access for South Africa to the IMF will require the consent of the US Government and Congress. The UK should enter into discussions with the US to achieve this result. (para. 6.8)

10. During our visit in South Africa we discovered that many South Africans regard sporting sanctions as particularly important. We believe that it is time now for the international community to begin to revive sporting links with South Africa. Nevertheless, it is important that the UK should do this in conjunction with the other signatories to the Gleneagles Agreement. We recommend that the UK back moves to remove the inhibition on sporting links with South Africa at the next meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government for those sports conducted on genuinely non-racial lines. (para 6.9)
11. We believe however that those sanctions which relate to the import and export of arms and related material, and to military contacts with South Africa should remain for the time being. They should not be removed until all South Africans of an appropriate age are given the right to vote under a new democratic constitution within the state of South Africa. (para. 6.10)
12. Whatever the merits of the cultural and academic boycotts of South Africa in the past (and we believe that they have closed an important channel through which the UK might encourage and influence the process of reform in South Africa) we believe that they are now out of date. Now is the time for Britain to increase its contacts at all levels with South Africa. (para. 6.11)

### **The Commonwealth**

13. We believe that it is important that the Commonwealth should redefine its role to concentrate on more functional activities, such as fostering cooperation in the economic, technical and developmental spheres. Such a redefinition of its activities may ensure the continued vitality of the Commonwealth in a post-apartheid world. (para. 6.12)
14. Britain should support the return of South Africa to the Commonwealth once a post-apartheid constitution is in place. (para. 6.12)

### **The British Missions in South Africa**

15. During our visit to South Africa we found the work of the British Ambassador, Sir Robin Renwick, and his immensely able and sympathetic staff to be a model for the operations of any embassy in politically difficult circumstances akin to those in South Africa. We pay tribute to their essential work and hope that it will not only continue in as impressive a fashion under his successor, but also continue to grow. Indeed, we believe that "community diplomacy" has possible applications in other situations and countries. We recommend that the FCO (Foreign & Commonwealth Office) assess such possibilities. (para. 6.13)



### **Political Aid**

16. While we believe that it is important for the UK to help along the process of democratic discussion and development, we would lay down a number of rules to govern the use of any funds laid out for this purpose. (para. 6.15)
17. We recommend that British financial and technical support be given for any multi-party elections held in Angola or Mozambique. The UK should also send observers to monitor that any such elections are carried out in a free and fair manner. (para. 6.16)

### **British Council**

18. We recommend that the British Council should open a centre in Cape town as soon as possible, and that its programmes in South Africa should seek to meet the challenge now posed by the pace of change. (para. 6.19)

### **Objectives**

19. The FCO's objectives for Sub-Saharan Africa should include support for democratic reform as well as stability. (para. 6.22)

### **The Aid Programme**

20. The weight given to Southern Africa in the aid budget we believe to be justified. We believe that the UK should intensify its aid efforts within the region. (para. 6.24)

### **Aid and Conditionality**

21. We welcome the Foreign Secretary's warning to governments in receipt of aid that with the growing demands on aid budgets everywhere, those countries that prove unable to distribute aid because of the ineffectiveness of their administrations or the nature of their regimes may find donors reluctant to use scarce resources to support them. We also support the staged approach to the encouragement of "good governance" outlined in evidence by the Foreign Secretary although, if the final stage of reducing aid to a government is reached, we would prefer to see that aid transferred to a non-governmental organisation, wherever possible. That does not mean, of course, that humanitarian aid or emergency aid programmes should be interrupted. (para. 6.26)

### **Project Aid and Technical Assistance**

22. We believe that the Limpopo railway line could provide an important boost to the economic prospects of Mozambique and Zimbabwe and in principle we recommend that ODA (Overseas Development Agency) should continue to support the project. (para. 6.28)
23. The British Government should press for the creation of a land resettlement programme in Zimbabwe which is workable and which will prevent investors losing confidence in the country and agricultural production falling into decline. If it is satisfied on these counts the UK government should aid the programme with fresh money. In any case, it should continue to support the infrastructure and services projects which it has already aided. (para. 6.30)

### **Debt Relief**

24. The "Trinidad Terms" provide an excellent opportunity for relieving some of the worst effects of debt on some of the poorest countries and we believe that they should be agreed at the forthcoming London summit of the Group of Seven and begin to be implemented urgently. The UK should also continue to press for further action on the cancelling of debt owed to the European Development Fund. (para. 6.32)

We recommend that the British Government adopt certain policy aims when negotiating the new Trinidad Terms, as set out in para. 6.33.

### **Emergency Aid**

25. We believe that the UK should expand its emergency relief commitments this year to meet the threat of drought coming on top of the conflicts of the region. (para. 6.34)
26. We recommend that the "community diplomacy" programmes be modestly extended. In keeping with our earlier recommendation (paragraph 6.13 above) we recommend that the experience of our embassy in South Africa in disbursing aid should be assessed with a view to extending such an approach to other countries. (para. 6.36)

### **Aid in South Africa**

27. We believe that the British aid programmes in South Africa should continue their steady growth. (para. 6.37)
- We endorse the current primacy of the education sector in the British aid effort. We would recommend that a greater proportion of educational aid be directed towards education at technician level as well as at the universities. (para.6.37)
28. We welcome Mrs. Chalker's statement that the ODA wants to do more work in the "development of small enterprise projects in South Africa." (para. 6.37)
29. We believe that ODA and FCO in conjunction with the British embassy in Pretoria should give urgent attention to the possibility of assistance in dealing with returning exiles and former prisoners and their rehabilitation and integration within South African society. (para. 6.38)

### **Non-Governmental Organisations**

30. We recommend that the ODA assesses its current programme of assistance to NGOs in Southern Africa with a view to extending the successful programme. (para. 6.39)

### **Trade Policy**

31. We believe that encouraging the development of small and medium-sized private sector businesses should become a priority for the aid programme throughout Southern Africa. (para. 6.44)

### **Conclusion**

32. A new "wind of change" is blowing through Southern Africa. The first led to the rapid decolonisation and transformation of colonial territories into independent nation states. This second wind of change is blowing through the political and economic structures of those states. (para. 6.46)
33. The UK, which has been deeply involved by history and interests in the region, must now be prepared to adapt its policies to these new conditions and developments. There is first the task of ensuring that, with radical political and economic change now going on in so many parts of the globe, the needs and potential of Southern Africa are not forgotten. The UK's position in the EC and in the Commonwealth make her well placed for this role. The process of negotiation and reform in South Africa has to be further supported and encouraged, and ties with all the parties and peoples truly committed to reform strengthened and thickened. (para. 6.47)

34. The economy of South Africa has to be given every opportunity to grow and develop. High standards of democracy and good governance have to be demanded and monitored – although without undue insistence on models or blueprints of particular systems of government. Aid and technical assistance programmes have to be re-fashioned to assist the new situation, both in South Africa and in the neighbouring states. (para. 6.48)
  
35. Our report has also identified the other enormous change, the change in the external context in which Southern Africa issues will be worked out. The region had become the centre of internal competition between the superpowers, part and parcel of the Cold War. Many Southern African leaders had turned to the Soviet Union, the East and communist world for support for the "armed struggle" and had adopted Eastern Bloc political and economic structures. The collapse of these structures in Eastern Europe and the change in Soviet foreign policy has fundamentally altered the international context in which Southern Africa issues may now be resolved. It is not likely to lead to a new "western" domination of the region; nor should it. It could lead to a new freedom for Southern African states to search for political and economic solutions which are "home grown" rather than imposed or fashioned from outside. The UK can and must be closely involved in this unfolding process, both to its own advantage and the advantage of all the nations of the region and all their peoples.

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